The Muleskinner Report Mo Agri-Business Development Team IV V O L U M E
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Commander’s Corner Breaking the cycle of poverty
Commander Col. Fortune Deputy Commander Lt. Col. Charles Senior Enlisted Advisor Senior Master Sgt. Blankenship
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INSIDE THIS ISSUE: Breaking the Cycle of Poverty cont.
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A Cooperative Inter-Agency Approach to Watershed Rehabilitation
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Breaking the Cycle of Poverty cont.
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Staying Focused in Afghanistan
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The Current Status of Agribusiness in Nangarhar
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Media and community outreach
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E
fficient and s u s t a i n a b l e agricultural and watershed management practices are keys to breaking the cycle of poverty in Afghanistan. This article provides a simple technical explanati on as t o why e f f ic i e nc y a n d sustainability are so important, identifies some of t he f or ces wor ki n g against the adoption of efficient and sustainable practices here, and discusses what the Afghan government, Agri-Business Development Teams, and other stakeholders must do to address the problem. At a fundamental level, a process is considered sustainable if the rate of r e g e n e r a t i o n , replenishment, or replacement of a resource is greater than or equal to t he rate of extr act ion, depletion, or failure of that resource. If a pri vat e Af ghan veterinary clinic can produce enough revenues to replenish its supplies, maintain its equipment and
facilities, and pay its owner and employees reasonable wages, the services provided to farmers can be sustained indefinitely. Similarly, if farmers can develop a crop rotation scheme that maintains the requisite levels of nutrients in their soil, production rates are likely to remain stable over time assuming other inputs such as rainfall do not fluctuate significantly.
Afghan women transport forage for their sheep, unaware that the lifeless hillside in the background was once forested.
However, the goal is not just to maintain the status quo, but to improve farmers‘ incomes over the long term. If, in the previous example, a crop rotation schedule was designed to
actually improve the quality of the soil rather than just maintain it, then the process would not only be sustainable, it would tend to increase crop yields from one year to the next. In other words, careful design of the crop rotation process would lead to improved soil quality, which would ultimately allow nature to generate resources in a more efficient manner. Unfortunately, many of the current practices used by the Afghans are not sustainable or efficient. Farmers continue to grow crops that deplete nitrogen from the soil resulting in increasingly smaller yields. Nomadic herds of sheep and goats consume grasses a n d s h r u bs f as t er t h an natural processes can replace them. The same is true of trees that are indiscriminately stripped of the landscape by timber smugglers for profit and villagers for fuel. The net result of these practices is that Afghans (Continued on page 2)
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Breaking the cycle of poverty (Continued from page 1)
find themselves with increasingly fewer resources at their disposal and a watershed that is no longer capable o f pr o du ci n g t ho se r e so ur c es efficiently. Renewable natural resources – vegetation and farm animals – have long been and will continue to be the primary source of income for the people of Afghanistan for the foreseeable future. Therefore, assuming efficient markets, the wealth and prosperity of these people is proportional to the quantity a nd q ual i t y o f t he r en e wabl e resources they can produce with their land. The bottom line is that, if the land is managed in such a way that it produces resources more efficiently over time, the people become more prosperous. If the land becomes less productive over time, the people become increasingly impoverished. Nature provides us rainwater and abundant sunlight at no cost. When these i nputs are captured and converted to vegetation through the photosynthesis process, valuable resources are created. This obviously does not occur when sunlight and rainwater fall on barren land. The point is that we must help the Afghans harness Mother Nature. Allowed to operate efficiently, she will generate large quantities of natural resources and enable the Afghans to prosper and thrive. In a paper published by the U.S. Department of Agriculture in 1953 called ―Conquest of t he Land through 7,000 Years,‖ author W. C. Lowdermilk sums up this concept very eloquently: ―Food comes from
the earth. The land with its waters gives us nourishment. The earth rewards richly the knowing and diligent but punishes inexorably the ignorant and slothful.‖ Another critical point is that, when renewable natural resources are diminished in an area, their ability to replenish themselves is also diminished. Good topsoil captures water and holds it for use by existing vegetation. Existing vegetation then uses the water, soil, and sunlight to produce more vegetation. However, the existing vegetation is the key to retaining topsoil so it can capture the water and nurture additional plant life. If the vegetation i s c o mp l e t e l y r e mo ve d f r o m a location, the topsoil is quickly eroded away. Once this happens, the ability of the land to regenerate vegetation is greatly, and to some extent, permanently diminished. Lowdermilk makes this observation in his 1953 paper: ―Here [in Northern Syria], erosion had done its worst. If the soils had remained, even though the cities were destroyed and the populations dispersed, the area might be re-peopled again and the cities rebuilt. But now that the soils are gone, all is gone.‖ Later in his paper he goes so far as to say: ―Unleashed and uncontrolled soil erosion is sufficient to undermine a civilization.‖ Unfortunately, there are forces at play here in Afghanistan that are impeding the adoption of sustainable and ef fi ci ent land management practices. As discussed in a previous Commander‘s Corner article, most Afghans tend to have a very short planning horizon and are therefore unwilling or unable to take risks, defer gratification, or focus on the future.
