Plato's Two Republics

PLATO’STWOREPUBLICS

By Bela Egyed

Copyright©2023byBelaEgyed Allrightsreserved.

Noportionofthisbookmaybereproducedinanyformwithoutwritten permissionfromthepublisherorauthor,exceptaspermittedbyU.S. copyrightlaw.

Preface

Thisessayisintendedforstudentsofpoliticswhohaveaninterestin Plato’s Republic. Thenoveltyoftheessayconsistsinexplainingthe existenceoftwoconictinginterpretationofPlato’stext,onetotalitarian andtheother liberal.Bydisruptingthecontinuitytraditionallyascribedto

theworkIamabletoextractfromittworelatedbutindependent teachings,oneaboutaprogressiveconservativepracticalpolitics,and anotherabout true philosophythathasdisastrousconsequencesfor politicalrule.Mymainthesisisthattherearetworepublicscontainedin the Republic aswehaveittoday:twocontrastingviewsaboutmoralityand politics;hence,thetitle: Plato’sTwoRepublics. Inparticular,myclaimis that,basedonBooksIItoIV,onecanascribetoPlatotheviewthatall typesofindividuals,notjustphilosophers,canbejust.Insupportofthis claimIproposetoreadoutfromthe Republic adistinctionbetweenwhat type apersonis,andonwhatconditionsuchapersonmightbevirtuous. AccordingtoPlato,allpersonshaveallofthethreeparts(dispositions)in theirsoul:appetitive,spiritedandreasoning,tosomedegree,butbynature, onlyoneoftheseparts predominates, makingthemthetypeofperson thattheyare. Buthealsosuggests,attheendofBookIV,thataperson havinganyoneofthesenaturescanbejustifitssoulisruledbyitsreason. Bypredominatingapartgivesthesoulits valueorientation,butwhether asoulisjustorunjustdependsnotonitsvalueorientation,butonwhich partinitrules,imposingitsvalueorientationonthewhole.Forexample, anappetitivepersonisorientedtowardsthesatisfactionofitsappetites.Its valueorientation(whatpartofitssoulispredominant)isinnateandstays thesamethroughoutitswholelife,butwithpropereducationsucha

personcouldbecomevirtuous,itssoul,then,comestoberuledbytheleast powerfulpartofitssoul,itsreason.

Mostinterpretersofthe Republic arriveatthepoliticallyandethically problematicconclusionthat,inPlato’sview,onlyphilosopherscanbejust. TheyarriveatthisconclusionbecausetheyputundueemphasisonBooks VtoVII.Inaddition,theythinkthattheirinterpretationismadeplausible bywhatissaidinBookIXabout“philosophers”and“philosophic”types. But,inmyview,whatissaidaboutphilosophersinBookIXisbestseenas continuingthediscussionofBooksIItoIV,independentlyofwhatissaid aboutphilosophersinBooksVtoVII.Alongwithmostcommentatorsof the Republic,Iholdtheviewthattheguidingquestionsoftheworkare: “Whatisjustice?”and“Whetheritismorebenecialtobejustthantobe unjust?”Thesequestionsaresettled,inmyview,bytheendofBookIV.So, onemightaskwhatrolethemiddlebooksandBooksVIIIandIXplayin answeringthesequestions.Myansweris,rst,thatBooksVtoVII introduceahyperauthoritarianviewofpolitics,alongwithahighly contemplativeconceptionofphilosophy.Nevertheless,besidesPlato’s ambivalenceabouttheroleofreasonineverydaylifeandinpolitics,Book VIconstitutesausefulaccountofthetheoreticalpresuppositionsofwhat makespracticalethicsandpoliticspossible.Itprovidesatheoryofhowthe conceptionofreason,andofwisepoliticalruleintroducedintheearly

books,presupposesadeeperunderstandingofwhatitmeanstograspthe unityofdiverseconceptualelements.Itshows,inotherwords,howthe goodofathing,orofanaction,isdeterminedbytheroleithasinawider, morecomplextotality.

Myanswertothesecondquestion:“OfwhatroleBooksVIIIandIX playinansweringthechallengeputtoSocratesatthebeginningofBook II?”iscontroversial.Iagreethatthesetwobooksattempttoshowthatthe lifeofthetyrant,themostcompletelyunjust,isfarworsethanthelifeof thecompletelyjust,thephilosopher.ButPlatofallsshortinhisattemptto showthisbecause,rst,hespendstoomuchtimeonhowmenwhoare inferiortophilosophersenjoylesspleasurethantheythinkthattheydo; and,second,hecollapsesthedistinctionbetweenwhattypeanindividual is,andwhetherheisjustorunjust.Asaresult,Platofailstomakethe distinctionbetweenwhyjustpeopleare happier thanunjustpeople,and inwhatsensephilosophicnaturesare moresecureintheirhappinessthan arenon-philosophicalnatures,evenifthelatterarejust.

Plato’sambivalenceabouttheissueofwhetheranycitizencanbejustis linkedtohisvaguenessaboutwhatconstitutesthesocalled“thirdclass”. Withoutsayingso,heimpliesthatamongthe“appetitive”typethereare sub-types:somewhoselabourisgratifyingandself-enhancing,andothers whoseconditionofworkisdehumanizing,preventingthemfrommaking

useoftheircapacitytoreason.Thereisdisagreementamonginterpretersof the Republic whetheritrecommendsthattheproducersreceivesomeform ofphilosophicaleducation.Ifeducationinmusicandpoetryisconsidered aformof“philosophical”education,thenthereisgoodreasontothink thatthey,too,shouldreceivesomeofthatkindofeducation,atleast,in theirchildhood.Howcouldtheyachieveharmonywithintheirsoul,and howcouldtheybejustandmoderatecitizens,withoutit?Oneofmy hypothesesisthatthedetaileddiscussionoftheeducationofguardiansin BooksIIandIIIismeant,followingthecity/soulanalogy,astheeducation ofwhatoughttobetherulingpartsofallindividualsouls,ofreasonandof spirit.

MyinterpretationoftheRepublichasbeeninspiredbytheargumentsof someofitsmostacutephilosophicalcritics.Mostnotableamongthemare: BernardWilliams,DavidSachs,RichardKrautandGeorgeKlosko,allof whomIdiscussinsomedetail.WhileIagreewithmuchofwhattheysay,I alsodisagreewiththemtosomeextent.Mydisagreementwiththem centersaroundthedistinctionbetween“rule”and“predominance”.Inmy view,noneofthemrecognizestheimportanceofthatdistinction,mainly becausetheyallhaveaunitarianviewofthe Republic: theydonotsee,asI do,thatthereisafundamentalchangeinperspectivefromtheearlybooks

tothemiddlebooks,andtheydonotallowforthepossibilitythatBooks VIIIandIXarealsoindependentofBooksVtoVII.

IciteevidencefromwithinthetextformyviewthatPlatoheld,atthe timeofwritingtheearlybooksofthe Republic, thatordinarypeoplecan alsobejust.(Idonotexploretherelationbetweenthatworkand The Laws.)Also,IprovidetextualevidenceformyclaimthatPlatois committedtothedistinctionbetween“rule”and“predominance”,even thoughheisnotalwaysclearaboutthedistinction.However,thereisno directevidenceformyviewthatthetextiscomposedoffragmentswritten atdierenttimesinlinewithdierentperspectives.Noristheredirect evidenceagainstit.Myonlyreason,andbasicmotivation,forproposingan unorthodoxreadingistopointtoPlato’sambivalenceaboutanumberof centralpoliticalandethicalquestions.

BelaEgyed,Sutton,September2023.

Introduction:Plato’s TwoRepublics

AmongcommentatorsonPlato’s Republic themajorityconsiderita uniedtextwrittenwithasinglefocusinmind,andaminorityconsiderit tobefragmented,composedofseparatepieceswrittenatdierenttimes.I willcallthem“unitarians”and“fragmentarians”.Iconsidermyselfaradical fragmentarian.GiventhedistanceseparatingusfromPlato’stimes,and given,also,therelativelyobscurehistoryofthetransmissionofhistexts,no decisiveargumentshavebeenputforwardinfavourofonesideorthe other.Mostofthedebatescentersaroundskimpyevidenceprovidedby Plato’scontemporaries,earlyfollowers;andsomeinternalevidencetobe foundinhisotherwritings.

Myradicalapproachtothetextisnotmotivatedbyadeepconviction aboutwhether,ornot,PlatoisresponsibleforthenalcompositionofThe Republic aswenowhaveit,orwhethersomeoneelsewas–thoughIdonot excludeeitherofthosepossibilities.Mymainmotivationforsubscribingto thefragmentarianthesisisthatbyreading TheRepublic asacomplexof severalfragments,onecanprovideareconstructionofPlato’sethical, psychologicalandpoliticalviewswhichcanretainalloftheprofound insightsusuallyattributedtoit,andcan,atthesametime,avoidsomeofits extremetotalitarianpoliticalimplications.

Onmyreading,BookXisbasicallyirrelevanttothemainargumentof thetext.BookIisacombinationofthedraftofanearlierdialogue(the Thrasymachus)andtheforeshadowingofsomeofthethemesofBooksII–IV(ItakethesebookstoconstitutePlato’smainargumentaboutethics, psychologyandpolitics:his“FirstRepublic”.).IconsiderBooksVIIIand IX,aseventheendofBookIVsuggests,tobeasequeltotherstfour books,independentofthemiddleones.BookV,whichisintroduced, explicitly,asaninterruptiontothemainargument,raisesthequestion whether,andhow,the polis outlinedinBooksII–IVcouldbecomea reality.1 BooksVI-VII,whichareusuallytakentoprovidetheanswerto thisquestion,donosuchthing(thequestionisraised,inslightlydierent form,again,attheendofBookIX.)ThesetwobooksprovidePlato’s answertoadeeperquestion,onewhichishintedatBookV,andonewhich preoccupieshiminhislaterperiod,namely,“Howtodistinguishbetween philosophersandsophists?”InBookVIIPlatostilltalksabout philosophersastheidealrulersofa polis,but,paradoxically,heseemsto admitthatpreciselythoseabilitieswhichwouldqualifysomeonetobea truephilosopherwouldpreventthemfromwantingtorule.2

1 )Thesle,(Thesle2009)themainproponentofthefragmentarian interpretationconsidersthatthersttwothirds,thersttwo“waves”,ofitwaspartof the,socalled,“Proto-Republic”.Thisleadsmetoquestionwhetherthehypothesisofthe Philosopher-KingwasaresponseonlytothepoliticalvisionoutlinedinBooksII-IV,or alsototheradicalcommunismproposedinthesecondthird(second“wave”)ofBookV. Allinall,Indthecontentofthesecondwavebothconfusedandrevolting.

2 )Isuspectthattwopassages:theoneatthebeginningofBookV,referringtothe notionthatfriendsshouldpossesseverythingincommon;andtheotherinthemiddleof

AnumberofattemptshavebeenmadebyPlato’scommentatorsto solvetheparadoxofthePhilosopher-King’sunwillingnesstogetinvolved inpoliticalrule,aswellastoclearthetextofthechargeof “totalitarianism”.Inmyview,theseattemptshavefailed.Myalternativeis totreatthe Republic asansweringtworelatedbutseparatequestions:First, “Givenwhatweknowabouthumannatureandthebasicrequirementfor thesurvivalofcities,whatisthebestformofgovernment,andwhypeople shouldbejust?”;second,“Whoarethetruephilosophers,andwhatisthe bestformofeducationforthem?”

ItisundeniablethatPlatothoughtthatonlyifitsrulerswerewise wouldcitiesourishandbejust.Therefore,itwasreasonabletomakea verycloseconnectionbetweenwhathesaysabout“guardians”inBookIII andIV,andwhathesaysabout“Philosopher-Kings”inBooksVIandVII. Still,forpurposesofatheoryaboutthepoliticsofrealsocieties,andan ethicsofrealindividuals,theaccountofthequalitiesofrulersproposedin BooksIIIandIVissucient.3 Infact,thereareelementsinPlato’srst

3 )TheRepublicthatstudentsofPlatohavebeenreadingformillenniaincludes BooksV-VII.Therefore,mysinglingouttheearlybooksforattentionisproblematic. Howtoexplainthedierenceinpoliticalperspectiveinthetwo?onemightask.My responseisthatovertimebothPlato’sconceptionofpoliticalruleandofphilosophyhas changed.Ironically,thewormgetsintotheappleattheendofBookV,withthe introductionofthe“Philosopher-Kings”.ItistherethatPlatoshiftsfromabroad BookIV,mentioningtheneedfora“longerroad”,arearticialdevicestocreatethe appearanceofcontinuitybetweentheearlyandthemiddlebooks.Therstconstruesa commentabout“otherthingsweareomitting”[423e4]asafundamentallawofthecity; andthesecond,havingtodowiththequestionofthetripartitedivisionofthesoul, doesn’tgetthepromisedanswerwiththedoctrineoftheGood.

republic4 whichcouldserveasimportantlessonsforourownpolitical thinking.Theseincludeasomewhatconservative,naturalist,but sophisticated,conceptionofpsychology,andofasomewhatelitistpolitics butonewhichisegalitarian,basedonmeritratherthenwealthormilitary power.Insum,Ibelievethat,asfaraspoliticsandethicsisconcerned, BooksII-IVcontainimportantinsights,onesthatcouldbeofuseeven today.Ibelieve,also,thatBooksVIandVIIprovideanimportantlesson forunderstandingmetaphysicsanditscontributiontoahigherformof humanexistence.Whatthesetwobooksdonotdoistoprovidea convincingaccountofhowacityruledbymetaphysicianscouldbejust andourishing.

Whateverelseonemightsayaboutit,Plato’sRepublic5 isafundamental politicalwork.And,assuch,itsinuencehasbeenenormous.Modern interpretershavetodecidewhetheritisaproto-fascisttotalitarianwork, whetheritisamerethoughtexperimentthatwasnevermeanttobeput

conceptionofphilosophyasanattempttograspproblemsintheirglobalcontexttoa narrowconceptionofphilosophyasahighlyspecializedintellectualactivity.Itisthe secondconceptionofphilosophythatisharmfultopracticalpolitics.So,Platoisrightin sayingthatunlesscitiesareruledbyindividualswhoarecapableofseeingissuesintheir globalcontext“citieswillhavenorestfromevils”,butheiswrongtothinkthatinorderto avoidevilscitieswillhavetoberuledbyindividualshavingspecialknowledgeof mathematicsandmetaphysics.

4 )Asmytitlesuggests,onmyreadingofthetexttherearetworepublics(andtwo Republics),theoneoftheearlybooks,referredtobysomeasthe“Proto-Republic”,andthe otherofthemiddlebooks.

5 )Plato,Republic,Trans.G.M.A.Grube,revisedbyC.D.C.Reeve,Hackett, 1992,Indianapolis,USA.

intopractice,orwhetheritwasmeantasanironicworkshowingthat philosophyandpoliticsarefundamentallyincompatible.Therstofthese interpretationswasforcefullyarguedbyKarlPopper,andthesecondand thirdweredefendedbyLeoStrauss.IndPopper’sinterpretationplausible butsupercial.Hisismoreofapolemictractthanaseriouscontribution tothehistoryofpoliticalphilosophy.Still,readinitsentiretytheRepublic doeshavetheappearanceofatotalitarianwork.6 Whetheritisalso“the mostsavageandmostprofoundattackuponliberalideaswhichhistorycan show”7 isdebatable.Popperseemstobemoreinterestedindiscreditingthe Republic thaninndingoutwhyPlatosaidwhathesaidatthetimeof writingthework.StraussisadevoutPlatonist.Heacceptsallthe fundamentaltenetsofPlato’sessentialistmetaphysicsandhisabsolutist epistemology.Andhethinks,quiterightly,thatphilosophyunderstood thatwayisincompatiblewitheverydaypoliticalpractice.8

Indsomethingplausible,andsomethingmisguidedinbothPopper’s andStrauss’Platointerpretation.Bothoftheirapproachesarea-historical, theybothseePlatoasafundamentallydogmatic,essentialist,philosopher, buttheyvaluethatphilosophydierently.Popperisunequivocallyhostile, whileStraussisfartoogenerous,toit.Myapproachtothe Republic is

6 )Infact,totalitarianismispresentonlyinthemiddlebooks.

7 )TheOpensocietyanditsEnemiesVol.I,KarlR.Popper,HarperTorchBooks, NewYork,1962,p.87

8 )TheCityandMen,LeoStrauss,UniversityofChicagoPress,Chicago,1964,p. 127,138.

charitablebutcritical.InspiredbythewritingsofHolgerThesleand DebraNails, 9 Iseeitasaningeniouslycraftedtextputtogetherfroma numberofrelatedbutdistinctfragments.Icouldnot,evenifIhadtimein thispaper,defendthe“fragmentarian”interpretationonphilological grounds,10 butabandoningtheviewthatthe Republic wascomposedasa uniedtextataspecictimeinPlato’slifeallowedmetobetterunderstand theexistenceoftensionsandinconsistencieswithinit.Morespecically, seeingthedialogueascomposedoffragmentsallowedmetoexplainPlato’s apparentfailuretoprovidesmoothtransitionsfromoneoriginallayerto another.AttimesevenPlatoadviseshisaudiencethatheisshiftingfrom onelevelofphilosophicalsophisticationtoanother.Asanexample,I considerhisreminderinBookVIofthedierencebetweenapreviously adopted“short”roadandasubsequentlyfollowed“long”roadsomewhat suspicious:anattempttostitchtogethertheearlyandthemiddlebooks.

AccordingtoanumberofPlatoscholars,ancientandmodern,Plato wrote,asearlyasthe390’s,apoliticalworkthathascometobecalledthe

9 )Agora,AcademyandtheConductofPhilosophy,DebraNails,KluwerAcademic Publishers,1993.andThesle,PlatonicPatterns,2009

10 )Frommyrstencounterwiththedialogueasagraduatestudentusingthe Cornfordtranslation,Iwasmoreorlessfavourablydisposedtothepoliticaltheory presentedintheearlybooks.ButIfoundtroublinginconsistenciesintheworkasawhole. Idiscoveredhistoricalandphilologicalargumentsinfavorofafragmentarian interpretationonlylater.

“Proto-Republic”11.Bymostaccount,thisearlytextwasincorporatedina revisedformintothe Republic asweknowittoday.The“Proto-Republic” correspondstoStephanuspages368cto472aandisthoughttomakeup thebulkofBooksII-IVandthersttwothirdsofBookVofthenal version.Onthebasisoffurtherevidenceofinternaltensions,Ileaveopen thepossibilitythatevenwhatThesleconsiderstobethe “Proto-Republic”maybeacompositeoffragments.12 However,mymain motivationforwritingonthePlato’smajorworkisnotonlyexegetical,itis alsopolitical.OnagenerousreadingtheRepubliccanbeseenasa conservative/humanistwork.LeavingasideBooksV-VII,onendsinthe

11 )Agoodsummaryofthesewritingscanbefoundin:PlatonicPatterns:A CollectionofStudiesbyHolgerThesleff,HolgerThesle,ParmenidesPublishing,2009,Las Vegas.Thesleisnottherst,ortheonly,championofa“Proto-Republic”,butheisthe scholarwhohasmadethemostthoroughargumentforit.

12 )ThersttwothirdsofBookVcontainthesocalled“twowaves”inwhichPlato introduceshisviewsontheequalityofwomenandmen,andonthecommonownership ofpropertyandthecommunityofwomenandofchildrenamongtheguardians.Italso includesaproposalabouteugenics.Indthelasthighlydisturbing,anddonotthinkthat itfollowsnecessarily,astheopeningpagesofBookVclaim,from424aofBookIV.First, thephraseinBookIVthat“Friendspossesseverythingincommon”isintroducedinBook IVassomething“insignicant”that“reasonablemen”willseeforthemselves,andnotasa lawtobeenacted.Second,theideaofowingcommonpropertyisinconsistentwiththe viewthatguardiansshouldowenoproperty,besidethebareminimumofpersonal belongings.Third,at417abitissaidthatwhileitwouldbeunlawfulforguardianstoown landandtohavegoldandjewellery“underthesameroof”,theywillstillbe“provided withhousing”.Butitisnotassertedthattheycouldnothavefamilies.Itispossible, therefore,thatthephrasewasmeantonlyasalightheartedreferencetoan“oldproverb”, orwassimplyintroducedlaterasapretextforthedefenceofradicalcommunism.

Republic elitist,conservative,butalso,humanistechoes.13 Acontemporary readercouldndinitquestionableassumptionsabouthumannature,but giventheseassumptionsonecanalsoseeeortsonPlato’sparttoarticulate avisionwherebyallhumanbeingcould,withtherightattitudeandthe righteducation,bejust;andthatasociallyjustsocietycouldexistbasedon theco-operativespiritofitscitizens.InthisconnectionImakea distinctionbetweenpredominanttraitsdierentiatingpeopleintermsof theirfundamentalnature,andrulewhichanythesetraits(reasoning, spiritedorappetitive),whetheritispredominantornot,mightexercisein governingtheirsouls.Inparticular,regardlessoftheirdominanttrait,I maintain,thatreasonmayrulethesoulof any individual,renderingthem just,andifanothertrait,whetheritispredominantornot,rulesthesoul,it wouldrenderitunjust.Similarly,acitymayalsobejustorunjust dependingonwhatpartrulesinit. 14

Inthepoliticalcontextoftoday,givingafairhearingtoPlato’sRepublic isespeciallypertinent.Theattacksondemocracyinthatworkarefamiliar. ButitisnotoftennotedthatPlato’sattacksonwhathecalls“democracy”, couldbebestseentodayasattackson“populism”.Inotherwords,Platois

13 )MyviewthattherearetwodistinctrepublicsintheRepublicisbasedonthe dierentversionsofthe“beautifulcity”(Kallipolis)intheearlyandthelatebooks,onthe onehand,andinthemiddlebooks,ontheother.Thedierenceissogreatthatitis plausibletoseethemasdescribingtwodierentcities.

14 )Forexample,thefourunjustcitiesandindividualslistedinBooksVIIIare unjustnotbecauseaclassotherthanthereasonableclassispredominantinthem,ora certaintraitotherthanreasonablenesspredominatesintheindividual,butbecauseaclass ortraitotherthanreasonrules.

criticalofalawlessformofpopularpoliticalcontrol.Andthisputshis conservatisminadierentlight.Yes,hemakesassumptionsaboutthe essenceofhumannature,andabouttheroleofreasoningovernancethat mostprogressivethinkerswouldrejecttoday.Butthosewhoclaimtobe progressivedismisstheseconservativeideastooquickly,notrealizingthat byfailingtogivethemafairhearingtheyplayintothehandstheirown worseenemy:populism.Butifoneistogiveafairassessmentofthe dangersofconservatism,letalonepopulism,Plato,oneofthemost dominantvoicesofconservatismintheWesterntradition,shouldalsobe takenseriously.Myeorttoretrieveamoderate,onemightsay “progressive”,conservatismfromtheRepublicaimstoservethatpurpose.

Adefenderevenoftherstfourbooksofthe Republic needstogivea moreorlessfavourableaccountoftheconstitutiondescribedinthem.Still, eventhosewhochampionliberaldemocracytodaymightagreethat executivedecisionsabouturgentkeypoliticalquestionsneedtobemadeby thosewhohaveanexpertknowledgeabouthowtogovernasociety. Aristotle,whoalsoheldthatview,distinguishedbetweenparticipationin politicsandmakingimportantdecisions.15 ButPlato’spositiononpopular participationinpoliticsisdierent.Clearly,hedidnotfavourdecision makingbylargeassemblies;inthatsensehedidnotbelieveindirect democracy.Hispoliticalstancecouldbedescribedasaformofpaternalistic

15 )InhisPolitics(Aristotle2013,p.79)Aristotlerecommendsthatordinary citizensshouldhavesomepartinpolitics,withouttakingpartinthe“greatestoces”.

liberalism.Liberal16 becausehefeltthateveryoneshouldhavefreedomto realizewhattheyarecapableof,andpaternalistbecausehefeltthatmost individualsneededoutsidehelptoachievefullself-realization.17

Platoisnotclearaboutwhatcontributionordinarycitizenscouldmake tothelifeofthecity.Hedoesnotgiveaclearaccountoftheeducationof theproducingclass.But,asothershavealsosuggested,18 itisdiculttosee howtheywouldacquirethelevelofmoderationrequiredfortheharmony, letalonetheunity,ofthecitywithoutsomeeducation.Itseemsreasonable tothinkthatsomeeducationwouldbeprovidedforallcitizensuptoa certainage.However,amoredelicatequestioniswhatcivicactivities,other thandirectpoliticalparticipation,themembersofthethirdclasswouldbe engagedin.Inordertoproduceeectively,theywouldneedtohave expertiseintheirowncraft.Howwouldtheyacquirethatexpertise?How woulditbetaught?Mostlikely,limitsonproductionandconsumption wouldbeimposedbytherulers.Butwithinthoselimitsproducerswould havetohavediscretionarypower.Itseemsthatmostofwhattodayis

16 )By“liberal”hereImean“positiveliberalism”,theviewthattruelibertyisnot simplyhavingfreechoicebuttobeabletoactrationallyinaccordancewithone’snature. And,thisformofliberalismiscompatiblewithwhatIhavecalled“humanistic conservatism”.Hegel,forexamplewasaliberalinthissense.

17 )At[590d2]Platosaysthefollowing:“Itisbetterforeveryonetoberuledby divinereason,preferablywithinhimselfandhisown,otherwiseimposedfromwithout”. Inotherwords,tobejustistoberuledbyreason,andthosewhoareunjustmustberuled bythosewhoarejust.ThiscorrespondstohowIunderstand“positive(rational)liberty”.

18 )SeeforexampleVlastos(Vlastos1971,p.93)whoarguesfortheneedto provideaminimaluniversaleducationtoensureharmonywithinthecity,andtomake senseofthemeritocraticegalitarianism,presentedat[415ab].

thoughttoconstitutetherealmofpoliticsdidnotseemtoPlatotobe important.19 Educationandhavingwiselawswouldbedecisivefactors.A signicantabsenceinPlato’saccountistheroleofadministrators:thesoft powercontributingtotheunityofthecityandofitssocioeconomicwell being.Theseareareaswhereagenerousinterpretationoftheearlybooks mightprovidethemissingelements.20 Inanycase,whatappearsasPlato’s paternalismneednot,especiallyinitshistoricalcontext,beanobstacleto theourishingofacityinwhichgreatervalueisplacedoncommunity thanonindividuals.Myaiminthisstudyistoprovidesuchgenerous interpretation.

19 )AnauraoflegalminimalismpervadestheRepublic.Repeatedly,Platoputsthe emphasisonrmbasiclawsandtheirwiseguardians.Muchofwhatgoesforpolitical deliberationtodaywouldbeconductedbytheseguardians.Ordinarycitizenswouldnot beconcernedwithfundamentalreligiousorscienticmatters.Inthoseareastheywould defertoexperts.Similarly,wiseandjustrulerswouldrespecttheexpertiseoffarmers, craftsmenandmerchants:theirproviders.

InthisstudyIengageanumberofscholarsonspecicissues.In ChapterOne IdiscussCharlesKahn’sviewthatBookIwasnevera separatedialogue.IarguethatthespeechesbyCephalusandPolemarchus couldhavebeenalateradditiontoanearlierdialogue,the Thrasymachus, 20 )IntheStatesmantherearesuggestionsaboutwhattradesandadministrative functionsarerequiredinawell-runcity.

inordertoanticipatethecharactertypesdevelopedinBookIV.21 Also,in ChapterOne,basedonAdkins’workontheevolutionofAthenian attitudestomorality,IsuggestthatSocrates’debatewithPolemarchusand ThrasymachusindicatesPlato’srejectionofacompetitive,Homeric, conceptionofvirtueinfavorofacooperativeone.ChapterTwo introducesGlauconandAdeimantus’challengetoSocratesthathe prove thatbeingjustismoreprotablethanbeingunjust.Next,Iturnto Socrates’replybasedontheanalogybetweencityandsoulasanattemptto meetthechallenge.InthischapterIquestionPlato’sargumentforhis methodofdeningofjusticeintermsoftheanalogybetweencityandsoul. Atthesametime,Iendorsehistripartitedivisionofthecityandofthe soul,aswellasthesuggestionthatthereisaformofrelationbetweencity andsoul.Toconclude,IcommentonBernardWilliams’andJonathan Lear’sevaluationsoftheanalogy.IndWilliams’criticismof[435de] valid.Also,IndLear’sattemptatreconstructingtheviewsexpressedin thatpassagepartiallycorrect.

ChapterThree developsmymainthesisaboutthe Republic. RestrictingmyselftoBooksIItoIV,Iarguethataccordingtothosebooks 21 )ItisplausibletothinkofCephalusastheappetitive,Polemarchusasthe spiritedandSocrates(andThrasymachus)asthereasoningtypes.Theabrupt introductionofGlaucontowardtheendofBookIisalsosuspicious.Giventhe introductionofa)thepenaltyforthebestwhowouldnotwanttorule[347a],b)theneed forinternaljusticeinacity,inanarmyandinabandofrobbers[351c7]andc)the introductionofthetopicoffunctions[352d-353e]doesalsosuggestthatBookI, re-writteninitspresentform,wasmeanttostandonitsownasadefenseofjustice,with only[354a7-c3]asalaterintroducedlinktothesubsequentbooks.

allcitizens,notjustphilosophers,couldbejust.Akeyelementinmy argumentforthatviewisthedistinctionbetweenwhatapersonis naturally:whatitsdominantcharacteristicis,andwhatpartofitssoulrules it.Educationplaysanimportantroleinaperson’sbecomingvirtuous.So,I addressthequestionofwhetherindividualsofthethird,appetitive,type receivesomeformofprimaryeducation.Twoscholars,KrautandKlosko, alsobelievethatitispossibleforallcitizenstobejust.Iexplainhowmy viewsresemble,andhowtheydierfromtheirs.In ChapterFour I evaluateDavidSachs’viewthatSocratesfailstomeettheoriginalchallenge.

My defence ofPlato’sconceptionofinternaljusticeistoclaim,rst,thatit putsemphasisonanagent centred,inoppositiontoanact centred, conceptionofjustice,and,second,thatbydoingsohemovesthe discussionfromofwhatoneoughttodo,towhatconstitutesthegood life.

22

Inthenextchapter, ChapterFive,IturntoBooksVIIIandIX,partly becauseIthinkthattheyareclosertoBookIVthantheyaretoBooksV,VI andVII,andpartlybecauseKrautandKloskorelyheavilyonthemfor theirviewsonordinaryjustice.IevaluatethemeritsofPlato’stheoryof civicandindividualdeclineinjustice,proposingwhatItaketobeamore

22 )DenitionsofjusticethatfallunderSocrates’criticismsinBookIareallaction centred.ThisraisesthepossibilitythatPlatothoughtittobeimpossibletogiveaprecise denitionofjusticeintermsofactions,hence,hemighthavethoughtthatonlyanagent centreddenitioncouldachievethatresult.Ifthisiscorrect,andiftheagentcentred denitionofjusticeasinnerharmonyundertheruleofreasoniscompletedinBookIV, onemayaskwhatmorecouldbesaidinBookVIaboutthedenition.

adequatetreatmentoftheissues.MydiscussionofBookIXisnot charitable.First,IpointtoPlato’sfailuretomakeclearthedistinction betweenhavingpleasuresandleadingafullledlife.Second,Icriticizehis failuretodistinguishbetweenpossessingavirtueandthesecurityof possessingit,dependingonthetypeofpersononeis.

