The Muleskinner Report Mo Agribusiness Development Team IV V O L U M E
DRIVING THE TEAM
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Commander’s Corner Winning the war on corruption
Commander Col. Fortune Deputy Commander Lt. Col. Charles Senior Enlisted Advisor Senior Master Sgt. Blankenship
www.facebook.com/ MONG.ADTIV
INSIDE THIS ISSUE: Winning the War 1-3 on Corruption Ensuring Continuity During Unit Transitions
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Private Sector Policy Development
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A Cheesehead Amongst Muleskinners
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Creating 12-15 Agriculture Opportunities for Women
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ince our arrival here in Nangarhar province in August 2010, Missouri Agribusiness Development Team IV has worked closely with the provinciallevel Director of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock to reduce corruption within his organization. While this has not been an easy task, we have made significant progress toward this objective and this progress appears to be somewhat irreversible. This article describes the method we used, discusses the underlying cultural dynamics that contributed to our success, summarizes some of our important lessons learned, and attempts to generalize our findings so our methodology mi ght be applied elsewhere. While anti-corruption is not a primary mission of the ADT, Gen. Petraeus’s counterinsurgency
guidance dated July 27, 2010 directs all U.S forces in Afghanistan to “identify and confront corrupt officials” and “help Afghans build accountable governance.” In the September 2010 Mul eskinner Repor t, I di scussed t he rampant cor r upt i on pr obl em i n Afghanistan and explained how corrupt officials undermine the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the people. I also described how the ADT would implement Gen. Petraeus’s anti-corruption guidance as we pursued our agriculture -related mission objectives. We did not set out specifically to uncover corruption, but rather, to improve the ability of the DAIL’s Agriculture Extension Agents to lead, manage, and deliver services to the farmers in their districts. One of the ways we hoped to achieve this was to transfer the responsibility for managing small, limited duration,
Cash-for-Work projects to the AEAs, and closely monitor and provide feedback on their performance. But before making this transition, we developed a fully transparent CFW project management process designed to ensure CFW funds got to their intended recipients. In doing so, we put ourselves in a position to identify corrupt officials and work with the DAIL to have them reprimanded. Our plan was simple but effective – show all stakeholders “the books” at the beginning, middle, and end of a project and provide them a hotline number to call if they knew of or even suspected corruption. Specifically, we provided copies of both the attendance log and pay log to the laborers shortly after they were paid and asked them to verify that t he y ha d r ec ei ve d t he correct amount and that all the people listed on the (Continued on page 2)
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attendance log and pay log actually worked on the project. In essence, we were showing the Afghans – both government officials and farmers – what accountable governance is supposed to look like and clearly demonstrating a methodology for achieving transparency that could be expanded to other types of processes. When, during our first round of CFW projects, we did encounter signs of corruption, we quickly gathered and organized the e vi de nce , a nd co nf r ont ed t h e suspected AEA in the presence of his boss – the DAIL. When the AEA could not account for discrepancies or explain the calls we received on our hotline, the DAIL told the AEA to either return the money he had skimmed, or be fired and put in jail. In all cases, the guilty parties returned the money and the DAIL made a point to personally distribute the recovered funds to the laborers for whom they were originally intended. Once word got out to the other AEAs that we were watching them and were prepared to hold them accountable, they abruptly fell in line and we have had few corruption -related problems since. The Pashtuns – the inhabitants of Nangarhar province – are a very proud people, know right from wrong, and like to be seen as altruistic. While many Pashtun officials may find it acceptable to partake in corrupt activities when no one is watching, they still consider it very shameful to be called out on their misdeeds, and will avoid this embarrassment at all costs. THE
They also tend to be terrified at the threat of being fired and thrown in prison because this would bring shame, not just upon them, but upon their entire family and extended family. Afghans put an extremely high value on their relationship with and status within their family because this is where they tend to find security, employment, power and respect, and
Engineer Safi, Nangarhar DAIL, takes a strong stance against corruption during a Leadership Training Academy session at Sheshembaugh Agriculture Research Station in Jalalabad.