Their religion, education level, current standard of living, and culture do not facilitate or encourage this type of thinking.
A herder watches over his goats as they scour the barren Afghan landscape foraging for whatever vegetation they can find.
But, as mentioned earlier, this lack of foresight has a profoundly negative impact on the ability of the Afghans to break their cycle of poverty. The poorer they get, the more desperate they become. The more desperate they become, the more they demand of nature and the less time they give her to heal herself. The less time she has to heal, the less efficient she becomes at regenerating renewable natural resources, and the downward spiral continues. At least two U.S. Agency for International Development implementing partners – IDEA NEW ( Incenti ves Dr i ving Economic Alternatives – North, East, and West) and AWATT (Afghanistan Water and Agriculture Technology Transfer) – are currently sponsoring projects in Nangarhar province aimed at either reconstituting the watershed, making more efficient use (Continued on page 5)
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A COOPERATIVE INTER-AGENCY APPROACH TO WATERSHED REHABLITATION By Lt. Col. Raymond Legg
W M. Hussein Safi, Nangarhar Director of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock signs a historic memorandum of understanding between the DAIL, ADT, USAID, and AWATT for the implementation of AWATT’s Farm Resource Management Program on Feb. 7 at FOB FinleyShields.
.C. Lowdermilk‘s 1953 study, ―Conquest of the Land through Seven Thousand Years,‖ traced the ability of civilizations throughout history to maintain productive agriculture systems in the face of conflict. When soil is destroyed, people are condemned to needless privation and danger. ―A just relation of peoples to the earth rests not on exploitation, but … on conservation—not on the dissipation of r esour ces, but … on restoration of the productive powers of the land and on access to food and raw materials.‖ Restoration of land productivity in Afghanistan begins with the rehabilitation of the watershed. However, success will be achieved only when large numbers of individual farmers understand the importance of watershed rehabilitation and begin to work together with the Afghan Government and other stakeholders to accomplish this massive undertaking. A recurrent problem throughout Afghanistan since 9/11 has been the
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failure to coordinate and plan activities to ensure programs are mutually supportive and do not duplicate or conflict with each other. In early January 2011, A DT hos t e d a wat er resource meeting with representatives from the Nangarhar Valley Development Authority, Nangarhar Director of Irrigation, Agriculture and Livestock, Nangarhar Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Nangarhar Provincial Reconstruction Team to begin identifying the issues and challenges of water resource management in Nangarhar Province. Recognizing the need to establish and implement coordinated watershed rehabilitation projects, Robert Smith of the U.S. Agency for International Development hosted meetings in January and early February to form a ―Watershed Management Board of Directors‖ c o n s i s t i n g o f representatives from all stakeholder organizations. At the February meeting, the Nangarhar DAIL, the USAID
implementing partner AWATT (Afghanistan Water and Agriculture Technology Transfer), and t h e N an ga r ha r A gr i business Development Team signed a memorandum of understanding to formalize their expectations and responsibilities in working together on rehabilitation of the lower watershed through AWATT‘s Farm Resource Management project. The MOU recognizes t hat FRM is a DAIL program and that AWATT and the ADT perform support roles. AWATT provides technical training to the DAIL‘s Agriculture Extension Agents and the thirteen famers participating in the FRM proof-of-concept so that Afghans can assume a strong leadership and training role in expanding the program throughout Nangarhar. The ADT focuses on using the project to further legitimize the government by preparing training materials for use by the AEAs and working with the DAIL to develop a media plan for his use.
