Karel kosík historism and historicism

Historism and Historicism Author(s): Karel KosĂ­k Source: New German Critique, No. 10 (Winter, 1977), pp. 65-75 Published by: New German Critique Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/487672 .

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Historism and Historicism*

by Karel Kos(k Marx's famous fragmenton classical Greek art shares the fate of many a brilliantthought:the sedimentof commentariesand a frequentoverstatementof the obvious have obscured its true sense.1 Was Marx investigatingthe significance and the timeless characterof antique art? Was he attemptingto solve problemsof art and beauty? Is the quote in question an isolated expressionor is it relatedto his otherviews?Whatis its propermeaning?Whydo those commentators fail who consider only its literalimmediacyand see it as an invitationto resolve the question of the ideal characterof Greek art?And why do also those fail who considerMarx's immediateanswer as satisfactory, without interpreters to middle of an the breaks off in the pausing question why manuscriptabruptly idea?

In this fragmentary text, dealing as it does with the method of political econthe omy, methodology of social sciences and with problemsof the materialist of concept history,considerationsof art are of secondaryimportance.Marx is not specificallyinvestigating the Greek epos, but ratherhe uses it as an example for solvingother,moregeneralproblems.He focuses attentionnot on explaining the ideal characterof antique art but on formulatingproblemsof genesis and validity: the socio-historicalconstraintsof art and of ideas are not identicalwith their validity.The main issue is not the problem of art but the formulationof one of the cardinal questions of materialistdialectics: the relationshipbetween genesis and validity, conditions and reality, history and human reality, the temporaland the eternal,between relativeand absolute truth.To solve a problem, one must firstformulateit. Outlininga problemis of course differentfrom narrowingit down. To outline, i.e., to formulatea problem means to traceand determineits internalrelationswith otherproblems.The centralconcernhere is not the ideal characterof antique art but a more generalquestion: how and why does a work of art outlast the conditions in which it originated?In what and why do Heraclitus' thoughtssurvivethe societyin whichtheyoriginated?Where and why does Hegel's philosophyoutlastthe class in whose ideology it had been formed?Only in this generalway can the actual question be graspedand solved. * This essay is a chaptertaken fromDialektik des Konkreten(Frankfurtam Main, 1967) which will be publishedsoon in Englishby the Reidel Pressin The Netherlands.The translation has been preparedby Karel Kovenda.

1. "But the difficultylies not in understandingthat the Greek arts and epic are bound up with certainformsof social development.The difficultyis that they still affordus artistic pleasure and that in a certainrespectthey count as a normand as an unattainablemodel."

Marx,Grundrisse,p. 11.

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And conversely,the general problem of absolute and relativetruth,of genesis and validity,can be exemplifiedby the fullycomprehendedspecificproblemof antique art.2 The problem of the work of art is meant to lead us to the problem of the eternal and the temporal,the absolute and the relative,of historyand reality.The work of art-and in a certain sense any work, includingthose of philosophy and of science-is a complex structure,a structuredwhole which conjoins in a dialectical unity diverse elements: ideas, themes, composition, language.3 The relationshipof a work to social realityis not treatedadequately if one declares that the work is a signifying structurewhich is disclosed to social and as a whole and in its individual is, elements,determinedby it. If the reality relationof the work to social realitywere conceivedas the relationof thatwhich is determinedto that which is determining,then social realityin its relationship to the work would be reduced merelyto social conditions,i.e., to "something" that is related to the work only as an externalgivenand an externaldeterminant.4 The work of art is an integralcomponentof social reality,a constructive element of this reality and a manifestationof man's socio-intellectualproduction. To comprehend the characterof a work of art it is not enough that a sociology of art treat its social characterand its relationshipwithsociety,in an examinationof its socio-historicalgenesis,impact,and reception;or that historical researchinvestigateits biographicaland biographical-socialaspects.