opportunities for advancement. Behind-the-scenes, what we also found both interesting and beneficial was that the DAIL himself seemed to be embarrassed, concerned, and even fearful that some of his AEAs were caught embezzling funds. This is most likely because, in confronting his AEAs, he felt we were confronting him as well – although this was not our intent. On multiple occasions during the next couple months and without prompting from the ADT, we observed him telling his subordinates
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that he would not tolerate corruption of any kind. At one point, he went so far as to state “A corrupt man has no conscience, and a man with no conscience might as well be a dead man.” And because he has taken such a strong stance with his subordinates, it seems unlikely that the DAIL himself will engage in corruption – either now or in the semi-distant future – for fear of being seen as a hypocrite. In working with the DAIL to r e d u c e c o r r u pt i o n w i t h i n h i s depar t ment , we l ear ned some important lessons that we would like to convey to other leaders engaged in, or preparing to engage in, development efforts across Afghanistan. For instance, shortly after arrival in theater, we recommend that commanders meet with their Afghan counterpart to clearly state their intent to address corruption. We believe that the longer it takes to have this discussion, the more difficult it will be and the less impact it will have. Taking a firm stance on corruption early in the relationship establishes the commander’s authority up front and this is one of the keys to success in working with Afghans as discussed in an earlier Muleskinner Report article. Failing to have this conversation completely is, in effect, failing to acknowledge the big pink elephant in the room. It is also important that commanders not only ensure processes have sufficient management controls to provide good accountability, but that they a l s o mi n i mi ze i n c e nt i ve s f or (Continued on page 3)
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corruption. For example, because management of CFW proj ects requires the AEAs to do additional work and expend money for fuel they would not have spent otherwise, we compensate them modestly for transportation and other incidental expenses – up to $50 per project. This seems to be about the right amount to keep the honest AEAs honest and less apt to try to undermine the process to make up for personal losses they may have incurred in managing a project. Commanders should also use shame to their advantage. When confronting corrupt officials, they should team up with their Afghan counterpart to make the experience as painful as possible for the guilty party. With that said, it is very important that suspected officials be given the opportunity to first explain themselves before being judged. We experienced one case where it initially appeared an AEA had skimmed funds, but he was able to clearly explain away all discrepancies when questioned about them. It is also critical to limit the number of people present during questioning. When confronting a corrupt official, the commander, his Afghan counterpart, and the interpreter should be the only ones in the room. In summary, we have found Afghan officials in Nangarhar to be mor e co mpet ent t han we had anticipated but also more corrupt. Given an opportunity to increase their personal wealth through corruption, it seems that a large percentage of them will opt to do so. THE
H o w e ve r , w i t h a ca r ef ul l y designed process and some due diligence on our part, we were able to force the issue and get these officials to operate in a transparent and uncorrupt manner. Even the DAIL himself, who was reluctant to even discuss the corruption upon our arrival, now takes a strong stance against it with his subordinates. Although this is our only data point, it appears that our bottom-up
down. ADTs and other tactical and operational -level units must continue to do all they can to reduce corruption within the provinces and districts, but ultimately, if there is no emphasis at the national level, these efforts will be in vain. At some point, Coalition Forces will leave Afghanistan. If we leave behind competent Afghan leaders w h o u n de r s t a n d t h e n e ga t i ve impacts of corruption and hold their subordi nates account able, the government has a good chance of being seen as legitimate by the Afghan people. If we fail to “A corrupt man has no conscience, do this, the government is and a man with no conscience might also likely to fail. as well be a dead man.” - Nangarhar Teaching Afghans about DAIL, Engineer Safi. transparency, holding them accountable, and convincing them to hold others accountable is hard work, but it is work that must approach might achieve similar be done at all levels of the Afghan results if applied to other line government if we are to succeed directors in other sectors and in here. other provinces. It might also be effective in modifying the behaviors of district sub-governors and their staffs. But for this or any other met hod t o t r ul y be eff ecti ve, officials at lower levels must be fearful or at least aware that their superiors are prepared to hold them accountable. It is questionable whether this same approach would work at the ministerial and provincial governance levels because, as mentioned in previous Muleskinner 1st Lt. Jodie McCall meets with local Report article, the higher an Afghan villagers as part of his quality control government official’s rank, the more check on a Cash-for-Work project in t h e y t e n d t o b e v i e w e d b y Surkh Rod. During the first round of themselves and others as above the AEA-managed CFW projects, the team discovered some loopholes in the process l a w a n d u n t o u c h a b l e . F o r that allowed the AEAs to embezzle corruption to be eliminated at these funds. However, the process has been relevels, it seems that enforcement worked and the ADT has had few probwill have to come from the top lems with corruption since.
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E n s u r i n g c o n t i n u i ty during unit transitions By Lt. Col. North K. Charles
C ADT IV agriculture team leaders and Col. Mike Fortune, ADT IV commander, discuss how to implement ADT V concepts during an assessment briefing on February 28.
