Introduction: Theoretical Understanding of China’s Selective Identities
Since the nineteenth century, due to the growing interaction with external others, China has been facing a problem of finding a place for itself in international society. Building an individual identity for the “state” that tends to be “all under the heaven” (tianxia) and a civilization has been perceived as a fundamental challenge. The then Sinocentric view, a model of auxiliary states (fuguo) and the Confucian vision of great unity (datong) was challenged by the Western modern state apparatus (Shang Huipeng, 2009, p. 57–58). Through interaction with external others, China had the Westphalia nation-state centric system imposed upon it by the Western powers. At this point, the collision between two different perceptions of the world in the nineteenth century played an important role in shaping China’s international behavior today. After years of being economically backward, China is rising and, like every rising power, is attempting to substantiate its legacy by building its own identity, and through these means, shape its power status. Along with China’s growing economy and greatly improved material status, Chinese authorities have raised questions of fairness, equality, and justice. On the one hand, China shows its aspirations, but on the other, it tries to meet international expectations. By building its own set of values and identity, China hopes to protect its national interests, create a peaceful environment for further modernization, as well as shape its identity at the same time. The Chinese identity is perceived as socially constructed and shaped by China’s historical
© The Author(s) 2019 D. Mierzejewski, B. Kowalski, China’s Selective Identities, Global Political Transitions, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0164-3_1
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experiences. For this, Chinese leaders have shaped the principles of peaceful coexistence and assisting the developing world. During Mao’s time, China developed a coherent, revolutionary identity, and tried to build a united front with the Third World. Despite being more pragmatic and non-revolutionary oriented, policymakers in the 1980s were reminded of China’s principles and the need for contributing to developing countries. During the next two decades, Beijing continuously built its economic strength and in 2005 used the moral term “harmonious world” to describe its actions in the world. Xi Jinping introduced new dynamics with his Belt and Road initiative and leveraged China to become a global actor that does business in every corner of the world.
To the surprise of Chinese policymakers, China’s macroeconomic success has elevated China to become the world’s second-largest economy. After China became involved in international affairs as a UNand WTO member state, the question “who is China?” has become more evident. The “new-old” questions raised by John K. Fairbank (1966) still remain: “Communist China? – How far Communist? How far Chinese?” A second important issue is how to build equal status among the family of nations. A third issue is how to evaluate the impact of China’s vast cultural heritage and historical experiences on China’s international behavior (Fairbank, 1966, p. 574). We also follow up on the question raised by Samuel Kim: How constant or changeable is Chinese foreign policy over time, especially in the transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era, and why? (Kim, 1984, p. 25). From the perspective of this work, the core question of how far China, as a rising power, is different from the West might be considered as one of the most critical issues. Other fundamental questions are: How does China place the United States within the format of selective identities, and what are China’s primary reasons for grouping political actors with different types of identity, what for, and how was this done? And finally, how does China build its position within the power transition theory?
Revealing the actor’s postures and variety of foreign policy approaches might explain behaviors in international relations. For a realist, the most important issue is power when understood as a material factor that shapes a state’s position in international relations, whereas for an idealist, the dominant idea of “lasting peace” plays a more significant role. Finally, for constructivists, identity and subjective knowledge are the driving forces of state behavior (Ruggie, 1998, p. 855–860).
The above research questions and puzzles are answered and discussed from the social constructivist perspective. Constructivists of different approaches agree on the fundamental point that “humans see the world through perspectives, developed socially … [meaning] reality is social, and what we see” out there “and within ourselves is developed in interaction with others” (Palan, 2000, p. 571–580). According to Alexander Wendt, constructivism in an international relationship is characterized more specifically by its “idealism.” The structures of human behaviors are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and these shared ideas construct identities and interests of purposive actors rather than being given by nature. Hans Morgenthau who was named the father of political realism said: “we look over his [the statesman’s] shoulder when he writes his dispatches; we listen in on conversations with other statesmen; we read and anticipate his very thoughts” (Ibid.).
Social constructivism argues that the ideational structure shapes the identity of the agent, and the structure in Wendt’s constructivism is not material but cultural, defined by the distribution of ideas. Culture is shared knowledge, which includes shared beliefs, understandings, and expectations formed in the process of interaction among social beings. The essence of international politics, in the view of Wendt, is ideas rather than material capabilities. It adopts mainstream assumptions of constructivism: cooperation among states is a social process and norms have essential constitutive effects, with culture taking priority. The primary model of interest and identity is transformed via interactions with external others (Qin Yaqing, Wei Ling, 2008, p. 125). Under the constructivist approach, significant policy actions taken by the People’s Republic of China are fundamentally based on spreading efforts to promote its status via constructing and exercising different types of identities. As a consequence, the Chinese hope to have a soft-influence and be different from other global actors. Following the constructivist approach, it is not only material issues that play an essential role in international relations. Rhetoric, which is understood here as a diplomatic language and argumentation, is also of crucial importance in shaping the understanding of foreign policy motivations, especially in triangular relations conducted by China with neighbors, significant powers, and developing countries. In some respect, we follow the argument presented by Soren Clausen (1998)
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who places Chinese identity on the trinity approach of ancient civilization, anti-imperialist resistance, and high power status. Following this understanding, however, we argue that Chinese character should be understood as the trinity of culture and civilization, anti-imperialist resistance based on ideological assumptions of justice and equal material status, and the state identity which is recognized through shaping borders and efficient administration.
The assumptions mentioned above suggest that international relationships should not be explained from a short-term perspective, but rather from a broader perspective on the issue. This kind of attitude has been rooted in historical and social approaches to global affairs. Taking China as an example, we have attempted to explain its behavior and motivation by analyzing three necessary parts of an actor’s international performance: equality status, identity, and influence. The first concept, as discussed later, is understood as a precondition for building self in the international area. Moreover, by shaping the equal status of self, there is a possibility of making a coalition of identities based on a fair platform. An interaction with an external other builds identity, but this other is anticipated by the actor, who could shape collective identity and sameness among actors. Finally, we debate the issue of influence and relations between shaping collectiveness and a relatively peaceful power transition in global affairs. This approach illustrates the complexity of China’s foreign behavior and argues that China fails to shape its own single and coherent identity in global issues (see Fig. 1.1).
feeling equal by interaction with others and looking for similar partners through shaping a common identity platform
building the self by communication with others and finding similarities and differences
building its position via a power transition process and keeping out of bilateral conflicts
Foreign Relations ‘EII’
Fig. 1.1 Foreign relations “EII”
Finding Equality and REcipRocity in intERnational
RElations
Discussing the importance of equality in social life has a long tradition. Political scientists have presented various views of equality: for some, it means the balance of ideas, others see it as equal material status. Equality is also defined as the correspondence between a group of different objects, persons, processes, or circumstances that have the same qualities in at least one but not all respects. However, the core question remains: equal in what respect? (Rae, 1981, p. 132). Equality consists of a triangular relation between two or more objects or persons, and one or more qualities. In other words, two objects are equal in absolute respect if, in that regard, they fall under the same general terminus. In international relations, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the concept of equality among nations was rooted in the justice in international law. Lassa Oppenheim (1905) described it through the importance of the law of nations: “Since the law of nations is based on the common consent of states as sovereign communities, the member states of the family of nations are equal to each other as subjects of international law […] as members of the community of nations these are equals whatever differences between them may otherwise exist” (Hicks, 1908, p. 530–561).
The early discussion on global equality tried to shape the common points of reference for finding and exercising balance. Edwin Dickinson’s book, The Equality of States in International Law (1920), is perceived as the most influential work dedicated to justice in international relations. First, there is equality before the law which prescribes that states should be equal under the international law. From this perspective, international laws should be regarded as general rules for all subjects to whom the rules apply and that all parties remain equal before the law. The second legal idea of equality prescribes the equality of rights for all participants. According to this concept, there can be no exclusive rights for some actors or groups of actors, but equal voting power and representation are embodied into the sovereignty concept (Hjorht, 2011, p. 2585).
Equality is often treated as an element of sovereignty or as a principle that is derived from sovereignty. China always refers to sovereignty but advocates it not only for itself but also for a group of countries. In this sense China follows the understanding presented by Pieter Kooijmans (1964) Equality should not be viewed as a characteristic of a state, but rather
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as something that results from some property that the units that enjoy equality have in common, that is, a standard descriptive property (cited after Higgins, 2012).
Taking into consideration the theoretical assumptions of building equal status, the most crucial issue is to establish the relations based on the reciprocity principle. Gouldner emphasized that reciprocity implies conditional action: reciprocal behavior returns ill for ill as well as good for good: “people should meet smiles with smiles and lies with treachery”—as quoted by R. Keohane (1986). Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane (1986) argued that heading toward equality “seems to be the most effective strategy for maintaining cooperation among egoists.” Reciprocity is also often invoked as an appropriate standard of behavior which can produce cooperation among actors in international society. From a broader perspective, the discussion on global reciprocity encourages discussion about global values and standards. Universal norms and rights enforced through internal or external sanctions are morally justified only if they can be reciprocally justified (Keohane, 1986, p. 1–12).
In the 1980s, during the Cold War period, the question of reciprocity was raised by the advocates of liberal free trade. In the United States, the discussion was derived from the trade imbalance with Japan. As declared, reciprocity means “moving toward a balance with Japan rather than a big surplus in their account trading with us” (Keohane, 1986, p. 14). More to the point for social scientists, reciprocal obligations hold societies together. Participants typically view diffuse reciprocity as an ongoing series of sequential actions which entail mutual concessions within the context of shared commitments and values (Ibid.).
