Capitalizing Africa: high finance from below

CapitalizingAfrica:highfinancefrombelow

JamesChristopherMizes1 andKevinP.Donovan2

1InstitutdeRechercheInterdisciplinaireenSciencesSociales,UniversitéParis-Dauphine,Paris, Franceand 2CentreofAfricanStudies,UniversityofEdinburgh,Edinburgh,UK

Emails: james-christopher.mizes@dauphine.psl.eu,kevin.donovan@ed.ac.uk

In2016,thecityofCapeTownhostedthefourteenthannualmeetingoftheAfrican CapitalMarketsConference.Eachyear,theconferenceassembles ‘Africansovereigns, corporates,regulators,localandinternationalinvestors,andfinancialserviceproviderswithinterestinfosteringthediversityofinvestmentandfundingoptions vialocalcapitalmarkets’ (IMN 2016).Theconferencebeganin2002and,atthetime, limiteditsgeographicfocustocapitalmarketsinSouthAfrica.Butin2012,theconferenceshifteditsapproachto ‘includeallofAfrica’ andtoemphasizea ‘particular focusonemergingmarketsinSub-SaharanAfrica’ (ibid.).Indeed,itsexpandinggeographicfocusaccompaniedanimportanttransformationinAfricancapitalatthe time:agrowingnumberofstockexchangesandprivateequityfirmswerespringing upacrossthecontinent,andagrowingnumberofAfricaninvestors,governmentsand firmswerestartingtousethem.

TheriseofAfricancapitalmarketsisanimportantfeatureofglobalfinanceinthe newmillennium.AlthoughEuro-Americandevelopmentinstitutionscontinuetooffer financialproductsacrossthecontinent,theseinstitutionshavetransformedhowthey understandtheproblemofeconomicdevelopmentandarenowproposinganewgenerationofsolutionstoit.Inthepasttwentyyears,internationalaidorganizations haveincreasinglyturnedtowardsAfricanstockmarkets,ratingsagenciesandcommercialbankstofinanceprojectsacrosssectors.Butthecontinent’sprivatesectorhas beenmoreforcefullyleadingthisexpansionbyintroducingnewwaystomeasurerisk, newdebtinstruments,andnewrolesforgovernmentintheregulationofanemerging financialindustry.ThisshifthasbeensimilarlyencouragedbyAfricaninvestors’ increasingopennesstofinancialassetsdenominatedinlocalcurrenciesandissued byAfricangovernmentsandfirms.FromfuturesmarketstoBitcoin,sovereignbonds tocreditscores,thecontinent – andespeciallyitsleadingcitiessuchasAbidjan, Nairobi,LagosandJohannesburg – ishometoaproliferationofsuchfinancialdevices. Buttheprecisecausesandconsequencesofthistransformationarenotyetclear.

Forcritics,thegrowthofcapitalinvestmentacrossthecontinentisanother instanceofaglobalformoffinancializationinwhichEuro-Americancapitalisonce againforcingAfricanstatesintodebtdependency(Kvangraven etal. 2021).Fromthis perspective,theexpansionofsovereignbondissuancesonEuropeanandAmerican ©TheAuthor(s),2022.PublishedbyCambridgeUniversityPressonbehalfoftheInternationalAfricanInstitute

stockexchangesisunderstoodasashiftin – butcontinuationof – olderformsof Africa’seconomicsubordinationanddependence.Theextentofthis ‘financialdeepening’ issuchthatStiglitzandRashid(2013)issuedawarningthatAfricansovereign debtwasatanhistorichighandthatpaymentsfromthesebondsweresooncoming due.Thiswas,intheirview,aharbingerofanewroundofsovereigndefaultsechoing thoseofpriordecades.Suchaconcernwasonlyheightenedasthisissuewenttopress amidstincreaseddebtdistressdue,inpart,toforeigninvestorspullingcapitaloutof theglobalSouthinresponsetointerestratechangesinEuro-America.Othershave pointedtotheroleofAmericancreditagenciesinrubberstampingrecklessborrowingandthereforeincentivizingaloomingfinancialcatastrophe(Chelwa 2020).And DanielaGabor(2021)hascoinedatermtosummarizethisseriesofnefariousevents: the ‘WallStreetConsensus’.AccordingtoGabor,globaldevelopmentbanksaretoday workingin ‘technocraticforumsawayfrompublicscrutiny’ to ‘enlist’ statesto ‘assumethedemandrisk’ onnewfinancialassets –‘de-risking’ forthebenefitofprivateinstitutionalinvestors(ibid.:440–7).

YetmanyAfricanofficials,professionalsandinvestorsunderstandfinancein starklydifferentterms.Intheirvision,capitalmarketsarepartofanewchapter ofAfricanhistoryinwhicheconomicself-determinationisachievedthroughtheharnessingofmoneythathaslongbeencontrolledbyforeignfinanciers.Ratherthana pernicioustrend,itisanopportunitytoputAfricanmoneytoworkforAfricans.Itis anaspirationthatisoftenexplicitlypan-African.Forexample,theAfricanUnion envisionsitsfinancialfutureintermsofAfricancapitalmarkets,andcreditrating agenciesandbanksacrossthecontinenthavelongunderstoodtheirmarketspace asdistinctively ‘pan-African’.Formanyofthesefinancialactors,theaimistowrest developmentplanningandcapitalallocationawayfromEuro-Americanfinancial institutionsandputtheminAfricanhands(Mizes 2016).Here,capitalmarkets,currencyswapsandfinancialaccountingappearnotasaformofdependence,butasa pathwaytoindependenceandsovereignty(MbengMezui 2017).Inotherwords,many ofthesetransformationsmaynothavemuchtodowith ‘WallStreet’,noristhereany global ‘ consensus ’ onhowtoorganizeandexpandAfricancapitalanditsmarkets.

Thisspecialissuemovesbeyondtheseduellingviews.Ratherthancelebrateor denouncetheseongoingfinancialtransformations,thearticlescollectedheretake financeinAfricaasafieldofanthropologicalinquiry.Theyinvestigatethesocial worldsoffinance,itstechnicaldevices,andthemundanemannerinwhichforms ofcapitalarebeingcomposed.Theyforegroundthemoraldisagreementsoverthe emerginginfrastructuresofAfricancapitalmarkets,andtheyanalysehowthese debatestakeshapearoundadiverserangeofspecificfinancialdevices:privatization, creditscoring,shareholderassociations,foreignexchangeregulationsandbankbailouts.Inplaceofbroadpredictionsontheinevitablefalloutsoffinance,ourcontributorsexplorenewmodesofpopularandprofessionalreasoningaboutfinancein AfricabyAfricans,andtheirspecificstrugglesoverhowtoknow,valueandmanage capital.

Whilethisissuedrawsonexemplarycasesfromacrossthecontinent,italsoanalysesadistinctlyglobaltransformation.Scholarsoffinancehavepreviouslyfocused theiranalysison ‘commandandcontrolcenters’ locatedin ‘globalcities’ suchas Tokyo,LondonandNewYork(Sassen 1991).Fromthisperspective,financialcentres are ‘global’ inthesensethattheirinfluenceextendsoutwardtostructuresocialand

economiclifeacrosstheworld.Intheseapproaches,placessuchasAbidjanandAccra aresubjecttothevicissitudesandpoweroffinancialactors – hedgefunds,consulting firms,insurancecompanies,creditratingagencies – largelylocatedoutsidethecontinentandlookingfornewinvestmentopportunitieswithinit(seeMawdsley 2018; Ouma 2020b;Roitman 2021).Asaresult,theactivitiesandaspirationsofAfricansparticipatinginthecontinent’sownfinancialindustryhavelargelyrecededfromscholarlyview.