o n d u c t i n g a g r i b u s i n e s s development during counterinsurgency remains an incredibly difficult and challenging mission. Due to the protracted nature of agribusiness development, the time required for successful counterinsurgency operations and the Secretary of Defense’s guidance on length of deployments, it is necessary to rotate multiple agribusiness development teams in a n d o ut of t h e f i gh t before the mission is complete. These c o n di t i o n s cr ea t e a n i mper at i ve t o ensur e continuity during ADT unit transitions. General David Petraeus, the commander of International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, recognizes this challenge. He provides specific guidance in writing, “… mai nt ai n oper at i o nal tempo and local relationships throughout transitions to avoid giving insurgents and malign actors a
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rest.” (COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance, 27 July 2010) Pa st i s sue s o f t h e Muleskinner Report have discussed the four standard elements of unit transitions: Predeployment Site Survey, Advance Detachment, Relief-In-Place and Transfer Of Authority. While these four specific elements are integral to any successful transition, this article f ocuses on t he t hr ee principles of continuity during unit transitions: consistency from the Afghan’s perspective, continuations in campaign planning and a blending of both rotating units’ conduct of the operation. Consistency from the Afghans’ perspective takes a wide variety of forms and pays a number of significant dividends. An incoming unit might maintain an existing, recurring meeting with an Afghan partner to avoid disrupting an established routine. For example, ADT IV c o nd u ct s a s er i es of meeting with the Director of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, Nangarhar University
and a Nangarhar Watershed Management Board of Directors. Those meeting are likely candidates for maintaining consistency. An incoming unit may a l s o c o n t i n u e communicating with l o c a l A f gh a n s u s i n g f a mi l i a r , est abl i she d formats. As an example, each Agriculture Extension Agent receives a Project Analysis Scorecard (a grade card) on their performance following each Cash-forWork project. Maintaining consistency in the eyes of Afghans reinforces established practices and ensures continued forward momentum in partnering with Afghan leaders. Continuation in campaign planning is the second principle to ensure continuity during unit transitions. While ADT IV developed its own campaign plan, we can trace our lineage back to the campaign plan issued by Lt. Col. Greg Allison and ADT I. Each commander must conduct his own mi ssion anal ysis and issue their own campaign (Continued on page 5)
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plans; however, the set of core tasks should remain consistent. In the case of ADTs, core campaign plan tasks remain the focus on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the support of counterinsurgency efforts a n d t h e r e q ui r e me n t t o partner with civilian agencies (the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, for example).
In the case of ADT IV, we will adopt and implement elements of ADT V’s plan. This not only ensures continuity, but prepares the operational environment for the arrival of the new unit.
those who ensure consistency from the Afghans’ perspective, maintain continuation in c a mp ai gn pl an ni n g an d blend both rotating units’ conduct of the operation.
In addition, the incoming unit may adopt some elements of the outgoing unit’s operation to ensure a smooth transition. In the case of ADT IV, the incoming ADT V leaders
These effective teams remain focused on accomplishing the mission, instead of being distracted by the numerous challenges of transitions.
may continue a number of Commander’s Emergency Response Program projects to blend the two teams’ operations.
Col. John Akers, commander of ADT V, and Col. Mike Fortune, commander of ADT IV, participate in a combined ADT campaign planning workshop at Forward Operating Base Fenty on January 28.
Commanders who do not ensure continuation in campaign planning experience an unacceptable cyclic, systematic loss of institutional knowledge. Similarly, rotating units can adopt similar metrics and assessment criteria to ensure uninterrupted progress in evaluating progress. Aligning campaign plans and assessments during transition ensures minimal loss of momentum. Effectively blending both rotating units’ conduct of the operation ensures smooth transitions. As each commander envisions how to accomplish this mission, the counterpart commander can ensure continuity by implementing appropriate elements of the other commander’s plan.
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A g r i b u s i n e s s development as a mission set is challenging for all ADTs. The mission is especially difficult during transition from team to team. The most effective ADTs are
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Private sector policy development By Lt. Col. Raymond Legg
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he Afghanistan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock recognizes the need to create and i mpl e ment economi c policies to foster the development of the private agribusiness sector throughout Afghanistan. However, it currently lacks either the resources or knowledge base to create, implement and enforce those policies. Despite nearly ten years of U.S. government involvement in Afghanistan and a heavy influx of USG capital into the country, much remains to be done to foster the development of a vibrant, organic and functional private agribusiness sector. T h e M A I L ’ s agribusiness development vision is for private sectordriven agriculture development that is world famous for quality and competitive products. In the last two years, the MAIL has made significant achievements in developing that vision. In October 2010, the MAIL convened an international AgFair to encourage international investors.
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ISO-9000 certification now enables raisin export to the United States and quality control labs have been established in major cities. The MAIL has established an Afghanistan Land Authority to streamline and simplify private access to land; an Agriculture Development Fund to ensure private sector access to agriculture and livestock credit; a Policy Analysis and Legal Advisory Department to promote an improved legal and policy framework that includes tax incentives, standardization and quality control; and a Private Sector Development Department (PSDD) to coordinate private sector development across all MAIL departments. Future plans for private sector growth include establishing Free Trade Zones and an International Food Center for packaging and whole-selling agriculture produce; and attaining international sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards to ease access to global markets. Funding limitations to support major programs and a lack of marketing expertise remain two major challenges facing
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Afghanistan’s agriculture development. The MAIL’s PSDD has been in existence for a little over two years. Since its establishment, however, the PSDD has done little relating to the development of the private sector. A new director will soon be appointed for the PSDD and will begin development of a department strategy and business plan. A timeline has not been established for this goal but hopefully it will not take long. Afghanistan’s rural population has traditionally relied upon subsistence or small scale agriculture for their existence. There are a few centers of economic devel opment, and few investors venture far from the major urban centers. Based upon experiences in other devastated countries, attempting to encourage growth and development through either indigenous farm development or large scale investment into the whole country, will not work. In order to be successful, private sector development must support provincial and district authorities, farmer associations and private agribusinesses. Provincial DAIL offices should be empowered to foster economic growth within the (Continued on page 7)
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Funding limitations to support major programs and a lack of marketing expertise remain two major challenges facing Afghanistan’s agriculture development.