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A COOPERATIVE INTER-AGENCY APPROACH TO WATERSHED REHABLITATION (Continued from page 3)
The ADT also provides assistance in filling small scale funding gaps with our ability to rapidly accomplish smaller supporting projects through the Commander‘s Emergency Response Program. While the MOU and the commitment of the parties represents a significant step forward in addressing environmental damage caused by unsustainable subsistence farming practices, the lower watershed cannot be addressed in isolation. The DAIL, AWATT, ADT, and PRT have agreed to develop a similar MOU to establish an integrated model upper and lower watershed rehabilitation project in northern Nangarhar. The watershed rehabilitation project is a DAIL program that utilizes a scientifically proven approach to watershed rehabilitation. USAID, AWATT and ADT will work together to provide t e c h ni c al a n d f i n a nc i a l assistance to ensure the project‘s sustainability and viability. The MOU will allow the development of a focused and sustainable proj ect that utilizes the strengths of each party and ensures the DAIL retains ownership of, and is fully invested in, the program. In the upper watershed, terracing will allow riparian and upland vegetation to be restored to control soil erosion. THE
Check dams will be built to control water flow and allow sediment to settle before reaching the river basin. The DAIL‘s extension agents and natural resource officers will work with the local communi t y t o prescribe grazing practices and control the harvest of trees. In the lower watershed, AWATT will implement its FRM program. FRM provides a comprehensive integrated farm management approach utilizing forage crop rotation to improve soil fertility and provide a source of on-farm fodder to control hillside grazing of sheep and goats. The program also uses laser leveling and concrete irrigation turnouts to reduce erosion and make more efficient use of available water resources. The overarching intent is to improve farmers‘ incomes through more sustainable and b e t t e r u s e o f a va i l a b l e resources rather than application of unsustainable ext er nal i nput s such as fertilizers and pesticides. Effective watershed rehabilitation programs must be supported and implemented through community based plans that address the needs of local inhabitants. Because these efforts require changes in land use practices, community based plans must address the social framework. This is especially critical in Af ghani st an because of longstanding land tenure and security issues.
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Effective planning with the local community is fundamental to the program‘s success. Community support reduces conflicts between local livestock owners over grazing and resource management on the rehabilitated landscape. AEAs and Department of Natural Resource officers will have to work closely with community members to ensure they understand the importance of all aspects of the program and provide training that allows the community to a dj ust t hei r a gr i c ul t ur e practices to ensure sust ainabi lit y and l ocal ownership of the program. The DAIL will provide training and advice in all areas of agriculture production relating to forage and fodder crops, on-farm animal husbandry practices, watershed rehabilitation techniques, leadership, and project management. Because the project will serve as a model for future watershed rehabilitation efforts in Nangarhar, the DAIL will monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the project‘s socioeconomic benefits, soil improvement, water use and crop yields. AWATT is the program‘s primary subject matter expert for watershed rehabilitation. AWATT provides technical and scientific expertise to train AEAs and DNR officers. (Continued on page 5)
“The overarching intent is to improve farmers’ incomes through more sustainable and better use of available resources rather than application of unsustainable external inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides.”
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A COOPERATIVE INTER-AGENCY APPROACH TO WATERSHED REHABLITATION micro-businesses in bee-keeping and poultry farming that will increase economic activity in the community.
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AWATT will also fund the construction of five concrete check dams to control water run-off and sedimentation. Through its local Afghan program officers, AWATT will also provide training and technical assistance for the implementation of the FRM program in the lower watershed area. ADT is primarily interested in defeating the counterinsurgency by increasing the capacity of the DAIL to provide agriculture services through technical, management and leadership training.
To maximize the impact of the project, the ADT will also work with the DAIL to develop a media plan to convey to the public the government‘s intent to help farmers increase their incomes.
Sgt. 1st Class Eisenbacher discusses AWATT’s upper watershed rehabilitation project in Kuz Kunar with local villagers.
ADT‘s AEA mentoring program will ensure the DAIL‘s extension and DNR officers develop and maintain community support for the project. ADT will also provide limited financial assistance to fill gaps between AWATT and the DAIL.
In addition, ADT will provide alternative livelihood training for disadvantaged women to allow them to build
As t he pr o gr a m devel o ps, additional expertise and resources will be needed from the PRT. The PRT can provide maps and weather data, additional technical advice on management and inspection of construction projects, and can get provincial-level buy-in from the Nangarhar governor and other high ranking officials.
