Islam beyond Violent Extremism by Lutfi Omar

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism Copyright Â© Imam Dr. A. Rashied Omar First Edition 2017 ISBN: 978-0-620-75273-2 Published by Claremont Main Road Mosque 40-42 Main Road Claremont 7700 Cape Town South Africa www.cmrm.co.za

Contents Foreword

Acknowledgements 7 Islam, Conflict and Violence

Muslim Extremism Myth or Reality?

Muslim Youth and Extremism The Case of the Boston Marathon Bombers

Muslim Sectarianism in South Africa Symptom or Cause?

Mitigating the Toxic Political Theology of ISIS

Liberating the Ummah from its Obsession with State Power

9/11 and the Cycle of Violence in our World Today

Drone Warfare Ethico-Moral Challenges

Boko Haram’s Kidnapping of Nigerian Schoolgirls A Violation of Islamic Ethics and Dignity

Islam and Peacebuilding

Opportunities and Challenges for Islamic Peacebuilding after September 11

Ta’aruf 95 Islam Beyond ‘Tolerance’ Beyond Ambivalence Peacemaking through the Prophetic Example

107

Notes

115

Bibliography

129

Islam, Conflict and Violence

Foreword This timely set of essays and sermons serve as a reminder that conscientious members of the global Muslim community are committed to remedy some troubling expressions of political violence. Needless to say, the perpetrators of large scale political violence and atrocities as well as the largest number of victims of political violence in the last decade or so, are Muslims around the world. Readers of this collection need no reminder of the places and locations where these gruesome acts of violence occur. You get detailed and relentless media feeds of these events. While the causes of political violence are countless and identifiable, everyone agrees that an end to this bloodletting is a major global priority. Dr Abdul Rashied Omar is not only a leading imam of South Africa at the Claremont Main Road Mosque in the city of Cape Town, but he is one of the few experts on Islam and Peace Building. He has made it his lifeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s work to not only address questions of political, social and economic injustice, but he has also strived to acquire the crucial skills in order to ensure that peace endures. His work at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies in the Keough School of Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame gives him a front row seat in the conversation of how best to secure peace and to devise strategies to make peace more robust. What this collection of writings provide is a lifetime of experience and carefully honed insights drawn from a specialized interdisciplinary literature on peace studies. Dr Omar provides resources from within the Islamic tradition that has long been neglected by peace studies scholars. This genre of literature and thinking that relates peace and human development requires the attention of a larger cohort of scholars, thinkers and activists. It is my fervent hope that these essays and sermons will inspire many to join the conversation on peace building. Here are a few pleas why we should join this effort in advancing the resources for enduring peace. Muslims cannot be oblivious to peace. We greet each other with peace numerous times a day. The name of our faith and creed is islÄ m, with the s-l-m, root in Arabic, which denotes peace. It is a travesty to make a greeting of peace but the conditions we foster with our existence amount to its opposite: indignity, violence and worse. 3

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism

Peace is not only the absence of war. Only a lifetime of building institutions and nurturing a critical mass of human resources can avert war and violence in the long term. Building strategic peace in a time of crisis and overall societal breakdown is the surest and most enduring building blocks to a future after the conflict. Peace building is not the talk of peaceniks and hippies of yesteryear. Peace building are the earnest efforts in human development. Only someone committed to the betterment of humanity understands the importance of this verse of the Qurʾān: “who feed them less they starve; and gives them security from fear.” (106:3-4) To avoid starvation means that we need to create opportunities for people to live their lives with dignity and create societies free from all kinds of threat and violence. When you see the gruesome pictures of war, hunger, migration and the suffering of refugees you are correct in labeling the immediate causes of these tragedies and identifying the perpetrators of this human suffering in order to hold them accountable. But what is often forgotten are the hidden long-term causes that produced the conditions for the disintegration of human beings and societies in the ashes of a relentless history of destruction that is becoming all too common in our world today. It is only when our humanity pays attention to a program of construction, growth and flourishing will we truly value the need to ensure we secure humane and livable futures for all people around the globe. The environmental crisis teaches us that we are no longer secure in our isolated continents. The flap of a butterfly’s wings in California causes a hurricane in the mid-Atlantic. Safe futures begin with a commitment in each of our hearts to educate every child, nurture human kindness, and cultivate deep friendships between individuals and communities. It requires a commitment to make respect for the diversity of our human nature our major priority. It requires us to conserve our natural and human ecologies. Until such desires do not become our heartbeats to further our individual and collective capacities and welfare, then until such time peace will be elusive and destruction will be our guaranteed future.

