SPECIAL REPORT
Enabling Technologies for Network Centric Warfare Enabling Today’s Networks to Support Tomorrow’s Needs The American-Led Trend Towards Network Enabled Warfare The Insurgent Threat in Afghanistan: Another Step in Redefining the Conflict to Enable an Exit for Armed Forces The Bowman Tactical Radio Network Soldier Modernization Systems and the Impact of Data Link Technology Secrecy, Cryptography and a Glimpse at the Future
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Published by Global Business Media
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SPECIAL REPORT
Enabling Technologies for Network Centric Warfare
SPECIAL REPORT: ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES FOR NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE
Contents
Enabling Today’s Networks to Support Tomorrow’s Needs The American-Led Trend Towards Network Enabled Warfare The Insurgent Threat in Afghanistan: Another Step in Redefining the Conflict to Enable an Exit for Armed Forces
Foreword
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Mary Dub, Editor
Soldier Modernization Systems and the Impact of Data Link Technology
Enabling Today’s Networks to Support Tomorrow’s Needs
Secrecy, Cryptography and a Glimpse at the Future
Mark Turvey, Ultra Electronics, Communication & Integrated Systems
The Bowman Tactical Radio Network
Sponsored by
Published by Global Business Media
Published by Global Business Media Global Business Media Limited 62 The Street Ashtead Surrey KT21 1AT United Kingdom Switchboard: +44 (0)1737 850 939 Fax: +44 (0)1737 851 952 Email: info@globalbusinessmedia.org Website: www.globalbusinessmedia.org Publisher Kevin Bell Business Development Director Marie-Anne Brooks Editor Mary Dub Senior Project Manager Steve Banks
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Introduction Background / Context Sharing Information Security Common Standards Ultra’s Approach Enabling Future and Legacy Connectivity
The American-Led Trend Towards Network Enabled Warfare Marushka Dubova, Defence Correspondent
Speed During Uncertainty: the OODA Loop The British versus the American Approach Extension of the Network to Whitehall and Civilian Military Leaders BAE’s Role in Working Towards Network Enabled Interoperability Post Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 2010 and Spending Cuts New Generation Cryptographic Equipment an Opportunity for Industry
The Insurgent Threat in Afghanistan: Another Step in Redefining the Conflict to Enable an Exit for Armed Forces The Key Role of ISTAR Challenges to ISTAR
Production Manager Paul Davies
The Bowman Tactical Radio Network
The opinions and views expressed in the editorial content in this publication are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily represent the views of any organisation with which they may be associated. Material in advertisements and promotional features may be considered to represent the views of the advertisers and promoters. The views and opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily express the views of the Publishers or the Editor. While every care has been taken in the preparation of this publication, neither the Publishers nor the Editor are responsible for such opinions and views or for any inaccuracies in the articles.
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Meredith LLewelyn, Lead Contributor
Advertising Executives Michael McCarthy Abigail Coombes
For further information visit: www.globalbusinessmedia.org
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Don McBarnet, Staff Writer ASTOR Enhances Bowman’s Capabilities The Value of Real-Time Wide-Area Search Capability in Helmand Province VOIP Capabilities UAVs Prove their Capability in Delivering Real-Time Intelligence of BLOS Data to Commanders on the Ground The Data Deluge “Too Much Information” and the Future in the United States
Soldier Modernization Systems and the Impact of Data Link Technology
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Don McBarnet, Staff Writer Significant Budget Constraints Market Opportunities out of Europe
Secrecy, Cryptography and a Glimpse at the Future
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Don McBarnet, Staff Writer © 2011. The entire contents of this publication are protected by copyright. Full details are available from the Publishers. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.
The National Security Agency and “Suite B” Network Enabled Encryption in the Air
References
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Foreword
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NABLING TECHNOLOGIES for Network Enabled Capabilities (NEC) or Network Centric Warfare (NCW), to use the American phrase, is a fast changing topic. In this Report there is a review of where we are now and some thoughts on paths forward to enable better connectivity for soldiers and commanders on operations in the Middle East, South Asia or elsewhere. The Report opens by setting out the background to NEC and its importance in combatting evolving threats in all forms of modern warfare from counterterrorism to cyberspace activity. It goes on to examine the importance of sharing informational data from a variety of sources by the use of sensors and how this contributes to good intelligence, on which the effective execution of modern military operations are reliant. Security is a key factor as connectivity increases – the obstacles and challenges are examined. The section ends by setting out the approach of divorcing data from the data link by building on existing communication links as a starting point, then adding various elements to bridge the gaps. In this way, systems can be constructed that offer connectivity to current and ongoing generations of networks, which are cost-effective and future-proof. The second piece looks at the origins of the concept in the United States in 1999 and assesses how the concept is being implemented in the United Kingdom in 2011. The UK Ministry of Defence is a key link in the network to the operational battlefield in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Here, as various distinguished figures from industry note, the impediment to connectivity can lie as much in institutional mindsets as weaknesses in technology. However, industry-led projects with BAE and others have resulted in the success of network enabling interoperability projects like Talon Strike with Niteworks. The caveat that hangs over such success is the political will to enable further developments given the financial climate of constraint and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (2010).
