Book Reviews

BOOKREVIEWS

TheConceptofWorldfromKanttoDerrida.BySeanGaston.Pp.xiv,241,London,Rowman&Littlefield, 2013, £24.95.

KantfamouslysuggestedthatWesternphilosophy isbuiltuponthreeindispensibleconcepts:God,the self,andtheworld.SeanGastonexpertlyexamines thefateofthethirdnotioninpost-Kantian,continentalphilosophy.StandingbehindKantwas,of course,ourGreekinheritance.Aristotle’s Physics waspremiseduponwhatGastoncalls‘structuresof containment’,theveryfoundationofthemetaphysicalworld,whichChristianitywouldsubsume. Therewas‘theuniverse(theuncontainedthatcontains),theworld(thecontainedthatcontains)and beingsandthings(thecontained)’(4).Kant’scontributionwastochallengethenotionofworlditself aseitherapurelyrationalistorentirelyempirical concept.Itcertainlycannotbethelatter,because noonehasempiricallyexplicatedtheentireworld. Andhowcanitbetheformer,whentheveryact ofpositingtheconditioned(contained)isalways againstthebackgroundofthetrulytranscendent (theunconditionedthatcontains)?Onecannotconfusethetranscendentalideaofacontainerforthe sumtotalofwhatiscontained.Auniversalsetis notidenticaltothetotalityofitsmembers.‘The problemwiththeworldasanideaofpurereason isthenapparent’Gastonwrites,‘itisanideathat canproduceillusionswhenitistakenasawhole bytreatingtheunconditionedasameansofexperiencingthetotalityoftheconditionedseries’(10). Kantwouldsolvethisdilemmabycallingthe worldaregulativeconcept,onerequiredbyreason butinnowayactuallyknownbyus.Gastoncharacterizestheveryconceptoftheworldinmodern thought‘aprofounddisjunctbetweenreasonand experience’(11).

Hegelchafedattheworldasonlyaregulative concept,butdidn’treturntotraditionalmetaphysics,instead,hemovedKantianconsciousness inward,wherereason,risingabovethemerely material,becomesself-constructiveratherthancorrelative.‘Theactualityoftheworldisfoundwhen theobjectivityoftheconceptofworldexpresses theunconditionedrealityof theworlditself’ (38). Butthisiswhattheologywouldcallaneschatologicalrealizationoftheworld,whenitisfullytransfusedbySpirit.Inthemeantime,theworldislike

everyotherconcept,ceaselesslyspiralingaspartof humanity’sspiritualself-construction.

Husserl’sprojectbeganwithadeliberatesuspension,abracketing,ofthenaturalattitudetowards theworld.Individualimpressionsthatenterconsciousnessareeverinflux,yettheyrepresentan essentialflow,onewhichallowsfortheconstructionofreality.Yetevenhere,subject-objectdiscernmentoccursagainstthebackdropoftheworld. ‘Theactual,materialandnaturalworldisfirstand foremostforHusserlaspatio-temporalworld.’ And,mostimportantly,‘thisdefinitionofworld willhaveaninfluenceonbothHeideggerand Derrida’(49).Theirlaterworlds,likeHusserl’s, willradiatefromthebodyanditssenses.

AlsoimportantforHusserlistheexistentialsuretythattheworldprovides.Theworldis‘not determinedbythesumtotalofobjects in the world.Thestabilityandcoherenceoftheworldas awholeor“thehorizonofallhorizons”arises fromourbeliefintheinexhaustibilityofthegiven horizonsofpossibleexperiences.Inhislaterwork, Husserlwillcallthisthe“universalhorizon”’(51). Here,worldhaslongceaseditsworkascontainer ofobjects.Theologically,onewouldsaythatitis nowcallandconfidence.Itcallstousastheplace ofourself-completionandpromisesthatitsexplorationwillnotbeinvain.

HeideggersummonedWesternthoughtbackto thesearchforbeing,whichisnotitselfabeing. Humanityisthatpartoftheworldthatisconscious ofbeing,notsimplyindividualbeings.Atleastit canbe.‘Because“we are”Dasein,inraisingthe questionofbeing,whatisonticallyclosesttousis alsoontologicallyfarthestaway’(68).Beingmust breakintoour worlds ofcareandconcern.Note theplural.Theworldisnolongertheexistentially neutralbackdropthatitwasforHusserl.Notealso thatthecorporealityofthehumanimposesthespatialmetaphoruponourthoughtsofthewhole. Whatever surrounds theseHeideggerianworldsisa placefortheself-manifestationofbeing,butit neveritselfbecomesanobjectofknowledge. ‘Worldnowonlyregistersthetranscendentrelation ofDaseinto“beingsasawhole”andtothe

essenceofgroundasanintimationoftheocculted truthofbeing’(81).AswithHusserl,theworldno longerrepresentsaputativeobjectofhuman knowledge.Itdesignatesthehumancapacityfor transcendence.Theworldisnowexistentialhorizon,aconceptKarlRahnerusedtogreateffectin hisconstructionofapost-KantianThomism.

Gaston’sowncontributiontothisdiscussionis indialoguewithDerrida,forwhom,‘itistheir inherentassumptionsaboutlanguagethatallow bothHegelandHusserltoestablishidealizedand hierarchicalspiritualworlds’(102).‘World’isconstantlybeingusedtoestablishavantagepointfor thesubject.SoDerridacanarguethatthedeathof another‘shouldbetakennotasdeath“inthe world”butas“theendof the world.”’(105).‘As Derrida’sreadingofKantsuggests,thereisan inherentfictioninallconceptsofworld—the Kantian asif isonlyoneofthemoreprominent— andthehistoryofphilosophyhasneverstopped producingnewfictionsinitstirelesseffortstoopen andclosesomanydifferentworlds’(116). Derrida’sdeconstruction—toeschewpostulation againstapresumedhorizon—waspremisedupon

dismantlingconceptualconstructionsthatpreclude others.Gastonnotes,‘Whileworldwithouthorizon enablesustothinktheuncontainedwithinthecontained,itdoesprecludetheotherdominantaspect ofthetraditionalconceptofworld:theceaseless attempttouseworldtoestablishasecurevantage pointbeyondtheworld.Thereissimplynot enoughtimeorspaceforthesubjecttoestablisha transcendentalperspectiveorgod-likeplatform fromwhichtoviewtheworldasawhole’(123).

Gastonconcludeshissuperbsurveybyentering acurrent,environmentaldiscussion,suggestingthat ‘apost-human,earthcenteredcriticismgenerates bothalimitedconceptofworldandtreatstheearth asanidealizedotherinphilosophy’(151).Ata timewhensomanydisciplinesbegintoexamine humanity’srelationshiptotheearth,thenon-human isnow,liketheworlditselfwasatthetimeofthe Enlightenmentneither‘onephilosophicalconcept amongothersoranutterlyuniquetangibleobject’ (154),thoughweare,ofcourse,temptedtomakeit both.

DodgeCity,KansasTerranceKlein

MetaphysicsandtheEndofPhilosophy.ByH.O.Mounce.Pp.x,198.London/NY,Continuum,2007,$148.00.

Worksasambitiousasthisoneareusuallyeither ridiculousorimportant.Iwouldcertainlyassignthis booktothesecondcategory.Itisasustainedattack onthedominanceofphilosophyby‘scientism’,and consequenthostilityto‘metaphysics’,whichhasprevailedinsomuchofthephilosophyofthelastfour centuries,beginningwiththeworkofFrancisBacon. TheargumentisdevelopedwithreferencetoLocke, Kant,Comte,Russell,QuineandWittgenstein.What theauthorisuptoissetoutwithadmirableclarity andconcisioninhisForeword.Thetitleisofcourse ambiguous,anddeliberatelyso.Thehydra-headed monsterofscientism,whetherinitspositivist, empiricist,ormaterialistform,doesnotliterally aspiretoputastoptophilosophy,butrathertoensure thatitispracticedinanentirelynegativeway,as extollingscience,anddestroyinganyrelicsofthe metaphysical.Thecureishistory,whichshowsus thesamemind-setatworkagainandagain-with tiresomereiterationoftheclaimthatnowatlast,for thefirsttimeandonceforall,thetruthhasbeendiscoveredwhichwillenablesciencetoprevailand metaphysicstobedestroyed.Theirsuccessorscondemntherevolutionariesforbeingalsoensnaredby metaphysics,butintimesufferthesamefatethemselves.Asaresultofstudyingthishistory,thereader isinvitedtoseethetrue‘end’ofmetaphysicalphilosophy,inthesenseofitsrealobjectandaim.

TheauthortakesBacontotaskformisrepresentingAristotle’saccountofscience,andinparticular hisviewsoninduction;Aristotle’sactualaccountof science,heinsists,isateverypointsuperiorto Bacon’s(21).BothKantandComte,asDr.Mounce showsatlength,maintainedthatthetranscendent wasunknowable,buttheydidnotdenyitsreality;in thistheywerefollowedbymostofthepositivistsof thenineteenthcentury.Thetwentieth-centurylogical positivists,however,deniednotonlytherealityof thetranscendent,buttheverymeaningfulnessofdiscourseaboutit.(Dr.Mouncegetsagreatdealoffun outoftheanticipationoflogicalpositivismby AlexanderBryanJohnson,aNewYorkbankerwho dabbledinphilosophyinhissparetime,andpublishedtheresultsofhisruminationsasearlyas1836 (10).)Iwasspeciallygratefulforthedetailed accountoftheworkofErnstMach-ahistorically crucialfigureinthedevelopmentofthedispute, whichlaterpreoccupiedAlbertEinstein,between realismandempiricisminscience.Machdeniedthe realitybothofatomsandofcausality.Accordingto him,oncewehavereallyovercomethemetaphysical illusionoftranscendence,wewillcometounderstandthat‘(b)odiesdonotproducesensations. Rather,complexesofelementsorsensationsmake upbodies’Hereportsarevelatoryexperiencethat occurredtohimonesummerday,where‘theworld

withmyegosuddenlyappearedtomeas one coherentmassofsensation’(85–6).

TherecurrentphenomenonpilloriedbyDr. MounceisfairlyrepresentedbyBertrandRussell. AsRussellsawthematter,traditionalphilosophy hadnotonlybeenconcernedwithtruth,butwith comfort;thisiswhyithadallowedplaceformetaphysicsandmysticism,andwhyithadshownno advanceinthemannerofthenaturalsciences. Advancecouldbemade,however,ifoneresolutely soughttruthinphilosophy;thiscouldbedone bylogicalanalysis,whichhadrecentlybeenfacilitatedduetoadvancesinmathematicallogic. Unfortunately,theresultofhiseffortsinthisdirectionwasmerelytoproducewhatwouldsoonbe denouncedasitselfanewformofmetaphysics,the philosophyoflogicalatomism(127–9).(Asahostilecriticcomplained,doesn’tallthispsychological atomismandlogicalatomismreallyamountinthe longruntopathologicalatomism?Yetperhapsit wasanunderstandableifexcessivereactiontothe idealismofF.H.Bradleywhichprevailedatthe time,whereeverythingisrepresentedasamodificationorvicissitudeoftheoneAbsolute.)

Tobethoroughlyrationalonanytopicwhatever istoattendtotherelevantevidence;tothinkup

possibleexplanationsforit;andtopreferasprobablyorcertainlytruetheexplanationwhichbest accountsforthatevidence-asopposedtowhat suitsone’sconvenienceorpeaceofmind,orthe demandsofthosewhopayone’ssalary.Natural science,withallthespectacularsuccesseswhichit hasachieved,isamatterofapplyingrationalityin thisgeneralsense toaparticularrangeofevidence;howfarrationality inthisnarrowersense is tobeappliedtohumanaffairs,andtothequestionsofaesthetics,ethics,metaphysicsandreligion,ismoot.Iwouldmaintainthatindeedone oughttoaspiretobeasrationalaspossible,inthe broadsense,withrespecttoallsubjectswhatsoever;whatiscalled‘scientism’istheopinionthat this,whenproperlyunderstood,amountstothe universalapplicabilityofrationalityinthenarrowersense.Itakeitthatthequestionofwhatis trueonthismatterisbyfarthemostseriousideologicalissueofourtime,asisshownespeciallyby thenewatheism.Dr.Mounce’sbook,whetherone agreeswithitsconclusionsornot,istobehighly recommendedasaseriouscontributiontoits resolution.

Calgary,CanadaHugoMeynell

SacrificeinthePost-KantianTradition:Perspectivism,Intersubjectivity,andRecognition

.ByPaoloDiego Bubbio.Pp.xiv,212,Albany,NY,SUNYPress,2014,$85.00.

Themotivationforthepost-KantianIdealistic attempt,manifestespeciallyinHegel,torecastthe direct,literal,or‘naively’realisticaccountofreality,communicatedinacommonsensevocabulary ofthesubjectcomingtoknowanddealresponsibly withapparentlyindependentobjectsandpersons, intoan‘Idealist’idiomofSpiritengagingininternalself-differentiation,losingitselfinitiallyina ‘fall’intoself-forgetfulnessandalienationwhich takestheformofsubordinationtoanddependence onrealitiesthatappearindependent,thenwinning itselfbackpainfullyandprogressivelythroughan advancetohigherlevelsofknowledgewherebyit ‘sees’thesedistinctrealitiesasactuallyproductsof itsownmentalactivityandthusasless-than-fullyclarifiedvisionsofitsownproductiveandautonomousactivity,hasitsoriginintheconvictionthat theearlier,commonsenseversionwasthevehicle, notonlyofdistortionanderror,butofoppression, injustice,and–aslongasitlasts–lackoffulfilment.ItcarriesforwardtheEnlightenmentproject tofreewesternsocietyfromthemostsubtleform ofslaveryandbondage,notbyphysicalshackles, butby‘unclearideas’,becausethelatter,once accepted,leadusto puton physicalshackles

voluntarily.TheIdealistadvanceoverthe Enlightenmentisnottobanishthecommonsense viewdefinitively,asanepistemological ancien regime thatmustbeledtotheguillotinetomake wayforthe‘Republic’,buttoretrieveorrecuperateitsprincipal(andunavoidable)forms,which maybebroughtback,properlysanitizedandwith thebrutalauthoritarianelementspurged,suchthat theybecomeacceptableformsbywhichfreespirits mayinterrelateinequalityandmutualrespect. Bubbio’sprojecthereistoperformthisoperation onthemostprimitive,archaic,andapparentlyirredeemablepracticefrompre-modernsociety–sacrifice–andshowthatittoocanbeirradiatedso thatitsnoxiouspotentialiseliminated,leavinga sacrifice‘lite’or‘soft’thatisacceptableandeven uplifting.Actually,Kantandhis19th-centurysuccessorsalreadydidthis,anditistheworkofthis booktodemonstratethisdevelopment.Inthisprojectkeywordsarere-defined–inthecaseof ‘kenotic’,asthe opposite ofwhatitnormally means–tobringitintolinewiththeprincipal Idealistthesisthateveryimportantstageinthe developmentofSpiritinvolves(a)anadvancetoa clearerormoreadequatelevelofknowledge,and

(b)ismotivatednotbyany‘heteronomous’lack, need,ornegative ressentiment toward(apparently) otherpersonsorobjects,butonthecontraryautonomouslyandgenerously.Specifically,ina‘kenotic recognition’wevoluntarilyrenounceourabsolute perspectiveorself-assertiontomakeroomforthe ‘other’andgrantthemthesamefreedomtocome tofullexpressionandself-realizationthroughsimilarlybeingdeterminedinternallyratherthanexternally.However,thisapparentlyadmirableorheroic self-diminutionturnsouttobeitsopposite,oronly anotherinstanceofSpiritrelatingprimarilyto itself.The‘real’significanceoragendaofthis apparentlyself-diminishinggestureistoshowcase one’sunprecedentedandever-greaterautonomy, self-sufficiency,creativity,super-richness,abundance,andgenerositybeyondanythingseenpreviously,asonecannowaffordtograntsuchfreedom

andscopetoapotentialrival.Spiritistherebyable todemonstratethatithasadvancedtoahigher stageofitsexistence;theapparentself-humiliation ofsacrificeallowsoneinsteadtogo‘overthetop’! Itjust‘lookslike’spiritisgoingdown;actually,it isgoingup!

TheoptionfortheIdealistidiomforconveying thesamecontentexpressedincommonsenserealismwouldbe,althoughstrangeandcounterintuitive,anodyneandharmless–likeapreference forpolarcoordinatesoverCartesiancoordinatesin analyticalgeometry–exceptthatthisidiomis weddedtoamonismofthedevelopingAbsolute that–despite‘sacrifice’–neverrequiresusto getbeyondself-preoccupationandinveterate narcissism.

HeythropCollegePatrickMadigan

EclipseofGrace:DivineandHumanActioninHegel.ByNicholasAdams.Pp.xi,227,Oxford,WileyBlackwell,2013,$110.95.

NicholasAdamsisouttoconvincetheologiansto readHegel;andnotonlytheologiansofacertain Protestantstripe,buttheologians-fullstop.Adams arguespersuasivelythatHegelisrelevantforthe Christiantheologian,notforhissupposedcontributionstoChristiandoctrine,butforhisphilosophical accountofhowtheologiansthinkaboutdoctrine.In short,Hegelshouldbereadbythetheologianfor hislogic.Adams’principalmotivesarepedagogical,andaredirectedspeciallytowardstheEnglishspeakingstudentoftheology,whomayatfirst blushfindHegel’slanguageintimidating,orholda prejudiceagainsttheSchwabianphilosophercome downtohimfromBarthorMilbank,thereby excusinghimselffromseriouslyengagingwitha Hegeltext.AsAdams’studydemonstrates,Hegel repayscarefulreading.Thisbookservesbothasan introductiontoHegelforyoungtheologians,as wellasforscholarsengagedinmorespecialized work.AdamsiscarefultoexplainwhatGerman andEnglisheditionsheworksfromandwhy,providesasuccinctyetthoroughsurveyofEnglish andsomeGermanscholarshiponhistopic,and remindsusoftheextentofHegel’sinfluenceon 20th centuryphilosophyandtheology.

ThethrustofAdams’argumentisthatHegel usestheologicalresourcestodevelopan‘alternativelogic’,alogicwheretherelationbetweenthe divineandhumancollapsestopointwherethey becomeidentical.SignsofHegel’sprojectareevidentalreadyinthe Phenomenology,whichis shapedbyJohanninethemesoftruth,lifeandlove. ForHegel,thelogicofJohn’sGospelmirrorsthe

relationallogicoftheChalcedonianTrinitarianformula,holdingtogetherdistinctionswhichintheir finitedeterminationsappearopposed,including faithandknowledge,theindividualandcommunity,spiritandconcept,beingandthinking,philosophyandreligion,Godandman.Hegel’s Christianitywasnotthehistorical-biblicalfashion ofday,butareligionofGodexistingascommunity,‘de-tensed’fromthecontingenciesofhistory, andyetmovinginhistory,inHegel’slanguage,as spiritbecomingconsciousofitself.

WhileAdamsrightlystressestheimportanceof AristotleforHegel(p.19,59),theGermanphilosopher’swayaroundthelegacyofcriticalphilosophy andCartesiandualismdependsasmuchonareturn totheNeoplatonicphilosophyrejectedbyKant,as itdoesonhisTrinitarianlogic;indeed,theseare complementaryforHegel.Hegel’slogicofrepairingfalseoppositionshasalegacythatreachesback tothe5th centuryphilosopher-theologianProclus, whosephilosophyHegelregardedastheculminationofantiquethought.Thereisnomoreimportant philosophicaltraditionforunderstandingthemedievalintegrationofphilosophyandtheologythat Hegelpursues.Augustine,thePseudo-Dionysius, Aquinas,NicholasofCusaandRichardHooker leaptomindastheologiansshapedbythe‘books ofthePlatonists’.LikeHegel,Christian Neoplatonistsalsoappeartopromotean‘eclipseof grace’.Theywereperennialyaccusedofconfusing Godandnature,aswellasconflatingdivineand humanaction–pantheismandpelagianismrespectively.AProclusoraCusacouldbedefended

againstsuchchargesinthewayAdamsdefends Hegel,byexplainingthattheseaccusationsdepend onlogicsoffalseopposition.AlthoughHegeldoes notusetheLatin(participatio)orGerman(teilhaben)termsinthetextshetreats,Adams‘discerns’ alogicofparticipationintheSchwabianphilosopher’smethod(p.48–49,100),alogicof mediationthatreachesbacktoNeoplatoniccommentariesonPlato’s Parmenides.Adamstantalizinglysuggeststhatthenegativetheologyof ChristianNeoplatonismmightserveasawayof repairingHegel’sfailuretomake‘gift’fundamentaltotherelationbetweendivineandhuman action,but‘repairingHegel’isnothispurposein thisparticularwork(p.69).Anotherconviction heldincommonbytheNeoplatonistsandHegelis thatphilosophyshouldguidethewaywetalk

aboutGodandworktopreserveatheological orthodoxy,aconcernofthephilosophicaltheologiansincePlatoandoneinheritedbythe ChurchFathers.Adamsoffersthisbookashis ownmodestcontributiontothistraditioninthe hopethatanencouragingreceptionwillmakethis workthefirstofmoretocome.Hemakeshiscase persuasivelythatbecausethecontemporarystudent oftheology,havingassumedtheseparationofphilosophyandtheologyinthemodernworld,needs morephilosophytobetterunderstandthelogicof Christiandoctrine,hewoulddowelltodrawon Hegelianlogicsofrepairtoresolvethisfalse opposition.

McGillUniversity, Canada PeterJames Richardson-Bryson

Politics,Religion,andArt:HegelianDebates.EditedbyDouglasMoggach.Ppvii,358,Evanston,Illinois, NorthwesternUniversityPress,2011,$39.95.

DouglasMoggach’scollectionofessaysonthe YoungHegeliansisacompellingandseriouswork onaneglectedsubject.Thecontributionsarerelativelyshort,andtherearefifteenofthem,with extensivenotes.TheydescribethepoliticalsituationintheimmediateaftermathofHegel’sdeath whilst,inthemain,providingbiographiesand expositionsofthemainmembersofthegroup.

Againstthebackdropoftheindustrialisationof Germany,andthesuccessionofFriedrichWilhelm IVtothethroneofPrussiain1840,theshortchaptersprovidesketchesoffiguresofvariousages, variouspoliticalandtheologicalpersuasions,their interactions,groupings,andtheirquarrels.Many weredismissedfromtheirpostsasuniversityprofessorsforholding‘Hegelian’ideas;somewent abroadtoFrance,orelsewhereinGermany. Overall,thereisasurprisingandunprecedented commitmenttoactiveandadversarialintervention inpoliticalandculturallifeconductedatahigh intellectuallevel.

Thesenseofthisbook,whichhasasweeptoo greattobeadequatelycoveredinthisshortreview, isthatthehistoryofphilosophygenerallymissesout thinkersbetweenHegel(1770–1831)andMarx (1818–1883).AnessayonMarxbyTom Rockmore,whichdisputesEngel’sinterpretationof, orcreationof‘Marxism’,andbythewayprovesthat MarxmisunderstoodHegel,isthesoleexception. Instead,thechaptersfocusonindividualwriters: D.F.Strauss(1808–1874),theauthorof TheLifeof Jesus,whosoughttoexaminetheGospelsassymbolicstoriesexpressingidealphilosophictruth,and whocausedacontroversywhicharousedthe

attentionoftheReformistPrussianauthorities,as wellasafuriouslongrunningcrisisamongHegel’s followers,dividingthembetweenLeftandRight; EdwardGans(1797–1839),theteacherofMarx; ArnoldRuge(1802–1880),themostbusiness-like andpoliticallyastuteoftheYoungHegelians,a patriotwhofoundedseveraljournalsacross GermanyandFranceinordertodiscusssocialand politicalquestionsinthelightofHegelandtheprogressiveEnlightenment;MaxStirner(1806–1856), theanarchistwhotooktheKantianvirtueof autonomytotheextremelimitandwasforatime influentialonMarx,belongingtothegroupcalling itself DieFreie,leadingascandalouslybohemian life;andLudwigFeuerbach(1804–1872)thetheologianof‘speciesexistence’andtheimpersonalGod. Theseareonlythemostsalientfiguresamonga fairlylargenumber.

These‘YoungHegelians’weregenerallyconfrontedwithasituationinwhichprogressive reformwaspromisedandthenwithdrawnin Prussiaintheearly1840s.Theywereopposedby whattheysawastheRomanticschoolinphilosophyandpoetry,andthegrowingauthoritarianism oftheBerlinauthorities.IntheimmediateaftermathofHegel’sdeaththeattentionofthe HegeliansturnedtothematterofwhetherHegel hadbelievedinandlecturedonapersonalGod; thematterwasalsoofinteresttotheStatesince thepersonalidentityofGodcreatedagroundfor thepersonalauthorityoftheKingofPrussia,and indirectlyfortheclaimtoinheritedprivateproperty.TheHegelianworkofinterestinthismatter wasthenewlypublished Lecturesonthe

PhilosophyofReligion,collectedfromnotesand editedbyPhilippMarheineke(1780–1846).

ButitwaswithFeuerbachandhis1841 The EssenceofChristianity thatthedebateaboutGod wasleftbehindandthematterwhichperhapsmore trulyaggravatedtheBerlinauthoritiescameupfor discussion.FeuerbachheldtotheHegeliannotion thatGodwasacreationofthecombinedideasof thehumanspecies,statingthisbluntly.Whilehis bookconfineditselftotheology,Marxandothers suchasHeinrichHeine(1797–1856)derived fromthisthat,withthehypostasisofapersonal Godshattered,theymustturntheirattentiontothe actualprevailingconditionsoftheirday.Therise ofcapitalismandresultingpovertyofthemasses wasthethemeofthenewergenerationofYoung

Hegelians:BrunoBauer(1809–1882),andMarx himself.

Inwhatare,bynecessity,nomorethansketchesof personalities,lives,andideas,thereaderfindsaperiod ofhistoryinwhichtheproperconceptionofGodhas anunusuallyurgentpoliticalandsocialimportance.If whatTomRockmorewritesistrue,thatastheories go,capitalismisthebesttheoreticalinterpretationof ourculture,thenthisvolume,layingoutmultipledistinct,individual,andphilosophicalanalysesofearly Germancapitalism,hasdirectrelevanceeventoday. Theyearsprecedingthefailed1848revolutionin Germany,acrisisinthemodernstate,seemtore-echo throughhistoryuptothepresenttime.

Wrexham,ClwydJasonPowell

Kierkegaard:ASingleLife.ByStephenBackhouse.Pp.300.GrandRapids,MI,ZondervanPress,2016,$24.99.

Backhouse’sbiographyofKierkegaardsupersedes allpreviousinEnglishbydintofhissuperior researchonthesocial,political,andecclesiastical conditionsin19th-centuryDenmark,especiallyin thetransitionfromtherestorationisthigh-church monarchicProtestantismthataroseinthewakeof theFrenchRevolutionandNapoleon’sensuingdisturbance,tolaunchanewcenturyofpeace,order, andmaterialprogress,tothe‘liberal’revolution thatoccurredin1848alloverEurope,butin Denmarkinparticular,whererepresentativegovernmentbloodlesslyreplacedthetraditionalclass privileges.Backhouseembedsthephenomenonof Kierkegaard,andthestrangeraspectsofhislife,in thiscontextwithagiftedprosestylethathits repeatedlyonanappropriateallusion,idiom,or wordchoicetosnapaconfusingpicturesuddenly intofocuswherebyitbecomesnaturalandtobe expected.

Ratherthanalienated,Kierkegaardwasallhis lifeintenselysocialandsawhimselfministeringto asocietyandchurchwhichhelovedbutwhich waspalpablysick–nowheremoresothanwithhis ownfather.Kierkegaardlovedhisfatherandgot onwellwithhim–ashedidinitiallywithmost authorityfigures.Hisfatherwasfromaprovincial peasantbackground,hadbecomeawealthytradesmaninthecapitalcity,butwasburdenedwitha depressiveguiltfromhisreligionthattheofficial churchwashelplesstoalleviate.Thecentreof Kierkegaard’smessagewastheneedforconversion tothegospels,which should havebeenthe Protestantprinciple,ratherthanrelyingonexternal ritesandceremonies,butwhichhadbeenabandonedbyaChurchthathadbecometooidentified withthestate,nationalism,progress,and

prosperity,wherebytheindividualisencouragedto off-loadthiskeystageofdevelopmentontohis participationinexternalgroupsthatweresupposed tosweephimautomaticallyandwithminimal efforttowards‘success’,bothinthislifeandthe next.Protestantsocietyevendevelopedanofficial philosophy–Hegelianism–thatundergirdedand justifiedthissomnolescentcapitulationofindividualresponsibilitytothepowerofexternalagencies, resultinginthetriumph,stultification,andservitude tothe‘nanny-state’.Everythinginthegospelsand authenticChristianityworksintheopposite direction,towardsarecognitionofone’spersonal sinfulnessthroughburyingoneself,deflecting responsibilityontoexternalorganizations,and engagingina‘group-think’wherebyoneisafraid toquestionan‘officialview’ortofightsocialpressure;oneisboughtoffwiththeprospectofsinking intoasenseofentitledsuperioritythroughnothing greaterthanthehappenchanceofhistory. Kierkegaardholdsthatthelattershouldbeopposed andsubjectedtotheharshestscrutinyratherthan huggedclosewithcomplacency,secrettriumph, andsmugpride.

Kierkegaarddisarmsourreservationsconcerning theintensityofhisprotestbytheingenuousness, freshness,honesty,andbeautyofhisprosestyle. Herehejoinsotherreformersofthe19th-century, fromJ.H.NewmantoOscarWilde,whofeltthat theworldhadmadesuchprogressthatwecould nowaffordtocomeoutfrombehindthefearful, protectivebarriersofconfessionalandfactional oppositions;inparticulartheChurchitselfshould nolongerparticipateinorsubsidizehypocrisy.She aboveallshouldteachustoscrutinizeourmotives, anddemonstratethisbyherownactions.We

shouldindulgeourselvesasindividualsinthe luxuryofidentifyingourselves,notthroughmembershipinexternalinstitutionstowhichwehappen tobelong,butbycoursesofthoughtwehavetaken andchoiceswehavemade,whichwearewilling tolaybeforeauthoritieswithfulltransparencyand advocacyforthiscrucial‘stageofdevelopment’ theindividualiscalledtomakeinthisnew‘ageof theindividual’.Theoldinstitutionshavetoooften heldusdownandapart,ratherthanliftedusup andtogether.The‘Reform’isitselfinneedof reform,forthisis not authenticChristianity; Kierkegaard,likeSocrates,seeshimselfas

ministeringtoasocietyhelovesandtowhichhe isloyal.

Inasense,KierkegaardconstitutestheapotheosisoftheProtestantprinciple,leadingtotherepudiationoftheProtestantrevolttowards-asthe inevitablealternativeorbydefault–nationalistic orethnicChristianity;asFrederickCoplestonsuggestedinhisHistoryofPhilosophy,Kierkegaard, unbeknownsttohimself,opensupaway-backand constitutesahalf-wayhousetoCatholicism.

StartingwithKierkegaard.ByPatrickSheil.Ppxi,172,ContinuumInternationalPublishingGroup,2011, £13.99.

Intheprefaceto StartingwithKierkegaard,Sheil describeshisprimarygoalasoffering‘anaccessibleandbalancedaccount’(p.vii)oftheworkof SorenKierkegaard.WithaPh.DfromCambridge UniversityonKierkegaardandLevinastohis credit,Sheilismorethanuptothistask.Thewide rangeoftextswrittenandmarketeddirectlytothe intelligentlayreaderthesedays,usuallysporting somevariationof‘starting’or‘guide’or‘introduction’intheirtitle,atteststotheongoingconsumer interestinreader-friendlyaccountsofprominent thinkersandideas.However,successfullybalancingeaseofaccessibilitywitharespectfor detailandnuanceisnodoubtharderthanitfirst appears.

Likemostofthebooksinthiscategory,itisnot surprisingthat StartingwithKierkegaard isdeliberatelyorganizedtohelpfacilitateanaccumulative understandingofitsmainsubject.Inchapterone, ‘Introduction,HistoricalContextandBiographical Outline,’Sheildescribesthelifeexperiencesand academicinfluencesthatonhisreadinghadthe mosttellingimpactonKierkegaard’scareerasa writer.Herehesuccessfullyblendstheconventionalbiographicaldetailswithahealthydoseof intellectualhistory.Chaptertwosummarizes ‘CentralThemesandKeyMotifs,’whilechapter three,‘Immediacy,’looksatthedifferentwaysthat Kierkegaarddevelopedtheconceptof‘immediacy’ andwhyitwassoimportanttohim.Chapterfour, ‘EthicsandLove,’focusesalmostexclusivelyon WorksofLove,whilechapterfive,‘Despairand Hope,’drawsupon TheSicknessUntoDeath asa keypointofdeparture.Thelastchapter,‘His ContinuingRelevance:Communityandthe Individual,’whichisalsoincidentallythelongest ofthebook,isalsothebestasSheiloffersinterestingandrelevantconnectionsbetweensomeof

Kierkegaard’smaininsightsandourowncontemporaryphilosophicalissuesandproblems.