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private agribusiness sector by r e mo vi n g b ar r i er s f or improved and alternative crops, supporting private sector and farmer associations, establishing a provincial agricultural identity, and maximizing local resources. However, this change requires reformulating the current governmental structure and will take time. In his September, 2005, “Potential Analysis of the Eastern Region and Nangarhar Province, Implications in Regional Planning,” prepared by the Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs, Raphy Favre suggested creating a small national office in Kabul to oversee the identification of pilot provinces and training to encourage economic development at the provincial and district levels. The office would report to a National Supervisory Board with representation of the key Afghan ministries as well as national representatives of farmer associations and the Chamber of Commerce. To be effective, the national office also needs to be mirrored at the provincial level. Establishing these Regional Agricultural Growth and Development Agencies could be a viable model to encourage foreign and domestic investment in fruit, vegetables, flowers and other agricultural products and aid
in stabilising the security situation. In addition they could become centers for irrigation, cultivation and processing technology. Improving the Agriculture Extension Agents technical skill sets through ADT’s Leadership Training Academy will provide the Nangarhar DAIL a solid foundation to use for increasing agriculture production in Nangarhar. Combining improved technical skills for AEAs and increased production by farmers creates the foundation for Regional Agricultural Growth and Development Agencies. Unless the AEA skill sets are improved, either before or concurrently with the establishment of regional agriculture growth and development agencies, Afghan farmers will be unable to fully exploit the opportunities these regional organizations would provide. Successf ul econo mi c reforms will require multiple efforts across the economic spectrum. As economic reforms are enacted, the Afghan government, local business communities and partner organizations must communicate those reforms across the economic spectrum to ensure they are understood by all participants. Provincial Development Councils must develop “bankable” agr icul t ur al projects with support from
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government and international donors. PDCs must also provide feedback to policy makers in Kabul on the impact of economic policy at the regional and provincial level ADT IV’s efforts to develop the professional planning and execution capacity of the Nangarhar DAIL will help ensure that agriculture projects presented to the PDC are sustainable and provide value added programs for local farmers. Farmer organizations, farmers, small holders and processors must be provided support for crop, product and process development. Provinces need to be promoted as viable and sustainable places to live and do business through exhibitions and specialized events. These exhibitions and events can promote the strength of the province’s existing agricultural business sectors and disseminate information. The primary objectives of the RAGD facilities will be to drive sustainable agricult ur al e c o n o mi c gr o w t h a n d development at the provincial level, stimulate agricultural economic development in targeted regions through the dissemination of agricultural policy, engagement in agricultural growth and (Continued on page 8)
A farmer examines a sample of seed on display at a booth set up as part of the DAIL sponsored Agriculture Exhibition at the Governor’s Compound on Mar. 21. This was the first time an agriculture exhibition was held during the Farmers Day celebration which is a traditional event held in conjunction with the Afghan New Year.
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Private sector policy development T he second window of opportunity is winter vegetable development policy formulation production before the beginning of through feedback from Pakistan production. These narrow stakeholders in the region, and the windows of opportunity explain the promotion of national and regional low vegetable production levels in policies to ensure that the private Nangarhar. Farmers and traders sector benefits from a consistent understand this counter-season opportunity and have proven to be and effective policy framework. fast in responding to market Even if these challenges are signals. overcome, the development of a vibrant private sector economy will Continuation of this economic be extremely difficult to establish practice does not require major in Nangarhar without infrastructure publ i c suppor t f or f ut ur e development as most development. farmers can afford to invest In 2005, CFNA in annual crops, including described the road network vegetables. in Nangarhar as “deplorable.” With U.S. The eastern region funding the road network produces significant cotton has since improved, but and clover crops. With there is insufficient 35% of the country’s cotton information to determine production, the eastern the measurable effects of region offers opportunities for small scale basic those road projects. processing plants. In addition to infrastructure challenges, The high level of clover Nangarhar’s limited land A vendor advertises locally produced honey and the banner in production reflects the availability limits the the background says “Home products are the pride of Afghanifairly good livestock and province’s agriculture stan” at the Farmers Day Agriculture Exhibition held March 21. dairy sector in Nangarhar. (Photo by Scottie McCord, Public Affairs, Nangarhar PRT) The eastern region also has potential. the highest number of cows With 145,280 hectares of arable agriculture market because, except land, the eastern region of f o r o k r a w h i c h r e q u i r e s per family in Afghanistan. Afghanistan, including Nangarhar Nangarhar’s warmer climate to However, the high summer Province, is not a main agriculture perform well, fruit, cereal and temperature in Nangarhar requires production area and only represents vegetable production is limited. a well operated cold chain, with 6% of the permanently irrigated Vegetables grown in Nangarhar are higher costs and technical land and 3% of the intermittently transported directly to Pakistan difficulties, to establish a irrigated land. Water availability is from farmer’s fields. productive dairy industry and there a constant constraint resulting in is no current initiative to support Two windows of opportunity increased dairy production or the predominance of annual for vegetable production exist in processing. cropping. Nangarhar. The first is the few The eastern region only weeks between the end of Pakistan Despi t e t hese hist or i cal produces 5% of the national wheat production and before the Afghan limitations, Nangarhar province has production. Rice and maize highlands enter production. the potential to develop a production are more significant at (Continued from page 7)
16% and 15% respectively. The rice crop is used mainly for local consumption, while maize is used for both personal consumption or as animal fodder. While fruit production in the eastern region of Afghanistan is currently limited, it has a vast potential. CNFA estimates that the annual cash flow of productive orchards in Nangarhar could be over $2,000 USD per hectare. Jalalabad lacks a wholesale
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By George Roemer, USAID h e i n o u s v i o l e n t a c t . Guest Contributor
George Roemer, USAID, and Staff Sgt. William Fox, ADT hydrologist, work together with the local village to evaluate the measures necessary to increase the agriculture productivity at Shinwar.
