MJPS Print 2023

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TheMcGillJournalofPoliticalStudies(MJPS)ispublishedannuallybythePolitical ScienceStudents'AssociationofMcGillUniversity(PSSA),843rueSherbrookeOuest, Montreal,QCH3A0G4.

ISSN0835-376X

Allassertionsoffactsandstatementsofopinionaresolelythoseoftheauthors. TheydonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheEditorialBoard,thePSSA,the ArtsUndergraduateSociety,theStudent'sSocietyofMcGillUniversity,McGill University,oritsfacultyandadministration.

TableofContents

9:“WalkOutorStaySeated?EvaluatingtheNamingandShaming StrategyofWalkingOutonRussiafortheInvasionofUkraine”

25:“IndigenousElectoralParticipationandNon-Participationin Canada:DefiningTheirIdeologicalDifferencesandtheCasefor Cooperation”

39:“Priests,Politicians,andPandemics:DriversOfCOVID-19 ConspiracyTheoryBeliefInRomania”

61:“State,Society,andRecklessSpending:20thCenturyArgentina’sNear MisswithSuperpowerdom”

74:“IndigenousDataSovereignty:TheCensusasanInstrumentof CanadianDecolonization”

89:“ADefenseofIslamicSectarianism”

108:“TheChallengesofMappingUndocumentedMigration”

119:“Understandingthe“ImpendingClimateDisplacementCrisis” Discourse:ReplacingAlarmistNarrativeswithTechnicalSolutions”

136:“Women’sWork:RisksandOpportunitiesforGenderEqualityin Ghana’sInformalEconomies”

150:“FromObjecttoAuthor:IndigenousPeoplesandInternationalLaw”

SubmissionandReviewProcess

TheMcGillJournalofPoliticalStudies(MJPS)acceptsmanuscriptsin eitherFrenchorEnglishfromundergraduatesofanyfacultyormajor. PapersmusthavebeenwrittenforaPoliticalSciencecourseatthe 300-leveloraboveandmusthavereceivedaminimumgradeof80% (A-)inthecourse.Selectedmanuscriptscontaincoherentandwellstructuredarguments,goodgrammar,andstrongsyntax.original analysisanduniqueperspectivesonrelevanttopicsinpoliticalscience andcurrentaffairsdistinguishselectedpapersassomeofthebestthat undergraduatestudentshavewrittenatMcGillUniversity.

ManuscriptsareacceptedthroughouttheFallandWintersemestersin multiplesubmissionrounds.Allmanuscriptsenteradouble-blind reviewprocess.Authors'namesarewithheldwhileananonymous teamofpeerreviewersanalyzesandcritiqueseachpaper.TheEditorial Boardthenconvenestoreviewtheanonymouspeerreviewfeedback andselectthestrongestmanuscriptsforthejournal.Atthistime,each editorispairedwithanauthorforarevisionphasetopreparethe manuscriptsforpublication.

TheJournalisastudent-runenterprisewithanEditorialBoard consistingofundergraduatestudentsatMcGillUniversity.

EditorialBoard

Editor-in-Chief

MatthewMolinaro

ManagingEditor

EmilySegal

DirectorofPeerReviewers

JulietMorrison

Editors

CatrionaArnott

RitaBroberg

HannahClarke-Andrews

JulienDuffy

CateyFifield

AmeliaFortier

LilyMason

ChloeMerritt

JeremyRotenberg

WordsfromtheEditor-in-Chief

Witheveryyearthatcomes,themembersoftheMcGillJournalof PoliticalStudiesPrintaskthemselves:whatcanwedoforpolitical scienceandhowcanthedisciplineitselfinviteopendialogue, exchange,andcuriosityintothenatureofpower,policy,andpolitics. TheundergraduatePoliticalSciencecommunityatMcGillresponds withunmatchedgrace,precision,andrigour,makinginturnour responsibilitiesaseditorschallenging,relational,anddynamic.Theten papersfoundinthisjournalpushtheboundariesofpoliticaltheory, Indigenouspolitics,comparativepolitics,andinternationalrelations, eachconstitutingaresponse,atimelyreminderfortheneedforclose attentionandlisteningtothemanysourcesthatmakeupourpolitics.

IhopeyouenjoyreadingthesefantasticpiecesasmuchasIhaveand lookatpoliticalsciencewithadifferentlens.

Thisjournalwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithout,aboveallelse,the hardworkandsupportoftheEditorialBoardandourteamofpeer reviewers.Theeditorsprovedthemselvestobedeeplyinvestedina mindfulandinterdisciplinaryapproachtothestudyofpolitics.I’dlike tothankthemindividually.

MythankstoLily,alsoaBSNcomrade,forhercriticaleyetodetailand brillianceacrossmultiplepoliticalspaces;Catey,forbringingher outstandingcopyeditingskillsandhercuriositiesfrompublishingto ourpaper;Hannah,forworkingacrosstimezonesonherexchange, anddoingsoflawlessly;Rita,afellowEnglishliteratureandpolitical sciencestudentandclassmatewhobreathesprofessionalismandsharp editingintopieces;Jeremy,forhiskeennessforpolicyimplementation

thatradiatesandhisgenerouscontributionstooureditorial discussions;Catriona,afellowOakvillian,forhercompassionandcare forthefieldandforthepeoplewhomakeit;Julien,forwritingoneof thebestwritingsamplesaneditorhaseversubmitted,atestamenthe embodiestohowgreatwritingandeditinggohand-in-hand;Amelia, forthinkingwiththemanyhistoricalvoicesthatshapepoliticsand doingsoacrossdisciplines;andChloeMerritt,forchoosingtodelve intotheeditingsideafterwritingoneofthestrongestpaperslastyear, twoyearsinarow,shehasbeenakeycollaboratorinourmoveto unbindtherelationshipofIndigenouspoliticstothesubgroupof Canadianpolitics.

I’dliketoextendmydeepestgratitudetoJulietMorrison,Directorof PeerReviewers,forcoordinatingsuchalargeteamwithease.I’dliketo sayamassive,massivethankyoutomyManagingEditorEmilySegal. JulietandEmilywerejoystoworkwith,andrepresenttomeintheir futureendeavoursasArtsSenatorandanincominglawstudent respectivelythekindsofjournalists,policymakers,andlawyersweneed inthefuture. Icouldnothavecompletedthisprojectwithouttheir supportandextensivecontributions.

Finally,IwouldliketothankmypredecessorKennedyMcKee-Braide. NowalawstudentatMcGill,Kennedyhastakentimeoutofherbusy yeartoinformallymentormethroughoutthisprocess.Shemodels howapoliticsofhope,socialchange,andfreedomcanstructurealife andmakeusthinkdifferently,collectively.Inall,Icouldnotbemore honouredtohavehadtheopportunitytoleadthejournalthisyear.

MatthewMolinaro Editor-in-Chief McGillJournalofPoliticalStudiesPrint,Volume

WalkOutorStaySeated?EvaluatingtheNamingand ShamingStrategyofWalkingOutonRussiaforthe InvasionofUkraine

KiranBasra

EditedbyRitaBroberg

OnFebruary28th,2022,Russialaunchedafull-scaleinvasionofUkraine topreventNATOfromgainingafootholdintheEast.Sincethen,tensof thousandsofcasualtieshavebeenreported,sparkingEurope’slargestrefugee crisissincetheSecondWorldWarwithnearlyeightmillionUkrainiansbeing displacedthusfar(UNHCR2022).Russia’sunlawfulinvasionofUkrainehas violatedseveralinternationalhumanrightslaws,includingjusadbellum,and Article2(4)oftheUNCharter.Theseviolationsofinternationallawincludethe righttolife,therighttoliberty,therighttosecurity,therighttosovereignty, genocide,warofaggression,andwarcrimes,amongothers.Thispaperwillopen withanextensiveliteraturereviewthatexplainshowwalkoutsareaformof namingandshamingthatcanbeaneffective,ineffective,andcounterproductive strategyofenforcingcompliance.Next,thispaperwillanalyzethespecific consequencesofconductingwalkoutsagainstRussiafortheinvasionofUkraine, concludingthatalthoughwalkoutsmaybeineffectiveduetotheRussian government’sinsulationfromdomesticpressure,orevencounterproductive,by threateningthepurposeofdiplomacy,failingtotakenotes,andinspiring backlashfromtheKremlin,walkoutscanalsobeeffectivebecauseRussiacares aboutprotectingitspublicimagefrominternationalscrutiny.Duetothese factors,staterepresentativesshouldcontinuewalkingoutagainstRussiabecause theargumentsforineffectivenessandcounterproductivitycanbemitigatedand outweighed,andtheinternationalcommunityhasaresponsibilitytopressure falsepositivestateslikeRussiaintocompliance. Russia’sdisregardforhumanrightslawhassparkedwidespread condemnationfromtheinternationalcommunity.Asaresult,stateshave implementedforeignpolicyinitiativestoexpresstheirdisapproval.Forexample, stateshaveappliedindividualsanctionsbyfreezingassetsandbanningthetravel ofRussianleaders(Funakoshietal.2022).Otherstateshaveexercisedmaterial sanctionsagainstRussia’seconomy,transportation,energy,anddefencesectors (EuropeanCouncil2022).Unlikestates,diplomatscannotleveragehardpower totargetdissidents.Instead,theymustrelyonsoftpowertoinfluencestate behaviourandforceacountrybackintocompliancewithinternationallaw.A recentsoft-powerstrategythatdiplomatshaveusedtocondemnRussia’s invasionofUkraineisawalkout,wherestatescoordinatetheirbehaviourby exitingacommissiontoexpressdisapprovalduringRussianinterventionsin multilateralforums.Walkoutshaveoccurredinseveralhigh-levelconferences overthepastyear,rangingfromtheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyandthe G20,totheAsia-PacificEconomicCooperationandtheUnitedNationsHuman RightsCouncil.

WhileworkingforthePermanentMissionofCanadatotheUnited NationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime,IparticipatedinawalkoutagainstRussia

duringthe31stCommissiononCrimePreventionandCriminalJustice.During Russia’sintervention,thestaterepresentativepropagatedfalseclaimsthat Ukrainewastrainingcybercriminalsandemulatingneo-Nazismthroughthe supportofseveralotherWesternstates,includingtheUnitedStates,theUnited Kingdom,France,andtheNetherlands.Theseinflammatoryremarkstriggereda coordinatedresponsefromUkrainianallieswhocollectivelyexitedtheroom duringRussia’sintervention.Afterthewalkout,alldelegatesreturnedtothe conferenceroomandcontinuednegotiations.Thismademewonder,are walkoutsameaningfulformofenforcinghumanrightslawbynamingand shamingcountriesintocompliance?DowalkoutsagainstRussialeadtogreater harmsorbenefitsinmultilateralforums?Shouldstaterepresentativescontinue walkingoutonRussia?

Thispaperwillarguethatwalkoutsareaformofnamingandshaming becausetheyfollowasimilarstructureofidentifyingandcondemningatarget statetoachievethesamegoalofenforcingcompliancewithhumanrights treaties.AlthoughwalkoutsmaybeineffectivebecauseoftheKremlin’s immunitytodomesticpressure,andcounterproductivebyinspiringbacklash whichimpedesthecreationofinternationallaw,contradictsthepurposeof diplomacy,andfailstorecordtheintervention,Iarguethatwalkoutsare ultimatelyaneffectivemechanismofenforcinghumanrightslawbecausethey offeranaccessibleandlow-coststrategyofcollectivesolidarity,spark internationaldiscussionthroughthemedia,andprovidethemostefficient responsetoRussia’sinflammatoryinterventions.Inordertomakewalkouts moreeffective,staterepresentativesmustcoordinatebehaviourthrough identifiabletriggerwords,exerciseinstitution-specificdiscretionwhendeciding whethertoconductawalkout,andselectivelychoosewhentoimplementthis strategytoavoidde-sensitizingRussiatoitseffects.

LiteratureReview

Namingandshamingisapopularenforcementmechanismthat diplomatsusetopressuredissidentstatesintocompliance.AccordingtoCarraro etal.,namingandshamingtypicallyinvolvesthreeactors:“theagentsofshaming (whoshames),thetargetsofshaming(thosebeingshamed)andtheaudience (whichamplifiesthesocialpressureonthetarget)”(2019,337).Theagentsname thetargetandthenshamethemthroughavarietyofmethodsincludingpublic condemnation,boycotts,orstagingaprotest.Thehopeisthatthepressurestates feelfrombeingshamedwillreflectnegativelyupontheirimage,leadingto reputationalcoststhatdeterothercountriesfromformingpartnershipsor grantingbenefitstothedissidentstateinthefuture.Namingandshamingis 11

thereforeconductedwiththeexpectationthatthesocialdiscomfortofbeing reprimandedwillforcethedissidentstatebackintocompliance(Carraroetal. 2019,337).

Walkoutsareaformofnamingandshamingbecausetheyfollowasimilar structuretoachievethesamegoalofenforcingstatecompliance.Inalignment withCarraroetal.’striangularrelationshipofnamingandshaming,walkouts involveagents(thosewhowalkout),targets(thosebeingwalkedouton),andan audience(thepublic,themedia,othersintheroomduringthewalkout,andso forth).Despitetypicallybeingconductedinsilence,walkingoutonadelegate whiletheyarespeakingclearlynamesthecountrybeingreprimanded,and shamesthembydemonstratingthattheyarenotworthlisteningto.In comparisonwithotherformsofnamingandshamingwhichverballyexpress statecondemnation,silentwalkoutscanbeunclearaboutthebehaviourthatis beingreprimanded.Toresolvethistension,manycountriespublishawritten statementfollowingtheirwalkouttoexplainthemotivationfortheirbehaviour. Thereismuchdebateaboutwhethernamingandshamingisaneffective strategyinenforcingcompliancewithinternationalhumanrightslaw.According toAusderan,namingandshamingiseffectivebecauseitcreatesdomestic pressureagainstthedissidentstatebyenforcingpublicaccountability.Whena citizen’scountryisshamedbytheinternationalcommunityforhumanrights violations,theywillperceivethehumanrightsconditionsintheircountrymore negativelyandwithgreaterscrutiny(Ausderan2014,83).Therefore,namingand shamingmaybeaneffectivetoolinmobilizingdomesticpressureagainsta dissidentstate.However,thisstrategycanalsobackfire.Citizenswhowitness internationalshamingagainsttheircountrymaystrengthentheirloyaltytowards theirgovernmentwhenconfrontedwithinformationthatrunscountertotheir predisposedbeliefs(Ausderan2014,83).Thisoperatessimilartotherally aroundtheflageffectwherecitizenswhoholdtheirgovernmentinhighesteem mayincreasetheirsupportforthemwhentheircountryisbeingcriticizedbythe internationalcommunity.Therefore,namingandshamingmaybe counterproductiveinmobilizingastate’sdomesticpopulation,asitrisks bolsteringsupportforthedissidentgovernment.

Namingandshamingcanalsobeeffectiveatenforcingcompliance becauseitshinesapowerfulspotlightonhumanrightsviolatorswhoareeagerto escapecentrestage.Hafner-Burtonarguesthattoavoidthisattention, governmentsoftendecreasehumanrightsviolationsafterbeingcalledoutin ordertominimizeinternationalpressure:“governmentsnamedandshamedas humanrightsviolatorsoftenimproveprotectionsforpoliticalrightsafterbeing publiclycriticized”(Hafner-Burton2008,690-691).Gallagherarguesthatthisis aparticularlyhelpfultoolinframingperpetratorsasuntrustworthypartnersto publiclysignalinternationaldisapprovaltoalliesandpreventdissidentstates from

formingprofitableagreementsinthefuture(2021,5).Thehopeisthatby exposingthesehumanrightsabuses,themoralcredibilityofthedissident countrywillbesubjecttointensescrutiny,forcingactorstotakeastand (Gallagher2021,5).Thiscanleadtomaterialdrawbacksforthedissident countryasotherpartiesbegintoexcludethemfromeconomicagreementsand tradepartnerships.Studieshavefoundthatnamingandshamingcansignificantly reduceforeigndirectinvestmentreceivedbyrepressivestates,including restrictingaccesstoportfolioinvestmentsandarmsexports(DeMerittand Conrad2019,130).Thus,namingandshamingcanbeaneffectivetool, especiallyforcountriesthatarevulnerabletoexternalpressureandrelyon internationalpartnerships.Despitetheseconvincingarguments,theeffectiveness ofharmingastate’sreputationthroughnamingandshamingissubjecttotheir relationalpower.ItmaybeeasytoconvinceotherstatestoexcludeMyanmaror NorthKoreafromtradeagreementsascountriesgenerallydonotrelyontheir exports,butitwillcertainlybemorechallengingtopersuadestatestorefuse tradedealswithcountrieslikeChinaandSaudiArabia,whoareresponsiblefor someoftheworld’smostvaluableexports.Therefore,theeffectivenessofnaming andshaminginelicitingreputationalcoststhatdeterfuturepartnershipswith othercountriesissubjecttothevalueofapartnershipwiththedissidentstate. ThisconnectstoApodaca’sargumentthat,whilenamingandshamingisan inexpensivealternativetoenforcementmechanismslikeeconomicsanctionsor militaryaid,itstillincurssocialcosts.Innamingandshamingatargetstate, nationswhorelyonarelationshipwiththatcountrywilldamagetheirprospect ofcontinuinganalliancewiththeminthefuture(2020).Forexample,smaller statesthatdependonthetargetcountryforanexportmayfacegreatertariffsif theychoosetoparticipateinthewalkout.Alternatively,statesthatrequire supportfromthetargetstateinmultilateralnegotiationsmayriskjeopardizing theirpartnershipinfuturediplomaticforums.WhileApodacaraisesalegitimate riskassociatedwithnamingandshaming,countriesthatdonotnameandshame mayfacesimilarorgreaterrepercussionsfromthestateswhodochoosetoname andshame,placinganultimatumbetweenwhicheverpartyhasthepowerto implementthemostsevererepercussions.Sincetherearemoreagentsthan targetsinawalkout,astatewilllikelyfacethegreatestharmfromsidingwiththe agent.Therefore,whiletherearecostsassociatedwithparticipatinginwalkouts asApodacatheorizes,theremaybegreaterrepercussionsinvolvedinfailingto walkout,incentivizingstatestojointhepackinnamingandshamingthetarget nation.

Namingandshamingcanalsobeineffectivebecauseasviolationsreduce inonearea,theymayriseinanother,leadingtoabalancingeffect.DeMerittand Conradcallthisrepressionsubstitution,aprocesswherethe“shamingofone physicalintegrityviolationisjointlyassociatedwithdecreasesinthatviolation andincreasesinotherviolationsofhumanrights”(2019,129).Examplesofthis

includefindingsthatshamingacountryforpoliticalimprisonmentincreasesthe probabilitythatthestatewillreducethefrequencyofpoliticalimprisonment whilesubsequentlyincreasingtherateofextrajudicialkillings,torture,and/or disappearances(DeMerittandConrad2019,142).Asaresult,thebenefitsofa statecomplyingwithapreviouslyviolatedhumanrightbecomeneutralizedas thestatebeginstoviolateadifferenthumanright,callingintoquestionthe efficacyofnamingandshaming.WhileDeMerittandConradoffervaluable insightintothepossibilityofrepressionsubstitution,itisquestionablewhethera decreaseinoneviolationandanincreaseinanotheralwaysleadstoanequally balancedeffect.Manytradeoffsthatresultfromnamingandshamingreplacethe frequencyofasignificanthumanrightwithalessimportantone.Forexample, namingandshamingleadssomestatestoreducetheirfrequencyofgenocidefor ethnicminoritieswhileincreasingtheirrateofimprisonmentforthesamegroup. Althoughstillresponsibleforcommittingahumanrightsviolation,inthiscase, namingandshaminghasreapedanetbenefitbysavingthelivesofmanyethnic minorities.Therefore,repressionsubstitutionneednotalwaysbeineffective,asit mayreplaceaserioushumanrightsabusewithalessharmfulviolation. Beyondineffectiveness,namingandshamingcanalsoproduce counterproductiveconsequencesbyincentivizingthedissidentstatetoviolate morehumanrightsoutofbacklash.AccordingtoSnyder,respondingtoshame withdissidenceisanaturalpsychologicalresponsebecauseshametriggersa “self-reinforcingsyndromeofanger,resentment,evasion,andglorificationof deviance”(2020,645).Thus,Snyderarguesthat“shamingismostlikelyto mobilizeintenseformsofbacklash”whichmanifestinmanydifferentforms (2020,645).

OneformofbacklashthatSnyderfindsviolatorsregularlyengageinisthe restrictionofspaceforcompromiseandbargaining(2020,645).Thisisespecially dangerousinmultilateralpoliticalforums,wherediplomaticwalkoutsoccur, becausestatesusethesespacestoreachaconsensusaboutinternationallaw. GallagheragreeswithSnyder,arguingthatbacklashcanproduceramificationsat theinternationallevel,whichcould“jeopardizeinternationalsociety’scapacityto dealwithhumanrightsviolationselsewhereintheworld”(2021,9).For example,thisbacklashcouldresultinthetargetcountrywithdrawingvoluntary fundsfromanorganizationorrefrainingfromsigningatreatythatisbeing drafted.WhileGallagherandSnyderposelegitimatethreats,itseemsequally dangeroustoallowacountrythatactivelyviolatesthevaluesofaninternational organizationtoalsoparticipateinit.ThissentimentwasechoedbyYevheniia Filipenko,thePermanentRepresentativeofUkrainetotheUnitedNations,after walkingoutonRussiaintheUNGeneralAssembly,whereshenotedthatthe UnitedNationsmuststepupandfulfillitsduty,asRussiaisviolatingtheUN Charterandits

membersthroughitspresenceandcontributions(GuardianNews2022).Thus, therestrictionofspacefordissidentstatesinpoliticalforumsmaynotbeas harmfulasSnyderandGallagherclaim,asitmaybemoredamagingtoallowthe participationofanactiveviolator.

Anothercounterproductiveconsequenceofnamingandshamingisthe backfireeffectofstatesincreasingviolationsofthehumanrighttheyarebeing shamedfor,orotherhumanrights.DiBlasiarguesthatcountriesaremorelikely tocreatepro-governmentmilitiasafterbeingnamedandshamedforahuman rightsabusebytheinternationalcommunity(2020,907).Therefore,namingand shamingmaybeharmfulbecauseittriggershostilityfromthetargetcountry, whichcausesthestatetofurtherincreaseviolationsofthathumanrightorother humanrightsoutofbacklash.

Despitetheharmsandbenefits,conductedcorrectly,namingandshaming canbeaneffectivemechanismofenforcingcompliancewithhumanrightslaw. Sohowshouldcountriesnameandshame?Wongarguesthatdiplomatsdonot usuallyexpresstheirdissatisfaction,thusanallywhoistypicallycollegialbut becomesupsetsymbolizestheimportanceofthattopictothecountryand informsotherleaders’expectationsoftheirbehaviour(2020,83).Therefore, namingandshamingismosteffectivewhenitisconductedsparingly.If conductedtoofrequently,namingandshamingcannormalizeanddesensitize theimplicationsofawalkoutforthetargetstate.Moreover,BatesandLaBrecque arguethatnamingandshamingismosteffectivewhenconductedcollectively (2020).Thus,mechanismsmustbeinstalledtoensurethatallparticipating partiesareclearonwhenawalkoutisbeingconducted,toensurethata co-ordinatedandcollectiveresponseisimplemented.

CaseStudy:WalkingOutonRussiafortheInvasionofUkraine

BaseduponCarraroetal.’sdefinitionofthetriangularrelationship involvedinnamingandshaming,thecaseofwalkingoutonRussiadisplaysthe followingactors:statedelegates,whoaretheagentsofshaming,Russia,whois thetargetofshaming,andtheaudience,whichisacombinationofthemedia, citizens,internationalorganizations,andotherstates.Themediaservesasan audiencebecauseitpublishesreportsonstaterepresentativeswhowalkouton Russia.Thesereportseducatethepublicandsparkconversationsonwhetherthis isanappropriateandeffectivediplomaticresponsetotheinvasionofUkraine. Internationalorganizations,liketheUnitedNations,serveasanaudienceby observingwalkoutsandlearninghowtomediatethenegotiationsmoving forward.Otherstatesalsoformanaudiencebecausetheycanlearntoemulate walkoutbehaviourbynamingandshamingRussiainotherpoliticalforums. WalkingoutonRussiaisaformofnamingandshamingbecause

countriesabandonsessionsduringRussia’sinterventionstodisplaytheir condemnationofthedissidentstate’sbehaviour.Thewalkoutsconducted againstRussiaareframedbythemediaaccordingtonamingandshaming principleswithsensationalarticletitlessuchas“EmbarrassedatUN;Over100 diplomatswalkoutinprotestduringMinister’sspeech”(HindustanTimes).This mediaattentionframeswalkoutbehaviourasatoolusedbydiplomatstoname andshameRussiabackintocompliancewithinternationalhumanrightslaw. Namingandshamingisaneffectivetoolbecauseitdamagesacountry’s reputation,forcingthembackintocompliancetoprotecttheirimage.Asaresult, ifacountrydoesnotcareaboutitsreputation,namingandshamingmaybean ineffectivestrategyinpunishingdissidence.Toevaluateifwalkingoutisan effectivemechanism,itisthusimperativetodeterminewhetherRussiacares aboutitspublicimage.Manyarguethatacountryaspowerfulanddissidentas Russiaisunphasedbyshamingtechniques.Afterall,Russiahasfacedsevere criticismfordecadesinresponsetoavarietyofhumanrightsviolationswithin theirownbordersfortheirtreatmentofracialminoritiesandmembersofthe LGBTQ+community,andoutsidetheirbordersfortheirviolationsof internationalhumanitarianlawintheFirstandSecondWorldWar,theCold War,theFirstandSecondChechenWar,theinvasionofAfghanistan,the interventioninCrimea,andmanyothers.Asaresult,somescholarsarguethat Russiahasbecomenormalizedtothislevelofostracizationandcondemnation fromtheinternationalcommunity,andthusnamingandshamingwillnotreap significantprogress.

However,thisperspectiveismisguided,asitisevidentthatRussia continuestocareaboutitspublicimage,despitefacingconsistentbacklashfrom otherstates.Afterall,thisiswhyRussianrepresentativesaredesperatelytryingto advancethefalseclaimthattheinvasionofUkrainewasactuallyamilitary interventiontoprotectcitizensandendthe“genocideoftheRussian-speaking populationbytheNazigovernmentofVolodymyrZelenskyy”(Fortuin2020, 314);Russia,aconsistentviolatorintheinternationalcommunity,doesnotwant tobeseenasahumanrightsabusingstate,despitetheirwillingnesstocontinue committingatrocities.Asaresult,Russiaclearlyfeelsthepressuretoconform. Thus,walkingoutmaybeaneffectivemechanismtoforceRussiabackinto compliancewithinternationalhumanrightslaw.

ThereareseveralreasonswhywalkingoutagainstRussiaisaneffective strategy.First,walkoutsareanaccessibleandlow-costmethodofsupporting Ukraineasallthatisrequirediscoordinationbetweenmemberstates.Therefore, walkoutsareaneasywayforsmallercountriestoexpresssolidarityand condemnation,especiallyiftheycannotaffordmoreexpensivedemandslike sendingtroopsorimposingsanctions.Acollectiveresponsetotheinvasionof UkraineisimperativetointernationallycondemningRussia,butitisunrealistic

tothinkallcountriescanactwithsimilarmeans.Thus,walkoutsprovidea mechanismforeverycountrytocollectivelysupportUkraine.

Second,becausewalkoutsarerareandcontroversial,theyreceive significantmediaattentionandareheavilypublicizedinthenews,sparkingan importantdiscussionfromthepublicandvaluedstakeholders.This conversation,coupledwiththefactthatthisresponseisanaccessibleand low-coststrategy,caninspiremanyaroundtheworldtoparticipateinsimilar walkoutsandboycotts,suchasbynotattendingRussiansportingcompetitions orrefrainingfrombuyingproductssoldbypubliclyownedRussiancompanies. Unlikematerialsanctionsormilitaryaid,walkoutsareastrategythatcanbe easilyreplicatedbycitizens.Thus,walkoutsgobeyondthediplomaticforumto affectpeopleinreallifeandsparkamassmovement.

Third,walkingoutisthemostefficientmechanismofrespondingto Russia’sinflammatoryinterventions.WhenRussiamakesaninterventionthat propagatesfalseclaims,countrieshavetwooptions:tostaysilentorspeakup. TheseinflammatoryremarksdispelinaccurateinformationbyequatingWestern countrieswithneo-Nazism,andarguingthattheinvasionofUkraineisjustified duetothehumanrightsabusescommittedbytheUkrainiangovernmenton theirownpeople.Therefore,choosingtoignoreRussia’sinappropriate interventionsisdangerousbecauseitcondonesstatementsthatwouldreap harmfulrepercussionsformanystatesinvolved.Ontheotherhand,ifstates choosetorespondtothesestatements,doingsowouldtriggerRussiatouseits rightofreply,whichwouldseverelyderailtheconversationintoabackandforth betweenRussiaandopposingstates.Thiswoulddistractthecommitteefromits mainfocusofcreatinghumanrightslaw,andvanquishthegreatergoalof protectingvulnerableminorities.Inlightofthesetwoill-fatedresponses,walking outintroducesathirdoptionwhichsendsanequallystrongmessagewithout elicitingadistractionfromtheconversationathand.Notonlydowalkouts expresscleardisapprovalofthefactitiousstatements,theyalsoallowthe committeetostayontask.ThisisbecauseRussiandelegatescannotusetheir rightofreplyagainstawalkoutliketheycanwithaninappropriateintervention, thuslimitingtheopportunityforarightofreplyface-offwhichwillderailthe conversation.Therefore,walkoutsintroduceathird,moreeffectiveresponseto Russia’sinflammatoryandfactitiousremarks.

Despitetheaforementionedbenefitsofconductingwalkouts,thisstrategy maybeineffectiveinthecaseofRussiaduetotheauthoritariannatureofthe Kremlinwhichhasmadethegovernmentimmunetodomesticpressure.Despite countlessRussiancitizensbravelyprotestingVladimirPutin’sinvasionof Ukraine,domesticpressurehasyettoreapsignificantprogressinendingthe intervention.EvenifwalkingoutonRussiadidcreatedomesticpressureagainst thedissidentstateasAusderantheorizes,itisunlikelythatthis

accountabilityisenoughpressuretoincentivizeRussiatopulloutofUkraine andtakeresponsibilityforitsinternationalhumanrightsviolations.Therefore, relyingondomesticaccountabilitymechanismstotriggerRussia’scompliance maybefutile.

Beyondineffectiveness,conductingwalkoutsagainstRussiamaybe counterproductivebysparkingbacklashfromtheKremlin.Forexample,naming andshamingcouldleadtostagnancyinthepoliticalforum.Inmultilateral committeeswhereinternationallawisbeingdrafted,countriesaresearchingfor consensussothatallpartiescanagreetocomplyingwiththerecommendationsof atreaty.ItisthereforedangeroustowalkoutagainstRussiabecausethishostility coulddeterMoscowfrommovingforwardwiththenegotiations,orfrom signingthetreatyatall.ThisisespeciallysignificantconsideringthatRussiais oneofthegreatestviolatorsofhumanrights,therefore,itisimperativetoinclude theminmultilateralconversationssotheycancontributetoatreatythatthey willcomplywith.

Furthermore,namingandshamingRussiamaybecounterproductiveas walkingoutonadelegatecontradictstheverypurposeofdiplomacy.Diplomacy representsaspaceforconversationandcompromise-thispromiseiswhat incentivizesstatesofalldifferentideologiestoparticipateinthecreationof internationaltreaties.Thispromiseisbrokenwhenstatesdonotletothersspeak, orsendthemessagethattheyrefusetolisten.Exitingtheroomduringastate’s interventionsymbolizesthatthecountryspeakingisnotworthyofparticipation inthatpoliticalforum.Thiscanleadtoaslipperyslopebydeterringthestate fromparticipatinginthatparticularcommitteeorothermultilateralforumsin thefuture.LosingRussia’sdiplomaticpresencewouldjeopardizethe internationalcommunity’sabilitytoformpeacefulagreements.IfRussia abandonsmultilateralforumsmoredangerousresponsesandreactionswilllikely replacediplomacy,suchasbargainingandswaggering.Therefore,walkingouton Russiamayjeopardizetheinternationalcommunity’sabilitytoreach compromisesoninternationallawbyexcludingakeyactorfromtheprocessof draftinglegislationandcontributingtohumanrightspolicies. Lastly,andoftenignored,whencountrieswalkouttheyeliminatetheir opportunitytorecordtheinterventionmade.Capitalsrelyontheirdiplomatsto takedetailednotesasmanymultilateralforumsarenotvisuallyoraudibly recorded.MostforumsrelyontheChairtomakenotesontheimportant recommendationsthatstatesmake,whichtheyaddtothedraftingofthe legislation.Walkingoutofthecommissionjeopardizesthechanceforstatesto collecttheirownnotesonRussia’sintervention,whichrisksnormalizing inflammatoryremarksthattheirdelegateswillnotbeabletorespondto. Therefore,walkoutsmaybeineffectiveastheyincreasetheriskoflegitimizing Russia’sfactitiousinterventionsandpreventstatesfromrecordingimportant contributionsandrespondingappropriately.

ShouldwalkoutsonRussiacontinue,andifso,how?

Todeterminewhetherwalkingoutisaneffectivemechanismofenforcing compliance,wecanexplorewhetherthebenefitsofnamingandshamingRussia outweightheineffectiveandcounterproductiveoutcomespreviouslydescribed. Perhapsthestrongestresponserefutingtheefficacyofwalkoutsistheriskthat namingandshamingRussiamayleadthedissidentstatetorefusefurther participationinthecreationofahumanrightstreaty.However,despitereceiving criticismforbeingoneoftheworsthumanrightsabusersintheinternational community,Russiacontinuestoparticipateinthedraftingofhumanrights treaties.ThishypocriticalperspectiveisexplainedbyBethSimmons,whoargues thatcountrieslikeRussiawhoratifyhumanrightstreatiesdespitehavingno sincereintentionofcomplyingwithitsrecommendations,arefalsepositivestates (2009,77).Russiahasfacedmuchstrongercondemnationforcommitting humanrightsviolationsthannamingandshaming.TheKremlinhasbeen subjecttoeconomicsanctions,publiccondemnation,militaryintervention,and thebreakingofalliances,yetRussiacontinuestoattendmultilateralhuman rightsforumsandcontributetointernationaltreaties.IfRussiaisalreadywilling toparticipateinthetreatyprocess,whichinvolvesasubstantialinvestmentof time,energy,andresources,Moscowisunlikelytobedeterredfromcontinuing negotiationsbecausecountrieschoosetoexittheroomwhiletheyarespeaking. Inresponsetotheargumentthatwalkoutscontradictdiplomacy,itis morelikelythatthealternative,speakinguporstayingsilent,risksevengreater harm.Speakingupinitiatesarightofreplybattlewhichderailstheconversation anddoesnotallowmemberstatestoefficientlyfocusonthetaskathand: formulatinglawtoprotectvulnerableminoritiesfromhumanrightsviolations. Ontheotherhand,stayingsilentlegitimizestheinflammatoryremarks propagatedbyRussia,which,duetotheirfactitiousnature,canleadtogreater harm.Moreover,diplomacyshouldbeaspaceforactorscommittedtothevalues ofdiplomacy.Thus,statesshouldnotbeallowedtoparticipateinthecreationof humanrightstreatiesiftheyarecurrentlybreakingtheverylawstheystriveto implement.