Sheilhasvaluableinsightstoshare,andhisknowledgeofbothKierkegaardandtheintellectualcontext inwhichhelivedandwroteissoundandthorough. Mymaincriticismoftheworkisthatasatextinthe Startingwith seriesitisnotasaccessibleandinviting totheambitiousnewcomerasitcouldhavebeen. Thereareafewproblemsinthisvein.First,Sheil sometimeswritesverynuancedsentencesinsuccessionthatprovidehistoricalbackgroundorinterpretivepointsthatIsuspectaresomewhatbeyondonly themostinformedorcommittednovicereader. Withoutfurtherexplanationsuchpointsassumetoo muchbackgroundknowledgeonthereader’spart. Second,hesometimesmakestopicchoicesthat whileinteresting,arealittlepeculiarforabookof thistype.Forexample,inchaptertwo,‘Central ThemesandKeyMotifs,’therearesectionheadings onpredictableKierkegaardtopicslike‘Sin’and ‘Self-Accusation,’butthereisalsooneon ‘Stillness.’Iamnotconvincedthatthelatter,asa Kierkegaardiantheme,deservedsomuchattention whenthereweresomanymoreprominentones,such as‘Authenticity’or‘Faith,’tochoosefrom.Third, Sheilsometimesalludestoabroaderdiscussionand thenveersawayfromittowardsanarrowerfocus. WhileIappreciatehowthismakestheexposition moremanageable,Iamnotsurethatthereaderis wellservedbythisstrategy.Forexample,heopens chapterfour,‘EthicsandLove,’byasking‘Where shouldwebeginthesearchfortheethicalin Kierkegaard?’(p.66).HethenquotesKierkegaard scholarM.JaimeFerreiratomakethepointthat whileitiscustomaryfornewreaderstoturnto Either/Or and FearandTrembling astheirfirstforay intoKierkegaard’sethicalviews,itisprincipallyin WorksofLove thatsuchviewsarefullydeveloped.

HeythropCollegePatrickMadigan

Sheilarguesthepointwell,anddoestransitiontohis thoroughdiscussionof WorksofLove quitenicely, butthediligentnewcomermightstillbeleftwonderingwhattheyaremissingbynothavingspent enoughtimeontheearlyKierkegaardtextsthat everyoneelsenewtoKierkegaardapparentlyreads. MaybeSheilcouldhavespentmoretimeontheearly textsandthenshortenedhisdiscussionof Worksof Love sothathisreaderscouldhaveabroaderand moregeneralunderstandingofKierkegaard’sethical views.

Despiteitsshortcomingsasanintroductorytext,I amgratefultotheauthorforhisgraspofintellectual

historyandsophisticatedandevenattimesnovel handlingofKierkegaard’sideas.Severaltimeswhile readingthebookIwaspleasedtofindacarefully wordedinsightorlineofargumentthathasstayed withme.FittingexampleswouldbeSheil’simaginativediscussionof‘theoccasion’inchaptertwo,plus hisstimulatingdescriptionofKiekegaardasa‘conservativerevolutionary’inthelastchapter.Perhaps StartingwithKierkegaard shouldbesomeone’sthird orfourthbookonthegreatDane?

St.Mary’sUniversity,Calgary, Canada TrentDavis

Kierkegaard:ExpositionandCritique.ByDaphneHampson.Pp.xii,344,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress, 2013, £25.00.

Althoughitisrare,everynowandthenabook comesalongthatseamlesslyexhibitsmultiple scholarlyvirtues.Combiningrigorousandsustained argumentwithvaluableandnovelinterpretations, andwrappedinclearandevendelightfulprose, Hampson’s Kierkegaard:ExpositionandCritique isjustsuchabook.Itisbeautifullywritten,surprisinglythorough,andischockfullofinteresting andrelevantinsightsthatshouldexcitenewaswell asmoreexperiencedKierkegaardreaders.

TheinsidebackflapsaysthatHampsonhas completedtwodoctorates:oneinHistoryfrom OxfordUniversity,andtheotherinTheologyfrom HarvardUniversity.Withsuchimpressiveeducationalaccomplishmentsitistrulyendearingtohear theauthor’spersonalvoiceandexperiencewith Kierkegaardemergeinthetextrightfromthestart. Intheprefaceshesharesthatinhermid-twenties shecametotherealizationthat‘IknewIhadto studyKierkegaard’(p.v).Thusbeganadeepand abidingintellectualexplorationthatcontinuedway beyondherlifeasastudent.Since1974shehas beenteachinghisworkatarangeofprestigious post-secondaryinstitutions.

Sheexplainsherfeltneedtotacklethewriting ofthebookwhensheexplainshow‘Ilackeda bookthatdevotedchaptersinturntoKierkegaard’s majortexts,givingbackgroundinformation, expoundingandfinallycommentingonthetext’(p. v).AtfirstIwassurprisedbythissincethereare quiteafewexcellentintroductorybookson Kierkegaardavailable,butwhenIconsideredfurtherIrealizedthatHampsonwasright–there reallyarenotverymanybooksthatbreakdown Kierkegaard’skeyworksinsuchasystematic fashion.

Thefinalproductshedescribesas‘adeeplysatisfyingculminationtowhathasbeenalife-long

involvementwiththesetexts’(p.v).Suchdepthof commitmentisheart-warming,andIwishmore authorssharedmoreofthemselvesandtheirpersonalengagementswiththeirareasofinterest.

Thefirstlineoftheintroduction,entitled‘Why ReadKierkegaard,’claimsthat‘ReadingKierkegaard opensoutaworld’(p.1),andHampsondoesastellar jobofbeingatourguideofthat‘world’byshowing usawealthofinterestingmomentsandinsights throughouttheKierkegaardiancorpus.Morespecifically,intermsofherapproach,Hampsonexplainsthat ‘OntheonehandIexpoundKierkegaard,settinghim inhisintellectualcontextandhistoricalsetting;onthe otherpursueafar-flungconsiderationoftheissues thathisauthorshipraises’(p.6).Hampsongetsthis balancejustright,andreadingthroughthetextitis hardnottofeelthatonehasacquiredsomewhatofa clearerunderstandingofKierkegaard’sinfluencesand background,alongwitharangeofnewandimportant questionstopursue.

Commentingonhislifeandthesocialenvironmentinwhichhewrote,Hampsoninsiststhat whenwereflectonKierkegaard’sbiographical detailsweshouldimmediatelyappreciatethat ‘Fromsuchalifeanauthorshipemergedthatisliterature’(p.9).Thisbeautifullyrenderedlineis generousandistypicalofthedepthofgenuine affectionHampsonrevealsforhersubject.Interms ofhermorespecificapproach,shesharesthat‘It strikesmethatagoodwayto“read”Kierkegaard istosaythat,translatingthestructureofLutheran thoughtintoanepistemologicalkeymorethoroughlythanithadoccurredtotheReformerstodo, heattemptstocountertheimportofthe EnlightenmentforChristianbeliefandsofinda wayforwardforChristianity’(p.10).Oneof Hampson’sgreatstrengthsisherunderstandingof theimpactthatLutheranismhadonKiekergaard,

andsheexplainsthisinfluencebetterthananyoneI haveeverread.IevenshareHampson’sconcern thatthishasbeengenerallyneglectedin Kierkegaardscholarship.

EachofthesubsequenteightchaptersisorganizedaroundaspecificKierkegaardtextandfollows adivisionaccordingto‘Introduction,’‘Exposition,’ and‘Critique.’Yetthissomehowneverfeelsrepetitiousandeachchapterissomethingontheorder ofarevelationasHampsontakesusthroughthe intellectualcontext,thekeypoints,andcriticisms ofeachofthebookssheexamines.Herinsights

areaccessibleyetscholarly,generousand interesting.

Kierkegaard:ExpositionandCritique deservesa wideaudience,anditofferssomethingforjustabout anyonewhohasanyinterestinKierkegaard’skey textsandideas.Hampson’sinfectiouspassionfor Kierkegaard,andhercapacitytocombinedeepscholarshipwithcrystalclearwriting,makesthisbooka raretreat.

St.Mary’sUniversity,Calgary, Canada TrentDavis

TheHiddenAuthorshipofSørenKierkegaard.ByJacobH.Sawyer.Pp.ix,180,Eugene,Oregon,Wipf&Stock, 2015,$22.00.

QuestionsconcerningSørenKierkegaard’srelationtohisauthorship,hisauthorialintentions,and hisuniqueformofcommunicationhavebeena stapleinKierkegaardstudiesforthegreaterpart ofacenturyandahalf.Withhiseasily-accessible andworthwhilebook,whichisthepublishedversionofhismaster’sthesisfromLaidlawCollege, Sawyernudgeshiswayintothiscrowdedresearch fieldinordernotonlytotemperwhatheperceivesastheextremeviewsofinterpreterssuch asRogerPooleorJoakimGarff,butalsotocome alongsidescholarssuchasC.StephenEvans, MurrayRae,andthelatePaulHolmerinarticulatingwhatheseestobeamorefavorablereading ofthelifeandworkofthegreatDanishthinker. Sawyer’sbroadthesisisthatKierkegaard,in ordertorealizehistaskofawakeningthesingle individualintoauthenticChristianfaith,hides himselfwithinhisauthorship.Moreover,suchhidingextendsdirectlyfromKierkegaard’sunderstandingofthegospelanditsemphasison meetingGodwhoishiddeninChristinthehiddennessofone’sownheart.Inmakingthiscase, Sawyerdivideshisworkintothreeparts.InPart I,hediscussesthe content ofKierkegaard’sprojectofhiddennessbyconsideringthemescentral toitsuchasthesingleindividual,revelation,subjectivity,andtheincognitoofChrist.ForPartII, heshiftstothe form oftheprojectandparticularlytoKierkegaard’sindirectmethodwhereby Kierkegaardcontinuallyremoveshimselffromhis communication.Finally,inPartIII,Sawyerturns tothequestionofhowwellKierkegaard’slife reflectshisproject,arguingthatKierkegaardsucceedstoanexemplarydegree.AlthoughSawyer raisesnumerousthought-provokingissuesinthese threeparts,wemayfocushereontwoofhis morecontentiouspoints,namelyhischaracterizationofKierkegaard’sownhiddennessandwhat

itmeanstocarryoutalovingreadingof Kierkegaard’sauthorship.

Regardinghiddenness,Sawyernotonlyargues thatKierkegaardsuccessfullyhideshimselfinhis authorshipsoastoenablethepossibilityofsubjectivityinhisreader,butalsothatindoingso Kierkegaard’slifeitselfbecomesatruthfulembodimentofthisindirectmethod.Assuch,Kierkegaard isfullydeservingofthetitle exemplaryChristian communicator.WiththismoveSawyerstakesouta clearbattlelineinthequestionofKierkegaard interpretation,sidingwithEvansandotherlikemindedthinkersagainstscholarslikeGarff.Inhis view,whereasGarff’sreadingbeginswithmistrust andthedesiretodeconstructKierkegaard,which revealsthatGarffis‘livingandseeingoutofan aestheticorethical-view’ratherthanstriving‘to lookinlove’(p.121),Evansoffersa‘humble reading’inwhichhebeginswithsympathyfor Kierkegaard’sChristianconvictionsandtakessuch convictionsseriously(p.123).AlthoughSawyer providessolidjustificationforhischallengeof overlyskepticalinterpretationsofKierkegaardand foradoptingwhatMarkTietjenhascalleda‘hermeneuticoftrust,’itisnotclearthathisconstructiveclaimconcerninghiddennesscanbesoeasily supported.Thereare,afterall,severalplacesinhis authorshipwhereKierkegaardfailstohide,and evendrawsovertattentiontohimselfasanauthor: forexample,inhisdetailedexegesisofhiswritings inboth Postscript and ThePointofView,inhis prominentpraiseofhisownauthorialabilitiesin hisjournalsorinhisapparentlyanxiouslate-life attemptstoensurethathis Nachlass wouldbepreservedandpublishedintheparticularmannerhe desired.AbroaderreadingofKierkegaard’swritings,particularlythejournalsandpapers,aswell asabroadersurveyoftheKierkegaardbiographical materialwouldhaveprovenhelpfultoSawyerfor

temperingwhatmightbeseenbysometobea ratherrosyreadingoftheDanishthinker.Atminimum,takingintogreaterconsiderationthesignificantmomentswhereKierkegaardunveilshimself wouldprovideuswithgoodreasontoresistastark dichotomybetweentrustandmistrustwhereweare forcedtochoosebetweenEvansorGarff,and insteadpushusintoatenserelationshipofboth trust and mistrustwithKierkegaardasanambiguousfigurewhoisbothhidden and revealed.This thirdpath,inturn,couldconstituteanevenmore lovingreadingthanthatofEvansorSawyerifwe characterizesuchareadingasonethatnotonly givesthebenefitofdoubttotheauthor,butatthe sametimealsoresiststhehagiographictendencyto downplaywheretheauthorisindeedrevealedto behuman,alltoohuman.Moreover,suchatwofoldlovingreading,intheend,wouldgoalong wayinchallengingustoremainhonestandcritical ofthetimeswhenourowninterpretationsmight operateasveiledattemptstoconscriptKierkegaard intosupportingourownviews,betheydeconstruction,EvangelicalChristianity,orsomethingelse altogether.

Inraisingthepointsabove,mypurposeisnot torejectSawyer’sargument,ofwhichmuchis indeedsound,butrathertopushagainstacertain kindofKierkegaardscholarshipthatmightrun

TheNakedSelf:KierkegaardandPersonalIdentity

theriskofveeringintoheroworshipandthereby missthenuanceandambiguityinKierkegaard’s relationtohisauthorship,hisauthorialintentions, andhisuniqueformofcommunication.Ofcourse, amorecomplexpictureofKierkegaardwould likelyleadustoadmitthathewasperhapsnotas well-intentionedasSawyermakeshimouttobe andthatheperhapsnevermadeitbeyondthe tensespaceof simuljustusetpeccator—between egotisticallyunveilinghimselfandworkingto remainhiddenintheserviceofGodandhisreaders.Thiscomplexpicture,however,neednot diminishKierkegaard,butcaninsteadcontribute tohisgreatnessinamannerthatisreflectiveof theApostlePaul’sdescriptionofhowstrength emergesinweakness(2Cor.12:10).Inother words,themomentsinKierkegaard’sauthorship inwhichheisunveiledashuman,alltoohuman revealhimtobeasinnerinneedofgrace,butin sodoingtheyalsoserveasapowerfulwitnessto thegloryofGovernancewhoisabletoachieve Hisgoodpurposesbycallingandtransforming sinners.AsfarasreadingsofKierkegaard’slife andauthorshipgo,Kierkegaardwouldlikelyagree thattherecanhardlybeamorelovingreading thanthis.

MarquetteUniversityMatthewNowachek

.ByPatrickStokes.Pp.vii,256,NY/Oxford,Oxford UniversityPress,2015, £40.00.

Overthelastfourdecadesissuesconcerningpersonalidentityhavebecomeincreasinglyimportant withinthephilosophicaldiscussion.Inhisrichly researchedbookPatrickStokescontributestothis trendbyfollowinginthefootstepsofscholarssuch asJohnJ.DavenportandAnthonyRuddindrawingonthethoughtoftheDanishthinkerSøren Kierkegaardastheentry-pointtotheclassicphilosophicalquestionofwhatitmeanstobeaself. Stokes’generalargumentisthatKierkegaard’svariousdiscussionsofthenatureoftheselfhave muchtocontributetocontemporaryscholarlywork onpersonalidentity,andmorespecificallyhe makesthecasethatofparticularvalueis Kierkegaard’sdistinctionbetweenrecollection (Erindring)andremembering(Hukommelse)as wellashisphenomenologyofcontemporaneity (Samtidighed).Despitetheimpressiononemight receivefromthesubtitleofthebook,Kierkegaard isnottheonlyfigureStokesdiscussesindepth. AlongsidethegreatDaneisalsofeaturedan impressivehostofthinkersstretchingasfarback asLocke,butincludingcontemporaryanalytic

thinkerssuchasDerekParfit,GalenStrawson, MaryaSchechtman,andJ.DavidVelleman. Ultimately,itisthetaskof‘demonstrat[ing] [Kierkegaard’s]usefulness’(p.18)intheserviceof engagementwiththelattergroupthatfunctionsas thecentralaimofStokes’text.

Stokes’projectiscomprisedofanintroduction andninechapters.The Introduction doesthe importantworkofoutliningwhatStokesseesas theratherbleakpictureoftheselfincontemporary philosophyaswellasfamiliarizingthereader (ofwhomStokeshasforemostinmindthesuspiciousandskepticalanalyticphilosopher)with Kierkegaardandhisowndiscussionofselfhood.In theeightchaptersthatfollowStokestakesupvariousthemesincludingrecollectionandmemory, contemporaneity,perspectivalsubjectivity,diachronicity,episodicity,synchronicity,self-alienation, continuityandtemporality,practicalandnarrative identity,andfinallysurvivalandeschatology.Asthis structuresuggests,Stokesframeshisdiscussionof Kierkegaardbydivingheadlongintothecontemporaryacademicdebateregardingtheself—amovethat

mightraisesomeeyebrowsforanyonefamiliarwith Kierkegaard’svehementattackonanddistastefor boththeprofessorsandtheacademicinstitutionsof hisage.Appropriately,then,Stokesconcludesinhis ninthchapterbyformulatingresponsestoseveralsignificantobjections,perhapsmostimportantofwhich ishisinsistencethatKierkegaard’saccountofthe present-tenseselfrevealsthatfirst-personalandthirdpersonalidentityortemporallyboundedandatemporalperspectivesoftheselfmustnotbecollapsedinto aunifiedmetaphysicalaccount.InthismannerStokes correctlyrecognizesthatforKierkegaardselfhoodis tobeunderstoodfundamentallyasaphenomenonof concretelivedexistenceratherthansimplyasubject forspeculativeacademicreflection.

AlthoughitistoStokes’creditthathegivesvoice tovariousobjectionstohisproject,oneisnevertheless leftwonderingifinarticulatingtheseobjectionshe actuallydigsdowndeeplyenough.Morespecifically, Stokesaffordssurprisinglysparseattentiontowhether ornothisowngroundingmethodologicalapproachof makingKierkegaardpalatableandusefulforanalytic philosophersisitselfappropriate.Butwhatexactlyis atstakeinthisissue?Tobeginwith,wecouldsaythat Stokes’approachofappealingtohisanalyticaudience attimesleadstoratheroddconclusionssuchaswhen heclaimsinhischapteronperspectivalsubjectivity that‘Kierkegaardcomesdownonthesideofthe PhenomenalPropertyApproach’(p.78).Kierkegaard wouldlikelyhavefoundstatementssuchasthese ratheramusing,ifnotsomewhattroubling.Potentially moreproblematic,however,isthatStokes’approach runstheriskofpresentingadistortedpictureof Kierkegaard’sownproject.Thisisperhapsmostevidentinthebook’sdiscussionofcontemporaneityasa conceptthatisrelevanttothecurrentphilosophical debateconcerningmemoryandsubjectivity.Whatis strikinghereishowthisdiscussionisstrangely divorcedfromtheAnti-Climaceandevelopmentof thenotionin PracticeinChristianity thatisessentiallyChristologicalandthatisinextricablytiedtothe concreteissueofwhatitmeanstoexistthrough

imitationofChrist.ForAnti-Climacustheentirepoint withsuchanaccountof Samtidighed istoemphasize thattobeafullselfisonlypossiblewhenoneisaself ‘beforeGod’inallofGod’sdivineglorywhile remaininginrelationtothelowlyGod-manofJesus Christ.Tobefair,Stokesattimesinhisconceptual workattemptstodistancehimselffromKierkegaard’s ownviewsuchaswhenhenotesthat‘Kierkegaardian contemporaneitymightbeofusetophilosophers, evenifit’snotanapplicationoftheideathat Kierkegaard,withhisoverridingexistentialandreligiousconcerns,wouldapproveof’(p.90).Atthe sametime,however,Stokesstillinsiststhathisfocus isprecisely‘Kierkegaard’sconcept’ofcontemporaneity(p.21).Theburningquestionwearethereforeleft withissimplythis:whymakeanappealto Kierkegaardandoneofhiscentralconceptsifonlyto departtosuchasignificantdegreefromKierkegaard’s ownusage?

Toconclude,wemaysaythatregardlessofhow nobleStokes’attempttodefendKierkegaardorto makehimrelevantfortheanalyticalphilosophical traditionmaybe,theunderlyingmethodological approachof TheNakedSelf threatenstoleave Kierkegaard’sthoughtutterlynaked—thatis, strippedofitscoreChristianandtheologicalcontent. TouseametaphorinspiredbyoneofKierkegaard’s contemporaries,H.C.Andersen,wecouldsaythat ratherthanembracingsuchstrippingdownandjoiningthenakedemperorintheparadeofcontemporary analyticphilosophy,IthinkKierkegaardwouldbe morethanhappytoremainatadistancefromthecelebrationfullyclothedinthesameoldunpopularand offensivetruthsofChristianity.Intheend,sucha decisionbyKierkegaardmightverywellbeamodel forthecontemporarythinkerinsearchoftheselfof whatitmeanstotakethefirststeptowardswhatthe ApostlePauldescribesintermsofbecomingclothed withanewselfinthelikenessofGod,aselfcreated inrighteousnessandholinessofthetruth.

MarquetteUniversityMatthewT.Nowachek

Kierkegaard,Aesthetics,andSelfhood:TheArtofSubjectivity.ByPederJothen.Pp.262,Surrey,UK,Ashgate, 2014, £65.00/$104.45.

ThisworktakesseriouslyKierkegaard’spseudonymClimacus’sclaimthat‘toexistisanart.’The bookshowshowKierkegaard’softenambiguous aestheticwritingsareunifiedtowardsacentralpurpose:edifyingthereaderbyencouragingherto becomeaspecificsortofself.Jothenwrites:‘The desires,actions,choices,andthoughtsofeachpersonmattertotheformoflife,andtostriveto becomeaselfasGodintended,onewithaneternal

purpose,isanartisticallyproductiveact’(77). Thus,whilethebookbeginsandendswithwiderangingdiscussionsofKierkegaard’saesthetics,it iscenteredonaspecificChristianunderstandingof selfhood.

ChapterOneclaimsthatKierkegaardandhis pseudonym’sdiscussionsofaestheticshouldbe viewedas‘fragments’inthatthey‘arenotpartof awhole,unifiedideaoftheaesthetic’or

‘Kierkegaardiansystem.’Thesefragmentsareakin toMicheldeCerteau’stactics,inthatKierkegaard writesfromapositionofweakness—‘without authority’—inordertocriticizethoseinpower.Yet thesefragmentsareunifiedbytheconsistentways inwhichtheyexpress‘thecalltobecomea Christian.’EachofthefourfragmentsJothendiscussespromptsthereadertoreflectontheways sheexistsasaself(10).

ChapterTwoarguesthatKierkegaard’smetaphysicalunderstandingofselfhoodundergirdshis aesthetics.JothenclaimsthatKierkegaard’sgoal ofedifyinghisreadershouldbeunderstoodasa metaphysicalprojectinsteadofanethicalone. ThegoalofthisprojectistobecomeaChristian selfthroughtheimitationofChrist.Despite beingmostlydescriptive,thechapterisdeeply provocative.SomereaderswillbalkatthesuggestionthatKierkegaard’sprojectisfundamentallymetaphysical.Otherreadersmayquestion theclaimthatKierkegaard’sprojectrequires‘an ontologicalethic’thatdoesnotfitintotraditional ethicalcategories.Kierkegaard’sprojectcouldbe readas both metaphysical and traditionallyethical(ratherthaneitheroneortheother).Finally, somereadersmayseeatensionbetweenJothen’s claimthatforKierkegaard‘Christianityisthe onlytrueexistentialorontologicalpossibility’ (48,c.f.51,60)andhisdiscussionof‘Christian truthasthehighestontologicalpossibility’(e.g. 67–68,75).Christianitymightbethehighest possibilitywithoutbeingtheonlyone.But despitethepossibilityofsomereaderstaking offenseatitsclaims,thechapterprovidesa Kierkegaardiantheologicalanthropologywhile puttingKierkegaardianauthorslikeClimacusand Anti-ClimacusindialoguewithAristotle,Luther, andHegel.

ThenexttwochaptersdevelopaKierkegaardian accountofhowtopracticetheartofsubjectivity, i.e.tobecomeaself.ChapterThreeexplainsthe processofbecomingaselfusingtheaestheticconceptsofformandcontent.Christisthetruecontent ofsubjectivity.Christfreesustobecomesubjective throughatoningforsin,allowsustorecognizeour needtobecomeselvesinthepresent,andisthe prototypefortheselveswemightbecomeinthe

future(103ff.).Ourtaskasindividualsistorelate ourlives(asembodiedhumanbeings)tothis Christiancontentthroughbeing‘definedsolelyby theGod-selfrelation’and‘willingwhatisright’ (115–117).Theartofsubjectivityisactualizing Christiancontentwithinone’sindividualform,i.e. one’slife.ChapterFourexploreshowthehuman capacitiesofimagination,will,andpassionare necessaryfortheartofsubjectivitythroughacarefulreadingof PracticeinChristianity’s portrayal ofayouth’sencounterwithimagesofChrist.Here JothenrightlystressesthatKierkegaardisconcernedwithboththeworldofartandthereader’s socialandpoliticalcontextsinthematerialworld.

Thebookconcludesbyconsideringaestheticsin lightofKierkegaard’saccountofselfhood.Chapter FiveshowshowKierkegaarduseshisstagesof existence(andthusmuchofthepseudonymous authorship)tobuildupreaders’imagination,passion,andwill.Consideringthestages—andirony andhumor,thebordersbetweenthestages—alongsideJothen’saccountofsubjectivityilluminates boththemes.ChapterSixshowshowpoetry,visual art,andmusicmighthelporhinderbecomingsubjective.Thepostscriptconsidersartisticproduction andconsumption(e.g.Facebook)andspecific worksofart,e.g.Disney’s TheLittleMermaid and Serrano’s PissChrist

SinceJothenrelatesKierkegaard’saesthetics tohisunderstandingofselfhood,hisbook requiresreaderstohavesomefamiliaritywith manyphilosophicalandtheologicalconcepts. Jothenoffersreadersmetaphysicalarguments (e.g.fundamentallyAristotelianconceptslike movementandpotentiality),epistemological claims(e.g.definitionsoftruthinchapter2and 3),andcontrastshisaccountwithtraditional ethicalcategorieslikedeontologyandvirtue ethics.Sowhilethebookofferssomethingto mostreadersofKierkegaard,manywillfind partsofthebookchallenging.Moreimportantly, however,Jothen’sbook—likeKierkegaard’s— challengesreaderstoreflectontheirown self-understanding.Ultimately,thebookisdifficultforalltherightreasons.

BaylorUniversityKarlAho

TheParadoxicalRationalityofSørenKierkegaard.ByRichardMcCombs.Pp.xii,244,Bloomington,Indiana UniversityPress,2013,$24.00.

Kierkegaard,Communication,andVirtue:AuthorshipasEdification.ByMarkA.Tietjen.Pp.x,156, Bloomington,IndianaUniversityPress,2013,$15.00.

Thesetwobookswerebothpublishedin2013by IndianaUniversityPress.Inanimportantwaythey tacklethesamequestion:inthewakeofSoren Kierkegaard’sextraordinaryoeuvre,whichincludes

differentgenres(suchasjournalentries,fictional asides,andmoredirectlyphilosophicalefforts), plusremarkablestylisticvariety(intheformof pseudonyms,indirectcommunication,ironicposes, andbiblicalinterpretation),isthereanycompelling waytoconceptualizeinageneralyetcomprehensivesensethetotalityofthework?

Thisquestionhasspecialresonancetodayinthe fieldofKierkegaardscholarship.Forsometime nowithasbeenwidelybandiedabout,evencelebrated,thatKierkegaard’scorpus,whenseeninits entirety,resistseasycharacterization.Themost extremeformofthisviewisthatasakeyintellectualfigureofmodernityhesupposedlyexemplified thesortofcontemporary‘post-structural’writer whoplayswithauthorialintentionandcommitment intheserviceof‘readerly’textsthatareopentoa varietyofdifferentandevenconflictinginterpretations.Allthatcanbeprofitablysaid,sothislineof thinkinggoes,isthatKierkegaardwasawriter whowrote,andhistextscannowbeenjoyedand re-readwithouttheburdenofwonderinghowthey alladdup.

Iamnotbeingentirelyfairinthischaracterization,perhaps,butreadingthesenewofferingsby RichardMcCombsandMarkA.Tietjenisnonethelesslikelytoputsomestrainonthisinterpretation ofKierkegaard,sinceeachtextoffersathoughtful andwell-arguedgeneralaccountofKierkegaard’s intellectualcontributionasawhole.Theformthis takesforbothauthorsistoarguethatdespitethe varietyondisplayinhiswriting,inbothformand content,Kierkegaarddidindeedhaveanoverall aimorpurposehewastryingtoachieve,andeven ifhestruggledtofullyrealizeit,wecannow clearlydiscernmoreorlesswhatthatwas.Whatis interestingisthatthetwoauthorsseethisaimor purposedifferently.

McCombsopenshisfirstchapter,‘APretenseof Irrationalism,’bywritingthat‘SorenKierkegaard oftenseemstorejectreason,butinfactheaffirms it’(p.2).Thisisthebigassertionthatanchorsthe book,andhowmuchworkitactuallydoes becomesclearwhenMcCombssaysfurtherthat ‘Kierkegaarddoesnotattempttocorrecthismisleadingappearanceofirrationalism,butinstead deliberatelycultivatesit,preciselybecausehe thinksthatheneedssuchdeceptioninorderto assisthisreaderstobecomemorerational’(p.2). ThetensionhereisthatMcCombsisattributingto Kierkegaardalevelofmasteryoverhisownwork wherehehasthecapacitytodeliberatelyappear irrationalintheserviceofenhancinghisreader’s rationality.Thekeymovehere,asheexplains,is that‘WhatIamcalling paradoxicalrationality, Kierkegaardhimselfcalls subjectivity’(p.2).Butof coursethisisanexpansivenotionofsubjectivity,

andMcCombsmakesitclearthat‘insofarassubjectivitydoesnotnarrowlyfocusonaction,but endeavourstoembraceanddojusticetothewhole humanperson,itismoreaccuratetocallit holistic or humanerationality’(p.3).

InthepagesthatfollowMcCombsattemptsto filloutthisthesisbydevotingeachchaptertoa keydistinctionorideaandthendrawingontheprimaryKierkegaardtextstofleshitout.Chaptertwo, ‘ParadoxicalRationality,’triestosortout Kierkegaard’ssenseofobjectivityandsubjectivity. Chapterthree,‘ReverseTheology,’looksat ‘Climacus’snegativetheology,’andhow‘hepretendstobefarmorescepticalabouttheological issuesthanhereallyis,andthathedoesthis preciselytocommunicateholisticreligiousness’ (p.84–85).Inchapterfive,‘ACritiqueofIndirect Communication,’McCombsblursthelinesbetween directandindirectcommunication.Inchapterssix andseven,‘TheFigureofSocratesandthe ClimaceanCapacityofParadoxicalReason,’and ‘TheFigureofSocratesandtheDownfallof ParadoxicalReason’respectively,McCombsdraws onvariousSocraticthemestoadvancehisargumentfurther.Inthelastchapter,‘TheProofof ParadoxicalReason,’McCombsdrawseverything togetherandinthefinalparagraphofferswhatI thinkisthebestsentenceintheentirebook:‘The principalpurposeofKierkegaard’sparadoxical mannerofwritingistoinvitehisreaderstosubjectivity,bymakingthemawareofbothoftheparadoxicalconstitutionofhumannature,withits divinegiftsanditsHerculeantasks,andofthe AbsoluteParadoxoftheIncarnationasaprototype tobeactivelyimitated’(p.219).

Intheintroductiontohisbook,Tietjenexplains that‘IwillpresentareadingofKierkegaardcentered onthenotionofedification,’whichhetakesinthe straight-forwardsenseas‘themoralandreligious improvementofhisreader’(p.2).Hefurtherargues that‘Thisthesisiscomprehensive,aimedatpermeatingKierkegaard’sinterestsacrosshisvastauthorship’(p.2).Thelastlineoftheintroductionqualifies thisthesisstillfurther:‘Andtheshapeofthis improvement,ofthiscareforvirtuethatKierkegaard hopestoenableinhisreader,ultimatelytakesthe formofChristianexistence’(p.14)

Inchapterone,‘BluntReading,’Tietjentriesto defendtheclaimthat‘thepseudonymouswritings sharethisedifyingfunction’(p.17),andheoffersa critiqueoftheworkofRogerPooletoachievethis end.Chaptertwo,‘AlternativestoDifferance,’is dedicatedtoanexaminationof‘theteleological schemeoftheexistence-spheres’(p.33),whilechapterthree,‘CommunicatingCapability,’tries‘tomove towardapositiveconceptionofKierkegaard’s indirectcommunication’(p.49).Chapterfour,

‘Deconstructing ThePointofView,’defendstheclaim that‘Throughout ThePointofView Kierkegaard’s explanationofhisauthorshipreliesuponparticular viewsofGodandGovernancethatproceedfroma standpointoffaith’(p.61).Thenextchapter, ‘Trusting ThePointofView,’offersaninteresting ‘hermeneuticoftrust’incontrasttoa‘hermeneuticof suspicion’(p.75).Inchapterssixandseven,‘The PseudonymousDialecticofFaith,I,’and‘II’respectively,Tietjenoffersthefullestpositiveinterpretation ofhiskeythesisthatKierkegaardwascommittedto edificationfromaChristianpointofview.