This is followed by an update on the current threat levels in Afghanistan. General David Petraeus’ phrase that the task in some areas is to “halt the downward security spiral” is forthright. New connectivity for ISTAR may help commanders on the ground to achieve greater accuracy of fire and further protect soldiers by delivering data that allows them to see over the horizon and monitor insurgent activity laying IEDs. The next section looks at the Bowman tactical radio network which, in the UK, is the key delivery agent of much data and is being enhanced by additional platforms, UAVs and satellite links. This results in the old dilemma that too much data may not be delivering the key intelligence information required. Soldier modernization programmes through Europe and beyond are in a state of disarray as countries grapple with putting add-ons to legacy equipment on tight budgets. This topic is covered in the fifth piece. There is the powerful feeling for many that they are running up a down escalator where richer countries with whom they seek interoperability have the funds to take on technology while the cash strapped appear to be forever buying state-of-the art equipment that doesn’t link with heritage kit and is out of date in 18 months, as Moore’s Law adds yet another twist to the spiral of technology development. The Report ends by looking at how the encryption of data is an ongoing complicating factor. As soon as data becomes standardized and can connect within armed forces and across coalitions, the issue of encryption muddies the water and raises the critical issue of trust and ties of loyalty. Yet further development of algorithms and other encryption devices are on the horizon. In such a secretive and obscure field, it is hard as ever to look into the future.
Mary Dub Editor
Mary Dub has covered the defence field in the United States and the UK as a television broadcaster, journalist and conference manager. Focused by a Masters in War Studies from King’s College, London, she annotates and highlights the interplay of armies, governments and industry.
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Enabling Today’s Networks to Support Tomorrow’s Needs Mark Turvey, Ultra Electronics, Communication & Integrated Systems
An evolutionary approach to upgrade legacy communications to mission critical battlespace multi media IP networks that will deliver NEC.
Network Enabled Capability
Introduction In the complex and confusing battlespace of today and tomorrow, it now matters less about how far and how fast you can go, but rather more about what you can sense, who you can tell and how quickly can you tell them. The ideal is where everyone is connected to everyone else and data flows seamlessly. This is the basis for Network Enabled Capability (NEC) which, although a simple concept, is not quite so simple to achieve in the real world.
Background / Context Defence and security forces around the world have recognised that there are a number of evolving threats that they must be prepared for. These include counter-terrorism, counter– insurgency, maritime security, cyber warfare as well as the conventional threats across the air, land and sea domains. This, allied with the rapid emergence and adaptation of technologies, especially in the cyberspace domain, and the more complex and confusing character of
conflicts, is having an increasing impact on the way nations conduct military operations. The rapid evolution of threats as they continuously adapt new technologies, behaviours and strategies to counter our conventional military superiority is driving the continuing need for updated and evolving communications and integrated systems. Today this is being addressed through the provision of solutions for Urgent Operational Requirements (UORS) and an increased focus on platform updates through technical insertion and spiral upgrades, to keep pace with evolving threats. This is particularly so now that militaries and governments are seeing platforms operate for in excess of thirty years, well beyond their original expected life span. This drive towards on-going spiral upgrades and technical insertion allied to the increasing financial pressures that all governments are facing mean that the procurement of single purpose / specific role platforms are no longer viable. Instead, there is a trend towards flexible multirole platforms that can be fitted with additional WWW.DEFENCEINDUSTRYREPORTS.COM | 3
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This drive towards ongoing spiral upgrades and technical insertion allied to the increasing financial pressures that all governments are facing mean that the procurement of single purpose / specific role platforms are no longer viable.
sensors, communications and weapon suites to meet additional operational roles. This trend towards smaller fleets of multirole platforms means that every platform is a correspondingly more valuable asset to the user (who will no longer have such depths of numbers for attrition losses). This means that situational awareness (SA), at tactical levels is increasingly important.
Sharing Information The ‘fog of war’ can be penetrated by the use of sensors and by the sharing of the situational awareness picture generated by a fusion of the data from sensors on a variety of platforms. The increasing demand for shared situational awareness, along with the increased demand for Full Motion Video (FMV) is also driving the move towards increased connectivity. Traditionally this has been achieved over recent decades with tactical data links (Link-11, Link-16 etc), but they have limited bandwidth and high latency. Over recent conflicts the emergence of real-time FMV and the need for it at the tactical front end has grown immensely. Its application has been limited by the constraints of communications channels (spectrum and satellite communications availability and bandwidth limitations). The proliferation of full motion video data links has seen a multitude of differing standards and hardware solutions with varying degrees of interoperability appear in the battlefield. The effective execution of military operations, especially in the increasingly complex asymmetric type conflicts, is hugely reliant on the provision of good intelligence. This has to be communicated rapidly to the point of decision making, which is increasingly moving to the 4 | WWW.DEFENCEINDUSTRYREPORTS.COM
tactical edge. This has significant implications for the last few miles of the communication channels, with specific mobility, environmental, weight, power and infrastructure limitations and challenges. Connectivity will be made and broken in real time as assets come on and off line. Low latency, secure, ad-hoc, interoperable communications and the associated communication channels are key to delivering this information in a timely and secure manner.