In ChaptersSixandSeven Idiscussthosebooksofthe Republic that falloutsidewhatIconsideritsdefensiblepoliticalandpsychological contributions.BookVaddressestwoquestions:thecommunityofwomen andchildren,andthepossibilityof“howandunderwhatconditions wouldmostbepossibletofoundsuchacity”,namely,theonetheyhave beendescribingsofar.ApartfromPlato’scorrectviewthatwomenhave thesamenatureasmenand,therefore,anycharactertraitcouldbe predominantintheirsoul,includingtheonethatwouldqualifythemfor rule,Icannotsupporthisviewthatwomenandchildrenshouldbe possessedincommon,norcanIsupporthisargumentforachievingthe practicallybestconstitution.Neitheroftheseissues,apartfromthebasic equalityofwomen,arerelevanttothemainpolitical,ethicaland psychologicalteachingofthe Republic.BooksVIandVII,Iarguein ChapterSeven,constituteaprofoundepistemologicalandmetaphysical theory.Thetheoryismostlyusefultophilosophersinterestedin foundationalquestionsbutnottothosewhowishtolearnhowtoinstitute meaningfulradicalpoliticalanethicalchange.OnewayofmakingBookVI

relevantistolocateonthedividedlinephilosophers,scientists,guardians andordinarycitizens.Ioerawayofdoingthat.

ThereareanumberofassumptionsbehindmyinterpretationofPlato’s text:a)itprovidesaconservative,butdefensible,politicalteachinginits earlybooks.(Eventhosebookswillappearpaternalistictomodernreaders.) However,mostlikely,Platobelievedthatordinarypeoplewhosematerial andspiritualneedshavebeenmetwouldbeneitherqualiednorinterested ingoverningtheircity,b)thepsychologypresentedinthoseearlybooksis, again,conservativebutdefensible.Theviewexpressedinit,thatthesoul andthecityaredynamicstructuresindominancecomposedofthree dierentpowers,isespeciallyinsightful.c)theearlybooksoeran elitist/meritocratic,yet,egalitarian,socialarrangement,d)itmakesa plausibleclaimthatthosewhohaveeconomicormilitarypoweroughtnot rule.Thismeansthatwhiletheproducingclassmayenjoythebenetsofa materiallyrichlife,thecity’sguardiansshouldnothaveprivatewealth,e) itsemphasisoneducationasakeyfactorincreatingsocialharmonymakes itapioneeringworkbothinpoliticalandineducationalphilosophy,and, nally,f)itsconceptionofjusticeasnon-meddlingandco-operation, withinthesoulandthecityimpliesthatanyonecanbejustaslongasits reasonrules.Inotherwords,Plato’stheoryofjusticerequiresthe distinctionbetween predominance and rule,bothwithincitiesand individuals.Thismeans,forexample,thatpeopleorcitieswhereappetites arepredominantcanstillbejustaslongastheirreasonrules.

Myassumptionsabout,andmygeneralapproachto,the Republic are opentocriticism,butIbelievethatmystudyasawholecouldprovidea tenablealternativetothewaymostscholarshavereadthework.By pointingtosomeofthetensionswithinthetext,andattemptingtoresolve them,IhopeIwasabletoencouragereadersofthe Republic toseeitina newlight.

Republic I:JusticeandPower

FragmentariansclaimthatBookIisareconstructionofanearlier dialogue,the"Thrasymachus",onwhich,insignicantlymodiedform,it wasbased.NoonedeniesthatBookI,initspresentform,anticipatesmany ofthemajorthemesofthenalversionofBooksIItoIVRepublic.But,the questionishowmuchofitwasre-writtenexplicitlywithaviewtothose subsequentbooks.Somethemes,orstatements,which"anticipate"later ones,couldhavebeenpresentinaworkwhichwasnotintendedasan "overture"toalongerone.Afterall,itislikelythatPlatohasthoughtabout major"Platonic"themes,insomeformorother,mostofhislife.Another questionisthis:evenifBookIwasdesignedasanoverturetotherest, whichofthesubsequentbookswasitdesignedfor?Werethere,inother words,several"proto-Republics"?Acloselookatthetextrevealsserious gaps,andeveninconsistenciesinthe Republic asawhole.BooksVIIIand IXseemtotbetterwithBooksI-IVthenwiththemiddlebooks,butthey donottverywellevenwiththose.

InadditiontoThesle'sdetailedsurveyofthedebatesregardingthe structureandcompositionofthe Republic,C.H.Kahn'simportantarticle onthesubject:"ProtrepticCompositioninthe Republic,or“WhyBookI WasNeveraSeparateDialogue",needstobementionedinthisconnection. Kahnisanadvocateoftheunitarianinterpretationofthe Republic.Heis

awareofThesle'sargumentsinfavouroftheviewthatBookIisan adaptationofanearlier,independent,dialogue,butherejectsthem.The oppositionbetweenthesetwoviewsmaybebroughtintofocusbythe followingtwocitations:

Themainargumentsagainst(theexistenceofotherversions of Republic I), producedrepeatedlybytheunitarians,arethatBookIdoesfunctionasan introduction,andthatmanyoftheideasdealtwithinlaterbooksare "foreshadowed"init.Butsurely,weunderratePlatoifweconsiderhimunableto transformaseparatesketchintoanintroduction.(Thesle’s,p.256)

WithoutreferringtothispassageinThesleexplicitly,thereislittle doubtthatKahnwishestorefuteexactlythatargumentwhenhesuggests thatifoneweretoremovethepassageswhichareprotreptictothelater books"roughlyhalfofthetwenty-sevenStephanuspagesofBookI"would havetoberemovedfromtheoriginaldialogue.Andheadds:

Unlessonebelievesinextraordinarycoincidences,onthehypothesisofan independentearliercompositionitwillfollowthatthesepassagesmustallform partofthelaterrevision...What,then,wouldbeleftofthe originaldialogue? (Kahn1993,p.139)

Kahn'sarticleliststwelvepassages(Kahn1993,136-8)thathethinksare protreptictotherestofthe Republic.Someofthesemustsurelyhavebeen writtenwithsubsequentsectionoftheworkinmind.However,those passagescouldmostlikelyhavebeenaddedlater,anticipateBooksII-IV only.ManyofthepassagesKahnconsidersprotrepticneednothavebeen

originallywrittenwithaviewtoanticipatinglaterdevelopments.Buteven withoutthemwecouldstillhaveacoherentdialogue,(especiallyifsome oftheoriginaldialogue,ofthesocalled Thrasymachus,hadbeen leftout.) Inaddition,thebeginningofBookIIitselfcouldhaveservedas anintroductiontotherestoftheworkwithoutBookI.Therefore,itis reasonabletosupposethatwhilePlatodidnotabsolutelyneedanearlier versionofBookIasanintroductiontotherestofthework,hefoundit valuableenoughforinclusionwithcertainmodications.

Insum,IsympathizewithKahn'sdecisiontodebatetheissueinterms ofinternalevidence.I,too,havedoubtsabouttheusefulnessofstylometric methodsinconnectionwithsuchdelicateissues.Asfarasreworkingan originaldialogueisconcerned,Inditplausiblethatthecharacter, Cephalus,waswrittenintotheworkatalaterdate.Infact,Cephalus' speechinBookIisfairlyimportant,asitwillturnout,formy reconstructionofthemainpoliticalargumentofthe Republic.Thereis onlyonepassageinBookIthatIhadsomehesitationabout.Itisthe referencetothe"bandofrobbers"towardstheendofthebook,which somecommentatorshavelinkedtothepsychologicaldoctrineofBookIV.I hadsomedicultydecidingwhetheritcouldhavebeenpartofanearly version,therefore,constitutingafairlyextraordinarycoincidence,or whetheritwasaddedlater.Finally,Ioptedfortakingittobealater addition.Thisisnosmallmatterforme,becauseIthinkthatthereference

tothebandofrobbersnicelysetsupSocrates'strategyofturningtothe cityasamodelfordiscussingjustice.

LeavingasidethequestionwhetherBookIisarevisedversionofan earlierdialogue,orwhetheritisacompositemadeupofseparate fragments,letmeconcentrateonthefactthatithasmanyfeatures suggestingthatitisanoverturetotherestoftheRepublic.Still,itshouldbe notedthatthespeechesdeliveredbyGlauconandAdeimantusatthe beginningofBookIIcould,inthemselves,alsohaveservedasanadequate introductiontoit.Infact,myviewthatthereisahumanistpoliticaltheory implicitinthe Republic couldbesupportedwithoutreferencetoBookI, althoughCephalus'speech,andhisverypresenceinitasa metic without politicalrights,providesaddedsupportforinterpretingitasahumanist text.Also,thereferencetothe"bandofrobbers"at351cthrowssomelight onSocratesdecisionat368etolookatjusticeinthecityasawayofgetting aninsightintothenatureofjusticeingeneral.

Inmyview,thethematicunityoftheRepublicistobelookedforinthe waythewholeworkprovidesaresponsetoGlaucon'sandAdeimantus' challenge.Inshort,theirchallengetoSocratesamountstothis:Firstofall, clarifyforustheprecisenatureofjustice,andhavingdonethat,explainto ushowalifeofjusticecouldbemadeattractivetoareasonable,andmore orlessdecent,individual.And,eventhoughBookIbringsintofocussome ofthemorecommonlyheldviewsaboutjustice,itisGlauconand

Adeimantus'challenge,atthebeginningofBookII,thatsetsthestagefor whatistocome.Thetwobrotherschallengeisverypowerful.And,I believethatbytheendofBookIXSocrateshasanadequatereplytoit.So, nowitremainstobeseenhowthedebatewithPolemarchusand Thrasymachussetsupthischallenge,becausewithoutitwewouldmissthe seriousattentionPlatopaystotheconictingviewaboutjusticethatwere emerginginGreeceattheturnofthefourthandfthcenturiesbeforethe Christianera.

TherearefewexistingPlatonicdialoguesinwhichPlatoissoattentive tothemeritsofthepointsofviewshecriticizes23 asheisinBookI.Infact, itispossiblethatthewholeoftheRepublicwasmotivatedbyhisrealization ofhowfragileordinarynotionsofjustice,andhowpowerfulthecynical argumentsagainstit,stillwere.IntheremainingportionofthischapterI shalltrytoshowhowrevealingsomeofThrasymachus'commentsare aboutgeneraluncertaintiesaboutjusticethatintelligentpeoplemight entertaineventoday.Butbeforedoingthat,letmemakeafewobservations abouttheevolutionoftheconceptsof arête, agathon, and dikaiosune, fromthesixthtothefourthcenturyinancientGreece.

Itisdiculttodeterminewithprecisionjustexactlywhatmeaningsthe ancientGreeksattachedtotheirvalueterms.Theonlysourcesavailableto usfordiscoveringhowthesetermswereunderstoodduringtheperiod 23 )But,notetheremarkablyfaircharacterizationofProtagoras'(theSophist) positionintheTheaetetus.

precedingthefourthcenturyarethewritingslefttousbythepoets,the historians,andthephilosophers.Plato'swritingsareuniqueamongthese sourcesbecausetheyrepresentasystematicattempttoresolvethetensions createdbytwocenturiesofgradualchangeinthewayGreeksevaluated socialconductandhumanexcellence.Whatthisimpliesforourapproach toBookIisthatweshouldseeitasaseriouseortonPlato'sparttogiveas accurateanaccountaspossibleofthetheoreticalcrisisbroughtaboutby thefactthatwhilethetraditionalvaluesofthe"heroic"agewereindecline therewasnotasatisfactoryalternativetothem.

AdoptingtheterminologyintroducedbyA.W.H.Adkinsinhissurvey24 oftheevolutionofvaluetermsduringtheperiodbetweentheHomeric poemsandPlato'swritings,Ishalldistinguishbetween"competitive"and "co-operative"excellence.Also,followingAdkins,Iventurethefollowing observation:theprimaryvirtue(arête)denoted"competitiveexcellence" duringtheheroicperiod.Co-operativeexcellencewasthoughttobemerely anadjunctoftheformer,existingonlyamongmembersofthesameclan.It wasnotvaluedinandofitself.Inotherwords, arête wastheattributeof thosewho,byreasonoftheirbirth,andpower,weresuccessfulinattaining thegreatestbenets,materialaswellasspiritual,fortheirclan(oikos)and forthemselves.Co-operationwithintheclanwasintimatelyrelatedtothe 24 )A.W.H.Adkins,MoralValuesandPoliticalBehaviourinAncientGreece.W.W. Norton&Co.NewYork1972.Adkinsworkcoverstheperiodbetween"TheWorldofthe HomericPoems"(Ch.2)tothe"LateFifthCentury"(Ch.5).

personalsuccessofitsleader,theagathon.Co-operationamongclanswas possibleonlyifitservedtheinterestofeach.Iftheinterestofaclanwas jeopardizedbyitsco-operationwithanotheritwasabandonedinfavourof gainingcompetitiveadvantage.

Totheextentthattherewasanotionofjusticeoperativeduringthe heroicperiod,itwaslinkedtotheconceptof hubris.Theonly inducementforbeingjustwasthefearofpunishmentbythegodsfor committinganactof hubris,thatis,transgressingthelimitsofwhatwas "natural".Primarily,"transgression"meantusurpingtherolesreservedfor thegodsalone.Thisimposedacertainamountofconstraintoneveryone's behaviour,includingthatofthe agathon.Butmoretypically,hubris meantthefailuretorespectone'splacewithintheir Moira structure:to demandmorethanwhatwasone'sdue,andtotransgresswhatwas appropriatetoone'ssocialstatus.

However,withthechangesinthewayinwhichwarfareandcommerce wereconducted,theimportanceofco-operationwithinlargerunits, namelycitystates,gainedprominence.Consequently,Homericvalues cameunderacertainamountofstrain.Firstsignsofashiftawayfrom arête,asa"heroic",virtuetothemoreegalitarianconceptionof"justice" canbeseenintheTheognispoems:bewillingtobeapiousmananddwell withlittlewealthratherthanbewealthywithpossessionsunjustly

acquired.Thewholeofarêteissummedupindikaiosune:everyman, Cyrus,isagathosifheisdikaios. 25

ButitisnotuntiltheendofthefthcenturyBCEthatjusticeasa co-operativevirtuecomestobeheldessentialtothesurvivalofcities: injusticecomestobeseenasadisruptiveelementinsocieties.But,even withthegrowingconsensusaboutthedesirabilityofco-operationaclear denitionofwhatitmeanstobejustisstilllacking.ItwaslefttoPlatoto giveaprecisedenitionofit.

Plato's Republic istherstattemptatgivingasystematicaccountofthe natureofjustice.Evenmoreimportantly,itisadirectattemptat reconcilingthetensionbetweentheancient,heroic,conceptof arête, whichputtheemphasisontheexcellenceofexceptionalindividuals;and theemergingconceptofjusticethatcouldapplytoallindividualsandcity states.26 Consequently,Platoaddressesanumberofinterrelatedquestions: rst,Whatistheexactnatureofjustice?;second,Whatistherelation

25 )QuotedinAdkins,p.42.

26 )Thucydides,writinghisHistoryofthePeloponnesianWarattheendofthefth centuryseemstobeawareofthistension.Inhisaccountofthe"MeleanDialogue"-which sometaketobelessofanaccuratereportofwhattookplacethananexpressionofhisown viewsontherelationbetweenimperialpowerandthemoralconstraintsthatitsexercise mightbesubjectto-ThucydidesimpliesthatthereisaconictbetweentheMeleans'and theAthenians'respectiveconceptionsofjustice.WhereastheMeleansinvokeaconception ofjusticewhichgoesbeyondself-interest(BookV,90and98),theAtheniansholdthat"it isageneralandnecessarylawofnaturetorulewhateveronecan"(ibid.105).The Athenians'positionmightbecharacterizedasanaturalizedversionoftheheroic conceptionofjustice,andtheMelians'positionasamoreuniversalisticconceptionof justice,onethatshouldapplyeventothosewhoarenotequal.

betweenpowerandjustice?;andnally,Ishappinessmorelikelytoresult fromjusticethanfrominjustice?

IfPlatoistogiveasatisfactorysolutionoftheproblemsraisedinBook I,hemustshowthatthereisanecessaryconnectionbetweenthepursuitof individualexcellenceandrespectfortherightsofothers.Naturally,thiswill requireare-denitionof"individualexcellence"aswellasgivinganaccount ofwhatitistorespectindividuals.However,itmustnotbethoughtthat Platoisstartingfromzero.ThroughoutBookI,itisassumedthatordinary consciousnesshasalreadyattainedalimitedconceptionofjustice,except thatitisunabletoclearlyarticulateit.Itismoreorlessabletotellwhich actsarejustandwhichareunjust,butitisunabletograsptheessential natureofjusticeitself.And,becauseoftheconictingviewsaboutwhat constitutedhumanexcellence,puttingtheemphasisoncompetitivesuccess ontheonehand,andputtingitonco-operationontheother,fourth centuryGreekshadnoclearmodelsofhumanexcellencetoappealto.Still, itissafetoassumethatbytheendofthefthcentury,Greekshadthe followingintuitiveideaofjustice:neithertotakefromothersthatwhichis rightfullytheirs,nortoallowotherstotakefromoneselfthatwhichis rightfullyone'sown.

Inthiscontext,theargumentsofBookIarerevealingofPlato'sgeneral strategy.BookIaimlessatprovidingadenitesolutiontoatheoretical crisisaboutjusticethanitistorevealthetensionsimplicitinthewayeven

hismostthoughtfulcontemporariesthinkaboutit.Forthisreason,the positionsofSocrates'adversariesmustbetakenseriously.Platoknewhis audiencewellenoughnottopresentthemwithcaricaturesoftheviews theymighthold.Thus,forexample,Thrasymachus'positionsoughttobe seen,eveniftheyrequiresubtlere-interpretation,aspositionsmost intelligentAtheniansmighthaveendorsed.27

Giventhegradualevolutionofconceptionsofmoralityduringthe centuriesprecedingthecompositionofRepublicI,thediscussionswiththe threeinterlocutors:Cephalus,Polemarchus,andThrasymachus,shouldbe seeninthiscontext.Cephalus'conceptionofjusticereectsthekindof moralvaluationthatmighthavebeenadoptedbytheAtheniancommercial class.Butwhenitisshownthat:"simplytospeakthetruthandtopayback anydebtonemayhavecontracted",cannotbeanadequate denition of "justice",hisson,Polemarchus,attemptstobroadenthedenitionbyan appealtotheearlyfthcenturypoet,Simonides.

TheensuingargumentbetweenPolemarchusandSocratesseems,on thesurface,tobeveryunsatisfactory.However,ifoneacceptsthatPlato mayhavehadadenitemotiveforhavingPolemarchusmakesuchan inappropriateintervention,thingsappeardierently.Itisclearthat

27 )TheintellectualforceofThrasymachus'positionmayhaveappearedtoPlatoas hewasre-workinganearlierdialogue.Hence,hecouldnotleaveSocrateswithapyrrhic victory.Or,simply,hemayhavecometorealizeovertimethatthedebatebetweenSocrates andThrasymachusraisedmorequestionsthanitanswered.Hence,hedecidedtobringit, insubsequentbooksoftheRepublic,toamoresatisfactoryresolution.

Polemarchusisnotqualiedtoengageinseriousphilosophicaldiscussion. Hemakesrashclaimsfromwhichheistooeasilydissuaded.But,his speechesdoevoketwoconceptionsofvirtuewhichmusthavebeenfamiliar tofourthcenturyGreeks.Therstisthe"naturalized"versionofthe Homericconceptionofjustice,namely,togivetoeachwhatishisdue.But, PolemarchusmisappliesSimonides'saying,asSocrates'reminderat332c implies.Thepointofthesayingisnotthatdebtsshouldberepaid,itis, rather,thatexistingsocial,economic,andpoliticaldistinctionsshouldbe respected.Thus,itisplausibletothinkthatinhavingPolemarchusdistort insuchanobviouswaywhatSimonideswassaying,Platowantedtoshow howdicult,ifatallpossible,itwastoreconcileheroicandcommercial values.

InanattempttoturnbacktothespiritofSimonides'viewsonvirtue, Polemarchusdeclaresthat"justiceistobenetone'sfriendsandharmone's enemies"(334b).Now,whilethisisanaccuratereectionofSimonides' heroicconceptionof arête,itexpresses,aswehaveseen,acompetitive conceptionofexcellencewhichisinconictwiththeco-operative conceptionofjusticeheldbyCephalus.Onceagain,itisreasonableto assumethatPlatowantedtoshowbythedicultiesthisnewdenition runsinto,thatacompetitive,clanoriented,conceptionofexcellencewill notmeetthecurrentdemandsofjustice.Socrates'argumentsagainstthis denition,weakastheymightbeagainstthedenitionprovidedbyamore abledebatingpartner,doshowthatanadequatedenitionofjusticemust

haveuniversalimport(335b+)and,forthatreason,beingjustrequires morecriticaljudgementthanwasrequiredofindividualsduringtheheroic period.

Alreadyinthedialogue, Clietophon,thequestionisraised:"what operationthejustmaniscapableofperformingforus?".Thecontext makesitclearthat Clietophon wantstondoutwhatspecicartis requiredintheexerciseofjustice,andhowitcanapplytohumanconduct. Thisquestionisraised,inBookIbySocrateshimself,inhiscritiqueof traditionalconceptionsofvirtue.

TheexchangewithThrasymachustakesplaceonahigherlevel. Thrasymachus'attacksonjusticeclearlytradeontheconfusion surroundingattemptstoreformulatetheHomericvirtuesincontemporary terms.OneoftheconclusionsPolemarchusismadebySocratestoacceptis that"itisneverjusttoharmanyone"(335e).However,Thrasymachus rejectsthekeypremiserequiredfordrawingsuchaconclusion,namelythat justiceisahumanexcellence.Consequently,themainpointofhis interventionistoshowthatthebestwillalwaysactunjustly,ifitserves theirinterest.Inordertoachievethis,however,heneedstomakeexplicit whatisimplicitinanytalkofjustice.

ThrasymachusbeginshisinterventionbyanattackontheSocratic methodofquestionandrefutation(336c).28

Ifyoureallywanttoknowwhatjusticeis,don'tonlyaskquestionsand thenscoreoanyonewhoanswers,andrefutehim.Youknowverywell thatitismucheasiertoaskquestionsthantoanswerthem.Giveananswer yourselfandtelluswhatyousayjusticeis.

Socrates'responseissomewhatdisingenuous.Itisunfairofhimto suggestthatThrasymachusisprejudgingthekindofanswerheshouldgive. Onthecontrary,theSophistdoesnotwanthimtoprejudgetheissueby suggestingthatjusticeisonthesideoftheneedful,thebenecial,orthe useful.So,whenheisurgedtogivehisownviews,Thrasymachusdeclares that"justiceisnothingelsethantheadvantageofthestronger"(338c). Duringtheensuingdiscussionhequaliesthisstatementbut,intheend, hedoesnotcomeupwithapositiveaccountofjusticeeither.Thereason forthisisthatinthecourseofhisdebatewithSocrateshebecomes convincedthatjusticeunderstoodasapositivevirtueishopelessly incoherent.And,therefore,thosewhoadvocateitsadoptionareeither dishonest,(avirtue)orstupid(avice).

28 )Thiscriticismisrepeated,insomewhatmorepoliteterms,byAdeimantusat 487b.Also,itrecallsthepointClietophonemakesinthedialoguewithhisname:(Ref.?) Donotsimplyexhortustobejust,explainwhatjusticeis,whatpreciselyisinvolvedinthe exerciseofjustice,andwhetheritisreallybenecialtotothosewhoexerciseit.Inshort,do notsimplyrepeatwhatissaidinfavourofjustice,for,itremainstobeshownwhether justicedoes,infact,possessthosequalities.

Nevertheless,thereisacertainamountofconfusionintheway Thrasymachus'positionispresented,duetothefactthatitisanattemptto captureanumberofdisparateideasaboutjustice.Forexample,hisopening statementcouldbetakentomeanthat"mightisright".Butthisphraseis ambiguous.Ontheonehanditcouldbetakenasasimpledescriptiveclaim opponentofmoralitymightmake.Namely,thatintheendeveryonedoes onlythatwhichisintheirpowertodoregardlessofwhatmorality commands.And,itisnotclearthatSocratesevermanagestorefutethis position.Infact,itmightbearguedthattheRepublicdoesnomorethanto deepenthenotionofpower,makingthispositionacceptable.Ontheother hand,thephrasecouldbetakenprescriptively.Itcould,inthatsense,be usedtoexhortthosewhoareinaclearpositionofweaknesstoactalwaysin theimmediateinterestofthosewhoarestrongbecausethatistheonlyway theycanprotecttheirownlong-terminterests.Initsprescriptiveuse,the phrasemightalsohaveamoreinsidiousintent.Itcouldbeappealedtoas wayofdiscouragingthosewhoonly seem tobeweakerfromactingin defenceoftheirowninterest.Therefore,inordertoappreciatethefull impactoftheclaimthat"justiceisnothingelsethantheadvantageofthe stronger"onemustkeepinmindthenumberofpossiblewaysPlato's audiencewaslikelytohaveinterpretedit.Theycouldhaveinterpreteditas acouncilofprudence:'donotchallengerecklesslythepowerofthe stronger'.Ortheycouldhaveinterpreteditcynically:sinceonlythestrong canenforcethelaws,"justice"isalwaystheirjustice.

InhisresponsetoThrasymachus'openingstatement,whichmaysimply beadescriptionratherthanadenitionof"justice",Socratesfocuseshis attentiononthemeaningof"stronger".TowhichThrasymachusreplies thatitisnotsimplyphysicalstrengthbutpoliticalpower:tyrannical, aristocraticordemocratic.[338de]And,thisfactindicatesacertain amountofsophisticationonhispart.Itindicatesthatheisnotcontent withsimplyreiteratingtheheroicconceptionofjusticewhichwas applicableonlyinapurelystatic,hierarchical,socialstructurelackingthe needforlawmaking.Also,hisinvokingdemocraticpoliticalpowershows thatheissensitivetotheimportantrolelawsplayinpluralisticsocieties. Finally,herevealshimselftobesensitivetothefactthatevenin constitutionalstates,wheretherulersarepreparedtoabidebythelaws, theyare,byvirtueofthepowertheywield,capableofformulatinglawin suchawaythatitwillservetheirownadvantage.

AssumingthatthesepoliticalpointsareimplicitinThrasymachus'rst rejoinder,hisrefusaltoacceptCleitophon'shelpissomewhatsurprising. Justbeforethelatter'sinterventioninthedebatebetweenthetwomajor protagonists,Socrateshadraisedanobjectionwhichcouldhavebeeneasily dismissed.BywayofobjectionSocrateshadposedthefollowingseriesof questions:'ifjusticeistheadvantageofthestronger,andifthestrongerare thosewhorule,andifevenrulerscanbefallible,isitnotpossiblethatthe “just”,i.e.therulers,thestrong,willsometimesactinawaywhichis againsttheirowninterest?'Onewayofdeectingthisobjectionwouldbe

topointoutthatinitSocrateshasshiftedfrom"legislation"to"direct action".For,itisnotevidentthattheobjectionhasthesameforceagainst theruler’scapacitytolegislateintheirowninterestasithasagainsttheir capacitytoalwaysactintheirowninterest.Socratescouldhavemadea strongerobjection,onewhichheonlyhintsatin(339e),namely,thatno legislatorcouldforeseeallthepossibleapplicationsofthelawsthey institute.Consequently,theremightbeinstancesinwhichlawsdesignedto servestrictlytheinterestofthestrongwouldplaceconstraintsontheway inwhichtheycouldact.

29

OnemightwonderhowThrasymachuswouldhavereplied,hadthe questionbeenputtohiminthisway.Butthatisnotthedirectioninwhich theargumentproceeds.Instead,Clietophonentersthediscussionbyhis attemptto"helpout"Thrasymachus.Hissuggestionisthat"theadvantage ofthestrongeriswhatthestrongerbelievestobeadvantageoustohim. This,theweakermustdoandthatiswhathe[Thrasymachus]denedthe justtobe."(340b)HadThrasymachusacceptedthissuggestion,hecould have,then,claimedthatoncethelawsareinplaceeveryonemustobey them,but,since,generally,andinthelongrun,lawsservetheinterestsof therulers,itis(generallyandinthelongrun)totheiradvantagethatthe

29 )Itmightbeinstructivetocomparethewaythequestionoftherelativepowerof lawandofpoliticalwisdomishandledinTheStatesman,thoughttobealateworkby Plato,andinAristotle’sPolitics.Therstholdsthatwhilewrittenlawsarefalliblewise rulersarenot.Thesecond,bycontrast,holdsthatbothlawsandwiseindividualsare falliblewithregardtopoliticalmatters.

ruled(theweaker)obeyallthelaws-eventhosewhichgoagainstthe particular,shortterm,interestsoftherulers.30 Legalstabilityisalwaysinthe interestofthoseinpower.

ButThrasymachusrefusesthesuggestionmadebyClietophon.Why doeshedothat?WhydoesPlatomakehimreplythathewouldnotcall someone"stronger" atthetimeheerrs.Inthecontextofhisprevious claim:thatthestrongeristheruler,thissoundsstrange.Whyshouldhe thinkthatarulerceasestobearuler,i.e.stronger,justbecauseasaresultof hislegislationhe,orhissubjects,willoccasionallyhavetoactinwayswhich donotservehisimmediateinterest.Thereareanumberofpossiblereasons PlatomayhavehadformakingThrasymachusgivethisreply.Hemight havewantedtosteerthediscussioninthedirectionoftheideaofa "perfect"(true)ruler.Or,hemaysimplyhavewantedtoestablishthepoint that,shortofpuretyranny,rulers(kings)mustacceptcertainconstraints onwhattheyareabledo.31

30 )Ifalawlegislatedbytherulersappearstogoagainsttheirlong-terminterests, thentheywillsimplychangeit.Thatistheessenceoftheirpower.Andthatisthereason whyadistinctionhastobemadebetweentheruler’spowertolegislate,whichisabsolute, andtheirpowertoact,whichisrelative.Insum,unlessitisadmittedthat"constitutional rulers"(inthewordsofTheStatesman,"Kings")willoccasionallybeconstrainedinwhat theycando,Thrasymachus'positionlosesitsforce.Foronething,hisinclusionof "democratic"rulerswouldmakesenseonlyifonethoughtofitascompletelytyrannical. Neitheratyrannicalindividualnoratyrannicalmobwouldinstitutelawsintherequired sense,theywouldsimply"actout"theirpower.

31 )IntheEighthLetter,whichisintendedaspracticalpoliticaladviceforthe followersofDion,herecommends"responsiblekingship"withthe"lawspunishingkings andcitizensalikeiftheydisobey".(355e)InBookI,wheretheemphasisisputon legislators,onemightstillraisethequestion:underwhatconditionsmaylegislatorschange

thelawstheyhaveinstitutedthemselves.Thrasymachusholdsthat"true"rulerswillnot makelawsthatwillneedtoberevisedtoaccordwiththeirinterests.Plato,ontheother hand,mightbetakentoholdtheviewthattruerulersmightrevisewrittenlawsonlyin conformitywiththescienceofstatesmanship.Thisis,infact,whathewillargueinBook VII.Thephilosopherkingsmustbegoodlegislators,butmoreimportantlytheymust knowtheartofeitheradoptingthewrittenlawstounforeseensituationsortorevisethem iftheneedarises.

Inanycase,asthesequeltothisexchangeindicates,Thrasymachusis notinterestedinexaminingthecomplexitiesofconstitutional governments.But,beforeabandoninghisaccountofjusticeintermsof politicalruleheismadetoseethatthereisanimportanttheoretical dierencebetweentyranniesandconstitutionalgovernments,evenifit mayarisethatinpracticethelawsofthelatterserveprimarilytheinterests ofthosewhoareinpower.Plato'spointbehindallthisisthat,oncewe granttheexistenceofaconstitutionalgovernment,howeveraweditslaws mightbe,wearealsograntingthattheremustbeatleastsomeinterests sharedbytherulersandtheruled;and,consequently,thereisaneedfor compromiseonbothsidesintheinterestofthewhole.

