The Reconfiguration of the Global State-Capital Nexus

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Globalizations

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The Reconfiguration of the Global State–Capital Nexus

Bastiaan van Apeldoorn a , Naná de Graaff a & Henk Overbeek a a VU University Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Version of record first published: 02 Aug 2012.

To cite this article: Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Naná de Graaff & Henk Overbeek (2012): The Reconfiguration of the Global State–Capital Nexus, Globalizations, 9:4, 471-486

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2012.699915

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Globalizations

August2012,Vol.9,No.4,pp.471–486

BASTIAANVANAPELDOORN,NANA ´ DEGRAAFF& HENKOVERBEEK

VUUniversityAmsterdam,TheNetherlands

ABSTRACT Notinganapparent‘return’ofthestatethisarticleanalyzestherearticulationof state–capitalrelationsinthecontextofthecurrentglobalcrisis.Departingfromthenotionthat capitalandstateareinternallyrelated,wedistinguishfourrolesthatthestatecanplaywith respecttocapitalaccumulationandonthatbasisexaminetowhatextentandhowthestate–capitalnexusisreconfiguredinboththeglobalSouthandglobalNorth.Wearguethatin spiteofamoreactivistroleofthestateinthelatterandtheriseofglobalizingyetstate-led accumulationstrategiesintheformer,theglobalizingdynamicofcapitalandtheconcomitant deepeningcommodificationgoonunabated.The‘reboundofthestate’thatisthefocusof thisspecialissueisthusseenasinstrumentaltoanongoingglobalizationofcapital, notwithstandingsignificantpowershiftsarisingoutofthiscontradictoryprocess.

Keywords: state–capitalnexus,statetheory,capitalaccumulation,globalcrisis,globalization

Introduction

Globalcapitalismisinadeepcrisis.SincetheoutbreakofthesubprimecrisisintheUSin2007, successivedestabilizingwaveshavegonethroughtheglobaleconomy.Thetrajectoryofthe crisishasmadeitclearthatwearenotsimplydealingwithasingularfinancialcrisis,but withanunderlyingcrisisofoveraccumulation,andwithacrisisoftheneoliberalhegemonic projectthathasshapedthecourseofglobalcapitalismforthepastdecades.Thisstructuralpoliticalandeconomiccrisisisfurthermoreintimatelylinkedtothedeepeningecologicalcrisisas wellasboundupwithanincreasinglypalpablepowershifttotheEastwithintheglobalpolitical economy.Theaccumulationregimeofthepost-WorldWarIIerawasbasedontheintensificationandglobalspreadofhydrocarbon-basedenergyandtransportationsystemsthatarethreateningthesurvivaloftheecosystemsofourplanet.Atthesametime,thesupremacyoftheWest, establishedinthefourteenthtosixteenthcenturies,appearstobewaningwiththedeclineofUS

CorrespondenceAddress:BastiaanvanApeldoorn,DepartmentofPoliticalScience,DeBoelelaan1081,1081HV Amsterdam,TheNetherlands.Email:e.b.van.apeldoorn@vu.nl

ISSN1474-7731Print/ISSN1474-774XOnline/12/040471–16 # 2012Taylor&Francis http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2012.699915

hegemonyandtheriseofAsiaasarivalcentreofaccumulation.Thehegemonictransitionthat thispotentiallyimplieshasbeenbothreflectedandreinforcedbytheglobalfinancialandeconomiccrisisofwhichtheUSitselfhasbeentheepicenter.Thereisanabundanceofliteratureon thecrisisandonmanyofitsaspects.1 Itisstriking,however,thatonecrucialaspectofthecrisis hassofarreceivedlittleattention,andthatisthechangingroleofthestate.

Intheearlydaysofthecrisissomesuggestedthatthecrisisofliberalcapitalismheraldeda returnofthestateandofstatistregulation.The‘returnofstatecapitalism’andthe‘returnof thestate’becamepopularcatchphrasesinthefinancialpress(e.g. TheEconomist,2008; FinancialTimes,2008).Indeed,tworecentdevelopmentsappearedtolendsupporttothisnotion.

First,inthecrisis-riddencoreoftheglobaleconomy,afull-blowndepressionwasavertedby thestatetakingoverthereinsfromcapital,savingthehypertrophiedfinancialsectorfromcollapsebyhugebail-outsorevenoutrightnationalization,andsubsequentlybyunprecedented ‘stimulusprograms’sustainingoveralldemandwhere‘themarket’wasunableto.Itsoontranspired,however,thatincreasedstateactivismdidnotinanywayrepresentareturntothetypeof interventioniststateknownfromthedaysofthepostwarboom.Infact,asthecrisisinthecore entereditsnextphasefrom2010onwardsinwhichthebail-outsandthestimulusprogrammes turnedouttohavebeenonlyapartialsuccesswhilecomingatthepriceofrapidlyrisingsovereigndebt,governmentsinbothNorthAmericaandinthecrisis-riddenEurozonehaveturnedto austerityinafutileattempttopacifythefinancialmarkets.Thisnewphaseofthecrisishasraised newquestionswithregardtotherelationshipbetweencapitalandthestate:iftheincreasedrole ofthestatedoesnotrepresentareturntothecorporateliberalconfigurationofthe1950s–1970s, whilethereisarguablyalsoaclearmoveawayfromthepeculiarneoliberalconfigurationofthe 1990sandearly2000s,thenhowshouldweunderstandthesechangesandtheemergingnew configurationofthe2010s?

Second,countriesoutsidethecoresuchasBrazil,India,andespeciallyChinainitially managedtoescapethecontractionoftheworldeconomyasaresultofstate-ledeffortsto sustainandevenaccelerateaccumulationthroughsuccessfulprogramsofcapitalcontrols,infrastructuralinvestment,demandstimulus,andtechnologicalupgrading(seethecontributionby SchmalzandEbenauinthisissue).Theimmediatelyvisibleresultwastheacceleratedriseof newcorporategiantsfromtheglobalSouth,both(quasi-)privateandstate-owned,inmanufacturing,services,energy,andfinance.Thishasreinforcedalonger-termriseofcapitalfromthe globalSouthgoinghandinhandwiththeassertionofanewlyconfidentstate-basedauthorityon thepartofsomerisingpowers(inparticularChinaandRussia).Insomecasesthesestatesseem topositionthemselvesascontenderstatesvis-a`-vistheWest.Thishappenedatthesametime thattheleadingpoweroftheWestitself,theUSstate,cametore-emphasizeandbolstertheterritorialandcoerciveaspectsofitsimperialistpower.