Working together toward a common goal, this comprehensive and effective watershed rehabilitation project will improve livelihoods of community residents, increase the capacity of the Afghan government, begin to reverse the environmental degradation of Afghanistan‘s countryside, and serve as a model for future watershed management projects.
Breaking the cycle of poverty (Continued from page 2)
of on-farm resources, or both. However, for these projects to be successful, impacted Afghan farmers will not only have to be trained on how to improve the sustainability and efficiency of their practices at a fundamental level, their incomes will have to be supplemented – either through cash-for-work or some other method – until they start to see the their standards of living improve. This is especially true of upper watershed projects which will take years to produce a return on investment. In addition to achieving their technical objectives, it is also critically important that these projects contribute to legitimizing the Afghan government and thereby maximize their support to the counterinsurgency effort. For this to occur, the government must understand
and take ownership of the problem, must be perceived as taking ownership for the purpose of helping common people improve their livelihoods, and must take the lead in educating impacted farmers. We see t he ADT ‘ s r ol e i n t hi s pr ocess as empowering, motivating, training, and inspiring the Director of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock and his Agriculture Extension Agents to own the problem, educate farmers on how and why they must adopt sustainable and efficient agriculture and watershed management practices, and inform the masses as to what their government is doing to increase their long term prosperity. Our plan is to work with the DAIL to develop both training materials for use by the AEAs in training farmers, and a media plan for use by the DAIL himself in helping to educate and increase support from the general public.
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By Capt. Ken Huenink
with countless ―great i deas,‖ usual l y pr oj ect ― C h a s i n g r a b b i t s proposals of various size down rabbit holes‖ is a n d s c o p e f r o m a n t he adage referri ng to assortment of individuals c o n t i n u a l l y p u r s u i n g and agencies, each with d i f f e r e n t i d e a s t o t he their own objectives. d et r i me n t of c o he r e nt Being the good intent and direction. humanitarians that we are, The ADT is unique in the temptation to take on that there is very little too much is ever-present. guidance, doctrinal or from However, the consequence higher headquarters, on of allowing this to happen – exactly how to implement what t he militar y calls our mission, which reads ―mission creep‖ – is the unit as follows: ―The Missouri losing focus; doing a lot, A D T c o o r d i n a t e s a n d but accomplishing little to integrates agri-business meet the established end capacity building activities state. i n t o e x i s t i n g The ADT has applied c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y several screening criteria to operations in Nangarhar avoid this trap. The first Province to legitimize the question we ask ourselves Government of the Islamic is: does the course of action Republic of Afghanistan s u p p o r t t h e l i n e s o f (GIRoA).‖ operation (LOO) in our There are an infinite campaign plan? The ADT‘s number of approaches and five LOOs are agriculture opinions on how to best extension, ag economics, ag employ an ADT in e d u c a t i o n , a g Afghanistan. The manner a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , a n d in which we approach this information operations. p r o b l e m i s t o a l a r ge Notably, the agriculture degree only limited by e xt en si on L O O, wh i ch manpower, which for the f o c u s e s p r i m a r i l y o n Missouri ADT is currently empowering the districteleven agriculture subject level, GIRoA, Agriculture matter experts. Extension Agents, reserves Therefore, of utmost 50% of our effort. This i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e LOO is most closely commander is the decision associated with the larger o n h o w t o f o c u s h i s counterinsurgency objective resources. During our time of connecting the Afghan here in Afghanistan, the p e o p l e w i t h t h e i r ADT has been approached government while drawing them away from insurgent THE
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forces. The strategic concept for Afghanistan is to build the capacity of the government to deliver basic services, so nearly every course of action we take must be fi lter ed through this LOO. Second, every proposal must be screened for sustainability. Those with an eye toward fiscal responsibility would be truly appalled at the number of what the Task Force Bastogne commander calls ―icons of failure‖ here in Nangarhar. Statistics are still being compi l ed, but t he i nit i al assessment suggests that the percentage of past projects that are still functioning as originally intended is ext remel y low. For thi s reason, we must strictly assess projects and ideas for their (Continued on page 7)
The Dari Nor slaughter facility, an empty building which looks to have never been used, has had the water tank, steel from the holding pins, and other hardware stolen.
Without discipline and strict mission focus, we run the risk of, as our executive officer, Lt. Col. North Charles, put it, “Chasing every shiny object in Afghanistan.”