Furthermore, the concept of reciprocity is defined as any stimulus by one actor that “may be expected to bring about a proportionate response in kind from the other” (Richardson et al., 1981, p. 130). Although the above-quoted definitions answer the core question of understanding, the problem of reciprocity’s measurement remains unanswered. Going through the literature, we acknowledge difficulties in measuring equality, and we recognize the needs to be specified in each particular case. In international relations, the reciprocal approaches have been measured with the equivalence of benefits (Temkin, 1993, p. 8). But according to Koehane, in international relations, as in the social world, precise measurement is often both impossible and inadequate: “Reciprocity refers to exchanges of roughly equivalent values in which the actions of each party are contingent on the prior actions of the others in such a way that good is returned for good, and bad for bad. These exchanges
are often, but not necessarily, mutually beneficial; they may be based on self-interest as well as on shared concepts of rights and obligations, and the value of what is exchanged may or may not be comparable” (Ibid.) Most authors measure it by military spending analysis. These studies attempt to determine whether power in global politics increased or decreased its military spending in response to the trends shaped by the adversary. The next approach of studies of the powers’ reciprocity focuses on patterns of events rather than on military spending. These studies analyze the causal links among countries’ cooperative or hostile behaviors toward each other (Goldstein, Freeman, 1991, p. 19–20).
From this perspective, China is understood as the ideology, state, and culture, and has grouped its partners according to similarities in identity, and by these means, builds a common platform for cooperation. Through this imagined equal status, both sides of “China+” build the reciprocal platform. The second meaning of reciprocity is an experience in a particular and specific crisis. In fact, it might be driven by the shortterm ebb and flow of actions and reactions. The action taken to counter the other side’s measures should be taken with a reciprocal approach and illustrate the level of interaction. Based on this view, China groups its neighboring countries by conflicting them with itself and by experiencing a territorial crisis which allows both sides to exercise reciprocity of equal states (Ibid.).
Going further, reciprocity is recognized as a norm that establishes an underlying level of expected behavior which serves to determine the pattern of foreign policy interactions among players in international relations. In the eyes of Schelling, there are different types of reciprocity: structural and induced. This model assumes an ideal world where the parties’ incentives are perfectly aligned. Such reciprocity exists in a world where the players are in a purely common interest scenario. The second approach is “induced reciprocity” and successfully binds each player’s strategy to that of its opponent. Here, reciprocity creates symmetric constraints for the players’ strategy. When a player chooses to cooperate, it knows and is sure that the other player will also collaborate. It means there is no incentive left for unilateral actions, or for that matter any other type of defensive strategy.
Regarding the Chinese understanding of equality, the majority of assumptions and considerations are placed within the Confucian school that was highly focused on secular and material issues. The core concern for those who administer and manage society and state should be the
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unequal distribution of wealth. In traditional Chinese understanding, the Confucian concept of jun fulun (均富论) is mainly based on fiscal equality, Mozi on “mutual brotherhood” (jian xiangai 兼相爱), and Menzi on equal distribution and mutual help. If wealth is equally distributed there will be no poverty, and where harmony is in place, there will be no imbalance in peace. Confucianism opposed the huge gap between the poor and the rich which has become a modern tradition in the ideal of “great harmony under the heaven.” In this perspective, the material well-being and equal redistribution of wealth were considered most important in managing society. Apart from its material dimensions, the potential idea of equality and reciprocity embodied in friendship and the principle of Confucian ethics of the Three Bonds and the Five Relations is explored and also explained in a modern way (Gao Ruiquan, 2010).
After the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established, Chairman Mao tried to narrow the gap between rich and poor and, by applying conventional socialist means of production, started to build socialism in China. After 30 years of Mao’s reign, the experiment collapsed, and Deng Xiaoping changed the egalitarian model into a model based on a contract responsibility system. Deng believed that material power should be built first, and only then could the country redistribute the wealth according to social needs. In other words, 30 percent of the Chinese population will become wealthy, and would then contribute to the rest of society. This approach was based on Ward’s (1978) understanding, who claimed that among the nations of the world: “Inequality tends to decrease as the level of development increases. As there are no societies (…) which have both a low level of inequality and a low level of development, neither is there any with a high level of inequality and a high level of development.” In other words, in the long-term development brings equality (Dye, Ziegler, 1988, p. 45–50).
The third generation of Chinese leaders further promoted the material approach. Jiang Zemin advocated the “distribution according to work” approach. Based on the social needs and growing disparities inside Chinese society, Hu Jintao (2005), for the first time in the period of communist rule in China, equated socialism with social justice of a harmonious society. In his opinion, without social justice, there was no harmonious socialist society. This concept was further promoted by Xi Jinping (2013) for whom international justice and equality are “majestic goals” that people from all over the world fight for. The concept of equality embodied in mutual trust, inclusiveness, cooperation, and justice became the primary
system of values in China’s foreign policy. In the context mentioned above, Chinese leaders follow the understanding of equality as a result of economic development, and not a type of political system. This belief is rooted in the material understanding of equality in development.
To conclude, we assume that as regards Chinese relations with the external world, the first concept of equality is revealed in China’s narrative on unequal treaties and finding a way to be equal among the family of nations. As rightly pointed out by Beijing-based scholar Zhang Baijia in his book Change yourself, and go to the World, the policy of Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong, and Jiang Jieshi was rooted in their perception of the international system as unfair and unequal. The memory of the “Chinese and dogs are not allowed” sign plays a significant role in shaping China’s foreign policy and in fact, has become the major motivation for China’s actions in foreign policy. The major goal for the Chinese leadership was to fight oppressors, and to join the rest of Asia in a struggle against “white imperialist domination.” Moreover, Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong, and even Jiang Jieshi never urged the Chinese to accept the leadership of Western or Japanese states, however friendly they might be. Although China decided to join and become open to the world in 1978 and has since then tried to build a relationship on a regular basis, the major perception of injustice remains unchanged. Zhou Zunnan (1988) argues that the most important issue for China has been to be respected and supported as a member of international society. He said, “Due to promoting the independent policy of peace and not supporting a superpower, China has won respect from the international audience” (Zhou Zunnan, 1988, p. 53). This brought the issue of identity to the Chinese leadership’s attention and was understood as a need for identity building, maintenance, and preservation (Zhang Quanyi, 2010, p. 217).
discussing sElF and idEntity issuEs
In international relations, as in the social world, an identity of self should be defined as unity and self-evidence of an actor. The identity is usually constructed and shaped in light of experiences indifference and by interaction with the other. According to Jurgen Straub (2002), the process of forming the identity, similar to the reciprocity concept, is inevitably connected with the specific experience of crisis. On a certain level of development, states experience domestic destabilization and foreign conflicts and call into question the orientation that will give directions to the actions
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taken by the actor (Straub, 2002, p. 60–61). On the one hand, during a crisis, loyalty toward the state-nation and cultural system was formed, but on the other unity and integrity were tested (Dai Xiaodong, 2006, p. 5–6). Moreover, the inherent parts of identity include personal characteristics such as the ability to bind anxiety, to perform efficiently in the face of turmoil, and self-esteem; independence of external pressure; autonomy and self-directedness; and changes in self-esteem and conformity. The concept of identity in sociological theories of the subject includes the idea of limited independence. In fact, the self is limited, provisional, and fragile, and is recognized in the process of interaction with others (Straub, 2002).
The basic theories in international relationships differentiate two types of identity: Wendtian Liberal Convergent Identity and Smittian Realist Discrete Identity. The first type of identity involves the possibility of building a collective identity, the second places emphasis on the differentiation between “you” and “me,” and a definition of the enemy. In line with the first type of identity, the primary issue is about building a common platform of understanding toward constructing the universal character of China’s global behavior as the benevolent, idealistic power, while in the second forming the enemy and the quest for being accepted are essential (Dong Qingling, 2010, p. 69). The behavior of an international actor should be understood via three significant perspectives: the active and constructive participant of the international system; the actor who has no impact on global affairs and is part of the status quo; and finally the actor who hopes to challenge the system because it perceives itself as a nonmember of a community. Moreover, as mentioned by Qin Yaqing (2010), the active identity is divided into three social identity subgroups: identity forced and dominated by another as China was during the Opium War regime and as a forced ally with the Soviet Union; the second type referred to maintaining the identity’s stability and interests, where the actor remains passive as in the 1980s and early 1990s when China concentrated on its economic development; and finally when it actively participates in the international community based on its identity and cultural heritage like China has from the beginning of the twenty-first century (Qin Yaqing, 2010, p. 349–351). More specifically, the construction of identity, as quoted by Chinese scholars, as in Darwinism and Marxian philosophy, depends on an actor’s economic strength and material power. Along with growing material power, the identity changes its face with an enhancement in the level of interaction and participation in global affairs. The creation of one’s own identity inevitably results in a quest for universal
values and builds a more comprehensive international system. This approach is structure oriented and just like Wilsonism and Kantian should be perceived as idealistic (Dong Qingling, 2008, p. 12).