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t i s n o w approaching fifteen months since I first stepped onto Afghan soil. In this time, I have experienced many things strange and new, as well as many things surprisingly familiar. A m e r i c a n involvement is entering its' 10th year in this country. I have been personally responsible for the monitoring and administration of our national treasure (your tax dollars) and have experienced the tragic l oss of f ri ends, bot h military and civilian. Life goes on for the United States and Afghanistan. Our confl uence i n world history at this point in time is borne out of a
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H o w e ve r , a s h i s t o r y judges either of us, it is obvious we will affect each other’s culture as a result of this experience. The expression, “One of the few constants in life is change” applies here as well. I have been here long enough to see an entire cropping cycle in Afghanistan's Nangarhar Valley. It is amazing the var i et y of cr ops and vegetables grown in this part of the country. Never having lived where double and even triple cropping is practiced, it is a learning experience to see the abundance of produce grown. I have been here long enough to see three rotations of Provincial Reconstruction Team Soldiers and Airmen, two rotations of the A g r i b u s i n e s s Development Team National Guard units from Missouri, and two rotations of Special Troops Battalion Soldiers. It p r o ba bl y i s t h e intensity of our Afghanistan experience that makes our friendships stronger and bonds so firm. Sometimes, we get so wound up in what we are
doing, we lose sight of the fact that this is but a way station in life for all of us serving here. Earthquakes and indirect fire are also a way of life here. We have had at least six earthquakes since my arrival. Fortunately, their epicenters have always been far away and we have only felt 'slight' t r emor s. Our B -Hut s wiggle with the earth during an earthquake, dampening the effect. Those in brick and mortar structures usually feel less, but have to worry about collapse. Indirect fire, which i ncl udes r ocket s and mortars, is fairly infrequent but unforgettable. It is amazing how sound and vibration transfer though the soil to your bed and wake you up. During this type of event, we B-Hut residents have to don our helmets and body armor and get into a bunker or 'hardened' structure. My former roommate and I had this down to 45 seconds. There was the time he had to remind me to put on my pants, and that added a few seconds to our timeline. As someone who can now claim 'hands -on' agricultural experience (Continued on page 10)
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on four continents and over half a dozen different countries, it is interesting to make some comparisons; 1. Farmers are farmers, whether American, European, African or Afghan. All engage in hard physical labor, are generally unappreciated, even looked down upon by their non-farm neighbors, and view their respective governments with some amount of disdain. T h e y a r e al so t he mos t genuine, friendly and honest people one will meet on any continent, in any country. 2. Livestock are a universal source of wealth, pride and burden. From the nomadic Masai of Africa, the pastoral Kuchi of Afghanistan, to the free stalls and feedlots of America, various species of livestock r epr esent t hei r kee pe r s ' investment and potential income. These animals also require considerable labor and resources to make them profitable production units. Animal husbandry is practiced to different degrees of success around the world, being dependent on feed, water, veterinary care and managerial skills. 3. Crops and soil management are the basis of all agriculture, anywhere it is practiced. Wheat is the most universally important crop, followed closely by corn and rice. Conservation practices (or lack thereof) significantly THE
affect the productivity of the land. Keeping topsoil on the hillsides is the single most difficult challenge to agriculture anywhere. As an 'adviser' to the Missouri ADT, I am able to get involved in some agricultural projects and programs, give advice (it's free) and have been graciously allowed on many ADT missions. I have written curriculum and learning objectives for classes on agricultural mechanics and cooperative associ at i ons. I am e ven planning to teach a cooperatives class to Afghan agriculture extension agents. The ADT is in the process of building agriculture information centers in Nangarhar's district centers. It is becoming an accepted opini on t hat agricul tur e extension is the single best w a y t o b r i n g i m p r o ve d management techniques to Afghanistan's farmers. Helping educate the current extension agents is an important step in this direction. Giving them a base of operation is another. It is somewhat amazing what a hard sell this is to the nonagriculturally-oriented in military and civilian command. Even in a place where agriculture employs 8 0 % o f t he po p ul at i on , getting respect is difficult. This face to face engagement is, I believe, key to whatever success we may