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long term, indigenous sustainability or we are wasting our time and money here. Additionally, we should look for models that self propagate, i.e., if we start this concept, will the Afghans take the idea and run with it on their own? Weaning the Afghan people off American initiative and aid should be an underlying theme in everything we do. Finally, we ask ourselves if the project is one the Afghans really need, and if there are cultural repercussions. If you ask most Af gh an vi l l a ger s i f t he y n eed something, they will automatically say ―yes‖, regardless if they truly need it or not. The Americans have endless pockets anyways right? Why not take whatever you can get? We must not make mistakes such as building a solar well that costs sixfigures if the Afghans cannot afford to maintain it. We must al so be car ef ul t o consider cultural influences such as collectivism and favoritism. The Afghan definition of the greater good may not coincide with that of w e st e r n s oci et i es . Will the project exacerbate an existing tribal feud? Will it be used by someone to leverage power?
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Is the project proposal just a front to skim money? Certainly, there are many factors to consider before selecting a course of action, and strict screening criteria are necessary to avoid becoming overwhelmed. As an alternative to simply telling people ―no‖, the ADT has become proficient at deflecting proposed projects which fall outside our mission focus or capabilities onto other agencies. Over the course of the deployment, the team has learned of the numerous programs funded and managed by the U.S. Agency for International Development and their implementing partners. This networking experience has allowed us to connect project seekers to p r o j e c t i mp l e m e n t e r s w i t h o u t detracting from our own mission focus. An example of this is our fallen brother Sgt. 1st Class Robert Pharris‘
work in Khogyani District. Local Afghans approached Pharris about a large project involving the planting fruit orchards in each schoolyard in the district for agriculture education purposes. Realizing agriculture education was a secondary focus and that the project exceeded the ADT budgetary constraints, Pharris worked with our U.S. Department of Agriculture partners to get the project funded. After ten years in Afghanistan, Coalition Forces have yet to find the perfect counterinsurgency solution. With limited internal resources and a shrinking timeline for results, the ADT must stay focused on high payoff courses of action that are ―Afghan-good enough‖, i.e., consistent with Afghan cultural and sustainment capabilities. To ensure we are staying on track, the ADT formally assesses our lines of operation every 75 days. The assessment allows the commander to refocus or adjust the team‘s effort as necessary to best accomplish the mission.
ADT leaders discuss how and where to focus efforts during a formal campaign plan assessment.
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Without discipline and str i ct mi ssi on focus, we run the risk of, as our executive officer, Lt. Col. North Charles, put it, ―Chasing every shiny o b j e c t i n Afghanistan.‖
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The current status of agribusiness in Nangarhar By: CPT Jeremy Berendzen
The Hasam Poultry Farm is located in Behsood District just outside of Jalalabad. Capt. Berendzen and 1st Lt. Wischmeyer met the owner of this farm while at the Peace Dividend Trust Eastern Region Business Conference. The facility produces approximately 80,000 eggs per month and has plans for expansion to increase capacity to 1 million eggs per month .
Before coming to Afghanistan, the ADT Ag Section did not i m a g i n e t h e entrepreneurial boom taking place in Nangarhar. Entrepreneurs are taking root throughout the province in spite of the unfavorable business climate. Privately owned busi nesses ar e doing what they must to survive and in some cases even grow. Even with these rays of hope, there is still much work to be done to help link people together. In the past, ADT‘s have focused mainly on the agriculture side of agribusiness by working directly with farmers and increasing the capacity of the government of Afghanistan through the Director of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock to provide services to these farmers. ADTs have generally not directed resources and effort at the business side of Agri-business development. When speaking with farmers about increasing their production, many of them simply ask, ―why?‖ Like farmers around the world, Afghan farmers have asked why they should grow more produce if they cannot
“Pushing risk adverse farmers is like pushing a chain up a hill; it just doesn't’ work.”