Islam, Conflict and Violence

If human dignity (karÄ ma) becomes our clarion call then we can be assured of an unprecedented and successful future. To nurture such a future requires us to ensure that all our teachings are measured at the touchstone of human dignity. This means that every teaching developed and delivered in our midst must as a necessity honor the human person and not degrade her. This begins in the mosque and the museum; in politics and sport; in public life and in the private sphere; in both the global and local domains. Dignity invites humility to acknowledge we do not have all the answers to some of the most pressing problems. And when one does not have good answers to difficult questions, we need to ensure that any protest or proposed remedy must also be cut from the fabric of human dignity. It is no point protesting a gross violation with remedies that are equally gross in their violation of human dignity. Therefore, it will behoove us to examine our means of combating injustice and terror in order to ensure that our means do not lead us to more degrading moral outcomes. Dignity begins with the means of expression: language, both the spoken and unspoken signs we deploy. In todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s world, the perpetration of war itself has become obsolete for several reasons. Not only are the weapons of war capable of disproportionate destruction, but even the powerless and the defeated can continuously destabilize the world with smaller and less potent weapons. There are fewer instances in our present experience when war can be justified. In when war is thought to be a remedy, it ought to be the means of last resort when all other means have been exhausted. Many of the essays in this collection by Dr Omar remind us that all strategies of resistance begin with a transformation in the self; a change in the heart that leads to new commitments in the world. Without that commitment and conviction deep inside us, our tradition warns us might turn all into naught. Without that deep sincerity and commitment all our actions can turn into a performative hypocrisy that even children can detect our falsity. More importantly oneâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s commitments and convictions must in turn be intelligible to others, not another set of mystifications. Similarly with dignity: one cannot merely claim something is dishonorable to us without intelligibility. We require intelligible convictions and justifiable dignity. 5

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism

And it is okay to admit that one does not have all the answers to pressing problems. It might be better to disclose how one is struggling and unsure of the solutions to challenging problems. That in itself might open up the possibilities for innovative solutions. One should always be skeptical of those who claim to have all the answers or claim to deliver the best solutions with such gusto and conviction that they cannot brook a question nor are they ready for deliberative conversation. Building peace and advancing human development are sensitive tasks for they touch the very essence of who we are as humans in our fragility. Development and peace building are tasks in human-making and society-making. They are indeed among the most noble of tasks of salvation since they are transformative to self and other. It is no wonder that the Prophet of Islam put so much effort in developing the human person from teaching us to preserving the dignity of even the wrongdoer, the dead or someone who manifestly rejects God, leave alone his lifelong struggle to heal and teach humanity. To engage in the various activities of peace building and human development is to participate in the vision and tasks of all the prophets who provided a road of human salvation through good works in this world. Not only am I honored to provide these few lines in support of the work of a remarkable friend but I also know the readers will learn from his writings and will be enriched, if not touched, by the humanity and compassion that palpates these pages. Ebrahim Moosa Professor of Islamic Studies Keough School of Global Affairs University of Notre Dame

Islam, Conflict and Violence

Acknowledgements This book is comprised of khutbahs (sermons) delivered at the Claremont Main Road Masjid, a number of conference papers as well as articles that I have published in other volumes. The predominant theme throughout the book is the major ethicolegal principles on Peace and Violence in Islam and I have applied these in order to analyze the theological justifications and political motivations of contemporary Muslim extremist movements. Most importantly, this book suggests possible ways in which we can mitigate the spread of Muslim extremism by identifying Islamic resources for peacebuilding and effective strategies for social justice. I wish to thank the many people who have contributed to editing and publishing this book. I am particularly grateful to Jaamia Galant for her critical comments and suggestions, and Mujahid Osman who helped to prepare the endnotes, compile the bibliography and manage the final layout and production. I dedicate this book to my mother, Latiefa Omar, to whom I owe my deepest gratitude for her love and encouragement and for constantly reminding me that I should publish more of my writing into books. Lastly, I offer my sincerest thanks to everyone who supported me in any respect during the completion of this project. A. Rashied Omar May 2017