Inthisissue,weplacethegeographyofAfricanfinancetodayinadifferentframe: ourapproachlinkstheflowofAfricanfinancialexpertisetotheflowofmoneyin,out andacrossthecontinent(cf.MontagneandOrtiz 2013),flowsthattogetherconstitute – andcanpotentiallyreconfigure – Africa’sroleinthe ‘worldsystem’.Weanalysehow Africanprofessionalsaretranslatingfinancialdevicesfromoutsidethecontinentto fitthemoraldilemmas,politicalstylesandeconomicpracticesfoundwithinit(Ong andCollier 2007;Guyer 2004).Manyoftheseprofessionalsareclaimingtoharness capitaltomeetAfricanneedsandopposeWesterncontrolofAfrica’sfuture.They oftenexplicitlyframetheseclaimsintheidiomofpan-Africancommerce.Asaresult, themoralvisionofaunitary ‘Africa’ isonceagainemergingasawaytoframeefforts atpromotingintra-Africanexchangeandreversingtheglobalflowofwealthoutof thecontinent.Atstakeinthisreversalistherelocationof ‘commandandcontrol’ centresfromLondonandNewYorktotheemergingfinancialcentresinAfrica’scities. ThefutureofAfricancapitalisfarfromcertain;indeed,financialanalyststhemselves ‘oftenfailtopredictthecorrectfuturedevelopmentsoffinancialmarkets’ (Leins 2018:4).Thearticlescollectedinthisissueof Africa provideinsightintothe diverselocationsinwhichthisfutureisbeingmadeanddisputed.Inthisintroductory article,webringawide-anglelenstotheserecenttransformationsandthenear futuresofAfricanfinancethattheyanticipate.Why,forsomany,hasAfricanpolitical liberationbecomeataskoffinancialengineering?AndwhyhavesomeAfricans’ aspirationsfordevelopmenttodayreturnedtoapromotionof ‘indigenous’ and ‘domestic’ finance?Toaddressthesequestions,webuildonourownethnographicresearch, readingsofkeyprogrammatictexts,analysesofrelatedscholarship,andthearticles collectedinthisissue.Withtheseresources,wesketchouthowtheproblemof Africaneconomicdevelopmentisbeingreframedtoday.Yetwealsoexaminethelimitsofthisreframingandthepotentiallycalamitousconsequencesofwhichmanycriticsarealreadytakingnote.

Currency,capital,colonies

Priortocolonialism,inmuchofAfrica,systemsofproductionreliedmoreondomestic labour,tributaryexchangeandenslavedpeoplethanontheexploitationoffreewage labourers.However,capital – inthesenseofmoneyinvestedincommercialactivities thatareexpectedtocreatemorewealth – predatesthearrivalofEuropeanmerchants, slavetradersandcolonists.Therewaswidespreadprofit-orientedmerchantactivity, includingamongNorthAfricanandSaharantraders(Iliffe 1983:4–7)andlivelyoceanic exchangefromtheentrepôtsoftheSwahiliCoast(Austen 1987:58–60).When EuropeansbeganarrivinginAtlanticAfrica,theyencounteredmercantileenclaves whereIslamicsystemsofcredit,cowrieshellsandsilverwereused.Peopledrewon avarietyofformsofcredit,includingtherotatingYoruba esusu groups, Nanemei

Akpee usedbyGawomentraders,billsofexchange,orloansfromlandlordsandrulers (Austin 1993:101–5).OntheIndianOceanlittoral,prolificformsoflendingfacilitated thetradeindates,pearls,clovesandivory,aswellastheformationofa ‘multi-ethnic andmulti-confessionalcommercialsociety’ (Bishara 2017:59).

Yetwealthwasnotalwayscashorcommodity.Priortocolonization,Africans tendedtoplacevalueonfollowersanddependantsratherthanaccumulatingcapital asanenduringandfungibleformofwealth(GuyerandBelinga 1995).Inpart,this wasduetothepaucityoflabourcomparedwithlandinlargepartsoftheregionand becausemoneywasnotwidelystandardizedandrarelycentralizedinitsissuance.As aresult,wealthwasstoredinnon-pecuniary forms:landandlivestock,pre-eminently. Whilesomemoneydidreachgeneralpurposestanding(Hopkins 1973:70),moreemblematicwasthemultiplicityofmonies,valuedfor theirparticularmeaningsandaffordances: fromcoppermanillasandironbarstotextilesandbeads(GuyerandPallaver 2018).

Inmanycases,theviolentdisruptionsandeconomictransformationsofEuropean interventionsledtowidespreadlossofwealth.InsouthernandeasternAfrica,for example,livestockdiseaseandpurposefulcullingeliminatedhugestoresofsuch wealth.SettlerenclosureoflandandstatelimitsonAfricanagrarianproductionlikewiseinhibitedwidespreadcommodityproduction,letalonecapitalaccumulation (Kanogo 1987).AndinAtlanticAfrica,hardcurrencies(thatretainedvalueovertime) wereexported.Asaresult,capitalaccumulationbecameevermoreheavilyconcentratedinotherworldregions,suchthatbytheearlynineteenthcenturyAtlantic Africa’saccesstocapitalwasataseveredisadvantage(Green 2020).

Similarly,wagelabourandinvestmentinindustrialproductionexpandedonlyin fitsandstartsacrossthecontinent.Theywereoftenconcentratedininfrastructural corridors,commercialhubsandexportenclaves.Productionforthemarketremained dependentonexistingformsofdomesticproductionandthelabourofwomenand socialjuniors(Meillassoux 1981).CurrencieswereapotentformofgovernmentalcontroloverAfricans(Mwangi 2001),butcolonialeconomieswereoftenrackedbyvolatility,underminingconfidenceintheirproductivecapacities.Theimperial enforcementof ‘customary’ landregimesandderogatoryviewsofAfricanacumen combinedtoimpedelendingtofarmers(CowenandShenton 1991).Evenwhenmetropolitanproponentsof ‘soundfinance’ werecompelledtosupportdevelopmental investmentsinthecolonies,outputwasfrustratinglylimited.Viableindustrieswere few,andAfricanactivismoftenunsettledtheplansofgovernmentofficials.InKenya, forinstance,theMauMaurebellionjeopardizeddevelopmentspendingand ‘threatenedthefiscalstabilityofthecolony’ (Tignor 1998:330).

ThishelpsexplainthelackofcommercialcreditinmostAfricancolonies.Unlike, forinstance, ‘Britain’sveiledprotectorate’ inEgypt,whichsawastupendousincreasein banklendingdirectlytopeasant farmersintheearly1900s(Jakes 2020:84–112),financial servicesweremorelimitedincoloniessouthoftheSahara.Somelucrativeproductssuch asAsantecocoaattractedconsiderablecredit(intheformofadvancesandmortgages), frombothEuropeanandAfricanlenders(Austin 2005).BarclaysDCO(Dominion,Colonial andOverseas),theStandardBankofSouthAfricaandtheBankofBritishWestAfrica openedbranchesinmanyBritishcolonies, yetwhatcredittheyprovidedwasfocused ontheimportofBritishgoodsandtheexportofrawmaterials(Zwanenbergand King 1975:280–1).Theirloanswereshort-term,expensiveandfocusedonexpatriates (andsometimescommercialminorities,suchasEastAfrica’sSouthAsianpopulation).

