FEATURE
GAME THEORY AND COLD WAR Katerina Ploussiou
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ar has been with us ever since the dawn of civilization. Nothing has been more constant in history than war. An American psychologist, William Janes, suggested that war creates a sense of unity in the face of a collective threat. It binds people together, it brings a sense of cohesion, with communal goals, and inspires individual citizens to behave honourably and unselfishly, in the service of a greater good. Robert J. Aumann, a mathematician known for his research and breakthroughs on repeated games, argues that there isn’t a theory which can avoid wars; however, game theory provides the strategies to help decision makers in conflict situations to hopefully avoid war and devastation. In the framework of repeated games, Aumann explains that if rivals give the impression of willingness to fight then there will be no war. Mutual Assured Destruction is based on the theory of deterrence which explains that the threat of using strong weapons against rivals prevents the enemy’s use of those weapons. Aumann points to Cold War as an example of Mutual Assured Destruction. Cold war was an ongoing geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union who had disparate ideologies. Let’s model out the Cold War in a game to find out how it had ended.
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Mutual Assured Destruction is based on the theory of deterrence which explains that the threat of using strong weapons against rivals prevents the enemy’s use of those weapons. In the game below, let’s consider that the Soviet Union makes the first move. It has to decide whether to utilize its nuclear weapons and attack, or not utilize its weapons and therefore choose don’t attack. If the Soviet Union, choose don’t attack, the game ends, and results in a stalemate where no nuclear weapons are used. However, if the Soviet Union choose to attack, the USA must then decide its move; whether to retaliate, or don’t retaliate. The payoffs for each player are shown at the end of the branches. In this game the payoffs are measured in “utility” to the player. The number are fairly arbitrary, and only matter in their relation to each other. If the two players choose don’t attack the game ends with both players getting a payoff of 0, which is not better or worse off than before. If the Soviet Union attacks, and the USA retaliates, both players receive a payoff of negative infinity, and the game ends in mutual destruction for both players. This leads to both players losing. If on the other hand, the Soviet Union chooses to attack, and the USA chooses don’t retaliate, the Soviet Union receives a payoff of 500 and the USA receives a payoff of -500. In this case both players are better off than receiving a payoff of negative infinity.