32

AtthispointSocratesisnotyetinterestedinpursuingthequestionof howjusticeandpoliticalpowerarerelated.Instead,hetakesupthe questionoftherelationbetweenjusticeandexcellence.Heappealstoan opinionthatmostofhiscontemporarieswouldhaveheld,namely,thatthe

32 )Inotherwords,Thrasymachus'positionat343bhastobequalied.Shepherds, inpromotingthewelfareoftheirsheep,actintheirowninterest.Similarly,rulerspromote thewelfareoftheirsubjectsinorderthattheybemoreecientservants,more co-operative,inshort,bettersubjects.This,asHegelwillarguewithgreatforce,means thatinallbutthemostprimitivesocietiessubjectsalsohavesomepower.Therefore,the secretofintelligentruleistocreatetheconditionswherebytheexerciseofthepower subjectshaveisintheinterestoftheirrulers.Howthisisworkedoutinspeciccontextsis thecentralquestionofpolitics.And,thecentralpoliticalquestionoftheRepublicishow politicalpoweristobedistributedamongcitizensinsuchawaythattheinterestofthe wholeismaximallysatised.And,inthecourseofansweringthisquestion,Platois providinginsightintothenatureofpower.ByrefusingCleitophon'shelp,Thrasymachus opensthedoortotheSocraticconceptionofpower,namely,theoneaccordingtowhich self-controlguidedbyknowledgeispower.

excellenceofathingisintimatelyrelatedtohowwellitcanfullits function.Incaseofa"craft"thismeansthatitsexcellenceliesinthebest performanceofitsfunction.And,ifrulingcanbeconsideredacraft;andif, asThrasymachusclaims,justiceistheproperexerciseofthiscraft,then justiceistorulethebestwaypossible.

Still,thiswayofapproachingthequestionofjusticedoesrevealthe ambiguityinThrasymachus'attempttodenejusticeintermsofpolitical rule.Inhindsight,itisclearthatbychoosingpoliticalruleasthehighest formofpowerhedidnotconsiderinsucientdetailwhatisinvolvedin theartofdominatingsubjectsthatthemselveshavesomepower.However, itisalsoclearthatThrasymachus'claimthatjusticeisintheinterestofthe strongerhasnotbeenrefuted.Allthathasbeenestablishedisthat,once therearelaws,subjects-theweaker-alsoenjoyacertainamountofpower grantedbythoselaws.And,eventhoughthesesubjectsmaybelievethatby obeyingthelawstheyare,ultimately,actingintheinterestofthosewho havethepowertolegislatethem,theycanalsoexpectthatthelawsgive themsomeprotectionagainstthemostviciousarbitraryactionsofthose whorulethem.

Therefore,ifThrasymachusistomaintainhispositionthatjusticeis thatwhichisalwaysandeverywhereintheinterestofthestronger,hehas togiveuphisappealtoapoliticalconceptionofjustice-whichhe,infact, didwhenheinvokedthenatureoflawmakingindierentformsof

government(338e)-andhastofallbackona"naturalistic"critiqueofthe moralconceptionofjustice.Thisiswhatheproceedstodo.Hisnal positionisthatthereisnojustice,understoodasamoralvirtue.And,byso doinghemakesadevastatingattackontraditionalvaluesandthedierent versionsofthemheldbyhiscontemporaries.

Thoseindividualswhoarelucid,hesuggests,realizethatactingjustly meansnomorethanactinginaccordancewiththepoweronehasatone's disposal.Thosewhoareweakwillnotchallengethosewhoaremore powerful,forprudentialreasons;andthosewhoarestrongwillnotactin wayswhichwilldiminishorcompromisetheirpower.33 Thisimpliesthat Thrasymachus'positionstandsorfallsontheissueofpower.So,ifSocrates istopresentaseriousalternativetoitheneedstoshowthatjusticeisinthe interestofthepowerfulbutinasensedierentfromhowThrasymachus understandsit.Allheneedstodoistoshowthattherelationbetween justiceandpowerismorecomplexthanThrasymachustakesittobe.And thishewilldoinBookIV.

Havingmadetheseanticipatoryremarks,wecangobackandexamine inmoredetailthecentralargumentbetweenSocratesanThrasymachus. Thelatter'sopeningstatementofhispositionthat,"thejustisnothingelse thantheadvantageofthestronger"isbestseenasironic.Thatis,itshould beseennotasseriouslymeantdenitionof"justice",butasasarcastic

33 )IamdeliberatelyinterpretingThrasymachus'positioninaSpinozisticfashion. For,nothingintheRepublicsuggeststhatsuchaninterpretationisinappropriate.

commentonwhatiscommonlyunderstoodbyit.Infact,hispositionis thatnoadequatedenitionof"justice"ispossiblesinceitisanincoherent notion.Itisincoherentbecauseitpurportstoinvokeamoralabsolute.34 Thosewhopraisejusticeareconfusedbecausetheythinkthattobejustis ineveryone'sinterest,notrealizingthatitisonlyintheinterestofthe strong.35 Justice,onthisaccount,presupposestheexistenceofnormswhich everyoneisexpectedtofollow.Butfollowingthosenormsservesonlythe interestofthestronger.For,thepowerofthestrongconsistspreciselyin thatitcanpresentitsowninterestintheguiseofsomeimaginaryuniversal norm.

TheironyinThrasymachus'positionisthatinfollowingexistingnorms boththestrongandtheweakareguiltyofinjusticeasitiscommonly

34 )ThroughoutthisstudyIhaveinmindthedistinctionbetweenethics:'howbest tolive,givenwhoIam?',andmorals:'whatmustIdo,unconditionally,asahuman being?'.ItismyviewthatKantwastherstmoralphilosophertomakethisdistinction absolutelyclear.Andmyreservationsaboutthe"moralviewoftheworld"willbecome evidentasIpursuePlato'stext.However,letmesaythisfornow:Platoisfacedwitha dilemma,ifheistomeetGlauconandAdeimantus'challengehemusteithergiveupona purely"moral"replytothem-hecannotshowthatjusticeisanintrinsicgoodirrespective ofitsconsequencesforthewelfareofindividuals-orhemustrestricthisaccountof "morallyabsolute"justicetoonlythose"godlikecharacters"whopossess"superior knowledge"(366c).Onamoregenerousreading,whichisminehere,Platooptsforthe rstalternative.Onalessgenerousreading,onewhichisalsoplausible,Platooptsforthe second.IcommentonthisissueinmoredetailwhenIdiscusstherelationofBooksVI andVIItoBookIV.

35 )InviewofmyearliercommentthatPlato'scontemporarieshadanintuitive idea,thatjusticeisboththerespectoftheinterestoftheother,aswellasone'sown, Thrasymachusmaybethoughttooverstatehisoppositiontoit.However,hispositioncan beseentoapplyeventothis"levelheaded"conception.For,hecouldbemakingthemore radicalclaimthatwhenpowerrelationsaresignicantlyuneven,respectingtheinterestof theotherleavesnoroomforsafeguardingone'sown.

understood.Neitheractinaccordancewithneutraluniversalnorms.Both actintheinterestofthestronger,onetoitsownadvantage,theothertothe advantageoftheother.ThisisthepointthatSocratesfailstounderstand whenheaccusesThrasymachustohave'turnedthedenitionofjustice intoitsopposite'.(343a)Thrasymachus'pointfromthebeginningwas thatwhatisordinarilycalled"justice"isreallyaformofinjustice.(What youcall"justice"isservingtheinterestofanother,butnooneservesthe interestofanotherunlessthatoneisstronger,therefore,whatyoucall "justice”isreallyinjustice.)

36

Thrasymachus'appealto"establishedgovernment"(339a)is,therefore, pertinent.Sincewhatisatissueistheexistenceofobjectivesocialnorms, onemustpresupposethatthereareagenciescapableofinstitutingand enforcingthem.Hispoint,then,isthatthenorms,whethertheyare formulatedexpresslyaslawsorwhethertheyaresimplyimplicitrulesof conduct,areinstituted,andenforced,bythosewhoareinpower.

37

36 )TheonlyeectiveobjectiontoThrasymachuswouldbetoarguethata)ina post-heroicsocietypowerisdistributedevenlyenoughforthemostpartthatservingthe interestofanotherneednotconictwithone'sselfinterest,andb)inacomplexenough societyco-operationbetweenallcitizensrequiresanactiveco-ordinationofinterests.This, Iwillargue,isPlato'smainobjectivetoproveinBooksIItoIV.

37 )‘Platonism’,asametaphysicaldoctrine,holdsthattherearerealtranscendent norms,fromwhichitfollowsthatthereisatranscendentFormofjusticewhichcanonly begraspedbythosewhohaveabsoluteknowledge,the‘true’philosophers.Itmightbe, then,thatthemiddlebooksweremeanttomakethatpoint.But,thatpointisnotmade specicallyinthosebooks,and,evenifitwere,itwouldnotconvinceasophistlike Thrasymachuswhoislessinterestedintranscendentalmoralnormsthaninthosewho interpretandenforcethem.

Consequently,groupsorindividualswill,dependingontheextentoftheir power,establishgovernmentswhichwouldbestsuittheirowninterests.

Socrates'replytothis,strippedoftherhetoric,isthatonceuniversal normsareinstituted,societiesmovebeyondtheexerciseofbruteforcebya few,totheruleoflaw;andthoseinpowerareforcedtoformulatelaws (norms)insuchawaythattheycanalsofollowthemthemselves.They must,inotherwords,notappeararbitraryintheirlegislation,andthey mustnotappeartobebreakinglawsoftheirownmaking.Butthis,he wouldadd,involvescertainrisks.Assumingthatrulersarefallible,itmay happenthattheyinstitute,unwittingly,normsthathaveadverse consequencesforthem.

Thrasymachus'refusaltoaccept Cleitophon's suggestiongaverisetoan ambiguitythatSocratesisabletoexploittohisownadvantage.Ineect, whatThrasymachuswasimplyingisthatthestrongest,thosewhoare powerfulintellectuallyaswellasmaterially,areinfallible,andwillnever institutelawswhichmightleadtoconsequencesdisadvantageousto themselves.Hisreasonforclaimingthisisthatthosewhoareinpower withinaconstitutionalframeworkdominatebyformulatinglawsthatserve theirowninterest.Theyneednotbeinfallibleineveryrespect,butifthey makemistakesinformulatinglaws-avitalaspectoftheexerciseoftheir powertodominate-theyshowweaknessand,forthatreason,arenottruly strong.

Damaginghisposition,PlatohasThrasymachusinvoketheexampleof crafts.'Isaphysician,atthemomentofcommittingamedicalerrortrulya physician?',heasks.["nopracticianofacraftevererrs"(340e)]Butthis exampledoesnotseemtohelphiscauseatall.Why,then,ishemadeto identifytheexerciseofpoliticalpowerasa"craft"?Inordertomaintainthe coherenceofhispositionThrasymachuswouldhavetodenethis"craft"as thecraftofexercisingpoliticalruleinsuchawaythatitisalwaystothe advantageoftheruler(establishedgovernment).The"perfectruler",inthis sense,wouldnotbetheonewhoservestheinterestsofitssubjects,butthe onewhoisabletoformulatelawswhicharebothgenerallyaccepted and servehisowninterest.Inotherwords,havingformulatednormswhichhe willhavetoviolatesubsequentlywouldbeasuresignofweakness.38

Theabovedoesnotprecludethepossibilitythatsubjects,inobeyingthe lawsestablishedbytherulers,derivesomeadvantagefromthem.For,after all,atleasttheappearanceofequalitybeforethelawisanecessary presuppositionofconstitutivegovernment,thatwhichdistinguishesit frompuretyranny.Whattheabovedoesprecludeisthattheadvantageof theweakerbeservedwithoutatthesametimeservingtheinterestofthe stronger.InviewofthisitisnotsurprisingthatThrasymachus"triedto ght"theconclusionthat"Noscienceofanykindseeksorordersitsown 38 )"Tospeakwithprecision,theruler,insofarasheisaruler,unerringlydecrees whatisbestforhimself,andthisthesubjectmustdo"(341a),isagoodsummaryof Thrasymachus'positiononthisissue.

advantage,butthatoftheweakerwhichissubjecttoitandgovernedbyit" (342cd).Infact,hehadtwocounterobjectionsopentohim.Hecould haverejectedSocratesanalogyofmedicine,orhecouldhaverejectedthe claimthatnoscienceseeksitsownadvantage.Asitturnsout, Thrasymachus'referencetosheepherdingdoessuggestthattheanalogy withmedicineisnotanappropriateone.Ashepherd,hemaintains,actsin theinterestofthesheeponlybecauseitisinhisowninteresttorearhealthy sheep.

Socrates'comment,at343a,that"thedenitionofjusticehadturned intoitsopposite",marksanimportantturningpointinthediscussion.It becomesclearatthatpointthatThrasymachusseesjusticeasnecessarily connectedtopower.Still,itwouldbehastytoconcludethatheissimply endorsingtheheroicconceptionofjustice.Atmost,heissayingthatthe heroicconceptionof"justice"reected,whileitlasted,thetruerelationsof power.Hisviewneedsnotevenbeconstruedasanoutrightrejectionofthe co-operativeconceptionofjustice.Allheiscommittedtoisholdingpower relationstobealimitingfactorindeterminingrelationsofco-operation.

ApossibleobjectiontothewayIaminterpretinghisviewsmightbase onThrasymachus'claimthat:"youdonotrealizethatthejustisreally another'sgood,theadvantageofthestrongerandtheruler,butforthe inferiorwhoobeysitisapersonalinjury".(343c)Itmightbearguedthat thisraisesthefollowingquestion:HowcanThrasymachusclaimthat

justiceisboththeinterestoftheotherand,also,ofthestronger?Ifthe weakisthestronger’s"other",then,asfarasthestrongisconcerned,justice istheinterestoftheweak.Butthisclaimceasestobeproblematiconceone realizesthatinmakingitheissimplyrearminghisviewthatjustice,asit iscommonlyunderstood,demandsrespectfortheother.Thus, accordingtothecommonlyheldview,itwouldmakenosensetocalla completelyselshindividual“just”.For,whateverelseordinary consciousnessmeansby"justice",itsrationalkernelistherespectforthe goodofanother.Itisademandmadeupongroupsandindividuals,in relationtoothers,thattheyrespecttheinterestsofothers’,inadditionto theirown.

Theaboveistheviewofjusticethateveryoneaccepts,atleasttacitly. However,noteveryonerealizesthatjusticesodenedisintheinterestof thestronger.Andthisissobecause,oncethedenitionisputintopractice, itwillalwaysservetheinterestofthestronger.Ofcourse,if"theinterestof theother"was all therewastothedenitionof"justice",noreasonable individualwouldsubscribetoit.Noonewoulddisregardtheirown interestsocompletelyastosacriceittotheinterestoftheother.And again,Thrasymachusdoesnothavetobecommittedtoseeingordinary justiceinsuchaone-sidedway.Allheneedstoclaimisthat,assuming healthyself-interest,justice,asanimperative,commandsrespectfor

another.39 But,simplybyexhortingagentstolookbeyondtheirself-interest thebalanceistippedinfavourofthestronger,for,itcandetermine,toits ownadvantage,thetermsofwhatitconstitutestorespecttheinterestof theother.Theonlyconstraintimposedonthestrongeristhattheyought togototheverylimitofwhattheyarecapableof,includingtheexerciseof theirintelligenceintheformulationoflawsthatinvariablyservetheirown interests.

Still,thereisaproblemwithThrasymachus'position,onewhich becomesincreasinglyevidentinthecourseofhisdiscussionwithSocrates. Ontheonehand,thewillingnesstoacceptaconstitutionalformof governmentdoesreectacertainamountofweaknessonthepartofrulers, for,iftheyhadabsolutematerialpowerovertheirsubjectstheywouldnot needeventhesemblanceoflaws.But,asHegelnoted,atacertainpointin socialandeconomicdevelopmentsomedegreeofpowerisachievedby thosewhoarerequiredtoproduce/reproducethematerialconditionsof theirmaster’sexistence.Andthischangesthenatureofpower.Power becomestheabilitytocausesubjects,whobythenatureoftheir contributiontotheessentialneedsofsocietyhavesomefreedom(i.e. power),tomanipulatethemintoserving freely theinterestsoftheirrulers (masters).

39 )Theideahereisthatevenwhenanagentdemandstherespectofitsown interestitseesitasdemandonanother.Hence,justiceinvolvesanimperative,bothonthe partoftheagentandonthepartofitsother.

So,theperfectlyunjustcannotsimplybesomeluckytyrantwhonds himselfinthefortunatepositionofhavingsomuchmaterialpowerover hissubjectsthattheirveryexistencedependsonabjectservitudetotheir tyrannicalrulers.40 Bytheendofthefthcentury,especiallyinAthens,pure politicalandeconomictyrannywithincitystatescouldbeconsidereda thingofthepast.41 And,ifThrasymachus'positionistohaveany plausibility,hisperfectlyunjustrulermustbecapableofthehighestlevelof politicalmanipulation.The"art"ofhisruler,inotherwords,istheartof dissimulation,aswellastheartofknowingthenatureofpowerandbeing capableofgoingtoitslimit.Inotherwords,tobeanexpertatthisart,the unjustmustexerciseitcompletelyandwholeheartedly-itcannotbe contentwithjustcommitting"pettycrimes".

Thrasymachuspositionisbestseenasacombinationofrationalegoism andanaturalistconceptionofrights.Inthissenseitisananticipationof Hobbes'views.(Thetheoryofsocialcontractisnotmadeexplicitbyhim, butastheinterventionsofGlauconandAdeimantusinBookIIshow,itis impliedbyit.)Havingstatedit,heispreparingtoendthedebatewith

40 )InBooksVIIIandIX,Platowillsuggestthetyrannicalgovernmentsarealso veryunstable.Notonlydoesthetyrantneedinniteresourcesofwealthandmanpower, healsoneedsagreatdealofluck,inordertostayinpower.

41 )AsthePeloponnesianWarsindicate,tyrannicalrelationsamongcitystateswas anacceptedreality.However,typically,theserelationsexistedonlyintimesofwar,and eventhen,onlywhenallianceswithstrongercitieswasdicultfortheweaktoachieve.I shallsaymoreabout"justice"amongcitystatesinconnectionwiththequestionof Socrates'reasonsforappealingtotheanalogyofthecityinordertoclarifythequestionof individualjustice.

Socrateswiththestatementthat"thejustiswhatisadvantageoustothe stronger,whiletheunjustistoone'sownadvantageandbenet".(345c)

Andthis,asIhavebeenarguingallalong,ceasestobeparadoxicalifone realizesthat"justice"isusedbyThrasymachusintwosenses.Inthewayitis ordinarilyunderstood"justice"is,infact,theadvantageofthestronger, andintheThrasymacheansenseitisitsnegation,injusticethatservesone's owninterest.

TheassumptionbehindThrasymachus'conceptionofjusticeisthat humanbeingsareessentiallyselsh,and,thatiftheyarelucidenoughand radicalenoughabouttheirselshness,theywillrealizethattheonlyway theycanbejustistobejusttothemselves,namelytoachieveforthemselves allthatisintheirpower.42So,thequestionis:Why,havingsaidthis,is Thrasymachusmadetostayon?WhatpossiblereasoncouldPlatohavehad forhavinghimstayon?TheansweristhatSocratesshiftsthefocusofthe discussionawayfromthequestion:whatisjustice?tothequestion:which ofthetwo,justiceorinjustice-stillunderstoodintheirordinarysense42 )InasubsequentessayIshalltakeupthequestionraisedbyDavidSachs regardingtherelationbetween"Platonic"justiceand"ordinary"justice.Fornow,itis sucienttonotethatthepositionSocrateswilleventuallyadoptisnotradicallydierent fromThrasymachus'position.Theirdierencewillhingeontheirrespective understandingof"power".ItmightalsobethatPlatointendedSocratespositionnotasan alternativetoThrasymachus'butasarenementofit.CouldthisbeacluetoSocrates' somewhatobscureremarkinBookVI(498c)thatheandThrasymachushavejustbecome friends?IfwhatIhavejustsaidistrue,thenasharpdistinctionneedstobemadebetween Thrasymachus'andCalicles'position.Forthelatter,powerservesonlytheunrestrained satisfactionofdesires.Inshort,thetyrannicalindividualofBookIXisrepresentedby CaliclesandnotbyThrasymachus.

resultsin"themostprotablelife"(344d).Thisisnottosaythattherst questionhasbeensettled.43 Infact,Socrates'ownanswertoitdoesnot cometilltheendofBookIV.AtwhichtimeitbecomesclearthatSocrates' denitionofjusticediersfromthecommonlyheldone.Anditremainsto beseentowhatextentthere-denitionofjusticeinBookIVcaptureswhat Isuggestedtobeessentialtoanyconceptofjustice:respectfortheinterest oftheother.44

SocratesputshischallengetoThrasymachusabouttheprotabilityof injusticeintwoways.Fist,heaskswhetheranexpertcraftsmanwouldwant tooutdoanotherwhoisexpertinthesamecraft,and,byanalogywhether thosebeingexpertinthecraftofinjusticewouldwanttooutdoanother expertunjustindividual[…].Inshort,whatSocratesdemandsisthatitbe shownthatapolicyofthoroughgoingselshnessisprotabletothosewho adoptit.ThisdemanddoesgototheheartofThrasymachus'position,but itsforceissomewhatdiminishedbythefactthatittradesonanambiguity surroundingthenatureofcrafts.Oneneedstodistinguish between

43 )Infact,Socratespromisesat347ethat"wewilllookintothismatteranother time".Bytheway,thiscomment,comingasitdoessomewhatprematurelybeforethe exchangewithPlato'sbrothers,hasthefeelofalaterinsertion.

44 )InBookIIGlauconturnsthetablesonSocrateswiththereferencetoGyges.In eect,heisaskingSocratestopersuadethemthatitisintheinterestofthosewhohave absolutepowertobejust,namely,thatitisintheirinteresteventorespecttheinterestof others.ThisraisesthequestionastowhoSocratesisspeakingforwhenhesaysthateven thosewhohaveabsolutepowerarebetterobeingjustthanunjust.AsIshallargue,in connectionwithAdeimantus'interventioninBookII,theburdenonSocratesistoshow thatnotonlysaintlyindividuals-likehimself?-buteveryonewouldbebetterobeing just,eveniftheycouldgetawaywithbeingunjust.

competitivecraftssuchaswarfareandtheartofdomination,and co-operative45 craftssuchasmedicineandsheepherding.Intheformercase, thereisnoexpectationthattheinterestofthe"other"beconsidered.One mightsaythatinthesecraftstheimperativeforjusticeisabsent,thegoalis tovanquishtheother.Inthelattercase,bycontrast,actingintheinterest oftheotherispartofactinginone'sowninterest.46

TheambiguitynotedabovediminishestheforceofSocrates'argument againstThrasymachusinwhatfollowsintherestofBookI.Heargues, rst,thatexpertsdonotcompeteinmattersthatconcerntheirexpertise"inrespecttothesameaction".(350a)Forexample,ifaphysicianhasfound thebestpossiblediagnosis,giventhenormsofhiscraft,hewillnotbe challengedbyanotherphysician,iftheotherisanexpert,inhiscapacityas aphysician,althoughhemaydosoforselsh,nonmedicalreasons. Socratesismakingthepointherethatthereareobjectiveconstraintson howfarselfinterestcanextendintheexerciseofaco-operativecraft. However,thisdoesnotpreventexpertsinthecompetitivecraftstooppose theactionsofanopponent,howeverwiseorcourageousthatopponent mightbe.Ifacontestantinacompetitivecraftisreallyanexpertitwill

45 )"Co-operative"maynotbethemostfortunatewaytocallwhatIhaveinmind here:sheepdonotco-operatewiththeirkeepers,nordopatientsco-operate,normally, withtheirdoctors.But,Icannotthinkofabettertermthatwouldcapturetheessential other-directednessofthesecrafts.

46 )Socrates'argumentappearsstrongerthanitisbecausetheterm"rule"isitself ambiguous.Itcanmean"governing"intheinterestofbothsubjectsandofrulers (shepherds,captainsetc.),anditcanmeansimply"dominating".

alwaysattempttooutdoitsopponents.47 Infact,theextenttowhicha contestantwillbeabletooutdoanexpertopponentwillbeanindication ofitsownexpertise.If,ontheotherhand,thecontestantrecognizesthatit isunabletodefeatitsopponent,itsownexpertisewoulddictatethathe avoidstheconict,ifhecan.Thrasymachuscouldhaveagreedtoallofthe abovewithout"blushing".(350d)WhetherornotPlatowasawareofthe ambiguity,itisclearthathisdramaticcharacter,Thrasymachus,wasnot.

ThesecondwaySocrateschallengesThrasymachusisgivenattheendof BookI.Thischallengereliesontheanalogyofcities(351b)and"bandof robbers"(351c).WiththisanalogySocratesshiftsthediscussionfrom individualjusticetojusticewithincommunities-ofcitizens,andof robbers.Butonceagain,Socratesintroducesanambiguity.Hisquestion, haditbeenformulatedclearly,wouldhavehadtohavebeen:Mustnot, evenanunjustcity,orabandofrobbers,thatengageunjustlyina commoncause, exercisesomeformofco-operativejusticeamong themselvesinordertobeunjustcompetitively?

Hadthequestionbeenputtohimthisway,Thrasymachuscouldhave replied,inaccordancewithwhathehadalreadysaid,that,inorderto maximizeone'sselfinterest,oneisoccasionallyrequiredtorespectthe

47 )Thesituationisdierentiftwoexpertsofacompetitivecraftdebatethemerits ofacertainmilitarystrategy.Inthatcaseitwouldshowalackofexpertisenottorecognise themeritsoftheopponent'sviewsonthematter.Onceagain,failuretomakethe distinctionbetweenatheoreticaldiscussionandanactualconict,wouldbiastheissuein favourofSocrates.

interestofothers.Thiscouldalsohavebroughtouttheimportant dierencebetweencitiesandbandofrobbers.Acitycould,conceivably, prosperwithoutpursuingapolicyofextremeinjusticetowardsother cities,48 butitisintheverynatureofabandofrobberstosystematically injuretheinterestofothers.

Ontheassumptionthatthereisaperfectanalogybetweencitiesand bandsofrobbers,andassumingthat"perfectinjustice"means"the unrestrainedpursuitofselshdesires"Socratescanarguethatalifeof perfectinjusticeisunsustainable.49 Butneitheroftheseassumptionsare justied,for,thesecondwouldinvolveanunwarrantedassimilationof

Thrasymachus'positioninBookItothatofCalliclesintheGorgias.There isnothingtoindicatethatThrasymachusadvocatescompleteslaveryto one'sdesires.(so,whataboutBookIX?i.e.Annas)Everythingthathesays indefenceofinjusticeisconsistentwiththeviewthatthemostunjustis theonewhoactsmostwiselyinitsowninterest.Itmayevenco-operate withothersprovideditkeepsitsowninterestintheforefront.

Thrasymachus'positionismadeclearbyitsreconstructionbyGlaucon andAdeimantusatthebeginningofBookII.However,alreadyinBookIa numberofcentralideasofthe Republic areanticipated. Cleitophon's

48 )Thucydides'accountofthe"MytilenianDebate"andofthe"MelianDialogue" are,asIshallargueinthenextchapter,relevanttoSocrates'shiftingthequestion,inBook II,tothatofjusticeamongcities.

49 )ThisiswhathewillargueinBookIX,inthecaseoftyrannicalcitiesand individuals.

interventionandThrasymachus'rejectionofitindicatesthat,accordingto Plato,thereisanintimateconnectionbetweenknowledgeandpower:the trulypowerfulhastohavesuperiorknowledge.Theanalogyofthebandof robbersindicatesthatPlatoseesanintimateconnectionbetweenthe welfareofindividualsandofcommunities,andtheirabilitytoachieve someformofinnerharmony.ThemainchallengePlatoneedstomeetin therestofthe Republic -and,withoutmeetingithecouldnotgobeyond Thrasymachus'position-istoshowhowitispossibletoreconcilerational self-interestwithaseriouscommitmenttorespectingtheinterestofothers. Inotherwords,hehastoshowthatrespectforothersisnotjustameansof furtheringone'sowninterests,butthatitisessentialtothebestlife possibleforanindividual,andofthegreatestwell-beingofacity.

What,nally,isatissueinthedebatebetweenThrasymachusand Socratesaretwodierentviewsofhumannatureandwhatitmeansto havepower?Accordingtotheone,itisessentialtothewell-beingof humans,andofcities,todominateotherswheneverpossible.Accordingto theother,thewell-beingofhumans,andofcities,demandsself-restraint andco-operationwithotherswheneverpossible.Themainpointatissueis notwhetherjusticeisinseparablefrompower.Theybothagreethatitis. Theissueisabouthowpowerisconstitutedandhowitistobemaximized. Plato'sview,articulatedbySocratesinBooksIItoIV,isthatthereare certainessentialinternalandexternalconditionsforachievingand

50

maximizingpower,andtheseare:awellconstitutedsoulinhabitingawell constitutedcity.

AtthebeginningofBookIIGlauconandAdeimantustakeoveras Socratesmaininterlocutors.TheirinterventionindicatesthatPlatowas notentirelysatisedwiththeoutcomeoftheexchangebetweenSocrates andThrasymachus.Infact,thebeginningofBookIIisareformulation,in clearerterms,oftheessentialcontentofThrasymachus'speeches.Itlays outincleartermsthechallengethattherestoftheRepublicwillhaveto meet.

50 )Imightaswellspelloutrighthereatthebeginning,thatmyreadingofthe debatebetweenSocratesandThrasymachusisinspiredbySpinoza'sEthicsor,more precisely,bywhatIseeasacrucial,thoughsubtle,dierencebetweenHobbes’and Spinoza'spoliticalethics.AsGlaucon'sreconstructionofitshows,Thrasymachus' positionisbasicallyaHobbesiancontractualistone.Spinoza's,whichItaketobealso Plato's,ismoreprofound.Initpower,freedom,autonomy,andreasonareallconstitutive ofwhatisrightorjust.Onthisview,individualsdonot"contractaway"theirpower,their freedomortheirautonomy,forthesakeofasafeandsecurelife.Instead,theymakeuseof theresourcesavailabletothemtoattainmaximumpowertheyarecapableof.Another essentialpartofthisviewisthatthemostvaluableresourcesavailabletoindividualsare other(rational)individuals,alongwiththeinstitutionstheycreatewiththe"guidanceof reason".

AnimportantconsequenceofthiswayofreadingtheRepublicistheneedto admitthattheHobbesian-Thrasymacheanpositionisunassailableinitsapplicationto citiesandindividualsastheyexisttoday.But,then,again,isnotthemaincontributionof Plato'sRepublictopoliticalethicsitsinsistenceontheimportanceofeducationandon theneedforanadequatepolitical,social,andeconomiccontextfortheachievementof justicebyindividuals?

JusticeinTheIndividualand IntheCity

Glauconistheonewhotakesup,inBookII,whereThrasymachusleft o.51 HeasksSocratestoconvincethemthatjusticeisakindofgoodwhich isvaluedforitsownsakeandnotsimplyforthebenetswhichresultfrom

51 )BookII,andnotBookI,couldhavebeenthebeginningoftheRepublic.Inmy view,thereferencetoThrasymachusat[358b](BookII),andtheinclusionofGlauconas aninterlocutorat[347a](BookI)areeditorialdevicesforprovidingacontinuityfromthe ThrasymachustoBookII.ItisunlikelythatBookIIwaswrittenatthesametimeasBook I,orimmediatelyafterit.

them.

52 Whilehisbrother,Adeimantus,willraisedoubtsaboutwhatpeople sayinpraiseofjustice,hewantsSocratestorefutethosewhopraise injustice.Todowrong,hesays,echoingThrasymachus,isgenerallyheldto be"naturallygood"(359e).But,sincetosuerwrongisheldtobebad, they"cometoanagreementwitheachotherneithertoinictinjurynorto suerit".(359a)Inshort,theymake"lawsandcovenants",andwhatthese lawscommandtheycall"just".Onlythosewho"lackthepowertodo wrong"(359b)willenterintothesecovenants."Themanwhohasthat

52 )WhenGlauconsaysthathewantstohear"justicepraisedforitself"(358d),he shouldnotbetakentomakeapurelyanti-consequentialistrequest.Onthepreviouspage heliststhreetypesofgoods:a)thosewhichwedesirefortheirownsake,having"no furtherconsequencesbeyondthejoywendinthem";(357b)b)thosewhichwewelcome "foritsownsakeandalsoforitsconsequences;(357c)andc)thosewewhichwelcome, eventhoughtheyare"wearisome","becauseoftherewardsandotherbenetswhichresult fromthem"(357d).Anexampleoftherstwouldbea"harmlesspleasure"likeeating;of thesecondwouldbe(theexerciseof)knowledge;andofthethirdbemoneymaking.

