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KNOW YOUR WORKPLACE RIGHTS! A Guide for Charter School Employees Second Edition by National Right to Work Legal Defense and Education Foundation, Inc.


Copyright 2013 2nd edition National Right to Work Legal Defense and Education Foundation, Inc. 8001 Braddock Road, Suite 600 Springfield, VA 22160 (800) 336-3600 http://www.nrtw.org All rights reserved. No part of this publication in excess of fair use, 17 U.S.C. § 107, may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the prior written permission of the publisher. No copyright is claimed in the text of statutes, regulations, and excerpts from court opinions quoted within this work.


What this Guide Covers This guide discusses in general terms the rights of charter school employees when there is a union present, or attempting to gain a presence, at their workplace. Its focus is to educate charter school employees about their rights so they can make informed decisions about union membership and representation, and not become victims of compulsory unionism abuses. Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has set out specific rights for employees when they face compulsory unionism. These rights find their protection in the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Other employee rights in this area may also be found in the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA�) and state statutes. For a summary of Supreme Court cases concerning these employee rights, see APPENDIX A, page 39. The National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation has the single purpose of defending employees against compulsory unionism abuses. If, after reading this guide, you have questions about your rights when there is a union present or attempting to gain representation status with your employer, you may contact the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation at (800) 336-3600, at legal@nrtw.org, or at http://www.nrtw.org/legal.htm.

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About the Right to Work Principle, the Foundation and This Guide The Right to Work principle—the guiding concept of the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation—affirms the right of every American to work for a living without being compelled to support or belong to a union. Compulsory unionism in any form— “union,” “closed,” or “agency” shop—is a contradiction of the Right to Work principle and the fundamental human right that the principle represents. The National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, established in 1968, is a nonprofit, charitable organization. Its mission is to eliminate coercive union power and compulsory unionism abuses through strategic litigation, public information, and education programs. The Foundation’s legal aid program is designed to fulfill two objectives: to enforce employees’ existing legal rights against forced unionism abuses and to win new legal precedents expanding these rights and protections. These objectives are fulfilled through the litigation of cases involving: misuse of forced union dues for political purposes; union coercion violating employees’ constitutional and civil rights; injustices of compulsory union “hiring halls”; union violations of the merit principle in public employment and academic freedom in education;

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union violence against workers; injustices of union organizing; and violations of other existing legal protections against union coercion. Individuals, corporations, companies, associations, and foundations are eligible to support the work of the Foundation through tax-deductible gifts. In addition to cash donations, the Foundation accepts contributions for gift annuities, bequests, stocks, bonds, appreciated real estate, life insurance policies, and the dividends paid on those policies. This guide is intended for general educational purposes only, and to provide accurate and authoritative information at the time it is published. It is not intended to provide legal advice or services. Facts and legal principles applicable to specific situations may vary. Any person with a legal problem should consult competent legal counsel and should not rely on this guide in making any legal decisions.

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Table of Contents What This Guide Covers

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About the Right to Work Principle, the Foundation, and This Guide

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An Introduction to Charter School Employee Rights When There Is a Union in, or Trying to Get Into, Your Charter School Workplace

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Charter School Employee Rights in Three Minutes

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What Are My Rights If the Union Is Conducting a “Card Check” or Organizing Drive at My Charter School?

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If There Is a Union in My Charter School, Can I Be Required to Be a Union Member or Pay Dues to a Union?

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When Can I Resign My Union Membership?

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How Do I Cut Off the Use of My Dues for Politics and Other Non-Bargaining Activities If I Am Forced to Pay Fees to a Union?

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What If I Want to Work During a Strike? 23

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Table of Contents (CONTINUED) What If I Am a Victim of Union Violence?

31

What Is a Decertification Election?

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What If I Have a Religious Objection to Joining or Financially Supporting a Union?

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If I Believe My Rights Have Been Violated by Compulsory Unionism Abuses, Can I File My Own Unfair Labor Practice Charges Against the Union and/or Employer with the NLRB or a State Agency?

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APPENDIX A: A Brief Outline of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent Concerning Compulsory Unionism

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APPENDIX B: Map of Right to Work States

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APPENDIX C: Sample Card-Check Revocation Letter

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APPENDIX D: Petition Against Union “Representation”

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APPENDIX E: Sample Resignation/ Objection Letter

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Table of Contents (CONTINUED) APPENDIX F: Sample Letter of Union Resignation and Dues Revocation in Right to Work States

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APPENDIX G: List of Nonchargeable Expenses

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APPENDIX H: Sample Letter for Non-member Objecting to Payment of Full Union Dues

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APPENDIX I: States Law on Decertification Elections for PublicSector Employees

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APPENDIX J: How to Start a Decertification Election under the NLRA

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An Introduction to Charter School Employee Rights When There Is a Union in, or Trying to Get Into, Your Charter School Workplace The unionization of charter schools is increasing rapidly, jumping 444% in the last decade (2001-10) over the previous decade (1992-2000). The percentage and actual number of unionized charter schools vary greatly from state to state. During the 2009-10 school year, 24 of the 40 states with charter schools had at least 1 charter school that had entered into a bargaining agreement with a union. In Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, and Maryland, all of the charter schools were unionized, while Wisconsin had 171 unionized charter schools, California had 122, and Ohio had 42. The unionized schools in these 7 states comprised 72% of the unionized charter schools in the country.1 To unionize employees is to take from them and hand to the union their natural rights to deal directly with their employer regarding the terms and conditions of their employment. The union then acts

National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, “Unionized Charter Schools: Data from 2009-10.�

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as the employees’ exclusive bargaining representative. Most employees, however, prefer a workplace where they are free to discuss their terms and conditions of employment directly with the employer, without intervention by a third-party.2 As Eva Moskowitz, former chair of the New York City Council Education Committee and current founder & CEO of Success Academy Charter Schools, which operates 14 charter schools in Harlem, the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Manhattan, with 6 additional planned for the 2013-14 school year, has noted:

The problem with the Soviet Union was not its leaders or its employees; it was the closed, uncompetitive economic system that stifled its innovation. We have the Soviet equivalent in our schools; it’s a system that shuns competition and thwarts change. But in America, it’s the [union] monopoly bargaining agreements that are the glue keeping the monopoly together.3

Even where there is union involvement, most employees prefer a workplace where union membership and the payment of union dues is voluntary, because this forces the union hierarchy to be more accountable to the rank-and-file workers. It also forces union officials to sell the benefits of union representation and membership to the individual employees, instead of resorting to threats, intimidation, and even firings to gain financial 2 3

“Union Members - 2011” News Release (Jan. 27, 2012). “Breakdown,” Education Next, summer 2006.

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support.4 When there is a union in the charter school, or trying to get in, the rights of the charter school employees are covered both by labor laws and the constitution. These laws generally provide similar rights and protections to employees in both the public and private sectors. Public-sector employees are governed by state labor laws and, depending upon specific state law, they can file a charge with a state labor board or file a claim in state court. Privatesector employees are governed by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (“NLRA”),5 and they may file unfair labor practice charges before the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”). The law differs somewhat between the public and private sectors. To know what rights the charter school employee is entitled to, the employee must first determine if he or she is a public-sector or private-sector employee. That determination starts with whether the charter school employee is hired and paid by a management company or by the charter school itself. If the employee is hired and “Public Opinion on Right to Work,” http://www.nrtwc.org/ pdfs/RTWpoll.pdf (last visited April 10, 2012); Stan Greer, “Voluntary Unionism Serves Workers, Not Bosses,” The Washington Times (Mar. 1, 2012).

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The NLRA is a federal statute that governs labor relations of private-sector employers and employees. The Act also creates the National Labor Relations Board, which is the federal agency primarily responsible for enforcing the provisions of the NLRA.

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paid by a management company,6 he or she is a private-sector employee.7 If the employee is hired and paid by the charter school, then the determination is based on who established and operates the charter school. In December 2012, the NLRB ruled in Chicago Mathematics & Science Academy Charter School, Inc. (CMSA), 359 N.L.R.B. No. 41 (2012), that CMSA, a private, nonprofit corporation, created pursuant to Illinois’ General Not-For-Profit Corporation Act, is a private employer under the NLRA because of unique factors in the Illinois charter school law and the specific facts applicable to CMSA.8 After receiving approval to create a charter school, CMSA established and operated the school. A union sought to represent the charter school employees. In deciding a petition for a union representation election, the Board held that CMSA was subject to the NLRB’s jurisdiction because it was not created directly by the state of Illinois, nor

Such private companies and non-profit organizations that contract with charter schools to provide educational services and employees, go by different names: Charter Management Organization (“CMO”); Education Management Organization (“EMO”); etc.

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In 2008, the NLRB declared that a private entity like a CMO/EMO providing educational services, including teachers and staff to a public charter school, is a private employer within the Board’s jurisdiction. See Charter Sch. Admin. Serv., 353 N.L.R.B. 394 (2008). Please contact a Foundation staff attorney at (800) 336-3600, at legal@nrtw.org; or at http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm to determine the current status of such charter school employees.

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359 N.L.R.B. at 3.

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Id. at 4.

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did it have a governing board that was “administered by individuals responsible to public officials or the general electorate.”10 Therefore, the NLRB declared CMSA was a private employer under the NLRA.11 The NLRB specifically did not apply the ruling to all charter schools throughout the United States. Although, the NLRB’s decision was limited to the specific Illinois parties involved, the Board will most likely classify Illinois charter schools similar to CMSA as private employers. As a result, employees who work at charter schools with factors and facts similar to CMSA will likely be considered privatesector employees. Although the NLRB’s decision in CMSA does not apply to all charter schools, its analysis does provide some guidance for how the Board might classify charter schools in other states. If the State directly creates charter schools or where the State, or related public or governmental entity, creates charter schools on its own initiative and without the involvement of third parties, then the charter school likely will be considered a public employer. Similarly, if there is a petition or application process to create a charter school, and the authorizer or sponsor is a public entity and the applicant is also a historically public or governmental entity or official, then the charter school likely will be considered a public employer. 10 11

Id. at 9, 12. Id. at 15.

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Additionally, if a charter school’s governing board is composed of and/or selected by individuals who are historically considered public officials or is selected by the general electorate, then the charter school likely will be considered a public employer. In these circumstances, charter school employees working for the charter school likely will be govern by their state’s labor laws applicable to public-sector employees. However, if the charter school is created by private individuals, a private entity, or a private non-profit or for-profit organization, directly or through an application process, then the charter school likely will be considered a private employer under the NLRA analysis in CMSA. Additionally, if the charter school’s governing board is selected and composed of primarily private individuals, where public officials or the general electorate have little to no involvement, the charter school likely will be considered a private employer. In these circumstances, charter school employees working for the charter school likely will be considered private-sector employees. Because each state’s charter school law varies from the provisions of those in Illinois, and because factors vary among the individual charter schools, the classification of a charter school employee depends on the law and facts present at the particular charter school. If you have any questions about the CMSA decision, your rights, or whether you are covered by public-sector or private-sector labor laws, please contact a Foundation staff attorney for assistance at (800) 336-3600, at legal@nrtw.org, or go to http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm. 6


Charter School Employee Rights in Three Minutes No employee in the United States can legally be required to be a full, dues-paying, formal union member. But under the NLRA, and many state labor laws, a charter school employee can be forced to pay the union certain fees by various means, including being fired from his or her job, if required by statute or if the charter school or CMO/EMO has agreed to a compulsory unionism requirement in the bargaining agreement.

