The Caspian Project 16

contents

06. editorial 08. How tHe caspian Greats Measure up Military Might Jeffery fishel 14. How tHe us was locked out of tHe caspian BlowBack DiploMacy laUra garriDo 18. cHallenGinG russia’s arctic aMerica’s UNeveN policy gregory roUDyBUsh 21. censorsHip or saVinG Grace? aMerica’s UNeveN policy acaDeMic scholarship aND iNtelligeNce vettiNg 25. russian diploMacy tryiNg to go froM the sMall stage to the Big screeN DayNa rice 29. russian interference in syria and turkey fp in Middle east orhaN gafarli 33. refuGee capitalisM a Mess of Moral coNveNieNce aND rUthless politics BriaN hUghes

37. Russia's stRategic stance in syRia-iRaq-iRan situation report elena M. 39. WHeRe is tHe sauDi-iRan ReLatiOnsHiP HeaDing?

HistorY as teaCHer stepHen sartY 44. tHe cascaDe effect loCal power froM old soviets to new russians (1985-2015) dr. MattHew Crosston, dMitrii seltser 55. ten bRiLLiant OutcOmes russian airstrikes in sYria rakesH krisHnan siMHa 58. can tHeRe be DeteRRence afteR tHe JcPOa? Breaking Bad BeHavior aaron good

tHe casPian PROJect bi-WeeKLy DigitaL eDitiOn www.moderndiplomacy.eu Caspian@moderndiplomacy.eu Dimitris Giannakopoulos Modern Diplomacy, Editor-in-chief Dr. matthew Crosston The Caspian Project, Director

authors petra poseGa teJa palko luisa monteiro nina laVrenteVa GaBriela pasCholati Do amaral BruCe aDrianCe troy BaXter GreGory Brew staCey Cottone antony Clement anDy Deahn JareD s. easton Jeffery fishel laura GarriDo orhan Gafarli aaron GooD amy hanlon Jeanette "JJ" harper

Jonathan hartner Brian huGhes VlaDislaV lermontoV paula malott meGan munoz elena m. norBerto morales rosa taylor morse sarah nolDer Joshua patterson Dayna riCe JessiCa reeD GreGory rouDyBush stephen sarty Dmitrii seltser rakesh krishnan simha eVan thomsen Dianne a. ValDez Christopher white

“The strong do what they have to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” Thucydides

www.moderndiplomacy.eu

HARD, SOft, SMARt: tHE POwER ISSuE Prof. Dr. Matthew Crosston Senior Editor, Director, The Caspian Project

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t can be a difficult thing in today’s complex world: keeping track of how power is expressed and utilized. From the ivory tower to the halls of diplomacy, states all around the world consider hard power, soft power, even smart power. There are economic forms that prove more indispensible, and influential, than the more traditional military expressions of power. Diplomatic power is hallmarked in today’s environment as being the key to not just maintaining peace and reducing conflict, but for the proper and efficient positioning and jockeying of countries against one another. This edition of The Caspian Project provides our readers with quite a diverse array of treatments on power, proving that no matter how much the world evolves, in the end, it all still comes down to estimations and perceptions of power: your own and your allies and, of course, your rivals.

Within this issue power is examined on a global scale, within the greater Caspian region, exclusively between the Caspian littorals, and also on a micro-scale amongst individual Caspian states.

Military endeavors in the Arctic (mirroring perhaps efforts made at the recent Caspian Summit) are examined; there are some fascinating treatments of Russian power, both in military and diplomatic forms; the slippery and complex aspect of deterrence power is viewed in Iran after the signing of the JCPOA; the Saudi-Iran power dance is also analyzed, with an interesting contrast to Russian and Iranian foreign policy objectives in the Syrian conflict. Finally, as is our tradition at the CP, we provide some outlier analyses as well just for novelty and general knowledge: an internal examination of the evolution of local power in Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and a small reflection piece dealing with a hot-off-the-presses concern about academic censorship in the Russian academy.

Taken together, this issue covers almost every imaginable expression of power available in a modern state today, along with the rather unique issues, problems, and dilemmas power brings to the greater Caspian region and all of its littorals individually. I am especially pleased this edition also sees the writer’s collective from Modern Diplomacy becoming larger and the richness of addressed themes here in the CP most certainly benefits us and, consequently, our dear readers.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

HOw tHE CAsPIAN GREAts MEAsuRE uP JEFFERY FISHEL Jeery Fishel is a combat leader that was wounded in action and retired from the military after 27 years and currently is still a Department of Defense employee. His academic credentials include a Master of Science in Security Management from Bellevue University and a Bachelor of Science from Excelsior College. He is a current student in the Bellevue University International Security and Intelligence Studies Program.

tHE CAsPIAN PROJECt 16

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his work will discuss the comparative impact the two ‘greater’ Caspian littorals have on global stability based on strategic objectives backed by military power and intervention. The comparison analyzes the United States, China, Russia, Iran, and Israel. The key areas reviewed are strategic objectives, military power, military intervention, and terrorism support.

The information gathered is used to create an ordering system designed to highlight each nation’s impact on global stability. In assessing military might, the following military strength indicator chart was used to measure each nation’s capacity.

This chart should be referenced throughout:

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Scoring for the ordering system was based upon a scale of one to five, with five representing the highest threat measure. In strategic objectives a score of five was the most globally assertive and intrusive nation. Military power was scored from strongest being a five to lowest being one.

Military intervention was based on global intervention operations and resultant instability. In scoring terrorism, a score of five is a nation that is a designated state supporter of terrorism, either directly or indirectly. Finally, the scores were combined to determine most threatening to least threatening for global stability.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

THREAT ASSESSMENT ORDERING SYSTEM

The United States outlined in its security strategy that it will lead with purpose, strength, by example, with capable partners, with all the power of the nation, and with long-term perspective. As outlined in Nabudere: The U.S. believes that as a leader of the "Free World" it has the responsibility to ensure global peace and security and to do this, it needs to develop the resources in the entire world on a "free trade" basis. But, as we have seen, this has been achieved through manipulation and the use and threat of use of force against its weaker opponents in the Third World.

Since September 11, 2001, the United States expanded its perceived responsibility to ensure global peace. The events of 9/11 sparked the United States to embark on a ‘Global War on terrorism’ and the execution of this policy centered on preemptive strikes. As the undisputed world military superpower, the United States has used the preemptive strike policy since 9/11 to weaken Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and remove Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

However, this has protracted into a fifteen year global war which has often crossed over into Pakistan. Overthrowing Saddam Hussein has resulted in instability within Iraq with regional implications most vividly seen in the DAESH threat. Finally, the United States has implemented a highly controversial drone program to attack and kill terrorists in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Syria and Somalia.

The strategic objectives of China revolve around regional interest. At present, China is pursuing three core security objectives in East Asia: exerting control over its near seas, promoting China-centered regional economic integration, and defending and advancing Chinese sovereignty claims. China exerts regional leverage while attempting to keep from direct confrontation with the United States. According to the military strength indicator chart, China ranks number three. China has embarked on a long military power buildup over the previous three decades. While China has steadily professionalized its army and naval forces, the emphasis has been on regional power and security.

tHE CAsPIAN PROJECt 16 While China still relies on Russia for many key military technologies, China has made its greatest technology strides in space as outlined in Office of the Secretary of Defense: China possesses the most rapidly maturing space program in the world and is using its on-orbit and ground-based assets to support its national civil, economic, political, and military goals and objectives.

China has invested in advanced space capabilities, with particular emphasis on satellite communication (SATCOM), intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite navigation (SATNAV), and meteorology, as well as manned, unmanned, and interplanetary space exploration.

Continued strides in space will lead to future technology advances that will benefit China’s military.

These advances will allow China to have less dependence on Russia in the future.

China has been involved in both maritime and territorial disputes at various times with Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. However, China chooses to handle these disputes using “Deng Xiaoping’s dictum from the early-1990s: that China should observe calmly, secure its position, cope with affairs calmly, hide its capabilities and bide its time, be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership.” While China does not directly support terrorism it is guilty of supplying arms to nations that are clear sponsors of terrorism.

Russia’s strategic objectives under Putin have been to regain legitimacy on the global stage. Russia’s current strategy has revolved around undermining American interests and to attempt to climb back to world power status, politically, diplomatically, and militarily. Russia is the number two military power on the military strength indicator chart. Russia is not afraid to use military might to achieve its objectives.

Russia continues to defy the international community with military and technological support being supplied to North Korea.

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North Korea has been under the watchful eye of the international community for its nuclear weapons ambitions for years. However, since it is the United States leading the effort to deter these nuclear ambitions, Russia has taken actions to assist North Korea. In addition to North Korea, Russia has also provided nuclear technology and military hardware and advisors to Iran.

Russia is currently leading a coalition in Syria with its own elite special forces, Iranian Quds Force members, Hezbollah fighters and Assad’s Syrian troops, all supported by Russian air power. Russia continues to embark on a global effort to reassert itself to the top of the world stage and seeks to gain international legitimacy at least on par with the United States.

To define Iran’s strategic objectives it must first be understood that Iran sees itself as the leader of the Islamic Shi’a world. Iran’s strategic objectives, therefore, are built around four overall objectives: export the Islamic revolution; regional dominance in the Middle East; gain nuclear weapons; and lastly overwhelming, if not outright destroying, Israel. Iran’s conventional military power did not make the list on the military strength indicator chart. Jane’s Defense Weekly offers this overall assessment of Iran’s military: "Iran’s armed forces are limited, despite their size, by a very poor maintenance record caused by lack of spare parts and very poor training, [t]here is little doubt that, at the moment, Iran is not capable of presenting any credible external threat and conventional force projection is almost certainly limited to within its own borders."

Iran’s military is old and poorly maintained and most of its conventional forces are centered on national defense via missile systems. The key to Iran’s projection of power is through the desire to acquire nuclear weapons and the exportation and support of terrorism against ‘enemies.’

MODERN DIPLOMACY

Israeli strategic objectives revolve around an aggressive defense of the state. Israel as a nation is surrounded on all sides by perceived enemy states or terrorist groups. Israel sees itself in a daily struggle for survival. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has embarked on a political propaganda campaign to gather support against Iran’s nuclear ambitions and to stop the United States from signing the JCPOA. The prime minister even accepted a controversial invitation to speak before the United States Congress from Speaker of the House Boehner. This was against the wishes of the White House, which saw this move as an attempt to undermine the administration and ruin the JCPOA deal. Israel is prepared to use any measure to defend its state. While Israel ranks as number fourteen on the military strength indicator chart, in reality it is one of the most advanced forces in the world. Israel backed by the United States is easily the best military in the Middle East.

While the nuclear ambitions of Iran have been slowed by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA), the unintended consequence has been financial assistance for the possible support of terrorism: But as those U.S. officials well know, Soleimani and a host of his Quds Force underlings and proxies are due to have international and EU sanctions lifted on their involvement in Iran’s supposedly now-resolved nuclear program, thanks to the contentious, American-spearheaded Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA), more commonly known as the Iran deal. Sanctions relief, commingled with the $150 billion “signing bonus” Iran is set to get upon implementation of the JCPA, means an inevitable cash infusion for the Quds Force, enabling it to better prop up whatever’s left of the House of Assad, not to mention its other proxies, from Hezbollah to the Yemeni Houthis.