Being a member of the international community, China faces a dilemma of shaping its behavior. In the past, as suggested by Bennett (1976), China had three types of cultural norms that developed its behavior: traditional, modern, and revolutionary. However, Kenneth Lieberthal (1982) identified three approaches in Chinese foreign policy: nativist, selective modernizer, and technology promoter. Finally, Peter Van Ness (1970) founded a foreign policy position and national development strategy nexus which is embodied in the following three routes: command economy, autarky, and market socialism (Chih-yu Shih, 1988, p. 606–607). Qin Yaqing makes China’s identity conditional on China’s different types of activities and the level of interaction with the outside world. He illustrates this thesis by saying that during Mao’s time, China’s actions were revolutionary and that is why China possessed the “revolutionary identity.” Contrary to this, Deng Xiaoping “hid China’s intentions,” and the Middle Kingdom was a selforiented actor. Taking responsibility and being a member of major international bodies like the United Nations, World Trade Organization, World Bank, and so on, China has changed its identity into a concept-oriented identity. It means China has expressed its hope to contribute to the world in the non-material sphere (Qin Yaqing, 2009, p. 99–101). As “China’s international identity has as a serious problem. Our credibility as a developing country is ridiculous! Who are our friends? North Korea, Iran, Myanmar, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Venezuela! We have a big problem. We do not have a priority identity. We have no main identity in the world so we cannot prioritize. Who are we?” Once China knows is single identity Chinese authorities can define China’s national interests. Contrary to this statement, Wang Guangya, the former China UN ambassador, “China still considers their [developing countries] position and our concern is closer to the G77” recognizing China’s global identity as very complicated and not fixed (Shambaugh, 2013, p. 215).
The non-material sphere is transmitted through the language used in declarations, statements, and discourse, and by action and international activity (Sun Jisheng, 2007, p. 63–74). In transferring the social definition of identity into international relations, the actor’s character is associated with a collection of discursive practices, including language with vocabulary, written or verbal, and characteristic behaviors such as gestures, a specific reaction to others, and conducting policy in terms of its own cultural
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pattern (Hopf, 2002, p. 1–2). The statesmen’s particular uses of language situate their states nationally, and, especially in a stratified world, according to their system of values. The usage of language, one or another, locates them in international affairs. Discourse can be defined as interrelated texts, conversations, and practices associated with a particular object. In this study, we adopt the standard meaning of discourse analysis depending on the context within which the text is produced and published (Philips, Hardy, 2002, p. 34–38). According to another definition, identity is conjoined with language and is understood as the linguistic construction of membership in one or more social groups or categories. More to the point, according to Peter Burke, language is one of the most important signs of identity. Speaking or using the same language and same notions is a simple and effective way of indicating solidarity. On the other hand, speaking a different language is an equally valid way of distinguishing oneself from other individuals or groups (Palan, 2000, p. 577–581). In the Chinese context, the role of rhetoric was somewhat passive and was perceived as a tool to restore public order. Barton Watson discusses the issue in the following words: “public address and discussions of rhetoric in China before the third century BCE are almost totally concerned with efforts to restore order to society, to induce rulers to act wisely, justly, and compassionately toward the people, to encourage the public to respond with loyalty to the regime, and to perpetuate ancient traditions in ritual and social relationships” (cited in Mierzejewski, 2013, p. 7).
Moreover, the importance of discourse was presented by Barbara Biesecker. She notes “the power of persuasive discourse” is “to constitute audiences out of individuals, to transform singularities into collectivities, to fashion a ‘we’ out of a plurality of ‘I’s,’ and to move them to collective action.” For Pierre Bourdieu, power is manifested through a structured discourse—an active phenomenon that rests upon accumulated capital (status) and mediating the body (Ibid.). The language here has the individualized potential to shape the meaning for an individual, and rhetoric contains the capacity to advocate and shape the identity. McGee is right to argue that “Virtually nothing about rhetoric is innocent of this power. Pick any rhetorical principle, and we’ll put it on the table, and I’ll show you how it’s connected with power” (Rufo, 2003). This conceptualization of the role of language in shaping identity bridges the gap between passive materiality and active discourses of power, allowing for a complete understanding in the particular case of China’s three types of identification. According to scholars Janice Bailly Mattern and Ludwik Wittgenstein,
language itself is the power that has shaped the international system, and the system is a material product of non-material factors. Argumentation and communication are not merely elements of international order but in fact are the source of global society (Guzzini, Leander, 2006). Without language nothing is possible. Furthermore, domination in the sphere of language has provided a basis for the construction of a truth regime (Sun Jisheng, 2007, p. 65). Following this understanding, language might play a role in shaping bilateral and multilateral relations, placing pressure or building peaceful and harmonious relationships. On the other hand, as mentioned by Ivere Neumann, we assume that language makes points of reference and contextualizes reality (Stenseth, 1998, p. 29–30).
Although Chinese identity was shaped by its interaction with Manchu since the seventeenth century, the significant factors that created China’s status are contained in the Middle Kingdom’s understanding of its past both from the nineteenth century and regarding itself as a victim of the West like other colonial countries, as well as by building relationships with developing countries. The influential factors shaping China’s international identity are: history—the mentality of a significant power but also the complex of a victim and the memory of being defeated; state-oriented factors: material power and ideological independence; international-oriented elements: international systems, global processes, and the psychological profile of the leadership (Zhou Pinyun, 2006, p. 396–402). The growing interaction with outside actors has provoked China to formulate its system with its values, drawing the border between “I” and “he” and finally strengthening the uniqueness of the actor. The identity was formed in the process of movement and interaction. As mentioned by Pan Wei (2010) due to the contacts with others, the Ming and Qing Dynasties identified themselves as different from foreigners. The next step was taken after the Opium Wars. Although the late Qing dynasty took the pro-nation state reforms, in 1905 China officially established the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and turned away from its tributary system. After being forced to join the Westphalia system, China experienced the first crisis and dilemma: why had the Middle Kingdom been defeated by “barbarians”? The unequal treaties and “one hundred years of humiliation” created a basis for shaping China’s identity. According to Kang Youwei, the biggest challenge for China’s tributary system was not even caused by the Western powers but by the Japanese victory in 1895. The subordinate defeated the superior. China’s next identity crisis was when it was part of the coalition with the Soviet Union in the early 1950s. Mao’s China needed to shape its own
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identity contrary to that of “big brother” which finally led to Mao Zedong presenting a new form of utopian government during the Cultural Revolution (Xu Zhouyun, 2010). The Chinese felt and were perceived as the “other” in the state-oriented system. However, breaking with mistrust and suspicion became the dominant theme of China’s identity as a positive power. This was the consequence of China’s post-Mao identity and the country’s strategy of step-by-step development. The next crisis in the era of reform arrived after the Tian’anmen 1989 isolation, with the US and European embargo becoming the catalyst for the breakthrough concerning China realizing its differences. At that time Deng Xiaoping announced taoguang yanghui—a low profile concept as the leading principle of China’s foreign behavior. After being in the shadow of the West, the Chinese leadership tried to shape China’s new identity in two different ways: using military tools and economic interdependence. The first unsuccessful attempt of venturing out into the world after 1989 was the Taiwan Crisis in the mid-1990s. The use of military forces signaled China’s readiness to become a member of the international order. However, the failure of re-joining the world via military means proved that the idea of peaceful coexistence via trade should have been exercised through Chinese diplomacy (Yan Xuetong, 2014). As mentioned by Men Honghua (2007), because of the Asian crisis and the passive stance that China adopted as it came out of the shadow of isolation, it failed to respond to the American military domination manifested for example by the bombing of China’s Embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo War (Liu Mang, 2007, p. 147).
The needs of being different from others pushed China into portraying and repeating the peaceful image of its international behavior. Its level of interaction with the world and its embracing of globalization have generated some challenges and obstacles for China’s idealistic vision of the world. After Washington was engaged in the war against terrorism, China was named as a responsible stakeholder by Robert Zoellick in 2005. As a brief observation states, although China compromises on some issues, it mostly sticks to its principles. The problem should be explained by the social approach framework. Apart from language and rhetorical strategies, China shapes its behavior based on principles rooted in the 1950s’ narrative of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, namely: mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual nonaggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality, and cooperation for mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence (Zhou Enlai, 1954).
The above-mentioned definition allows us to conclude that identity is made of a set of values and principles. Principles have become a coherent part of a global actor’s behavior. Usually, principles are ideality-oriented and reveal wishes, desires, and plans. States, as with human beings in social science, check on their activities, status, and qualities and compare perceptions against reference values. If the opinion of behavior differs from what they intended to do, the outcome typically manifests itself in a change in behavior. Principles are an underlying platform for action in international society. They are aspects of practice for which we have names in the diplomatic language such as benevolence, honesty, responsibility, thrift, and experience. Principles specify qualities that can be manifest in acts of many types. These specific activities are driven by factors behind an actor’s international behavior and play the dominant role in the perception of this actor in the eyes of external others (Carver, 2009, p. 27–30).
Despite being idealistic, identity plays a vital role in shaping our world and affects actors by making them interdependent. Since identity has not been formed in a clear-cut manner, the influence of an actor on the international stage is perceived as chaotic and casts doubt on its intentions. The question remains how the PRC would like to achieve its status via its interaction with others and whether and what kind of identity or identities the country needs to go through during the peaceful transition of power. As mentioned by Su Changhe (2010), China earns its position in global affairs by building a coherent identity. The absence of this cohesive identity would cause global public opinion to doubt China’s intentions. Moreover, coherence will make China more active in global affairs, which to a certain extent would challenge Confucian passiveness. As mentioned by Yu Xintian (2010), the PRC’s identity was, paradoxically, coherent during the Cultural Revolution. By linking China’s identity with fighting against revisionism, revolution, and anarchism, Mao has tried to build its international status. Since 1978 China should have created its coherent identity by taking peace, development, cooperation, and human rights as the banner of global citizenship. The Communist government should have departed from its communist rhetoric, values based on Marxism, and communist nomenclature. Only by referring to cultural values will China be able to build coherent universal values of all human beings (Yu Xintian, 2010, p. 175–176).