Under the NLRA, union members have the right to resign from formal union membership at any time. However, if they are paying their dues through payroll deduction, the deduction authorization they previously signed may limit when those authorizations can be revoked

Charter school employees in the 24 states covered by Right to Work laws12 cannot lawfully be required to pay any union fees to keep their jobs.

Because unions enjoy “exclusive representation,” they have a legal duty to fairly represent all charter school employees in their bargaining units.13 Unions are legally required to represent

For a map of the 24 Right to Work States, see Appendix B, page 54.

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“Exclusive representation” means that a union has the right to represent and collectively bargain for all employees in a bargaining unit. In other words, it is a monopoly bargaining privilege.

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non-member charter school employees the same as members, but unfortunately this duty is often breached. If a law or bargaining agreement permits it, charter school employees can be forced to pay certain union fees. However, a charter school employee who either does not join the union or resigns from union membership, may further reduced the amount of forced fees by notifying the union in writing he or she objects to paying full dues. The required fee then must be limited to the union’s proven costs of monopoly bargaining activities. This fee may not lawfully include things like political and ideological activities, lobbying, public relations, illegal strikes, etc.

Union non-members with sincere religious objections to supporting a union have the right to ask the union to redirect the forced fees amount to charity. Religious objectors do not have to belong to a specific church to claim this right.

A union member who wants to work during a strike should resign from union membership before going to work. If the resignation is mailed, the charter school employee should not work until the day after the resignation is postmarked. Otherwise, the charter school employee could be fined by the union. If a charter school employee is already a union

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non-member, then he or she can work any time during a strike and not be lawfully fined. Union members who work during a strike may be fined. Many charter school employees have a legal right to petition for an election to oust an unwanted union from their workplace or to eliminate the union’s ability to collect forced fees. If you want to do this, you should contact a Foundation staff attorney at (800) 336-3600, at legal@nrtw.org, or at http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm.

Foundation attorneys have represented many employees like you, and have even taken 15 cases to the United States Supreme Court to protect employees’ rights. If, after reviewing the information in this guide, you are still unclear about your rights, or believe that you need legal aid because union officials have violated your rights (as they frequently do), contact a Foundation staff attorney at (800) 336-3600, at legal@nrtw.org, or at h t t p : / / w w w. n r t w. o rg / e n / l e g a l . h t m .

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What Are My Rights If the Union Is Conducting A “Card Check” or Organizing Drive at My Charter School?14 If a union collects signed “authorization cards” from 50% plus 1 of the charter school employees at your charter school, your employer could, or may be required to, recognize the union as the monopoly bargaining representative of all charter school employees without a secret-ballot election. You have the legal right to: (1) not sign a union authorization card; (2) revoke any authorization card you may have signed; and (3) sign and circulate a petition against union representation. However, you may be denied the right to decertify or remove, an unwanted union for up to one year after the employer’s recognition of the union or up to three years after the employer and union sign a monopoly bargaining agreement, whichever is longer. Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72 (2011). The rights provided in this section are pursuant to the NLRA and NLRB case law and, therefore, only apply to private-sector charter school employees. If you have questions on this subject matter or are a public-sector charter school employee, where similar rights may apply, contact a Foundation staff attorney at (800) 336-3600, at legal@nrtw.org, or go to http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm.

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(1) You have a legal right to refrain from signing a union authorization card. Whether you wish to sign such a card is completely up to you. It is unlawful for an employer or a union to threaten or coerce any employee to sign a union authorization card, or to misrepresent the purpose of the card. For example, it is unlawful for a union or employer to tell you that if you do not sign a card, you will be fired when the union becomes the monopoly bargaining representative. You should also be wary of union propaganda that claims, “We already have a majority of signed cards, and we want you to sign in order to show the employer that we really have a unanimous workforce.” If the union truly had a majority of signed cards, it likely would have already demanded “exclusive representation” status from the employer. (2) You have a legal right to revoke any union authorization card that you have signed. It is illegal for a union to restrict your right to revoke such a card. You may revoke it by signing a letter, card, petition, or other document stating that you do not support the union, or that you support another union. To possess proof of delivery, you should send the letter by certified mail, return receipt. For a sample letter to revoke an authorization card, see APPENDIX C, page 55. Under the NLRB’s “dual card” doctrine, when a charter school employee signs two documents with conflicting statements of union support—for example, signing a card in favor of union

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representation and then signing another card against representation—then neither document establishes valid proof of the employee’s preference for union representation.15 Basically, a charter school employee’s signature on a card or petition against union representation invalidates any union authorization card he or she signed earlier, or signs in the future, for up to one year. Consequently, if 50% or more of charter school employees in a bargaining unit sign a card or petition against union representation, it is mathematically impossible for the union to organize your school or CMO/EMO via a “card check” for one year. While it is not required for you to inform your employer or the union that you oppose union representation in order to invalidate your previously signed authorization card, if you fail to inform the union or employer that you revoked the union authorization card you signed, they may count you as a union supporter during any card count. If you have questions regarding authorization cards and whether you should notify, in writing, the union or your employer, or both, of your revocation to ensure that they know your union representational preference, contact a Foundation staff attorney at (800) 336-3600, at legal@nrtw.org, or at http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm. (3) You have a legal right to sign and circulate cards or petitions against union representation. You have See Parkwood Developmental Ctr. Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. 974 (2006); Le Marquis Hotel, LLC, 340 N.L.R.B. 485 (2003).

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the legal right to campaign against union representation if you choose, provided that it is done on non-work time (such as during work breaks) and in non-work locations (such as in break or lunch rooms). An employer cannot discriminate against you or other charter school employees based on your opposition to or support of union representation, if done on non-work time in non-work areas. If you oppose union representation, signing and circulating such a petition may be the most important way to exercise your legal right to refrain from union representation. For a sample petition, see APPENDIX D, page 59. Every charter school employee has a protected legal right to decide whether to sign a union authorization card, free from threats, restraint, harassment, coercion, or misrepresentation. The Foundation takes no position about how you should exercise your right to join or refrain from joining a union. It simply wants all charter school employees to make this choice in an atmosphere free of restraint, threats, and coercion. If you have questions about your rights when a union is conducting a “card check� campaign or attempting to organize your charter school workplace, you should contact a Foundation staff attorney at (800) 336-3600, at legal@nrtw.org, or at http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm to get answers or assistance in dealing with the appropriate state agency, court, or NLRB office to take action against the individuals or entities that are interfering with your rights. 13


If There Is a Union in My Charter School, Can I Be Required To Be a Union Member or Pay Dues to a Union? No. You cannot be required to be a union member in any state. But, depending upon in which state you work, you may be required to pay certain monies to a union. As recognized by the United States Supreme Court in the Foundation-supported cases of Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), you cannot be required to be a formal union member or pay full union dues to keep your job in any state. If you work in a Right to Work state, you cannot be required to join a union as a member or be required to pay anything to a union unless you choose to become a voluntary union member. For a map of the 24 Right to Work states, see APPENDIX B, page 54. In a non-Right to Work state, however, as a condition of employment (keeping your job) you can be required to pay a fee equal to the union’s proven expenses related to monopoly bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment. This forced fee cannot lawfully include the union’s expenses for things such as political and ideological activities, lobbying, public relations, illegal strikes, etc. Therefore, if the monopoly bargaining 14


agreement says you must be a union member or pay full union dues to keep your job, it is unenforceable as written. If you declare yourself in writing to be an objecting non-member of the union, you can only be required to pay the reduced fee amount that represents the union’s bargaining costs.16 Except in extraordinary cases, the union’s costs of monopoly bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment do not equal the amount of full union dues.17 In the Foundation-supported case of Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held that a public employer and union that agree to a compulsory unionism requirement must establish procedural safeguards to protect an employee’s right as a nonmember to only pay a reduced fee that covers the union’s bargaining costs. The mandatory safeguards provided in Hudson include all of the following: ■ notice financial

of was

independently audited information explaining

For further explanation on what it means to be an objecting nonmember, see the section entitled, “HOW DO I CUT OFF THE USE OF MY DUES FOR POLITICS AND OTHER NON-BARGAINING ACTIVITIES IF I AM FORCED TO PAY FEES TO A UNION?” page 21. 16

17 Before you can object to receive the reduced fee, you must first become a non-member of the union. For more information on resigning union, membership and/or your rights as a nonmember, see the section entitled, “WHEN CAN I RESIGN MY UNION MEMBERSHIP?” page 18. If you would like to see a sample union membership resignation/objection letter, see APPENDIX E, page 61.

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how the forced fee was calculated, and providing an opportunity to object and pay less than full dues;

an opportunity to challenge the reduced forced fee amount before an impartial decision-maker; and

the right to place the contested forced fee amount in escrow to prevent the union from illegally using your money while a decision of the amount of the proper reduced fee is pending.18

As ruled by California Saw & Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224 (1995), enforced, 133 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 1998), the following procedural safeguards must be provided to private-sector employees: 18

the union must inform all employees that they have a right to be non-members;

the union must inform non-members have the right to for union activities unrelated duty as a monopoly bargaining objectors have a right to have reduced to exclude those activities;

the union must provide non-members with sufficient information to enable them to make an intelligent decision whether to object;

the union must inform non-members about its procedures for filing objections; and

employees that object to paying to the union’s agent; and that their forced fees

■ if non-members object, the union must inform them of the percentage of the reduction, how the reduction was calculated, and that the objectors have a right to challenge those figures.

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As a non-member, you remain fully covered by all of the provisions in the monopoly bargaining agreement negotiated between the union and your employer. The union is obligated to represent you fairly. You still are entitled to receive all benefits provided in the monopoly bargaining agreement, which the employer must offer to all employees (e.g., wages, seniority, vacations, pensions, health insurance).19 Under the NLRA and most state labor laws, as a union non-member, you can be kept from participating in internal union elections or meetings, voting in monopoly bargaining ratification elections20 or participating in other “internal” union activities. However, the union cannot discipline you for any of your conduct as a non-member.