WhilebankersoftendeemedAfricansunfitasborrowers(Uche 1996)andsettlers werewaryofnativecompetition,theconservativeturninimperialgovernanceadded anotherimpedimentaspaternalisticrulesandworriesaboutdisintegratingtradition blockedcommercialfinancetoAfricans(Shipton 2010:30–5).Colonialstatefinancing wasequallylacking,inpartduetotheexistenceofcurrencyboardsthatsubordinated colonialcurrenciestoBritishsterlingandtheFrenchfranc.Onlyinthewaningdaysof empiredidcurrencyboardsreceivetheauthoritytoofferseasonalcropfinancing,and eventhentheypursueditcautiously.Asaresult,bankingandcurrencywereobjects ofpopularfrustration,especiallyasdemandsforpoliticalindependencemergedwith economicaspirations(Donovan 2018).

Fromeconomicindependencetodebtdependence

Withindependence,manyAfricannationstatesbegancreatingtheirownbanks,their ownstockexchangesandtheirowncurrencies.Acrossthecontinent,postcolonial statesendeavouredtocraftpoliciesandinstitutionsthatwouldharnesscitizens’ labour,naturalresourcesandinternationaltradeinthedirectionof ‘economic independence’ (Ghai 1973;Getachew 2019).Asourcontributorsdiscuss,parastatal banksissuedcreditto ‘indigenous’ entrepreneursand,beginninginthe1970s,countriesprivatizedlargepublicservicestojumpstarttheirownnewlymintedstock exchanges.Yetwithinthisbroadpostcolonialvision,criticismsanddivisions emerged.Amarket-ledliberation,forexample,clashedwiththeideaofAfricansocialismandthecontinentalrealignmentstakingplacealongsidetheglobalColdWar.In manycases,EuropeancontroloverAfrica’sfinancialandmonetaryinstitutionspersistedlongafterformalpoliticalcontrolended(Gadha etal. 2021) – thisiswhat KwameNkrumah(1965)diagnosedas ‘neo-colonialism’ .

Afternationalindependence,commodityboomsincertaincountriesbroughtyears ofcommercialsuccessandadecidedlyunequaldistributionofitsmonetarygains (Arrighi 2002;Jerven 2014).Thequestionofdependencyloomedlarge,yetinsome casescapitalistproductionexpandedatthehandsoftheAfricanbourgeoisie. Oftenthiswasfurtheredbymoreorlessexplicitdrivesto ‘Africanize’ industry, includingthebankingsector(Bamba 2020).InKenya,thisbourgeoisieovercamea smalldomesticmarketandlowagriculturalproductivitytoestablishthemselves ascentralactorsinthelocalcompositionofAfricancapital(Swainson 1977). Similarly,inSenegal,Islamicleadersaccommodatedtheexport-orientedgrowthof thelocalpeanutindustryandtransformeditintoacosmopolitannetworkofmerchantsthatpersiststothisday(Diouf 2000).Nigerianentrepreneursexpandednot onlyinimport–exportindustriesandinagriculture,butinsectorssuchastransport, bankingandpackagedfoods(Forrest 1994).Thiscross-continentalsampleofferssubstantialreasontounderstandthattechniquesforthecompositionandcirculationof Africancapitalhavelongbeencreativelyinventedandrepurposedacrossthe continent.

The1980schallengedsuchaconception.Theendofpost-independencegrowthin the1970spromptedanewwaveofreflectionontheproblemofdevelopment.The OrganisationofAfricanUnity(OAU)publishedthe LagosPlan (1980),condemning the ‘exploitationarisingfromcolonialism,racism,andapartheid’ (ibid.:5)andadvancinginitsplace ‘afar-reachingregionalapproachbasedprimarilyoncollectiveself-

reliance’ (ibid.:4).Intra-Africantradeandthe ‘mobilisationofdomesticfinancial resources ’ (ibid.:69)emergedaskeyleversofthisresponsetotheinheritedproblems ofAfrica’sunderdevelopment.Incontrast,theWorldBankpublishedthenowfamous ‘BergReport’ (WorldBank 1981),whichsubsequentlysettheintellectualagendafor addressingthecontinent’ s ‘economicdevelopmentproblems’ byforcefullyforegroundingthedevelopmentofexport-orientedagricultureasa ‘preludetoindustrialization’ (ibid.:1–6).Anditreplacedthe LagosPlan’svisionofeconomicself-reliance anddomesticfinancewithacallforadoublingoftheworld’saidtoAfrica – aidoverwhelminglyconstitutedbydirectloansfromEuro-Americandevelopmentbanks.

Bundledtogetherwithanowfamiliarsetofpoliciesfocusedontradeliberalization andfiscalausterity,theseloansremainedfordecadesthedominantdevicewithwhich Africangovernmentsaccessedcapitaland,insomecases,thisfocusonpublicdebt largelyreplacedexistingdevelopmentprogrammesfocusedonlendingtoprivate enterprises(Ducastel 2019).Criticspointedtotheongoingfailureofstructuraladjustmentpoliciestoaddressthestagnationthatbothreportsidentifiedasasourceof profoundconcern – but,ofcourse,inradicallydifferentterms:oneasasteptowards ‘liberation’ andtheothertoaddressAfrica’ s ‘economiccrisis’ .

Bytheendofthetwentiethcentury,scholarsanddevelopmentexpertsconsolidatedafocusonthishistoricallyspecificframingofAfricaneconomicproblems. Criticsandadvocatesalikeunderstoodthisproblemintermsofthedynamicsofinternationalaid,extractiveexportsectorsandthequestionof ‘ access ’ inwhatcametobe knownas ‘theinformalsector’.Andtheyconceptualizedcapitalassomethingthatwas eitherinvestedfromoutsidethecontinentorextractedfromit.Amongmanyscholars,thereremainedanoverwhelmingviewthatsupposedlyglobalcapitalhadsimply bypassedriskyAfricaninvestmentsandejectedmuchofthecontinentfromitsglobal flows.Wheresuchcapitaldidre-routetowardsthecontinent,therewasashared sensethatitwastobefoundbeyondthecityofficesandbranchesofAfrica’sbanks andstockexchanges.InJamesFerguson’sinfluentialphrasing, ‘capitaldoesnot “flow” fromNewYorktoAngola’soilfields,orfromLondontoGhana’sgoldmines;ithops, neatlyskippingovermostofwhatliesbetween’ (2006:38).

ReturnstoAfricancapital

Inthenewmillennium,therehasemergedarenewedframingofAfricaneconomic developmentthatisrevivingoldpan-Africanconcernswitheconomicindependence, sovereigntyandintra-continentalexchange.Andtodaythereisamovementof investors,officials,firmsandconsumersfashioningfinanceintoasignificantsector acrosstheAfricancontinent.Thegrowthofthissectorislinked,inpart,tothefinancialcrisisof2007–08andtheresultingsuppressionoffinancialreturnsacrossEuroAmerica(Aryeetey 2009).Thesubsequentsearchforreturnselsewhereencourageda newwaveofinvestmentinAfricanandother ‘emergingmarkets’.Itwasalsolinkedto thediscursiveshifttoward ‘AfricaRising’,inwhichthecontinent’smiddleclasswas framedasagrowingsourceofnewinvestmentopportunities.AsRoitman(2021)demonstrates,thisnotionwaspushedbytheEuro-Americanfinancialindustry’saspirationsforfrontiermarkets.ButitalsoemergedfromAfricanentrepreneursadvancing conceptssuchas ‘Africapitalism’,inwhichprivatesectorinitiativeisunderstoodtobe thepathtoeconomicprosperityandsocialwealth(Amaeshi etal. 2018).