Third,whilethefailuretorecordRussia’sinterventionduringawalkout posesanimportantproblem,itcaneasilybesolvedwiththerightsolution.Many conferencesarealreadylivestreamed,makingthemeasytorecord.Moreover,the internationalorganizationcanhirenote-takerstoassisttheChairandnotifyall statesaboutwhatwaspreviouslysaid.Regardlessofwhetherornotwalkoutsare beingconducted,thetranscribingoftheseimportantpoliticalforumsis imperative.Implementingthissolutionwouldnotonlyalleviateariskassociated withconductingwalkouts,butitwillalsoprovidestaterepresentativesand internationalorganizationswiththeresourcestheyneedtoensurefull

understandingandtransparencyovertheconversationandhavemorefruitful communicationthatisnotburdenedbyafailuretoremember. Thus,consideringtherisksofwalkoutscanbesolvedoroutweighed,why isitintheinterestoftheinternationalcommunitytocontinuethisstrategy?In ordertofostergreatercompliancewithhumanrights,statesmuststrivetoturn falsepositivesintosincereratifiers,countriesthatbelieveinthetreaty’spurpose andintendtocomplywithitsrecommendations(Simmons2009,354).False positivesactastheydobecauseitiseasyforthemtonotgetcaughtcheatingand eveniftheyarecaughtthemechanismsinplaceareweakenoughthattheywill notfacesignificantconsequences.Namingandshamingcanthereforeholdfalse positiveslikeRussiaaccountable,sothattheycanreceiveproportionalharmto deterfutureviolations.

Howcancountriesbecomemoreeffectiveatwalkingout?Therearethree keymethodsthatstatescanimplementtoconducthigherqualitywalkouts.First, countriesmustestablishacoordinatedresponseaboutwhenandhowtoact.The mosteffectivewalkoutsareconductedwhenthereisacollectiveandunified responsewhichsendsaclearmessageforwhytheactionisbeingconductedand whoitisbeingconductedagainst.Thiscanbedonebyusingtriggerwords, whereagroupoflikemindedcountriesdecideinadvancewhichwordswillcause thegrouptoabandonthecommissionduringanintervention.Inthecaseof Russiawalkouts,thesetriggerwordscanincludemessagesthatrefertotheWest asneo-NazisorimplythatUkraineiscommittinggenocideagainstitsown people.Triggerwordsareaneasyandclearmechanismofestablishingwhento walkoutandwhentostayintheroom,allowingallcountriestooperate consistently.Triggerwordsarealsoimportantbecausetheyactasamechanismof factcheckingRussia’sstatementsandensuringthatMoscowisreprimandedfor spreadingfalseinformation.

Second,walkoutsshouldbespecifictotheorganizationthattheyare beingconductedin.Someorganizationsarenotconducivetoawalkout,suchas theUNSecurityCouncil,whereaprotestcouldinspireunwantedconsequences fromvetomemberslikeanunwarrantedmilitaryresponse.Similarly,inabody liketheUNOfficeonDrugsandCrimeswhereconsensusisusedtopass internationallaw,conductingawalkoutmayriskjeopardizingthecreationofa treaty.Inotherinternationalorganizations,especiallythosewherehumanrights arethemainareaoffocussuchastheUNHumanRightsCouncil,awalkout maybetheperfectstrategytoexpresscondemnationofRussiawithoutthe politicalrepercussionsembeddedinotherinstitutions.

Third,walkoutsshouldbeconductedsparinglyandintentionally.If conductedtoofrequently,walkoutsmayrisknormalizingtheconsequencesof beingshamedforRussia.Moreover,continuouswalkoutswilldisrupttheflowof conversationinamultilateralforumandprohibitprogressindrafting recommen-

-endations.Thus,namingandshamingshouldbeselectivelycarriedoutwhen andifRussiamakesanextremeaction,whetheritbethroughanewmilitary interventioninUkraineoranovelinflammatoryremarkinapoliticalforum.For example,ifRussiaweretocommitanunprecedentedhumanrightsviolation,or spreadnewmisinformationthatrequirescondemnation,awalkoutmaybean appropriatestrategy.However,ifRussiamakesasimilarstatementtheweek followingawalkoutmotivatedbythesamebehaviour,awalkoutmaybe redundant.

Conclusion

Namingandshamingcanbeaneffectivetooloftriggeringdomestic pressureanddamagingastate’sreputation.However,walkoutscanalsobe ineffectivebyreplacingoneviolationwithanother,leadingtorepression substitution.Walkoutscanalsoincurcounterproductiveeffectsbyincentivizing thetargetstatetoactoutofbacklashbylimitingroomforcompromiseinfuture negotiationsandincreasinghumanrightsviolationsoutofhostility.Toconduct walkoutseffectively,thisstrategymustbeimplementedinfrequentlyand collectively.

Namingandshamingisaneffectivemechanismofenforcingcompliance becauseitisalow-costandaccessiblestrategyofcollectiveactionthatsparks mediaattentionandefficientlyrespondstoRussia’sinflammatoryinterventions withoutderailingtheconversationinapoliticalforum.Despitethesebenefits, thereisconcernabouthowwalkingoutagainstRussiamaybeineffectivebecause thecountryisimmunetodomesticpressure.Moreover,walkoutsmayproduce counterproductiveconsequencesbygeneratingbacklashfromtheKremlin, leadingMoscowtopulloutofinternationalnegotiationsonhumanrights treaties.Furthermore,walkoutsmaycontradictthepurposeofdiplomacyand impairstates’abilitytorecordRussia’sinterventions.Inresponsetotheseharms, Russiaisunlikelytopulloutofinternationalnegotiations,astheyarefrequently criticized,yetcontinuetoparticipateinmultilateralforumsonhumanrights issues,likeatruefalsepositivestate.Furthermore,thepurposeofdiplomacyis moreseverelyharmedbyallowingacountrywhoregularlyviolatesthat internationalorganizationtoparticipateinit.Finally,alackofnotetakingduring walkoutscanbesolvedbyimplementingtranscribersandbyrecordingmeetings. Sincethebenefitsofnamingandshamingoutweightheharms,walkoutsarean effectivestrategyforenforcingRussia’scompliance.

Toensurethatwalkoutscontinuetobeeffective,statesmustdothree things.First,statesshouldestablishacoordinatedstrategyofknowingwhenand howtoact,byagreeingupontriggerwordsthatdeterminewhentoexita politicalforum.Second,walkoutsshouldbespecifictotheorganizationto ensuretheydo

notimpedeoncertaininstitutionalstructureswhicharenotconduciveto namingandshaming.Third,walkoutsshouldbeconductedsparinglytoensure thatRussiaisnotde-sensitizedtotheireffects.Ifconductedproperly,statescan leveragethesoftpowerstrategyofnamingandshamingtopressureRussiainto compliancewithinternationalhumanrightslaw.Whilethismechanismmaynot beenoughtoforceMoscowbackintocompliance,itisanimportantfirststepin protectingUkraineandpreventingfuturehumanrightsviolations.

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IndigenousElectoralParticipationand Non-ParticipationinCanada:DefiningTheir Ideological

DifferencesandtheCaseforCooperation

MiaGill

EditedbyCatrionaArnott

(Matt Comte / Getty)

Thispapermustbeginwithanacknowledgementofmypositionality.I amanIndigenousstudent:aDehchoDenewomanandastatusmember ofLiidliiKueFirstNation.Iwasbornandraisedin Kootsisáw/Wincheesh-pah/Moh-kíns-tsis(Calgary),onTreaty7land, separatefrommynation.DespitenotbeingraisedinLiidliiKue,Iremain connectedtomyfamilyandcommunity.MyDenelinecomesfromthe HorassiandHoresayfamiliesoftheDehchoregion-whoarerelated, howeverhavedifferentspellingsofaphoneticallyidenticalsurname-my grandmother,aHoresay,marriedasettlermanandhadmyfatherbefore 1985.Duetothis,IamaBillC-3statusperson.Mymotherisa refugee-immigrantborninPolandwhofledduringthePolishPeople’s Republiccommunistrule.IhavelivedandworkedinLiidliiKueduring thesummersof2020and2021asanexecutiveassistanttotheGrand ChiefofDehchoFirstNations.

Introduction

WhydosomeIndigenouspeoplesbelieveinCanadianelectoral participationwhileothersdonot?Aretheseideologiescounterintuitive,orcan theyworkincollaboration?Indigenouspeopleswhoseekthegoalof self-determinationareengagedinaperpetualdebateonwhethertovoteinthe electionsofcolonialpoliticalsystemsorabstain(Narine2021).SomeIndigenous peoplesarguethatelectoralparticipationunderminestheirfightforsovereignty (Katsi’tsakwas[Gabriel]2021;Waabshkigaabo[Landon]2021).Nevertheless,in the2015election,61.5percentofregisteredvotersonreservescastaballot (SlaughterandMacyshon2019).Thispaperevaluatestheinteractionbetween twomainfactors:Indigenousself-determinationand,therefore,rejectionof colonialpoliticalsystemsandparticipationintheCanadianelectoralsystem.This ‘Canadianelectoralsystem’excludesallchiefandcouncilelectionswhile includingthosethatmakeupthesettler-colonialstateapparatus:municipal, provincial/territorial,andfederalelections.Thispaperwillarguethefollowing threeconclusionsusingtheoreticalandempiricalanalysis.First,bothIndigenous26

non-participatoryandparticipatoryideologiesaredeterminedbypotentialvoters simultaneouslyconsideringthefactorsofelectoralparticipation:rationalchoice theoryanddutytovote.Second,whilethenon-participatoryideologyisdefined byconsideringelectoralparticipationfactorsinrelationtoalienationand Indigenousnationalism,theparticipatoryideologyisdefinedbythesefactors' interactionswithstrategyandrepresentation.Lastly,Indigenouselectoral participationdoesnotunderminethegoalofself-determination.Thisisbecause thegoalofdualcitizenshipasameansforself-determinationmakeselectoral participationbothnecessaryandactivelycreatesuniquevalueforautonomy;the utilizationofthefourrolesoftheactivismmodelrequirestheIndigenousactive voterandelectedrepresentativewhilearolethatincludesthoseengagedinrefusal isstillvital.

FactorsofElectoralParticipation

Touncoverthepatternsandcoexistenceofparticipatoryand non-participatoryIndigenousideologies,onemustunderstandwhypeoplevote. Rationalchoicetheoryisoneapproachtounderstandingvoterturnout.Inbrief, rationalchoicetheoryarguesthatvotersdecidewhethertovotedependingonan independentcalculationthatweighsthecostsandbenefitsoftheirchoice.A decisiondependsonwhichoutcomeresultsinthemostsignificantpersonal benefits(LevinandMilgrom2004).Inthequestionofwhethertovote,a calculationmaylooklikethis:anactorwillaccruexcostfromvotingandis expectingtoreceiveybenefits.Ifyminusxispositive,theywillvote;ifnegative, theywillnot.Animportantcaveattothistheoryisthatbenefitsmustbe expected,notmerelypotential;thereforeifanelectorvotesforthemost beneficialcandidatewhoissuretolose,theexpectedbenefitsarenil,andwill chooseacandidatewithahigherexpectedbenefit(Blais2000,1).However,this raisesthe“paradoxofnotvoting:”ifelectionsaredecidedbysuchalargenumber ofpeople,onevoter’sdecisionseemsunlikelytomakeadifference,andtherefore, theyhavenoreasontovote(Feddersen2004).Anexperimentalstudyonstudent votersinthe1993Canadianfederalelectionshowedthatevokingtherational choicetheory’sparadoxinpotentialvotersresultedinreducedturnout“mainly becausethepresentationdiminishedtherespondents’senseofduty,aneffectthat was

indirect”(BlaisandYoung1999).Opponentsofrationalchoicetheorymay arguethatitprovidesalimitedscopeonhumanbehaviour,specificallyby assumingthecontinuousrationalityofindividualsandignoringtheinfluenceof affectivedimensions.Thisobjection,alongwiththeimplicationsarisingfromthe paradoxofnotvotingleadustoconsiderasecondfactorinthevotingequation. Thesecondfactoraffectingwhetheranindividualelectordecidestovote is‘duty’,whichcanbeunderstoodastheemotionofpersonalresponsibilityto vote.Thisfactorisnotconcernedaboutpotentialgainsbutinsteadreflectsa philosophicalstressorthatholdsvotingasavirtuousactionforacitizenofa democracy.ThroughdatacollectedinCanadaduring2008and2009andSpain from2010to2012,researchersfoundthateventhoughdutyisreinforcedafter voting,itstillstronglyaffectsone’smotivationtovotebeforeengaginginsuch behaviour(GalaisandBlais2016).Ithasalsobeenshownthatrationalchoice anddutycansimultaneouslyaffectindividuals,andthosewithaweakersenseof dutyrelymoreontherationalchoicefactorwhendecidingwhethertovote(Blais 2000,92-114).Thefactorsofrationalchoiceanddutywillbeusedtoanalyzethe differencesbetweenparticipatoryandnon-participatoryIndigenousvoters’ ideologicalunderpinnings.

DefiningtheIndigenousNon-ParticipatoryIdeology

Non-participationofIndigenouspeoplesincolonialelectionsis motivatedbytwomainfactors:alienationandnationalism.Tounderstand Indigenouspeoples’alienationfromtheCanadianelectoralsystem,onemust examineCanada’scolonialhistoryofpoliticaldisenfranchisementandattempted assimilation.Post-confederationCanadadeniedstatusFirstNationspeoplesthe righttovote;astringofassimilationistenfranchisementlegislation(includingthe GradualCitizenshipActof1857andtheIndianActof1876)hadmeanwhile beenprovidingtherightinexchangefortheadoptionof‘civilized’waysoflife (Leslie2016).Inuitwereallowedtovotein1950,althoughitwasnotuntil1962 thattheywereprovidedsufficientballotboxes.FirstNationpeoplesweregiven thefederalrighttovotein1960and,bytheendofthe1960s,Indigenouspeoples couldvoteineveryprovincialandterritorialelection(Leslie2016).Oneresultof thisrecenthistoryofthedenialofvotingrightstoIndigenouspeoplesisthe

continuinglackofelectedIndigenousrepresentationingovernment,which Daltonarguescauses“alackoflegitimacy[oftheelectoralsystem]fromthe perspectiveofmanyFirstNations”(2007,252).

Indigenousnationalismisthefoundationfortheoriesof self-determination.AudraSimpson’sMohawkInterruptusoffersasuccinct theorytounderstandhowIndigenousnationalismpresupposesthepraxisof non-participationincolonialelections.Simpsoncoins“politicsofrefusal”asa responseto“politicsofrecognition,”thelatterofwhichisthetendencyof CanadaasasettlercolonialstatetoattempttoundermineIndigenous sovereigntythroughtheofficialrecognitionofIndigenouscultureasdistinctyet nestedinCanadiancitizenship(2014,11).Politicsofrefusalinstead "acknowledge[s]anduph[olds]"the"politicalsovereignty"ofthecolonized peopleswhilequestioningthe"legitimacy"ofthecolonizingforcewhich maintainsthepowerof"recognizing";forIndigenouspeoples,thiscanmanifest intherefusaltovoteintheelectionsofcolonialstructure(Simpson,2014,11). Indigenousnationalismarguesthatengagementwithintheimposedcolonial structureofelectionsisparadoxicalandservestheharmfulpoliticsof recognition.Therefore,Indigenouspeopleshaveanideologicalbasisforengaging inapoliticsofrefusalasresistancetoassimilation.

Theinteractionbetweenalienationbornfromahistoryof disenfranchisementandsubjugationandIndigenousnationalismasthe resistancetothisalienationisself-perpetuating:“theendresultisanelectoral systemthatlackslegitimacyforFirstNations,ultimatelyleadingtofurther alienation”(Dalton2007,274).Assimilationistmotivationsforexpandingthe righttovotedirectlyunderminetheself-determinationofIndigenouspeoples expressedthroughIndigenousnationalism.Canada’shistoryofenfranchisement asacivilizingforcerevealsthattherighttovotewasnotgiveninorderto strengthenthenation-to-nationrelationshipsbetweenIndigenouspeoplesand Canadabutwasinstead“becauseoftheideathatCanadiancitizenshipwould furtherintegrateFirstNationsintoCanadiansociety,assistwithsocio-economic issuesandhelpCanadaincontinuingtoignoreFirstNationsautonomy, nationhoodandtheirowncitizenship”(Cowie2021).

InasurveyofIndigenousyouth,manyofthosewhohavepreviously abstainedfromvotingreporteddoingso“asamatterofprinciple,”andinstead,

alternativeengagementinpoliticswasreferenced,including“traditional governance,radicalpoliticsanddirectactions”(GeraldR.,Pitawanakwat,and Price,2007,11).Understandingtheinteractionbetweenalienationand nationalism,itisclearthatforsomeIndigenouspeoplesengagingin non-participationdutyhasbeentransformedandisnolongerapplicable.Aduty forthecolonialdemocraticsystemhasbeennullified,andinstead,anewdutyhas emerged:self-determinationandsupportofnon-electoralpoliticalparticipation. However,sincethosewithaweakerdutytovoterelymoreheavilyonrational choicetheory(Blais2000,92-114),whydoIndigenouspeopleswithout democraticdutynotinsteadvotebasedonrationalchoice?Inthesurveyof Indigenousyouth,itwasfoundthat“[a]pragmaticcalculationisbeingmade thattheIndigenousvoteisunlikelytohaveanimpact‘unlessyouhavean overwhelminglyhighnumberofIndiansinoneprovince.’”(GeraldR., Pitawanakwat,andPrice,2007,11).Thisshowsthatforsomefollowersofthe non-participatoryroute,itseemsasthoughtheparadoxofrationalchoicevoting isalsomotivatingtheirnon-participation.

DefiningtheIndigenousParticipatoryIdeology

ThemotivationsbehindtheIndigenousparticipatoryideologycanbe definedwithtwomajorthemes:strategyandrepresentation.Thechoicetovoteis sometimesexplainedbyIndigenousvotersasstrategic,withthegoalof preventingworseoutcomesthatmayresultfromnotvoting.Oneofthe justificationsprovidedmultipletimesbysurveyedIndigenousyouthwhohave previouslyvotedwas“apreventivestrategy–asameanstopreventpeoplewith dramaticallydifferentvaluesandbeliefsfromrepresentingthem”(GeraldR., Pitawanakwat,andPrice,2007,7).Intheirtestimony,individualsreferencedthe possibleadverseeffectsofelectedrepresentativesontreaties,theircommunities, andtheirrights(GeraldR.,Pitawanakwat,andPrice,2007,6).Thismotivation canbeseenasdirectlyreflectingrationalchoicetheory.WhileIndigenous individualsmayunderstandthatvotingwithincolonialstructuresseems paradoxical,theymayweightheexpectedcostsofnotvotingtobetoolargeto abstain.

Thesecondmotivationalthemeisrepresentation:specifically,adesirefor electedrepresentativestorepresentIndigenouspeoplesand,therefore,electoral

supportforcandidateswhoidentifyasIndigenous.InthesurveyofIndigenous youth,thosewhohavepreviouslyvoted“arguedthatsupporting,encouraging andvotinginAboriginalcandidateswasparamount,”specificallytoensurethat thosewithsimilarbeliefsandvaluesastheminfluencecolonialgovernance structures(GeraldR.,Pitawanakwat,andPrice,2007,7).Thisthemeis supportedbyevidenceof‘affinityvoting’:thetrendofminoritiesbeingmore likelytovotewhenacandidatethatrepresentstheirminorityidentitiesis running.InastudyofdatafromCanada’s2006,2008,2011,and2015federal elections,researchersdiscoveredthataffinityvotingisinfluentialinIndigenous votechoice(Dabin,Daoust,andPapillon2019).Voteturnoutwashigherin IndigenouscommunitieswhenanIndigenouspersonwasontheballot;with threeoffourIndigenouscandidatesontheballot,turnoutincreasedbymore than15percent(Dabin,Daoust,andPapillon2019,50).Further,political partiesalsobenefitedfromhighervoterturnoutfortheirpartyinIndigenous communitieswhentheyhadIndigenouscandidates,withthepartysupport scalingalongsidethenumberofIndigenouscandidates(Dabin,Daoust,and Papillon2019).

Thethemeofrepresentationasamotivationalfactorfortheparticipatory Indigenousideologyreflectsboththefactorsofdutyandrationalchoicetheory. Indigenouspeopleslikelyfeelanemotionaldutytosupporttheirkininpolitics. ItalsofollowslogicallythatanIndigenousrepresentativewiththesamevaluesas Indigenousvotersismorelikelytoworktowardspositivepolicydecisionsfor Indigenouspeoplesspecifically.Thustheexpectedbenefitofelectingan Indigenousrepresentativeisboosted,andpotentialvotersaremorelikelyto decideusingtherationalchoicetheorythatvotingismorebeneficialthan abstaining.

ElectoralParticipation:CounterintuitiveorCollaborative?

Isitpossiblefornon-participatoryandparticipatoryideologiestoexist withoutunderminingoneanother?Palmaterarguesthisisimpossible,asthe virtuesofelectoralparticipationaremythologicalforIndigenouspeoples,making theboldclaimthat“whenIndigenouspeoplesvote,theyvotefortheirnext oppressor”(2019).SheclaimsthattheCanadianpoliticalsystemintentionally subjugatesandharmsIndigenouspeoplesthroughtheirexclusion.

Palmater

pointstotheHarperandTrudeaugovernmentsasexamplesofhowregardlessof statedintentionorpartyinpower,theCanadianpoliticalsystemactivelyworks againstIndigenousself-determinationandautonomy:“Whatisthecore differencebetweenpastracistandaggressivegovernments,whichdidn’tgiveour landsbackorrespectourtreaties,andthecharmingandpositivePrimeMinister Trudeau,whodoesexactlythesame?”(2019).Further,whilethepotentialfor increasesinbeneficialfundingisacknowledged,thesearetemporaryanddonot makeupforthelackofactiononmissingandmurderedIndigenouswomenand girlsandtheincreasingIndigenousoverrepresentationinthefostercaresystem, inthecarceralsystemandpovertyorhomeless(Palmater2019).

ThecruxofPalmater’sargumentisthatforIndigenouspeopleswho participateintheCanadianelectoralsystem;“theirvoicemakesnoactual difference,”asthestructuresofcolonialismandanti-Indigenousracismare ingrainedintoCanada’spartysystem(2019).Palmaterisessentiallyassertingthat thereisnoexpectedgoodfromIndigenousvoterparticipation,regardlessof partyplatformsorleaders.Therefore,therationalchoiceforIndigenouspeoples istorefrainfromvotingandengageinothermeansofpoliticalactiontobetter theircircumstances,whetherthrough“protests,publicpressure,litigationor outsideinterventionattheUnitedNationslevel”(Palmater2019).Underthis argument,thereisnomovementforstrategicvoting–the‘worseoption’is essentiallythesameasthestrategic‘better.’

However,PalmaterignorestherelevanceofdutyinIndigenous participatoryideology.Whileshedoesstatethattheconceptualizationofcivic participationasadutyisamythforIndigenouspeoplesinthedemocraticsense oftheterm,as“botharightandaresponsibilityofcitizens,”sheignoresthe representationaldutyIndigenouspeopleshavetoeachotherwhenvoting (Palmater2019).Asnotedearlier,Indigenouspeoplesaremuchmorelikelyto voteiftherearecandidateswhoidentifyasIndigenous.Thisdutyliesoutsideof theEurocentricdemocraticdefinitionofdutyandinsteadistheresultof Indigenousrelationalityandresponsibilitytokin.RelationalityasanIndigenous conceptisexpressedthroughwaysoflifeandone’sresponsibilitytotheir relations(Tynan2021).Further,relationalityasapracticeisapartofIndigenous self-determinationbyrejectingcolonialimpositionsofidentityandcommunity (Tynan2021).InordertosupportIndigenouskinshipties,anewdutyiscreated

andexistsdespitethefailureoftherationalchoicecalculation,andtherefore Indigenouspeopleshaveareasongroundedinself-determinationundersome circumstancestoengageinelectoralparticipationwhilenotbeing counterintuitive.Further,asPalmaterfailstoconsiderIndigenousrepresentation inCanadianpoliticsaltogether,sheignoresthattheelectionofIndigenous peopleintogovernmentcanservetolessentheharmofthecolonialsystemfrom theinside.

SomeonearguingindefenceofPalmater’sthesismayrespondthat Indigenousrepresentationinpoliticsdoesnotmagicallysolvethecolonial structureofthatsystem–despitethereinforcementofIndigenousrelationality indoingso.In“Being-in-the-Room-Privilege,”Táíwòmakeshis‘elitecapture’ argument,whichraisescriticalissueswiththeacceptanceofstandpoint epistemology,particularlyforpeopleinpositionsofprivilege.Standpoint epistemologyisusedinradicalpoliticalspherestorefertotheclaimthatthose withlivedexperiencesofmarginalizationhaveaccesstouniqueknowledgethat thosewithoutthoseexperiencesdonothave–andthus,minorityrepresentation inpositionsofpowercanservetounderminethemarginalizingeffectthosein thatpositionhavehistoricallyreinforced(Táíwò2020).AnIndigenous proponentofstandpointepistemologywouldarguethatIndigenous representativesintheCanadiangovernmentwouldchampiontheotherwise unheardperspectivesofIndigenouspeoplesandthereforebringgoodto Indigenouspeoplesthroughpolicy.However,Táíwòarguesthatthosewho managetogainaccessto‘theroom’–inthiscase,bybeingelectedasa representative–aremostoftenthe“elites”oftheirmarginalizedgroupand thereforedonothavelivedexperiencesthatwouldbemostusefulfortheaverage orthemostmarginalizedofthatminoritygroup(2020).Usingthisargument, howcanIndigenousvotersbesuretheirIndigenousrepresentativehasthesame valuestheydo?Theansweristhattheycannot;instead,theyoughttobewary aboutusingrepresentativesoftheirvaluesandbeliefstogainfurther self-determinationthroughactionwithintheCanadiangovernment. Nevertheless,byreconceptualizingthegoalforIndigenous self-determinationasthejourneytowardsdualcitizenship,itbecomesclearhow engaginginelectoralparticipationcanfurtherthepoliticalgoalsofIndigenous peoplesandcommunities.CowiearguesthatIndigenouspeoplesoughttouse

Canada’spoliticalsysteminordertopushforasocietythatembracesBorrows’ conceptualizationof“dualcitizenship:”whereinnation-to-nationrelationships arerespectedinapoliticallandscapeofseparatenessratherthandifferenceand equalityratherthanpoliticalentrenchment(2013,84-96).Byengagingin electoralparticipation,Indigenouspeoplescanpushfortheoriginal nation-to-nationrelationshipsbetweenthemselvesandCanadiansandincrease theIndigenoussphereofinfluenceacrosstheCanadianlandscape(Cowie2013, 94).ThislatterbenefitcanfurtherexpandIndigenousidentityandcitizenship: pastbloodrelationsandtowardsacivicidentitythatexistsalongsideCanadian identities,thusreturningself-determinationtotheveryfoundationof communityandIndigenousidentityitself(Cowie2013,92-93).Itbecomesclear howbydefiningIndigenouspeoples’goalforself-determinationasthecreation ofa‘dual-citizenship,’theveryactofelectoralparticipationbecomesnecessary andproductiveforIndigenoussovereigntyandwell-being.

Lastly,Moyer’sconceptualizationofthe“fourrolesofsocialactivism” showshowitisshort-sightedtocategorizeIndigenouselectoralparticipationas counterintuitive(2001,21).Moyerdescribesfourrolesthatareallneededfor effectiveactivism:thecitizen,rebel,changeagent,andreformer,allofwhichcan beplayedeffectivelyorineffectively(2001,21).Thetworolesthatrelyon electoralparticipationarethecitizenandthereformer.Thecitizen’spurposeis “winningoverandinvolving”thegreaterpublicthroughdemonstrationsof “goodcitizenship,”whichkeepsthesocialmovementfrombeingrelegatedtothe fringesofsociety(Moyer2001,22-23).Oneoftheexplicitrolesofthecitizento dosois“advocat[ing]anddemonstrat[ing]awidelyheldvisionofthe democraticgoodsociety;”forIndigenousactivists,thoseengaginginelectoral participationarefillingthisroleeffectively(Moyer2001,24).Thereformer’sjob istoinstitutionalizenewlyacceptedalternativespushedforwardbytheother threerolesintoformalinstitutionsofsocietythroughlegislation,policies,and practices(Moyer2001,26).Inordertohavereformersabletoperformthisfinal act,Indigenouspeoplesmustworktoelectreformersintopositionsof institutionalpower.Therefore,electoralparticipationisarequirementforthe furtheringofIndigenousself-determinationactivism.Itiscrucialtonotethat underthismodel,thereisstillaroleforthosewishingtoengageinapoliticsof refusalpurely:therebel.Thekeyspecificityoftherebelisthateventhoughthey aremeanttogain

attentionforcausesthroughdramaticacts,theydosowiththegoalthatthose causescaneventuallybeformalizedbythereformer(Moyer2001,24).Murphy (2008)arguesthatelectoralparticipationhasbeenburdenedbyunrealistic expectationsofitsabilitytoresultinIndigenousself-determinationalone.By understandingthefourrolesofsocialactivismandapplyingthemtothegoalof dualcitizenship,itbecomesclearhowIndigenouselectoralparticipationisnota counterintuitiveactbutratheranecessarytoolforcooperationinthefightfor Indigenousself-determinationthatcannotworkalone.

Conclusion

Theuseofrationalchoicetheoryanddutyasexplanatoryfactors illustratestheideologicaldifferencesbetweenIndigenouselectoralparticipation andnon-participation.Theformerisdefinedbytheinfluenceofstrategyand representation,whilethelatterisdefinedbyalienationandIndigenous nationalism.Throughtheredefinitionofthegoalofself-determinationas towardsdualcitizenship,itbecomesclearthatIndigenouselectoralparticipation isnotcounterintuitivetogreatergoalsofsovereignty.Rather,itisamodeof activismthatfitsintoamoresignificantmodelthatrequiresandisfurther propelledbyitsachievements.Indigenousactivistsseekingself-determination mustcooperatewhethertheytaketheroleofrefusalorelectoralparticipation,as bothfunctionsarecrucialinthefightforsovereignty.

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Priests,Politicians,andPandemics:Driversof COVID-19ConspiracyTheoryBeliefinRomania

Edited

SaraParker

byLilyMason

(Daniel Mihailescu / AFP)

RomaniahasoneofthelowestratesofCOVID-19vaccinationinEurope; lessthanhalfthepopulationhasreceivedonedoseandlessthan10%have receivedtheirbooster(ECDC,2023).Theselowvaccinationratesarenotdueto alackofdoses,however,despiteanextensivevaccinationprogram,Romaniawas forcedtosellexpiringdosestocountrieslikeDenmark,Ireland,andSouth Korea.Rather,Romanianschosetonotgetvaccinated.Thispaperwillthus explorethedriversofCOVID-19conspiracytheory(CT)beliefinRomania, payingparticularattentiontothecontentofCTs,theliteratureaboutCTbelief, theliteratureaboutvaccinehesitancy,corruptioninRomania,andsourcesof institutionaldistrust.ItwillthenengageinaqualitativeanalysisofRomanian CTsandaquantitativeanalysisonsourcesofinstitutionaldistrustandvaccine hesitancy,demonstratingthatthecharacterofprominentCOVID-19CTsin Romaniahasstrongrootsininstitutionaldistrust,whichis,itself,correlatedwith lowvaccinerates.Ultimately,itarguesthatinstitutionaldistrust,asmotivatedby personaleconomichardship,increasestheprobabilitythatanindividualwill believeCOVID-19CTsinRomaniaand,therefore,thattheywillnotget vaccinated.

COVID-19ConspiracyTheoriesInRomania

ACTisdefined,forthepurposesofthispaper,asatheorythat“explains aneventorsetofcircumstancesastheresultofasecretplotbyusuallypowerful conspirators,”(Merriam-Webster).EverydominantCTregardingtheCOVID-19 virusinRomaniaimplicatesthegovernmentinaconspiracytocontrolthe population.AsdescribedinLupandMitrea’s(2021)studyonuniversity studentswithconspiracybeliefs,themostpervasivetheoryisthatthevirusisnot asdangerousasthegovernmentisleadingthepublictobelieve(7).Althoughnot assevereasothertheories–forexample,theassertionthatthepandemicisascam tousherintheNewWorldOrder–thiswidely-heldbeliefunderminesthe authorityofgovernmentandsowsdistrustinRomanian,European,and internationalinstitutions.Othertheoriesincludetheassertionthatthepandemic isaconspiracybypoliticalelitestorestrictandcontrolcitizens;thattheviruswas

createdbyscientistsinalab,likelyinWuhan,China;andthatthepandemicisa conspiracybyinterestgroups,likethepharmaceuticalindustry,forfinancialgain (LupandMitrea2021,7).ThesetheoriesweresupportedbyOrthodoxpriests, manyofwhomassuredtheircongregationsthatreceivingtheCOVID-19 vaccinationwasunnecessary(Higgins2021).TheRomanianOrthodoxChurch furtherrejectedacollaborationwiththenationalgovernmentonacoordinated vaccinationcampaign,citingtheirrefusalas“fundamentallyethical”becauseof theChurch’spromotionof“personalfreedom,”(Muresan2021).Additionally, somedoctorshavecontributedtotheCTs,includingFlaviaGrosan,a pulmonologistwhohasfalselyassertedthatCOVID-19shouldbetreatedlike pneumoniaandthatmedicaloxygenisdangeroustopatients.Althoughthe pandemicskepticswithinthereligiousandmedicalcommunitiesinRomania infrequentlysupportmajorCTsaboutaNewWorldOrderorthevirusbeing madeinalab,theyhaveallparroted–inonewayoranother–thetheorythatthe governmentisexaggeratingtheseverityofCOVID-19,andthatthesubsequent publichealthrestrictionsareameansofcontrollingthepopulation.

DriversOfConspiracyTheoryBelief–Literature

Evidently,itisnotsufficienttosimplycharacterizeCTs,wemustunderstand whypeopleareinclinedtobelievethem.ThedriversofCTbeliefhavebeena subjectofsocialscienceresearchsinceasearlyas1992,whenGoertzelconducted atelephonesurveyof348randomly-selectedNewJerseyresidentstounderstand thecharacteristicsunderpinningsusceptibilitytoCTbelief(Goertzel1994,733). GoertzelfoundthatCTbeliefwasnotsignificantlycorrelatedwithgender, education,oroccupation,butthattherewasahighcorrelationbetweenCT beliefandwhathecalls,“anomia”.Anomiareferstothebeliefthatthesituation oftheaveragepersonisgettingworse,thatitwouldbeunfairtobringachildinto theworldtoday,andthatmostpublicofficialsdonotcareabouttheaverage person.Inotherwords,pessimistsweremorelikelytobelieveinconspiracies (Goertzel1994,737).CastanhoSilva,Vegetti,andLittvaycontinuedthis researchin2017withasurveystudyon1415AmazonMechanicalTurkworkers intheUSthatattemptedtoidentifyapotentialrelationshipbetweenpopulist

attitudes(thebeliefinamalevolentgovernment)andCTbelief.Theyfoundthat populistpoliticalbeliefs,coupledwithlowlevelsofpoliticaltrust,increasedthe likelihoodthatsomeonewouldbelievethatthegovernmentisengagingina malevolentglobalconspiracy(CastanhoSilvaetal.2017,437).

