GlobalEnvironmentalChange
journalhomepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/gloenvcha
Climatechangeandthetransitiontoneoliberalenvironmentalgovernance
DavidCipleta,⁎,J.TimmonsRobertsb
a UniversityofColoradoBoulder,397UCB,Boulder,CO80309,USA
b BrownUniversity,IBES,BrownUniversity,Box1951,85WatermanStreet,Providence,RI02912,USA
ARTICLEINFO
Keywords:
Climatechange
Neoliberalenvironmentalgovernance Unitednationsframeworkconventionon climatechange
Inequality
Climatejustice
ABSTRACT
Whataretheguidingprinciplesofcontemporaryinternationalgovernanceofclimatechangeandtowhatextent dotheyrepresentneoliberalforms?Wedocument fivemainpoliticalandinstitutionalshiftswithintheUN FrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC)andoutlinecoregovernancepracticesforeachphase.In discussingthecurrentphasesincetheParisAgreement,weoffertotheemergingliteratureoninternational neoliberalenvironmentalgovernanceananalyticalframeworkbywhichtheextentofinternationalneoliberal governancecanbeassessed.Weconceptualizeinternationalneoliberalenvironmentalismascharacterizedby fourmainprocesses:theprominenceoflibertarianidealsofjustice,inwhichjusticeisdefinedastherational pursuitofsovereignself-interestbetweenunequalparties;marketization,inwhichmarketmechanisms,private sectorengagementandpurportedly ‘objective’ considerationsareviewedasthemosteffectiveandefficient formsofgovernance;governancebydisclosure,inwhichtheprimaryobstaclestosustainabilityareunderstood as ‘imperfectinformation’ andonerousregulatorystructuresthatinhibitinnovation;andexclusivity,inwhich multilateraldecision-makingisshiftedfromconsensustominilateralism.Againstthisframework,wearguethat thecontemporaryUNFCCCregimehasinstitutionalizedneoliberalreformsinclimategovernance,althoughnot withoutresistance,inaconfigurationwhichisstarklydifferentthanthatofearliereras.Weconcludebydescribingfourcrucialgapsleftbythistransition,whichincludetheabilityoftheregimetodriveadequate ambition,andgapsintransparency,equityandrepresentation.
1.Introduction
Duringthelastweekofthelong-anticipatedUNclimatechange negotiationsinCopenhagenin2009,leadingclimateactivistBill McKibbenpublishedanarticleinthe Guardian withthetitle “Copenhagen:onlythenumberscount – andtheyadduptohellon earth.” HewasreferringtothefactthatanewwebsitecalledClimate Interactivehadaddedupallofthepromisesmadebystatestoreduce theiremissions,andtheconclusionwasthatglobalemissionsconcentrationswouldincreasetomorethandoublewhatmanyscientists believedtobereasonablysafebytheyear2100.McKibbensaidthat undertheseconditions, “wewouldliveinhell,oratleastaplacewitha similartemperature” (McKibben,2009).
AtthetimeofMcKibben’sstatement,ashiftingovernanceinthe UnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC) wasbelievedbymanytohaveweakenedtheabilityoftheregimeto carryoutitscorefunction:reducinggreenhousegasemissionsand stabilizingtheglobalclimatesystem,whichhadparticularimplications intheneartermfortheworld’spoorestandlowest-lyingislandcountries(Cipletetal.,2015).Changesininternationalclimategovernance
⁎ Correspondingauthor.
thatwereintroducedinCopenhagenwereinstitutionalizedoverthe nextsixyearsofnegotiations,culminatinginParisinlate2015.In particular,a ‘topdown’ systemofmorebindingnational ‘targetsand timetables’ foremissionsbasedonresponsibilityforclimatechangeand capabilitiestoaddressitwerereplacedbyasystemof ‘bottomup’ pledgesbyeachnation.Thoughtherewasmuchcelebrationatthe final gavelinParis,theambivalenceabouttheoutcomeandnewdirection wasstillpalpable.Someobservershailedtheoutcomeandapproachas bringingnationstothetablewiththelevelofcommitmenttheywere comfortablewith,providingthebestoutcomepossible(e.g. Stavins, 2015;Bodansky,2016;Victor,2016).Butacknowledgingtheinadequacyofthedealtostabilizetheclimate,journalistGeorgeMonbiot wrote, “Bycomparisontowhatitcouldhavebeen,it’samiracle.By comparisontowhatitshouldhavebeen,it’sadisaster” (Monbiot, 2015).
Whatdrovetheshiftinclimategovernance,andhowdoweunderstanditspotentialforfuturesuccessinaddressingtheneedforrapid ofgreenhousegasemissionsreductionsinanequitablefashion?This articlecontributestoanemergentbodyofscholarshipthatseeksto makesenseofclimategovernanceandparticularlythepost-Paris
E-mailaddresses: david.ciplet@colorado.edu (D.Ciplet), timmons@brown.edu (J.T.Roberts).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2017.09.003
Received15December2016;Receivedinrevisedform18August2017;Accepted1September2017
regimeandtheneoliberalizationofenvironmentalgovernancemore broadly(e.g. Goldman,2006;Conca,2006;Newell,2008; Fieldman, 2011;BondiandLaurie,2012).Weask:whataretheguidingprinciples ofcontemporaryinternationalgovernanceofclimatechangeandto whatextentdotheyrepresentneoliberalforms?Wedocument five mainpoliticalandinstitutionalshiftsandoutlinecoregovernance practicesforeachphase.Weacknowledgethesephasesareashiftingset ofnegotiatedsettlements,dealsandaccommodationssubjecttochange andcontestation.Whiletherearedistinctandsignificantinstitutional andnormativechangesrelevanttoeachphase,manycharacteristicsof theclimateregimehaveremainedconstantacrossphases.Asaprocess shapedbycompetingpoliticalcoalitions,wedonotsuggestthatthe regimehasevolvedinalinearorpredictablefashion.Indiscussingthe currentphasesincetheParisAgreement,weoffertotheemergingliteratureoninternationalneoliberalenvironmentalgovernanceananalyticalframeworkbywhichtheextentofinternationalneoliberalgovernmentcanbeassessed.Whileseveralexistingarticlesaddressaspects ofboththeclimateregimeandneoliberalgovernance,effortssofar havefocusedonspecificcomponentsoftheregime;lackingisamore comprehensiveviewinrelationtogovernance,politicaleconomicand ideologicaldevelopments.
Notably,thisarticlebuildsfrompreviousscholarshipwhicharticulatedtheforcesthathaveshapedthisshiftingovernance. Ciplet etal.(2015) arguedthatthecontemporaryclimateregimewasconditionedbystrategicinteractionsbetweenstate,businessandcivilsociety coalitions,andworldhistoricdevelopmentswhichstymieddomestic mitigationactionandinternationalcooperation.ThisincludedthedeclininghegemonyoftheUnitedStatesanditsresultingeconomicinsecurityinrelationtoChinaandwaninginternationalleadership; fragmentationofeconomicandenvironmentalpositionsandidentities amongstatesintheglobalSouthfromasimplerNorth-Southduality;a majorglobaleconomicrecessionduetospeculativecapital,andsubsequentausteritypoliciesinseverallargeemittingcountries;theriseof libertarianandpopulistideologiesantagonistictostateinterventionon environmentalproblems;shiftinggeopoliticalrelationsrelatedtounconventionalenergydevelopment;andagrowingemphasisbymainstreamenvironmentalorganizationsandtheirfundersonmarket-based andvoluntarystructuresofgovernance(Roberts,2011;Cipletetal., 2015;CipletandRoberts,2017).Thespecificformthecontemporary governanceregimehastakenwasalsoconditionedbydevelopingstate andcivilsocietyresistance(Ciplet,2015;Cipletetal.,2015;Ciplet, 2014).Assuch,wedonotassertthatthereisanyinevitableorlinear pathtoneoliberalformsofinternationalenvironmentalgovernance.