Together,thesetrendsindeedappeartosignalafundamentalpowershiftinfavorofthestate. However,suchaconclusionwouldbemisleadinginasmuchasitfailstograspthatcapitaland thestateare internallyrelated:statepowercannotbeabstractedfromtheprivatepowerof capital.Hence,wefocusourattentionintheremainderofthisarticleonkeyaspectsofwhat wecallthe state–capitalnexus andwewillexaminetowhatextentandhowthisnexusisreconfiguredinthecontextofthecurrentglobalcrisis.Wethusseektothrowlightonhowthe ‘ReboundoftheState’—thefocusofthisspecialissue—isrelatedtowhatweseeasthe ongoingglobalizingdynamicofcapital.Thoughthecontradictionsofneoliberalglobalization havebroughtusintothecurrentcrisis,thecrisis,andtheresponsestoitbystatesandelites, hasnotyetdentedtheseculartrendofdeepeningcommodificationaccompanyingaccumulation capitalaccumulationonaworldscale.

TheReconfigurationoftheGlobalState–CapitalNexus 473

Ratherthanamountingtosomeone-dimensional‘returnofthestate’,thetrajectoryofthe crisisoverthepastfewyearshasratherbeenmarkedbythe combination ofa‘returnofthe state’withacontinueddeepeningoftheprocessofcapitalisttransnationalizationandglobalization.Inordertomakesenseofthiscontradictorymovementourkeypointsofdepartureare (1)thenatureofthecapitaliststateastheinstitutionalensemblenecessarytoguaranteethe generalconditionsforcapitalaccumulationandthereproductionofanycapitalistsocial formation,and(2)thenatureofthestateasaterritorialpowercontainer(Taylor,1994)and theparticularfunctionsofterritorialityinthereproductionofthecapitalistglobalorder. The twoaspectsarerelatedinasmuchasglobalcapitalismhasbeenboundupwithandmediated byapre-existingsystemofterritoriallydemarcatedstatesfromitsinception(Teschkeand Lacher,2007).

Followingtheabove-notedtrends,wewilldistinguishbetweenarearticulationofstateand capital within thetraditionalcoreofthecapitalistworldeconomy,thatis,withinwhatafter WorldWarIIbecametheliberal‘West’,and outside thattraditionalcore,inparticular(butnot exclusively)inthoserisingpowersthatarenowfashionablyreferredtoastheBRICs(Brazil, Russia,India,China).Inbothcaseswearguethatthetransformationofthestate–capital nexusdoesnotimplythestateabandoningtheprojectofglobalcommodification.Onthecontrary,bothinthecoreandintheerstwhileperipherystatestrategiesseemtobegearedtowards deepeningcommodificationoflaborandnatureratherthantowardsde-commodification.

Theremainderofthisarticleisorganizedasfollows.Insectiontwo,weelaboratethegeneral relationshipbetweenstateandcapitalintheaccumulationprocess.Then,sectionthreeturnstoa discussionofthechangingstate–capitalnexusintheWesternheartlandofglobalcapitalism. Finally,sectionfourprovidesadiscussionoftheapparentriseofstatistcapitalisminthe ‘globalSouth’.

TheRoleoftheStateinCapitalAccumulation

Althoughinthecontextofthecurrentcrisisthecriticalroleofthestatewithincapitalismisplain foreveryonetosee,foralongtimethishasbeenratherhiddenbyaneoliberalideologysustainingthemythof laissez-faire capitalismenabledbythenegationratherthantheapplicationof statepower.Thismythhasoftenbeenmirroredinmanyleftist(esp.popular)critiques,invoking theimageofthestatebeingsubordinatedtooverpoweringmarketforces.Inmuchacademicliteraturethesedistortionshavetendedtobesustained,evenifinadvertently,byadichotomous discourseofstates versus markets,orthenotionthatstatesandmarketsarebydefinitionopposite forcesandmarketscanonlyexpandwherestatesretreatandviceversa(e.g.Strange,1996; Underhill,2001;Weiss,1998;cf.Schwartz,2010,foraslightlydifferentapproach).For manythishasmadethe‘returnofthestate’soremarkableandunexpected,whereasinfactof coursethestatewasnevergoneinthefirstplace.Insomesensetheextensionofmarkets mayindeedinvolve‘rollingbackthefrontiersofthestate’,asMargaretThatcherputit,butit iscriticaltounderstandhowthisistrue,andinwhichwaythestate—despiteappearancesto thecontrary—remainscriticalwithrespecttothereproductionofthecapitalistsystem,even initsmostliberalmode.

Goingbeyond‘state–market’conceptualizations,wedrawupon statetheory withinMarxian politicaleconomy(e.g.HollowayandPicciotto,1978;Jessop,1990)andPolanyi’sinsightsinto theemergenceofmarketsocietytodistinguishfourrolesthestateplayswithrespecttothe capitalaccumulationprocess(focusingnarrowlyontherelationshipbetweencapitalandthe state):

1 Marketcreation:helpingtobringabout,andifnecessaryre-establish,andgenerallyensure theeffectivefunctioning,ofmarkets—includingthemarketsforwhatPolanyi(1957)called the‘fictitiouscommodities’oflabour,land,andmoney,whichareapreconditionforcapitalistaccumulation;

2 Marketcorrection:mitigatingthedestructivesocialeffectsofthosesamemarketsor,more generallyspeaking,managingthecapital–labourrelationshipandreproducingthesubordinationoflivinglabortocapital;

3 Marketdirection:directingandsupervisingcapitalaccumulationwhereprivatecapitalfails todoso;

4 Externalrepresentation:representingtheexternalinterestsof‘domestic’capital,ranging fromthepracticeofeconomicdiplomacytotheforcefulprotectionandpromotionof businessinterestsifneedbebymilitarymeans.

Whereasthefirstroleisanecessaryconditionfortheconsolidationofcapitalism,andthe secondroleisarguablynecessaryforitssocialreproduction,thethirdrole,whichiftakento itsextremewouldactuallycontradictthelogicofcapitalism,ismorecontingent.Thefirst threerolescanbeabstractlyunderstoodasreferringtothe‘capitaliststate’assuch,without referencetotheexistenceofapluralityofstates(i.e.thestatessystem).Thatis,although eachofthesethreerolesmayhaveanexternaldimension,theyinthefirstinstancereferto theinternalroleofthestate,i.e.totherelationbetweenstateandcapitalwithintheterritory overwhichthestateexercisessovereignty.Thefourthroleisexplicitlyexternalinasmuchas herethestateactsasprotectorofcapitaloutsidethebordersofitsterritory(referringtothehistoricalgenesisofthebourgeoisstate,HeideGerstenbergercalledthis‘merkantileAussenvertretung’—literally‘externalmercantilerepresentation’;Gerstenberger,1973).Inthecontemporary eraofglobalcapitalism,thisroletranscendsthelimitationsofthenational.Thestate–capital nexusthusrefersfirstofalltothe(internal)relationshipbetweenthestateandcapitalin general,andattheleveloftheworldmarketthisbringsintoviewthespecificroleofthehegemonicstate,andofglobalquasi-stateinstitutions(vanderPijl,1998)orwhatCoxcalledthe internationalizedstate(Cox,1987)inguaranteeingtheruleofcapitalglobally.Letuslookat eachrolesomewhatmoreclosely.