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have in this country. My ADT friends have had to hear me say too many times, “A country cannot have an industrial revolution until it has an agricultural revolution.” At least the ADT guys nod their heads in agreement before rolling their eyes. My nonagricultural colleagues just roll their eyes. It is the human element in the Afghan enigma that is most compelling to contemplate. Whether on or off the FOB, we see a wide variety of people and motivations. It is easy to get negative feelings about this country and its people. There are those who want to do we expatriates physical harm; others who see us as the last in a long line of invaders with our own selfish motives for being here; still others who are trying to capitalize on our generosity for their own gain. Yet for every one of those negative elements there are, I would argue, a greater number of positives. For example, during my vi si t s t o f ar mer s i n t he surrounding area while on mission with the ADT, I have had some amazing exchanges and conversations. Afghan farmers talk about the weather, crops and gover nment agricult ural programs. Sound familiar? We also found out there are custom pesticide (Continued on page 11)
George Roemer stands on the edge of a cornfield with Staff Sgt. Eli Colson that doesn’t look much different from farmer’s fields in the U.S. Roemer say, “Farmers are farmers…”
“A country cannot have an industrial revolution until it has an agricultural revolution.”
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applicators in Afghanistan! Of course, the custom operator we met uses a three gallon hand pump and something from a bottle we couldn't read, but his area's farmers (“between those two mountains” he pointed out) depend upon his services for crop protection. Another example is the young Afghans who have returned from abroad to help their fellow Afghans. They f r e q ue n t l y c o me t o o u r office, sometimes looking for advice but almost always looking for funding to assist their countrymen in rehabilitating watersheds, improving irrigation systems or training farmers on better agriculture practices. Two instances stand out; a pair of young Afghan born men living in Norway came to us looking for advice on building a school in their home village. Another young Afghan man called me from San Diego, then had his brother stop in for a visit to also ask about building a school in their home village. There is a large group of younger Afghans (mostly men) that we see at meetings who are patiently waiting their turn for authority. Many of them are graduates of Nangarhar University here in Jalalabad. It is amazing how adaptable we humans are to an array of circumstances.
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Soldiers and civilians here alike take our environment in stride and attend to their respective tasks. The military element here is hi ghly professional and does an excellent job of keeping us safe, both on the base and on mi s s i o n s . T h e c i vi l i an s include support staff who cook and maintain equipment, as well as those of us who supervise d e ve l o p me n t . W e o f t e n become good friends and respect each other’s work. Part of the next step in the Afghan strategy is to have e ve n mo r e c i vi l i a n an d military presence in what are called, 'Key Terrain Districts' or KTDs. The idea is to focus development strategy in areas with larger concentrations of people (most are farmers), and along critical transportation corridors. My post is now in Shinwar District, as part of a designated District Support Team. I am living and working out of Forward Operating Base Shinwar. Most of this and the surrounding districts are agricultural. My major responsibility will be to work with farmers, agriculture extension agents, and farmer associations (cooperatives) in Shinwar and neighboring KTDs. I bring to our team almost a year's worth of experience with provincial level programs, as well as an
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agricultural background. This will help give some guidance and technical knowledge to what we do. We in agriculture know better than most about not stopping until 'the job is done'. The job is far from done here in Afghanistan. I point out that production agriculture is not just a lifestyle but a business as wel l , even i f it ma y be subsistence. It is critical to economic development in Afghanistan. It is my experience that all farmers recognize the need to update and innovate, regardless of country or continent. Based on what I have seen, Afghan farmers are no different than those with whom I have interacted in any other country. One of the most productive efforts here, in my opinion, is the Missouri ADT's focus on training agriculture extension agents. This includes their efforts in b u i l d i n g a n d e q u i p pi n g a gr i c u l t u r e i n f o r ma t i o n centers in each of Nangarhar Province's district centers. These agents will represent the government of Afghanistan at the most fundamental level of development. It is rewarding to be advising and assisting t he s e f i n e S ol di er s an d Airmen in this endeavor. Afghanistan's agricultural revolution is somewhere in the future. Hopefully our efforts here will help it begin.
“The job is far from done here in Afghanistan. I point out that Agriculture is not just a lifestyle but a business as well, even if it may be subsistence. It is critical to economic development in Afghanistan.”