FromthecontextoftheensuingdiscussionitisclearthatGlauconaccepts Socratessuggestionthatwhatneedstobeshownisthatjusticeisintheb)category:the "nest",classofgoods.Thatis,itissomethingwewelcomeforthejoywendinpractising it,andforthebenecialconsequencesitspracticehasforus.

InanticipationofBookVI,wemightaskwhatmorethanwhatissaidinBooks II-IVneedstobesaidaboutthenatureofjustice.Infact,IshallarguethattheRepublic couldhave,andperhapsshouldhave,endedwithBookIV.For,inthatbookSocratesgives aconvincingargumentthatjusticeisamongthenestclassofgoods.So,isthereanother, ner,kindofgoodthantheonethatgivesusbothjoyandhasbenecialconsequences? Thereisnot.BookVIraisesdierenttypeofquestions:whatmakeswhatisgoodwhatit is?Whatisitaboutactionsandobjectsthatproducesjoyinus,andwhatreallyarethe benecialconsequencesofpossessingknowledge.Readinthisway,BooksV-VIIturnout tobelessimportanttothemainethical/politicalargumentoftheRepublic.Their importanceliesonlyinthefactthatBookIVleavesopensometroublingphilosophical questionsaboutthemetaphysicalassumptionbehindpolitical/ethicalthinking,notinthe factthatitaddsanythingsubstantivetothepolitical/ethicaltheorydefendedinit.Thereis no"nercity"!

power,therealman",saythepeople,"wouldnotmakeacompactwith anyonenottoinictinjury,[andThereasonisthedesireforunduegain whicheveryorganismbynaturepursuesasgood,butthelawforcibly sidetrackshimtohonourequality."(359c)

Toillustratethepoint,GlaucontellsthestoryofGyges.Thepointof thestoryistoinvitethosewhopraisejusticetoprovethatitistoanyone's interestinallcircumstancestobejust,evenwhendoingwrongcouldhave nopossibleadverseconsequencesforthem.Glauconconcludesby describingalltheadvantagesofbeingmostunjust-anessentialaspectof whichisalwaysto seem just-andasksSocratesto"putthemostjustman andthemostunjustmanfacetoface".(360e)

Glaucon'schallengetoSocratesseemsformidable.Andifitssuppressed premisewereaccepted,thereisnowaythatSocratescouldrefutethis "popular"praiseofinjustice.Thesuppressedpremisebehindthechallenge -onethatisnotbroughtoutclearlyinthediscussion,butwhosenegation iscentraltothewholeargumentoftheRepublic-isthatcitieswillcontinue tobethewaytheyhavebeenhitherto,andthatindividualswillcontinueto havethesamedesiresthattheyhavetoday.Aslongastyrannicalindividuals aresurethattheywillbeabletoholdontoabsolutepowertheyhaveno goodreasonforbeingjust.Aslongascitiesaregovernedbyunjustruler’s citizenhaveeveryreasonforbeingunjust,ifitservestheirinterest.Inshort, giventhestatusquo,theviewsaboutjusticearticulatedbyGlauconare

plausible.53 WhatSocratesneedstoshowisthata)allformsofgovernment thathaveexistedhitherto,frompuretyranny,througholigarchy,to democracy,makeitimpossibleforcitizenstobejust,andthatb)itis possibletoreformcitiesandindividualsinsuchawaythattheywillhave goodreasonsforbeingjust.

ThenatureofAdeimantus'subsequentinterventionindicatesthat Platomeanthisviewsonjusticetoapply,also,toordinarycitizens,andnot justtophilosophers.IfGlauconrepresentsPlato’sphilosophicalaudience, Adeimantusrepresentsthemanofthestreet.Itisnoaccident,therefore, thatheismadetoexpressscepticismaboutwhatisordinarilysaidin defenceofjustice.Heisespeciallycriticaloftheincoherentteaching54 about thebenetsofjusticetheyoungreceive,andconcludesbyasking:

So,givenallthathasbeensaid,Socrates,howisitpossible foranyoneofany power...tobewillingtohonourandnotlaughaloudwhenitis praised?He knowsthatapartfromsomeonegodlikecharacter...nooneis justwillingly. (366c)

Neartheendofhisspeech(367b&e),AdeimantusasksSocratestogive "notmerelytheoreticalproofthatjusticeisbetterthaninjusticebuttellus

53 )Howcanindividualsbeconvincedthatbeingjustistotheiradvantage?That dependsonhowmuchpowertheyhave,andhowwelldisposedtheyaretopromotingthe commongood.

54 )ItisimportanttonotethatitisAdeimantuswhoraisesthequestionof education:whateect,heasks,willthestoriesusuallytoldaboutthegods"haveuponthe mindsofouryouth?".(365a)Thefactthatheasksthequestionindicates,thatatleastat thispoint,Platoisthinkingabouteducationingeneral,andnotsimplyaboutthe educationofguardians.

howeach,inandbyitself,aectstheman,theoneforthegoodtheother forevil".HowisonetounderstandwhatAdeimantuswantsSocratesto avoid?Hisreference,afewlinesearlier,toa"manofgodlikecharacter", mayhelptoanswerthisquestion.Amanofgodlikecharacterissomeone whom"injusticedisgusts",orissomeonewhohas"superiorknowledge".55

AsIhavealreadysuggested,Adeimantusisthespokesmanofordinary, non-philosophical,consciousness.Infact,itishewhoinBookVIwill expressmisgivingsabouttheusefulnessofphilosophyandphilosophersfor thecity.ItispossibletoseeAdeimantus'roleinthedialogueasasimplistic foilagainstwhomSocratesmakestheargumentthatonlyphilosopherscan betrulyjust.However,ifmyinterpretationof366ciscorrect,Adeimantus doesnotwishtobeconvincedthatsaintsandphilosophersarejust.What heissaying,ineect,isthathewantsSocratestoshowthatpracticalmanmoreorlessreasonable,moreorlessdecent,havingsomepowertodogood orevil-couldbebothjustandhappy.Therefore,whenhedemandsthat Socratesgiveanon-theoreticaldefenceofjustice,heisobligingSocratesto makeacaseforjusticethatwouldbeabletoconvinceeveryone,notjust philosophers.

55 )ItisworthnotingthatAdeimantusseemstograntthatthosewithsuperior knowledgewillavoidinjustice.AtthispointthisconcessiontoPlato'sviewofjustice seemspremature.For,untilitisdecidedwhatthis"superiorknowledge"consistsof,one cannotdecidewhetherthosepossessingitwillavoidinjustice.Still,thefactthatthe requestismadenegatively,couldsimplymeanthat,asfarasAdeimantusisconcerned,itis importantthatSocratesnotpresumethatheistalkingeithertosaints,ortophilosophers.

Truephilosophers,asSocrateswillargueinBooksVIandVII,havea passionfor"thateverlastingrealitywhichdoesnotwanderthrough generationanddecay".(485b)Adeimantuswouldagreethatthese individualsdonotneedtobeconvincedofthesuperiorityofjusticeover injustice.Thesituationisdierentwithnon-philosopherswhoneither shunthepleasuresofthebody,norhaveaninsightintothestructureof realityasawholebutcanengagein"reasonablediscourse".Sincetheywill neverhaveanoeticinsightintoit,theirgraspofrealityextendsonlyto whatconcernsthemmoreimmediately.Andiftheyhavesucientinsight intowhotheyare,andwhattheyarecapableofachieving,andiftheylive inawell-runstate,theycanbebothjustandhappy.Toshowthisisone56 of themainchallengesofthe Republic,onewhichwillbeaccomplished, alreadyinBooksII-IV.

Havingacknowledgedthedicultyofthetaskthatthetwobrothers havesetforhim,Socratesproposestoinquireintothenatureofjusticeasit relatestocities.Whathesaysinfavourofthisapproachdoesnotsound veryconvincing:

Perhapsthereismorejusticeinthelargerunit,anditmaybeeasiertograsp. So,ifyouarewilling,letusrstinvestigatewhatjusticeisinthecities,and 56 )Theotherchallengewillbetoshowhowdierentcitiesandcharactertypeswill degenerate,endingupwiththeimageofthemostcompletelyunjustperson,the tyrannicalone.ThiswillbeaccomplishedinBooksVIIIandIX.Itwillshow,nally,that themostjustlifeismorebenecialthanthemostunjustone.

afterwardsletuslookforitintheindividual,observingthesimilaritiestothe largerinthesmaller(369a).

Whyisiteasiertoseewhatjusticeis"onalargerscale"?Whatreason haveweforthinkingthattherearesimilaritiesbetweenthe"larger"andthe "smaller"?Nevertheless,onemightthinkofanumberofmoreprofound reasonsforstartingwiththequestionofwhatmakesacityjust.First,one mightthinkthatwhetheracitizencanbejustdependsonwhetherhelives inajustcity,and,forthatreason,onemightwanttolookforjusticeinthe cityrst.However,anevenmoreprofoundreason,onethatPlatomayalso havehad,isthatthesoulofanindividualcanalsobeseenasapolitical structure.Inthatcase,startingwiththecity,whichhasaclearpolitical structure,mightprovideacluetothenatureofthesoulanditsvirtues.The onlyproblemwiththeapproachofusingthecityasananalogueforthe justiceoftheindividualisthat,contrarilytowhatPlatosayslater[435b], “justice”doesnot,typically,havethesamemeaninginboththecityand theindividual.Typically,acityissaidtobejust,orunjust,notsomuch becauseofthewayitrelatestoothercities,(externaljustice)butbecauseof thewayitscitizensaretreatedinit(internaljustice).Bycontrast, individualsaretypicallysaidtobejust,orunjust,dependingonhowthey treatotherindividuals.(externaljustice)

Infact,thereisapassageinBookIthatsuggeststhatPlatohadalready inmindaconceptionofjusticeasapowerinternaltoindividuals.Nearthe endofthatbook[351c-e],Socratesasksthefollowing:

Doyouthinkthatacity,anarmy,abandofrobbersorthieves,oranyothertribe withacommonunjustpurposewouldbeabletoachieveitiftheywereunjustto eachother?

Anumberofthingsarenoteworthyinthispassage.First,itimpliesthat thereisaformofinternaljusticewhichisrequiredbyeventhosewhoaim tobeunjusttoothers,eectively.Second,itpointstothedierence betweeninternaljusticeandexternaljustice;namely,italreadycontraststhe conventionalconceptionofjustice(competitive)witharadicallydierent conceptionofit(co-operative),anticipatingaperspectiveonjusticethat willbedevelopedinBookIV.ThequestioniswhetherPlatohadinmind hisinnovativeconceptionofjusticealreadyatthetimeofwritingthe originalversionofBookI(the Thrasymachus)ordidheaddittoalater version.Inmyviewthesecondalternativeisquitepossible.Inanycase,the inclusionofthereferencetoinjustice“arisingwithinasingleindividual” [351e6]suggeststhattheideaofinternaljusticewasonPlato’smindwhen thepassagewaswritten.

Still,thequestionneedstobeasked:“Ofwhatvaluethelong descriptionofeducationinmusicandpoetry,andofimitation,givenin BooksIIandIII,hastothedevelopmentofthisnovelconceptionof justice?”.57 Woulditnothavebeenenoughtoconcentrateonthestructure 57 )Aplausiblehypothesismightbethatthediscussionoftheeducationof guardiansisametaphorforeducatingthehigherelementswithineverysoul,namely, reasonandspirit.Inanycase,thelengthofthediscussionmightalsobeexplainedby Plato’sdesiretomakeacleardistinctionbetweenhisandthetraditional,Homeric,model ofeducation.

ofcitiesingeneral,andthestructurethatmakesforthebest,inorderfor thecitysoulanalogytoserveitspurpose?So,letmespelloutwhatIthink isrelevantinBooksIIandIIItotheissueofmodellingjusticeinthesoul onjusticeinthecity.

AnunderlyingassumptioninBooksIIandIII58 isthatawellconstituted cityisjustbecauseitservestheneedsofitscitizens,andthatitis autonomous.Acitycanachieveautonomybecauseitrespectsthenatural dierencesamongitscitizens,encouragingthemtodotheonething"for which(theyare)naturallysuited"(370bc).Intherstinstance,thismeans thatdierentindividualswillbeengagedinfarming,commerce,andother craftsneededintheproductionofthematerialmeansofexistence.59 Citizensofthis"primitive"societywillleadmodestbutfulllinglives. However,instigatedbyGlaucon,Socratesisforcedtoacknowledgethe possibilityoftheemergenceofexcessivedesires,and,whichwillleadto attemptstosatisfylessimmediatelynecessarymaterialdesires.Thistakes thediscussionfromtherealmofbasicmaterialneedstotherealmof complexhumandesires.

58 )Apartfromitsend,BookIIIdoesnotsaymuchabouttheproperconstitution ofcities.

59 )Atthisearlystage,inthedescriptionofwhatGlauconwillcallthe"cityofpigs" (372d),Socratesdistinguishesbetweenonlythosewhomakeuseoftheirintelligencethoseengagedinthevariouscrafts-,andthosewhoearnwagesbythemereuseoftheir physicalstrength(371e).

Atrst,Socratesresiststhismove,for,hethinksthattheintroduction of"luxuries"willunderminethecity'sstability:itwillbecome"feverish" causedbytheexcessofunnecessarydesires.Thedesireforthe"limitless acquisitionofwealth"(373d),willresultinwarwithitsneighbours. However,onceitisagreedthatarealisticdescriptionofcitiesmustinclude therealmofexcessive,unnecessary,desires,and,alongwithitthe possibilityofwars,thequestionbecomeshowstabilityisachievedwithin suchacity.Socrates’answertothisquestionrequiresastrictdierentiation ofsocialfunctions,and,asaresult,astricterdivisionoftasksamong citizens.First,warriors(guardians)willhavetobeseparatedfromthose engagedinfarmingandthedierentcrafts.Finally,thosewithaptitudefor deliberationwillhavetobechosenfromamongtheguardians (389b/412c).

TowardtheendofBookIIIPlatointroducesthefamous“noblelie”. Mostcommentatorshaveanegativeviewofit,takingittobeanevidence ofPlato’sdisregardforthepoliticalrightsofordinarypeople.However,a charitablereadingofPlato’streatmentofdierenttypesofindividuals mightyieldmorepositiveaccountofwhatheproposes.Thatthereare naturaldierencesbetweenpeopleiscentraltohismoralpsychology.On hisview,peoplehavedierentinclinationsandtalentsonthebasisof whichtheyareassignedsocialandeconomicroles.Themetaphorofmetals indicatesthattheseinclinationsandtalentsareinnate.Whattypeaperson isdoesnotdepend,necessarily,onthenatureofone’sparents,for,inrare

cases,anospringofareasoning(philosophical)typemighthavethe naturepossessedbyaspiritedoraproducingtype.Itisonlyafterhaving beentestedinchildhoodthattypedierentiationcanbemade.Onemight callthisaformofmeritocraticegalitarianism.60 Also,inorderfortheteststo bemeaningfulthosebeingtestedneedtohavehadsomepriorphysical trainingandsomeexposuretomusicandpoetry.Itisprobablethatthese testsaretobetakenataroundageseven.

BookIIIconcludesbydeclaringthattheguardiansshouldhaveno privateproperty.Bycontrast,producerscouldhaveprivatepropertywithin limit.ThereiseveryreasontothinkthatatthisstagePlatoenvisionedthe lifeofordinarycitizensashappyandself-containedevenina“luxurious” city,providedthattheyacceptedtheruleofthosewhohadtalentforruling it.ButitisinBookIVthathegivesamoredetailedaccountoftheevilsof socialmeddlingandoftherewardsofavoidingit.

InBooksIIandIIIitisassumedthattherearethreebasicfunctionsthat anywellconstitutedcitymustfull,andthattherearethreebasictypesof individualsbestsuitedforthesefunctions.Itisreasonabletothinkthatina citywherethethreefunctionsareclearlyseparated,andwherethethree typesofindividualsperformthose,andonlythose,functionswhichthey arebestsuitedfor,willbeajustcity.And,thisiswhatBookIVwillseekto establish.

60 )AsInoteelsewhere,Platorulesoutthepossibilitythatsomeonemightchange itsnatureduringthecourseofitslife.

Havingestablishedthatinjusticeinthecityis"meddlingandexchange betweenthethreeestablishedorders"61 (434bc),andthatjusticeis"doing one'sownjobbythemoneymaking,auxiliary,andguardiangroup,when eachgroupisperformingitsowntask"62 (434c).Socratessaysthefollowing:

Donotletus,Isaid,takethisasquitenalyet.Ifwendthat thisquality, whenexistingineachindividualman,isagreedtheretootobejustice,thenwe canassenttothis-forwhatcanwesay-butifnot,wemustlookforsomething else.(434d)

WhatSocratessaysimmediatelyafterindicatesthatPlatohadsome reservationsabouttheapproachtakeninBooksIIandIII.Thesecond sentenceaboveisconditional,i.e.thepossibilityisleftopenthatjusticein theindividualdoesnotmean"performingitsowntask".Inthatcase,we

61 )Thereisanambiguityhere,thesolutionofwhichwillbecrucialtomymain argumentaboutPlato'spoliticalethics.Whatarethethreeestablishedorders?Aretheythe threedierentfunctions?Aretheythethreedierentgroupsbestsuitedforthese functions,or,aretheythethreedierenttypesofindividualswhomakeupthesethree groups?Toanticipate,myshortansweristhatitismoreimportantforthejusticeofacity thatthethreefunctions(economic;militaryandadministrative;anddeliberative/judging) notbeconfused,andthatthethreegroupsperformingthesefunctionsnot"meddle"with eachother,thanitisforindividualstondthemselvesperformingspecictradesnot perfectlysuitedtotheircapacitiesandinclinations.

62 )Somecommentators(Vlastos,1978)wanttofoistonPlatotheviewthatjustice iseachindividual’sdoingitsowntask,inthestrictsensethat,forexample,acobblermay notbeanythingelsebutacobblerbecausecobblingisproperlyitsownfunction. However,Platoinsistsonaweakerformofsegregation.First,heis,asthispassage indicates,moreinterestedinseparationaccordingtobasiccivicfunctions.Second,what heinsistsuponisthat"eachmandoesonethingwhichiscongenialtohim"(370c),and thatnomanhavemorethanoneoccupation"atonce"(397e),whichleavesopenthe possibilitythatanindividualdoesdierentthingsatdierenttimesofhislife.

mightask,wherecouldonelook"forsomethingelse"?andwhatcouldthat be?Socratescontinues:

Forthepresent,letuscompletethatexaminationwhichwethoughtweshould make,thatifwetriedtoobservejusticeinsomethinglarger whichcontainsit, thiswouldmakeiteasiertoobserveitintheindividual.Wethoughtthatthis largerthingwasacity,andsoweestablishedthebestcitywecould,knowingwell thatjusticewouldbepresentinthegoodcity(434d).

Thispassagereintroducesanotheraspectofthe"method"for discoveringindividualjusticementionedearlier:ndacitythatis "completelygood",andsinceitis"good",itwillhaveallthevirtues including:wisdom,bravery,moderation,andjustice.Havingfoundoneof thevirtues,wecansearchfortheothers.Inthiswaywecandiscoverjustice byaprocessofelimination(427c).However,notknowingtheresultPlato wishestoreachbythismethod,itisnotclearhowthisparticularmethod willreachit.Inorderforthemethodtowork,severalassumptionshaveto beaccepted.First,thatitiseasiertondtheothervirtuesthanitistond justice.Second,thatthethreepreviousvirtuesarecorrelateddirectlywith thethreecivicfunctions,andwiththegroupsperformingthem.Third,it mustbeassumedthatthelastvirtue,justice,notyetfound,mustbe correlatedwitha"secondorder"civicfunction,namelythewayinwhich thesefunctionscanharmonizewithoneanother.But,inordertomake thislastassumption,wemustalreadybelievethatjusticeisakindof harmonization.And,thetroubleisthatthisispreciselywhatPlatoneedsto

prove.So,onceagain,wehaveaprofoundinsightintothenatureofcivic justice,thatitisaformofinnerharmony,buttheargumentwearegivenin favourofitisnotveryconvincing.63

Also,iftheanalogyofthecityistobeappliedstrictly,weshouldrst ndthebestindividual,then,assumingthatindividualandcivicvirtuesare thesame,wecoulddiscoverindividualjusticebythesameprocessof elimination.But,instead,Socratessuggests,notwithoutsomehesitation,64 thatsince:It[justice]hasnowappearedtousthere[i.e.inthecity],solet usnowtransferittotheindividual,andifitcorrespondsallwillbewell (434e).

Notwithstandinghishesitation,Socratesassertsthatsincea"name" appliestoathingunivocallywhetheritisbigorsmall,justicemustmean thesamewhetheritisappliedtoanindividualandtoacity:"Sothejust manandthejustcitywillbenodierentbutalikeasregardstheveryform ofjustice"(435b).This,asIsuggestedatthebeginningofthischapter,is unconvincing,for,itbegsthequestion,itassumedtheidentityinnature

63 )Socrates’startingwiththevirtueofwisdominthecity,possessedbyitsrulers, anticipatesassociatingjusticewiththeruleofreason.

64 )Socrates’hesitationiscausedbyhissuspicionthatjusticemaybesomething dierentintheindividual.Andifthatturnsouttobethecase-wegetverylittleideaof howandwhyitmightturnouttobethecase-"wemustgobacktothecityandexamine thisnewnotionofjustice.Bythuscomparingandtestingthetwo,wemightmakejustice lightuplikerefromtherubbingofresticks"(434e-435a).WhatdoesPlatohavein mindhere?Doeshe,atanypoint,performthisexperiment?Ishereferringtothis (thought)experimentwhen,afewparagraphslater,hemakesamysteriousreferenceto "anotherlongerandfullerway"(435d)?

betweenindividualsandcities.So,insteadofjustassumingit,Platoneeds toarguefortheidentity.Andthishedoesbyanargumentwhichisalso questionbegging.Hegoeson:

Nowthecitywasthoughttobejustwhenthethreedierentkindsofmen withiniteachperformedtheirowntask,anditwasmoderateandbraveandwise becauseofsomeotherqualitiesandattitudesofthesamegroups

True.

Andweshallthereforedeemitright,myfriend,thattheindividualhasthe samepartsinhissoul,andthesamequalitiesinthosepartswillcorrectlybegiven thesamenames.

Thatmustbeso.Onceagain,mygoodman,Isaid,wehavecomeuponan easyenquirywhetherthesoulhasthesethreepartsornot(435c).

Aftersayingthis,onceagain,Socratesexpressesreservationsaboutthe adequacyofthis"easyenquiry".

65 However,urgedbyGlaucon,hegoeson:

65 )Henotesthat,"weshallnotattainanypreciseanswerbyfollowingourpresent methods.Thereisanotherlongerandfullerwaywhichleadstosuchananswer".It remainstobeseena)whatexactlythequestioniswhichrequiresa"preciseanswer".Isit thequestionaboutthenatureofjustice?orisitthequestionwhetherthesoulof individualshasthesamepartsasthecity?At441cSocratesconcludeshisargumentforthe tripartitedivisionofthesoulbythefollowingcomment:‘Wehavenowmadeourdicult waythroughaseaofargumenttoreachthispoint,andwehavefairlyagreedthatthesame kindsofparts,andthesamenumberofparts,existinthesoulofeachindividualasinour city’(441c3).Now,thisispuzzling.Forone,itimpliesthatstartingwith436athe discussionhasleftbehindthe"present(easy)method",andhasalreadyembarkeduponthe "longerandfullerway".Also,itsuggeststhattheargumentfromtheanalogywiththecity wasnotabsolutelynecessary.AllSocratesneededtosay(whichhedoessimplyassert withoutargument,anyway)wasthatcorrespondingtothethreetypesofindividualsthere arethreepartsinthesoul.For,theargumentthatthesoulisstructuredpoliticallycanbe made-ismade-independentlyofthepoliticalstructureofthecity,andofthevirtuesit

Well,then,Isaid,wearesurelycompelledtoagreethateachofushaswithin himselfthesamepartsandcharacteristicsasthecity?Whereelsewouldthey comefrom?Itwouldberidiculousforanyonetothinkthatspiritedness[thelove oflearning,andtheloveofmoney]hasnotcometobeinthecityfrom individualswhoareheldtopossessit...(435e).

Thisargumentispointless.For,ifthecityhasthepartsthatithasbecause theindividualsconstitutingithaveit,thenwhatisthepointinlookingto thecityfordiscoveringindividualjustice?Sincejusticeinthecityisbased ontherightdistributionofthecharactersthatitcontains,andsincethese charactersaredeterminedbythestructureofthedispositionswithintheir soul,onemightjustaswellbeginthesearchforjusticeinindividualsbythe considerationofindividualcharactersandtheirdispositions.Thisisone partofWilliams’criticismofthecitysoulanalogy,theotheristhattherule applyingtopartsofthecitywhenappliedtopartsofthesoulsleadstoan

mighthave.Ishalladdressthequestionofthe"longerway"atthetimewhenIdiscussthe connectionbetweentheearlybooksandBooksVIandVII.

66 Williams’isaseriouscritiqueoftheanalogy, onethatheshareswithAnnas(Annas1981,p.302),for,itdoesseemthat thecity/soulanalogyinvitestreatingthesoulsashavingpartswhich,in turn,leadstotreatingthosepartsasiftheywerefullyedgedindividual subjectsthemselves.Onewayofavoidingthesocalled“homonculi” problem,withoutabandoningthecity/soulanalogy,wouldbetoabandon theterminologyof“parts”andtoreplaceitbytheterminologyof “functions’,“drives”and“dispositions”.Infact,thetripartitedivisionof thesoulcouldbemaintainedonitsown,withouttheanalogy.Therelation

66 )AccordingtoWilliams(Williams,1973,p.199),thecitysoulanalogyseems“to helpPlatotohaveitbothways”.Namely,inordertoavoidtheabsurdityofpositingan “extralittlelogisticonofitsown”withintheappetitivepartofthesoulsothatitcould “harken”tothelogisticonpartinajustsoul,onemustsaythatappetitesareweakened, keptintheirplace,byreason.However,goingbacktothecityfollowingtheanalogy,from thedescriptionoftheindividualsoul,Williamscontinues,resultsinthetotallylogisticon rulersholdingdown,withthehelpofatotallythymeticmilitaryclass,aweakenedand oppressedepithymeticclass.ButthiswayofavoidingtheoriginalabsurditypreventsPlato fromclaimingthatthereisaharmony,aco-operation,betweenappetiteandreason.In short,accordingtoWilliams,Platoiswaveringbetweentwoconictingviewsofthe relationbetweenreasonandappetitewiththehelpofthecity/soulanalogy.Inmyview, therearetworeasonsforwhatappearsPlato’shavingitbothways.Heistroublinglyvague aboutthe“thirdclass”,callingit:“appetitive”,“producer’s“craftsmen”“moneymakers” wageearners”and“manualworkers”.Itislikelythathesharedthegeneralcontemptfor banausicindividuals.Also,PlatodoesnotmakeacleardistinctionbetweenwhatIcall “dominance”and“rule”.Infact,Williamsisnotclearaboutthedistinctioneither.

betweensoulandcitymightalsobeseenasacausalone.67 AsIhave suggestedearlier,themostimportantaspectoftheanalogyisthefactthat onthemodelofthecitythesoulcanbeseenasastructureindominance, consistingofthreeseparatebutinterrelatedparts.So,whileWilliamsis justiedinhiscriticismofwhatissaidin[435de]thiscriticismdoesnot underminetheusefulnessofproposingthecityastheanalogueforthe soul.68

Sofar,wehavereachedthefollowingresults:Wearetoldthatinall (existing)citiestherearethreeessentialfunctions:economic (producing/reproducingwealth);defensive (defence/policing/administration);anddeliberative.Wearealsotoldthat therearethreetypesofindividualswiththreedierentcapacitiesand inclinations:the"desiring",thosewhoarecapableofproducingwealthand

67 )AsIshowinwhatfollows,tracingthegenealogyofcitiesalongwiththe genealogyofhumanneedsonemightndaninterconnectionbetweenthem.Human needsandtheirsatisfactionmightcausedierentfunctions,andgroupsperformingthem, emergingwithinacity.InthiscontextitisworthmentioningJonathanLear’ssuggestion, (Lear,1992),abouttherelationbetweencivicandindividualtraits.Heseesitas“a dynamicaccountaccountofthepsychologicaltransactionbetween....aperson’sinnerlife andhisculturalenvironment”.Heseesguardiansplayingacrucialroleinthisprocessof “internalization”and“externalization”.Myview,bycontrast,putsemphasisontheroleof thematerialproductionofthemeansofexistence.Inotherwords,whileIconsiderthe psychologicaldynamicessentialIseethematerialdynamicmorefundamental.

68 )TherearetworesponsestoWilliams’argument.Therstis(Lear1992)which proposesthatthecharacteristicsofcitiesandsoulsareinareciprocalcausalrelation.He callsthem“externalization”and“internalization”.ButasFerrarisuggests(Ferrari2005,p. 51-2),inthiswayLeardoesnotpresentasignicantimprovementontheposition presentedat[435de].Ferrari,bycontrast,rejectsthecausalinterpretation,proposing insteadthattheanalogybeconstruedsimplyasa“proportionalhierarchicalmetaphor”.In this,hecomesclosetoseeingtheanalogyintermsofwhatIcall“structureindominance”.

whoenjoythematerialbenetsderivingfromit;the"spirited",thosewho aresteadfastintheirdefenceofthecityanditstraditions;andthe "reasonable",thosewholovelearning,arecapabletodeliberate"aboutthe cityasawhole"(428d),andare,inaddition,giftededucators.Also,weare toldthat,atleastinthe"completelygood"citywecanexpectthespiritedto becourageous,thereasonabletobewise,andthedesiringtobemoderate.

Finally,wearetoldthatawellconstitutedcityisjust,becauseinitthethree essentialfunctionsareperformedbythethreedistinctgroupsmadeupof thethreetypesofhumanbeings(427e-432b).Withcertainqualications, thepoliticsandpsychologypresupposedbythisviewisplausible.

However,beforeexplainingingreaterdetailwhatItaketobePlato's "politicsofthesoul"letmeconcludethisdiscussionofthemeritsofthe Platonicmethodofstartingwiththeenquiryintojusticeinthecity.First, alreadyinBookIitissuggestedbythereferencetocitiesandtobandsof robbersthatthereisakindofjusticewhicheventhemostunjustcannotdo without.Thishastheeectofshiftingattentionawayfromjusticeasa

Second,whilePlato'sargumentfortheshiftfromjusticeinthecityto justiceintheindividualisnotveryconvincing-andmightevenbe consideredquestionbegging-,thepoliticalparallelbetweenthecityand thesoulisveryfruitful.Theideathatdierentcivicfunctionsarebestkept apart,andthattheyarebestperformedbygroupsofindividualsmost suitedforthem,hasafairamountofplausibility.Also,theideathatthere arethreebasichumantypesinwhomoneofthreedierentcharactertraits -traitsthatallhumanspossesstovaryingdegrees-dominates,isasound startingpointforapoliticalpsychology.70

69 )ItissignicantthatneartheendofBookIVSocratesadmitsthattheprimary senseofjusticedoesnotlieinaman'sexternalactions,butinthewayheiswithinhimself: thatheisreallyconcernedwithhimselfandhisinnerparts,hedoesnotalloweachpartof himselftoperformtheworkofanother,orthesectionsofhissoultomeddlewithone another,heorderswhatareinthetruesenseofthewordhisownaairswell;heismaster ofhimself,putsthingsinorder,ishisownfriend,harmonizesthethreepartslikethe limitingnotesofamusicalscale,thehigh,thelow,andthemiddle,andanyothersthere maybebetween.Hebindsthemtogether,andhimselffromapluralitybecomesaunity (443cd).Immediatelyfollowingthispassage,hesuggeststhatanindividualwhoisjustin this"Platonic"way(IhaveinmindD.SachsthoughtprovokingarticletowhichIshall turnattheendofmynextchapter)willalsobejustinhis"external"actions.But,whythat isso,willrequireabitmoreargument.ItisalsosignicantthatPlatodoesnotthinkthat whetheritismoreprotabletobejustthanunjustisnotyetestablishedbytheendof BookIV(444e).