In addition to superior equipment and training, Israeli forces are proven. “Israel also has one of the region's most battle-ready armies, a force that has fought in four major engagements since 2006 and has experience securing a few of the most problematic borders on earth.” (Rosen, Bender, and Macias).

Israel uses its forces to intervene or conduct preemptive strikes anytime there is a perceived threat.

This has included invasions into Lebanon and air strikes on suspected Syrian nuclear facilities. Israel combats terrorism daily and has been in a consistent fight since the creation of its state.

In conclusion, Russia is the most threatening state to global stability. Russia scored a seventeen, placing it two points ahead of the United States. The major difference between Russia and the United States hinged on the indirect support Russia gives to states that sponsor terrorism, support to North Korean and Iranian nuclear ambitions, and direct military interference to assist in the destabilization of Ukraine and support of Syria’s Assad regime.

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Perhaps surprisingly, the United States scored the highest in most categories, but its high anti-terrorism agenda arguably makes the United States less a stability risk than Russia. While Iran was the leader in state support of terrorism, it is currently isolated as a regional power and severely hampered by a non-modern military.

Some may be even more surprised to find China tying for last place in this assessment, but this ranking must be read with a grain of salt: two of its low scores (strategic objectives and military intervention) admittedly are fueled by an historical strategic philosophy that emphasizes stealth and subtle influence over aggressive overtness.

For example, if an economic power used for military coercion factor was included in the study, China would undoubtedly score extremely high, challenged only by the United States. This is why all such studies have to be humble in the assessments made: while the information provided here is hopefully enlightening, it must never be taken as a be-all-end-all assessment of global instability and the states that act as the motor of that chaos. Nevertheless, this study shows that the Caspian ‘greaters’ are indeed major factors on the global stage and can choose to be either a force for good or for chaos when it comes to the ways of war and peace.

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BLOWBACK DIPLOMACY

HOW THE US WAS LOCKED OUT Of THE CASPIAN LAURA GARRIDO Laura Garrido is currently finishing her Master’s degree in the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program at Bellevue University in Omaha, Nebraska, USA. Her primary research interests cover the post-Soviet space and the fight against radical Islamism.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

After giving the newly independent states some time, the United States became increasingly active in its diplomatic efforts in the region. It started out with official visits, first by the leaders of the region to the United States: President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan visited the White House in 1996; President Eduard Shevardnadze of Georgia, President Heidar Aliyev of Azerbaijan, President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan in 1997; and President Saparmurat Niyazov of Turkmenistan in 1998.

These visits were then followed by US Secretary of t has been almost one year since the IV State Madeleine Albright touring the region in Caspian Summit in Astrakhan, Russia, where 2000. the presidents of the five Caspian states To add to this, possibly one of the most significant signed a political declaration that denied any US policy decisions in the Caspian region, the Clinforeign military presence in the Caspian Sea. This ton Administration appointed a “special envoy”, or means that possible future deployment of NATO a special inter-agency working group, which foforces in the area will not be allowed. According to cused on Caspian policy. This was interesting beRussian President Vladimir Putin, this declaration cause so much focus was placed on this remote “sets out a fundamental principle for guaranteeing region, even though there was no significant trade stability and security, namely, that only the Caspian relationship between the Caspian littorals and the littoral states have the right to have their armed United States, no real threat of major war, and no forces present on the Caspian.” While this is a threat immediate threat to regional or international peace to the United States, the decision may not have and stability. The United States military also began been as much of a shock. It may have been US poli- to pay attention to the region. Many training sescies that pushed this decision to the forefront. sions and programs were conducted in the area and between 1992 and 1999. The United States also proLooking back to the collapse of the Soviet Union, vided the Caspian area with nearly $1.9 billion the United States was careful not to make it seem under the Freedom Support Act to promote deas though it was siding with the new states in their mocratization, market reforms, health care, and efforts to achieve independence from Russia. This housing. was important because the United States did not However, not all good deeds go unpunished. While want to give the impression that a “cordon sanitaire” supporting the region, the United States also adwas being created around Russia in order to isolate dressed the importance of Central Asia and the Cauit from Europe. The new states and Russia were casus. A mistake the United States may have made given the opportunity to create arrangements in addressing the importance of this region was emamongst themselves that were acceptable to both phasizing the region’s oil and gas wealth. In an adsides. The United States was to basically stay out of dress before the Senate Appropriations it. This policy was a way to allow the United States Committee’s Foreign Operations Subcommittee, to slowly and strategically become involved in these Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted that it new states in the years following the collapse of the was of national interest to support states in the Soviet Union without bothering or irritating or wor- Caspian Basin because they were strategically lorying Russia. cated and energy-rich.

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THE CASPIAN PROJECT 16 This may have planted a seed of suspicion in Russia toward US motives in the area, which could have led long-term to the decision to lock them out of the region militarily in last year’s summit.

Thus, the very policy that was meant to help the United States gain the littoral states’ trust and future access to the Caspian’s resources and strategic location may have backfired. The US invested so much time, money, and energy working to build the navies and strengthen the military in Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan.

However, all of that training and arms supplied were ultimately manipulated by Russia and Iran, cajoling the states that they could protect their interests themselves without more direct foreign military aid and involvement.

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The littoral states bought into the idea that their bolstered militaries, along with Russia and Iran’s supplementally pledged military support, would be enough to protect themselves. It seems apparent that the idea of needing protection from Russia and Iran in the future was not considered a relevant threat. This concept is something loudly crowed about in the West but these decisions show it is not shared by the ‘lesser’ Caspian littorals.

Another policy of the United States that may have contributed to this lockout decision was the imposition of sanctions on Russia and Iran. Russia not only has soft power influence throughout the region, many of the littoral states are fearful of a belligerent Iran. The United States imposed sanctions on Russia in response to the annexation of Crimea and subsequent involvement in the war in Ukraine.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

The sanctions have caused severe economic harm to Russia causing food prices to soar, the exchange rate to weaken, inflation to increase, and incomes to decrease. The United States also imposed further sanctions on Iran due to its illicit nuclear activities.

Like in Russia, the sanctions severely affected Iran’s economy, causing incredibly high inflation, unemployment, and food prices.

Thus, Russia and Iran’s distrust and anger toward the United States, along with their own national security interests, fueled their actions to push the littoral states to agree with the lockout.

The decision to block foreign militaries from the Caspian Sea is a threat to the strategic interests of America and, to a lesser extent, the EU. Potentially, it could have negative repercussions on energy security. By removing any Western military influence in the region, Russia will be able to maintain the regional hegemony it considers its natural birthright.

In addition to that, Iran will be able to ensure greater strategic flexibility moving forward with the JCPOA nuclear accord. It is now clear that there were policy decisions made by the US that negatively affected its relationship with Russia and Iran and fueled the push for the military lockout. Additionally, the United States’ discussion of the strategic location and energy wealth of the Caspian Basin undoubtedly caused an air of doubt by the ‘greater’ Caspian littorals and clearly motivated them to improve their relations with Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan enough so that those three could legitimately believe in the wisdom and efficacy of relying on their own regional securitization. In short, the biggest decision that came from the IV Caspian Summit was the product of a long and gradual process of ‘blowback diplomacy,’ where the United States was forced to reap a bitter harvest from its earlier sowing season.

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AmERICA’S UNEvEN POlICy

CHAllENgINg RUSSIA’S ARCTIC

GREGORY ROUDYBUSH Gregory Roudybush is currently a graduate student at Bellevue University’s International Security and Intelligence Studies program in Omaha, Nebraska. He served previously in the United States Marine Corps.

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he policy of the United States concerning climate change in the Arctic has been and is one that is everchanging. Since 2009 there have been adaptations to the policy in order to face the concerns of today while anticipating the challenges of tomorrow. However, if the current policy does not continue to change in an effective manner to meet the evolution of Arctic challenges, the United States will be further behind the curve. This will have an impact on both allies and adversaries that are active in the region, most especially the Russian Federation.

mODERN DIPlOmACy The current policy of the United States concerning the Arctic region was originally developed in 2009 under the Bush Administration as National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) no. 66 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) no. 25. This policy discusses topics and issues that concern international governance of the Arctic, territorial claims, international scientific cooperation, maritime transportation, economic and energy issues, environmental protection, and conservation of resources. It takes into account that due to climate change there are new issues that must be addressed concerning United States’ interests. This policy has been so useful that Obama only added to the policy rather than replace it.

In May of 2013, the National Strategy for Arctic Region was released with the implementation plan following in January of 2014. Much like the original policy, it focuses on climate change and the challenges that come with it. It discusses maintaining freedom of the seas for maritime transportation, working within international institutions such as the Arctic Council to address issues between states, and working to protect the environment and conserve resources in the region. The unwritten portion is how much of this is meant to countermand Russian initiatives in the region.

The NSPD 66/HSPD 25 has been effective in stating how the United States plans on approaching the Arctic region for energy development. Anders Rasmussen stated in A Place Apart: A Peaceful Arctic No More, “that the US Geological Survey indicates that the region contains approximately 13 percent of the world's undiscovered oil and 30 percent of the world's undiscovered gas deposits, as well as vast quantities of mineral resources including rare earth elements, iron ore, and nickel.” Being able to exploit these resources would be beneficial to the United States, yet it has been slow to approve permits for companies to explore parts of the Arctic.

Thus, while the policy does address energy issues, it may be ineffective in providing greater energy independence, especially given how aggressive Russia wants to be and has been in recent years in the Arctic region.

NSPD 66/HSPD 25 and the National Strategy Arctic region both address economic issues and advancing American security interests. Currently, though, the United States does not have a modern fleet of Arctic ice breakers, while Russia has the largest number of Arctic capable ships. The United States lacking a modern fleet of Arctic ice breakers means that it cannot advance its security interests and address economic issues that relate to maritime traffic.

When this is coupled with not belonging to a significant international convention (UNCLOS), the United States will have a hard time protecting and promoting its interests in the region and countering a Russian Federation that has assertively declared the Arctic region a major focus of its own national security portfolio.

THE CASPIAN PROJECT 16 The current policy has also been ineective in getting the United States Congress to agree to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As Dobransky points out, the NSPD 66/HSPD 25 came up short largely due to the United States still not being a member of UNCLOS. This becomes a serious issue if another state makes territorial claims that are accepted by following UNCLOS procedures. The United States would be unable to contest these claims or have its counterclaims recognized by the international community. This could have large detrimental ramifications in the future as other Arctic states make more claims in the region.

The United States might try to have better success with other means of international cooperation. Its policy puts an emphasis on international cooperation and working within existing international bodies. This allows the United States to work out conflicts of interests with other states through the use of diplomacy.

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As Richard Weitz stated in Russia Tensions Threaten U.S. Arctic Council Agenda, the United States is working with other countries to challenge Russia’s broad territorial claims in the Arctic, which include the Northern Sea Route. The Arctic Council consists of eight states with many other states in observer status. With so many states displaying interest in the Arctic region it is important for the United States to emphasize and practice more international cooperation, whether it is a part of UNCLOS or not.