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Creating agriculture opportunities for women By Sgt. 1st Class Earl Eisenbacher
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Photo by Scottie McCord, Public Affairs, Nangarhar PRT
A Soldier speaks to a promoter of the Development Association for Afghanistan which trains and hires women to process and can fruits and vegetables.
of the greatest challenges to the Agri-business Development Team is the creation of agriculture related opportunities for women. A big hurdle in Nangarhar Province, and likely much of Afghanistan, is the importance Muslim society places on men and the status of each within their social circles. This pattern is ingrained in each boy from the day they are born. To understand how the ADT can increase opportunities for women, one must understand the basics of Afghan norms and values. From this basis, the ADT can work within the limiting factors to develop programs which empower women but yet stay within the framework of the male dominated society. For a person from West er n soci et y, t he culture of Afghanistan can be a bit shocking. More than once we have seen the difference in status of women in the Pashto culture. Women are typically fully covered with a burka or hejab after the age of 15. The burka is a
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complete one piece dress which covers the person from the top of the head to her feet. The hejab is a full length dress without the head covering but is typically worn with a scarf to cover the head and face. According to traditional society, only the husband is allowed to see his wife uncovered. M o d e r n l a w s d o n ot enforce the wearing of a burka or hejab but the culture places a big importance on preserving family honor and status is directly tied to the protection of women’s honor. During missions, women will avoid contact with Soldiers. This includes squatting down and placing their back towards us or moving indoors out of sight. A major taboo is for a Soldier to attempt to engage a woman directly in conversation. The woman may be beaten or possibly killed, depending on the area of Nangarhar Province, as this interaction is shameful for the husband or the male relatives of that woman. In some of the outlying areas of the province, the farmer's animals seem to have a greater importance than the women and children.
We have seen animals being transported inside a vehicle while the women and children were riding in the trunk of the car. The disparity of education between males and females has been well documented in Afghanistan. Currently, of the over six million students in Afghanistan, 35 percent of them are girls. During the reign of the Taliban, women were not allowed to go to school. Typically today, rural villages allow their girls to attend school through the sixth or eighth, depending on the district. Tribal norms influence education. The more progressive and developed areas, such as Behsood and Kama districts, see more women completing high school and some ar e allowed to attend college. In the more restive districts, such as Khogyani and Hesarak, girls are not allowed to complete more than a few grade levels if they are allowed at all. Education is power and power is controlled as much as possible with some tribes by limiting education largely to the males.
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Creating agriculture opportunities for women (Continued from page 12)
So what is the involvement of women in agriculture? On most farms, they play as vital of a role as the husband. Their labor inputs to the farm are sometimes as great as the man's. The woman is charged with maintaining the home and responsible for cooking food, raising c hi l dr en an d c ar i n g f o r livestock. The men tend to the field crops and take on daily labor outside of the f ar m w h e n a vai l a bl e t o supplement the family income. The women also help with duties in other relatives' homes when possible, as well as assist men with planting, weedi ng and har vest ing when extra labor is needed for a short period of time to complete critical farming tasks. Women are typically in charge of tending the farm livestock. This includes chickens, turkeys, goats, sheep and cattle. All l i vest ock are gr own for family consumption first and then, if extra animals are available, they are sold off. There seems to be a division of thought with marketing excess products with farmers. Some farmers we have interviewed viewed selling excess production as rather selfish, the farmer
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s houl d t a ke car e of hi s relatives in his village with his bountiful harvest before selling it for his own personal gain. Obviously, that is not always the case as a trip through any district will reveal markets bloated with the current vegetable crop. Multiple butchers are also typical in any given market; the product has to come from somewhere and the nearby farms are usually the source. Women are able to make a contribution to the farm income from the products provided by their tended animals. Chicken meat; eggs; milk from goats, sheep and cows; as well as yogurt and cheese made from excess milk are sold to local villagers and markets. Bartering is important for farm economics; trading of production goods is made to access needed commodities. For the ADT to implement a sustainable woman's initiative, it has to fall within the norms of society and the accepted farm life. The ADT can increase women agriculture opportunities by focusing on their responsibilities on the farm. Specifically, poultry training has been the first step for the Missouri ADT. The first hurdle the ADT overcame was answering the question “How do we teach women about poultry?”.
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Men are not usually allowed to have direct contact with women. The Kentucky ADT overcame this by hiring an Afghan company to conduct training with a woman trainer. We have adopted this practice and hired Mr. Mohammad Sultani with the Agency for Building a New A f gh a ni st a n t o c o nd uc t poultry training using his female instructors. T he t rai ning program included two days of training conducted by a female trainer from ABNA. Additionally, the Nangarhar Department of Agriculture, Irrigation and L i ve st oc k h as a f e mal e master trainer who sat in on the training as well. The first program was initiated in Qalah-ya Atek village, Kuz Kunar district in early February. The program was designed to train 25 poor, widowed or disadvantaged women from the village how to raise and manage chickens for meat and egg production. In addition to the training, each woman received nine hens, a rooster, a feeder, a waterer and two months worth of feed. The chickens were six months old and ready to lay eggs immediately. The ADT was not present f or t he t r ai ni ng but the (Continued on page 14)
“Women are able to make a contribution to the farm income from the products provided by their tended animals.”