Despitetheirnumerousstrengths,bothtextshave theirweaknesses.McCombsdemonstratesa remarkablefacilitywithKierkegaard’skeytexts, butfailstoreallyengagewithanyofthesecondary literature.Also,hisuseoftheterm‘subjectivity’ seemstoslightlyexpandorcontractdependingon thecontext,andtryingtokeepthemeaningstraight canbesomethingofastrainattimes.Forhispart, Tietjendoesastellarjobarguingbothagainstthe readingsofKierkegaardthatemphasizepoststructuraldifferance,andinfavourofhisviewof edificationinaChristiankey,buttheninthe

conclusionsaddleshimselfwiththeclaimthat ‘KierkegaardcanandoughttobereadasamemberoftheWesternvirtuetradition’(p.117).This feelstackedon,andfranklyunnecessary,sincehe haddonesuchaclearandeffectivejobupuntil thatpoint.Tohiscredit,Tietjenexamineswhathe seesasthethreekeyobjectionsto‘Kierkegaardas VirtueEthicist,’butintheshortspaceofaconclusionitisdifficulttodojusticetoawheelbarrow fulloffreshargumentsfromotherserious Kierkegaardscholars.

BothofthesebooksshouldbeofinteresttoanyonewhohasreadKierkegaardandhasbeenleft wonderingwhattheirreadingamountstoand whetheritisworthsummingupinadeliberateand systematicway.Attheveryleastthetextsshould fuelfurtherdebateregardingthelimitsandbenefits ofvariousapproachestoKierkegaardinterpretation thatcanonlybegoodforthefuturestateof Kierkegaardscholarship.Iamthankfultoboth authorsfortheircontributionsinthisregard.

St.Mary’sUniversity,Calgary, Canada TrentDavis

Kierkegaard’sConceptofFaith.ByMeroldWestphal.Pp.v,284,GrandRapids,MI,Eerdmans,2014,$35.00.

Westphalhaslongbeenaninfluentialvoicein Kierkegaardscholarship,andthisexcellentvolume representsthefruitsofoverfourdecadesof researchandteachingonthegreatDanishthinker. Inadditiontoprovidinganinsightfulreadingof Kierkegaard’sthought,Westphalalsodoesthe readeravaluableservicebyplacingKierkegaard intodialoguewithanimpressivearrayofphilosophersandphilosophicaltraditions.Thebookis dividedintothreemajorparts,eachofwhichcentersonadifferentoneofKierkegaard’spseudonyms,withtheoverallaimofemployingthese variousperspectivesinordertoilluminate Kierkegaard’sconceptoffaith.Althoughhemakes noclaimtopresentacompletepicturewiththis method,Westphalneverthelessarguesthathis accountcapturestheheartofKierkegaard’stheistic projectwithinhisauthorship.

InpartoneWestphalfocusesonthepseudonym Johannes desilentio andthework Fearand Trembling inrelationtowhichhedevelopsfive thesesaboutthenatureoffaith.Thepurposeof chapteroneistoshowhowKierkegaarddescribes faithasthetaskforalifetimeincontrasttothe viewofHegelandtheHegeliansthatfaithissomethingonemovesbeyondbymeansofspeculative philosophy.Inchaptertwo,Westphaldescribes faithastrustindivinepromisesbycontrastingthe

figureoftheknightoffaithwiththefiguresofthe knightofinfiniteresignationandthetragichero.In doingso,hestressestheimportanceofunderstandinghopeintermsoftrustingindivinepromises now asopposedtotrustingintherealizationof promisesinastrictlyeschatologicalsense.The themeofchapterthreeisfaithasobedienceto divinecommands.HereWestphaldiscusseshow KierkegaardsetsfaithagainsttheHegelianview thatsocietyand Sittlichkeit aretodetermineone’s highestduty,andhearguesthatthemainpointof FearandTrembling canbesummarizedintheidea thatoneistodetermineone’srelationtosocietyby one’srelationtoGod,andnotviceversa.Chapter fourisabriefinterludeframedaroundthreeinterpretivequestionsthatdealwithimitation,divine commandethics,andwhatwearetounderstandas theinterpretivecoreof FearandTrembling.In chapterfive,Westphalreturnsto desilentio’stext todiscussfaithastheteleologicalsuspensionof reason,andspecificallyreasonthatmakesclaimto beingabsolute,inrelationtowhichheundertakes aninterestingdiscussionofideologycritique. Finally,inchaptersixWestphalconsidersfaithas thehighestpassion.Afteralong,butnevertheless insightfuloverviewoftheconceptsofpassion, emotion,andfeeling,Westphalpointstotheimportanceofpathosforfaith,andspecificallyhow de

silentio emphasizesnegativeemotionssuchasfear, trembling,anxiety,anddistressasachallengeto hispassionlessChristendomcontemporaries.

Parttwocentersontwotextsofthepseudonym JohannesClimacus, PhilosophicalFragments and ConcludingUnscientificPostscript,andhere Westphalprovidesfiveadditionalthesesabout faith.Chapterseven,“FaithastheReceptionof Revelation,”focusesontherolerevelationplaysin thedescriptionoffaithin Fragments,and Westphalemploysthisdiscussiontocritiqueany attempttogroundfaithonmerehumancategories. Inchapter8,Westphalremainswith Fragments wherehenarrowsinonparadoxanditsrolein definingfaithasthehappypassionthatovercomes offense.Acrucialpointdevelopedhereishow offenseoperatesnotasameresteppingstoneon thewaytofaith,butratherasaperpetualcomponentoffaithunderstoodasthetaskforone’s wholelife.Forchapter9,Westphalshiftsto Postscript whereheoutlinesfaithasthepassionate appropriationofanobjectiveuncertainty.Herehe discussesClimacus’classicdistinctionbetween truthasobjectivityandtruthassubjectivity,and hedoessoinanilluminatingfashionthroughuse ofananalogy:inalovingrelationshiponenever hasobjectivecertaintythatlovewillbereciprocated,butoneneverthelessstillriskseverythingin loving.Inchapter10,Westphalbranchesintothe topicofepistemologyinordertopointouthow,in Climacus’view,objectiveuncertaintyandthelimitationsofhumanunderstandingentailthatfaith requiresbothaleapandunendingstrivingas essentialtothepursuitoftruth.Finally,inchapter 11,‘FaithasaStrivingPathosthatGoesAgainst Reason,’Westphaldiscussesthedifferences betweenReligiousnessAandB,andhowfaith manifestsitselfasguiltinthefailuretofulfill one’staskofbecomingaself,butalsointhe humilityonestrivesafterinengagingwithand embracingtheparadoxoftheGod-manthatstands againsthubristichumanreason.

Inpartthree,Westphalturnstothefinalpseudonyminhisanalysis,Anti-Climacus,andthetwo works TheSicknessUntoDeath and Practicein Christianity.Ofthethreeparts,thisoneisbyfar theshortest,eventhoughthefinalchapteralso includesseveralconcludingremarks.Chapter12 takesuptheissuein Sickness ofhowdespair emergesinthefailureoftheselfbothtorelate itselftoitselfandtorelatetoGodaswellashow faithaswillingtobeoneselfbeforeGodservesas thecureforsuchdespair.Inthefinalchapter, Westphaldiscussesfaithascontemporaneitywith

Christ—withoutoffense,andindoingsohe focusesonAnti-Climacus’accountoftheimitation ofChristhedevelopsin Practice.Towrapupthe chapterWestphalmakesthreeconcludingclaims: thedifferentperspectivesonfaithpresentedbythe variouspseudonymsfittogethercoherently,this coherenceisduetoKierkegaard’stheism,andthe coherenceissignifiedbywhatitmeanstolivea life(asAnti-Climacusdescribesit)‘beforeGod.’

OnepotentialproblemforWestphal’sprojectis thatKierkegaard’s WorksofLove isalmostentirely absentfromthediscussion.Granted,tokeephis studywithinthenarrowparametersofasinglevolumeWestphalmustnecessarilyexcludecertain Kierkegaardtexts,andthereisnothinginherently wrongwiththispractice.However,giventhespecificaimofthebook,suchapracticebecomes moreproblematicifwhatisleftoutisessentialto Kierkegaard’saccountoffaith. WorksofLove,as Kierkegaard’smostrobustdiscussionofChristian ethicsandmostdevelopeddescriptionofhowone istorelatetothehumanother,appearstoplaya crucialroleinKierkegaard’sdescriptionofthe Christianlife.Thus,Westphal’saccountwould undoubtedlybestrengthenedwereittoinclude(at minimum)achaptersuchas‘FaithastheLoveof GodandtheLoveofNeighbor.’Greaterattention to WorksofLove wouldnotonlyaidWestphalin hisfightagainsttheentrenchedcaricatureof Kierkegaard’sfaithashyper-individualistic,butit wouldalsosupplementwellWestphal’sowngesturestowardthesocialaspectsandimplications offaith,especiallyhisclaimthatthe telos of Kierkegaard’sphilosophyofreligionis‘alifeof self-sacrificiallove’(p.270).

Inconclusion,itisimportanttonotethatthe criticismarticulatedheredoesnotdetractfromthe overallvalueofWestphal’stext.Thereading Westphalprovidesofthethreepseudonymsand theirrespectivetextsprovesconsistentlyinsightful andthereforewillbeofinterestnotonlyto Kierkegaardscholarsbutalsotothosewithageneralinterestinphilosophyandtheology.Inthe end,thebookissuccessfulinachievingitsstated purpose—apurposeWestphalclaimstomirror Kierkegaard’sownmotivationforwriting—thatis, toelucidatetheconceptoffaithinamannerthat encouragesfurtherdialogueandtherebyleads,ultimately,togenuineexistentialengagementwith Christiantruth.

SørenKierkegaard ResearchCentre/ MarquetteUniversity MatthewT.Nowachek

TheConceptofAnxiety:ASimplePsychologicallyOrientedDeliberationinViewoftheDogmaticProblemof HereditarySin.BySørenKierkegaard,AlastairHannay(ed.,tr.).Pp.xxxiv,217,W.W.Norton,2014, $27.95.

TheConceptofAnxiety isafamouslydifficulttext ofafamouslydifficultwriter.Indeed,thefactthat Kierkegaardaffixestheword‘Simple’tothesubtitleofhisdeliberationcan,itseems,onlybeinterpretedasaninsulthisreaders,presumablylesser mortalsthanhe.Yetthetextdoeshavethegoalof makingthingssimple:byplacingrealitieslike‘first sin,’‘psychology,’and‘science’intotheirproper conceptualcategories,Kierkegaardaimstobring claritytoconfusedissues.

Thechiefmatteratstakein TheConceptof Anxiety ishereditarysin,andalltheinventiveand seminalpsychologicaldescriptionsofanxietythe textoffersareorientedtowardgeneratingan adequatedescriptionofhereditarysin.Kierkegaard resolutelyresiststheideathatahumanbeingisa sinneratbirth;thisforhimisacontradiction,a conceptualconfusionofthehighestorder,forsin mustbebornoffreedom.But—thequestioninexorablypresentsitself—howthencanweexplain thatthefreechoiceforsinissoinvariably repeated?

Kierkegaard’sanswerisanxiety.Herewemust becareful:anxiety,astateofthehumanbeingdiscoveredbythescienceofpsychology,doesnot explainawaysinitself—thatisandalwaysremains afreeactofthewill.Sinisanactwhichisposited bythewill,andinthatpositingmakesaleapthat canneverbeexplainedbyscience.(Ifyouthought thattheleapoffaithwastheonlyleapin Kierkegaard,thinkagain.)Themostpsychology canofferisadescriptionofthestatewhichprecedessin,andthatisanxiety.

HereKierkegaardoffersoneofhimmostquotableformulations:‘anxietyisfreedom’sactualityas thepossibilityofpossibility’(51).Anxietyhasan essentialrelationtofreedomandispresentinthe considerationofpossibilities.Whenweaskthe question,‘whatwillIchoose?’—hereanxietyis present.Kierkegaardelaboratesthispointwithone ofhisfinestpsychologicaldescriptions:‘Anxiety canbecomparedwithdizziness.Hewhoseeye happenstolookdownintotheyawningabyss becomesdizzy.Butwhatisthereason?Itisjustas muchhisowneyeastheabyss,forsupposehehad notlookeddown.Itisinthiswaythatanxietyis thedizzinessoffreedomthatemergeswhenspirit wantstopositthesynthesis[betweensouland body],andfreedomnowlooksdownintoitsown possibilityandthengrabsholdoffinitenesstosupportitself.Inthisdizzinessfreedomsubsides. Further,psychologycannotandwillnotgo.Inthat

veryinstanteverythingischanged,andinraising itselfupagainfreedomseesthatitisguilty. Betweenthesetwomomentsliestheleap,which nosciencehasexplainedandwhichnosciencecan explain’(75).Utilizingabody/soul/spiritanthropology,Kierkegaardoffersinthisparagraphan evocativedescriptionofwhatitfeelsliketobea freehumanbeingandintimateshowthatfeeling relatestosin.

Itisbecauseofdescriptionslikethis—phenomenologicallycorrecttoourexperience,butalsocategoricallylimitedinscope—thatafterreadingthe work,wefindourselvessurprised,wonderingto ourselvesthatmaybe TheConceptofAnxiety is simpleafterall,or,perhaps,itdoesatleastmake somethingsmoresimple.

Yetitshouldberecognizedthatthehardwon simplicityofthetextisaresultoftheconceptual clarityatworktherein,andthisisexactlywhat comesthroughinAlastairHannay’sadmirablenew translation.HannayisanemeritusprofessorofphilosophyattheUniversityofOslo,andhasnow translatedsixofKierkegaard’smostsignificant books(andalsoaselectionofentriesfrom Kierkegaard’sjournalsandpapers).

Yetoneisinitiallypuzzledastothepurposeor placeofHannay’stranslations.Wheredotheystand, inrelationtotheinitialtranslationsofKierkegaard dashedoffintoEnglishbyWalterLowrieandhis colleagues,andalsoinrelationtothecomprehensive scholarlyedition(Kierkegaard’sWritings)published1978–2000byPrincetonUniversityPress? Kierkegaardtranslationisacrowdedfieldalready, andonenaturallywonderswhyHannayhasgone aboutthiswork.InhisreviewofHannay’s2009 translationofKierkegaard’s ConcludingUnscientific Postscript,DavidD.Possenofferedasatisfying explanationtothisriddle(NotreDamePhilosophical Reviews,2010.01.19).Possenproposedthreestages oftheEnglishtranslationofKierkegaard:thereligious(WalterLowrie),theethical(Howardand EdnaHong),andtheaesthetic(Hannay).

Thistripartitemodelcertainlyholdstrueforthe threeavailabletranslationsof TheConceptof Anxiety,withtheminormodificationthatReidar Thomte(incollaborationwithAlbert.B. Anderson)—notHowardandEdnaHong—provided thetranslationforthe1980PrincetonUniversity Pressedition.Possennotesinrelationtothetranslatorsof ConcludingUnscientificPostscript that Lowrie’stranslationis‘markedbyalyricaland solemnenthusiasm,’thatthe Kierkegaard’s

Writings edition‘prizedconsistencyandliteralprecision,’andthatHannay’stranslationpossessesa ‘daring’inrearrangingthesyntaxoftheoriginal Danishtextthatmanagestobeboth‘highlyaccurate’and‘asintelligibleaspossibletothoseofus whocannotconsulttheoriginal.’

Hannay’sapproachlendsanaestheticsensibility tothetextthatismoreakintotheparticularsof Englishgrammar,refusingthetemptationsimplyto mirrorthesyntaxoftheDanishoriginal.Whenit comestoatextlike TheConceptofAnxiety,this aestheticsensibilityisnotsimplyamatterofa morepleasurablereadingexperience,foritlends thetexttheclarityitwas,inthefirstplace,supposedtoproduce.

ThevirtueofHannay’stranslationisnotitsoriginality.Hannayachievestheaforementionedclarity byattimespreferringLowrie’smorefluidtranslationoverThomte’sPrincetonedition,atranslation practicewhichHannayhimselffreelyadmits (xxxii).Onotheroccasions,Hannayprefersthe precisionofThomte’stranslationtothe‘energetic effusiveness’ofLowrie.Ratherthanproviding whollyoriginalsolutionstotranslationproblems,it isthiskindofcuratingactivitybetweenLowrie andThomte—attimespreferringone,attimesthe other—thatresultsintheperfectlybalancedaccuracyandreadabilityofHannay’stranslation.(This istodescribeageneraltendency,nottoclaimthat Hannayneverpensanoriginalline.)

Yetonthewhole,itissomethinglessdefinable thatmakesHannay’stranslationsowelcome.Ifwe

mayborrowfromKierkegaard,Hannayunderstands the‘mood’ofthistext,andeffectivelyrendersthat moodfortheEnglishreader.Herewefeelnotthe momentaryblissofawell-wroughtsentence(such asonemightfindintheoriginalDanishofthe Diapsalmataof Either/Or,orinanyofWalter Lowrie’sEnglishtranslations),butpleasureofa differentsort,thatwhichcomesfromamoregraduallypercolatingdelight.

Thesearethepleasuresoflucidity,ofcategories carefullydefinedandconfusionswrestedfromthe mindsofanoverlyhastyage.Nolongerdowe findtheoriginofsinexplainedawaywithchatter; instead,wehaveaprecisepsychologicalunderstandingofwhatprecedessin—anxiety—withthe concomitantunderstandingthatnosciencecan explaintheactualleapofsinitself,sincesuchan explanationliescategoricallyoutsidethepossibilitiesofscience.Itisthemoodoflucidity—rather thanLowrie’slyricalevocativenessorThomte’s textbookprecision—thatmostdistinguishes Hannay’sworkfromtheseothers.Insomeinexplicableway,thecadencesofHannay’stranslation allowustoexperiencethislucidityinawaythat previoustranslationshavenot.With TheConcept ofAnxiety,Kierkegaardaimedtoteachusdifferences(ashemakesclearintheepigraphto thework),andwewalkawayfromHannay’s translationwiththeconvictionthathehas,infact, doneso.

BaylorUniversityThomasJ.Millay

TheLilyoftheFieldandTheBirdoftheAir:ThreeGodlyDiscourses.BySørenKierkegaard.Translatedby BruceH.Kirmmse.Pp.vii,90,Princeton/Oxford,PrincetonUniversityPress,2016,$16.95/£12.95.

Itisdifficulttooverstatethesignificanceofthe servicethatHowardandEdnaHonghavedonefor Kierkegaardscholarshipthroughtheirtranslations ofthewritingsofthegreatDane.Withthatsaid, thetimehasneverthelesscomefornewtranslations tobloomandtotakeflight.BruceKirmmse’s remarkabletranslationofSørenKierkegaard’s The LilyoftheFieldandtheBirdoftheAir represents preciselythetypeofnewcontributionsthatare neededifKierkegaard’stextsaretoremainfresh andrelevantforthecontemporaryreader.Kirmmse iscertainlywell-equippedtocarryouthistranslationtask.Inadditiontohisdistinguishedcareerin Kierkegaardstudiesthatincludesservingasoneof theeditorsofthenewtranslationseriesof Kierkegaard’sjournalsandpapersaswellashis excellenthandleontheDanishlanguage,Kirmmse, asanAmericanscholar,alsopossessesagood senseofthepoeticinhisnativeEnglish.Assuch,

Kirmmse’sbookisbothconceptuallywellinformedandstylisticallysound.

InordertomirrorthestructureofKierkegaard’s originalpublication,Kirmmsedivideshistranslationintothreediscourseseachofwhichfocuseson differentthemesandaspectsfromMatthew6:24–34.Moreover,tointroducethetranslationKirmmse providesatwenty-ninepageessayentitled‘Letting NaturePointbeyondNature’wherehenotonly touchesontherelevantbackgroundinformationto Kierkegaardandhistext,buthealsodrawsanilluminatingparallelbetweenKierkegaardandthe greatAmericanpoetHenryDavidThoreau.Inhis view,thesecontemporaneousfiguresaresimilarin severalrespectsincludingintheircritiquesofmodernsociety,intheirloveandastuteobservationsof nature,andperhapsmostinterestinglyintheirperipateticnatures.ForKierkegaardasforThoreau, faithandpoetrybloomwhileoneisonthemove—

whetherinwalksthroughtheparksofCopenhagen oraroundWaldenPond.Suchemphasisonmotion isforKierkegaardinparticularareflectionofthe HebrewimageembeddedintheApostlePaul’suse oftheGreekwork peripateo in2Corinthians5:7 whenhewritesthat‘wewalkbyfaith,notby sight,’anditispreciselysuchanaccountof motionthatrunsthroughoutKierkegaard’sreflectionsin TheLilyoftheFieldandtheBirdofthe Air.KierkegaardaswithThoreau,however,isstill adialecticalthinkerinthesensethatalongsidethe peripateticchallengetoremaininconstantforward motionisanequallyimportantchallengenotto forgetthatinthemidstofsuchmotiononeis neverthelesstoobserve,tolisten,towait,andto receive.Inthisfashion,natureisthusgiventhe opportunitytoinstructandtherebyultimatelyto pointbeyonditself.

Therearecertainlyanumberofplacesonecould pointtoinordertodemonstratethequalityand proficiencyofKirmmse’stranslation,butoneof themorerelevantofthesegivenKirmmse’sintentionalgesturetowardsmotioninhisintroductory essaycomesattheconclusionofKierkegaard’s finaldiscourse.AsKierkegaardwritesthere,‘you areinparadise thisveryday,becausefroma Christianstandpoint,you abide [bliver] inGod’(p. 90).Althoughitmayatfirstglanceseemtrivial, Kirmmse’stranslationoftheDanishword bliver as ‘abide’representsacruciallysignificantinterpretive choice.InKierkegaard’sDanish,theconceptof at blive alwayscarrieswithitconnotationsofmovementandongoingprocess.WhereastheHongs’ useof‘remain’driftsfromthissenseandthereby alltooeasilylendsitselftoamisunderstandingof Kierkegaard’saccountoffaithasaformofstatic

rest,‘abide,’withitsetymologicalconnectionsto gebiden anditsconnotationsofcontinualforward motionmoreadequatelyreflectsKierkegaard’s viewofChristianityas becoming (i.e., Vorden). Moreover,useof‘abide’providestranslationconsistencyacrossKierkegaard’swritings,suchas whenhewritesintheHongtranslationof Worksof Love thatChristianloveistheactiveandongoing taskofabiding(i.e., bliver)inGod’slove. Althoughitcanbedangeroustoplaceagreatdeal ofstockinnarrowlinguisticpointssuchasweare doinghere,Iwouldsuggestthatinthiscase Kirmmse’stranslationoftheconcept bliver hasthe potentialtoprovedeeplysignificantforshaping one’sbroaderinterpretationofKierkegaard’s thought.

Toconclude,wemaynotethatinadditiontothe illuminatingintroductionandthefinetranslation, theveryphysicalformatofthebookisitselfone ofitsmainassets.If,asKierkegaardwritesin WorksofLove,‘tolearntoknowlifeandoneself isanearnestwalk’(WOL,p.77),thenthisthin andsmallvolumewithonlyafewshortessaysthat cantherebybeeasilystowedinapocketorahikingpacklendsitselfperfectlytoaccompanyingthe peripateticonherspiritualwanderings.Andinthe midstofsuchjourneys,whenthewandererturns onceagaintothebookshehasbroughtalongwith her,Kierkegaard’swordsthroughKirmmse’svoice willbetheretoremindherthatjustasthelilyand thebirdarecontinuouslyupheldintheirbecoming bytheircreator,soalsoiseverymovementinfaith madebythespiritualperipateticfundamentally dependentuponthesustenanceofdivinegrace.

MarquetteUniversityMatthewT.Nowachek

Kierkegaard’sDancingTaxCollector:Faith,Finitude,andSilence.BySheridanHough.Pp.vii,169,NY/ Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2015, £25.00.

AtthecenterofthedramathatisSøren Kierkegaard’sauthorshiponefindsarich dramatis personae ofdiversecharacterseithercreatedby Kierkegaardorrefashionedthroughhiscreative genius.Inheraccessibleandplayfulbook, SheridanHoughnarrowsinononeofthesefigures,thedancingtaxcollectorfromthepseudonymouswork FearandTrembling,andshe treatshimastheinterpretivekeythatopensup thethoughtofthegreatDanishphilosopher.As shedescribesit,herprojectis‘existentialphenomenological’inthesensethatitpursues issuescentraltowhatitmeanstoexistasahuman beinganddoessobyinvestigatingthephenomenonofaparticularwayofbeingintheworld.

LoominglargebehindthisapproachisHusserland Heidegger,butperhapsevenmoresoHough’s mentoranddissertationadvisorHubertDreyfus— whoseownparticularexistentialreadingof Kierkegaardhasleftarecognizablemarkonthe presentwork.Hough’sargumentisperfectly straightforward:inassumingthetaxcollectoras herpointofdepartureandher telos shemakesthe casenotonlythatfaithisthe‘highestwayof worldlyengagement’thatpreservesallthreeof Kierkegaard’sspheresofexistence,butthatsuch faithplaysoutthroughtheprocessofreceivingall thingsasagiftandtherebyembracingwithjoyin eachandeverymomentone’s‘quotidianenvironment’(pp.viii-ix).

Indevelopingheraccount,Houghproceedsina personalstyleoverthecourseofeightchapters. Followingthefirstchapterinwhichsheleadsoff herexistential-phenomenologicalinvestigationwith apaeanforthetaxcollector,shethendedicates onechaptertoeachoffourmovementsthatconstitutethelivedexistenceofthisexemplaroffaith. ThefirstmovementiswhatHoughcallsthe aduton ofselfhoodandwhichshecharacterizesintermsof thetaskofinwardnessbywhichthepersonoffaith pullsawayfromthelevellingofthecrowdinorder toturninwardtothesilentrecessesofoneselfso astobecomeaselfthroughpassionatecommitment tohisorherlife’sproject.Thiscommitmentneverthelessturnsoutwardasthetaxcollectorreengages himselfintheconcreteworldbygivingthanksin allthingsand,despitethefinitudeofhislife, neverthelessseeingthislifetoberichwithpossibilityduetoGod’sgraceandgoodness.Thesecond movementinvolvesthetaskofchoosingpleasure. Incontrasttothefutileattempttofulfilltheaestheticlifecarriedoutbyfiguressuchas‘A’from Either/Or,thetaxcollectorisabletorealizesensualpleasurenotbecausehebouncesrestlessly frompleasuretopleasureinpursuitofaesthetic stability,butratherbecausethroughfaithhe receivesthesensualasagiftthatcanbethoroughly enjoyed.Thethirdmovementdealswiththeethical taskofchoice.Althoughthetaxcollector’slifein manywaysresemblestheethicalstanceofJudge Williaminthattheformerchooseshisconcretelife andfindsjoyinit,thetaxcollectornevertheless departsfromtheJudgeinacrucialsense:whereas Williamassumesthattheethicallifecanbefulfilledthroughone’sownability,thetaxcollector beginswiththepremisethatinrelationtoGodwe arealwaysinthewrongandthereforeethical choiceapartfromtheenablingofgraceproves impossible.Thisbringsusnicelytothefourth movement,inwhichthenotionofsincomesfront andcenter.Sinremindsusthatfaithforthetax collectorisnotathoughtorasystemofbeliefs, butratheraphenomenonandaparticularwayof beingintheworld.Butwhatcharacterizessuchan existentialstance?ForHoughitisconfession—the confessionalmovementwherethetaxcollectorparadoxicallyhaltsinhissinfulself-relianceand insteadopenshimselfasaflawedandtransparent

selfbeforeGod.AnditisherethroughanencounterwithGodbymeansofconfessionthatwewitnessthetaxcollector’sgreatestjoy.Takenby themselves,thesefourmovementsstillpresentan incompletepictureoffaith,andforthisreason Houghturnsin Chapter 7tothenotionoflove whereshenotonlypointsoutthatthetaxcollector isinessencealover,butwhereshealsoappropriatelystressesthatloveforKierkegaardfunctionsas anontologicalneedthatrevealshowallhuman beingsarefundamentallyco-constitutedthrough interpersonalrelationships.

Althoughtherearenumerousmeritstothisbook, threeoftheminparticulardeservemention.First, theplayfulandnovelisticstyleofthebook,which extendsfromHough’sownexperienceasapoet andnovelist,isbothrefreshingandentirelyappropriateforengagementwithKierkegaardandhis particularliteraryapproachtofaith.Atthesame time,however,inherplayfulnessHoughdoesnot discardtheseriousness(i.e., Alvor)withwhich Kierkegaardhimselfbelievesthequestionoffaith istoberaisedandpursued.Second,Houghdoes anexcellentjobofdrawingoutthethemeof motionwithinKierkegaard’sthought—something whichisnotonlyexplicitinherfocusonthefour ‘movements’ofthetaxcollector,butwhichisparticularlyclearinthepostludetothebookwhere sheemphasizeshowtheliveddispositionoffaith isakintowalkingandtodancing(hencethe dancing taxcollector).Inthissense,Hough’swork nicelyjoinsforceswiththatofscholarssuchas ClareCarlisleinofferingavaluablere-articulation ofhowKierkegaard’sexistentialismplaysoutasa philosophyofbecoming.Third,Hough’sbook makesanimportantcontributiontoforwardingthe promisingresearchprogrambegunnottoomany yearsagothathascenteredonthetaskofplacing Kierkegaardintodialoguewithphenomenology andmajorthinkersfromthistradition.Intheend, evenassheaffordsaprominentroleinher approachtothevoicesofHusserl,Heidegger,and Dreyfus,sheisneverthelesssuccessfulinmaking surethattheydonotoverpowereitherhervoice orthevoicesofKierkegaardandhisvarious characters.

MarquetteUniversityMatthewT.Nowachek

Kierkegaard’sInfluenceonLiterature,CriticismandArt (TomeIV:TheAnglophoneWorld).EditedbyJon Stewart.Pp.xv,239,Farnham,Surrey,Ashgate,2013, £65.00.

Hereisaninterestingquestion:whatdothewriters W.H.Auden,JamesBaldwin,DonDeLillo,Louise Erdrich,JamesJoyce,DavidLodge,FlanneryO’ Connor,WalkerPercy,andWilliamStyronall

haveincommon?Theanswer,accordingtothis editedcollection,whichispartofvolume12inthe ‘KierkegaardResearch:Sources,Receptionand Resources’seriespublishedbyAshgate,isthat

theywereallinfluencedbytheworkofSoren Kierkegaard.

EversincePlatoin TheRepublic firstcontrasted thepurportedlyrationalanduniversalaimsofphilosophywiththepotentiallymisleadingandeven dangerousseductivenessofpoetryandfictivelanguagegenerally,theoreticallyatleastphilosophy andliteraturehavehadasomewhatuneasyrelationshipgiventheirconflictingpriorities.Without diminishinganylegitimatedifferences,itisgenerallythecasethatthelivedexperiencesofphilosophersandwritershavebeensomewhatdifferent. Philosophy,afterall,isusuallyexpressedinlanguage,whichmeansthatmostphilosophershave ofnecessitybeenwriterstoo,andasignificant numberoffictionalwriters,fortheirpart,have drawninspirationfromthephilosophicaldiscussionoftheirtimeandplaceintheirimaginative projects.

Whattheeditor,JonStewart,hasaccomplished hereistobringtogetherafirst-rateteamofinternationalscholarstowritetightandinteresting piecesthatdescribehowthewriterslistedabove, aswellastheliterarycriticsHaroldBloomand GeorgeSteiner,andeventhecomposerSamuel Barber,wereimpactedintheirworkbyreading SorenKierkegaard,whohimselfwasamongthe mostliteraryandimaginativeofphilosophers. Kierkegaard,itisworthremembering,wroteunder variouspseudonyms,utilizedironyintheservice ofindirectcommunication,andcouldbehilariouslyfunnyordeeplyseriousdependingonhis moodandpurpose.

Eachoftheessaysondisplayhereisverywellwrittenandquiterevealingaboutthecomplexand subtlewaysthatsomeaspectsofKierkegaard’s thoughtimpactedthepersonalstrugglesandcreativeactivityofsomeveryprovocativeandinterestingfigures.Itisimportanttostresshowvaried andparticularthisinfluencehasturnedouttobe. IntheessayonAuden,forexample,welearnhow inastraightforwardway‘Kierkegaard’sinfluence onAudenisbestexaminedinthreedifferentcontexts:thatofhispersonalbiography,thatofhis activityasapoet,andthatofhismoreconceptual interestinKierkegaard’sthought’(p.2).Incontrast,thepieceonDeLillofocusesonhisnovel FallingMan andhowKierkegaard’sworks

‘suggestareadingofthenovelintermsof Kierkegaard’sinterestinwhathappenstopeople whostruggletraumaticallywithexperienceof somethingatthelimitsofunderstanding,who struggletomakeitapartoftheirexperience, whattheyknow’(p.82).Morepragmatically,in thecontributiononSteinerwereadhow‘Soren Kierkegaardhasplayedanimportantroleinthe developmentandcommunicationofSteiner’s attempttoteachhisidiosyncraticremedialmode ofreading’(p.193).

Theproductionvaluesofthishardcovertextare first-rate,withasolidbindingandcoverwith brightpaperandageneroussizedfontthroughout. However,mymainconcernwiththecollectionis thatthereisnointroductionorforwardbytheeditor.Thisabsenceofatransparentandexplicitcontexthasseveralnegativeconsequences.Thefirst andmostobviousisthatitisnotclearhowthe peopleimpactedbyKierkegaardwerechosen.How manycandidateswereconsidered?Giventhe extentofKierkegaard’sinfluenceonecouldimaginethatthelistwaspotentiallyquitelong.The depthoftheKierkegaardianimpactisalsoquite varied.OnoneendofthespectrumthereisDavid Lodge’snovel Therapy,wherethemaincharacter actuallyreadsKierkegaardwithinthefictional worldofthestory.Ontheotherendthereisthe muchmoresuggestiveandspeculativerolethat Kierkegaard’swritingplayedonthenovelsof JamesJoyce,whereitisveryhardtodetectany connectionthatonecouldconfidentlycall Kierkegaardian.Theessaysarealsoofuneven length,withtheshortestonLouiseErdichcoming inatonlyeightpages,andthelongestbeingthe thirtypageessayonHaroldBloom.