Regardingthefirstrole,wemustnotethatalthoughmarketsexistedinpre-capitalistsocial formations,itisonlywithincapitalismthatcommoditiesarespecificallyproducedforthe market, and theproductionprocessitselfisregulatedbythemarketmechanism,involving,as Polanyi(1957,p.71)argued,thesubordinationof‘thesubstanceofsocietyitselftothelaws ofthemarket’,thusprimarilyemphasizingthesphereofdistribution.Marx,ofcourse,essentiallydescribedthesameprocess,whichheaptlyreferredtoascapitaltaking‘commandofproductionitself’,thushoweverplacingmoreemphasisontherealsubsumptionoflabourunder capitalintheproductionprocess(1991,p.444).Crucially,capitalismisnotanoutgrowthof anatural‘commercializationprocess’(Wood,2002);rather,itistheeffectofhistorically specificsocial(class)relationsexpressedin,aswellasbroughtaboutby,thestate.Oneofthe mostlastinginsightsofferedbyPolanyiisthatthe‘self-regulatingmarket’isa‘utopia’and thatthestatehasalwaysplayedanessentialroleinestablishingcapitalistmarketsandincreating the‘fictitiouscommodities’ofland,labour,andmoney(1957,pp.68–76).AsvanApeldoorn andHorn(2007,p.215)pointoutitisthestatethatprovidesthe(interrelated)institutionalpreconditionsforcapitalistmarketstoariseanddevelop:forexample,byenablingcertain‘things’ tobeturnedintocommodities;bycreatingandguaranteeingpropertyrights;byissuingandsustainingthevalueofmoney;andbyensuringsufficientlycompetitivemarketsthrough,for

example,competitionlaw.Thisunderlinesthe internal relationshipbetweencapitalandthestate inany,evenaneoliberal,capitalisteconomy.

Now,withinthelimitsofthecapitalistmodeofproductiontheroleofthestateisnot exhaustedbyprovidingtheseinstitutionalandpoliticalpreconditions.Theroleofthestate maygo,andoftenhasgone,andsometimesinorderto‘savethesystem’, must go,beyond thisroleinseveralways.Goingbeyondheredoesnotnecessarilymeangaininginimportance butitdoesmeanacquiringamoredirectandmorevisiblerolevis-a`-visandwithinthecapitalist economy.Thesecondroleofthestateincapitalistsocialformationsisagainonewefindinthe workofPolanyiandinhisaccountofthe doublemovement inwhichthecapitalistmarketis (re-)embeddedlestitshouldfallvictimtoitsownutopiaanddestroythesocialfabricby whichitissustained.Hereembeddednesscanbetakentomeanthat‘society,inandthrough theagencyofawiderangeofsocialforces,seekstoconstrainthedestructiveanarchyofthe freemarketbysubjectingittovariousformsofextra-economicregulationthatnonetheless supportandsustaincapitalaccumulation’(Jessop,2001,p.3).Examplesofsuch‘extraeconomicregulation’includethewholeplethoraofsocialpoliciesassociatedwiththewelfare state.Thesepoliciesmayperformthefunctionofavoidingcapitalism’scollapseunderthe weightofitsowncontradictionsbuttheymayalsopotentiallybe‘anti-capitalist’innature and,dependingonpolitics,ultimatelytranscendcapitalistrelationsofproduction.Moretothe point,theroleofthestatehereisnot directly orientedto(sustaining)capitalaccumulationas such,butrathertomitigatingitsdisruptivesocialeffects.

Thethirdrole,whichalsogoesbeyondthepoliticalconstitutionofcapitalistmarketsand comesclosesttotheestablishednotionof‘statecapitalism’(aswillbediscussedinthefinal sectionofthisarticle),isbecomingmoreimportantwithintheglobalpoliticaleconomywith whatmisleadinglyisseenasthe‘returnofthestate’.Wherethisroleorfunctionmanifests itself,thestateplaysa directing roleinthecapitalistaccumulationprocessitself:seekingto foster,guide,anddirectcapitalaccumulationnotthroughtheestablishmentofmarketsand thefreeingupofmarketforcesbutbytakinguparoleofitsownasanagentofcapitalaccumulation.Thiscanhappenunderconditionsofstalematebetweensocialforceslockedinindecisive classconflict(asunderfascismandNationalSocialismintheInterbellum:seeCox,1987, pp.140ff.),orinthepursuitofapassiverevolutionfromaboveindevelopmentaliststates (ibid.,pp.230ff.)orwhatvanderPijlcallscontenderstatesengagedinacatch-upstruggle (vanderPijl,2006;seealsohiscontributiontothisissueonChina).

Thefourthrolecanpartlyoverlapwiththefirstthreeroles,especiallytherolesof‘marketcreation’and‘marketdirection’,butisheredistinguishedanalyticallyinordertoemphasizethe importanceoftheexternaldimension.Externallythen,thestateservesastheprotectorof‘its’ capitalontheworldmarket.AccordingtoGerstenberger,externalrepresentationwasindeed constitutiveofthebourgeoisstateassuch(Gerstenberger,1973).Theinstrumentsemployed inthisfunctionrangefromdirectcommercialsupporttodomesticfirms(importlevies,export subsidies,conditionalitiesimposedonaidrecipients,etc.),viatraditionalcommercialdiplomacy (becomingincreasinglydominantintheoverallpackageoftasksassignedtothediplomatic corpsofadvancedcapitaliststatesinrecentyears)totheapplicationofmilitarypowerin supportofthecompetitivepositionofdomesticcapitalontheworldmarket.Oneonlyneeds tothinkoftheextensiveglobalmilitary/securityinfrastructure—aboveallprovidedbythe US—thatunderpinsworldwidefreetrade(‘theglobalmarket’)toillustratethevastroleof thestateinbackingupcapitalaccumulationontheworldmarket(herethentheexternalrole overlapswiththefirstroleof‘marketcreation’).Althoughwiththeongoingglobalization processasubstantialpartofcapitalaccumulationistransnationalized,capitalnevertheless

continuestobeembeddedinspecificnationalsociopoliticalstructures.Transnationalcapital oftenstillhasastrongnationalorregional(EU)homebaseandmarketwhilenational classes,astiedtotransnationallyorientedbutstillalsopartiallynationallyembeddedcapital, tendtopersist‘underneath’oftenregionallyconfigured(ratherthantrulyglobal)processesof transnationalclassformation.