The primary argument here is that Chinese identities are culturally constructed in the sense that China has failed to build its identity as one
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single self-entity but has grouped other players into one basket with China. This situation is visible in each particular case of being a state, a civilization, and an ideology. In the first case, China’s state identity is shaped by two processes: first by Chinese foreign investment and the need for protecting its people, and second by experiencing territorial disputes with neighbors, especially with Japan. The second type of identity was based on the group of developing countries where the Middle Kingdom is placed among equals which shared a similar historical background and experiences. Here the core ideas of justice and equality have been transmitted. By being together with developing countries, the PRC allows itself to find equal partners in international relations. The third chosen cultural identity allowed China to play the role of an equal partner in its relations with Europe and the United States. From the perspective discussed earlier, China feels comfortable with being among the developed countries and can enjoy its status. Moreover, the understanding of the selective identities of “three in one” (san weiyiti 三位一 体 ) means that China is not eager to play a dominant role by itself but rather within a group of countries. This approach reflects both China’s inclusive approach and its very cautious strategic tactics. On the one hand, this method is rooted in the Chinese culture of inclusiveness that is focused not only one country but also on inviting countries with similar historical experiences, cultural heritage, and need to build statehood as well as identities. However, this approach is also a product of China’s interaction with different types of actors. By conducting relations with developing and developed countries as well as its neighbors, China shapes its identities. The process of communication is, in fact, a method of establishing relations and also a means of mutually influencing and reshaping each other’s identity and interests. Any identity is path-dependent and subject to the flux of historical events and processes. Since the era of reforms in 1978, China has changed not only in behavior but also in identity, both of which are interrelated and correlated. China has struggled over the threshold of becoming a member of international society and has evolved in the last three decades from a revisionist power to one that was detached before finally becoming a status quo power. The identity shift, the institutional selection, and norm acceptance have all been peaceful. The triangular identity presents itself as a core, dominant approach that allows China to raise peacefully (Zhu Liqun, 2010, p. 38–40).
shaping collEctivE idEntitiEs and powER tRansition quandaRiEs
In the case of China, as argued before, the pre-requisite condition for building its international character and developing its position in international relations is to create equal status within the global society. As our argument states, China failed to establish its fair status based on bilateral relations and prefers to group partners into three different types of identity cycles. By grouping other actors, China can exercise its power within this group of equal partners. This allows China to go through the process of power transition in a relatively peaceful way. From this perspective at least two approaches should be discussed, firstly the collective identity and secondly the power and power transition theory.
In this regard, Alberto Mellucci’s (1996) understanding describes collective identity as an interactive and shared definition produced by several interacting individuals who are concerned with the orientation of their actions as well as the field of opportunities and constraints in which their efforts take place. Within this framework, the actor has tried to formulate a cognitive framework concerning goals, means, and environment of action; conduct active relations among participants; and build emotional recognition between individuals. In fact, the idea of collective identity is grounded in a variety of traditional sociological concepts, starting from Durkheim’s “collective conscious” to Marx’s “class consciousness.” It “addresses the ‘we-ness’ of a group, stressing the similarities or shared attributes around which group members coalesce” (Cerulo, 1996, p. 386). In organizational research, collective identity has predominantly been explained as members’ beliefs about the central, enduring, and distinctive attributes of their organization (Hardy, Lawrance, 2005, p. 58–77). The collective identity is based on the same processes as the above-discussed discourse-self nexus. The collective identity is produced via the creation of texts, and on the relationship of collective identity as a discursive object to patterns of action. Following this perspective, the collective identity is not naturally generated but socially constructed: it is the intentional or nonintentional consequence of interactions which in turn are socially patterned and structured. In fact, as with the individual self, the collective self produces and constructs boundaries between “we-ness” and “other-ness” (Eisenstadt, Giesen, 1995, p. 72–102).
Elaborated more fully, we define the collective identity of a social movement as the participants’ shared sense of a movement as a collective actor
D. MIERZEJEWSKI AND B. KOWALSKI
and as a dynamic force for change that they identify with and are inspired to support through their actions. The collective identity develops within an imagined world or, to use another term, a figured world (Holland et al. 1998). The definition of collectiveness is based on two primary dimensions: belonging and action. Standard definitions of collective identity in anthropology and other social sciences emphasize identity concerning difference. This approach assumes that people who are considered culturally, racially, ethnically, nationally, or in some other way are distinctive in that they have a basis for solidarity and individual belonging. In international relations, similar to the process of building collective self through the nation-state paradigm, we acknowledge that collective identity is placed as an important pillar of the current international scene. This process is particularly visible in big power politics. On the one hand, building coalitions is based on material premises, but on the other is supported by values, understanding, and finally as identity platforms. By grouping countries together, either by their own decision or by third parties, new alliances or blocs form through the collective identity assigned to them, even if sometimes this assignment is based on inaccurate binary groupings. Regardless of the accuracy of these groupings, the very act of grouping these countries affects how the international system views them and thus treats them. This, in turn, causes the countries to identify with each other regarding their common position internationally. Following A. Wendt (1999), understanding the corporate/collective identity of the state generates four basic interests or features: “physical security, including its differentiation from other actors, ontological security or predictability in relationships to the world, which creates a desire for stable social identities, recognition as an actor by others, above and beyond survival through brute force, development, in the sense of meeting the human aspiration for a better life, for which states are repositories at the collective level” (Wendt, 1999, p. 384–396).
The first step in the process of building collective identity is the increasing interdependence among entities that interact with each other. This can take on at least two forms. One discussed by Buzan (1983) and Ruggie (1983) is an increase in the “dynamic density and substance” of interactions due to, for example, trade and capital flows. This provides the emergence of a “common other,” whether personified in an external aggressor or a more abstract threat like nuclear war or ecological collapse (Lasswell, 1972, p. 24). While one generates “dilemmas of common interests” and the other “dilemmas of common hostility” (Stein, 1983), both increase the objective vulnerability and sensitivity of actors to each other (Keohane,
Nye, 1987). The first approach might be illustrated by investments of transnational companies or sovereign wealth funds as in the case of China and which characterizes China-Africa relations. The second is visible in the history of the NATO-Warsaw Pact during the Cold War period, and in the current balance of military power in the South China Sea.
Going further into more systemic processes, the collective identity formation is encouraged by the transnational convergence of domestic values. This can take place in various issue areas, but two of the most salient are cultural and political, for example, the American model of liberal democracy and the Chinese model of development. To put in a nutshell, the societal convergence can result from rising interdependence, in which case, its effects will be hard to separate from the latter.
As it has been argued, the most critical aspect of China’s building of its peaceful influence, transition, and exercise of power in the international arena is building a coalition of collective identities. When discussing power, we understand the ability of a state to impose on or persuade another state to comply with its will. Power is achieved through the combination of a state’s population, this population’s economic productivity, and the ability of its government to mobilize these aspects efficiently and efficiently. John Kenneth Galbraith in Anatomy of power distinguishes three types of power: first, “deserve power” (condign power), by using threats and punishment to ensure the other side’s obedience in its ability to act; second, the “compensation of power” (compensatory power), by using rewards and prizes to obey self-ability to act; third, “about as power,” by shaping the beliefs and preferences of other’s influence on the ability to act. In the context of the identity-influence nexus, power is the ability of one actor: “to induce forces on the other, toward or against movement or change in a given direction, within a given behavior region, at a given time.” Two conditions are necessary for the actor to have power over the other: first, the other must have needs or goals which it feels can be satisfied or attained with the help of another’s resources but not without such assistance, second, the other must perceive the actor as having resources which might be made available to it. Power and authority are similar concepts in the case of dealing with the ability of one social entity to influence or affect the behavior of another (Wolfe, 1959, p. 99–101).
In the process of rising and attaining position, the core question is: how to conduct a prosperous and relatively peaceful means of persuasion, and what kind of argument is used? From this perspective, China exercises its different types of identity in order to build its position and escape from
D. MIERZEJEWSKI AND B. KOWALSKI
global conflict during the process of power transition. The above-discussed power concept is bonded with the power transition theor y. The primary argument of the power transition theory posits that war is likely when a challenger approaches power parity with the dominant actor. A. F. K. Organski, in War and Change in World Politics (1958), argued that bipolar systems are unstable because rising powers tend to be dissatisfied with the systems organized by the dominant forces or hegemon. In this context, the balance-of-power system fails to provide stability and becomes the system that builds conflict and confrontations. In developing their model of power transition, Organski and Kugler ( 1980 ) used GNP to indicate the strength of a nation and found support for their thesis among major powers that they considered contenders for hegemony in global affairs. This implies that the realist theory of the balance-ofpower approach predicts that the international system will be peaceful if no nation is allowed to acquire predominant strength. Breaking this consensus, it is argued, could lead to a global war, by a rising hegemon that challenges the position of existing power. According to the power transition theory, “The dominant nation and the challenges are very likely to wage war on one another whenever the challenger overtakes in power the dominant nation” (Organski, Kugler, 1980 ). Following this argument, Organski argues that the aggressor will come from a small group of strong but dissatisfied countries; and it is the weaker, rather than the stronger power that is most likely to be the aggressor. But all presented analyses are based on the experiences from the same cultural cycles. In other words, the examples of rising and declining power within the power transition theory are only based on Western examples. The second important challenge is that in the original concept, Organski did not include the effects of alliances and believed that the dominant power would pre-empt in anticipation of any attempt to overtake it. This perspective supports the argument that while rising China has no single identity, it does have at least three types of identities as a rising power. From the above-mentioned understanding, the PRC will not be perceived as a single power that challenges the international system but rather as part of those group of entities shaped by China. On the one hand, creating three types of identity allowed China to escape from being labeled a dominant power that maintains dominance by establishing its own system, and on the other allows to be a leader within three different international societies. By applying the three fold identity, China can maintain the status quo peacefully,
rather than enforce its will on partners. To a certain extent, China follows this understanding based on power transition, when a dominant power leads by creating satisfaction rather than fear, cooperation rather than conflict, and the sharing of resources rather than fights over resource allocation. The core problem for China in constructing its rising status is how to escape from the Western logic of rising powers? As history teaches us, dominant powers consider preventive wars as the most important means of eliminating the threats and challenges posed by rising powers. On the other hand, the hegemon can respond by reducing commitments, forming new alliances, rapprochements, and appeasing challengers.