Iampleasedtohavehadtheopportunitytoread thisinterestingandintellectuallystimulatingcollectionofessays.Irecommendittoalmostanyone withaninterestintheoftencomplexandeven mysteriousinfluencethatphilosophyhashadonliteratureandcreativeworkgenerally,aswellas forreaderswithamorespecificinterestin Kierkegaard’sinfluenceintheaestheticrealm.

St.Mary’sUniversity,Calgary, Canada TrentDavis

KierkegaardonthePhilosophyofHistory.ByGeorgiosPatios.Pp.xi,187,Basingstoke,PalgraveMacmillan, 2014, £60.00.

Patiosencouragesareadjustmentinourappreciation ofKierkegaard.Heis‘wellknownasawittywriter mainlyoccupiedwithChristianity’butperhapswe

canalsoregardhimas‘aphilosopherwhocanprovideuswithsomenewandauthenticideasaboutthe natureofhistory.’(ix)Patiosacceptsthat

Kierkegaarddoesnotmakelifeeasyforhisreaders, whatwithallthepseudonyms,differentwriting styles,andplayfulness,butweshouldnotallow Kierkegaardto‘vanishinthemultitudeofhispersonae’(1).Lookclosely,saysPatios,andthereisasingle,authenticvoice.Thisdoesnotmeanthatthereis asystematicphilosophyofhistory,whichiswhy PatiospreferstotalkaboutKierkegaard’s‘approach’ tohistoryorhis‘concepts.’Atanyrate,Patiosfinds Kierkegaard’smusingsveryinteresting.

Inessence,KierkegaardwasconcernedwithrefutingHegelso,naturallyenough,thatiswherePatios begins.TwocentralthemesareidentifiedinHegel’s philosophyofhistory.First,reasonisthemainhistoricalagentandtranscendshumansubjectivity. Second,humanbeingsarecapableoffullyunderstandingtheirpast:theycanhavea‘securegraspon history’spattern,structureandultimategoal’(25). Kierkegaardflatlyrejectsbothpropositions.The humanselfistheonlyhistoricalagentandtheworkingsandstudyofhistoryaredirectlyrelatedtoour freedomofwill.Suchsubjectivityalsomeansthatit isourdutyto‘decideaboutourfuturehistoryinstead ofsimplytryingtounderstandourpasthistory’(ix). Andtalkingofthepast,Kierkegaard-againoverturningoneofHegel’sbasicprinciples-insiststhat wecannotfullyknowourhistory.Itisalways‘an uncertainobjectofcognition’(28)

PatiosclearlyadmiresthethrustofKierkegaard’s reasoning.Itcreatesan‘absoluteinterrelation betweenhistoricalandhumanexistence’(2)andit

can‘restorethepassionandthedignityofourpersonalparticipationtohistory’(79).WithHegel,you endup‘beinganinstrumentforthehistorical completionofreason’,whichdoesn’tsoundlike muchfun,andyour‘historicalselfhoodisthereby lost’(79).

Patiosdoesnot,however,thinkthatKierkegaard goteverythingrightand,sinceHegelgotthings wrongaswell,theideaofasynthesisisfloated. Thisseemshighlyambitioussincethetwothinkers couldhardlybefartherapart.Patiossuggests, though,thatthetwofiguresrepresentthelimitsof anydebate,soreadingthemtogethergivesusour parameters,and‘onlyifwecanabsolutelyprove thateitherHegel’svieworKierkegaard’sviewis totallyanduniquelycorrectmustweacceptonly oneoftheseviews.’(167).Fairenough,butthisis alongwayfromreconcilingthoseideaswhich Patiosattempts,unsuccessfully,todo.Onemust admirehisconfidence,however.Apparently,when itcomestodiscussingHegelandKierkegaard together,‘allthepastpositionsregardingtheirrelationsareeitherpartlyortotallyflawed.’(80)

Patiostakesonagreatdealinthisbookbuthe alsofindstimetocoverHeideggerasapossible existentialalternativetoKierkegaard.Hedoesnot passmusterbecauseheis‘eitherborrowinghis mainconceptsfromKierkegaardorheistoo vague’(ix).

UniversityofDurhamJonathanWright

CatholicTheologyafterKierkegaard.ByJoshuaFurnal.Pp.xv,255,OxfordUniversityPress,2016,$99.00.

Thisbookisrefreshinglystraightforwardinterms ofcataloging20th CenturyCatholicresponsesto Kierkegaard.Whatisclearisthatputting Kierkegaardindialoguewith ressourcement Catholicthoughtprovidesaninterestingbyway throughwhichtoviewproductiveCatholic responsestomodernityanew.Thishighlyspecific focusofitssubjectmatterdoesattimeslackacertainengagementwithalargercontemporarytheologicalhorizonuponwhichthereflectiontakes place,onlypointingattimestowardadesirefor furtherstudyinleaguewiththeThomismoffiguressuchasJohnMilbankorAlasdairMacIntyre (p.217).Nonetheless,thebook,inmyopinion, succeedsinremindingitsreadersofhowinfluentialKierkegaardhasbeenupon20th Century thought,andthisisasituationthatisnotsoonto letup.Indeed,Furnal’srepeatedsuggestionthat Catholictheologiansinparticularneedtopay moreattentiontoaseminalProtestantfigurethey haveoftendismissedoutofhandisareminder

toooftheecumenicalageinwhichweliveand whichmustgrowmoreandmorecomfortable withwhathadatfirstappearedtobeanunwanted otherness.

ThefirstchapterattemptstoopenKierkegaard’s theologicalanthropologytowardCatholicthought bydemonstratinghowitisperhapsmoreecumenicalthanhaspreviouslybeenmaintained,and mightevenpointtowardaprofitable‘Catholic’ readingofKierkegaard’sworkonthewhole. Furnalsearchesthroughvariouscriticalreadings ofKierkegaard’sworkinordertoreveal,for example,amysticalundercurrentofthoughtthat mightjointogetherwiththeCatholictradition. Likewise,acloserreadingof WorksofLove seeks todemonstratehowKierkegaardinfactdeviated fromamoreorlessstandardLutheranaccountof thehumanperson,openingupourunderstanding ofhispointofviewtowardaCatholichorizon thatmuchfurther.RatherthanreadLutherasat therootofhisthought,Furnaldemonstrateshow

Kierkegaard‘offersinsteada parody ofLuther, whichcarrieswithinitanimplicitcriticismofan extrinsicistinterpretationofgrace’(p.27),pushingKierkegaardperhapssomewhatcloserto AquinasthantoLuther,andmaybeeven,hesuggests,toBenedictXVI’sremarksonloveas expressedincommunityinhisencyclical Deus

CaritasEst

Kierkegaard’stheologyofcreationandredemption,whichFurnalexaminesnext,likewiseis showntohaveadeeperresonancewithAquinas’ thoughtthanonemightinitiallysuspect—arecurringconclusionwithineachchapter,butonethatis playedouteffectivelyenough.Furnalsubsequently addressesKiekegaard’sallegedly‘non-historicist approachtotheChristianfaith’(p.44),whichis, intruth,entirelycompatiblewithCatholicefforts tointegratefaithandhistory.Healsotakesupthe themesofparadoxandcontemporaneityinan attempttoreiteratethetrajectoryofthebookin eversubtlerterms:‘Again,myclaimisthat Kierkegaardactuallysharesthebasictaskof ressourcement theologians:aparadoxicalrelation offaithandhistoryinthemodernage’(p.57).In thisparadoxicalrelation,wefindtoothatthereisa Kierkegaardianillustration,onepickedupbyvarious ressourcement theologians,forthenecessityof performingacontinuouslyself-critical‘autopsy offaith’whenstandingbeforeGod,onethatsustainsthoseoffaiththroughoutavarietyof circumstances.

Thesecondchapter,comprehensivelytitled ‘CatholicReceptionofKierkegaard’sWritingsin theTwentiethCentury’,attemptstofindaparticularresonancebetweenaKierkegaardiantheological anthropologyandthegeneraltrajectoryof ressourcement thought,targetingspecificallysuch luminariesasTheodorHaecker,RomanoGuardini, ErichPrzywara,ErikPeterson,JeanDanielou, YvesCongar,JamesCollinsandLouisDupre. Whatunfoldsisabriefhistoricalnarrationthat takesadeeperlookathowKierkegaardwasgenerallyreceivedafterhisdeathinEnglish,Frenchand German-speakingcontexts,focusinginparticular ontheseminalstudiesof,inFrance,JeanWahl and,inGermany,TheodorHaecker,whotranslated bothKierkegaardandJohnHenryNewman. Alongsidethishistory,wefindtooasurveyofthe receptionofvariousthemesinKierkegaard’s writings—wonder,idlechatter,theabsurd,melancholy,theleapoffaith,hisattacksonthe(mainly Protestant)Church,sinandgrace,paradoxand faith—astheyarepickedupandenmeshedwith theaforementioned ressourcement theologians. Eachhighlybalanceddiscussionofamajor CatholictheologianengagingwithKierkegaard’s worksufficestodemonstratethatthelatter’s

influencewasrealandlasting,evenifattimes subtleorseeminglyofsecondaryimportance.

Thethirdchapteroutlinestheimpactof Kierkegaard’sworkuponthepersonallifeand writingsofHenrideLubac.Ingeneral,andaswith thechaptersthatfollow,Furnalspendsagooddeal oftimechasingdownreferencestoKierkegaard withineachtheologianswork,evaluatingthemfor whattheyareworthandlookingatthesametime forfainterhomagestoKierkegaard’sthoughtand stylisticswithintheoeuvre.WhatstruckdeLubac aboutKierkegaard’sworkspecifically,Furnaldemonstrates,washowhewasabletoformulatean authenticresponsetoatheisthumanisminthemodernera,somethingthatKierkegaardhadmadea legitimateenterpriseandthatfromwhichdeLubac drewcontinuousinspirationashefacedagood manychallengesboththeologicalandpersonalvisa-vistheCatholicChurch.Overcomingselfdeceptionandformulatingatheologyofgrace becamecentralconcernsfordeLubacand,as Furnalshowsus,hemeticulouslyworked Kierkegaard’sthoughtintoeachdomaininorderto constructrelevant,modernnotionsoftherealpresenceofChristintheEucharistandinwardnessasa spiritualdimension,amongotherideas.

Thefourthchaptertakesamoresustainedlook atHansUrsvonBalthasar’svariouscritiquesof KierkegaardwhilealsomountingwhatFurnal referstoas‘AKierkegaardianCritiqueofHans UrsvonBalthasar’sTheologicalAesthetics’(p. 144).Accordingly,Furnaldevotesthefirstsection tore-assessingBalthasar’scritiqueof TheConcept ofAnxiety,eventuallyconcludingthat,inleague withKierkegaard,‘anxietyisnecessary and redeemablethroughthetheologicalvirtueoffaith’, somethingwhichBalthasaroverlooks(p.151). Indeed,thereisanapparentlackofnuancepresent inBalthasar’scritiqueofKierkegaard’saccountof theaesthetic,onethatFurnaltakeshimtotaskfor inordertorevealaspecific‘ChristologicalmalfunctioninBalthasar’stheologybecauseofhis divergencefromKierkegaard’(p.167).Atthe sametime,Furnalwillspeculatethattheological insightcanberecoveredfromKierkegaard’stake onthesacramentsifheisonlyreadmuchcloser thanBalthasarwaswillingtodo.Itisinthissense thatCatholictheologiansmightprofitagooddeal fromthatwhichistypicallyunderestimatedor devaluedinKierkegaard’sthought.

The20th CenturyItalianThomistandtranslator ofKierkegaard,CornelioFabrowhoseownunique Thomism,Furnaldemonstratesinthefinal chapter,isnotonlycompatiblewithmodern, Kierkegaardianthought,butengageswiththelatter’sworkonMariologyandecclesiology(read alongsideJohnHenryNewman)specifically.

Fabro’sanalysisofmodernatheism,whichtoo drawsfromKierkegaardianinfluence,istheonly workofhistobetranslatedintoEnglish, Godin Exile (1968).Bymovingbeyondthissinglework, inmanywaysFurnaldoesthereaderagreatservicebysimplyprovidinginsightintoFabro’s deeperworkandlegacy.Fabro’sclaimthat Kierkegaard’sworkuniquelybringsustothe doorstepofThomismseemsinmanywaystobe theunderpinningtoFurnal’sargumentthat Kierkegaardshouldbetakenmoreseriouslythan hehasbyCatholictheologians.BringingFabro’s claimstolight,then,perhapsservesasthecentral lynchpinofthebookonthewhole.Framinga positivereceptionofexistentialisminthecontext ofbothKierkegaard’sworkandCatholictheology,FabrodoeswhatmanyCatholictheologians ofthetimewereunabletodo,recoverthe thoughtofKierkegaardinsuchawayasto strengthenCatholicclaimsandtopointtheway towardamorefeasibletheologicalfuture.Among themanyinsightsFabrogleansfromKierkegaard

arehissustainedcritiqueofidealism,an‘ethical defenseofindividualhumanfreedom’andthe chargesleviedagainstliberalProtestanttheology watereddowninthewakeofmodernity(p. 195)—eachofwhichprovidingastableplatform forCatholicthoughttorenewitselfinrelationto Kierkegaard.

Therearepassagesinthebookwherethelink betweenKierkegaardandsomeparticular ressourcement theologianwearsperhapsabitthinnerthanmightbedesired,orwheretheconnection toThomisticthoughtseemsperhapsabittoo forcedasatidyconclusion.Thecentralargument ofthework,however,neverwaversorbuckles undertheweightofthegeneralthesis:Catholic theologiansmustdigdeeperintoKierkegaard’s workthantheyhavedonethusfar,andimmense richesawaitthosewillingtotakethetimetostudy oneofthemostcomplexandedifyingtheological mindsofthemodernera.

LoyolaUniversityChicagoColbyDickinson

DialoguesBetweenFaithandReason:TheDeathandReturnofGodinModernGermanThought.ByJohnH. Smith.Pp.xii,309,Ithaca,NY,CornellUniversityPress,2011,$35.00.

In DialoguesBetweenFaithandReason,JohnH. Smithseekstotracethewayinwhichtheinteractionbetweenfaithandreasonhasresultedina ‘“slipperyslope”thathasledfrombelieftounbelief,fromGodtothedeathofGod’,inmodern Germanthought,particularlyfrom‘intellectualand philosophicaldevelopments within modern Christiantheology’(viii).Smithseesthisdevelopmentasloadedwithironyasthosewhointendedto savefaithfromtheattacksofreason,eitherby showingtheharmonybetweenthetwoorbyeliminatingreasonaltogether,endedupundermining faithandgivingwaytoarationalizedChristianity. Inordertodothis,hebeginswiththequarrels betweenErasmusandLutheratthebeginningof theReformationandthenmovestosuchthinkers asDescartes,Spinoza,Leibniz,Pascal,Kant, Hegel,Schleiermacher,Schelling,Schopenhauer, Feuerbach,Nietzsche,Heidegger,Gogarten,Barth, Bultmann,Rosenzweig,Buber,Derrida,and BenedictXVI.

Settingasidetheconspicuousfactthatnotallof thesefiguresareGerman,oneimmediatelyperceivessomethingevenmorearresting—mostof thesethinkersarenotevenChristian.Smith’s choiceofthinkerstochronicleispuzzlinggiven hisexpressedthesis.Hestatesinregardtothese thinkers,‘Infact,whatmakesthemsointeresting isthattheygenuinelyinhabitthepositionsof

“faith”and“knowledge”’(16).Onewonderswhat Smith’sdefinitionof‘faith’ishereinregardsto suchthinkersasSpinoza,Hegel,Nietzsche, Heidegger,etc.Hecontinues,‘Theironyofthe “slipperyslope,”thefactthat,inusingonekindof discoursetodefendreligionandGod,thinkersin themodernWestoftenunderminedtraditional faith,makesthemallthemore“useful”asexamplesofeffortstobridgethegap.’Hereagain,one isstretchedtoseehowmanyofthesefigures ‘defendreligionandGod’.

ItseemsthatSmith’schoiceofthinkersismotivatedbytwofactors,theformerofwhichinfluencesthelatter.Thefirstishisself-designationasan ‘atheist’(19),whichgiveshimanaffinitytomany ofthethinkershehaschosen.Inhiswords,‘The ironythatthisgradualcorrosionoftraditionalreligionoccurredinlargemeasurethankstotheinfluenceofthosewhowouldhavesavedit,makesthe storyallthemoreinterestingforatheistslike myself.Thereisanundeniabledelightinthe “cunningofhistory”thatwouldturnthebrilliant effortsofaLeibniz,Lessing,Kant,orHegeltojustifytheexistenceofGodintoyetanothernailin thecoffin’(20–21).

Thesecondfactor,influencedbythefirst,ishis preconceivedconclusionthatthereisaninherent contradictionbetweenfaithandreason.Inconcludinghisbook,Smithstates,‘Iwouldstressthatthe

entireargumentofmybookhasmadethecasethat thehistoryofChristianity,especiallyinthemodern periodfromtheReformationtothepresent, must beconsidered...aconstantlyrevisited,failedand failingdialoguebetweenPaulandJohn,faithand reason’(267–268).TothinkthatPaulisopposed toJohn,orthatPaulisopposedtoreasonandthat JohnisopposedtofaithisnotonlytomisunderstandradicallyPaulandJohn,buttoinjectafalse dichotomyintothefoundationoftheChristian faith.Andindeed,SmithdoesinfactmisunderstandandmisinterpretJohn.InJohn1:1,insteadof translating theos enhologos asisdemandedby theGreek(theLogoswasGod),heignoresthe functionofthedefinitearticleandrendersitas ‘Godwasthelogos’.Thisleadstohischaracterizationof logos (andultimatelyGod)throughoutthe bookasa(rationalist-mathematical)concept. InsteadofstartingwiththeFourthEvangelist’s ownunderstandingofthe Logos inJohn1,Smith readsbackintotheprologueoftheGospela Hegelian-Heideggerian-Bultmanniannotionof logos asdialogicalreason.Yet,fortheEvangelist, influencedbytheJewish-HellenisticWisdom literature,the logos isnotmerelyaconcept,but the Logos,WisdomincarnateandtheSecond PersonoftheTriuneGod.Thefailureto adequatelyaccountforthisleadstostriking

mischaracterizationsinhisbook,suchasattributing a‘Hegelianism’totheworksofRatzinger/Benedict XVI(260–261).

Thereisahistorytobetracedoftheironicpath ofbelieftounbelief within modernGerman Christiantheology,but,unfortunately,Smith’sis notit.SuchanaccountwouldstartwithLuther(as Smithrightlydoes),butwithanexaminationofthe rolenominalismplayedontheReformerandhis Reformation(whichSmithsilentlypassesover), andthentouchingonfiguressuchasHermann SamuelReimarus,DavidFriedrichStrauss,Julius Wellhausen,AdolfvonHarnack,BernhardDuhm, ErnstTroeltsch,aswellasBultmann,Ernst K€ asemann,JurgenMoltmann,HeinrichSchlier,and yes,Ratzinger/BenedictXVI.WhatSmithdoes giveusissomethingmuchbroader.Despitehis objectionstothecontrary,herelatesthestoryof themodernstrugglebetweenChristianityandsecularization,astorythatshowshowtheexternal influencesofsecularizationhelpedtofosterthe internaltensionswithinmodernChristianity,tensionsthatarebynomeansinherenttoChristianity itself.HisbookisagoodresourceforunderstandingthephilosophicalbackgroundtoGerman Christiantheologyinmodernity.

AveMariaUniversityDanielM.GarlandJr.

TheAgeofDoubt:TracingtheRootsofOurReligiousUncertainty.ByChristopherLane.Pp.x,238,New Haven/London,YaleUniversityPress,2011, £18.00.

Religiousdoubtisinnoshortsupplytoday. Institutionalreligiousbelongingisonthewaneand another’sprofessedcertitudeinone’sfaithismore likelytoinspireskepticismthanpraise.Inshort, manyofusseemtodoubteverythinginthisAge ofDoubt:ourselves,oneanother,ourpoliticaland religiousleaders,andofcourse,God.Andyet,as ChristopherLaneshowsin TheAgeofDoubt: TracingtheRootsofOurReligiousUncertainty, wecanlearnmuchaboutdoubt(andfaith)byturningtodebatesamongtheVictoriansintheirown livelyandilluminatingAgeofDoubt.

Suchanagewasdominatedbythespecterand extentoftime.Howoldwastheearthandhuman beings?Wheredidhumanbeingscomefrom? Darwin’s1859 OntheOrigenofSpecies wasa seminaldateinthiscrisisofthought,butDarwin’s contemporaries(likeCharlesLyellorRobert Chambers),nottomentionpre-Victorianthinkers (likeBenedictSpinoza,Voltaire,andDavidHume) werenoteworthyvoicesaswell.OthercrucialvoicesincludedGermanphilosopherslikeKant, Schopenhauer,andFeuerbach–andthehigher

criticismofGermanbiblicalscholarslikeJohann GottfriedEichhorn.Oncetheirworksweremade availabletoVictoriansinEnglisheditions(suchas GeorgeElliot’stranslationofFeuerbachorof DavidStraus’ LifeofJesus,it“setoffacrisiseven deeperthanDarwin’s OrigenofSpecies in1859” (119).

AsLaneaptlytraces,scientificdiscoveries demandedclarifyingreligiousresponsesandmany ofthesewerehostile.Toomuchseemedtobeat stake.AswiththeseventeenthcenturycontroversiesinvolvingGalileo(andbeforehim,Copernicus), theliteraltruthoftheBibleseemedtobeunder potentialsuspicion,ifnotbeundermined.Many Victorianintellectualscouldnotdisinterthe robustroleofdoubtintheirthoughts.Beliefwithoutdoubtbecamesuspecttosuchthinkers.For many,agnosticismseemedthemostreasonable position.Butthejourneycouldbepainfuland angst-ridden.Ultimately,Lanenotonlywantsto showhowcontemporarydebatesonfaithand doubtcanlearnfromthestrugglesofthese Victorianthinkers,buttohighlighttheroleof

faithanddoubtinallsidesofthedebate.AsLane closesthebook:‘Theprocessofworkingthrough doubtremainsoneofthebestwaystogoon thinking,reflectingonchoices,andwonderingat uncertainoutcomes’(186).

OneauthorsurprisinglyomittedinLane’swork isthescientist,naturalist,andpoetLorenEiseley. BornsixyearsafterVictoria’sdeathin1901,his classicworkslike TheFirmamentofTime or The UnexpectedUniverse (nottomentionhis Darwin andtheMysteriousMr.X) wouldhavebeenavaluableandkeybridgeforLanetoconnectwithcontemporaryvoices.WhileLanefocuseshislast chapteronAmerica’sbiblicalfundamentalists,creationists,and LeftBehind advocates,thework couldhaveendedonamoreilluminatingandchallengingperspectivewithathinkerlikeEiseley:a secularhumanist,andDarwinianscholardeeply attunedtoethicsandasearchformeaningbut unwillingtobelieveinGod.Eiseley’spenetrating reflections,linkedwithLane’sanalysisofpoets likeTennysonandnovelistsliketheBrontesisters,

wouldhavebeenarichresourceandprovided deepermaterialforLane’slivelyproseandliterary andhistoricalacumen.

Oneminor,butnotinsignificantquibble:the bookisclassifiedonitsbackcoverunderHistory ofScience,butitisreallyaliteraryanalysisofthe wordsandbiographiesofkeyVictorianthinkers aroundtheissuesoffaith,doubt,andevolution. MostofLane’sfocusisonpoets,novelists,philosophers,andtheologians,orthephilosophicaland theologicalgrapplingofscientistslikeDarwinor Renaissance(Victorian)menlikeHerbertSpenser, whowasaphilosopher,geologist,andsociologist, amongotherprofessionalroles.Lane’sinsightson theBr€ onteSistersandtheirbrotherBranwell; GeorgeElliot;Tennyson;orMatthewArnold; amongothers,iswhatmakesthisbookajoyto read.Infact,inthis,ourageofdoubt,Ihavelittle doubtofthepleasureandilluminatingmoments readerswillencounterwiththisbook.

MaterDeiInstitute,DCUPeterAdmirand

Schleirmacher:AGuideforthePerplexed.ByTheodoreVial.Pp.viii,150.London,BloomsburyT&TClark, 2013, £14.99.

WorkonSchleirmacherintheEnglish-speaking worldhaslargelybeenfocusedonhistheology, butSchleirmacherwasafarmorediverse thinker,anditisTheodoreVial’scontentionthat wecannotfullyunderstandorappreciate Schleirmacher’stheologywithoutlocatingitin thebroadercontextofhis thought.Hearguesthat anhistoricallackofcontextualizationhasledto somepervasivemisreadingsofSchleirmacherin theEnglishliterature,particularlychargesofindividualismandinternalism(2).Vialintroducesthe readertoSchleirmacher’sthoughtasawhole,and situateshisworkinitsintellectualandhistorical context.Hetracesseveralthemes,suchasthesignificanceoflanguageandcommunity,through thebreadthofSchleirmacher’sthought,while alsolocatinghisthoughtinrelationtotheintellectualandpoliticalactivityofhisday.Assuch, Vialnotonlypresentsthecontentof Schleirmacher’swork,butalsodemonstrateshow theseviewswereformed.Vialseekstohereby introduceSchleirmacher’sthoughtnotonlyto theologians,butalsotonon-theologicalscholars ofreligion(2).

VialdescribesSchleirmacher’sworkasa‘move toplacemoderntheologyonthefoundationof experience,anexperiencenotchallengedby Enlightenmentepistemologiesthesamewaythat foundationsofScriptureandreasonwere

challengedbythoseepistemologies,’butanepistemologythatembracesthesechallenges(8).While VialmentionsthatSchleirmacherwasinfluenced byKant,Spinoza,andtheearlyGerman Romanticismofhisdaythroughtheliterarysalons thathefrequented,heonlydescribesthesignificanceofKantinanydetail.WhileSchleirmacher acceptstheKantianpositionthatwecannotknow thingsdirectlybutonlytheirappearancetoour mind,Schleirmacherneverthelessdepartsfrom Kantinsuggestingthatknowledgeinvolvesthe two-foldprocessoforganizingourthoughtscorrectlyinlogic,aswellasbringingthosethoughts intoproperrelationshiptotheirobjects(35).This latterelementisaprocessofdiscernmentincommunity,whichSchleirmachernames‘dialectic.’ Theprocessofbringingthoughtsintotheirproper relationwithobjectsistheapplicationofconcepts torepresentations.Themostgeneralconceptisthe transcendent,universalbeing,whichisunattainable.However,whereasconceptsareforKant innatestructuresinthemindthroughwhichreality isfiltered,concepts,forSchleirmacher,arebased inlanguage(38).

Thesetwoideas,communityandlanguage,are centraltotherestofthebookasVialdescribes Schleirmacher’sworkandrespondstocriticisms. Forexample,Schleirmacher’sexpressivistanthropology,hisbeliefthatethicalmeaningislocatedin

thefreeexpressionofself,leadstothecriticism thatheisanindividualist.However,thiscriticism forgetsthatforSchleirmacher,‘Thecommunity precedestheindividual,aslanguageprecedesour thoughtandexperience.Wearegivenourselvesby ourcommunity,andinexpressinganddeveloping ourselvesweshapeandmakethatcommunitypossible’(58).Moreover,VialarguesinthefinalchapterthatSchleirmacher’sunderstandingofpoliticsis notoneinwhichatomisticindividualsarejoined togetherbyacontract,butthegroupprecedesthe individualbecauseeachindividualisbornintoa sharedlanguageandcommonexperience(107). Likewise,Vialalsocountersthechargethat Schleirmacher’stheoryofreligionisinternalist. Ourreligiousexperiencesandintuitionsareculturallydeterminedinlanguage,makingthempublic. Schleirmacherdoesaccountforreligioninindividualterms,butthemeaningofthatreligionsexperienceisshapedbyconceptsderivedfromour languageandcommunity.(70).

Vial’sintroductiontoSchleirmacherisaccessible andconversationalinstyle.Itisexcellentlysignposted,thoughtheauthoraddstheoccasional superfluousanecdote,whichinterruptstheflowof thematerial.Thebookisbothbroadinitsattempt toconsiderSchleirmacher’sworkasawhole,and unifyinginitsfocusonseveralcentralconcepts thatreappearthroughoutSchleirmacher’scorpus. TheorganizationofthematerialisnotalwaysintuitiveinthatthefinalchapteronSchleirmacher’s politicsmayhavebeenbetter-placedwithVial’s discussionofSchleirmacher’shermeneuticsand ethics,asthisiswherehediscusseschargesof individualism.Thiswouldhaveservedtoorganize thebookaccordingtoincreasingcommunalspecificity.Nevertheless,thesemattersofflowdonot effecttheaccessibilityofthebook,andVialsucceedsindemonstratingthewaysinwhich Schleirmacher’sepistemology,heremeneuticsand theoriesaboutcultureinfluencedhistheology(25).

RegentsCollege,OxfordAlexandraEikelboom

Afteraddressingthesecritiques,Vialturnsto howtheseconceptsarespecificallyembodiedin Schleirmacher’stheology.Schleirmacherdescribes religionastheexperienceoftheinfiniteinthe finite.Theseexperiencesthennaturallygiveriseto outwardexpressions,aroundwhichcommunities form.Inaccordancewithhisreligioustheory, SchleirmacherconsidersJesustobetheonlypersoninhistorywhohashadaperfect‘Godconsciousness,’orexperienceoftheinfiniteinthe finite.TheChristiancommunityhasthenformed aroundthereligiousexpressionsofJesusthatgrew outofhisperfectGod-consciousness.Vialcalls thisa‘linguisticrevolution’(89),inwhichJesus’ experiencegeneratednewwaysofspeakingand acting,resultinginanewcommunity.

BeyondReason:WagnercontraNietzsche.ByKarolBerger.Pp.xvi,529,Oakland,CA,UniversityofCalifornia Press,2017, £54.95/$65.00.

Thisisanexceptionallyclearandaccessiblebook ontopicsonwhichitistraditionallydifficulttobe clearandaccessible:theorigin,genesis,andnature ofWagner’sachievementinhis‘musicdramas’, andtheevaluationofthesedramasintermsoftheir impactonGermanculturefromaphilosophical pointofview.Wagnerbeganasarevolutionary wishingtooverthrowthevestigesofthe ancien regime hefoundstillinplaceaswellastheperniciousinfluenceoftherisingphilistinebourgeoisie duringthe19th centuryinfavourofanobleking guidedbyanartist-prophet;swungovertosemiChristianrenunciationbasedonaconversionto Schopenhauerianpessimism(althoughduringthis phaseheclosedallhismajorworkswithasemiNietzscheanexultationofthe‘Will’comingtotriumphantandpowerfulexpression);andendedin excusinghimselffromproducingtheculminating masterpiecehehadpromisedbysayingthatsucha workdependeduponculturaldevelopmentand institutionsinplaceatthetime,andsuch

institutionsweresimplylackinginthecapitalcontrolled,power-hungry,andmilitaristiceraafter Bismark’ssurprisingvictoryovertheFrenchin 1871andunificationofGermanyintoanew ‘Reich’,toreplacethe‘HolyRomanEmpire’ whichhadendedwithNapoleon’svictoryover Prussiain1807atJena.Musicologistswillhavea feastwiththiswork,asBergersurprisinglyshows theoriginofWagner’smusicalformsinItalian operaticmodels,andalsoshowshowsuperficial andincorrectwasNietzsche’slater,spitefulcriticismofhisformermasterandidol,thathewasa ‘decadentromantic’becauseheforegroundedthe sensational,iftellingandarrestingdetail,atthe expenseofamore‘classical’satisfactionbasedon anappreciationofaworkasawhole.

Artwasthevehiclebywhichculturewas advancedandevaluatedduringthisperiod,andthe Wagner-Nietzscherelationshipdevelopedintoa bitterquarrelbetweentwomenwhobothbelieved themselvestobethe‘artist-prophet’oftheage.

Bergerdoesanexcellentjobofgivingabalanced viewofeach,butinsidingwithWagner(slightly) attheend,Idon’tbelievehehasdonefulljustice tothelogicofNietzsche’sposition.Bergerholds NietzscheinhisfuriousembracewithWagner,but foranultimateevaluationitisnecessarytoplace Nietzscheinawidercontext.