Thisarticledrawsuponovertwodecadesofcollectiveexperienceby theauthorsasobserversandparticipantsinUnitedNationsclimate negotiations.Datacollectionhasincludeddozensofextensiveinterviewswithkeystate,industry,bureaucratic,andcivilsocietystakeholdersintheprocess,informalinterviewsandobservationaldata collectedduringthenegotiationsandrelatedeventssince2003(includingvideoarchives),andanalysisofkeytexts,agreements,and secondarysourcesextendingbacktothefoundingUNFCCCConvention in1992.Interviewswereconductedwithstateactorsindelegations fromtheUnitedStatesandEuropeancountries,andcloseworkwith LeastDevelopedCountries(LDC)GroupandtheAssociationof IndependentLatinAmericanandCaribbeanstates(AILAC)negotiators andexpertsupportstaff.Wealsoparticipatedininternationalcivil societymeetingsinovertwentyUNFCCCnegotiationssince2003and incollaborativeworkwithresearchinstitutionsindevelopedanddevelopingcountries.Climatechangeisacrucialissue,buttheanalysis andconceptualizationofinternationalneoliberalenvironmentalgovernancepresentedinthispaperalsohasimplicationsforourunderstandingoftheguidinggovernanceprinciplesthatmaybeemergentin otherglobalenvironmentalregimes.
Webeginbydrawinguponrelevantliteraturetomapthekey characteristicsofneoliberalenvironmentalgovernance.Inthenext section,wediscussthe firstfourdistinctphasesofinternationalclimate
governanceandtheguidingcharacteristicsofeach.Insectionthree,we assessthecontemporaryphaseinrelationtoouranalyticalframework, anddiscussthewaysinwhich “actuallyexisting” neoliberalclimate governanceappearstoconformtoaneoliberalapproach.Weconclude byassessingtheimplicationsoftheseshiftsininternationalgovernance. Wedescribefourcrucialgapsthatremainatleastpartlyasaresultof theneoliberalturninenvironmentalgovernance.Theseincludethatthe regime appearsunabletodriveadequatemitigationactionand financialsupportforpoornations,andunacceptablegapsremaininaccountability,equityandrepresentation.
2.Neoliberalismininternationalenvironmentalgovernance
Neoliberalismcanbedescribedas “apoliticallyguidedintensificationofmarketrule” inthepublicrealm(Brenneretal.,2010;184).Or morecritically,associologistPierreBourdieuhasexplained,neoliberalismisa “programmefordestroyingcollectivestructureswhichmay impedethepuremarketlogic” (Bourdieu1998citedinGareau2013: 42). GillandLaw(1993) describedhowtheReaganandThatcher governmentssoughttoliberatetheprivatesectorfromstateregulation as “aconsciousefforttochangeexpectationsandideasabouttheappropriateroleofgovernment,theimportanceofprivateenterprise,and thevirtuesofmarkets.”
Scholarshiponneoliberalismhasoftenbeencritiquedforanalytical imprecisionoftheconceptanditsapplicationtolocalandtransnational contextsofgovernance(Castree,2008a;PeckandTickell,2002; Mansfield,2004).Specifically,theprojecttomorepreciselydefinethe commonlinesandprocessesthatbringcoherencytoneoliberalismasa politicalprojecthasbecomeamajorfocusinrelatedscholarship (Castree,2008a,b),andhasoftencentereduponeffortstoclarifyits variegatedformsandwaysinwhichitiscontextuallybound(Peckand Tickell,2002).Tobesure,numerousworkshavearticulatedthatneoliberalismisneverimplementeduniformly,andfacesformsofresistanceandcritiquethatconditionitslivingarticulations(Peckand Tickell,2002).Wesupportthatpositionhere,whileattemptingto outlinethechangesthathavecomeindifferentphasestohowglobal climatechangeisgoverned.
Aninterdisciplinarybodyofscholarshiphasidentified “neoliberal environmentalism” or “marketenvironmentalism” (Beder,2001),as partofagrowingtrendtowardtheneoliberalizationofnature (McCarthy,2004;Mansfield,2004;Bridge,2004;Prudham,2004). Theseworksemphasizeanapproachtosolvingenvironmentalproblems throughprivatization,commercializationandcommodificationofnaturalresourcesandecosystems(Bakker,2005;544),theerosionofstate governanceinfavorofmarketmechanismsandpublic-privatepartnerships(Bakker,2007),increaseddominanceoftheprivatesectorin environmentaldecision-making(Corson,2010), andtheminimizingof normativeconcernsthatdeviatefrommarket-basedornarrowlydefinedscience-basedprinciples(Gareau,2013).
Notably,asmallbutgrowingfocushascenteredonwhatsome scholarsviewasaneoliberalturnofglobalorinternationalenvironmentalgovernanceinregimessuchastheMontrealProtocol(Gareau, 2013),BaselConvention(LucierandGareau,2015;Okereke,2007),the UnitedNationsConferenceontheLawoftheSea(Okereke,2007),and theUNFCCC(Okereke,2007;Bond,2008;Lohmann,2009;Newelland Paterson,1998,2009,2010;Parr,2014;Koch,2012;Cipletetal., 2015).Thisworkhaspointedtofourmaindevelopmentswhichdefine internationalneoliberalenvironmentalgovernance(Table1).First, Okereke(2007) arguesthatthedominanceof libertarianideasofjustice haveundermineddistributivejusticeprinciplesembeddedinformative regimetextsinregimessuchastheUnitedNationsConferenceofthe LawoftheSea,theUNFCCC,andtheBaselConvention.Okerekepoints totwomain “neoliberaljusticeprinciples” whichhearguesdominatein thesecontexts:justiceasprivatepropertyandjusticeasmutualadvantage.Theprincipleofjusticeaspropertyrightsassertsthatindividuallibertiestrumpallothersocialandpoliticalideals(41).In D.Ciplet,J.T.Roberts
D.Ciplet,J.T.Roberts
Table1
Definingcharacteristicsofinternationalneoliberalenvironmentalgovernance.
KeycharacteristicsGuidinglogicsOmittedandexcludedprinciplesandpractices
LibertarianjusticeidealsSustainabilitycanbestbeachievedbyprotectingindividualliberties andpropertyrightsandenablingtherationalpursuitofsovereignselfinterestbetweenunequalpartiesbasedonpluralconceptionsofthe good;responsibilityfortakingenvironmentalmeasuresshouldbe sharedbyallactorsvoluntarily
MarketizationMarketmechanisms,privatesectorengagement,andpurportedly ‘objective’ considerationsaremosteffectiveandefficientformsof governance
Governancebydisclosure andvoluntarism
Primaryobstaclestosustainabilityare ‘imperfectinformation’,lackof transparency,andonerousregulatorystructuresthatinhibitinnovation
Exclusivedecision-makingIntensifiedminilateralismandbilateralismbetweenstates,oftenoutside oftheconstraintsoftheregimearemoreefficientandeffectivemeansof governanceinthecontextoftransnationalcomplexityandcoordination problems
internationalregimes,thismeansthat “institutionsmustguaranteethe freedomsofindividuals[orpresumablysovereignstates]toexploit theirnaturaladvantages …” (41).