DriversofConspiracyTheoryBelief–Romania

Someresearchershaveattemptedtospecificallyidentifythedriversof COVID-19CTbeliefinRomaniausingsurveymethodssimilartothose aforementioned.Achimescu,Sultanescu,andSultanescu(2020)conducteda websurveyof582Romanianadultstodetermineiftherewasaconnection betweendistrustinWesternactors(i.e.,theUS,theEuropeanUnion,and NATO)andnoncompliancewithCOVID-19publichealthguidelines(301). Theyhadtwokeyfindingsrelevanttothispaper:first,54%ofrespondentsagreed withatleastoneCOVID-19CT(suggestingthatapproximatelyhalfof RomaniansmaybelieveinCOVID-19CTsandtherebyassertingtheimportance ofunderstandingtheireffects),and,secondly,thatthelevelofconcernan individualhadaboutthespreadofthevirus–and,therefore,theiradherenceto publicguidelines–wassignificantlydependentontrustinRomanian governmentalinstitutions,illustratingtheimportanceofinstitutionaltrustin takingCOVID-19seriously(Achimescuetal.2020,305).Butoroiuetal.(2021) alsoconductedawebsurveyof945Romanians,aimedatunderstandingthe profilesofpeoplewhopubliclyendorseCOVID-19CTs.Theyfoundthat perceptionofonlinefakenews,perceivedusefulnessofsocialmedia,education level,andreligiosityweresignificantpredictorsofCTbelief(Butoroiuetal. 2021,7).Theauthorsspecificallyhighlighthighlevelsofchurchattendanceas beingassociatedwithanincreasedlikelihoodthatanindividualwillbelievein CTsaboutCOVID-19vaccines,pointingtotheimpactthatOrthodoxpriests havelikelyhadonspreadingCOVID-19CTsanddrivingthelowvaccination rate(Butoroiuetal.2021,10).Althoughbothstudiesarefairlysmall,andneither includespeoplefromallregionsofRomania,theyrepresentanimportantfirst stepinidentifyingthedriversofCOVID-19CTbeliefinthecountry.

VaccineHesitancy–Europe

Researchhasalsobeendonespecificallyondriversofvaccinehesitancy,the findingsofwhichbearsimilaritiestothedriversofCTbelief.Mostprominently, Jenningsetal.’s2021studyonCOVID-19vaccinehesitancyintheUKfound thatCTbeliefhadasignificanteffectonvaccinehesitancy,whilealsoidentifying aconsistentrelationshipbetweeninstitutionaldistrustandunwillingnesstoget theCOVID-19vaccine(8).Theyultimatelyconcludethat“holdingconspiracy beliefsisasignificantpredictorofvaccinehesitancy,”whileinstitutionaldistrust actsasakeypredictorofone’slikelihoodofholdingaCTbelief(Jenningsetal. 2021,10).Recio-Romanetal.(2021)findsimilarresultsintheirstudyon vaccinehesitancyandpoliticalpopulisminEurope.Usingthe2020 Eurobarometersurveyandaninvariantcross-nationalstudy,theauthorsfind that“distrustininstitutionswasthemainunderlyingdriverthatwasassociated withbothvaccinehesitancyandpoliticalpopulism,”(Recio-Romanetal.2021, 10).Mostnotablyforthispaper,Recio-Romanetal.concludethattheclusterof countriesofwhichRomaniawasapart(includingFrance,theUK,Spain, Greece,Bulgaria,andCroatia)hadthehighestratesofpopulism,institutional distrust,andbeliefthatvaccinesareuselesscomparedtotheotherEuropean clusters(2021,9).

VaccineHesitancy–Romania

Ahandfulofstudieshaveaimedtounderstandvaccinehesitancyspecificallyin Romaniaandhavefoundasimilarlinkwithinstitutionaldistrust.Forinstance, Radu(2021)usedthecityandsurroundingsuburbsofClujasacasestudy.He surveyedapproximately700citizensabouttheirdemographicindicators,trustin publicinstitutions,andcompliancewithpublichealthmeasures,andfoundthat citizenswithhightrustinpublicinstitutionsweremorelikelytofollow guidelines(Radu2021,143).Mikoetal.(2019)alsouseClujasacasestudyto assesstheprevalenceofvaccinehesitancy–notably,priortotheCOVID-19 pandemic.Theauthorsfoundthat30%ofrespondentswerehesitanttoreceive

vaccinesorallowtheirchildrentoreceiveit(Mikoetal.2019,6).Uponasking respondentswhytheywereskepticalofvaccines(specificallythoseagainst varicella,measles,andHPV),mostrespondedwithassertionsthatvariousmedia sourcesandsomepoliticalleadershadsoweddoubtabouttheirefficacy,while otherspointedtoageneralmistrustofthepharmaceuticalindustry(Mikoetal. 2019,8).

Bothpapersexperienceddifficultyinclearlyidentifyingthedriversof institutionaldistrustthatspecificallyledtovaccinehesitancy:Radu(2021) foundthatlevelofeducationhadaminimaleffectoninstitutionaltrust,while occupationhadastatisticallysignificantbutsmalleffectonfollowingpublic healthmeasures(139,142).Furthermore,Mikoetal.(2019)couldonlyspeculate aboutwhypeoplemistrustpoliticalleadersandthepharmaceuticalindustry, suggestingthatknowledge(oreducation)andaversenesstoriskcouldplayapart (7-9).ThefollowingsectionswillthereforeexploreRomanianinstitutional distrustinmoredetail.

CorruptioninRomania

TrustintheRomaniangovernmentishardtofind.Romaniaconsistently sitsatthetopofcorruptionlistsintheEuropeanUnion(in2020,Transparency Internationalrankeditthird)andreportsremarkablyhighratesofperceptionof corruption.Forinstance,22%ofRomaniansreportedhavingtobribehealth officialsforbasicservices(slippingthenurseafewbillstopayattentiontoa patientorchangeanIV,forexample),while51%ofRomaniansbelievethat MembersofParliamentareinvolvedincorruption(Transparency2021).These attitudesarebasedinhistoricalcontext:inconversation,manywillalludetothe notoriouslycorruptCeausescuregime,which,post-1989,gavewaytoanequally corruptdemocraticgovernmentconsistingofmany“reformed”ex-Communist officialsandfrequentlyembezzledmoney.Thispersistentcorruptionultimately complicatedRomania’scaseforascensiontotheEU.Discussionsbeganin2000, yetthecountrywasonlyadmittedsixyearslaterontheconditionthatit demonstratedsufficient“politicalwilltoestablishingruleoflawandcombating corruption”(Ristei2010,348).However,Romania’sfightagainstcorruption

hasachievedlimitedsuccess.Forthepasttwodecades,therulinggovernments havemaintainedapatternoflegislatingbywayofgovernmentordinancesor attachingbillstomotionsofconfidence,therebyeithernegatingtheroleof Parliamentinpassinglegislationorthreateningitwithanotherelection(Ristei 2010,342).Additionally,theautonomousanti-corruptiondirectorate(Directia NationalaAnticoruptie,orDNA),witha38-million-dollarannualbudget, focuses“disproportionatelyoneffectivenessofprosecutionattheexpenseof reasonableness,”(Mendelski2020,251).Mendelski(2020)essentiallyarguesthat theDNAhasfocusedtoomuchonachievingguiltyverdictsratherthanactually identifyingandpreventingcorruption.Citingthefactthat,between2009and 2015,corruptionconvictionsrosefrom22to879peryear,Mendelski(2020) showsthatthehasteRomanianprosecutorshaveexercisedinconvictingthose accusedofcorruptionhasunderminedtherighttoafairtrialandultimately derailedthefightagainstcorruption(238).

Corruption,therefore,isamajoraspectofRomanianpoliticalculture: politiciansaccuseoneanotherofcorruptpracticesfrequently,andmanymajor protestsinthepastdecadehavebeeninresponsetopubliccorruptionofthe nationalgovernment.Thecountryexperiencedtwoyearsofalmost-dailyprotests from2017to2019inresponsetoaseriesofsecretly-passedbillsthat decriminalizedabusesofpowerresultingindamagesofunder$50,000and pardonedconvictionsoflessthanfiveyears.Over500,000Romanians participated,makingthemthelargestdemonstrationsinRomaniasincethe overthrowoftheCeausescuregimein1989.

SourcesofInstitutionalDistrust

Asaresultofcorruption,institutionaldistrustispervasiveinRomania,however itssourceonanindividuallevelremainsdisputed;inotherwords,whydocertain peopleexperiencehigherlevelsofinstitutionaldistrustthanothers,despiteliving inthesameenvironment?MishlerandRose(2001)analyzed1998surveydata from“post-Communist”societies(thatis,Bulgaria,theCzechRepublic, Slovakia,Hungary,Poland,Romania,Slovenia,Belarus,Russia,andUkraine)in anattempttoidentifythekeydriversofpoliticaldistrust(40).Theyfoundthat

mostpeopletrustedreligiousandmilitaryinstitutionsandtheircommunity,but veryfewtrustedgovernmentinstitutions,likeParliament,orprivateenterprises (MishlerandRose2001,42).Notably,theyfoundthataggregateeconomicand politicalperformancehadlittleeffectoninstitutionaldistrust–inessence, people’sperceptionoftheirgovernment’seconomicorpoliticalperformancedid notnecessarilyaffecttheirtrustintheinstitutionsthemselves.Rather, evaluationsofpoliticalandeconomicperformanceastheypertaintoone’s personalconditionsweresignificantlymoreimportantinpredictinginstitutional trust.Respondentswhowere“hopefulabouttheirownhousehold’sfuture economicprospects”weremuchmorelikelytotrustpoliticalinstitutions (MishlerandRose2001,52).Puzzlingly,demographiccharacteristics,like education,gender,churchattendance,andemploymentstatuswereeithernot significantorhadinsignificanteffects,thereforemakingitdifficulttopinpoint theempiricalfactorsthatpredictinstitutionaltrust(MishlerandRose2001,50, 52).Drakosetal.(2019)complementthesefindings18yearslaterwiththeir explorationofthedeterminantsofinstitutionaltrustintimesoffinancialcrisis. UsingtheEurobarometersurvey,theyfindthatunemploymenthasaconsistent, althoughminor,effectontrustintheEuropeanCentralBank,theEuropean Parliament,andone’sownnationalgovernment(Drakosetal.2019,1239). Drakosetal.ultimatelyconcludethatone’spersonaleconomicconditionshavea directrelationshiptoinstitutionaltrust,particularlytowardsEuropean institutions(1243).

TheoreticalFramework

Mytheory,therefore,isthefollowing:anindividualexperiencingeconomic hardshipismorelikelytodistrusttheRomaniangovernmentandwillthusbe moresusceptibletoCOVID-19conspiracytheories,whichwillheavilyinfluence theirdecisiontonotgetvaccinated.Thiscanberepresentedindiagramonthe followingpage.

Ibelievethiswillbereflectedinanalysisofmainconspiracytheorysources,that willlikelyappealtofinancialfactors(suchasRomaniaspendinglotsofmoney onvaccines)andusepopulistmessaging(anti-COVID-19rhetoricoftencomes fromthemainpopulistparty,theAUR).Furthermore,aquantitativeanalysisof thesefactorsandvaccinationratesatthecountylevelwillshowanegative relationshipbetweenpersonaleconomichardshipandvaccinationstatus,with educationlevelandreligiosityhavinglittletonoeffectonvaccinationrates.

Methodology

Toassessthevalidityofmytheory,Iperformtwotypesofanalysis.First,I engageinaqualitative,textualanalysisofparticularlyimportantsourcesof COVID-19CTsinRomaniatoidentifyallusionstoindividualeconomic conditions,likeunemploymentasaresultoflockdownmeasures.Ithenconduct aquantitative,regressionanalysisofCOVID-19vaccinationratesand unemploymentratesatthecountylevel,withothervariableslikeeducation, religiosity,andAURsupport,toseewhetherthereisacorrelationbetween measuresofpersonaleconomichardship(suchasunemployment)andlow vaccinationrates.Inthequalitativeanalysis,Iaimtoidentifythepotentialtarget audienceofthosewhospreadCOVID-19CTs;astheCTsquestionthevalidity oftheCOVID-19vaccine,identifyingtheirtargetaudiencewillcontributeto ourunderstandingofwhattypeofpeoplearemoresusceptibletotheseCTs.In thequantitativeanalysis,Ihopetoprovethatincreasedprobabilityofbelieving inCTscontributestothedecisiontonotreceivethevaccinebymeasuringthe correlationbetweenmyestablisheddriversofCTbelief(institutionaldistrustas inspiredbypersonaleconomichardship)andvaccinationrates.

QualitativeAnalysisofConspiracyTheories

ActiveNews

ActiveNewsisanindependentRomanian-languagewebsitethatdescribes itselfasa“siteofuncensoredinformationandnews,conservativeanalysisand opinions,dedicatedtothedefenceoflife,family,faith,andnationalculture.”Itis alsoamajorsourceofCOVID-19CTs(asofApril2022,theirFacebookpagehas almost88,000likes),frequentlypostingimpassionedreportsofpeoplewhowere vaccinatedagainstCOVID-19andthenexperiencedseverehealthproblems relatedtothevaccine,suchasbloodclotsorthevirusitself.Otherarticlesonthe siteassertthatpublichealthmeasuresinRomaniaandothercountriesare “tyranny,”labellingvaccinepassportsasa“Nazi”inventiontotrackandcontrol everyone,andallegingtheCOVID-19vaccine“hybridises”one’sDNA.Inone notablearticlefromMarch2022,ActiveNewsarguesthattheCOVID-19 pandemicmaskeda“genocide”byglobalelites.Thearticlearguesthatdoctors inventedthevirustosupporta“maskedgenocide”necessaryforusheringinthe NewWorldOrder;hospitalsreceivedmoneyforsayingsomeone’scauseofdeath wasCOVID-19;hospitalpatientswere“automaticallydiagnosedwith COVID-19andthengiventhe‘anti-covid’protocol,amonstrosityofcriminal cocktailsdesignedto‘treat’anon-existentvirus,”;thegovernmentbanned autopsies;andthatvaccinepassportswereawaytoforcepeopletogetvaccinated sotheirDNAcanbealteredorsothattheycandieasaresultofcomplications fromthevaccine(ActiveNews2022).Thisarticledemonstratesextremedistrust ofinstitutions,bothinRomaniaandglobally,andaimstoexploitthereader’s distrustofthegovernmenttofurthertheCTaboutthe“NewWorldOrder.”All institutions,frominternationalbodiestolocalhospitals,areportrayedas malevolentandthewholepandemicistreatedasanelaborateconspiracyto controltheworld’spopulation.

AnotherActiveNewsarticleassertsthattheRomaniangovernmentlost95 millioneurosonunusedvaccines,pointingtotheincompetenceoftheMinistry ofFinanceandPresidentKlausIohannisinusinggovernmentfundsand planningthevaccinerollout(ActiveNews2022).Thisarticlerepresentstwo centralcomponentsofRomanianCOVID-19CTs.Firstly,itstokesinstitutional

distrust,thoughinadifferentmannerthanthepreviousarticle.Whereinthe “NewWorldOrder”pieceassertedthattheworld’sgovernmentsareevil,this articleassertsthattheRomaniannationalgovernmentisincompetent.Although takingdifferentangles,botharticlesareabletotapintothereader’sdistrustof theirgovernment.Secondly,byhighlightingthefinancialincompetenceofthe Romaniangovernment,thisarticleislikelymosteffectiveatattractingthe attentionofsomeonedependentongovernment-fundedsocialprograms.The article’stargetaudience,therefore,islikelycomposedofpeoplefacingpersonal financialchallenges.Inreality,thoughtheRomaniangovernmentmayhavelost money,itlikelydidnotlose19millioneurosonafailedvaccinationprogram. Althoughthegovernmentorderedasurplus(120milliondoses,or7.5dosesfor eachcitizen),itdidnotreceivealltheordereddosesandsoldatleast5million unitsofthesurplustoothercountries.

Populism

TheAlliancefortheUnionofRomanians(AUR)isaright-wingpopulist oppositionpartythathassurgedinpopularityoverthecourseofthepandemic. Thepartyhasfourmainpillarsreflectedintheirpolicies:family,nation, Christianfaith,andliberty,AccordingtoDoiciarandCretan(2021),public healthmeasuresandrisingunemploymenthavefacilitatedtheparty’sriseby givingitaplatformtoseverelycritiquethegovernmentandorganisemass proteststospreadpopulistideas(251).TheAUR’sconnectionto anti-COVID-19conspiraciesisclearinananalysisofitsleader,GeorgeSimion’s, Facebookpage.AsofMarch2022,Simionhas1.2millionfollowersonFacebook (forreference,Romaniaonlyhasapopulationof19million).Hefrequently postsunproducedvideosofhimselfdiscussingkeypoliticalissues,including(but notlimitedto)COVID-19.InavideofromMarch7,2021(thedaynewpublic healthmeasureswereannouncednationwide),Simionpostedavideoofhimself walkingthestreetsofBucharest.Thecaptionreads,“Redscriptagain! RestaurantsandschoolsareclosinginBucharest,Timis,andotherareas.[…] OthersdecideonbehalfofRomanians.It’stimeforprotests!”AlthoughSimion doesnotexplicitlyrepeataCT,thecontentofthisvideoevidentlyencouragesit: healludestothepreviousCommunistregimeandassertsthatpublichealth

measuresareintendedtofacilitatethegovernment’scontroloverthepopulation. ThissentimentisechoedinapostfromJuly8,2021,whichreads,“Only60new COVIDcases.CNSU[NationalCommitteeforEmergencySituations]proposes extendingthestateofemergency.”Again,publichealthmeasuresareportrayedas anexerciseofgovernmentcontroloverthepopulation,andtheseverityofthe COVID-19virusisignored.

Simionalsomakesconsistentappealstotheworkingclassandrural population.InaseriesofvideosfromJuly2021,Simioncampaignsagainsta draftordinancethatwouldrestricthowpeopleraisepigsintheirhouseholds.He interviewsvariousinhabitantsofruralareasanddisplaysclipsoffriendly-looking pigs,juxtaposingthiscontentwithclaimsthattheordinancewouldseverely impactpeoplewhoraisepigsforfoodandthepigsthemselves,whowouldhave tobefedwith“scraps.”Furthermore,inavideofromMarch22,2021,Simion makesaspeechtotheRomanianParliament,callingforaninterventionforthe miners“stranded”inCrucea,Suceava,duringamulti-daystrikeforunpaid wages;thecaptionreadsthattherequestwasrejected,butthattheAURwill “notgiveup.”Similartootherpopulistleaders,Simionconsistentlyportrays himselfasaherofortheworkingclass,which,inconjunctionwithhisstance againstthegovernment’spublichealthmeasures,demonstratesthathisprimary audienceisnotthemiddleorupperclass.

Simion’sstancesarefurtherexaggeratedbyDianaSosoaca,another RomanianParliamentarianandformermemberoftheAUR.AsofMarch2022, shehas452,000followersonFacebookandisknownforherrecordedanticsin Parliamentandpublicspaces.UnlikeSimion,Sosoacaisveryclearabouther endorsementofCOVID-19CTs.ThecoverphotoofherFacebookpageasof October2021isapictureoftheRomanianflagwiththetext,“Idonotweara mask,nordoIgetvaccinatedagainstCovid.IchoseGod!”Thisexemplifiesher consistentappealstoreligioninheranti-COVID-19rhetoric:Christianity appearsfrequentlyinRomaniandiscussionsaboutvaccinehesitancy;acommon refrainis,“ifGodwantsmetogetCOVID-19,Iwillgetit,”tojustifynot receivingthevaccine.SosoacaalsofrequentlyspreadstheCTthatCOVID-19isa conspiracybythegovernmenttocontrolthepopulation:thecaptionofalive videofromJuly12,2021,reads,“theCOVIDdictatorshipbeginsagain![…]

Eitheryouwillwakeuporitistheendoffreedom!”Thecommentsbelowthe postreflectasimilarnationalist,militantideal(e.g.,“Isworetofightformy country,”“Come,brothers,defendtheladysenator…”).Finally,Sosoacaalso appealstotheRomanianlowereconomicclass:thecaptionofalivevideo, showingapoorvillageinRomania,fromJuly3,2021,reads,“Extremepoverty livesonthebiggestgoldreserveofEurope–Romania,PlainofTears!The unimaginableghettosoftheGoldenZone!Howmuchlongercanyoustandit, PeopleofRomania?”

Intheirpopulistrhetoric,bothSimionandSosoacaspreadtheCOVID-19 CTthatthepandemic’shealthmeasuresarepartofaconspiracybythe governmenttocontrolthepopulation.TheothercontentontheirFacebook pagessuggestthattheirtargetaudiencesarelower-classRomanianswhoarelikely experiencingfinancialhardship;therearealsoindicationsthattheytargetdevout ChristiansduetoSosoaca’sallusionstoGodandtheAUR’sofficialpolicypillar ofChristianity.Thus,theydemonstratetheclearconnectionbetweenRomanian populismandanti-COVID-19sentiment.

QuantitativeAnalysis

Ialsoattempttoprovetheconnectionbetweeninstitutionaldistrustand beliefinCOVID-19CTsthroughquantitativeanalysisofvaccination, education,andunemploymentrates,numberofchurches,andAURsupportin Romania’s42counties.Althoughatownship-basedlevelofanalysiswouldbe preferabletocapturetheurban-ruralcleavage,onlycountyandregion-leveldata waspubliclyavailable.

Dependentvariable

MydependentvariableisthevaccinationrateineachcountyasofJuly 2021.Thisrate,aswellastheeligiblepopulationasawholeandpeoplewhohave receivedthevaccine,wasprovidedbytheGovernmentofRomania.Alow vaccinationrateisagoodmeasureofvaccinehesitancyinRomaniabecause,as establishedearlierinthepaper,vaccinehesitancyisakeydriveroflow vaccinationratesinthecountry(e.g.,Marcauetal.2021,260;Higgins2021).

Furthermore,thelowvaccinationratecannotbeattributedtopoorhealth infrastructureinruralareas,asthenationalgovernmentundertookspecific initiativestodelivervaccinestoruralvillagesinApril2021(HotNews.ro2021). Althoughaccesstoprimaryhealthcareinruralareasisundoubtedlylimited relativetoaccessinurbancities,thisisnotcitedintheliteratureasamajor componentindrivinglowvaccinationratesinRomania.

Independentvariables

Themainindependentvariableofinterestistheunemploymentrateper county.Thisvalueistreatedasaproxyforeconomichardship.Although householdincomedatawouldbepreferable,thisdataisonlyavailablefromthe censuswhichhasnotbeenconductedsince2011.Unemploymentratesare thereforeamorecurrentmeasureofpersonaleconomichardship.The unemploymentrateforeachcountywascalculatedusingdatafromthe GovernmentofRomaniawhichprovidesthetotalnumberofpeople unemployedinagivencounty,whichwasthendividedbythenumberofpeople eligibleforvaccinationasofJuly2021.Thevaccinationeligibilitynumberis suitablebecause,asofJuly2021,allRomanianadultswereeligiblefor vaccination.

TheotherindependentvariableisthepercentageofsupportfortheAUR inthe2020Romanianlegislativeelectionspercounty,determinedbydatafrom theRomanianNationalMediaAgency.Sincetheotherprominentpartiesin Parliamentleantowardsthecentre,thepercentageofAURsupportisconsidered ameasureofpopulistsupportineachcounty.

Controlvariables

Thecontrolvariablesarethenumberofchurchespercapitapercountyand thepercentageofadultswhoattendeduppersecondaryschoolorhigher.The dataonchurcheswastakenfromtheGovernmentofRomania,whilethe educationnumbersarefromEurostat.Themeasureofchurchespercapitais usedtodeterminetherelativereligiosityofeachcounty.Unfortunately,dueto thedelayofthe2021Romaniancensus,themostcurrenteducationnumbers wereonlyavailableonaregionallevel.Eachcountyinthedatasetwastherefore

assignedaregion;thus,theeducationvariablemaybeinaccurateformany counties.

Thehighereducationrateandothercombinationsofvariablesdidnot havestatisticallysignificanteffectsonthevaccinationrateineachcounty. Therefore,asevidencedbytheregressionresults,theunemploymentrateper county–which,recall,isaproxyforpersonaleconomichardship–isthe primaryvariabledeterminingvaccinationrates.Thisquantitativeanalysisthus supportsmytheoreticalframework.

Limitations

Thereareevidentlylimitationstothisquantitativeanalysis.Primarily,it doesnotexplicitlyengagewiththephenomenonofCOVID-19CTs;the vaccinationrateactsasaproxyforbeliefinCTs,buttheremaybeotherfactorsat play,suchasaccesstovaccinations.Themodeldoesnotaccountfordifferences betweenurbanandruralpopulations;peopleincitiesevidentlyhaveeasieraccess tovaccinations,althoughtheRomaniangovernmentdidlaunchamajor“mobile clinic”initiativetocompensateforpoormedicalserviceinruralregions. Furthermore,abetterwayofunderstandingthekeydriversofCTbeliefusing quantitativemethodswouldbealarge-Nanalysisofcommentsonposts containingoralludingtoCOVID-19CTs;ifIcouldidentifythefrequencyof keyconceptsinthecomments(suchas,God,jobs),Iwouldgainabetter understandingofwhyindividualssupportCTs.

However,besidestheselimitations,thestudyprovidesvaluableinsightinto driversofvaccinehesitancyinRomaniancounties.TheCTexplanation– that peoplefacingeconomichardshipareinclinedtodistrustinstitutionsandare thereforemorelikelytobelieveinCTs–isnecessarytoexplaintherelationship betweenunemploymentandvaccinationratesinthedata.

Conclusion

Thispaperhasexploredthesourcesofanti-COVID-19CTbeliefin Romaniaasawaytounderstandthecountry’slowvaccinationrate.Ithas engagedwiththeliteratureonCTbelief,vaccinehesitancy,andinstitutional distrust,andhasconductedanin-depthexplorationofRomanianCTsandtheir sources.Ithasproducedoriginalanalysisonthesubject,andsubstantially contributedtotheunderstandingofCTsinRomania.Ultimately,ithas establishedthatinstitutionaldistrust,asmotivatedbypersonaleconomic hardship,increasestheprobabilitythatsomeonewillbelieveanti-COVID-19 CTsinRomaniaand,therefore,choosenottogetvaccinated.Futureavenuesof researchshouldincludeamoredetailedexplorationofRomanians’interaction withCTsonlineandutiliseup-to-datecensusdataonceitbecomesavailable.

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State,Society,andRecklessSpending: 20thCenturyArgentina’sNearMisswith Superpowerdom

HarlanHutt

EditedbyEmilySegal

(Everett Collection)

TheRíodelaPlatariverbasinisamongstthemostresource-richregions onEarth.Theriverisflankedonallsidesbyfertileland,allowingforthe cultivationofbothcashcropsandsubsistenceagriculture.Theriversthemselves arepracticallyhighwaysforeconomicactivityandtrade,beingeasilynavigable, yetwideenoughforlargershipstotransit.Possessingafractionofthewealthof riverineconnectionsandnaturalresourceswithintheRiodelaPlatabasinwould beaboonforanynation,yet,oneholdsthelion’sshare:Argentina.Situated withintheSouthernConeregion,ArgentinacontrolsmuchoftheRiodela Platabasin,grantingitanenviablegeographicpositionrelativetoothernations. Argentina'speacefulneighborhoods,lackofinter-stateconflictsrelativetoother regions,andfavorablegeographymakeitspositionintheregionallthemore impressive.Bytheearly20thcentury,Argentinawasallbutguaranteedaseatat thetableofgreatpowers,forecastedtojointheUnitedStatesasthesecond independentEuropeansettlercolonysuperpower. However,asthe20thcenturyunfolded,thecountry’sprevious exponentialgrowthstagnated.TheFirstWorldWarandthesubsequentGreat Depressioninflictedrepeatedeconomiccrisesonthecountry.Argentinasoon descendedintoaseriesofmilitarycoupsandfraudulentelections,whichfurther destabilizedthecountryandpushedArgentinaintoanextendedperiodofsocial andeconomicdecline.Despiteareturntodemocracyin1983,theseproblems persistinpresent-dayArgentina.Whilevariousfactorscontributedto Argentina’sdescentintopoliticalcorruptionandinstability,theeffectsofits foundational economicstructurepermeatedintoallaspectsofArgentinianlife. Thus,thisessaywillarguethattheprimarycauseofArgentina’sexistential declineisitsdependenceonanexport-driveneconomyintheearly20thcentury, whichsetintomotionachainofeventsthatdroveArgentinafromanaspiring greatpowertoacountrymovingfromoneeconomiccatastrophetoanother.

Early20th-CenturyEconomicRise&theAgrarianEconomy

Argentinaenteredthe20thcenturyasarisingLatinAmericanpower. RidingawaveofEuropeanimmigrationandforeigninvestment,alongwith

policiesofeconomicliberalism,theArgentinepopulationquintupledandthe economyexploded,leadingtoArgentina’smeteoricrisefromafledgeling, post-colonialstate,toamajorexporterandgloballysignificanteconomicplayer (Whitaker1961,104).Argentinaenjoyedremarkablepoliticalstability,which attractedsubstantialEuropeanmigration,andprecipitatedmassiveforeign, particularlyBritish,investment.Theinfluxofforeigncapital,alongwithhigh demandforitschiefexports,beefandgrain,allowedsuccessiveArgentine governmentstoreinvestinpublicinfrastructureandprograms,includinga compulsory,freenationaleducationprogramunderLaw1420,andmassive expansionsofthedomesticrailwaynetwork(Mosk1990,88).AsaresultofLaw 1420,andbroadinvestmentsintosocialprogramsandeducation,literacyrates balloonedfrom22%toastaggering65%,andGDPjumpedalongsideit(Mosk 1990,89).

However,theexport-drivennatureoftheArgentineeconomygaveriseto aproblemthatwouldcharacterizemuchofmodernArgentina’shistory: corruption.EconomicelitesinBuenosAiresbecameincreasinglyinvestedin Argentineindustries,namelyagriculturalindustrieslikecattleandgrain.Asthey continuedtoinvest,theseelitesgrewintoapseudo-oligarchyandbeganto dominatetheArgentinepoliticalsystem.Thoughgoverningasanominal democracy,the‘cattlebarons’andgrainlobbyistsweredeeplyinvolvedinthe ArgentinegovernmentandfirmlyentrenchedinArgentina’spolitical institutions.Thoughotherfactorsinfluencedtheslowgrowthofurbanindustry, theprevailingfactorwasthebusinessinterestsoftheArgentineeconomicelite, whoprofitedimmenselyfromtheagrarianeconomy,andtheBritish-funded railwaysusedtobringgrainfromthefieldsofLaPampatothedocksofBuenos Aires(Wright1967,68).

Therefore,withelitescontinuouslyprofitingfromagrarianexports,there waslittleincentivetodiversifythecountry’seconomicactivity,norwastherethe capitaltodoso.Thoughoverseasinvestmentwasplentiful,foreigneconomic activitywasconcentratedoninfrastructure:particularly,railwayinfrastructure, toextractresourcesasefficientlyaspossible.Fundamentally,Argentina’sdecline beganasadirectresultofthisexport-driveneconomy.TheArgentinerulingelite consolidatedeconomicactivityintoagrarianindustries,creatingadominant

exporteconomyduringaperiodinwhichdemandforresourceslikebeefand grainwasextremelyhigh.Thoughthisallowedforaperiodofimmense economicstabilityandprosperity,italsocreatedastructurallyinflexible economyuniquelysusceptibletofluctuationsindemandforitsagricultural exports,and,therefore,unabletoadapttoradicalchangesintheglobaleconomy.

Argentina’sdependenceonagricultureisillustratedbyitsexportmetrics: in1870,Argentinaexported100,000tonsofwheatperyear-by1910,they exported2,500,000tons,amajorincrease,andasignificantportionof Argentina’sGDP(Mosk1990,89),Inthisrespect,early19th-centuryArgentina isnotunlikeChavez’sVenezuela,orthecontemporaryGulfstates:nationswhose economiesareentirelydominatedbytheeconomicactivityofonesector,and thereforemorevulnerabletocollapsesthancountrieswitheffectivelydiversified economies.Thiscollapsewouldreachitspeakin1933,andArgentinawas woefullyunpreparedforitsrepercussions(Haring,1936,506).Thoughmost,if notall,nationsexperiencedsignificanteconomicconsequencesasaresultofthe GreatDepression,theeconomicandpoliticalramificationsthatArgentina enduredweredistinctivelydestabilizing.

TheGreatDepression&StateDependenceonForeignCapital

LikemanyLatinAmericancountries,Argentina’srelianceonexportsand foreign,particularlyEuropeanandAmerican,investmentmadeitvulnerabletoa declineinpricesforrawmaterialsandagriculturalproducts(Haring1936,506). Agriculturalexportswerefurtherneuteredbyalacklusterharvestin1929, turninganalreadyseriouseconomicdownturnintoasubstantialeconomiccrisis (Federico2005,955).By1932,therelativepriceofArgentineagricultural productexportshadfallen37.7%from1929,oneofthehighestdeclinesin agriculturalrelativepriceamongagrariannationsintheAmericas(Federico 2005,955).

Furthermore,thesedeclineswereintensifiedbytheincreasinglackof foreigncapitalinvestedinthecountry,particularlyBritishcapital.Argentinahad, bythe20thcentury,becomeincreasinglyreliantonBritishinvestmentin domesticinfrastructure.ThisdominantrelianceisevidencedbyBritish

ownershipofsome66%oftheforty-thousandkilometersworthofrailwaysin Argentina(Duncan1937,559).However,by1932,Britain,sufferingcrippling economicconsequencesasaresultofthedepression,begantofavorprotectionist solutionstothecrisis,particularlythosefavoringCommonwealthnationsover foreigntradepartners(Wright1967,75).Thoughmirroringmuchoftheworld’s tilttowardsnationalisticsolutionstotheGreatDepression,Argentina nonethelesssufferedtheconsequencesofUKprotectionism,particularlyof colonialimports.Argentina’skeycompetitorsintheBritishmarket-the CommonwealthcountriesofCanadaandAustralia-weresimilarlyagrarian, settlercolonieswhostoodtobenefitimmenselyintheirrespectiverecovery effortsthroughBritishprotectionism.Thus,Argentina’seconomicsituation worsened,whileArgentinefarmers,amajorcomponentoftheagrarian economy,weredrivenbankrupt.

Inadditiontoagriculturalprotectionism,1932markedtheBritish government’simpositionoftheImperialPreference,asystemof mutually-reducedtariffsamongstBritishcolonieswiththestatedintentof increasinginternaltradewithintheCommonwealth(McGinty1945,525). Specifically,BritainsoughttoprotectCommonwealtheconomiesbyintroducing greatertariffsontheimportofforeignstaples,namelywheat,corn,and,crucially toArgentina,beef(WorldAffairs,83).Before1933,Britainhadboughtmore than90%ofArgentinebeefexports,andthepotentiallossoftheBritishmarket wouldhavebeenacatastrophicblowtobothArgentina’seconomyandthe “cattlebarons”whodominatedmuchoftheindustry(Duncan1937,76).