Security Increased connectivity also brings with it a need for increased security, which is often at odds with the demand for interoperability. Security adds layers and complexity to moving data / knowledge around the battlespace, e.g. encryption, authentication, access control, national, alliance, coalition classification levels and the associated crypto and key management – getting the right keys to the right people at the right time is a significant burden on interoperability and logistics. Interoperability is not just about conventional military encryption and decryption at each end of the specific communications channel. As the information from the original source / sensor is transmitted back from the tactical edge to the higher echelons, it is probable that it is being more widely disseminated. As channels and networks get more complex and serve ever more users, there is a need to strike the balance between network confidentiality, integrity and availability. The confidentiality, integrity and availability of the battlespace network(s) and the information they handle are essential if we are to have trust and confidence in using the information presented to us from the cyberspace domain to make decisions. This is particularly so if the information
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is being used to make targeting decisions. The continuous provision of ‘goods’ and services to users depends upon the smooth running of the networks and information systems supporting them. Importantly it should be noted that in a complex networked battlespace, no single government or entity can make the network and information systems secure by itself. Most information systems are neither owned nor operated by one single organisation or company, so all the involved parties must contribute in protecting the information. Confidentiality and integrity are concerned with how information is protected when it is not known where it is or where it has come from. Availability is about maintaining the engineered information pathways, which could be unique and mobile, to ensure that the information can get to and from the critical node users in the most timely manner to reduce the decision making cycle. This is difficult to manage within regular national formations, services and infrastructures, let alone in complex, multi-national coalition expeditionary operations where the situation on the ground is typically more complicated and fluid. E.g. ISAF consists of over 40 nations, encompassing those who are in NATO, nonNATO, in addition to multiple Non Governmental Organisations who may also be operating in the battlespace (e.g. UN flights). In these challenging operational environments, the need to have distributed real-time situational awareness and maximise the coordination between assets is vital. Collecting, fusing, disseminating and coordinating a coherent situational awareness picture and other vital information across so many nations and parties is a considerable security and interoperability challenge.
Common Standards NEC can only be achieved through use of open architectures and standards. Whilst today’s battlefields will see a number of common standards deployed, they will also see a large number of proprietary standards and interfaces in the battlespace which are effectively stovepipes. Even where there are mature common standards (e.g. Mil-Stan-6016 and STANAG 5516 for Link16), there are still often interoperability issues at the platform implementation level that have to be resolved. Multiply this with the desire for security and the associated various crypto algorithms, classification levels, crypto keys and so on, and it becomes clear that achieving seamless interoperability is some way off. The continuing need for updated and evolving communications, increased connectivity and integrated systems is making real use of current and emerging commercial IT technologies and products. As a part of this, there will be a shift
The continuing need for updated and evolving communications, increased connectivity and integrated systems is making real use of current and emerging commercial IT technologies and products. towards IPv6 as the common interface baseline or addressing protocol. However, despite the proliferation of commercial off-the-shelf IT / communication technologies, many existing platforms, and, in particular air platforms, are extraordinarily costly and timeconsuming to change. This results in many platforms, across air, land and sea, being constrained by their existing communications equipment. These constraints have significant implications for wider battlespace interoperability inasmuch as they dictate that certain (legacy) standards and architectures will continue to be used. Further consideration here is that, particularly in today’s economic climate, nations cannot afford to carry out wholesale replacement of their entire military communications systems and infrastructures. So, the key question is – how is it possible to move forward towards NEC, despite starting with a large number of technical and financial constraints? This puzzle includes existing platform infrastructure, encryption, tactical data links, IP messaging, interoperability, voice, data, platform integration and budgets.
Ultra’s Approach Ultra’s approach ultimately is to divorce the data from the data link. This way the data links become WWW.DEFENCEINDUSTRYREPORTS.COM | 5
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Ultra has a successful track record in Information Assurance, ranging from Cryptographic products, Key Management, through development and implementation of secure communications architectures to Tactical
ignorant bearers transmitting all the data, carrying out the routing, according to congestion, priority and latency. Ultra won a contract from the UK MoD to explore practical ways of doing this. The Cross Layer Ad Hoc Networking (CLAHNS) project investigated combining legacy data links into adhoc networks to distribute information around the battlefield. This involved combining state-of-the art networking algorithms, intelligent routing and bridging nodes with the practical limitations of legacy data link and communications networks using both modelling and simulation techniques. The practical starting point is to build on the existing communication links as a baseline backbone, and then add some of the missing pieces that allow Ultra to begin to bridge the gaps. This baseline communication link may be different for each customer, subject to their national and international needs. For many nations the more mature and proven tactical data links will be used as the tactical backbone. This Tactical Data Link (TDL) interoperable infrastructure (Link-11/Link-22 and Link-16) is already implemented in Ultra’s MLP product range.
of networked weapons and secure transfer of imagery. Ultra has developed HIDL for this purpose and this is being adopted as an open NATO standard to enable interoperability. Another missing piece is an encryption system that can host multiple algorithms at different levels of classification and provide national operational sovereign security for different nations, which can be updated or enabled via electronic key management or, national security authority willing, over-the-air. Ultra has developed such a capability with its C3 (Common Core Crypto) which is programmable and being accredited by CESG as part of Ultra’s End Crypto Unit Replacement Programme contract to refresh the UK’s stock of high grade crypto. This is being accomplished using Application Specific Enclosures (ASE) so that there is no change to the platform form or fit, thus eliminating expensive platform integration costs.
Data Links.