Asforjusticeasmutualadvantage,thisprincipleproposesthat “the rulesofjusticecanbederivedfromtherationalagreementofagentsto cooperatewithoneanothertofurthertheirself-interest” (Okereke, 2007:43).Inthecontextofinternationalenvironmentalgovernance, thisviewseekstorecognizeandaffirmasymmetriesofresourcesand powerbetweenstatesingovernancearrangements,ratherthanmitigate them.Thispointstotheimportanceofinstitutionsthatenablevoluntarycoordinationbasedonpluralconceptionsofthegood,andthat allowforstateswithunequalresourcestopursueandmaximizetheir gainsundertheminimalconstraintsofanagreedframework(45).The applicationofthisprincipleintheParisAgreement’srelianceonentirelyvoluntaryandself-determined “nationally-determinedcontributions” isunmistakable.
Asappliedininternationalregimes,bothneoliberalprinciplespoint totheabilityofexistingmarketconditionstosolvesustainabilityproblems.However,Okerekearguesthattheseconceptionsofjusticeare pitteddirectlyagainstnormativeidealsofdistributivejusticeand equityinthatrequirementstotransferresourcesfromtheglobalNorth totheglobalSouthareseentoviolateidealsoflaissez-fairepoliticsand therightsthatpeopleandstateshavetotheirproperty(Okereke2007: 191-92,citingNozick1974:238).AsOkerekeexplains, “…themost significantinadequacyofneoliberalenvironmentalpatternsofgovernanceistheirinabilitytocountenancequestionsofdistributiveequity inherentintheconceptofglobalsustainability” (176).
Aspartoftheshifttolibertarianprinciplesofjustice,responsibility fortakingenvironmentalmeasuresisviewedassharedbyallactors, ratherthanasbasedona ‘polluterpays’ principle.Thiscanbeunderstoodasaprocessof ‘responsibilization ’– thatofburdeningabroad rangeofstateandnon-stateactors(includinginthosesocietieswiththe leastresources)withtheresponsibilityto fillthemoralgaps “leftbehindbytheretreatoftheneoliberalstatefromassumingitssocio-moral duties” (Shamir,2008:3).
Second,scholarsofneoliberalinternationalenvironmentalgovernanceidentifyincreasingrelianceonmarketmechanismsandprivate sectoractorstoaddresssocialandpoliticalproblems.InGramscian terms,scholarsarguethatmarketandprivatesectordominancehas becomehegemonicinguidingregimedecision-making.Througha processof “depoliticization”,thatis, “toremoveissuesfrompolitical contention” (Jaeger,2007,258),thesenormsareoftenpaintedas common-sense,objectiveorneutral,ascomparedtoconsiderationsof equityandjusticewhicharedepictedasvalue-ladenandnormative, andtherefore ‘political.’ Gareau(2013) arguesthat “The historyof
Distributivejusticeinresponsetostructuralinequalities
Precautionaryprincipleandregulatoryformsofgovernance;human rights,socialwell-being,equity,socialandenvironmentaljustice; Indigenousandotherknowledgesystems;andnormsthatdon’tconform withmarketinterestsorthatarenotreadilymeasurable
Regulatoryandcompliancebasedformsofgovernance;responsibilityof environmentalactionbasedon “polluter-pays” principle,capabilityand historicalconsiderations
Consensus-based,universalistdecision-making,rootedinstate sovereignty;pluralisticglobalgovernance;representationofvulnerable actors
globalenvironmentalgovernanceinvolvesthegradualmovefrom precautionary, ‘command-and-control ’ stateregulatorysolutionsto private,market-basedsolutions” (43).Severalscholarshaveattributed theriseofemissionstradingwithintheUNFCCCprocesstoaneoliberal logicandalignmentwithprivatesectorinterests(NewellandPaterson, 1998,2009;Lohmann,2009;Bond,2008).Forexample, Newelland Paterson(2009) arguethatemissionstrading “becamethepreferred solutionbecauseofitsideological fitwithneoliberallogic,butitwas alsosuccessfulbecauseofits fitwithnewlydominant financialactors” (88).Thusitisnotnecessarilya “pure” formofneoliberalismthatis beingarranged,butonesthatbenefitspecificelites.
Thedominanceofmarket-basedapproachestoenvironmentalgovernance,andtheheightenedinfluenceofprivatesectoractorsindecision-makingandscienceprocesseshasalsobeenobservedinregimes suchastheBaselConvention(LucierandGareau,2015)andtheGlobal CommissiononDams(McCormick,2006).Forexample, Lucierand Gareau(2015) arguethatintheBaselConvention,hazardouswastes havebeenincreasinglytreatedaseconomic “resources.” Indoingso, marketactorshavere-framed “thetoxicwastestradeasessentialfor sustainableeconomicdevelopmentratherthanasamanifestationof globalenvironmentalinjustice ” (495).Similarly,inhisstudyofthe MontrealProtocol, Gareau(2013) arguesthatinthegovernanceof methylbromide,anozonedepletingsubstanceusedinagriculture,at thebehestofprivatesectorinterests,thetreatyhasinrecentyears turnedtomarket-basedpolicymechanismsandconsiderations.This move,heargues,hasfundamentallyinfluencedhowscientificknowledgeisacteduponinpolicygovernance,andwhatissues,strategiesand perspectivesareexcludedfromconsideration,ultimatelyundermining thetreaty’seffectiveness(249–250).
Whilescholarsarguethateconomicconsiderationshavealways beenpartofinternationalenvironmentalgovernance(suchasinthe StockholmConvention),including ‘liberal’ forms(see Bernstein,2002), environmentalneoliberalismrefersspecificallytocontemporarystages ofregimedevelopmentinwhichmarket-basedprinciplescometo eclipseornegatethoseofprecautionaryandequity-basedconcerns. Thus,ascomparedtoBernstein’s “liberal environmentalism”,neoliberal environmentalgovernancecanbeunderstoodasamorefullyimplementedstageofliberalism,withtheexpansionofthemarket,economicrationalityandprivategainasincreasinglyidentifiedasthe primarygoalsandsolemechanismsfortheprotectionofpublicand environmentalgoods.Intheprocess,governanceisinsulatedfrom normativeinterventionswhichextendbeyondthewell-definedinstitutionalboundsofmarket-orientedconsideration.Thishastheeffect ofempoweringthosethataredeemedtopossessexpertknowledge, includingmarketactors,whileoftenmarginalizinglaypeopleandtheir
context-speci ficconcerns(McCormick,2006:322).
Third,numerousscholarshavepointedtotheprominenceofthe principleof transparency asacentralcomponentofneoliberalinternationalenvironmentalgovernance.Underthebannerof “governanceby disclosure” and “empowermentthroughinformation”,transparency governancedefinestheprimaryobstaclestosustainabilityasthatof ‘imperfectinformation’ (Mason,2008,10),andonerousregulatory structuresthatinhibitinnovation.Addressingsuchgapsininformation disclosureispresumedtoenablecooperationamongactorsinan otherwiseanarchicinternationalsystem.However,despitetheattentiontotransparencyinneoliberalformsofgovernance,suchgovernanceframeworksrarelyfullyembracetransparencyinpractice(Weikmansetal.,2016)anddosoinpoliticalcontextsinwhichcertainideas andformsoftransparencytakeprecedenceoverothers.AsGuptaargues, “information(includingscientificinformation)isneithervalueneutral,noruniversallyvalid,andthusinformationaloneisnotlikely toresolvenormativeandpoliticalconflicts” (2008,5).
