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Case: 1:11-cv-00103-GHD-DAS Doc #: 259 Filed: 10/08/13 1 of 14 PageID #: 2628

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI KMART CORPORATION VS.

PLAINTIFF CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:11-CV-103-GHD-JAD

THE KROGER CO., E&A SOUTHEAST LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, FULTON IMPROVEMENTS, LLC, KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, CITY OF CORINTH, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, JOHN DOE, and ABC CORPORATION

DEFENDANTS

MOTION TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF JOHN R. KREWSON COMES NOW, The Kroger Co. (“Kroger”), by and through its counsel of record, and files this its Motion to Exclude the Testimony of John R. Krewson, and in support thereof would state unto the Court as follows, to-wit: 1.

On May 2, 2011, the Plaintiff, Kmart Corporation (“Kmart”) filed its Complaint

against Kroger, E&A Southeast Limited Partnership (“E&A”), Fulton Improvements, LLC (“Fulton”), Kansas City Southern Railway Company (“KCSR”), the City of Corinth (“Corinth”), and the United States of America (“United States”) based on claims arising from floods which occurred on May 2, 2010. [Doc. No. 1 at 1, 5] In its Complaint, Kmart alleges its store in Corinth “incurred flood damages as a result of Kroger’s location within a floodway, which was allowed pursuant to a Letter of Map Revision.” [Doc. 1 at 1-2] 2.

The building which houses the Kroger store was removed from the floodway by

the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) through a “Letter of Map Revision Floodway Determination Document (Removal)” (the “LOMR”) issued on November 18, 2005, because of FEMA’s determination that the structure was inadvertently included in the floodway.


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[Exhibit A at 1] The removal of the Kroger store from the floodway was re-validated by FEMA for the new flood maps which became effective in September 2010. [Exhibit B, exhibit 2 thereto] 3.

John R. Krewson, a representative of EFI Global, submitted an expert report dated

September 20, 2012 on behalf of the Kmart in order to “evaluate the causes and the extent of the flooding that occurred at the [Kmart store in Corinth, Mississippi] on May 2, 2010”. [Exhibit C at 2] This expert report discloses that, “[t]o determine the impact of the Kroger encroachment and general conditions of the flood hazard at the time of the May 2, 2010 flood,” Krewson prepared a “HEC-RAS evaluation for the site using as-built survey data and flows for the area listed in FEMA’s 2009 Flood Insurance Study.” [Exhibit C at 6]

HEC-RAS is a computer

program which can be used to predict the behavior of water as it drains over land. [See Exhibit B at 186-93] 4.

Krewson concluded in his report that “[t]he presence of the Kroger as well as

other buildings in the floodway increased the depth of flooding during the flood event of May 2, 2010, causing damage to Kmart.” [Exhibit C at 7] In his deposition, however, Krewson admitted that there was a mistake in his HEC-RAS analysis as it pertains to the claims asserted against Kroger. [See Exhibit B at 117, 207-12] Krewson also admitted that he was not trying to model the flooding that actually occurred on May 2, 2010 in connection with the creation of his opinions.

[Exhibit B at 228-29]

Instead, Krewson testified that he was “trying to do a

comparative model” and that his opinion doesn’t relate to what actually happened on May 2, 2010 and was never intended to re-create those events. [Exhibit B at 229-30] Krewson admitted that there were other buildings in the floodway that he didn’t account for in his modeling; his 2


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explanation was that he “was trying to keep the model simple and direct” and “the study . . . was not intended to be a full complete model.” [Exhibit B at 238-39] 5.

Krewson also admitted that his methodology failed to take into account the

possibility that it flooded so much on May 2, 2010 that the Kmart store would have flooded regardless of the presence of the Kroger store, even though he admitted that such a scenario was a possibility. [Exhibit B at 234-35] He further admitted that he could not rule out that scenario. [Exhibit B at 234] Importantly, Kmart relies entirely upon the testimony of Krewson for its evidence that the Kroger store caused flood damage to the Kmart store during the flood event of May 2, 2010. [Exhibit D at 15-17] 6.

Krewson’s report also contains numerous legal conclusions, which are

inadmissible. 7.