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eat or sell it. In their eyes, that would be a waste of not only the food but the farmer‘s resources, time and effort. In a society stressed by years of conflict that has resulted in stifled aspirations, risk adverse farmers are unable or unwilling to push the development of markets. To encourage farmers to increase their production, and their incomes, the market must pull them to grow more. Pushi ng ri sk adverse farmers is like pushing a chain up a hill; it just doesn‘t work. If there is a pull or a reason to grow more, farmers will find a way to do it and all the links in the chain will follow suit. It‘s simple supply and demand economics. With a pull from the markets, the farmers will reach out for more knowledge. A ready source for that knowledge is the DAIL‘s Agriculture Extension Agents. In order to facilitate the linkage between the A E A s a n d i n c r e as e d production for market development, ADT is training the AEAs so they can better serve the farmers in their districts and attempting to more closely link the DAIL
with the agriculture and veterinary medicine f acult y at Nangar har University. Our intent is to increase the capacity of the DAIL and his staff, and encourage Nangarhar University to better support the agriculture community. In doing so, rural farmers will see a usefulness and credibility in their government. 1st Lt. Richard Wischmeyer and I had the privilege of attending the Peace Dividend Trust Eastern Region Business Conference at the Nangarhar Governor‘s Palace on January 27. Our mission was to meet with Afghan business owners in order to make connections that might lead to private sector value chain enhancements and to find Afghan businesses that produce and conduct agricultural training. We also hoped to find entrepreneurs in the agribusiness field that could be linked with farmers that had no idea these markets were open to them. We discovered numerous i nter esting businesses that we had no idea existed. Some examples include two juicing and (Continued on page 9)
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The current status of agribusiness in Nangarhar (Continued from page 8)
canning facilities in Jalalabad, three different large poultry farms in Nangarhar province, and a textile company by the name of Rodat Textile which is actually located in the Deh Bala District. The irony is that Wischmeyer has been trying to link the cotton growers in the Rodat District with a textile company. We also discovered there is a private seed cleaning facility in northern Behsood District that has plans to clean 1,200 to 2,000 metric tons of wheat, maize, and rice next year. This is over ten times more than the 120 metric tons the governmentrun seed cleaner in Behsood cleaned last year. Representatives of the Eastern Region Fruit Growers Association explained how a variety of commercially-oriented farmer groups in the eastern region are collaborating to rehabilitate old orchards and are exporting fruit in compliance with international quality st andar ds t o hi gh -val ue markets. Farmers pay fees to EFGA and EFGA provides crates and refrigerated trucks to transport the produce to markets. If this process can work with orchards, it can work with vegetables and hopefully can be replicated throughout Nangarhar and Afghanistan.
We have begun talks with these entrepreneurs and are planning missions in the near future to visit some of these companies. We want to find out how these businessmen achieved success, how the ADT can help challenge the government to facilitate further business expansion, and what is the economic model for entrepreneurship in Afghanistan. As we continue to learn what economic forces are present in Nangarhar, we can provide that information to the AEAs who can become a clearing house for the distribution of commercial agriculture market information. While at the conference, Wischmeyer also spoke with a representative of the Afghanistan Central Business Registry. This organization helps local businesses register with the government and produces a directory of all government registered businesses. Wischmeyer and I also spoke with representatives of the Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Industries. This organization focuses on the private sector, lobbying for the government to be more business friendly, and making suggestions to Coalition Forces and NonGovernment Organizations on how to more effectively utilize their funds to stimulate the Afghan economy.
This conference was truly an eye opening experience and will hopefully lead to continued growth in economic activity in Nangarhar and throughout Afghanistan. With our Commanders Emergency Response Program budget limited to $400,000, the days of large scale project construction by ADT are gone. The limited budget will be used to help the DAIL focus on projects that will increase his department‘s ability to educate and train farmers. While our budget for construction may be small, there is much work that can be done to improve markets and value chains at little cost. Growing the Afghan economy by promoting agribusiness development and helping keep the value chain within the borders of Nangarhar Province and Afghanistan will, we believe, be a significant impact on improving farmers‘ livelihoods and helping end the insurgency.
“We also discovered a private seed cleaning facility in northern Behsood District that has plans to clean 1,200 to 2,000 metric tons of wheat, maize, and rice next year. This is over ten times more than the 120 metric tons the government seed cleaner in Behsood cleaned last year.”
1st Lt. Wischmeyer exchanges information with a representative of a canning and juicing company located in Jalalabad. The ADT was able to meet many local businesses while at the Peace Dividend Trust Eastern Region Business Conference.
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Media and community outreach: converting non-believers By Capt. Marie Orlando
T “By taking into account the culture of the Afghans, putting together a plan with specific goals, and linking media messages to community outreach, the ADT can assist the DAIL in using the media to build farmers’ trust in the government.”