Whilethepursuitoftransparencymayalsolenditselftootherpoliticalgoalssuchasdemocracy,empowermentofdiversestakeholders, andimprovedgovernance,neoliberalenvironmentalgovernancehas beenarguedtoembracetransparencyspecifically inlieuof commandand-controlandcompliancebasedformsofgovernance,andasa ‘valueneutral’ meansofensuringgreaterefficiencytowardsustainability. Indeed, Mason(2008) contendsthatanalysisofdisclosuremeasuresin internationalenvironmentalgovernanceneedstosituatethesemeasuresinthebroaderpoliticaleconomiccontext(12).Specifically, transparencycanbeusedtopreemptstronger,complianceformsof regulatoryaction(Roberts,1998;Haufler,2010),toreinforceneoliberalnormsofindividualresponsibility(Mason,2008,12),andto elevatetheconcernsofpowerfulactorsoverothersunderaveilof neutrality.Indevelopingindustryprogramsofself-reportingonenvironmentalissues,thechemicalindustrywasanearlyinnovator,and its ‘ResponsibleCare’ programmewasexplicitlyproposedasanalternativetoregulation(Roberts,1998).As Mason(2008) argues, “The normativeagendahere,oftenunexamined,isthescalingbackof mandatoryenvironmentalregulation(nationallyandinternationally), theprivatizationofenvironmentalresources,andtheframingofinformationdisclosureoptionsintermsofindividuallifestylechoices” (10).Inclimategovernance,theParisMechanismforEnhanced Transparencyistheculminationofmanyyearsofnegotiationsonthe issue,butlacksteethforactualenforcementofactionsreported(Gupta and Asselt,2017).
A finaldevelopmentiscentraltotheshifttointernationalneoliberal environmentalgovernance: exclusivedecision-making.Specifically,while earlyphasesofenvironmentalgovernancehavebeenfoundedon principlesofconsensus-based,universalistdecision-making,equalsovereignstaterepresentation,and(sometimes)civilsocietyinclusion andpluralisticglobalgovernance(Rosenau,1995),developmentsinthe realmofclimategovernancesuggestthatneoliberalgovernanceinvolvesintensifiedminilateralismandbilateralismbetweenstates,often outsideoftheconstraintsoftheregime(Cipletetal.,2015).Thenature ofshiftingfromtop-downcompliance-basedformsofgovernanceto voluntary,transparency-orientedmechanismsshiftsthelocusofpower fromtheinternationalregimetodomesticcontexts.Assuch,states, oftenincoordinationwithprivateauthority(Cutleretal.,1999),are empoweredtoformexclusivealliancesoutsideofanyrigidconstraints oftheregime.
Scholarshipon “regimecomplexes” and “polycentricgovernance theory”,whichdirectsattentiontohowclimatechangeisnowgoverned byalooselycoupled,fragmentedanddecentralizedsetofspecific governanceprocesses,transnationalinstitutions,standards, financing arrangementsandprograms,ratherthanacomprehensiveoroverarchingregime(KeohaneandVictor,2011;Abbott,2012).Notably,the shifttoexclusivedecision-makingisrationalizedasamoreefficientand effectivemeansofgovernanceinthecontextoftransnationalcomplexityandcoordinationproblems,andnecessarytoovercometherigid
constraintsofmultilateralism.Scholarsarguethattheseamalgamshave advantages,includingadaptabilityand flexibility,particularlyinthe caseofhighuncertaintyintermsofcollectiveaction(Keohaneand Victor,2011).Benefitscanbeincreased,andcostsreduced,itisargued, wheninternationalorganizationsplayaroleoforchestratingnonhierarchicalactiontosupportschemesthatfurtherthepublicinterest (Abbott,2012).
However,developmentstounderminemultilateralismandconsensus-basedgovernanceinfavorofexclusivedecision-makingforms havenotoccurredwithoutresistancefromdevelopingcountrystates andcivilsociety,andthereareseriousimplicationstoequity.Forstates suchastheLeastDevelopedCountries,multilateralregimesareoften theonlycontextstomeaningfullyexpressoppositiontounequalpolicies,andtomakedemandsforenvironmentalandsocialjustice.Ifcore regimedecisionscanbemadeoutsideoftheregimecontext,meaningful oppositionandinsistenceondifficultissueslikeequityanddistributionaljusticecanbeminimizedandneoliberalreformscanbepushed through,aswasthecasewiththeCopenhagenAccord(seee.g. Ciplet etal.,2015).
3.Phasesofclimategovernance:aneoliberalclimatepolicy pivot?
Weidentify fivemajorphasesininternationalclimategovernance. The firstphasebeganinthe1970swithsupportforactiononglobal environmentalissuesattheStockholmconferenceandbeyond,through theMontrealProtocolonozone(Gareau,2010).Thesefocusedon protecting globalsocietyandtheecosystemuponwhichitrelies, withoutrequirementofcost-effectiveness.Rather,theycalledupon “Governmentsandpeoplestoexertcommoneffortsforthepreservation andimprovementofthehumanenvironment,forthebenefitofallthe peopleandfortheirposterity” (UNEP,1972).Fromthebeginning, developingnationssoughttoprotecttheirrighttodevelopment,andit wasunderstoodthatfairsolutionswouldinvolvesubstantial flowsof fundingfromtheglobalNorthwhichcreatedtheglobalenvironmental problems,totheglobalSouth,whichwassufferingmostoftheimpacts (NewellandRoberts,2007).