Consequently, Krewson’s testimony should be excluded because it fails to satisfy

the requirements of FED.R.EVID. 702 and is otherwise inadmissible under FED.R.EVID. 401 and 403. 8.

The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by the standard articulated in

Daubert v. Merrell Dow. Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).1 9.

The opinion in Daubert clearly mandates that FED.R.EVID. 702 placed the

responsibility of gatekeeper on the trial judge to assess proffered expert testimony and “determine at the outset, pursuant to FED.R.EVID. 104(a), whether the expert is proposing to 1

Daubert provides that expert testimony is admissible only upon a showing that the proffered testimony is both relevant and reliable. See 509 U.S. at 589-94. Expert testimony is relevant when it is sufficiently related to the facts of the case so that it will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact at issue. See id. Reliability is shown when the testimony is based on scientific methods and procedures. See id.

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testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact.” See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. This Court must fulfill a vital gatekeeping role that requires it to make a threshold assessment of “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the [expert] testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning and methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93. 10.

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires a sound basis and a sound methodology,

properly applied to the facts of the case, before an opinion can be admitted into evidence: A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliability applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. Thus, courts must exclude expert evidence that is not “based on sufficient facts or data,” that is not “the product of reliable principles and methods,” or whose methods are not applied “reliably to the facts of the case.” See id. “[A]ny step that renders the analysis unreliable . . . renders the expert’s testimony inadmissible. This is true whether the step completely changes a reliable methodology or merely misapplies that methodology.” Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note (2000)(quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994))(emphasis and omission in original). 11.

Under Rule 702, the proponent of the testimony has the burden of establishing

that the pertinent admissibility requirements are met by a preponderance of the evidence. See 4


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Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note (2000)2(citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). As the proponent of Krewson’s testimony, Kmart bears the burden of showing that it is admissible. Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F. 3d 448, 459-60 (5th Cir. 2002). Kroger does not bear the burden of demonstrating its inadmissibility. See Rieger v. Orlor, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 99, 102 (D.Conn. 2006); Soldo v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434, 534 (W.D. Pa. 2003). 12.

Because “expert testimony may be assigned talismanic significance in the eyes of

lay jurors,” United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004), “the Supreme Court . . . has noted the uniquely important role that Rule 403 has to play in a district court’s scrutiny of expert testimony.” Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 397 (2d Cir. 2005). To this end, an expert opinion’s “lack of reliable support may render it more prejudicial than probative, making it inadmissible under [Rule] 403.” Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987). 13.

Kmart relies entirely upon the testimony of Krewson for evidence that the Kroger

store caused flood damage to the Kmart store during the flood event of May 2, 2010. [Exhibit D at 15-17] Krewson’s opinion that the Kroger store caused flood damage relies entirely upon the HEC-RAS models that he ran which allegedly showed that the existence of the Kroger store in its current location caused a rise in the flood water at the Kmart store on May 2, 2010. [Exhibit C] Both Krewson and Kmart have now admitted that the HEC-RAS model he used was flawed due to a data entry error. Moreover, this error is significant, because as Kmart and Krewson

2 “The language of Rule 702 has been amended as part of the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.” See Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note (2011).

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have both admitted that the later HEC-RAS model, created in an effort to correct the flaw in the original HEC-RAS model, showed that the existence of the Kroger store in its current location caused “no significant difference in the rise of the flood at the Kmart building.” [Doc. No. 176-1 at 3] Consequently, Kmart cannot show that the opinions of Krewson that the presence of the Kroger store caused flood damage to the Kmart store on May 2, 2010 satisfy the factors required by Daubert and FED.R.EVID. 702. Krewson’s opinion as to the Kroger store is also inadmissible because his opinion cannot satisfy the standards of relevancy required by FED.R.EVID. 401. Moreover, since it is admittedly flawed, this opinion is inadmissible pursuant to FED.R.EVID. 403, because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice to Kroger, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, and wasting the time of the Court and the jury through the presentation of an admittedly flawed and erroneous opinion. 14.