Theexcitementsurrounding ‘AfricaRising’ and ‘Africapitalism’ hasbeenwidely criticizedforitsocclusionoftheongoingimportanceofcommodityprices,thelimits toindustrializationonthecontinent,thewaninggainsinGDP,andfortakinginspirationfromdeeplyunequalEuropeaninstitutions(Rodrik 2018;Sylla 2014;Ouma 2020a).Yetratherthandismissordenouncesuchaspirations,weunderstandthem asimportantelementsinahistoricallyspecificreframingoftheproblemof Africaneconomicdevelopment.Inthismoment,Africanfinancialinstitutionsare seizingonacriticalshiftinglobalfinance – itsmorals,itsaims,itstechniques,its geography – toreviveapan-Africanpoliticalvisionfirstarticulatedintheyearsprior to ‘debtdependency’ .

Inthepasttwodecades,thefinanciallandscapehaschangeddramatically.African nationstatesbegandrawingonanarrayofnewcreditfacilities.Theywelcomedan immenseexpansionofChinesefinancialinvestmentandlending,which,by2013,had surpassedthecombinedoutstandingloansofthefivelargestdevelopmentbanks (Dobbs etal. 2013).Chinaisnottheonlysignificantchange:between2006and2014, fourteenAfricanstatesissuedforeign-denominatedbondsforthefirsttime,amounting toUS$15billion(GevorkyanandKvangraven 2016:721).Withlowerreturnsavailablein Euro-Americanmarketsafter2008,internationalbanksarekeentoadvancesuchloans. Africanfinanceministries,fortheirpart,arehappytodrawondebtthatlackstheconditionsofdevelopmentbankborrowingandisoftencheaperandlongertermthan bondsintheirowncurrencies.Yet,by2019,theborrowingbingewasraisingredflags, andtheCovid-19slowdownsonlyexacerbatedthehighwireactofremainingfiscally dependentonhighlyvolatileprimaryresourceexports(Chelwa 2020).

Analysesofmicrofinancehaverevealedasimilarfinancialtrajectory.Once groundedinasocialmissiontoprovideaccesstocreditforindividualsexcludedfrom traditionalbanklending,microfinanceinstitutionsmovedtowardsamorelimited focusonfinancialreturnsforinvestors(Guérin 2015).ManyofthelargestmicrofinanceinstitutionsintheglobalSoutharepubliclylistingsharesonstockexchanges acrosstheworld,fromNewYorktoNairobi.Andinresponsetothistrend,microfinanceinstitutionsareinvestingintheimprovementoftheircreditscoringmethodologiestoensuremorepredictableandprofitablereturns(seeOpalo,thisissue).

TheWorldBankhasreactedtothisnewfinanciallandscapebyreconceptualizing itsownroleindevelopmentfinance.And,assomecommentatorshaveobserved,the shifttowardsthe ‘knowledgebank’– astoreofexpertise,ratherthanmoney – has alsomeantlettinggoofmuchofthecontroloverdevelopmentplanningitonce enjoyed.Thus,theBank’snewloanprogrammesclaimtoeasemanyofitsformerly stringentstandardsbyrelying ‘onclientstoidentifyexpectedresultsofaprogram’ ratherthanbankofficials(Runde 2015).Theseexpertshavealsoturnedtocapital marketsasawaytobridgethenew ‘financinggap’,anapproachthattheBankhelped popularizeinitsagenda-settingreport FromBillionstoTrillions (WorldBank 2015).In thisreframingofdevelopmentlending,WorldBankprojectspreparegovernmentsto improvetheircreditratings – theseratingsarethoughttoreducethecostoflending andtoopenupaccesstoanewpoolofcapitallocatedintheworld’sgrowingnumber ofstockexchanges.

CriticshavefocusedontheexpansionofAfricanEurobonds,sovereigndebtand theintegrationofmicrofinanceintoEuro-Americancapitalmarkets.Theyseeinthese trendsthepotentialforpowerfulinstitutionalinvestorssuchasBlackrocktobegin

negotiatingthetermsofloansandtheirloomingdefault(e.g.Gabor 2021).Indeed,the typesoffinanceemerginginAfricatodaycanbevolatile,extractiveandpredatory; capitalisunevenlyavailableandcouldusherinforeigninstitutionalinvestorsasnew andmorepredatorycreditorstoAfrica’seffortsateconomicdevelopment.Yetthere isnodoubtthat,fromLagostoNairobi,JohannesburgtoDakar,thereisalsoanewfoundsenseofopportunityaccompanyingthisbroaderfinancialshift – itisanorientationtowardsthefutureandanoutward-facingdispositionthatisnotnegatedby ongoingvolatility,precarityandinequality.Anumberofthearticlescollectedhere documentthisfuture-orientedexcitementasasocialfact,productiveofnewsocial relations,personalethicsandcommercialdealings(cf.GoldstoneandObarrio 2016).Muchofthisenergyandactivityisfuelledbyyoungerurbanprofessionals, ofteneducatedabroadandworkinginindustriesrangingfrominformationtechnologytoaccountingandfinance.

Fortheseactors, African capital, African creditratingsand African stockexchanges areunderstoodtobeapoliticallyviablealternativetothemorefamiliarEurobonds –sovereigndebtsecuritiesissuedonAmericanorEuropeanstockexchanges – onwhich mostscholarsandglobalcommentatorshavefocusedtheircriticalattention.They accompanyasignificantinstitutionalshift:between1990and2009,thenumberof stockexchangesonthecontinentgrewfromfivetoeighteen(Andrianaivoand Yartey 2010).Inthefollowingyears,Africancorporationssteadilyincreasedtheir issuanceofequityonstockmarkets,fromatotalofapproximatelyUS$5.5billion inissuancesin2011toUS$12.7billionin2015 – anincreaseof44percent (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2016).Asaresult,byDecember2015Africanexchanges hadamarketcapitalizationofapproximatelyUS$1trillion,with23percentresiding inexchangesoutsideSouthAfrica(ibid.).Whileholdingscanbeconcentratedinthe portfoliosoflargeinstitutionalinvestors,tradersandpolicymakersacrossthecontinentalsoworktomakeshareholdingapopularactivity:frominvestmenttrainingto promotionalcampaigns,thestockmarketisofferedtocitizensasameansofachievingtheirowngoalsandcontributingtocollectivewealth(seeMizes,thisissue).

Formanygovernments,privatizationwasameanswithwhichtoestablishthefirst generationofAfricanstockmarkets.Inthe1970s,theCôted’Ivoiregovernmentissued certaintaxrebatesintheformofvoucherstopurchaseassetsonwhatwasthencalled theAbidjanStockExchange(Mizes,thisissue).Later,ZambiaandTanzaniaboth establishedaprivatizationtrustfundthatpurchasedandheldhalfoftheoriginalissuanceoffmarkettobesoldlateratasteepdiscounttolocalinvestors.Suchinitiatives servedmanypurposes,fromnationalprestigeto ‘politicalcover’ forpotentially unpopularprivatizations(KennyandMoss 1998).EastAfrica’slargestbourse,in Nairobi,hasexpandedtoaconsiderabledegreethroughthesaleofoncepublicentitiestoprivateshareholders.Forinstance,sharesofthetelecommunicationscompany Safaricom – onceadepartmentofgovernment – arenowthemostvaluablestockat theNairobiSecuritiesExchange.

Stockmarketsarenotalone;thecontinent’sprivateequitymarketssimilarly appeartobeontherise.AsokoInsight,aNairobi-basedfirmspecializingindata andconsultancyservicesforAfrica’sprivatesector,recentlyassertedthatthecontinentisnowhometo ‘over400privateequity,venturecapitalandassetmanagement firms’ (Withagen 2021).Thegeographicspreadoftheirinvestmentsisunsurprising, withSouthAfrica,Nigeria,Kenya,MauritiusandEgyptfiguringastheleadinghubs.