Islam, Conflict and Violence

Islam, Conflict and Violence A. Rashied Omar

The Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World, 2nd edition (Oxford University Press, 2015)

n the contemporary period, Islam is frequently depicted as predisposed to conflict and violence. The intractable Middle East conflicts, the attacks on the United States in September 2001, and subsequent events during the first two decades of the twenty-first century in which Muslim extremists have been implicated in acts of terror have served only to reinforce this widespread perception. To discern the veracity of the accusation that in some special way Islam is inclined toward deadly conflict, it is important to situate the discussion within concrete socio-historical contexts. Moreover, in order to correctly understand the ethical norms of Islam represented in the Muslim sacred scripture, the Qur’an, and in the exemplary conduct of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), it is necessary to analyze the historical milieu within which such norms were negotiated.

The Makkan Context of the Early Muslims

When the prophet Muhammad brought the message of the Qur’an to the Arabs in the early seventh century Common Era (CE), pre-Islamic Arabia was steeped in oppressive social relations and caught up in a vicious cycle of violence. Muhammad’s egalitarian message quickly began to threaten the Makkan elite. They opposed his teachings with great vehemence, to the point of brutally torturing the whole family of `Ammar ibn Yasir, one of Muhammad’s followers, to death. He was thus forced to send some of his early followers to seek refuge in Abyssinia, five years after he began his prophetic mission in 610 CE. Later, in 622, he avoided persecution in Mecca by taking refuge in the nearby city of Yathrib (later renamed Medina) at the invitation of the people of that city. Throughout the Makkan period, the early Muslims responded to 9

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism

the mental anguishes, physical abuse, and persistent threats to their lives with passive resistance. It was only fifyears into his prophetic mission, and after he had fled to Medina, that Muhammad and the early Muslims were permitted to engage in armed resistance, but only under certain stringent conditions, as specified in the following verses of the Qur’an.

Permission [to fight] is given to those against whom war is being wrongfully waged. God has indeed the power to succor them. (They are) those who have been evicted from their homelands for no other reason than their saying, “Our Lord and Sustainer is God! For, if God had not enabled people to defend themselves against one another, monasteries and churches and synagogues and mosques— all in which God’s name is abundantly extolled—would surely have been destroyed. God will surely support those who support Him. Indeed, God is Al-Powerful and Exalted in Might (Surah al-Hajj, Q22:39–40) It is interesting to note that the above verses give precedence to the protection of monasteries, churches, and synagogues over that of mosques in order to underline their inviolability and the duty of the Muslim to safeguard them against any desecration or abuse and to protect freedom of belief. The aim of fighting, according to this critical verse, is the defense of not only Islam but also of religious freedom in general.

Islam, Conflict and Violence

The Qur’an and the Ethics of War and Peace

In the succeeding eight years (624–632CE) Muhammad and his growing group of followers engaged in a series of battles to defend Islam against the military aggression of their adversaries, including the critical battles of Badr, Uhud, and the Ditch. Warfare was a pugnacious affair in seventh-century Arabia. A chieftain was not expected to display weakness to his enemies in a battle, and some of the Qur’anic injunctions seem to share this spirit (Q4:90). Because the Qur’an was revealed in this context of deadly conflict, several passages deal with the ethics of warfare (Q5:49; Q8:61; Q11:118– 119; Q49:9; 49:13). The most contentious of these is the so-called sword verse (ayāt al-sayf):

When the sacred months are over, you may slay the idolaters wherever you may encounter them. Seize them and encircle them and lie in wait for them. But if they repent and perform the prayer and pay alms to the poor, then let them go their own way. For indeed! God is Forgiving and Merciful (Surah al-Tawbah, Q9:5) This passage has received considerable exegetical attention from both classical and modern Muslim scholars. The majority of Muslim scholars both past and present have argued that this verse cannot be generalized (`am) and that it relates to a limited context (khass). They point out that this verse was revealed at a time when hostilities between Muhammad and his enemies were frozen for a three-month period. During this difficult period, Muhammad encouraged 11