Havingbrieflyoutlinedinrathergeneralandabstracttermstheroleofthestateintheprocess ofcapitalaccumulation,wewillnowengagemoredirectlywithrecentrearticulationsofthe state–capitalnexusundertheimpactoftheglobalcrisis,lookinginturnatwhatappearsto beamore‘activist‘roleofthestatewithintheNorthAtlanticarea,andat‘returnofstatecapitalism’intheformoftheincreasingimpactof‘emergingeconomies’oftheglobalSouthandthe associatedriseofstate-ownedenterprisesontheworldmarket.

TheStateComingtotheRescue:RearticulatingtheState–CapitalNexusintheWest

Asindicatedabove,andasisbynowwellestablishedintheliterature(e.g.Birchand Mykhnenko,2010;Dume´nilandLe´vy,2011;OverbeekandvanApeldoorn,2012),neoliberalismwasneveraboutthewitheringawayofthestate,orthedeclineofstatepowervis-a`-vis marketswithstateandmarketsviewedindichotomousterms.Neoliberalism,instead,representedaconcertedinterventiontoshiftthebalanceofclassforcesinresponsetothecrisis ofthe1970s,thatis,a‘strategyofthecapitalistclassesinalliancewithuppermanagement, specificallyfinancialmanagers,intendingtostrengthentheirhegemonyandexpanditglobally’ (Dume´nilandLe´vy,2011,p.1;seealsoOverbeekandvanderPijl,1993).Thisstrategywas aboutconfiningtheroleofthestatetoguaranteeingthegeneralconditionsforcapitalaccumulationandthecreationofmarketswheretheydidnotexist,andhencebringingmoreandmore areasofsociallifeunderthedisciplineofcapital.Stateshavedonesothroughactivistpoliciesof privatizationandmarketizationbuttheresultofthathasbeenthatthestateitselfhasrecededinto thebackground,stillplayingakeyregulatoryrolebutnotinterferingwiththepricemechanism assuch(seealsovanApeldoornandHorn,2007).Indeed,inmanyareasandatdifferentlevelsof governancewehavewitnesseda‘marketization’ofregulationitself(e.g.seeBuch-Hansenand Wigger,2011;andHorn,2011).Althoughtheseneoliberaltransformationsareglobalprocesses, asapolitical project neoliberalismmustbeviewedascentredwithinandledbytheliberalWest, abovealltheUS.Neoliberalismwasafterallaresponsetoahegemoniccrisiswithinthis ‘heartland’.

Thenearcollapseofglobalfinancialmarketsin2008appearedtoheraldthefinaldemiseof theneoliberalprojectasstatescametotherescuethroughbail-outsandevennationalization.The statehadnotonlyintervenedtosaveaninflatedfinancialsector,butgovernmentsacrossthe OECDalsoseemedreadytorespondtoagroundswellofpublicopinioncallingfortougher publiccontrolofinparticularthosefinancialactivities—suchastradinginmortgagebacked securities,creditdefaultswaps,andotherderivatives—thatmostclearlyremindusofMarx’s observationthatitisinthenatureofcredittodevelop‘themotiveofcapitalistproduction... intothepurestandmostcolossalsystemofgamblingandswindling’(Marx,1991,p.572). Withsuchstrictregulatorycontrol,andinconjunctionwith(partial)nationalization,wethen mighthavewitnessedashifttowardswhatwehaveidentifiedasthethird(possible)roleofcapitaliststates,thatofdirectingandsupervisingcapitalaccumulation—atleastwithregardtothe financialsector.

Theseexpectations,however,havenotbeenborneout.Governmentofficialseverywherehave beenadamantinproclaimingthatstateinterventioninsupportoffinancialinstitutionswasonlya

temporarymeasure,andthattheseinstitutionswouldbe‘returnedtothemarket’assoonasconditionswouldallow.Thus,inpublicdebatesthroughouttheOECD,frequentreferenceswere madetotheSwedishexperiencesintheearly1990s(Jackson,2008; NewYorkTimes,2008), wheretheSwedishstatenationalizedbanksintroublein1992andprivatizedthemagain yearslater,makingaprofitintheprocess.IntheUS,nationalizationofbankswaseffectively ruledoutasanoption‘[n]otonly’,Obamahasexplained,‘becausephilosophicallythatwould havebeenaradicalshift’butalsobecauseoftheexpectedmarketdistortion(Susskind,2011, p.457).

Inthemeantime,muchofthefinancialsectoritselfquicklyrecoveredwithprofitsandbonuses reachingpre-2008levelsagain(ontherecoveryoftheUSfinancialsector,seee.g.Hager,2012). Thishasfurthermorebeentakenasaconfirmationofthewisdomofanotherpathchosenby statesthroughouttheoldcapitalistcore,whichistorefrainfromanyradicalregulatoryoverhaul ofthefinancialsector.Despiterepeatedcallsformakingfinancetheservantoftherealeconomy again,thefreedomoffinancialcapital—afreedomwonafteralltheregulationoftheNewDeal/ Fordisterahadbeenundoneinthe1980sand1990s—hasremainedlargelyuntouched.Inspite ofitsawarenessthatsomethingneededtobedone,thecrisismanagementoftheObamaadministrationhaslargelystayedwithinthelimitsimposedbythepowerfulinterestofWallStreetto whichObama’seconomicteamhasproventobesubservientthroughoutthecrucialfirstyearsof theadministration,whichcametoofficeinthewakeofLehman’sfall.Asdocumentedby Susskind(2011),Obama’seconomicteam,largelyconsistingofformerClintonofficialsresponsibleforthederegulationofthe1990sandcloselyaffiliatedwithWallStreet(seevanApeldoorn anddeGraaffinthisissue),wasfirstofallguidedbytheprincipleof‘first,donoharm’ (Susskind,2011,pp.200–202,417),thatis,donotinanywayinterveneinthemarketifyou arenotsurethatthiswillnotdistortitorratherpreventthereturntoprofitabilitywithinthefinancialsector.AlthoughObamain2010didsigntheDodd–FrankAct,whichwashailedasthe biggestregulatorymovesincetheGreatDepression,thiswassimplybecausenoreregulation, butonlyderegulation,hadtakenplacesince.Infact,thisfinancialreformpackagewasvery watereddown,largelybecauseofthesuccessfullobbybyAmerica’sleadingfinancial institutions.

