Round Table Discussions on the
MNLF Track of the Peace Process 17 August 2007
We R Inn, Davao City
On September 2, 1996 the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) signed the final agreement on the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement of 1976. The agreement provided for twophase implementation process. During phase one, the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD), the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), and the Consultative Assembly were established. The process of the joining in of the MNLF elements with the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the PNP was started during phase one. During phase two of the implementation process, R.A. 9054 (amending R.A. 6734 and strengthening the Organic Act of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) was passed by Congress on February 7, 2001, and lapsed into law on March 31, 2001. During the plebiscite conducted on August 14, 2001, the province of Basilan and the city of Marawi opted to join the ARMM (originally composed of Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi). During phase one, the SPCPD and the ARMM were under the leadership of the MNLF. MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari was elected regional governor of the ARMM in September 1996 and served until the following election in November 2001. At the end of his term he was imprisoned for charges of rebellion, and he is still languishing in jail. Misuari was succeeded by MNLF central committee member Dr. Parouk S. Hussin who served as ARMM regional governor from November 2001 to August 2005.
The Bangsamoro Forum contributes to the Institute of Bangsamoro Studies role as a forum for discussion of issues affecting the Bangsamoro people and their homeland. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and not necessarily of the IBS.
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Nevertheless, disagreements on the implementations of the 1996 peace agreement keep on towering above discourses on the GRP-MNLF peace process. What is more disturbing is the persistence of armed conflict between Government and MNLF forces, which should have ended after the signing of the peace accord. The recent armed conflict in Sulu is an illustrative example. Although Government spokesmen said that the operations of the Armed forces of the Philippines (AFP) are directed at the Abu Sayyaf but the MNLF maintains that the military is targeting their forces on the ground. As a result of the fighting, more than twenty thousand people were displaced.
Summary of the Discussions The discussions started with assessment of the present situation in Sulu and Basilan where armed conflicts resurged recently. The Sulu situation was of interest to the participants because it is a known bailiwick of the MNLF. The 1996 peace agreement is supposed to put a stop to armed encounters between Government and MNLF forces. Although the military claimed that the encounters were between the AFP and the Abu Sayyaf, but the MNLF belied the claim and said that MNLF forces were the ones attacked by the military which compelled them to take defensive actions. The participants
With the objective of analyzing the trajectory of the GRP-MNLF peace process under these circumstances, three field commanders, two leaders of the People’s Congress, a political and a woman leader of the MNLF were gathered in Davao City on August 17, 2007. The group also looked into the implementations of development programs/projects in support of the peace process. At the end of the discussions, recommendations were put forward. The discussions were facilitated by the Institute of Bangsamoro Studies (IBS), and the logistical supports came from the Area Management Office for ARMM, GOP UN ACT for Peace Programme.
observed that if the target of the military is just the Abu Sayyaf why deploy several thousands of troops in Sulu to run after few lawless elements. The campaign against the Abu Sayyaf in Sulu can be undertaken effectively by the police force in the province. The police know the terrain and can easily identify known Abu Sayyaf
3 personalities. Added advantage is the election into office of MNLF leaders in some municipalities in Sulu. Close cooperation between the Government and the MNLF is the effective way of addressing the peace and order problem in the province. On the issue of integration of MNLF forces into the AFP and PNP, it was observed that they were assigned in different units of the AFP instead of being organized into separate units as provided in the agreement. The GRP and MNLF are far apart in their appreciation of facts of the implementations of the peace agreement. While the GRP contend that it had fully implemented the agreement, the MNLF insists on that there are substantive parts of the agreements that are not implemented. The MNLF also argues that R.A. 9054 watered down the gains it had achieved in the agreement. The participants are aware of this on-going debate and do not intend to add more to it. On the other hand, the participants were of the opinion that discussions can be more productive if focused on how the agreement can be harnessed to achieve peace and development, and be able to address the problem of the Bangsamoro people. The substance of the agreement and the possible impact to the Bangsamoro once implemented should be what the parties should consider rather than dwell on the literal interpretation of the provisions.
It was brought out by the participants that the difficulty in appreciating the implementations of the agreement is there is no functioning body that monitors the implementations and reconciles differences of appreciation. The Tripartite Meeting of the OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference), GRP and MNLF have never been realized despite the fact that it has been scheduled several times. This was also complicated by the leadership struggle within the MNLF that brought confusion within its rank.