Unwillingtoacceptthelikelymassivelossofrevenue,Argentina’selites tookdrasticactiontomaintainaccesstotheBritishmarket,signingthe Roca-RuncimanTreatywiththeBritishin1933(Duncan1937,76).The Roca-RuncimanagreementsprovedmassivelyunpopularwiththeArgentine public.Britainwasgrantedsweepingeconomicprivileges,includingpreferred treatmentofBritish-ownedinfrastructureandpublicservices,inreturnfor Argentina’suninterruptedaccesstoanalreadydecliningBritishbeefmarket (Duncan1937,76).Thoughthetreatydidpreventthecompletecollapseof Argentina’scattleindustry,itlargelyservedthedeeplyvestedinterestsof Argentina’spoliticalandeconomicelite,whocontinuedtoprofitimmensely fromtheexportofbeef.

Asaconsequence,Argentineintellectuals,andeventually,thepublicat large,begantoperceivethisrelationshipasimperialistic,withBritaingradually usurpingcontrolovermuchofArgentina’sindustries,growingtodominate muchofArgentina’sbeefindustry.Thesemisguidedandflagrantlycorrupt effortstoinsulatetheeconomicelitefromtheongoingeconomiccrisisand failuretoalleviatethepublic’seconomicwoesledtopoliticalturmoiland dissatisfactionwiththeprevailingpolicyofeconomicliberalism.This disaffectionwiththecurrentpoliticalorderledtogrowingnationalismamong Argentines,especiallytheworkingclass,whoflockedtoradicalideasand candidatesinsearchofsomeonewhowouldrepresentandprotecttheirinterests.

TheRiseofPerónandEconomicReforms

TheseradicalideasandnationalisticfervorledtotheelectionofJuan DomingoPeróninthe1946presidentialelections,whocruisedtoan11-point victoryoverJoséTamborini’sRadicalCivicUnion.Perónhadpreviouslyserved inArgentina’sbriefmilitaryjunta,asbothSecretaryofLaborandVicePresident. PerónpromisedArgentineeconomicself-reliance,amessagethatresonatedwith vastswathsoftheArgentinepublic,whohadsufferednearlytwodecadesof economicmismanagementandforeigndominationofmuchofthecountry’s industries.Shortlyafterhisvictory,Perónbeganaprogramofself-sufficiencyand nationalizationtoaddressthepublic’sconcernsoverforeigninvestmentand influence.

Thefirst,andmostobvious,targetofthisprogramwasGreatBritain.By 1943,theBritishgovernmentownedacontrollingstakeofover70%ofArgentine railwayshares,andpriortreaties,likethepreviouslymentionedRoca-Runciman agreement,hadgreatlysolidifiedBritishdominationoverArgentineagriculture (Wright1967,84).Perón’sintentiontonationalizetherailwayshadbeen forecastedfarinadvanceofhisvictory:railwayunionswereamonghiskey supporters,whothrewtheirsupportbehindhiminexchangeforanenlargedrole intheoperationofrailways(Wright1967,84).Anexpandedrolewouldlikely requiregovernmentownershipoverthoserailways,lestPerónberequiredtohave everychangeapprovedbytheirBritishowners.

Beyondcampaignpromises,thenationalizationofrailwaysandother industrieswasanessentialcomponentofthenationalimagePerónhadcarefully craftedforhimselfandhisideology.Peróncreatedjusticialismo,anideology whichportrayeditselfasasupposed‘thirdposition’betweentheColdWar struggleofUS-stylecapitalismandSoviet-stylecommunism(McLynn1982,15). Justicialismo,andbyextension,Perón,supposedthatthispositionlayinbotha harshcondemnationofinternationalcapitalism,whichPerónhimselfdecriedas a“coldandinhumanforce,”andarejectionofcommunisminfavorofavaguely nationalisticalternative(McLynn1982,20).Justicialismowasinparta manifestationofPerón’spositioningofhimselfasArgentina’s‘economic liberator’:hedenouncedBritishownership,arguingthatforeigncontrolover essentialrailwayinfrastructurewasthegreatestobstacletorealizingthe“national aspirationofbeingeconomicallyindependentandpoliticallysovereign”(Wright 1967,84).ThoughhewasthefirstPresidenttoespousethesebeliefspublicly, theywereverymuchacontinuationofthedogmaadoptedbyanotably anti-BritishgroupofArgentina’sintellectualclass,whocriticizedBritain’snear monopolyofrailwaysandagricultureasaformof‘economicimperialism’ (Wright1967,83).ThiscombinationoffactorsdrewPerónandGreatBritainto thenegotiatingtableandorganizedtherailway’spurchasein1947.Perónlater issuedthe‘DeclarationofEconomicIndependenceoftheArgentineRepublic’ anddeclaredArgentinaliberatedfromforeigneconomicimperialism(Wright 1967,91).Thesebolddeclarationsillustratedtheissueofnationalization’s transitionfromapurelyeconomicconcerntoanimmenselysymbolicand emotionalissueamongArgentines.

Symbolicissueorotherwise,thepurchasewasnotsymbolicfor Argentina’streasury.Thepurchase,amountingto135millionpounds, equivalentto4.1billionin2022,ledtoatrendofstatespendingunderPerón. MuchofthisstatespendingcameintheformoftheoutwardlyambitiousFive YearPlan,introducedin1946.Theplan,billedbyPerónasaprogramthatwould “penetrateeverydepartmentofArgentinelife,”coveredeverythingfromland reformtolaborlawstosocialinsurance,withallitstenetsfallingunderthree categories:stategovernment,nationaldefense,andnationaleconomy(A.N.O, 398).Thenationaleconomy,thelargestbeneficiaryoftheplan,includedmassive67

investmentsintopublichealthprograms,sanitation,androadinfrastructure, alongwithplansforaguaranteedminimumwageandotherpromisestothe Argentinepopulation(A.N.O,399).Alongwithpublicprograms,Perón’splan soughttofinallydiversifytheArgentineeconomyawayfromtheagrarian industryandtowardsindustrializationandenergyindependence.Theplan includedbillionsofpesosinfundingforthedevelopmentofoilfields, hydroelectricity,naturalgas,andstate-ledindustrializationefforts(A.N.O,399). AlthoughtheFiveYearPlan’sprogramsprovedimmenselypopularwiththe Argentinepeople,theyalsoyetagainprovedcostly.Spendingballoonedduring Perón’spresidency,withtheplanaccountingforover1.65billionpounds.Along withthenationalizationofArgentina’srailways,thisexponentialincreasein spendingputimmensestrainonthestatetreasury.

Perón’snascentgovernmentalsofounditselfplaguedbyanother problem:lackofforeigncapital.WhereArgentinaoncehadbillionsofdollarsin foreigninvestmentstimulatingtheeconomy,by1947,ithadverylittle.Unlike theDepressionyears,thiswasnotduetoaneconomiccrisisbutafundamental mistrustofthePeróngovernmentamongstpotentialinvestors.Thoughrelatively stable,Perón’spenchantfornationalizationofforeignassetstroubledinvestors, whooptedtoinvestinnationswithgovernmentswhohadlittleriskof denouncingforeigncorporationsas‘imperialistic’andseizingtheirassetswhenit becamepoliticallyexpedientforthem.ThoughPerón’smovetowards nationalizationwouldhavelikelyoccurredeitherway,agradualprocessof nationalization,thoughfarlesspoliticallyadvantageous,wouldhaveallbut guaranteedacontinualflowofforeigninvestment.Instead,Perónchoseto alienateinvestorsandquicklydepletedmuchofthecapitalremainingwithin Argentinatofundhisgrandioseprojects.Althoughtheeconomyenteredabrief, five-year-longupswing,theeffectwastemporary,asanearly1950seconomic recessionrapidlyerodedthePeronistcoalitionofmilitary,union,andchurch leaderscollapsing(Little,661).

Perón’sfailedeconomicpoliciesweredoubtlesslythechieffactorbehind thecollapseofhisgoverningcoalitionandhissubsequentlossofpopularsupport amongstArgentines.Hisremovalthrougha1955militarycoup,dubbedthe RevoluciónLibertadora,placedyetanothermilitarydictatorshipinpower.

DespitePerón’sreformsbeingmetwithpopularsupport,theynonetheless continuedandacceleratedatrendofextremestatespendingwithinArgentina. WithforeigncapitalallbutevaporatedafterBritain’sdeparture,loanswere necessary,causingthenationaldebttoincreasesubstantially(Little1973,659). AnotherofPerón’sattemptstosolveoneofArgentina’smajor shortcomings,thestate’sexcessiverelianceonagricultureexports,generatedeven moreproblems.Peron’seffortstoimplementimport-substitution industrialization(ISI),whichinvolvedconcentratingstate-ledindustrialization effortsonreplacingforeignimportswithdomestically-producedproducts, reduceddependenceonforeignproductsandincreasingself-sufficiency (Alexander1960,166).Simultaneously,Perónintroducedastateagriculture monopoly,forcingfarmerstosellgrainandmeattothestatebelowglobalmarket prices,causingruralproductiontoshrink.Additionally,Perón’s‘socialjustice’ initiativesandtheFiveYearPlanmeantthatruralproducerswereexpectedto simultaneouslyabidebyagovernment-enforcedminimumwage,significantly increasingworkerpay,andselltheirproductstothegovernmentata below-marketrate(Alexander1960,166).Combined,thesefactorsmaderural agriculturelargelyunprofitable,and,predictably,theindustrydeclined substantiallyduringPerón’stenure.Despitehisintentions,thesemeasuresleft Perón’ssuccessorswithevenlesscapitalandflexibility.

DemocratizationandMenem’sreforms

Afterseveralyearsofregularshiftingbetweennominaldemocracyand militarydictatorship,the1983presidentialelectionbroughtthegovernmentof RaúlAlfonsíntopower.Whilethiselectioninitiallyprovidedhopethatanend toArgentina’seconomicstruggleswouldarrive,Alfonsín’sattemptsateconomic stabilizationfailed,andbythe1989election,hewasreplacedbyCarlosMenem,a self-identifiedPeronist.MeneminheritedanArgentinarifewitheconomic instability.In1998,anothereconomiccollapseunderAlfonsín’sadministration ledtomassivehyperinflation,withconsumerpricesrising3610%,greatly impactingtheaverageArgentine(Smith1991,45).Menem’ssolutiontothis crisiswasaradicalprogramofneoliberal‘freemarket’reformstotheArgentine

economy,explicitlyrejectingthePerónistlineofstate-ledeconomicdevelopment thathadpredominatedPerón’sregime(Smith1991,46).However,despitethis seemingrepudiationofPerón’seconomicpolicy,Menem’seconomicsretained animportantPerónistcharacteristic:excessivestatespending.

Menemengagedinaseriesofhigh-profileinfrastructureprojectswiththe intentionofrallyingpopularsupportaroundhisnascentgovernment. Emphasizingtheneedtomodernizedecrepitinfrastructure,Menem’s governmentinvestedbillionsintoroads,energyinfrastructure,healthcare,and otherpublicworksprojects(Wynia1991,58).Theseambitiousprojectswere funded,inpart,throughtheprivatizationofstate-runenterprises,includingthe nationalairline,phonecompany,coalandgascorporations,and,yetagain, Argentina’snationalrailways(Wynia1991,58).Thoughthesereformsonly provedtobemildlysuccessful,theyneverthelessallowedMenemtocoastto re-electioninthe1995presidentialrace.Althoughinitiallysuccessful,Menem’s privatizationfailedtoproducesufficientfinancialcapitaltofundhis infrastructureandsocialspendingprojects.Instead,Menem’sreforms fundamentallyoverextendedtheArgentinestate,whichwaseffectivelytryingto solvetoomanyproblemsatonce.Thoughintheshort-term,investmentin infrastructurecouldgeneratepopularsupport,overaprotractedperiodoftime, Argentinasimplylackedthefinancialcapitalandeconomicstabilitytoattempt sucheffortsatthemodernizationoftheirinfrastructure.Coupledwiththe pre-existingissueofhyperinflation,infrastructurespendingeventuallyforcedthe Argentineeconomyintoarecessionfrom1998until2002(Paddock2002,156). By2001,Argentinahaddefaultedon$93billionworthofexternaldebt,causing severecapitalflightasforeigninvestorsfledArgentinaforstablemarkets (Paddock2002,156).

MuchlikePerónbeforehim,Menem’spoliciesprovedtooambitiousfor thefragileArgentineeconomy,prioritizingspectacleoverpracticality.Menem investedbillionsintoinfrastructureandhealthcareprograms,improvinghis standingamongstthepublic,yetunderminingthestabilityoftheeconomy. Succinctlyput,MenemspentmoneytheArgentinestatedidnothave,tookout loansthestatecouldnotrepay,andspentthemoneytofinanceprojectsthat, whilepossessingshort-termupside,wereultimatelydetrimentaltolong-term

economicstability.Asaconsequence,theeconomicrecessionhastenedand plungedArgentinaintoyetanothereconomiccatastropheforwhichits governmenthadnosolution.ThoughMenemrejectedPerónisteconomicpolicy infavorofpragmaticneoliberalismtocombathyperinflation,histenure, particularlyhisextremestate-ledspending,mirrorsPerón’stenure,andwas,toan extent,acontinuationofhisoverspending,despitesomecontrasts,namely Menem’sprogramofprivatization.

Conclusion

Despitepossessinganenviablegeographicpositionandenteringthe20th centuryasaneconomicpowerhouse,Argentinafailedtocapitalizeandascendto thestatusofgreatpower.Fundamentally,therootofArgentina’sdeclineliesin theexporteconomy,whosenearcompleterelianceonagrarianexportsenabled rampantcorruptionthatkeptArgentinastagnantanddependentonforeign capital.Thiseconomicinfrastructureleftthecountrysusceptibletofutureglobal economiccrises,liketheGreatDepression,whichhasteneditseconomicdecline. Economicrecessionledtopoliticalturmoil,empoweringaseriesofcoupsthat wouldeventuallyresultintheriseofthePerónregime.AttemptsbyPerónto addresstheoverrelianceonagriculturalexportsanddependenceonforeign capitalledtothesuddendeclineofruralagriculture,andthecompletedeparture offoreigncapitalfromthecountry.Coupledwithextremespending,Argentina quicklydepleteditsfinancialresources.Finally,whendemocratizationoccurred andMenemeventuallyseizedpower,hisreforms,thoughdistinctfromPerón’s, continuedthetrendofspendingoutstrippingstatefunds,provokinganother catastrophiceconomicrecession.Therefore,Argentina’sfailuretocapitalizeon itsgreat-powerpotentialwasinevitable:internalmismanagement,intheformof overrelianceonagriculturalexports,relianceonforeigncapital,state overspending,andfailedeffortstoaddressallthree,wasfundamentallycausedby theArgentineexporteconomyoftheearly1900s,whichfailedtoindustrializeor adapttomarketchanges.Coupledwithinternalmismanagement,external events,likeglobalmarketcrashesandrecessions,exacerbatedthesefoundational flaws,andpushedArgentinafrompotentialgreatpowertoeconomicpariah.

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IndigenousDataSovereignty:TheCensusasan InstrumentofCanadianDecolonization

MadalenaMonteiro

EditedbyChloeMerritt

ThispaperexaminestheCanadiancensusasapotentpoliticaltechnology thathasservedcontradictoryfunctionsinbothconsolidatingstatepower andadvancinganticolonialprojects.Whilesomescholarscontendthatthe censusisaninherentlycolonialtool,acriticalanalysisofthehistoricaland contemporaryrelationshipbetweencensusdesign,statehood,anddata decolonizationunveilsamorenuancedpicture.Throughanexploration ofIndigenouscounter-censuses,whichseektoestablishIndigenous sovereigntyoverdata,thispaperilluminatesthepotentialofthecensusto challengecolonialstructuresandadvancetheself-governanceof Indigenouscommunitiesandresources.

Introduction

Thenotionofaccumulationbydispossessionliesattheheartofthe Canadiancolonialproject.Whenwetakestockoftheconsequencesof colonialism,weoftenthinkofdispossessionasitrelatestomaterialobjects,such aslandornaturalresources.Inpractice,however,controloverIndigenous peopleshasbeenexpressednotonlythroughmaterialdispossessionbutalso throughepistemicide:theongoingdenial,obstruction,andco-optionof Indigenousmodesofknowledgeproduction.Asthesettler-colonialstateseeksto legitimizeitselfandconsolidateitspower,itlatchesontothecensusasatoolto establishitselfastheultimateauthorityonthepeopleitgoverns.Indigenous peoplesarethusdispossessedofsovereigntyovertheirowndataandare transformedintoobjectsofthestate.

IndigenouscommunitiesinCanadahaveresistedcolonialdatacollection throughdatadecolonizationprojectsandcounter-censuses.Theseprojectsaim togatherinformationaboutIndigenouspeoplesforIndigenoususe,withthe ultimategoalofadvancingsovereigntyclaimsandinformingtheautonomous governanceofIndigenouspeoples,communities,andlands.Indigenous counter-censusescanthusbecharacterizedasanticolonialand sovereignty-affirmingprojects.Someacademicshavearguedthatthecensusisa colonialconstruction,andisthereforetooenmeshedwithcoloniallogicstoserve75

asatoolofdecolonization(Thompson2022). However,thispositionbetrays fundamentalassumptionsabouttheoriginsofthecensuswhilesimultaneously dissociatingIndigenouspeoplesfrommodernityandstatecraft.Inthefollowing pages,IwillarguethatIndigenouscounter-censuseshavedemonstratedthat,in thecorrectcontext,thecensuscanserveasaninstrumentofdecolonization.Iwill beginbydiscussingtheroleofthecensusasastate-buildingtoolandexamining howpreconceptionsaboutlegitimacycancreatehierarchiesindatacollection anduse.Inthesubsequentsection,Iwillprovideabriefoverviewofthe historicalrelationshipbetweencensusdesign,statehood,andcolonialism.Next,I willexplorehowdatasovereigntyinitiativeshaveservedtoadvanceIndigenous claimsaboutstatehoodandself-governance,followedbyadiscussionrelatingthe censustorationalizationandpower.Finally,Iwillconcludebyaddressing counter-argumentsandreassertingthelegitimacyofcensusesthatchallengethe colonialmold.

State-BuildingandtheCensus

LeadersofthedatasovereigntymovementconceptualizeIndigenousdata governanceasa“reciprocalrelationshipofdataforgovernanceandgovernanceof data,whichbothcontributetothecycleofnationanddatarebuildingandcenter onIndigenousconceptionsofsovereignty”(Leone2021,63).Gatheringinternal datathroughcounter-censusesallowsIndigenouspeoplestodevelopthe foundationaltoolstogoverntheircommunitiesandresourcesina self-determinedform.DatasovereigntyalsoreducesIndigenousdependenceon datacollectedbythecolonialstate,andbyextension,state-runprogramsand servicesthatsystematicallymarginalizeFirstNationscommunities.While governanceofdataimpliesrepossessionandself-definition,dataforgovernance impliesstatecraft,autonomy,andsovereignty.Bothimplydecolonizationthatis achievedthroughthedevelopmentofIndigenousdataecosystems. Thecensusisdeeplyrootedinnotionsoflegitimacy.BoththeCambridgeand CollinsEnglishDictionariesstipulatethatsurveysofagivenpopulationmustbe ‘official’toqualifyaslegitimatecensuses;however,neitherdictionaryspecifies whatcharacteristicsmakeabodyofficial,andbyextensioncapableofcarrying

outavalidcensus(CambridgeEnglishDictionary2021;CollinsEnglish Dictionary2014).Evaluatingthelegitimacyofacensusthusnecessitatesavalue judgementaboutwhetherornottheorganizationcarryingitoutcanbe consideredofficial.Itfollowsthattoconductacensusistoassertoneselfasa legitimatepoliticalbodywithsomeformofjurisdictionoveragivenpopulation. Regardlessofitscontents,carryingoutacensusisadistinctlypoliticalactthat carriesanimplicitclaimtolegitimacyandauthority. Historicallyandcurrently,muchofthedatacollectedbyIndigenous peopleshasbeendeemedillegitimatebyacademiaandthestate.Thiscanbe attributedinparttoepistemicbiases;culturally-informedWesternconceptions ofknowledgeoftenprivilegequantitativedataoverothermodesofresearch, particularlythosethatintersectwithspirituality.Indigenousculturesoften regard“place,cosmology,elders,dreams,visions,andpaths”aslegitimatesources ofknowledge,whileWesternerstendtoremainskepticalofnon-positivistmodes ofknowledgeproduction(Campbell2014,21).Oftenhowever,Indigenous data-collectioneffortsareimpededandmarginalizedbythecolonialstatebecause theyconflictwith“constanteffortsbygovernments,states,societiesand institutionstodenythehistoricalformations”ofIndigenousoppression(Smith 1999,4).InCanada,Indigenousresearchershavebeenforcedtopursuelegal actionagainstthefederalgovernmenttosecurethereleaseofresidentialschool documentswhichholdkeyinformationaboutthelocationsofmassgraves (PressProgress2017). Asrecentlyas2020,theCanadiangovernmentwona secondcourtcasethatblockedIndigenousresearchersfromcreatingstatistical reportsregardingabuseattheschools(PressProgress2017).Suchinstances reinforcethecolonialstateasthelegitimatecollectoranddeployerofIndigenous data.

Thenotionofthe‘expert’isanotheravenuethroughwhichCanadian colonizershavehistoricallyassertedtheirlegitimacyanddominanceover Indigenouscommunities.DevelopmentprojectsinFirstNationscommunities frequentlytaketheformofculturalimperialismwrappedinthetechnocratic knowledgeof‘expertise.’Forexample,in1964,NorthernCanadianbureaucrats undertookamissiontoreduce“tuberculosisrates,infantmortalityrates,and incidence[s]ofenvironmentaldiseases”thathadbeenrecordedinsurveysofthe

Inuitpopulation(Stevenson2012,592-613).Stateexpertsrecommendedthat traditionalaccommodationsandhuntingcampsbedismantledtoimprovehealth outcomesamongInuitpeoples,resultinginthemassdisplacementofentire communitiesandasuicideepidemicamongInuityouth(Stevenson2012, 592-613).

Similardynamicsareenabledbydata-collectiontoolssuchasthecensus, whichturncommunitiesofpeopleintoproblemstobesolvedbyexpertsinthe colonialbureaucracy.Expertiserevolvesaroundcertainmethodologies, particularlythosedrawnfromquantitativeandseeminglyobjectivesources— suchasthecensus.Asaresult,state-sponsoreddevelopmentexpertslookto censusresultstolegitimizetheirdevelopmentagendas.Sinceexpertsmustbe objective,theyarealsonecessarilyoutsiders,resultinginadynamicwherein Indigenousdataiscollectedandappropriatedwithoutinputfromthe communitiestargetedbydatacollectioninitiatives.Counter-censusesdisruptthis colonialdynamicbysituatingIndigenouspeoplesastherightfulexpertson Indigenousissues,data,anddatause.

Counter-censusesassertthelegitimacyofIndigenousgovernmentsand rejectthehierarchiesofdatacollectionestablishedbycolonialpowers.By counteringinformationcollectedbythestate,theyalsoestablishIndigenous communitiesastheultimateauthoritiesonIndigenousinformation,thereby challengingthecolonialstructuresthatrestrict,co-opt,andmarginalize internally-generatedIndigenousdata.

TheCensusAsaColonialInstrument

InhisiconicbookSeeingLikeaState,JamesScottdescribesthecensusasa toolusedbycolonialstatestoincreasethelegibilityofagiventerritory(Scott 1998,2). Therationalizationofdiversepopulationssimplifiesbasicfunctions suchastaxation,conscription,andthepreventionofrebellion,thusfacilitating thestate’sinterventionsinandmanipulationsofsociallife.InCanada,effortsto defineandenumerateIndigenouspopulationsemergedasearlyas1677,when theBritishgovernmentorderedofficialsurveysofNativecommunitiesandtheir assets(StatisticsCanada2015).Initialcensuses,whichlargelyexcludedwomen

andchildren,aimedtodeterminethenumberofwarriorsresidinginvarious tribes;the1677census,forexample,identified2,340warriorsbelongingtothe Mohawk,Oneida,Onondaga,Cayuga,andSenecanations(StatisticsCanada 2015).Thedatacollectedthroughtheseinitiativeswaslaterusedtoinform militarystrategyin1687,whenBritishforcesfoughttofurtherexpandtheir coloniesintoIndigenousterritories(GovernmentofCanada2018). WhileearlysurveysreliedoninformationgatheredinternallybyIndigenous communities,thecolonialstateeventuallybegantoconducttop-down enumerationsofthepeopleslivingwithinitsborders.Autonomyoverdata collectionwasstrippedfromIndigenousgroupsandrelocatedwithinthestate’s sphereofauthority,thusarmingthenewCanadiangovernmentwiththemeans toreconstructIndigenousidentityinwaysamenabletopolicyintervention. Censusdataeasedtheadministrativeburdenofthestateasitcarriedoutvarious disciplinaryandbiopoliticalprojects,includingtheenrollmentofIndigenous childreninresidentialschools,theimpositionofCatholicism,theseizureof Indigenousterritory,andtheforcedrelocationofIndigenouspeoplesinto agriculturallabour(Andersen2013,625-650). Thetransformationofrobust socialrealitiesintostaticcategoriesallowedtheCanadiangovernmentto rearrangeitspopulationinwaysthatincreasedlegibilityandstrengthenedthe state’scoerciveapparatus,therebytransformingrealpeopleandcommunities intoresourceswithinacentralized,utilitarianlogic.

Evidently,thecensusisapotentpoliticalinstrumentwhich,whenallied withideologicalpower,hasthecapacitytoreimagineandreconstructtherealities itrepresents.Inthehandsofthestate,thecensusfunctionedtoimposeWestern rationalitiesuponformerly-independentNorthAmericancivilizations.Inthe handsofIndigenouscommunitieshowever,ithashadthepowertochallenge contemporarynotionsofdataownershipanduseinadistinctlyanticolonialway. ThefollowingsectionsanalyzehowIndigenouscommunitiesinmodern-day Canadahavemadeuseofthecensustoasserttheirautonomyandchallenge colonialstructures.

Counter-CensusesinPractice

Whilethecensushasbeenusedtofurthercolonialaims,ithasalsoformed

thebackboneof Indigenous-leddevelopment.TheFirstNationsIndigenous GovernanceCenter(FNIGC)isoneoftheleadingCanadianorganizations engagedindatasovereigntyinitiatives.CensusesconductedbytheFNIGC includetheFirstNationsRegionalHealthSurvey,theFirstNationsRegional EarlyChildhood,Education,andEmploymentSurvey,andtheFirstNations LabourandEmploymentDevelopmentsurvey(FNIGC2022).Censusesare usedtoinformIndigenous-leddevelopmentprojects,includingTheAboriginal DiabetesInitiative,TheAboriginalHeadStartProgramonReserve,The Children’sOralHealthInitiative,TheMaternalChildHealthProgram,andThe NationalAboriginalYouthSuicidePreventionprogram(FNIGC2022).

Theprograms’focusonhealthisnotable,ashealthservicesaretraditionally providedbyCanada’sprovincialgovernments.Healthcarehasalsohistorically beenamajordriverofanimositybetweenIndigenouscommunitiesandthe Canadianstate,largelybecauseofracismandbarrierstoaccessexperiencedby IndigenousCanadiansattemptingtosecureservices.Further,Westernmodelsof medicinetendtoprivilegetangibleindicatorsofhealthoverpatientexperience, whileIndigenousmodelsoftenfavourmorepatient-centeredapproaches (NCCIH2022). TheFirstNationsHealthAuthority(FNHA),anNGO operatinginBritishColumbia,has“implementedholisticandaffirmative [censuses]totrackFirstNationshealthwithintheprovince”(Geddes2022). DatagatheredbytheFNHAisusedtoinformworkshopsandprovide internally-directedhealthcareservices,allofwhichareorientedtowards advancing“Firstnationsself-determinationandtraditions”(Geddes2022).

ThehealthdisparitiesexperiencedbyIndigenouscommunitiesare manifestationsofcolonialismthattheFNIGCandFNHAhavesoughtto challengethroughdatacollectioninitiativesandincreasedself-sufficiency.Itis distinctlyanticolonialtoconductacensusandusetheinformationgathered fromittoperformastatefunction.Bycollectingandusingcensusdatato addressfailuresoftheCanadianstate,theFNIGCandFNHAdemonstratethat Indigenouscommunitiesaremorecapableofperformingcertainstatefunctions thantheircolonizers.Thisdemonstrationofself-relianceisacrucialsteptowards establishingdefactoIndigenousstatehoodandself-governance.

AsScottwritesinSeeingLikeaState,censuses“havethepowerto

transformthefactstheytakenoteof”(Scott1998,9).Censusesaregenerative;by constructingandcategorizingIndigenouspeoples,theytransformthewaysin whichthegeneralpublicconceptualizesindigeneity.Insomeinstances, counter-censuseshavefunctionedtoreconstructpopularnotionsofindigeneity tobetterreflecttherealitiesofIndigenousidentity.Asof2021,theCanadian censusasksrespondentswhethertheyidentifyas“Indigenous,”with subcategoriesallowingfor“Metis”and“Inuit”identification(StatisticsCanada 2022).ManyIndigenousCanadianshaveexpressedtheirdistasteforthese signifiers,arguingthatlabelssuchas‘Indigenous’or‘FirstNations’define Indigenouspeoplesinrelationtotheircolonizers.Theterm‘Indigenous’does notdenoteanyparticularculture,linguistictradition,orgeography.Rather,itis givenmeaningbyitsdisjunctrelationshipwiththesettlerswhoarrivedin Canadaanddisplacedpre-existingcivilizations.

Today,thehomogenizinglabelof‘Indigenous’hasbeenrejectedbymany Canadiancommunitiesandtribes,who“continuetoresistcolonialidentification throughmeansofself-determinationandself-identification”(Leone2021,43). Thecounter-censushasbeenanimportanttoolinadvancingIndigenous self-identificationanddismantlingcolonialracializationandclassification schemes.ManyofthesurveysconductedbygroupsliketheFNIGCprompt respondentstowriteintheirowngenealogicalinformationratherthanproviding preselectedoptions.ByencouragingmembersoftheIndigenouspopulationto formallyidentifywiththeirancestralcommunities,groupssuchastheFNIGC begintodismantlethehomogenizingclassificationmechanismsthatlabelall membersofdiverseandancientNorthAmericancivilizationsassimply ‘Indigenous.’

RationalizationandPower

ThewritingsofMichelFoucaultandGillesDeleuzehighlightthewaysinwhich thecensus,asapoliticaltechnology,isusedtoimposestatepowerandsubjectify individuals,yetalsohasthepotentialtoshiftpowerdynamicsandincrease agencyformarginalizedcommunities.Foucaultimaginesstatepowerasbotha totalizingandindividualizingforcewhichbothgroupsindividualsintoamass, 81

andimposesuponthemaprocessofself-definitionthatismediatedbyan externalauthority(1982,785).Thisistheprocessbywhichindividualsare transformedintosubjectsofthestate(Foucault1982,785).Thecensus,which groups,enumerates,andidentifiesindividuals,isoneofmanypolitical technologiesaidingtheprocessofsubjectification.Deleuzeexpandsonthis notioninPostscriptontheSocietiesofControl,writingthat“thenumerical languageofcontrolismadeofcodesthatmarkaccesstoinformation… individualshavebecomedividuals”(Deleuze1992,5). ForDeleuze,technologies suchasthecensusindicatethattheindividualselfisnolongeranindivisible entity;thepowerofthecensusliesinitsabilitytostripbitsofinformationfrom theindividualandreconstitutetheminwaysbeyondtheindividual’scontrol, enforcingone’spositionassubject.

ToFoucault,powerisaconstitutiveforce,linkedcloselywithcapacityfor action—particularlyactionwhichtakestheformofgovernance(Foucault1982, 790). Powerisdiffusedthroughsocietybywayofknowledge,makingquestions ofauthorityovertruthanddatacentraltothelegitimizationofgoverningbodies. Toconductacensus,andbyextension,toclaimownershipoverdataandtruth,is adeploymentofpower.Crucially,Foucaultdoesnotconceiveofpowerasan inherentlynegativeforce,oradisavowaloffreedom.Rather,itisembeddedin thefabricofsocialreality.Themosteffectivemodesofresistancedonotseekto opposepoweritself,butinsteadseekto“[detach]thepoweroftruthfromthe formsofhegemony…withinwhichitoperatesatthepresenttime”(Foucault 1984,75).

Counter-censusesdetachtruthfromhegemonybyestablishingtechniques ofknowledgethatfalloutsidethepurviewofthestate.Thecensus’anticolonial potentialliesinitsabilitytorelocateclaimsregardingauthorityovertruthfrom theCanadianstatetoIndigenouscommunities,therebytransformingthose communitiesfromrecipientstomobilizersofpower.Thecensusisthereforenot aninherentlyoppressivetool,butaninstrumentofpowerthatfunctionsto increasethecapacityforgovernmentofthosewhodeployit.

Counter-Arguments

Someacademicshavearguedthatthecensusisacolonialconstruction,and

canthereforeneverassistintheliberationofthepopulationitwasdesignedto objectify(Thompson2022).Othershaveaddedthatthequantitative enumerationwhichcharacterizesthecensusisinherentlyopposedtoIndigenous epistemologicaltraditions.Forexample,Evanset.al.listIndigenousresearch methodsas“storytelling,personalreflection,visiting,sharingcircles,ceremony, artcreation,anddance”(2015,1663). Whiletherecertainlyoughttobeaplaceforalternativemodesof knowledgeproductioninacademia,topresenttheaforementionedlistof researchmethodsasanexhaustiveaccountofIndigenousepistemologiesisto divorceIndigenouscommunitiesfromstatecraftandmodernity.Historically, mainstreamnotionsofwhichactivitiescanandcannotbeconsidered ‘Indigenous’havebeenexternallyimposed,staticcategoriesthatcaricaturize IndigeneityandreduceIndigenousculturetoitsformatthepointofinitial colonialcontact.ThistraditionisdeeplyembeddedinCanadianlaw,partiallyas aconsequenceofthelandmark1996SupremeCourtcaseR.vVanderPeet.Van derPeet,amemberoftheStó:lōFirstNationinBritishColumbia,wascharged withsellingtensalmoncaughtundertheauthorityofafish-foodlicense.The provincearguedthatrestrictionsposedbys.27(5)oftheBritishColumbia Fishery(General)Regulationsprohibitedthesaleoffishobtainedundersucha license;VandePeetarguedthattheserestrictionsinfringedupons.35(1)ofthe ConstitutionAct(SupremeCourtofCanada1996). Akeyelementofthecase wasChiefJusticeJosephLamer’sdecisiontoadopta‘frozenrights’approach, whichdefinedIndigenousactivitiesusingthefollowingcriterion:

Lamer’srulingestablishedaprecedentrequiringfutureIndigenousclaimantsto demonstratecontinuitybetweentheirpresent-dayactivitiesandthosepracticed priortothearrivalofEuropeansinNorthAmerica.Lamer’smetric,knownin Canadianlawasthe‘VanderPeettest,’determinedthatestablishingsucha linkagewouldallowanactivitytobedeemed‘Aboriginal.’

Itispreciselythosepresentpractices,customsandtraditionswhichcanbe identifiedashavingcontinuitywiththepractices,customsandtraditions thatexistedpriortocontactthatwillbethebasisfortheidentificationand definitionofAboriginalrightsunders.35(1)(Primeau2010,63).

Lamer’sapproachfailedtorecognizethatIndigenouscultures,likeanyothers, areinaconstantstateofflux;theyundergotransformationsandevolutionsand arenotincompatiblewithmodernity.Hisrulingdemonstrateshowdominant, staticcharacterizationsofindigeneityhavecontinuedtoimpedeIndigenous developmentinitiatives,excludingIndigenouscommunitiesfromthetemporal flexibilitythatotherculturesareassumedtobeentitledto.