WithinthecontextoftheEurocrisisthereisverylittlediscussionoftakingonthefinancial sector,eventhoughitisclearthatherewecanfindoneoftherootcausesoftheso-calledsovereigndebtcrisis(Overbeek,2012a).ThepolicydiscourseonthepartofEurope’sgovernment leadershasbeenlimitedtotalkaboutafinancialtransactionstax,which,however,iseffectively blockedbytheUKandarguablybythosememberstatesthatarehidingbehindit(andarguethat theywouldonlyfavouritifthewholeworldwouldgoalong).Thebail-outshavethusfarthen notturnedouttobeapreludetothestatetakingthereinsfromcapital,butratherhaveturnedout tobejustthatwhatthenamesuggests,namelythebail-outofthebankersandthespeculators who,enabledbyfinancialderegulation—thatisthemarket-makingrolethatthestateplayed intheneoliberal1990sand2000s—hadincreasinglybeenluredtoPonzifinance(Minsky, 1986).Herethestatehasprovenitsindispensabilityforthecapitalistclass,aswithoutitsintervention,notonlywouldthereigningfinancialaristocracyhavebeenwipedout,butthereproductionoftheglobalcapitalistsystemasawholewouldhavebeenmortallyendangered.Though suchacataclysmiceventwouldhavearguablyalsohurtmanyordinarypeople—especially sinceworldsocialismwasnotwaitingaroundthecornertotakeitsplace—thepointisthat theconditionsunderwhichthis‘rescue’hastakenplacehavebeenhighlybeneficialaboveall totheleadingsectionsofthecapitalistclass.AsDavidHarvey(2011,p.266)concludesin hisrecentbook,whathasbeenfollowedisthetriedandtestedrecipeof‘rescuethebanks

andsockittothepeople’.Politicallytoo,thebankingworldappearstobebackinthedriver’s seat.InEurope,ofallthesocietalinterestsaffectedbythedebtcrisis(wageearners,publicsector workers,pensioners,smallenterprises)onlythefinancialsectorrepresentedbytheInternational InstituteofFinance(IIF)wasabletoobtainaseatatthenegotiatingtableinarevealingdisplay ofitsstructuralpower(CEO,2012).InthecontextoftheEurozonecrisiswehavefurthermore seenthecorestatesprotectingtheir‘own’capitalandmarketsbycoercingtheperipheryintoa programofintensifiedausterityandretrenchment,thatis,thefourthroleofexternalrepresentation—namely,thestateactingonbehalfofcapitalratherthaninanywaytakingthereinsof theaccumulationprocessintoitsownhands.IntheUSthetiesbetweenWashingtonand WallStreethaveremainedascloseasever,andthesetieshavearguablypartlypreventedthe USadministrationfrommakinganymoreforcefulstepstowardsreversingfinancialization andtakingonthelikesofGoldmanSachs(vanApeldoornanddeGraaff,2012,andinthis issue;seealsoSusskind,2011).

Finally,theenormoussumsofpublicmoneybeingpouredintotheglobaleconomytosustain demandinthefaceofthetotalblack-outintheglobalcreditmarketsin2008–2009didnot,we knownow,announceafull-scalereturntoKeynesiandemandmanagement.Rather,theyturned outtobeanemergencymeasuresoontobereplacedbyarenewedandindeedevendeeper neoliberaloffensiveofausterityandretrenchment.IntheEurozoneinparticular,thediscipline imposedbytheTroikaissqueezingalllifeoutoftheperipheraleconomiesinadesperateattempt toupholdtheGerman-ledprojectof‘competitiveness’inaglobalcontext(e.g.Bellofiore etal.,2010).

Insum,inasmuchasneoliberalismhasbeenaprogramofrestoringandsubsequentlyreinforcingthepowerofcapitalthroughaglobalprojectofmarketizationandcommodification,the crisisthusfarseemsnottohavebeenabletoseriouslydentthis.Intermsoftheframeworkoutlinedabove,thismeansthatintheWestwethusfardonotseeasignificantshiftfromthefirst, market-makingroleofthestatetothesecondandthirdrolesofmarketcorrectionandmarket direction.Infact,theneoliberalprogrammeinsomerespectsappearstohavegainedanextra leaseoflife,albeitlessasahegemonicprojectthanasa(last?)flightforwardinwhichtherepressivecharactercomestodominatetheconsensualaspects(asissoclearlydemonstratedinthe peripheryoftheEurozone).Neoliberalism’scontinued‘ecologicaldominance’(Jessop,2010) hasenabledtheforcesdrivingit—firstandforemostUS-ledfinancialcapital—toredrawthe boundariesbetweenthepublicandtheprivate,betweenthestateandthemarket,pushing,yet again,thereignofcapitalintonewcorners,destroyingnotonlyremnantsofpre-capitalist socialrelationsbutalsoleadingonaglobalscaletowhatSaskiaSassen(2010)hasaptly calleda‘savagesortingorwinnersandlosers’.Thesustainederosionofwagesandpensions, theintensifiedprivatizationoffensiveintheareaofwelfareandhealthcare,theforcedsaleof stateassetsatfiresalepricesintheindebtedcountriesintheperipheryoftheEurozone,thecontinuedcreationofnewmarketsinthefaceofclimatechangeandbiodiversitydepletion(carbon credits,biodiversitybanking),theseallbearwitnesstotherealityofyetanotherphaseofaggressiveneoliberalprivatization.Capitalhassuccessfullyoffloadedthelossesthatitsspeculative flightforwardofthe1990sandearly2000scaused,thuscontributingtoamassiveredistribution ofwealthandincomebetweenthemassofthepopulationontheonehand,andthetop1%of wealthownersontheother.FocusingontheWestorthe‘globalNorth’,neoliberalismindeed appearstoarisefromitsasheslikeaphoenix(cf.Peck,2010,p.275).

Amorefundamentalrearticulationofthestate–capitalnexusintheWestmayyetbeinthe offing,butthusfarithasremainedlimitedasthestatehasratherplayedtheroleofprotecting theinterestsofcapitalingeneralbysavingthecapitalistsfromthemselves,butnotinaway

TheReconfigurationoftheGlobalState–CapitalNexus 479

thatleadstoanydurablestatistdirectionofthemarketbutratherinstrumentalizingthecrisisto promotefurtherneoliberalization.Yetatthesametimeitmustberecognizedthatneoliberalism isnolongerahegemonicprojectandinthatrespectmightbereaching,asvanApeldoornand Overbeek(2012)havesuggested,theendofitslife-cycle.Althoughforsurewecannotyet observeeithertheemergenceofanalternativeaccumulationstrategynoraconcomitanthegemonicproject—evocativeofwhatGramsci(1971,p.276)calledtheinterregnuminwhich‘theold isdyingbutthenewcannotyetbeborn’(cf.Hay,2011)—itisalsoclearthattheconsentamong significantsectionsofWesternworkingandmiddleclassesuponwhichneoliberalgovernance previouslyrestedhaslargelyeroded.