If the union does not provide such procedural safeguards, or you want to challenge the forced fee amount, you either may bring a lawsuit in federal court for the union’s breach of the duty of fair representation or file an unfair labor practice charge at the nearest NLRB regional office. Either action must be filed within six (6) months of the offending conduct. Contact a Foundation staff attorney at (800) 336-3600, at legal@ nrtw.org, or at http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm, if you are interested in pursuing these remedies. If the union offers “members-only” benefits, as a non-member you will most likely not receive those benefits. You also cannot be compelled to pay for members-only benefits for which you are not eligible.

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This does not include decertification elections. As a nonmember, you are still entitled to vote in a decertification election.

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When Can I Resign My Union Membership? Sometimes unions, in their constitution and bylaws or in monopoly bargaining agreements, attempt to impose limits on the right of members to resign. However, under the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), public-sector employees cannot constitutionally be prevented from resigning from their union at any time. In addition, the NLRA and some state laws guarantee employees the right to resign. If you are unsure about whether you can resign or if a union is preventing you from resigning, contact a Foundation staff attorney at (800) 336-3600, at legal@nrtw.org, or at http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm. The decision whether to resign is yours alone. As a non-member you are not subject to union rules and discipline. The union must continue to represent you and all union non-members fairly, without discrimination, in all monopoly bargaining matters. Additionally, as a non-member, you remain fully covered by all of the provisions in the monopoly bargaining agreement negotiated between the union and your employer, and cannot be denied benefits with the employer provided in the monopoly bargaining agreement because of your nonmembership. Therefore, you still are entitled to receive all benefits provided in the monopoly

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bargaining agreement, including benefits which the employer must make available to all employees (e.g., wages, seniority, vacations, pensions, health insurance).21 Under the NLRA and most state labor laws, as a union non-member, you can be kept from participating in internal union elections or meetings, voting in monopoly bargaining ratification elections or participating in other “internal” union activities.22 However, the union cannot discipline you for any of your conduct as a non-member. In addition, as a non-member you have the right to object to paying a forced fee equal to membership dues. After objecting, you should pay a reduced fee that is the portion of union dues covering monopoly bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment. As an objecting non-member, you cannot be required to pay for members-only benefits.23 If you work in a non-Right to Work state, and state If the union offers “members-only” benefits, as a non-member you will most likely not receive those benefits. You also cannot be compelled to pay for members-only benefits for which you are not eligible.

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This does not include decertification elections. As a non-member, you are still entitled to vote in a decertification election. 22

Formoreinformationabouthowtoobjecttotheportionoftheunion’s fees unrelated to monopoly bargaining, contract administration, or grievance adjustment, go to the section, “HOW DO I CUT OFF THE USE OF MY DUES FOR POLITICS AND OTHER NONBARGAINING ACTIVITIES IF I AM FORCED TO PAY FEES TO A UNION?” page 21. 23

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law or the monopoly bargaining agreement includes a provision that requires charter school employees to join the union or pay union fees, after you have resigned union membership and objected, you only are legally required to pay the reduced fee. To see a sample union resignation and objection letter that can be used in a non-Right to Work state where state law or the contract requires you to join the union or pay union fees, see APPENDIX E, page 61. If you work in a Right to Work state or where state law or the monopoly bargaining agreement does not contain a forced unionism clause, once you resign your union membership you have no financial or other obligations to the union.24 For a sample resignation letter in these two situations, see APPENDIX F, page 67. Whichever letter you use, verify whether there are instructions in the union’s constitution and bylaws about to whom to send the resignation letter. Moreover, although the sample resignation and objection letter says that your objection is continuing and permanent, some unions do not honor this provision and require you to annually renew your objection. The courts are inconsistent on whether this annual objection requirement is legal. Contact a 24 However, if you have signed a dues deduction authorization card, which gives your employer permission to pay your dues directly to the union, the card may limit when you can revoke authorization of payroll deduction of union dues. Therefore, even though you submit a valid resignation letter, it may not automatically revoke your dues deduction authorization. You may have to wait and resubmit a separate revocation letter during the actual time frame for revocation listed on the authorization card or in the union’s bylaws.

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Foundation staff attorney at (800) 336-3600, at legal@nrtw.org, or at http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm to determine whether you need to annually renew your objection.

How Do I Cut Off the Use of My Dues for Politics and Other Non-Bargaining Activities If I Am Forced to Pay Fees to a Union? NOTE: You must be a non-member to possess the rights discussed in this section. If you are currently a union member, you must first become a non-member, and then object, in order to receive the dues rebate or reduction. To learn how to resign your union membership, see the previous section, “WHEN CAN I RESIGN MY UNION MEMBERSHIP?� page 18. In non-Right to Work states,25 you have the right to cut off that portion of union dues used for political and non-bargaining activities by filing a written objection with the union.26 This is true even if the employer, the union, or the monopoly bargaining agreement says otherwise. Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), held that a 25

See APPENDIX B, page 54.

In Right to Work states, non-member employees have the right to stop paying all dues and fees to the union.

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reduced fee, reflecting only the union’s expenses for monopoly bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment, is the sole fee you, as a union non-member, can be required to pay as a condition of employment in non-Right to Work states.27 To adequately protect your right to object and against infringements on your First Amendment rights, the United States Supreme Court established mandatory procedures the union must have in place prior to using non-members’ fees. For public-sector employees, these procedures were established in Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986).28 For private-sector employees, the NLRB established mandatory procedures to protect non-members’ rights pursuant to Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) in California Saw & Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224 (1995), enforced, 133 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 1998).29 In the Foundation-supported case of Lehnert v. 27 For charter school employees who are hired by a private CMO/EMO employer, the United States Supreme Court held that this right was protected by the NLRA. See Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), a Foundation-supported lawsuit.

For a more detailed explanation of your rights as a non-member public-sector employee under Hudson, see the section entitled IF THERE IS A UNION IN MY CHARTER SCHOOL, CAN I BE REQUIRED TO BE A UNION MEMBER OR PAY DUES TO A UNION?” page 14. 28

For a more detailed explanation of your rights as a non-member private sector employee under California Saw, the section mentioned in footnote 28 supra. 29

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Ferris Faculty Association, 500 U.S. 507 (1991), the United States Supreme Court provided guidelines for the types of expenses that are or are not chargeable to union non-members. For a list of union expenses that are not chargeable to union nonmembers. APPENDIX G, page 72. If you are a non-member employed in a non-Right to Work state where state law or the monopoly bargaining agreement requires you to pay union fees, see APPENDIX H, page 74, for a sample objection letter allowing you to pay only the reduced forced fee. Contact a Foundation staff attorney at (800) 336-3600, at legal@nrtw.org, or at http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm, if you want assistance in drafting or sending your objection letter.

What If I Want to Work During a Strike? In many states, strikes by public-sector employees are illegal. If that is true in your state, then you may have to work during a strike to avoid possible penalties for violating the law. However, many strikes under the NLRA, which applies to privatesector employees, are legal, leaving private-sector employees with the option of whether or not to work. If you want to work during a strike, you must confirm you are not a union member or become a non-member to avoid union discipline. For more information on becoming a non-member, see the 23


section, “WHEN CAN I RESIGN UNION MEMBERSHIP?” page 18. To view a sample resignation/objection letter, see APPENDIX E, page 61. Many courts have held that unions have the power to discipline their members for crossing a picket line. Such discipline can include imposing a significant fine that the union can collect by suing the employee in state court. To avoid such consequences, you should not cross the picket line while remaining a union member. If a strike is illegal, however, the courts probably would rule that the union cannot lawfully fine members who obey the law and work. Should you work during a strike? This is a personal decision in which the Foundation takes no position. Whether you have a right to strike depends either upon your state’s law, if you are considered a public-sector employee, or upon the NLRA, if you are considered a private-sector employee. If your employer operates during a strike, you must decide what to do based upon your own needs and the law. Do not let anyone force you one way or the other. Contact a Foundation staff attorney at (800) 336-3600, at legal@nrtw.org or at http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm, if you need assistance in determining whether a particular strike is legal or not. Can the union fine you if you work during a strike? This depends either on state law or whether you are covered under the NLRA. If your state’s law permits charter school employees to legally strike or you are covered by the NLRA, then the union may

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lawfully fine you for returning to work during a strike before resigning your union membership. Union members are bound by their union’s constitution and bylaws. In those documents, most unions provide that members who work during a lawfully called strike can be disciplined or fined. However, if you are considered a public-sector employee due to your charter school employment and your state law makes public-sector employee strikes illegal by way of prohibition, then in the event that you fail to resign your union membership before returning to work during an illegal strike, a court likely will choose not to enforce the relevant penalty provision(s) of your union’s constitution and bylaws. Should you resign from union membership if you work during a strike? Yes. Non-members are not subject to a union’s constitution and bylaws. Nonmembers cannot be fined or disciplined for working during a strike. If you are a union member who has not yet crossed the picket line and you desire to otherwise avoid all fines, then do not cross the picket line until after midnight of the day you mailed your resignation letter to the union via certified mail, return receipt. (Keep a copy of the letter and your post office receipt for your records).30 Unions cannot lawfully discipline you for post-resignation conduct once they receive notice of your membership 30 Seethesection,“WHENCANIRESIGNUNIONMEMBERSHIP?” page 18, for more details, and see APPENDIX E, page 61, for a a sample resignation/objection letter.

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resignation. Attempts to bring internal union charges against you for post-resignation conduct will be unsuccessful. If strikes by charter school employees who are considered public-sector employees are illegal in your state, you may not have to resign to avoid union fines for working. However, resignation would strengthen your position that you cannot lawfully be fined. If you worked during a strike before resigning your union membership, are you protected from all fines? No, not when strikes by charter school employees are legal. Under the NLRA, and in those states where public-sector strikes are legal, even if you are now a non-member, the union can fine you for pre-resignation conduct, but not for postresignation acts. Fines are usually based on the number of days you worked as a union member during the strike. The courts generally hold that fines cannot be excessive. “Excessive” is not defined, but arguably, if the union’s fine exceeds the amount of money you earned before resigning, it is excessive. If strikes by charter school employees who are considered public-sector employees are illegal in your state, you probably cannot lawfully be fined for working even before you resign. Can the union’s constitution prohibit you from resigning during a strike? No. It necessarily follows from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), that public-sector employees cannot constitutionally be prevented from resigning from a union. The NLRA and some state laws also guarantee the right to resign. 26


What about the monopoly bargaining agreement? Doesn’t it require you to be a union member to keep your job? No. Under Abood and Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), you are not required to be an actual union member to keep your job, regardless of what the monopoly bargaining agreement, the employer, or the union says. You are only required to do one of two things: one, you must only pay the union dues amount; two, if you are a non-member and object to the union using your money for non-monopoly bargaining purposes and notify the union of this fact in writing, then you only must pay the reduced fee reflecting union expenses for monopoly bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment. In Right to Work states, any agreement requiring a public-sector employee to join or pay money to a union is illegal. For a map of the 24 Right to Work states, see APPENDIX B, page 54. If you resign your union membership, what rights will you lose? You will not lose any rights under the monopoly bargaining agreement, for example, seniority. The union must represent you fairly in bargaining and grievance handling regardless of whether you are a union member. You will lose only those rights that are available to members under the union’s constitution, such as voting in union elections, and you may lose the right to vote on the monopoly bargaining agreement’s ratification. You may also lose your right to continue