“Where expert evidence is necessary to establish a causal relationship, the party

bearing the burden of proof may not prevail if the ‘expert evidence consists of testimony expressed only in terms of various possibilities.’” Cleary v. Knapp Shoes, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 309, 318 (D. Mass. 1996)(citation omitted); see also Hammond v. Coleman Co., Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 522, 539, 541 (S.D. Miss. 1999)(rejecting expert testimony expressed in terms of “possibilities”), aff’d 209 F.3d 718 (5th Cir. 2000). The exclusion of alternative causes is required for a reliable causation opinion. See Michaels v. Avitech, Inc., 202 F.3d 746, 753 (5th Cir. 2000); accord United States v. Eff, 461 F. Supp. 2d 529, 534 (E.D. Tex. 2006). The inadequate treatment of other potential causes necessarily undermines the reliability of an expert’s opinion. See Burleson v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 393 F.3d 577, 587 (5th Cir. 2004); Winters v. Fru-Con, Inc., 498 F.3d 734, 743 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Controneo v. Shaw Envtl. & Infrastructure, Inc., 2007 WL 3145791, at *5 and n. 23 (S.D. Tex. 2007). An expert’s 6


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failure to negate possible alternative causes of the damage “renders his methodology unreliable” and inadmissible. See Alexander v. Smith & Nephew, P.L.C., F.Supp. 2d 1310, 1316 (N.D. Okla. 2000). So, if the experts failed to rule out alternative causes, it means that these alternative causes may have been the sole causes of the damages. See In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 761 and n. 31. An expert must rigorously evaluate and rule out potential alternative causes and not simply pick the cause that is most advantageous to plaintiff’s claim. See Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Brown v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 919 F.2d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 1990). 15.

Krewson admitted that there were other buildings in the floodway that he didn’t

account for in his modeling; his explanation was that he “was trying to keep the model simple and direct” and “the study . . . was not intended to be a full complete model.” [Exhibit B at 23839] Krewson also admitted that his methodology failed to take into account the possibility that it flooded so much on May 2, 2010 that the Kmart store would have flooded regardless of the presence of the Kroger store, even though he admitted that such a scenario was a possibility. [Exhibit B at 234-35] Krewson also ignored other possible causes of the alleged flood damage at the Kmart store which arise from Kmart’s prior conduct. [See Exhibit C at 4] 16.

Because of his failure to account for other possible causes of the flooding which

took place in the Kmart store on May 2, 2010, and because he failed to address whether it flooded so much on that day that the Kmart store would have flooded regardless of the presence of the Kroger store, Kmart cannot show that the opinions of Krewson that the presence of the Kroger store caused flood damage to the Kmart store on May 2, 2010 satisfy the factors required by Daubert and FED.R.EVID. 702, since the exclusion of alternative causes is required for a 7


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reliable causation opinion. See Michaels v. Avitech, Inc., 202 F.3d 746, 753 (5th Cir. 2000). Krewson’s failure to rule out these other factors also renders his opinion inadmissible under Rule 403 because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice to Kroger, confusing the issues, and misleading the jury. 17.

Krewson also admitted that he was not trying to model the flooding that actually

occurred on May 2, 2010 in connection with the creation of his opinions. [Exhibit B at 228-29] He only intended to create a “hypothetical comparison.” [Exhibit B at 230] He admitted that his opinion doesn’t relate to what actually happened on May 2, 2010 and that his model was never intended to re-create those events. [Exhibit B at 230] Krewson explained that he was trying to do a “comparative model” to see what the impact of the presence of the Kroger store assuming a 100-year flood event. [Exhibit B at 229-30, 207-08, 233] 18.

An expert opinion must properly “fit” the facts and issues of the case to assist the

trier of fact. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591; FED.R.EVID. 702. An expert who provides “no reliable link between his data and the facts at issue in the case,” Phillips v. Am. Honda, 238 F. App’x 537, 540 and n. 2 (11th Cir. 2009), or whose opinion is not “‘connect[ed] to the pertinent inquiry . . . should be excluded because there is no fit’.’” Boca Raton Comm. Hosp. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 582 F.3d 127, 1232-33 (11th Cir. 2009); see Korte v. ExxonMobil Coal USA, Inc., 164 F. App’x 553, 556-557 (7th Cir. 2006). 19.