InEurope,themovetowardsGerman-led,evermoreextremeausterityispartofaconservativepoliticalprojectandintermsofaccumulationstrategycombinesdisciplinaryneoliberalism withakindofmercantilismwithintheEurozoneoftheNortherncreditorandsurplusstatesvisa`-vistheindebtedanduncompetitiveSouth(Overbeek,2012a).Althoughthesepoliciesenjoy supportamongatleastsignificantsectionsof,forexample,theGermanelectorate,other elementsthatwerekeytotheneoliberalprojectbeforehaveclearlylosttheirlegitimacyin thewakeofthecrisis.Thisappliesabovealltofinancializationbutalsotomarketization moregenerally,including,forexample,theprojectofshareholdercapitalismormarketization ofcorporatecontrolpromotedbytheEUinrecentyears(Horn,2011).Whileindeed,as noted,thishasnotyetledtoanysignificantreversalofthesepolicies,itisdifficulttosee howtheycanbesustainedinthelongerrunwithoutanyrenewedhegemonicprojectthat wouldsomehowsuccessfullyincorporatethem.Chancesforsucharenewalofneoliberalhegemonyseemtobeasdimthoughastheprospectforeconomicrecovery.Regardingthelatter, anotherEurope-widerecessionseemsallbutcertain.Asaresult,massivesocialunrestofthe kindthatatthetimeofwritingcontinuestoenflameGreecewilllikelyspreadeventotheEU heartlandandfurtherdeepenthemultilayeredlegitimacycrisisfromwhichtheEU— reflectingthefailureoftheelite-drivenneoliberalprojectthathasbeeninformingitspolicies—hasbeensufferingevensincebeforethecurrentcrisis(vanApeldoorn,2009).

Indeed,resistancetothecurrentausteritydriveisalreadygrowingandnotjustinSouthern Europe.Currently—andespeciallywiththeelectionofHollandetotheFrenchpresidency— thepoliticsoftheEurozoneappeartobereconfiguredwithanincreasingchorusalsofrom withinthepoliticalestablishmentcallingforagrowthagendatoatleastcomplementifnotmitigatefiscaldiscipline(BarberandSpiegel,2012).Neverthelessitisfarfromclearwhetherthis shiftwillbesufficienttoswayGermanyandothercreditor/surpluscountriesenoughintothe directionofamoresensiblesetofpolicieswithrespecttotheEurozonecrisis.Andevenifit would,thereisnoguaranteethatthiswouldinfactpreventabreak-upoftheEurozone.

IntheUS,theepicenterofthecrisis,wecanobservethatObama,asindicated,hasthusfarnot inanysignificantwaybrokenwiththeneoliberalmodel.However,hisdiscoursehasrecently shiftedbacktoaformofpopulismthatclaimstorespondtomiddleclassdiscontentby seekingtocreateaneconomyinwhich‘everyonegetsafairshot’ratherthananeconomy‘weakenedbyoutsourcing,baddebtandphonyfinancialprofits’,andcalling interalia forhigher taxesforthe1%ofhighestearners(Obama,2012).Whetherthisismorethancampaignrhetoric andactuallyconstitutesanincreasedmarketcorrectingroleofthestateremainstobeseen.

AsBrenneretal.(2010)havesuggested,neoliberalismisstillwalkingbutratherlikea zombie.Whetheritwillcontinuetodoso,orwhetheritwillreturntothelivingthrougharegeneratedhegemonicproject,orwhetheritwillfinallygotoitsgrave,ofcoursedependsuponstrategiesadoptedbyelitesaswellaspursuedbythoseresistingthecurrentstate–capitalnexusfrom thestreetsofAthenstoZuccottiPark(cf.KoningsaswellasHorninthisissue).Thuswhether

thestateanditsrelationshiptocapitalcanbereconfiguredwillintheendbedeterminedby broadersocialandpoliticalstruggles.Thesestruggles,however,arenotconfinedtotheWest andinordertocometoamorecomprehensiveunderstandingoftowhatextenttheroleofthe stateintheglobalpoliticaleconomyischangingwenowturnourattentiontothe‘global South’,inparticularthatpartoftheSouthwhichisnowemergingtochallengethepowerof WesternstatesandWesterncapital.

TheRiseofaNewStatistCapitalism?State-OwnedEnterprisesfromtheGlobalSouth ontheWorldMarket

Talkofanew‘statecapitalism’surgedinparticularinthewakeofwhatwasthenstillthesubprimecrisiswithinthefinancialpressandothercirclesoftheWesternfinancialelite.Thusearly in2008the FinancialTimes publishedan‘in-depth’dossieronitswebsiteentirelydevotedtothe themeofstatecapitalism(FinancialTimes,2008).Thediscourseconstructedtheretendedto viewthenewstatecapitalismascomingfromtheEast,andinparticularemanatingfrom‘illiberal’and‘autocratic’regimessuchasChinaandRussia,andasathreattotheinterestsofthe Westandmorespecificallyitsfreemarketmodel(e.g.Bremmer,2008;Kagan,2008).

Inthesediscussionstheterm‘statecapitalism’isusedinaratherlooseanda-theoreticalway asacolloquialismreferringtoaperceivedtendencyofanincreasedroleofthestateinthemanagementoftheeconomy(whethernationallyoroftheglobaleconomyasawhole).Inthe Marxisttradition,statecapitalismhashadamuchmorepreciseandtheoreticalconnotation, employedbysomeasreferring,ratherconfusingly,tothepoliticaleconomiesoftheSoviet Unionorpre-1979China(e.g.ResnickandWolff,2002),whileinanotherstrandofolderliteraturethetermreferstostrategiesofeconomicdevelopmentintheperiphery(e.g.Petras,1977). WiththecollapseofcommunistruleintheSovietUnionandEasternEurope,andwiththesteady marchtomarketcapitalisminChina,thefirstusageoftheconcepthaslargelybecomeonefor historians.Thesecondmeaning,referringto‘catch-up’strategiesonthepartofdevelopmentalist statesoutsidetheWesterncore,isarguablymorerelevanttounderstandingtoday’srearticulation ofthestate–capitalnexusinwhatwemaybroadlydefineasthe‘globalSouth’.However,given themorespecificmeaningsattachedtothetermsstatecapitalisminsomeliterature,wehere prefertheterm‘statistcapitalism’(inanalogytoHarris,2009,whotalksaboutstatistglobalization)todescribewhatweseeasaparticularconfigurationofstate–capitalrelationsinwhichthe state’sthirdpossibleroleasoutlinedabove,namelythatofinpart directing thecapitalaccumulationprocess,isparticularlypronounced.Stayingwithintheconfinesofcapitalism,weview statistcapitalism asacontingentphenomenon—whichmaymanifestandhasmanifested itselfinvaryinghistoricalcircumstances—inwhichtheroleofthestatetendstogobeyond whatisnormallydeemedtobetheessenceofcapitalism(thatis,theprivateownership and controlofthemeansofproduction)butstopsbeforethepointwheremostofthesurplus valuewouldineffectbeappropriatedcollectivelyratherthanprivately,andwherecapitalist competitionwouldceasetofunctionassuch.