70 )inthefollowingchapterIshallattemptareconstructionanddefenceofPlato's politicalethics.MydefenceofPlatowillconsistin:a)makingafairlysharpdistinction betweenthepoliticsofBooksItoIVandVIIItoIXontheonehand,andthepoliticsof BooksVIandVIIontheotherand,b)arguingthatintermsofthe"factual"knowledge availabletoPlatoaboutpoliticsandpsychology,hispoliticalphilosophyismuchmore plausiblethanitiscommonlytakentobe.

Insum,thereisamerittotheanalogybetweencitiesandindividuals, evenifPlato'sargumentfromthecitytotheindividualappearscircular.

Onemayask:“whyistheanalogyconvincing?”Theanswertothis questionmightalsoabsolvePlato'sargumentfromaviciouscircularity. Whatmakesitplausible,wemightask,tocorrelatethethreefunctions withinacitywiththethreeaspectsofthehumansoul?How,inother words,doestheeconomicfunctioncorrelatewithappetite,theexecutive withspiritedness,andthelegislativewithreason?

OnthebasisofwhatPlatosaysaboutthenatureofhumans,onecould makethefollowinghypothesis:Humanindividualshavebasicappetitive (economic)needs.Inordertosatisfytheseneedstheyneedtoengagein producingthemeansofsatisfyingthem.Mostofthemwilldojustthat. However,havingproducedthemeansofsatisfyingtheseneedstheir consumptionneedstoberestrained,for,appetitesareinherentlypleonexic. Also,theyandwhattheyproduce,needtobeprotectedagainsttheattack fromenemies.Thisrequiresadefensiveapparatusstaedbycourageous (spirited)individuals.Asahumancommunity71 getsmorecomplexitneeds torelyonindividualswhohavegoodjudgmentaboutwhatandhowmuch needstobeproducedandconsumed.Good judgment isalsoneededto restrainthedefensiveelementfrombecomingoveraggressive.

71 )Whatdistinguishesahumancommunityasopposedtoananimalcommunity isitscapacitytojudgeandtodeliberate.

Theaboveaccountofthejointevolutionofcivicfunctionsandhuman needsanddispositionsgivessupporttoseeingthemasbeing interconnected.Whatitdoesnotshowisthatthepoliticalstructureofthe cityandthepsychologicalstructureofthesoulareidentical.But,onemay supposethatintheprocessoffulllingcivicfunctions,dierent individualswithdierentdispositionsandtalentswouldemerge;andover timethesequalitieswouldgetentrenched,creatingdierenttypesof peoplewhowouldbemostsuitableforthosefunctions.So,ifthis hypothesisisaccepted,therewouldbenoneedtoexplainhowstructuresof thecityarereectedinthestructureofhumansoulsbyinvokingethnic stereotypes,asdoesPlatoat[443e].

TheproblemwithPlato'sargumentisthat,byfailingtomakeaclear distinctionbetweencivicfunctionsandsocialgroupsheisleadtoan uncriticalshiftfromindividualvirtuestocivicvirtueswhenhepromisedto explaintheformerbythelatter.Evenso,hecouldavoidarguinginavicious circlebyinvokingthedistinctionbetweentheorderofknowledgeandthe orderofreality.Hecouldsaythat,eventhoughthecivicfunctionsare ultimatelydeterminedbythemakeupandspecicneedsofindividual citizens,wecanonlycometoknowthewayindividualsoulsare constitutedbyrstexaminingthewaycitiesareconstituted.More specically,hecouldarguethat,eventhoughwemightknowthat individualsareconstitutedbyappetite,spiritedness,andreason,wewould havetolooktothecityinordertodiscoverhowacongurationofthese

aspectscanresultinhumanjustice.Forexample,wemightlooktohowina justcityawiserulerrules,inordertondouthowinajustindividual reasonrules.

Platodidnotgivetheabovejusticationforstartingwithjusticeinthe city.However,itisconsistentwithwhathesaysinBooksItoIV.Still,the importantquestioniswhetherPlato'stheoryofjusticemeritsserious consideration.Myanswertothisquestionisanemphatic“yes!”.Makinga caseforthemeritsofhistheoryofjusticewillrequireamoredetailed examinationofBookIVoftheRepublic-atasktowhichIshallturnina subsequentchapter.

OnPlato’sDefenseofJustice

Morethanhalfcenturyago,DavidSachsargued(Vlastos,1971)72 that Platohascommittedafallacyinhis Republic: thefallacyofirrelevance.In hisview,whilePlatocanshowthatthosewhosesoulspossessinner harmonyarehappierthanthosewhosesoulsdonot,butthatisirrelevant tothequestionwhetherthosewhodonotcommitactsofinjustice, understoodintheordinarysense,arehappierthanthosewhodo.

Theordinaryconceptionof individual73 justiceisrestrictedtotheway individualsrelatetooneanother:respectingoneanother,andrefraining fromtakingadvantageofoneanother.Ifjusticeisunderstoodthisway,itis diculttoseewhatithastodowithsimplyhavingaharmonioussoul.For, whileitmightbearguedthatthoseindividualswhosesoulsisinharmony arenotlikelytocommitactsofgraveinjustice,theymight,inorderto maintainthatharmony,commitsomeminorunjustactions.Inother words,itisproblematicwhetheronecanreducethequestionofthequality ofactionstothequestionofwhethertheagentperformingthemhasits soulinharmony.Yet,accordingtoSachs,thisiswhatSocratesneedsto proveinordertomeetGlauconandAdeimantus’challenge.Hepresents

72 )“AFallacyinPlato’sRepublic”inG.Vlastos(Ed.)Plato:aCollectionofCritical EssaysII,UniversityofNotreDamePress,NotreDame,1971.Originallypublishedin 1963.

73 )Sachsdoesnotraisethequestionwhetheracity’sbeingjustorunjust internallycontributestothelikelihoodofindividualsleadingajustorunjustlife.

twoargumentsagainstPlato.First,Platodoesnotestablishthatthosewho arejustinhissensearealsojustintheordinarysense.Second,becausehe failstodothis,PlatodoesnotmeetthechallengeofSocrates’interlocutors. Thus,Platofailstoprovethatthosewhoarejustintheordinarysenseare happierthanthosewhoarenot.

Sachs’criticismraisesanumberofquestions.Therstiswhetherthe ordinaryconceptionofjustice,applyingtothewayindividualsactin relationtooneanother,isreducibletothequestionoftheharmonywithin thesoulofindividuals.ThisisbasicallytheStoicview,anditispossible thatPlatoalsoheldaversionofthatview.Sachsisrightinclaimingthatif Platoheldthatviewheshouldhavegivenabetterargumentforit.Inmy view,acasecouldbemadefortherebeingacausalconnectionbetween waysofactingandwaysofbeing,butnotforalogicalconnectionbetween them.Second,fromthisfollowsthequestionofwhat,precisely,Platoseeks toprove.Attimeshesuggeststhatoneneedstodenewhatjusticeis beforedecidingwhetheritisakindofvirtueorakindofvice.[354b3]But, atothertimeshecollapsesthetwoquestions:a)whatjusticeandinjustice are?,andb)whataretheirrespectivebenets?[368c3].Thesuggestionhas beenmadethatthesetwoquestionsareinseparable,anditmaybethat Platoalsoheldthatview,whichmaybethereasonforhisambivalence aboutwhichofthetwoquestionswasmoreimportant.Third,attheend ofhisarticle(Vlastos,p.50-51),Sachsconsidersthepossibilitythatby “whathetooktobepermissibleexceptionstomoralrules...ledPlatoto–

orconrmedhimin–theviewthatrulesofconductdonotconstitute anythingessentialtomoralityorjustice”.IfSachs’speculationaboutwhat motivatedPlatotoemphasizeanagentcentredviewoveranactcentredone iscorrect,itmightalsoexplainwhyPlatofeltthatitwasnaturaltocollapse thetwoquestions:a)andb).74

Inmoderndiscussions,especiallyamongcontinentalphilosophers,itis customarytomakeadistinctionbetweenethicsandmorality,therst havingtodowithwhatisagoodlifeandthesecondwithwhatones’ obligationsare.FollowersofNietzsche75 emphasizeethicsovermorality,and thosewhofollowKantdothereverse.76 Others,beingmorecautious,hold thatthegoodlifecannotprecludefollowingsomerulesofconduct.In theirview,whatmakesforagoodlifemustincluderespectforothers.(See, forexampleComte-Sponville1988.)Inmyview,Platowasambivalent aboutthisquestion.Manyofhiscommentssuggestthathethoughtthat

74 )Cephalus’suggestionthatjusticeistorefrainfromcheatingandfromdeceiving someoneissound.Theproblemis,asSocratesargues,thatitdoesnotamounttoan adequatedenition.So,onepossiblemotivationPlatomayhavehadishisviewthatno actioncentreddenitionofjusticecanbeadequate,butthatanagentcentredonecanbe. Ifthishypothesisisaccepted,thenjustice,asdenedinBookIV,isthelastwordonthe matter,makingthesearchforthe“Form”ofjusticeinBookVIredundant.

75 )UnliketheStoics,Nietzscheandhisfollowersdonotconsidermoralityto followfromethics,theysimplydismissthemoralperspectiveonlifeasslavish.(See,for exampleNietzsche,2003)

76 )Inmyview,Kantwastherstthemakethecleardistinctionbetweenpure morality(deontology)andethics(eudaimonianism),arguingthatmoralityhasnothingto dowithhappiness.Inotherwords,hewasthersttogivearigorousdenitionofwhatit istobemoral.Hegel,incontrasttoKantconsiders“ethicallife”ahigherdevelopmentof morality.(SeeKant,1959andHegel,1971.)

whilebeingmoralisdesirable(followingrulesofconduct)itcannotsimply bereducedtoethics(leadingahappylife).Inotherwords,contrarilytothe Stoics,hedidnotthinkthatleadingagoodlifelogicallyimpliedacting justly,thoughhebelievedthattherewasarealconnectionbetweenthem.A clearexampleofthisisattheendofBookIV.[442d6-443b3]Having arguedthatthoseindividualswhosesoulisinharmonyarehappy,hegoes ontosaythattheywillnotcommitactscommonlythoughttobeunjust. Thisisso,accordingtoSocrates,becausejusticeisnothingotherthan“this power,theonethatproducesmenandcitiesofthesortwe’vedescribed” [443b3],echoingthereferencetothesoul’sinnerpowerGlaucon[358b5] andAdeimantus[366e4and367b3]madeatthebeginningofBookII.77

Speakingofjusticeandinjusticeasinnerpowersindicatesthatfromthe beginningPlatothoughtofjusticeandinjustice,whateverelsetheymight be,asinternalattributesofthesoul.78 InBooksII-IVthreeconceptionsof justiceareintroduced,therstisjusticein,andof,cities.Acityisjustif threeofitsbasicfunctions:economic,defensiveandlegislativeare separatedfromoneanother.Thesecondconceptionreferstothecivic justiceofindividuals.Individualspossesscivicjusticeonlyiftheyperform thosetasks,andonlythosetasks,forwhichtheyarequalied.Inother

78 )IhavealreadysuggestedthatevenattheendofBookI,byreferringtocitiesand bandsofrobbers,Platoopenedthedoortoapproachingjusticeasaninternalfeature complextotality. 77 )ItissignicantthatboththetwobrothersandSocratesrefertojusticeasa “ power”withinthesouls.

words,iftheydonotmeddlewiththetaskstheyarenotqualiedfor.The thirdconceptionreferstotheinnerstructureofindividualsouls.Onthe analogyofthecity,thesoul,too,cansaidtobejustorunjustdepending howitsthreeparts:appetite,spiritandreason,avoidmeddlingandactin harmonywithoneanother.

Noneofthisproves,asSachsthinksPlatoshould,thatindividualjustice understoodthethirdway,islogicallyequivalenttothewayitisunderstood ordinarily.But,Sachs’criticismwouldapplyonlyiflogicalequivalencewas Plato’scriterionfortherelationbetweenbeingjustandactingjustly.79 Itis generallyagreedthatPlato’sdenitionofjusticeismostfullyarticulatedin BookIV,andthathisfullestanswertothequestionwhetherthejustare happierthantheunjustisprovidedinBookIX.Itisinthelatterbookthat Platocomesback,also,tothesubjectofwhichofthethreetypesof individuals,appetitive,spiritedandreasoning,aremorelikelytobejust thantheothers.Sachsfocusesonthequestionofwhatismeantordinarily tobejustorunjust,buthepaysnoattentiontothequestionofwhatit meansordinarilytobehappy.However,inmostoftheearlybooksofthe

Republic Socrates’interlocutorsassumethathavingagoodlifemeans havingplentymaterialgoods,havinganadvantageoverothersandtohave unrestrainedpoliticalpower.Bycontrast,forPlato,thegoodlifemeans 79 )ThequestioniswhetherPlatoisredeningtheordinaryconceptionofjustice orheispointingtoadeeperaspectofit.

somethingquitedierent.Hisconceptionofthegoodlifeisinseparable frommoralconsiderations.

Take,forexample,thecaseofGyges.Thosewhotakethegoodlifetobe havingunlimitedmaterialwealth,andhavingunrestrainedaccessto pleasures,and,alsobelievethatforattainingthosegoalsoneneedstobe unjust;forthoseindividualsitwouldbereasonabletobeunjust.Butthose whodonotconsidermaterialwealthandbodilypleasuresasessentialtothe goodlifewouldnotbeinclinedtocommitunjustactionsinordertoattain thosegoals.WhatisassumedbyGlauconandAdeimantus’challengeis thatactingjustlymustbeshowntobebenecialinthisworld,intheworld thattheyarefamiliarwith.However,thereareindicationsthatPlatodid notthinkthatbeingjustwaspossible,eitherinhissenseorintheordinary senseformostpeopleinanunjustworld,suchastheonethatexistedinhis time.Hebelievedthatacertainamountofjusticewithinthecityis necessaryforachievingindividualjustice.80

AttheendofBookIX,[592c]whichItaketobetheeective conclusionofthe Republic, Socratesraisesthepossibilitythatapersonof understandingwillalwayscultivatetheharmonyofhisbodyforthesakeof theconsonanceinhissoul[591a].Properlyunderstood,hisnalexchange

80 )ItisclearthatneitherSocratesnorhisinterlocutorsbelievethatitisdesirable, orevenpossible,tobeconventionallyjustinacompletelyunjustworld.But,whileitis dicultformostpeopletobePlatonicallyjustinanunjustworld,somemightachieve Platonicjustice,innerharmony,withintheirsoulsinaworldthatisnotjust.[443c]and [592c]suggestthis.

withGlauconshedslightonwhotheintendedaudienceofthe Republic reallyis.Theaudience,asthetwobrotherssuggestatthebeginningof BookII,areindividualslikethem:moreorlessdecentindividuals,having someaspirationforpoliticalpowerand,inaddition,havingaloveof learningthroughintelligentdiscussion.Theassumption,asIsuggested,is thatwhiletheyarecitizensofarelativelyunjustcitytheyneedtoputtheir soulsinorder,and,atthesametimehopetomaketheircitymorejust.In otherwords,thebestonecanhopeforisthatmenofunderstandingwill bringasmuchharmonyintotheirownsoulsasitispossible,giventheir circumstances.And,byhavingdoneso,andactingasiftheywerealready citizensofthatjustworld,theycansearchforotherswhowilljointhemin achievingtheirgoal.

Atthispointonemayaskwhattheprecedingdiscussionhastodowith Plato’sdefenseofjustice.Isitadefenseofjusticeintheordinarysense,that is,followingruleslaiddownbyconvention?Therearepassagesinthe Republic indicatingthatPlatoviewed acting justly,intheordinarysense, tobedesirable.But,healsobelievedthat being justisethicallymore fundamentalthanactingjustly.Hismaincontributiontothesubjectof moralityistheclaimthatbeingjustmeanshavingharmonywithinone’s soul.Nevertheless,itissafetoassumethatPlatodidnothavetheclear distinctionbetweenwhatsinceKantandHegelhascometobeknownas “morality”and“ethics”.Forthisreason,Sachsisjustiedinhisobjection thatPlatodidnotpaysucientattentiontothequestionofhowacting

justlybenetsanagent.Atthesametime,Sachs’criticismisnotwholly satisfactory,for,hedoesnotquestionwhatPlato’sinterlocutorsmeantby benetingfromone’sactions.Ifbeneting,and,therefore,beinghappy,is notrestrictedtohavingmaterialgoodsandpleasuresinexcess,andto dominatingothers,onemighthaveadierentviewaboutthebenetsof actingunjustly.Yet,itisnotablethatneitherdoesPlatoexploreinany detailtherelationbetweenactingunjustlyandwhatarecommonlyheldto beitsbenets.81

Insum,Plato’sdefenseofjusticeconsistsinshowingthatbeingjust, havingaproperbalancewithinone’ssoul,issuperiortobeingunjust, namely,nothavingabalancedsoul.Sachs’worryisthathavingabalanced soulmaynotentailactingjustly.Heisright.Itispossibletohavea balancedsoulandstillactunjustly.Inotherwords,actingunjustlymay benetapersonregardlesswhetheritssoulisinharmonyornot. Consequently,Socrates’defenceofjusticemustallowforoccasional, minor,actsofinjustice:hemustallowthatinallbutthemostexceptional circumstances,namely,livinginaperfectlyjustcity,havingabalancedsoul requiresoccasionalviolationofwhatareconventionallyacceptednormsof

81 )InBookIXPlatoarguesthatbeingunjustresultsinaninferior,more miserable,lifethanbeingjust.Still,heliststheadvantagesordisadvantagesassociatedwith oneortheotherlifeintraditionalterms.Forexample,atyrannicalindividualissaidtobea slave“fulloffear,convulsions,andpainthroughouthislife”[579dc].WhatPlatodoesnot do,evenindescribingthedisadvantagesofinjusticecomparedtojustice,istospellout clearlydierencebetweenbenetslookedatfromtheordinarypointofviewandfromthe pointofviewofsomeonewhovaluesthePlatoniclife.Allhesaysisthatthosewhoare followingreasonaremorereliablejudgesofwhatpleasureconsistsof.

justactions.InfairnesstoSachs,ithastobeadmittedthatSocratesdoes notexplorethequestionofhowfarconventionalnormsoflessthan perfectlyjustcitiesmayneedtobeviolatedinordertoachieveharmonyin one’ssoul.Hisemphasisisonextremecases[443a]suchastemplerobbery, theftandthebetrayaloffriends.82 Inthosecasestheharmonyofone’ssoul wouldsurelybeundermined.How,then,couldapersoncommittinggrave injusticesbealwaysbetterothanonewhodoesnot?Socrates’answerto thisquestionisinBookIXwherehecomparesthelivesofthecompletely justandthecompletelyunjust.Thatanswergiventheremaysatisfy GlauconandAdeimantus,butithasmisledmanyinterpretersofthe Republic intothinkingthatonlyphilosophers,thecompletelyjust,arejust. Myessayisanattempttoblockthatinference.

82 )OnmyrstvisittoHungaryin1978Iwassurprisedbyhowmanydecent peoplethoughtthatitwashonourabletocommitactsofinjusticeagainstthe(totalitarian) regimeinpower.

Plato’sPoliticsoftheSoul

Mymymainobjectiveinthisstudyistoproposeaninterpretationof the Republic asaconservative,yethumanist,text.Inordertodothis,I makeanumberofassumptions.First,Iassumethatthereisadierencein perspectivebetweentheearlyandthemiddlebooks.Second,Iassumethat thereisatacitdistinctionintheearlybooksbetweenanindividual’s specicnature,itsinnatecharacteristic,anditsvirtueorvice,dependingon whatpartofitssoulrulesit.Onanumberofoccasions(435b,441c,580e) Platodeclaresthatallhumanbeingshavethreeparts(drives,inclinations) withintheirsoulstodierentdegrees.Inotherwords,apersonmay naturallybeanappetitivetypebutstillhavethefacultiesofspiritedness andreasonwithinit.Asaresult,undertherightconditions,anindividual couldberuledbyitsreasonevenifitisnaturallyweakerthanitsother parts.

Theabovedistinctioncouldbemarkedbytheterms:“predominance” (or“preeminence”)and“rule”.83 Giventhisdistinction,onemightsaythat regardlessofwhichpart(characteristic,inclination,driveetc.)isin dominancewithinanindividual,itsreasonmayruleit.Forexample,an 83 )ThereisnocleardistinctioninEnglishbetweentheuseof“dominates”and “rules”.But,inmyview,aperson’snatureisdominant(innate),whileitsvirtueis determinedbywhatpartofitssoulrulesit.Thelatterisamatterofexperience,habitsand education.

appetitivetypeofpersonmay,ormaynot,beruledbyitsreasonand,asa result,itmay,ormaynot,bejust.84 Thisreadingiscontroversialbecause mostinterpretersofthe Republic maintainthat,accordingtoPlato,only philosopherscanbejust.But,evenifonedisregardsthemiddlebooks wherejusticeisnotdiscussedseriously,onecanndpassageswhich collapsethedistinctionbetweenthenatureofindividualsandwhatpartof theirsoulrulesit.Thesepassagescanbefound,mostlyinBookIX. However,thestrongestsupportformyinterpretationcanbefoundin BooksIIIandIV.85 What,then,isPlato’sconservativehumanism?

Platoholdsthattherearenatural,innate,dierencesbetweenhuman beings.Thisishisconservatism. 86 Healsoholdsthatallhumanbeingscould leadhappylives,fulllingtheirdesiresandlivinginaccordancewiththeir naturalcapacities,providedtheyarecapableofmoderatingtheirown nature:notmeddlinginareasoutsidetheircompetence.Thisishis

84 )At[442a]afterhavingdeclaredthatthatitisappropriatefortherationalpartto rule.Hegoesontosaythatitshouldeducateandgoverntheappetitivepart“whichisthe largestpartineachperson’soul”.Thisputsappetiteinaspecialposition.Itisdierent frombeingdominant,reasonorspiritcouldalsobedominant,itdoesnotnecessarilyrule inasoulbutitisthelargestand“strongest”[580d]init.

85 )[586b](ofBookIX!)alsoimpliesthat,iftheyfollowknowledgeandargument, anyindividualmightattainthehighestpossiblepleasurepossibleforthem.

86 )Still,moderncriticsofPlato’sstrictclassdivisionbetweenthosewhocan accumulatewealth,thosewhoareinchargeofthearmedforcesandthosewhowhomake executivedecisions,shouldkeepinmindthatithasitsmeritseventoday.Notallofthe thirdtypeofcitizens,forexample,poorworkers,wouldbeabletoaccumulatewealth.But Platothoughtthatontheirowntheywouldnotbeinterestedinpolitics,anyway.Why,he mighthaveasked,dosomecitizensofAthensneedtobepaininordertoattendthe meetingsoftheassembly?

humanism.Withoutoutsideinuence,dominanttraitswillalsorule.Take thethreeinnatetraits:appetite,spiritandreason.Sinceappetiteisthemost pleonexic,itneedsotherforcestomoderateit.Itsprimaryfunctionisthe satisfactionofneedsnecessaryforhumansurvival,andaslongasitdoes thatwithinlimits,itwillbenetthesoulasawhole.Butitcannotdothis withoutbeingguidedbyreason,andconstrainedbyspirit.Guidanceand constrainmightbedirect,butinanidealsituation,wheretherearewise lawsandthereisapropersystemofeducation,anindividualcouldplace, withthehelpofitsspirit,itsownfacultyofreasonincommand.Still,since inanappetitiveperson’sreasonisweakest,evenafterhavingachieved control,thehappinessandjusticeitbringstothewholepersonwillbe fragile.Satisfyingthedesireforhonourandcompetitivesuccessisalsoopen touncertainties,onlyreason,whichisselfdirectedandwhosemain objectiveisthemaintenanceofharmonywithinthewholesoulisfreefrom unexpecteddisruptions.

MyreasonforcallingPlato’sconservatismhumanisticisbecauseIseein itanattempttoadvocaterationalfreedom:providingtheconditionfor humanautonomy.Onacharitablereading,thedenitionofjusticeas non-meddlinghasapositivevalueforindividuals,directingthemtolive

accordingtotheirnature,and,thereby,realizingtheirfullpotential.

Admittedly,hiscommentsabouttheproductiveclassarenotalways generous.Hedoesnotsayso,butitislikelythathesawadierencewithin theclassofproducers.Accordingtohim,somemanualworkers, metal-workers,anddaylabourers,whosecontributiontothecitydoesnot dependontheirmentalabilities[371de,590c],donothavethesame independenceanddignityasindependentfarmersandcraftsmenmight have.Ontheotherhand,hisfrequentcommentstotheeectthatthe producingtypesareinferior[431c1]followsfromhisviewthatthosewho arebynatureappetitiveareinferiortothosewhoarebynaturerational.

Thereisnocleardistinctionmadebetween“dominance”and“rule”in the Republic.And,asIsuggestedearlier,itishardtondaterminology thatwouldmarkthedistinctionclearly.AnaddeddicultyisthatPlato doesnotusetheterm“nature”consistently.At[434ab]itismadeclearthat thedierencebetweennaturesisbasedonthepsychologicalcharacteristics (producers,soldiersandguardians)andnotonprofessionaloccupation

87 )Apartfrom[443e3]wherePlatosuggestthatbeforeanindividualcan“engage inpolitics”itmustharmonizethethreepartsofhimself,itisclearthathedoesnotthink thateveryone,exceptreasonabletypes,should,orwouldwantto,engageinpolitics.Itis diculttoreconcile[443e3]withwhathesaysaboutcivicjusticeat[434b],whereheis rminhisrejectionofmeddlingbetweenthedierentclasses.Thebestonecansayisthat Platohastwodierentissuesatinmind:oneistheproperorderingofanysoul(soul craft),andtheotheristheproperorderingofthebestcity(statecraft).AsIsuggest elsewhere,itmakessensetoseparatecivicfunctions.Or,perhapsheisanticipating Aristotle’sposition(Aristotle,2003,1281b25)thatfreecitizens,notincludingmanual workers,couldhavesomeroleinpolitics,butnotinmakingimportantdecisions“having themtakepartinthegreatestoces”ibid.

(cobbler,carpenter).Butelsewhere,notablyinBookV[454d3],heextends theconceptof“nature”tocovertherelativeaptitudeforsometradesrather thanforothers.Thisextendeduseisincorrect.Bynature,Platocanonly meanoneofthethreepsychologicaltypes.Themainsupportformy interpretationisinBookIV,especiallytwopassagesinit.Therstisthe oneIalreadyinvoked.Itgivesacleardescriptionofthekindofmeddling thatleadstoinjusticeinthecity:

(cobblersandcarpenterexchangingtheirtradeswoulddono harmtothecity) Butsupposethatwhensomeoneisbynatureacraftsmanorsomeotherkindof money-maker,ispuedupbywealthor,byhavingamajorityofvotes,orbyhis ownstrength,orbysomeothersuchthing,andattemptstoentertheclassof soldiers,oroneoftheunworthysoldierstriestoentertheclassofthejudgesand guardians,andtheseexchangetheirtoolsandhonours,orwhenthesameperson triestodoallthesethingsatonce,thenyou’llagreethattheseexchangesandthis sortofmeddlingbringthecitytoruin.[434ab]

Thesecondpassagemovesfromthecitytothesoul.Unfortunately,he startsbyreferringtopeoplebeingcobblersorcarpenters“bynature”, adding,fortunately,thattheseparationoftradesisonly“asortofimageof justice”.Andhecontinues:

Andintruthjusticeis,itseems,somethingofthissort.However,itisn’twith someone’sdoinghisownexternally,butwithwhatisinsidehim,withwhatis trulyhimselfandhisown.Onewhoisjustdoesnotallowanypartofhimselfdo theworkofanotherpartorallowsthevariousclasseswithinhimtomeddlewith eachother.Heregulateswellwhatisreallyhisownandrules himself.Heputs

himselfinorder,ishisownfriend,andharmonizesthethreepartsofhimselflike threelimitingnotesonamusicalscale-high,lowandmiddle.Hebindstogether thosepartsandotherstheremaybeinbetween,andfromhavingbeenmany thingshebecomesentirelyonemoderateandharmonious.Onlythendoeshe act.Andwhenhedoesanything,whetheracquiringwealth,takingcareofhis body,engaginginpolitics,orinprivatecontracts–inallofthese,hebelievesthat theactionisjustandnethatpreservesthisinnerharmonyandhelpsachieveit, andcallsitso,andregardsaswisdomtheknowledgethatoverseessuchactions. [443cd]

Theconcluding sentenceofthisdenitionofindividualjusticeishighly signicantformyinterpretation.Init,itismadeclearthatanyone,notjust philosopherscan,underfavourableconditions,bejust.Bydenition guardians/philosophersdonotacquirewealth,nordotheyengagein privatecontracts.Therefore,thosewhodo,cannotbephilosophers.88 This istheinterpretationIwishtodefend.Inmyopinion,thosewhorestrict justiceonlytophilosophersputtoomuchweightonthemiddlebooks, whichasIargueelsewherearemoreaboutepistemologyandmetaphysics thanaboutethicsandpolitics.89

88 )Earlier,at[425],Platodeclareshissupportforlegalminimalism.Heisagainst theproliferationoflaws.Inhisview,theemphasisshouldbeplacedonprovidingaproper education.Thecontextsuggeststhathehaseducationofthegeneralpublicinmind.In short,headvocatesbasic,primary,educationforthosewhowillparticipatein“market business”and“privatecontracts”.Unfortunately,Plato’sloosereferencesto“producers”, “craftsmen”,“moneymakers”,“manualworkers”“metalworkers”,allasappetitivetypes, createsconfusion.

89 )TheallegoryofthecaveinBookVIIhasacertainpoliticalresonance.Plato’s referencetothefteenyears,betweenthirtyveandfty,thatprospectiverulersneedto spenddowninthecaveistheonlysuggestioninthesebooksthatheisconcernedwith

practicalpolitics.Butevenherehedoesnotexplainhowtheirexperienceinthecavewould beappliedintheirrulingofthecity.

Plato’smoralandpoliticalphilosophyisintimatelyconnectedtohis psychology.Virtuesarerelatedtothethreepartsofthecityandofthesoul.

Courageistheprimaryvirtueofthespiritedpart,wisdomofthereasoning partandtheothertwovirtues:justiceandmoderationarevirtuesofthe whole,ofthewayallthreepartsarerelatedtooneanother.Moderationis theconsentamongthepartsaboutwhichofthemistorule.90 Justiceisthe harmoniousworkingtogetherofthepartsundertheguidanceofreason. HowPlatoviewstherelationbetweenvirtuesisnotobvious.Forexample, hedoesnotsaywhattherelationbetweenwisdomandjusticeis,norwhat itisbetweenjusticeandmoderation?91

90 )Consentbyordinarycitizensaboutwhoshouldrulemakessense.But,howa partthesoulcanruleandhowitcangiveconsentismoreproblematic.Thisisaquestion towhichIwillreturntolater.

91 )IntheCharmides,forexample,hedenestemperance(moderation)thesame wayhedenesjusticeintheRepublic.

Themainformofmeddlingtobeavoidedismeddlingwithrule.92 The jobofreasonistorule,bothinthecityandinthesoul.Andwhileat [434ab]Socrateswarnsagainstonetypeofpersondoingthejobofanther type,realharmcomestothecitywhentheruleofreasonistakenoverby spiritorappetite.93 Thisraisesthequestionastowhatitisforreason,orany otherpart,torule.Inconnectionwiththecitythisquestionhasarelatively simpleanswer.Ahealthycityisruledbyreasonwhenitsleadersarethe wisest,thebesteducatedamongthereasoningtype.Asomewhatdecient cityisruledbythebesttrainedspiritedtypes.Anevenmoredecientcityis ruledbytheappetitivemajoritywhosegreatestvalueismaterialwellbeing andtheacquisitionofmaterialgoods.