Krewson’s testimony suggests that the lack of rainfall data for the Corinth area on

May 2, 2010 required him to conduct a comparative analysis instead of attempting to model what actually occurred on that day. However, the “non-existence of good data does not allow expert witnesses to speculate or base their conclusions on inadequate supporting science.” Perry v. 8


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Novartis Pharm. Corp., 564 F. Supp. 2d 467-68 (E.D. Pa. 2008). Instead, an expert’s opinion “is admissible only if [the existing] data are objectively sufficient to support it.” Id. at 468. An expert whose “opinions amount[] to abstract conclusions not adequately grounded in the facts of the case” is properly excluded. El Aguila Food Prods., Inc. v. Gruma Corp., 131 F. App’x 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2005). 20.

Krewson’s failure to model what actually occurred on May 2, 2010 renders his

opinion inadmissible under Rule 702 and Daubert. Krewson’s opinion as to the Kroger store is also inadmissible because his opinion cannot satisfy the standards of relevancy required by FED.R.EVID. 401; since he made no attempt to recreate the events of May 2, 2010, his opinion is not relevant.

For the same reasons, Krewson’s opinion is also inadmissible pursuant to

FED.R.EVID. 403, because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice to Kroger, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, and wasting the time of the Court and the jury. 21.

The only claim pending against Kroger is for common law negligence.3 [See Doc.

No. 207 at 1; Doc. No. 208 at 7-8] 22.

Again, Krewson admits that he did not attempt to model what actually occurred

on May 2, 2010. Furthermore, Krewson did not consider other possible causes of the flooding in the Kmart store in formulating his opinions, including the existence of other buildings in the floodway. For these reasons, Krewson cannot say that “but for” the presence of the Kroger store 3

In a negligence claim, there are four elements that must be established by the plaintiff: (1) duty or standard of care, (2) breach of that duty or standard of care, (3) proximate cause, and (4) damages or injuries. See Lopez v. McClellan, --- So.3d ---, 2010 WL 1664937, *6 (Miss. App. 2010). Proximate cause is a concept which is more accurately defined by reference to the distinct concepts of which it is comprised, which are: (1) cause in fact; and (2) foreseeability. See id. at *7. “Cause in fact means that, but for the defendant’s negligence, the injury would not have occurred.” Huynh v. Phillips, 95 So.3d 1259, 1263 (Miss. 2012).

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the Kmart store would not have suffered flood damage, and his opinion regarding the Kroger store is not helpful to the trier of fact. This opinion therefore fails to satisfy all of the necessary elements for admissibility under Rule 702. For the same reasons, Krewson’s opinion fails to satisfy the relevancy standards of Rule 401, and it should be inadmissible under Rule 403 because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice to Kroger, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, and wasting the time of the jury and the Court. 23.

Expert opinions that are contrary to law are inadmissible. See Loeffel Steel

Prods., Inc. v. Delta Brands, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 794, 806 (N.D. Ill. 2005). They cannot be said to be scientific, to be reliable, or to be helpful to the trier of fact. See id. Indeed, it is not an expert opinion. See id. (citation omitted). Krewson’s report is replete with statements that the Kroger store is in a floodway. [See Exhibit C] FEMA removed the Kroger store from the floodway approximately five years prior to the occurrence of the May 2, 2010 flood which is the subject of this suit. [Exhibit A] Moreover, the removal of the Kroger store from the floodway was re-validated by FEMA for the new flood maps which became effective in September 2010. [Exhibit B, exhibit 2 thereto] These opinions are contrary to law and thus inadmissible pursuant to Rule 702. 24.

The Court should also preclude Krewson from proffering legal conclusions. An

expert may not state legal conclusions drawn by applying the law to the facts. See Kuehl v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 909 F.Supp. 794, 804 n. 2 (D. Colo. 1995). The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that opinion testimony about “what the law is” or some expert’s understanding about what the law means is impermissible. See United States v. Rothenburg, Fed. App’x. 897, 902 (5th Cir. 2009); see also C.P. Interests, Inc. v. California Pools, Inc., 238 F.3d 690, 687 (5th Cir. 10


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2001)(expert witness may not offer conclusions of law); Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983); Snap-Drape, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 98 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1996). Krewson’s report contains numerous legal conclusions, which are set forth in Kroger’s contemporaneously-filed memorandum in support of this Motion, which is incorporated herein by reference. 25.