The current policy of the United States on the changing conditions in the Arctic region has mixed results up to this point. The policy addresses many of the current issues that are present in the Arctic while anticipating the ever-changing future of the region. However, there is no substantive progress to challenge the clear elephant in the Arctic room: Russia. There is no state today acting more assertively and proactively than Russia as concerns the Arctic. American policy was clearly developed to answer this reality and yet the details of said policy are markedly poor answering that challenge specifically.

Just as Russia took steps recently at the IV Caspian Summit to ensure its military dominance over the Caspian Sea, it seems quite intent on ensuring an economic and political dominance over its other great sea body to the north. This likely means the immediate future of the Arctic is going be decidedly more bold bear than bald eagle.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

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ACADEMIC SChOLARShIP AND INtELLIgENCE VEttINg

CENSORShIP OR SAVINg gRACE? DR. MATTHEW CROSSTON Senior Editor, Caspian Project Director Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science, Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program, and the Miller Chair at Bellevue University

new article by The Moscow Times revealed a mixed reaction to supposed FSB ‘vetting’ of academic scholarship.

The Times, which has largely become a holding repository of intense criticism of the Russian government (and no, the irony of a media organization sharply critical of the government for infringing on media freedom has apparently not sunken in yet in Moscow), is clearly siding high on the indignation side of this issue: for the most part the article is a not-so-thinly veiled accusation of Russian intelligence services trying to basically return the country’s academic community to a Sovietera intellectual censorship system. And while it is true there are examples of Russian academics unfortunately being subjected to investigation and even arrest, there are aspects to this story that are importantly irresponsible and propagandistic.

thE CASPIAN PROJECt 16 The past is no help to the Russian Federation in this case. Older generation academics indeed remember all too well a time when literally all academic scholarship had to be ‘approved’ by the KGB. The article that the Moscow Times took from the prestigious journal Nature highlighted how scientists today need to seek ‘permission’ from their home university’s First Department, an entity that supposedly exists in all Russian universities and is meant to be ‘closely associated’ with the FSB. It is at this point that even the Times article gets a bit confusing. Administration officials in the powerful Moscow State University admit that faculty meetings had taken place discussing the need to have original scholarship reviewed, but that this process has long been in place as a source for improving the standards of quality and citation rate and in no way is associated with the FSB.

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In addition, even at MSU, the vanguard of Russian academic institutions, the practice of First Department vetting seems to be selectively engaged, where certain departments are required to submit scholarship while other departments are not. It is not readily clear, to the Times, Nature, or the faculty of MSU, what decision-making process is involved to determine which departments receive scrutiny.

And as one might expect in this situation, wherever there is confusion or ambiguity, there goes suspicion and dread.

Given the history of Soviet censorship and contemporary worries about academic freedom, it is not entirely shocking that academic and media groups in Russia would profess concern about the insidiousness of the overall process. But I cannot help but see some less sinister possibilities that explain this situation.

MODERN DIPLOMACY

Anyone affiliated with university administration, ANY university administration, is well-acquainted with what can only be called an interminable and seemingly illogical bureaucracy that often eludes the principles of rationality and sanity. The idea that a huge institution like Moscow State University might make decisions that are not standardized or universal, that do not apply to all departments across the board, and even perhaps make decisions that seem contradictory and inexplicable to its faculty, is so commonplace all over the academic globe that it is almost not worth mentioning. The essence of academic bureaucracy often seems to be about good intentions badly performed. The inconsistency of First Department application across Russian universities could and likely is easily explained by this frustrating intellectual reality all scholars face, regardless of a country’s specific history with censorship. But even this is minor compared to the larger issue not being properly discussed in the Times article: standard procedures of oversight on scholarship that deals with sensitive topics and materials.

The Nature journal understandably focuses on the hard sciences, but this issue falls on all academics, even students, who produce material that engage national security interests. The idealistic utopia that some academics proclaim should be the standard for intellectual engagement has ALWAYS been a myth: there is no country and no university where professors and advanced students can simply ‘write whatever they want and go talk to whomever they want whenever they want,’ especially at institutions that have either a connection to government or have persons under their employ or guidance who are also affiliated with government agencies.

This is not about Russia slowly creeping back into some weird form of Soviet revanchism. This is about all countries. For example, my own program has had issues with this challenge as it concerns the analytical commentary endeavor, The Caspian Project: given that I run an International Security and Intelligence Studies Program in the United States, it is not outrageous to learn that some of my students are already employed or were formerly employed by the US government or American military.

Every single student in my program that has had this affiliation and wanted to contribute to The Caspian Project has had to submit their work ahead of time to ‘vetting services,’ either in the US government or the military, to simply ascertain that no classified information was accessed in order to write the pieces and no secret information was revealed in the pieces themselves.

In America, some have derisively referred to this as a ‘post-Snowden reflex,’ implying the United States Intelligence Community still stings from the embarrassment of the theft and release of thousands of classified documents by Edward Snowden. While there may be a small bit of truth to that, the reality is this process has always existed in America and will exist in any other country that considers itself important on the global stage and having significant national security secrets to maintain (ie, every single country on earth, quite frankly). What the derision and suspicion of articles like the one in Nature or the commentary provided by The Moscow Times fail to understand or recognize is just how easy it is to unknowingly violate national security laws in a given country. That is the aspect sorely needed within this debate and what I provide here.

Academics who do not have familiarity with or exposure to working with the government often have a ‘Hollywoodized’ vision of national security and what it means for information to be Top Secret and classified.

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This is what leads us to the final important point about academics in general: while on the whole wonderfully engaged and purely intentioned when tackling new scholarship, our naiveté as a group can get a bit overwhelming. When tackling scholarship that clearly cannot touch in any way national security interests, this trait can be endearing if also eccentric.

When researching issues that do matter to national security, this trait makes us dangerous to ourselves.

In such a way the existence of a First Department at a university (an organ that does not exist in American universities and thus makes the still required vetting process more labyrinthine and unknowable for scholars and students alike) can potentially speed up what no doubt will always be an excruciating example of bureaucracy run amok. But dealing with an inefficient, illogical, and sometimes inexplicable bureaucratic organ ahead of time is far superior to dealing with the unemotional, ruthless, The Times uses that fact to show the unjustness of and cutting professionalism of your country’s law the system, intimating that something was first ‘fine’ enforcement. because it was presented previously and then later on the academic falls under the thumb of FSB sus- This reality should be considered when we read arpicion. In my world, here in the United States, this ticles like the one in the Times. Is this censorship is an area where it is most assuredly not better to rearing its ugly head back into the world of the ‘ask forgiveness rather than seek permission.’ Too academy or is this a saving grace helping academics many academics working in important areas of na- avoid their own worst habits? Bureaucracy can intional security, whether directly or indirectly, cannot deed often be dumb. But that doesn’t always autobe so cavalier: put simply, asking forgiveness does matically mean it is also a demon. not usually go over so well when dealing with a country’s intelligence community.

The old American Supreme Court adage in the 1970s about pornography (what is porn? I’ll know it when I see it) does not apply here, though most academics unwisely think it does. Unfortunately, the process of classification and designation of Top Secret is not intuitively logical or easily surmised. An academic can easily be working on materials or topics that seem far-removed from issues of national security and yet the conclusions and originality devised from said sources end up pushing the work incredibly close if not beyond the standards under which the government works and is beholden to.

This is why preemptive vetting is a much safer process for the academic: failing to get that formal approval exposes the scholar in question to the accusations seen in the Times article. It is not a question of how many times the material has been discussed in public or whether or not it has been published previously.

I know for a fact that is the case for America. There is no reason it would be any different for the Russian Federation. The fact that information can go unnoticed at first just means it is a failure of bureaucracy, which is why academics in every country are usually charged with the responsibility of seeking the vetting themselves. Host governments are basically de facto admitting they do not believe in the efficacy of their own bureaucratic institutions. And rightly so.

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RussIAN DIPLOMACY

TRYINg TO gO fROM ThE sMALL

DAYNA RICE Dayna Rice is a recent graduate of the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program at Bellevue University in Omaha, NE, USA. She is also a veteran of the United States Army.

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ne of the Russian government’s worries that propelled it to face the conflict in Syria against DAESH was the probability of it morphing into issues within the Nagorno-Karabakh region.The role that Russia has been increasingly playing as a diplomatic partner in the region is entrenching Russia and President Vladimir Putin as the go-to players for security concerns. It was not that long ago though that Russia was in the Western limelight because of its own involvement with Ukraine over the Crimean peninsula, cast as the villain.

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sTAgE TO ThE BIg sCREEN Russia has been trying to find a diplomatic solution to the dispute, but has been largely unsuccessful in its attempts. Overall, Russia has always remained somewhat closer to Armenia, with Armenia hosting a Russian base within its borders. The contract for that base was recently renewed until 2044. Russia also invited Armenia to be a part of the Eurasian Union. Russia has also started to shift closer to Azerbaijan too, however, selling heavy weapons that it can use to fortify and strengthen its military. The presence of a Russian military base on one side of the conflict and the sale of weapons from Russia to the other side of the conflict is not, however, creating momentum for solving the region’s dilemma.

More likely it is further exacerbating the issues of insecurity between the two old rivals in the Caucasus.

Is Russia trying to recast its role in Syria, shifting from villain to diplomatic envoy? Some think that Putin is trying to affirm the military’s glory to the Russian people and show the world that Russia cannot be pushed into the background. This strategy, though, is continually stretching the limits of the Russian military, its economic burdens, and the lines of acceptance from the international community.

One region potentially impacted by this is NagornoKarabakh, the self-proclaimed autonomous region between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

While Russia has tried to play a part in the diplomatic process between Armenia and Azerbaijan regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict it also has given contradictory support (to Armenia by placing troops within the country and to Azerbaijan by selling weapons to the Azeri government), leading to an increase in the spread of violence and discord.

The violence is spreading beyond the NagornoKarabakh region and is now travelling along the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Where skirmishes previously consisted only of small-arms fire, today it is more common that exchanges consist of larger-arms fire and rockets.

There are six main obstacles to overcome in the Nagorno-Karabakh region and they all give Russia tremendous difficulty in proving its diplomatic strength.

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The first is the deep rooted mutual distrust between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The second is that the Azeris and the Armenians think that the conflict should not involve outside forces: they actually believe that outside forces are doing nothing more than aggravating old tensions.

The issue of refugees from the region is a third obstacle that must be addressed. Without having a settlement in the near future it will be near impossible to repatriate any of the 800,000 to1,000,000 refugees spread across the region. Fourth, deep mistrust creates security issues between the two countries that extend far beyond the single disputed region. Azerbaijan is incensed that Armenia is ‘occupying’ nearly six of its provinces, but any move to retake those provinces would provoke further feelings of insecurity for Armenia and could be the spark to set off a full-blown war. Trying to get the two sides to release their claims on various parcels of land has been futile. This deep sense of

insecurity and impending dread of renewed militia engagement is keeping hundreds of thousands of refugees from returning to their homes. This leads to the fifth complication: getting either side to agree to a deal or to at least agree to a timeline for renewed diplomatic engagement based on substantive promises and negotiations. The problems in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are deep-rooted.