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism

the combatants to join his ranks or leave the Muslim-controlled areas in peace. If, however, they rejected both of these options and chose instead to continue with their aggression, then the Muslims would have no alternative but to fight back until victory. The concluding part of the above verse provides still another opportunity for forgiveness, mercy, and clemency. The vast majority of Muslim jurists conclude, from the specific context to which the verse refers, that it was permitted to kill the idolaters (mushrikūn) only if they declared war and posed a mortal threat to Muslims. Moreover, classical exegetes explain that this so-called sword verse does not apply to Jews and Christians. Their discussion of the verses in question center on relations with the idolaters, to the exclusion of the “People of the Book” (ahl al-kitāb). For example, al-Qurtubi (d. 671/1272), renowned for his exposition on the legal implications of the Qur’anic text, stated, concerning the verse in question, that the expression “idolaters” (mushrikūn) did not refer to Jews and Christians (ahl al-kitāb). Contemporary extremist groups such as al-Qa`ida, Boko Haram, and the Islamic State, cite the sword verse to justify their attempts to coerce non-Muslims to convert to Islam or face death. According to the vast majority of Muslim scholars, this interpretation of the sword verse is inappropriate and constitutes a manipulation of the passage to suit the political agendas of extremist movements. In contrast to the specific context of the revelation of the sword verse, other Qur’anic verses encompass more general exhortations to peace, including the following:

Thus, if they let you be, and do not make war on you, and offer you peace, God does not allow you to harm them (Surah al-Nisa’, Q4:90)

Islam, Conflict and Violence

The Qur’an also quotes the Torah, the Jewish scriptures, which permits people to retaliate eye for eye, tooth for tooth, but like the Gospels, the Qur’an suggests that it is meritorious to forgo revenge in a spirit of charitable benevolence (Q5:45). Hostilities must be brought to an end as quickly as possible and must cease the minute the enemy declares peace (Q2:192– 93). The Qur’an, moreover, makes it emphatically clear that conflict can be successfully ameliorated only through the establishment of justice, which transcends personal or sectarian self-interests (Q4:135; Q7:29).

O Believers! Stand up firmly for justice, as witnesses to God, even if it means testifying against yourselves, or your parents, or your near relatives, and whether it is against the rich or the poor, for God is nearer to all of them in compassion. Follow not the lusts of your heart’s desires, lest you distort or decline to do justice, For surely God is all-aware of what you do (Surah al-Nisa’, Q4:135)

Conflict Resolution in Early Islam

During his stay in Medina, Muhammad drafted a constitution known as Sahifah al-Madina to regulate intertribal and interreligious relations between the various communities in Medina. The constitution also granted rights and responsibilities to all communities and was instrumental in bringing an end to persistent intertribal conflicts Muhammad also attempted to resolve the conflict with the Meccan leaders and their allies by entering into a peace treaty at a place called al-Hudaybiyya. The treaty came 13

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism

to be known as sulh al-Hudaybiyya. Sulh is an important virtue in Islam. The purpose of sulh is to end conflict and hostility among adversaries so that they may conduct their relationships in peace and amity (Q49:9). The word itself has been used to refer both to the process of restorative justice and peacemaking and to the actual outcome of that process. Even though sulh al-Hudaybiyya never actually achieved its aims because the Meccan tribesmen violated its conditions, it remains an example of an instructive conflict-intervention strategy. Toward the end of Muhammad’s life, in 630CE, the Muslims gained their most significant victory when they captured the city of Mecca, remarkably without bloodshed. This provided Muhammad with a third opportunity to institute a genuine sulh process. In a spirit of magnanimity, he forgave his enemies and enacted a process of reconciliation. A general amnesty was proclaimed in which all tribal claims of revenge were abolished. Two years later Muhammad died in Medina, at around the age of sixty-two.

Perspectives on the Concept of Jihad

The Qur’anic term most often conflated with that of violence is jihad. The Arabic verb jahada from which the verbal noun jihad is derived literally means, “to strive hard, to exert strenuous effort and to struggle.” The Islamic concept of jihad should not be confused with the medieval concept of holy war because the actual term for holy war — al-harb al-muqaddasa —is never used in the Qur’an. In Islam, a war is never holy. As a multivalent Islamic concept, jihad denotes any effort in pursuit of a commendable aim. Jihad is a comprehensive concept embracing the struggle against oppression and injustice as well as the personal struggle to purify the soul and improve one’s character. In mystical (Sufi) traditions of Islam the greatest form of jihad is the personal jihad (jihad al-nafs), which involves purifying the soul and refining the disposition. Muhammad is reported to have advised his companions as they returned after a battle, “We are returning from the lesser jihad [physical fighting] to the greater jihad [jihad al-nafs].” Sufis have traditionally understood this greater form of jihad to be the spiritual struggle to discipline the lower impulses and base instincts in human nature. The renowned thirteenth14