Undoubtedly, any work of art is socially determined.Uncriticalthinking, however,reduces this relationshipto the connectioilbetween social realityand art, and thus distortsthe characterof both. The theoryof social determination

2. Only in thislightdoes the fragment in questionclearlyconnectwithMarx's otherworks and opinions. Marx dealt with a similarproblemwhenevaluatingcertainclassicaland political economics and when askingthe questionof objectivetruthin science. "Everydiscipline of scholarship,includingpolitical economy and philosophy,has its own internallaws which guide its development,which are independentof the subjectivecapricesof individuals,and indeed prevail even against subjectiveindividualintentionsor antipathies.In the case of Richard Jones, a successor of Malthus and an anglican priest,Marx proved thisobjective characterof laws of science which,when respected,lead to positiveresults,independentof the scientist's subjective intentions." K. Kosfk, Dejiny filosofie jake filosofie: Filosofie: Filosofie v dejinach ceskeho naroda (History of Philosophy as Philosophy: Philosophy in

Czech History)(Prague 1958), p. 15.

3. See R. Ingarden,The LiteraryWorkof Art (Evanston 1973); also V. Vinogradov,Prol-

lema avtorstve i teoris stilei (Moscow 1961), p. 197; L. Dolezel, O stylu moderni ceske prosy

(The Style of ModernCzech Prose) (Prague 1960), p. 183.

4. A falsemethod again ends up makinginadvertentsubstitutionswhich the scholaroverlooks: he discusses "reality" whereas his falsemethod has meanwhiletransformed reality into somethingelse, and reducedit to "conditions."

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tacitly assumes that social reality remains outside the work. The work thus effectivelyturnsinto somethingextra-social;it does not constitutesocial reality, and thus has no internalrelationto social reality.Such an analysis of thework could deal with the social determinationof the work separately,in a general introductionor in a footnote, as it were; but it would not enter the actual structureor the scientificanalysis; indeed, it would not even belong there. In this relationshipof mutual externality,social realityand the work itselfboth structurein its own rightdoes not enter degenerate: if the work as a signifying the analysis and investigationof social reality,then social realityturnsinto a mere abstract frameworkand is seen as the basis for social determinationin general-concrete totality turns into a false totality. If one does not investigate the work as a signifyingstructurewhose concretenessis grounded in its existence as a moment of social reality,and if one sees determinationas the only "link" between the work and social reality,then the work as a relatively autonomous signifyingstructure changes into a structurethat is absolutely autonomous: concrete totality turns,again, into false totality. Hidden in the theory of social thesis are two completely differentmeanings of social determination of the work. First, social determinationmeans that social reality is related to the work as a deistic God, actingas primemover,who once the work has been created, changes into a spectatorand observesthe autonomous development of his creationwithout influencingits fateany further.Secondly, social determinationmeans that the work is somethingsecondary,derivative,mirrored, whose truthis not contained in itselfbut outside it. If the truthof the work is not in the work itself,but in the conditions,only he will be able to graspit who knows all about the conditions.The conditionsare seen as the realitythat the work reflects.But in and of themselves,the conditions are not reality;theyare reality only to the extent that they are the realization,the fixingand development of objective praxis of man and his history,and insofaras theyare grasped as such. The truthof a work (and forus, a work is always a "real" work of art or of philosophy, as opposed to mere "writings") is not in the situation of the times,in its social determinationor in the historicityof conditions,but in sociohistoricalrealityas the unityof genesisand replicability,and in the development and actualization of the subject-objectrelationshipas the most specificcharacteristicof human existence. The historismof social realityis not the historicity of conditions.

Only now have we arrivedat the point from which we can returnto the originalquestion: How and why does a work outlast the conditions in whichit has originated?If the truth of the work is in the conditions, then it survives because, and only insofar as, it is a testimonyto these conditions. A work testifiesto its times in two ways. First,by simplylookingat a work we findout

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which era it belongs to, which society has engravedits mark on it. Second, we look at the work askingwhat testimonyit offersabout its timesand conditions.

We take it as a document. In order to examine the work as a testimonyto its times or as a mirrorof its conditions,we firsthave to know those conditions.

Only aftercomparingthe conditionswith the work can we decide whetherthe work reflectsits era correctlyor falsely,whetherit presentstrue or false testimony about its time. But every culturalcreation fulfillsthe functionof a testimony or document. A cultural creation that mankind looks upon exclusively as a testimonyis not a work. It is preciselya propertyof a work that it is not primarilyor exclusivelya testimonyto its times,but that independentlyof the time and conditions of its genesis,to which of course it testifiesas well, it is, or is in the process of becoming,a constitutiveelement of mankind,of a class, of a nation. Characteristicof works is not theirhistoricity,that is, "bad uniquebut theirhistoricalnature,i.e., the capacityfor concreness" and irreplicability, tizationand survival.