92 )Giventhecentralrole“meddling”playsinPlato’sdenitionofjustice,itdoes notgettheclaricationitdeserves.OneoftheproblemsisthatPlatodoesnotgivea satisfactorydenitionofwhattheproperjobofapartofthecityorofthesoulmightbe. Hedoesnot,forexample,describewhatthepositivejoboftheofmembersofthethird classmightbe.Ifhedid,onemightaskwhether,andhow,thehigherfunctionsorclasses wouldmeddlewithit.Athirdtypeofcitizenwoulddoitsjob,accordingtohim,by obeyingtherulers.Andalthoughhereferstopossiblemeddlingwithinthethirdclass,for example,cobblersdoingthejobofcarpenters,hedoesnotthinkitwouldseriously underminejusticeiftheydid.[434a]Theconclusiononemightdrawfromthisisthatthe kindofmeddlingthatisrelevanttothequestionofjusticeismeddlingbetweentypes, classesandfunctions.Eventherethequestionisleftunansweredwhetherreasoncould meddlewiththelowerparts.Inmyview,meddlingisaminorissue.Therealissueis harmonywithinthewholecityorsoul.Andthatcanbeachievedbyreason.Justice,then, isdependentontheruleofreason.Andthatwouldmeanthatthereisacloseconnection betweenthem.

93 )In[434ab]Platosuggeststhatmeddlingoccurswhenalowertype misappropriatesthejobofahigherone,hedoesnotexplainwhattheproper,positive,job ofanappetitivetypeis.But,ifreasonrulesbyoverseeingtheinterestofthewhole, meddlingoccurswhentheruleofreasonisundermined.

Thetwoscholarswhoseviewsareclosesttomine,R.KrautandG. Klosko,believethatPlato’sthird,producing,classcanalsobevirtuous,and theyalsotakeupthequestionofwhatitisforapartofthesoultorule. Thedierencebetweentheirviewsandmineisduetoourdierentnotion of“rule”.Krautbeginsbydistinguishingtwoconceptionsof“rule”: normativeandnon-normativerule.(Kraut,1973,p.208and211)

Non-normativeruleisaformofdecisionmakingregardlessofmotivesthat underlietheindividual’sdecision.Normativerule,bycontrast,is motivatedbyanindividual’spreferenceofavalueassociatedwithonepart ofthesouloverothers.Anexampleoftherstwouldbeaspiritedperson restrainingitsangerinordertoprotectitschancesofattainingpolitical oce.Inthatcase,Krautdeclares,reasonnon-normativelyrulesspirit whilespiritnormativelyrulesreason. [...] Myreadingofthisexampleis dierent.Insteadoffollowingnormativeornon-normative rule Iwould distinguishbetweenactinginaccordancewithone’snature,andacting undertheruleofreason.Theruleofreasonistheexerciseofpractical wisdom:“exercisingforesightonbehalfofthewholesoul”[442e23].A personwhosystematicallyactsundertheruleofreasonisjust,evenifheis notareasoningorphilosophicaltype.94 Aspiritedtypeofpersonmay occasionallyfollowthecounselofreasoninadvancingitsparticular psychologicalnature,asitdoesintheexamplecitedbyKraut.But,sucha personwouldbeunjustifitcouldnot,orwouldnot,restrainitswillto

94 )IwillreturnPlato’suseof“philosophical”inBooksII-IIIandBookIX].

victoryandgoodrepute,eveniffailingtodosowouldthreatenthe harmonyofitssoul.

AccordingtoKraut,thenon-normativeconceptofrulecanbefoundin BookIVandthatofnormativeruleinBooksVIIIandIX.ItisPlato’s introductionofthe“correspondence”[580d]betweenpartsandpleasures inBookIXthatinspiresKrauttoinvoketheideathatdierentpartsofthe soultohavingdierentvaluepreferences.Buthereoneneedstomove cautiously.ThedegenerateconstitutionsandindividualsofBookVIIIare allunjust,todierentdegrees,Innoneofthemdoesreasonrule.So,a timocraticpersonisunjustnotbecauseitsnatureistheloveofvictorybut becauseitsconstitutionisruledbyit. Thesamegoesfortheappetitive person.BasedonhisreadingofBookIX,Krautsuggeststhatjusticeinthe producersisachievedbyreorientingtheirvalueorientation.Since, accordingtohim,theyarebynatureloversofphysicalpleasureswith limitedintellectualcapacity,theyneedphilosopherrulerstoinstillinthem theirownvaluesforlearning.Thisisachievedbycompellingappetitive personstodevotewhateverintelligencetheypossesstothepursuitof one occupation.Andsincedoingtheirjobisthemostimportantaspectoftheir lives,doingitwithdevotionwillpromotetheirlimitedreasontothe positionofrulingtheirsoul,therebyachievingjustice.Inthiswaydemotic virtueismadepossiblethroughthedirectinterventionofguardiansinthe livesofordinarypeople:

Theideaisthatsincethecraftsmandoesnothavetheintellectual capacitytodevelopaloveforphilosophy,hewould,iflefttohimself, becomeanappetitiveperson.However,hehasenoughintellectualtolearn askilledtrade,andthephilosopherofanidealpolisexploitsthisabilityby makingsurethatasachildthecraftsmanreceivesthepropertrainingand environmentinwhichhisloveforhisspecialtradecandevelop.Hethus fostersaruleinthecraftsman’ssoulwhatruleshisownsoul.(Kraut,1973, p.221)

IndKraut’ssolutiontotheproblemofhowordinarycitizenscanbe just,relyingtoomuchonthemiddlebooks.Itassumesthatonly philosopher-kingsaretrulyjustandthatjusticeisonlytheloveoflearning. Itdoesnotgiveanadequateexplanationoftheconditionsfor demotic justice.Inmyview,allindividuals,insofarastheyhaveanelementof reason,tendtoactintheinterestoftheirsoulasawhole.Insomesoul’s reason,duetoitsrelativeweaknessissubjectedtothevaluesofstronger parts.Thatiswhyitisunjust.But,withtherighteducationin music/poetry,andwiselaws,citizenscanalsodevelopthecapacityfor rulingtheirsouls’asawhole.Thatwouldbeaformofwisdom,andjustice, appropriatetotheirownnature.Asfarastheirproductionand consumptionhaswidersocialandpoliticalconsequencesproducerswould havetobeundersomeconstraint.Andifoneweretoincludeintheloveof learningthedesiretoseethewholecontextinwhichonesneedsarise-a formofwisdomappropriatetoone’snature-thenwecouldagreewith

Krautthatdemoticjusticewouldhavetoinvolvealoveoflearning.Tothe extentthatthirdtypecitizensaregivenspacetodevelopinaccordwith theirnature,theybecomemorevirtuous.

IalsodisagreewithKraut’sclaimthatwiserulers,wiselawsandproper educationdonotmakeproducerscitizensvirtuous.Hesaysthat“(the craftsman)continuestohaveappetitivegoalsinspiteofbeingruledby someoneelse’sreason”(Kraut1973,p.218),suggestingthathaving appetitivegoals,beinganappetitivetype,impliesthatonecannot,by oneself,bevirtuous.95 Inmyview,reasonablecraftsmenareruledbytheir ownreasonandareservingtheirappetitivegoalswisely.Itisonlyin exceptionalcasesthattheywouldrequirecontinuedoutsidecompulsion.

[590c] Pursuingappetitivegoals,suchashavingadequatenutrition, comfortablehousingandhealthyfamilylife,doesnotpreventaperson frombeingvirtuous,provideditpursuesthosegoalsinmoderation.

Klosko,whoreliesonmostofKraut’sndings,alsoarguesthatordinary citizenscouldbecomejust.WhileKlosko’spositionisevenclosertomine thanisKraut’s,Idisagreewithhim,too.Hepointsto,butdoesnotmake, thedistinctionImakebetween“predominance”and“rule”.AsdoesKraut, hedistinguishesbetweentwotypesofrules:normativeandnon-normative (instrumental).Also,henotes,butdoesnotsolve,akeyproblempresented bythecity/soulanalogy(Klosko1982,p.371),thesocalled“homunculus”

95 )Bybecomingvirtuousanappetitivepersondoesnotchangeitnature.Thisis oneinstancewherethedistinctionbetweenruleandpredominanceisrelevant.

problem.96AsKraut,andmostinterpretersofthe Republic do,including Ferrari,WilliamsandLear,KloskoreliestooheavilyonBooksVIIIandIX indiscussingrulebyreason.Morespecically,hereliesonthesebooksto explainnormativerulebyreason.ButBookIXcomplicates,unnecessarily, asolutiontothatissuepresentedalreadyinBookIV.

Intheend,KloskocomestothesameconclusionasIdo.Infact,witha smallterminologicaladjustmentourtwoviewswouldcoincide.What Klosko(andKraut)calls“normativerule”Icall“predominance”:the dominanttraitofanindividualthatgivesitslifeageneralorientation,a directionforitsplanoflife.Inotherwords,onmyinterpretationwhatis normativeforanindividualdoesnotnecessarilyruleit.Anormatively appetitivetypeofindividualcouldberuledbyitsreasonevenifthelatteris onlyasmallpartofitssoul.97

Kloskoisrightinthinkingthatonlyphilosophers,whoselife orientationistowardlearningaboutthetruth,couldbeperfectlyvirtuous. Heisalsorightinthinkingthatthevalueorientationofanindividualdoes notchangeonceitsreasontakescommand.Thisallowshimtoclaim, correctly,thatthevirtueofanordinarypersonisdecient.(Klosko1982,p.

96 )Theproblemis,thatpartsofthesoularetreatedasiftheywerelittlesubject withinalargerone.

97 )Ontwooccasions[442a5]and[580d9]Socratesnotesthattheappetitivepartis thelargestpartineachindividual’ssoul.So,whatispredominantcannotbethelargest.In thatcase,allindividualswouldbeappetitivebynature.Predominancebyonepartisthe soul’s(abiding)valueorientation.

376)Hisreasonsforclaimingthatdemoticvirtueisdecientisthat“it stemsfromself-interestedappetitivemotives”[opcit279].Puttingitthis waygivesaconcreteandplausiblereasonfortakingthevirtueofan appetitivepersontobeinferiortothatofaphilosophical(reasoning)type ofperson.Anappetitive,producer,typeofpersonisfocusedonbringing harmonytohisownkindoflife.Itswisdomwouldbeprudence.Withthe guidanceofreasonsuchpersoncouldlead,forthemostpart,ahappyand virtuouslife.Whileitwouldrefrainfromharmingthem,itisnotprimarily concernedwithhelpingitsfellowcitizens,norisitprimarilyconcerned withmakingthecityasawholevirtuous.Thatistheprimaryvirtueof guardians,thephilosophictypes.

ThemainsimilaritybetweenKlosko’sviewsandmineisthathealsosees demoticvirtueguidedbyaholisticorientationofreason.Thisiswhathe says:“Itisthisholisticorientationoftheindividual’sreason,inasoulruled normativelybyalesseralesserappetitethatstrikesmeastheessenceof demoticvirtue”(Klosko,1982,p.376).And,heconcludes:

Tosumupthen,thelivesoftheproducerswillbelivesofbalanceand moderation.Thoughtheypursuethegoalsofappetite,theywillproducethem ‘holistically’ratherthan‘factiously’.Itisanecessaryconditionoftheirvirtue,as wellasthatoftherulers,thateducationinmousikeandgumnastikeimposeorder ontheirsouls[441e-42a].(Klosko,1982,p.379)

ItissignicantthatKloskoallowsforthepossibilityofeducating producersinmusicandgymnastics.NotallcommentatorsoftheRepublic

wouldagree.98 But,therearereasonsforclaimingthatunlesstheywere educatedtosomedegree,producerscouldnotbecountedontoobeytheir rulers.Infact,asImentionedearlier,itispossiblethatinthecontextofthe city/soulanalogythelengthydiscussionoftheeducationoftheguardians inBooksIIandIII,hadasasubtexttheeducationoftherulingparts (reasonandspirit)ofallhumansouls.Thatmightexplainwhythereisno specicreferencetheretotheeducationoftheproducingclassintheearly books.

Appetitesareunstablebecausetheyare pleonexic, andifthereisno constraintonthemtheirattachmenttovirtueisfragile.However,under theruleofreason,promotedbyanadequateeducationalsystem,aperson wouldbemorestablyhappyandvirtuousbecausetheobjectassociated withitsvalueorientationwouldbemoreharmonious,leavingitless vulnerabletoexternalfactors.Reason,asIhaveshownearlier,hasthe functionofself-reectiononthesoulasawhole,whichmeansnotonly thatreasonstrivestocomprehendthetruth,butitalsostrivestograspthe truthaboutitself.Andthisselfdirectednessprovidesitwiththemeansto holdontoitsvirtue.

AttheendofBookIV,havingdiscoveredthenatureofjusticeandof injustice,[445e]Socratesproposesthat,now,theyhavetoexaminehow

98 )SeeHourani(1949)arguingthatPlatodoesnotallowfortheeducationofthe “thirdclass”intheRepublic,andMintz(2016)givingexamplesofthosewhothinkPlato does.

manyformsofvice(injustice)thereare.InBookVIII,onethatcouldbe readasasequeltoBookIV,hegoesontodescribefourtypesofcitiesand fourtypesofindividualswhichareincreasinglymoredegenerateformsof thebest,theoneruledbyphilosophicreason.99 Itissafetosaythatthe degenerateformsaredistinguishedbywhatrulesinthemandnotbywhat theirinnatenatureis.AsIsuggestedearlier,injusticeisnotsimplyhavinga timocraticnature,itis,rather,havingexcessiveprideandloveofvictoryin one’ssoul.Again,thetyrantisthemostcompletelyunjustpersonbecause itssoulisundertheruleofitsmostoppressivedesire,andnotbecauseits fundamentalnatureisappetitive.Withoutsayingsoexplicitly,Plato assumesthatcitiesandindividualsofasuperiornaturemightabandonthe rulebytheirparticularnatureandadopttheruleofthenextinferiorone.A philosophicaltypeabandonstheruleofreasonandoptsforrulebythelove ofvictorybecauselivingunderitsbetternatureprovestobe unsustainable.100

AssumingthatBookVIIIisaboutdegreesofinjustice,BookIXposesa problem,for,thatbookseemtobefocusedmoreondierencesintypesof

99 )Itisdiculttoseethepointoflistingfourdegeneratetypeofconstitutionsand individuals,unlessitismeanttoillustratefourdierentdegreesofinjustice,andhowthey arise.Namely,howtheruleofreasonisreplacedbytheruleofspiritwhich,inturn,is replacedbythreeformsofappetite.

100 )IndPlato’sappealtoexternalconditionsfordeclinehelpful,buthedoesnot putenoughemphasisonthefactthatbothinthecaseofthecity,andoftheindividual,it isthesecond-bestnatureavailablethattakesthepositionofrulefromthenolonger availablebest.Inthecaseofthephilosopher’ssonweneedtoassumethathe,too,likehis father,hasaphilosophicalnaturewhoseruleitneedstogiveupduetoexternal circumstances.Inthecaseofthecitytheinternalfactorismoreexplicit.

personsthanondegreesofjustice.OnesourceoftheproblemwithKraut andKlosko’saccountofdemoticjusticeisthatbothrelyonBookIXfor theirconceptofnormativerule.And,inmyopinion,theconfusionofrule anddominanceinBookIXleadsthemtoassimilatewhatsomeoneisby natureandwhichoftheirdesiresrules.ButifBookIXistobearesponse tothechallengeputinBookII,thefocusshouldbeonshowingthat dierentdegreesofinjusticeleadtodierentdegreesofunhappinessand notthatdierentkindsofvalueorientationsleadtomoreorless pleasurablelife.Butinsteadofshowingthat,BookIXshowsonlythat typesofindividualswhoarebynaturespiritedorappetitivehaveless pleasurethanthosewhoarebynaturephilosophical.

ThereisafundamentaldistinctionPlatodoesnotmakeexplicitinBook IXbetweenthereasonableappetitivepersonwhoenjoyshispleasuresin moderationandtheimmoderateonewho,withouttheruleofreason,fails tosetlimitstoitspleasures;andtheperfectlyjustindividualwhosenature isphilosophicalandwhoisruledbyitsreason.Suchpersonprefers intellectualtophysicalactivitiesand,therefore,isthehappiestofall.The distinctionbetweenbeingjustandhavingacertainvalueorientationisalso missingfromKrautandKlosko’saccountofnormativeandnon-normative useofreason.Theydistinguishtwodierentusesofreasonderivedfrom theirreadingofBookIV,andofBookIX.Therstisexempliedbythe conictbetweendierentpartsofthesoul(BookIV)andtheotheris exempliedbyonepartinfusingthewholesoulwithitsvalues.However,

theydonotgiveanadequateaccountoftherelationbetweentwodierent functionofreasoninitsnon-normativeuse.

Forexample,Kloskoclaimsthatonlyinthephilosopher’ssouldoes “instrumentalreasonlookstotheinterestofallthesoul’spart”(Klosko, 1982,p.373).Forthisreason,heclaims,“philosopherslivewellwhileother menlivebadly”.Myclaimisthatnon-philosophicalpersonscanalsolive welliftheirsoulisruledbyreason,holistically.101 Inotherwords,any individualcanbejustandhappyinthePlatonicsense,whetherits dominantcharacteristicis“philosophical”ornon-philosophical.102 Inmy view,itisconatingruleandvalueorientationthatleadsKrautandKlosko todevaluedemoticjusticeasaformsemblanceofperfect,philosophical, justice.Itistheiremphasisonthe“proofs”BookIXthatleadsthemto inventtheconceptofnormativerule.But,asIclaiminasubsequent chapter,theproofsofBookIXconfusequestionofjustice,rulebyreason, andthequestionofnormativeorientationcorrespondingtoonesnature.

Forthisreason,itispreferabletodiscusstheruleofreasononlyintermsof thewayitisdescribedat[443cd]inBookIV.Apersonwhosesoulisruled byappetiteisruledbyonepartofitssoulfactiously.Butapersonwhose whosedominantcharactertraitisappetitive,orspirited,couldberuledby

101 )(Klosko,1988)

102 )InmydiscussionofBookIXinthenextchapter,Iraisethequestionwhether “philosophical”canbeappliedtoindividualswhosedominanttraitisappetitive.

itsreasonholistically.Inwhichcaseitsdirectdecisionswouldbeinthe interestofitswholesoul.103

KrautandKloskoarerighttothinkthatdecisionsmadebydemotic reasonarefundamentallyprudentialones.Buttheyarewrongtodenythat prudentialactionarenotjustactions.(Instrumental,Humean?)They seemtignorethatinitsfourthcenturyBCcontext phronesis meantboth “prudence”and“practicalwisdom”.104 ThisisalsothereasonthatKlosko considersdemoticvirtuedecient.Still,inadditionwhatIhavealready saidaboutprudentialreasoningandself-interest,itneedstobesaidthat whatKrautandKloskocall“instrumentalreason”,thefacultyofresolving conictsbetweenpartsofthesoul,ismostoftenpartofpromotinga

103 )Myinterpretationiscontroversialforanumberofreasons:First,Idonottake BookIXseriouslyasa“proof”oftheviewthatthejustlifeismoreprotablethanthe unjustlife.NordoInditenlighteningregardingthequestionwhichtypeofindividuals leadanunjustandwhichanunhappylife.Second,Idonotattachimportancetothe resolutionofpsychologicalconictspresentedinBookIV.Itdoesnotprovethatthesoul hasasmanypartsasdoesthecity.Thattherearethreebasicdriveswithinthesoulcanbe assumed,basedonsociological,psychologicalandeconomicconsiderations.Third,Ido notthinkwhatKrautandKloskocall“normativerule”ismorallyrelevant.Apersons moralsarenotdeterminedbywhattypeapersonis.Itisdeterminedbywhatpartofits soulrulesit.Thetypeofanindividualdeterminesnotwhetheritisvirtuous,buthow securelyitisinhavingthatvirtue.

104 )Dismissingdemoticjusticeas“decient”comparedtothejusticeofguardians andofphilosophersmayberesponsibleforthecommonlyheldviewthatonly philosophersarejust.Forexample,JuliaAnnasconsidersthat“AstheRepublicproceeds, Platoinfactlosesinterestinanyonebuttheguardians.”(Annas,1981,p.136)Thisistrue ofBooksVIandVII,butnotofBookIX.KrautandKlosko’sdeparturefromthe commonlyheldviewisthattheythinkthat,whileallcitizenscouldbejustonly philosopherscouldbe“truly”just.Inmyview,eventhoughthejusticeofordinary individualsismorefragileandmoreself-centredthanthatofphilosophers,whentheyare justtheyarejustexactlyinthesamesense.(see443de)

certainplanoflife.Inotherwords,evenifadecisionisbetweentwo appetitivechoices,itwould,normally,impactonone’squalityoflife.105

EarlierinthisessayIreferredtothesocalled“homunculus”problem. Takingtherelationbetweencityandsoulasananalogyofpartsmakesthe problemalmostinevitable.Classes,andindividualsofthecitywillhave theirreason,spiritandappetite,butitisabsurdtoclaimthatpartsofthe soulcanbesplitintothesamethreeparts.Seeingthecityashavingthree dierentfunctions:economic,protectiveanddeliberative,andseeingthe soulashavingthreedierent(non-purposive)drivesmakesmoresense. Reasonintheindividualisadrivetoself-reproductionandself-reection. Itisnotanindependentagentwithinalargeragent.Instead,itislikea programmewithinthesoulthatdoesnothaveaspecicgoalapartfrom maintainingtheharmonyandintegrityofthesoul.

ThischapterarguedthatallcitizensinPlato’scitycanbejust,ifthey receivesomebasiceducationinsoulcraft.Tobejust,accordingtoPlatois toavoidmeddlingamongpartsofone’ssoul.This,inmyview,isachieved bytheholisticruleofreason.Unfortunately,thereisnoaccountofhow dierentpartsofthesoul,wouldmeddlewithoneanother.Inthecaseof

105 )ThroughoutthischapterIhadinmindwhatDavidSachscalls“Platonic justice”,thebalancewithinone’ssoul.Thisleavesopenthequestionwhetherbeingjustin theordinarysensemakesonehappierthanbeingunjustintheplatonicsense.Thebest answertothatquestionistheonePlatogivesonanumberofoccasion,as,forexample,at [442e-443b].Namely,thatbeingunjustintheordinarysenseleadstobeingunjustinthe Platonicsenseaswell.

thecitymeddlinghastwoversions:a)itismeddlingamongproducers: interchangingtheircraftsandworktools,b)andmoreimportantly, encroachingontheeldofcompetenceofasuperiorclassbyaninferior one.Thus,itmightbesaidthatmeddlinginitsmostimportantsenseis encroachingontheruleofreasonbyaninferiorfunctionofthesoul.Inthe cityitwouldbetheruleofthewise,andinthesoulitwouldbethefaculty ofreasoning.

Inordertoprovemymainthesis,Ineededtodistinguishbetweenrule anddominancewithinthesoulofindividuals.Idenedominanceasthe naturalinclinationofindividuals,theirinnatenature.Idenetheruleof reasonasthe“exerciseofforesightonbehalfofthewholesoul”[441e4].106 Twocommentators,whoseviewsIndattractive,distinguishbetween normativeandnon-normativerulebyreason.Mybasicdisagreementwith themisthreefold:IdonotsharetheiremphasisonBookIX,Idonot considerwhattheycallvalueorientationasaformofrule.Forme,value orientationcorrespondstoanindividual’sbasicnature,nordoIplaceas muchemphasisastheydoonthevirtueofphilosophersasamodelfor demoticvirtue.

106 )Thequestionofhowtheinferiorpartscanrulethesoulismoredicult, especiallyifthesepartsarenottreatedasagentshavingtheirownagenda.Thebestanswer Icanthinkoftothisquestionisthattheappetitesareblindandpleonexic,soiftheyare uncontrolledtheywouldoverrunthewholesoul.Spiritis,asPlatosays,is“inbetween”.It ispartlyblindandinitselfcontrollable.But,initsdrivetovalouritisalsoself-directed.It ruleswhenitsdrivetovictoryoritsangeroverwhelmbothreasonandappetite.

SomeProblemswithBooksVIIIand IX

BooksVIIIandIXofthe Republic presentanumberofproblems.The endofBookIV,whereSocratespromisesadiscussionofthetopicstobe coveredinthesubsequentbooks(whichturnouttobeBooksVIIIand IX),aswellasthereferencetothemiddlebooksas“thedigressionthat broughtushere”[543c]atthebeginningofBookVIII,suggeststhatBooks VIIIandIXshouldbereadasnaturalcontinuationofBookIV.Leaving asidethequestionwhetherthelatebookswerewrittenbeforethemiddle books,thereisevidencethattheircontentisindependentofthem.

107

Atitsend,BookIVmentionsvedierentconstitutions,thebestand fourdeviantones.Thismoveisjustiedbytheclaimthat“thereareas manytypesofsoulastherearespecictypesofpoliticalconstitution” [445c].But,thisseemstoclashwithanearlierclaim[435e+]thatthereare threetypesofcitiescorrespondingtothethreepartsofthesouls.So,where doestheideathatthereare ve typesofconstitutionsandvetypesof souls,comefrom?ThemainthesisofBookIVisthattherearethreetypes ofindividualsdependingonwhichpartoftheirsoul(disposition)is 107 )Thereferencetojoiningbridesandgroomsatthewrongtimeasacauseofthe declineofaristocracysuggeststhatthereisaconnectionbetweenBookVandBookVIII. However,thisexplanationfordeclinehereseemsweakandwasperhapsalsoalater addition.Iwillsaymoreboutthisinthemainbodyofthefollowingchapter.

predominant,and,thattherearethreetypesofcitiesdependingonwhich typeoffunctionsandindividualsdominateinthem.108 Gettingclearonthis issuerequiresacloserlookatwhatissaidinBookVIIIaboutthedecline fromthebesttotheworsecitiesandsouls.

AclosereadingofBookVIIIinvitesthequestionofwhatrelevancethat bookhastothemainthemeofthedialogue.ModernreadersofBookVIII couldndsomeinterestingpoliticalinsightsinit.Themainonesbeing: theaccountoftheemergenceoftyrannyfrompopulism,andthe emergenceofdemocracyfromoligarchy.109 Platogivesanaccount,also,of theemergenceoftimocracyfromkingship(aristocracy)andtheemergence ofoligarchyfromtimocracy.Indnomeritintherstaccount,andlittle meritinthesecond.(ButIndthedescriptionofthedeclineofthe individualsoulofakinglypersonmorepersuasive.)Ingeneral,Platocould havemadeabettertheoreticalcasehadhefocusedonthe internal structuralcausesofdecline.Forexample,anemphasisonthetension betweentheoreticalandpracticalconstraintwithinthebestregimemight haveyieldedamoresatisfactoryexplanationofitsdeclinethantheone Platogives.

108 )Inmyearlierchapter,onBookIV,Ioeradierentaccountoftherelation betweentypesofcitiesandtypesofsouls,buthereSocratesseemstotakeanother position.Couldthisrepresentadierentstageinhisthinking?

109 )Asthedialogueassumes,theidealregimehasnotyetexisted.So,Platocould nothaveanydirectknowledgeofitsdecline.Therefore,hespeculates.Andalthoughhe mentionsSpartaandCreteasexamplesoftimocraticregimes,hisdescriptionoftimocracy doesnottthemcompletely.Hisdescriptionofthetransformationoftimocracyinto oligarchyisalsosomewhatproblematic.

LetmebeginwithwhatIconsidertheweakestargument:thedecline fromkingshiptotimocracy.ItishardtotellwhyPlatoinvokedtheabsurd numbermambo-jumbotoexplainthedecline.For,hestartswiththe correctinsightthat:”itisasimpleprinciplethatthecauseofchangeinany constitutioniscivilwarbreakingoutwithintherulinggroupitself”[545c]. Fromthishecouldhavegoneontogiveamorerealisticexplanationof whatthosecausesmightbe.Itiscorrecttosaythattheresponsibilityfor revoltlieswiththeleadersoftherulinggroupwhoaretheguardiansofthe constitution.Platodoesimplythattheculpritwastherulers’(mis)useof reason(poorcalculation):theymadeerrorsincalculatingthegeometrical numbersguidingbirths.Butitwouldbemorerealistictosaythatwise rulerscouldturnintounwiseonesasaresultoftakingtoanextremewhat theyaremostqualiedfor,thattheybecomevictimstotheirexcessive emphasisonrationalcalculation.Ishort,IndPlato’saccountofdecline intermspooreugenicpracticebasedonesotericmathematicsvery unhelpful.So,insteadofcriticizingitdirectly,Iwillgiveadierent account,allalongstayingclosetothespiritofPlato’sownconceptionof justiceasnon-meddling.

InmychapteronPlato’sdenitionofjustice,Iindicatedthatifinjustice isaformofmeddling(overreaching)whichcouldbecommittedbyanyone ofthethreepartsofhesoul,includingthereasoningpart,areasoningsoul couldalsobeunjust.Therefore,itispossibleforareasoningtype,indeed forreasonitself,tobeunjust.Inthecaseofacompletelygoodcitythis

mighthappeninthefollowingway:theleadersmightoverstatetheneed forrationalizingtheadministrationofthecity.Theymayputtoomuch weightonperfectingit,eitherbyputtingtoomuchemphasisontheunity ofthecityattheexpenseofkeepingupwithtraditionalvalues,orby institutingmeasureswhichwouldundermineitsspiritedauxiliaries’sense ofhonour.Inotherwords,excessiveemphasisonreasonmightresultin innerconict.Inthatcasethemilitaryfactionmighttakeoverpower. However,excessiveemphasisonmaintainingtraditionalvaluesbythe military,andontheneedforprotectinghonour,mightrequireincreased amountofwealth.Whichwouldleadtotheascendanceofaninterestin makingmoney,hence,theincreaseinpowerofthemoney-making, economic,faction.

Initially,themoneymakers,themostfrugalandrationalsegmentofthe economicclass,wouldavoidincurringunnecessaryexpensesandindulging inunnecessarydesires.Butexcessivefrugalitywillleadtoitsopposite.So, again,overemphasisonwhatstartsoutasanoblecharacteristic,defending theintegrityandhonourofthecityanditstraditions,andprovidingthe economicmeansforachievingit,wouldbringoutitsopposite.AsPlato himselfrecognizes,thewealthy,havingbecometiredoftheirausterewayof lifewillbecomesoft,leadingthemtoindulgeinallformofpleasure,andin responsetothis,thepoor,whosedesiresare,bycontrast,frustrated,will overthrowthem.This,inturn,wouldleadtoapopulardemandfor freedomtoenjoy,openly,pleasuresthatdecadentoligarchsenjoyedin

secret.And,asthesedemandsofthemajorityaremet,rulewouldbetaken fromthefewrichbythemanypoor,givingrisetodemocracywhichPlato seesastherealmof“insatiabledesireforfreedom”[562bc].

Plato’saccountoftheemergenceofdemocracymightbeseenasa critiqueofSolon’sreforms.Bygivingpowertothepoor,thesixthcentury lawmakeralsoactedintheinterestoftherichbycurbingtheirdestructive practiceswhichhad,inturn,ledtotheaccumulationofexcessivewealth.

But,forthemostpart,Plato’saccountofthedegenerationofoligarchic constitutionsisnotbasedonaknowledgeofSolon’sreforms.Itismore likelymotivatedbyhisowntheoreticalandpoliticalbiases.Someofthese biaseshavenothingtodowithhistoricalfact,othersusehistoricalfacts onlyasabasisforspeculation.Forthesereasons,modernreadersofBook VIIIhavemixedreactionstoit.Theyfeelthatsomeaspectsofitresonates withhistoricalfactandtheirownexperience,butotheraspectsseemto themnomorethanspeculationsbasedondistortionsofancientAthenian history.