All sides request concessions that must be in place before they will move forward with any plans to reengage.

The concessions are not unreasonable, but the timelines in which they are requested cause continuous issues and arguments. Armenia requests that the Nagorno-Karabakh region is left solely in its care, the Azeris request that the Armenians withdraw from the region and return it to Azerbaijan’s control, and the Nagorno-Karabakh region itself will not concede anything unless it is recognized as an autonomous state. These issues continue to boil under the surface, waiting to erupt.

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The last and final obstacle that must be overcome in order to find peace in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is that the parties represented in the negotiating process must come to an agreement on being equal participants at the table. This may seem simple but is in fact arguably the most problematic.

There are three parties concerned in the NagornoKarabakh conflict: the Armenians, the Azeris, and the Karabakh Armenians. Even though the region has declared itself an autonomous state, the reality is that such declarations are not recognized by the Armenians or the Azeris. This has subsequently left the self-installed government of Nagorno-Karabakh out of the negotiations entirely. Russia has also shown little support for the autonomous government of Nagorno-Karabakh, further excluding it from the negotiations. This likely has to change if real progress is to be made.

With all the major diplomatic/military operations and maneuvers that Russia has become a part of in

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the last year, it leaves one to wonder how it will continue to spread resources so thin and still hope to find success. Putin is playing a strategic but potentially risky game in his eort to reestablish the power and glory of Russian international significance. Indeed, the eects of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh reigniting have implications that would aect not just Russia but also Turkey, Iran, and Syria. The conflict needs a great deal of time and attention to stop festering problems from erupting into an all-out war that would devastate the region far beyond the Caspian. The Russian government needs to seek solutions that would aid in keeping peace, repatriating refugees, and providing relief for the diverse security issues at hand. If it does manage this incredible feat, then it may just be successful in its impassioned desire to be seen as a force for diplomatic good on the world stage. That may seem far-fetched at the moment, but they are still the largest stakes at play.

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RussIAN INtERfERENCE IN sYRIA AND tuRkEY fP IN MIDDLE EAst

ORHAN GAFARLI Ph.D candidate at Ankara University Analyst on Russian and Caucasus Region

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ussia after October 1, aiming to support the Assad regime, is carrying out military operations on ISIS and the other opposition forces. Such a development has created a serious concerning the Middle East from the view point of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey.This situation is contrary to Turkey’s Syrian policy based on Assad’s leaving power that it has been carrying on continually for almost four years. The existing circumstance in the area brings Turkey closer to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as it does Moscow, Tehran, Bagdad, Damascus and the Kurdish movements.

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His several visits to Saudi Arabia prior to Russian interference in Syria and improvement in relations with the Gulf countries, helped Turkey’s convergence policies on the Syrian issue. It is important to perceive Russia’s latest military interference in this context. Namely, Russia was recently uncomfortable about the opposition forces, backed by Saudi Arabia, Arab Emirates and Turkey, progressing toward areas under Assad regime’s control. As a result of dialogues between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries, the opposition groups in Syria could merge and gain strength.

These developments threatening Russian military presence in Syria have forced Moscow to openly defend Assad. A military move in Syria was essential to counter these proceedings as well as to save Russia from international isolation. Lack of direct intervention from the USA, despite all these developments in the region, helped Moscow take advantage of the gap formed.

Such a balance of power complicates the solution of the Syrian problem and had adverse impact on Moscow-Ankara relations especially on October 45-6 due to border violations of Russian military planes. The strategic affiliation Turkey has established since 2012 with Muslim Brothers and Qatar and the policies to design the region accordingly have been altered in 2014 with the new king in Saudi Arabia.The fact that Muslim Brothers lost Egypt and its failure to be effective in Syria have forced Erdogan to seek new cooperation possibilities in the Arab World. Especially following the agreement on nuclear issues between US and Iran, Turkey was forced to ally with the Sunni countries.

It is possible that Russia may be alienated by siding with the Arab countries or with Turkey. In order to prevent being pulled into the regional anti-Sunni equation, Russia is continuing its dialogue with Egypt and is trying hard to get Egypt on his side. But this is not expected to be successful.It could be a very dangerous game for the Egyptian President Sisi, who came to power with a coup. It was Saudi Arabia that provided the greatest support in bringing Sisi to power. Both the US and the EU allowed this to happen. If Sisi gets into this game with Putin, it is a great possibility that he will be toppled by Muslim Brothers and Salafis again.

The Russian military operation seems to proceed in two directions. First is air strikes on the South-Western parts of opposition group in Syria and operations against ISIS to ensure the existence of Assad’s regime. Here we should take into consideration the feeling that there has been an exchange of information between Russia and Turkey prior to these operations.

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RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN SYRIA AND TURKEY Before the start of operations Erdogan visited Moscow to open a Mosque. According to information infiltrated from these meetings, Russia has informed Turkey on the joint military quarters they had established with Iran, Iraq and the Assad regime against ISIS and proposed Turkey to take part in it. Second is that they have agreed on a transition period under the leadership of Assad. Third is I think that Turkey has been given an important guarantee regarding the Kurdish Issue? This was that there will no Kurdish corridor formed from North to South in Western Syria.

After his visit to Russia, Erdogan stated that a transition period may be possible with Assad. Also the diplomatic sources rendered the fact that a proposal was made by Russia to Turkey to join the military quarters. For this reason, on the first days of the operations Turkey has expressed its discomfort only by diplomatic language. Later when Russia has directed its air attacks against the opposition forces, it became hysterical. It is evident that the Turkish side was not expecting this.

Turkey’s continued presence in Syria depends on the existence of the opposition forces it supports.

With Russia’s elimination of these forces, Turkey will be out of the battlefield. A development like this will weaken Turkey’s hand at the table on its cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries related to Syrian issues.

Turkey’s discomfort on the matter is felt clearly.

Such a development would mean a total failure of the Turkish Syrian policy. For Turkey to save its position in the Middle East equation, it has to continue dialogues with the Gulf Emirates and Saudi Arabia as well as maintain its strength on the battlefield.

This is also a strong instrument in its negotiations with US and EU on Syrian issues.

As we have observed on Geneva I. and II. told, Russia always by-passes Turkey, as much as it can, when negotiating Syrian issues with USA. This time because it has no direct relation with US and EU, Russia is by-passing Turkey on the battlefield in order to strongly pressure Ankara into accepting his own conditions.

Turkey, in order to by-pass Russia and actually prevent Russia’s emergence from international isolation on Syrian issues, has to change its attitude toward Moscow this time. This means that Turkey ends the cooperation among the two countries regarding the Turkish Stream Project and the power plants and must join the policies followed by US and EU on Crimean issues. Actually Turkey didn’t take part in the economic sanctions of the western countries against Russia. As a matter of fact its wish was to penetrate the Russian markets more deeply.

It is known that the Turkish companies’ investment in Russia is over 10 billion US dollars. We can say that in the first 7 months of 2015, the total trading volume between the two countries has decreased by 21,5% and dropped to 14,4 billion US dollars.

tHE CAsPIAN PROJECt 16 According to some, the reason why the Turkish Stream treaty has not been signed yet is the failure of Russia’s signing the promised %10.25 price reduction agreement. Since reaching an agreement on gas prices transmitted by the South Stream Project, Turkey wishes the Turkish Stream treaty to be evaluated separately. Russia, however, favors discussing the 10.25 percent reduction in gas prices to be paired with the Turkish Stream Project. The aim of Turkey, in this case, is to bring different terms to the negotiation table concerning the new line.

Turkey wants guarantees not to relive the stress of “buy or pay” articles of previous gas agreements with this new pipeline project. However, the Turkish side has already reached an agreement within the scope of the Turkish Stream Project, with Russia, upon two of the total of four pipelines crossing underneath the Black Sea. The four pipelines together have a total export capacity of 63 billion cubic meters of gas. The capacity of the permitted two pipelines is 15.75 billion cubic meters. The aim is to utilize the gas from these lines mainly in the Turkish domestic market.

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After all these developments, on October 6, the yearly capacity of the Turkish Stream gas line has been diminished from 63 billion cubic meters to 32 billion cubic meters by the decision of Russian energy company, Gazprom. It has been noted that with this decision the Russian-Turkish relations have declined even more. Actually Turkey is not in a position to risk its economic relations with Russia and both energy and economic relations with Moscow are of great importance for Turkey.

It is expected that Erdogan will continue his convergence policy with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries as before the Russian operations in Syria. As the leader of the Sunni bloke in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia together with Turkey wants them to stop soon. Keeping in mind the fact that the decisions on Turkish foreign policy are taken not by Erdogan but the National Security Council, after November 1 elections, in case of a CHP (Republican People’s Party)-AKP (Justice and Development Party) coalition there is a possibility of improvement in TurkishEgyptian relations. That is why we can say this is one of the greatest expectations after November 1. elections. A CHP-AKP coalition is also expected to smooth out relations with Israel. Turkey, not getting the full support of US regarding Middle East policies, wants to adjust the political balance on his side by taking part in building the Sunni bloke and concurrently improving relations with Israel. So as a result, we can witness Russia’s super activity in the area together with Turkey settling relations with Israel and Egypt. Actually, my opinion is that Israel will have the priority.

Therefore it is not possible for Turkey to take any harsh measures against Russia at present, since any such action can also seriously affect the November 1st general elections. The vulnerability of the Turkish Lira against the US dollar can increase. Due to all this, the prediction is that without support from USA, Turkey’s hand will grow weaker in Syrian policies and it will be left out of the field.

In case of AKP getting enough votes to come to power alone, the expectation is a Middle East policy based on close relations with the Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The unfavorable relations between Turkey and Israel is expected to continue as it is. The relations with Egypt might be established again if the most important issue Morsi, the leader of Muslim Brothers, is freed.

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BRIAN HUGHES Brian Hughes is currently a student in the International Security and Intelligence Studies program at Bellevue University in Omaha, NE, USA.

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he Syrian refugee crisis has clearly displayed the difficulties of Western societies to accept culturally and religiously different peoples in the wake of regional civil war. This is in contrast to previous refugee crisis solutions that were fully embraced and enforced successfully (elaborated below). Namely, the decision on whether to accept Syrian refugees has hinged on the perceived immediate detrimental effects to the economy and a not-so-subtle concern about ‘hidden terrorism.’ This is not only a more brutal side to globalization, but is also using terrorism to power a new xenophobia, turning refugees into something akin to human capital estimates.

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A MESS Of MORAL CONvENIENCE AND RuTHLESS POLITICS

REfugEE CAPITALISM THE IRANIAN EXAMPLE Historically, perhaps the most telling refugee immigration was the Iranian one, lasting decades in the long shadow of the Ayatollah revolution. At a time when the United States’ population was diametrically opposed to the Iranian government, America still kept its borders to Iranian migrants and refugees largely open. Importantly, due to the Shah’s close relationship with Washington, Iranian familiarity with English, and Western education, there was relatively little transitional difficulty for the Iranian population. Iranian immigration largely continued unabated, with nearly 15 percent of Iranians with a tertiary education leaving for the US by 1990. Additionally, the IMF reported that more than half of the over 420,000 Iranians living in the US with higher education degrees were physicians or engineers. Thus, even as the political and societal opposition to Iran was at a heightened state, the US clearly recognized the economic value of Iranian refugees and did not fear there were ‘secret Ayatollah plants’ trying to get in.