By preservingand outlastingthe conditions and the situationof its genesis, the work proves its vitality.It lives as long as it has an impact.The impact of a work includes that which affectsboth the consumerof the work and the work itself.Whateverhappens to the work is an expressionof what the work is. That something happens to the work does not mean that it is abandoned to the elementswhich would toy with it; on the contrary,it is the veryinternalpower of the work, which realizes itselfin time. In the cGurseof this concretization, the work acquires meaningsof which we cannot always say in good conscience that exactly they had been intended by the author. As he creates,the author thatwill be attributedto the cannot foresee all the meaningsand interpretations work in the course of its reception.In thissense the work is independentof the author's intentions.On the other hand, this independence and autonomy are fictitious:the work is a work and livesas a work because it demands interpretations and because many meanings are realized in the course of its reception.

What is the basis for concretizingthe work, of it acquiringvarious historical formsduringits "lifetime"?Clearlytherehas to be somethingin the workwhich generatesthis effect.There exists a certainspan withinwhich concretizationsof the work are conceived as concretizationsof this particularwork; beyond this span, one talks about distortions,lack of comprehensionor subjectivistinterpretations of the work. Whereis the borderlinebetween an authenticand an inauthentic concretization of a work? Is it contained in the work itself or is it outside the work? How is it that a work thatlivesonly in and throughconcretizations outlasts all specificconcretizations,leavingeach of themin its wake, and thereby provingits independence. The life of a work points beyond the work itselfto somethingthat transcendsit.

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The life of a work is not to be comprehendedfromthe work itself.If the impact of the work were its propertyas radiation is a propertyof radium,then the work would live, i.e., would have an impact even when "unperceived"by a human subject. The impact of a work of art is not a physicalpropertyof objects, of books, paintings,sculptures,i.e., of natural or artificialobjects, but it is a specificmode of the existence of the work as a socio-humanreality.The work lives not in the inertnessof its institutionalcharacteror thanksto tradition,as sociologismwould have it,5 but throughtotalization,livinganew. The life of the work does not follow from the work's autonomous existence but from the mutual interactionof the work and mankind.The life of the work resultsfrom (1) its infusionwithrealityand truth,and (2) the "life" of mankind as a producingand perceivingsubject.All parts of the socio-human realityhave to demonstratethis subjective-objectivestructurein one form or another.

The life of a work of art can be conceived as a mode of existenceof a partial structuresignifyingstructure,integratedin some way into the total signifying into socio-humanreality.

A work that has outlasted the time and conditionsof itsgenesisis frequently creditedwith the quality of timelessness.Is temporalityperhapssomethingthat gives in to the passing of timeand becomes its prey?And conversely,does timelessness overcome and subjugate time? Timelessness of a work would literally mean its existence without time. The idea of a work's timelessnesscannot, however,rationallycope with two basic problems: (1) How can a work, "timeless" in character,originatein time?(2) How can one proceed fromthe timeless characterof a work to its temporal existence,i.e., to its concretization?Conversely,the key question foreverynon-Platonicconcept is this: How can a work generatedin timeacquire a "timeless" character?

What does it mean that a work withstandstime, and the times?Is it resisting decay and destruction?Or does the work cease to exist altogetheras it resists time and places time outside itself,as somethingexternal?Is eternitythe exclusion of time, and timelessnessthe stoppage of time? The question, what does time do to a work, can be answeredby another question: Whatdoes a work do with time? We arriveat the conclusion,paradoxical at first,thatthe timelessness of a work is grounded in its temporality.To exist means to be in time. Being in time is not movementin an externalcontinuum,but rathermodifyingthe times, havingan effectin time.The timelessnessof a work is in its temporalityas activity. The timelessnessof a work does not signifyits permanenceoutside time or

5. Cf. A. Hauser, The Philosophy of Art History (New York, 1959), pp. 185-6.

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without time. Timeless permanence would amount to a stupor, to a loss of "life," i.e., of the ability of the work to modifythe times.The greatnessof a work cannot be gauged by its receptionwhen it firstappeared. Many greatworks have been rejected by their contemporaries;others have been immediately recognized as seminal; yet still others have "lain on the shelf" for dozens of years before "their time" came. Whateverhappens to a work is a formof what the work is. The rhythmof its temporalitydepends on its nature: whetherits message holds for everytime and everygeneration,or whetherit has something to say only in certaintimes,or whetherit must first"hibernate"in orderto be revivedlater. This rhythmof revivingand temporalityis a constitutiveelement of the work.