Wearguethatthenewstatistcapitalismontheonehandcanstillbeassociatedwiththestrategiesofdevelopingstatesseekingtocatchupwith—andintheprocesscontendwith—thepower oftheWest,butthat,ontheotherhand,thenatureandformofthenewstatiststrategiesarerather differentfromthoseoftheprecedingera.Thelikelyupshotofthesedevelopmentsisnotastateledroll-backofglobalcommodificationprocesses,butrathertheircontinuationbydifferent means.Also,althoughtheriseofstatistcapitalismisunlikelytooverturntheliberalglobal ordercompletely,itmayverywellbeexpectedtoconsiderablytransformit.Chinainparticular

representsadifferent‘varietyofcapitalism’thanthatwhichhasbecomehegemonicintheWest. AsKeesvanderPijlnotesinhiscontributiontothisissue,thestateclassratherthancapitalis sovereigninChina,whichatleastleavesopenthepossibilitythatChina’srisewillresultina reshufflingofthestructuresofglobalgovernance,withareducedroleformarket-basedgovernancemechanismsandagreaterroleforinter-statebargaining.

Thereisofcourseagreatvarietyinmoreparticularformsofstatistcapitalismand‘catch-up’ strategiesamongthevariousrisingpowersfromtheglobalSouth(seealsothecontributionby SchmalzandEbenauonthesetrajectorieswithinBrazil,India,andChina).Animportantdistinctiontobemade,however,isbetween rentierstrategies and developmentaliststrategies (Overbeek,2012b).2 Whereastheformerreferstoastrategymaximizingincomederived fromthepossessionofnaturalresources(exploiting‘naturaladvantages’),thelatterconstitutes aninvestment-drivenindustrializationstrategythatpartlyignores‘natural(dis)advantages’.This heuristicdeviceishelpfulismakingsenseofhowdomesticpowerconfigurationsandexternal manifestationsontheworldmarketarecorrelated(seealsothecontributionbySchwartzinthis issue).Wecansubsequentlyrelatethistodifferentideal-typicalstate–societycomplexes—in turnimplyingdifferentconfigurationsofthestate–capitalnexus—outsidetheWesterncore, representingdifferentdegreestowhichtheymaypotentiallybeexpectedtochallengetheexistinggeopoliticalorder:

1Proto-states(Cox,1987,pp.218,230–231):stateswheretherelationshipbetweenstateand societyisinconstantcrisis,andwherenosocialforceisabletogainwidespreadconsentand governeffectively.

2Rentierstates(Beblawi,1990):stateswherethenationaleconomydependsmostlyonthe realizationofrent,basedonthepossessionofcertainnaturalresources(e.g.minerals)orgeographicadvantages(e.g.controloverastrategicseaway),andwheretherentaccruestoa stateclass(Elsenhans,1991)orrulingclique.

3Late-industrializingdevelopmentaliststates(Cox,1987;Gerschenkron,1962),wherethe stateplaysaleadingroleinthepromotionofindustrialdevelopment,andwherethestate classiscommitted(inanycaseforlegitimationpurposes)topursuingdevelopmentgoals forthesocietyatlarge.

4Hobbesiancontenderstates(vanderPijl,1998,2006)areasubsetoflate-industrializing developmentaliststateswherethestateclassdevelopsanambitiontochallengethehegemonyoftheLockeanheartlandinthepowerstructureoftheglobalpoliticaleconomy.

Twokeyexamples(bothofwhichreceivefurthertreatmentinthisissue,cf.deGraaffand Schwartz,respectively)mayservetoillustratetheriseofstate-capitalistforcesfromthe globalSouthmakingtheirmarkonthestageoftheglobalpoliticaleconomy.Oneisthatof theriseofstate-ownednationaloilcompanies(NOCs),whichhaveplayedakeyroleinthecontestationoverenergyresourcesatleastsincetheestablishmentofOPECandareincreasingly becomingprominentplayersinglobalenergynetworks(deGraaff,2011,andinthisissue). Theotheristheriseofsovereignwealthfunds(SWFs),whoseincreasinglysignificantrolein theglobaleconomywasbroughttothelimelightinthecontextofthecurrentcrisis(e.g. Farrelletal.,2008).WeobservethatmanyNOCsandSWFsoriginateinrentierstatesonthe onehand(primarilytheAraboilproducers),andincontenderstatesontheother(e.g.China). Insomecaseswedealwithregimesrelyingonoilandgasrents(SWFsplayarelatively minorroleinthesecases)toeitherresistdeclinefrompreviousHobbesiancontenderstatus (Russia)ortoconvertthemselvesinto(junior)Hobbesiancontenders(Iran,Venezuela).

Finally,wehavesomesuccessfullateindustrializersproper,whoseSWFsplay(ormaybe expectedtoplayinthefuture)amajorrole(Singapore,SouthKorea).

Whatisimportanttoemphasizeisthatgenerallyspeakingall—includingthoselocatedin risingcontenderstates—ofthesenewglobalstate-ownedplayersdisplayan outward-looking, economicallyexpansionist (ratherthanprotectionist)outlook,integratingthemselvesintotransnationalcircuitsofcapitalistproductionandfinance.Whileatthemomentthis‘integration’ impliesthatthestatistcontendersplayaccordingtotherulesofthegameas‘defined’in thosetransnationalcircuitsofWesterncapitalism,itdoesnotnecessarilyimplyawholesale internalizationofthisruleset(cf.Harris,2009).Nordoesitimplythattheyareatthe momentactuallychallengingtheserules.Meanwhile,itdoesgenerateadifferentdistribution ofpowerwithintheglobalpoliticaleconomy,leadingtowardsanincreasinglymultipolar order.Althoughthisis,asofyet,notrepresentingafundamentalreconfigurationofthestate–capitalnexusintheWesterncore,thestatistcontendershavegainedaseatatthetableinthe globalgovernancestructures,whichmightverywellleadtoarealchallengetoWesterndominanceinthelongerrun.Overtimethesteadyriseofthestate-directedcapitalfromoutside thecapitalistcoremightthusalsoforceamoreactiveroleofthestateintheWest;more than,aswehaveobserved,hasbeenthecasehitherto.Decisivewillbetoseewhetherthese countriesdevelopintoautonomouscentersofcapitalaccumulation,withsurplusbeing reinvestedandservingtostrengthenthestate–societycomplexesinquestions,orwhetherultimatelytheaccumulationofcapitalintheseemergingeconomiesissuccessfullyintegratedinto, andsubordinatedto,thehierarchicallystructuredglobalcircuitsofcapital,with‘WallStreet’at theapexsiphoningoffamajorpartofthesurplusesproducedlocally.Whenlookedatinthis way,itmaywellbethatinthefinalanalysisthestateinperipheralformationsincludingmost would-becontenderstatesultimatelyservesasaninstrumentforcontinuedandintensified accumulationbydispossession(Harvey,2003).AsvanderPijlarguesinhiscontributionto thisissue,thestateclassesincontenderstatesmayverywellonlybeabletosuccessfullyinsulate themselvesagainsttheco-optingandsubmissiveforcesofWesterncapitaltotheextentthatthey areabletosuccessfullyundertakeandcontinueasocialrevolutioninternally.Mostemerging countriesdonotappeartohavethesecharacteristics.