Thefocusoftheirinvestmentsisalsounsurprising:financialserviceandinformation technologywerethetopinvestmentsectorsin2020(ibid.).ConsultantsatAsoko laudedtheUS$3.3billioninprivateequityinvestmentin2020,despiteitshalfbillion declinefromthepreviousyear – adeclinelargelyattributedtotheCovid-19pandemic.Whatisremarkableaboutsuchdescriptivestatisticsisnotonlythesizeof theinvestmenttheydescribe,buttheirexistence:consultingfirmsonthecontinent haveonlyinthepastdecadebegunpublishingthesenumbersashighlystylized graphicdisplaysinAfrica’sbusinesssectormedia.Suchfactscirculateaswindin thesailsofcapitalmarkets,enticingnewparticipantsandpotentiallycementing thelegitimacyofthisburgeoningindustry.

Closertotheconcernsofmanycitizens,thecontinentisalsohometoahostof consumerfinancialnovelties.Kenya’sM-Pesaquicklyexpandedtoanational

Figure1. Mapofmarketcapitalizationofstockexchanges,December2019.

Figure2. Mapofprivateequity,venturecapitalandassetmanagementfirmsinAfricabyregion.

Source:AsokoInsight(Withagen 2021).

phenomenonafterits2007launchandisnowamodelforusingmobilephonestosend andreceivemoney(Park 2020).WhileM-Pesaconsolidatedadomesticremittance market,subsequentinvestmentsinotherenterprisesarenowdirectedatcreating theinfrastructureforinternationalmoneytransferandnewapproachestoregulating it(seeNing,thisissue).Diasporaremittanceshavegrownenormouslyandhave becomeasignificantenoughsourceofcapitaltocapturetheattentionofgovernments.WhileEthiopia’sfirstissuanceof ‘diasporabonds’ in2007fellshortofexpectations,Nigeria’ssuccessfulissuancein2017raisedUS$300millionforthe government’sinfrastructuralambitionsandwasoversubscribedby130percent (Benson 2019).

Therehasalsobeenanincreaseinintra-Africantrade.Whilemostpaymentson thecontinentremaindenominatedinUSdollars,thesepaymentshavedecreased

fromarateof51.1percentin2013to45.1percentin2017 – asix-pointdeclinecelebratedbytheAfricanDevelopmentBank(SWIFT 2018:3).Initsplace,currenciessuchas WestAfrica’sfrancCFAandtheSouthAfricanrandwereonasteadyincline.Industry analystsalsoforegroundtherelatedtrendoftheincreasingimportance ofintra-Africantradesuchthat ‘almost20%ofallcross-bordercommercialpayments sentbyAfricanBanksnowremainwithinthecontinent,upfrom16.7%in2017’ (ibid.: 4).Suchanincreaseis,ofcourse,aresultofAfricansfocusingtheirmonetaryexchanges onfamilial,commercialandconsumerpaymentswithinthecontinent.Butthese paymentsalsofigureasacentralelementinabroadervisionofpan-Africanintracontinentalexchange.

In2020,theAfricanUnionanticipatedtheinauguralimplementationoftheAfrican ContinentalFreeTradeAgreement(ACFTA),whichwilleliminate90percentofthe existingtariffsoninter-continentalexchangeofgoodsand,eventually,services (MooreandKenewendo 2020).Aspartofthisagreement,ahostofAfricaninstitutions arethussupportingthedevelopmentofthePan-AfricanPaymentandSettlement Platform,whichisanticipatedtofacilitatethecross-borderexchangesalreadyontherise acrossmuchofthecontinent.Crucialtothesetransformationsarethepan-Africanbanks, whicharealreadyleadingthemarketinfacilitatingsuchpaymentsandpositioningthemselvesasthelargeststoresofAfrica’smonetarywealth.Ecobank,forexample,claimsto haveexpandeditsinvestmentbankingoperationsby50percentperannumforthelast fiveyears.Indeed,wheresovereignbondsandprivatizationshavepreviouslydominated theassetsavailableforpurchaseonAfricanstockexchanges,Africa’sbanksaretoday takingstepstowardsexpandingthelistingofprivatefirmsandincreasingtheintegration ofcommercialbanksavingsandcapitalmarkets.

Andyet,atthesametimein2020,newinvestmentinAfrica’sequitycapitalmarketswasatadecadelow.Farfromtheheadydaysof2015anditsnearlyUS$13billion innewcorporateinvestment,theCovid-19pandemichadreducedthecontinent’ s issuancestoaroundUS$5billion(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2021).Butevenwith theslumpinnewequityissuances,anewroleforcapitalmarketsemerged:asanovel financialinfrastructurethroughwhichgovernmentscouldissue ‘pandemicrecovery bonds’ inlieuof – orinadditionto – assistancefromforeigngovernmentsandEuroAmericandevelopmentbanks.InMay2021,forexample,theMaliangovernment issueditsthirdrecoverybond(obligationderelance)ontheWestAfricanStock ExchangeinresponsetotheCovid-19pandemic.AndtheAfricanDevelopment Bankhassimilarlyturnedtocapitalmarkets – albeitoutsideAfricaontheLondon StockExchange – tofunditsownpandemicrecoverybonds(Yount-André 2021). Thesestepsremaintentativeandpreliminary,buttheyareneverthelessexemplaryofareformattedunderstandingoftheroleoffinanceinAfrica’spoliticsof development.Interpretivescholarshavemostlyavoidedthesetopics,cedingthe studyofcapitalmarketstoeconomicsanddevelopmentstudies.Yetsuchadisciplinarydivisionfurthersaviewoffinanceasabstractanddisembeddedfromsocialrelations,ethicalpracticesandeverydayactivity.Andwhileaflurryofwhitepapersand policyreportshavebeguntoanalysethequantitativeincreaseofsuchfinancialtransactions,thereissignificantlylesspublicandscholarlyattentiontohowmanyofthe actorsadvancingthisshiftinAfricancapitalaredrawingonthehistoriesofsolidarity, stateformationandpopularmoralitythatfirstemergedintheearlyyearsfollowing independence.Inotherwords,thereisanimmensesocialuniverseofordinarylabour, 550JamesChristopherMizesandKevinP.Donovan

newtechnologiesandcollectiveaspirationgoingintocomposingAfricancapitaltoday.

Hautefinanceparlebas

Butwhatdoesitmeanto ‘ compose ’ capital(cf.Guyer 2016)?Andwheredoessucha compositiontakeplace?Thearticlescollectedinthisissueof Africa buildonthenotion of ‘capitalization’,aconceptthatdrawsattentiontothearrayofdevices,institutions, proceduresandpoliticsthroughwhichcapitalismobilized.Ifcapitalis ‘valueinmotion’ (Harvey 2020),thenatstakeincapitalizationishowthatmotionisinaugurated,propelledandsustained.Thereis,inotherwords,considerablelabour – living,immaterial, affective,technicalandlegal – requiredforcapitalization,andthegoalofthispartissue istodepictsomeofthemanifoldwaysinwhichAfricansarepursuingit.