Ultra’s C3 with ASEs
Ultra’s Proven Multi Link Processor (MLP) One important piece is a secure networked IP data link with low latency high data rate and transmission security. Such a High integrity data link is needed to meet Command and Control (C2) and high-bandwidth video needs. These applications include information exchange between unmanned systems and ground / control stations, launch and C2 platform control
Ultra has a successful track record in Information Assurance, ranging from Cryptographic products, Key Management, through development and implementation of secure communications architectures to Tactical Data Links. Ultra works closely with international government agencies to deliver successful security solutions across the battlespace from the strategic to tactical levels. Rather than pursuing product development in the traditional manner of isolated domain stovepipes, Ultra is exploiting the key technologies from each of these product areas and has developed a family of modular capabilities that will underpin and enable NEC connectivity.
Enabling Future and Legacy Connectivity
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Ultra has converged the key technologies from the MLP, HIDL and C3 products into core elements of a wider capability. These elements allow compatibility with existing legacy standards and cryptographic systems, whilst also being compatible with current and emerging standards. Ultra have also added
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modules that support additional processing, messaging and network management. One variant of this modular family is the Multi Link Network Processor (MLNP), which is tailored to provide voice and data connectivity and integration between major headquarters / commands and specific key platforms, without the need to replace the legacy communication systems.
Ultra is now able to bridge the stovepipes of legacy communications products whilst offering connectivity to current and future networks and systems
Connecting future and existing systems Building on these core elements has allowed Ultra to develop a modular concept for a secure multi media IP communications node. This modular secure IP node is a customisable and scalable system that offers control of new and legacy radios, voice over IP, military messaging, encryption, tactical data links, legacy communications (including Morse) and IP remote control switching and network management. It also has the capability to work with legacy links i.e. is compatible with legacy infrastructure and networks. This IP communications node can be exploited in the ground environments (e.g. headquarters.) and be mounted on key platforms (e.g. Airborne C2 platform). This offers compatibility with existing / legacy communications links and future systems / standards. The system can be tailored to suit various national requirements, including hosting third party national cryptographic solutions and algorithms. Combined with the flexibility of the system to host independent data link / message sets, this allows nations not only to support and modify the system in-service, but also to ensure that their important operational sovereignty requirements are met. It should be made clear that Ultra is not arguing that everyone should throw everything away and replace it with Ultra’s secure IP node. It comes back to understanding the complete information exchange requirements and the overall communications architecture. Judicious placement of such secure IP nodes, as intelligent gateways / nodes, will allow previous stovepipes to be connected into the wider system with data being forwarded in a secure and timely manner. As a result Ultra is now able to bridge the stovepipes of legacy communications products
– without the prohibitive expense of throwing away all the existing / legacy communication systems.
whilst offering connectivity to current and future networks and systems – without the prohibitive expense of throwing away all the existing / legacy communication systems. Given the above market trends and factors, it would suggest that Ultra’s approach of a modular, secure, scalable system that can support legacy and future common standards, is valid and likely to be increasingly important. With experience across a wide variety of communication programmes, a proven systems integration capability and access to unique technologies, Ultra is well placed to deliver innovative, cost effective, future-proof solutions that meet the demanding requirements of battlespace connectivity.
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The American-Led Trend Towards Network Enabled Warfare Marushka Dubova, Defence Correspondent
There has been a longstanding
“War is a product of its age. The tools and tactics of how we fight have always evolved along with technology. We are poised to continue this trend.”1 David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka and Frederick P. Stein
impression that the American approach rests on a belief in the drive to deliver the latest technology to the battlefield on the assumption that this may well deliver dominance in operations.
John Garstka and Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski are always credited as the first articulators of the concept of Network Centric Warfare in 1999. They were responding to the powerful drive towards the transformation of United States forces in the immediate post-Cold War era, where the revolutionary power of the internet was still emerging. The fundamental idea that information superiority in the battle space led to dominance in war was still relatively fresh. Its wider implications for networking vast numbers of individuals within all the armed forces was still an aim rather than an achievable plan. Twelve years later, that original concept has been taken forward and altered in the process of implementation and technological development.
Speed During Uncertainty: the OODA Loop The original concept was redrawn by Colonel John Boyd, a United States Air Force fighter pilot, and developed into what has become a cliché of Network Centric Warfare – the OODA loop. (This doctrine of Observing, Orienting, Deciding and Acting intended to enhance the speed of decision making in manoeuvre warfare. This was particularly relevant to air combat but had wider implications). The aim was to reduce “the sensor-to-shooter time.” Manoeuvre warfare speed was not the only key factor as Dr Grant Hammond in his book on Col Boyd describes. There were also the important issues of trust and innovation. These were to be key concepts with strong implications for interoperability between different arms of one nation’s forces, and even more importantly between allied countries fighting in coalition, because preparation for full spectrum coalition warfare with NATO and other allies is integral to achieving networked warfare in the 21st century.