SuggestingthecensusopposesIndigenousepistemologiesextendsthelogic oftheVanderPeetcase.IntheWesternimagination,Indigenousknowledgeis reducedtothepassingofsacredancestralmythologiesdownthrough generations,unchangingoverthepastsixcenturies.However,Indigenous communitiesarenotfrozenintime;theyholdimportanttraditionalknowledge, buttheyarealsomembersofevolvingmoderncivilizationsandshouldnotbe excludedfrompopularquantitativemodesofresearch.DiscountingIndigenous perspectives,andlimitingIndigenousformsofknowledgeto15th-century methodologies,arebothactsofIndigenouserasure.

Thenotionofthecensusasacolonialconstructionisalsomore complicatedthansomeresearcherswouldsuggest.Whilelittleisknownabout thepre-colonialpracticesofCanadianIndigenousgroups,evidenceof census-takingasastate-buildingexercisehasbeenfoundamongancientsocieties elsewhereintheworld,longbeforetheadventofcolonialism.Inpre-colonial India,humaninventorieswereundertakenfortaxationpurposesandto determinethepopulationsofgivencastes(Peabody2001,823). InEgyptand China,censusadministrationforthepurposeofstate-buildingoccurredasearly as2,500BCand2AD,respectively(OfficeforNationalStatistics2022). In short,whilethecensushasbeenusedtofurthercolonialaims,itisnotan inherentlycolonialconstruction.Theprimarypurposeofthecensusistocement thelegitimacyofagoverningbodyandtobringapopulationunderthecontrol oftheactorthatiscollectingdata.Whenstate-buildingactivitiesarepracticedby colonialpowers,theyreaffirmcolonialism;whentheyarepracticedbyoppressed groups,theyaresovereignty-affirming.

Conclusion

AstheInformationAgeunfolds,dataisbecominganincreasingly

importantresource.PatFoster,aresearchanalystattheFirstNations InformationGovernanceCenter,hasbeenaleadingvoiceamongIndigenous activistsexpressingconcernovertheencroachmentoftwotechnologies—big dataandartificialintelligence—intodatacollectionspacesformerly monopolizedbytheCanadianstate(Leone2021,174).Newmodesofdata collectionpromisetoeasetheadministrativeburdenofthestate’sdata-collection initiatives;inseveralWesterncountries,includingCanada,theyarebeing employedwithincreasingregularitytofillinformationgapswith externally-generatedapproximationsandaggregations(Leone2021,174). While newtechnologiesareimbuedwithanauraofneutrality,theyaredeeplypolitical; theyareengineeredandoperatedbypeople,andtheprioritiesandbiasesoftheir designersareembeddedintotheiralgorithms.Further,theabstractionofthese technologiesfromthecommunities,individuals,andproblemstheydescribe threatenstoreinforcethepassiveobjectificationofIndigenouspeopleswhile expandingtheinterventionistcapacitiesoftheCanadianstate.Fosterarticulated thisconcernina2021interview,remarkingthat:

Itwon’tbelongbeforesurveysaren’tbeingdonebecauseAIcandoit quicker…[but]theworldviewwehaveversustherestoftheWestern civilization,thatcan’tbemodeled,itcan’tbearticulatedintheformof artificialintelligence.So,it’scriticalthatanIndigenouswayevolves (Leone2021,174).

Emergingtechnologiespromisetopavethewayformoretotalizingformsof colonialcontrol.Inthewakeofthesedevelopments,itiscrucialthatIndigenous communitiesestablishindependentinformation-gatheringsystems,suchas counter-censuses,toassistintheiranti-colonialendeavours.

Thisphenomenonisoccurringatacriticaljunctureintime,duringwhich pressureismountingontheCanadianstatetoconfrontbothitscoloniallegacy anditscontinuingappropriationofIndigenousassets.Thedecolonizationof Indigenousdatahasprovedtobeastickingpointforthestate’sreconciliation efforts;torelinquishcontroloverdatais,afterall,toyieldsomedegreeofstate sovereignty.Inthewakeofcontinuingcolonialoccupation,Indigenous

communitieshaveseizedownershipovertheirowndatathroughcounter-census initiatives,andindoingsohavetakenonmanyoftheresponsibilities traditionallyheldbytheCanadianstate.Muchofthecontentcontainedin counter-censusesisalsodistinctlyanticolonial,andhasassistedineffortsto challengetheconstructionandclassificationofIndigenouspeoplesbythestate. Inlightofthesuccessofcounter-censusinitiatives,wecanbegintoimaginea futurewhereinCanada’sIndigenouscommunitiescanusetheirowndatato informtheirstate-buildingendeavoursandassistintheself-governanceoftheir peoples,lands,andresources.

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CambridgeEnglishDictionary,4thed.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 2021.S.v.“Census.”

Campbell,T.D.“AClashofParadigms?WesternandIndigenousViewson Health ResearchInvolvingAboriginalPeoples,”NursingResearch,no.6 (2014):39-43.

CollinsEnglishDictionary,12thed.Glasgow:HarperCollins,2014.S.v. “Census.”

Deleuze,Gilles.“PostscriptontheSocietiesofControl,”October,no.59(1992): 3-7.

Evanset.al.“VisibilityandVoice:AboriginalPeopleExperienceCulturallySafe andUnsafeHealthCare,”QualitativeHealthResearch,no.25(2015): 1662-1674.

FirstNationsInformationGovernanceCenter.“OurImpact.”Accessed2022.

Foucault,Michel.“SubjectandPower,”CriticalInquiry,no.8(1982):777-795.

Foucault,Michel.“TheFoucaultReader(1926-1984).”(NewYork:Pantheon Books,1984).

Geddes,B.“MeasuringWellness:AnIndicatorDevelopmentGuideforFirst Nations.”BCFirstNationsDataGovernanceInitiative,Accessed2022.

GovernmentofCanada.“TheArrivaloftheEuropeans:17thCenturyWars.” NationalSecurityandDefense,2018.

Leone,Donald.“DataColonialisminCanada:DecolonizingDatathrough IndigenousDataGovernance,”M.A.diss.,(CarletonUniversity,2021).

NationalCollaboratingCenterforIndigenousHealth.“AccesstoHealth ServicesasaSocialDeterminantofFirstNations,Inuit,andMétisHealth.” Accessed2022.

OfficeforNationalStatistics.“Census-TakingintheAncientWorld.”Accessed 2022.

Peabody,Norbert.“Cents,Sense,Census:HumanInventoriesinLate PrecolonialandEarlyColonialIndia,”ComparativeStudiesinSocietyand History,no.42(2001):819-850.

Primeau,Stefanie.“Modernity,ResourceDevelopmentandConstructsof Indigeneity:ASummaryAnalysisofCanadianJurisprudenceandAboriginal Rights,”M.A.diss.,(YorkUniversity,2010).

R.v.VanderPeet(SupremeCourtofCanada1996)

Scott,James.“SeeingLikeaState.”(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1998).

Smith,Linda.“DecolonizingMethodologies:ResearchandIndigenousPeoples.” (London:ZedBooks,1999).

StaffWriters.“WhyNo-OneKnowsHowManyChildrenDiedInsideCanada’s ResidentialSchools.”PressProgress,2017.

StatisticsCanada.“AboriginalPeoples.”CensusesofCanada1665-1871,2015. StatisticsCanada.CensusProfile.2021CensusofPopulation.StatisticsCanada Catalogueno.98-316-X2021001.Ottawa:StatisticsCanada.Released2022.

Stevenson,Lisa.“ThePsychicLifeofBiopolitics:Survival,Cooperation,and InuitCommunity,”AmericanEthnologist,no.39(2012):592-613.

Thompson,Debra.GuestLecture.McGillUniversity,2022.

ADefenseofIslamicSectarianism

Hussain

EditedbyCateyFifield

Zahra

Islamicsectarianismisoftenwronglyconflatedwithideasofsectarian discriminationandviolence.Sectarianismisawordwithmany definitions,andthesedefinitionsareneutralatbestandnegativeatworst. Thispaperproposesanewdefinitionofsectarianism—asectarianism concernedwithvalidatingandempoweringtheparticipationofdifferent sectsinthesamesphereofreligiousjurisprudence.Itthenarguesthat sectarianviolenceisnotaresultofsectarianismbutisratheraproductof politicalgroupscapitalizingonsectariandivides.Finally,thepaper concludesbyexplainingthepotentialcontributionsofthisnew “sectarianism”toreligioussociety.Thispaperarguesthatsectarianismcan helptocreateamoredemocraticIslambymoderatingextremistgroups, empoweringminoritysects,andimprovingunderstandingsofIslamic ideologies.

KeyWords

Shi’a,Sunni,religiousviolence,Islamicjurisprudence,democracy

Introduction

Sectarianismhasbecomeabuzzwordinmodernpoliticaldiscourse, especiallyasitpertainstoIslamandtheArabworld.Thewordisrarelyfreeof negativeconnotationsandisoftenusedinterchangeablywith“sectarian violence”and“sectariandiscrimination.”Yet,theword“sect”didnotoriginatein anegativecontext.Theearliestdefinitionsoftheworddescribesectsinneutral termsandincontrasttotheprincipalleadershipoftheRomanCatholicChurch. ViewedthroughanIslamiclens,thewordbecomesevenmoreneutral:agiven sectisnotsetininferiorityorsuperioritytoanyotherbutisratherunderstood simplyasoneofmanydifferentiatedgroupsundertheumbrellareligionofIslam. IwilldiscussinparticularthemostprominentoftheIslamicsects:theSunnis andtheShi’ites.

TheSunni-Shi’aenmityisoneofthemainissuesraisedindiscussionsof

sectarianism,withmuchofrecentconflictintheArabworldbeingblamedon thisdivide.Idisagreewiththeattributionofblamefortheseconflictstothe Sunni-Shi’adivideandbuildmyargumentonthispoint.Evaluatingtheorigins oftheword“sectarianism,”Iarguefirstthatwithoutcontextualmodifiersthe wordisneutral.Next,Iproposeacounter-definition—onethatpaints sectarianisminapositivelightandtakesitsmeaningtobetheequalityand inclusionofdistinctreligiousgroupsadheringtothesamebasicsetofreligious beliefs.Ithendiscusstheframingofsectarianismasadiscriminatoryorviolent force.Iarguethatthisunderstandingofsectarianismismerelyamanipulationof sectarianidentitiesbypoliticalforcesandthatthereisnothinginherently discriminatoryorviolentaboutsectarianism.Toconclude,Idemonstratethat sectarianism,astheempowermentofdifferentIslamicideologies,hasgreat positivepotentialinreligioussociety.Specifically,Iarguethatsectarianism providesthebasisforademocraticreimaginingofIslamicjurisprudence,isan essentialconditionforthemoderationofextremistgroups,empowersminority sects,andaidsinaffirmingandreshapingindividualreligiousbeliefs.

SincethetopicofIslamicsectarianismisnecessarilybroad,Imustclarifysome aspectsofthisanalysistomoreaccuratelysetuptheargumentsIammaking. First,althoughmyargumentsmentiondemocracy,Iusethetermonlyin referencetoapoliticaldimensionofIslamictheology.Thefocusofthispaperis notthecompatibilityofIslamorIslamicsectarianismwithanypolitical structure;rather,IfocusonIslamicsectarianismasitmayrelatetopolitical concepts.WhenIrefertoIslamicjurisprudence,Ireferspecificallytorulingson religiouspracticesprescribedtoMuslims,nottojurisprudencewithinanygiven state.Second,Idonotassumeinwritingthispaperthatauthoritarianregimesor IslamistmilitantgroupsaspiretothepositiveaspectsofIslamicsectarianismthat Idescribe.TheconclusionsIdrawaremeantonlytoinformapproachesto sectarianisminstudiesofsectarianismandinindividualreligiousopinions. Themajorprojectofthispaperistocountertheprominent“justaMuslim” rhetoricthatpridesitselfonbeingabovesectarianidentitiesandsectarianismbut inrealitycenterstheSunnisect.Suchrhetoricnegatessectarianidentitiesand benefitsonlytheSunnimajority.Iargueinthispapernotonlythatsectarianism isnottheevilithasbecomeassociatedwithbutthatsectarianismcanbeof positivevaluetoreligioussociety.

Shi’aandSunniIslam:KeyConcepts

Shi’aandSunniIslamsharebeliefswithregardtomanybasictenetsof Islam:bothbelievethattheQuranistheultimatesourceofIslamicknowledge, bothbelievethatMuhammadwasthelastprophet,andbothconsiderSalah (prayer),Zakat(charity),Sawm(fasting),andHajj(pilgrimage)tobepillarsof Islam(TheMetropolitanMuseumofArt2013).Thesectariandividebegins afterthedeathoftheProphetMuhammadin632CEandconcernsthe appointmentofMuhammad’s successor.WhiletheShi’itesbelievedthatthe ProphethadappointedhiscousinAliashissuccessor,theSunnisdidnotbelieve thattheProphethadchosenasuccessoratall(FarmanullahandFakhr-ul-Islam 2015,29–30).TheywantedtoappointoneoftheProphet’scompanions,Abu Bakr,asthefirstcaliphoftheRashidunCaliphate(Farmanullahand Fakhr-ul-Islam2015,29–30)(TheEditorsofEncyclopaediaBritannica1998). TheSunniviewwasthemostwidelyaccepted,andAbuBakrbecamecaliph (FarmanullahandFakhr-ul-Islam2015,29–30).However,thosewhoviewedAli asthetruesuccessordidnotrelenttheirbeliefs(FarmanullahandFakhr-ul-Islam 2015,29–30).

Thesuccessiondebatewasnotsimplyabouttheindividualsuccessor chosenbutabouthowthesuccessorshouldbechosen.Sunnisbelievedthatthe caliphshouldbeelectedbythepeople,whereasShi’itesbelievedthatsuccession washereditaryandthatthepeoplewerenotcapableofchoosingtheProphet’s successor.TheyarguedthattheProphet,indeclaringAliastheMawla(masteror friend)ofeveryone,wasannouncingthewillofGod(Farmanullahand Fakhr-ul-Islam2015,30).Thesedisagreementsbeganimmediatelyfollowingthe deathoftheProphet,andanon-sectarianIslamhasnotexistedsincethe Prophet’slifetime.

AlthoughShi’athoughthasexistedsincetheProphet’sdeath,Shi'ismasa separatesectwasfirmlyestablishedaftertheBattleofKarbalainIraqin680 (FarmanullahandFakhr-ul-Islam2015,35–36)(Newman,n.d.).TheBattlewas foughtbytheProphet’sgrandson,Hussain,andseventy-twoofhissupporters againsttheoppressiveregimeofthethen-caliphYazidibnMu'awiya(Newman, n.d.).Hussainandhissupportersweremartyred,andhisfamily,includinghis

sisterZainab,atleastoneofhiswives,andhischildren,weretakencaptive (Newman,n.d.). TheBattleofKarbalaremainsthecentraleventinShi’aIslam andafocusofShi’apractices(Newman,n.d.).Hussainandhisfamily’sdecision tofightandnotsurrendertheirbeliefstotyrannystrengthensShi’ism’sclaimtoa resistanceideology.ThisideologyhadbegunformingintheiroppositiontoAbu Bakr’sappointmentbutwassolidifiedthroughKarbala. WhileSunnisbelievearulermaybelegitimateeveniftheyareoppressive, Shi’itesbelieveinquestioningthelegitimacyofrulersandinnotrelentingone’s valuesevenwheretheyareintheminority(FarmanullahandFakhr-ul-Islam 2015,31).Lastly,althoughtherearemanysubsectsevenamongShi’aIslam (includingIsnāΆsharīyyah,Ismā‘īlism,andZaidism)andSunniIslam(including Hanfī,Shāfī,Hambalī,andMālikī)(FarmanullahandFakhr-ul-Islam2015,31), thispaperwillbeconsideringSunniandShi’asectsgenerally,anditsconclusions areapplicabletoallsectsandsubsects.

DefiningSectarianism

Inordertodefinesectarianism,Iwillbreaktheworddownintoits componentpartsbeforeconstructingthemoststraightforwarddefinition.The rootwordin“sectarianism”issect,whichisdefinedas“areligiousgroupthatisa smallerpartofalargergroupandwhosemembersallsharesimilarbeliefs”by EncyclopediaBritannica,“adissentingorschismaticreligiousbody”by Merriam-Webster,and“areligiousgroupthathasseparatedfromalargerreligion andisconsideredtohaveextremeorunusualbeliefsorcustoms”byCambridge Dictionary.BothCambridgeandMerriam-Websternotethatthewordcarries negativeconnotationsandisgenerallyuseddisapprovingly.Thesedefinitions understandasectasasubgroupofareligionthatisgenerallyviewedinanegative lightbythelargergrouptowhichitbelongs. Islamicsectsdonotfitneatlyintothisdefinition.WhileChristiansects divergedfromthecentralauthorityoftheCatholicChurch,Islamhasbeen dividedintosectsalmostsinceitsbeginning.Therefore,whilethesedefinitionsof sectimplythatagivengroupisnecessarilyaminorityinthereligion,themajority ormainstreamgroupinIslam,theSunnis,arestillasectamongmanyothers.

ApplyingthisdefinitionmoreappropriatelytoIslam,then,sectscanbe understoodasgroupsbelongingtothesamegeneralreligionwithdifferentiated beliefs.WhethernegativeconnotationsshouldstillapplyintheIslamiccontextis amatterofsubjectivity:sectsmayormaynotviewotherswithdisapprovaland suspicion.Itisimportanttonotethat,insomecontexts,theSunnimajoritydoes viewothersectstobehereticalorunlawful,andviceversa(Zaman1998,692). However,forthepurposeofthisdefinition,IwillapproachIslamicsectswitha neutralstance;sincethereisnopureandunaffectedversionofIslam,norany centralauthorityapplyingtoallMuslims,theexistenceofsectsinitselfcannotbe negative,becauseeachMuslimclaimsmembershiptoone.ForaMuslimto renouncetheideaofsectswouldbetorenouncetheirownallegiance. Additionally,hostilitiesbetweensectsarealwaysmarkedby socialandpolitical contexts.Sectshavealwaysbeensubjecttothesecontexts,butthereislittleto suggestthattheyarenegativeinthemselves,orwithoutcontextualmodifiers. Afterall,claimingmembershiptoagroup,althoughnotnecessarilyaneutral action,isnotnecessarilynegative.

Developingthewordfurther,wecantake“sects”intheIslamiccontextto meandifferentgroupsorassociationsbelievinginIslambutdivergingonkey aspects.Oftenaddedtothiswordisthesuffix-arian,whichsuggestsbeliefinor thepracticingoftherootword(OxfordDictionaries,n.d.).Thus,“sectarian”can betakentomeanthebeliefinorpracticingofanyoneoftheIslamicsubgroups. Where“sectarian”isanadjective,itcanmodifywhatevernounfollowsitby relatingthebeliefinorpracticeofanIslamicideologytothenoun.Forexample, sectarianallegiancemaybeallegiancesformedonthebasisofone’sbeliefina certainsetofIslamicteachings.Noneofthese,again,arenecessarilynegative terms,andnoneofthemsuggestaharmfulnature.

Finally,completingthewordwiththesuffix-ism,wefindapossiblesource fornegativeinterpretationsofit.Thissuffixcarriesarangeofmeanings,withthe onesmostrelevanttothistopicbeingitsfunctionofcreatingawordthat signifiesanactofsomething,prejudiceordiscriminationonthebasisofa (specified)attribute,andadoctrineortheoryofsomething(Merriam-Webster 2022a).Consolidatingtheabovedefinitions,wearriveatthreedistinct definitionsofsectarianism:thefirst,astheactofbelievinginorpracticingthe

teachingsofasubgroupofIslam;thesecond,asdiscriminationonthebasisof one’sbeliefinorpracticingofdifferentiatedIslamicteachings;andthethird,as thedoctrinebehindone’sbelieforparticipationinanIslamicsubgroup. Thefirstandthirddefinitionsarefairlyneutral,whilethesecondpresents akeyproblemforsectariandiscourse.Sectarianismbecomessimilarto-ismslike racismandsexism,anditcomestobeunderstoodasanideologyofhatred towardsothersects.ThisisthedefinitionIcontendinthispaper.Thenext sectionofthepaperdirectlyaddressesthewrongfulassociationofsectarianism withsectarianviolenceandthereasonsthatsectarianismhasbeenunderstoodas anideologyofdivisionanddiscrimination.Inthissection,Iwillfocuson argumentsthatrefutetheapplicationofthislanguageandtypologytoIslamic sectarianism.

First,althoughIhavepresentedheremyownformulationregarding “sects,”“sectarian,”and“sectarianism,”Ithinkitispertinenttounderstandthe originsofthesewords.Thefirstauthortothoroughlydefine“sect”—albeitinthe frameworkofaChurch-sectrelationship—wasMaxWeber(Swatos1976,129). ForWeber,“sect”andrelatedwordswereneutraldescriptors,or“idealtypes”for modesofmembership,meantmostlytoprovidemeasuresforcomparisonina Christiancontext(Swatos1976,131–32).TheRomanCatholicChurchwasthe overarchingorganizationtowhichmembershipwasmandatoryforChristians, andthesectwasasubgrouptowhichmembershipwasbothvoluntaryand earned(Swatos1976,135).Thelanguageofsectsbecamemoresubjectivewith theworkofErnstTroelstch,acontemporaryofWeber’swhotookhisframework andconfiguredittohisownpurposes(Swatos1976,133–34).Troeltschsetthe Churchandsectincontrast,attachingthecharacteristicofbeing accommodatingtotheChurchandthecharacteristicofbeing non-accomodatingtothesect(Swatos1976,134).

BeforeTroeltsch,thewords“Church”and“sect”hadbeennothingbut namesofdifferentorganizations,butTroeltsch,whetherintentionallyor unintentionally,laidthegroundworkforsubjectiveandpotentiallynegative connotationsof“sect.”Asaforementioned,thisdichotomydoesnotapplyas concretelytoIslamicsectsduetothelackofacentralreligiousauthority. However,sinceWesterntextsgenerallytakethedefinitionof“sect”fromthe

worksofWeberandTroeltsch,authorsareunabletoescapetheirsubjective understandingsoftheterm.Thus,sectarianism,evenwhenmeanttoexpress beliefintheteachingsofadifferentiatedIslamicgroup,containsthenegative underpinningsofbeingunobligingandstrict.Iarguethattheconceptof sectarianismhasbeenunfairlygroupedwithasetoftermsthatindicate discrimination(suchasracismorsexism)becauseofthesepre-existing subjectivities.Ifdefinitionsof“sect”hadstayedtruetoWeber’sneutralideas, therewouldlikelybelessofapredispositiontopessimisticallydefine “sectarianism.”

Second,Iarguethatsectarianismdoesnotexistinthesamerealmof languageasracismorsexismduetothefactthatthereisspacefornumerous definitionstoexist.Whileracismandsexismcanbeunderstoodasnothingbut discriminationonthebasisofraceorgender,forinstance,sectarianismis understoodandusedinvariousways.Focusingonlyondiscriminatorybehaviour “stigmatize[s]whatareinfactperfectlylegitimateexpressionsofsectarian identityandlegitimateformsofsect-centricity”(Haddad2020,17).Itis impracticaltosuggestdisposingofanyonedefinitionaltogetherduetoits contradictionwithothers.However,Iwouldarguethatforsectarianismto concurrentlyhaveallthemeaningsithas,itmustonsomelevelbeneutral.Justas thediscrimination-centereddefinitionofsectarianismcannotbedisregarded,I askthatthedefinitiondenotingalegitimateformofidentityalsonotbe discarded.Forsectarianismtofitboththesedefinitionssimultaneously,itisthe firstandthirddefinitionspresentedabovethatcanmostaccuratelycoverall aspectsoftheword.Islamicsectarianism,withoutdefinitivecontext,canbe understoodasanactorideologyrelatingtobeliefinorthepracticeofa differentiatedIslamicgroup.

IhaveestablishedintheaboveparagraphswhatIunderstandtobeneutral definitionsof“sect,”“sectarian,”and“sectarianism,”buttheobjectiveofthis paperisnotsimplytosuggestthatsectarianismisaneutralconcept.Rather,this paperfocusesonsheddingapositivelightonsectarianism.Tothisend,Ipropose myownsubjectivedefinitionoftheterm.Isuggestdefiningsectarianismasthe empowermentandinclusionofdifferentiatedIslamicsects.Iadoptanapproach notjustoftolerancebutofencouragingpoliticalandsocialengagement.

CuttingtheTiesBetweenSectarianismandSectarianViolence

InaninterviewIconductedwithSarmadSaeedKhan,aformerInspector GeneralofPoliceinPakistan,henotedthatwhilehedoesnotbelievethat terroristgroupsinPakistanhavereligiousideologies,hedoesbelievetheyhave anti-sectarianideologies.Inparticular,hedescribestheirmotivesasanti-Shi’a. Interestingly,heunderstoodanti-sectarianismthesamewaythatmanydefine sectarianism.Iagreewithhisdefinitionandarguethatanti-sectarianismisamore appropriatetermtoattachtosectarianviolence.Theviolencedoesnotpromote thedivergenceofgroupsbuttriestosuppressit.Evenifthischangein terminologyisunwarranted,theflexibilityininterpretationsayssomething abouttheroleofsectarianismintheviolence.Theideologypromotedbyviolent groupscanbechanginganddynamic,butdespitechangesinnarrative,the groupsremainconsistentlyviolent.Theirviolenceisunaffectedbychanging motives,suggestingthattheyseekmotivestosupporttheirviolenceratherthan fightingforspecificideologicalpurposes.

Ifsectarianismisthesolecauseof“sectarian”violence,then“sectarian” violenceshouldhavebeenasignificantissuesincethebeginningsofIslam.The Sunni-Shi’adividebegansoonaftertheProphet’sdeathintheseventhcentury (FarmanullahandFakhr-ul-Islam2015,28),andyetsectarianviolencedidnot becomeprevalentuntilthelatetwentiethcentury(Sein2016,109).Accordingto the ReligionandArmedConflict(RELAC)dataset,thecasualtyrateforall armedconflictswithasectariandimensionrosefrom0.03percentin1989to44 percentin2017(Hashemi2019).Ifthisisasectarianissue,thenwhywouldthe violencebeincreasingnow,morethanathousandyearsaftertheeventsthat spurredthedivision?NaderHashemiarguesthatthemissingpieceisthe presenceofauthoritarianregimesinmostMuslim-majoritystates(Sein2016, 109).

EspeciallysincetheArabSpringoftheearly2010s,theseregimeshave beenweakstateswithlittleclaimtolegitimategovernment(Hashemi2016,69). Theytrytocompensateusingdivideandconquertacticsthatparticular identities,includingsects,againsteachother(Hashemi2016,69).Religious identitiesarethoughttobepronetoradicalization,andregimescapitalizeonthis

byexacerbatingexistingdivides(Cavanaugh2013).Withtheircontrolover mediaoutlets,authoritarianregimesfuelconflictbydisseminatinginformation thathelps“discoverasectarianidentitybyperceiving,orimagining,theexistence ofthreatstoit”(Zaman1998,690).Thecreationofsectarianconflictdividesthe populationsothatnoonegroupiscapableofcreatingresistance.Somestatesside withonesectoveranotherorothers,gainingsupportfromthesecttheyhave validatedandleavingopponentstooweaktorespond(Haddad2020,26).Thisis nottosuggestthattheShi’a-Sunnidividewascreatedbyanygivenregimeorthat conflictsbetweenShi’aandSunnidonotpredatetheauthoritarianregimesof Arabcountries.Thedividehasexistedformorethanamillennium,butitwas notuntilthemanipulationofthesesectsbypoliticalleadersthatsectarian violencebecamesoprominent.

Fortunatelyforsuchleaders,theviolenceiscyclic,andonceithasbegun, itisalmostguaranteedtocontinue.Targetedminoritygroupsjustifytheirown politicalviolenceasretribution.Theinitialmajorityperpetratorsthencometo believethattheyareunderattackandthattheminoritygroupisunjustifiedin theirviolencebutthattheirowncontinuedviolenceissimplyadefensive response.Forexample,boththeSunniextremistgroupSipah-iSahabaandthe Shi’aextremistgroupSipah-iMuhammadblametheviolentactivitiesofthe otherfortheirownexistence(Zaman1998,699).BothShi’aandSunniIslamist groupsjustifytheirviolenceagainsttheiropponentsbystatingthattheyareonly enactingviolenceindefense.Violentgroupsmakeuseof“humaninsecuritiesto attractrecruits”(Sein2016,109),andoncethestatehasinitiallycontributedto thecreationofinsecurities,thecycleofIslamistviolencewillcontinuewithlittle attentiontothestate’srole.Aslongassectsfeelmarginalized,theywillstartor joinviolentgroups.Oppressingsectscanleadtouprisingsthatthestatecaneasily usetojustifyfurthercontrol.

Byfocusingonreligiousissues,stateleadersescapeaccountabilityand distractfromtheirownoppressiveregimes.Thediscriminatorynotionof sectarianismmeansthatitcanbecomeaneasyscapegoatforpoliticalelites hopingtodistractfromtheirowngovernanceissues.Puttingalltheweighton sectarianismcontributestoanimageofpassionateandirrationalfightingrather thanoneofcalculatedactions.Thissuggestsboththatso-called“sectarian”

fightersarenotreasonableactorsandthattheirviolentactivityisnotpredictable enoughforthestatetotakeanyconcreteresponsivemeasures.

Byvictimizingcertaingroupsandvilifyingothers,regimesareableto paintone-dimensionalimagesofpoliticalbodiesanddolittletoaddress legitimateconcernsofthegroups.Settingthepredominantmotiveofanygroup assectarianismmakestheoppositionappearirrationalandreducestheiragenda toonlyonegoal:thedestructionofothersects.Opposinggroupsareunderstood tobeirrationalandsolelyconcernedwithreligiousviolence,andtheireconomic andpoliticalgoalsareentirelydismissed(Haddad2020,37).Regimesareableto glossoverthevalidandcomplexgoalsofoppositiongroupsandmakethem appearillogicaltothegeneralpublic.Thus,sheddinganegativelighton sectarianismallowspoliticalentitiestoshifttheblamefortheirownpartinthe violence.

ThePositivePotentialofSectarianism

Havingestablishedadefinitionofsectarianismandnegatedthecommon conflationofsectarianismandsectarianviolence,wereachthecruxofthis argument:thegoodofsectarianism.Thissectionbeginswithanexplanationof thebridgebetweenIslamicjurisprudenceand deliberativedemocracy.Then,I explainhow,inframingIslamicsocietyasademocraticinstitution,Shi’itesand otherminoritysectsbecomesmallbutpoliticallyrelevantactors.Sectarianism,by thispaper’sdefinition,istheperfecttooltoenrichthedeliberativeprocessof democracyinIslamicsociety,anddemocracycreatestheidealsituationfor minoritiestoincludethemselvesinthegreaterreligion.Icontinuebyexplaining howareligiousframeworkthatresemblesandembodiesdemocraticidealsis likelytoreduceextremismandempowerminoritysects.Finally,Iarguethat individualsshouldbeincentivizedtoparticipateinpositivesectariandiscourseto enrichandconfirmtheirownbeliefs.

IslamicextremistsliketosuggestthatdemocracyisanentirelyWestern idealandthatIslamanddemocracyareantithetical,butthereisawealthof Islamicliteraturetocounterthatargument.Islamictextsarenotnecessarily compatiblewithrefinedideasofconstitutionalorpopulardemocracy,butthey

reflectanIslamthatistolerantandegalitarian.InestablishingtheConstitution ofMedina,theProphetwasnotedashavingademocraticspirit(Kubbaetal. 2002,1).HisstanceonIslamwasdemocratic,tolerant,andcompassionate (Kubbaetal.2002,5).Furthermore,whilescholarsdisagreeastowhetherthe practiceismandatedorrecommended,theyacceptthelegitimacyofShura,“a consultativedecision-makingprocess”(Kubbaetal.2002,4).Thepractice indicatesthatdeliberationandacknowledgementofdifferentviewpointsare foundationaltoIslam.Shurapresentsclearevidencethat,byIslamicprinciples, decision-makingisacollaborativeprocessnottobelimitedtothewillsoffew. OpponentsofdemocraticprinciplesinIslamarguethatdemocracygives toomuchpowertoflawedhumans,whoarenotcapableofmakingdecisionsas Godis(Kubbaetal.2002,4–5).Thisargumentforoppositionisweak,asthe processofShuraindicatesclearlythatGodexpectstheinputofhumansin legitimatedecision-making.Ifhumanswereincapableofmakingimportant decisions,GodwouldhavecreatedIslamiclawtocompensateforhuman deficiency.Opponentsofdemocraticdecision-makingalsohavelittletoofferin thewayofaviablealternative:decision-makingbyanyotherarbitrarymeansis likelytoleadtotyranny(Kubbaetal.2002,4–5).Democraticprocessesare criticizedforputtingsovereigntyinthehandsoftoomany,butarbitrary decision-makingismorelikelytoinstillGod’srightfulsovereigntyinaflawed individual.

BothSunnismandShi’ismendorsecertainvaluesthatsupportdemocratic andtolerantIslamicleadership.Sunnis’supportfordemocraticprocessesliesin theirbeliefthatsuccessioniselective(FarmanullahandFakhr-ul-Islam2015,30). Shi’ites,althoughtheybelieveinhereditarysuccession,havestrongconvictionsto show“resistancetocorruptandoppressiverulers”(Farmanullahand Fakhr-ul-Islam2015,31).Shi’itesareinclinedtoagreewithademocratic approachtoIslamicleadershipinordertopreventoppressionby decision-makers.Thus,thetwomajorIslamicsectscanbeconvincedofthe validityofadeliberativedemocraticapproachtoIslamicleadership.Sectarianism isintegraltothisdemocraticapproachinthatatrueconsultative decision-makingprocesscanonlyoccurifminoritygroupsareempoweredto providetheiropinions.

Moreover,anti-sectariannarrativesdolittletocombatextremism.Aspecial reportbytheUnitedStatesInstituteofPeace(USIP)showssignificant correlationbetweentheradicalizationofIslamicpoliticalmovementsand repressionandexclusion(Kubbaetal.2002,3).Inotherwords,strategiesof violentpushbackonlyempowerextremistmovements.Similarly,“moderationof Islamicpoliticalmovementsiscloselylinkedtoinclusioninthepoliticalprocess” (Kubbaetal.2002,3),whichsupportstheviewthatempoweringminority groupsislikelytodecreaseIslamicviolence.Asmentioned,violentandextremist groupsarevalidatedbyoppressivestateresponses,andfeedingintothiscycleonly strengthensclaimstoviolenceforthesegroups.Increasingtheirvisibility—for instance,eveninstate-controlledmedia—isnotlikelytoreducetheirtendencyto violencebutismorelikelytoexposeitforwhatitis:notreligiousinitselfbut justifiedonreligiousterms.

Anotherissuewithanti-sectarianismisthatittargetsprimarilyminority sects,passingoffSunniIslamastheonetruenon-sectarian“Islam.”Thenarrative silencesminoritysectsandsubjectsthemtogreaterstigma.Islamisalready dividedandhasbeenforcenturies,andananti-sectarianismmindsetisnotgoing tochangethis.Moreover,ideasofsect-blindnessandMuslimunityonly reinforceSunniidealsandmayforcethemontodissentingminorities.Slogansto thiseffectclaimvirtuositybutinrealityignorehistoriesofconflictandskewed powerrelations.Suchapproacheseitheroverlookdistinctionsbetweensectsor viewthemnegatively,asflawsandpointsofconflict.Theexistenceofdivisions evenwithinSunniIslamshowsclearlytheinevitabilityofdifference.