‘Capitalization’ hasatechnicalmeaningforfinancialaccountants:expectedfuture profitsadjustedforrisksanddiscountedintheirpresentvalue.Thediscountingof capitalduetoitsexpectedfuturevaluecanbetracedbacktofourteenth-century Italianmerchantswho ‘allowedcustomerstopre-paytheirbillsata “discount”’ (NitzanandBichler 2009:155).Theydidthisbecauseitgavethemcertaintyofpaymentinthepresentratherthanriskingtheirclientsdefaultingontheirdebtsinthe future.Discountingmeantthemerchantsreceivedlessmoneythantheywouldotherwise,butitprovidedcertainty.Andthisnotionofdiscountingremainsanimportant elementoffinancialexchangetoday: ‘discountedcashflow’ isoneofthemostwidely usedmethodsoffinancialvaluationacrosstheworld.

Putanotherway,anyenterpriseplanningforthefuturefacesuncertaintyabout whatmightbefallitsrevenuestreams – thismeansthatthereisatrade-offbetween whatitcanearntodayandwhatitmightearntomorrow. ‘Capitalization’ isawayto calculatethepresentvalueoftheserevenuestreamsgiventheirpotentialfuturevalue. Inthissense,capitalizationisanaccountingpracticethatguidestheallocationofwealth: itallowsaccountantstocalculatethecostsandreturnsofanassetoverthe extended courseofitsuse,andtoestimatethefuturevalueofthatasset.Today,capitalizationisan enormouslyinfluentialpracticeguidingnotonlybankersbutalsonon-financialcorporationsandstates:calculatingcapitalizationallowsinvestorstoevaluate firmsasassets andpotentiallyleveragethisequityintonewroundsofcapitalinvestment. Assuch,capitalizationisoneofthemostsignificantcategoriesoffinancialreasonthat hasemerged alongside – andmadepossible – thegrowthofthefinancialindustrytoday.

IntheUSA,anewwaveofcriticalreflectiononcapitalmarketsswelledaroundthe 2007–08crisis,andregulatoryauthoritiesandacademicsaliketookupthefamiliar taskofmakingsenseofaneconomyin ‘crisis’ (Roitman 2013).Initsscholarlyform, capitalizationthusemergedas ‘theconstantsearchingout,ortheconstructionof, newassetstreams’ (LeyshonandThrift 2007:98).Here,financeisnotunderstood toworkthroughungroundedspeculation,butisinsteadfoundedon ‘somekindof collateral ::: thatusuallyturnsouttobeintheformoffixedassetsthatwillyield apredictableincomestream’ (ibid.:99).Insuchcases,determining ‘earningpower’–theexpectedrateofreturnonaninvestment – isfundamental,andcapitalizationis theconceptualcategorythatrendersthisfuturecapacitycalculable(Muniesa etal. 2017:31).Itiswiththeknowledgeofthisincomestreamthatfinancierscanleverage

552JamesChristopherMizesandKevinP.Donovan

theirposition,borrowingandengineeringthespeculativeexercisesthatcapture headlinesandhavetodayamassedagrowingcrowdofglobalcritics.

Butassetsdonotsimplyexist.Rather,theyarecomposedthroughhighlyspecific constellationsoflabour,law,infrastructure,accountingandrhetoric(Birchand Muniesa 2020).Capital,inotherwords,isanachievement.So,ouranalyticaltask istounderstandhowculturalvalues,socialrelationsandtheexerciseofdiverse andoftencompetingformsofpowerarrangethemselvessothatcapitalization becomesapossible,knowableandcontroversialthingintheworld.Africanistanthropology,ofcourse,haslongexcelledatthissortofanalysisofvalueandwealth: whethertheimportanceofaestheticandaffectivejudgementsofNuercattle (Evans-Pritchard 1940),thecommunalboundingofspheresofexchange(Bohannan 1955),thenegotiationofcross-culturalformsofsocialvalue(Pietz 1985),orthedistributionofresourcesbasedonsocialrank(Guyer 2004),theiconicstudiesinthis traditionareconcernedwiththemannerinwhichputatively ‘cultural’ commitments shapewealth,exchangeandproduction.

Morerecentworkinthistraditionattendstotheproliferationofconsumerfinance acrossthecontinent.Anthropologistsemphasizehowsupposedabstractionssuchas ‘capital’ or ‘credit’ areembeddedwithinpopularethicsandtransformedthroughconsumerbehaviour.SibelKusimba(2021),forinstance,locatesthesuccessofKenya’ s breakthroughmobilemoneyservice,M-Pesa,withinthecountry’sextendedkinship networks.Growingindebtednesshasbeenaparticularfocusofstudy,withanthropologistsdemonstratingnotonlyhowpredatorylendingfuelsdispossessionandsubordination,butalsohowfinanceisitselfdependentuponpopularpracticesandvalues (Elyachar 2005).Whetheritisaspirationsforeducationandconsumptionamong SouthAfrica’spost-apartheidmiddleclass(James 2014),ordesirestosecureagood death(Bähre 2020),noveltechniquesofindebtednessdonotstandapartfromlongstandinghistoriesandcultures.

Yetthisscholarshipcontinuestoworkonanunspokendivisionoflabour:economistsanalyse ‘highfinance’ whileanthropologistsattendtoeconomiclife ‘from below’ (HullandJames 2012:1).Theemergenceoftheideaofthe ‘informalsector’–and,later,the ‘populareconomy’– isacaseinpoint:economicanthropologists advancedthis ‘sector’ astheappropriatedomainofethnographicinquiry(Hart 1973).ThishaslongbeenheldupasanempiricalcontrasttothemistakenassumptionsofexpatriatedevelopmenteconomistsabouteconomiclifeinAfrica(Ferguson 1994).Anthropologistshavearguedthattheuniversalizingtendencyofeconomists hasoverlookedruralinequality,theextendednatureofAfricanhouseholds,and theroleofwomeninproduction(Hill 1986).Theresulthasbeenadisciplinarydivide: ethnographywasthoughttobetheappropriatemethodwithwhichtowitnessand experience ‘thirdworld’ bazaars;andeconometricsemergedasamethodthateconomistsemployedtoanalyseaseeminglydifferentuniverseofeconomicphenomena.1

1 Morerecently,someeconomistshaverecognizedtheneedforeconometricapproachesthatincorporateanthropologicalinsights.Forinstance,giventhatthe ‘household’ istheunitatthecoreofmany economicmodels,theculturallydistinctwaysinwhichfamiliesareorganizedhavereceivedsomeattentionbyquantitativeandformalistscholars.CelestinMonga(2017)goesfurther,callingfor ‘postmacroeconomics’,anapproachfocusedonthelimitsofmathematics,thepluralityofhumanmotivations andinterests,andtheutilityofvarioustypesofdata.

Amonganthropologists,thecommitmenttothisdichotomycontinuestoshape understandingsofthe ‘ opaque ’ economictransformationsofcapital’ s ‘violenceof abstraction’ (ComaroffandComaroff 1999).Here,thefinancialindustryappearsless asanobjectofstudythanasaspectrehoveringinthebackgroundandproducing superstructuralformations – xenophobia,witchcraftor419scams – onlytheeffects ofwhichareavailableforethnographicanalysis.