It is a curious coincidence that the adherentsof historicalrelativismconverge with their opponents, advocates of natural law, on one central point: both schools eliminatehistory.Both the basic thesis of historicism,that men cannot transcendhistory,as well as the polemical assertionof rationalism,thatman has to transcendhistoryin order to arriveat somethingmeta-historicalthat would guarantee the truth of knowledge and of morality,share the assumption of historyas variability,irreplicableuniqueness,and individuality.For historicism, historybreaks up into the transienceand temporalityof conditionswhich are not connected by a historicalcontinuityof theirown but are broughttogether by a meta-historicaltypology,an explicative principle of the human spirit,a regulatingidea that introducesorder into the chaos of particulars.The idea that man cannot step outside history,which indicatesthe impossibilityof achieving objective truth, is ambiguous; history is more than historicity,temporality, transienceand irreplicabilitythat exclude the absolute and the meta-historical, as historicismwould have it. Equally one-sided is the notion that history,as an event, is somethinginsubstantialbecause behind all of its metamorphoses,and thus behind history,there endures somethingsupra-historical, absolute, which the course of historycannot touch. History,accordingto this view, is external variabilityperformedon an unvaryingsubstance.The absolute thatexistsbefore historyand above historyis also pre-human,for it exists independentlyfrom the praxis and existence of men. If the absolute, universaland externalis unvaryingand endures independentfromvariability,thenhistoryis historyonly in appearances.

For dialectics-as opposed to the relativismof historicismor the ahistoricism of the concept of naturallaw-there is no absolute and universalbeforehistory and independentfrom it, nor at the end of historyas its absolute final telos; rather,the absolute and the universalare formed and realize themselvesin the course of history. In distinctionfrom ahistorical thinkingwhich knows the absolute only as somethingnon-historical,and thus eternalin the metaphysical

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sense, and in distinctionfromhistoricismwhich eliminatesaltogetherthe absolute and the universalfromhistory,dialectics considershistoryto be a unityof the absolute in the relativeand of the relativein the absolute; a process in which the human, the universaland the absolute appear in forms both of a general prerequisiteand of a specifichistoricalresult.

History is historyonly because it includes both the historicityof conditions and the historismof reality;because it contains ephemeral historicitywhich recedes into the past and does not return,as well as historism,i.e., the forming and the creative.Always a historicalbeingand of the enduring,the self-forming never leaving the sphere of history,humans (in the senses of real possibility) stand above everyact or circumstancein historyand thus can set standardsfor evaluatingthem. That which is universallyhuman, "historical" and common to all phases of history,does not exist independentlyin the formof an immutable, substance;rather,it existsboth as the universalcondition eternal,meta-historical of everyhistoricalphase and as its specificproduct.

The universallyhuman is reproducedin everyepoch as a particularresult,as somethingspecific.6 Historicism,just as historicalrelativism,is on the one hand itselfa product of a realitysplitbetween a transient,emptiedvaluelessfacticity, and a transcendentalexistence of values outside reality;while on the otherhand it fixes this split ideologically. Reality breaksdown into the relativizedworld of values. historicalfacticityand the absolute world of meta-historical Yet what are those meta-historicalvalues that eitherneverenter into conditions or else outlast them? The belief in transcendentalvalues of a historical characterindicates that concrete values have disappeared from the real world which has been emptied and devalued. This is a valueless world, whereasvalues inhabitan abstractworld of transcendenceand moral obligation.

The absolute, however,is not divorced fromthe relative,but is "composed" of the relativeor, more precisely,is formedwithinthe relative.If everything is subject to change and extinction,and if all that exists exists only in time and space, transiencebeingits only quality,then the speculativetheologicalquestion

6. Since theoreticalthinkingdoes not disappearwiththe conditionsthatgave riseto it, the 17th century discoveries concerninghuman nature are valid in this century,too. Every theoryof historyand of social realitythereforefallsback on Vico's seminaldiscoveryof the historicalcharacterof humannature."La naturehumaineest une naturetotalementhistoricisee qui est ce qu'elle devient,qui n'est plus une nature permanenteque l'on pourrait connaitreau dela de ses expressionshistoriques:elle ne faitplue qu'un avec ses expressions qui sont les moments de sa presenceet de son avenir." A. Pons, "Nature et histoirechez Vico," Les itudes pbilosopbiques. Paris, 1961, N). 1, 46. Marx's highesteem forVico is generallyknown.