Ibelievesectarianismisthebestremedyforthisanti-sectarianism.By creatingspaceforminoritiestoengagemeaningfully,theywillnolongerbe requiredtoacquiescetothedecision-makingofareligiousmajority.Empowered andsociallyengagedminoritiesarelesslikelytoparticipateinconflictsbetween sectsandaremorelikelytofindtheirproperplaceinIslam.Theaforementioned USIPspecialreportemphasizesthatcivilsocietyanddebatearetheantidoteto violentgroups;extremismandviolencethrivewherecivilsocietyanddebateare limited(Kubbaetal.2002,7).

Finally,thegreatestpositiveofsectarianismisitsabilitytoleadallMuslims

towardthetruthsofIslam.Manypluralistsarguethattruthisnotamatterof relevanceinthecoexistenceofdiverseidentitiesandbeliefs,butIarguethatthe potentialtoreachtruthshouldbethebiggestincentiveforcollaboration. Especiallyinreligiousdebates,whereone’ssalvationandafterlifeareatstake, wouldn’tseekingoutthetruthoftheIslamicmessagebethemostreasonable approach?IfanindividualiscommittedtoIslamandbelievesthatIslamisthe keytoahappyafterlife,thentheybenefitinensuring—oratleastin believing—thattheirversionofIslamisthetrueIslam.Toverifyone’sbeliefs againstthoseofothers,itispertinenttoempowerminorityvoicesalongside majorityones.Subjectingeachsecttocriticismcreatesspaceforindividualsto reachsomecommonunderstandingsofIslamicjurisprudence.Common understandingsarenecessaryindiminishinghostilitiesbetweendifferentsects.It isunlikelythatallissueswillberesolved,butsectscanconnectoverthoseaspects theyagreeonandcreatesomenon-sectariantruthsofIslam. Somewillbewaryofthisprocess,andsomewillfearbeingmanipulated intothewrongbeliefs,butunderstandingotherviewpointswillnotnecessarily dissuadeyoufromyourown.Ifitdoes,youmaybecompelledtochangeyour belief—somethingthatisnotnegativeorharmfulbutratheranopportunityfor youto“try[]togetandremainintherightrelationtothetruth”(Plantinga 1995,187).Ifyouarepersuadedbyopposingviewsandchangeallegiances,then youmaybemovingclosertotrueIslam.Sectarianismisthusvaluablebecauseit leadspeopletofindanIslamicperspectivethattheyfeelservestheirinterestsand protectsthem.Manymayreviewtheinformationtheyobtainanddecidethat, althoughtheynowunderstandopposingviews,theystandmostcomfortably besidetheirown.Thesearebothappropriateresponses.Thoseworriedabout beingmisledwillbesatisfiedbythepossibilityofthesecondresponse,whereas thoseworriedonlyaboutseekingthetruthwillbesatisfiedbyeither.

Conclusion

Inconclusion,Islamicsectarianismisnotequivalenttosectarianhatredand violence.Thisinterpretationofsectarianismexistslargelyinthecontextof authoritarianregimesthatbenefitfromusingitasascapegoat.Itiscrucialto 10

maintainthedistinctionbetweenanti-sectarianmovementsthatworkto diminishintersecthostilitiesandanti-sectarianmovementsthatonlyseekto oppressminoritysects.Despitethenegativeconnotation“sectarianism”carries, ithasgreatpotentialasapositiveconcept.Iseektoredefinesectarianismasan ideologyofsect-empowermentandopenIslamicdiscoursethatprovidesa platformfortheinclusionofallsects.Iarguethatthisnew“sectarianism” enablesamoreegalitarianapproachtoIslamicjurisprudence,workstowardsthe weakeningofextremeIslamistgroups,validatesminoritysects,andhelps individualsexpandontheirpersonalreligiousbeliefs.Iconcludebynotingthat althoughattitudestosectarianismareunlikelytochangeanytimesoon,an emphasisonthepositiveaspectsofsectarianismcanpreventthepromotionof anti-minoritysectargumentsassolutionstosectarianviolence.

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TheChallengesofMappingUndocumented Migration

JuliettePerinetti

EditedbyJulienDuffy

Ahighlycontestedtopicinmodern-dayWesternsocieties,theissueof undocumentedmigrationhasgeneratedanabundanceofmediacoverageand cartographicproductioninthepastdecades.Deemedmorelegiblethanmere statisticalcharts,migrationmapsoftenpassasanaccessibleyetnolessscientific wayofobjectivelyrepresentingtheflowsofpeoplereachingtheGlobalNorth. However,behindmaps’“illusorylackofauthorshipanddeceptiveiconographic simplicity”–grantingthemtheadvantageofapparentuncontestableneutrality–oftenliehiddenpoliticalagendas,whichhavethepotentialtoshapepeople’s perceptionofmigrants.(VanHoutum&Lacy,2020,213-214).Infact, cartographyisaprocedureofexclusioncarriedoutbyaninevitablybiased cartographer,whomayfail(orrefuse)toconcealtheirprejudice.Asaresult, mapsreflecttheirauthor’ssubjectivetakeonwhatandwhoshouldbemade visible,andthroughwhatmeans.Thispaperwillarguethatinthecontextof migration,curatedvisualdepictionsofundocumentedmigrantsmayreinforce popularanti-migrationsentiment–especiallyifbasedondistorteddata.Because mapsonlyprojectsnapshotsofselectedperiodsandregions,theymayalsofailto representtheintricacyofmigrants’mobilitiesaccurately.Therefore,mapping migratorymovements,whichentails“immobilizingacomplexspatial,temporal, socialandpoliticalsystem,”presentsmajorchallengesthisessaywillattemptto address(Baconetal.,2016,1). First,Iwillfocusonthedangersoftheinvasion rhetoric,which,throughspecificimageryandsymbology,portrays undocumentedmigrantsasthreatstoWesternsocieties. Then,Iwillexplainthe intricacyofrepresentinghumanmovementonmapsandpresentpossibleways ofdepictingfaireraccountsofmigrants’trajectories.Finally,Iwillfocuson migrants’narrativesandexploremoreequitablealternativestocurrentmapping processes.

TacklingtheInvasionRhetoric

Cartographers’mainchallengeisvisuallyrepresentingmobilitywith numbers,dots,andfigureswithoutusingadjectivesoradverbstoaddprecisions.

Thischallengingexerciseofsimplificationcanbeproblematicforasubjectas multifacetedandpoliticizedashumanmigration,especiallysincemeaningsare ascribedtothesymbolsandcharacteristicsthatcomposemaps(Baconetal., 2016,2).Indeed,arrows,squares,circles,andlinessymbolizerefugees,camps, crossingpoints,walls,orborders.Althoughthesesymbolsmaybeconsidered harmless,theirverypresenceandcharacteristicsonthemapmaycontributeto generalizationsaboutmigrationand,morespecifically,aboutundocumented migrantsthemselves.Arrowsreinforcethe“invasion”rhetoricwhentoodenseor straight.Indeed,thickerarrowsthatallpointinthesamedirectionriskevoking orunconsciouslysuggestingan“invasion”ofmigrantscomingfromtheGlobal South.Thismaycontributetothespreadofxenophobictheoriessuchas“the GreatReplacement,”whichstipulatesthatnon-whitepopulationswilldisplace andoutnumberlocalwhitepopulationswiththehelpofcomplyingelites. Further,thickarrowsfailtoaccountformigrants’complextrajectories,as theysuggestthatundocumentedmigrantsallcomefromthesameplaceand shareadestination.Thislinearframingofmigrationisproblematicasitevokes imagesof“massive,unidirectionalandunstoppableflows”ofundocumented migrantsreachingtheirhomecountry.Suchideasprofoundlyshapethepublic’s understandingofmigrants(VanHoutum,2012,408).Disproportionatearrows mayalsorecallpropagandisticmilitarymapswheremigrantsareimplicitlyshown asdirectthreatstothenation.Byusingsuchalarmraisingarrows,whosecolours, usuallyredorblack,contrastthelightertonesofthemap,cartographerspresent migrationmovementsasanomaliesthatdisturbthegeneralorderandstabilityof theregionsthey"invade.”Infact,thedichotomoususeofcoloursonmapsoften makesforeye-catching“friendvs.foe”visualcompositions,feedingintohatred towardsmigrantsaswellaswhatscholarTazzioli(2015,1)qualifiesas “cartographicanxiety.”Becausesuchsymbologyportraysmigrantsascrossing nationalbordersmassivelyandintentionallytogether,thelattertendtobe consideredamenaceautomatically.Thisisparticularlythecasewhenarrowsdo notoriginatefromspecificlocationsbutinsteadshowvaguetrajectoriesof migrantscomingfrom“thegreatunknown”(Vermeulen,DeKorte,&Van Houtum,2020).Hence,“insteadofadirectionaldevice,[arrows]taketheroleof afrighteningmetaphor,”therebyunderminingtheirinitialnavigational

practicality(VanHoutum&Lacy,2020,201).Adjustingtheirdimensions

if notremovingthem–tomakethemsmallerthanthecountriesthemselvescould beafirststepintacklingtheinvasionrhetoric.

Figures1and2showthesimilaritiesbetweenEuropeanmilitaryinvasion mapsdatingfromthetwentiethcenturyandthe2015Frontexmap.InFigure1, foreignarmiesanddangeroussoldier’invasionisdepictedthroughlargered, menacingarrows.Thesymbologyquiteclearlyinstillsanideaoffear,callingfor immediatecounteraction.ThesamearrowsareusedinFigure2,wheremigrating populationsareshownasequallythreateningtoWesternEuropeaswoulda twentiethcenturyrivalarmy.Thoughdepictingwidelydifferentphenomena, bothmapsemphasizeabreachofterritorialsovereigntyandprovokeanxietyand indignation.

Source:https://

Figure1‘MilitaryInvasionMap'(1940).

tinyurl.com/y4qerpaf

Figure2TheFrontexmapof2015.Source: Frontex:https://tinyurl.com/y6o38jq3

Remappingmobilities

Oneofthemostcriticalchallengesinmappinghumanmobilitiesis accuratelydepictingmovementswithoutoversimplifyingpeople’strajectories.As explainedabove,suchmappingdoesnotprovidecontextformovementsand oftenlooksverysimilartoamapdepictingtrendsintradeingoods.Thisovert lackofinformationonmigrants’countriesoforiginorfinaldestinationmayfeed intotheaforementioned“invasionrhetoric”,forthesemapsfailtogiveproperor penetratinginsightsintomigrationtrends.Indeed,depictingpopulation movementwithoutregardforthecomplexsociopoliticalconditionsthat engenderandshapesuchflowsnecessarilyinsistsonthemovementitselfandnot itscauseorsolutions.Suchgraphicalsimplificationalmostsolelycommunicates thefactthatforeignersarecomingin.Infact,byrepresentinggroupsofmigrants movinguniformlyonthemap,littletonoinformationisprovidedonthe countrytheyareemigratingfromandthedifferentborderstheycross.Mobilityis impliedbutnotpreciselydepicted,whichleavesplentyofroomfordata misinterpretation.Suchmapswilllikelydomoreharmthangoodiftheydonot provideaccurateorcompleteinformation.Hence,rethinkinghowmigration mapsaredoneisnotmerelyanoptionbutanecessity.

Fighting“state-border-gridism,”asscholarVanHoutumconceptualizesit, couldtacklemaps’inherentstrugglewithmobility(2012,408).Thetermrefers tomaps’depictionofnationstatesasstaticentitiessurroundedbyfixedand untouchedborders.Thisfairlyconservativeperspectiveonterritoriality perpetuatesborders’“objectificationprocess,“givingthemtheirintrinsic meaningandpower(VanHoutum,2012,412).Byorganizingmapsrelativeto states’borders,cartographersenhancetheimaginarysocialconstructbehind themandgrantthemmorevisibilitythanmigrantsthemselves.Asatellite overlookoftheworldcouldeasilyprovetoanycartographerthatnoborders physicallyexist.Theyarehumanmadeandcouldbeunderstoodassetinmotion orevolvingwithconjuncture.Ultimately,theyreflectcountries’willingnessto isolateand“protect”themselvesfromundocumentedmigration.Presenting bordersasfixedandanobstacleformigrantstosurmountisneitherinnocentnor withoutconsequences.Currently,migrants’journeysareinaccuratelydepictedas11

anaccumulationofbordercrossingsratherthanacomplexexperienceof multiplebreaksandsteps.Movingawayfrom“simplistic,dehumanizedand staticgrids”couldthusleadtoafairerreorderingofspaceandallowmapsto conveyinformationmoreneutrally(VanHoutum&Lacy,2020,201).

Apossiblewaytoinformreadersaboutmigrationflowsandtrendswithout visuallyinducingprejudicearethroughcircularmigrationplots(Sander,Abel, Bauer,&Schmidt,2014).Theyallowforabetterunderstandingof intercontinentalandinterregionalmigrationwithoutsolelyfocusingon southern‘flows’ofmigrantsreachingtheNorth.Theychallengethe conventionalpracticeofcartographyinthattheymaybecreatedthrough encodedalgorithmswithnoinputfrombiasedcartographers.Theyconveythe samestatisticalinformationaboutmigrationastraditionalmapsdo,ifnotmore. Yetmanagetodosowithoutusingsuggestivesymbolsorevocativevocabulary. Figure3and4areexamplesofcirculationmigrationplots.

Figure3Intercontinentalmigrationin millions,2017.Source theNewYorkTimes, 2018

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/0 6/20/business/economy/immigration economic-impact.html

Figure4Circulationmigrationplotbetween worldregionsin2005-2010.Ticksindicate thevolumeofmigrationinmillions.Source: https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Circular -migration-plot-of-migratio

Contextualizingtrajectories

Condensingbroadandcomplexdataonmapssurrenderscritical informationaboutmigrants’backgroundsandspecificities.Althoughmigration ‘flows’makeitseemlikemigrantsliveauniversalexperience,theydisregard migrants’varyingtrajectoriesandpersonalmotivesinmigrating.Itisimpossible throughgeneralizedvisualmeanstounderstandthechallengesmigrantsmight faceinmovingalongoracrossborders.Inshowingmigrationasaoneofflinear movement,mapsalsosuggestmigrantsundertaketheirwholejourneyasone longtripmadeofmultipleillegalcrossingstoreachtheirfinaldestination.Maps donothighlightthenumerousbordersmigrantscrosslegallyandthebreaksthey mightbeconstrainedtotake.Theyalsofailtogiveanynotionofthetimethey mightspendatdifferentlocationsbeforeevenconsideringmovingelsewhere. Ultimately,“mapsdon’ttakeintoaccounttheheterogeneityofthosewhomove, andthepossibleshuttleorcircularmovementmigrantsmayhavealreadymade” (VanHoutum,2012,410).Althoughsomemapsshowthemostcommonroutes takenbymigrants,theyignorealltheconcretedetailsofwhatthisextremely challengingexperiencemeanstomigrantsinveryvulnerableandprecarious positions.Theydonotconveyqualitativeinformationonwhatmigrationentails forthesehumanbeings,therebyfailingboththereaderandthosewho experiencedmigration.Theirlackofqualitativeinformationfurtherdamages undocumentedmigrants’imageand,inturn,locksthemintoanegativeand degradingperception,whichpreventsthepublicfromsympathizingwiththeir cause.Infact,“aplethoraofhumanrightsviolationsthatmigrantpeoplesendure resultfrommoralmisjudgmentsofprescribingunequalvalueto[their]lives” (NelsonAgudeloHiguita2022,5).Althoughmigrantsoftenwalkhundredsor thousandsofmilesinunsanitaryandhighlyprecariousconditions,maps portrayingtheirjourneysperpetuatethestereotypeofaseamlessorobstacle-free commute.Migrantsarefacedwithsurvivingdeath,exhaustion,illnessesandthe constantfearofbeingrobbed,rapedorkilled;theirstoriesandtraumasare recountedthroughmerenumbers,chartsandsimplifiedmaps. Hence,manyhavetriedtocreatealternativemapsfeaturingmigrant subjectivityandnarratives.Awaytodothisisbygivingmigrantsthe

opportunitytomaptheirjourneythemselvesasaformofmigration countermapping,or“deep-mapping.”Whenaskedtodrawtheirexperience movingcountries,migrantswilloftenemphasizetheimportanceofnatural landscapes,weatherandsheltersratherthansimplytheactofcrossingborders andreachingnationstates(Campos-Delgado,2018,490).Deepmappingalso incorporateshumanexperiencesthroughthemapbyincludingaudioorvideo footage.Doingsogivesadeep,situationalaccountofplacerelatedfeelings migrantsmightsense.Visually,thesemapscouldnotfallfurtherfrom ‘traditional’worldprojectionmaps.Yet,theycontainatleastasmuch–ifnot more–informationaboutmigration.Infact,“byquestioningstandardsof representation,thesemapsseektochallengethepositivistprojectofknowledge neutrality”asacontestationofemotionlessstatecentredmaps(Baconetal., 2016,13).Countermapsmayalsodisplaymigrantswhodiedortheconflicts theyarefleeingfromtoemphasizethecomplexityandharshrealityofirregular migrants’journeys.“Mobilemapping”isanotherwayofpicturingmigrants’ struggles.Itusesmanytypesofdata–fromphones,satellitesorsocialmedia–to mapmobilitynetworks.Thus,ithighlightsthe“dynamic,relationaland convolutedpathsofhumaninteraction”throughmigrantbasedaccountsofthe routestheytook(VanHoutum&Lacy,2020,211).

Figures5and6areexamplesofmigrationcountermapsandreflectindividual, contextualizedtrajectoriesofundocumentedmigrantswhoriskedtheirlivesto move.

Figure

yearstoreachHamburgfrom Kabul”.Source:MichalonBénédicte(2010) EntretienréaliséàBucarest.Credit: L.Bacon, 2015.

5“Five

Figure6"Sarah'sMap".Source:Campos-Delgado, A.(2018).Counter-mappingmigration:irregular migrants’storiesthroughcognitivemapping.

Digital,interactivemapsareotheralternativestotraditionalmigration mapping.Theyinvitethereadertoclickonbuttons,linesandcountriestoaccess dataaboutmigrants. Becausethepubliccaninteractwiththeinformation provided,itmightunderstandandtakeawaymorethanmerelyvisualizinga staticpieceofpaper.However,onemustbecarefulnottoconfusecartographers forgraphicdesignersordigitaldevelopers.Bymovingawaytoomuchfrommore conventionalmappingprocesses,thepracticeofcartographymaybeimpactedto thepointthatendresultsmaynotbecalledmapsanymore.Perhapsmigrationis notarealitythatcanbesimplifiedthroughmapsafterall,especiallysinceother techniquesormodesofvisualizationwoulddepictitbetter. Finally,migrationmapsinviteustoreconsiderthewaywethinkabout cartographicprocesses.Everydetail–fromthesymbolsandcoloursused,tothe projectionoftheworlddepicted–iscrucialinshapingreaders’understandingof migration.Becausecartographersmayfailtopresentanobjectiveaccountof migrants’trajectoriesandignorepersonalaspectsoftheirjourneys,alternative mappinghasdevelopedandintroducedmoreprofoundwaysofexposing migrants’experiences.Toavoidcrudelycategorizingthosewhomigrateand representingthemasthreats,theyfocus“notontheroots,butontheroutesof migrants”(VanHoutum&Lacy,2020,415).Theyrevealthehazardouspaths irregularmigrantstakeanddenouncethefewlegaloptionstheyactuallyhaveto reachtheirfinaldestinationsafelyandlawfully.Ultimately,everymapis productiveandprovidesalensthroughwhichreadersmaycomprehenda particulartopic.Maybemigrationwillneverfullybeexplainedthroughmaps, butoverall,thereseemtobewaysthat,ifcombined,couldbetterdepict migrationquantitativelyandqualitatively.

Bacon,Lucie,OlivierClochard,ThomasHonoré,NicolasLambert,Sarah Mekdjian,andPhilippeRekacewicz.2016."MappingtheMigratory Movements."Revueeuropéennedesmigrationsinternationales32(3):1-28.

Campos-Delgado,Amalia.2018."Counter-mappingmigration:irregular migrants’storiesthroughcognitivemapping."Mobilities13(4):488-504. Fias,Mona.2020.Ethicallymappingmigration.December7.

https://childmove.com/2020/12/07/ethically-mapping-migration/. NelsonAgudeloHiguita,etal.2022."U.S.boundjourneyofmigrantpeoplesIn TransitacrossDante’sInfernoandPurgatoryintheAmericas."Travel MedicineandInfectiousDisease,March24:1-5.

Orangotango,Kollektiv.2018.CounterMappingMilitantResearch. notanatlas.org.

Sander,Nikola,GuyJ.Abel,RamonBauer,andJohannesSchmidt.2014. "VisualisingMigrationFlowDatawithCircularPlots."ViennaInstituteof Demography1-37.

Tazzioli,Martina.2015."WhichEurope?Migrants’unevengeographiesand counter-mappingatthelimitsofrepresentation."Journalfürkritische Migrations-undGrenzregimeforschung2:1-20.

VanHoutum,Henk.2012."Remappingborders."InACompaniontoBorder Studies,byHastingsDonnanandThomasWilson.BlackwellPublishingLtd.

VanHoutum,Henk,andRodrigoBuenoLacy.2020."Themigrationmaptrap. Ontheinvasionarrowsinthecartographyofmigration."Mobilities2: 196-219.

Vermeulen,Maite,LeonDeKorte,andHenkVanHoutum.2020.Howmapsin themediamakeusmorenegativeaboutmigrants.September2.

https://thecorrespondent.com/664/how-maps-in-the-media-make-us-more-ne gative-about-migrants.

Understandingthe“ImpendingClimate DisplacementCrisis”Discourse:ReplacingAlarmist NarrativeswithTechnicalSolutions

LiamBlakely

EditedbyJeremyRotenberg

(UNHCR/Roger Arnold)

Bymid-2022,theUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees (UNHCR)estimatesthattherewillbe103millionpeopledisplacedaround theworld.Thereisconsiderableconcernamongtheinternational communitythatfurtherincreasesinhumanmobilityduetoclimatechange andenvironmentaldisasterswillseverelyexacerbatethecurrentbacklogin displacementsolutions.Still,theinternationalcommunityhasfailedto producenewlawsthatguaranteeprotectionforthosewhoaredisplaceddue tothesereasons.Thispaperexploresthecurrentlegalshortcomingsthat jeopardizethehumanrightsofenvironmentallydisplacedpeople(EDPs).It furtherevaluatesthefeasibilityofsolutionssuchastheamendmentofthe 1951RefugeeConvention,thedraftingandratificationofanew internationaltreaty,andthecombinationofenvironmentalandmobility justicemovements.Duetospecificinstitutionalconstraintsontheprinciple actorsandtraditionalissuesofcooperationattheinternationallevel,Iargue againstatop-downsolutiontothelackoflegalprotectionsforEDPsthat oftenarisesfromalarmistdiscourse.Instead,drawingontenetsofthe mobilityjusticemovement,Iadvocateforaninclusivestate-ledapproach thatpromotescross-partisanpolicysolutionstoclimatechangeand displacementinconsultationwithregionalandsub-regionalactors.

Introduction

Bymid-2022,theUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees (UNHCR)estimatesthattherewillbe103millionpeopledisplacedaroundthe world(UNHCR2022).AstheleadingUnitedNations(UN)agencywitha specificmandateforrefugees,theUNHCRincludesbutdifferentiatesbetween asylum-seekers,refugees,internallydisplacedpeople(IDPs),andothergroupsin theirfigureofmobilepopulationsin2022.Thisunprecedentedvolumeof displacementcontinuesarisingtrendthathasacceleratedinrecentyears. UNHCRdataindicatesthatnewdisplacementshaveoutpacedtheavailable solutionsforbothrefugeesandIDPssince2010(UNHCRGlobalTrends 11

2022).Thereisconsiderableconcernamongtheinternationalcommunitythat furtherincreasesinhumanmobilityduetoclimatechangeandenvironmental disasterswillexacerbatethisbacklogindisplacementsolutions.Whilerisingsea levels,deforestation,extremeweather,desertification,environmental degradation,andnaturaldisastershavebecomemorefrequentandwidespreadin thelastdecade,theinternationalcommunityhasfailedtoproducenewlawsthat guaranteetheprotectionofthosewhoaredisplacedduetothesereasons (CoordinationUnit:PlatformonDisasterDisplacement2018).

The1951RefugeeConventionmandatesthatstatesgrantasylumtothose whoare“unableorunwillingtoreturntotheircountryoforiginowingtoa well-foundedfearofbeingpersecutedforreasonsofrace,religion,nationality, membershipofaparticularsocialgroup,orpoliticalopinion”(1951Refugee Convention,3).Thosewhoaredisplacedduetoclimateanddisasterrelated reasonsaretypicallyexcludedfromasylumonthesegrounds.Iwillrefertothese individualsasenvironmentallydisplacedpeopleorEDPs.Manyacademicsand policymakersbelievethattoadequatelyprotectthesegroups,statesand internationalactorsmustadoptcomparablelegalagreementsobligingthemto grantasylumtoEDPsinalessrestrictivemanner.Whilethereisanemerging consensusintheinternationalcommunityoftheneedtorecognizethe intersectionbetweenclimatechangeandhumanmobility,thereissignificant variabilityinapproachestoframingandimplementingtheseprotections(Naser 2021).Insomecases,thereissupportforarevised1951RefugeeConvention.In others,academicsandpolicymakershavecalledforanewconventiontoentrench andenforcestates’perceivedobligationstowards“climaterefugees”.However, manykeystakeholdersareskepticaloftheabilityoftheinternationalcommunity toeffectivelycoordinateatop-downapproach,electinginsteadtosupport nationalandregionalprocesses(PDD2018).Furthermore,somesee humanitarianclimatemigrationdiscourseandthe“climaterefugee”labelas alarmistandreinforcingofthehistoricalcapitalistperspectivethatpositions displacedpeopleas“others”(Ahuja2021,4-5,Baldwinetal.2019).

Afterconsideringtheinternationalsystem’scurrentinabilitytoprotect thosedisplacedduetoclimaterelatedreasonsandevaluatingthestrengthof proposedsolutions,thispaperseekstoidentifythemosteffectivewaytomitigate

theimpendingclimatemobilitycrisis.Duetospecificinstitutionalconstraintson themostrelevantactorsandtraditionalissuesofcooperationattheinternational level,Iargueagainstatop-downsolutiontothelackoflegalprotectionsfor environmentallydisplacedpeoplethatarisesfromalarmistdiscourse.Instead, drawingontenetsofthemobilityjusticemovement,Iadvocateforaninclusive state-ledapproachthatpromotescross-partisanpolicysolutionstoclimate changeanddisplacementinconsultationwithregionalandsub-regionalactors.

LegalBarriersintheCurrentInternationalOrder

Astheintroductionmentions,the1951RefugeeConventionarticulatesa precisedefinitionofwhoqualifiesasarefugee.Beingtheprimaryinternational institutionresponsibleforpromotingandprotectingthe1951Convention,the UNHCRoutlinestheproceduralstandardsforRefugeeStatusDetermination (RSD).AlthoughsovereignstatescanproducetheirownversionoftheRSD process,itisoftenbasedontheUNHCR’sproceduralstandard.Inparticular, thefollowingbasicrequirementsmustbeensuredbyeachcontractingstate, including:

(i)Aqualifiedandcompetentofficial(e.g.,immigrationofficerorborder policeofficer)withclearinstructionsfordealingwithcasesinaccordance withrelevantinternationalprinciples.

(ii)Adequateinformationfortheapplicantabouttheprocedure.

(iii)Aclearlyidentifiedauthorityresponsibleforexamininganddeciding onrequestsforrefugeestatus.

(iv)Theapplicantshouldreceivethenecessaryaidtofacilitatethe submissionoftheircasetotheauthoritiesconcernedincludingcontactwith arepresentativeofUNHCR.

(v)Recognizedrefugeesshouldbepromptlyissuedwithdocumentation certifyingrefugeestatus.

(vi)Reasonabletimetoappealarefusaldecisioneithertothesameortoa differentauthority.

(vii)Theapplicantshouldbepermittedtoremaininthecountrypendinga

decisiononhisinitialrequest,includingincasesofappeal(UNHCR Handbook42-43,2019).

TheUNHCRdirectlyadministerstheRSDprocessthroughtheirlocalofficesin about50states.Liketherestoftheinternationalcommunity,theUNHCRis notoriouslystingywhengrantingrefugeestatus.IninterviewswithEligibility Officers,theUNHCRprotectionstaffwhoareresponsibleforconductingthe RSDprocess,workersoftenfeltthattheylackedtheresourcesor decision-makingindependencenecessarytoprioritize“quality,fairness,”and humanitarianaims(FresiaandvonKanel2016,114).Officersalsodescribeda “cultureofsuspicion”inthedeterminationofaclaimant’scredibilitythat developsalongsidethecynicalattitudesofmoreexperiencedpeersand supervisors(FresiaandvonKanel2016,112).Thisatmosphereissupportedand enforcedbystateswhofundandregulatetheextentofUNHCRoperationsin theinterestofmaintainingthesanctityoftheirborders.Giventherestrictive natureoftheUNHCRandtheRSDprocesswhenconsideringtraditional refugees,itisunsurprisingthatenvironmentallydisplacedpeoplearelargely excludedfromtheprotectionsprovidedforunderthe1951Refugee Convention.

TheselegalbarrierscanbeobservedthroughcasessuchasthatoftheNew ZealandSupremeCourtv.IoaneTeitiotain2015.Mr.Teitiotaandhiswife movedfromthePacificIslandofKiribatitoNewZealandin2007undera three-yearpermit.Oncethepermitexpired,Mr.Teitiotaandhisfamilyremained inNewZealandillegally.Whenhewasapprehended,Mr.Teitiotaappliedfor refugeestatusbasedonthethreatofenvironmentaldegradationcausedbyrising sea-levelsinthePacificIslandofKiribati(Buchanan2015).AfterhisRSD applicationwasrejectedbytheImmigrationandProtectionOfficer,Mr.Teitiota appealedthedecisionwithNewZealand’sImmigrationandProtection Tribunal,whoupheldhisrejection(Buchanan2015).Mr.Teitiotathenfiled requestsforappealwiththeNewZealandHighCourtin2013andtheCourtof Appealin2014,bothofwhomdeniedhisrighttoappealthefindingsofthe initialprotectionofficer(Buchanan2015).Finally,theSupremeCourtofNew Zealand“upheldthedecisionsofthelowercourtsanddismissedMr.Teitiota’s

applicationforleavetoappeal”in2015(Buchanan2015,1).Thecourts recognizedthatKiribati’scapacitytosupportitspopulationwas“significantly compromised”bytheeffectsofboth“sudden-onset”environmentaleventssuch asstorms,and“slow-onsetprocesses”suchasaconsistentlyrisingsea-level (Buchanan2015,2).Despitethis,theyfoundthatMr.Teitiotawasnotatriskof seriousharmandthathehadengagedina“voluntaryadaptivemigration” strategythatwasnotprotectedunderthe1951Conventionnoranyother internationallaw(Buchanan2015,2-5).Asaresult,hisappealwasdeniedand neitherhenorhisfamilyweregrantedrefugeestatus.Thiscasedemonstratesthe literalandstrictreadingofthe1951Convention,preventing“climaterefugees” suchasMr.Teitiotafromclaimingasylumonthesegrounds.

AddressingLegalBarriers:Amendingthe1951RefugeeConvention?

CertainscholarsandpolicymakershavereactedtocaseslikethatofMr. Teitiotabysuggestingthatthesimplestwaytoaddressthegapinlegal protectionsaffordedtoenvironmentallydisplacedpeopleistobroadenthe traditionaldefinitionofarefugee.Somebelievethiscanbedoneby reconceptualizingtheunderstandingofpersecutioninthe1951Convention’s definitionofarefugee(Scott2020,129).AccordingtoScott,theprincipalaimof the1951Conventionistoprotectagainstnon-discrimination(Scott2020).In thiscontext,insteadoffocusingonisolatedactsofpersecution,thebasisofa well-foundedfearofpersecution“entailsaconditionofexistenceinwhich discrimination”contributestoanactual,orhighriskof,exposureto“serious denialsofhumanrights''(Scott2020,129).Sinceclimatechangeand environmentaldisastersoftenresultinsuch“seriousdenialsofhumanrights” andfailuresofstateprotection,EDPscouldberecognizedundertheproposed definition.Scottbelievesthatthis“recalibrated''definitionaddressesproven limitsinthestatusquounderstandingofwhatitmeanstobepersecutedby incorporatingbetterriskassessment,broadertemporalandsociological consideration,andanarrowerpersonalscope.Additionally,Scottclaimsthis definitionallowsthosefacingenvironmentally-drivendenialsofhumanrightsto accessasylumwithoutover-broadeningandweakeningthe1951Refugee

Convention(Scott2020,129).Crucially,Scottspecifiesthatdenialsofhuman rightsmustbe“aconsequenceoftheindividual’spoliticalorcivilstatus”(Scott 2020,156).Furthermore,Scottarguesthesechangesarereadilyaccessibleand applicableinthecontextofRSD,makingitapracticalsolutionthatdoesnot underminestatesovereigntyorthesanctityoftheRSDprocess.

Scott’snoveldefinitionforwhatconstitutesawell-foundedfearof prosecutioninthecontextofdeterminingthestatusofarefugeeclaimantis carefullydevelopedalongsideanestablishedframeworkofnon-discrimination andhumanrights.Infact,hearguesthathisdefinitionismorealignedwiththe “principlesfortreatyinterpretation”outlinedinArticle31-33ofthe1969 ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties(Scott2020,131).However,I contendthatre-negotiatingthe1951RefugeeConventiontoincludethisnew interpretationofpersecutioncouldresultinapoliticalstalematethatmight severelyweakenthetreaty.ThisviewisheldbyformerHighCommissionerfor RefugeesandcurrentSecretaryGeneraloftheUN,AntonioGuterres(Prieur 2018,235).Thedefinitionsofthe1951RefugeeConventionhaveonlybeen modifiedoncesincethetreatycameintoforce,toremovethetemporaland geographiclimitationsviathe1967ProtocolRelatingtotheStatusofRefugees. Itisimportanttonotethatin1967,nonewlanguagewasadopted;the internationalcommunityalreadywidelyrecognizedtheproblemsassociatedwith adefinitionof“refugee”restrictedtoEuropeans.Scott’sproposeddefinition altersthelanguageofthetreatytoimposenewobligationsonstateswithout widespreadconsensus.Consideringthepre-existingrestrictiveandemotional attitudesadoptedbymoststatestowardstheissueofmigration,itwouldbe unlikelytoconvinceasubstantialgroupofstatestodraftandratifythisnew definitionofpersecutionatthistime.Additionally,evenifthenewdefinition weretobeentrenchedininternationallaw,itwouldhaveanegativeimpacton theabilityofconventionalrefugeesandEDPstoseekprotectionsunderthe1951 Convention.Anticipatingthestinginessandcultureofsuspicionthatpervades theRSDprocessandthebroaderborderregimes,Scottproposedadefinition thatwasdesignedtomaintainthenarrowconceptionofrefugeehoodthat appliedonlytothoseindividualsfacingdiscriminationbasedontheircivilor politicalstatus.Insodoing,ScottreinforcesastrictandprincipledRSDprocess 12

(Scott2020,156).Whilecertainindividualswhoarespecificallydiscriminated againstduetoanintersectionoftheirpoliticalorcivilstatusandenvironmental factorscouldbeeligibleforprotectionunderScott’sversionofthe1951Refugee Convention,largergroupsfleeingmoregeneralandwidespreaddenialsofhuman rightswouldnot.Consequently,thisdefinitiondoesnotadequatelyreinventthe 1951RefugeeConventiontoaddresstheincreasingneedsofpeopledisplaced duetoclimaterelatedreasons.