The Iranian migration is in stark contrast to American (and Western in general) reaction to Syrian refugees, many of which have little firm knowledge of English, are poorly educated, and are perceived to observe very different cultural customs and religions.

While the US abruptly went from allies to enemies with the new Ayatollah regime, public opinion about Iranians had not changed to reflect the changing political situation. Numbers affirm this: as refugees and migrants from Iran continually increased throughout the 1980s, they were mostly accepted into the US, found success in the wake of fleeing their home state, and are the most highly educated among all refugee groups in the US. THE YUGOSLAV EXAMPLE As a result of the civil war in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995, a third of its entire population now lives outside of its borders. Germany alone contains approximately 240,000 Bosnian refugees. At the time of the mass migration of Bosnian refugees, the rhetoric was almost identical to what is expressed about Syrians today. In 1996, the Economist noted that “most countries are simply slamming their doors in the interest of looking after their own.” In addition, Germany took the brunt of Bosnian refugees and criticized the UN Convention on refugees and overall EU policy as incoherent. Despite this German chastising, most European countries simply ignored or refused Yugoslav refugees, as the crisis was far from their borders and they were not involved in the war.

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THE HAITI EXAMPLE

The Bosnian crisis is echoed nearly two decades later as Syria fits many of the same attributes, including the same ‘problematic’ religion as Bosnians.

Kosovo was similar to the Bosnian crisis, but had very different timelines and outcomes. As NATO controversially got involved in the Kosovo crisis in 1999, there came a deep moral obligation to assist in the refugee problem. This largely stemmed from the fact that NATO air strikes helped displace over 1.5 million people, with 800,000 of them being refugees. Thus, NATO created its own very painful dilemma, being seen as both liberators in war and yet also forcing the Kosovo population from their homes. Therefore, largely because the Western world was directly involved in the unrest, it felt obliged and responsible to help those forced to flee.

It also seemed important to repair the diplomatic public relations image of NATO. A very stark difference is evident in the NATO assistance to Kosovo vs. Bosnia: refugees were centered around nearby countries, not in far-off developed Western states, as the conflict ended relatively swiftly. This may be why there is such reluctance and slow reaction from NATO countries for Syria today: the conflict is most certainly not going to be short-lived and refugees cannot be housed safely in the most immediate nearby countries, thus demanding greater participation from far-off ones.

Similar to Syria, Haiti was experiencing an unstable government and tumultuous political climate from the 1980s through the 1990s. During the massive influx of 100,000 Mariel Cuban refugees in 1980 (who had special protections), some 1000 Haitians also arrived each month. In 1981, President Reagan changed the policy on “excludable aliens” and as a result Haitians were subject to incarceration and exclusion proceedings. Additionally, the Republic of Haiti and the United States formally agreed that the US would interdict on the Haiti “boat people” and Haiti would do no harm to them when they were returned. During the next ten years over 350 vessels and 21,000 Haitians were intercepted, with only six admitted to the US. Damnably, the same policy that allowed Cubans to stay and become citizens never applied to Haitians. Perhaps more tellingly, after the Cold War ended in 1994, the policy toward Cubans was also reversed and Cubans were then treated like the “Haitian boat people.” Thus, while the Cubans and Haitians were nearly identical in mode of transportation and time of arrival, their treatment did not become identical until the Cold War was decisively over, insinuating that the deeply divided politics between Cuba and the US decided refugee and migration treatment, not the actual crisis situation on the ground in-country. This could be most disturbing when looking at Syria: without an explicit and highly defined Cold War proxy development (though some might say that is happening now with Russian air strikes against DAESH in Syria), it seems that many Western countries will not find Syrian refugee populations important enough to make sacrifices.

As parts of the developed world have made additional pledges to take in more refugees, much of the world is refusing to do so.

THE CASPIAN PROJECT 16 Predominantly, this has been dominated in the media by Hungary’s closure of its borders and Japan’s echoing of European history when it declared it would take care of its own people before caring for others. However, while xenophobia plays a large role, these decisions can only occur in a country that has no moral, economic or political benefit for accepting refugees. In the United States, accepting Iranians meant allowing the best of Iran into its borders (who were also diametrically opposed to the anti-American revolutionary regime).

Cubans were welcomed in face of the anti-American Civil War as deserters of dictatorship and a prong against the Soviet Union. This element does not exist yet in Syria and thus, apparently, Syrian refugees are simply out of luck.

The goal of Western countries should be to eliminate these various cultural and political prerequisites for accepting refugees. While the Refugee Convention of 1951 is easily navigated around, public opinion and strong leadership can enforce

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humanitarian ideals in the face of xenophobic realizations, as has been shown by Germany in 1995 and again two decades later. Refugees being judged ‘worthy or unworthy’ according to their long-term human capital to the hosting nation is viciously cruel and ruthless, even if economically rational. The Syrian refugee crisis presents a soft power opportunity that is distressingly rare. Western countries must stop turning to isolationism and their policy concerns must not continually and conveniently turn inward.

Hungarian barbed wire and American Islamophobia does not represent the Western ideals of democracy and human freedom. Rather, they are antithetical and regressive. There is nothing wrong with the free market per se, accept when it is forcibly used in the Syrian crisis to create a ‘refugee capitalism’ that should be the shame of Western leaders and will no doubt become a huge destabilizing regional problem, especially across the Greater Caspian region.

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SItuAtION REPORt

RuSSIA'S StRAtEgIC StANCE

ELENA M. Intelligence Analyst

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n 14 October, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said in Moscow that Russia was closely monitoring the situation in Iraq as well as Afghanistan, but that only Syria had asked for direct support. Lavrov added that any such requests, if they are made, will be decided on by President Putin.

At least one western news agency reported that Russia was providing troops to Iraq with the approval of the Iraqi government. That is not accurate, at least not yet. Iraq has permitted the creation of the four-party intelligence center in Baghdad.

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IN SYRIA- IRAq- IRAN developments in Egypt. Notable exceptions to this strategy are Afghanistan and Yemen. The Afghanistan conflict predates the current US administration whose policy has bee to reduce the US presence to an embassy by the end of 2016. In Yemen, the US tends to support the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia against the Houthis, possibly because all the Gulf state air forces fly US combat aircraft.

The Russian strategy is built on supporting the governments in power in order to stabilize the existing order. Russia lacks the resources of the US, but President Putin has used his limited resources prudently and maneuvered deftly to advance Russian military presence and influence. Putin’s timing has been almost superb.

For old hands, the Russians and Americans appear to have reversed their traditional roles and swapped strategies and roles. Twenty-five years ago, the Soviets were destabilizing regions by supporting opposition elements in states friendly to the US. Now they are on the side of regional stability.

However, we should expect that other forms of cooperation also are in discussion.

A significant divergence of policy and strategy between the US and Russia is now apparent in Syria, Iraq and other Mid-eastern countries. The US strategy since 2011 mostly has focused on building up opposition entities to replace authoritarian governments with democratic systems.That has backfired by contributed to widespread instability; civil war and state fragmentation; legitimation of elected Islamist regimes and a backlash among the local populations in favor of stability, exemplified by political

The Russians/Soviets have been steadfastly on the side of the Syrian government for decades. The Soviet Union also was an important arms supplier to Iraq for many years. President Putin has positioned Russia to take advantage of Iran’s expected strategic breakout, now that the Iranian Majles has approved the nuclear agreement.

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HIstORY As tEACHER

WHERE Is tHE sAuDI-IRAN RELAtIONsHIP HEADINg?

STEPHEN SARTY Stephen Sarty is a graduate student in the International Security and Intelligence Studies program at Bellevue University in Omaha, NE, USA. He is a former U.S. Marine and has lived and worked in the Middle East for the last 23 years.

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In trying to determine what the next stage for the Iran – Saudi relationship might be, one must first look at similar relations between other states to see if they might contain clues. What do these other states share in common, what factors might be different, and how did these states approach these conflict areas in an effort to either mitigate the problems, eliminate them altogether, or to just simply accept that they exist and move forward peacefully? In reviewing which states could lend an insight into the IranSaudi conflict we must first identify some of the factors that contribute to the problem.

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The following are some of the sources of conflict that weigh into the relations between the two nations: Religious sect differences Desire for regional hegemony History of armed conflict/invasion Cultural differences Presence of outside powers Territorial disputes Considering these factors, there are a number of state conflicts that qualifies in one or more of these categories. During the great colonization periods England, France, and Spain had numerous clashes over issues such as regional hegemony and territorial disputes. More recently we’ve seen clashes between Pakistan and India caused mainly by religious differences, Germany against other nations during the World Wars in its desire for global hegemony, as well as two Asian powerhouses (Japan and China) that center around a number of factors such as cultural differences, historical resentment, and territorial disputes. Of these conflicts, some evolved where the nations now work collectively on many fronts.

Others continue with strained relationships marked by periods of armed conflict such as between Pakistan and India. And yet others exist still as an uneasy stalemate with periods of muscle-flexing and posturing but devoid of any real military confrontation.

Looking at the examples of England, France, Spain and ultimately Germany we see nations that have had long histories of armed conflict, resulting in clashes both on home soil as well as via proxies. This is very much like Iran and Saudi Arabia today.

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Yet now these European nations are almost completely at peace with one another and work in unison with one another to overcome regional issues covering economics, immigration, and security.

How did these nations, once committed to the destruction of one another, overcome those obstacles to get to this point and could this hold relevance for Iran and Saudi Arabia?

Since the end of World War II the nations of Europe have enjoyed a long period of relative peace. One major factor working in these nations’ favor was, ironically, the existence of the Cold War and reliance on the United States for military protection. The existence of NATO helped keep the peace by keeping the Soviet Bloc out of Western Europe as well as limiting each individual country’s ability to pose a threat to its neighbors. Another major factor is certainly the deterrence factor of nuclear weapons.

Both France and England possess nuclear capabilities so an outbreak of such warfare has the potential for dire consequences. Additionally, factors such as the new wealth these nations were unwilling to risk, democratic governments which were more accountable to the will of the people as opposed to an individual leader’s whims, and largely open borders that led to more transcultural understanding across all of Europe, all contributed to greater peace and less tension.

In Pakistan and India we see two regional powers that are largely at odds due to their religious and territorial differences, just as in the Iranian-Saudi conflict. Since the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, the two countries have engaged in numerous territorial, cultural and religious disputes, and as well as three instances of outright war. These disputes have mainly centered on the Kashmir region and again, like the case with Iran and Saudi Arabia, is the scene of local insurgents being used as proxies in the fight. Numerous periods of peace have occurred only to be broken by violent outbursts, such as the Mumbai terrorist attacks.

A parallel can unfortunately be drawn to the mosque bombings inside Saudi Arabia, where they were ultimately attributed to Iranian-influenced groups inside Saudi territory.