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Creating agriculture opportunities for women (Continued from page 13)
Spec. Virginia Fletcher stands with recent graduates of a poultry course the Nangarhar ADT sponsored in Kuz Kunar.
ABNA later provided photographs of the twoday session. The District Agriculture Extension Agent, Mr. Mohammad Zarif, was present and his role was to oversee the project. Involvement of the District AEA was important because it put the face of GIRoA on the project and enabled the villagers to see a direct benefit from their government. In this way, the training contributed t o t h e A D T ’ s counterinsurgency efforts. The next obstacle to overcome was the ability of the ADT to check the status of the project at a later date to see if the women who received the training were actually sustaining their poultry operation. Because the
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ADT Ag Section is allmale and because all of our interpreters are also men, making an unannounced visit to the village required additional planning not typically required for other Ag missions. To resolve this problem, a female Soldier was selected fr om the securit y f or ces plat oon to conduct a key leader engagement with the trained women. Spec. Virginia Fletcher was up to the task and she was given a list of q u est i o ns t o as k t h e group of women involved with the training program. Also, a female interpreter was requested from the PRT unit on FOB Fi nl ey Shields to accompany the Ag Team to the village. Once on site, the district AEA arranged a meeting place for the women, Fletcher and the female interpreter. Fletcher reported the women were excited to have received the training and had taken necessary steps to make the program sustainable. They had organized themselves into what resembled a farmer’s cooperative association by c onsol i dat i ng t he
housing area for about two- thirds of the chickens. This eased securing and maintaining the flock. The eggs were collected daily and taken to the Jalalabad markets by a local villager. He returned the money earned from egg sales to the women. Some of the eggs had also been col lect ed and pl aced under broody hens to be hatched, to add to the future flock. An agreement had been set up with a local farmer to provide grain for future feed needs. Finally, training of additional women in the village had been done by some of the elder women on their own accord. The village has seen a direct and tangible benefit from the training program. It appears the women can appreciate the future possibilities with the simple provision of agriculture education and a few materials. The long term s u st ai na bi l i t y o f t h e project has yet to be determined but from the outside, it appears the t r a i n e d w o me n h a ve made the most of their opportunity to start a small business. (Continued on page 15)
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Creating agriculture opportunities for women (Continued from page 14)
The ADT will continue periodic assessments of the project to determine if additional adjustments are needed or if other information is essential for long term sustainability. A reasonable goal would be for the DAIL female master trainer to continue poultry training throughout Nangarhar with the assistance of local women previously enrolled in the program. Their first hand experience would be an invaluable part of training other women. This process would not only be empowering for women but an added value to each farm community.
Additional opportunities exist for women in agriculture. The ABNA offers training for bee keeping, carpet weaving, and goat rearing also. Other economic opportunities are available through home canning and juicing businesses and maintenance of greenhouses. The largest stumbling block for an outsider is to recognize the importance of society norms and values in Afghanistan. Agriculture programs can empower women but to be successful, they have to be within the acceptable cultural range of responsibilities. Taking small steps forward will ensure no major setbacks will occur in the progress of Afghan female agriculturists.
Private sector policy development (Continued from page 8)
significant agribusiness sector. A thorough and comprehensive agri-market analysis can determine what infrastructure and market improvements will have an immediate and direct positive impact on agribusiness sector. ADT IV has begun to analyze the agribusiness market situation to determine the scope and extent of agri-business activity throughout Nangarhar. That analysis will provide an information transition to ADT V that allows them to develop a focused plan to improve agriculture markets. Establishing Regional Agricultural Growth and Development facilities in Afghanistan will be challenging and will require the support of MAIL, Provincial Governors, Provincial Development
Councils and donors. In order to be successful private agribusiness sector development must be championed by the key ministries – MAIL, MRRD, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy. On the provincial level ADT IV will allocate approximately ten percent of its time during its fourth phase focusing on economics by enhancing the value chain for Agribusiness in Nangarhar. This will be done by linking businesses with other businesses, individuals, cooperatives, non governmental organizations, and Government Islamic Republic of Afghanistan officials to further their economic opportunities; better coalition forces, GIRoA, and private sector knowledge of such opportunities; and help encourage sustainable private sector growth.
Contact Information
MONG ADT IV
The Muleskinner Report provides insights and analysis on the Nangarhar Missouri National Guard Development Team’s mission. If you have questions or comments on the Muleskinner Report, please contact Col. Mike Fortune at mike.fortune@afghan.swa.army.mil The Muleskinner is an unofficial publication authorized by AR 360-1. It is published monthly by the Missouri Agribusiness Development Team IV to provide important information related to their deployment for the Soldiers and Airmen, their Families, units and commands, the Army, DOD and the public. Views and opinions expressed in the Muleskinner are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or DOD.
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