AddressingLegalBarriers:DraftingaNewConvention?

Thereareotherinherentissuesinthelanguageofthe1951Refugee Conventionthatmakeitunsuitableforprovidingenvironmentallydisplaced peoplewithlegalprotections.Twomajorconcernsaretherequirementsthatthe displacedpersoncrossaninternationalborderandthattheyareforcedtodoso. Scottaddressesneitherofthese.Recognizingthecombinationoftheslowand sudden-onsetimpactsofenvironmentaldegradation,protectionsdesignedfor thosedisplacedbysuchthreatsmustaccountfortheagencyofmigrantsto voluntarilyleavetheirhomesiftheyarenolongerorbeginningtobecome uninhabitable.Additionally,theprotectionsmustaccountfortherealitythat peoplewhoaredisplacedwithintheirowncountriesmaystillbedeniedbasic humanrights.Consideringthemultipleaspectsofthe1951Refugee Conventionthatpreventenvironmentallydisplacedpeoplefromclaiming asylumunderinternationallaw,scholarslikeMichelPrieurhavesuggested draftingacompletelynewconventiontorecognizethedistinctlegalstatusof environmentallydisplaced-persons.Thisapproachisstillfocusedonhuman rights,butinsteadoftryingtoincorporateEDPsintotheexistingrefugee structureitlookstocreateauniqueandspecificframeworktoprotectthese groups.Whiletheaimistodevelop“alegalinstrumentandprotection mechanismsthataremoreflexiblethanthe1951Convention”,theymustalso imposelegallybindingdutiesuponstates(Prieur2018,238).

TogetherwiththeUniversityofLimogesandtheInternationalCenterof ComparativeEnvironmentalLaw(CIDCE),Prieurpresentsadraftconvention thatradicallyattemptstofulfilltheseaims.Themaininnovationoftheirdraft, 12

Article10,grants“environmentallydisplacedpersons”therighttofreelychoose whichevercountryorregiontheywouldliketoresidein(Prieur2018,238).This articlealsoallocatesstatusholderstherighttorejoinafamilymemberorfriend wholivesabroad“withoutadministrativeobstacles”(Prieur2018,238).Unlike Scott’snarrowingofthepersonalscopeforrefugeeconsideration,Prieur’sdraft conventionrecognizesbothindividualandcollectiverightstofreedomof movementbasedonArticle9and12oftheInternationalCovenantonCiviland PoliticalRights(ICCPR).Theseflexibleandbroadlyapplicablerightsare contingentonstatesaccepting“theobligationtoreceivethedisplaced”andgrant themasylum(Prieur2018,239).Prieurandtheircolleaguesbelievethis obligationissupportedbyPrinciple27ofthe1992RioDeclaration,which providesthelegalbasisforstatecooperationandsolidarityinpublicinternational law,especiallyconcerningtheenvironment(Prieur2018,239).Ifimplemented, thisconventionwoulddirectsignatorystatestoestablishaspecialcommission underdomesticlegislationwhoisresponsiblefordeterminingthestatusclaims ofenvironmentallydisplacedpeople(Prieur2018,240).Thecommission’s membersaretobeappointedandmonitoredbythestate’s“highestjuridical authorities”andapplyasetofinternationaldeterminedguidelinestodetermine theprotectionstatusoftheclaimant(Prieur2018,240).Importantly,the commission’sdecisionswouldbereversibleundertheHighAuthorityofthe WorldAgencyforEnvironmentallyDisplacedPeople(WAEP),anorganization createdbythedraftconventionforthepurposeofmonitoring,funding,and enforcingtheoperationsoftheconvention(Prieur2018,240-241).

Prieurpresentsthisdraftconventionasanalternativesolutiontotheslow, bureaucraticapproachtakenbytheUNFCCCandtheWarsawInternational MechanismforLossandDamage(WIM).WhileIagreethatalegallybinding internationalconventionspecificallydesignedtogiveenvironmentallydisplaced peopleaccesstohumanrightsprotectionsisaviablepolicygoal,Iarguethat Prieurandtheircolleagues’draftconventionisbothprematureandunattainable inthecurrentinternationalcommunity.Aconventionofsuchmagnitudeand forcecannotsimplybeimposeduponstatesintheanarchicworldorder.For successfulratificationandobservance,asignificantandinfluentialpartofthe internationalstatesystemmustadopttheperspectivethattheybearthe

responsibilitytoprotectenvironmentallydisplacedpeople.Finnemoreand Sikkink(1998)describetheprocessbywhichthesenormativevaluesare propagatedasa“normlifecycle”,wherebyemergingnormsmustbeadoptedbya criticalmassofinfluentialstateswhoareconsidered“normleaders”(Finnemore andSikkink1998,895).Thisconstitutesatippingpointthatleadsto“norm cascading”,thestageinwhichnormleadersconvinceincreasingnumbersof statesandorganizationstoacceptthenormthemselves.Eventually,whena majorityofthepopulationofstatesacceptthenormanditisnolongerthe subjectofdebate,thenormisconsideredtobe“internalized”(Finnemoreand Sikkink1998,895-896).ThedraftconventionoutlinedbyPrieurassumesthat theinternationalcommunitycanjumpstraighttothestageofnorm internalizationinthecontextofprotectingenvironmentallydisplacedpeople. Consideringstates’marginalisationofrefugees,IDPsandEDPs,Iarguethat statesgenerallydonotperceivethemselvesasobligatedtoprotecttheworld’s mobilepopulations.Specifically,thenormativeobligationofstatestoreceive EDPshasyettoreachthetippingpointidentifiedinFinnemoreandSikkink’s normlifecycle.

Inadditiontotheinternationalcommunity’soverallunreadinesstoadopt thisnorm,Prieur’sdraftconventioncontradictsanumberofothernormsthat arethoroughlyinternalizedacrosstheworld.Mostglaringly,themechanism proposedtoenforcethedraftconventionandmonitorstates’compliance,the HighAuthorityoftheWAEP,violatestheprincipleofstatesovereigntythatisof utmostimportanceinthecurrentworldorder.Inunilaterallydictatingthe internationalguidelinesforeachcountry’sspecialcommissiontofollowwhen determiningthestatusofanenvironmentallydisplacedperson,theWAEP alreadyencroachesontherightofstatestoprotectandenforcetheirown borders.Moreover,ingivingtheHighAuthoritytheabilitytoappealandreverse thedecisionsmadebytheconcernedcountry’sspecialcommission,Prieur’sdraft conventionislikelytoraiseserioussovereigntyconcernsamongstates.

Furthermore,Article10ofthedraftconventiongivingEDPsandtheirfamilies thefreechoiceofcountryorregiontowhichtheywouldliketorelocateraises pertinentquestionsaboutwhatkindoflimitsstatescanreasonablyimposeon potentiallyoverwhelminginfluxesofimmigration.Contrarytothenarrow

protectionsofferedtoEDPsinScott’sremodelled1951RefugeeConvention, Prieur’sdraftconventionproposestobroadentherightsavailabletoEDPs beyondthecapabilitiesofthecurrentinternationalstatesystem.

ItisclearthatPrieurandtheircolleagueshavedeliberatelyproduceda provocativedraftconventionthatpushestheboundariesofstatecomfort.While theinternationalcommunityiscertainlyunwillingandunpreparedtoadopt suchaconvention,Prieur’sdraftprovidesafascinatingmodeltoconsiderwhen assessingandevaluatingpotentialsolutionstotheintersectionofincreasing displacementandclimatechange.Itraisesimportantquestionssuchas“whois responsibleforclimatechangeanditsimpactsondisplacedcitizensofthe world?”and“whatshouldstatesdotocoordinateandengageinsolutionsto theseissues?”

TheMobilityJusticeMovementandtheProblemwithAlarmist Discourse

AccordingtoMimiSheller’sconceptionofthemobilityjusticemovement, thepredicamentofenvironmentallydisplacedpeopleisaresultofglobal capitalistregimesthatunevenlygovernthecontrolofmovementbasedonaccess toresources,wealth,andurbanlife(Sheller2018).InherbookMobilityJustice, Shellernotesthatwhiletouristsandelitesdoastheypleaseinvariouscountriesof theirchoosing,displacedpeopledisproportionatelysuffertheconsequencesof restrictiveborderregimesandunequaldistributionofresources(Sheller2018). Sheller’sideabuildsontheclimatejusticemovement,whichrecognizesthe overwhelmingconsequencesofenvironmentaldegradationfacedbytheworld’s morevulnerablepopulationsinspiteoftheirminutecontributionstotheissue. In2014,theCanadianCentreforPolicyAlternativesacknowledgedacollective obligationto“climatemigrants”inareporttitled“PreparingBCforClimate Migration”aspartoftheirClimateJusticeProject(Dicksonetal.2014).The authorsnotedthatalthoughCanadaconstitutedonly0.5%oftheworld’s populationin2012,itproduced2.1%ofglobalgreenhousegasemissions (Dicksonetal.2014,5).Whileglobalnorthstateslargelydependonfossilfuel relianteconomiestomaintainthequalityoflifestandardsintheirowncountries,

97%ofclimateinducedmortalityoccursintheglobalsouth(Dicksonetal.2014, 5).Manyinterpretthisrealitytoimpartasenseofresponsibilityontheworld’s largestpolluterstohelpothercountriesrespondtoclimatechangeand displacementissuesthroughhumanitarianintervention.Inspiteofthisreport, theauthorsacknowledgethatthereisverylittlegovernmentalinterestinCanada todepartfromdominantfossilfueleconomies(Dicksonetal2014,9-10).This remainstruetothisday.

Fundamentally,MimiSheller’sconceptionofmobilityjusticeviewshuman movementasthe“foundingcondition”ofsocialorganizationratherthanthe exceptiontoit(Baldwinetal2019,290).Still,astheimpactsofclimatechange inevitablyincreasethevolumeofdisplacementaroundtheworld,such movementisoftencharacterizedbystatesandinternationalorganizationsasa crisisthatthreatensthewellbeingofstatesandtheircitizens.Thispromotes alarmistdiscoursethatwarnsagainsttheinevitabilityofclimatechangethatwill directlycausemassivehordesof“climatemigrants”toarriveirregularlyatthe doorstepofwealthyglobalnorthcountriesinsearchofabetterlife(Munoz 2020,1273).Thisperspectiveisreinforcedbyunidimensionalrepresentationsof environmentallydisplacedpeopleasboatpeopleandillegalimmigrantsand promptspoliciesofsecuritization(Munoz2020).Securitizationcanbe understoodas“theprocessthroughwhichnon-traditionalsecurityissues,inthis caseclimatechangeandmigration,arediscussedandacteduponintermsof securityandtherebydrawnintothesecuritydomain”(Boas2019,901).The strategiccharacterizationofenvironmentallydisplacedpeoplethroughthislensis employedbycountriesasapoliticaltooltoentrenchstate-centeredsecurity policiestominimizethe“threatmultiplier”thatisclimatechangeand displacement(Boas2019,901).Thiscanbeobservedinargumentsthat“climate migration”threatenspeaceanddevelopment,especiallyinvulnerablecountries andthuswarrantsan“integratedforeignpolicyapproach”requiringthe interventionofstatemilitaries(VanderVliet2018,18).Thesedivisivepolicies reinforcethemeaningofcitizenshipinglobalnorthcountriesandtheperceived threatofasylumseekers,whoarepositionedasthe“other”(Munoz2020,1273). Whileneoliberalpublicpolicyandmediapropagateahumanitarianfocuson reducingtheinequalitiesofcarbonemissionsandrestrictiveimmigration

regimes,theproposedsolutionsareoftendominatedbysecuritydiscourse.In lightofalarmistclimatemigrationdiscourse,NeelAhujaargueshumanitarian justicenarrativesareco-optedbystatestoobscurethereproductionofcapitalist behaviourthatdrivesclimatechangeanddisplacementtobeginwith(Ahuja 2021,3-4).Whilethismaybetrue,statesremainthemostpowerfulactorsonthe internationalscaleandtheirabilitytoinfluenceclimatechangeanddisplacement paradigmscannotbeoverlooked.

TowardsaTechnicalandInclusiveState-LedApproach

Frequently,theanti-immigrationandclimatechange-denyingattitudesin globalnorthcountriesareattributedtothepoliticalpolarizationofright-and left-wingideologies.Thestaunchrefusalofright-wingpoliticiansandcitizensto accepttheimpactsofclimatechangeontheenvironmentandhumanmobilityis framedasaresponsetoradicalleft-wingsuggestionstocompletelydoawaywith fossilfueleconomiesandborderregimes(Stanleyetal.2021).Whilepolitical polarisationiscertainlyarealissueinglobalnorthcountries,Iarguethatitis oftenoveremphasizedbypoliticiansandmediapersonas.Drawingontheirstudy ofattitudestowardsclimatechangeandclimatemigrationpolicyinAustralia andNewZealand,Stanleyetal.(2021)demonstratethatthereiswidespread recognitionofclimatechangeandsupportforimmigrationasasolutionacross politicalorientation(Stanleyetal.2021,3-4).Whilerespondentswithmore right-wingpoliticalorientationswereonaverageslightlylesssupportivethan respondentswithleft-wingpoliticalorientationstowardsclimatemigration policies,thesignificantmajorityofvotersfromallpoliticalpartiesinNew ZealandandAustraliawereinfavourofthepolicy(Stanleyetal.2021,5).The onlyexceptionwasthevotersoftheminorityOneNationparty. Overall,this suggeststheexistenceofacross-partisanpoliticalconsensusinAustraliaandNew Zealandontheneedtomitigatetheimpactsofclimatechangeandtowelcome environmentallydisplacedpersons.

Consideringthesefindings,Iarguethatglobalnorthstatesdohavethe politicalwilltoprovideprotectionstoenvironmentallydisplacedpersons. However,thisdoesnotneedtobeaccomplishedthroughtherevisionofthe

1951RefugeeConventionoranovelinternationalconvention.Instead,the alarmistdiscoursedisseminatedinvariousglobalnorthcountriesshouldbe questionedandreplacedwithtechnicalsolutionsinformedbothbyexpertssuch astheInternationalOrganizationonMigration(IOM)andenvironmentally displacedpersonsthemselves.Anexampleofsuchsolutionsincludesestablishing directand“earlypathwaysformigration”betweenhostcommunitiesand countriesoforigin(Stanleyetal.2021,7).Thisallowsthehostcommunityto framemigrationinabeneficialandpositivemannerbeforethereisextensive nationalandinternationalattentionontheissue,potentiallyprompting polarisedpoliticisedinterjections(Stanleyetal.2021).Thispreventativeand proactiveapproachtoprovidingenvironmentallydisplacedpersonswith protectionsisoneofthecentralgoalsoftheGlobalCompactforSafe,Orderly, andRegularMigration(GCM),alongwiththeaimforstatestoembed environmentalconsiderationsintheirdomesticimmigrationpolicy(Chazalnoel andIonesco2018,107).Establishedin2016attheUNGeneralAssemblyin NewYork,theGCMisacrucialtoolforpushingthenormofprotectingEDPs towardsthetippingpointdescribedbyFinnemoreandSikkink.Itisaplatform throughwhichstatescanshareanddebatenationallawsandpoliciespermitting the“safeandeffectivemanagementofclimatemigration”(Chazalnoeland Ionesco2018,112-113).Althoughitisimperativetorecognizethedifficultyin combiningtwocontentiousareasofinternationalpolicy,mobilityandclimate change,state-ledinitiativeslikethePlatformonDisasterDisplacement(PDD)is anotherkeyforumthroughwhich“policymakers,researchers,andpractitioners'' cansharetechnicalpolicysolutionsandfurtherdiffusethenormofprotecting EDPs(PDD2018,128).WhilethestructureofthePDDisheavilyinfluencedby theUNHCRandtheUNFCCC,Iarguethattheseforumsmustbeusedby statesprimarilytoinformandinfluencetheirownnationalandsub-regional policiesratherthanparticipatingininternationalagendasetting.Asnationaland sub-regionalorganizationssharetheirmosteffectivepoliciesandpractices,the normofprotectingenvironmentallydisplacedpeoplewillnaturallycascade acrosstheinternationalcommunity.

Whileenvironmentaldegradationandclimatechangeincreasinglyprompt migrationasanecessaryadaptivesolution,thereisconsensusacrossthe internationalcommunitythatthecurrentlegalandinstitutionalframeworks insufficientlyprotectenvironmentallydisplacedpeople.Consideringthis situation,manyhavesuggestedalteringorcreatingnewinternationallawto bridgethelegalgapandenforceatop-downimpositionofhumanrights protectionsforEDPs.However,theintentofthe1951RefugeeConventionwas nevertodesignabroadprotectionregimeformigrants,makingitextremely difficulttochangeinawaythatwouldreflecttheneedsofEDPstoday.Onthe otherhand,anewconventionsuchastheonedraftedbyMichelPrieurandthe CIDCEwouldencroachtoostronglyonstatesovereigntyandpushthe internationalcommunityinadirectionthatcontradictscurrentattitudes.Yet, consideringtheoverwhelmingcontributionsofglobalnorthstatestothe proliferationofclimatechangeandthesubsequentimpactsonhuman displacement,inadditiontothecentralroleplayedbystatesinthecurrent internationalsystem,protectingthehumanrightsofenvironmentallydisplaced peoplemustbecomeastate-ledpolicyinitiative.Thatbeingsaid,thispolicymust notmanifestthroughalarmistandsecuritizedframeworksthatsimplyreinforce theissuestheyclaimtoaddress.Asaresult,statesmustendeavortoseek cross-partisansolutionsinconsultationwithsub-regionalactorsthataimto protectenvironmentallydisplacedpeoplebyentrenchingconsiderationsof environmentalmobilityjusticeindomesticlegislation.Thismaybeanadhoc solutionthatwillonlyincrementallyimprovetherightsofenvironmentally displacedpeople,butIargueitisthemostlogicalwaytobeginextendingthe legalframeworksneededtoaccommodatedisplacement.

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Boas,Ingrid,etal.2019.“ClimateMigrationMyths.”NatureClimateChange9, no.12:901–03.https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-019-0633-3.

Buchanan,Kelly.2015.NewZealand:ClimateChangeRefugee,CaseOverview. Washington,LawLibraryofCongress,GlobalLegalResearchCenter. HeinOnline.

Chazalnoel,MiriamTraoreandDinaIonesco.2018.“AdvancingtheGlobal Governanceof ClimateMigrationThroughtheUnitedNationsFramework ConventiononClimateChangeandtheGlobalCompactonMigration.”In ClimateRefugees:BeyondtheLegalImpasse?,editedbySimonBehrmanand AvidanKent,103–117.London:Routledge.

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Dickson,Stephanie,Takaro,Tim,andWebber,Sophie.2014.“PreparingBCfor ClimateMigration.”CanadianElectronicLibrary.CID: 20.500.12592/090cd6.

Finnemore,Martha,andKathrynSikkink.1998.“InternationalNormDynamics andPoliticalChange.”InternationalOrganization52,no.4(Autumn): 887–917.https://www.jstor.org/stable/2601361.

Fresia,Marion,andAndreasvonKänel.2016.“UniversalizingtheRefugee Categoryand StrugglingforAccountability:TheEverydayWorkofEligibility OfficersWithinUNHCR.”InUNHCRandtheStruggleforAccountability Technology,LawandResults-basedManagement,editedbyKristinSandvik andKatjaJacobson,101–18.London:Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315692593.

Munoz,SarahM.2021.“EnvironmentalMobilityinaPolarizedWorld: QuestioningthePertinenceofthe‘ClimateRefugee’LabelforPacific Islanders.”JournalofInternationalMigrationandIntegration22,no.4 (Winter):1271–1284.https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-020-00799-6.

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Stanley,SamanthaK.,ZoeLeviston,CarolineNgTseung-Wong,andIain Walker.2021.“AcceptanceofClimateChangeandClimateRefugeePolicyin AustraliaandNewZealand:TheCaseAgainstPoliticalPolarisation.”Climatic Change169,no.26.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-021-03278-8.

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Women’sWork:RisksandOpportunitiesforGender EqualityinGhana’sInformalEconomies

MagritteGordaneer

EditedbyAmeliaFortier

TheinformalmarketeconomyinGhanamayrepresentanimpassein genderequalityeffortstoanuntrainedeye.However,inreality,theinformal economy—orblackmarket—canbeabountifulspaceforanexplorationof women’sdevelopment,orlackthereof.Thepresenceofwomenininformal marketeconomies,andthegeneralfailureinacknowledgingtheirnecessity,poses significantquestionsabouthowthesemarketsshouldbeaddressedtoaccount fordevelopmentsingenderequality.Barredfromformalormoretraditional economies,womenattemptingtosurviveininformalmarketsectorsface unregulatedandunexpectedrisks,posinggreatriskstotheirsurvival.Women’s frequentinabilitytoparticipateinformalmarketsinAfrica,andspecificallyin Ghana,duetosystemicsexismandawiderangeofbarriersleadstodependency ontheinformaleconomytosurvive.Whileinformalmarketscanharmwomen’s healthanddevelopment,theyalsoposeuniqueopportunitiesfortheir advancement.Theseopportunitiesshouldnotbenegated,butratherconsidered andanalyzedinthecontextofauthoritativeeffortstoregulatethesesectors. Women’sinteractionwiththeseblackmarketsandinformalsectorsisakey featureinthestoryofGhanianeconomies,andoftennegateddespitebroader attemptstoassistgenderequalityindevelopingeconomies.Womensignificantly makeup80percentoftheinformaleconomyinGhana(Dziwornu2018,417). Itis,therefore,crucialtoexaminehowtheinteractionsbetweentheformaland informalsectorsofGhanaposemulti-dimensionalrisks,barriers,andadvantages togenderequality.AnalysisofAfricaneconomiesandtheirtiestocolonialist financialmodelscontributestofurtherexaminationofwomeninthesemodels. Moreover,studyingeffortsbyWesternstatestosuppressinformationaboutthe informalAfricaneconomycanrevealhowwomenfacecomplicatedand multidimensionallyinfluencedformsofharminthesesectors.Giventhese multifacetedfactorsintheinformaleconomy’sinteractionwithgenderin Ghana,attemptstosuppressilliciteconomiesriskcausingharmtowardswomen, allowingabusetorunrampant,andextendingthethreatofcontinuedviolence againstwomen,allofwhichchallengethepotentialpositivegenderopportunities withintheinformalsector.Women’sparticipationinGhana’s

informalsectorsillustratestheharmfulnatureofblackmarketeconomies,in additiontotheirsimultaneousofferingofopportunitiesforgenderequality,and providesanecessarylenstoexaminethemarket’scolonialistorigins.

BarrierstoWomen’sParticipationintheFormalEconomy

Theinformaleconomy,characterizedby“small-scaleunitsproducingand distributinggoodsandservices,andconsistinglargelyofindependent, self-employedproducersinurbanareasofdevelopingcountries…generally provideverylowandirregularincomesandhighlyunstableemploymenttothose whoworkinit”(Wrigley-Asante2013,526).Firstusedtodescribe non-traditionalincomeopportunitiesinGhana’surbanmarketsinthe1970s, theinformalsectorbecameanessentialpieceofanalysisinregardstoAfrica’s storyofdevelopment(Wrigley-Asante2013,527).Ignoringtheinformalsectors withinAfricawouldconsequentlynegatemuchofthecontinent’sactual economy,inadditiontoreducingwomen’scontributionsandeconomicand politicalrealities.Theseinformaleconomies—suchasgovernmentalwork, financialinstitutions,andtraditionaltradeofgoods—arehighlyunregulatedin directcontrasttoformalmarketsinAfrica.InformalityinthebroaderAfrican economyprovidesAfricanswiththeabilitytoengageincommercewithout payingtaxesorhavingtheircommoditiesregulatedbystateauthorities.The natureofthesemarketsgiveswayforexploitationofworkersinadditionto opportunitiesforadvancementanddevelopmentwithoutadministrative overheadsuchastaxes(Obeng-Odoom2011,224).Theseinformalmarketsare oftentheonlyformofworkavailabletowomen,makingtheirsituationsas precariousasthesectorstheyrelyupon.

Barrierstowomenwhoenterandmeaningfullyparticipateintheformalor traditionaleconomyarefrequentandofteninsurmountable.Thesebarriersare builtonculturesofsexismandassignedgenderrolesandpreventwomenfrom participatinginthetraditionaleconomythroughrejectionintheformaljob marketandsuppressionwithinit.Thisisespeciallytrueinnatural-resourceand mineralricheconomies(Dzisi2008,262).Theinformaleconomyisalsoadeeply genderedenvironment.Muchoftheinformaleconomy’sactivityisbasedonthe

unofficialjobsmanywomenacrosstheworldfulfilldaily:domesticwork. Domesticandinformalworkarehighlygenderedandtangledtogether,whereas domesticworkexpectedtobedonebywomenwithoutpaycanbecommodified intheinformalmarket.Thisentanglementprovideswomenwithmore opportunitiesinblackmarketsthaninformalsectorswheremalelaborisoften favored.Thisistrueinbothresource-extractivejobsorjobsrequiringhigher educationingovernmentintheformalmarket.Manydevelopingeconomiesare basedonprimaryresourceexportsthusoftenrequiringastrongand physical-labororientedworkforce,whichinturnfavorstheconsistenthiringof menoverwomenduetophysicalattributes(Ross2008,108).Thisisespecially prevalentinthecaseofGhana’seconomy,whichreliesontheexportofgold, cocoa,andcrudeoil(InternationalTradeAdministration,2022).Additionally, tradeitselfintheinformaleconomyisagenderedprofession.Withouteducation, womeninGhanaseepettytrading,thesmall-scaletradingofitemsorservices,as theonlyopportunityavailabletothem(Owusu2004,119).Additionally,trading intheinformalsectorisoftentheonlylivelihoodwomencanparticipatein whilstinurbancentersandagriculturalworkisonlyavailabletowomeninrural settingsinGhana(Owusu2004,119).

Furthermore,cultural,andgendered,expectationsofmenandwomen infuseintotheworkplace,negativelyimpactingwomen.AsNadjeSadigAl-Ali discusses,economiescansociallybarwomenfromparticipatinginvarious sectors,especiallyinprimary-resourceandconflicteconomies(2009,57).These barriersarebasedinsexistinstitutionsandtheculturalrolesassignedtowomen overmen.Thus,responsibilitiesrelatedtocaregiving,cleaning,andcookingare placedsolelyonwomen.Giventhebarrierstowomen’sparticipationinthe formalsectorofeconomies,especiallyindevelopingnations,informaleconomies becometheonlysourceofadditionalincomeforthesewomen.Withtheeffects ofStructuralAdjustmentPrograms(SAPs)imposedbytheInternational MonetaryFundinthemid-eighties,wherethecostsoflivingraiseddramatically forordinaryGhanaians,womenarepressuredtoenteranyformofmarketjustto supportandsustaintheirfamilies(Owusu2004,117-19).Women,additionally, ofteninstinctivelyfeelthemostpressuretoprovidebasicgoodsforthefamily suchasfood,water,andshelter,therebyincreasingthestressfulneedtoenter

informalorhazardousmarkets(Owusu2004,118).Theseculturalpressureson womentoensurethesurvivaloftheirfamilywhilstnothavingaccesstosafeor stablesourcesofincomeiswhatmakestheinformaleconomysoessentialto manyGhanaians’survival.

TheInformalSectorasaThreattoGenderEquality

Womenworkingintheinformalsectorlackformalandcomprehensive protectionfromanyexternalorauthoritativebody,makingthemhighly susceptibletoexploitationandabuse.Womenwhoengageinriskierlaborin theseinformaleconomiesoftenseemonetarybenefitsforthisharshertypeof work(Wrigley-Asante2013,537).Whathasfurtherbeenfoundamongwomen workingininformaleconomies,especiallythosetaskedwithfacilitating cross-bordertradebetweenGhanaandneighboringstates,isseverenegative healthimpacts(Wrigley-Asante2013,537).Physicalmaladiesinadditionto variousdisorders—bothphysicalandmental—arefoundmorefrequentlyin womenengaginginharderlaborassociatedwithinformalwork(Wrigley-Asante 2013,528).Theprimacyofhardphysicallaborisnotonlydetrimentalto womens’health,butalsowomen’sdesirabilityandproductivityintheeconomy. Contrarily,menalmostalwaysholdmorephysicalandculturalcachettoexecute manuallabor,furtherthrustingwomentothefringesofprimary-resourceexport sectors.Healthriskstowomenintheseareasalsoextendtodiseasescontracted viainformalmarketactivities.InastudybyCharlotteWrigley-Asante,itwas foundthatmanywomendevelopsexuallytransmitteddiseasesaspartofthe trust-basedorsex-worknetworkswhichtheytakepartintosupporttheirtravel orcommerce(2018,534).Negativehealthimpactsassociatedwiththeinformal marketholdobviousthreatstogenderequalityandwomen’sdevelopment.

Women’shealthnotonlydirectlyaffectsgenderequality,butcanalsobean indicatorofbroadertrendsinequalityindevelopingnations.Informal economiescanbeexploitativebynature,howeverauthoritiestargetingthese sectorscanputwomeninsituationsthatfurtherrisktheirhealthandsafety.

Centralizationeffortstocombattheunregulatednatureofthesemarketsare alsopronetobeinghighlygenderedandviolentwhilebeingimplemented.

Theinformaleconomyposesahostofthreatstothecentralizationand legitimationofgovernmentsinAfrica,especiallyinthecessationoftaxesinthese sectors.When,forexample,authoritiescrackdownoninformalmarketplacesin ordertoenforcetheirowntraditionalmarketsandlegitimacy,theyoftenharm women’seconomicendeavorsandtrades,eitherdiminishingtheirpotentialfor economicmobilitybyceasingtheiractivity,orbysendingthemfurther undergroundtocontinuetoworkinformallywithevenlessoversight.InGhana, informalmarketworkersandsellersfaceregularharassmentandphysicalviolence fromstateauthoritieswhotrytoshutdowntheiractivities(Sowatey2018,336). AsEmmanuelSowateyetal.explain,Ghanaianwomeninthesemarketplaces faceviolence,beatings,undueinterrogations,andthedestructionoftheir merchandiseatthehandsofauthoritiessetonsuppressinginformalmarkets (2018,336).Harshenvironmentalconditions,overcrowding,riskoffire,and theftalsoaddtothehazardousconditionsmanyGhanaianexperience inthese markets.Furthermore,manymarketwomeninAccrareporthavingtopayhigh anduncheckedmarkettollswhencaughtbyauthorities(Agyei2016,306).Head portersorKayayei—youngwomenwhotransportgoodsontheirheads—often experiencesexualandphysicalharassmentfromcustomersduetotheirposition andvulnerabilityinthemarket(Agyei2016,298).Kayayeiencountersexual assaultatanalarminglyhighrateinthesemarketswhereby teenpregnancyand sexuallytransmitteddiseasesarecommonhavinggraveimpactsontheirhealth andabilitytowork(Agyei2016,298).FacingtherisingcostoflivinginAccra, manyworkersarecordonedoffintothesedangerousprofessionsthatincrease theirvulnerabilitytothreatsandharassment,withoutmuchpossibilityfor escapeduetomountingeconomicpressures.

Theinformalnatureofthesemarketeconomies,thematically,donot supportgenderequalityinGhana.Withoutsystemsofprotectionhardenedwith enforcementintheformalmarket,exploitationofinformalworkerscanrun rampantandintensifysexistandviolentculturaltendenciesagainstwomen’s equalityanddevelopment.Often,avenuestoreportviolencearelimitedand acceptingabusebecomestheonlyfinancialoptionforthesewomenengrainedin theinformalsector.Women,unabletoentertheformaleconomyduetodisfavor inemployabilityanddiminishingjobs,areforcedtoseekoutharmful,informal

workasanessentialmeanstosustainthemselvesandtheirfamilies. Informalityalsopreventswomenfromgainingrecognitioninan administrativecapacity.Workers’protectionlawsandothersocialinsurancesdo notextendtothewomeninGhana’sinformalsector,makingtheworktheydo notonlyrisky,butsubjecttopunishment.Migrantwomenmakeupalarge portionofGhana’sinformaleconomy,andwithoutmeanstohaverecognized employmenttherearefewpaths,ifany,tobecomingcitizensorgainingcrucial rightssuchasvoting,healthcare,oremploymentinsurance(Ameyaw2014,225). Additionally,astheinformalsector’smarketwomenare“self-employed,”their exploitationcouldbeseenasself-inflictedandcausedbygreatertrendsand institutionalizedsexism(Obeng-Odoom2011,382).Broadly,Ghana’sinformal economyharborsmanychallengestowomen’sdevelopmentwhichareseriously detrimentaltogenderequality,andwillcontinuetobeifnotcorrected. However,thereremainsomeformidableoutcomesanddevelopmentsinthe informalsectorwhichshouldbeconsideredinourresearchaspositiveavenues forimprovedgenderequality.

PossibilitiesforPositiveGenderOutcomesinGhana’sInformalEconomy

Whileinformaleconomiesposeahostofchallengestoimprovinggender equality,theyalsohaveunseenorundervaluedpositiveoutcomes,suchas remittancenetworksandsystems.Alargeandoftenunrecognizedpartofthe Africancontinent’seconomyinvolvesinformalremittancewages.Remittance wagesareanindividual’searningsthatarerepaidtotheiroriginalcommunities, villages,ornetworksaftermigratingaway.Therepaymentstotheiroriginal communitiesareeitherforaltruisticreasons,ormorecontractuallyafteraninitial investmentintheirendeavorsbytheaforementionedcommunity.Remittances arewidelyusedthroughoutAfricaandessentialtotheireconomies,with women’sinvolvementinthisformofinvestmentbeingextremelyrelevanttoany analysisoftheinformalsector.Remittancelaborearningsprovidecommunities andfamiliesawaytoeffectivelymakefinancialgainsthroughinformalmeans whilesupportingtheirkinorsocialnetworks(Medani2021,7).Furthermore, theseremittancesystemsthatsendmoneydirectlyinto

communitiesareabletobypassformalauthoritativefinancialbodiesandwaive excessivetaxes,makingthereturnoninvestmentfasterandgreater(Medani2021, 7).Womenengageinremittancebyeitherbeingtheindividualthatleavesand sendsmoneyinreturn,orbyfinancingsomeoneinitially.Bothwaysgivethem newagencytotheirfinancialdecisionsandinvestments.Whenbarredfrom formalmarketsandinvestments,remittanceofferswomenanopportunityto investandincreasetheirchancesatsocialandfinancialmobility(UNODC56). Hawala,ananonymousandinformalcurrency-transfersystembasedonkinship tiesandtrust,iskeytotheseremittancefundsasitisoftenhowwagesreturnto theircommunities(UNODC56).Thus,remittancewagesthatarereceivedin GhanaandmanyotherAfricannationsbecomeessentialforwomentosurvive. AnotheremergingaspectoftheinformaleconomythatwomeninGhana couldgreatlybenefitfromincludesmobilefinancialservices.Theseservicesallow cash-transfersbetweenindividualswithouttheneedforphysicalcashorvisitinga bank(Dziwornu2018,416).Nearly60percent ofwomenworkingas entrepreneursinGhana’sinformalmarketsstudiedbyRaymondDziwornuetal. usemobilefinancialservicestoconducttheirdailybusiness(2018,423).These systemsminimizetheamountofphysicalcashpresentonawomanatanygiven time,reducingthelikelihoodshemaybetargetedfortheftorharassment (Dziwornu2018,416).Thesesystemsarealsomorefrequentlyusedamong educatedwomeninthesemarkets,potentiallyindicatingwhatthefuturemay looklikeforthesesectors(Dziwornu2018,424andObeng-Odoom2011,229). Mobilefinancialservicesareasmallyetpowerfulwaywomencantakechargeof theirindustryandreducetheirriskofbeingharmedinthemarketplace.