In China and Japan we see regional powers with a long history of conflict that centers on their own desires for regional hegemony. What we also see that is similar to Iran and Saudi Arabia are factors such as territorial conflicts, economic conflict, the presence of US interests, and one nation claiming the cultural high road over the other. The presence of the United States in Japan and its deepening economic ties/interdependence with China helped to settle some of those military tensions, although they still do have areas of conflict over territorial claims. Economic transformation has basically shifted the tension from a once intensely militarybased engagement to one more predicated on global positioning and diplomatic leverage.

tHE CAsPIAN PROJECt 16 This is in fact a great positive sign of progress. In 2006, after Prime Minister Abe assumed oďŹƒce in Japan, relations underwent a period of improvement as the two nations became more committed to high-level discussions. In an important symbolic gesture, Japan showed a willingness to admit and atone for some of its wartime atrocities against China. The two countries have also entered into joint ventures in oil and gas exploration, instead of competing for these resources inside disputed territorial areas. These two regional powers have grown to become two of the largest and most influential global economic powers. Their mutual economic interdependencies have provided a stable base upon which they are able to work on more productive overall relations. Economic collapse via war would be catastrophic to both nations so this interdependence has been a huge contributor in resolving dierences.

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At the moment the China-Japan case oers less hope for Iran and Saudi Arabia. In the present day one is hard-pressed to see economic opportunity building close interdependence between the two countries. The JCPOA accord may also end up only increasing tension over the short-term as Iran begins to gain greater global influence and establish more economic stability and prosperity for itself.

This could engender a reflexive counter-balancing reaction from Saudi Arabia. Some would even argue it has already begun such economic strategies in the past two years by keeping the price of oil low.

This is the opposite of what we have seen with China and Japan, where economic development on a global scale brought them closer together.

Analyzing these strategic conflicts shows that there are lessons to be learned that could lead Iran and Saudi Arabia along a path of conflict resolution. As is often the case, the devil is in the details. The presence and actions of a global superpower in the region (like the United States) can be an enabler of peace or an exacerbator of conflict. Trade and economic interdependence can break down prejudices and barriers and increase transcultural understanding, but that tends to be a slow process requiring patience from all parties involved. Communication and an element of trust, however, are essential across all of the conflict cases. If the opposing sides are unable to communicate, either through third parties or directly, then it becomes nearly impossible to develop the trust necessary to resolve issues.

At the moment that still remains the biggest single obstacle between Iran and Saudi Arabia: a failure to communicate.

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THE CASPIAN PROJECT 16

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LOCAL POwER fROM OLD SOvIETS TO NEw RuSSIANS (1985-2015)

THE CASCADE EffECT

Matthew Crosston, PhD Bellevue University, Omaha, Nebraska, USA Professor of Political Science Miller Endowed Chair for Industrial and International Security, Director – The ISIS Program: International Security and Intelligence Studies DMitrii seLtser Tambov State University named after G.R. Derzhavin, Tambov, Russia Doctor of Political Science, Professor of Foreign Aairs and Political Science

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We have undertaken an inter-regional comparison of seven subjects of the Russian Federation: the Ryazan, Samara, Tambov, and Ulyanovsk oblasts and the Republics of Mordovia, Udmurtia, and Chuvashia. This approach we feel creates an adequate field for analysis as it encompasses two oblasts each from the Volga and Central Russian regions (these are traditional subjects for comparison in Russia) as well as three national republics with their extraordinarily high political diversity. The principal results of the project have already been published [1, 2]. However, in Russia over the past 10 years, new elections were held.

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tabLe 1 eLeCtoraL ProCeDures for City heaDs anD ruraL raion aDMinistrations in russia (1991-2015)

In Russia sub-regional authority was first appointed in 1991 and then elected through five electoral cycles (1996, 2000, 2004, 2008-2010, 2012-2014). Two new electoral cycles have occurred, thus creating a need to continue the research. This article is a report made by the authors in ICCEES IX World Congress, Makuhari, Japan, 3-8 August 2015.

ii. the CoLLision: 1991 Recall the historical context: the autumn of 1991 was the zenith of Yeltsin’s glory as concerns societal support (not popularity, mind you, but glory in the pop-culture movie-star sense). This glory was marked by the ovations from oblast committees, the renaming of newspapers, the removal of Derzhinskii’s statue from Lyubyanka Sqaure and the naked pursuit of the local nomenclature with the shrill question – where were you on August 19? In a word, it was the apotheosis of an emergent anticommunist democratic country. The new authority would be able to begin its reign with great fanfare and, in the sense of obtaining legitimacy, with great effectiveness.

The way was open and obvious – if you could win through general, fair, direct, and transparent elections, in direct contradiction to the Soviet experience, you could be infused by the process with a true democratic essence. Such a task seemed wholly attainable.

But if that was the case, why weren’t there such elections? The official explanation always returned first to the danger of a communist retrenchment, of a new August putsch: that the extraordinary circumstances brought the threat of the Russian state’s actual dissolution. These maxims (Don’t let the Russian Federation suffer the same fate of the Soviet Union!) were widely distributed both for public consumption and the scholarly community.

Thus, the new Russia missed its chance for constituent elections (i.e., missed its chance for making a real movement to democracy) and began instead a transition to a more ‘culturally appropriate Russian way.’ Ultimately, this was in fact a tremendous mistake by the new authorities, a barrier to the democratization of the country, a blow to the party system, and a main source of the bitter conflict that would emerge between the President and Federal Parliament.

THE CASPIAN PROJECT 16 In our view this mistake was largely false and manmade, connected with a critically low-brow and peculiar world-view that was seemingly innate to the post-putsch Russian leadership. The new residents of the Kremlin not only understandably feared the Communist party, but they also didn’t believe in the personal victory they had just achieved and were not ready to fulfill a more responsible governance role. They possessed neither the statesman’s demeanor nor the legislative experience and thus found themselves buried deep in the captivity of decades-long complexes and stereotypes. From this foundation they inevitably positioned themselves like a fortress under siege and treated all around them as if they were enemies, actual or potential.

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The procedure they developed, born from the President’s inner circle, was quite simple: the President would appoint governors while these, in turn, would appoint the heads of sub-regional administrations. In this way, the glow of democratic victory following the August coup led immediately to the very same democrats turning their backs on democracy for the rest of the country moving forward. If Lenin felt he needed a vanguard of the proletariat, Yeltsin’s team apparently felt it needed the exact same for democracy.

In more than half of the cases (52%), the heads of administration were recruited directly from the chairs of the city and raion executive committees.

The directorate and first secretaries lagged significantly behind, with only 17.6% and 16.6% respectively. The chairs and deputy chairs of the soviets, as well as the deputy chairs of the executive committees, added to the surprisingly impressive success of Soviet apparatchiks (5.1% and 4.6% respectively).

The Presidium of the Verkhovnii Soviet of the RSFSR, which had just before been a supporter of Yeltsin in opposition to the Soviet Union central government, adopted a decision on September 6, 1991 to allow for the direct election of the heads of regional administrations beginning on November 24, 1991.

However the decision was subsetabLe 2 quently vetoed: analysts for “DemocrareCruiting the heaDs of City tic Russia” prognosticated a tremen anD raion aDMinistration (1991-1992) dous defeat for the supporters of the President (at best they felt there might be 10 or 12 victories versus 36 iron-clad defeats). It was this very prognosis, which subsequently proved to be partly mistaken, that served as the basis for the realization of the “executive vertical.” As a result of this dramatic struggle the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies acquiesced to a resolution on November 1, 1991 that effectively placed a moratorium on elections across all administrative levels until December 1, 1992. Thus, in 1991 the new authority de facto rejected constituent elections and began a “democratic” transition in the style of a Byzantine court.

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In total it worked out that 117 people came to leadership positions in the sub-regions (58.4%) directly from the Soviet nomenclature apparatus. Most importantly, there were no striking inter-regional differences with this percentage, only a few minor exceptions. In Ryazan Oblast, the chairs of the executive committees of the Soviets achieved an extraordinary 75.9%. In Samara Oblast, the divergent result came from the first secretaries with 28.6%. In Udmurtia, the directors were greatly represented with 34.5%.

the directors of local industry (for example, in Samara and Ulyanovsk Oblasts and the Republic of Udmurtia.)This collision produced a direct hit on the authority of the first secretaries acting as the new chairs of local soviets and felt like someone was playing a cruel joke on them (in Tambov Oblast and the Republic of Chuvashia, for example).

What accounts for this relative lack of success of the first secretaries? We surmise the continuous rotation of the oblast committee first secretaries (it subsequently came to be commonly known as the cadre meatgrinder), organized by the general secretary across the top echelons of the party hierarchy, created a de facto collapsing interchangeability at the sub-regional level.

This “contra-elite” worked against the first secretaries/new soviet chairs, blocking all their attempts to penetrate the elite local power structure. Recruiting for the new elite thus came mostly from an old reservoir of power – the old guard Soviet party nomenclature with its preservation of an unadulterated pre-Perestroika rhetoric and access to local insider knowledge. In opposition to this development a democratic movement did try to emerge simultaneously at the local level, but in reality the aforementioned contra-elites had already formed the irrefutable foundation of regional power by 1991.

The continuous shifting of first secretaries across various locations placed them in a tremendously difficult position. Many who appeared in the subregions for the first time were immediately placed in the position of first secretary. For a non-competitive system with a continuous rotation of cadres this would have been almost normal. In a competitive system this made the first secretaries politically doomed. Recall that in March 1990 Gorbachev became the President of the USSR and allowed for the simultaneous holding of dual political office, thereby crudely raising the status of local soviet leaders. The elections for these local soviet deputies in 1990 became a bitter pill for the city and raion first secretaries. They were charged with the difficult task of finding a way to be elected to these local soviets and then subsequently head them. Those who did not succeed were consequently relieved of their right to head the city and raion committees.In the majority of cases where the first secretaries succeeded in becoming the leaders of the local soviets, they usually found themselves in collision with

In the regions, where the successes of the first secretaries had been more humble in 1990, an immediate substitution was consequently made in favor of the chairs of the city and raion executive committees. Thus, the new federal authorities by 1991 had placed a risky political wager on their success. This was most easily symbolized by President Yeltsin’s decree on July 20, 1991, ‘About the dismantling of the party’ (O departizatsii). In the Republic of Mordovia, for example, the local apparatchiks reacted to the decree by being totally demoralized and were subsequently more preoccupied with finding new work. In the Republic of Bashkortastan only 34 city and raion secretaries remained, in Tambov Oblast only 13. In most cases replacements would end up being second secretaries who had no future prospects. These substitutions would succeed in place for only a few weeks at most, while some only managed to work in these positions for just a few days. These people were nearly without authority and wholly unsuited for the role of head of the local administration.

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tabLe 3 interChangeabiLity of City anD raion first seCretaries of the CoMMunist Party of ussr

tabLe 4 Chairs of LoCaL soviets (eLeCtions of 1990)

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These people were nearly without authority and wholly unsuited for the role of head of the local administration. The only remaining ‘choice’ to the first secretaries, becoming a source of regional support for the federal center, was not much better.