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The British versus the American Approach Twelve years on, what does Network Centric Warfare mean for NATO and specifically British armed forces? First, there is a trans-Atlantic difference in terminology and emphasis. In the United States the phrase Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is used – in the UK it is Network Enabled Capability (NEC). This difference in words accentuates a difference in approach. There has been a longstanding impression that the American approach rests on a belief in the drive to deliver the latest technology to the battlefield on the assumption that this may well deliver dominance in operations. The British approach, cautioned by many years of limited budgets, is more aware of the need to deliver effective support to the commander or soldier. Inevitably, this favours what is sometimes described as human factors.2
Extension of the Network to Whitehall and Civilian Military Leaders In 2000, the British MOD initiated the process of the Defence Information Infrastructure (DII). The process is still in play. In an insightful review of the current level of achievement, in Spring 2011, Alistair Murray, Key Systems Advisor for Network Enabled Capability, summarised what he sees as the central weakness of the process of networking Whitehall and all the armed forces: “When I was chief technology officer for a large bank, we did not spend time grappling with the ‘Open Systems’ issue. Instead, we worked out how best to enable clearly articulated requirements for exploiting customer information. The architectures were merely necessary enablers to provide the integration demanded by the bank’s customers in the simplest way possible. In defence, this ‘integration’ happens too late in the acquisition lifecycle. It often occurs on the battlefield, occasionally in design and delivery, but it needs to
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happen in the strategy and requirements phases. This is a lot to ask of a strategy. Without a clear set of goals communicated throughout the enterprise and then further translated into subordinate strategies for business units, the enterprise will not be able to cohere around its strategic goals.” Bob Barton, Managing Director of Niteworks, BAE, sees the issue from a slightly different perspective. Using a medical analogy, he asks whether the Ministry of Defence’s immune system is rejecting change.3 He outlines a list of priorities which need to be considered within the MOD, including superior information management, practical and economic processes and practices, more incisive decision-making, consequences (sanctions and rewards), adequate skills and capabilities, and longevity of staff in key roles.4
BAE’s Role in Working Towards Network Enabled Interoperability Since 2003, BAE has been working in partnership with the British Ministry of Defence, Dstl and a total of 12 other companies5 calling itself Niteworks. BAE describes it as “a highly flexible decision support provider for the MOD, overcoming traditional intellectual property constraints through a unique MOD/Industry partnership.” This special working partnership has produced a range of working solutions to ongoing problems in theatre. An example of the strategic importance of the partnership has been Talon Strike, the biggest project yet undertaken, which over two years has demonstrated solutions to the implementation and acquisition of effective command-andcontrol interoperability between coalition partners. The priority was to lay down the command and control architecture with the Command and Control Development Centre (C2DC) at the Land Warfare Centre. In the US, this task fell to the Battle Command Battle Lab, Leavenworth (BCBL-L), assisted by TRAC. “This stage enabled the development of a suite of systems, based on the technologies that were due to be used by each nation in the near future, but integrated to facilitate the efficient passage of electronic information. The integration included the exchange of vital positional information, orders, graphical overlays and situational awareness data, initially between UK and US operational headquarters, but also exploring how this could be applied more widely.”6 Former Royal Marine Pincher Martin, who led the project, described its effect and its dramatic finale in May 2010. “The result has been a major shift of the boundaries of command and control: namely, the demonstration of working solutions to complex components that were not originally designed to work together, and the identification of solutions to
capability gaps that can drive real improvements for current operations.”7
Post Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 2010 and Spending Cuts However, the question must be asked mid-2011, what is the Coalition Government’s defence strategy and the implications of spending cuts? Professor Paul Cornish of Chatham House describes SDSR as potentially the most short-lived strategic review and “unfortunately not affordable” But Major General (Retired) David Shouesmith and Dean Gilmore from the aerospace and defence practice of PRTM draw out the positives: “– The importance of open-market competition to buy off-the-shelf equipment… – A modular approach to delivering through-life equipment capability, featuring lowertechnology solutions, sufficient to meet simpler requirements…. – Speed of new capability creation will become an industry differentiator. As the MOD looks to the open market, the ability to turn technology into working solutions faster than the competition becomes the main determinant of success.8”
New Generation Cryptographic Equipment an Opportunity for Industry Most importantly for industry is the ring-fencing of spending on cyber security, inherently important in network enabling technologies and, demonstrably so, given the consequences of the 2010 Wikileaks affair: “The ring-fencing of cyber-security in the SDSR to ensure it received sufficient attention was broadly welcomed, and many see this as the hot new area for investment. However, our early experiences show that, even though the SDSR describes the wider implications of cybersecurity, it remains largely a technology play for most participants. There are potentially large wins for those companies that can bring together the entire security solution, encompassing risk/ threat assessment and prioritisation, infrastructure provision, skills development, training, security screening, and continual updating to keep pace with “internet time” developments.” But it is important to stress that there are some differences in the UK approach. For instance, as Brigadier David Meyer put it: “we need to recognise that investments in NEC are vital because exploitation of these technologies holds out the prospect of significant improvements in UK military capability. NEC is also critical to our interoperability with the US, our NATO allies and coalition partners.” WWW.DEFENCEINDUSTRYREPORTS.COM | 9
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The Insurgent Threat in Afghanistan: Another Step in Redefining the Conflict to Enable an Exit for Armed Forces Meredith LLewelyn, Lead Contributor
The insurgency on the ground continues and there is resilience among Taleban and insurgent forces and a drive to harry ISAF forces with IED’s.