Democracy,asPlatoseesit,willbefollowedbytyranny.For,“excessive actioninonedirection,”Socratessays,“usuallysetsupareactioninthe oppositedirection”[563e7].First,the“people”(theworkers)“advisedby theidleextravagantmen”[564b3],willturnagainsttherich,causingcivil

war.110 Thetyrantwillemerge,initially,asanappointedchampionofthe peoplewhohewilleventuallybetray.Oncecitizensrealizethattheyhave beenmanipulated,itistoolate.Theyhavebecomeslavestoaslavewhose onlypoweristheonehehasoverthem.Thequestionnotaddressedatthe endofBookVIIIishowstableatyrannycanbe.Onemightthinkthat withthehelpbrutalforceandcleverpersuasionatyrantmaystayinpower indenitely.ButPlatoseemstoignorethispossibility.Hehintsthatasa resultoftherevoltofitsbodyguardthetyrantmightbereplacedbyanew one.However,thepossibilitythatitisreplacedbyanaristocracy,ora democracycannotberuledout,for,therearehistoricalexamplesforthe second,andPlato’sexperimentwithDionysus II indicatesthathe envisionedthepossibilityoftherst.

InPlato’sview,thedeclineof individualsouls ismeanttobe analogouswiththedeclineofthecity.Theaccountofthedeclineofthe philosophictypedoesnotttheanalogyperfectly,yet,itismuchmore realisticthantheonegivenforthedeclineofthekinglycity.The philosophictypewillfallpreytotheexcessofitsownvirtue.Itwill disregardsaspectsofbeinghumanbesideindulginginactivitiestypicalof personswhosemainattributeistheloveoflearning,andparticipatingin reasonablediscussion.Inshort,suchpersonwillbecomelessjustpartlyasa

110 )By“drones”PlatoseemstohaveinmindwhatMarxcalledthe“lumpen proletariat”,butitisnotclearhowthedronescanhavethekindofinuenceonpoliticshe wantstoascribetothem.By“people”hemeanstheworkingclasswhosetupthe prospectivetyrant.This,too,seemsquestionable.

resultofinternalfactors.Asinhisdiscussionofthecity,Platohere,too, emphasizesexternalcausesforthedeclineofindividuals:anaggingwife etc..Yet,itwouldhavebeenmoreconsistentwiththegeneralspiritofthe worktoputemphasisoninternalcauses.Forexample,itwouldhavebeen moreplausibletoshowhowareasoningtype,havingbeenfrustratedinits failuretopayattentiontoitsotherinclination,wouldstarttoputmore weightonself-preservationandhonour.Similarly,thespiritedtypewould ndthatthepursuitofhonour,andthepreservationofselfinalessthan perfectworld,requireswealth.Hence,itwouldturntomoneymaking. Themoney-making,“oligarchic”,typewould,inturn,degenerateintoa hedonistic,“democratic”type.

Plato’saccountofthedeclinefromdemocratictotyrannicaltypeinthe caseoftheindividualislessconvincingthanhisaccountofthedeclineof oligarchictypestodemocraticones.BookVIIIendswiththedescriptionof thewretchednessofthetyrannicalman,asapoliticalgure.Theissueof thedeclineofthedemocraticindividualistakenuponlyatthebeginning ofBookIX.Theaccount,whichshouldhaveexplainedhowthesoulofthe individualiscorruptedbythediscordofinternalfactors,startsbyinvoking externalones:badcompanyof‘cleverenchanters’[572e3].Whenitcomes tointernalcauses,Platosinglesoutthepowerfuleectoftheeroticon otherdesires:“...eroticloveliveslikeatyrantwithinhim,incomplete anarchyandlawlessnessashissoleruler”[574e6].Thefactthatintense

eroticdesiremighttyrannizethesoulisplausible.But,itisquestionable howanindividualsotyrannizedcouldbeasuccessfultyrant.

TherearealsoseriousquestionsregardingBookIX.Forexample, contrarilytoappearances,thereisnoconvincingevidenceinitofthemajor themesofthemiddlebooks:thenatureof“true”philosophy,of“true” philosophersandoftheireducation.Also,thereisnomentionofthe communityofchildrenandwomen,andthereisnomentionof philosopher-kings.Thepointabouttherenotbeingreferencetothe philosophersofBooksVIandVIImightseemcontroversialbecauseofthe frequentuseof“philosophy”and“philosophic”inBookIX.Also,the descriptioninitofthecompletelyjustindividual,theoppositeofthe tyrannicaloneas“kingly”,mightsuggestthatthecompletelyjust individualisthephilosopher-kingofBookV.111

InordertoanticipatetheobjectionthatBookIXpresupposesthe middlebooks,Iwanttomaketwopreliminarypointsaboutit.Therst regardstheuseof“kingly”.SincePlatocallsthebestconstitution “kingship” inBookIV[445d],whywouldhenotcallthebestindividual also“kingly”inBookIX,withoutpresupposingthemiddlebooks?A kinglyindividualcouldjustbeonewhosesoulisruled,inasecureway,by

111 )Ferrari(Ferrari2005,p.110-111)notesthedierencebetweentheguardiansof theearlierbooksandphilosopherkingsofBooksV-VII.But,heputsemphasisonthe “dog-likeaggression”oftheearlyguardians,ignoringPlato’scomment[428c8-10]that (complete)guardiansmustalsopossessphilosophicalknowledge,namely,knowledge aboutthecityasawhole.

itsreason.Andaking,understoodthatway,wouldbeacompletelyjust individual.Butthisisarelativelyminorpoint.Amoreimportantpoint concernstheuseof “philosophy” and“philosophical”.Here,too,I believethattheusageofthesetermsconformstothewaytheyareusedin BooksIIandIII.Forexample,inBookII[375e-376b]thefutureguardians arearesaidtobe“philosophical”inadditiontobeingspirited;and, philosophyischaracterizedthere,also,as“theloveoflearning”and“the loveofwisdom”.Inaddition,inBookIII[410d]itissaidthatthe‘the philosophicpartofone’snatureiswhatprovidesthecultivation’.Insum, thereisnoreasontothinkthattheuseoftheterms“king”,“kingly”, “philosophy”,“philosopher”or“philosophical”referstothe Philosopher-Kingsofthemiddlebooks.

KeepinginmindthatthemainpurposeofBookIXistogiveaclear accountofthedierencebetweenthelifeofthecompletelyjustandthelife ofthecompletelyunjust,itisnaturaltoidentifythecompletelyjustwith thephilosopher,anditslifewiththephilosophiclife.Keepinginmind, also,thattheguardiansofthecity,itskings,areamodelforthewisdomof ahealthysoul,thesocalled“philosophers”couldbeseenasthecompletely justindividualsregardlessoftheirbeingguardians,orkings.AsIsuggested inapreviouschapter,philosophers,asPlatounderstandsthem,arethe mostjustbecausetheirmaincharacteristicistheloveofleaning,keeping themlessvulnerabletoexcessivedesiresofthespiritandtothepleasures correspondingtotheinferiorpartsofthesoul.UnlikeinBookIV,where

thesoul/cityanalogyiselaborated,[436a]andwherethethreepartsare describedas:reasoning,spiritedandappetitive,herethereasoningpartof thesouliscalledthe“philosophic”.Apartfromthemisleadinguseof “philosophical”atthispoint,thereis someresemblance betweenthis descriptionofthesoulandtheonegiveninBookIV.Eachindividualhasa reasoningpartwithwhichitlearns[581b4],and,dependingonwhichpart rules (!) intheirsoulsthereare,Socratessaysmisleadingly,“threeprimary kindsofpeople”[581c3].

But,asIhavesuggestedearlier,Idonotthinkwhattypeapersonis dependsonwhichpartofitssoulrules.Iarguedthatoneshould distinguishbetween“rule”and“predominance”.And,forthatreason,I thinkthatwhattypeanindividualis,whatcharacterithas,dependson whichpartofitssoulispredominantinit,andnotonwhatpartrules.This way,Iallowthat,potentially,everyindividualtypecouldbejust,although nottothesamedegree.Apersoninwhosesoulappetitepredominates,the producersoftheearlybooks,couldbejustifitsreasonrules.Sucha person’sbeingjustisfragileand,therefore,vulnerabletodecline.Its appetite,whichisbynaturepleonexic,may,onoccasion,overruleitsreason, renderingitssoulunjust.112 PlatomaybeforgivenforfocusinginBookIX onthereasonabletypewhich,withproperqualications,couldbecalled

112 )Insomecasesreasonmayruleunjustly,asinthecaseofanindividualwhoisso obsessedbykeepingitsbodythinthatitignorestheneedforpropernourishment.Insuch caseitwouldbejustforappetitetooverrulereason.

“philosophical”.Thecontrastbetweenthephilosophictypeandthetyrant doesservetohighlightthedierencebetweenthemostjustandthemost unjust.Yet,itmustnotbedeniedthatastherearedierentdegreesofbeing unjusttherearealsodierentdegreesofbeingjust.

The“FirstProof”,socalled,ofBookIXarguesthat,contrarilyto appearances,atyrannicalpersonisaslave.Ruledbyitsuncontrolled appetite113 atyrantisaswretchedasisatyrannicalcity[576c-577d].But, notmuchofsignicanceisaddedtowhathasbeensaidalreadyaboutthe wretchednessofindividualswhoseappetiteisnotunderthecontrolofits reason.(See,forexample,445ab)Theemphasisinthisproofisonlawless sexualappetiteanditsgenesis.Thegreatlust,asPlatocallsit,arises“when otherdesiresbuzzaroundthedrone”(eroticlove)AsSocratessays,“[t]en] thisleaderofthesouladoptsmadnessasitbodyguard”.Itislikelythat someoneobsessedwithsexisaplatonicallyunjust,miserable,person.What isnotclearishowsuchapersoncanachievethepoweroverothersthat historicallytyrantshavehad.TowardtheendoftherstproofSocrates claimsthatatyrantofacityis,infact,aslavelackinginalliesandisfullof fear.[579de]Thisisnotbornoutbyexperience.Realtyrantsofcitiesmay beobsessedbyhavingpoweroverothers,buttheyarenotnecessarilysex 113 )OneoftheproblemswiththedescriptionofthetyrantinBookIXisthattoo muchemphasisisplacedonitsappetite.ThismaybecausedbyPlato’speculiarviewson sexualappetite.However,acasecouldbemadethatanindividualmayalsobeaslaveto tyrannicalpassions,forexampleitmaybeaprisonerofitsdesireforhonourortothe impositionofitssuperiorityonothers.

maniacs.So,onemightargueinsupportofSachs(Sachs1963,p.48)thata platonicallytyrannicalsouldoesnotanordinarytyrantmake.Also,in comparingthetyrannicalcityandthetyrannicalman,Socratesclaimsthat “thereisnocitymorewretchedthanoneruledbyatyrant”.[576e3]Again, thecitizensofsuchcitywillhavewretchedlives,butwillthetyrantrulingit thebealsowretched?

Inthesecond“Proof”Socratesgivesausefulaccountofthedierent degreesofpleasuresenjoyedbydierenttypesofindividuals.But,ashe notesat[581e],thefocusofthisproofisnotabouttherelativeobjective valueofthelivesleadbydierenttypesofindividualsbutonthesubjective assessmentthemakeaboutthemeritofthevirtuestheyenjoy.The conclusionSocratesreachesisthatsinceithasmoreexperience,better judgment andisbetteratarguments,the“philosopher”isbestqualiedto favourhiskindofpleasure.Hence,hispleasureisthemostvaluable. However,thisconclusionshouldnotbeusedasawayto“prove”thatonly philosophers,thereasoningtypes,are,orcanbe,just.This“proof”is problematicmainlybecauseitcollapsestwodierentissues:whoisbest qualiedtojudgethemeritofitspleasure,andwhetherpleasureisallthere istohappiness.

Throughoutthisproof,andthefollowingone,Socratespraisesthe philosophiclife,assumingthatthelifeofaphilosopherisajustone.A “philosopher”understoodinthewidestsense,asonewhohasgood

judgment,willbejust.Also,understoodinanarrowsenseastheloverof wisdomandofreasoneddiscussion,sh/ewillbemorestablyjustthanthose whosesoulsaredominated(notruled)114 bytheirspiritortheirappetite.In thisnarrowsenseatruephilosopher’slifewillbemoresatisfyingthanthat ofatyrant’s,oranyoneelse’s,howeversuccessfulthelattermaybeinthe realworld.Regrettably,thepreviouspointsareonlyimpliedbyPlato’stext.

Hedoesnotmakethemclearlyandexplicitly.

Thethird“Proof”endswiththenumbermambo-jumboreminiscent ofthebeginningofBookVIII.ItisnotthemostbrilliantinsightPlatohas lefttoposterity.Butbeforeintroductionofthemathematicalformula,he doessayusefulthingsabouttheroleofreasonintheenjoymentof pleasure.Thepleasureofthosewhosesoulisruledbyappetiteorspiritis notastrueandpureastheone’swhosesoulisruledbyreason.Andhe notes,quiteusefully,that: “thosedesiresofeventhemoney-loving (appetitive)andhonourloving(spirited)parts(inclinations)thatfollow

114 )Letmerecallthedistinctionbetween domination and rule Imadeearlier.In myview,spiritedandappetitivetypeindividualsmaybejustiftheirsoulisruledby reason.Itisstrangebutnotabsurdtocallindividualsruledbytheirreason “philosophical”,butthatiswhatSocratesseemstodo.Howevertherearetwoothertypes ofphilosophersinthe Republic:the“completeguardians”[414b1]ofthethirdandfourth book,andthephilosopher-kingsofBooksV-VII.Inmyview,itisnotnecessarytoassume thatinBookIXPlatohasinmindphilosopher-kingswhenhespeaksof“philosophers”

knowledgeandargumentandpursuewiththeirhelp,thosepleasuresthat reasonapproveswillattainthetruestpleasurepossibleforthem”.(586d6)

Thispassageisfavourabletomyinterpretation,for,itimpliesthatall typessoulscouldberuledbyreasonand,therefore,couldbejust.In addition,itintroducesthequestionaboutthevalueofpleasuresof appetitesandofspirit.Whatfollowsfromtheideacontainedinthis passageisthatinferiortypescanalsoleadhappylivesiftheirsoulisruledby reason,namely,iftheyarejust.AsIsuggestedearlier,unhappinessfollows notfromwhatonesnatureis.Itfollowsfromreasonlosingcontrolto inferiorparts(dispositions,drives)ofthesoul.Inferiortypeswill,asIalso suggested,belesssecureintheirjusticeand,hence,intheirhappiness.Yet, inthecontextofBookIX,andeveninthecontextofBookIVthispointis notmadeforcefullyenough.

JustbeforeconcludingBookIX,Platosinglesoutmanualworkers whosebestpart(reason),hesays,isnaturallyweekand,therefore,cannot rule.Butheaddsthat“itisbetterfor everyone toberuledbydivine reason, preferablywithinhimselfandhisown,otherwiseimposed fromwithout”[590d].Thiscommentcomplicateswhathesaidearlier abouttheproducingclass.Amongproducerstherearecraftsmenand farmers.Someofthemworkwiththeirhandbutsomeofthemdonot. Introducingmanualworkershere,suggeststhatamongthethirdtypeof personstherearesignicantdierences:somewhoareguided(ruled)by

theirownreasonandsomewhoneedtoberuledbyothers.However,this doesnotaddanothertypetothethreementionedinthesecondproofof thisbook,andinBookIV.Itmerelyintroducesadierencewithinthe thirdtype.115

BookIXendswithareturntothethemeoftheearlybooks:Howwill an ordinary personofunderstanding116 conductitslife?Ifheistrainedin musicandpoetry“hewillalwayscultivatetheharmonyofhisbodyforthe sakeoftheconsonanceinhissoul...(and)alsokeeporderandconsonance inhisacquisitionofmoney”.[591d]Suchpersonwill“looktothe constitutionwithinhimandguardagainstdisturbinganythinginit” [591e].117 ToGlaucon’sobjectionthatsuchpersonwon’tbewillingtotake partinpolitics[592a]Socratesrepliesthatwhileitmaynotparticipatein thepoliticsofhisfatherlanditmightmakeitself,inthought,thecitizenof

115 )OneofthemoreinterestingaspectsofBookVIIIisthedierentiationitmakes withinthe“third”type.Thenotionof“money-maker”,whichwasnotclearlydenedin theearlierbooks(itwasusedinterchangeablywith“appetitive”),receivesamoreplausible accountwiththeintroductionoftheoligarchictype.But,evenasidefromthedierence betweenmoneymakersandothercraftsmen,withtheintroductionofwageearners [371de]andmanualworkers[390c]Platosignalsanotherempiricaldierenceamongthe thirdtype.Whiletheirsoulisstructuredthesamewayasisthesoulofothercraftsmen, becauseoftheiroccupationtheirreasonwillremainundeveloped.

116 )ItisanimportantquestionwhoPlatomeansby“personsofunderstanding”.Is itsomeonelikeGlauconandAdeimantus,orjustanyofthethirdtypewhoiscurious aboutthenatureofthingssurroundinghimhintedat[443c-e]?Whileitmightbeoddto thinkofthirdclasspeoplewouldwanttoengageinpolitics,(whydidordinaryAthenians neededtogetpayasanincentivetoattendsessionsoftheassembly?).Butitisimpliedat [443e2]thatsomemightwouldwanttoengageinpolitics.

117 )ThisresonateswithapassagefromBookIV[443cd]whereSocratesclaimsthat truejusticeisharmonizingthethreepartsofone’ssoul.

thecitytheyhavebeenfoundinganddescribing[592ab].Thepromiseis heldoutthatifsucientnumberofcitizenslooktothecitythatSocrates andhisinterlocutorshavedescribedinthought,thelikelihoodofawise groupofpersons,suchastheguardianswhomtheyhavebeendescribingin BookIII,wouldtakecommandoftheirexistingcity.

ThisendingcalltomindthequestionraisedinBookV[471c]whether itispossiblefortheconstitutionpreviouslydescribedtobecomeareality. Butthequestionstillremains:Which“constitution?”Isittheconstitution ofBooksII-IV?Isittheconstitutionthatincludesthecommunityof womenandchildren,orisittheconstitutionofBooksVIandVII?There isnodecisiveevidenceonthebasisofwhichitcanbesaidwithabsolute certaintywhichanswertheauthorofof[592]hadinmind.Basedon internalevidenceitcouldbesaidthatthe Republic’spolitical/ethical message,giveninitsnallines,respondstotheoriginalchallengemadeby thetwobrothers.Namely,justiceisastateofbeinginwhichpartsofthe cityandpartsofthesoulareinharmoniouscooperationamong themselves.Andthosewhoachievethatstateofbeing,will,onthelong run,havehappyandfullledlives.

BywayofanticipatingKant’snotionofthe“kingdomofends”,Plato’s answertothequestion:“How,moreorlessdecentindividualsof understandingcouldchoosetobejustinaworldthatisunjust?”,mightbe thattheyshould,forthemostpart,conducttheirlives asiftheylivedina

justworld,and,livingthatwaywould,inthelongrun,bebenecialto them.Itwouldallowthemtokeepkeeptheirsoulinharmonywithitself, andmightalsocontributetomakingtheirowncityajusterone.

Inmyview,BooksVIIIandIXhaveonlyalimitedvalue.Therstoers someinsightintothefragilityofallconstitutionalarrangements.The secondprovidessomeadditionalconsiderationsforthesuperiorityofajust lifeoveranunjustonebyhighlightinghowthecompletelyunjustlifeis miserableandunenviable.But,inneitherbookdoesthecity/soulanalogy turnouttobeparticularlyhelpful.Forthatreason,itisalsoquestionable howoneistoreconcilethemwiththeearlierbooks.Apartfromsome terminologicalaspects:thefrequentuseof“kingly”and“philosophic”, thereisnoindicationthatthesebooksmighthavereliedonBooksVIand VII.SomedoubtscouldberaisedevenabouttheirconnectiontoBooksIV andV.ThereisenoughsaidinBooksIIandIIItoseethelatebooksas naturalsequeltothem.And,asJuliaAnnashaspointedout,thesoul/city analogy,totheextentthatitispresentininthelatebooks,ismoreofa hindrancetotheargumentsinthemthanahelp.118

118 )See(Annas1981,p.305):“ThevaluablepointsinBooks8-9comeoutwith theirproperforceonlywhenthehamperingcity-soulparallelisdropped”.

RepublicV:PlatoOnWomen,The

FamilyandPhilosophy

At[471c]GlauconpromptsSocratestogobacktoaquestionheset asideearlier[458b4and466d6].Thequestionis:“whetherit’spossiblefor thisconstitutiontocomeintbeingandinwhatwayitcouldcomeabout”. Socratesanswersthat,“untilphilosophersruleaskings...thatis,until politicalpowerandphilosophyentirelycoincide...citieswillhavenorest fromevil”[473c7].Thisisnotadirect,orevensatisfactory,answertothe questionwhichisaskingnotwhatattributesrulersofthebestregimewill havetohavebuthowtheregimetheyhavebeendescribingsofarcould comeintobeing119.Also,inhindsight,itisnotclearwhichconstitution Socrateshasinmind.IsittheconstitutiondescribedinBooksII-IVorisit theconstitutionthathasbeendescribedinthersttwothirdsofBookV: thebookunderdiscussionhere.Thewaythequestionisframedat[458e] suggeststhattheinstitutionofthecommunityofwomenandofchildren 119 )Immediatelyaftergivingthisanswer,Socratestakesupthequestionaboutthe natureoftruephilosophy.Giventhatthe“completeguardians”,introducedinBookIII, [414b1]weredescribedinBookIVasbeingwise,havinggoodjudgmentandhaving knowledgeofthewhole[428a-d],thequestionseemsredundant:thepointthatthebest citywillberuledbyphilosophershasalreadybeenmade.So, itissafetoassumethat Socrates’interestatthispointisnotinthepossibilityof thebestregimecominginto being,butinthequestionofhowtopresentthetruenatureofphilosophy.Ishallreturn tothisissuelater.

alsorequiresrulebyphilosophicalkings.120 At[427e3],inBookIV,Socrates declaresthat“Ithinkourcity,ifithasbeencorrectlyfounded,is completelygood”.So,thisraisesthequestionwhetherwhatissaidinthe rsttwothirdsofBookVisadescriptionofastillbettercity,orwhetherit isjustaclaricationofthecompletelygoodcityalreadypresented.

Ineithercase,itisimportanttondoutwhatmotivatesSocratestotake upthequestionoftheequalityofmenandwomen,andofthecommunity offamily.At[424a1],inwhatseemsanaside,Socratessuggeststhat “reasonablemen”willseethedesirabilityof“friends”havingwivesand childrenincommon.ItisthiscommentthatgivesPolemarchusand Adeimantusthepretext,atthebeginningofBookV,fordemandingthat Socratesexplaintothem“themannerinwhichtheyaretobeheldin common”[449c6].Here,too,Socratesstartsbyevadingthequestion. Insteadofstartingwith how wivesandchildrenareheldtobeincommon hestartsbyarguingthatmenandwomenhavethesamenatureand, therefore,theymusthavethesameeducationandthesameopportunityfor guardianship.

Leavingaside,fornow,thequestionofwhatlogicalrelationequality andcommunityhavetooneanther,letmerstaddressthequestionof whatmighthavemotivatedPlatotoembarkonsuchcontroversialtopics.

120 )Itcouldbearguedthatfromthedescriptionoftheguardianswayoflifegiven at[416d-417]theabolitionofthenuclearfamilywouldlogicallyfollow.Iwilldiscussthe logicalrelationbetween[416-17]andthesocalled“secondwave”laterinthischapter.

Onereason,theoneIndthemostnoble,wouldhavetodowiththe notionofhumannature.InBookIVSocrateshasestablishedthatall humanbeingshavethreedispositions,“parts”,tovaryingdegreesintheir soul.So,ifwomenarehumanbeingsthey,too,willhavethreedispositions oneofwhichwouldbepredominant.Thequestion,then,iswhetherall womenhaveonlyoneortwoofthethreedispositions.ThisiswhatPlato wantstodeny.Accordingtohim,therearedierencesamongwomenjust asthereareamongmen,butwomenarenotnaturallydierentfrommen. Thereare,inotherwords,appetitive,spiritedandphilosophicalwomen. Mostwomen,asmostmen,haveappetitivenaturebutsomeofthemwill bespiritedandstillfewerofthemphilosophical.Forthatreason,women should,iftheyqualify,beadmittedintotheranksofguardians.Platodoes notmakethecaseforequalopportunityexactlythewayIhavejustdone, butheiscommittedtoit.

121

Platowasnotafeminist.Hethoughtthat,asagroup,womenwere weaker,andthereforeinferiortomen.Thismayhavebeentruefor soldiering,butPlatodoesnotexaminethequestionwhetheritwouldalso

121 )Plato’sdiscussionof“nature”hereismisleading.Inthecontextofarguing, correctly,thatnotalldierencesarenaturalones,heusestheexampleofexcellingin dierentcraftsasanindicationofpossessingdierentnatures.Butthedierencebetween beingacobbleroracarpenter,orevenadoctor,isnoindicationofwhattypeapersonis. Whattypeapersonisisdecidedbywhichdisposition(part)ispredominantintheirsoul. Inotherwords,itiswhattypeapersonisthatdeterminesitsnature.Learningsomething easilyandrememberingwhathasbeenlearnedisamarkofaptitudeforagivenactivity, butitisnotadecisivefactorindeterminingwhethersomeoneisbasicallyappetitive, spiritedorphilosophical.Anditisthosecharactertraitsthatindicatewhetheroneis,oris not,qualiedtobeaguardian.[454cd]

betrueforgoverning,nordoesheindicatewhethersomewomenmightbe superiortoallmen,orwhethersomemenareinvariablysuperiortoall women.Neitherdoesheexaminethequestionwhetherwomenwould makeupasmaller,orlarger,numberofguardians.Giventhepressureon themtogivebirthtothegreatestnumberofchildren,itislikelythatfewer ofthemwouldbe.122 So,onecandismisstheideathatadvocacyforwoman’s rights,regardingallaspectsoftheirlives,isastrongmotivationforPlato’s advocacyforequalopportunityforthem.Strongermotivationsforitare hiscommitmenttosocialunityandtotheproductionofasmanyexcellent guardiansaspossible.

123

ThereareanumberofassumptionsSocratesmakesindicatingthathe sawsomesortofconnectionbetweenequalopportunityandthe communityoffamily.First,heassumesthatthenatureofparentsis,most ofthetime,inheritedbytheirchildrenand,second,heassumesthatboth parentsneedtohavesuperiornatureiftheirospringaretobesuperior.

Basedontheseassumptions,itdoesfollowthatmarriagebetweenmenand womenoughtnotbeaprivatematterbutthatitshouldberegulated accordingtoeugenicprinciples.Thestatemusthavesomeroleindeciding whichindividualsarequaliedtoformaunion;for,itisonlythestatethat

122 )Platopointsout,correctly,thatfemales,havingthecapacitytogivebirthisno proofthattheyaredierentfrommen[454d7],buthedoesnotconsiderwhetherbeing obligedtogivebirthfrequentlywouldrenderfemaleslessavailableforcivicdutiesthan males.

123 )AsIshallarguelater,hisradicaleugenicprogramme,willnotservehis intentions.

willbeinpossessionoftheknowledgeofwhatittakestoproducethe highestpossibletypeofospring.However,themoreimportantquestion iswhetherSocratestotalitarianversionofthecommunityofwivesand childrenalsofollowsfromtheequalityofmenandwomen.

Allinall,Socratesmakesaconvincingcaseforincludingwomenamong theguardianclass.Buthisprogrammeforthecommunityofwivesand childrenisproblematic.Theprogrammeishighlyoppressive,itcontradicts someofwhathasbeensaidonthesubjectearlier,andithassomeinternal inconsistencies.Letmestartwiththetensionbetweenwhatissaidabout thetopicattheendofBookIII,andwhatissaidinBookV.Tobeginwith, thewaytheguardians’wayoflifeisdescribedat[416d-417b]inBookIIIis notcommunistic.Everyonebesidestheguardianshasprivatewealthbut theguardianshavenone.So,noonesharesitspropertywithanyoneelse: somebecausetheyownitprivatelywhileothersbecausetheyhaveno propertytoshare.Thequestion,asIputitearlier,iswhethernothaving anyprivatepossessionsnecessitates,orevenrequires,theabolitionofthe nuclearfamily.Traditionally,inAtheniansociety,womenwereconsidered propertyoftheirhusbands.So,whenSocratessuggests[424a1]that friends,asfaraspossible,should“possesseverythingincommon”he assumesthatwivesareownedprivatelyby“friends”whowillsharethem

willinglyamongthemselves.124 But,beingorderedtosharewomenfor reproductivepurposes,asheproposes,isnotthesameassharingone’swive withsomeoneelsewhoisa“friend”.125 So,evenif[424a1]isanaccurate reectionofthespiritof[416d-417b],whatSocratessaysabouthis programmeofeugenicsdoesnotfollowfromit.

OnereasonthatSocratesgivesinfavourofhiseugenicprogrammeis thatitwillpreservetheunityofthecity[462a-d].“[P]rivatizationof pleasuresandpainswilldissolvethecity”,hedeclares.[462c]Ifnoonecan callanything“mine”or“notmine”withouteveryoneelsecallingthemso atthesametimetheircitywouldbemostlikeasingleperson.Thisseemsto ignorethefactthatmostcitizens,thethirdclass,willhavepossessionsand familiesofheirown.126 Amoreconvincingargumenthegivesfor communismisthatallprivateownershipdividespeople.Thiswasalready

124 )Thereferencetothe“oldproverb”isabusive.Theproverbwasoriginally referringtomaterialpropertyonly.So,includingwivesandchildrenamongproperty “possessed”altersitsmeaning.Thosewhointroducedtheproverbdidnotincludeamong possessionoffriend’swomenandchildren.Itisdoubtfulwhethertheybelievedthatthere wasalogicalconnectionbetweenpossessingmaterialgoodsandpossessingpersons.Itis alsodoubtfulwhetherinwritingwhathedoesattheendofBookIIIPlatothoughtthat nothavingmaterialpossessionsimpliednothavingwiveseither.Signicantly,thelistat [416e]ofwhatpropertyguardiansoughtnothavedoesnotincludehavingwivesand children.

125 )BysecrecyanddeceptionSocrateshopestoconvincecouplesthatthedecision ismadeforthembyfateandnotstateauthority.Thisdevicecouldhardlybecalledsharing spousesbyfriends.Itshouldbenotedthatsharingspousesforreproductivepurposeswas nottotallyunknowninancientGreeksocieties,butthatchoicewaslefttofamilies.

126 )OnthequestionofunitySocratesisambiguous.Attimesheseemstobe suggestingthat“allthecitizens”,or“mostpeople”willcontributetotheunityofthecity, withoutexplaininghow.Atothertimeshecomesbacktotheideathatcommunismwill existonlyfortheguardianclass.

madeclearattheendofBookIIIregardingprivatewealth.Here,inBook V,Socratesmaintainsthatbyabolishingthenuclearfamilyforguardians makesthemevenbetterguardians.[464c3]Bydoingso,heimputesthe evilsofprivacyinmaterialgoodstoprivacyofthefamily.