27


in any union pension plans that are based on union membership rather than service with your employer as an employee benefit. If you resign your union membership, can you rejoin the union after the strike is over? That depends upon the union and its constitution and bylaws. The law does not require a union to permit a non-member who has crossed a picket line to rejoin. Often unions refuse to allow so-called “strikebreakers� to rejoin. There are some instances where unions require strikebreakers to pay large fines to rejoin. You should assume that, if you resign and cross the picket line, you will not be allowed to rejoin the union. However, even if you do not rejoin, the union must continue to represent you fairly in monopoly bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment. You also have the exact same rights as do union members under the monopoly bargaining agreement. How do you resign? See APPENDIX E, page 61, for a sample union resignation/objection letter. You may eventually have to prove when your resignation letter was received. Therefore, it is recommended that you send your letter by one of the following means: by certified mail, return receipt; by fax and retain the confirmation slip the facsimile machine produces; or by hand-delivery to a union officer with a friendly witness present. What rules apply if the union attempts to fine you? Under the law that generally applies to union disciplinary proceedings, you may not be fined or 28


otherwise disciplined as a member, unless you are served with specific written charges, given a reasonable time to prepare your defense, and afforded a full and fair hearing. Within these limitations, a union’s constitution and bylaws determine the rules for disciplinary action. What should you do if specific charges are served on you by the union, if you resigned before you went back to work? If you have clear proof that you resigned before returning to work, immediately show the evidence to the union and ask it to dismiss the charges before the hearing. If the union persists under those circumstances, it will violate the law, and you should contact Foundation staff attorneys at (800) 336-3600, at legal@nrtw.org, or at http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm to get advice on how to proceed. What should you do if specific charges are served on you by the union, if you did not resign before you went back to work? If you went back to work during a strike before resigning, or worked and never resigned, you should attend the unionscheduled hearing and raise any potential defenses. It is also best to exhaust any appeals process available under the union’s constitution and bylaws. Possible defenses include that the proposed fines are excessive or you were told that you could not resign during the strike. If your state makes public-sector employee strikes illegal by way of prohibition, and due to your charter school employment you are considered a public-sector employee, then that defense should be raised. It is highly recommended that you contact either Foundation staff attorneys at 29


http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm, or experienced attorneys to determine defenses.

other possible

How can the union collect its fines if it finds you guilty of working during a strike while still a member? The union cannot have you fired for refusing to pay fines. The union’s only recourse is to sue you for the fine in state court. The union may lawfully do this if strikes by charter school employees are legal in your state or you are considered a private-sector employee under the NLRA. In these types of lawsuits, you have the right to raise any defenses brought up in the union’s internal proceedings, provided that you exhausted internal union appeals. What should you do to protect yourself from harassment and violence? Whatever you decide about resigning and working during a strike, you should keep as low a profile as possible. You should also attempt to maintain existing cordial relationships with fellow workers on both sides of the picket line. Avoid the zealots! Should you return to work, keep in close touch with other charter school employees who are working during the strike, providing each other support and sharing information. Also, if you work during a strike, it is recommended that you get an unlisted telephone number; keep a diary of all strike-related threats and incidents of harassment and violence (who, where, what, when, names of witnesses, etc.); and take photographs of your private property, such as home

30


and car, to document any damage if you become a victim of union violence. If you begin to receive harassing phone calls, consider installing Caller-ID on the home phone. You should report all threats and incidents of harassment and violence to your employer and the local police. If you are the victim of union violence, contact Foundation staff attorneys at (800) 336-3600, at legal@nrtw.org, or at http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm.

What If I Am a Victim of Union Violence? If you or someone in your family is or was a victim of union violence within the past three years, please contact Foundation staff attorneys at (800) 336-3600, at legal@nrtw.org, or at http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm.

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What Is a Decertification Election? Most employees prefer a workplace where they are free to discuss their terms and conditions of employment directly with their employer, without intervention by a third party. They also prefer a workplace in which union membership and the payment of dues is voluntary, as this forces the union hierarchy to be more accountable to the rank-and-file workers. Instead of relying on threats, intimidation, and even firings to gain financial support, union officials have to sell the benefits of union representation and membership to the individual employees. “Exclusive representation” refers to a union’s right to represent and collectively bargain for all employees in a bargaining unit. It is actually a government-granted monopoly bargaining privilege that gives union officials the power to negotiate contracts that you and other charter school employees may not like, while barring you from negotiating your own terms of employment. Except in Right to Work states, monopoly bargaining agreements almost always include a provision mandating that employees be fired for not paying fees to a union they do not want to support, or mandating automatic deduction of union fees. A decertification election is an election in which employees vote to revoke the union’s certification as the monopoly bargaining representative with their 32


employer. In effect, the union is voted out of the workplace and any requirement that non-members must pay fees to the union is revoked. State law varies as to the rules for conducting a decertification election for charter school employees who are considered public-sector employees. To see a particular state’s laws regarding such elections, see APPENDIX I, page 80. If you do not see your state listed, your state most likely has no decertification law for charter school employees. The NLRA governs decertification elections for all privatesector employees. According to the NLRA, as interpreted by the NLRB, and most state bargaining laws, there are several requirements governing when you may file for a decertification election. The first rule is the “certification bar,” which states that decertification election petitions cannot be filed for at least one year after a union either wins a certification election or is voluntarily recognized by the employer and no monopoly bargaining agreement is agreed to. Another rule is the “contract bar,” under which decertification election petitions cannot be filed during the first three years of a bargaining agreement, except during a specific 30-day “window period.” In most workplaces, the 30-day “window period” is 60 to 90 days prior to the monopoly bargaining agreement’s expiration date or three-year anniversary, whichever is first.

33


In other words, decertification petitions may be filed any time after a contract expires or is more than three-years old.31 However, if the employer and union enter into a new monopoly bargaining agreement, then the agreement begins another 3 year “contract bar” on decertification elections and prevents the filing of any decertification petition. Therefore, if the “window period” comes and goes with no petition filed, charter school employees may have to wait another 3 years before requesting a decertification election. Under the NLRA and most state laws, if 30% or more of employees in a bargaining unit sign a decertification petition, the NLRB or state labor board will conduct a secret-ballot election to determine if a majority of charter school employees in the unit wish to decertify the union and stop it from further “exclusive representation.” If the petitioning employees win that election, then the employer becomes non-union. As a result, all charter school employees are free to bargain on their own, and negotiate their own terms and conditions of employment. Under the NLRB, if 50% or more of the employees in a bargaining unit sign a petition that they no longer want to be represented by the If a new employer takes over near the expiration of the bargaining agreement or after the contract has expired, the union has a “reasonable time” to bargain with the new employer, even if the contract had expired months ago. Contact Foundation staff attorneys at (800) 336-3600, at legal@nrtw.org, or at http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm if you are unsure when you can collect signatures on a decertification petition or file the petition. 31

34


union, the employer can withdraw recognition without an election if it wishes to do so (except where the certification and contract bars apply, as discussed above). The petition must be an employee-only effort. Employer assistance is unlawful and, if there is any, the union will attempt to nullify the effort by filing an unfair labor practice charge. For information on how to start a petition for a decertification election under the NLRA, see APPENDIX J, page 100. For all questions about decertification, please contact Foundation staff attorneys at (800) 336-3600, legal@nrtw.org, or go to http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm.

35


What If I Have a Religious Objection to Joining or Financially Supporting a Union? If you work in a Right to Work state, you have the right to decline union membership and not to financially support a union for any reason, including religious reasons. For a map of the 24 Right to Work States, see Appendix B, page 54. In non-Right to Work states, sincere religious objectors have the right to redirect the entire union fee to a non-union, non-religious charity. To determine whether you have a sincere religious objection to joining or supporting a union, and to understand the steps you must take for accommodation of your religious beliefs in this area, call (800) 336-3600 or email legal@nrtw.org and request a copy of “An Employee’s Guide—To Union Dues and Religious Do Nots,” or go to http://www.nrtw.org/ro1.htm.

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If I Believe My Rights Have Been Violated by Compulsory Unionism Abuse, Can I File My Own Unfair Labor Practice Charge Against the Union and/or Employer with the Nlrb or a State Agency? Choosing to file charges against the union or against your employer is a personal decision that the Foundation neither recommends nor opposes. However, if you want to file charges with the NLRB or a state labor board against a union or your employer concerning abuses of compulsory union representation or forced membership or union fees, please contact Foundation staff attorneys at (800) 336-3600, at legal@nrtw.org, or at http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm for free legal advice regarding the correct procedures to use and the best circumstances under which charges may be filed. The NLRB and many state labor boards require the filing of charges to be within six months of the illegal actions by the union and/or employer. Some state labor boards have shorter or longer limitation periods. So do not delay in contacting Foundation staff attorneys.

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APPENDIX A A Brief Outline of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent Concerning Compulsory Unionism 1937—Virginian Railway v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515; and National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 The Court held that compulsory monopoly bargaining is constitutional, but declined to address the constitutionality of exclusive representation because these cases were brought by employers, not employees forced to accept a union as their exclusive bargaining representative.

1944—J.I. Case Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332; and Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 The Court interpreted the NLRA and Railway Labor Act as prohibiting individual employees from negotiating their own terms and conditions of employment where an exclusive bargaining representative has been recognized. Constitutional questions were not raised.

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APPENDIX A (CONTINUED) 1944—Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 323 U.S. 192 The Court recognized that exclusive representation presents constitutional problems, but again ducked the issue by holding that exclusive representatives have a duty of representing non-members “fairly.”

1949—Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525; and American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 The Court ruled that state Right to Work laws are constitutional.

1949—Algoma Plywood Co. v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U.S. 301 The Court held that the NLRA (“Wagner” Act) permitted state Right to Work laws even before Congress passed the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act amendments.

40


APPENDIX A (CONTINUED) 1954—Radio Officers’ Union v. National Labor Relations Board, 347 U.S. 17 The Court ruled that compulsory unionism agreementsmay not be used “for any purpose other than to compel payment of union dues and fees”; that is, employees may not be required to be formal union members and abide by internal union rules to keep their jobs.

1956—Railway Employes’ Department v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 The Court held that “union shop” agreements authorized by the Railway Labor Act are constitutional, because the only condition of employment that the Act authorizes is “financial support” of “the work of the union in the realm of monopoly bargaining.” The Court suggested that if compulsory dues are used “for purposes not germane to monopoly bargaining, a different problem would be presented” under the First Amendment.