In Spring 2011, UK and United States armed forces in a variety of coalitions, are committed in Afghanistan against the Taleban and in Libya against the Gaddafi led government. The war in Afghanistan is the most longstanding and has evolved in 2011 into a very different kind of conflict than that perceived at its inception. According to General David Petraeus, Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Commander of U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A), the mission is transforming itself through working with the Afghan National Army and Police Force. The role of the ISAF coalition forces has transformed from “Leading-to-Partnering-to-Overwatch” of the Afghan National Forces. “All of our operations must be conducted in complete partnership with, and in full support of our Afghan counterparts. This is, after all, their country, and we are working together towards a better future for them and their children. Increasingly -- and understandably Afghans want to exercise greater sovereignty in their country. This should be applauded”.11 Combining this “overwatch” with the recent commitment by President Obama to “drawdown” forces from Afghanistan by 2014 and a parallel commitment by the British to introduce a phased reduction in the number of troops partnering and training the Afghan armed forces from 2011, a new strategy is emerging. Nevertheless, the insurgency on the ground continues and there is resilience among Taleban and insurgent forces and a drive to harry ISAF forces with IED’s. At the same time, ISAF forces try to use all the political skills available to them to build relationships with the local communities through “shuras”, and a commitment to avoid civilian casualties and to apologise for their occurrence. This is described by Gen David Petraeus as working to “halt a downward security spiral”.12
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The Key Role of ISTAR Information Superiority is now integral to the fight: as UK Air Vice Marshal Carl Dixon OBE, Director, Information Superiority puts it: “The military think of battle winning information as Intelligence. And normally it is the side that exploits Intelligence best that wins. The UK military fields a range of Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) platforms and systems. Each of these systems, whether based on Sea, Land, Air or Space, help to build up part of the Intelligence picture”13.
Challenges to ISTAR In both Afghanistan and Libya, Britain and the United States fight as a coalition, in an operation that demands a diversity of skills from the ordinary soldier: s/he must negotiate with locals, dismounted from his vehicle, while being prepared to defend himself from small arms fire, at the same time as partnering and mentoring Afghan soldiers of diverse skills, while working in concert with soldiers from other nations and in an environment where foreign civilians working as NGOs work beside them. This requires high levels of professionalism and, most importantly, trust among allied forces in an environment of high uncertainty where any person, including civilians, could be attacked by IEDs on the road. Other technological challenges derive from insufficient bandwidth to allow communication along the links that have been established.
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The Bowman Tactical Radio Network Don McBarnet, Staff Writer
The first unit of tactical communication is Bowman, produced by General Dynamics. Bowman is, first and foremost, a family of radios, ranging from low level, personal radios through to larger, data radio systems. The system provides secure tactical voice and data communications for joint missions across the British Armed Forces in support of land and amphibious operations. It has been integrated with a range of vehicles, from Land Rovers and Warriors to Challenger 2 tanks. The entire Royal Navy surface fleet is also be fitted with Bowman equipment and major helicopter types supporting land operations are fitted with Bowman equipment… Known as an ‘all-informed net’ this concept envisages numerous commanders within a particular unit listening to the same radio net or tuned into the same frequency. Every commander can, therefore, hear the broadcast of ‘battle critical’ information while other, lower priority, administrative information, such as requests for the re-supply of ammunition and repair of equipment, is transmitted on other radio nets or frequencies to keep the command net free for battlecritical messages.
ASTOR Enhances Bowman’s Capabilities ASTOR (Airborne Stand-off Radar), by Raytheon, delivers an integrated modular system which is valued at close to £1 billion. When ASTOR completed trials in 2008, the then UK Minister for Defense Equipment and Support, Quentin Davies described it in glowing terms, saying: “The new ASTOR system onboard our Sentinel R 1 aircraft is a unique and technologically advanced capability that will deliver exceptional battlefield surveillance. The ASTOR radar will link up with other intelligencegathering equipment, providing commanders with a complete picture of the ground and allowing them to make immediate decisions on operations. One of its key outputs to the soldier on the ground is its ability to look over the horizon and tell him what was coming”. ASTOR would be a beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) capability.
The Value of Real-Time Wide-Area Search Capability in Helmand Province Major Will Tosh, Intelligence Corps Detachment Commander at No 5(AC), describes how ASTOR was used in Afghanistan: “The ASTOR system was closely embedded within 3 Commando Brigade during operations in Helmand province and provided a near real-time, wide-area search capability on operations for the first time. It worked in unison with troops on the ground, delivering timely intelligence and situational awareness to those on the front line.” This is enhanced further by connections to the Falcon and Skynet 5 satellite communications system. This means commanders on the ground using Bowman should soon be able to receive ASTOR produced intelligence via the Falcon communications system. This could be either directly from the ASTOR ground stations themselves, or via the Skynet 5 satellite communications system. Furthermore, in an active demonstration of interoperability, ASTOR can also connect with US aircraft, such as the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS ). ASTOR ground stations can use JSTARS data, and JSTARS and Sentinel can alternate to provide around-the-clock target set coverage.
VOIP Capabilities BAE Systems is the prime contractor on the first stage of the British Army’s new Falcon trunk communications system. According to Major Mould, Falcon: “…will provide a state-of-the-art network operating at up to 34 megabits-per second using Internet Protocol (IP) technology. Voice calls will be made using Voice Over IP (VOIP) technology, providing a resilient and highly efficient data network.” Major Mould argues that, in the future, Falcon will be seen as “a description for the British Army’s wide-area, wide-band deployable network, as opposed to a specific piece of equipment.” Essentially, it is ‘go-anywhere’ broadband and VOIP network that can be rapidly deployed to the field and quickly set up. Falcon would WWW.DEFENCEINDUSTRYREPORTS.COM | 11
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The flexibility and relatively low cost of UAVs allow them to be used for extensive periods to monitor strategic roads, to watch for IED emplacement or to monitor activity around an area.
allow patrols to speak to FOBs and have their communications relayed back to the United Kingdom by satellite.