Acasecouldbemadethatifguardianshadprivatewealth,havinga familywouldaugmentthechancesofconict.ButSocratesdoesnot addressthequestionwhethernon-owingguardianswouldalsobelikelyto generateconictiftheyhadfamilies.Itispossible.Strongattachmentto wivesandchildrencouldhavethatresult.Butalooseformoffamily attachment,liketheonesthatwerepopularamongadvocatesofthe Counter-culturemovementduringthenineteensixties,mightavoidthat danger.GiventheemphasisPlatoputsoneducation,andoninstillinglove forthecommunity,itislikelythatallcitizens,letaloneguardians,would haveemotionalattachmenttochildrenandspousesoftheir“friends”,and, wouldwelcomesharingtheirspouses(wivesorhusbands)ifitwasinthe interestofthefamily,andofthecity.Also,the“noblelie”introducedat [414d-415d]isintendedforallcitizens,includingguardians.Socrates clariesthatifoneoftheirospring“shouldbefoundtohaveamixtureof ironorbronze,theymustnotpityhiminanyway,butgivehimtherank appropriatetotheir nature anddrivehimouttojointhecraftsmenand farmers.”127 Whywouldtheypityhimiftheyhavenoparticularemotional

127 )Therearetwothingsnotableinthispassage.First,theospringarereferredto inthemasculine,second,theterm“nature”isusedinreferringtotypes.

tietothem?But,moreimportantly,theselectionismadeafterbirthonthe basisoftestsandnotpriortobirthbasedonthequalityofparents,asitis inBookV.ThispointleadstotheinternalincoherenceofSocrateseugenic programme.

At[460c2]Socratesdeclaresthat“thechildrenofinferiorparents... they’llhideinasecretandunknownplace”.Thisisinfanticide,notlikethe morehumanesolutionproposedinBookIII.Butwhatismoretroubling aboutitisthatafterhisproposalforinstituting“sacredmarriages”,based on“sophisticatedlotteries”,wherethebestcandidatesforreproducing guardianshavebeendetermined,Socratesstillputsemphasison eliminatingchildrenof“inferior”parents.Inferiortowhom,other superiorparents?Whatisthepointoftheeugenicprogrammeifitcanso easilybeunderminedbyraisingdoubtsabouttheselectionofguardians?

Eithertheinitialselectionofguardiansisinadequate,allowinginferior candidatestoqualifyasguardians,oreliminatingtheospringofqualied guardiansdefeatsthepurposeofselectingguardiansforrulingand parenting,intherstplace.

Anotherinconsistencyoccursregardingpromiscuity.Havingnotedthe persuasiveforceoftheeroticnecessity,Socrateswantstoforbid promiscuity[458d7].Whathereallymeansisthatsexualunionsshould notbebasedonindividualpreferences,butonstateorganizedmarriages instead,for,thesocalled“sacredmarriages”,aformofstateendorsed

promiscuity,wouldbeencouraged.Tomakethingsworse,“anyone distinguishinghimself...whilestillonthecampaign...Aslongasthe campaignlasts,noonehewantstokissshallbeallowedtorefuse.”[468b]. Thissuggeststhatsexbasedpromiscuityisallowedforbravesoldiers.The bravewillhavefreeaccesstosexbothasarewardforvalour,andasan incentivetoproduceasmanychildrenaspossible.128

InviewofthedicultiesinvolvedinthetotalitarianwayPlatodescribes thecommunityofwivesandchildren,itishardtoseewhyheputsomuch emphasisonit.AsIsuggested,itisnotnecessaryeitherforthegoalof reproducingthemaximumnumberofqualiedguardians,norisit necessaryforensuringunityamongcitizens.Withthepropereducation, persuasionandasmallamountofcoercionbothgoalscouldbeachieved withoutthetotalitarianprogrammeSocrateswishestoinstitute.Why, giventhesound,butconservative,visionofpoliticalrule,doeshestillwant togofurther,beyondhismoderatelyauthoritarianproposalsoftheearlier books?129

128 )Platoacknowledgesthatthepersondesiredbythebravemightbetheloverof another.Butadds,cynically,thatfrustratedloverswould,then,be“moreeagertowinthe rewardsofhonour”[468c2].

129 )MydisgustwithPlato’sprogrammeofgeneticengineeringisnotdiminishedby believingthathedidnotintendtoimplementit.Asanideal,thecontentsofBooksII-IV wouldhavesuced.Theearlyrepublichasfeaturesthatwouldstilloendsomemodern readers,a)itconsiderspoliticalleadershipanartthatcannot,andshouldnot,beopento everyone,b)ithasaxednotionofhumannature,c)ithasapaternalisticviewof citizenshipanditadvocatesastrictclassdivision.However,modernconservativescould endorsemuchofit.For,itisnotobviousthateveryoneisqualiedforpoliticalleadership, evenindemocraciesvotersareexpectedtoacquiresomelevelofpoliticalexpertise.How

Basedonwhatissaidathebeginning[18-9]ofthe Timeaus, Thesle believesthattheprogrammeofcommunityofwomenandchildrenwas partofthe Proto-Republic.130 The Timeaus alsoreferstothecommunityof wivesandchildren,andtonuptialweddingsasawayofsecuringthebest breed,but,ithasaslightlydierentconceptionofthedetails.Ontheone hand,childrenofbadparentsshouldbe“secretlydispersedamongthe inferiorcitizens”,againraisingthequestionhowbadindividualscan remainguardians.Ontheotherhand,inlinewithBookIII,Socrates declaresthefollowing:whiletheywere all (presumablyospringofboth goodandbadparents)growingup,therulersweretobeonthelook-out, andtobringupfrombelowintheirturnthosewhowereworthy,and thoseamongthemselveswhowereunworthyweretotaketheplaceof thosewhocameup.(Timeaus,19)

theywillacquireitisanotherquestion.Whethertherearedistinctpersonalitytypesbased ondistinctcharactertraitsisopentoquestion.Also,itisfeasibleeveninmarketsocieties thatthosewhogovernshouldnotbepreoccupiedwithaccumulatingwealth.Lastly, Plato’sassumptionthatmostpeoplewhoaregiventheconditionsforrealizingtheirfull potentialwouldnotwanttospendtheirtimeparticipatinginpoliticshassomebasisin reality.NotethatinAthenspeopleweregivenmoneytoattendsessionsoftheassembly otherwisetheywouldnotattend.Theseideasareimpliedbytheearlybooks,andunlike thoseofthemiddlebooksarestillworthyofconsiderationtoday.Thatismyreasonfor salvagingthemfromtheRepublicaswehaveittoday.

InspiteoftherepeatedattemptsinBookVtomakesurethatthebest individualswillbeproducedbygeneticengineering,thereisnoguarantee 130 )PartofThesle’sreasonforthepriorexistenceofa“Proto-Republic”isthe viewthatAristophanes’AssemblyofWomen,anearlywork,wasPlato’stargetintherst twothirdsofBookV.However,as(Ellis,2011)arguesAristophanes’playcouldaseasily havefollowedasprecededtheRepublic.

thatsuccesswillbeachieved.Superiorparentswillbelikelytoproduce superior ospring but,inthenalanalysis,onlytestingcanyieldreliable informationaboutthe ospring’squalications.Thus,inthe Timeaus emphasisisplaced,onceagain,onakindofmeritocraticegalitarianism advocatedinBookIII.Breedingisstillpresent,butitiscomplementedby educationandsupervision.Isitthecasethatafterpresentinghisvisionof thecompletelygoodcityinBooksII-IVPlatowasexperimentingwith dierentmethodsforachievinghistwomaingoals:makingsurethatthe cityismaximallyunited,andthatitisruledbythebestofitscitizens?

AsIhavenotedanumberoftimes,thedateofcompositionofPlato’s dialogues,oreventheircompositionalintegrity,needstobeleftopento discussion.Changesofemphasis,andeveninconsistencieswithinand amongthevariouswritings,doesnotimplyintellectualdevelopmentonhis part.WecannotsayforsurethatthebeginningoftheTimeauswaswritten beforethemiddlebooks,butthatitwas,isarealpossibility.Thehistoryof thecompositionof TheLawsisuncontroversial.Mostscholarsagreethatit isaposthumousworkcomposedfromPlatonicfragmentsbyPhilipof Opus.InthatworkPlatomakesafewremarksaboutwhathetakestobe the“absolutelyidealsociety”[739b3].Thissocietyisbothradicallyand completelycommunistic:allcitizenssharealltheirpropertywhichincludes notonlywivesandchildrenbutalsoorgansofsenselikeeyes,earsand hands[739c9],allforthesakeofunity.Readingcertainpassagesofthe Republic onehastheimpressionthatPlatoisirtingwiththeideaof

communityofpropertybeyondtheguardianclass.131 Here,inTheLaws,he leavesnodoubt.132 So,howcan Timeaus and TheLaws shedlightonthe lengthstowhichPlatowaswillingtogoinordertoachievecivicunity? Andhowfarbeyondhisaccountofjusticeinindividualsandcities presentedinBookIVishepreparedtogo.InBookVheshiftshisemphasis fromsocialjusticeasaformofco-operationamongdierentgroupsof individualstothecompleteunityofthecity.Doesthissignalanew perspectiveonwhatisbestforacity?Plato’sintroductionofthe hypothesisofphilosopher-kingssuggeststhatheisentertainingthe possibilityofaradicalrevisionofwhatitmeanstobeaphilosopher.

Socrates’initialreplytoGlaucon’srequestat[471c4]thatititbeshown “whetheritispossibleforthisconstitutiontocomeintobeingandinwhat wayitcouldbebroughtabout”isquestionbegging.Insteadofadirect answerheremarks[472d]that“weweren’ttryingtodiscoverthesethings inordertoprovethatit’spossibleforthemtocomeintobeing...wewere makingatheoreticalmodelofagoodcity”.But,afteramomentof prevaricationhedeclaresthattheymight,bymakingthesmallestchangein theconstitutionoftheircity,approximateit.[473b4]And,thisisfollowed

131 )See,forexample[462a-c].

132 )Intheidealsociety,herepeats“theoldsaying,‘friends’propertyisgenuinely shared”,extendingitashedidinBookVtochildrenandwives.Whathemeansby” genuinelyshared”isperplexing.Doeshemeanthatextendingcommunismtothefamilyis adierentkindofsharingfromsharingmaterialpossessions?Sinceheputsemphasison achievingunitywithoutreferencetobreedingmethod,itispossiblethathehadother meansofbringingitabout.Forexample,througheducation,trainingandsupervision.

bythefamouspassageaboutphilosopher-kings.Namely,that“until politicalpowerandphilosophyentirely133 coincide...theconstitutionwe havebeendescribingintheorywillneverbeborntothefullestextent possibleorseethelightofthesun”[473de].

AfterwhatissaidinBooksIIIandIV,therequestisappropriate:Given whatweknowaboutcitiesastheyareatpresent,isthereawaytoachieve whatwehavedescribedasthe“completelygoodcity”?[427e4]Socrates suggestion,thatacitywhichcomesclosesttothebestwouldhavetobe ruledbyphilosophersraisethequestionaboutwhophilosophersare.Are thephilosophersastheyweredescribedinBooksIIIandIV,oraretheyare philosophersastheyexistedinAthensatthetime.Thelatter,asSocrates notes,haveabadreputation.Therefore,hefeelstheyneedtoclarifywhoa philosopheris.And,thatservesasthepretextinBooksVIandVIIforthe discussionsofwhotheytrulyareandhowtheyshouldbeeducated.

However,asimpleranswertothequestionwouldhavebeentorecallthe qualitiesoftheguardiansandtheeducationtheyreceivedasitwas describedinBooksIItoIV,andtosaythat,ifbymiraclearulerwiththose qualitieswerefound,thebestpossiblecitywouldbeachieved.Themain qualityascribedtowiserulersinBookIV[428cd]istohavegoodjudgment aboutthecityasawhole.Perhapssomethingcouldhavebeenaddedabout whatpracticalandtheoreticaltrainingtheywouldhavehadtoreceivein

133 )Notethatthisexcludesthepossibilityofawiseadvisercounsellingapowerful rulerwhomightacceptorignorehisadvice.

additiontogymnasticsandmusic,buttherewasnoneedtoenterintothe detailedaccountofeducationinmathematics,metaphysicsand epistemologyprovidedinBooksVIandVII.134 Thatway,someofthe politicallyoensiveconsequencesofhyperrationalpoliticalrulecouldhave beenavoided.But,asIhavesuggestedearlier,Plato’sinterestinwriting whathedidinthemiddlebookswastondthenatureoftruephilosophy andnotndhowthepracticallypossiblebestpoliticalconstitutioncould comeabout.

134 )NoteTheLaws[709e]onfoundinganewcity:ayoungtyrantwhoisluckyto havewiselegislatorsashiscontemporaries.

TheLongerRoad

At[435d1]Socratesnotesthatusingtheirpresentmethodofargument theywillnevergetapreciseanswertothequestionwhetherthesoulhasas manypartsasdoesthecity.But,hesuggeststhatthereis“anotherlonger andfullerroadthatdoesleadtosuchananswer”.Afewparagraphslater [436ab]headdsthatanevenharderquestioniswhether“whenwesetout aftersomething,doweactwiththewholeofoursoulineachcaseordowe dothemwiththreedierentparts?”Inspiteofthesesuggestions,Socrates continuestheargumentinBookIVfortheparallelbetweencityandsoul followingtheirpresentmethod.And,whilehisargumentisnotvery convincing,theviewthattherearethreeparts(threedierentaspects)to thesoul(reason,spiritandappetite)isinsightful.135 Only,itisnotclearwhy thesoul/cityanalogyisneededinordertomakethatpoint.Onecouldbe convincedofthetripartitedivisionofthesoulwithouttheanalogywith thecity.Also,Socratesdoesnotaddresstheharderquestion:whetherwe actineachcasewithadierentpartofoursoul:inlearning,ingetting angry,inhavingacertainappetite;orwhetherweactwiththewholeofour soulatthesametimeasweactwithanyoneofthem.Morespecically,he

135 )Freudin(Freud,1949)makesuseofthetripartitedivisionofthepsyche withoutinvokingthetripartitedivisionofstates.Cooperin(Copper1984)makesa convincingcaseforthepriorityofpsychologyoverpoliticsinPlato’spresentationofthe tripartitedivision.

doesnotaddressthequestionwhetherwhenweactwithoneofthe dominantpartofthesoultheotherpartsarealsoinplay.136 Besidesthese crypticsuggestions,Socratesdoesnotgiveusclearindicationofwhat precisequestion“thelongerroad”issupposedtobeananswerto,orwhat precisepointthepresentmethodwassupposedtoprove.Wasthepoint thatthesoulisstructuredthesamewayasthecity?Wasitthattheyboth consistedofexactlythreeparts?Wasitthatthevirtuesarecorrelatedina certainwaywiththestructuresofthecityandofthesoul?Or,wasitthat justiceisaformofnon-meddlingofthethreeconstituentpartsofthesoul?

InBookVI[504a1]Socratesremindshisinterlocutorsthatearlierhe madeadistinctionbetweenthethreepartsofthesoulinorderto“bring outwhatjusticemoderationcourageandwisdomeachis”.And,headds thatthelongerroadwouldprovide“thenestpossibleviewofthese matters”[504b1]137 He,then,raisesthequestionwhetherthefourvirtues arethemostimportantthings.Hisanswerisinthenegative.Themost importantsubject,hesays,istheFormoftheGood.Thelongerroad,one mightassumeonthebasisofthesecomments,istheexplanationofthe

136 )BasedonwhatIsaysubsequentlyabouttherelationbetweentheFormsand theGood,onemightthinkthatthehardquestioniswhetherthewholesoulisimmanent intheactionofanyoneofitsparts.

137 )Toanticipate,onemightsupposethatthesubsequentdiscussionoftheGood, thelongerroad,isthoughtbyPlatotoprovideamorefundamentalapproachtothe questionofjustice.Whetherthatwashismotivationforhisdigressionintothehighly theoreticalaccountofepistemologyandmetaphysicsisunclear.StillBooksVIandVIIdo notexplainhowtheGoodissuperiortojustice,nordotheycontributetoSocrates’ responsetothetwobrothers’challenge.

Good.And,indeed,therestofBookVI[505b1-511e3]isdevotedtothat. Socrates’explanationoftheGoodinthosepagesisbothdicultand profound.Butitdoesnotprovideasatisfactoryanswertothequestionin whatwaytheGoodissuperiortojusticeandtheothervirtues.Infact,it doesnotmakeclearhowtheprofoundmetaphysicalaccountoftheGood isrelevanttothemainthemeofthe Republic, namely,toitsmoraland politicalteaching.

138 TheGood,asitisdescribedinthelaterpartofBook VI,isaconceptofpuremetaphysics,ofepistemologyandofaxiology,not ofpracticalpoliticsorethics.

139

ItisclearthatpartofPlato’sintentioninthemiddlebooksistoshowin moredetailwhatisinvolvedinhavingaknowledgeofthewholeasitis describedat[428e].ThekindofphilosophicalknowledgePlatoascribesto philosopher-kingsisnothelpfulinthepracticaldaytodayaairsof runningacity,140 butitishelpfulforatheoreticalphilosopherwhowishes

138 )AristotleisreputedtohavetoldthestoryofPlato’slecture“OntheGood”. (SeeGaiser1980)Apparently,theaudiencewasdisappointedbyhearingalectureon mathematicsraterthanonethics.Thesamethingmightbesaidaboutreaderswho expectedanaccountofvirtuesbutgotanaccountofmetaphysicsinBookVIofthe Republic.

139 )OneofthechallengespresentedbyPlato’sconceptoftheGoodisthatthereis, infact,aconnectionbetweenmetaphysicsandethicsthatcouldbemade,butthe Republicdoesnotmakethisconnection.Spinoza’smajorworkisanillustrationofamore satisfactoryaccountofthatsubject.And,ifoneweretogoastepfurtherandsawthe GoodofPlatoonthemodelofSpinoza’sinnitesubstance,onemightgaininsightinto therelationbetweentheGoodandtheForms.(ThinkoftherelationbetweenSubstance andformalessencesinSpinoza’sEthics.)

140 )ThereferenceinBookVIItoreturningtothecaveforfteenyearsmightbe seenaspoliticallyrelevant.Still,itdoesnotspecifyhowbeingactiveinciviclifeduring thatperiodteachesdialecticianspracticalwisdom.

tounderstandwhatitistograspthecomplexunityofdierentfactorsthat makeitup.Forthisreason,itistemptingtoseethesectionontheGoodas adigressionfromthemainargument,alateradditiontoanearlierversion ofthework.141 Inmyview,BooksVIandVIIaddressthequestionofwhat philosophytrulyisincontrasttotheonearticulatedintheearlybooks. Theguardiansofthoseearlybooksarephilosophersinapopularsense, theylovelearning,andpossessknowledgeofthecityandofthesoulin theircomplextotality.[428c0]142

Consequently,thequestionsraisedbythe Republic aswehaveittoday, includingBooksVIandVII,are:a)Howtheoreticalknowledgesupports

141 )H.Thesle(Thesle2009)givesanumberofstylisticandhistoricalreasonsfor theexistenceofa“Proto-Republic”,andforregardingtheworkaswehaveittodayasa complexoffragmentscompletedonlyattheendofPlato’slife.But,wheneveritwas completed,today’sRepublicisacoherentwhole.So,thediscussionoftheGoodmight haveseemedtoPlatoasaneededmeta-theoreticalreectiononsomeofthekeyconcepts ofethicsandpolitics.And,forthatreason,headdeditlater.

142 )Cooper(1977,p.151)aimstodirectattentiontoPlato’smetaphysicsinorder todiscover“whatkindofpersonthisiswhomPlatocallsjust”.Inhisview,therearetwo componentstothedenitionofjustice.TherstisgiveninBooksIItoIVandtheother inBooksVtoVII.Hisaccountofjusticeintheearlybooksisclosetomine,buthis accountofwhatissaidinthemiddlebooksisslightlydierent.Sincehisaccountofwhat itistobejustrequiresamodelofperfectjustice,herequiresthedescriptionofwhatisthe perfectlygood.Inhisview,theknowledgeofthegoodiswhatprovidesasubstantive accountoftheruleofreasonmissingintheearlierbooks.IdierfromCooperinthathe believesthattobejustonemusthaveatheoreticalknowledgeofthegoodbutIdonot.In myview,someonecanbejustwithouthavingthatknowledge.Anappetitivetypeof personcould,inmyview,beas“platonically”justasareasoningtypeifitssoulisinorder. ThesourceofthedierencebetweenmyviewandCooper’sisthatforhimperfectjustice requirespromotionofthewelfareofothersandofthecity.Thismaybepartofjusticeasit isordinarilyconceivedbutnotasitconceivedbyPlato.Inmyview,thetheoretical knowledgeofthegoodisrequiredbythosewhowishtoknowwhatmakesjusticewhatit is,butitisnotrequiredbythosewhowishtobejust.

practicalknowledgeand,b)inwhatprecisewaythissupportisexercised?

Tosaythatinanidealregimephilosopherswouldhavetobekingsdoesnot answerthosequestionsbecauseitdoesnotexplainwhyrulersofcitiesneed tohavemorethanapracticalknowledge(phronesis)ofpoliticsand psychology.AttheendofBookV,havingstatedthat“Untilphilosophers’ ruleaskings...citieswillhavenorestfromevils”[573d],Socratesremarks that“[they]needtodene[forthepeople]whothephilosophersarethat wedaretosaymustrule”[474d4].Thissuggeststhat,insteadof elaboratingonwhathesaidinBooksIItoIVaboutphilosophyand guardianship,heisturninghisattentiontothebadreputationphilosophy hasamongthepeople.Andthisiswhatleadshimtoelaborateanovel, morerigorousconceptionofit.143 However,asfarasmoralandpolitical wisdomisconcerned,thetraininginmathematicsandastronomy describedinBookVII,ishardlyrelevant.TheguardiansofBooksII-IVare wiserthantheirsubjects.Havingagraspoftheneedsofthewholecity, theyaloneknowhowparticularmatterstintothegeneralcontext,and theyalonehavetheproper judgment forknowingwhentomaketheright politicaldecision.And,insofarasknowingtheGoodistoknowhow

143 )TheallegoryofthecaveinBookVIIimplies,rst,aradicaldierencebetween philosophersandordinarycitizens,suggestingthatphilosophercouldteachthem somethingaboutwhatliesbeneaththeirillusions.Second,thefteenyearsspentby prospectivephilosophersbackinthecave[540a2]impliesthattheeducationisalsoabout practicalandnotonlyhighlyesoterictheoreticalmatters.Whatismissing,though,isan explanationofhowtraininginmathematicsandparticipationinargumentwillprepare candidatesforpoliticalrule.

eternaltruths(Forms)relatetooneanotherinacoherenttotality,ithas implicationsfortheprocessofpracticaldecisionmaking.Butthis knowledgeisnotdirectlyrelevanttomakingthosedecisions.Oneproblem withthepoliticsofthemiddlebooksisthatitchampions absolute (infallible)knowledge,andthereforethosewhohaveitmusthaveabsolute politicalpower.

At[509b5]SocratesnotesthattheGoodisbeyondbeing.Presumably, thismeansthatitisnotoneoftheForms144,butthatitis,rather,their conditionofexistence.Onmyreading,thismeansthattheGood,like Spinoza’sinnitesubstance,isimmanenttoForms(essentialbeings)and thatatthesametimeitisbeyondthem145.Also,thiswayofunderstanding theGoodshedslightontheethical/politicalissue.Platoidenties four virtuesinordertodene one ofthem.Threeofthefourareassociated

144 )Itispuzzlingthatat[505a]heasksGlauconwhetherhehasheardof“theform ofthegood”.ThequestionseemstobeincontradictionwiththeclaimthattheGoodis beyondbeing,andwiththecommentthat“[they]havenoadequateknowledgeofit”. WhatareFormsifnottheultimateobjectsofknowledge,andifFormsaretheparadigms ofbeing,howcantheGoodbeoneofthem,yetbebeyondthem?

145 )AplausiblereadingofPlato’sdescriptionoftherelationbetweeneveryday objects,FormsandtheGoodmightbethis:scienticknowledge,outlinedinthethird sectionofthedividedline,decomposesobjectsofperceptionintotheirconceptual elements,Forms.Thisre-orientationofthesoulcausesatraumaticexperience.However, inthelightoftheGoodthesethoughtobjectsarerecomposedintoaconceptualunity, whichexpressesthetruenature,thegood,oftheperceptualobject.It,then,becomes apparentthatthelatteraremerecopiesoftheformer.Thus,forexample,isthewaythe dialecticianslearnofthegoodofbeingjust.

withthreepartsofthesoul.Thefourth,justice,isa)apower146 thatmakes theothervirtues,andcitiesandsouls,whattheyare[443b3,443b8].Also,

b)itisakindofnon-meddlingofthethreepartsofthesoul.But,inorder forittobeaneectivepower,andaneectivecoordinatorofthedierent partsofthesoul,thejustmusthaveagraspofhowdierentelements withinitcancombinetoformaneectiveunit,aOne.Thegoodofathing isthatwhichmakesitwhatittrulyis.Inmetaphysicalterms,theGoodis whatrevealsindividualFormsasthespecicFormsthattheyareinrelation tooneanother.Inthemoralandpoliticalcontext,theGoodofaperson, andtheGoodofacity,theirvirtue,iswhatmakesthemtrulywhatthey are,auniedwhole.Apracticallywiseperson,actingwithaviewtowhata personoracityasawholeis,hasatacitknowledgeofwhatmathematics andmetaphysicsteaches.Butitdoesnot,andneedsnot,haveanexplicit knowledgeofthosetwodisciplines.So,Plato’sdiscussionoftheGood,and itsrelationtoForms,isrelevanttothedialecticalpursuitofthebasic preconditionsofpoliticaltheorybutnotofpracticalpoliticalrule.

Socratesdeclaresat[462ab]that“thegreatestgoodindesigningacity -thegoodatwhichthelegislatoraimsatinmakingthelaw(is)...thatwhich bringsittogetherandmakesitone”.Itistemptingtoseethisas anticipationoftheGoodasitisexplainedinBooksVIandVII.Infact,a 146 )Whattomakeoftheearliercomment[443b3]thatjusticeis“thispower,that producesmenandcitiesofthesortwehavedescribed”?Doesitimplythatjusticeisthe mostimportantsubjectbecauseitproducesalltheothervirtues?Doesit,then,anticipate whatwillbesaidabouttheGoodlater/[504e3]

passageinBookVI[504e-505a]impliesthatthemostimportantsubjectis thatoftheformoftheGood,because“bytheirrelationtoitthatjust thingsandtheothersbecomeusefulandbenecial”.EversinceAristotle, commentatorsonPlato’saccountoftheGoodquestioneditsrelevanceto moralandpoliticalphilosophy.Inmyview,thedoctrineoftheGoodisa highlyabstractmetatheory.Itinviteslegislators,suchasSocratesandhis interlocutors,toconsidernotsimplywhatisajustsocietybut,also,to considerwhatitmeansforitbejust.InPlato’sview,Ipropose,unityisthe preconditionofjusticeinthecityandintheindividual.Itisthatwhich makesitaGood.Aguardianofthecitymuststrivetobringaboutthe unityofitsmanyparts,butitsfoundersneedtohaveahigherknowledgein ordertoseehowitisitsgreatestgood.

ThetenuousrelationbetweenthetheoreticalphilosophyofBooksVI andVIIandthepracticalphilosophyoftherestofthe Republic mightbe clariedbyacloserlookatthemetaphorofthe dividedline givenatthe endofBookVI.Foursectionsofthelinerepresentfourtypesofcognition inascendingorder(AD,DC,CEandEB).Therstsection,AD,covers cognitionbasedonfragmentsofimpressionsprovidedbythesenses,and fromillusionsresultingfromadisorderlycombinationofthose impressions.Thenextsection,DC,bycontrast,coversanorderly,butstill partial,constructionbasedontheinformationgainedthroughthesenses.

Thistypeofknowledgeisabouttheactuallyexistingconstituentsofthe perceptibleworld:ofnaturalobjectsandartifacts.Itispossessedby craftsmenwhoareexpertsintheirspecicrealmofendeavour.Onmy readingofthemetaphor,statesmen:craftsmen147 ofthecityandofits citizens,wouldoccupythetopofthesecondsection.Thethirdsection, CE,theintelligible,representsaradicalbreakwiththeworldofeveryday objects,itisadeconstructionofthecognitionofactuallyexistingvisible objectsintotheirbasicconceptualelements:simple,primitive, mathematicalForms.148 Still,trueunderstandingisnotyetobtainedonthis levelofcognition.Inordertoattaintrueunderstanding(noesis),the fundamentalconceptualelementsneedtoberecombined/reconstructed intocoherentthoughttotalities.Itisatthispoint(EB)thattheGood comesintoplay.Itisboththeinstrumentandtheendresultoftheprocess ofreconstruction.149

147 )Amastercraftsman,asitisdescribedintheStatesman[259e-260b]wouldhave agraspofthetotalityofwhatisrequiredinhistrade.Similarly,theguardiansofBooks II-IVwouldhaveagraspofthecityasawhole[427c8].Bothwouldhaverightopinions aboutwhattodo,whenandwhy,buttheywouldnothaveapurelytheoreticalknowledge ofthewaytheirtheirdecisionsandactionsrelatetoexpertiseinothercrafts.

148 )IntheallegoryofthecavePlatodescribesthetraumaofleavingandreturning asatwofoldprocess.First,leavingthedarknessofthecavetheescapedprisonerisblinded bysunlight.Second,onhisreturnheisonceagainblinded,thistimebydarkness.Forme, thisillustratestheradicalbreakbetweenempiricalandconceptualcognitioninthemove fromtherstandthesecondhalfofthedividedline.

149 )IntoorderreconstructsimpleprimitiveFormsintoFormsofactuallyexisting things noesis, thehighestlevelofintelligence,needstogobackdowntothetopofsecond level,thatofperceptualtotalities,naturalthingsandartifactsastheycomeintopractical

Inordertomaketheaboveanalysismoreaccessible,anumberof interpretivehypothesismighthelp.How,forexample,cantheGoodbethe guidingprincipleabovetheFormsyetbeinseparablefromthem?Oneway ofansweringthisquestionistosaythatthemainfunctionofreasonisto seekunitywithinthepluralityofelementswithwhichitisconfronted conceptually.Withouttheseelementsitwouldbeinoperative,butit cannotbeidentiedwithanyoneofthem.Totheextentthatonecan speakofa“formofthegood”[505a1,508e1]andatthesametimesaythat itis“notbeing,butsuperiortoitinrankandpower”[509b7],onemust haveinmindadistinctionbetweensingularbeingsandtheBeingoftheir totality.150 Inconclusion,IwishtorestatemyinterpretationofBooksVIandVII ofthe Republic. Theconnectionbetweentheepistemologicaland metaphysicaldoctrinesofthesebooksandthemoral/politicalteachingof theearlybooksistenuous.Onthemostgenerousinterpretation,the middlebooksprovideametaphysicalcomplementtothemorepractical

150 )ItwouldnotbefarfetchedtosuggestthatwithhisconceptionoftheGoodand itsrelationtotheForms,PlatoanticipatesSpinoza’sdistinctionbetweensubstanceand attributes,or,Heidegger’sdistinctionbetween“Being”and“beings”. consciousness.Indtherelationbetweentheempiricalobject,water,andH20,its essence,suggestivehere.ByunderstandingwhatH20is,one understandstheelements, Forms,thatwaterismadeof.

notionofphilosophy151 reliedonintheearlybooks.Infact,contrarilytothe waytheyhaveusuallybeenread,BooksVIandVIIaremoreabout philosophythanaboutmoralityorpolitics.152 Nevertheless,thephilosophy ofBooksVIandVIIisnotcompletelyirrelevanttopolitics.For,itisPlato’s beliefthatphilosophy,bothinitspracticalanditstheoreticalpractice,is fundamentallylinkedtoasearchforacomplextotalityofthatwhichunites disparatefactors.ThediscussionoftheGoodrevealsthenatureofwhatit istobeacomplexwholeandhowitrelatestoparticularbeings.Inthat way,itprovidestheconceptualunderpinningofallformsofthoughtthat seektoberational.Whatitdoesnotdo,however,istogivepracticaladvice forgoodgovernance.

151 )At[410d-412b]andat[428cd]philosophyisassociatedwithmusicandpoetry, anditischaracterizedastheloveoflearning,havinggoodjudgementandgraspingthings intheirtotality.Thesearethemainqualitiesrequiredforguardianship.

152 )WhatmakesthepoliticsofBookVIIoensivelytotalitarianisPlato’s misguidedbeliefthatphilosophyatisbestisthepreconditionforpoliticsatitsbest.

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