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APPENDIX A (CONTINUED) 1961—Machinists v. Street, 376 U.S. 740 Again ducking constitutional questions, the Court ruled that the Railway Labor Act prohibits unions from using objecting non-members’ compulsory dues for political purposes. The Court did not clearly define political purposes, nor did it address whether unions could lawfully use objectors’ monies for nonpolitical activities unrelated to monopoly bargaining. Justice Black dissented and predicted that the Court’s rebate remedy would be ineffective. He would have held the statute unconstitutional.

1963—Railway Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 The Court found that, since unions hold all pertinent facts and records, they must prove the proportions of their expenses that are lawfully chargeable to objecting non-members. However, the Court reaffirmed Street’s rulings that only non-members who notify their union that they object are entitled to relief and that the appropriate remedies are refunds and reductions in futrue exacations.

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APPENDIX A (CONTINUED) 1963—National Labor Relations Board v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734 The Court reiterated that the “union shop” is “whittled down to its financial core”; that is, unions may require payment of initiation fees and dues as a condition of employment, but may not require formal membership.

1963—Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 & 375 U.S. 96 The Court held that state Right to Work laws may prohibit “agency shop” agreements under which employees are required to pay fees to unions to defray the costs of monopoly bargaining. In a second decision in the same case, the Court ruled that the state courts, not just the National Labor Relations Board, can enforce state Right to Work laws. (The National Right to Work Committee financed this case in the Supreme Court for the non-member plaintiffs.)

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APPENDIX A (CONTINUED) In 1968 the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation was established. (Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent cases listed were brought by Foundation attorneys.) 1976—City of Charlotte v. Firefighters Local 660, 426 U.S. 283 The Court ruled that a public employer is not constitutionally obligated to provide payroll deductions for union dues. The Foundation was not involved in this case.

1976—Oil Workers v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407 The Court held that an employee’s “predominant job situs” determines whether a state Right to Work law applies, and that seamen employed primarily on the high seas are not protected by the Right to Work law of the state in which they were hired. The Foundation filed an amicus brief urging that Texas’ Right to Work law should protect the seamen.

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APPENDIX A (CONTINUED) 1976—City of Madison Joint School District No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 429 U.S. 167 The Court ruled that a state may not constitutionally require school boards to prohibit non-union teachers from speaking against “agency shop” agreements at public meetings. The Foundation filed an amicus brief supporting the non-union teachers’ free speech rights.

1977—Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 A six-member majority of the Court rejected arguments that requiring public employees to pay forced fees to keep their jobs violates the First Amendment. The Court ruled that the “agency shop” as such is constitutionally valid, but only “insofar as the service charges are applied to collectivebargaining, contract administration, and grievanceadjustment purposes.” The Court unanimously agreed that “a union cannot constitutionally spend [objectors’] funds for the expression of political views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward the advancement of other ideological causes not germane to its duties as collective-bargaining representative.”

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APPENDIX A (CONTINUED) 1979—Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, 441 U.S. 463 (per curiam) The Court held that the “First Amendment does not impose any affirmative obligation on the government . . . to recognize [a labor] association and bargain with it.” The Foundation was not involved in this case.

1983—Knight v. Minnesota Community College Faculty Association, 460 U.S. 1048 Without an opinion stating its reasons, the Court affirmed a lower court decision rejecting arguments that exclusive representation of public employees by a union such as the National Education Association is unconstitutional because it forces association with a political action organization.

1984—Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 The Court ruled that a state may constitutionally bar non-members from participating in their public employers’ “meet and confer” sessions with the employees’ exclusive bargaining representative on policy questions relating to employment, but outside the scope of mandatory monopoly bargaining. 46


APPENDIX A (CONTINUED) 1984—Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 The Court held that the Railway Labor Act not only prohibits coerced financial support of a union’s politics and ideological activities, but also coerced support of other activities unrelated to monopoly bargaining and contract administration, such as organizing, litigation not concerning objecting employees’ bargaining unit, and the parts of a union’s publications reporting on non-chargeable activities. The Court also ruled that a “union cannot be allowed to commit dissenters’ funds to improper uses even temporarily” and prohibiting “rebate” schemes under which unions collect full dues, use part for improper purposes, and only later refund that part to the employees.

1985—Pattern Makers v. National Labor Relations Board, 473 U.S. 95 The Court recognized that the NLRA guarantees workers the right to resign union membership at any time. The Foundation filed an amicus brief urging this ruling.

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APPENDIX A (CONTINUED) 1986—Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 The Court unanimously held that First Amendment due process requires that certain procedural safeguards be established before compulsory union fees can be collected from public employees: adequate advance notice of the fee’s basis (including an independent audit), reasonably prompt impartial review of non-members’ challenges, and escrow of “amounts reasonably in dispute” while challenges are pending. Because the Court had earlier ruled in Railway Employes’ Department v. Hanson that constitutional limitations apply to the Railway Labor Act, these procedural safeguards also must be established by railway and airline unions.

1988—Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 The Court determined that Congress intended the substantially “identical” authorizations of compulsory unionism arrangements in the NLRA and the Railway Labor Act “to have the same meaning.” The Court, therefore, held that the former statute, like the latter, “authorizes the exaction of only those fees and dues necessary to ‘performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on

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APPENDIX A (CONTINUED) labor-management issues.’” As a result, privatesector employees have the same right not to subsidize union non-bargaining activities as railway, airline, and public employees, and are entitled to the procedural protections outlined in Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson.

1991— Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, 500 U.S. 507 Summarizing its earlier decisions from Hanson through Ellis, the Court concluded that union activities are not lawfully chargeable to objecting non-members unless they are both “‘germane’ to collective-bargaining activity” and do “not significantly add to the burdening of free speech that is inherent in allowance of an agency or union shop.” Applying this test, the Court ruled that objecting public employees may not be charged for litigation not directly concerning their bargaining unit, lobbying (except for ratification or implementation of their monopoly bargaining agreement), public relations activities, and illegal strikes. However, the Court also held that the First Amendment does not limit lawfully chargeable bargaining-related costs to the objecting employees’ bargaining unit.

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APPENDIX A (CONTINUED) 1998—Air Line Pilots Association v. Miller, 523 U.S. 866 The Court ruled that non-members who do not agree to union-established arbitration procedures cannot be required to use those procedures before bringing a federal court action challenging the amount of their compulsory fees for monopoly bargaining.

1998—Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, 523 U.S. 866 The Court held that a union does not breach its duty of fair representation “merely by negotiating” a compulsory unionism provision that says that employees must be union “members in good standing” as condition of employment without expressly explaining in the agreement that the National Labor Relations Act does not permit unions and employers to require that employees become formal union members. Importantly, for the first time, the Court declared that, if a union negotiates a compulsory unionism provision, it must notify workers that they may satisfy the provision’s requirement merely by paying fees to support the union’s “representational activities” in monopoly bargaining and contract administration, without actually becoming members.

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APPENDIX A (CONTINUED) 2007—Davenport v. Washington Education Association, 551 U.S. 177 The Court unanimously ruled that, because unions have no constitutional right to collect fees from nonmembers, a state may require unions to obtain affirmative consent before spending non-member public employees’ forced fees on political activities. The Court’s decision also reiterated that, as the Court had decided in 1949, Right to Work laws are constitutional.

2008—Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60 The Court ruled that the National Labor Relations Act preempts a state statute prohibiting companies that receive state grants or program funds from using those monies to deter union organizing. Significantly, the Court emphasized that the 1947 amendment to the Act that guarantees the right to refrain from union activities “calls attention to the right of employees to refuse to join unions, which implies an underlying right to receive information opposing unionization.” The Foundation filed an amicus brief that made this very point.

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APPENDIX A (CONTINUED) 2009—Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 207 The Court held that the First Amendment permits a local union to charge non-member public employees for national litigation expenses for other bargaining units if the litigation is related to monopoly bargaining or contract administration and the charge is reciprocal in nature, i.e., if the national union and other locals would similarly contribute to the cost of litigation for the non-members’ unit should the need arise. A concurring opinion by three Justices noted that the Court’s decision did not decide what “reciprocity” means or what burden a union has to establish true reciprocity, because in this case the parties assumed that reciprocity existed.

2009—Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association, 555 U.S. 353 The Court held that a state may constitutionally prohibit payroll deduction of contributions to union political action committees by state and local government employees, because the First Amendment “does not confer an affirmative right [for unions] to use government payroll mechanisms for the purpose of obtaining funds for expression.” The Foundation joined an amicus brief urging that result.

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APPENDIX A (CONTINUED) 2012—Knox v. Service Employees International Union 132 S.Ct. 2277 The Court held 5-4, in an opinion by Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, that “when a public sector union imposes a special assessment or dues increase, the union must provide [a notice of the purpose of the assessment or increase] and may not exact any funds from non-members without their affirmative consent.” The Court also held that a union could not constitutionally charge non-members for its expenses opposing ballot questions even if they “may be said to have an effect on present and future contracts between public-sector workers and their employers.” Justice Sotomayor, joined by Ginsburg, concurred in the favorable judgment, but agreed only that “[w]hen a public-sector union imposes a special assessment intended to fund solely political lobbying efforts, the First Amendment requires that the union provide non-members an opportunity to opt out of the contribution of funds.”

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APPENDIX B Map of Right to Work States A Right to Work law secures the right of employees to decide for themselves whether to join or financially support a union. However, employees who work in the railway or airline industries are not protected by Right to Work laws, and employees who work on federal property may also not be protected, depending on whether federal jurisdiction as to labor relations is exclusive on that property.

WA OR

ID NV

CA

NH VT

ND

MT

WY

AZ

MA

MN

WI

SD

CO

IL

KS OK

NM

MO

PA OH

IN KY

WV VA

AL

CT NJ DE MD

RI

DC

NC

TN

AR MS

TX

NY

MI

IA

NE UT

ME

SC GA

LA FL

AK

HI

Right To Work States Forced-Unionism States

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APPENDIX C Sample Card-Check Revocation Letter SAMPLE LETTER TO UNION:

[NOTE: It is recommended to send this letter by certified mail, return receipt.] [You may want to send copies of this letter to officials of both the local union and the international union.] [insert your Name] [insert your Mailing address] [insert Date] [insert Name of appropriate union officer] [insert Name of union] [insert Address of union] Dear [insert Name of appropriate union officer]: I write to inform you that I do not want to be “represented� by your union, do not wish to be a member of your union, and do not support your union in any manner. Please consider my opposition to representation by your union to be permanent and continuing in nature.