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he United States Institute of Peace Center of Innovation for Media, C o n f l i c t , a n d Peacebuilding published a report in 2010 which combi ned t r adit i onal media assessments with conflict analysis to evaluate the Afghanistan media. T h e r e p o r t , ―Afghanistan Media A s s e s s m e n t , Opportunities and Challenges for Peacebuilding‖, by Eran Fraenkel, Ph.D., Emrys Shoemaker, MA, and Sheldon Himelfarb, Ph. D., offers useful observations and recommendations which the Missouri AgriBusiness Development Team can put into practice. By taking into account the culture of the Afghans, putting together a p l a n wi t h s p e ci f i c goals, and linking media messages to community outreach the ADT can assist the DAIL in using the media to build f ar mer s‘ t r ust i n the government. The report reflects optimism that the media can serve as a peaceful way to resolve conflicts in Afghanistan. They
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a l s o r e al i ze t h at t h e Western world has had very little impact to the extremist message from the successful Taliban media campaigns during the past nine years. These ideas are also echoed throughout the media communities working in Afghanistan. Gordon Adam‘s article, ―Could the media save Afghanistan?‖ Prospect Magazine (July 7, 2010, issue 172) states that the ―allies urgently need a new approach.‖ He also points out, ―The Afghan government could also gain badlyneeded legitimacy a mo n gst Af ghan s b y l ist eni ng t o peoples‘ views and acting on their concerns.‖ While the USIP assessment recommends many changes which do not fall within the scope of the ADT Campaign Plan, several of the suggestions for positive strategic change can be applied by the ADT as they execute their Information Operations Line of Operation of their Campaign Plan. For instance, the assessment states that ―for these contents to be received as authentic and credible, they must reflect the vulnerabilities and priorities that
Afghans themselves have identified as vital‖. The ADT can internalize this to read: Encourage the Director of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock to identify vital vulnerabilities and priorities to the farmers in Nangarhar. Another applicable suggestion states that ―donors should support media institutions and infrastructure when that support would facilitate the production and dissemination of socially constructive contents; and without the expectation that these institutions or structures will become selfsustaining.‖ The ADT, which is essentially a donor by virtue of contracts, can interpret this to mean they should only financially support programs that will achieve a specified goal a n d w i t h t h e understanding that upon the completion of the contract, the media source may not replicate or continue the program. The assessment also points out that ―as often and as intensively as possible, media interventions should be accompanied by face-toface community outreach (Continued on page 11)
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Media and community outreach: converting non-believers (Continued from page 10)
activities that provide Afghans an opportunity to put into practice ideas and options that the media has brought to their attention.‖ This is a practice the ADT has already adopted, but this advice is an important guideline which should always be considered in future media campaigns. To fully understand why these recommendations have been made, it is important to understand the Afghan culture and their perceptions. According to the USIP report, Afghans, both Pasto and Dari, have a term, amniyat, referring to ―holistic peace and security‖. The authors explain that Afghans want a whole range of improvement that together make it possible ―to live a proper or good Afghan life.‖ One area of their lives which needs improvement is information insecurity- they don‘t know who to trust anymore. Adam points out that the ―strategic messaging‖ carried out by the ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] has a limited, useful role. But he adds, ―Afghans are canny media users, quick to sense when they are being manipulated. They have had 30 years of propaganda by many shades of government s, from Communist to Islamic extremist.‖ The USIP assessment says that the ―major hurdle to constructive change is that Afghans must make crucial decisions about the future of their country, communities, and families based on information from sources they do not trust, or on information from trusted sources that may not be factual.‖ In their field interviews, the
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USIP authors said respondents stressed they were more likely to trust who provided the information rather than the ―veracity of any specific piece of information‖. In practice, this means that information from within a community, group, or tribe, would be perceived as more reliable than information from outside sources, including other tribes, central government, or foreign governments or NGOs, even when it seemed empirically truthful. They also found that ―Afghans especially mistrust information from military associations‖ They point out the Provincial Reconstruction Team media communication efforts are generally discounted, including broadcasts from the military RadioIn-A-Box, which is used in Nangarhar. Yet, Afghans paradoxically repeatedly express a need for outside information. Much of the information provided by donors is related to reconstruction and development. However, the Afghans feel alienated from the development and see it as an outcome rather than a process due to faulty information from the media. The reports says, ―Af ghan respondents gave several examples of informational vulnerability in this area, such as not knowing which development plans are prioritized, where development funds are going to be spent, or how a community could qualify for development assistance.‖ It is also important to understand the role of religious influence on Afghans. In Afghanistan, separation of religion and state will only serve to separate