“Partycrat” Y.F. Goryachev (Ulyanovsk Oblast), industrialist L.P. Bashmakov (Ryazan Oblast), academic V.D. Guslyannikov (Republic of Mordovia), doctor V.D. Babenko (Tambov Oblast), duma deputies V.K. Tubilov, N.E. Mironov (Republic of Udmurtia) and E.A. Kubarev, N.A. Zaitsev (Republic of Chuvashia), all were chosen according to one stark logic: chief support fell on the chairs of the local executive committees as they were the least politically dangerous.

If for whatever reason the chairs were inappropriate, then the choice fell on the industrialists. Only in those instances where both chairs and industrialists were not available did they seek out “loyal” first secretaries of the new authority, capable actors of the democratic movement, or people who had fallen out of the nomenclature during the Soviet era.

Indeed this process of appointing first secretaries was done only with great reluctance. The only exception to this process seemed to be K.A. Titov in Samara.

It was because of this that the first secretaries only managed to maintain their positions in 15% of the cases. Simultaneously, a small part of their number (less than 10%) did not fall from the nomenclature but simply exited into the oblast structures, as the new heads of local administration needed experienced and young administrators. These first secretaries of the provinces who ended up in the oblast centers were not considered dangerous and therefore acceptable. For example, first secretary of the Kotovsk city committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union O.I. Betin became the first deputy for the head of the Tambov Oblast administration in 1999. Betin would then become Governor of Tambov Oblast and has remained in this position.

In this way nearly a quarter of the leaders of the sub-regions were able to preserve a primary spot for themselves in the local organs of power.

tabLe 6 first seCretaries of the City anD raion CoMMittees of the CPsu – subregionaL LeaDers (<+> = aPPointMent of first seCretaries as heaDs of aDMinistration [between eLeCtions]) (<-> = reMovaL of first seCretaries as heaDs of aDMinistration [between eLeCtions])

THE CASPIAN PROJECT 16 tabLe 5 “agents of infLuenCe” for the feDeraL Center in the regions

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iii. the transforMation: 1992-2015 The above explains why the events of 1991 did not allow the first secretaries many chances to hold on to their former positions of power. At best, only a few of them were able to hold on to power at the sub-regional level. This collision of appointments happened throughout 1991-1992. It is now necessary to move forward, discussing the developments that have emerged since the fall of the Soviet Union.

After this appointing collision, the sub-regions in Russia went through three electoral cycles (the mid1990s, the late 1990s, and the early 2000s). Each successive cycle further weakened the position of the first secretaries. Each successive election the first secretaries suffered losses of around 50%: the first cycle put an end to their dominant leadership role in the sub-regions; the second cycle displayed the futility in attempting to return to power; and the third cycle basically ended as a total fiasco for the former first secretaries.

What accounts for these trends across the electoral cycles? This ‘washing away’ of the party nomenclature out of the local administration system can be explained through a number of circumstances. During the elections of the mid-1990s the first secretaries who remained in power largely conceded to one of two groups: either to the minions of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) or to the local industrialists/businessmen (ironically, these candidates were often overlapping in the sub-regions). During this time the opposition leaders within the CPRF were concentrated mostly in the local legislative organs (the Soviets and Dumas) and were continuously on the attack.

For them, the first secretaries – whether they be the heads of administration already or simply candidates for the position – were traitors and opponents to their overall agenda. In Tambov Oblast, for example, during the elections for the head of the Muchkapskoi raion administration in December 1996, the raion committee for the CPRF issued a summons for its members to vote for A.V. Trubnikov as first secretary of the raion committee. Trubnikov was at the time only a farmer and had as the height of his Soviet career a position as instructor of the agricultural divison of the raion committee of the CPSU. As a result, nine candidates ended up being carried to victory across the oblast because of the support of the CPRF. Amongst them were only three former first secretaries (Uvarovo, Staryuryevskii, and Mordvoskii raions). Fascinatingly and contrary to the scholarly literature in the West, the Tambov communists simply ignored the former party nomenclature. The organizational structures of the CPRF instead supported representatives from the powerful industrial elite, who had been almost wholly unconnected to the former nomenclature.

The elections in the late 1990s clearly demonstrated that the only leader capable of mobilizing the popular vote was one that had become part of some clan, namely, one that was pro-presidential. At the local level a peculiar ‘party of power’ arose again and again – formed from the various politico-economic groups that were stable enough to be consolidated around formal and informal leaders. The unity of such structures was established through official coordination, informal connections, coinciding interests on the personal front, and the manipulation of extreme dependence. The elections in the early 2000s only strengthened that trend toward clan development. Unfortunately for them, a place for the first secretaries really was not part of this new power structure.

THE CASPIAN PROJECT 16

It quickly became clear to them, however, that there were other options, post-USSR, for achieving a more-or-less comfortable standard of living outside the organs of local administration. In fact, it would be more accurate to say that only the less successful first secretaries were ultimately recruited into the organs of local administration. For obvious financial reasons, these administrative positions were clearly on a secondary level in terms of priority.Two other sectors were more ideal and preferred: head in the direction of industrial activity, as captains of new industry emerging with the privatization of state property, or the pursuit of positions within the oblast administrative structures. Regardless of the choice, both of these options were attractive in comparison with local administrations because of their swift opportunities for personal enrichment.

And so, where does that leave scholars if they seek to find the footprints of the sub-regions’ original ‘local heroes’? What became of them and what finally were their long-term career trajectories?

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iv. the Post-soviet Careers of City anD raion first seCretaries The post-Soviet career of city and raion first secretaries evolved along six trajectories: first trajectory: ‘the boom – jumping to a new system.’

This trajectory comprised governors, vice-governors, heads of oblast administrative structures, and top managers. It was less than 10% of the overall nomenclature and was marked by an ability to achieve increases in overall authoritative capacity.

In 1991-1992 they became the new authority and ultimately the self-interested protectors of the new order. These figures would have likely achieved a comparable status within the Soviet Union with but one significant difference: under the new system they were incomparably better off financially.

MODERN DIPLOMACY second trajectory: ‘the Preservation – successfully maintaining the continuation of administrative-political activism.’

This trajectory was comprised largely of the heads of oblast and raion administrations and was about 15% of the overall nomenclature. These figures managed to sustain their pre-1991 levels of authority. They did not form a support network for the new powers within the system (as this effort would be politically dangerous) and by the mid-1990s had achieved an administrative distance between themselves and the top trajectory.

third trajectory: ‘the Quasi-survival – remaining in the system of administration but suffering a reduction in authority to secondary roles within municipal structures.’

This trajectory comprised the largest percentage of the nomenclature, nearly 35%, and included the deputy heads of city and raion administration, the chairs and deputy chairs of city and raion soviets, and municipal workers who had a higher administrative status pre-1991. These successes did sometimes become significant: across a majority of sub-regions (57.1%) the first secretaries succeeded by 1990 in combining their post with another, usually chair of the local soviets. The dissolution of all local soviets, however, in 1993 ended this opportunity. fourth trajectory: ‘the exchange – voluntarily transitioning away from political authority toward economic opportunities.’

This trajectory was the second largest category (25%) and was comprised of the managers/directors of industry. A large number of industrial managers came into the party organs by answering the “Gorbachev summons” during the second half of the 1980s, as Gorbachev sought to produce a swift transformation of party cadres. This status gave them a significant advantage when the privatization of industry and agriculture began. These managers and directors eagerly returned to what was for them a more comfortable and habitual role of activity and quickly established for themselves an enviable standard of living. fifth trajectory: ‘the orthodox – resisting the new system.’

Comprising only 10% of the overall nomenclature, this group was mostly made up of the first secretaries of the official raion and city branches of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. They successfully clung to their orthodox rhetoric and became ideological fighters against the new system.

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In the first half of the 1990s this trend was actually rather popular. The calculation to pursue this course of action paid off in the success of G.A. Zyuganov as a potential candidate for Russian Federation President and in their own personal success as the most believable and trusted heads of local administration. In the present day such opposition to the authority of V.V. Putin is not only futile but almost masochistic. Today this trajectory is basically closed. sixth trajectory: ‘the exit – retiring into the pension system.’

This age group, who were mainly the most elderly first secretaries of the local Communist Party branches, made up only 5% of the total nomenclature. For the most part they put in for retirement immediately after the failed coup attempt in 1991.

This presentation has elaborated six trajectories which explain the general mutation and flow of authority and power of the sub-regional party nomenclature after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

While this article certainly provides proof of the fusion between municipal service and business, it also shows the subtlety and diversity of options from which the late-stage Soviet nomenclature was able to choose. Clearly some options for lines of authority dominated over others. What should be emphasized, however, is how closely those choices ultimately gave foreshadowing for some of the most significant problems and flaws that would occur throughout the 1990s and beyond as Russia tried to complete its transition to democracy and a free-market economy.

The poor choices and frustrations of the sub-regional nomenclature were often ultimately mirrored in poor choices and frustrations within the transition at the federal level.

Thus, the chain of power in Russia evolved in the following manner: 1991 – Manager with work experience in Soviet organs (so-called «the Soviet nomenclature»).

1996 – Manager Nomenclature of the Soviet era.

2000 – Non-nomenclature Managers, placed by clans.

2004 – Non-nomenclature Managers plus other persons, also placed by clans.

2008-2010 – Peoples from outside, Varangians (Businessmen and Intelligence officers).

2012-2014 – Varangians somewhat transformed into a new type, but still close to the governors.

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ith its devastating air strikes on ISIS and US-funded rebel groups, Russia is now at the centre of the Syrian chessboard. Moscow is using its massive firepower to dramatically alter the balance of power in the Middle East. Here are nine strategic spinoffs from Moscow’s military action.

RussIAN AIRstRIkEs IN sYRIA

tEN bRILLIANt OutCOMEs Rakesh kRishnan simha New Zealand-based journalist and foreign affairs analyst. According to him, he writes on stuff the media distorts, misses or ignores.

Russia is the new sheriff in the middle east What America couldn’t do in 365 days, Russia has done in three, with the result that Vladimir Putin is the new sheriff in town. More than 40 years of American diplomacy lies in tatters, with almost all countries in the region, barring the Gulf emirates, supporting Moscow. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider alAbadi says he would welcome Russian airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq. Leading Shiite politician Hakim al-Zamili agrees: “In the upcoming few days or weeks, I think Iraq will be forced to ask Russia to launch air strikes, and that depends on their success in Syria.”

Wow, the US spends trillions of dollars to conquer Iraq, only for Russia to waltz in.

tHE CAsPIAN PROJECt 16 syria gets breathing space ISIS and other terror groups which were operating with impunity in Syria are finally on the run, having lost hundreds of personnel, leading commanders and heavy armour. It is unlikely these outfits will recover soon from the pounding by Russian jets and cruise missiles. Russia has therefore bought valuable time for the secular Syrian Arab Army to reequip itself and recover lost territory.

Western backing of terror groups lies exposed Looks like NATO didn't just accidentally drop supplies in ISIS areas; they also accidentally trained these terrorists. The Western public and media are asking questions why Vladimir Putin was able to destroy what their leaders could not. Putin has put the US into a corner so it will find supporting these terrorist outfits difficult, although not impossible (as the CIA can use other channels and countries).