Islam, Conflict and Violence

century Sufi scholar Jalaluddin Rumi articulated such an understanding of jihad when he wrote: “The prophets and saints do not avoid spiritual struggle. The first spiritual struggle they undertake is the killing of the ego and the abandonment of personal wishes and sensual desires. This is the greater jihad.”1 After the death of Muhammad and the completion of the textual guidance of the Qur’an, Muslims were faced with the challenge of interpreting and applying the Islamic normative principles on conflict and violence to their own peculiar socio-historical contexts. Subsequent generations of Muslims have interpreted these normative values pertaining to conflict and violence in such a way as to give Islam a paradoxical role in human history. In the first three centuries of Islam the classical doctrine of warfare, jihad al-qital, was forged by Muslim jurists primarily in response to the imperial politics of the Abbasid caliphate on the one hand and the Byzantine Empire on the other. According to this doctrine, the world was simply divided into a dichotomy of territories: the abode of Islam (dar al-islam) and the abode of war (dar al-harb). The abode of Islam constituted the Islamic caliphate. In accordance with this belligerent paradigm, a permanent state of war characterized relations between the two abodes. The only way a non-Muslim territory could avert a war with the abode of Islam was either to convert to Islam or to pay an annual poll tax (jizya) and thereby accept the hegemony of the Islamic caliphate. According to this classical doctrine, jihad is the instrument of the Islamic caliphate to expand Muslim territories. Contemporary Muslim extremist groups, such as al-Qa`ida, Boko Haram, and the Islamic State, have employed the classical doctrine of jihad al-qital to legitimate their struggles against colonial or postcolonial secular state rule. This controversial interpretation of jihad fails to capture the full range of the term’s rich meaning. This hegemonic doctrine of jihad al-qital has and continues to be challenged by Muslim scholars.

Challenges to the Doctrine of Jihad al-Qital

One of the earliest scholars who represented an alternative perspective on jihad 15

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism

al-qital was Sufyan al-Thawri (d. 161/777). Al-Thawri believed that jihad alqital was justified only in defense (jihad al-dafi`i). Other contemporary Muslim scholars, such as Muhammad Abu Zahra, Mahmud Shaltut, Mohammad Talaat al-Ghunaimi, Louay M. Safi, Ridwan al-Sayyid, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Asma Afsaruddin, and Ahmed al-Dawoody have criticized the predominant classical doctrine of jihad al-qital as being seriously flawed because it violates some of the essential Islamic principles on the ethics of war. Other contemporary scholars have challenged the classical dichotomy of territories (abode of Islam and abode of war) and insist on a third territory— namely, the Abode of Peaceful Coexistence or (dar al-sulh or dar al-`ahd). This was also the view of the classical scholar Malik ibn Anas (d. 179/795), the founder of the Maliki School of Islamic jurisprudence. In support of the Abode of Peaceful Coexistence, contemporary scholar Omid Safi (2009) reflects on the cordial relationship that had existed between the early Muslims and the Abyssinian Christian state. He recalled that Muhammad himself had sent the earliest group of his followers from Mecca to seek refuge from persecution in Abyssinia. They lived there peacefully for many years, and some of them did not return, even after Muslims were in power in Mecca. Moreover, Muhammad had advised peaceful coexistence with the Abyssinians, reportedly saying, “Leave the Abyssinians in peace as long as they leave you in peace”.2 Furthermore, Safi contends that the fact that the early Muslims did not make any attempts to turn Abyssinia into an Islamic state is sufficient evidence that a third abode, the “Abyssinian model,” was an Islamically sanctioned alternative. The alternative paradigm represented by the Abyssinian model was marginalized and ignored by the partisan interpretations of the dominant classical Muslim jurists during the first three centuries of Islam. Some contemporary Muslims seek to reclaim this third paradigm of peaceful coexistence. Other contemporary Muslims attempt to reclaim the rich Sufi tradition on conflict transformation by relinking the lesser jihad to that of the greater jihad. Both strategies have profound implications for expanding Muslim resources for conflict transformation and peace-building efforts. 16

Muslim Extremism: Myth or Reality?