Conclusion

InthisarticlewehaveexaminedtowhatextentandhowthecurrentglobalcrisisofWestern capitalismhasreconfiguredthestate–capitalnexusbothwithintheWestern‘heartland’and intherivalcentresofaccumulationoutsideoftheformercapitalist‘core’;inparticularsome ofthemajorpowersfromtheglobalSouth.Wehavearguedthatthisreconfigurationischaracterizedbythecontradictorymanifestationofa‘returnofthestate’ontheonehand,andacontinueddeepeningoftheprocessofcapitalisttransnationalizationandglobalizationontheother. Departingfromthefundamentalinterrelatednessofstateandcapitalwehaveproposedaconceptualizationofthestate–capitalnexusthatidentifiesfourdifferentrolesofthestatewithin (global)capitalaccumulationprocessesandthatallowsforanalysisofthechangingdynamic ofthestate–capitalnexus.

Wehaveconcludedthatwithrespecttoarearticulationofthestate–capitalnexusintheWest, theresponsetothefinancialcrisisandmoregenerallythecrisisoftheneoliberalgrowthmodel hasnotbeenaturntosomeformof‘statecapitalism’norafundamentalshifttowardswhatwe haveidentifiedasmarketdirection.Ratherithasimpliedanintensificationofthefirstmarketcreatingandmaintainingroleofthestateaswellasre-enforcingthe(fourth)dimensionof

externalrepresentation,withadeepeningofglobalcommodificationasaconsequence.This rearticulationhasbeenmanifestedbymajorstates’powerplays—boththeUSassertingits powervis-a`-vistherestoftheworld,andcoreNorthernEuropeanstatesvis-a`-vistheir‘Southern periphery’—andhasbeenunderpinnedbycoercivemeansrangingfromtheimpositionof sweepingausterityandretrenchmentmeasurestomilitaryintimidationandwar.

Ourgeneralobservationwithrespecttothenewstatistcapitalistsisthatwhereasearlierthe ‘statist’catch-upwiththeWestinvolvedamercantilistandprotectioniststrategyinwhichthe country’sownindustrieswereshieldedfromglobalcompetition,thestatistcapitalistsof todayhaveopeneduptotheworldeconomy,andareseekingtoachieveaprominentplace withinit,byandlargeplayingalongwiththe(neo-)liberalrulesofthegame.Atthesame time,however,weshouldnotmakethemistakethatwhatHarris(2009)hascalledthe‘statist globalizers’are—orwithtimewillbecome—justliketheWesterntransnationalcapitalist elites.Fornow,andfortheforeseeablefuture,thenewcatch-upstrategyisonly(neo-)liberal initsouterform,atitscoreitisstillmoreaboutstatesovereigntythanaboutthesovereignty ofcapital.Insum,wearguethatalthoughthecontradictionsofcapitalaccumulationinthe twenty-firstcenturytakeonaverydifferentformandshapeintheworldoutsidetheso-called Lockeanheartland,itisstillanopenquestionwhetherinthefinalinstancetheriseofrival centersofaccumulationconstitutesachallengetothefoundationsoftheneoliberalglobalorder. Thejuryisstilloutontheextenttowhichamorefundamentalreformulationofthestate–capitalnexuswillbegeneratedbythemultilayeredcrisisthatglobalcapitalismisfacing. Whatwehaveshownisthatsofarareconfigurationofstatepowerwithincapitalaccumulation—orforthatmatterademiseofWesterndominance—doesnotnecessarilyobstructorcontradictadeepeningandwideningprocessofglobalcommodificationandmarketization.

Acknowledgement

WewouldliketothankBarryGillsforhishelpfulcommentsonanearlierdraftofthispaper.

Notes

1Wecanonlymentionasmallsectionofthisliteraturehere.Onthecrisisinaverygeneralsense,seee.g.Gills(2010) andMcNally(2009).Onthecrisisasacrisisofneoliberalism,seeBirchandMykhnenko(2010);BrandandSekler (2009);Crouch(2011);Dume´nilandLe´vy(2011);Panitchetal.(2011);OverbeekandvanApeldoorn(2012).Onthe geopoliticaldimensionsofthecrisis,includingthetwinphenomenaofthecrisisofAmericanempireandtheriseof EastAsia(China),seeArrighi(2007);Callinicos(2010);Jacques(2009);Mahbubani(2008);vanApeldoornandde Graaff(2012);vanderPijl(2006).

2ThisdistinctionissimilartotheonemadebySchwartzbetween Ricardian and Kaldorian strategies(Schwartz,2010, pp.59–62).

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BastiaanvanApeldoorn isReaderinInternationalRelationsatVUUniversityAmsterdam.His researchcentresontherelationshipbetweenstatepowerandsocialpowerwithintheEuropean andglobalpoliticaleconomyandwithincontemporarygeopolitics.Hismostrecentbookis NeoliberalisminCrisis? (co-edited,Palgrave,2012).

486 B.vanApeldoornetal.

Nana ´ deGraaff isLecturerinInternationalRelationsatVUUniversityAmsterdam.Hermain researchinterestsarethegeopoliticsofenergy,globalgovernanceofenergy,corporateelitenetworks,andUSforeignpolicy.

HenkOverbeek isProfessorofInternationalRelationsatVUUniversityAmsterdam.His currentresearchfocusesontheimpactoftheglobaleconomiccrisisontheprojectofEuropean integration,andontheimplicationsofChina’sriseforglobalorder.Hismostrecentbooksare NeoliberalisminCrisis (co-edited,Palgrave,2012)and GlobalisationandEuropean Integration:CriticalApproachestoRegionalOrderandInternationalRelations (co-edited, Routledge,2012).