TheEnlightenmentphilosophersbegananepistemologicalprojecttoseparate‘clear’from‘unclear’ ideasbycheckingtheirintellectual‘genealogy’or pedigree;thoseideaswhichcouldtracetheiroriginsbacktosenseorreasonwouldbeallowedto stay,whilethosediscoveredtohavetheiroriginin imaginationwouldbeexpunged.Further,Descartes launchedarevolutionaryproposaltouse(maximal) doubttoovercomeproblemsofrelativismand uncertaintywhichdoubthadcreatedinthefirst place;thisdoubtcouldbecarriedoutfirstthrough reason,andlaterduringtheRomanticerathrough theimaginationconjuringupevenworsepossibilities.KantshowedthatWill,whichgivesusaccess tomoralfreedom,takesusfurtherthanreason, whichislimitedtotheworldofdeterministic science.SchopenhaueridentifiedWillwiththe ‘thing-in-itself’andmadethisthebasisforhisphilosophicalpessimism.Nietzsche,likeWagner,was entrancedwithSchopenhauer’sphilosophy,but NietzscheeventuallycriticizedSchopenhauerfor falteringatthefinalhurdle:Schopenhauerheldthat whenWillviewsitselfinthe‘mirror’ofagreat workofart,itsuffersarevulsionandself-loathing sointensethatitundergoesamiraculous‘conversion’intoitsopposite,becominga‘will-lesssubject’,givenovertorenunciation,charity,and

eventuallysainthood.ForNietzschethiswasacopout,ajury-riggedfailureofnerve,whichhadtobe correctedforhisphilosophytobecomeconsistent. WillcanonlybeWill,anditcanonlybedifferentiatedbyintensity,asstrongorweak.Asismade clearbyaphorism341in TheGayScience,‘The GreatestStress’,the‘Overman’isabletoreverse thedespairanddepressionhefeelsatthedownwardtrendofWesternculturepreciselybyengagingintheactivitythat‘hurts’themost,by imaginingthissamecyclerepeatedendlesslyto eternity–withouta‘highpoint’.Thestrongindividualuseshisimaginationtosearchoutthesecret ‘consolations’–the‘intellectualcrutches’-hestill needs,andexpellingthem.It’snotaquestionof ‘Truth’,becausethereisno‘Truth’(Thatisthe last‘consolation’);thereisonlyStrength.The ‘Overman’willcrushhisdeepesthopelikeacinder beneaththeheelofhisboot-and laugh while doingso!This,Nietzscheinsists,istheonlyway torenderSchopenhauer’sphilosophyconsistent,to liveitoutauthenticallyanddispassionately.The factthatNietzschetherebybecomesembroiledin hisowncontradiction(orsecretattemptfinallyto demonstratethedeepestEnlightenmentallegiance tofreedompreciselybyacceptingitsopposite–amorfati)showsmerelytheincoherenceofthe modernprojectasawhole,asdistinctfrom Niezsche’scriticismofSchopenhauer’s(and Wagner’s)half-hearted,weak,and‘decadent’pretencetohavingachievedthis.

HeythropCollegePatrickMadigan

Hegel,HusserlandthePhenomenologyofHistoricalWorlds.ByTanjaStaehler.Pp.xi,246,London/NY, RowmanandLittlefield,2017,$120.00.

Itis,inonesense,easytosaywhatthisbookisabout –infact,thetitledoesanicejobofsummarizingit. Butinanothersenseitisdifficult:Iamnotsurewhat motivatesthebookotherthaninterestinHegeland Husserl;inotherwords,asIreadtheopeningpages, Iamnotsurewhatproblemsthis(re)readingof HegelandHusserlwillhelpussolve.Isitthatby readingHusserlinthelightofHegelwewillbetter understandoneorthebothofthem,suchthatthisis amainlyexegeticalworkofinteresttostudentsof Hegel,HusserlorGermanphilosophymoregenerally?OrwillthebookdemonstrateahithertounappreciatedengagementwithHegelbyHusserlbased onpreviouslyunidentifiedtextsculledfromthe Husserlarchives?Orisitthatbyreadingthem togetherwewillbetterunderstandhistoryandculture,suchthatthisworkisacontributiontothe

philosophyofhistoryandofinteresttoanyoneworkinginthefield,evenifnotworkingonHegelor Husserl perse.Butifso,whatparticularproblemsor questioninthephilosophyofhistoryisthebook addressing?Neithertheintroductionnorthefirst chapterprovidesasatisfactoryanswertothesequestions,orevenraisesthem.

Hiddendeepinthebook(infootnote58tochapter9,)IfoundwhatIthinkisapromisingwayto framethebook.Theretheauthornotesthatboth StephenCrowellandJacquesDerridasuggestthat thehistoricalcharacterofourideasunderminesthe scientificpretensionsofHusserl’sphenomenology. ThisissurelyaproblemfororthodoxHusserlians, forwhomphilosophyshouldbearigorousscience; howeverourauthorwritesthat‘thisdependson whatconceptofsciencewebringtobear,andifit

isaHegelian-inspiredconcept,yetinaradicalized form,Iseenoproblemassuch.’Soherewefinda motivationfortheHegel/Husserlpairingwith whichthebookisconcerned.Itisregrettablethat theopeningpagesofthebookdidn’thighlightand developthisproblemsinceittakesthebook beyondthemerecomparisonsoftextsandintothe realmofproperlyphilosophicalproblems,i.e.the relationshipbetweenpristineconceptionsofabsoluteknowingorscienceandthehistoricalmuddinessinwhichwefindourselves.

Inanycase,earlyoninthebook,Staehler claimsthatherjuxtapositionofHegelandHusserl neitherentailsnorrequiresthatHegelhaveany directinfluenceonHusserl’sthought.Whatever radicalizationofHegelonefindsinHusserlis,it appears,unintentionalandisperhapsbetterunderstoodasanengagementwithagenerally ‘Hegelian’pictureofphilosophyratherthanasa confrontationwiththedetailsofHegel’sworks. Afterall,Husserlneverreadthemcarefully.In contrasttoHusserl,Staehlerisacarefulreaderof Hegel(andofHusserlaswell).Shemovescarefullythroughthetexts,andsignpoststhemajor twistsandturnsoftheirarguments–thisisespeciallyusefulwhenitcomestoHegel,aphilosopher towhomtheHomericepithet“manoftwistsand turns”couldeasilybeapplied.Staehler’sfocusin herreadingofHegelison ThePhenomenologyof Spirit;sheisquicktopointoutthatwhatison offerhereisneitheracommentaryonthe Phenomenology norisitaphenomenologicalreadingofit.Instead,sheoffersafairlystraightforward (intheloosesensethatanythinghavingtodowith Hegelcanbestraightforward)accountofthemain themesofhis Phenomenology andthenoffersan accountofparallelthemesintheworkofHusserl. So,forexample,thefirstchapterbeginswithadiscussionofHegel’saccountofskepticism,andthen turnstoHusserl’s epoche.Thesecondchapter beginswithanaccountofidentityanddifference

SophisticalPractice:TowardaConsistentRelativism

inHegel’ssystem,followedbyadiscussionofthe roleplayedbythethinginitselfinHegel’s thought.Thechapterconcludeswithasectionthat showingthatbothHegelandHusserlarguethatan objectxcanonlybeperceivedinacontext,but thattheydisagreeinhowthisisarticulated:Hegel tendstoclaimthatthecontextisprovidedonlyby otherobjects,yandz,whileHusserlproposes somethingmoregeneral,thehorizonofmeaning. Theotherchaptersfollowasimilarstructure.

Thebookconsistsofanintroduction,tenchaptersandapost-scriptthatmainlyaddresses HeideggerandMerleau-Ponty.Thechaptershit majorpointsinHegel’s Phenomenology andparallelpointsinHusserl’swork,i.e.thoselociwhere Husserlisdiscussingrelatedissues.Inadditionto theaforementionedreferencestoHeideggerand Merleau-Ponty,onefindsdiscussionsofDerrida, IragaryandLevinassprinkledthroughoutthebook. Thesediscussionsaremeanttobemoresuggestive thandeterminative–Staehlerisnotinterestedin offeringusanotherdeconstructionofHegelor Husserl. DeoGratias! Wealsofindtwointriguing butshortdiscussionsof‘analytic’appropriationsof Hegeland/orHusserlbyJohnMcDowellandhis interlocutors.Staehler’streatmentofthesemany figuresiscareful,ifabitshallow.Andthat,perhaps,bestsumsupthisbook:acarefulreadingof HegelandHusserl,rangingoveragreatmany texts,butnever,tothisreader’smind,lingering longenoughtoengagewiththeissuesatstakein thosetexts.Throughoutthetext,Staehlerrefersto scholarlycontroversiesorargumentativedifficulties onlytowavethemtothesideasnotgermaneto hertask.Whilethatmaybethecaseinsomecases, thecumulativeeffectofthishand-wavingisto leavethereaderwiththesuspicionthattherealdifficultiesarebeingelided.

TexasWomen’sUniversityBrianHarding

.ByBarbaraCassin.Pp.x,374,NY,FordhamUniversity Press,2014, £19.99.

Cassinhasworkedonanumberofeditorialcommittees.SucceedingPaulRicoeurandFranc¸oisWahl, shecollaboratedwithAlainBadiou,theeditorial directorof‘ThePhilosophicalOrder’seriesforthe Frenchpublisher LeSeuil andfoundeditsseries ‘Pointsbilingual’.Since2007,shehasbeendirecting,withAlainBadiou,thecollection‘Ouverture’ andOuverture-billingues’fortheFrenchpublisher Fayard.AttherequestofUNESCO,shefoundedthe NetworkofWomenPhilosophers in2009,forwhich

sheco-ordinatestheonlinemagazine.Shehasalso workedonthepowerofwordsinrelationtothe TruthandReconciliationCommissioninSouth Africa(Verite,reconciliation,reparation,‘LeGenre humain’,Seuil,2004).Forherextensivebodyof workandresearch,CassinreceivedtheGrandPrixof PhilosophyfromtheAcademieFranc¸aisein2012. 14ofher17chaptersherehavealreadyseenthe lightofdayinotherpublications,somedating fromtheendofthepreviouscentury,afew

originallyinFrench. SophisticalPractice isin Englishthroughout.HerIntroductiontakesthe unusualapproachofadialoguebetweenCassin andPenelopeDeutscher,whospecializesincontemporaryFrenchphilosophy,andseemsaskeen asthereadertodiscoverwhyCassinwishesto reappraisetheSophisticsandwhyCassindeemsit urgenttodevelopaconsequentialrelativism(relativismeconsequent).

Thebookproperisinfivesections.PartOne, ‘UnusualPresocratics’,hasthreechapters:Who’s AfraidoftheSophists?AgainstEthical Correctness,SpeakIfYouAreaMan,orthe TranscendentalExclusion(amajoressayonKarlOttoApel),andSeeingHeleninEveryWoman: WomanandWord(paceGoethe –myitalics), whichserveasacontextualisingintroduction.The secondpart,‘Sophistics,Rhetorics,Politics’,also hasthreechapters:RhetoricalTurnsinAncient Greece, Topos/Kairos:TwoModesofInvention (onrhetoricsofplaceandtime),andTimeof DeliberationandSpaceofPower:Athensand Rome,theFirstConflict.

PartThree,‘SophisticalTrendsinPolitical Philosophy’,similarlyhasthreechapters:From OrganismtoPicnic:WhichConsensusforWhich City?(on homonoia),AristotlewithandAgainst KantontheIdeaofHumanNature,andGreeks

andRomans:ParadigmsofthePastinArendtand Heidegger.

PartsFourandFiveeachhavefourchapters. PartFour,‘PerformanceandPerformative’,consists ofHowtoReallyDoThingswithWords: PerformanceBeforethePerformative(buildingon J.L.Austin’s HowtoDoThingswithWords),The PerformativeWithoutCondition:AUniversity sans appel (developingJacquesDerrida’s TheUniversity WithoutCondition,towhomshereturnsinChapter 13),GenresandGenders.Woman/Philosopher: IdentityasStrategy,PhilosophizinginTongues(on DictionaryofUntranslatables, passim).

Thefifthpart,‘EnoughoftheTruthFor ’, includeschaptersheaded‘EnoughoftheTruthFor ...’:OntheTruthandReconciliationCommission (continuedinthenextessay,ontransitionaljustice ofthekindillustratedbypost-apartheidSouth Africa),PoliticsofMemory:OntheTreatmentof Hate,GoogleandCulturalDemocracy,andThe RelativityofTranslationandRelativism.

Awide-rangingworkanddrawingontheearlyas wellasthelateCassin, SophisticalPractice is‘a majorcontributiontothedebatebetweenphilosophicalpluralism,unitarism,andpragmatism’.Itiswell referencedandwithagenerallysatisfactoryindex.

DorsetLukePenkett

Hegel.ByMartinHeidegger.Trans.J.Arel&N.Feuerhahn.Pp.xix,168,Bloomington,IndianaUniversity Press,2015,$28.23.

Thistexttranslatesvolume68ofHeidegger’s Gesamtausgabe;volume68waspublishedaspartof thethirddivisionofHeidegger’s Gesamtausgabe, devotedtounpublishedworks.Themostfamous memberofthisdivisionisdoubtlesslyhis BeitragezurPhilosophie.Nevertheless,despitethe importanceaccordedtothe Beitr € age byHeideggerscholars,weshouldn’tassumethateveryunpublishedworkisofequalorevensimilarimportance. Inanycase,thetwounpublishedworkstranslated herearefromthelatenineteenthirtiesandearlynineteenfortiesand,asthetitleofthetranslationindicates,bothconcernHegel.Sincetherelationship betweenHeideggerandHegelisbothcomplicated andcontroversial,thetextstranslatedherewillbeof interesttothosephilosophersworkingonthatparticularproblem.Idonotthinkthattheyare‘essential’ textshowever–eitherforthoseworkingon Heidegger-HegelorforthoseworkingonHeidegger moregenerally.Whileadissertationormonograph ontheHeidegger-Hegelrelationshipwouldcertainly needtotakethesetextsintoaccount,onepresumes thattheweightwould,orshould,fallmoreheavily

onthepublishedtexts–‘HegelandtheGreeks’, ‘TheOnto-theologicalConstitutionofWestern Metaphysics’andsoon.Ontheotherhand,more generalizedreadingsofHeideggerwouldfindlittle ornothingherethatisessentialforunderstanding Heidegger’sphilosophy.

TheprospectofreadingabookbyHeidegger aboutHegel–bothknownfortheirdifficultprose –isprobablyenoughtoputoffallbutthemost devotedormotivated.Thisiscompoundedbythe factthatthetextstranslatedherearefairlyrough; thetextisbasedonHeidegger’snotesandattimes devolvesintomeresketchesofpointsthathe plannedonexpandingextemporaneouslywhenlecturing.Assuch,theyarecertainlynotaspolished asHeidegger’spublishedworksonHegel,norare theyevenassmoothasthevariouslecturecourses whichhavebeenpublishedintheGA.Thetranslatorscharitablydescribethestyleas‘ellipticaland fragmentary’(xi)but‘unfinished’mightbeamore aptdescription.Theobviousstylisticshortcoming foundinthiskindoftextare(sothetranslators argue)offsetbytheopportunityofseeing

Heidegger‘atwork’,andtherebygettingmore ‘insightintotheprocessofHeidegger’squestioning andthinking’(xi).Similarpointsaremadeinthe afterwardbytheeditoroftheGAtext,Ingrid Schußler.

Thefirsttexttranslatedinthisvolumeis ‘Negativity:AConfrontationwithHegel approachedfromNegativity.’HereHeidegger beginswiththeclaimthatacritiqueofHegelmust operate,initiallyatleast,onHegel’sterms;one worksagainstthesystemfromwithin,sotospeak. Heideggerarguesthattheproperpointofentryfor acriticalinterpretationofHegelphilosophyis Hegel’sdiscussionofnegativity.Accordingto Heidegger,despitetheimportanceHegelplaceson thenegative,heneverthelessdoesn’ttakeitseriouslyenoughandnever really asksaboutnegativity.Becauseofthisshortcoming,Hegelfailsto unfoldthedeepestquestionsofphilosophyandas such,hissystemisnotthefinalunsurpassable wordinphilosophy.Thesecondtextinthevolume, ‘Elucidationofthe‘Introduction’toHegel’s PhenomenologyofSpirit’isexactlythat.Here Heidegger’smainconcernistoexplainHegel’s conceptofexperienceasdescribedintheintroduction.Manyreadersmaywonderifthecombination ofHegelandHeideggercouldpossiblyelucidate anything.Thisisafairsuspicion;thefragmentary characterof(especially)thelaterportionofthis textonlycompoundstheproblem.Nevertheless, thetextdoesrewardthecarefulandwell-prepared reader;ifonecomestothetextalreadyfamiliar with(a)Hegel(b)Heideggerand(c)Heidegger’s

readingofHegel,onewillfindthetexthelpful.On theotherhand,readerslackingthatpreparation willprobablyfindthetextmoremystifyingthan helpful.

ThetranslatorsdidanadmirablejobofrenderingHeideggerintoreadableEnglish,andprovided twoglossaries–GermantoEnglishandEnglish toGerman–sothatanyinterestedreadercould checktheirwork.Perhapstheonlymistakethe translatorsmadewasinthechoiceoftext.Tobe perfectlyhonest,Iamnotatallconvincedthat thistextwasworththetimeandeffortittookto translateit.UnlessthegoalofAnglophone Heideggeriansistotranslateeveryvolumeofthe Gesamtausgabe intoEnglish(anditmightvery wellbeforallIknow),somediscernmentought tobeexercisedinchoosingwhattotranslate.A volumeofunpublishedandoftenfragmentary notesonafigurediscussedatlengthinpublished essayshardlyseemstobeapriorityunlessthe goalissimplycompleteness.Itseemstomethat anyoneworkingonHeidegger’sreadingofHegel atthelevelofdetailwherebytheytoneedtogo beyondhispublishedtextsandlecturesandappeal tothesenotes,oughttobeabletodosoin German.However,despitemysourattitude towardstheproject,whichmightsaymoreabout methanabouttheprojectandbestignoredby thoseinclinedtobeinterestedinit,thetranslation isadmirableandthetranslatorsshouldbecongratulatedfortheirsuccesses.

TexasWoman’sUniversity,DentonBrianHarding

BeingandTruth.ByMartinHeidegger.Trans.G.FriedandR.Polt.Pp.xviii,236,Bloomington,Indiana UniversityPress,2016,$39.95.

Thisreviewisofthepaper-backeditionof Being andTruth;thetextwasfirstpublishedinhardcover in2010.FriedandPoltarewell-knownandwellrespectedtranslatorsofHeidegger.Thetextitselfis atranslationof Gesamtausgabe 36/37andcontains materialtakenfromtwolecturecourses:‘The FundamentalQuestionofPhilosophy’(giveninthe summersemesterof1933)and‘OntheEssenceof Truth’(giveninthewintersemesterof1933–34). ThematerialissometimesHeidegger’sprepared lecturetexts,sometimeshisworkingnotes,and sometimesstudentnotes.Mostly,thetextisbased onHeidegger’slecturenotesandreadsaccordingly –almostlikeamonograph;occasionallythereare gapsinHeidegger’snotes,anditisherethatthe othersourcesareincorporated.Thereisadiscussionofthesourcematerialinanafterwardwritten byHartmutTiejen,theeditorofthecorresponding

GAvolume.Inwhatfollows,Iwon’t‘review’ Heideggerinthesenseofsummarizingandcritiquinghisarguments,butratherdescribethecontent ofthevolumesothatthereadercandecide whetherornottheywishtoreadthisparticularvolumeofHeidegger.

Ofcourse,theyear1933–34isanimportantyear forHeideggerscholars–itistheyearof Heidegger’sinfamousdecisiontojointheNazi partyandactasrectoroftheuniversity. Metaphoricallyspeaking,1933isthesceneofthe crime.Theselectures,therefore,couldbeexpected toshedsomelightonhisdecisionasitrelatesto hisphilosophicalresearch.Andtobesure,thereis agreatdealofgristforthatparticularmillinthis text–hisemphasison Kampf andthedestinyofa Volk andsoon.FriedandPoltprovideasuccinct andusefuldiscussionofHeidegger’suseofsuch

chargedtermsintheirtranslator’sintroduction.As theypointout,whileHeideggercertainlyand regrettablyusedtermschargedwithNaziovertones,hisusagewasalwaysataslightvariance fromofficialmeanings.WhetherornothesufficientlydivergedfromtheNazimeaningsissomethingthatgoesbeyondthelimitsofthisreview. ButHeideggercertainlygoesoutofhiswayto alignhisphilosophywithconcurrenteventsin Germanpolitics;theopeningremarksinthefirst lecturecoursepresenthisinquiryintothefundamentalquestionofphilosophyasanessentialelementinnewspiritualmissionGermanyis embarkingupon.Inanycase,MigueldeBeistegui addressedtheseissuesinhisreviewofthehardcovereditionasadequatelyasispossibleinthe spaceofabookreview,soIwillnotdwellon themhere.(MigueldeBeistegui,‘Reviewof Being andTruth’ (NotreDamePhilosophicalReviews, 2011).Availableon-lineathttps://ndpr.nd.edu/ news/24718-being-and-truth/#_ednref.Accessed1/ 19/16)

Ifoneavertsone’seyesfromtheNazi-question, whatelsedoesonefind?Thetwolecturecourses, takentogether,offersomethinglikearapid-fire introductiontomajorthemesinHeidegger’swork: poetryandphilosophy,onto-theology,thecritique ofChristianphilosophy,thehistoryoftruth,the overcomingofPlatonism,andsoon.Manyofthese themesaretreatedbetterbyHeideggerinworks intendedforpublication.Forexample,thetreatmentofPlato’sanalogyofthecaveinthisvolume isthematicallysimilartotheanalysisin‘Plato’s DoctrineofTruth’butlackingthesmoothedgesof apublishedessay.Butthereareitemsofinterestin thebook.Forexample,inthefirstlecture,on‘The fundamentalquestionofphilosophy’Heidegger doesnot,(asonemightexpectgiventheclaimin 1935’s IntroductiontoMetaphysics)identify‘Why istheresomethingratherthannothing?’asthefundamentalquestion.Instead,hedescribesthefundamentalquestionas‘theceaselessstruggleoverthe essenceandBeingofbeings’(7).Ithinkthatthere isasenseinwhichHeideggerisstrugglingtoformulatethequestionhere;heishasnotfullyrealizedtheimportanceof‘nothing’intheformulation ofthequestion,butismovingtowardsit.Forthat reasonalone,thisessaywillbeofinteresttothose interestedinthedevelopmentofhisthinking.In anycase,inthistext,toappreciateandenterinto thatstruggleovertheessenceandBeingofbeings, onemustfirstengageina Destruktion ofthehistoryofphilosophyfromtheGreekstoHegel,and thatiswhatoccupiesHeideggerformostofthe lecturecourse.Thepointoftheexercisebeingthat wewillnotbeabletoenterintothestruggleover

beingunlessanduntilweclearawaytheprejudices anderrorsthatculminateintheworkofHegel.As noted,thecoursewassupposedtoculminateina confrontationwithHegel,buttheconfrontationisa bitanticlimactic:thebulkofthecoursefocuseson modernmetaphysics,inparticularDescartesand Baumgarten;perhapsHeideggerranoutoftimein thesemester.

Thesecondlecture,‘OntheEssenceofTruth’ concernsitselfalmostexclusivelywithancient Greekthought,mainlyHeraclitusandPlato.It shouldnotbeconfusedwiththeessayof1930with thesamename;thebasicideathatHeidegger workswithherewillbefamiliartoreadersofthe 1930essay,orthealreadymentioned‘Plato’s DoctrineofTruth.’However,thereadingofthe analogyofthecaveinthislecturecoursehasatantalizingdiscussionof‘thephilosopherasliberator’ thatisnotemphasizedinthepublishedessay.Isay tantalizingbecauseHeideggerdoesn’tdevelopthis themeasmuchasonewouldwish.Acentraltheme inPlato’s Republic isthetensionbetweenthephilosopherandthe polis;indeed,asHeidegger acknowledges,thediscussionofthephilosopher’s returntothecaveismeanttoechothedeathof SocratesatthehandsofAthens.Itwouldhave beeninterestingtoseeHeideggerwrestlewiththis themeatgreaterlength,especiallyinthecontextof the1930’s.ButHeidegger,asishistendency, pausesatthethresholdofmoralandpoliticalphilosophy,returningtometaphysics–evendeathand killingbecomeanallegoryforalapseintoinauthenticity(141).FollowinghisdiscussionofPlato’s allegoryofthecave,thesecondpartofthelecture coursefocusesonPlato’s Theatetus.Here Heidegger’sfocusisontheessenceof untruth. HereHeideggerarguesforadynamicinterplay betweentruthanduntruth:‘Theessenceoftruth is the struggle with untruth,where untruth is posited with theenablingoftheessenceoftruth’(200).

Thetwolecturecoursesaddtoourunderstanding ofHeidegger’sthinkingintheearly1930’sbut don’t,tomymind,surpassinvalueanyofthe morewidelyavailableessaysthataddressthesame figuresandtopics.Itwillbeofinteresttothose philosophersandscholars(a)researchinghispoliticalinvolvementandtheextenttowhichitcompromiseshisphilosophicalworkor(b)researchingthe developmentofHeidegger’sthought.Butthose whoseengagementwithHeideggerislesspolitical ordevelopmental,thereareothertextsthatoffer moredevelopedandpolishedargumentsthanthose presentedinthesetwolecturecourses.

TexasWoman’sUniversity,DentonBrianHarding

TheHistoryofBeyng.ByMartinHeidegger;translatedbyWiliamMcNeillandJeffreyPowell.Pp.xiii,208, Bloomington,IndianaUniversityPress,2015,$36.00.

Ishouldbeginbyassuringthecasualreaderthat thereisnotatypointhetitleofthebookunder review:itreallyisspelled‘beyng.’‘Beyng’isan archaicspellingof‘being’usedtotranslate Heidegger’suseofthearchaicGermanspelling, Seyn,ratherthanthemoremodernform Sein.To besure,Heideggerisnottheonlyauthortoindulge inakindofanachronisticspelling;thegreatLatin historianSallustcomestomindasonewho enjoyeddoingsomethingsimilar,witharguably similarmotivations,i.e.tosignaladistancefrom thethoughtandmoresofone’scontemporaries. ButinthecaseofHeidegger,forsomereason,it seemsfartooprecious.InSallust’scase,theanachronismsweremeredecorationsoraffectsthatdid notdistractfromtheoverallthrustofhishistories (suchthathisEnglishtranslatorsdonothaveto runtoChaucerforvocabularysuggestions),while inHeidegger’scasetheanachronisticspellingis,in asense,theentirepointofhishistory–whence thetitle.Thegeneralsensethatemergesfromtext isthatofadesiretothinkbeingdifferentlythan (Heideggerfinds)modernphilosophytohavedone. Roughlyspeaking,hewouldliketothinkofbeing asaneventratherthanathingorprinciple.Itis thisideaof‘beingasevent’thatthearchaicspellingissupposedtohighlight.Heideggerdidnot choosethetitleforthebook,andtothatextent,the preciousnessofHeidegger’stitleismoreforgivable thanitwouldbeotherwise.

Thetitlehoweverisslightlymisleadingsinceit suggestsacoherentnarrativeorinquiryinto ‘beyng’thathassomekindofargumentoratleast narrativeark.Thetextathanddoesnot.Thetext beingtranslatedwaspublishedinGermanas volume69ofthe Gesamtausgabe aspartofthe thirddivision.Fortheuninitiated,Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe isdividedintofourparts.Thefirst partcontainswritingspublishedduringhislifetime; thesecondparthislecturecoursesatMarburgand Freiburg.Itisinpartsoneandtwo,tomymind, thatonefindsHeideggerathisbest.Partthreecontainsunpublishedworksandpersonalnotes;part fourcomprisesnotesandrecordingsofHeidegger. Thesetwopartsare,generallyspeaking,ofless value.Sofar,Ihaveavoidedreferringtothetext asa‘book.’Idothisbecausetocallita‘book’ wouldbemisleading;itwouldsuggestakindof unitythatisabsenthere.The Gesamtausgabe volumeisbasedonsmallnotebooks(roughly5”by8” sizedpagesandsmaller)keptbyHeidegger.It seemsthatthebulkofthetextcontainedinthe notebookswaswritteninthelatenineteen

thirties,aroundthesametimeashewasworking onthe Beitr € age and Besinnung texts.ThenotebookswerenotpublishedinHeidegger’slifetime, nordoesitseemweretheyevermeanttobe published.Theeditorsofthe Gesamtausgabe volumegivetheappearanceofmoreorderandplanningtothetextthanitreallyhasbyintroducing sectionnumberingsinArabicandRomannumerals.Whileadmittingthatthisisaninterpolation (p.189)theyseeminsufficientlyattentivetothe misrepresentativenatureoftheinterpolation:it givestheunpolishednotesamisleadingresemblancetoorganizedandrefinedaphorismslike thoseonefindsinNietzscheoreven Wittgenstein.Thisishighlymisleadingthepublishedandtranslatedtextsobscurethesituationof itscomposition:whatlookslikeaphorismsare forthemostpartfragmentary,repetitiousand ellipticalnotes.AtonepointwefindHeidegger listinghisbooks(seepp.146–148),inotherplaces,quicklyjottedandundevelopedcomments and,rarely,developedorsustainedarguments.I wouldnothavebeensurprisedtofindagrocery list.Tobefrank,IfoundmostofHeidegger’s notesunhelpfulandunilluminating.

IdonotmeanthisasacriticismofHeidegger sinceIdoubtthatheintendedthenotestohelpor illuminateanyoneotherthanhimself;theyseemto functionprimarilyasamixofmnemonicdevices, ideasforfuturework,andsketchesofpossible argumentsandsoon.Forthoselookingforinsight intothedevelopmentofHeidegger’sthinking,these notesmightbeuseful,butonlyinalimitedfashion.Overall,thisdoesnotstrikemeasabookthat onereadscover-to-cover,oronethatisunifiedby anythingotherthanitsbinding;certainlyitcould beavaluableresourceforscholarswhoalready knowwhattheyarelookingfor.Forexample,one whowishedtoclarifyanobscureorcontroversial pointfoundelsewhereinhiswritingsbyputtingit inthecontextofthedevelopmentofhisthought willfindthatthebookprovidesausefulglimpse intohisthoughtprocessfromroughly1938–1940. Or,if(inspiredbytheBlackNotebookcontroversy)onewantstoseetherolethatHeidegger’s bigotryplaysinhisunderstandingofbeing/beyng, onewillfindgristforthemillhere.Andsoon.On theotherhand,ifonewantstoreadagreatwork ofphilosophybyagreatphilosopher,oneshould lookelsewhere.

However,whoeverdoesdecidetostudythistext, willfindthatthetranslationbyMcNeilland Powelliswelldone.TheEnglishtranslationis

aboutasreadableasitcouldbegiventhesource material.Thetranslators’introductionprovidesa discussionoftheirdecisionsregardingthetranslationsofafewcrucialwords.Meanwhile,attheend ofthebookonecanfindbothanEnglish-German

andGerman-Englishglossary.Followingthecustomofothertranslationsofthe Gesamtausgabe, thereisnoindex.

TexasWoman’sUniversity,DentonBrianHarding

InterpretationofNietzsche’sSecond UntimelyMeditation.ByMartinHeidegger;translatedbyU.Hasse& M.Sinclair.Pp.xiv,312,Bloomington,IndianaUniversityPress,2016,$55.00.

Nietzsche’ssecond UntimelyMeditation isbetter knowntomostreadersas‘OntheAdvantagesand DisadvantagesofHistoryforLife.’Thetranslated textconsistsmainlyofHeidegger’slecturenotesfor aseminarhegaveonthattextin1938–1939;the latterportionsofthetextaretakenfromreports writtenbyHeidegger’sstudentsandasummaryby hissonHermannHeidegger(whowaspresentduringtheseminars).Theusualrulesfortranslatingthe Gesamtausgabe arefollowed:thereisabriefintroductionbythetranslatorsdealingonlywithtextual andtranslationissuesprecedingthetranslation–no substantivephilosophicalclaimsareallowed;the bookconcludeswithatranslationoftheGerman editor’spostscript.Unlikeothertranslations,thereis neitheranindexnoraGerman-Englishglossary. Thisislamentablesinceitisalwayshelpfultobe abletoquicklyseeHeidegger’spreferredGerman formajorterms.Theintroductionfocusesonafew translationchoices,inparticularthoserelatingtothe twokeyGermanterms, Historie and Geschichte Theimportanceofdistinguishingbetweenthetwo words(whichcouldbothbedefensiblyrendered intoEnglishas‘history’)iskeytoHeidegger’sreadingofNietzscheanddemandscarefultranslation. Whentranslating Historie,thetranslatorsofthis textprefer‘historiology’to‘historiography’because ‘thelattercannameametareflectiononthewriting ofhistory’(xiii).Theadvantageof‘historiology,’I takeit,isthatitnamesnothingtomostEnglish speakers;ifitisanEnglishword,itisafairlyrare one.WhileoverallIhavenocomplaintsaboutthe translation,Ithinkthatthepreferencefor‘historiology’over‘historiography’ismisplaced.Given Heidegger’sinterestelsewhereinanalyzingthe variousmeaningof logos,usingthe –ology ending inEnglishis,Ithink,moremisleadingthan ‘historiography.’

SinceHeideggerisaknownquantity,Iwon’t spendtoomuchtimeoutliningorcriticisingthe argumentdevelopedinthetext.Readersof Heideggerknow,atleastingeneral,whattoexpect fromhimandwillbeabletoevaluatethetext’s claimsontheirown.Instead,Iwillsimplymentiona numberofreasonswhyreadersofHeideggershould beinterestedinthisparticulartext.First:

Heidegger’sengagementwithNietzscheiswell known;his Nietzsche volumesarewidelyreadby studentsofcontinentalphilosophy;hisshorteressays onNietzsche(e.g.,‘OnNietzsche’sWord“Godis Dead”’arelesswidelyreadbutshouldbe.Inthose works,Heideggerfocuseshisattention(mainly,but notexclusively)onNietzsche’slaterworks,inparticularthenotebookspublishedas TheWillto Power.Whence,forthoseinterestedinthe Heidegger/Nietzscherelationship,thesustained engagementwithanearlyworkbyNietzschewillbe highlyinteresting.Second:someofHeidegger’slecturecoursesshowanengagementwithanimalsthat isnotpresentinhismajorwritings,e.g.,the1929–30 lecturecoursetranslatedas TheFundamental ConceptsofMetaphysics.Intheselectureswealso findHeideggerdiscussingthedifferencebetween manandanimalatsomelengthandscholarstrying toworkouttheplaceofanimalsinHeidegger’s ontologywillfindthislecturecourseveryuseful. Third,butbynomeansfinally,sincetheselecture coursesweregivenduringwhatcouldbecalled Heidegger’sNaziperiod,andthelecturescontain manyreflectionsoncultureandpeople(volk),itwill beofinteresttoscholarsdealingwiththefalloutof Heidegger’sodiouspolitics.