Muslim Extremism Myth or Reality? A. Rashied Omar

IPSA Spring Symposium, October 2009

We have made of you a community that is justly balanced (i.e. avoiding extremes)

so that you may be witnesses to humanity (of being a community of the middle way) as the Messenger bore witness (to this golden mean) unto you

(Q2:143)1

he Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) understood the above Qur’anic imperative and worked tirelessly against tendencies of extremism prevalent amongst even some of his own followers. He is reported to have repeatedly proclaimed: “The extremists will perish.” (Saḥih Muslim).2 (Halakal Mutanatti`un) What then should our response be to what we perceive to be Muslim extremism in today’s context?

Genesis of the Term Extremism

The attacks on the United States of America in September 2001 and the Bush administration’s subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq - have all served to reinforce the widespread perception that Islam is in some special way linked 17

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism

to extremism and violence. Even conventional academic perspectives regard Islam as having a predilection for extremism and violence. According to this view, Islam is defined as inherently violent and one of the primary sources of global conflict.3 In direct opposition to this perspective, Muslims often categorically deny that Islam has anything to do with extremism and violence. In their view, all violence in which individuals or groups who claim an Islamic affiliation are implicated, is either a conspiracy against Islam or alternatively, a vile distortion of the peaceful teachings of Islam.4 As with all received understandings, there are elements of truth in both of these formulations. The first formulation largely understates the contemporary socio-political and economic conditions in which people affiliated to Islam are implicated in violence. The second formulation ignores the fact that virtually all Muslims accept that Islam is not a pacifist tradition. The overwhelming number of Muslim schools of law and theology permit and legitimate the use of violence under certain conditions mostly defensively, but some also authorize offensive violence. Definitions of types of violence and condition differ from one Muslim scholar to the other. It is here that a large measure of the problem lies: Under what conditions does Islam condone the use of violence? This critical dilemma is not unique to Islam. All religious traditions agonize about the question of what might constitute a â&#x20AC;&#x153;just warâ&#x20AC;? and it becomes particularly acute in situations of deadly conflict. Three central points emerge from this that we need to bear in mind if we were to correctly appreciate the relationship between Muslims, extremism and violence.

The Text is as Moral as its Reader

First, it is important for all of us to acknowledge that most, if not all, of our sacred texts provide opportunities for justifying violence. A pertinent example of this was the vociferous theological debate in South Africa concerning the Biblical perspective on Apartheid. The white supremacist policy of apartheid was formed in the name of Christianity. Many of the key leaders of the oppressive apartheid regime were also devout adherents of the Dutch Reformed Church. This led to an important theological document, the Kairos Document (1985), produced by black South African Christians to lament this by posing a 18

Muslim Extremism: Myth or Reality?

challenging question: “Can the Bible be used for any purpose at all?”5 The answer of course is yes. This is however not unique to the Bible; all sacred religious texts are open to ambivalent interpretations. Arguing within the context of the Muslim sacred texts, the contemporary Muslim jurist, Khalid Abou El-Fadl has provided a cogent response to this issue. “The meaning of the text”, he contends, “is often as moral as its reader. If the reader is intolerant, hateful, or oppressive, so will be the interpretation of the text.”6 A distressing Muslim example of this is the interpretations of Qur’anic texts and Prophetic traditions (ahadith) offered in the intermittent messages released by Usama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, to justify hatred and violence. One of their so-called fatwas, urges Muslims to kill any and all American citizens including their allies – irrespective of whether they are civilians or military.7 They argue that such action is warranted in any country in which it is possible to do so, because American citizens pay taxes to their governments and thus there are no innocent civilians living in America or in the lands of their allies. Such action, they claim, is justified in reference to the Qur’anic verse 5 of Surah al-Tawbah (chapter 9):