TheavoidanceofhighfinancebyAfricananthropologyreflectsasensenotonly thatitisirrelevanttomostAfricans’ livesbutthattheindustryisarealmofabstract uniformity,unavailabletosocio-culturalanalysis.Yetinrecentyears,anthropologists workingelsewhereintheworldhavesuccessfullychallengedsuchdivisionsand openeduptheeliteuniverseoffinancetoanthropologicalinquiry.Theyhaveoffered anewperspectiveonthe(im)moralaspirationsofstockexchangetradersthemselves (Ho 2009)andthetechnicalandperformativeworkoffinancialanalystsandcorporate lawyers(Riles 2011).Indoingso,theyhaveshownthatsupposedly ‘global’ financeis theresultofemplacedactivitiesandequipment:aderivativesmarketforcorn,for example,existsthroughtheembodiedactivitiesoftradersinanoffice,communicatingthroughparticularinfrastructuresandsocializedhabits(see,forexample, MacKenzie 2008:8–37).AndasDaromirRudnyckyj(2018)argues,theseextantfinancialconfigurationsarecontinuallyincompetitionwithemergingfinancialcentresin theglobalSouth.Inshort,thesescholarshavereframedhighfinanceasalegitimate objectofanthropologicalinquiryataglobalscale.YetAfricahasmadelittleappearanceintheseanalyses.

NewerapproachesdooffersomeinsightsforAfricancapitalanditsinstruments (BreckenridgeandJames 2021).StefanOuma(2016:84),forinstance,adoptsan approachtothe ‘operationsofcapital’ thatdescribesthe ‘socio-legalandtechnical architecture’ throughwhichAfricanagricultureisconverted ‘intoanalternativeasset class’.Suchanapproachfocusesontheworkittakestocreateandsustaincapital,as wellasitsfrictionsandtensions.Otherapproachesfocusmoreontheprofessional legitimacyofexpertsdoingthiswork,whetherAfricaneconomistsorbureaucrats. AccordingtoBéatriceHibouandBorisSamuel(2011:12),macro-economictechniques emergedinAfricaalongsidetheexpansionofitsdevelopmentalstates,leadingupto andintheyearsfollowingnationalindependence.Yetbeyonddocumentingthesimpleappearanceofsuchtechniques,theirapproachto ‘macroéconomieparlebas’ (macroeconomyfrombelow)drawsattentiontotheuniverseofsocialrelations andstrugglesamongeconomicexpertsthatexists ‘behindthefrozen,etherealimage of[macro-economic]statistics’ (ibid.:13).Whilemanyofthesetechniquesremainthe jurisdictionofgovernmentalexpertsandtheirstrategiesforadvancingnational economicdevelopment(Samuel 2011),therealsoexistsauniverseof ‘politicsbeyond thestate’ (ibid.:9)inwhichcreditratings(Vallée 2011)andunregulatedcredit markets(Guyer etal. 2011)arethemselvesconsequentialformsofmacro-economic government ‘parlebas’ .

Thearticlescollectedinthispartissueof Africa complementthisapproachbycentringourcollectiveanalysisonwhatcanbehelpfullytermed ‘hautefinanceparlebas’ (highfinancefrombelow).Withthisapproach,weaimtofurtherelucidatethediverse devicesoffinancialgovernancethatareconstitutingthenetworkoffinancialinfrastructuresappearingacrossAfricatoday.Thecontributionstothiscollectiontakethe perspectiveoftheinvestors,analysts,entrepreneurs,regulators,bankersand

technocratstaskedwithrealizingthisnewapproachtoeconomicdevelopment,an approachoftenexplicitlylinkedtoAfricancapitalizationandliberation.Here,particularculturalunderstandingsoffinancearefarmorethanatooltolegitimize,accommodateanddomesticateEuro-Americancapitalflows.Asthearticlescollectedhere emphasize,long-standingvisionsofAfricaneconomicdevelopmentshapethecreationofassetsandtheircompositionintoAfricancapitaltoday.

CapitalizingAfrica

TheAfricanCapitalMarketsConferencewithwhichweopenedthisarticleisexemplaryofthesortsoffinancialtransformationsappearingonthegroundacrossthe continenttoday – andinthepagesofthisissue.In2016,wearrivedinCapeTown totakestockofhowonecornerofAfrica’sfinancialuniversewasmakingsenseof thesetransformations,andhowcapitalmarketactorsthemselvessoughttoadvance orrestrainthem.Althoughtheconferencewasheldinoneofthecontinent’smost raciallyexclusiveenclaves,itneverthelessexemplifiedan aspiration forpanAfricancapitalization.Manyofitspanelswerebilledasanexplorationofcapital growth ‘throughoutAfrica’ oroftheimpactofglobalchanges ‘acrossthecontinent’ . Eveniffewofthesecouldtrulyreckonwithsuchanambitiousremit – whetheronthe daisorinmoreinformalconversationsatlunch,oncigarettebreaksorinthetrade showhall – thevisionofacontinent-widemarketservedasbothaconcretegoalanda legitimatingdevice.

Despitetheseaspirations,theconferenceisareminderofthecontinent’ s unevenfinancialgeography:SouthAfricahaslongseemedinaclassofitsown, andevensignificanthubssuchasNairobiorLagoscanseemaworldapartfrom theeconomicrealitiesafewhoursaway.Whereconversationattheconference explicitlyexpandedbeyondnationalborders,thedifficultiesofdoingsowereevident. Consider,forexample,theloneroundtablefocusedexplicitlyontheproblemof integratingAfrica’sdiversecapitalmarkets.GatheringtogetherstockexchangeexecutivesfromSenegal,Namibia,KenyaandSouthAfrica,theroundtableaimedat ‘improvinginter-marketcollaborationandtransparency’ acrossthecontinent.And thehostbeganbyposingseveralintroductoryquestions: ‘Whatisnecessarytofoster greater standardizationamongemergingAfricancapitalmarkets?Whatrolecan thevariouslocalexchangesandpan-Africanassociationsplay?’

Toelaboratethisvisionofpan-Africanintegration,theseexecutivesturnedtoa discussionofsomeofthemoremundanetechnicalaspectsofsecuritiesmarkets. Theyposedthequestion:whatisthe ‘requisitefinancialinfrastructure’ neededto drivethisintegration?Foryears,thesestockmarketshadsoughttoincreasethe cross-listingandinter-marketexchangeoffinancialassetsinordertoexpandtheir liquidityand,inturn,theamountofcapitalflowingthroughtheirexchanges.While theyhadalreadyintegratedtheirdigitalplatforms,tradingacrossbordersremained limited.AccordingtotheCEOoftheNamibianStockExchange,thetroublewasalack of ‘socialinfrastructure’:brokerssimplydidnotknowortrustoneanother.Industry conferenceswereonewaytobuildmoreconfidenceandstrongerrelationships betweenbrokersandexecutivesacrosscontinentalborders.

Atstakefortheseexecutiveswas,inpart,capitalization.Beyondaplatformfor tradingassets,stockmarketsarethemselvescompaniesseekingtoincreasetheir

ownreturnsandexpandtheirmarketcapitalization.Butwhatisnotimmediatelyevidentishowintra-Africanintegrationcametobeanimportantframewithinwhichto advancesuchcapitalization.Iftheproblemweresimplyoneofliquidityandcapital flow,forexample,thenattractingforeigninvestorsfromoutsidethecontinentmight beamoresuitableapproach.Yetalongsideanarrayofpan-Africanofficials,these executivesareturningtowardsotherlocationsacrossthecontinenttocompose andcirculatethefinancialassetsthattheirstockmarketsneedtogrowandsurvive inagloballycompetitiveindustry.

Thisspecialissuereflectsthissenseofgeographicindeterminacy.Seenfromthe perspectiveofGDPfiguresorstockvaluations,nationaleconomiessuchasSouth Africa,NigeriaandKenyamaycapturetheattentionofjournalistsandscholars. ButJohannesburg,LagosandNairobifadeinpredominancewhenseenfromtheperspectiveoffinanciersseekinganewfrontier,orfromtheperspectiveofaccountants inLomé(Opalo,thisissue)andbankersinBrazzavilletryingtosecuretheirownprofessionalfutures(Ning,thisissue).Inotherwords,ratherthanhewingtoobviouscartographiesofAfricancapital,thecontributionstothisissueanalysetoday’ s unexpectedeffervescenceofcapitalizationacrossAfricafromlocationsinwhichsuch techniquesarenotyet – butmayonedaybe – amoralandfinancialnorm.