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APPENDIX C (CONTINUED) I hereby revoke and rescind any union “authorization” card, or any other indication of support for your union, that I may have signed in the past. Any such card or indication of support for your union is null and void, effective immediately. Please return to me any union authorization card that I may have signed. Alternatively, please inform me in writing that you are honoring this revocation and rescission of support for your union. Please be aware that refusing to honor my revocation and rescission will violate my rights under the National Labor Relations Act. Moreover, representing to my employer (or any third party or “arbitrator”) that I support representation by your union will similarly violate my legal rights. Sincerely, [Name]

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APPENDIX C (CONTINUED) Sample Card-Check Revocation Letter SAMPLE LETTER TO EMPLOYER: [NOTE: It is recommended to send this letter by certified mail, return receipt.] [insert your Name] [insert your Mailing address] [insert Date] [insert Name of appropriate payroll department management employee] [insert Name of department responsible for payroll deductions] [insert Address of department responsible for payroll deductions] Dear [insert Name of appropriate payroll department management employee]: Included in this letter is a copy of the letter I sent to [insert Name of union involved] revoking and rescinding any union “authorization� card, or any other indication of support for this union that I may

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APPENDIX C (CONTINUED) have signed in the past. In addition, any such card or indication of support for this union is null and void, effective immediately. I want you to be fully aware of my revocation. Please contact me if there are any problems or concerns with this request. Sincerely, [Name]

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APPENDIX D Petition Against Union “Representation” The undersigned employees do NOT want to be represented by the Union [FILL IN NAME], do NOT want to join the Union, and do NOT support the Union in any manner. To the extent that any of the undersigned employees have ever previously signed a Union “authorization card” or other indication of support for union representation, the undersigned employee hereby REVOKES that card, effective immediately. More specifically, our employer, the Union, and all third parties or arbitrators must take NOTICE that any such card signed by an undersigned employee is NULL and VOID. Should our employer ever voluntarily recognize the Union as the bargaining representative of employees, the undersigned employees hereby petition the to hold a National Labor Relations Board32 DECERTIFICATION ELECTION to determine whether the majority of employees truly wish to be represented by the Union.

The NLRB covers private-sector employees. If you are a charter school employee who is considered a public-sector employee, follow your state law as to where to file this petition, and replace the name of the NLRB with the name of the appropriate state labor board.

32

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APPENDIX D (CONTINUED)

Name (Print)

Signature

Date

Signature

Date

Name (Print)

Name (Print)

Signature

Date

Signature

Date

Name (Print)

Name (Print)

Signature

Date

Signature

Date

Name (Print)

Name (Print)

Signature

Date

Signature

Date*

Name (Print)

*You may add more lines for names, signatures, and dates.

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APPENDIX E Sample Resignation/Objection Letter SAMPLE LETTER TO UNION:

[NOTE: It is recommended to send this letter by certified mail, return receipt.] [You must determine whether the union’s constitution and bylaws specify to whom a resignation must be sent. Some unions spell the procedures out while many others do not.] [insert your Name] [insert your Mailing address] [insert Date] [insert Name of appropriate union officer] [insert Name of union] [insert Address of union] Dear [insert Name of appropriate union officer]: I hereby resign as a member of [Name of union]. My resignation is effective immediately. I will continue to meet my lawful obligation of paying a representation fee to the union under its “union security” agreement with [Name of employer].

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APPENDIX E (CONTINUED) Furthermore, I object to the collection and expenditure of a fee for any purpose other than my pro rata share of the union’s costs of monopoly bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment, as is my constitutional right under Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and if applicable, my statutory right under Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988). Pursuant to Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986), I request that you provide me with my First Amendment and duty of fair representation procedural rights, including: reduction of my fees to an amount that includes only constitutionally chargeable costs; notice of the calculation of that amount, verified by an independent certified public accountant; and notice of the procedure that you have adopted to hold my fees in an interest-bearing escrow account and give me an opportunity to challenge your calculation and have it reviewed by an impartial decision-maker. [If you pay dues by payroll deduction, include the following. Accordingly, I also hereby notify you that I wish to authorize only the deduction from my wages of representation fees limited to those costs that are lawfully chargeable under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. If I am required to sign a form to make that change, please provide me with the necessary form.]

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APPENDIX E (CONTINUED) Please reply promptly to my request. Any further collection or expenditure of dues or fees from me made without the procedural safeguards required by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution will violate my civil rights under the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. ยง 1983, or if applicable, under the National Labor Relations Act, and the U.S. Constitution. Finally, this objection is permanent and continuing in nature. Sincerely, [Name]

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APPENDIX E (CONTINUED) Sample Notice of Union Resignation/Objection Letter SAMPLE LETTER TO EMPLOYER: [NOTE: It is recommended to send this letter by certified mail, return receipt.] [insert your Name] [insert your Mailing address] [insert Date] [insert Name of appropriate payroll department management employee] [insert Name of department responsible for payroll deductions] [insert Address of department responsible for payroll deductions] Dear [insert Name of appropriate payroll department management employee]: Today I submitted my resignation from [Name of the union]. A copy of my letter to the union is enclosed. I will continue to meet my lawful obligation of paying a representation fee to the

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APPENDIX E (CONTINUED) union under its “union shop” or “agency shop” agreement with [Name of employer]. Furthermore, I object to the collection and expenditure by the union of a fee for any purpose other than my pro rata share of the union’s costs of monopoly bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment, as is my right under Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and/or Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988). Pursuant to Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986), I request that you ensure that the union provides me with my procedural rights, as outlined in my letter to the union. If it does not, I ask that [Name of employer] provide them. [If you pay dues by payroll deduction, include the following: Accordingly, I also hereby notify you that I wish to authorize only the deduction from my wages of representation fees limited to those costs that are lawfully chargeable under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. If I am required to sign a form to make that change, please provide me with the necessary form.]

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APPENDIX E (CONTINUED) Please reply promptly to my request. Any further collection or expenditure of dues or fees from me made without the procedural safeguards required by law will violate my rights under the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. ยง 1983, or if applicable, under the National Labor Relations Act and/or U.S. Constitution. Sincerely, [Name]

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APPENDIX F Sample Letter of Union Resignation and Dues Revocation in Right to Work States SAMPLE LETTER TO UNION: [NOTE: It is recommended to send this letter by certified mail, return receipt.] [At the same time that you resign from the union, you should also notify your employer.] [insert your Name] [insert your Mailing address] [insert Date] [insert Name of appropriate union officer] [insert Name of union] [insert Address of union] Dear [insert Name of appropriate union officer]: I am employed by [Name of employer] in the Right to Work state of [insert state’s name]. Effective immediately, I resign from membership in the local union and all of its affiliated unions.

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APPENDIX F (CONTINUED) Because I have resigned my membership in the union, you must now immediately cease enforcing the dues check-off authorization agreement that I signed. That dues check-off authorization was signed solely in conjunction with, and in contemplation of, my becoming a member of the union and, as such, is no longer valid. See IBEW (Lockheed Space Operations Co.), 302 N.L.R.B. 322 (1991); Washington Gas Light Co., 302 N.L.R.B. 425 (1991) (employer in Right to Work state must cease dues deduction upon receipt of resignation/revocation). If you refuse to accept this letter as both an effective resignation and an immediately effective dues check-off revocation, I ask that you promptly inform me, in writing, of exactly what steps I must take to effectuate my revocation of the dues check- off authorization. More specifically, if you contend that I must meet a “window period” in order to revoke my dues check-off authorization, I ask that you promptly send me a copy of the actual dues deduction authorization form that I signed, and also tell me specifically what “window period” dates I must meet in order to revoke the dues check-off authorization. Sincerely, [Name] 68


APPENDIX F (CONTINUED) Sample Letter to Employer of Union Resignation and Dues Revocation in Right to Work States SAMPLE LETTER TO EMPLOYER: [NOTE: It is recommended to send this letter by certified mail, return receipt.] [insert your Name] [insert your Mailing address] [insert Date] [insert Name of appropriate payroll department management employee] [insert Name of department responsible for payroll deductions] [insert Address of department responsible for payroll deductions] Dear [insert Name of appropriate payroll department management employee]: I am employed by [Name of employer] in the Right to Work state of [insert State’s name]. Effectively

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APPENDIX F (CONTINUED) immediately, I resign from membership in the local union and all of its affiliated unions. Because I have resigned my membership in the union, you must now immediately cease enforcing the dues check-off authorization agreement that I signed. That dues check-off authorization was signed solely in conjunction with, and in contemplation of, my becoming a member of the union and, as such, is no longer valid. See IBEW (Lockheed Space Operations Co.), 302 N.L.R.B. 322 (1991); Washington Gas Light Co., 302 N.L.R.B. 425 (1991) (employer in Right to Work state must cease dues deduction upon receipt of resignation/revocation). If you refuse to accept this letter as both an effective resignation and an immediately effective dues check-off revocation, I ask that you promptly inform me, in writing, of exactly what steps I must take to effectuate my revocation of the dues check- off authorization. More specifically, if you contend that I must meet a “window period� in order to revoke my dues check-off authorization, I ask that you promptly send me a copy of the actual dues deduction authorization form that I signed, and also

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APPENDIX F (CONTINUED) tell me specifically what “window period” dates I must meet in order to revoke the dues check-off authorization. Sincerely, [Name]

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APPENDIX G List of Nonchargeable Expenses Courts continue to sort out union expenses that are chargeable and not chargeable to union nonmembers. No union expense is chargeable to an objecting non-member unless the union proves it concerns monopoly bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment before a neutral decision-maker. EXAMPLES OF NONCHARGEABLE EXPENSES

Political activities, including activities related to ballot and bond issues Ideological activities Lobbying, unless necessary to ratify or fund the monopoly bargaining agreement in a non-member public employee’s bargaining unit Public relations activities

Litigation unrelated to monopoly bargaining and bargaining-related litigation solely for other bargaining units where the union does not show a reasonable expectation that other union affiliates will similarly fund litigation for the non-member’s bargaining unit

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APPENDIX G (CONTINUED)

Engagment in illegal strikes

All or most organizing and member recruitment, depending on whether you are a public- or private-sector employee

Union “members only” benefits

Portions of union publications reporting on the foregoing activities

SOURCES FOR THE EXAMPLES OF NONCHARGEABLE EXPENSES

Ellis v. BRAC, 466 U.S. 435 (1984)

Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, 500 U.S. 507 (1991)

Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 207 (2009)

Pirlott v. NLRB, 522 F.3d 423 (D.C. Cir. 2008) [private-sector organizing]

Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977)

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APPENDIX H Sample Letter for Non-member Objecting to Payment of Full Union Dues33 SAMPLE LETTER TO UNION:

[NOTE: It is recommended to send this letter by certified mail, return receipt.] [insert your Name] [insert your Mailing address] [insert Date] [insert Name of appropriate union officer] [insert Name of union] [insert Address of union] Dear [insert Name of appropriate union officer]: I object to union of a rata share bargaining, adjustment, 33

the collection and expenditure by the fee for any purpose other than my pro of the union’s costs of monopoly contract administration, and grievance as is my right under Abood v. Detroit

Note: This sample letter applies only to non-members.