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about the meaning of the temporal and transientmust remainan eternaland eternallyunanswered question. The question concerningthe relation between the relativeand the absolute in historycan be articulateddialectically:How do historicalstages in the evolution of mankindturninto meta-historicalelements of the structure of mankind, i.e., of human nature?7 How does genesis and evolution interconnectwith structureand human nature?Differentformations of human consciousness,in which classes, individuals,epochs, or mankinditself struggledand became conscious of their own practical-historical problems,in turn become (as soon as theyare formedand articulated)componentsof human consciousness,that is, finishedformsthroughwhicheveryindividualcan experience, be conscious of, and actualize the problemsof all mankind.Unhappy consciousness,tragicconsciousness,romanticconsciousness,Platonism,Macchiavellism, Hamlet, Faust, Don Quixote, JosefSvejk, and GregorSamsa are all historically generatedformsof consciousnessor modes of human existenceand in their classical form they were created in a particular,unique and irreplicableepoch but, once created, theirpredecessorsturnedup in scatteredfragmentsfromthe past, if only as comparativelyincompleteattempts.As soon as theyare created and are "here," they occupy a distinctplace in historybecause theythemselves form history and acquire a validity independent from the originalhistorical conditions of theirgenesis. Social realityas humannatureis inseparablefromits products and forms of existence: it does not exist other than in the historical totalityof theseproducts which,farfrombeingexternaland accessory "things," reveal and indeed reciprocallyform the characterof human reality(of human nature). Human reality is not a pre-historicalor meta-historicalimmutable substance, but is formed in the course of history.Reality is more than conditions and historicalfacticity,and yet at the same time does not hover above empirical reality. The dualism of emptied empiricalfacticityon the one hand, and the spiritual realm of ideal values, risingindependentlyabove it, on the other,is the mode in which one particularhistoricalrealityexists; thishistorical realityexists in thisduality,and in its entiretyconsistsof thissplit.Idealistically hypostatizingthis historical form of reality leads to the conclusion that the world is cleaved into a true intransientrealityof values and an untrue"reality" or facticityof transientconditions.8 7. It is oftenoverlookedthat Hegel's logical apriorismwith which he considershistoryas the explication of Spirit in time and thus as applied logics, as the unravellingin time of momentsof the otherwiseessentiallytimelessSpirit,is the most grandioseidealistattempt of moderntimesto overcomeor turnback relativismand historicism.

8. In modernizingHegel's concept of realityas "Bedeutung,Wertbedeutung, Kulturbedeutung," Emil Lask is clearlyviewingHegel as an orthodoxKantianand a discipleof Rickert.

Cf. Lask, Schriften,vol. 1, p. 338.

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The only reality of the human world is the unity of empirical conditions, complete with the process of theirformation,on the one hand, and of transient or lasting values and their formation on the other. The particularhistorical nature of reality determineswhether this unity is realized as a harmonyof incarnatedvalues, that is, in conditionsinfusedwithvalues, or as a splitbetween an empty and invalidatedempiricismon the one hand, and ideal, transcendental values on the other.

Reality is "higher" than are the conditions and historicalformsof existence, which means that realityis not the chaos of eventsor of fixed conditionsbut is ratherthe unityof eventsand theirsubjects; a unityof eventsand the process of theirformation;a practical-spiritual ability to transcendconditions.The ability to transcendconditionswhich allows forthepossibilityto proceed fromopinion to cognition,fromdoxa to episteme,frommythto truth,fromthe random to the necessary,fromthe relativeto the absolute, is not a step out of historybut an expressionof the specificityof man as an acting and history-creating being; man is not walled into the animality and barbarismof race, prejudices and character(qua praxis) the ability circumstances,9but has, in his being-creating to transcendtowardtruthand universality.