4 A review of the peace agreement and R.A. 9054 shows that implementation of some provisions of the agreement needs enactment of legislative measures by the Regional Legislative Assembly (RLA). On the implementation of development programs/projects, it was observed that the impacts were not greatly felt by the Bangssamoro people. Instead of counting figures, implementing agencies should focus on impacts of programs/projects. The lack of concrete and tangible fruits of the peace accord contributed much to people’s misgiving of the peace process. It was also observed that there were instances whereby MNLF field officers and funding institutions had serious differences in implementing programs/projects. Recommendations For the GRP – 1. Assign to the police the maintenance of peace and order in the ARMM, particularly in Sulu and Basilan. The police forces in these areas should be provided with logistical support and training. The campaign against the Abu Sayyaf and the Jemaah Islamiah in these provinces shall also be assigned to the police in coordination with the military. Aside from mastery of the terrain, the police forces can be effective working through community networks.
2. Reduce the number of military personnel in the ARMM to a minimum level. 3. Review policies on the integration of MNLF forces, that they should be organized into one unit in the AFP and PNP and assigned in the ARMM area. 4. Establish an integrated socioeconomic program for MNLF forces, who were not integrated into the AFP and PNP, and for their families. The program can be effective and efficiently implemented if assigned to one agency rather than leave it to different funding agencies. For the MNLF – 5. Resolve the leadership issue. Resolution of the issue should be communicated to the field to avoid confusions on the ground, particularly among the MNLF Bangsamoro Armed Forces personnel. 6. Conduct leadership training for senior and junior officers of the MNLF, with emphasis on shifting of role from revolutionary to political struggle. For the GRP and MNLF – 7. Conduct information campaign on the opportunities under the 1996 peace accord to achieve peace and development in Mindanao.
5 For the RLA – 11. Enact regional laws necessary in the implementations of some provisions of the peace agreement as mandated by R.A. 9054.
8. Organize a Joint Commission as implementing body of development aspect of the agreement. The commission shall be composed of equal representatives from the GRP and MNLF. To ensure transparency and accountability, the commission shall operate through e-governance and shall be audited by external auditors. For the OIC, GRP and MNLF – 9. Convene the Tripartite Meeting (among the OIC, GRP and MNLF) soonest possible. 10. Establish a Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) composed of representatives of the OIC, GRP and MNLF with the tasks of monitoring implementations of the agreement, and settle differences between the GRP and MNLF on issues arising from implementations of the peace accord.
For the Bangsamoro Think Tanks and Research Institutes 12. Assist the RLA in research and drafting of bills, which are needed in the implementation of the 1996 peace agreement, for its consideration. For the Funding Agencies – 13. Give priority consideration to impacts of programs/projects in the implementation of programs/projects in support to the GRP-MNLF peace process. The measurement of impact should take into consideration the contribution of the programs/projects in realizing the objective of the peace agreement which is to address the problems of the Bangsamoro people and answer their aspirations.
6 14. Strengthen the coordination between the funding agencies and the MNLF in the implementation of development programs/projects.
15. Review the capacity building programs being implemented to give emphasis on the leadership roles of the MNLF in social change and community development rather than on project implementation.
PARTICIPANTS Moro National Liberation Front Atty. Joe Lorena, Jolo, Sulu Bainon Karon, Cotabato City Jojo Sanday, Zamboanga-Sibugay Naque Amad, South Cotabato Mike Taratingan, Lanao del Norte Datu Jhularab H. Sampang, Basilan Abubakar M. Asjali, Maimbong, Sulu Institute of Bangsamoro Studies Abhoud Syed M. Lingga, Facilitator Rahim B. Sinarimbo, Secretariat GOP UN ACT for Peace Programme Diosita T. Andot, Programme Manager Suharto A. Abas, Area Manager Norina G. Hatamosa, Admin. and Finance Assistant The Institute of Bangsamoro Studies is a non-profit and non-stock institution the functions of which are to undertake research on subjects concerning and affecting the Bangsamoro people, conduct trainings and render community services to depressed Bangsamoro areas.
INSTITUTE OF BANGSAMORO STUDIES Hadji Daud Bldg., Campo Muslim, Cotabato City, Philippines TeleFax (63-64) 4213551 Email: morostudies@yahoo.co