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APPENDIX H (CONTINUED) Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and if applicable, my statutory right under Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988). Pursuant to Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986), I request that you provide me with my First Amendment and duty of fair representation procedural rights, including: reduction of my fees to an amount that includes only lawfully chargeable costs; notice of the calculation of that amount, verified by an independent certified public accountant; and notice of the procedure that you have adopted to hold my fees in an interestbearing escrow account and give me an opportunity to challenge your calculation and have it reviewed by an impartial decision-maker. [If you pay dues by payroll deduction, include the following. Accordingly, I also hereby notify you that I wish to authorize only the deduction from my wages of representation fees limited to those costs that are lawfully chargeable under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. If I am required to sign a form to make that change, please provide me with the necessary form.] Please reply promptly to my request. Any further collection or expenditure of dues or fees from me made without the procedural safeguards required by

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APPENDIX H (CONTINUED) law will violate my rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. ยง 1983, or if applicable, under the National Labor Relations Act. Finally, this objection is permanent and continuing in nature. Sincerely, [Name]

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APPENDIX H (CONTINUED) Sample Notice of Letter for Non-member Objecting to Payment of Full Union Dues SAMPLE LETTER TO EMPLOYER: [NOTE: It is recommended that this letter be sent by certified mail, return receipt.] [insert your Name] [insert your Mailing address] [insert Date] [insert Name of appropriate payroll department management employee] [insert Name of department responsible for payroll deductions] [insert Address of department responsible for payroll deductions] Dear [insert Name of appropriate payroll department management employee]: Today I submitted my objection to [Name of the union] regarding the collection and expenditure by the union of a fee for any purpose other than my pro 77


APPENDIX H (CONTINUED) rata share of the union’s costs of monopoly bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment, as is my right under Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and if applicable, my statutory right under Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988). A copy of my letter to the union is enclosed. I will continue to meet my lawful obligation of paying a representation fee to the union under its “union shop” or “agency shop” agreement with [Name of employer]. Pursuant to Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986), I request that you ensure that the union provide me with my procedural rights, including those outlined in my letter to the union. If it does not, I ask that [Name of employer] provide them. [If you pay dues by payroll deduction, include the following. Accordingly, I also hereby notify you that I wish to authorize only the deduction from my wages of representation fees limited to those costs that are lawfully chargeable under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. If I am required to sign a form to make that change, please provide me with the necessary form.]

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APPENDIX H (CONTINUED) Please reply promptly to my request. Any further collection or expenditure of dues or fees from me made without the procedural safeguards required by law will violate my rights under the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. ยง 1983, or if applicable, the National Labor Relations Act, and/or U.S. Constitution. Sincerely, [Name]

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APPENDIX I State Laws on Decertification Elections for Public-Sector Employees Unless otherwise stated, the state laws mentioned below were last verified in August 2010. These laws may have changed since the verification date. For questions regarding decertification laws in your state, contact Foundation staff attorneys at (800) 336-3600, at legal@ nrtw.org, or at http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm.

Alaska Alaska law permits public employees to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining representative if “an employee or group of employees or an organization acting in their behalf alleg[es] that 30 percent of the employees of a proposed bargaining unit . . . assert that the organization which has been certified or is currently being recognized by the public employer as bargaining representative is no longer the representative of the majority of employees in the bargaining unit.” Alaska Statutes § 23.40.100. A petition for a decertification election must be presented to the Alaska Labor Relations Agency on a form prescribed by the Agency, accompanied by a 30% showing of interest. See Alaska Statutes §§ 23.40.100(c) & (e) for rules covering when a decertification election can be held.

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APPENDIX I (CONTINUED) California Public school (including charter school) employees are covered by the Educational Employee Relations Act (“EERA”) that outlines the procedures for decertification. EERA requires the decertification petition to be filed with the California Public Employment Relations Board (“PERB”). Persons must file a decertification petition with the appropriate PERB regional office per PERB Regulation 32075, and must accompany said petition with proof of support of at least 30% of the employees in the established bargaining unit.

Connecticut Connecticut law permits public employees to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining representative if a petition has been filed by an employee or group of employees alleging that a “substantial number of employees” assert that the employee organization which has been certified or is currently being recognized by their employer as the bargaining representative is no longer the representative of a majority of employees in the unit. Connecticut General Statutes § 7-471(1)(ii). A petition for decertification must be presented to the Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations on a form prescribed by the Board.

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APPENDIX I (CONTINUED) Delaware Delaware law permits public school employees to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining representative. According to state law: A group of employees within the bargaining unit may file a petition with the Board for decertification of the exclusive bargaining representative. The petition must contain the uncoerced signatures of at least 30 percent of the employees within the bargaining unit and allege that the employee organization presently certified is no longer the choice of the majority of the employees in the bargaining unit. If a lawful monopoly bargaining agreement of no more than 3 years duration is in effect, no petition shall be entertained unless filed not more than 180 days nor less than 120 days prior to the expiration of such agreement. A decertification petition also may be filed if more than 1 year has elapsed from the date of certification of an exclusive bargaining representative and no monopoly bargaining agreement has been executed.

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APPENDIX I (CONTINUED) Delaware Statutes Title 19, § 1311(b). Employees may obtain a petition for a decertification election from the Delaware Public Employment Relations Board (“PERB”).

District of Columbia

District of Columbia law permits public employees to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining representative: “The Board shall issue rules and regulations which provide procedures for decertification of exclusive representatives upon the request of 30 percent of the employees.” District of Columbia Code § 1-617.10. A petition for decertification filed by an employee shall be accompanied by a showing that at least 30% of the employees in the bargaining unit no longer desire to be represented by the exclusive representative. Such petitions must be presented to the District of Columbia Public Employee Relations Board (“PERB”). The rules explaining the procedures and petition contents required for filing include PERB Rules 505.1 through 505.3 and 505.8.

Florida

Florida law permits public employees to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining representative.

Any employee or group of employees which no longer desires to be represented by the 83


APPENDIX I (CONTINUED)

certified bargaining agent may file with the commission a petition to revoke certification. The petition shall be accompanied by dated statements signed by at least 30 percent of the employees in the unit, indicating that such employees no longer desire to be represented for purposes of monopoly bargaining by the certified bargaining agent. The time of filing said petition shall be governed by the provisions of s[ection] 447.307(3)(d) relating to petitions for certification.

Florida Statutes § 447.308(1). A petition for a decertification election must be presented to the Florida Public Employees Relations Commission (“PERC”) on a form prescribed by PERC, accompanied by a 30% showing of interest.

Hawaii

Hawaii law permits public employees to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining representative, stating:

[a] petition to decertify or to change the exclusive bargaining representative must be supported by fifty percent of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit, through verifiable written proof of the names and signatures of employees. Signatures of employees supporting such a petition must 84


APPENDIX I (CONTINUED)

be obtained within two months of the date of the petition to be valid with the Board.

Hawaii Revised Statutes § 89-7(a). A petition for decertification must be filed with the Hawaii Labor Relations Board, on a form prescribed by the Board.

Idaho

Note: The following statute uses the word “Deauthorization” but establishes a decertification procedure. A petition in a union shop for an election to determine whether there should be any union representation must show at least thirty percent (30%) or more of the employees in the unit covered by the agreement desire such deauthorization. This petition must be filed with the Idaho Department of Commerce and Labor and Industrial Services. Idaho Administrative Code § 09.05.03.014.12.

Illinois

Illinois law has a separate statute that permits educational employees to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining representative if:

an employee or group of employees or any labor organizations acting on their behalf alleging and presenting evidence that 30% or more of the employees in a bargaining unit wish to be represented for monopoly bargaining or that the labor organization 85


APPENDIX I (CONTINUED)

which has been acting as the exclusive bargaining representative is no longer representative of a majority of the employees in the unit.

Illinois Statutes Chapter 115, § 5/7. Unless a specific bar applies, decertification petitions may be filed between January 15 and March 1 the year that the monopoly bargaining agreement expires, or in the third year of an agreement that is in effect for more than three years. For further information on decertification rules, see Illinois Administrative Code § 1110.60 and § 1110.70. A petition for a decertification election must be presented to the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (“IELRB”) on a form prescribed by the IELRB.

Indiana

Indiana law permits certified school employees to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining representative. “A petition may be filed by twenty percent (20%) of the school employees in any unit asserting that the designated exclusive representative is no longer the representative of the majority of school employees in the unit.” Indiana Code Annotated § 20-7.5-1-10(c)(3). A petition for decertification must be filed with the Indiana Educational Employee Relations Board (“IEERB”)

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APPENDIX I (CONTINUED) at the Indiana Government Center, accompanied by a 20% showing of interest.

Iowa Iowa law permits public employees to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining representative. “The petition of a public employee shall allege that an employee organization which has been certified as the bargaining representative does not represent a majority of such public employees and that the petitioners do not want to be represented by an employee organization or seek certification of an employee organization.” Iowa Code §§ 20.14.3 and 20.14.5(a). A petition for decertification election must be obtained and filed at the Iowa Public Employment Relations Board (“PERB”), accompanied by a 30% showing of interest. Rules covering decertification, including when such a petition may be filed are available at Iowa Code Annotated § 20.15.6.

Kansas Kansas law permits public employees to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining representative. The Kansas Public Employment Relations Board (“PERB”) “is authorized to hold elections to determine whether . . . a recognized employee organization should be decertified” when 30% or more of the employees in a bargaining unit

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APPENDIX I (CONTINUED) petition for a decertification election. However, any petition calling for such an election, shall be dismissed by the board without determining the questions raised therein if such petition is filed more than 150 days or less than 90 days prior to the expiration date of an existing memorandum of agreement which governs the terms and conditions of employment of the employees within the appropriate unit. Kansas Statutes Annotated § 75-4327(d). A petition for decertification can be obtained and filed at the Kansas Public Employee Relations Board (“PERB”). See Kansas Administrative Regulations § 84-2-7 for PERB’s rule covering decertification of a public-employee organization.

Maine Maine law states that municipal employees have a right to not join a union. Maine Revised Statutes Annotated Title 26, § 963. Maine law permits public employees to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining representative if 30% of the employees in a bargaining unit petition for decertification. Maine Revised Statutes Annotated Title 26, § 967 (municipal employees). A petition for a decertification election may be obtained and filed at the Maine Labor Relations Board on a form provided by the Board.

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APPENDIX I (CONTINUED) Massachusetts

Massachusetts law permits public employees to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining representative when:

a petition filed by or on behalf of a substantial number of the employees in a unit alleg[es] that the exclusive representative therefore no longer represents a majority of the employees therein, shall investigate, and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a substantial question of representation exists, shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice.

General Laws of Massachusetts, Chapter 150E, § 4. A petition for a decertification election must be presented to the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission (“MLRC”) on a form prescribed by the Commission.