Thetranslation,asInoted,isgenerallyvery good.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatthetextiseasy toread.TheseareHeidegger’slecturenotes,and somesectionsarefairlyfragmentaryandopaque.It seemsthatsometimesHeideggerwroteouthistexts whileatothertimeshesimplysketchedsomegeneralideaanddeliveredthelecturesextemporaneously.Afurtherdifficultythatreaderswill encounterisinHeidegger’sconstantquotingand referencingNietzsche’stexts.Heideggerseemsto havebasedhislecturesonaneditionof Nietzsche’scollectedworkspublishedin1917by FritzKoegel.Isuspectthatmostreaderswillhave readieraccesstotheColli/Montinarieditionspublishedin1967.Thismakesrunningdown Heidegger’sreferencesabitdifficult,sincethepaginationisquitedifferentbetweenthosetwoeditions.Thingsaremorecomplicatedforreaders withoutGerman:itisnotclear,whenciting Nietzscheinthetext,ifthepagenumbergivenrefer

totheaforementionedGermantext,ortotheEnglish translationof AdvantagesandDisadvantages cited inthefirstfootnote.Sincethelecturecourseisbased onanextremelyclose–paragraphbyparagraph ifnotlinebyline–readingofNietzsche’stext, someclearerwayofnavigatingbetweenthetwo wouldhavebeenhelpful.Thisisnot,however,necessarilythefaultofthetranslators:Heidegger’s estateisnotoriouslystrict,andmayhaveprevented thetranslatorsfromupdatinghisreferenceand

providinganapparatusmappingHeidegger’slecture ontoNietzsche’stext.Whence,thesecomplaints aside,thebookishighlyrecommendedforthose scholarsworkingontheareasmentionedearlier. CasualreadersofHeidegger,orevencarefulreaders ofHeideggernotfocusingonthoseparticular treesinthevastHeideggerianforest,couldlivewithoutit.

TexasWomen’sUniversityBrianHarding

HeideggerinFrance.ByDominiqueJanicaud.TranslatedbyFranc¸oisRaffoulandDavidPettigrew.Pp.xv,540, Bloomington,IndianaUniversityPress,2015,$68.31.

DominiqueJanicaudisprobablybestknownto readersofthisjournalastheprincipleopponentof theso-called‘TheologicalturninFrenchphenomenology.Thepublicationofthisbookshouldgoa longwaytowardsalteringthatreputationandintroducingAnglophonereaderstoamorenimble, subtleandcharmingphilosopherthanthepolemics inspiredbyhiswell-knownessayonthetheological turnsuggests.Withoutwantingtoreducethis text–originallypublishedintwovolumesin France–toanappendageofthetheologicalturn debate,onenotesthatthesamesensitivityfor properapplicationofphenomenologicalmethod andacarefulinterpretationofHeidegger’stexts thatanimatedhiscritiqueofthetheologicalturnis presentinthistext,especiallyinthechapters devotedtotheearlyreceptionofHeideggerin France.Icannothopetosummarizetheepisodes describedorthemestracedbyJanicaudinthe book,butwillbrieflydescribetheflavorortenor ofthetext.Atnumerouspoints,Janicaudreminds hisreaderthatheisattemptinganintellectualhistoryandnotworkingasaphilosopherperse.Like Tacitus,hestrivestowrite sineiraetstudio,and largelyachieveshisgoal.UnlikeTacitus,Janicaud showshimselftobeacharmingwriter,andthe Englishtranslationadmirablyconveystheclarity anddeftnessofhisFrenchproseintoEnglish. Indeed,onelargelyunsungqualityofJanicaud’s writings,beitthistextorhismoreproperlyphilosophicalworks,ishisprose;combiningclaritywith wit,heismuchmoreenjoyabletoreadthanmany ofhiscontemporaries,andhistranslatorsaretobe complementedforbringingthoseelementswith themintotheEnglishtranslation.

Janicaud’stexttracestwothings:first,thereceptionofHeidegger’sthoughinFrance,andsecond, theinteractionbetweenHeideggerthemanand variousFrenchthinkers.Thissecondstrand includesthefamouspilgrimagestoHeidegger’shut intheBlackForestandHeidegger’sowntripsto

ParisandProvence.WhileIcan’tsummarizethe detailsofthislongandexhaustivelyresearched volume,Ithinkthegeneralmovementrecountedin thetextshowsthereceptionofHeideggerdevelopingfromakindinitialenthusiasmforHeideggerian themeslacking,however,preciseknowledgeofhis textstoamorereservedbutpreciseappreciationof thedepthanddetailsofthisthought,chastenedby thevariouscontroversiessurroundingHeidegger’s politics.

Janicaud’sstorybeginsin1928andendsin 2000.Hisresearchisgoesfarbeyondthatstandard methodsusedinthehistoryofphilosophy–lookingatasequenceoffamousbooksandthinkers–todigintouniversityarchives,oldnewspapers articlesandletters.Janicauddiscussesnotmerely textsandpublications,butlooksintocoursecataloguesandoldsyllabi.HisdiscussionofthepersonalrelationshipsbetweenHeideggerandhisFrench interlocutorsaddsrichnesstohisstorythattakesit beyondameresummarizingofphilosophersand theirrelationshiptoHeidegger’sthought.The Frenchinterlocutor parexcellence is,nodoubt, JeanBeaufret.Beaufret’saffinityforboth Heideggerandhisphilosophycreatedakindof inner-circleofpost-WarFrenchHeideggeriansthat ranparalleltothereceptionofhisthoughtinthe majorFrenchuniversities.TheFrenchreception ofHeideggerwasbothaidedandslowedbythe loyaltyofcertainFrenchHeideggerian’stothe thoughtoftheMaster:onthehand,itcreatedan audienceforhisworkinFrancewhichencouragedscholarstowriteandpublishonHeidegger, butontheotherhand,thisloyaltytendedat timestofunctionlikeanintellectualpraetorian guardthatpreventedoutsidersfromaccessinghis thought. SeinundZeit wasn’ttranslatedinto Frenchuntilthemid-nineteeneighties,restricting accesstoHeidegger’smasterpiecetoasmall circleofphilosopherssufficientlytrainedin German.Thecontroversiessurroundingthetwo

rivaltranslationsof SeinundZeit (oneby EmmanuelMartineauandtheotherbyFrancois Vezin)wasperhapstheculminationoftherivalry betweentheHeideggerianinsidersandoutsiders. Vezin’swaspublishedbyGallimardwiththe approvalofBeaufret,whileMartineau’scirculated privately.Ingeneral,thepublishedtranslationwas fullofHeideggerianneologismsthatweredefended byBeaufret’scircle,whiletheMartineautranslation(whichcouldnotbepublishedbutcirculated intypescript)wasthepreferredtextforthoseoutsidethecircle.

Thelaterportionofthebookcontainsanumber ofinterviewswithimportantfiguresinthereceptionofHeideggerinFrance,mostnotably(perhaps)JacquesDerrida,Jean-LucMarionandJeanLucNancy.Itisatthispointwhereonecomplaint mustberegistered:noteveryinterviewfromthe FrenchvolumeisincludedintheEnglishtranslation.Thiscomplaint,however,onlytestifiestothe excellentworkofbothJanicaudhimselfandhis translators:thetextasIhelditinmyhandleftme wantingmore.Itisacomplaintsimilartowhatone

wouldhearattheendofaconcertwithoutan encore.Onehopesthatthiseditionsellsout quickly,andthatthepublishercommissionsanew editionwithalltheinterviewstranslated.Inadditiontotheinterviews,Janicaudspicesthebook withhisownpersonalreflections,setofffromthe restofthetextinitalics.

ThemajorfiguresofrecentFrenchphilosophy arenotascentraltothisbookasonemightexpect –onewillnotfindlongdiscussionsof,e.g.,Camus orFoucault,andevenLevinasandDerridaturn outtobelessimportantthanonemighthave expected.Janicaud’sfocusisontheless-wellknownscholarswhotranslated,digestedandtransmittedHeidegger’sworktoFrancethanonthose whotookinspirationfromhim.Thisbookwillbe ofinteresttoatleastthefollowingaudiences:(a) scholarsof20thcenturyFrenchphilosophy,(b) Heideggerscholars,(c)thoseworkingonthetheologicalturnorrecentFrenchphenomenologyand (d)anyonewhoenjoysreadingintellectualhistory.

TexasWoman’sUniversity,DentonBrianHarding

Heidegger:HisLifeandPhilosophy.ByAlainBadiouandBarbaraCassin;IntroductionbyKennethReinhard, TranslatedbySusanSpitzer.Pp.xx,96,NY,ColumbiaUniversityPress,2016,$20.00.

Thetitleofthisbookishighlymisleading.TheinnocentreadermightsuspectthatthebookoffersdiscussionofHeidegger’slifeandthoughtbyoneofthe leadingfiguresincurrentFrenchphilosophy.Indeed, thetitlepromisessomethingthatwouldcombinethe biographicalworkofRudigerSafranski’s Martin Heidegger:BeyondGoodandEvil withthe philosophicalacumenofWilliamRichardson’s Heidegger:FromPhenomenologytoThought.The firstsignthatthisbookisnotgoingtooffereitheris itsslimsize–only96pages.Thesecondsignisthe verywidemarginsonthose96pages.Tobefairto BadiouandCassin,theoriginalFrenchtitlewasthe slightlylessdeceptive Heidegger:LeNazisme,les Femmesetlesphilosophes.Perhapsthemostimportantpointtomakeaboutthisbook(undereithertitle) isthatitoffersnothingofinteresttoscholarsorphilosophersstudyingtheworksofHeidegger.Ilearned nothingaboutHeideggerfromreadingthisbook. Likewise,thoseinterestedinthewritingsofAlain Badiouwilllearnnothingabouthisworkfromthis text.ItisneitheracontributiontoHeideggerscholarship,nortoBadiou’sownprojects.

TheoriginalFrenchtextwassupposedtobepublishedasanintroductiontotheFrenchtranslationof Heidegger’sletterstohiswifeElfride.Heidegger’s estateobjectedtotheinclusionofBadiou’sand Cassin’sintroduction.Intheend,aftersomelegal

battles,BadiouandCassinpublishedtheirtextwithouttheletters.Wecanreadilyguesswhy Heidegger’sliteraryexecutors–notoriouslyprotectiveoftheMaster–wantedtosuppressthetext;a goodpartofitisdevotedtogossipabouttheextramaritalaffairsofMartinandElfrideHeidegger.The textismadeupofeightshortchapters,combined withafewinterludes(sometimescalled‘Local Disagreement’sometimes‘Hypotheses’)where BadiouandCassin,writingasindividualsratherthan asateam,reflectonwhattheyhavewritten,anddisagreewitheachothergently.Thesesectionsareset offinitalicsandareabittooprecious.

Thebookisamissedopportunity.AlainBadiou isoneofthemajorfiguresincriticaltheoryand Frenchphilosophymoregenerally;hismajorwork BeingandEvent purportstoofferamathematical ontology;Heideggeroppositiontothereductionof ontologytomathematicallogichadaprofound impactonthedevelopmentofFrenchphilosophy. Onewouldexpect,therefore,thatwhenBadiou publishesabookonHeidegger’slifeandphilosophy,thisissuewouldbecentral.Instead,thebody ofthetextofferssuperficialcommentson Heidegger’sinfluenceonFrenchphilosophy,on Heidegger’santi-Semitismandmembershipinthe Naziparty,andtheaforementionedextramarital affairs.Onthesepoints,muchmorehasbeen

said,andbetter,byothers.Regardingthefirst, DominiqueJanicaud’s HeideggerinFrance is infinitelybetter.Thediscussionofthelaterpoints segueintoaweirdthoughtexperiment(or,less charitably,fantasy)abouthowthingswouldbedifferentifHeideggerabandonedElfrideforHannah Arendt.SometimesIwonderwhatwouldhavehappenedhadHeideggerfollowedinthefootstepsof earlierGermanphilosopherslikeErnstKappand immigratedtotheTexasHillCountry.Butthese sortreveriesshouldnotbedignifiedas‘existential andhistoricaleidetictransformations’(55):atbest thesearevariationsonCleopatra’snoseandgames of‘whatif ’

Despiteallthis,thebookisnotwithoutsome merit.Itisaneasyread,andifoneapproachesit

withtherightspirit–notasaworkofscholarship orphilosophybutasacademicidlechatter,itcan beanenjoyableread;andsincethebookisso short,itmightbeworththetime.Theintroduction, byKennethReinhard,ismoreusefulthanthebody ofthetext.Reinhardprovidesausefulsummaryof Badiou’sengagementwithHeidegger’sworkin othertexts–mostimportantly, BeingandEvent –andofCassin’sinteractionwithbothHeidegger’s workandperson(attheseminarsheldwithRene Charin1969).Thesearesummaries,ratherthan analysesorcritiques(asisperfectlyappropriatein anintroduction),butevenso,theyareinformative andwelldone.

TexasWomen’sUniversityBrianHarding

HeideggerandTheology.ByJudithWolfe.Pp.viii,242,BloomsburyT&TClark,2014, £16.99/$29.95.

Givenmyinterestin—andgrowingdisdainfor— MartinHeidegger,Ieagerlythepublicationofthis book,whichwaspromisedasearlyas2010.Judith Wolfe’sstrikinglyerudite,meticulouslyresearched, andpenetratingbookrewardedmywait.Ihighly recommendit,especiallyfortheologiansambivalenttowardHeidegger.

Wolfealreadyestablishedherselfasaleading theologicalinterpreterofHeideggerin Heidegger’s Eschatology:TheologicalHorizonsinMartin Heidegger’sEarlyWork (Oxford,2013).Sheelucidatedinpainstakingdetailthehistorical-theological arcofHeidegger’searlyphilosophicaldevelopment (fromanti-ModernistCatholictodoggedatheist), usingrecentlypublishedvolumesofthe Gesamtausgabe andrelatedliterature.Thisworkis extendedhere.Wolfepresentsabroadernarrative ofHeidegger’sphilosophicalevolutionfromhis earliesttohislatestdays(chapters1–6),ofhis decades-longdealingswiththeologyandtheologians(chapter7),andaschematicdiscussionof theologicalappropriationsofHeidegger’sthinking (chapter8).Allchaptersaresolidinwaysthat commentariesonHeideggeroftenarenot.Ishall focusonthefirst,fifth,andeighthtoelucidate Wolfe’sdistinctivecontributionand,inthecaseof thefinalchapter,shortfalls.

ChapteronenarratesHeidegger’sengagement withCatholicism.Wolfetraceshiseducationfrom hisdevoutupbringinginMeßkirchthroughthe 1915thesisonScotus.Thechapter’schiefmeritis itscarefulhistoricalpositioningofHeidegger’sparticularCatholicism,markedbyhisfather’sultramontanismandPiusX’spugnaciouspapacy(9–17).WolfedetectsinHeidegger’searlydenunciationsofsuspectedModernistsandhisexhortations

to‘authentic’Catholiclivingforeshadowingofhis lateraccusationsagainstthemetaphysicaltradition and‘emancipationofphilosophy’(thisisthetitle ofchapterthree,61–80).Priorauthorshavepointed inthisdirection(mostsuccessfulisS.J.McGrath), butWolfeconcretizestheconnectionbetween Heidegger’searlyCatholicismandhisphilosophy from BeingandTime forwardbetterthananyone else.

Thebook’spivotpointischapterfive, ‘HeideggerbetweenHitlerandHolderlin’(99–127),whosetitlealonewillgarnerahostofreaders consideringtheresurgenceofdismissalsof HeideggerquaNaziinthewakeofEmmanuel Faye’s(overblown,journalisticexpose) Heidegger: TheIntroductionofNazismintoPhilosophy (2005).Oneshouldbeclear:Wolfe’sinterestis notinHeideggerasamemberoftheNaziparty. Norshoulditbe.Wolfe’smeasuredtoneandvigilantscholarshipareabsolutelynecessaryinthis chapter,andshedeliversbeautifully.Herdeft handlingofGermanhistoryof‘nationalism’and ‘spirit,’particularlytheinvaluablesection ‘NationalSocialismasaMessianicIdeology’ (109–113)placeHeidegger’sdiscoursewith respecttoapocalypticand,persuasively,toexculpatehimoftaintingbyspecificallyNaziapocalyptic.WolfeforegroundsHeidegger’s‘apophatic eschatology,’whichhedevelopsthroughhisreadingsofHolderlininthemid-1930scoursesand beyond(117–118,seealso143–146).Apophasis functionsapologeticallytodistanceHeidegger fromNazism,andtounderscorehisidiosyncratic eschatologicaltaste:helooksforanewhistorical time.HeideggerunderstandsH€ olderlinasprophesyinganecessarywatchfulnessinagod-forsaken

age(118,cf.144–145).ThoughWolfeacknowledgesthetensionbetweenHeidegger’sapophatic eschatologyofgodforesakennessandmainline Christianity(145,196),clearlyshefindsitintriguing and,Ibelieve,convincing.

ThefinalchaptershowsWolfe’spositiveestimationofHeidegger’sthoughtasgenerativefortheology.Hertreatmentofindividualtheologiansspeaks loudly,ifindirectly,ofhercommitmentto Heidegger,evenamidcriticismsofhim.Comments ontheincommensurabilityofHeidegger’sthought withKarlBarth’sarefair,ifloadedinHeidegger’s favor(173–174).Bultmannisamplyandgenerouslytreated(180–186),whichmakessensegiven hisclosefriendshipwithHeidegger(discussed muchinchapterseven),butmakeslesssense insofarashisimportancehasfaded.Lessthan cogentaresharpreproachesagainstAlfredDelp andErichPrzywara,whoareaccusedofforcing

Heidegger’sexistentialanalyticontothe ‘Procrusteanbed’ofscholasticontology(176). KarlRahnerissummarilyandundulydismissed (189).ThankfullyEdithSteincomesoffwell(191–193).Postmetaphysicaltheologiansarebrieflybut sensitivelytreated,withWolfehighlightingconstitutiveproblemsofappropriatingHeideggertheologically(193–197).Thislastchapter,then,which shouldprovidethepayoffofWolfe’slabors, provesamixedbag.Wolfeisatherbestwhen exegetingHeideggerdirectly,andherclosereadingsofhimareworththepriceofadmission. Nevertheless,therelativeweaknessofherlateapologiafortheologicalappropriationofHeidegger makesonewonder,contrarytoWolfe’sintent, whetherHeidegger’sinfluenceintheologyis—or shouldbe—waning.

CollegeoftheHolyCrossPeterJosephFritz

TheEclipseofHumanity:Heschel’sCritiqueofHeidegger (StudiaJudaica,Band91).ByLawrencePerlman. Pp.205,Berlin/Boston,deGruyter,2016,$126.00.

ThisisadistantsequeltoPerlman’s Abraham Heschel’sIdeaofRevelation (1989),butnow ratherthanjustexposingandexplainingHeschel’s thought,heconcentratesonaparticularlatework WhoisMan?,whichbeganasaseriesoflectures atStanfordUniversityin1963andwaspublished twoyearslater.Perlmanconsidersthis‘thesinglemostimportantJewishbooksincetheappearance ofMaimonides’ GuideofthePerplexed –indeed, evenmoresignificantthanthelatter’(p.2). AlthoughHeschelhasaloyalfollowing,ithaslong beenassumedthathe‘ignoredtheissueofthe Holocaust,thathewrotepoetrywithoutattempting philosophicalandtheologicalargumentation,and thatindoingso,hesteeredclearofseriousphilosophicalideas.’(p.1).Perlmanmeanstosetthe recordstraightonallthreecounts,andgivesa closetextualanalysisof WhoisMan? asa response,mostproximately,toMartinBuber’s WhatisMan? (1938)butalsotohislater Eclipse ofGod,bywhichtitlehemeanttodescribethe deplorableconditionofourtimes.Notso,says Heschel;weareratherexperiencinganeclipseof man.BuberhadengagedHeidegger,whointurn hadbeenprovokedbyTheodorHaecker’s Whatis Man? toproducearesponsein AnIntroductionto Metaphysics,(1935;pub.1953).Heschelhadbeen equallywellschooledinHusserl’snew‘phenomenological’method,asamoreradicalempiricism, allowingaccessto‘thethingsthemselves’soasto foundphilosophyonascientificbasis.Heidegger turnedthismethodinanoriginaldirectionwhich

Husserldeplored,andhereHeschelattemptsto reverseitseffectsandrefuteitsclaims.Heschel treatsHeideggerasthe‘postmodern’thinker par excellence whohassubstitutedaphenomenological analysisof Dasein initsinauthenticaverageeverydayness,whereitcollapsesinto DasMan orthe irresolute‘crowd’,forthetraditional‘biblicalman’ called,challenged,andindividualizedbythe pathos ofexistencetodeedsofconcernforhisfellow man.Itisthe Who ofmanthathasbeeneclipsed oroverwhelmedbyHeidegger’sphilosophy,and PerlmanunfoldsHeschel’scriticalpoint-by-point refutationinthisbook.

Atthesametimeheoccasionallyconcedesthat HeideggerisnotendorsingDasein’spassivity, inauthenticity,orlackofresoluteness,butwas ratherdiagnosingthediseaseofourtimesoasto reinforceourresulting‘anxiety’in‘beingtowards death’soastopromptareversemovement. Heidegger–likeHeschel–adaptedthetraditional exitus-redditus patternfromNeoplatonism;hesimplyseesthe exitus asfarlongerandsteeperthan wehadimagined,andasinfectingmanyinstitutionsthatwehadthoughtwerealreadyworkingto turnusback:e.g.,language,metaphysics,humanism.Wethoughtweweremerelyonthe‘thirdrock fromthesun’,butitturnsoutweareon Pluto,and thewaybackismuchlongerandmoredifficult thanwehadimagined!DelvingintotheextralegalistictreasuresofhisHasidicJewishtradition, Heschelalsostressesthe‘ineffability’ofthe divine,inourresponsesofawe,embarrassment,

andcelebration–allincitinghumanbeings towards‘beinghuman’.However,boththinkers sodisqualifyordinaryreasonbyelaboratingan extremeapophatictheologyasthesolesourceof valuethattheyriskpassinga‘tippingpoint’that afflictseveryattempttogetbeyondanthropomorphicconceptionsofGod.IfGodisexalted beyond‘Person’–asstarteddangerouslywith MaimonidesandwascompletedbySpinoza–thenweendupprojectingasoursolesourceof value,worship,andobediencea deusabsconditus orKafkaesqueirrationalauthoritywherebyconversion,transformation,andheroicself-sacrifice

becomeindistinguishablefrompassivityandsubmissionbeforethejuggernautofhistoryandan inexorablefatality.Weexertourselvespassionatelytonolongerimpedeorinterferewith,but rathertofoster,facilitateor‘lethappen’aburningofValhallain Gotterdammerung.Mankind’s greatesttriumphcoincideswithatraitorousabdicationofresponsibility,unavoidablecomplicity, andthemostshamefulself-betrayal.Thesetwo thinkersfightbecausetheyhavesomuchin common.

HeythropCollegePatrickMadigan

SimoneWeil:MysticofPassionandCompassion.ByMariaClaraBingemer,translatedbyKarenM.Kraft, ForewordbyTomeuEstelrich.Pp.xx,146,Cambridge,TheLutterworthPress,2016, £15.00.

BingemerisanotedBraziliantheologian.Holding adoctoratefromthePontificalGregorian UniversityinRome,sheisprofessoratPontifıcia UniversidadeCatolicadoRiodeJaneiro. Specialisinginsystematictheology,inparticular onLatinAmericanandliberationtheology,sheis particularlysuitedtowritingaboutSimoneWeil, andhermajorpaper,‘AfflictionandOptionforthe Poor:SimoneWeilandLatinAmericanLiberation Theology’,ispublishedinA.RebeccaRozelleStoneandLucianStone,eds., TheRelevanceofthe Radical:SimoneWeil100YearsLater (T&T Clark,2009),pp.240–67.Recentlyshepublished A FaceforGod (Convivium,2014),aspiritualand theologicalreflectiononcontemporarybeliefs aboutGod.Inherpresentbook,atranslationof SimoneWeil:unamısticaaloslımites (Ciudad Nueva,2011),sheentersfullyintoWeil’sworld andproducesanelegantyetcompellingwork.

OvertheyearsWeilhasbecomeforBingemera favouredifwoundedhero;asTomeuEstelrich, VicePresidentoftheAmericanWeilSociety, writesinhisForeword,‘Weilappealstoher not onlyforconceptualizingtheexperienceoflivingin aworlddevoidofGod,butalsoforformulatinga spiritualitythataimstofindHiminhisvery absence’(viii).WhatBengemerachievesinthis briefbutprofoundstudyis,havingpresenteda timelineandprofileofWeil(ChapterOne),discussingherencounteringthepoor(ChapterTwo),and exploringherChristicmysticismand‘theExodus ofSelf’(ChapterThree),toinviteherreaders‘to facetheuncomfortable,butprobablyunavoidable, questionaboutwhetherweagreeordisagreewith herpremises;whetherweadheretoorrefuseher viewpoints;andwhetherweacceptorrejecther provocativeproposalsaltogether’(xi).Estelrichsuggeststhatwedonotacceptorrefuse,basingour

emotiveresponseorreactionon‘thedegreeofemotionalbondingthatthereaderiscapableofestablishingwiththeauthor’buttotakeastepbackand ‘contemplateafreshthebigpictureofSimoneWeil’s life. Exitusandreditus.’Whether,aftersuchcontemplation,weareproorantiSimoneWeil,wecertainly cannotsimplyignoreher.AsJoseMarıaPoirier,editorof Criterio,writesintheIntroduction,‘thatis whyherstorymeritsbeingtoldasoneofthegreat witnessesofourage’(xviii).

Thefirstchapterengagesimmediatelywith Weil’suncommonchildhood,herintellect woundedbycompassion,herthoughtandpolitical commitment,hervocation,andherdeath.Inthe secondchaptertheauthorreturnstothethemeof compassion,Weil’sfaithandattentiontothepoor, andtheimpactofthecrossonWeil.Thethirdisa thorough-goingdiscussionofWeil’smysticism. ChapterFour,AParadoxicalTestimony,examines Weil’switness;asaself-exiledJew,asanunaffiliatedmystic,andasapioneerofinterfaith dialogue.

InallofthisBingemerisservedwellbyher translator,KarenM.Kraft,engagedincommunicationsandeditorialworkintheCenterforWorld CatholicismandInterculturalTheologyatDePaul University.Krafthashelpfullyprovidedabibliographiclistofallthesourcessheconsultedinthe process,withexistingEnglishtranslationsof Weil’sworksgroupedseparately,‘todistinguish themmoreeasilyforthereader’(xix).Kraftalso notesthatBingemerdrewonmanydifferentsourcesinnumerouslanguages,manyofwhich,of course,areWeil’sownworks,whichBingemer consulteddirectlyintheiroriginalFrench.

MostfrequentlycitedisRaymondRosenthal’s translationofSimonePetrement’s LaViede SimoneWeil (Fayard,1973)knowninEnglishas

SimoneWeil:ALife (Pantheon,1976).Kraftwisely usesEmmaCraufurd’sEnglishtranslationof AttentedeDieu, WaitingforGod (orig.1951, reprintedHarper,2009),inspiteofitsvagaries,in preferencetothemorerecent AwaitingGod (translatedbyBradJersak,FreshWind,2012),on accountofitsseniorityandbeingbetterknown toBingemer.Therearealsofourappendices,

includingletterstoGeorgesBernanosonher Orwelliandisillusionanddisaffectionwiththe SpanishCivilWar,andtoMauriceSchumannon front-linenurses,andadescriptionofamystical experience,alltakenfromthe SimoneWeilReader (MoyerBell,1999).

DorsetLukePenkett

IsaiahBerlin:TheJourneyofaJewishLiberal.ByArieM.Dubnov.Pp.xiv,316.Basinstoke/NY,Palgrave Macmillan,2012, £25.00.

Dubnov’sintellectualbiographysupplantsMichael Ignatieff’seulogisticappreciationof1998and uncoversaprofoundtensionorinconsistencythat aroseearly,wasremarkablyconstant,andwas neverresolvedinthelifeofthisimportant politicalthinkerandhistorianofideaswhois perhapsbestknownforestablishingtheimportanceof‘negativefreedom’and‘thecounterEnlightenment’.BorninRiga,Berlin(1909–97) washeirbothtohismother’seast-Europeanfascinationwith Haskalah,orWesternsecularculture astheavenuetopost-Emancipationupwardsocial mobility,freedom,andEnlightenment,aswellas hisfather’sselectiveretentionofJewishcustoms, nolongeronthebasisofreligiousbelief,but‘on functionalgrounds,asameansforpreservationof Jewishnessandaguardagainstassimilation,rather thanasanendinitself.’(p.27)Uprootedand forcedtomoveseveraltimesbytheRussianrevolution,thefamilyendedupinLondonin1921. Isaiahbecameadisbelieverearlyinlife,but scarredbyexposuretoanti-Semitism,healsosaw thevalueofJewishness(ifnot‘Judaism’),not onlyasasocialsupportandrefugeinthefaceof oppressionandasameansofhandlingastigma onecouldneverescape,butmorecruciallyasa morehonestorauthenticpsychologicalgambitand defenceofone’sintegrity,towrong-footthebigot andputhimonthedefensivebyone’sin-yourfaceassertionofotherness,arefusaltoacceptan automaticpositionofinferiorityorembarrassment inanofficiallyliberal,pluralisticsociety,towordlesslyinsistthattheofficial‘rulesofthegame’be enforcedeveninthefaceofentrenchedsocialand classprejudice.AlthoughhegaveupJewishpracticeassoonashelefthome,Isaiahrefusedstubbornlytoalterhisfirstnameto‘Jim’,ashadbeen suggestedbyaprepschooltutor,andhadonly contemptandscorn(aswellasthinkingitunwise, asitcouldneverbefullysuccessful)forthose

Anglo-Jews,suchastheMontefiore’s,Montagu’s, andRothschild’s,whominimizedtheimportance oftheirJewishnessorattemptedassimilation. InsteadBerlindevelopedalife-longfascination withthosepowerfulJewishmalesaroundhim whohaddiscoveredawayofcombiningbotha successinupper-classWesternculturewitha stronginsistenceontheirJewishness,suchas FelixFrankfurterandChaimWeizmannwhomhe tookasmodels,againstthestyleofA.J.Ayer andErnstCassirer.ItwastheEnlightenmentthat hadledbothtothepossibilityofaliberal,pluralisticsociety,butalsotowhatBerlincameto believewastheunattainableidealofacosmopolitan,universalegalitarianism.Thisledtothe instabilityinhispersonality;heinsistedona privateindividualcompartmentof‘negativeliberty’wheresocietyshouldgiveeachpersonthe righttodowhateverthatpersonwantedwithout interference;however,inthepursuanceofone’s happiness,Berlincounselleda‘thicker’liberalism, ‘positive’freedom,or‘diasporaZionism’,and championedsuch‘counter-Enlightenment’thinkers asGiambattistaVicoandJohannesHerderwho stressedtheimportanceoftraditionalrootsand diversifyingcustomsthatcometousthroughfamily,clan,tribe,andthe(moderate)state,asthe meanstofindanadult,psychologicallyhealthy, andenduringsenseofflourishing.Berlinwanted ‘Jewishness’,butnot‘Judaism’.AsBertrand RussellwroteabouttheAmericanphilosopher GeorgeSantayana,‘hedidnotbelieveinGod,but wasinlovewiththeBlessedVirgin.’Itwasas thoughbothmenwantedtomaintainabank accountfromwhichtheycouldcontinuetodraw interest,longaftertheyhadgivenuppayingthe principle.

HeythropCollegePatrickMadigan

TheFallOutofRedemption:WritingandThinkingBeyondSalvationinBaudelaire,Cioran,Fondane,Agamben, Nancy.ByJosephAcquisto.Pp.218,London:Bloomsbury,2015,$110.00.

Thisbookisdirectedtowardsthoseimmersedin recentcontinentalphilosophicalturnstothetheological,heretakenupasageneral‘structureof thought’itself(p.2).Byisolatingthisstrain, Acquistocertainlyintendstofurtherquestionthe arbitrarysplitbetweenthesacredandthesecular, butalsotochallengethenatureofthephilosophicalinthefirstplace,somethingheachieves throughanexplorationofthepoetic.InCharles Baudelaire’s‘amodern’poetry,asitfacedandtried torejectthe‘impossibilityofredemption’(p.3), Acquistofindsasuitablefoundationforthistheologicalturnthathasbeendescribedasa‘religion withoutreligion’(aphraseveryfamiliartothe workofJohnCaputo,butwhichgoesunmentioned byAcquisto).ThoughCaputomightbemissed here,Acquistodoesnotmisstheopportunityto parallelBaudelaire’sinitiativewiththedeconstructionofChristianityputforthmorerecentlyby Jean-LucNancyandGiorgioAgamben.Acquisto willdevelopthroughsuchthinkersaspecifically modern‘asoteriology’,oramovementawayfrom thetypicaldoctrinesofsalvation(soteriology)and towardanexplorationofthisparticularmetaphysicalandaestheticatheismthatarisesoutofthe Christiantradition.

Whatwewitnessthroughoutthisremarkable studyisaveritableliteraryplaygroundofexperimentationwiththeconsequencesofsuchasoteriologicalgestures,suchaswefindintheworkof Baudelaire,butalsoEmilCioran,whoseaphorisms challengedthedescendantsofmodernitytocontemplateredemptionanew.Thefocusonliterary formsthatAcquistogiveshisbookisasearchnot forsystematicrigor,butforthatwhichopensusup towardtheeternalorunending,hencethepreferenceformaxims,aphorisms,poetryandothersuch forms.MuchasthepoetWallaceStevenshadonce pointedout,withthelossofredemption,poetic endeavorstakeonanewresonanceandsignificance;theyofferussomethingthatreligiononce did,butwhichnowhaslostitspower.