Thesecondphaseoccurredduringthefoundingyearsofthe UNFCCC,sometimeinthemid-1980s,throughthe1992UNFCCCdebateandapprovalinRiodeJaneiro,untilabout1996withtheinstitutionalizationoftheKyotoProtocol.Afterafailedconferencein Nairobiin1982,formerPrimeMinisterofNorwayGroHarlem Brundtlandwastaskedtoleadacommissiontoreconcilebusinessand environmentalism.Theirreportspecificallycalledformoreeconomic growth,arguingthatbusinesshadtobepartofthesolution(Brundtland Commission,1987;Lélé,1991;NewellandRoberts,2007).Inthat contextofcompromiseofstrongprotectionwiththeimperativeof growth,theUNFCCCwasoneofthreemajorinternationalconventions thatemergedoutofthenegotiationsattheRioEarthSummitin1992. Mostcentralwastheprincipleof “commonbutdifferentiatedresponsibilityandrespectivecapabilities” (UNFCCC,1992).Thisprinciple signifiedthatallcountrieshaveacommonroleinaddressingclimate change.However,italsoimpliedthatthisroleishighlydistinctinterms ofwhichstatesareresponsibleforhavingcausedtheproblem(largely understoodasbasedonhistoricalgreenhousegasemissions)andwhich stateshavethecapabilitytoaddresstheproblem(largelyunderstoodas basedonGDPorGDPpercapita).Thus,theideasof “equity” and “polluterpays” werecentraltothefoundingconvention:thosethat causedtheproblemandthathadthecapabilitytoactshoulddoso first andassumethelargestburdenofmitigationand financeobligations. Twoothermajorelementswerecarefullywordedaspartofthe foundingConvention.First,stateswouldtake “precautionary” actionto “avoiddangerousclimatechange,” meaningthattheywouldrespondto climatechangebasedonthebestevidenceavailable.Thisreflectedthe ideathatearlyandprecautionaryenvironmentalactionwasessentialto preventtheworstconsequences,particularlyincountrieswith “special
circumstances ” includingsmallislanddevelopingstatesandtheLeast DevelopedCountries,thetwogroupsofstatesbroadlyunderstoodtobe particularlyvulnerabletoclimatechangeimpacts.Second,theideasof “costeffectiveness” and “economicgrowth” werecentraltothe foundingConvention.Thetextcallsforactionwiththeunderstanding thatpoliciesandmeasurestoaddressclimatechangeshouldbe “costeffectivetoensureglobalbenefitsatthelowestpossiblecost” (UNFCCC, 1992).Moreover,itarguedthat, “ThePartiesshouldcooperateto promoteasupportiveandopeninternationaleconomicsystemthat wouldleadtosustainableeconomicgrowthanddevelopmentinall Parties,particularlydevelopingcountryParties,thusenablingthem bettertoaddresstheproblemsofclimatechange” (UNFCCC,1992). Thus,fromtheverybeginning,thediverse(andlikelycontradictory)principlesofequity,polluterpays,environmentalprecaution, cost-effectivenessandeconomicgrowthwereatthecenterofthe UNFCCCregime.ThislargelyreflectsStevenBernstein’sconceptionof liberalenvironmentalism(2002).Bernsteinarguedthatliberalenvironmentalismisreflectedintheideaofsustainabledevelopmentthat waspromotedbythe1987WorldCommissiononEnvironmentand Development.Thisideatriedtobridgeenvironmentalandeconomic concerns.InthewordsoftheWCED,sustainabledevelopment “aimed tolegitimateeconomicgrowthinthecontextofenvironmentalprotection” Bernstein,2002,2;seealso Lélé,1991).Thisnewapproach whichbecameincreasinglydominantintheearly1990s,framedenvironmentalproblemsinliberaltermsacrossenvironmentalregimes. Bernsteinarguedthattheprinciplesofliberalenvironmentalismwere institutionalizedaspartoftheRioEarthSummittoreflect “theview thatliberalizationintradeand financeisconsistentwith,andeven necessaryfor,internationalenvironmentalprotection,andthatbothare compatiblewiththeoverarchinggoalofsustainablegrowth” (2001,4). Lélédescribeshow “sustainabledevelopment” wasaphraseunderstood inentirelydifferentwaysbydifferentgroups,andwhichwasinconsistentandincompletelyconceptualized.Hedescribedhowitwasnecessarytoacknowledgethestructuralbasesofpovertyandenvironmentaldegradation.However,duetoambiguityinthetextsanda completelackofimplementationintoactionablepolicy,theseguiding principleswereinterpretedindiversewaysduringthefoundingyearsof theUNFCCC.Specifically,theextenttowhichtheregimewouldinclude primarilytop-down ‘command-and-control’ regulationoramarketbased systemwithtradableemissionspermits,orsomecombination, wasn’tyetclear(LevyandNewell,2002).Italsowasn’tclearhowthe principleofcommonbutdifferentiatedresponsibilitiesandrespective capabilitieswouldbeinterpretedinpractice,andtherewereseveral competingproposalsonwhichstatesshouldassumetheburdenofreducingemissions,andaccordingtowhatlogic.
Thedominantformofdecision-makingofthisphasewaswhatwe callinclusivemultilateralism.Makingdecisionsinthenewregimeincludedall194statesthathadratifiedtheConventionworkingcollectivelytoensurethattheirowninterestswererepresentedeffectivelyin thetexts.However,certainactors,andnamelytheUnitedStatesand EuropeanUnion,heldmuchgreaterinfluencethanotheractorsoverthe formthatthenextagreementwouldtakeinKyotoin1997(Meckling, 2011;LevyandNewell,2002).
ThethirdphaseoftheregimebeganwiththeKyotoProtocolagreed toin1997andendedwiththeCopenhagenAccordin2009.Duringthis phase,theguidingprinciplesoftheregimewereinstitutionalizedintoa regulatoryframework.The firstcommitmentphaseoftheKyoto Protocolwouldcomeintoeffectin2005andexpirein2012.Akey decision,whichwasparticularlycontentious,concernedwhetherto allowthetradingofemissionspermitsbetweencountries,andthe “offsetting” ofemissionsreductionresponsibilitiesthroughinvestment inlow-emissionsprojectsintheglobalSouth(LevyandNewell,2002; Meckling,2011).ThelogicoftheCleanDevelopmentMechanism (CDM)wasthatamarketmechanismwouldeasetheeconomicburden ondevelopedcountriesbecauseemissionsreductionscouldoftenbe achievedatafarlowercostindevelopingcountries.Thisapproach
embodiedliberalenvironmentalism:internationalgovernancewould stillplayanactiveregulatoryrole,butitwouldbecomplementedwith amarketapproach.
AftergettingitswaywiththecreationoftheCleanDevelopment Mechanism,theU.S.neverratifiedKyoto,creatingafragmentedsystem whichwassupposedtoberesolvedin2009intheCopenhagennegotiations.There,theguidingapproachoftheUNclimateregimewas dramaticallytransformedwhen fivecountries,theUS,China,India, BrazilandSouthAfrica,heldaprivatemeetingwheretheywroteanew pithythree-pagedraftclimateagreementcalledtheCopenhagen Accord.Thiswaslatersharedwithaslightlylargergroupoftwentyeightstates,withonlyonerepresentativefromeachoftheentireregionsofAfricaandLatinAmerica(EnvironmentalNewsService,2009). Theothermorethan150stateswerethenaskedtoadoptthetext withoutfurthernegotiation.TheideasputforwardinthefewparagraphsoftheCopenhagenAccordwouldeventuallyreplacethehundredsofpagesofnegotiatingtextsthathadbeendevelopedfortwo years.WhiletheCopenhagenAccordwasadamantlyrejectedbyseveral developingstatesongroundsofbothprocessandcontent,thebasic tenetsofthisagreementwereadoptedalmostwordforwordaspartof theCancunagreementsandDurbanPlatformforEnhancedActionin thefollowingtwoyears(Cipletetal.,2015).
TheshiftinCopenhagenwassignificantbecauseitlargelydismantledthetop-downregulatory-markethybridapproachoftheKyoto Protocol,andusheredinafourthphase,between2009and2013.This phasewascharacterizedbyashifttowhatwascalleda “pledgeand review” system.Whileoriginallyproposedaround1994,pledgeand reviewdidnottakeholduntilitsintroductionatCopenhagen.This phasealsoinvolvedunprecedentedcivilsocietyparticipation,which wasaccompaniedbyexclusionarypractices(Fisher,2010).Inplaceof theKyotoProtocolinwhichwealthy(Annex1)countriesheldfullresponsibility forreducingemissions,theCopenhagenAccordintroduced theideathatallcountrieswouldplayaroletomitigateemissions. Notably,duetolargepushbackbyanalliancebetweentheLeastDevelopedCountries,smallislanddevelopingstatesandtheEuropean Union,asecondcommitmentperiodoftheKyotoProtocolwasestablished,butveryfewactorstookpart,withonly15percentofglobal emissionsaccountedfor(Ciplet,2015).
Alongwiththenowvoluntarymitigationactionsofwealthycountries,developing(non-Annex1)countriesseekinginternational financialsupportwouldalsoberequiredtointroduce “nationallyappropriatemitigationactions” thatare “subjecttointernational reporting,andverificationinaccordancewiththeguidelinesadopted bytheConferenceoftheParties” (UNFCCC,2009).Thus,theprinciple ofcommonbutdifferentiatedresponsibilityandrespectivecapabilities wasnolongerinterpretedasplacingprimaryresponsibilityonthe globalNorth;nowallParties,excepttheLeastDevelopedCountriesand SmallIslandDevelopingStateswhichweredeemedtohavespecial circumstances,wereencouragedtoplayaroleinshoulderingthe burdenofimplementingactionstomitigateclimatechange.However, withmuchambiguityinthetextandfewspecificsonhowsuchactions wouldbeimplemented,inpractice,thelargelynon-binding,voluntary andbottom-upnatureofthemitigationapproachduringthisphase representedaphaseofwhatcriticallycouldbecalledsharedunaccountability:Theagreementrequiredthatnoonewasrequiredtoact atanycertainlevel.