Michigan

Michigan law permits public employees to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining representative if “a public employee or group of public employees . . . alleg[es] that 30% or more of the public employees within a unit . . . assert that the individual or labor organization, which is certified or is being currently recognized by their public employer as the bargaining representative, is no longer a [majority] representative.” Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated § 423.212. A petition for 89


APPENDIX I (CONTINUED) a decertification election must be presented to the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (“MERC”) on a form prescribed by the Commission, accompanied by a 30% showing of interest. If a monopoly bargaining agreement applies to employees of a public school district or a public educational institution, and the agreement expires between June 1 and September 30, the petition covering those employees may be filed between January 2 and March 31 of the year the monopoly bargaining agreement expires, or the third year of monopoly bargaining agreements that last longer than three years. See MERC Rule 423.141(c); Michigan Compiled Laws § 423.214. For further rules covering decertification, including when such a petition may be filed, see MERC Rules 423.141 and 423.145. The petition or cards signed by bargaining unit employees to establish the 30% must state that they “no longer consider the certified bargaining unit representative as their representative,” not just that they request an election. Hepler v. State Department of Labor, 235 N.W.2d 161 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975).

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APPENDIX I (CONTINUED) Minnesota Minnesota law permits public employees to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining representative: “An individual employee or group of employees in a unit may obtain a decertification election upon petition to the commissioner stating the certified representative no longer represents the majority of the employees in an established unit and that at least 30 percent of the employees wish to be unrepresented.” Minnesota Statutes § 179A.12.3. A petition for a decertification election must be presented to the Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Services on a form prescribed by the Bureau, and accompanied by valid “deauthorization” (decertification) cards signed and dated by at least 30% of the employees included within the appropriate unit.

Missouri Missouri law permits public employees to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining representative: “A petition for decertification of public employee representative may be filed by any employee or group of employees or any individual acting on their behalf alleging that the certified or currently voluntarily recognized employee representative is no longer the majority representative of such employees.”

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APPENDIX I (CONTINUED) Code of State Regulations, title 8 § 40-2.020. A petition for decertification election must be presented to the Missouri State Board of Mediation on a form prescribed by the Board, and accompanied by a 30% showing of interest.

Nevada Nevada law permits local government employees to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining representative. If “the board in good faith doubts whether any employee organization is supported by a majority of the local government employees in a particular bargaining unit, it may conduct an election by secret ballot upon the question.” Nevada Revised Statutes § 288.160, subdivision 4.

New Hampshire New Hampshire law permits public employees to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining representative if “a petition is filed by [a]t least 30 percent of the employees in the bargaining unit . . . asserting that the employee organization which has been certified by the board is no longer the representative of the majority of employees in the bargaining unit.” New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated § 273-C:10. The petition for a decertification election must be presented to the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board on a form prescribed by the

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APPENDIX I (CONTINUED) Board, accompanied by a 30% showing of interest by employees who have signed a decertification signature card.

New Jersey New Jersey law permits public employees to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining representative if there is “a showing of interest of not less than 30 per cent of the employees in the unit in which an exclusive representative has been recognized or certified. A showing of interest shall indicate that the employees no longer desire to be represented for purposes of collective negotiations by the recognized or certified employee representative or by any other employee representative.” New Jersey Administrative Code § 19:11-1.3. A petition for decertification must be presented to the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission on a form prescribed by the Commission, accompanied by a 30% showing of interest. Note, however, that for one year after certification of a majority representative, its majority status is conclusively presumed so as to bar the filing of any petition . . . seeking decertification of the present one. Galloway Township Board of Education v. Galloway Township Association of Educational Secretaries, 78 N.J. 1 (1978).

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APPENDIX I (CONTINUED) New Mexico New Mexico law permits public employees to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining representative if “thirty percent of the public employees in the appropriate bargaining unit make a written request to the board or local board.” New Mexico Statutes Annotated § 10-7E-16(A). A decertification election will be valid if 40% of the eligible employees in the bargaining unit vote in the election. New Mexico Statutes § 10-7E-16 (A). A written request for a decertification election must be presented to either a local board if it exists or the New Mexico Public Employee Labor Relations Board (“PERB”).

New York New York law permits public employees to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining representative: “A petition alleging that an employee organization which has been certified or is being currently recognized should be deprived of representation status as to all or part of a unit (hereinafter called a “petition for decertification”), may be filed by one or more public employees.” New York Civil Service Rules & Regulations § 201.2. Petitions for decertification elections must be presented to the New York Public Employment Relations Board (“PERB”) on a form prescribed by

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APPENDIX I (CONTINUED) the Board, and accompanied by a 30% showing of interest.

Ohio

Ohio law permits public employees to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining representative if:

“a petition is filed, in accordance with rules prescribed by the state employment relations board . . . [by] any employee or group of employees, or any individual or employee organization acting in their behalf, alleging that at least thirty per cent of the employees in an appropriate unit . . . assert that the designated exclusive representative is no longer the representative of the majority of employees in the unit.”

“[T]he board shall investigate the petition, and if it as reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation exists, provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice to the parties.” Ohio Revised Code § 4117.07(A)(1). A petition for a decertification election must be presented to the Ohio State Employment Relations Board (“SERB”) on a form prescribed by the Board, accompanied by at least a 50% showing of interest. Additionally, employees of a charter school that was converted from an existing public school are included in the monopoly bargaining unit that they 95


APPENDIX I (CONTINUED) were in immediately prior to the school’s conversion, and therefore subject to the applicable monopoly bargaining agreements. However, employees at the conversion charter school may get out of the old bargaining unit and decertify the union as the exclusive bargaining representative if a majority of the conversion charter school’s employees, subject to the same monopoly bargaining agreement, sign and submit a petition to the SERB requesting the following: (a) That all the employees of the community school who are subject to that agreement be removed from the bargaining unit that is subject to that agreement; (b) That any employee organization certified as the exclusive representative of the employees of that bargaining unit be decertified as the exclusive representative of the employees of the community school who are subject to that agreement; (c) That the governing authority of the community school be regarded as the “public employer” of these employees for purposes of Chapter 4117. of the Revised Code. Ohio Revised Code §§ 3314.10(A)(5)(a)-(c) (verified May of 2013).

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APPENDIX I (CONTINUED) Oklahoma

Oklahoma law permits school employees to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining representative. If:

[i]n any February more than two (2) years after recognition of an organization pursuant to the provisions of this section and upon the receipt of a petition calling for discontinuation of representation signed by thirty-five percent (35%) of the employees eligible to be included in the unit, [then] a local board shall call an election to determine whether the members of a unit wish to discontinue being represented for bargaining.

Oklahoma Statutes, title 70, § 509.2.C.7. A petition for a decertification election must be presented to the local board of education.

Oregon

Oregon law permits public employees to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining representative, if “[a]n employee or group of employees alleging that 30 percent of the employees assert that the designated exclusive representative is no longer the representative of the majority of employees in the unit.” Oregon Revised Statutes Annotated § 243.682. A petition for a decertification election must be presented to the Oregon Employment Relations Board, on a form prescribed by the Board, accompanied by a 30% showing of interest. 97


APPENDIX I (CONTINUED) Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania law permits public employees to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining representative. “[A] public employe [sic] or a group of public employes [sic] may file a petition for decertification provided it is supported by a thirty per cent showing of interest.” Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated Title 43 § 1101.607. A petition for a decertification election must be presented to the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board on a form for public employees, available from the Board.

Rhode Island

Rhode Island law permits public employees to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining representative. “[W]henever it is alleged by an employee or his or her representative that there is a question or controversy concerning the representation of employees, the board shall investigate the question or controversy . . . .” General Laws of Rhode Island Annotated § 28-7-16. The Rhode Island Labor Relations Board Rules and Regulations § 8.06.1(a), Petition for Decertification, states: “A petition may be filed by either employees, an employer, or a rival labor organization to displace or decertify a certified or recognized labor organization.”

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APPENDIX I (CONTINUED) A petition for decertification election must be presented to the Rhode Island Labor Relations Board on a form prescribed by the Board and must be accompanied by a 30% showing of interest The Board Rules and Regulations § 8.06.1(e) states:

[w]hen thirty (30) percent or more of the employees in a bargaining unit covered by an agreement between their employer and a labor organization requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment file a petition alleging that they desire that the authority of the labor organization to make such an agreement be rescinded, the Board’s Agent shall conduct a secret ballot of the employees in such unit and certify the results . . . .

Wisconsin

Wisconsin law permits public employees to obtain an election to decertify an exclusive bargaining representative. “If a petition is filed . . . for the discontinuance of existing representation indicating a showing of interest by 30% of the total number of employees . . . , the commission should hold an election . . . .” Wisconsin Statutes Annotated § 111.83(5)(h). A petition for a decertification election must be presented to the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commissions (“WERC”) on a form prescribed by the Commission, accompanied by a 30% showing of interest.

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APPENDIX J How to Start a Decertification Election under the NLRA First, you should assess the strength of your fellow employees’ support for decertification within your specific bargaining unit. Usually, it is not worth calling for such an election unless you believe you can gather support from a majority of co-employees. To win, you will need a majority vote from charter school employees who vote on the election day. Remember, no employer involvement is allowed. To proceed, you and other charter school employees should collect signatures on a petition that is similar to the following sample petition.

PETITION TO REMOVE UNION AS REPRESENTATIVE The not

undersigned want

to

employees of [employer name] do be represented by [union name], hereafter

referred to as “union.” Should the undersigned employees constitute 30% or more, but less than 50%, of the bargaining unit

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APPENDIX J (CONTINUED) represented by the union, the undersigned employees hereby petition the National Labor Relations Board to hold a decertification election to determine whether the majority of employees also no longer wish to be represented by the union. In addition, should the undersigned employees constitute 50% or more of the bargaining unit represented by the union, the undersigned employees hereby request that our employer immediately withdraw recognition from the union, as it does not en joy the support of a majority of employees in the bargaining unit. Name (Print)

Signature

Date

Signature

Date

Name (Print)

Name (Print)

Signature

Date

Signature

Date

Name (Print)

Name (Print)

Signature

Date

Signature

Date

Name (Print)

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APPENDIX J (CONTINUED) These signatures should be collected when the employees are on non-work time, and in nonwork areas. You must fill in the names of the union and employer in the blank spaces above, before you collect signatures. There should be no employer help, and employer resources should not be used. Once employees have collected the appropriate number of signatures, they also need to fill out a separate NLRB “Petition” cover sheet, NLRB Form 502. This single sheet of paper is easy to fill out, and is available from any Regional Office of the NLRB. The NLRB’s website contains copies of the Petition Form (requires Adobe Acrobat Reader), as well as a directory of the regional NLRB offices in your area.34 Finally, Foundation staff attorneys may be contacted with questions about how to proceed, about assistance making contact with the NLRB, or about any legal difficulties faced in your efforts at (800) 336-3600, at legal@nrtw.org, or at http://www.nrtw.org/en/legal.htm.

34

Visit http://www.nlrb.gov/forms and click on “NLRB Form 502 Petition.”

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