ThefirstchapterlinkstogetherBaudelaire, WalterBenjamin,PauldeMan,GiorgioAgamben and,briefly,Slavoj Zizek.Wearegreetedbya richtapestryoffigures,poemsandcommentary thatinterweavetogiveusa fascinatingportraitof anatheologicalworldviewthatatoncetakesseriouslythestateoffallennessororiginalsinthat humanityfindsitselfmiredin,butalsohowour moderncontextcannolongerfindawayforward withinsuchasituation.Reconceivingthecategoryofredemptionfromthisplacemeans,forthe

mostpart,andtotheauthorsassembledhere,to seeitascancelledoutbyitself—thatis,ineffect, acancellingoutofthedualityofsin/redemption thathashauntedtheWestforcenturies(p.24). Thesuspensionofactionandthepreferencefor simultaneityovereternity,thusrealigningour conceptualizationoftime,isparamountfor Baudelaireandsetsacoursethatwillguide,in someways,therestofthestudy. Zizekisbrought in,quiteappropriately,todemonstratehowsuch areadingisnotnecessaryopposedtothe Christianstory,butratheritsown‘perversecore’ (p.48)thathastoooftenbeensilenced.Inthe end,andthroughtheinteractionsofthesevaried authors,Acquistoexploreshowthelossof redemptioninthemodernperiodopensthought uptoviewingtheredemptivequalitiesofartor ofpoliticalrevolutionasformsof‘alinearcritical dialogue’(p.55).

ThesecondchaptercontinuesAcquisto’ssomewhatcriticalstancetowardBenjamin,whichwas takenupinthefirstchapterasanattempttoread Baudelaire with AgambenandasagainstBenjamin. Here,hetakesupavarietyofrelatedthemesin pursuitofthislineofinquiry,fromBenjamin’s readingofBaudelaire(aswellasa‘Baudelairean readingofBenjamin’)to,moresignificantly,the Romanian-bornFrenchpoetBenjaminFondane’s writingsonBaudelaire.Benjamin,inAcquisto’s estimation,retainstoomuchofthetheologicalin hisreadingofBaudelaire,allowingamessianic senseofhopetopermeateaworldthatistruly voidofsuchthings.Thefullmetaphysicalweight ofsinthatisnotbeholdentoanexplicitlytheologicalpointofviewisonlygivenitsdue,notby Benjamin,butbyFondane—aninterpretivemove thatmobilizesagainstsomuchofBenjamin’scurrentpopularity(andalsoJean-PaulSartre’scontemporaneousstudyofBaudelairethathad overshadowedFondane’swork),butwhichoffers usarefreshing,alternativeperspectiveonthefalse dichotomybetweenmetaphysicsandexperience. Fondane,forhispart,illuminatestheCatholic, mysticalsideofthedarknessthatthemodernpoet hasfalleninto,butinareversedsense,one thathighlightsthehumansideofthings: ‘Transcendenceisthetemptationhere,theimpossibleattempttogobeyondthehuman’(p.92).What salvationislefttohumanity?InFondane’seyes, poetry’sabilitytopartakeinthesufferingof humanity—the‘graceofpoetry’(p.96),whichsustainsusthroughitscreative,albeitpessimistic,linguisticcapabilities.

ThethirdchapterisolatesAgamben’snotionofthe ‘endofthepoem’inrelationtohisconceptionofmessianictime,alongsidecloserreadingsofthealready developedpoeticlegacyofBaudelaire.Inparticular thechapterfocusesuponpoetry’sabilitytorefusethe linearprogressionoftime,somethingthatBaudelaire demonstratestimeandagaininhisplayofpoetic forms,andwhichAgambenhastakenupinstudiesof bothpoetryand(Pauline)theology.InAcquisto’s words,‘[...]itispreciselythepoetry’srefusaloflinearprogression,itsinfinitedoublingback,thatsubtractsitfromthelinearlogicofthemodernwhile makingtheproblemofendingscentraltoitsesthetic andmetaphysicalconcerns’(p.117).Wecanseein thisdescriptionofformanditsdissolutiontoowhy thestructureofAcquisto’sbook,whichinvolvesa ceaselesscirclingaroundBaudelaire’spoetryfroma varietyofangles,ismorethanjusthaphazardlyconceived—itisratheremblematicofthenatureofthe amodernquestthathewishestofurtheridentify.

Thefourthchapterfindsanimmediateexample forthekindofalinear(oreven‘anti-linear’)writing thatAcquistosuggestspermeatesBaudelaire’s poetry:theaphorismsofCioran.Tosituatethings properly,Acquistoguidesthereaderfirstthrough Nietzsche’sviewsonartandredemption,followed byabriefanalysisofthisNietzscheaninfluence uponCioranand,finally,uponCioran’sechoesof Baudelaireinhisownwork.Whatweareshownis that,ratherthanadoptNietzsche’spreferenceforthe aestheticasthelastworkofsalvationinthemodern period—apositionthat,likeBenjamin,overcommits itselftoatheologicalworldview—Cioran’sfragmentarystyleofthoughtdoesnotmakesuchareligious commitment,butratherrecognizestheimpossibility ofredemptionasperhapsanotherformofredemption,aliberationfromtheconfinementtoseek knowledge(theresultofourfallenstateofexistence).WhatwearegivenbyCioranthenisnotsimplyanihilisticstance,butonethatrecognizesthe paradoxicaltensionthatexistsforthepoetwhois alwayssuspendedbetweenabandoningpoetryin favorofredemptionand‘remainingincapableof endingapoemandthusfulfillingthecreativeact’(p. 136).ThisirresolutionwithinCioran’sworkiswhat leadsdirectlytothenextchapter.

Thefifthchapterfurtherpursuestheresonances betweenCioranandBaudelairemorecarefully,specificallyexaminingthenecessaryrolethatfiction, whichcanbeboth‘poisonous’or‘nourishing’,must playwithinourexistence(p.148).Byrecognizing howweare,atbest,onlyabletoabideliminally withinsuchafictionalwayofliving,the‘luciddelusion’weclamorfor,Cioranpaintsalandscape whereinsintakesusbothinandoutoftime,the ‘eternalfall’fromwhichthechapterdrawsitstitle.

Wherethiseternalfalltakesus,interestingly,isto thethresholdofourabilitytocreateaworldthrough language,throughpoetryasthroughallactsofwriting.InAcquisto’srendering,‘Writingthereby becomesameansofconfronting,evenifnotvanquishing,theillusionsinherentinhumanlife,and thereforerequirescouragetemporarilytoenterthose illusionssoasbettertoilluminateandgivevoiceto them’(p.165).ThoughCioranremainsapessimist (andnotanihilist)intheend,hisworkgestures towardsthealmosttherapeuticvalueofclingingto ourfictionalworldsfoundwithinwritingratherthan byclamoringforasalvationthatisnevertocome.

Thesixthandfinalchapter,whichservestooasthe conclusionoftheentirestudy,returnstoBaudelaire andCioranconcerningtheirnotionsofsinandthe fallennatureofhumanity,notinordertoissueatotal condemnationorstateofdespairoverexistence(any allegednihilism),butrathertofosterasenseofaestheticcreationthatjoltshumanityoutofitstheologicalslumber.Acquistosubsequentlyguidesusthrough areadingofbothNancyandAgambenoncommunity, salvationandtheattempttorejecttranscendenceand liftupaformofimmanencefromwithin,ratherthan externalto,aChristian-theologicalpointofview.His effortsarecenteredonshowinghowsuchareading thatseekstorecoversomethingofatheologicallyinflectednotionofcommunityafterasignificantloss ofmeaningwithinmodernitycannotsimplybe achieved.WhatCioranandBaudelairepresent,rather, isacancellationofredemptionthat‘[ ]facilitates theesthetic and ethicalrelationwhilerejecting,itis true,anynotionofcommunity,whetheractualor,like Nancy’sandAgamben’s,always“tocome”’(p.201).

Intheend,Acquisto’sviewofasortofaesthetic redemptionisprominentlyondisplay,causing himtodivergeevenfromthosephilosophical responses—Benjamin,Agamben,Nancy—that wouldtrytomakesomethingfromthetheological fragmentsthatstilloccupyagooddealofthemodern landscape.Iwonderhowviablesucharejectionof communityisfromatheologicalstandpoint(probablynotverymuch),thoughthisdoesnotdetract fromtheinsightsofeitherCioranor,morecentrally tothiswork,Baudelaire,whoserichpoeticuniverse stillresonatesdeeplywiththefragmentedmassesof themodernworld.ThoughIamnotasconvincedas AcquistoseemstobethatBaudelaireisasopposed toBenjamin,AgambenandNancyasheportrays matters,Istillfindmyselfdeeplyenrichedandgratefulforthestudythathehaspresenteduswith,one thatwill,undoubtedly,guideagooddealofmyown thoughtovertheyearsyettocome.

LoyolaUniversityChicagoColbyDickinson

BetweentheCanonandtheMessiah:TheStructureofFaithinContemporaryContinentalThought.ByColby Dickinson.Pp.266,London,Bloomsbury,2013,$39.95.

Despitewhatthetitlesuggests,thebookisabout neitherthecanonnortheMessiahbutabout abstractandformalstructuresof canonicity andthe messianic.Thekeyphraseofthebook’stitleis foundinthesubtitle:‘TheStructureofFaithin ContemporaryContinentalThought.’Oneshould notexpecttofinddetaileddiscussionsofcompeting canons(e.g.SeptuagintvsMasoreticcanons)or howthesecanonsinfluence(orwereinfluencedby) understandingsofwhois–orisn’t–theMessiah. Ourauthortellsusthathisgoalistoarticulatethe ‘oscillationbetweennormative,institutionalstructuresoftradition[thecanonic]andthoseaccompanyingforcesthatseektoundotheirdominant narrative[themessianic]’(2).Whilenottrueofall philosophersworkinginthecontinentaltradition,it seemsfairlyuncontroversialtosaythatvariations onthistheme(i.e.theinterruptionoftotalizing structures–betheymetaphysical,epistemic,politicalorwhathaveyou—bysomethingthatundermines,overcomesorescapesthem)haveanimated continentalphilosophysinceKierkegaardsatdown tocritiqueHegel.Indeed,resistancetototalizing structuresisperhapsthedefaultpositionofcontinentalphilosophy:onceyouareonthelook-outfor thistheme,youfindversionsofitalloverthe place.Thistextisparticularlyhelpfulasanexpositionofhowthisgeneralthemedevelopsinthe workofscholarsandtopicsofcontemporary interest:Agamben,Assmann,Benjamin,Butler, Derrida,Ricouer,Scholem,andTaubes.

Thebookisdividedintotwoparts,withtwo chaptersineachpart;thebodyofthetextis framedbyageneralintroductionandconclusion. Thefirstpartisentitled‘BetweenTheologyand Philosophy’;thesecondpartisentitled‘The RadicalHermeneuticsofTheology.’Ingeneral,the firstpartisconcernedwithshowinghowsomeconceptsgenerallythoughtofasbeingtheological (messianism,forexample)migratedintophilosophyorviceversa.Thisisastorywithalonghistoryinthe20th century(thenamesL€ owithand BlumenburgshouldsufficetoindicatewhatIhave inmind)thatourauthordoesn’tdiscuss;thereader candecideforthemselvesthemeritsofthisomission.Thesecondpartseekstodevelopa‘radical hermeneutics’thatwouldanswersomequestions raisedbythiskindofpoliticaltheology.Herewe areintroducedtotheworkofJanAssmannand givenamoredetailedreadingofWalterBenjamin. Asparttwodevelops,JudithButlerandPaul Riceourareaddedtothemix.

Thefirstchapterofthebookintroducesthecentralconceptsofthecanonicandthemessianic throughadiscussionofJacobTaube’saccountof St.Paul’santinomianism.Fromthere,theauthor movestoadiscussionoffirstDerridaandthen Agamben.Notsurprisingly,hefindsthatmajor partsofDerrida’sthoughtcanbedescribedin termsoftheinterruptionofcanonicbythemessianic.Overall,thereadingofDerridaonoffer heredoesn’tbreaknewground:whilepresenting themajoroutlinesofDerrida’sthinkingonthe relevantpoints,itdoesn’tdigdeeporoffermuch inthewayofanewreadingofDerrida.Whenour authorturnstoAgamben,however,thingsgeta littlemoreinteresting.IfforDerridathereare onlyrepresentations,nothingoutsidethetext, Agambenarguesforthepossibilityofexperiencingapresencebeyondrepresentation(84).While referringtothisasan‘irresolvabletension’ betweenDerridaandAgamben,Idon’tthinkthat thisphrasingdoesfulljusticetotheseriousnessof thedisagreement;Agamben’spositioncaneasily beinterpretedaslapsingintoexactlythekindof metaphysicsofpresenceDerridaspenthiscareer critiquing.Thisislessatensionthanitisan exclusivedisjunction:theycannotbothberight. ThetensionbetweenDerridaandAgambeninpart onecreatesakindofGordianknottheuntyingof whichleadsnottomasteryofAsia,but‘anew waytoapproachanaporiaofexistence’(85).This aporialeadsusthehermeneuticalworkofpart two:radicalhermeneuticsshouldenableusto untietheknot(ratherthancutit)withoutlosing tension.Thepacepicksupdramaticallyhere,pullingattheknotfromallsides;wearetreatedtoa readingofAssmannandBenjamininchapter three,RicouerandButler(withashoutoutto Levinas)inchapterfour.

Theuntyingculminatesintheadvocacyofa turntowards‘canonicalformsthatadmittheirown failures,thatsidewiththevictimsandoppressedof history,andthatdenounceothermoreviolent canonicalforms’(205).Ifoundthisconclusion bothabitdisappointingandpredictable.Iwasdisappointedbythepairingofthe meaculpa ofpenitenceandthe tuaemaximaculpa ofdenunciation. Beatingmybreastoughtnottobepreparatoryfor beatingsomeoneelse’sandalliancewithhistorical victimsdoesnotprecludethecreationofnewvictims.Itisveryeasyforthevictimandtheirchampionstobecomevictimizers;indeed,theworkof R.Girard(brieflyalludedtoon61)showsusthat victimizerstypicallythinktheyaredefending

themselvesorothersfromavillain.Thescapegoat, afterall,isaninnocent(oratleast,nomoreguilty thantheothers)wronglyblamedasthecauseof theevilsafflictingthecommunity.IfGirard’sreadingisright,thescapegoatisavictimofviolence sanctionedbythedefenseofthevictims!Inlight ofthis,Iwouldarguethatthedenunciationof others’violenceintheendofthesentenceundoes theregretforpastviolenceinthesentence’sbeginning.Ifoundtheconclusionpredicableinsofarasit isaninstanceofthatgeneralizedcontinentaltheme Ispokeofearlier.Indeed,assoonastheauthor explainswhathemeansbyCanonicaland Messianic,anyonewithpassingfamiliaritywiththe traditionknewthejigwasup:ofcoursethe MessianicwouldinterrupttheCanonic,andof courseweshouldpreferopen,fallible,canonsto closedtotalizingones.

IfIfoundtheconclusiontochapterfourabit disappointingandpredictable,theconclusiontothe bookasawholeismoreexcitingandsurprising. Here,relyingonashortpresentationAgamben gavetotheclergyofParis,Dickinsonsketchesan argumentfortheChurch’smessianicvocationof disruptingthecanonicalstructuresoflatermodern neo-liberalism.Followinguponthis,Dickinson indicatesthathewouldliketofollowupthis largelystructuraldiscussionwithhistoricaland exegeticalstudiesofactualcannons.Boththese pointssuggestpromisingfutureresearch.Allinall, thisbookwillbeofinteresttophilosophersand theologiansworkingintheareaofcontemporary continentalsocialtheoryassociatedwiththework ofAgambenandhiscircle.

TexasWoman’sUniversity,DentonBrianHarding

FormandObject:ATreatiseonThings.ByTristanGarcia,trans.MarkAllanOhmandJonCogburn, ‘SpeculativeRealism’,ed.GrahamHarman.Pp.xxv,462,EdinburghUniversityPress,2014,$39.95.

Markingthecontextoftheprojectaswellasits verytimelysubjectmatter,TristanGarciaobserves: ‘Ourtimeisperhapsthetimeofanepidemicof things’(p.1).Withinourglobalized,industrialized, commercializedworldthattradesdailyininformationandknowledge,weareawashin‘things’, thoughwerarelyknowthevalueormeritofthe thingsthatwethinkwe‘know’.Garcia’sbook,a sizableandhighlyoriginaltomethatattemptsto assessthevalueofmyriad things inourworld,also triestopointawaybeyondmanyphilosophical impassesthathaveplaguedwesternthoughtfor centuries.

Seekinga‘flatontology’thatseesa‘systemof interchangeablethings’allaroundus,Garciamore orlessplayswithinthefieldof‘speculativerealism’thathastriedtoconceptualizean‘objectoriented’ontology,suchasfoundinGraham Harman’swork,whoservesasserieseditorforthe volume.Thebook,however,andasmanywhoare familiarwiththemovementwouldknow,isnota phenomenologicaltreatise,asGarciaproposesnot tothinkaboutouraccesstothings,butabout the thingsthemselves,as‘impossible’asthismight seemtosome.Hisisaswellnotanobjective attemptto present thethingsthemselveseither;it isratheranattempttothinkasubjectas always already anobject,thoughonestillneedingtobe qualified.WhatGarciaisafterresemblesmorea ‘relational’ontology,onewhereinthingsare ‘attached’tootherthings,andtherebyprovide understandingonlythroughtheirrelationshipto

suchobjects,whateverorwhereversuchobjects maybe.

Throughoutthestudy,Garciaaimsnottorealign classicalformsofdeterminingathing’snatureor essence,butratherto‘de-determine’things,to removetheiridentityasithasbeenwronglyconstituted.Inhiswords,‘Thegoalofthisdedeterminationistohaveatone’sdisposalacrosssectionalplaneofeverycontainerandeveryorder whichmapsthetopographyofthephysical,biological,animal,andhumanuniverse;artefacts;artworks;economicnetworksofproduction,exchange, andconsumption;class,gender,andagedifferences’(p.5).Inthisformulationofhisinquiry,we alreadybegintosensetheadmittedlypurposive encyclopediccharacterofthebookasawhole,as wellasthelargescopeheseekstoelaboratewithin theframeworkofthese‘worlds’ofthings.Indeed, moreorless,whatheisafterisanattempt‘to generateaformalworldofde-determinedthings’ (p.5);inotherwords,thiseffortisaboutdeterminingthe‘magnitudes,values,depths,variations, andinterestsofpresentobjects,accumulatedendlessly,andcontestedbyseveralmethodological approaches’(p.6).

Eschewingdialecticalmethods,whichinevitably reduceathingtosomethingelse,Garciafavorsa non-reductivemethodthatrespectsthesingularity ofeachthing,evenifsuchathingisdeemedby sometobe‘dead,past,false,imaginary,nonexistent,orcontradictory’(p.8).Suchthingsare,for Garcia,verymuchstillthingswithinagivenworld

ofthingsinrelationwitheachother—theyarejust limitedintheirpresentintensity.Assuch,he makesexplicitthathisviewpointisnotaneffortto gettoknowathing‘initself’,whichdoesnot reallyexistanyway,butratherto‘representthings thatarereallyintheworldwithoutbeinginthemselves’(p.11).WhatGarciameansbythisisthat everythingistraversedbyotherthings,rendering nothingasmerelyathing‘initself’,evenifcontemplated‘toitself’.Everythingissomething‘in itself’(‘whatwhichis’)butitisalsoinacontext (‘thatinwhichitis’):‘Athingisnothingother thanthedifferencebetween thatwhichisinthis thing and thatwhichthisthingis’(p.13)—astandardformulationthatunderpinsmuchofthetheoreticalframeworkbehindthebook.

Hethusdoesnotwishtotranscendtherelations ofthingsinthisworld,tobesomehow‘outside’ them,whichamountstoasortof‘salvation’or ‘redemption’ofthethingbeyonditsthingness.He wishesonlytoenterintotheserelationsbetween thingsandtoexploretheirlimitsfromtheinside out.Doingso,hewagers,istheonlytruewayto achievesomethinglikeaformofuniversalitypreciselybyadheringtotheabsoluteparticularityofa thing.Asheoutlinesthesignificanceofthisturn: ‘Ifonewantstoformulatethisundertakingina singleequation,itwouldbethis:howdoweobtain universalityandmaintainthesenseofrelativityat thesametime?’(p.14).Tositinthislocation betweenthetwo,accordingtohisconclusion,we mustabandonboth‘ecstaticbecoming’and‘selfsaturatedthings’,findingaway‘beyond’bystayingcompletely‘within’theworldofthings.

BookI,thefirstoftwo,whichtriesto‘conceive ofthingsemptiedofthemselves,withoutidentity andde-determined’(p.14–15),beginswithaseries ofalmostWittgensteiniannumberedtheses(acommonoccurrencethroughoutthebook).Ratherthan askwhatthematterofthethingis,Garciaisintent onestablishingthepreferentialrelationshipswith thingsthatactuallyconstituteourconstructed worlds:‘somethingsalways matter morethan others’(p.20).Formingthebasisofhisargument thateverything,whichisalwayssomething,must betakenintoaccount,despiteitsapparentcontradictoryorillogicalnature(e.g.aswitha‘squared circle’),heseekstodemonstratehoweverything canbeaccountedforwithinsuchaschema,even thosethingswehadpresumedwouldbeexcluded. ‘Tonotwanttobeintheworldisonewayof arrivingattheworld.Togooutsidetheworldis one way ofenteringintotheworld’(p.74).

Itisinthiscontextthathewill,briefly,among otherthings,analyze‘sanctity’whichappearsto removeitselffromthesystemofthings,butwhich isstillpartofit,muchas,later,hewillbringthe

‘impossible’intotherealmofpossibilityasittoo canbeathingpresentbeforethought.Respectfor humanlife,whichisactuallyjustathinglikeany otherthing,becomesthatwhichisbasedonone’s ‘interest’inthething(p.29),and,assuch,valueis ascribedtoparticularthings.Inthealmostidiosyncraticwayinwhichhemovesthroughavarietyof denselypopulatedtheses,Garciawillthereby determine—andinawaythatreiteratesoneofthe centralaxiomsofthebook—thateverythingis equal,buteverythingisalso‘contaminated’by someotherthing(p.38).Thispositiondefineshis oppositiontothetraditionalnamingofsomething as‘substance’,whichisalwaysconcernedwitha thing’sautonomy,necessityorexistence‘inandby itself’(p.41).Ratherthanadheretothisformulation,Garciawantstodemonstratehoweverything isalsoalreadysomeotherthinginitself,andthis istrueforbothmaterialandimmaterialthings.

Thereisno creatioexnihilo forGarcia,but ratheronlythingsthatprecedeand,inasense,flow intootherthings.Hence,aswell,hecanclaimthat nothingiseverwhole(p.52),butisratherpartof anotherthingthatmoveswithinit—apointwhich willleadGarcia,lateron,toformulate‘bigthings’, morecomplexthings,ifyouwill,thatarereally justacollectionofsmallerthings.Unity,inthis sense,existsonlyinsofarasathingcanbecounted assolitary,astatethatcanbesaidto‘makethe thing’athing(p.55).Asthings,weexistin‘solitude’withintheworldandbecome‘selves’onlyto theextentthatwerecognizeourselvesassomethingthatalso‘escapes’ourcomprehension.The selfassuchisanever-ending‘process’(p.62).

Followingthephilosophicalstagesofoneassertionafteranother,hewillnextdeterminethatthe worldisthatwhichis‘contemporaneous’with eachthing(p.75),andwhichthereforedoesnot ‘exist’asathing,butisratherthe‘formofthings’ themselves.Sincewemustaccountforeachthing’s ownconfigurationofthethingswithinitsworld,its particularrelations,thereareofcourseinfinite worlds,thoughweareonlyeverabletorepresent theonethatis‘ours’sotospeak.Theworldtakes onnospecificqualityandcertainlydoesnot dependonusoranythingelseforthatmatter;there isonlythe‘givenness’ofalreadyestablishedrelationswithintheworld(p.81).Moreover,he claims,theworldisanexceptiontothestateof things,butitisalsoonethatcannotleavethese things.Whenweattempttostepoutsidetheworld, wearereallyenteringintotherealmofform,or thatwhichdoesnotreallyexistandisnotanobject orathing,butwhichisthecontainerinwhich thingsrelatetoeachother.Itiswheretheaccumulationofmanyobjectstakesplace.

Anothersectionofthisfirstparttakesupthe questionofbeingasonewhereinbeingissimply ‘beingcomprehended’(p.105),thatis,being in relation tootherthings.Inthisway,whichstrikes measratherLevinasian,relationshiptakesprecedenceoverbeingandalterity,athing’sotherness toitself,providesthehermeneuticalkeyforunderstandingthe‘nature’ofthething.Bythiscount, significationisonlydonethroughthemovementof thingsinotherthings,orthroughrelationship(p. 121).Inastrikingformulationofthiscomplexity ofrelationsthatactuallydescribethething,whateverthingthatisgiventousorthatweourselves are:‘IfIgivemeaningtomylife,Ifindoutin whatmylifehasvalueassomethingandknowin whatmylifeiscomprehended,whatgoesbeyond mylife,andthatmylifeis:anIdea,anideal,a familialline,acommunity,theprogressofhumanity,thesolitudeoftheworld,thethoughtofdeath, natureandevolution,ageneticstrategy,awork,a God,anothing’(p.122).Fromthisperspective,the ‘tragic’senseoflifethatweembodycomestobe thestandardmodeofrelatingtoourworldbecause wesimplydonotunderstandtheserelationsas fullyaswemightliketo—wecanneverfullygrasp thecomplexityofrelationswithin‘our’world whichis,inturn,permeatedbyotherworldsof things.Inevitably,weareledtodevelopan‘interest’,ora‘primary’interest,incertainthingsthat wewishtoknowbutcannoteverfullycomprehend.Inthiscontext,Garciadefines‘matter’as ‘everythingthatenters intothething’(p.137)but whose‘substance’itisapointlessexercisetodiscern.Hence,hediscussesaswellthelimitsthatwe approachbetweenthingsandtheworld.

BookII,whoseexplicitfocusisto‘conceiveof thingsreplenishingeachotherandorderedencyclopedically’(p.15),beginswiththeuniverse,orthe ‘biggestpossiblething’(p.155),aswellasthe ‘smallest’things,bothofwhichareobjectsofscientificstudy.Allowingfortheexistenceofa ‘humanuniverse’inwhichsomethinglike‘rights’ mightbesaidtoexistinsofarashumansallrecognizethemselvesasmembersofthisuniverse, Garciaproceedstorethinktheconceptofuniversality,whichismadepossiblethroughaformal processof‘oneobject’scomprehensionbyanother’ (p.158).Whatensuesis,tomymind,averyinterestinginterpretationoftheconflictbetweenuniversalityandrelativism,butalsoofabsenceand presence(bothdefinedinrelationtobeingand comprehension,asalreadydefined).

Agoodportionofthebookatthispointenters intoaseriesofattemptstodefinehisterminology, whichishighlyinventive.Eventsarethusdeterminedasthemobilizationofobjects—‘Anobject isathinginanotherthing.Aneventisthe

inclusionofthisthinginanotherthing’(p.174)— andtimeisconsideredasthegrowth(or‘accumulation’)ofpresents/presence,makingpresent,past andfutureallsimplyvariationsofthepresenceof things.Livingthingsaretherebythemostintense presences,butnottheonlyoneswithinourworld.

Thisdiscussionnaturallyflowsintooneconcerningthoseother‘livingthings’,animals,andtheir relationshiptothatmostintenseoflivingthings (becausethatisourlimited‘worldview’,youmight say):humanbeings.Garciainterestinglydefines ‘species’asaneventofoneanimalformmoving intoanother(p.219),adefinitionthatshould,by now,notstrikeusasanythingbutconsistentwith hisoverall‘world-view’.Includedinthisfastpaced re-definingofphilosophicalterminologyarerelated re-readingsofvegetarianism,speciesismandantispeciesism,beforeheengagesinalengthydiscussionofwhatexactlyconstitutesthehuman‘talking animal’.Inshort,wearethatwhichis‘between’ otherspeciesandourownartificiality—aprecise pinpointingthatdemonstratestherelationalwayin whichallthingsaredefined.Ashewillputit, ‘Humanityisarepresentation-producinganimal specieswhichmoreorlesscoexistswiththerepresentationsthatitproducesintheformofartefacts’ (p.239).

Inaddition,Garciawillredefineavarietyofconceptualtermsthroughasimilarprogressionof thought:representationsandpresentation,artand rulesforart,natureandculture,historyandhistoricalconsciousness,economics,valueandthe exchangeofgifts,theassessmentofvaluessuchas thegood,thetrueandthebeautiful,athing’smembershipinsocialclasses,genderanddomination, thedivisionsofthe‘agesoflife’,and,finally, death.Thisapparentragtagassortmentoftopics actuallyconformsquitewelltotheoverallscope andtrajectoryofthestudy,whichunfoldsonetopic onlyinrelationtoanother—theverylogicofthings thatthebookasawholetriestoarticulate.

Ihavenodoubtthatmanyreadersofthebook— andmostlikelyofthisreviewaswell—willwonderwhatexactlytheyaretomakeofsuchanambitiousprojectthatattemptsto(re)thinkphilosophy fromthegroundup.Itiscertainlyawhollyoriginalundertakingthatisintentionally‘devoidof referencesorcitationsfromthehistoryofphilosophy’(p.15).Ialsobelieveagoodmanyreadersof theworkmightbegintheirreadingwithaninitial assessmentsomewherealongthelinesof‘whatis thepointofthisnon-historicalapproach,onethat doesnotimmerseitselfinongoingdebatesthat haverunalongtheselinesalready?’WhatIwould liketopointout,amongsttheparticularinsightsI haveculledanddelineatedabove,issomethingthat mightgomissingthroughafirstreading,butwhich

Ibelieveisinstrumentallynoteworthy:Garcia’s studyisanattempttouseanoriginalcreativeand cohesiveframeworkinorderto‘re-map’thephilosophicalcoordinatesthatwehavebecomevery accustomedtousing,butwhich,fromtimetotime, weneedtobeforcedtorethinkentirely.Itismuch tohiscredit,Ibelieve,thathesucceedsnotonlyin forcingthereaderto think inawaytheywillmost likelybeunaccustomedtodoing,butalsoin

presentinguswithanewandprovocativewayto thinkaboutthose‘things’thatdosurroundusin everyconceivableway,fromourmemoriestoour neighborhoods,andfromsatellitestoearthworms. Iwouldnotbesurprised,infact,ifthisworkwere togeneratecommentaryforyearstocome.

LoyolaUniversityChicagoColbyDickinson

TheCrisisofModernity.ByAugustodelNoce.EditedandTranslatedbyCarloLancellotti.Pp.312,Montreal, McGills-Queen’sUniversityPress,2014,$34.95.

ThemostwidelyknownItalianphilosophersinthe AnglophoneworldarearguablyGiorgioAgamben, AntonioGramsciandGianniVattimo.Both VattimoandAgamben,togreaterorlesserdegrees, representtheItalianversionofthewell-known synthesisofHeideggerandleftistpoliticscommon toacertaingenerationofEuropeanphilosophers. Thetextunderdiscussionhereintroduces AnglophonereaderstotheworkofAugustoDel Noce.Inwhatfollows,Iwon’tenterintoadetailed discussionofDelNoce’sarguments,butrather attempttopresenttheoverallflavorortenorofthe book,soastogiveageneralintroductiontoDel Noceandhisclaims.Iwillleaveittotheinterestedreadertoevaluatehisarguments.Thebookis somethingofa‘greatesthits’–excerptingfrom longertextsandgatheringtogetheressaysandlecturespublishedinavarietyofplaces–ratherthan atraditionalmonograph.Thetranslatorandeditor ofthecollectiondecided–rightlyinmyview–thatinsofarasthisisthefirsttranslationofDel NoceintoEnglish,itmakessensetointroduce readerstohisworkthisway.Withthistranslation ofAugustoDelNoce,wefindadifferentvoice andaradicallydifferentpositionfromthatof VattimoandAgamben.DelNoce’sworkwas sharplyanti-communist,theisticand,ingeneral,a defenderoftradition.ForDelNoce,traditionsignifiesnotmerelythatwhichishandeddownfrom thepast,but“therecognitionofanorderofeternal andmetaphysicalvalues,whichthereforemustbe handeddownandtransmittedfromonegeneration tothenext”(179).Intheinterestofdefendingtradition,DelNoceofferscarefulandsubstantivecritiquesofMarxism,thesexualrevolutionandafew othercontemporarymovements.IfDelNoce deservescreditforprophesyingthecollapseofthe SovietUnionlongbeforeothersthoughtitpossible,hewillprobablyfindfewerwillingauditors whenhecritiquesthepost-SovietorderintheWest ashavingitsowninternalflawsthatwillleadtoits collapseaswell.