UAVs Prove their Capability in Delivering Real-Time Intelligence of BLOS Data to Commanders on the Ground The Watchkeeper system is Europe’s largest UAS programme and is produced by Thales. It will provide an enhanced all-weather, dual-sensor multi-mission, image-exploitation and dissemination capability for the UK armed forces. Covering 160 units, including unmanned air vehicles, ground control stations and support vehicles it is Europe’s largest UAS programme.14 The flexibility and relatively low cost of UAVs allow them to be used for extensive periods to monitor strategic roads, to watch for IED emplacement or to monitor activity around an area.
The Data Deluge “Too Much Information” and the Future in the United States The unforeseen consequence of the flow of real-time video data to the commanders on the front line is “too much information arriving too quickly to be turned into actionable intelligence” as Mark Bigham, Vice President for Defense and Civil Mission Solutions at Raytheon Intelligence and Information Systems describes it, in an apt analogy, it is like ‘drinking from a fire hose’. In the US, Raytheon, establishing a Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS), was selected as the foundation stone – an open-architecture and web-based ‘backbone’ that others can plug into seamlessly. Taking the concept even further, Raytheon is now rolling out a similar system designed for use at combat brigade level and below. Called Green Thunder, it is a cloud-based, small, portable version of DCGS that is modular, mobile and robust.15
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Soldier Modernization Systems and the Impact of Data Link Technology Don McBarnet, Staff Writer
The integration of the latest technologies into the soldier modernization programmes of many NATO and non-NATO countries is problematic. Many are hampered by budgetary limitations and the need to work with legacy systems that may fail to be either lightweight enough, effective or interoperable with other allies’ systems. Britain’s (Future Infantry Soldier Technology) FIST programme is intended to provide the dismounted soldier with the benefits of state-of-the-art technology integrated into a single architecture in a project managed by Thales UK in association with Bowman. The first stage, according to Thales, will be the integration of voice communications and a data gateway so that information displayed on the dismounted commander’s FIST tablet can be replicated on the vehicle commander’s integral displays. This will achieve a first for Infantry vehicle commanders – their ability to ‘see’ their troops once dismounted and to fight more effectively in support of them.16 A part of Austria’s Soldat der Zukunft 17 modernization programme involves the acquisition of a new range of HF and VHF Combat Net Radios (CNRs) from Elbit Systems Land and C4I – Tadiran. Lt. Col. Jacques Levesque, Project Manager, Canada’s Integrated Soldier System Project, said: “We have the capability but not enough integration.” The particular problem is the dismounted soldier: “Every vehicle has its own LAN system displaying access to all kinds of applications. When the ramp goes down at the back and the soldier steps out, he steps back fifty years in technology. He is back to using a map, compass and relatively simple unintegrated devices.” In the United States, one area of concern is the US Army’s Air Warrior programme which is now at the end of its third and final increment. Lt. Col. Klinkhammer, Product Manager, Air Warrior, said: “The two top priorities yet to field in Increment 3 are the encrypted Aircraft Wireless Intercom
“When the ramp goes down at the back and the soldier steps out, he steps back fifty years in technology. He is back to using a map, compass and relatively simple un-integrated devices.” System (AWIS), [a cooperative development with the US Navy] and the dual Electronic Data Manager (EDM). We are awarding a Low Rate Initial Production contract to Telephonics for the AWIS that will take us to operational test. The next priority piece besides AWIS in Increment 3 is the dual EDM. We have one EDM tablet computer in every non-digitized cockpit right now and we want two, one for each pilot. In early 2011, we will begin fielding dual EDMs to the UH-60A/L and CH-47D fleets.”
Significant Budget Constraints Luc de Beer, Project Manager VOSS, Netherlands Ministry of Defence De Beer, is emphatic that: “The choice of equipment is primarily being decided by the system integrator, not by the programme team. Of course we look at the market, we know about the equipment, but there is no mandating of new equipment.” In Spain, on hearing that a contingent was going to be sent to Afghanistan, the Ministry of Defence said that ComFut would be sent: WWW.DEFENCEINDUSTRYREPORTS.COM | 13
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Soldiers will be able to view information through a hand held colour display or through an integrated head gear subsystem display. Pakistan has a requirement for an Infantry Battle Field Command and Information System.
“In the very short term we will be ready to deploy part of the system, but before we want to be sure that all the functionalities delivered really work and are accepted by users. In the short term the whole system may follow. Further work is needed before that”... “Integration with the vehicle is also ready to go because it works and it is a functionality that can be helpful there, supporting situational awareness, communications and logistics to the debarked Squad /Team.” The Czech republic has stopped working on new technologies because of budget cuts, Slovakia is similarly strapped for funding.