Systemsofcreditareanotherkeyareaoftheinformaleconomythatare highlyutilizedbyGhanaianwomentomakebothfinancialandsocialgains. InformalsystemsandlinesofcreditusedbyGhanaianwomeninthesemarkets operateoutsideoftheinternationalmarket,andthusdonotebbandflowwith thedevaluationofgoodsorfluctuationsofforeignmarkets(Schindler2010, 235).Creditgivenoutbythesemarketwomenarethusmorestablethanthe formaleconomiestheyoperateoutsideof.Furthermore,theseloansandlinesof creditgivenoutandrepaidbywomeninGhanaianmarketsstrengthensocialties tooneanother,deepeningbondsbetweenlendersandborrowersinthisinformal

system(Schindler2010,235).Womentakingresponsibilityasfinanciallendersin theinformaleconomybecomeimportantexamplesoftheopportunitiesthis sectorholdswhennotimpactedbybureaucratizedsexism.Thesesystemsof creditalsoprovidereliefandrisk-management,especiallytolower-incomeand poorfamiliesduringtimesofinstability,whereasmoreaffluenthouseholds typicallyonlyhaveaccesstoformalavenuesofloansandsavings(Schindler2010, 235).Additionally,creditofferedbymarketwomencanaidotherwomenin buildingenterprisesontheinformalmarketorensuringbasicnecessitieswhen formalfinancialinstitutionsdenythem(Owusu2004,58).Theinformalcredit systemsalsohelpmanageriskformarketwomenandlendersthemselves.By buildingstrongtiesamonglargerswathsofthemarket,theycannotonlyhelp othersweathermarketstormsbutensurelongevityandsocialcapital(Schindler 2010,249).LinesofcreditprovidedandlentbymarketwomeninGhanashow immensepromiseinpromotinggenderequalityandgivingagencyinstabilizing andsecuringtheirowneconomieswhenforeignmarketsfalterandshock.

Informaleconomicstructuresshowuniquepossibilitiesingivingnew agencyandmobilitytowomeninGhana.Opportunitiestoprovideforfamilyin otherregions,escapedangerousconditions,andgainindependenceareall significantdrivingforcesforwomenintotheinformalsector,despiteits drawbacks(Agyei2016,295).Therearenumerousexamplesofwomenstepping intonewandpowerfulrolesintheinformalsectorwhichrequireconsideration alongsidetherisksofoperatingontheblackmarket.Moreover,it’sessentialto reflectontheconditionofthemarketasawhole:womenrepresentonlyasmall portionofthetraditionaleconomy,makinguponly19percent oftotaltypical householdwealth(WorldBank2018,4).Itshouldthenbeunderstoodthatthe informaleconomyprovidesanecessaryoutletforwomentogainindependence andprovideforthemselvesandtheirfamilyfinancially,breakinggenderrolesand barriers.Theinformaleconomy,whilebeingasourceofgreatriskandpotential harassmenttonumerouswomen,canalsobeabountifulsourceofdevelopment. Thus,informaleconomiesmustbeunderstoodfortheirgainsingenderequality andwomen’sempowermentalongsidethehazardousenvironmentsthey produce.

InformalEconomies:WomenWithintheContextofColonialismand InternationalActors

WomenareessentialtoboththeformalandinformaleconomiesofAfrica andthus,mustbeconsideredinanalyzingthesemarketsandtheirimpacton broadertrendsinAfricanpolitics.Thismarginalorperipheraleconomy destabilizestraditionalorcorefinancialsystems,makingwayfornewor reclaimedpracticesofinformalnetworksystems(Sowatey2018,329).Basedon thestruggleswithintheinformalsector,pushedasidetothemargins,women havetheopportunitytoseizecontrolofnewandemergingmarketsandmake wavesinchallengingtraditionalnormsandgenderroles.Theinformalmarket canbeusedtorecenterwomen’spowerasdriversinthebroaderAfrican economyandteardowngenderrolesthatrelegatewomentothedomesticsphere ofunpaidwork.InliteratureandresearchonAfrica’seconomies,studyofformal marketpreferencesandcrashesmusthaveagenderedlens.Without comprehendingtheinternationalizedandinstitutionalizedsexismpresentin economiesinAfrica,suchasGhana,meaningfuleffortsdonetobridgegender equalitywillhavelittletonoimpact.Additionally,itisimportanttorecognize thatwomenruntheGhanaianeconomyinmultifacetedandcomplexways. However,thiscanalsopointtoapastmoreorientedincomplextrade-based informalnetworks.

PrecolonialAfricaneconomieswerebuiltontradenetworks,informal creditsystems,anddistributionofresources(MedaniJan12).Thecharacteristics ofpre-colonialAfricaneconomiesacutelyalignwiththatofGhana’sinformal economytoday.Thisisanythingbutcoincidence.Whencolonialintervention cameintoGhana,andmorebroadlytherestofAfrica,colonists destabilized these‘informal’economicsystemsandimposednewformsofforeigntradeand currencyonthecontinent(Dzisi2008,258).Thepostcolonialperiodhas attemptedinnumerouswaystooperatewithinthecolonial-basedforeignmarket system,withvariedandminimalsuccessduetotheimpositionofSAPsandother negativemarkettactics(Owusu2004,117andMedaniFeb23).The‘traditional’ orformaleconomicsystemsinthiscontextinGhanaandthemajorityofAfrica arecolonialinnatureanddisplacedfromanysemblanceof

pre-colonialcommercialmethods.Theimpositionofthesecolonialmarkets undoubtedlyexacerbatedpovertyandtheexploitationoflaborinAfrica(Minnis 2011,336).Thisexploitationoflaborand,especially,womennecessitatesa returnandreclaimingofinformalsectorsintheAfricaneconomy.Thus,these sectorsholdnotonlypossibilitiesforactualizedgenderequality,butalso postcolonialfuturesbasedonpre-coloniallegacies.Thatis,thewomeninthese marketsmustbeunderstoodfortheireffortsindecolonizingeconomicsystems notonlyinGhana,butalsofortheirgainsindecentralizingcolonial-based financialmethodsacrossthecontinent.Colonialeconomiesandunderstandings oftheinformalor‘blackmarket’sectorcannotaccountforitsprimacyand successandthus,useitasascapegoattocombatotherformsofillicitactivities includingterroristorganizing.

Regardingtheroleofinternationalactors,KhalidMedanioutlinesinBlack Markets,Militants,andClans:InformalNetworks,Islamism,andthePoliticsof Identitythat,fortheWest,combattingterrorismrequirestheinterruptionof informaleconomicsystemsandtransfernetworks(2021,3).Theforeignpolicy oftheUnitedStateshassoughttotargetIslamicmilitantorganizationslocatedin AfricanstatessuchasEgypt,Somalia,andSudanbydisruptinginformal financial-transfersystemssuchashawalaandotherkeyfeaturesoftheinformal economy(Medani2021,4).Attackingtheseinformalnetworkscanhave insurmountableeffectsonthewomenwhorelyonthesesystemsforsocialand financialmobility.TheUNODChandbookonGenderDimensionsofCriminal JusticeResponsestoTerrorismoutlinesthreewaysthecrack-downsonthese informalsystemscanharmwomen’sstandinginthesestates:byshuttingdown remittances,spousalaccesstofunds,andaccessofwomen'sorganizationstoaid andsupport(2019,56-7).WhileGhanaianmarketshaven’texperienceda shutdownduetoterrorist-basedconcerns,thethreattheseforeignactorsand Westernattemptsatcontrolposecouldbeextremelyharmfultogenderequality byreducinganypositiveinvestmentswomencanmake.Thegendered implicationsofWesternactors'attemptstoregulateorshutdowninformal systemsoffinanceriskthesafetyofalreadyvulnerablewomenwhorelyonthese economiesforbasicneedsortoadvancetheirfiscalstanding.Whileinformal economiesandsectorscanposeagreatnumberofriskstowomen’shealthand 14

wellbeing,Westerninterventiontoshutthesemarketswouldonlydrivemore ‘illegal’economicactivitiesunderground,whileatthesametimediminishingthe positiveaspectsandopportunitiesofthesemarkets.Thus,informalsectors cannotthriveorcontinuetogrowwithpossibilitiesforgenderequalitywhile beingtargetedbycolonial-basedforeignactors.

Conclusion

TheinformaleconomyinGhanarepresentsavastportionofthestate’s economicproductivity,withwomenaccountingforthemajorityofactorsinthis sectorofthebroader economy.GenderequalityinGhanahasmadesubstantial stridesinthepasttwentyyears,butthereisstillmuchmoretobedone in renegotiatinggendernormsandculturalexpectationsofmenandwomen, particularlyintheircontributionstothelaborsector.Theinformaleconomyis, moreover,multifacetedbothinitsthreatsanditspromiserelativetogoalsof genderequality.TheGhanaiangovernmentmustconsiderthepositivenaturesof thissystemwhilstmeaningfullyattemptingtoreducetheharmswagedon womeneverydaywithinthesesectors—includingbytheirownauthorities.The colonialsystemswhichmakethesemarkets‘informal’alsoallowforharmtogo largelyunaddressedbygovernmentofficialsandresearchers,makingthe postcolonialanalysisoftheseinformaleconomiesincomparisonto‘formal’ones necessary.WomenhavebeenlargelybarredfromenteringGhana’sformal economies,pushedintohazardousenvironmentsassociatedwiththeinformal sector,yettheystillmanagetoelevatetheirstandingandgenderequalitywithin thesemarketsthey’vebeen‘banished’to.Authoritieshavefoundtheycannot fullyshutdownorcontrolthesemarkets,buttheirgreatergoalssuggesttheyalso cannotallowdiscrimination,harassment,andexploitationtooccurasithas heretoforeinthesesectors.Thecomplexandmultifacetedrolewomenplayinthe formalandinformaleconomyprecludetheshuttingofthesemarketsfroma genderedperspective.Futurepoliciesregardingtheseeconomiesmustconsider postcolonialanalysis,women’sdevelopment,andbroaderequalityinGhana.

Addressinginstitutionalizedsexismandcolonialismisimperativeforwomen’s developmentandequalityinGhana,andunderstandinginformalmarketplaces asanopportunitytoseetheseadvancementsremainsessential.

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Ameyaw,Stephen,andFranklinObeng-Odoom.2014.“ANewInformal EconomyinAfrica:TheCaseofGhana.”AfricanJournalofScience, Technology,InnovationandDevelopment,vol.6,no.3:223–230.

Dzisi,Smile.2008.“EntrepreneurialActivitiesofIndigenousAfricanWomen:A CaseofGhana.”JournalofEnterprisingCommunities:PeopleandPlacesin theGlobalEconomy,vol.2,no.3:254–264.

Dziwornu,RaymondK.,etal.2018.“EmergenceofMobileFinancialServicesin Ghana:ConcernsforUseamongInformalSectorWomenEntrepreneurs.” JournalofEmergingMarketFinance,vol.17,no.3(Dec):415–432.

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Minnis,John.2011.“NonFormalEducationandInformalEconomiesin Sub-SaharanAfrica:FindingtheRightMatch.”AdultEducationQuarterly, vol.56,no.2:119–133.

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FromObjecttoAuthor:IndigenousPeoplesand InternationalLaw

JosephineDuc

EditedbyHannahClarke-Andrews

FromtheAgeofExplorationtothe20thcentury,powerfulnationshave usedinternationallawtofurthertheirimperialpoliciesintheAmericas, subjectingIndigenouspeoplestounjustlegislation.However,thispractice haschangedinrecentdecades;Indigenouspeopleshavebecomean authoritativepartyoftheglobalcivilrightsmovement.Initially unconsentingsubjects,theyhavebecometheauthorsofinternationallaw. Thispaperwillinvestigatethechangeintheauthorshipofinternationallaw beforemovingtoacasestudyonCanada.Itwilldosobyexaminingthe PapalBullsontheNewWorld,theInternationalLaborOrganization Convention169onIndigenousandTribalPeoples,theUnitedNations DeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples,andthecurrent implementationofinternationallegislationinCanadiandomesticlaw.This paperfindsthatwhilemanyissuespersist,Indigenouspeopleshavelargely becomecontributorstointernationallawthroughrepresentationat intercontinentalmeetings,resultinginthereflectionoftheirtruedemands inglobalpolicies.

Introduction

Untilthe20thcentury,thepurposeofinternationallawconcerningthe NewWorldandIndigenouspeopleswastofurthertheimperialisticpoliciesof powerfulnations.Undertheguiseofthecivilizingmission,Westerncountries sponsoredassimilationpracticesandtookadvantageofcomparativedisparitiesin thetechnologicaldevelopmentofIndigenouspeoples(Anghie2007,751).This, however,haschanged.Inrecentdecades,“Indigenouspeopleshavearguably cometorepresentoneofthemostinfluential,andwellrecognized,partiesof [the]globalcivilmovement”(Barelli2009,959).Indigenouscommunitieshave madesignificantstridestowardbecomingtheauthors—ratherthanthe objects—ofinternationallaw.

Thispaperwillinvestigatetheevolutionofinternationallawwithregardto Indigenouspeoples,followingitwithacasestudyofCanada.Itwilldosoby 15

examiningthePapalBullsontheNewWorld,theInternationalLabor OrganizationConvention169onIndigenousandTribalPeoples,theUnited NationsDeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples,andthecurrent implementationofinternationallegislationinCanadiandomesticlaw.Itwillbe concludedthatIndigenouspeopleshavelargelybecomecontributorsto internationallawthroughrepresentationatintercontinentalmeetings,resulting inthereflectionoftheirtruedemandsinglobalpolicies.

ThePapalBulls:ChristianityasJustification

ThePapalBullsoftheCatholicChurchwerethefirstofmanyinternational lawsdeveloped“inthe15thand16thcenturies…tomanagemorecomplexforms ofinteractionbetweenEuropeanandnon-Europeanstatesand…theacquisition ofsovereigntyovernon-Europeanpeoples”(Anghie2007,742).While individualcountriesmadetheirowntreatieswithIndigenousnationsupontheir arrivalintheNewWorld,thePapalBullswereimplementedtoregulate state-to-stateinteractionsinthenewlydiscoveredlands.Importantly,theselaws appliedtoallChristiannations—which,atthetime,meantmostofthebig powersinEurope.ThePapalBullswerealsothefirstpiecesofinternational legislationtoundermineIndigenousrights,especiallythoseofterritoryand self-governance.

ThemostimportantPapalBullforthispaperisthe1493InterCaerta,or the“DoctrineofDiscovery.”ThislegislationgaveSpainamonopolyonmostof thelandintheAmericas,temporarilyblockingotherEuropeanpowersfrom acquiringland.Inaddition,“theBullstatedthatanylandnotinhabitedby Christianswasavailabletobe"discovered,"claimed,andexploitedbyChristian rulers”andfurtherelaboratedthatCatholicismshouldbespreadtoallpeople encounteredinthenewterritories(TheGilderLehrmanInstituteofAmerican Historyn.d.).ThismeantthatanylandintheNewWorld,includingthat inhabitedbyIndigenouspeoples,wastobetakenoverbyaChristiankingdom. TheBull,therefore,gavemassiveamountsofjurisdictiontoanyChristiannation thatwantednewland,whetherthatbeforsettlementorresources.TheDoctrine ofDiscovery“becamethebasisofallEuropeanClaimsintheAmericasaswellas

thefoundationoftheUnitedStates’westernexpansion”(TheGilderLehrman InstituteofAmericanHistoryn.d.).ThelongevityoftheBullcanbe demonstratedinimportantcourtcases;theDoctrinewasusedinthe1823US SupremeCourtcaseJohnsonv.Mcintosh—wherethejudgesheld“thatthe principleofdiscoverygaveEuropeannationsanabsoluterighttoNewWorld lands”(TheGilderLehrmanInstituteofAmericanHistoryn.d).TheSupreme Courtcitation,over300yearsafterthePapalBull’spublication,demonstrates howimportanttheChurch’sdecreewasinshapingthenormsthatgoverned expansionandthetreatmentofIndigenouspeoplesintheAmericas.

AsecondimportantPapalBullisSublimusDei:ontheEnslavementand EvangelizationofIndiansin1537.Init,PopePaulIIIdeclaredthat“Indiansare trulymenandthattheyarenotonlycapableofunderstandingtheCatholicFaith but…theydesireexceedinglytoreceiveit”(PopePaulIII1537).Thisalleged eagernessofIndigenouspeoplestoconvertwasareflectionofthe1493Bull:the onlywaytoprotectanationfromcrushingconquestandexploitationwasforit toacceptCatholicism.However,beingaccordedthesamebasicstatusliketheir Europeaninvadersdidnotgrantequalrightsofself-determinationtoIndigenous nations.TheBullstatedthatIndigenouspeoples,despitebeingdeclaredmen, were“unfittofoundoradministeralawfulStateuptothestandardrequiredby humanandcivilclaims”(Anghie2007,743).Duetothisso-called“unfit”nature ofIndigenouspeoplesandtheirgovernments,thechurchauthorizedWestern controloverthem(PopePaulIII1537).Thisisacleardemonstrationof self-governancebeingtakenawayfromIndigenouspeoples,solelybaseduponthe argumentthattheywereunfitforsovereigntybyWesternstandards. Indigenousrepresentativeswerenotpresentforthewritingofeitherof thesetwoPapalBulls,noranyofthosethatfollowed.Throughthese internationallaws,nativeinhabitantsoftheNewWorldsuddenlyfound themselveswithouttherightsthattheyhadpossessedforcenturies.Therights takenawayfromthemhavestillnotbeenfullyreturnedtothemajorityof Indigenouspeoples.ItwouldtakecenturiesbeforeIndigenouspeoplescould begintofighttohavetheirrightsgivenback,andstilllongerbeforetherewould beanyevolutionininternationallaw.

InternationalLaborOrganizationNo.169onIndigenousandTribal Peoples:theStartofAuthorship

WhiletherehadbeenearliereffortstoreclaimIndigenousrights,itwas “duringthe1960s[that][I]ndigenouspeoplesbegandrawingincreasedattention todemandsfortheircontinuedsurvivalasdistinctcommunitieswithhistorically basedcultures,politicalinstitutions,andentitlementstoland”(Sargent1999, 455).Oneofthemanifestationsofthedevelopmentsinthesixtieswasthe InternationalLaborOrganizationConventiononIndigenousTribalPeoples (ILO169)in1989inBrazil,adoptedbytheGeneralConferenceoftheILO.The twobasicprinciplesofILO169are“respectforthecultures,waysoflifeand traditionalinstitutionsof[I]ndigenouspeoples;andeffectiveinvolvementof thesepeoplesindecisionsthataffectthem”(Sargent1999,455).Theseprinciples representasignificantdeparturefrompastIndigenous-orientedinternational law,especiallywhencomparedtoveryearlyinternationallawsuchasthePapal Bulls.Thelegislation’simportanceextendsfarbeyonditstextandprinciples. ILO169wasalandmarkpieceoflawasitwas“oneoftheonlyinternational instrumentsinforce—inthecountriesthathaveratifiedtheConvention—that [dealt]explicitlywiththerightsof[I]ndigenouspeoplestonaturalresources pertainingtotheirlands”(Anaya1997).Until1989,Indigenouspeopleshad reliedontheUnitedNations’CommissiononHumanRightsandotherhuman rightslegislationandbodiesasthelegalbasisfortheirrightsandlandclaims (Sargent1999),buttheirargumentshadnotbeenacceptedbytheinternational community. ILO169wasthefirstdocumentspecificallydedicatedto Indigenousrightsandneedsinthemoderninternationalcontext. ThemostimportantcomponentofILO169isthelevelofIndigenous involvementanditseffectsonthedocumenttext.Thisinvolvementiswhat allowedILO169tobe“internationallaw’smostconcretemanifestationofthe growingresponsivenessto[I]ndigenouspeoples’demands”(Anaya1997).

Duringthediscussionsoftheconvention,“specialarrangementsweremadeto allowrepresentativesof[I]ndigenousgroupslimitedparticipationinthe deliberationsoftheconferenceCommittee”(Anaya1997).Thisparticipation resultedinIndigenousorganizationsfromaroundtheworldvoicingtheir 15

support;thesegroupsincludedCentralandSouthAmericancouncils,aswellas internationalgroupssuchas“theSaamiCouncil,theInuitCircumpolar Conference,theWorldCouncilofIndigenousPeoples,andtheNationalIndian YouthCouncil”(Anaya1997).Whilelimitedparticipationisfarfromideal,ILO 169representsamonumentalchangeinthelevelofinvolvementofIndigenous peoplesinthedraftingofinternationallawasitconcernsthem.TheConvention broughtIndigenouspeoplesclosertoauthorshipandfurtherfromsubjugation. However,ILO169fellshortinseveralareas,disappointingmany Indigenouscommunitiesandtheiraspirations.Thelegislationwas“criticizedby many[I]ndigenousorganizations,particularlythoseofnortherncountriessuch asCanada”(Sargent1999,455).Thiswasastrongcontrasttothesupportithad gatheredfromgroupsinCentralandSouthAmerica.Mostofthecriticismwas “leveledatseveraloftheconvention’sprovisionsthat[contained]certaincaveats or[appeared]intheformofrecommendations,andattheunderlying assumptionofstateauthorityofIndigenouspeoples”(Anaya1997).Many groups,therefore,didnotseeILO169asasufficientmeasuretoprotecttheir rightsagainsttheimpositionofcolonialpolicies.Moreover,theConventionhad anincrediblylimitedscopeasitwasonlyratifiedby20countries,mostofthem belongingtoLatinAmerica(Barelli2009).ThismeantthatmanyIndigenous communitiesthatneededtheprotectionaffordedbythelawwereleftout,and thestrengthofthelegislationwasundermined.Non-signatorystates,including Canada,refusedtoratifythetreatybecauseoflowlevelsofinternational enforcement(Daes2008).ThisinspiredIndigenouscommunitiestorallyfora moreenforceablepieceoflegislation.Finally,theILO169“[failed]torecognize indigenouspeoplesas“peoples,”toconferonthemtherightof self-determination,andaddresscontemporaryissuessuchas…indigenous intellectualpropertyrights”(Barelli2009,958).Stoppingshortofthese importantIndigenousissuesmadeILO169unpopulardespiteitsnormative significance. ILO169,however,contributedtothedevelopmentofthe movementbecauseofitsfailures.Byreviewingtheissuesofthelegislation, Indigenousgroupswereabletopushformoreexpansiveandrights-affirming internationallaw.

ILO169representedanewtrendoftreatmentofIndigenouspeople

ininternationallaw.ThelimitedparticipationallowedIndigenousgroupsto “exercisecontrolovertheirowninstitutions,waysoflife,andeconomic developmentandtomaintainanddeveloptheiridentities,languages,and religions,withintheStatesinwhichtheylive”(Anaya1997).However,the documentfellshortofprovidingenforcementmechanismsandinitsaffirmation oftherighttoself-governance.TheseissuesinspiredacontinuedIndigenous globalcivilmovementforabetterinternationallawtoprotectthem.

TheUnitedNationsDeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples (UNDRIP)“representstheculminationofanextraordinaryprocesswhichhas graduallytransformedindigenouspeoplesfrom‘victims’to‘actors’of internationallaw”(Barelli2009,957).TheUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly adoptedUNDRIPonthe13thofSeptember,2007(UnitedNations(General Assembly)2007).Thispieceofinternationallawguaranteesthe“survival, dignity,andwell-being”ofIndigenouspeoplesaroundtheworld(United Nations(GeneralAssembly)2007,961).

UNDRIPrepresentsthecontinuationinthetrendofincreasedIndigenous representationintheformationofinternationallaw.Indigenousgroupswere involvedinthedraftingprocessregardlessoftheirconsultativestatuswiththe EconomicandSocialCouncil,arareallowancebytheUN(UnitedNations (GeneralAssembly)2007).Withoutsuchhighlevelsofparticipation, shortcomingsofotherinternationallawssuchasILO169wouldhavepersisted andlessenedtheDeclaration’simpact.Indigenousinvolvement“duringthe draftingprocess,andsubsequentnegotiations,waskeytotheinclusioninthe finaltextoftheDeclarationofvital,andyetcontentious,provisionssuchasthose ontherighttoselfdeterminationandlandrights”((UnitedNations(General Assembly)2007,966-967).Instrongoppositiontothelegacyoftheremovalof theserightsbythePapalBullsandsubsequentlegislation,UNDRIPincorporates andemphasizestheimportanceoftheserights.Thehigherlevelofrepresentation also“allowed[I]ndigenouspeoples’representativestodirectly

TheUnitedNationsDeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples:the CurrentStateofIndigenousInternationalLaw

negotiatewithStates’delegates,andcreatedfavourableconditionsfor internationalsupporttodevelop”((UnitedNations(GeneralAssembly)2007, 969).Nation-to-nationstylenegotiationsbetweenIndigenousgroupsandstates werevitaltothelegitimacyoftheDeclaration.Thecollaborativeworkledto“an internationalconsensus,producedbyrepresentativesfromtheworld’snational governments,”whichgave“moralandethicalvaliditytopoliticalprocessesthat previouslyexistedlargelyinisolationfrominternationalconditions”(Coatesand Holroyd2014,8).ThisaddsvastnormativeweighttoUNDRIP,makingit difficultforthemorereluctantgovernmentstoresistitsimplementation.The natureofnegotiationsalsorepresentsamoreinternationallyunifiedapproachto thediscussionandaffirmationofinternationalrights.Thissharplycontrastswith muchoftheotherlegislationinregardtoIndigenouspeoplesbeingwritten domesticallyonanationbynationbasis.Theunifiedapproachincreasesthe legitimacyofUNDRIPasitdemonstratesthatitsprovisionsareacceptedas normsbythemajorityoftheglobalcommunity.

Importantly,UNDRIPaddressesenforcement,whichhadbeenoneofthe largestshortcomingsofILO169.EnforcementofUNDRIPexistsatboththe internationalanddomesticlevel.Scrutinyofstatepoliciesbythe“HumanRights CouncilandtheCommitteeontheEliminationofRacialDiscriminationwill provideinfactthemostimmediateformofmonitoringStatecompliancewith theDeclaration”(Barelli2009,983).Thestrengthofenforcementnegatesthe argumentthatmanystatesusedin1989inordertoavoidsigningILO169.Many “nationalcourtshavealreadystartedtorespectandimplementtheprovisionsof thedeclaration”(Daes2008,980),whichmeansthatviolatorsoftheDeclaration insignatorystateswillhavetofacelegalconsequences.UNDRIP’senforcement throughUnitedNationsbodiesanddomesticcourtsensuresanewlevelof protectiontoIndigenouspeoplesandtheirrights.

AnotherstrengthofUNDRIPstemsfromthefactthatthemajorityofits importantprovisionsarealreadyentrenchedprinciplesofinternationallaw.The rightsaffirmedbytheDeclarationaregroundedon“establishednormsof internationallaw,and,specifically,internationalhumanrightslaw.Thisholds truealsowithregardtothemostcontroversialrights,namelytherightto self-determinationandlandrights”(Barelli2009,963).Beinggroundedin 15

existinginternationalhumanrightslawisanothercomponentthatgreatly increasesthelegitimacyofUNDRIP.TheDeclaration“acknowledgesarangeof internationallegalinstrumentsthatprovideforself-determinationandthe internalrightofself-government.”(Boyer2014,13).Withthereinforcementof existinginternationallaw,UNDRIPmakesthedenialofIndigenous self-governancedifficultforstatessincedoingsowouldunderminetheexistence andlegitimacyoftheirowngovernments.UNDRIPitselfhasalreadyhada reciprocalimpactoninternationallawgiventhat“referencestotheDeclaration canbefoundinmajordocumentsrecentlyadoptedundertheauspicesofthe UnitedNations”(Barelli2009,972).Thisisademonstrationofthefeedback looppresentininternationallaw,inwhichUNDRIPwasinfluencedbyprevious internationalpolicies,andnowitinturninfluencesfuturepolicies.This feedbackloopwillaidinthefurtherdevelopmentofIndigenous-centered internationallaw.

TheDeclarationhashadanimpactontheinternationaldiscourseon Indigenousrights.UNDRIPaffirmstherighttoself-determination,among otherimportantrights,toIndigenouspeopleswhohavehadtheirrightstaken awayfromthemthroughdomesticandinternationallawsincethePapalBulls. WhileUNDRIPisnotlegallybindingonitsparticipantsasitisadeclaration fromtheUNGeneralAssembly,itsnormativeinfluenceonthestatepoliciesand dialoguemakesitpowerfulnonetheless.Itisalsoimportantforthefutureof internationallawanditstreatmentofIndigenouspeoples.Manyseeitas“the firststeptowardtheestablishmentofafuture[international]treaty”(Barelli 2009,967)thatwouldguaranteeIndigenouspeoplestheirrights;an internationaltreatywouldalsobeenforceableandbindingonallsignatories. Regardlessofthefuturestateofinternationallaw,UNDRIP“isoneofthemost significantinternationalpoliticalachievementsofthisgeneration”(Coatesand Holroyd2014,5).TheDeclarationanditslevelofIndigenousinvolvementinits creationsignifiesabigsteptowardtheaffirmationandreturnofrights,especially thatofself-governance.

UNDRIPintheCanadianContext

implementationofUNDRIPonadomesticlevel.Canadapresentsavaluable casestudyforthispaperbecauseitiswidelythoughtbyoutsidersthat“thearray oflegal,politicalandadministrativeaccommodationswithAboriginalpeoplein Canadaisstriking”whencomparedtootherstates(CoatesandHolroyd2014, 6).Inreality,however,beforethearrivaloftheUNDRIPin2007,the IndigenousattitudeontheirrightsinCanadawasratherpessimistic.Indigenous groupshadlongpetitionedforself-governmentbecauseCanadianfederalism “createdanair-tightsystemthatgivesalllaw-makingprivilegestoallbut Aboriginalgovernments”(Jhappan1995,179).Duetothefailuresofthe CanadianCharterandConstitutioninthe1980sand1990s,itseemed“unlikely thataconstitutionalamendmentonself-government[could]beachievedinthe nearfuture”(Jhappan1995,180).Instead,manyturnedtooutsidesourcesto protectIndigenousrights;UNDRIPhasbecomesuchasource.TheDeclaration “outlinedapoliticalstrategyandasetofdemandsthatresonatedwithAboriginal activisminCanada”(CoatesandHolroyd2014,5).Finally,thereexistedalaw thatprotectedtherightsofIndigenouspeoples—Canadajusthadtosignit.

TothedismayofIndigenouspeopleslivinginCanada,thefederal government“wasareluctantparticipantintheUNDRIPprocess,votingagainst thedeclaration…in2007andholdingoutuntil2010”tosignit(Coatesand Holroyd2014,5-6).Governmentofficialsjustifiedtheirdecisionbystatingthat UNDRIPwas“toosweepingandopen-ended”(CoatesandHolroyd2014,7). Someofthecontroversialpoliciesincludedtherighttoself-determination (Article3),therighttoautonomy(Article4),therighttoownland(Article26), redressforstolenland(Article28),andtherighttodeterminetheuseoflands (Article32)(UnitedNations(GeneralAssembly)2007).Allofthesehadthe potentialtoupsetthebalanceoftheIndigenous-settlerorderthattheCanadian governmenthasestablished.

In2010,CanadafinallysignedtheDeclaration.However,thefederal government“arguedthatUNDRIPisnotlegallybindingandisonlypoliticalin nature,thatitdoesnotcreateanyproceduralorsubstantiverights,andthatitis notcustomaryinternationallaw”(Boyer2014,13).Thiswasanattemptto preservethestatusquoofIndigenous-settlerrelationsandtosubduethosewho hopedtoutilizeUNDRIPtoachievetheirrights.Theaspirationalargument

presentedbytheCanadiangovernment,however,wasquicklyignoredby Indigenousgroupsacrossthecountry.Instead,asanexample,theDeclaration wasoftencitedbyvariousspeakersduringtheIdleNoMoretoillustratethe Indigenousvisionofthefuture(CoatesandHolroyd2014).

TheCanadianimplementationofUNDRIP,whilenotcomplete,has beguninnationalinstitutions.FollowingtheendorsementoftheDeclaration, “theFederalCourthasacceptedthatUNDRIPappliestotheinterpretationof domestichumanrightslegislation”(Boyer2014,14).Thisisamajor accomplishment;implementationofinternationallawindomesticcourts indicatesthatithasbeguntobeintegratedintonationallaw,andthatitwill continuetodoso.However,fullimplementationof“UNDRIPwilltakea concertedeffortfromlegalpractitioners,…academics,policymakers,educators, andtheindigenousandnon-indigenouspublic”(Boyer2014,15).Implementing anewpolicythatoverridesdomesticlawshasmanybarriersinitsway.A completeimplementationofUNDRIPwillrequire“thatalllawsandstatebooks willhavetobecheckedforconsistency…andifnecessary,they’llhavetobe amended”(Smith2021).Despiteitsdifficulty,thisprocessisnecessarytoensure thefullaffirmationandreturnofimportantrights.

Conclusion

ThroughtheexaminationofPapalBulls,ILO169,UNDRIP,and UNDRIPinCanada,thispaperhasfoundthatIndigenouspeopleshavelargely becomeauthorsofinternationallawasitconcernsthem.They“haveceasedtobe mereobjectsofthediscussionoftheirrightsandhavebecomerealparticipantsin anextensivemultilateraldialoguethathasalsoengagedstates,NGOs,and independentexperts”(Anaya1997).Indigenousparticipationisattherootof thisevolutionofrolesininternationallaw.ThePapalBullsandotherearly internationalpoliciesweredraftedwithnoIndigenousrepresentation. IndigenouspeopleswereallowedlimitedrepresentationwithILO169,which thenincreasedtofullrepresentationwiththedraftingofUNDRIP,where Indigenousrepresentativesacrosstheglobewereinvitedforitscreation.While thispaperhasdemonstratedthatIndigenous-centeredinternationallawisnotyet15

asstrongasotherglobalpolicies,thereisahighprobabilityoffurtherevolution. ThetrendtowardhigherlevelsofIndigenousrepresentation,strongerlegal obligations,andenforcementmechanismsindicatesthatinternationallawmay, oneday,beusedtoguaranteeIndigenouspeopleseverywheretheirrights.Inthe future,Indigenouspeoplesmayuseinternationallawtoensurethecompleteand assuredrighttoself-governance,thestatusofnationhood,andevenseatsinthe UNGeneralAssembly—withequalsovereigntyandpowertoothernationsof theworld.Internationallawhasthusbecomeaviableinstrumentforthefuture oftheIndigenouscivilrightsmovement.

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