Following the constructivist approach rather the realist perspective, we embed the power transition within the international society concept. From the constructivist perspective, China became a member of global society that is defined by Watson as a group of states or political communities which form a system by dialog and shared principles and institutions for the conduct of their relations (Zhang Yongjin, 1991, p. 3–16).
Following Watson’s understanding, international society is a particular form of human association that is thought to include and somehow organizes the relations among different political communities. Hedley Bull once wrote that an international society exists when “a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of community” (Watson, 1987, p. 149). By articulating the research agenda based on China’s three selected identities, we argue that China builds three different types of international society. It goes against globalization understood as unification and Americanization and presents a kind of alternative to existing world orders. This approach is rather based on China’s cultural narrative of unity in diversity, a world for all human beings, or a more utopian understanding of “great unity” (datong).
Within this framework, China builds and exercises its social influence. The concept of social impact is recognized as the process by which individuals make real changes to their feelings and behaviors as a result of interaction with others who are perceived to be similar. In this concept, the social power concept is described as an individual’s potentiality for influencing one or more other persons toward acting or changing in a given direction. According to this definition, social power is the ability to exert interpersonal influence (Levinger, 1959, p. 83).
D. MIERZEJEWSKI AND B. KOWALSKI
Following the steps taken by China in building its social influence, the Chinese government uses this approach to shape its interdependence in international relations. Interdependence advocates, for example, argue that a hegemonic actor is required for peace because it can unilaterally impose rules that secure stability. In this perception, the most significant point of reference is the current hegemonic power—the United States. From this perspective, China has been building a multipolar world through multilateral platforms. Multilateralism is understood as the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states. Ye Zicheng, the Beijing-based scholar (1998), defined multipolarization ( duojihua 多 极 化 ) as hua —process, and changes. In this regard, the Chinese have placed multipolarity as a process of adjustment of China’s position in the changing global order, contrary to a unipolar world led by the United States and as an essential focal point in the worldwide balancing of powers. Contrary to multipolarity, Qin Yaqing (2001) defined multilateralism ( duobian zhuyi 多 边 主 义 ) as stable, with a solidly principled institutional system with nation-states as the core element. But the discussion on a multipolar world started in January 1986 when Huan Xiang claimed that because the Cold War conflict had become relatively static, the superpowers were losing their ability to control their camps and therefore political multipolarity was increasing. The undertaken analysis proved the thesis that the US experiences in Vietnam and the Soviet Union’s in Afganistan demonstrated that both superpowers’ power was limited. The collapse of the Soviet Union was the event that allowed the People’s Republic of China not to follow a single power policy but rather group partners and bind them together with China. In their analysis, the Chinese leadership usually perceived multipolarity through the lenses of five powers the United States, Russia, China, Japan, and Europe. The balance between the five powers and the adjustments of each respective power’s policy toward each other should be understood as the only way to stability. Stability is defined as the probability that the system retains all of its characteristics and that no single nation becomes dominant, and that the majority of its members continue to survive with the avoidance of large-scale war. From a particular actor’s standpoint, stability is related to the perspective of securing its sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity. The asymmetrical approach followed by realism and neo-realism assumes that a more powerful country can usually impose their power and will on a less powerful country (Guzzini 2012). As Kenneth Waltz argued,
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"No, no, no…", yrittivät molemmat miehet heikolla äänellä.
"Minun mieheni tietysti vaan istuu ja katselee rauhassa, kun minua häväistään", sanoi rouva Bunnett ja nousi suuttuneena tuoliltaan.
"Ja minun mieheni hörppii teetään, välittämättä, jos minua syytetäänkin valehtelemisesta", sanoi rouva Fillson ja loi harmistuneen katseen perämieheen.
"Jos sinä luulet, että minä makaan samassa hytissä tuon naisen kanssa, George, niin suuresti erehdyt", sanoi rouva Bunnett pelottavalla äänellä. "Ennen olen vaikka lattialla."
"Ja minä makaan ennen vaikka romuraudoilla", sanoi rouva Fillson ja vilkasi vihollisensa luisevia ruumiinmuotoja.
"No, sitten makaamme me perämiehen kanssa siellä", sanoi laivuri. "Sinä saat perämiehen kojun ja rouva Fillson makaa kajuutan sohvalla. Ei suinkaan teillä ole mitään sitä vastaan, George?"
"Ei, Georgella ei tietystikään ole mihinkään mitään vastaan", huudahti rouva Fillson. "George myöntyy kaikkeen, kun on kysymys hänen vaimostaan."
"Jos sinä hiukankin olisit miesmäinen, George", ähkyi rouva Bunnett, "et noin antaisi loukata minua."
"Ja jos sinä olisit hiukankin miesmäinen", sanoi rouva Fillson, kääntyen mieheensä, "vapauttaisit minut tuon naisen seurasta. Koskaan et sinä katso minun parastani."
Hän ryntäsi kannelle, jonne rouva Bunnett'kin pian seurasi. Molemmat miehet jatkoivat hiljaisuuden vallitessa syömistään.
"Meidän täytyy tehdä riita keskenämme heidän mielikseen", sanoi vihdoin laivuri ja asetti tyhjän kuppinsa pöydälle. "Ennen he eivät ole tyytyväisiä."
"Se ei käy", sanoi perämies ja taputti laivuria olalle.
"Teeskentelemme, tarkoitan", sanoi tämä.
"Se ei kävisi luonnollisesti", sanoi perämies. "He huomaisivat sen. Olemme nyt purjehtineet viisi vuotta yhdessä, eikä koskaan ole pahaa sanaa vaihdettu."
"No, jos te tiedätte paremman keinon, niin laulakaa ulos", sanoi laivuri vähän äkäisesti. "Tätä tällaista ei ihminen voi kestää."
"Katsotaan nyt ensin, miten käy aamiaisellakin", sanoi perämies ja sytytti piippunsa. "Jos se onnistuu yhtä huonosti, kuin tähän saakkakin, niin voimmehan, heidän mielikseen, koetteeksi, vähän riidelläkin."
Aamiainen seuraavana aamuna, oli kerrassaan kauhea; rouvat suoraan yllyttivät miehiään vihollisuuksiin. Siinä he eivät sentään onnistuneet; mutta aamupäivän kuluessa, sopivat miehet asiastaan ja seuraavalla aterialla puhkesi myrsky.
"Minä en tahdo surkutella itseäni, enkä loukata kenenkään tunteita", sanoi laivuri, vilkaisten perämieheen, "mutta jos hiukan vähemmällä kolinalla voisitte syödä ruokanne, George, olisin erinomaisen kiitollinen teille."
"Vai niin, todellakin", sanoi perämies — ja hänen vaimonsa suoristi yht'äkkiä selkänsä.
Molemmat sotaakäyvät voimat katselivat toisiaan kiukkuisin katsein ja ponnistivat ajatuksiaan uusien loukkauspuheiden keksimiseen.
"Syötte kuin sika", jatkoi laivuri.
Perämies ajatteli niin kauan musertavaa vastausta, että hänen vaimonsa kadotti kärsivällisyytensä ja hypähti purppuranpunaisena seisomaan.
"Kuinka rohkenette puhua siten minun miehelleni?" huusi hän. "George, tule heti kannelle!"
"En minä välitä hänen puheistaan", sanoi perämies, joka juuri oli alottanut päivällisensä.
"Tule heti!" sanoi hänen vaimonsa ja työnsi pois lautasen.
Perämies nousi huoaten, huomasi kauhistuksen ja osaanoton välähdyksen laivurin silmissä, mutta vastasi siihen samanlaisella, täynnä voimatonta raivoa.
"Käyttäkää suurempaa veistä, kapteeni", sanoi hän häijysti. "Tuon pienen raukan voitte jonakuna kauniina päivänä niellä vatsaanne."
Kysymyksessä oleva ase nyrkkiin puserretussa kädessään kääntyi laivuri ja tirkisteli miestä, kivettyneenä hämmästyksestä.
"Ellen olisi kapteeni tällä laivalla", sanoi hän käheästi, "ja pakoitettu käymään hyvällä esimerkillä, saisitte komean selkäsaunan noista sanoistanne, George."