Market Opportunities out of Europe Brazil’s COBRA, Programme Manager, Col. Jao Denison Maia Correia, explained: “COBRA is an individual combat system but must be still network connected and linked to central command, improving the soldier’s efficiency in communication, positioning and navigation, firepower, protection and survivability.” But the picture is quite different in Pakistan where Lt Gen. Muzammil Hussain, Inspector General Training and Evaluation (IGT&E), GHQ speaking in 2010 said that: In communications terms a “Personal Net Digital Radio” is required with integrated GPS and with the, “capability to be linked with a PDA (Personal Data Assistant) at second in command level.” A low level Multi-band inter/intra team radio with ground to air transmission facility is also required. This will be supplemented by an Individual Soldier’s Computer Communication. This is described as being smart enough to display information and provide position/navigation data. Soldiers will be able to view information through a hand held colour display or through an integrated head gear subsystem display. Pakistan has a requirement for an Infantry Battle Field Command and Information System.
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Secrecy, Cryptography and a Glimpse at the Future Don McBarnet, Staff Writer
In 2005, the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) identified a set of cryptographic algorithms that, when used together, are the preferred method for assuring the security and integrity of information passed over public networks such as the Internet. Achieving secrecy in conflict is complex and a highly specialist field. As the recent information on the Wikileaks affair reveals, training soldiers not to leave sticky notes on screens containing passwords can enhance computer secrecy. However, the balance between immediacy of access of information and concealment is always going to be fine. There are the further dimensions of trust not only up and down a hierarchy, but also across different armed services and with coalition partners who may not speak the same language and may have conflicting loyalties. Leaving these complex and important political and social issues on the side, fighting forces will always have a need to use encryption. And this is an expanding and constantly changing specialist area.
The National Security Agency and “Suite B” In 2005, the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) identified a set of cryptographic algorithms that, when used together, are the preferred method for assuring the security and integrity of information passed over public networks such as the Internet. The NSA called the set of algorithms “Suite B.” Suite B is globally recognized as an advanced, publicly available standard for cryptography. It provides a security level of 128 bits or higher, significantly greater than many commonly used standards. Integrated into IETF standards, Suite B algorithms make it easier to collaborate in environments where costs or logistics traditionally hindered information sharing. Others have ideas for the next generation, for example the MISTY block cipher from Mitsubishi Electric. Mitsubishi have also been working on Quantum cryptography communications which are transmitted by assigning a digital one or zero signal to each photon, or so-called “grains of light”. Also in Japan, Sony Corporation have been working on “AURORA”, a new secure and efficient cryptographic hash algorithm developed in cooperation with Tetsu Iwata, Associate Professor, Nagoya University, as part of research on next generation cryptographic hash functions.
Network Enabled Encryption in the Air Since 2009, Raytheon with EADS Defence and Security have been implementing a variation of Ectocryp (a next generation encryption technology called Aircraft Crypto Variable Management Unit (ACVMU)), which will by instated on the Eurofighter Typhoon. Traditionally, modern military aircraft and ground installations require multiple communications systems to enable them to operate in a network centric environment; these systems include radio, IFF, GPS and data links. The need for high demands of security also requires multiple cryptographic protection devices, each of which has different requirements for key variables and fill devices. This has made key management a time-consuming and labourintensive task, often requiring erasure and re-keying between missions when aircraft are powered down. WWW.DEFENCEINDUSTRYREPORTS.COM | 15
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References: 1
2nd Edition (Revised) NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority David S. Alberts John J. Garstka Frederick P. Stein
2
AIR WAR COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY C2 AT THE EDGE OF CHAOS; THE REAL TRANSFORMATION TO ENABLE NETWORK WARFARE by Marcus F. De Oliveira, COL, United States Army
3
Driving Change in the Ministry of Defence – Are We Learning the Lessons? Bob Barton, managing director of Niteworks BAE
4
Driving Change in the Ministry of Defence – Are We Learning the Lessons? Bob Barton, managing director of Niteworks BAE
5
BAE Systems, EADS, EDS, Finmeccanica, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin UK, Logica, MBDA, QinetiQ, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman and Thales
6
Talon Strike – Securing a Clear View of the Battlefield Jessie-May Brown and Pincher Martin http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/RDS_201103_Brown_and_Martin.pdf
7
Talon Strike – Securing a Clear View of the Battlefield Jessie-May Brown and Pincher Martin http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/RDS_201103_Brown_and_Martin.pdf
8
Post SDSR: Where Now for the Defence Industry? Major General (Retired) David Shouesmith and Dean Gilmore from the aerospace and defence practice of PRTM, a global management consultancy, take a balanced view of the opportunities hidden behind the small print in the UK Government’s Strategic Defence and Security Review
9
Post SDSR: Where Now for the Defence Industry? Major General (Retired) David Shouesmith and Dean Gilmore http://www.prtm.com/uploadedFiles/Expertise/Industry_Sectors/Individual_pages/ PRTM_RUSI_Post_SDSR.pdf
10
MOD understanding NEC http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/F40663B6-F2D2-4058-A1EB-B843559BCCB5/0/1926_NEC.pdf
11
25 January 2011 Letter to troops by Gen David Petraeus
12
25 January 2011 Letter to troops by Gen David Petraeus
13
Air Vice Marshal Carl Dixon OBE, Director, Information Superiority
14
Thales UK Thales awarded Watchkeeper support contract 01 April 2010
15
The Challenge of Evolving ISR: Controlling the Data Deluge Mark Bigham, vice president for Defense and Civil Mission Solutions at Raytheon Intelligence and Information Systems
16
FIST TIM MAHON NEC MOD
17
Soldier Modernisation IQPC January 2011 http://www.soldiermod.com/volume-6/soldat.html
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