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the government from the people. The assessment said that in order to ―gain the trust of the wider public, which is mostly rural and highly traditional, media producers must be sensitive to the ‗basket of norms‘ that constitute the general practice of Islam in Afghanistan.‖ But they acknowledge just how to accomplish this is unclear, especially since there are conflicts internally as to what this actually means. Radio is the most pervasive media outlet in Afghanistan and Afghans selectively listen to the stations they trust most or find most useful. Radio Television Af ghani st an ( RT A) w hi ch i s government owned, has the greatest reach across the country, but it is also has the smallest audience because people see it as representing the central government, which they do not trust. The challenge for the ADT is to accept the differences we find in Afghan culture from our own and see things from an Afghan point of view. Despite their inclinations to distrust most sources, the Afghans are in agreement that the media can be a tool for change; we need to find the means to make believers out of non-believers. Overcoming their skepticism r e mai ns a di f f i cul t o bst acl e, especially for messages paid for by the U.S., put out by the DAIL- an Afghan government official, and played on a government radio station. Both the ADT and the DAIL have a difficult challenge ahead. Fortunately for the ADT, the Nangarhar DAIL actively engages the press both on a provincial and (Continued on page 12)
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Media and community outreach: converting non -believers (Continued from page 11)
national level. In this, he is much more progressive than many of his countrymen serving in official capacities. One of the goals of the IO LOO is to build trust in the office of the DAIL as well as to support efforts to legitimize GIRoA in the eyes of the citizens. The ADT has recognized that the messages, whether informational, educational, or inspirational must speak to the needs of the Afghans as identified by the citizens, not the ADT. Most Afghans have cellular phones and through call -in programs they can effectively communicate their concerns to the DAIL and he in turn can respond and speak to them about the process of development. T h e A D T c a n u t i l i ze t h e recommendation of the assessment to keep media goals specific and not open-ended. The ADT will analyze and support agriculture media programs that meet the needs of farmers and change the knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors of those involved with agribusiness activities. While listeners may believe
RTA pushes propaganda intended to benefit the politicians rather than t h e i n d i vi d u a l , t h e D A I L i s convinced that it is more appropriate for him to participate on RTA since it is a government station. The ADT will work to incorporate the USIP assessment recommendation to reinforce the messages broadcast on the radio with community outreach. This concept needs to be applied to all the messages from the DAIL office. For the Afghans, it is not enough to express hopes and ideals - seeing is believing. For example, it is one thing to promise farmers assistance. However, the DAIL has trained and equipped his Agriculture Extension Agents to assist the farmers and he has built classrooms and soil testing labs within the Agriculture Extension Centers in a few of the di st ri ct s. When he put s out messages about training opportunities which will benefit the farmers, the farmers have tangible results they can experience firsthand. This builds the trust of the people in the messenger– the DAIL and RTA– both which represent GIRoA. To assist the DAIL, the ADT is
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working with the DAIL and his assigned media spokesperson to develop media campaign plans about the programs the DAIL is promoting. To continue to forge a bond of trust, the DAIL must continually explain to the public the processes of development and steps taken to bring about development. The ADT‘s goal is to mentor the D A IL me d i a s p o kes pe r s o n t o encourage him to capitalize on every meeting, training event, conference, and program implemented within the province by the DAIL. The ADT will demonstrate the use of news releases to provide regular updates on projects and to speak about the challenges encountered. In a memorandum dated Jan. 31 General James N. Matthis tells commanders, ―We will counter the adversaries‘ efforts with an effective communication campaign, linking our intent and our words with actions.‖ He says we must be believed if we‘re to prevail. ―We must also more fully understand our e n vi r o n m e n t , a n d t h i s me a n s listening to the people and having an appreciation of their history, culture and concerns.‖ The ADT is already working on it.
MONG ADT IV
The Muleskinner Report provides insights and analysis on the Nangarhar Missouri National Guard Development Team’s mission. If you have questions or comments on the Muleskinner Report, please contact Col. Mike Fortune at mike.fortune@afghan.swa.army.mil The Muleskinner is an unofficial publication authorized by AR 360-1. It is published monthly by the Missouri Agribusiness Development Team IV to provide important information related to their deployment for the Soldiers and Airmen, their Families, units and commands, the Army, DOD and the public. Views and opinions expressed in the Muleskinner are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or DOD.
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