"Teidän paraaksenne se vaan oli, kapteeni Bunnett", sanoi rouva Fillson ivallisesti. "Minä kerran tunsin erään ruotu-ukon, joka aina söi veitsellä ja lopulta söi itsensä kuoliaaksi."
"Niin, sen hän teki ja hänellä ei ollut puoliksikaan niin suurta suuta, kuin teillä", lisäsi perämies varottavasti.
"Kapteeni tai miehistö", sanoi laivuri, melkein tukahtuneena, "mutta tätä en enää siedä. Tulkaa kannelle, George, ja toistakaa nuo sananne."
Ennenkuin perämies ennätti seurata haastetta, tarttui vaimonsa hänen käteensä ja kauhistuksen huudolla kiersi rouva Bunnett käsivartensa laivurin kaulaan, kieltäen häntä liikkumasta paikaltaan.
"Vartokaa, kunnes tapaan teidät maalla, poikaseni", sanoi laivuri uhaten.
"Minä kyllä yksinkin vien laivan kotiin, jahka olen pehmittänyt teidät", vastasi perämies ja nousi rouvansa kanssa kannelle.
Iltapäivällä ei kumpikaan pari virkannut sanaakaan, miehet vaan vaihtelivat katseita. Kun rouvat vihdoin olivat menneet alas, lähestyi perämies hupaisesti hymyillen vihollistaan.
"Hyvin, poikani", sanoi hän sydämellisesti.
"Mitä tarkoitatte?" kysyi laivuri, suuttuneella ihmetyksellä.
"Tarkoitan teeskenneltyä tapaanne riidellä", sanoi perämies. "Teitte sen kerrassaan mainiosti. Minäkin koitin pitää puoliani, mutta se ei käynyt likimainkaan niin hyvin kuin teiltä."
"Tarkoitatteko, ettette tarkoittanut, kuten sanoitte"? kysyi laivuri.
"Tietysti", vastasi perämies, ja näytti hyvin hämmästyneeltä. "Ette suinkaan tekään sitä tehnyt?"
"En", sanoi laivuri ja nielasi. "En, tietystikään en. Mutta te ajoitte myöskin asianne hyvin, George. Mainion hyvin."
"En puoliksikaan niin hyvin kuin te", sanoi perämies. "Niin, me kai jatkamme yhä?"
"Se kai parasta", vastasi laivuri. "Vaan ei suinkaan liene tarpeellista, että samaa tapaa seuraamme. Tarkoitan veitsien nielemistä ja muuta sellaista."
"Ei, ei", sanoi perämies hätäisesti.
"Ja jos te voisitte saada vaimonne Summercovesta matkustamaan junalla kotiin George, saisimme ehkä vähän rauhaa täällä."
"Hän ei koskaan antaisi anteeksi minulle sellaista pyyntöäkään", sanoi perämies. "Saatte luvan käskeä häntä itse, kapteeni."
"Sitä en tee", sanoi laivuri päättävästi. "En koskaan voisi laivallani kohdella naishenkilöä sillä tavalla. Toivon sentään tietäväni, miten käyttäytyä, niin veitsellä kuin syönkin."
"Unohtakaa pois tuo", sanoi perämies ja punastui. "Odottakaamme nyt vielä ja katsellaan mihin asiat kääntyvät", lisäsi hän toivovasti.
Seuraavina kolmena päivänä ei tultu mihinkään parempaan tulokseen ja riita, miesten teeskennelty ja naisten teeskentelemätön kärjistyi huippuunsa. Oli selvää, että naiset pitivät näitä kahakoita
hauskempina kaikkia muita huvituksia laivalla. Kun molemmin puolin puhjettiin suonenvedon tapaiseen itkuun, jota miehistö katseli suurella osanotolla, oli naineiden miesten ryhdyttävä ajattelemaan voimakkaampia keinoja.
"Asia käy päivä päivältä pahemmaksi", sanoi laivuri alakuloisesti.
"Me tulemme koko miehistön ivan esineiksi, ennenkuin pääsemme heistä.
Vielä päivä ennenkuin saavumme Summercoveen, viisi tai kuusi siellä ja vähintäin viisi paluumatkalla."
"Murha ennen sitä tulee tapahtumaan", sanoi perämies ja pudisti päätään.
"Jospa saisimme ne molemmat junaan", jatkoi laivuri.
"Se maksaa rahaa."
"Mutta ne olisivat oikein käytettyjä rahoja."
"Eivätkä ne siihen suostu", sanoi perämies. "Ei kumpikaan."
"Olen ennenkin nähnyt naisväen riitelevän", sanoi laivuri, "mutta silloin on ne kuitenkin voinut pitää aisoissa. Se juuri on onnettomuus, että pitää asua näin ahtaasti."
"Ajatelkaa, jos sanoisimme, ettei laiva ole merikelpoinen", ehdotti perämies.
"Silloin ne eivät erkanisi meistä pahallakaan", sanoi laivuri.
"Niin luulen minäkin", sanoi perämies miettivänä. "Mutta riennossa ne lähtevät, jos sanomme laivalla olevan rokkoa, tai jotain muuta sentapaista."
Laivuri murisi myöntävästi.
"Koetus ei suuria maksa", jatkoi perämies. "Juuri kun saavumme satamaan, niin voimme antaa jonkun miehistöstä — esimerkiksi pojan — sairastua rokkoon."
"Miten se käy päinsä?" kysyi laivuri, vähän ivallisesti.
"Antakaa minun hoitaa koko asia", vastasi perämies. "Minulla on ajatus, jonka mukaan sen pitäisi onnistuman."
Hetkisen epäiltyään myöntyi laivuri, vasten parempaa tahtoansa.
Seuraavana päivänä, kun hitaasti lähestyttiin Summercovea ja matkustajat olivat kannella tähystämässä satamaa, ryntäsi kokki pelästyneen näköisenä kannelle ja kuiskasi jotakin laivurin korvaan.
"Mitä?" huudahti tämä. "Tyhmyyksiä!"
"Mitä?" kysyi rouva Bunnett'kin ja kääntyi ympäri.
"Kokki on saanut päähänsä, pojan sairastuneen rokkoon", sanoi laivuri naurahtaen.
Molemmilta naisilta pääsi heikko huudahdus.
"Tyhmyyksiä!" sanoi rouva Bunnett vaaleten.
"Loruja", lisäsi rouva Fillson ja hänen suupielissään värähti.
"Niin", sanoi kokki levollisesti, "rouva tietystikin tietää parhaiten, mutta minä olen kerran purjehtinut parkkilaivassa, jossa rokko oli hyvin ankara; minun pitäisi tietää miltä se näyttää."
"Niin ja nyt luulette kaikkia rokoksi", sanoi rouva Bunnett epävarmalla äänellä.
"Kuulkaa nyt rouva", sanoi kokki ja teki teatterimaisen liikkeen, "ehkä haluatte tulla katsomaan häntä."
"En", läähätti rouva Bunnett ja otti pari askelta taaksepäin.
"Kapteeni tulee varmaankin", kysyi kokki.
"Sinä pysyt paikallasi, George", sanoi käskevästi rouva Bunnett. "Pysykää vähän edemmällä kokki."
"Ja pitäkää suunne kiini, maalle päästyämme", sanoi perämies. "Teidän ei ole tarvis laulaa sitä koko kaupungille, sillä silloin on mahdotonta saada apuväkeä lastinpurkaukseen."
"Kyllä, kyllä", sanoi kokki ja asteli poispäin. "Minä en rokkoa pelkää. Olen siinä kerran ollut, eikä se minuun koske."
"Ooh, minä toivoisin olevani kaukana tästä inhottavasta laivasta", huokasi rouva Fillson hermostuneesti. "Täällä ei ole muuta kuin selkkauksia. Miten kauan vielä kestää, ennenkuin pääsemme Summercoveen, kapteeni Bunnett?"
"Puolessatoista tunnissa sen pitäisi mennä", vastasi laivuri.
Molemmat naiset huokasivat levottomina ja katselivat jännityksellä satamaan, joka vähitellen sukeltautui näköpiiriin.
"Minä matkustan junassa takaisin", sanoi rouva Bunnett. "Kerrassaan inhoittavaa, että vapaa-aikansa tällä tavalla pilaa."
"Se kuuluu asioihin, joita ei voi auttaa", sanoi hänen miehensä.
"Parasta, että annat minulle vähän rahaa", jatkoi rouva. "Aijon vuokrata huoneen kaupungissa päiväksi, tai pariksi, nähdäkseni miten tauti kehittyy."
"Matkusta sinä vaan suoraan kotiin", sanoi laivuri.
"Tyhmyyksiä", vastasi rouva Bunnett kiivaasti. "Ajattele, jos sinä itse vielä saisit rokon, silloin minun kuitenkin pitää olla täällä ja katsoa, että saat hyvää hoitoa. Olen varma, ettei rouva Fillsonkaan matkusta."
Rouva Fillson ojensi kätensä herra Fillsonille ja sanoi, ettei hän mitenkään sitä voisi tehdä.
"Myllynkivi putoaisi hartioiltamme, jos matkustaisitte", sanoi perämies laivurinkin edestä.
"Joka tapauksessa emme kuitenkaan matkusta ennen päivää eli paria", sanoi rouva Bunnett ja katsoi melkein ystävällisesti rouva Fillsonia.
Tämän selityksen perusteella, sekä naisten innokkaista pyynnöistä, oli miesten, joskin vastenmielisesti, hellitettävä rahat.