Human memory as one of the formsof overcomingthe temporaryand the momentary10is more than the ability,to store and recall,i.e., to bringout into the presentideas, impressions,feelingsfromthe storageroom of semi-oblivionor of the subconscious; it is also a particularactive structureand organizationof human consciousness (of knowledge). It is a historical ability and structure because it is based not only on historicallyvariableextentand contentof knowledge but also on a historicallyevolvingsensory-rational"equipment" of men.

Memory bringspast thingsout into the present,and thus transcendsthe temporary,because for man the past itselfis somethingthat he does not leave behind as a discarded thingbut somethingthat entersinto his presentand constitutes his presentas the process of creatingand forminghuman nature.The historical stages of human developmentare not emptiedformsfromwhich lifewould have and relativismof closed-horizontheoriesare opposed, as expressionsof 9. The primitivism antirational theories,by Th. Litt in Von der Sendung der Philosophie (Wies20th-century baden 1946), pp. 20f, who calls for philosophyto be in the searchforuniversaltruth.The lies in its failureto recognizenot only knowledge, idealismof this critiqueof antihumanism but also praxisas a crucialway of overcomingrelativism.

10. "The greatdiscoveryof the 18th centuryis the phenomenonof memory.By remembering,man escapes the purelymomentary;he escapes the nothingnessthatlies in wait for him between momentsof existence." G. Poulet, Studies in Human Time (Baltimore1961), pp. 23f. The author documents his view with referencesto works of Quesnay, Diderot, Buffonand Rousseau.

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evaporated because mankindhas reached higherformsof development.Rather, they are continuallyincorporatedinto the presentthroughpraxis-the creative activityof mankind.This process of incorporationis at the same timea critique and reevaluationof the past. The past, concentrated,i.e., dialecticallysublated, in the present,shapes human nature,a "substance" that includes objectivityas well as subjectivity,materialrelationsand reifiedforcesas well as the abilityto "see" the world and to explicate it in differentmodes of subjectivity,i.e., scientifically, artistically,philosophically,poetically,etc.

The society that gave birth to the genius of Heraclitus,the era in which Shakespeare's art originated,the class in whose "spirit" Hegel's philosophywas vanished in the past. Nevertheless,the "world of formed,have all irretrievably Heraclitus," "the world of Shakespeare" and "the world of Hegel" continueto live and exist as live momentsof the present11because they havepermanently enrichedthe human subject.

Human historyis an incessanttotalizationof the past, in the course of which human praxis incorporatesand thus revivesmomentsof the past. Human reality is in this sense not only the production of the new but also a (critical and dialectical) reproductionof the old. Totalization is a process of productionand reproduction,of revivingand rejuvenating.12 The capacity for and the process of totalizationare at all times both a preand universalizedcapacityof requisiteand a historicalresult: the differentiated perceptionwhich equally recognizesas artistictreasuresthe worksof antiquity, creations of the Middle Ages, and the art of ancient nations is a historical product that did not exist and would have been unimaginablein any medievalor slave society. Medieval culture was unable to revive (totalize and integrate) antique cultureor thatof "pagan" nations,withoutexposingitselfto the danger of disintegration.Progressivemodern cultureof the 20th century,however,is a universalculture in its own right,witha highcapacity fortotalization.Whilethe

11. It followsfromwhat has been statedpreviouslythatthis"life" includesthepossibility of many interpretations, everyone of whichemphasizesdifferent aspectsof the work.

12. The connection between categoriesof rejuvenationand reproductionin Hegel's and Marx's philosophyhas been correctlypointedout by M. Lifshitz(Philosophyof Art of Karl Marx, pp. 109ff). "The rejuvenationof the spiritis more than a returnto the formerself; it is a self-purification, a workingover." Hegel, Philosophyof History,vol. 1.... The great ether of his philosophy, thoughtof Novalis, scatteredthroughoutthe Christian-romantic identifytotalization with animation. Cf. Th. Haering, Novalis als Philosoph (Stuttgart, 1954), p. 45. Haering'sextensivebut poorly organizedwork suffersfromone basic shortcoming, in that it dilutes the specific contributionsof Novalis' thinkingin the general dialectical atmosphereof his times;subjected to such treatment, Novalisemergesas a Hegel junior.

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medieval world was blind and closed to expressionsof beauty and truthof other cultures, the modern view of the world is by contrast based on universality, on the ability to absorb, perceive and reevaluate expressions of most diverse cultures.

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