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism

This passage has received considerable exegetical attention from classical as well as modern Muslim scholars. The majority of Muslim scholars both past and present have argued that this verse cannot be generalized (`am) and that it relates to a limited context (khass). They point out that this verse was revealed at a time when hostilities between the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) and the enemies of Islam were frozen for a three-month period. During this difficult period, the Prophet (pbuh) encouraged the combatants to join the Muslim ranks, or leave the Muslim controlled areas in peace. If, however they rejected both of these options and chose instead to continue with their aggression then the Muslims would have no alternative but to fight back until victory. The concluding part of the above verse provides still another opportunity for forgiveness, mercy and clemency. The vast majority of Muslim jurists conclude from the import and contextual significance of the above verse, that it was permitted to kill non-Muslims only if they posed a clear threat to Islam and Muslims. Moreover, many of the classical exegetes explain that this verse does not apply to Jews and Christians. Their discussion of the verses in question center on relations with the polytheists, to the exclusion of the “People of the Book.” For example, Imam al-Qurtubi (d.1272 CE), renowned for his exposition on the legal implications of the Qur’anic text, states, concerning the verse in question, “… it is permissible to [understand] that the expression ‘polytheists’ does not deal with Jews and Christians (ahl al-kitab).”8 For these trained scholars and jurists, the Bin Laden-Zawahiri interpretation is unprecedented in Islamic scholarship. Taken to its logical conclusion, the Bin Laden-Zawahiri fatwa would mean that the millions of Muslims residing in the United States and Europe, as well as those non-Muslims, who oppose state policies, are legitimate targets in any “terrorist attacks.” Even more absurd, is the deduction that those who live in majority Muslim countries who are allies of the United States and pay taxes to their governments are also legitimate targets in Al-Qa`ida’s war. It is obvious that the Bin Laden-Zawahiri interpretation of this text of the Qur’an has been manipulated to suit their political agendas. It is these kinds of interpretations that have fed into Islamophobic depictions of Islam as an extremist religion. 20

Muslim Extremism: Myth or Reality?

Freedom of Belief in Islam

One way of responding to such manipulative interpretations of Muslim sacred texts, is to turn to the central Islamic principle of Tawhid (the Oneness of God). The genius of Islam lies in its strict Monotheism-the belief in the Oneness of God. Islam teaches that the more we embrace diversity in Godâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s creation the closer we are to acknowledging the unity of God. It is essentially this creative paradox that escape Muslim extremists. The latter seek to homogenize Islam and the world and eliminate diversity and pluralism. Their worldview is not that of unity in diversity, but rather that of uniformity and regimentation. Extremists are predisposed to both civic as well as violent intolerance of both non-Muslims in general as well as fellow Muslims who espouse a different understanding of Islam. The latter are accused of working against the interest of Islam and consequently branded as hypocrites (munafiqun). In contradistinction to the extremist perspective, the most primary source of Islamic guidance, the Qurâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;an, regards differences in religious beliefs, perspectives and viewpoints, as being natural and an essential part of the human condition:

Let there be no compulsion in religion (Q2:256) A denial of the right of others to hold beliefs and views that are different and incompatible to oneâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s own is tantamount to a denial of God himself:

If your Lord had so desired, all people on the earth would surely have come to believe, Do you then think you can compel people into believing? (Q10:99) 21

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism

Had your Lord so willed, He could surely have made all human beings into one single community: but (He willed it otherwise, and so) they continue to hold divergent views (Q11:118) All of these aforementioned Qur’anic verses establish the principle of freedom of belief and thought in Islam. Imam Al-Qurtubi cites the doyen of Qura’nic exegesis (tafsir) the companion `Abdullah ibn `Abbas (d.688 C.E.) as claiming that at the conclusion of the first verse, the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) is himself reproved for transgressing this principle by being over-enthusiastic in convincing others with regard to the truth of Islam. Thus, the Qur’an stresses that the differences in beliefs, views and ideas of humankind is not incidental and negative but represents a God-willed, basic factor of human existence. In the Islamic perspective of religious pluralism, human beings are called upon to excel and celebrate in the contestation of ideas, known as jihad-al-afkar. This generates intellectual and social vitality. The process of contestation spawns a rich variety of competing solutions for dealing with any particular problem, each of them valid in its own right. There is no moral judgment and vilification of partners/opponents in the contest. The challenge, which Muslim extremists present for mainstream Muslims, is to amplify the Qur’anic teachings on religious pluralism and work hard to make it an integral part of the fabric of contemporary Muslim culture.

Global Injustices and Extremism

The third critical point that we need to bear in mind if we are to correctly appreciate the relationship between Muslims and violence is that the religious legitimization of violence does not occur in a socio-historical vacuum. An increasing number of academic studies are beginning to highlight this point.

