Ecology and Society - ES-2013-5673 8
318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323.
In sum, our findings suggest the possibility that the two different forms of self-governance of SSFs we examined could be associated to a spatial dimension of social-ecological fit most closely linked to transaction costs of commercialization. Further exploring this issue could help determine where co-ops versus patron-client self-governance arrangements are more likely to be established and sustained. Or where promoting the establishment of co-ops could offer a better social-ecological fit to local fishers.
324. Which form of self-governance is better fitted for resource stewardship? 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338.
As two different self-governance arrangements, co-ops and patron-client structures offer different potential for adaptation and social-ecological fit. Patron-client structures are usually thought to be less conducive to the development of resource stewardship and co-management for conservation (Johnson 2010) than co-ops (Ovando et al. 2012). In forest common-pool resources, market access has been found to reduce the durability of cooperative institutions for resource management (Agrawal 2001, Young 1994). Cinner et al. (2007) has reported that fishing communities located far from markets are able to develop customary management systems (e.g., customary fishery closures), while those closer to them fail more often, and even show signs of overexploitation (Cinner and McClanahan 2006). While our study finds that distance to markets is only one of a larger set of transaction costs of commercialization, under a patron-client structure, incentives for governing fish production and understanding of ecosystem dynamics can be easily decoupled (Crona et al. 2010). Middlemen face strong incentives to supply demand for fish and do not pay the costs of ecosystem degradation because they can move unrestricted to other areas acting as roving bandits (Berkes et al. 2006).
339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347.
The capacity of adaptation for environmental variability is usually embedded in the knowledge and understanding that fishers develop through experimentation in daily fishing activities (Berkes 2008). Patron-client structures offer little incentives for building resource stewardship through the exchange of rich and valuable knowledge for adaptive capacity. Fishers holding knowledge about resource dynamics have less decision-making power in their relation with fish buyers, particularly if these patrons provide fishers with fishing permits, credits, loans or fishing equipment. Thus, discussions of long-term concerns about resource depletion will come secondary to fishers’ short-term concerns of building a relationship with a fish buyer to secure adequate buying terms for their catch.
348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360.
In contrast, cooperative governance structures offer the possibility fishers might find in their interest to internalize and integrate different aspects of the fishing activity, like processing, transportation, and even commercialization. When this happens, the likelihood increases of incorporating into decision-making relevant knowledge for the maintenance of ecosystem functions. Differently from all the co-ops in this study—which are ten years old or less (Table 1)—older co-ops in other parts of the Gulf of California have shown capable of increasing their administrative expertise and incorporate more production, processing and marketing activities (Castañeda et al. 2012, Méndes 2012). Besides following a vertical integration business model, the federation of co-ops in the north Pacific (FEDECOOP) makes regular investments in the maintenance of ecosystem function by closing some abalone reefs and taking the lead in monitoring and enforcement of these areas inside of their fishing concessions (McCay et al. 2013). A diverse range of conservation benefits has also been documented for the Chilean context (Gelcich et al. 2008), and by Ovando et al. (2012) more generally.
361. Policy perspective 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367.
In Mexico, the 1992 fisheries reforms made it possible for fishers as well as non-fishers to obtain fishing permits without having to belong to a co-op, effectively formalizing the existence of patron-client governance arrangements as a common form of SSFs governance. We anticipate patron-client strategies will become an even more common form of organization fishers will adopt in the future, as the transaction costs of commercialization decrease, for instance, as a result of coastal development, urbanization or road development towards coastal areas.