Thepledgeandreviewapproachwasrootedintheprinciplesof governancebydisclosureandvoluntarism.However,theemissions pledgesvoluntarilyputforwardbystatesintheyearsafterCopenhagen wasestimatedtobeonlyslightlybetterthanwhatwasanticipatedina businessasusualscenarioandwasanticipatedtoallowwarmingof 3.7°C,whichwasconsideredanextremelydangerouslevel(Climate ActionTracker,2010).
Twosignificantpledgesofclimate financeweremadein CopenhagenandconfirmedinCancun:todeliverUS$30billionin “Fast Start” financeoverthenextthreeyears, “scalingup” toUS$100billion D.Ciplet,J.T.Roberts
ayearby2020(Cipletetal.,2012,2015).Inpractice,outsideofthese pledgesofclimate finance – whichwerenotdeliveredaspromised (Cipletetal.,2012;Oxfam,2012,2016;AdaptationWatch,2015) – the regimeembodiedalmostsolelyavoluntaryapproachtoaddressing climatechange.
InthenegotiationsinDurbanin2012itwasagreedthatanew frameworkforactionwouldbeadoptedin2015,andimplementedin 2020.ThismarkedaturntothecurrentphaseoftheUNFCCC.Those thathadadvocatedforaKyotoProtocolstyleapproachhadlostthe fight.Rather,thepledgeandreviewapproachwouldbeinstitutionalizedintotheUNFCCC,buttressedbynewformsofchecksand balancestostrengthenitsabilitytoensuretransparencyandshared accountabilitybetweenstates.InWarsawin2013,thenewterm “intendednationallydeterminedcommitments” wasintroducedtosignify theinstitutionalizingofthepledgeandreviewapproach,whichwas workedoutattheLimanegotiationsin2014.
Then,justpriortoLimatheUnitedStatesandChinamadeajoint announcementofpledgestoreducetheiremissions(Landler,2014). Thispartnershiprepresentedanimportantshiftinhowmitigationdecisionswouldbemademovingforward:informalbilateralandminilateralagreementsoutsideoftheconstructsoftheUNFCCCwereput forwardasawaytoadvancethepledginground.Atthiswriting,165 Nationally-DeterminedContributionshavebeen filedwiththeUNFCCC Secretariat,butthereissignificantdisagreementaboutwhetherthey andtheirsuccessorpledgesinlaterroundsarelikelytosufficiently reduceemissions.
4.Discussion:theParisAgreementthroughthelensofneoliberal environmentalgovernance
The2011Durbannegotiationssetafour-yearroadmapforaround ofnegotiationsthatwasscheduledtoculminateinParisinDecemberof 2015.Thetwodocumentsthatresulted–thelong-termAgreementand theDecisiondocumentthatlaidouthowtheAgreementwouldcome intoeffect(UNFCCC,2015cp21)weresignedbyover190countriesand widelyacclaimedasamajordiplomaticachievement.
Howdoesthisnewagreement fitwiththeneoliberalgovernance processesoutlinedintheframeworkabove?First,theagreementhas beenstructuredlargely,thoughnotcompletely,aroundlibertarian principlesofjustice.Distributivejusticeconcerns,suchashistorical disparitiesinwhocausedenvironmentalproblemsandstructuralforms ofinequalityintermsofcapabilityforbearingtheburdenofaction havebeenlargelyomittedorreinterpreted;thishasmostlybeenreplacedbyan “everyoneisresponsible” discourseandinstitutionalframework.
ThecoreoftheParismodelis “nationallydeterminedcontributions,” ornationalclimateplanspledgedbystatesaboutwhattheywill dotoreducetheiremissions,adapttoclimateimpacts,andprovide supportforothernations.InplaceofdefinedAnnexestospecifynations withresponsibilityandcapability,therearedelineationsbetweenexpectationsforthreegroupsofnations:developedcountriesononeend ofthecontinuumandtheLeastDevelopedCountriesandSmallIsland DevelopingStatesattheotherend,withathirdgroupofdeveloping countriesbetweenthem.LDCsandSIDSareinvited,butnotrequiredto submitNationallyDeterminedContributions,andtheirexpectationson reportingemissions,adaptationand financereceivedarequitelow. Thereareprovisionsstatingthatthesepoorestnationsshallbeassisted inmeetingtheirexpectations,butleftunclearareanymechanismsfor raisingandprovidingthatsupport.Expectationsarelessclearforthe groupinthemiddle,andthelinedelineatingthatgroupfromthedevelopednationsisnotspecified, norareconditionsforgraduationfrom onegrouptoanother.Asaconcessiontooil-richnations,theconcerns ofcountries, “witheconomiesmostaffectedbytheimpactsofresponse measures” arealsotobetakenintoaccount(CP/21.4).Intermsof measurestoensurethatstatesfollow-throughontheiractions,acompliancemechanismwasestablished,butthetextspecifiesthatthisis
“non-punitive” (CP/21.15)andthatpartiescanleavetheagreementat anytimewithoutpunishmentthreeyearsaftertheagreemententers intoforce(CP/21.28).ThisistheclauseunderwhichtheUnitedStates hasproposedtowithdraw.Thus,theprocessofvoluntarismembraced since2009hasbeguntotakeamoreinstitutionalizedandstructured form,andsomeofitsfragilitiesandstrengthsarebecomingclear.
Distributivejusticelanguageisstillpartoftheagreement,especially inthe(non-binding)Preamble,buttherearefewinstitutionalconstructsthatencouragethisinpractice.Perhapsmostnotableisthatthe Agreementisto “beimplementedtoreflectequityandtheprincipleof commonbutdifferentiatedresponsibilityandrespectivecapabilities,in lightofdifferentnationalcircumstances” (CP/21.2),andthatmitigationactionswillbepursued “onthebasisofequity,andinthecontext ofsustainabledevelopmentandeffortstoeradicatepoverty” (CP/21.4). Someothernotableinclusionsthatdepartfromalibertarianviewof justice(allmentionedinthepreamble)includerecognitionofthe specificneedsandcircumstancesofdevelopingcountriesandLeast DevelopedCountriesinparticular,ajusttransitionfortheworkforce, respecttohumanrightsandtherightsofindigenouspeoples,pursuitof “climatejustice”,andtheprotectionof “MotherEarth” (CP/21.preamble).Overall,thefocusintheParistextsisonuniversalismofexpectationthatmostnationsmakecontributions,butthatthesebedifferentiatedbylevelofdevelopment.Thisshowssomecompromise betweenlibertariananddistributivejusticeideals,butgiventhelackof enforcementmechanismsandrelianceonvoluntaryuniversalpledging, Parisisamajordepartureinpracticeandstructurefromaregime rootedintheprinciplesofequityandcommonbutdifferentiatedresponsibilityandrespectivecapabilities.