ForDelNoce,thecontemporaryWestisbest understoodasaweirdsynthesisofMarxistmaterialismandthesexualtheoriesofWilhelmReich. Indeed,Reich’slargelyforgottentext, TheSexual Revolution,isdiscussedrepeatedlyandatgreat lengthbyDelNoce.ThisisnotbecauseDelNoce thinksthatReichisaparticularlygreatordeep thinker–heactuallythinksthatReichisshallow andstupid–butonlyinsofarasheisasuccessful one.Reich’sideawasthatpsychoanalysisteaches usthatsex,ratherthanclassisthetruegroundfor emancipatorypolitics.Moreover,accordingtoDel Noce,astudyofReich’sworkrevealsthatthe sexualrevolutionisincompatiblewithtradition; indeed,therevolutionispreciselyarevolution againsttradition.Tobolsterthisargument,Del NocepointsoutthattheSovietUnion,inits attempttoweakenwesternresistancetocommunismevangelizedforthesexualrevolutioninthe West,whilemaintainingakindofStalinistpuritanismbackhome.Thecommunistregime,apparently understoodbetterthansomechurchmen(179),that thepromotionofthesexualrevolutionwenthand inhandwithrazingofthebastionsofwestern resistance.Thesexualrevolution,asbothReich andDelNocepresentit,goesfarbeyondthecommunistrevolutionsdesiredbyMarxandhisfollowers;indeed,inacertainsense,Reich’ssexual revolutionisauniversalsolvent,dissolvingnot onlytradition,butalsocommunism.In The CommunistManifesto,MarxandEngelsremark thatincapitalistsocieties,everythingsolidmelts intotheairandeverythingholyisprofaned;on DelNoce’sreadingthesexualrevolutionamplifies andextendsthisdissolutionevenfurther.Although Reichconsideredhimselftobeamanoftheleft, delNocegivesonereasonstoconsiderthesexual revolutionasakindofhyper-capitalismratherthan analternativetoit;ratherthanweakeningmodern capitalism,Reich’srevolutionweakenseverything thatmighthaveresistedit:family,religion,tradition,eventheLeftitself–forwhensexual

liberationreplaces,e.g.worker’srights,astheflagshipoftheleft,capitalisleftunopposed.While DelNoceiscreditedwithforeseeingthefallof communisminEasternEurope,heoughtalsotobe acknowledgedasprophesyingthestrangerelationshipofcapitalismanderoticismthatgrewlike wormsfromitscorpse.

Inconclusion,DelNoce’sworkwillbeofinteresttoawidevarietyofreaders.Firstlyandobviously,studentsofcontemporaryItalianphilosophy willwanttolookcarefullyatthistext,particularly insofarasitshowsaradicallydifferentkindof Italianphilosophythanthemorewidelyreadphilosophersmentionedatthebeginningofthis review.Secondly,thoseinterestedinMarxistand post-MarxistsocialtheorywillbenefitfromDel Noce’sdiscussions,eveniftheydonotsharehis conclusions.Thirdly,asathinkerwhosupportsand defends‘tradition’readerswhosharehisconcerns willcertainlyfindmuchtochewonthisbook.

TexasWoman’sUniversity,DentonBrianHarding

TheContemplativeSelfafterMichelHenry:APhenomenologicalTheology.ByJosephRivera.Pp.xi,394,Notre Dame,IN,UniversityofNotreDamePress,2015, £49.91.

MichelHenrybelongstothegenerationofFrench thinkerstogetherwithMichelFoucault,Jaques DerridaandGillesDeleuzewhowereallstudents oftheFrenchHegel-scholarJeanHyppolite. However,itisnotonlyduetohisdefenceofthe phenomenologicalprojectinoppositiontothehermeneuticalandpoststructuralistdevelopmentsin post-warFrenchphilosophy,butalsobecauseofits demandingoriginalitythatthereceptionofMichel Henry’sworkhasprovendifficult.Butintherecent decadeorsoarecognitionofHenry’soriginalityis startingtomakeitselffeltalsooutsidetheFrench academiccircles.Itisperhapssymptomaticthat GaryGuttinginhis FrenchPhilosophyofthe TwentiethCentury onlymentionsMichelHenry, whosefirstmajorworkwaspublishedin1963,as belongingto‘recentdirections’attheendofthe century.IsMichelHenryathinkerofthetwentieth centurywhoseimportancemightbelongmoreto thetwentyfirst?Nomatterwhat,JosephRivera’s studyisanimportantcontributiontowhatmust stillbeconsideredan early phaseofHenryreceptionintheEnglishlanguage.

ItisthereforeinterestingtoseehowRiverasets outtoofferatheologicalreadingoftheself‘after MichelHenry’.Oneasksthereforewhat,moreprecisely,isimpliedbythis‘after’,andhowcanitbe assessed?Aninitialremarkisherecalledfor. GiventhecurrentexplorationsamongHenryscholarstoaccesswhatBeno^ıtKanabushascalled themanysecretsofHenry’swork,itmightseema bitaudacioustomakeclaimonatheologicalreading‘afterMichelHenry’.Ontheotherhand,an audaciousphilosophysuchasMichelHenry’s mightjustbeinneedofaudaciousreaderswhodo notshyawayfromitsdeepestsecrets.And Rivera’sstudyreadsasawelcomeengagement,in theformofamonography,withtheimplicationsof Henry’sworkforaphenomenologicaltheology.It isastudythatalsotestifiestothetheologicalvalue

ofcontemporaryphenomenologyasaresource,not simplyforreturningtothetheologicaltradition, butforreactivatingitsconceptualityandessential problems.

AsRiverapointsout,thelinguisticturnsincontemporarythoughthasconcealedandthusblinded usfromtheexperienceoftheselfinasphere beforelinguisticmediation,symbolizationornarration;whatRiveracallsthe‘protology’oftheself. InHenry’sphenomenology,thisisachallenging themebecauseitrefersustoasphereofintelligibility,notsomuchbeyondas before representationalconsciousness.However,inhisown theologicalreading,Riveradoesnotwantto followallthewayintothenewdomainofinvestigationthatHenry,in Incarnation,calls‘Archintelligibility’.Riverafindsproblematictheway thatHenry’sphenomenologyconflatesphilosophy andtheologyintothesameclassicalintelligibility ofrepresentation.Themethodologicaldecisionthat informsRivera’sreadingconsiststhereforeina defenceoftheology’sanalyticaldistinctionbetween natureandgraceagainstHenry’sconflatinggesture;therebysecuringtheautonomyofatheologicalorthodoxyfromthedeconstructiveimplications ofHenry’sradicalphenomenology.Giventhis defensivestrategy,Riveraisneverthelessableto useHenryasaconstructiveresourceforhisown theologicalattempttoadvancebeyondthemodern conceptionofsubjectivityinordertoexplorewhat hecallsa‘contemplativeself’;aselfthatseeks Godintime.

Aninfluenceofradicalorthodoxyisfeltin Rivera’sattempttocontextualizeHenry’sphilosophy(part1).RiverareadsHenry’spositioninrelationtoacritiqueofapost-Nietzscheanconception ofsubjectivitythatunderstandsthe‘willtopower’ asacelebrationofviolenceanddominance(cf. 34).Itisunfortunate,however,thatRiveradecides toleaveasideHenry’simportantreadingof

Nietzsche.Instead,wereadthat‘[t]hewillto powergiveswayimmediately,forHenry,toan anti-theismthateliminatestheinwardrealityofthe subjectaltogether.’(38)Formypart,Idonotfind thisreadingconvincing,andIseeadifferentconnexionbetweenHenry’sreadingofNietzsche’s ‘willtopower’andhisreadingofChristianity. Ratherthanrenderingitanti-theistic,Henry’swork allowsusinsteadtoreadNietzsche’s‘willto power’inaKierkegaardianfashion,asa‘hyperpower’thatemploysitsownfreedomonthebasis ofamorefundamental‘nonfreedom’expressedin themythoftheeternalreturn,whichHenrytranslatesastheoriginalpassivityinwhichlifeisgiven totheself-aslife’s‘eternalarrivalintoitself’ (fr. eternelparvenirensoi).

IthereforethinkthatRivera’scontextualizing strategyhasatendencytowardsatotalizingconceptionofphilosophicalmodernity,thusneglecting whatSebastienLaoureuxhasaptlycalledthe‘heterogeneous’aspectinHenry’sreadingofthephilosophicaltradition.IfRiverathinksthatHenry’s worksetsoutto‘conqueranddisposeofthe CartesianegoandNietzsche’swilltopower’(328), itshouldberecognizedinwhatwaysuchdisposal occursthroughaheterogeneousrereadingofmodernphilosophyintheorderofpathos,oraffectivity.WhatHenry’sphilosophyoffersistherefore notsomuchaconqueringasitisayieldingtothe internaltestofsubjectivity.Thisthemealsoopens upfortheproblemsof self-movement, force and praxis oflife,themespresentinHenry’sreadingof Nietzsche,Freudandalsointhetwovolumestudy on Marx (whichRiveradoesnotreferto).

ThetheologicalaiminRivera’sstudyisto employHenry’sworkinordertodevelopaphenomenologicalreadingofa‘contemplativeself’by returningtoAugustine(part3).Butinsodoing, Riveraalsowantstoofferacorrectivetowhathe seesasdefectiveinHenry’s‘theo-phenomenology’. WhatRiverafindsproblematicinHenryistheway thattheradicalimmanenceoftheselfexposedby Henryimplicatesanon-temporalandnon-historical accountofsubjectivity;therebyendingupwitha ‘duplicitousself’conditionedby‘animpassable abyssbetweenthefullnessofinteriorityandthe desolationofexteriority’(111).Thiscriticism (developedinpart2)repeatswhatcanbeobserved inthesecondaryliteratureasastandardpictureof Henry’sphenomenology.ButreadingsofHenry’s workthatseestheimmanenceofselfasaninterioritydetachedfromtemporalityandtheworldare suspiciousofoversimplifyingthequestionofthe temporalinHenry’swork.

WhatisdeconstructedinHenry’sworkisaspecificconceptionoftemporalityasanecstatic,and alienatingforceoftranscendence.Anyengagement

withthistopicwouldthereforehavetotakeseriouslyHenry’sstatementthathisphilosophical workalsoseekstothinkadifferentconceptionof time,whathecallsa‘non-ecstatic’,and‘immanent’temporality;in L’essencedelamanifestation Henrycallsthisothersenseoftimea‘historiality oftheabsolute’.Andinaninterview,Henrysays thathehadtoseekoutsidethephilosophicaltradition,turningtoChristiansources,inordertoinvestigatethis‘immanenttemporality’.ForHenry,the ecstaticstructureofphenomenalityisanobstacle blockingtheaccesstotheoriginal Logos of ChristianityandthegestureofHenry’stranscendentalgenealogyinrelationtoChristiantheology istoreadtheorderofcreationbackintoanimmanentorderofsalvationthusrejectingtheecstatic interpretationofthecreated imagoDei.Rivera’s criticism,ontheotherhand,seeksitsalliance withtheHeideggerianecstaticconceptionof being-in-the-worldthusrevertingbacktoaclassicalphenomenology.ItisbecauseRivera’sphenomenologicaltheologysimplyleavestheecstatic structureoftheologicalthoughtunchallengedthat hecansayofHenry’spositionthatitentailsan ‘abandonmentofcreation’(149)ratherthanfinding hereareinterpretationoftheessenceofcreation. How,then,arewetounderstandRivera’sconceptofthe‘contemplativeself’?Turningtothe thirdpartandtheconclusionofthebook,weread thatthecontemplativeintentionalityconsistsinthe ‘pursuitofthefullvisionofglory’(276),which involves‘theeschatologicaldirectionoftimeitself’ (329).That‘protology’,accordingtoRivera, ‘meetsitslimitineschatology’(329)meansthat thecontemplativeself‘seeksGodintime’(228) butatthesametime‘Godisneveraphenomenon presenttomeinsomeimmediateintuition’(239). Consequently,the‘contemplativedesire’(271)is drawninto‘anunendingprocessofseeking’(262); aseekingofa‘theologicalfulfilment’thatinthe finalanalysesissaidtofindits telos only‘beyond time’(271).The‘contemplativedesire’ismodelled accordingto epektatis and‘thecomingrenewalof creationpromisedbytheSpirit’(273).Itissuch understandingofthe‘contemplativedesire’that determinesRivera’snotionofthe‘theological attitude’.

Inshort,the‘theologicalattitude’,asRiveraconceivesit,consistsinanintentionalityaimingata fulfilmentthatisimpossiblebyprinciple:atemporalintentionalitythatseeksitsfulfilmentbeyond time.Consequently,theeconomyofa‘contemplativedesire’willnotfinditsfulfilmentinthe renewalofearthlylife.Mustwenotthereforedare toaskifnotthistheologicaldesirecanbe exposedasaneffortofescapingthesufferingtrial oflife’simmanencebyseekingsalvationinthe

transcendentek-stasisoffuture?However,with Henrytherenewaloflifecanonlyoccurthrough the‘primalsuffering’thatbelongstolife’smaterial condition.Apotentialityforlifetoberenewedin theSpiritisalreadypresentinthe‘originalpassivity’whichbindstheselftoitself,inthe‘primal suffering’towhichtheselfmustyieldinorderto acceptthetestoflife’sself-transformation;ayieldingtothe‘eternal’understoodbyHenryinits radicalimmanenceas‘theindestructiblebondof self-affection’(SeeHenry’sessay‘Qu’est-ceque celaquenousappelonslavie?’).

Riveraishelpfulinbringingdescriptiveclearnesstowhatwemight,inallusiontoHenry’s work,callthe classical senseofthetheological attitude;anattitudedeterminedbythe incurvatus inse ofthefinitudeoftheself.Onsuchaccount,it istoatranscendentmovementofecstatictemporalitythattheeschatologicalgrammaroffaithrefers. ButHenry’swork,Iwouldcontend,challenges suchclassical,or‘contemplative’,determinationof thetheologicalattitude.Inamaterialtheology,the intentionality offaithissubstitutedbythe pathos offaith,apathosthatcanberecognizedasthe materialcontentoftheologicaldiscourse.Such materialtheologyisnotexhaustedbyacontemplativedesirethatseeksanimpossibleobject,butit findsitscontentinthevery‘self-movement’and ‘self-transformation’inwhichtheselfisputtothe testbyan‘innernecessity’ofspiritualandethical ‘growth’(fr. accroissement);whattraditionaltheologicallanguagenames‘sanctification’or‘deification’.Byaclassicalconceptionoftheology,one

endupwitha‘contemplativeself’.Butthrougha radicalizeddestructionofacontemplativetheology ofglory,amaterialtheologyisabletooffersa readingoftheconceptofgraceasaninvisibletest (fr. epreuve)-inthesecretdepthofflesh-ofa divineself-transformationoflifeinthehistoriality oftheabsolute.

Riverahasprovidedavaluablestudyonwhathe callsthe‘contemplativeself’afterMichelHenry. Andhisbookatteststoaneruditeengagementwith Henry’sphenomenology,richinideasforphenomenologicalexplorationsoftheologicalconcepts; alsowritteninaveryfinestyleandwithastringent argument.ForallthisRivera’sstudyisworthyof praise.However,inmyassessment,ifwewantto dotheology after MichelHenry,Rivera’scontributionisvaluableasaphenomenologicalclarification ofaclassical,or‘contemplative’,determinationof thetheologicalattitude.Butasamaterialtheology, whichseekstofollowHenryinhisopeningbeyond suchclassicalself-interpretation,Rivera’stheologicalreadingfails.Conclusively,Rivera’stheological receptionofHenry’sphenomenologyisverysuccessfulindisarmingitsradicalimplicationsfor theologicalself-understanding.Forsomereaders thiswillpresumablybewelcomedasitsvirtue.But forothers,therelevantquestionisifthisearly receptiondoesnotalsoindicatethefailingsofa ‘contemplative’theologytoexplorethepossibilities foraradicalrethinkingoftheology after Michel Henry.

UppsalaUniversitySimonHenriksson

WithoutGod:MichelHouellebecqandMaterialistHorror.ByLouisBetty.Pp.161,UniversityPark,PA,The PennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress,2016,$46.95.

ThisisasecondcriticalstudyofHouellebecqin English(seethereviewinthesepagesofNurit Buchweitz’s AnOfficerofCivilization:thePoetics ofMichelHouellebecq in57:5,Sept.’16,pp.871–2).H.israpidlyemergingasourmostaggressive, scathing,anddominantsocialcritic,allthemore powerfulinthatthecritiqueisdeliveredthrough novelswherethenarratordoesnotthunder, ala Nietzsche,fromanoutsideposition,butinalowkeymannerbya‘loser’whoselifemanifestsboth hissupposed‘success’,butinrealitythemiserable failureofourlate-capitalist,liberal,secularlifestylethat,accordingtoFukuyama,hasbroughtus tothe‘endofHistory’.Thislifeisdescribedina monotone,one-level,deadpanmanner‘fromthe inside’bysomeonewhohasnointentionof criticizingthesystem;heismerelydescribinghis life,andthelivesofeverybodyheknows.His

‘education’amountstotrainingintheparticular branchofsciencethatkeepsonepartofthe‘new tech’societygoing,butgiveshimnoadequatecategoriesbywhichtocomprehendpeopleandsituationsotherthantheirphysical,economic,orsexual aspects.Hisintimaterelationsaretypicallyshortliveddisasters;heendsupisolated,lonely,aging, depressive-anuglypieceofdecayingmattervolunteering,whenthepainbecomestoomuch,for death.

BettydoesnotgointoH’sownbiographyasa sourceforthecasual‘horrors’hereportsasall-toorepresentativeofFranceandEuropeasawholefor thegenerationafter’68.HismotherwasaFrench doctorofCorsicandescent,hisfatheraskiinstructorandmountainguide.H.wasbornonthePacific islandof LaReunion;hisparentsquicklylostinterestinhimanddivorced.Hishippymotherwentoff

toBrazilwithanewboyfriendandshippedH.off toherownmothertoberaisedinmiserableconditionsinAlgeria.Laterhewasshippedsimilarlyto hisfather’sgrandmother.TrainedinAgronomyand IT,heisinonesensea‘success’ofthesystem; clearly,however,heisalsooneofthe‘casualties’ ofthelifestylehesobrilliantlyillustrates.Weare allvictims,andhispointistogetpasttheshallow delusionsthe‘system’feedsustolegitimateits continueddominanceandtoendthedenialthrough whichwepaperoverthegapingholesandwounds whichlieasuntreatedsourcesforourcommunal misery.

Anautodidactinsecularizationtheoryafterthe FrenchRevolution,embracingSaint-Simon,Fourier, AugustComteand,interestingly,Robespierre,and fascinatedinhighschoolbythe‘ideology-porn’of H.P.Lovecraft,whosesciencefictionintriguingly depictedthehumanraceasaninsignificantoutcrop ofunimpressivecreaturesbetweenlarger,more powerful,butimmenselymalevolententities,H enjoyspickingapartourpatheticstrategiesforavoidingtheshallownessofourchoicesandtheirdestructiveconsequencesfromwhichwehavebeen schooledtoavertourvision.Hismessageisthatlate capitalist,liberalsecularsocietyisunsustainable,is unviable.Heiscandidinadmittinghehasnoremedy.LikeComte,heiscommittedtoan‘immanent

monism’thatrulesoutanyreachtowardsatranscendentreality,evenwhiletragicallyrecognizing thatonlysuchcangivelifeasenseofworthandprovideatrueexitfromourcondition.HedepriveshimselffromrecoursetoaNeo-Platonic‘GreatChainof Being’,sothathecannot‘convertinto’higherlevels ofReality,butkeepsthrowingouttentativestrategiesfromwithinthe‘matter’thatdisgustshim–suggestingthatQuantumMechanicsmayinjectmysteryandoverturnthemechanismof‘inert’passive blockswhichclassicalphysicsreducesusto,orpossibly‘cloning’ourselvessothatwemayatleast carrytheselivestoeternity.Butthismerelyextends andrepeatstheproblem,ratherthanresolvingit. MilitantIslamhasarrivedtoshakethericketyplatformofWesterncivilizationthatseemsreadytofall ofitsown;Hremainsambivalentabouthowthis mightend.

Thisisasuperbbookthatshowshow Houllebecq–likeNietzschebeforehim–isthe bestdiagnosticianandtherapistforthedeepestills thatbesetourculture.Another‘canaryinthemineshaft’,he‘seestheendineverything’,anddragsus -kickingandscreaming-tofaceintelligently socialprioritieswehavebeeninducedto committo.

HeythropCollegePatrickMadigan

Givenness&Revelation.ByJean-LucMarion.TranslatedbyStephenE.Lewis.ForewordbyRamonaFotiade andDavidJasper.Pp.xix,137,OxfordUniversityPress,2016, £25.00/$40.00.

‘Somuch mysterion,somuch apokalypsis’(75)— withthisJean-LucMariontransposesintotheology hisphenomenological-philosophicalprinciple,‘so muchreduction,somuchgivenness’(Reduction andGivenness, 203).ThewholeofMarion’s luminously-translatedandhelpfully-introduced 2014GiffordLectureseffectsthistransposition. Theselecturesareamust-readforanyonewho wishestounderstandMarion’sthought;theybrilliantlyilluminatehisdecades-longintertwiningof intellectualhistory,phenomenology,andChristian theology.

TheintroductionpreparesforMarion’selucidationoftheparadoxicalrationalityofrevelation fromthestandpointofphenomenality,the‘how’of appearing(4).Inthisway,phenomenologycan freshlyaidChristiantheology(5,7).

Chapter1,‘TheAporiaoftheConceptof Revelation,’willrewardthosewhoenjoyMarion’s workinintellectualhistory(e.g.,Descartes).He tracesthequestionofrevelationfromThomas Aquinas(10–20)tohismoderninterpreterslike FranciscoSuarez(20–25),andtheCouncilsof

Trent,VaticanI,andVaticanII(25–28).Thomas raisesthequestionofrevelation’sclaimtothestatusofscience(20),thusopeningtwomoderntrajectoriesforinterpretingrevelation:epistemological (SuarezthroughVaticanI)andaccordingtolove (incipientinVaticanII).Marionexploresthelatter possibilitywhilecritiquingtheformer.

InChapter2,‘AnAttemptataPhenomenalReappropriationofRevelation,’themainconflictof thelecturesappears:betweenreason’sunconcealmentoftruth(aletheia)andrevelation’suncovering ofwhatitgivestobeknown(apokalypsis)(34). FromAugustine’scommentaryonJohn6:44, Marionadducestheideathatrevelationexhibitsa logicoflove,anattractionbytheFathertoward theSon(39,41,cf.83).WilliamofSt.Thierry addsthatnoonecanseeunlesssheloves;lovesets conditionsforknowledge(42–43,45).Inorderto beproperlyexpansiveinits logos,philosophymust reformitsprinciples(47).

Chapter3,‘ChristasSaturatedPhenomenon,’ movesfromthetopicof‘themysteriesofthekingdom’toaphenomenologicalreconsiderationof

truth(61,63).Thisnewphenomenologyoftruth centersonMarion’scategory,developedsobeautifullyin BeingGiven, of‘anamorphosis’—achieving,throughthereduction,aproperstandpointfor receivingandrespondingtoaphenomenon(64). Anamorphosisconsistsinleavingthefinitehorizon ofbeingandBeingsandenteringintotheunlimited horizonofcharity(70).Christ,theSon,perfects anamorphosis,entirelytakingtheFather’spointof viewinordertomanifestit(85).Inthisway, Christcompletes avantlalettre thehighestaspirationsofcontemporaryphenomenology:‘render[ing] thethingmanifest assuch,andcompletely’—the ‘thing’heremeaningGod(76).HereMarionposes thephrasewithwhichIbegan,‘somuch mysterion,’i.e.,thehiddenrelationshipofSontoFather, ‘somuch apokalypsis,’i.e.,thishiddenrelationship isnottheoppositeoforanobstacletomanifestation,butits‘irreducibledepthoffield’(74–75).

Chapter4,‘ALogicofManifestation,’shows paralleldevelopmentbetweentheepistemological interpretationofrevelationandthedivisionof knowledgeoftheTrinityalong“natural”and “supernatural”lines(91–92).Suarez’sparsingof thedivineessence(92)leadstoKant’sdoubting theTrinity’spracticalrelevance(95).Butthe Trinityistheeconomyofanapocalypseoflove (96).MarionrephrasesKarlRahner’scontroverted

dictum(theeconomicTrinityistheimmanent Trinityandviceversa)inphenomenologicalterms: ‘themodeofmanifestation(thephenomenal wie) coincidesexactlywiththatwhichmanifestsitself (the Sich-selbst-zeigende)’(99).Marionupdates, withrichreadingsofBasilofCaesareaand Augustine,histheologyoftheicon,centeringiton theHolySpiritandhisrevisionofanamorphosis (102–110).Pages108–09onthistopicaretwoof thebestMarionhaseverwritten.Marionendsthe chapterbywithanapologiaforaTrinitariantheologycenteredon‘threeoperatorsofphenomenality’ (115),aphenomenologicaltranspositionof ‘Persons.’

Iwasthrilledtofindherethefecundpayoffof Marion’sdecades-longdevelopmentofaChristian theologyresponsivetophilosophicaldiscoveries regardingphenomenality.Theologicalaestheticiansinparticularmusttakenote.Alltheologians shouldappreciateMarion’selaborationof‘faith seekingunderstanding’intoafaiththat‘bring[s] theunderstandingtowillornottowilltoaccept thecomingofGodwhogiveshimselfinand as theeventofJesus’(117).Faithdemandsdecision, atopicIhopeMarionwillpursueinsubsequent texts.

HolyCrossCollegePeterFritz

Freedom’sRight:TheSocialFoundationsofDemocraticLife

.ByAxelHonneth,translatedbyJosephGanahl, Pp.x,412,Cambridge,PolityPress,$28.00.

Honneth’s Freedom’sRight (FR)isanattemptto reconnectatheoryofjusticewithananalysisof societythroughprovidingaricheraccountofthe socialfoundationsofdemocraticlifethanthatpresentedbymoreabstractKantian-inspiredsocial contracttheoreticalapproaches.Hegelactsas Honneth’sguideinthisventureandFRshouldbe readasanattempttoreinterpretHegel’s PhilosophyofRight forthetwenty-firstcentury.

Honnethbuildsuponhisearlierworkonrecognitiontheorybyfocussingonarguablythecentral valueofmodernity:freedom,asthenormativecriterionbywhichanalysesofsocialstrugglesfor recognitionshouldbeevaluated.Thegreaterrealisationoffreedominsocietyispartlybrought aboutthroughthesestrugglesforrecognitionas excludedgroupsgraduallybecomerecognisedand theirviewsintegratedinlegallysecuredand sociallyanchoredinstitutionalarrangements.But aswellasthesecontingentcausesofchangein socialprotests,Honnethdevelopsanargument thatteleologicalvectorsintherealmoffreedom arethemselvesembeddedintheverynormative

coreoftheinstitutionalspheresofmoderndemocraticsocietiesandthattheseinstitutionalorders cannotsurviveandflourishwithouttheirgreater recognitionandrealisation.Hedrawsonthework oftheAmericansocialtheoristTalcottParsonsto arguethatthenormativeordersencodedinthe institutionsofsocietyrequireindividualstoadhere tocertainroleexpectationsthatgeneratespecific socialdynamicsorientedtowardstherealisation offreedomthroughrelationsofmutualrecognition.Whentheseroleexpectationsaresystematicallyinhibitedbycontradictorybehaviourpatterns involvingalackofrecognitionacrisisoflegitimacyoccursinsocietyandtheconsentrequired forsocialorderiswithdrawnthroughvarious formsofsocialprotestandnon-cooperation.The socialordergainedthroughasocietyoperating accordingtoitsownnormativeinfrastructure ensuresthatwhilsthistoricaltrajectoriesinevitably deviatefromtheseidealnormsaHegelianvector tohistorycanbediscernedinthesocialevolution offreedomasthenormativebasisoforderin democraticsocieties.

Throughadoptingthemethodologicalapproach of‘normativereconstruction’,Honnethprovidesa socio-historicalphilosophicalaccountofthetrajectoryofdevelopmentoffreedominthedomainsof personalrelationships,themarketeconomy,and thepoliticalpublicsphere,whichrepresenttogether withthelegalandmoralspheresthesocialfoundationsofmoderndemocraticlife.Thismethodof reconstructingtheinstitutionalcorrespondencewith immanentvaluesalsoprovidesHonnethwithacriticalapproachtotheexistingsocialreality,which asathirdgenerationcriticaltheoristinthe FrankfurtSchooltraditioncharacteriseshisphilosophicalprojectasawhole.Thefactthatdemocraticinstitutionscannotbearthechargeof hypocrisyovertimewithoutlosingtheirlegitimacy meansthatthiscriticalmethodologyhasimplicationsforthenormativeevaluationofthesesocietal institutions.Inshowingthatthisisthecasethrough anormativereconstructionofthedomainsofpersonalrelations,theeconomy,andthepoliticalpublic sphere,HonnethfollowsHegelinemphasisingthe necessarystructuralconditionsforhealthysocial andculturalevolutioninmodernity.Consequently, inFRHonnethprovidesanewunderstandingof Hegel’sconceptof‘ethicallife’(Sittlichkeit)for ourtimes;somethingwhichismadeexplicitinthe originalGermansubtitleofthebook:‘Grundriß einerdemokratischenSittlichkeit’.Thisnewinterpretationof‘ethicallife’tradesuponhisdistinctive conceptionoffreedom,whichheterms‘social freedom’.

Hedevelopsthenotionof‘socialfreedom’ throughacriticalreconstructionoftwootherdominantconceptionsoffreedom,whichheterms‘negativefreedom’and‘reflexivefreedom’.‘Negative freedom’isthattypeoffreedomcharacterisedby ThomasHobbesinhis Leviathan astheabsenceof externalimpedimentsorcoercion.Eveninlater versions,suchasdevelopedbyRobertNozick,the fundamentalidearemainsthatofprotectingafree spaceofego-centricactionwithoutconsideration ofourresponsibilitiestowardsothers.Honneth holdsanegativeconceptionoffreedomtobea necessarybutnotsufficientconditiontogenerate anadequatemodelforunderstandingdemocratic lifetoday.Thisconceptionlacksanawarenessof therequirementofself-reflectionforanactionto betrulyconsideredfree;aconsideration,whichthe otherunderstandingoffreedomdealtwithby Honeth,‘reflexivefreedom’,placesgreater emphasis.

In‘reflexivefreedom’,heseesadevelopmentof ourunderstandingoffreedominapositivedirection.Heretheideaoffreedomisbasedontheview thatinorderforapersontobesaidtobeacting freelytheiractionsneedtobetheresultofthe

subject’sintentionality.Inotherwords,itnotsufficientforapersontosimplyfollowtheirdesires, theyalsoneedtohaveengagedinaprocessof ownershiporreflexivityaboutaparticularcourse ofaction.IsiahBerlinfamouslyarticulatedthis accountoffreedominhisnotionof‘positiveliberty’inwhichasubjectissaidtobemasterof theiractionswhentheycorrespondtotheirintentions.Historically,thisnotionof‘reflexivefreedom’hasbeendevelopedintwomajordirections bothbuildinguponRousseau’sideas:inaKantian directioninwhichfreedomisaresultofthe rationalwilloftheagent,andfollowingHerderfor whomfreedomisviewedasaconsequenceof articulatingone’sownauthenticwill.Honnethsees bothoftheselinesofdevelopmentasexpressing importantdimensionsofcontemporaryfreedom: autonomyandself-realisation.However,whilst importantdevelopmentsinthemodernunderstandingoffreedomtheyareinsufficienttothetaskof developingatheoryofjusticethroughananalysis ofthenormsofwesternliberaldemocracies. Honneth’sarguesthattheybothfailtoelucidatea successfulmodernaccountoffreedombecause theydonotinterpretthesocialandinstitutional conditionswhichactuallyenabletheexerciseof realfreedom.

Hiscritiqueoftheseconceptionsoffreedom opensthewayforHonnethtoproposehisthird anddistinctivealternative,whichheterms‘social freedom’.FollowingHegelagain,heintegrates theobjective,institutionalaccountoffreedominto hisuseofthe‘negative’,andthe‘reflexive’traditionsoffreedom.Arguingthatfreeactionsdepend onareceptivesocialenvironmenttoprovidetheir meaningandpurposeandtocoordinateindividual actionsintoacooperativeframeworkofsocial action,hedefendstheviewthatbothsubjective andobjectiveconditionsarenecessaryforreal freedomtobeexercised.Thisdualsubjectiveand objectivemodeloftheconditionsoffreedom givesHonnethatheoryoftheethicalliferequired foralegitimatesocialordertomaintainsocially justinstitutionswhichintheirturnensure freedom.

FRisundoubtedlyHonneth’smostambitious booktodate.Hedevelopsnewstrandsofcritical socialtheorythatbuilduponhisearlierworkon theconceptofrecognitionandproposesaHegelian inspiredtheoryofthesocialfoundationsofdemocraticlife.Bothhisuseofthemethodologyof ‘normativereconstruction’andhisconceptualelucidationof‘socialfreedom’displayrealinnovationsthatjustifyhisplaceintheranksofthemost creativesocialandpoliticaltheoristswritingtoday. Moreover,inselecting‘socialfreedom’,astheconceptualleitmotifofhisproject,Honnethhaschosen

avaluewhichiscentraltoallaspectsofourmodernwayoflifeandheprovidesaninstitutional inventoryofjustwhatsuchavaluelookslike whenembodiedinourdaytodaylifeofpersonal relationships,markettransactionsanddemocratic willformation.Inproducinganaccountofjustice thatisconnectedtosocialanalysis,healsoprovidesamuchmoregroundedtheoryofjusticethan

manyofhispredecessorswhobasetheiraccounts onabstractnormativeprinciples.Forthisreason alonetheideasofFRshouldbeasourceofdebate foranyoneconcernedwithdefendingtheemancipatoryidealsoftheEnlightenmentinaneraof manycontraryvoices.

HeythropCollegeAnthonyJ.Carroll