Limitations of american military power As Putin chases his quarry, the US military can do little about it. The CIA had trained the Free Syrian Army and other rebels groups for terror activities in

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Syria but now the Americans are watching helplessly as the terrorists they spawned are being blasted into plasma. An indication of American impotence is that after a near collision with a Russian jet, the US Air Force has asked its fighter pilots to stay clear of the combat area. The US military that overran such fearsome opponents as Grenada, Panama and Afghan goatherds now realises that going into combat with a serious peer is a different ballgame. sukhoi showstoppers are the new must have toys Following their spectacular performance over Syrian skies, Russia’s Sukhoi warplanes are set to be the hottest commodity on the international arms market. With the MiG-29 providing top cover, the Sukhois – including the massive Su-34 fighterbomber, the swing-wing Su-24 ground attack jet and the subsonic Su-25 tank buster – are doing a fantastic job.While the Su-24 is due for retirement, the Su-25 and Su-34 tandem could be the hottest new items on the wishlist of air forces around the world.

MODERN DIPLOMACY The cruise missiles – probably the Klubs – that are thudding into terrorist hideouts are also likely to see an increase in popularity. intelligence bonanza for Russia The near collision between Russia and American jets gives you an idea of the cramped confines in which foreign aircraft are operating. This proximity has allowed Russia to gather valuable intelligence on a variety of US and NATO aircraft, including the F-22, claimed to be the world's premier stealth fighter. Such opportunities are rare and the guys in Russia’s military intelligence must be having a lot of fun going through all that data.

Russia has got saudi arabia over a barrel Saudi Arabia is losing its shirt because of its relentless production of crude oil aimed at weakening Russia and Iran. The IMF says the Saudi budget is in tatters, and the outlook appears grave for the kingdom. Russia’s comeback in the Middle East, along with Iran and the Hezbollah – the Shiite militant group that gives nightmares to the Saudi sheiks – could be the incentive that OPEC's largest member needs to announce production cuts.

And with its patron America having lost face, it is no longer in a position to ask the Saudis to hold the line. europe wants to patch up with Russia It has taken only a few Russian missiles to bring Europe to its senses. Europeans are taking the view that Moscow’s decisive action in neutralising ISIS seems like a good idea compared with US actions that created millions of refugees, many of who are now flooding into Western Europe. Both Germany and France are thinking of rolling back economic sanctions against Russia. That’s called cost-effective diplomacy.

isis can no longer steal iraqi and syrian oil ISIS was selling Iraqi and Syrian crude oil on the black market for as low as $10 a barrel. The regular market price is around $47 a barrel. Exporting oil requires transporting it via pipelines to the coast.

Clearly, ISIS was free to conduct the sale of illicit crude without the fear of NATO airstrikes. This alone is enough evidence that ISIS was enjoying some form of American and NATO protection. Although ISIS exports were just a trickle in the torrent of crude oil flooding the world, the markets responded positively to the Russian airstrikes by moving up. Even a small uptick in the price of oil translates into billions of dollars in revenue for Russia.

Putin has multiple military options By launching cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea 2400 km away – instead of the Mediterranean nearby, where the Russian Navy has stationed a powerful flotilla – Putin is indicating that he has multiple options. The Caspian was considered a Russian lake for centuries, and Moscow is signalling that nothing has changed today. Because Russian cruise missiles are flying at treetop level via Iraq and Iran, it follows that both Baghdad and Tehran have given their approval for Russian airstrikes. As well as showing off the range and lethality of Russian cruise missiles, it is a message to the US that the Russian military has access to Iranian and Iraqi airspace.

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CAN THERE bE DETERRENCE AfTER THE JCPOA?

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n July 14, 2015, much of the world gave a sigh of relief as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program was announced.

At best, the comprehensive agreement is the kind of policy that instills hope in global diplomacy and solidifies presidential legacies. Despite years of multilateral negotiations, however, some critics believe that Iran remains a substantial threat to U.S. and global security. Many of the agreement’s critics cite Iran’s habitual use of asymmetric warfare and deterrence as reason to speculate that the joint agreement will not only fail but will increase Iran’s nuclear threat. This commentary inventories alternatives to the JCPOA and the pros and cons of each of these policies. A specific evaluation of Israel’s future policy towards Iran is also essential because the JCPOA has the potential to affect Israel’s strategy the most.

With the acceptance of the JCPOA, most influential governments from around the world adopted very similar nuclear deterrence strategies with regard to the Iran nuclear program. The White House has assured the U.S. public and other interested parties that the deal will create transparency that “ensures sanctions can be snapped back into place if Iran violates the deal.”

AARON GOOD Aaron Good is presently a graduate student in the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program at Bellevue University in Omaha, Nebraska, USA. He is currently employed by the US Department of Justice.

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Despite these assurances, Scott Sagan importantly illustrates, “Washington learned with India and Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s, sanctions only increase the cost of going nuclear; they do not reduce the ability of a determined government to get the bomb.” Because of this potential complication, it is important to evaluate other viable options for deterring Iran from attaining a nuclear arsenal.

There are three primary options that could extend deterrence to the region: a multilateral agreement, a regional security system, and the ‘Holocaust’ declaration. The multilateral agreement, as Carlo Masala explains, “entails the great nuclear P5 powers declaring their willingness and readiness to defend Israel and the Arab states, by nuclear means if necessary, if Iran attacks.” If the P5 countries announced their willingness to such an arrangement, then Iran may feel less inclined to become hostile towards regional adversaries. The problem with this strategy is that it does not address the question of the P5 countries using nuclear weapons if Iran simply breaches the terms of the JCPOA. In other words, if Iran chooses to incrementally breach aspects of the agreement with more and more severity, will the P5 countries have the resolve to use force to stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon?

Additionally, even if a multilateral agreement such as this were reached, there is no reason to believe that the Israelis would view the guarantee as credible.

The second option that has been considered is the idea of a regional security system. The notion behind this strategy is that a security team or alliance would have a security plan with a single goal: to deter a nuclear Iran. The security team would be comprised of Arab states, Israel, as well as external powers like the U.S. and possibly Russia.The participants would commit themselves to defend any member of the system attacked by any means necessary.

Again, there is potential with this strategy, but there are two major conflicts that could hinder its success.

The first dilemma is the commitment of external powers to the success of the security system. Unsurprisingly, countries like Russia and China have been eager to conduct business with Iran, even while Iran was under sanctions. To be fully committed to the success of a security system such as this would require these external powers to be more concerned with regional issues and less concerned with the prosperity of their own economies.

That may be too high of a demand. The second dilemma, and most important, is a security system and agreement such as this would have a high probability of ineffectiveness or even collapse due to the estranged relationship between Israel and Arab states and the U.S. and Arab states.

The third and final option is what Charles Krauthammer has named “The Holocaust Declaration”. The basic idea of this policy would be to treat any aggression by Iran towards another state, particularly Israel, as an act of aggression towards the U.S. Krauthammer argues that the greatest deterrence towards Iran can be declared by adopting and rephrasing Kennedy’s language during the Cuban Missile Crisis: "It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear attack upon Israel by Iran, or originating in Iran, as an attack by Iran on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon Iran.” This final option may be the best for deterring Iran if the U.S. wants to consider an action besides reinstituting sanctions. But this strategy has flaws as well. By making the declaration that an attack against Israel would be viewed as an attack against the U.S., it could lead other nations within the region to believe that Israel is the only country valued by the U.S. This could make an already shaky relationship between the U.S. and Arab nations deteriorate even further.

THE CASPIAN PROJECT 16 The P5+1 countries obviously have a vested interest in the success of the JCPOA, as they were responsible for its creation, but every nation within the Middle East is equally concerned with the success of the agreement. No country has more to lose from the Iran nuclear deal than Israel, who announced its staunch opposition to the agreement on countless occasions. Before calculating what Israel’s next move will be now that the JCPOA has been signed, we must first comprehend the reasoning behind Israel’s discomfort with the agreement. The most obvious reason for Israel’s discomfort resides in former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s constant spew of anti-Israel and Holocaust-denying statements.

These statements, accompanied by the Iranian governments’ nurture of resurrection ambitions against Iran’s Sunni neighbors and support of Hezbollah, has made Israel extremely uncomfortable with an agreement that will allow Iran to join the global community and gain economic and possibly global political power.

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Second, Israel views Iran’s real government to be extremely unstable. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is a group giving grave concern to Israeli leadership. The IRGC has been known to recruit “true believers” to join its ranks and to subject them to ideological indoctrination.

Additionally, Mohammad Ali Jafari, head of the IRGC, has come out against the JCPOA in certain aspects stating, “some points included in the draft [are] clearly contrary to and a violation of the red lines of the Islamic Republic of Iran, specifically of Iran’s arms capabilities, and will never be accepted by us.” This statement, paired with the fact that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) discovered in 2003 that the IRGC was responsible for securing production for nuclear materials, gives Israel no confidence to assume that other political authorities in Tehran could control the actions and operations of the IRGC.

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The far more likely scenario for Israel’s future deterrence policy will be a declaration of its own nuclear capabilities and the development of rigid “red lines” that, if breached, would facilitate an aggressive response. For years now Israel’s nuclear ability has been its worst kept secret and, if Israel truly fears that Iran will gain military nuclear abilities, it is time to announce what nuclear capabilities it possesses and what actions will illicit an aggressive response.

Israeli leadership will need to consider the likelihood of the U.S. backing its deterrence standpoint as well. After all, it is improbable that Israel would employ a deterrence strategy that was not fully supported by the U.S. and even more inconceivable to imagine Israel utilizing a military option without first presenting U.S. intelligence officials with convincing evidence to substantiate such an attack. No matter what strategy that Israel employs in the future, the U.S. will need to be a fundamental aspect to that strategy.

Israel realistically has two options: a preemptive strike against Iran or revision of its nuclear deterrence policies to include clear “red lines” for Iran, trusting the U.S. will honor its policy of extended deterrence. In theory a preemptive strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities and key infrastructure could make sense for Israel, but only if certain assumptions were presumed: 1. Israel believes that Iran will inevitably have nuclear military power. 2. Iran will plan to use its nuclear forces as a first-strike option against Israel. 3. Iran’s key decision-makers will likely be irrational. While none of these assumptions can be dismissed outright, a strategy of preemption could prove risky and the retaliatory costs towards Israel could certainly exceed the anticipated benefits. This accompanied by the near unanimous worldwide praise of the JCPOA make this strategy an unlikely option for Israel to pursue.

Although there are several different theories as to how Iran can be deterred by obtaining nuclear weapons, each option has a critical repercussion.

The snap-back sanctions that the U.N. has threatened Iran with may not be enough to dissuade Iran from breaching the recent agreement, but, for the time being, it remains the best option for global security. What will be essential to the success of deterring Iran will be the communication of the P5 powers that need to keep the peace between Israel and Iran. Equally important is the amount of resolve these nations will demonstrate if Iran does in fact break its promises. The old adage of ‘trust, but verify’ seems to be the only path the world is currently treading down. One hopes it will be enough.

“The strong do what they have to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” Thucydides

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