Second,theParisAgreementislargelyindicativeofaprocessof marketization.Thediscourseintheyearleadinguptoandduringthe Parisnegotiationswasthatgovernmentfundingwouldnottransform theeconomyawayfromfossilenergy,butratheritwouldrequire “shiftingthetrillions” bycreatingincentivesformarketsandinvestors toquicklymovetorenewableenergyandclimateresilience. NegotiationsinParisandMarrakeshshowedagrowingfocusonhowto effectivelyleveragetheprivatesectortoengageonclimatechange. Arguably,thishasbecomeamorecentralfocusduetothelackofpublic financecommittedbywealthystatessinceCancunin2010,includingas nations’ attempttoshowtheyaremeetingtheir financialpledges (Roadmap,2016;StandingCommitteeonFinance,2016).Inthisway, theprivatesectorhasemergedastheprimarymechanismforspurring mitigationandadaptationactions.
Theseandother finance issuesarepivotal.Ratherthanincreasing expectationsbeyond2020,theParisAgreementextendedthepledgeto jointlymobilize$100billionannuallythrough2025;therearenonew concretepledges,onlythatactorsshouldbuildonpreviouscommitmentsatalaterdate(CP.21.9;Decision.114).Thereisnoindicationof whichspecificstatesshouldberesponsiblefordeliveringthesefunds (CP.21.9),noranyindicationthatfundswillbeforthcomingtohelp nationslikeIndiatakethemoreaggressiveactiontheyconditionally offeredwithadequate finance.Thecriticalissueof “lossanddamage” fromclimatechangeimpactsthatcannotbeadaptedtohasbeenwatereddownwiththeexplicitlanguageintheDecisiontextthatthe measure “doesnotinvolveorprovideabasisforanyliabilityand compensation” (CP.21.Decision.51)
WhileaGreenClimateFundwascreatedinCancunin2010anda pledgingroundbeforeParispromisedjustover$10billionforitover fouryears,nocoordinatingmechanismexiststomeettheneedsofdevelopingcountriestoshifttheireconomiesandbuildresiliencetothe impactstocome,andwiththechangeintheU.S.administration,the $10billionpromiseisalmostcertainnottobemet.Inaddition,the Agreementestablishesamechanismfortheuseof “internationally transferredmitigationoutcomes” (CP.21.6),whichwilllikelyinvolve marketmechanismsbywhichwealthynationsareableto ‘offset’ their emissionsthroughleveraginginvestmentsindevelopingcountries. However,thereisnoclarityaboutwhydevelopednationswouldneed
toresorttopurchasingoffsetswhentheirownpledgesarevoluntary andthereisnoenforcementmechanismtoassurecompliance.Thus private financeandleveragingthemarkethavegrowninemphasis duringthecontemporaryphasebutformalmechanismstodrivethem arenowoutsidethecoreoftheregime,andarevoluntary.TheUNFCCC systemislargelyreducedtocheerleadingforprivateandvoluntary nationalactiononclimatechange.
ThemaininstitutionalframeworkoftheregimetoachievemitigationtargetsisthatoftheNationallyDeterminedContributions,and whilereportingrules(modalities,proceduresandguidelines)arebeing hammeredoutinthe2016–2018period,itisveryunlikelythatequity orjusticeconcernswillbemeaningfullyincluded.Developedcountries arerequiredtoprovideconsistentandtransparentinformationon supportmobilizedfordevelopingcountries(asdiscussedbelow) (CP.21.7)andwererequiredtoexplainhowtheirmitigationand financeactionsrepresentedtheirfairshare(CP.20.Add.1.76;see Van Asseltetal.,2017);however,reportingsofarhasbeenpartialandoften obfuscatory(AdaptationWatch,2015,2016).Thereislittletosuggest thatpositivelanguageintheParisAgreement–suchaslevelsofsupport thatmatchcountryneeds(Article2.1c)andtheaspirationaltargetto limitthetemperatureincreaseto1.5°Cabovepre-industriallevels” (CP/21.2) areimplementablepriorities.Thephrase “sustainabledevelopment” ismentionedtwelvetimesintheAgreementbutitisnever tiedtoexplicitreportingorevaluationrequirementswithintheregime, andoftenseemsacorollaryforeconomicgrowthindevelopingcountriesratherhumanrightsorothercontext-speci ficequityorjustice concerns.Notably,effortsbycivilsocietygroupsanddevelopingnationstoestablishspecificmechanismstoupholdhumanrightsand addressabusesweresidelinedbynumerousdevelopinganddeveloped statesalike(observationofnegotiationsessions,Lima,2014).
Third,asexpectedinneoliberalenvironmentalgovernance,governancebydisclosurehaseclipsedotherformsofregulatoryaction.The newapproachisrootedinneoliberalidealsofinformationsharingand mutualaccountability(see VanAsseltetal.,2016a,b; GuptaandAsselt, 2017).Strengtheningelementsrelatedtotransparencywereaddedat Parisastheresultofpressurefroma “highambitioncoalition.” Paris specifieda “globalstocktake” every fiveyears,toassesstheadequacyof thepledgesandactionstaken,andnationsweretosubmitupdated NationallyDeterminedContributions(CP.21.14).A “ratchetmechanism” wasagreed,bywhichnationscouldnotbackslidetoweaker plans,buthadtoscaleuptheirambitionovertime.Oneofthemore bindingelementofPariswastherequirementfornationstoreporttheir actionsandlevelsof financesupport,capacitybuildingandtechnology developmentandtransfer(VanAsseltetal.,2016a,b;CP.21.13).A transparencyframeworkwasestablishedfordevelopingcountriesto reportonthesupportthattheyhavereceivedandtheirneeds,withthe intentiontoconsiderdifferentcapacities(VanAsseltetal.,2016a,b; CP.21.13).Whilethesetransparencyprovisionsembodyseveralofthe equity concernsofdevelopingcountries,howmodalitiesareestablished inpracticewillnotbeworkedoutuntilthe firstsessionoftheAgreement,probablyin2018(WeikmansandRoberts,2016;CP.21.13).
Fourth,theParispledgingyeardescribedaboveshowedthatthe locusofdecision-makingonclimatechangehasshiftedawayfromthe UnitedNations,tobilateralandminilateralagreements.Asaresult,this phaserepresentstheinstitutionalizationofexclusivebilateralismand minilateralism – adramaticshiftinhowdecisionsaremadeininternationalclimategovernance.Minilateralismisalsoformalizedin Article6oftheAgreementwhichallowsforstatestoformtheirown alliancesofvoluntarycooperationintheimplementationofNationally DeterminedContributionsforpursuinginternationalemissionsoffsettingpartnerships(e.g. “ClimateClubs”).Whiletherewillstillbe heateddebatesintheUNFCCCprocessabouttheparticularitiesofwhat isreportedonandthewaysinwhichverification,complianceandcoordinationofemissionsreductionsand financialcommitmentstake place,themostmeaningfuldecisionswilllikelybemadefarfromthe UNconferencecenters,indomesticcontextsandbetweennationsas
partofbilateralandmultilateralpartnerships.Thoughthissystemmay bemoreuniversalthantheKyotoapproachandmaysometimesinspire moreambitiousstatementsofintendedcontributions,theserelatively informalpledgesandpartnershipsarelikelytobeextremelyvulnerable tochangesinnationalleadership.
5.Conclusion:implicationsofneoliberalclimategovernanceand areasforresearch
Theneoliberalizationoftheclimateregimehasdramatically transformedthenormativeprincipleswhichguideinternationalaction onclimatechange,theinstitutionalarrangementswhichensurecompliance,andthedecision-makingprocesseswhichdetermineprocedural justice.However,as Brenneretal.(2010) havepointedout,neoliberalism,likeanyidealtypeofapoliticalproject,neverexistsinaperfect form.Rather,giventhatitisimplementedinapoliticalrealitywhereit isoftencontestedandinvolvesstrategicconcessions(Ciplet,2015), therehasnotbeenafullylinearprocessintheadoptionofneoliberal governanceintheUNFCCCduringanyphase.Thecontemporaryregimemaintainssomenon-neoliberalandvariegatedforms.Asthisarticledemonstrates,itiscriticaltodevelopamorepreciseunderstanding oftheevolvingnatureofactually-existingneoliberalismininternationalenvironmentalgovernance.