"Muistakaa, ettette puhu asiasta mitään kaupungissa", sanoi perämies, kohdatessaan laivurin harmistuneen katseen.
"Mutta pitäähän teidän saada lääkäri", sanoi rouva Bunnett.
"Minä tunnen erään täällä", sanoi perämies, "ja haen hänet."
Hän astui jonkun askeleen syrjään ja iski silmää laivurille. Tällä ei kuitenkaan ollut halua puhelemiseen ja loppumatka satamaan kului täydellisen hiljaisuuden vallitessa.
Heti kun laiva kunnollisesti oli kiinni laiturissa, lähtivät rouvat etsimään itselleen asuntoa. Tunti sen jälkeen saapui sana, että huone oli saatu, siisti ja mukava, vaikkakin se tuli vähän kalliimmaksi, mitä ensin oli ajateltu. He pyysivät etteivät miehensä antautuisi mihinkään tarpeettomaan vaaraan ja lähettivät pesua varten tarttumista ehkäisevää saippuaa.
Kolme päivää viipyivät rouvat Summercovessa, tulivat hyviksi ystäviksi ja tekivät, levottomuudesta huolimatta, pitkiä kävelymatkoja ympäristössä. Vähintäinkin kaksi kertaa päivässä lähetettiin sairaalle lihalientä ja muita herkkuja, mutta ne eivät koskaan tulleet kajuuttaa edemmäksi, sillä liikettä välittävä pieni poika, oli saanut jyrkän määräyksen olla astumatta laivaan. Neljännen päivän aamulla tulivat rouvat itse niin lähelle laivaa kuin uskalsivat — ottamaan jäähyväisiä.
"Kirjoita, jos tauti pahenee", huusi rouva Bunnett.
"Tai jos sinä saat rokon, George", lisäsi rouva Fillson.
"Hän on jo paranemaan päin", sanoi perämies. "Olkaa huoleti!"
Molemmat rouvat näyttivät tyytyväisiltä ja kääntyen ainakin joka kymmenennen askeleen päästä heiluttamaan nenäliinojaan, poistuivat he rautatieasemalle päin.
"Jos minä joskus vielä otan naisväkeä laivaani, niin nielköön minut paholainen elävänä", sanoi laivuri. "Mutta kuka tuo vanha herra on?"
Hän osoitti vanhaa valkopartaista miestä, joka lähestyi kuunaria musta laukku kädessään.
"Kapteeni Bunnett?" kysyi mies.
"Se olen minä", sanoi laivuri.
"Vaimonne lähetti minut", sanoi mies. "Nimeni on Thompson, tohtori Thompson. Hän kertoi teillä olevan ison rokon laivalla. Tahdon nähdä sairaan."
"Meillä on jo lääkäri", sanoivat laivuri ja perämies yht'aikaa.
"Vaimonne sanoi sen, mutta hän tahtoi välttämättä, että minä tulisin katsomaan potilasta", sanoi tohtori Thompson. "Se on myöskin minun velvollisuuteni piirilääkärinä."
"Nyt olette saanut asiat kauniiseen kuntoon", huokasi kauhistunut laivuri moittivasti.
"Jokainen voi joskus tehdä tyhmyyden", kuiskasi perämies. "Antakaa hänen tulla laivaan, eihän meillä rokkoa ole. Pahimmassa tapauksessa syytämme kokkia koko asiasta."
"Se kai lienee parasta", sanoi laivuri ja autti lääkärin laivaan. Perämies juoksi kanssiiin, ja pakotti raivostuneen pojan kiireesti
riisumaan vaatteensa ja asettautumaan vuoteelle.
Syvän hiljaisuuden vallitessa tutki tohtori potilasta ja kaikkein suureksi hämmästykseksi, käski hän miehistönkin pistää ulos kielensä, yskiä ja puhaltaa.
"Miten kauan poika on ollut kipeänä?"
"Suunnilleen neljä päivää", vastasi hämmästynyt laivuri.
"Tästä näette, miten käy, kun salaa tällaisia asioita", sanoi tohtori ankarasti. "Te olette pitäneet sairaan täällä, vaikka hänet välttämättä olisi ollut vietävä sairaalaan. Nyt sitä on jokaisessa noissa miesraukoissa."
"Mitä?" huudahti laivuri. "Heissä — mitä?"
"Rokkoa tietystikin", sanoi lääkäri. "Vieläpä vaikeinta laatua. Rokko on sisällinen. Rakkuloista ei yhtäkään ole päälle noussut."
"Ooh! Peijakas!" ihmetteli laivuri ja miehistö huokasi onnettomana.
"Miksi sitä sitten luulitte?" kysyi tohtori ankarasti. "Nyt ei heitä enää voi muuttaa, miesten on ruvettava sänkyyn, jokaisen, ja teidän on perämiehen kanssa hoidettava heitä."
"Mutta jos se tarttuu?" sanoi perämies valittaen.
"Siihen saatte mukautua", sanoi lääkäri, mutta lisäsi vähän lempeämmin: "Koitan iltapäivällä lähettää tänne pari hoitajatarta. Siihen saakka saatte tehdä parhaanne."
"Hyvä, sir", sanoi laivuri sortuneella äänellä.
"Mitä ensiksi on tehtävä", sanoi tohtori, nousten hitaasti rappuja, "on, että valelette heitä kylmällä vedellä. Tehkää se kerran joka puolen tunnin kuluessa siksi kunnes kuumenäppylät lyövät ulos."
"Tapahtuu", sanoi laivuri. "Mutta kiiruhtakaa hoitajattaria, sir."
Hän jäi seisomaan sanattomana, kunnes tohtori katosi näkyvistä, sitten riisui hän, raskaasti huoaten, takkinsa ja ryhtyi työhön.
Koko aamupäivän valelivat laivuri ja perämies miehistöään, odotellen väsymyksen sekaisella kärsimättömyydellä kuumenäppylöitä, samoin kuin miehistökin. Kokki kirosi ja hyppi kuin vimmattu joka kerta kuin ämpärillinen kylmää vettä valui pitkin hänen alastonta ruumistaan.
"Toivoisin nyt jo hoitajattarienkin tulevan, George", läähätti laivuri, kun hetkeksi istuttiin puhaltamaan. "Tämä on kauheaa työtä."
"Pahempaa kuin viimeisellä tuomiolla", sanoi perämies surullisesti.
"Halloo!" kuului ääni laiturilta.
Molemmat miehet kääntyivät katsomaan huutajaa.
"Halloo!" vastasi laivuri alakuloisesti.
"Mitä te olette lörpötelleet rokosta?" kysyi äsken tullut.
Laivuri viittasi väsyneesti keulaan.
"Viidellä kappaleella, tuolla, on sitä", sanoi hän. "Oletteko tekin tohtori."
Vastaamatta mitään hyppäsi mies laivan kannelle ja astui kiireesti kanssiin, toisten kahden seuratessa jälessä.
"Älkää seisoko valon edessä", ärjäsi mies. "Antakaa kun katson teitä, pojat."
Hän alkoi tutkia puhtaaksi valeltuja miehiä ja murisi ihmetellen.
"He ovat saaneet ankaria kylmiä kylpyjä", sanoi laivuri huomattavalla ylpeydellä.
"Mitä?" kysyi mies.
Laivuri selitti asian lähemmin ja katsoi kummissaan ympärilleen, kun lääkäri yht'äkkiä alkoi nauraa täyttä kurkkua. Sopimaton nauru kiusasi epämiellyttävästi potilaittenkin korvia ja Joe Burrows nousi varovasti istumaan kojussaan ja koetti nyrkillään ulottua mieheen.
"Teitä on narrattu", sanoi tohtori ja kuivasi silmiään.
"En ymmärrä tarkoitustanne", sanoi laivuri arvokkaasti.
"Joku on vetänyt nenästä teitä", sanoi tohtori. "Ylös hullut! Teissä ei ole enempää rokkoa kuin minussakaan."
Lääkäri lähti matkaansa ja miehet kiroten puoleksi helpotuksesta, puoleksi kiukusta, nousivat etsimään vaatteitaan.
"Kuka on voinut tehdä tuollaista", sanoi perämies ajattelevana.
Laivuri pudisti päätään, mutta hetkinen senjälkeen selvisi hänen katseensa vähäisen. Hän otti piipun suustaan ja viittasi peukalollaan kohden rautatieasemaa. Ja perämies vähän tuumittuaan, nyökkäsi myöntävästi.
VELI HUTCHINS
"Saamme erään hyvän ystävän mukaamme tälle matkalle", sanoi "Aallon" laivuri istuessaan teen jälestä perämiehen kanssa kannella.
"Eräs uusi jäsen seurassamme, veli Hutchins."
"Lähetysystävä varmaankin", sanoi perämies huolettomasti.
"Niin lähetysystävä", toisti laivuri. "Olen varma, että tulette pitämään hänestä, George; hän on ennen ollut suurimpia lurjuksia."
"Mitä sillä tarkoitatte?" kysyi perämies ja katsoi vihaisesti laivuriin.
"Hänen elämänsä historia on kovin kirjava", vastasi laivuri. "Melkein puolissa Englannin vankiloissa on hän tunnettu. Kuullessaan hänen puhettaan on kuin lukisi avonaista kirjaa."
"Vai niin! Ja hän tietysti taas alkaa ja lopettaa ateriat pitkillä rukouksilla ja veisuilla, kuten tuo viimekesäinenkin paksuniskainen, lihava roisto, joka saappaani varasti?" kysyi perämies.
