Wolfendale’s Argument from Realism: Assumptive and Unpersuasive

Nico Wada PHIL237 March 15, 2017 TA: Raymond Aldred

Wolfendale’s Argument from Realism: Assumptive and Unpersuasive In her article “Training Torturers: A Critique of the ‘Ticking Bomb’ Argument,” Jessica Wolfendale argues that torture should be avoided at all times, even in the contentious ticking bomb scenario, whereby only by torturing a terrorist who knows the whereabouts of a ticking bomb can the bomb be found and defused before it detonates and kills many innocent people.

Taking a pragmatic approach to the issue, Wolfendale claims that the training of torturers, especially the training required for a case like the ticking bomb scenario, leads to immense suffering. Wolfendale first explains the technical, physical, and emotional skills that would be required of the hypothetical ticking bomb torturer, then delineates a series of strategies used in shaping prospective torturers to become desensitized to the infliction of pain and unhampered by feelings of empathy or sympathy. The most problematic of these strategies is what Wolfendale refers to as routinization, or using a veneer of professionalism to disembody violence and encourage torturers “to adopt an extreme form of professional detachment” (279). Citing statistical and historical evidence, Wolfendale maintains that the mere act of training torturers, necessary for the ticking bomb scenario, induces dispositions that lead to systematic violence, or what sociologist Herbert Kelman terms “crimes of obedience” (270). While I support Wolfendale’s advocacy for an absolute ban on torture, I ground my argument in firm moral sentiments rather than hypothetical beliefs about what would happen if torture were adopted as a

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legal practice. As I later demonstrate, Wolfendale’s reasoning depends too strongly on assumptions that stand vulnerable to criticism.

Wolfendale begins her argument by addressing a forgotten aspect of the ticking bomb debate, namely the notion that permitting torture translates to permitting torturers. Because the ticking bomb scenario requires that the torturer be successful in extracting information from the terrorist, Wolfendale describes in detail the various strategies used to ripen an individual, typically a military personnel from elite Special Forces, “to manage the psychological stress associated with torturing” (273). While trainee soldiers endure brutal exercises to render them obedient, loyal, and desensitized to pain, Wolfendale claims that the characterization of torture as a profession, known as professionalism, allows for torturers to reach the level of detachment necessary to successfully torture a subject. Deceptive terminology disguising any reference to violence or cruelty, such as Hitler’s term “Final Solution,” is just one element of professionalism Wolfendale references that is intended to both legitimize and normalize the infliction of suffering. As Stanley Milgram’s psychological experiments demonstrate, professional detachment can lead individuals to abdicate all moral responsibility.

Applying a “slippery slope” argument, Wolfendale claims that training torturers will inevitably lead to unwarranted suffering and injustice. Wolfendale evidences her claim by referencing specific data: “Amnesty International has identified over 150 countries that use torture” (283). As she explains, real instances of torture occur most frequently when individuals are given authoritative orders to perform acts of violence. Wolfendale holds that further crimes of obedience are guaranteed to occur when torturers are “quite deliberately trained not to question the morality of torture” (284). While a supporter of the ticking bomb scenario may hold !2

that it is possible to imagine a case of torture that avoids Wolfendale’s consequences, Wolfendale states that she is not interested in the permissibility of torture in any possible world or hypothetical example. Instead, Wolfendale depicts herself as a realist who is “interested in the actual arrangements needed for even isolated instances of torture to occur” (517). Because the ticking bomb scenario arises in debates concerning the real world, arguments about torture must take into consideration realistic consequences, such as how torture training renders individuals prone to committing systematic acts of violence.

I agree with Wolfendale that torture leads to undesirable consequences, however I disagree with her method of reasoning and find her logical deductions unconvincing. Ultimately, Wolfendale’s argument rests on assumptions that she dresses as truth under a guise of realism.

While claiming to consider the real-life consequences that would stem from permitting the use of torture, Wolfendale cherry-picks certain facts and statistics to satisfy her tendentious argument.

Her realistic approach to the issue is therefore ostensibly persuasive, yet ultimately fallacious.

The philosopher Alan M. Dershowitz argues from the opposing side of the issue, claiming that an absolute ban on torture is an idealistic impossibility.1 Even if torture were deemed totally illegal without any exception, Dershowitz reasons that it would still occur and therefore must be managed through a legal framework to uphold the virtue of democratic accountability. Much like Wolfendale, Dershowitz cites facts and statistics to support his view. Going off his conviction that the use of torture in society is an inevitable reality, Dershowitz references Watergate and the Iran-Contra scandal to demonstrate the horrors that occur when actions are done in secret or “off-the-book” (Dershowitz, 622). While Dershowitz’s argument also stems 1

Dershowitz, Alan. "Should The Ticking Bomb Terrorist Be Tortured?". Disputed Moral Issues. Mark Timmons. 3rd ed. London: Oxford University Press, 2014. 617-639. Print.

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from the grounds of realism, he advocates a point of view that stands in direct contrast to Wolfendale’s denunciation of torture. Wolfendale cautions against the devastating consequences that she believes will arise from the use of torture, whereas Dershowitz praises the permissibility of torture under a legal framework as reducing the amount of suffering in the world.

Wolfendale’s reasoning ultimately relies on predictions and speculations regarding ultimately unknown consequences of allowing torture, making it susceptible to refutation and unpersuasive.

My argument against the practice of torture rests on a deontological belief that torture is morally impermissible. Because the suffering caused by torture is concretely wrong, legal systems should not support torture in any form. This reasoning is parallel to an opponent of the death penalty adhering to the maxim “thou shalt not kill.” Despite the horrific actions a criminal sentenced to death row may have committed, adversaries believe killing to be an unjustifiable sin. Unlike Wolfendale, my reasoning against torture does not attempt to vaguely foreshadow the future of a world with legalized torture or perform a utilitarian calculus on the amount of suffering produced with or without the practice. While Wolfendale claims that she is “not interested in the permissibility of torture in any possible world of hypothetical example” (286), she ironically grounds her argument in speculative reasoning.

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