Whataretheimplicationsoftheparticularshiftsdescribedinthis article?Canneoliberalclimategovernancebeeffectiveandequitable? Forthe firsttimeinthehistoryoftheregime,inParis,theworld’stwo biggestnetemitters,theUnitedStatesandChina,committedtoemissionsreductionswithintheUNFCCCprocess.Moreover,nearlyallthe world’scountrieshavemadeemissionsreductionpledges.However, despitetheseoften-celebratedaccomplishments(e.g. Stavins,2015), thereisamajorgapinambitionrelatedtotheabilityoftheregimeto fulfilitsstatedfunctionin “avoidingdangerousclimatechange” (UNFCCC,1992).Namely,theNationallyDeterminedContributions thatweresubmittedthroughParisaddedtoanexpectedglobal warmingof2.7–3.5°C,notthe2or1.5°Cthatthescientificandpoliticalconsensussuggestareneeded(ClimateActionTracker2016).
Inaddition,despitethegrowingattentionintheUNFCCCtogovernancebydisclosure,inpractice,amajorgapintransparencyexists. Forexample, Acostaetal.(2015) foundthat “almostaquarterofa century intoclimatechangenegotiations,westilllackanadequate systemfordefining,categorizing,trackingandevaluatingclimate change finance.” Majorinadequaciesalsoexistintermsofstandards relatedtomitigationcommitmentsandperformanceinNationallyDeterminedContributions(VanAsseltetal.,2016a,b).Improvedtransparencysystemsareneededforassessingprogressanddevelopingpilot programsforbestpractices.Moreover,tocreateanenduringsystem withlegitimacyandbalance,transparencymechanismsshouldextend beyondcountingcarbonandclimate finance,totrackinghumanrights, socialimpactsandotherjustice-relatedconcernsrelatedtoclimate changegovernance.Transparencysystemsareneeded,buttheyarenot adequatebythemselvestodrivenationstomeettheirpledgedactions.
Theinternationaldistributionofpledgestoreduceemissionsisalso farfromequitable.Byoneimportantreckoning,developingcountries havepledgedmoreemissionsreductionsthandevelopedcountries, despitehavinglessresponsibilityforhavingcreatedtheproblem(Civil SocietyReview,2015,2016).Moreover,internationalsupporthasnot beenforthcomingforlow-carbontechnologiesandpracticesforthe world’spoorercountriestocontinueorincreasetheireconomicgrowth toaddresspoverty.Rapidlyindustrializingstateswillaccountformost emissionsgrowthinthecomingdecades,butsomecountries,likeIndia, stillhaveextremelylowpercapitaemissionsandhundredsofmillions ofpeoplelivingindirepovertywithnoelectricity.Topursuelowcarbonstrategiesofdevelopmentratherthanburnitscoal,forexample, Indiacalledfor$2.5trilliontoimplementitsNationallyDetermined Contribution,whilethe48LeastDevelopedCountrieshaveputforward acollective figureof$1trillion(Raietal.,2015).Thereisnosystem D.Ciplet,J.T.Roberts
D.Ciplet,J.T.Roberts
underParistopredictablyraisethesefunds.Thisgapinequityisperhapsnotsurprisinggiventhatrelatedconsiderationsoffairburden sharingwerelargelysidelinedintheParisAgreement.Ambitiousinternationalcooperationandtrustdependuponsomefocalpointsoffair action(Klinskyetal.,2016).
Anadditionalgapinequityexistsintermsoftheneedsofdevelopingcountriesandvulnerablepeoplestoadapttoandrespondtoa changingclimate,andthelevelofpublicfundingprovidedfrom wealthycountries.In2013,theglobalcommunityprovidedamere$3.4 billioninadaptation financefordevelopingcountries(OECD DevelopmentAssistanceCommittee2014).Innovativemechanismsto raise public financeforadaptationhavealsoincreasinglybeensidelined inthenegotiations.TheUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramestimatesthat$150billionayearareneededby2025/2030tomeet adaptationneeds(UNEP,2014).Andintermsofcostsrelatedtoclimate impactsthatarebeyondthepossibilityofadaptation(whatisknownas ‘lossanddamage’), Hope(2009) estimateddamagesashighas$2.8 trillionin2060.Thus,majorquestionsexistabouthowwecanscaleup adaptation financeandaddresslossanddamageconsiderationsina regimenowrootedinprinciplesofvoluntarismandmarketization (Durandetal.,2016).Thereislimitedevidencetosuggestthatadaptationneedscanbeaddressedbymarketforces,inlieuofpublicsources (see Fieldman,2011).
Finally,theshifttoexclusiveminilateralismraisesconcernsfor ensuringproceduraljusticeandrepresentationofthosemostimpacted (Cipletetal.,2015).Aswehavediscussed,inthepost-Parisphase, mitigationdecisionsaremorelikelytobemadeunilaterally,bilaterally andin “climateclubs,” outsideoftheUNFCCCprocess.Inthiscontext, low-incomedevelopingcountriesandcivilsocietygroupsfromthe globalSouthmaybeevenmorelikelytobeexcludedfromhavinginput intodecisionsthathavemajorimpactsforthem.Thisraisesdifficult questionsabouthowdisproportionatelyimpactedgroupscan find greaterproceduraljusticeinneoliberalclimategovernanceinthe comingdecades.Attheinternationallevel,researchisneededtoproduceastrongerunderstandingoftheconditionsthatproduceneoliberal shiftsininternationalenvironmentalgovernance,theforcesthatdrive effectiveeffortstocreatemorejustandambitiousagreements,andhow distinctvariegatedformsofneoliberalenvironmentalgovernancevary acrossissueareassuchasbio-diversity,hazardouswastetransport, desertificationanddisasterresponse.Moreover,giventhecurrentpredicamentofneoliberalclimategovernance,researchshouldinformhow theUNFCCCregimeandotherrelevantmultilateralprocessesmightbe retooledtoaddressthegapsinambition,transparency,equity,and representationdiscussedabove.Otherwise,theUNFCCCsystemwill continuetobereducedtomerelyacheerleadingforumforprivateand voluntarynationalactiononclimatechange.
TocontrasttheParisoutcomewithwhatnon-neoliberalgovernance inthecontemporaryperiodmightlooklike,weendwithsomepossible elementsofa ‘differentworld’ asareferenceforcomparison.Anonneoliberalgovernancemodelmightdothefollowing:bebasedupon scientificconsensusonthelevelofeffortneededandbemandatory basedonidealsoffairness,providecompliance-basedregulatorymechanisms,privilegedistributiveandnon-libertarianidealsofjustice, strengthenratherthanerodepublicmechanismstoaddressdeveloping countryneedswithadequate finance, incorporatemultiplelogicsof legitimacy(notreductivetomanagerialquantifiedandmarket-based measures),andbebuiltwithproceduraljusticeandinclusivedecisionmaking.Werecognizethisisanidealsetofcriteriafordevelopinga globalregimeadequatetoaddressclimatechange,andunlikelytobe takenupwithoutasharpturnintheneoliberalpathwaywearetraveling.
Acknowledgements
ThisresearchwasfundedinpartbytheRobertandPatriciaSwitzer Foundation.Weappreciatetheveryhelpfulcommentsofthereviewers
andeditors.
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