Consider,forexample,thecaseofprivatizationinEthiopia(Collins,thisissue). Ethiopianofficialshaveresistedthecontinentaltrendtowardspubliclisting:there isnonationalstockmarketandprivatizationremainsselective.Yetthepastdecades haveseenanegotiated – ratherthanforeclosed – processofrenderingpublicentities intoprivateones.TheEthiopianstate’slegitimacydependsonsuccessfuldevelopmentaloutcomes,butitisalsocognizantoftherisksofsurrenderingtoprivateactors theabilitytocommandresources.Selectiveprivatization,therefore,providesameans ofgeneratingrevenuethatcanberepurposedforotherdomains,suchasinfrastructure orindustryorfortheanticipatedconstructionofEthiopia’sownnationalstockmarket. Doingsoisnotmerelyadrytechnicalmatterofaccounting.AsChristinaTekeCollins analyses,PrimeMinisterAbiyfashionsitasaprojectof medemer,anAmharicwordfor ‘comingtogether’ or ‘ synergy ’ thattodaygesturesalsotoeconomicopenness.

PrivatizationinCôted’Ivoireisalsoinvestedwithsimilarmoralsignificance – itis linkedtoapost-independencevisionofeconomicself-sufficiencyandgrowth.Inline withthisvision,nationalleadersinthe1970screatedastockexchangeastheirpreferredvehiclefortheprivatizationofpublicassets.Today,anorganizationofsmall shareholders(petitsporteurs)ontheRegionalStockExchangeofWestAfrica(LaBourse RégionaledesValeursMobilièresdel’Afriquedel’OuestorBRVM)isadvocatingfora returntothemoralvaluesthatguidedsuchreforms:theyadvancewiderstockmarket participationnotsomuchasastrategyofeconomicdevelopment,butasoneofmoral reformationoftheeconomy(Mizes,thisissue).FrustratedbythecaptureofcommercialreturnsbyAfricanandEuropeanelites,the petitsporteurs envisionamorewidely distributedequitymarketasameansofdiscipliningunaccountableelitesthrough transparency.The petitsporteurs seecommercialandmoralvalueincapitalmarkets, andtheytakestepstoreformulatefinancialinstrumentstomaximizethem.

TherefashioningofsuchdevicesisalsoatstakeinTogo,wherethelendingindustryishometodivergentideasandpracticesofestablishingcreditworthinessand managingrisk(Opalo,thisissue).FunderssuchastheWorldBankhavesupported theexpansionofcreditbureausthatgatherandstandardizefinancialhistoriesin

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ordertodetermineassessmentsofcreditworthiness.Theresultingcreditscoresare promissorytechniques,offeringameanstoknowthefuturelikelihoodofrepayment byindividuals.Theyarealsomeanttoendinformationasymmetriesthataresaidto keepcreditexpensiveandexclusive.Incontrasttotheseideasofriskmanagement, theloanofficersattheLomésavingsandcreditcooperativewhereVanessaWatters Opaloworkedthinkthatrepaymentisonlypossiblethroughwhattheycallthe ‘real work’ ofinterviewingclientsandvisitingtheirhomes.These ‘relationalformsof assurance ’ worknotthroughthetranslationofpastbehavioursintofuturepredictionsbutratherinthehereandnow,adaptingtovolatilecircumstances.

Riskscomeinmanyforms.InGhana,Anna-RiikkaKauppinen(thisissue)explores howatangleofriskswasinterpretedthroughalonghistoryofeconomicnationalism andnewerinstrumentsoffinancialengineering.BetweenAugust2017andJanuary 2019,theGhanaianstatetookovernine ‘indigenousbanks’.Workinginoneofthese banks,Kauppinentracksthevaluesattachedtoindigeneity,showinghowpoliticians, bankersandcitizensaspiredtoeconomicsovereignty – anotionassociatedwith KwameNkrumahbutthatassumednewsignificanceinaneraofeconomicliberalization.Itwasnotthequantitativeaccumulationofcapitalthatwasatstakesomuchas thequalitativeharnessingofcapitalasGhanaian,whilebankers,regulatorsandcitizensdebatedtheethicsoffinancialreform.Itisthroughthiscombinationoffinancial instruments,encountersanddiscontentthatthemoralcategoryof ‘indigenousbank’ cametoaffectfinancialflowsinGhana.

Ofcourse,fewinGhanawantedanythinglikeautarky.Inadvocatingeconomicsovereignty,theywereadvocatingforaversionofcontrolovertheallocationofcapital ontimelinesandatpricesthatwouldservethenation.Thenation,though,ishardly coterminouswiththeterritory – whetheritbethroughcross-bordercommercialnetworks,regionalmonetaryunionsordiasporaremittances.RundongNing(thisissue) turnsourattentiontothesedynamicsinastudyoftraders,foreignexchangeand centralbankregulationinCongo(Brazzaville).Howdoesastateregulatemonetary flowswithintheconfinesofthefrancCFAregime?Ningarguesthatitcomesdownto formalities – namely,thepaperformsthatmustaccompanyrequestsforforeigncurrencies.Paperwork,heargues,isnotsomuchabouttheconveyanceofinformationas itisaboutslowingdowndemandforforeigncurrency.Requiringnewformalities allowsthecentralbanktoindirectlyaffectthecostofforeignexchangeandthespeed withwhichitcirculates.Adjustingthesechannelswasacentralmeansofgoverning moneyintheaftermathofadropinoilprices.However,thecentralbankcannotact unilaterally:instead,itmustcreativelyrepurposepaperworkrequiredofChineseand Levantinemerchantswho,inturn,themselvescreatetheirownwaystoadjustthese bureaucratic ‘valves’.Theresultisasetoffinancialflowsshapedbymultipleinterests, technologiesandnorms.

Takentogether,thearticlesinthisissuerevealtheemergingdynamicsofAfrican capitalization.Thereare,inshort,immenseanddiversefieldsofpoliticalandcultural engagementsurroundingAfricancapitalizationtoday.Theyarelocatedinthecontested constructionofthevariousdevicesandpracticesthatmay – ormaynot – cometo constituteanintegrated,independentnetworkoffinancialinfrastructuresfitfor Africanaspirations.

Acknowledgements.WearegratefulforthesupportofWaleAdebanwi,whooriginallyinvitedusto submitthiscollection.ManythanksgoaswelltoJanetRoitmanandHannahAppelfortheirgenerous engagementwithearlyversionsofthearticlescollectedhere.Ouranonymousreviewersofferedcrucial guidancethroughtheeditorialprocess,forwhichwearethankful.ThanksalsotoBorisSamuelforhis support,inspirationandthoughtfulsuggestionsaswecomposedthisintroduction.Andfinally,weare especiallygratefultothecontributorstothisissueforofferingusthechancetothinkthroughourmaterialtogether.

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JamesChristopherMizes isanIFRISpostdoctoralresearchfellowattheInstitutdeRecherche InterdisciplinaireenSciencesSociales,UniversitéParis-Dauphine.

KevinP.Donovan isananthropologistandhistorianattheCentreofAfricanStudies,Universityof Edinburgh.

Citethisarticle: Mizes,J.C.andDonovan,K.P.(2022). ‘CapitalizingAfrica:highfinancefrombelow’ . Africa 92,540–560. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0001972022000444