"Hän ei niitä varastanut, George", sanoi laivuri. "Olisittepa nähneet hänen itkunsa ja epätoivonsa, teidän epäilyksenne kuultuaan, ette
mitenkään voisi antaa anteeksi itsellenne tällaista puhetta. Hän puhui siitä kokouksessa ja me rukoilimme kaikin teidän edestänne."
"Oli turha vaiva! Te olette kaikki yhtä hyviä, te ja lähetyksenne", sanoi perämies halveksivasti. "Nenästä teitä aina vedetään. Joku roikale tulee luoksenne, puhuu kauniisti armosta, joka on tullut hänen osakseen ja te toimitatte hänelle heti helpot ja mukavat päivät. Kas niin, älkää keskeyttäkö minua. Aioitte kysyä, miksi en minä yhdy joukkoonne ja minä vastaan, että minulla on hyvä, terve järkeni vielä tallella."
"Joskus tulette muuttamaan ajatuskantaanne, hyvä George", huokasi laivuri hurskaasti ja nousi seisomaan. "Toivon sydämestäni, että Jumala lähettäisi teille jonkun surun, jonkun, jota teidän olisi mahdoton kestää. Se on ainoa mikä teidät pelastaa."
"Sitä luultavasti toivoo tuo paksuniskainen saappaiden varaskin", tuumi perämies.
"Kyllä, sitä hän juuri sanoi", vastasi laivuri hartaudella.
Perämies nousi seisomaan, kopisti pilkallisena piippunsa laivan syrjään ja alkoi kävellä edestakaisin kannella. Saamatta kuitenkaan takaisin entistä rauhaansa, hyppäsi hän laiturille ja läksi kävelemään kaupunkiin.
Oli jo myöhäinen kun hän palasi takaisin. Kynttilä piipitti huonolla valolla kajuutan pöydällä ja kapteeni istui silmälasineen lukemassa jotakin vanhaa evangelista aikakauskirjaa, laihalle mustapukuiselle miehelle.
"Tämä on perämiehemme", sanoi laivuri ja katsoi ylös kirjastaan.
"Kuuluuko hän meihin?" kysyi vieras.
Laivuri pudisti alakuloisena päätään.
"Eikö vielä?" sanoi vieras, rohkaisevalla äänellä.
"Olen nähnyt tarpeekseni teidän kaltaisianne", sanoi perämies ylpeästi. "Ja mitä enempi teitä näen, sitä vähempi teistä pidän. Ihan vereni kiehahtaa, kun katselen teitä."
"No, nyt se on paha, joka puhuu teissä", sanoi herra Hutchins tunteellisesti ja varmasti.
"Niin, hänen äänensä te kai hyvin tunnette", sanoi perämies levollisesti.
"Olen elänyt hänen kanssaan 30 vuotta", sanoi herra Hutchins kunnioitusta herättävällä painolla, "mutta silloin väsyin minä häneen."
"Kaipa se jo häntäkin pitkästytti", tuumi perämies. "30 päivää olisi jo ollut tarpeeksi minulle."
Näin sanoen, meni hän hyttiinsä, antaakseen herra Hutchinsille aikaa miettiä sopivaa vastausta, tuli taas takaisin kokonaisen whiskypullon ja lasin kanssa ja sekotti itselleen väkevän groggin. Hutchins-herra veti syvään henkeään, katsahti neuvottomana laivuriin ja pudisti päätään pullolle.
"Tiedättehän, George, etten salli teidän käyttävän tuota viheliäistä moskaa kajuutassa", sanoi vihdoin laivuri.
"En sitä itselleni tuonutkaan", vastasi perämies viisastelevasti. "Se on vaan sille 'pahalle'. Kehuu saavansa kurkkunsa kuivaksi,
katsellessaan vanhaa toveriaan, Hutchinsia."
Kummakseen huomasi hän vieraan kaikin mokomin taistelevan nauruaan vastaan; hän puri huultaan ja pienet viekkaat silmänsä vetistyivät. Pian hän sentään sai takaisin totisuutensa, nousi tuoliltaan ja piti sydäntä liikuttavan puheen raittiudesta. Kiroten whiskyn syntisenä ja tarpeettomana aineena, hän lopuksi huomautti kahden englantilaisen karamellin veteen sekoitettuna ajavan saman asian.
Whiskyn näkö näytti saavan hänet aivan raivoihinsa ja laivuri istui kuin kivettynyt, kuullessaan tuonlaista merkillistä kaunopuheliaisuutta, kunnes saarnaaja vihdoin, puhuttuaan tarpeeksi perämiehelle, veti raskaasti henkeään, sieppasi pullon käteensä ja lennätti sen tuhansiksi muruiksi lattialle.
Silmänräpäyksen istui perämies voimattomana raivosta, sitten hyppäsi hän parahtaen pystyyn ja aikoi rynnätä saarnaajan niskaan, mutta onneksi sai laivuri kiinni hänen käsivarteensa, ja veli Hutchinsin onnistui pujahtaa hyttiinsä.
"Päästäkää irti", kirkui perämies. "Annan selkään sille heittiölle."
"George", sanoi laivuri ankarasti, "minä häpeän teidän tähtenne."
"Hävetkää h—tissä", ulvoi perämies. "Mikä oikeus hänellä oli rikkoa whiskypulloni."
"Hän on pyhimys", sanoi laivuri. "Hän on pyhimys, George. Nähdessään, etteivät hyvät sanat auttaneet, käytti hän voimakkaampia keinoja."
"Odottakaa vaan, jahka saan hänet käsiini", sanoi perämies uhkaavana.
"Kyllä minä hänelle voimakkaampia keinoja näytän."
"Joko hän rauhoittuu, kallis ystävä?" kuului herra Hutchinsin ääni oven takaa. "Minä nimittäin kokonaan unohdin lasin."
"Tule ulos!" kiljasi perämies. "Tule ulos ja kaada vielä sekin, jos uskallat."
Herra Hutchinsia ei vaatimus sentään näyttänyt miellyttävän, vaan rukoili hän oven takana itkevällä äänellä perämiestä alkamaan parempaa elämää; samalla sai laivuri moitteita, että kärsi sellaista syntistä elämää laivallaan. Nöyränä otti tämä vastaan läksynsä ja kun herra Hutchinsin ääni oli vaijennut ja perämies samaten hiukan rauhoittunut, läksi hän päivän viimeiselle tarkastuskierrokselle, palasi taas kajuuttaan ja meni kojuunsa.
Seuraavana aamuna oli määrä purjehtia ja miehistö oli aikaisin pystyssä. Mutta herra Hutchins pysyi hytissään, vaikka perämies useat kerrat kävi kolkuttamassa oven takana. Kun hän viimein tuli kannelle oli perämies peräsimessä ja miehistö söi aamiaistaan.
"Hyvinkö nukkunut?" kysyi herra Hutchins lempeästi ja istuutui lastiruuman luukulle, pikkusen matkaa perämiehestä.
"Sen saatte kuulla, jahka pääsen tästä peräsimestä", kuului perämiehen kuiva vastaus.
"Vieläkö vihainen?" sanoi herra Hutchins sokerimakealla äänellä. "Tuletko hartaushetkeen illalla?" lisäsi hän sitten.
Perämies ei suvainnut vastata, mutta hänen vihaansa, kun illalla, herra Hutchinsin pyynnöstä, koko miehistö tuppautui kajuuttaan, ei voi sanoin kuvata.
Kolme iltaa perättäin pidettiin näitä "rakkausjuhlia", kuten herra Hutchins niitä nimitti, vaikka perämies niitä kutsui "pahemmaksi" elämäksi, kuin "kapakassa." Miehistö ei muuten niinkään ollut ihastunut psalmeihin, mutta kun he nyt saivat rääkyä niitä koko keuhkojensa voimalla ja lisäksi vielä samasta kirjasta laivurin kanssa, muutti se kokonaan asian. Sitäpaitsi huomasivat he sen ärsyttävän perämiestä ja tieto, että täten uskalsivat vastustaa päällysmiestään ja samalla sentään työskentelivät sielujensa pelastukseksi, oli kylliksi ihana. Laivapoika, jolla juuri oli äänenmurros, päästeli merkillisiä mölyääniä ja näytti vaivatta hallitsevan viittä oktaavia.
Kun oli väsytty laulamiseen, piti herra Hutchins lyhyen puheen, ottaen tavallisesti esimerkiksi voimakkaan miehen, mutta juomahimon orjan ja irstaspuheisen. Puhuja todisti, että juoppo tavallisesti tekee muitakin syntejä, vaikkapa vaan salaisuudessakin ja kuvaili miten tällainen mies meni kotiinsa ja löi vaimoaan, kun tämä moitti häntä lapsen säästölaatikon rikkomisesta ja sisällön tuhlaamisesta irlantilaiseen whiskyyn. Joka lauseen lopussa huokasi hän ja kun miehistö huomasi heilläkin olevan oikeuden tehdä samaten, huokasivat he erinomaisella mielihyvällä, — pojan huokaukset olivat varsinkin kauheat kuulla.
Saavuttiin Plymouthiin, jonne osa lastista oli jätettävä — tosiaankin kreivin aikaan, sillä perämiehen järki oli jo mennä sekaisin, kuten toistenkin, herra Hutchinsin ansiosta. Laivakissa yksin oli