For the reasons set forth herein, and as further set forth in Kroger’s supporting

memorandum which is contemporaneously-filed herewith and incorporated herein by reference, Krewson’s testimony should be excluded because it fails to satisfy the standards of Daubert and Rule 702 and is otherwise inadmissible under Rules 401 and 403. 26.

In support of its Motion, Kroger relies upon the pleadings filed in this action, its

supporting memorandum, and the following exhibits: (a)

Exhibit A:

Letter of Map Revision from FEMA.

(b)

Exhibit B:

Excerpts of Deposition of John R. Krewson.

(c)

Exhibit C:

Flooding Evaluation by John R. Krewson.

(d)

Exhibit D:

Plaintiff’s Responses to The Kroger Co.’s First Set of Interrogatories.

(e)

Exhibit E:

Excerpts of Deposition of Dale Menendez, Kmart’s 30(b)(6) Representative.

11


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THIS, the 8th day of October, 2013. Respectfully submitted, THE KROGER COMPANY

By:_/s/ David A. Norris ____________ Of Counsel

OF COUNSEL: David A. Norris (MSB No. 100616) Edley H. Jones III (MSB No. 3201) Stephen F. Schelver (MSB No. 101889) McGLINCHEY STAFFORD, PLLC City Centre South, Suite 1100 200 South Lamar Street (Zip - 39201) Post Office Drawer 22949 Jackson, Mississippi 39225-2949 Telephone: (769) 524-2314 Facsimile: (769) 524-2333 Email: dnorris@mcglinchey.com; ejones@mcglinchey.com, sschelver@mcglinchey.com

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, the undersigned David A. Norris, McGlinchey Stafford PLLC, hereby certify that on this day, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system, which sent notification of such filing to the following: Ryan O. Lumainis James M. Garner John T. Balhoff, II SHER GARNER CAHILL RICHTER KLEIN & HILBERT, LLC 909 Poydras Street, 28th Floor New Orleans, LA 70112 Email: rluminais@shergarner.com Mary Clift Abdalla FORMAN, PERRY, WATKINS, KRUTZ & TARDY, PLLC 200 S. Lamar Street, Suite 100 Jackson, MS 39201 Email: abdallamc@fpwk.com Walter G. Watkins , Jr. FORMAN, PERRY, WATKINS, KRUTZ & TARDY, PLLC P.O. Box 22608 Jackson, MS 39225-2608 Email: wwatkins@fpwk.com Walter Garner Watkins , III FORMAN, PERRY, WATKINS, KRUTZ & TARDY, PLLC P.O. Box 22608 Jackson, MS 39225-2608 Email: trey@fpwk.com Gerald Haggart Jacks JACKS, ADAMS & NORQUIST, P.A. P. O. Box 1209 Cleveland, MS 38732-1209 Email: gjacks@jacksadamsnorquist.com Jamie Ferguson Jacks JACKS, ADAMS & NORQUIST, P.A. P. O. Box 1209 Cleveland, MS 38732-1209 Email: jjacks@jacksadamsnorquist.com 13


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Charles E. Ross WISE, CARTER, CHILD & CARAWAY P. O. Box 651 Jackson, MS 39205-0651 Email: cer@wisecarter.com Terry Dwayne Little DANIEL, COKER, HORTON & BELL - Oxford P.O. Box 1396 Oxford, MS 38655 Email: tlittle@danielcoker.com Wilton V. Byars , III DANIEL, COKER, HORTON & BELL P.O. Box 1396 Oxford, MS 38655 Email: wbyars@danielcoker.com John Evans Gough , Jr. U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE - Oxford 900 Jefferson Avenue Oxford, MS 38655-3608 Email: john.gough@usdoj.gov and I hereby certify that I have mailed by United States Postal Service the document to the following non-ECF participants: None THIS, the 8th day of October 2013.

s/ David A. Norris David A. Norris

275667.1

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259 motiontoexcludetestimonyjohnrkrewson kroger combine