Muslim Extremism: Myth or Reality?

For example, a 1999 study by the Carnegie Commission on the prevention of deadly conflict found that, “religious diversity does not spawn violence independently of predisposing social, economic and political conditions as well as the subjective roles of belligerent leaders.”9 Graham Fuller, writing in Foreign Affairs, powerfully illustrates this point when he asserts that: “If a society and its politics are violent and unhappy, its mode of religious expression is likely to be just the same.”10 Considering the socio-historical contexts in which Muslim extremist behaviours are demonstrated, we note that they are either contexts in which Muslim citizens are subjugated to becoming victims of state violence or contexts in which Muslims feel vilified for practicing Islam. Globally, the increase in Islamophobic discourse in the western media, the military alliance of western forces against Muslim majority nations in Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq, and the lackluster response globally to the plight of the Palestinian people, are just some of the conditions that also have to be considered in relation to the emergence of Muslim extremism. Taking these into consideration, it should come as no surprise that Muslims who feel marginalized, oppressed, victimized, desperate and powerless, resort to their faith and sacred texts to mobilize their resistance, and in some cases, to seek justification for resorting to violence. We should thus always be cognizant of the socio-historical conditions that spawn acts of violent religious extremism, while still condemning the loss of innocent lives.

Conclusion

To return to our central question: Is Muslim extremism a myth or reality? In our response we need to avoid apologia, conspiracy theories and simplistic analyses. Instead, we should attempt to understand the reality and root causes of extremism as a complex combination of a number of variables including the socio-economic and global political contexts. At the same time, we should be wary of interpretations of Muslim sacred texts that are used to justify extremist behaviour. It is our responsibility to reflect on these texts and to ask questions of the morality of the reader offering these interpretations. More especially, 23

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism

we should challenge those interpretations that violate Islamic teachings of tolerance and respect for religious diversity. It is important to remember that the contemporary global order is not by any stretch of the imagination a just one. Furthermore, Islam places a strong emphasis on social justice and hardly any Muslim scholar interprets Islam as a pacifist tradition. Our challenge today is to uphold the fight for social justice and to defend the principle of pluralism in beliefs, while at the same time mitigate against the flagrant misinterpretations of Islamic texts for extremist purposes. Our primary strategy towards combating Muslim and all other forms of extremism should be that of ameliorating the root causes that provide a fertile ground on which extremism can thrive.

Muslim Youth and Extremism The Case of the Boston Marathon Bombers

Muslim Youth and Extremism

The Case of the Boston Marathon Bombers A. Rashied Omar

Khutbah delivered on 26 April 2013 at the Memorial Masjid, South Bend, Indiana, USA

he topic for my khutbah (sermon) today has been prompted by the distressing news that the suspects of the abominable bomb attacks of the Boston Marathon on Monday 15 April 2013 that left 3 people dead and more than 260 people maimed have been identified as two young Muslims. The two suspects Tamerlan Tsarnaev (26 years old at the time) and his younger brother, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev (19 years old at the time) were permanent residents of the United States originally from Chechnya and were seemingly practicing Muslims. While the overwhelming majority of Muslims have unequivocally condemned their contemptible actions it is also a distressing fact that this is not the first time that ‘ordinary’ young Muslims have become transformed into radical extremists. Family members claim that the elder brother, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, fell under the influence of a new friend, a Muslim convert, who steered the young man toward a rigid and austere interpretation of Islam. Under the tutelage and mentorship of his new friend, Tamerlan gave up boxing, stopped studying music, ditched his non-Muslim friends, condemned the celebration by American Muslims of Thanksgiving, and claimed that the CIA was behind the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and that Jews controlled the world. Reports from congregants of the Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center are particularly instructive. According to one of these reports Tamerlan was apparently enraged at the Imam of the Boston Islamic Center for praising Martin Luther King Jr. during his sermon. He apparently shouted out the following words during the Imam’s talk “You cannot mention this guy because he’s not a Muslim!” 25

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism

An Identity cum Cultural Crisis

Even though the story of the two young Muslim suspects is still developing, their story is not unique but rather fits a small but observable pattern within the immigrant Muslim communities living in North America and Europe. The story of the Tsarnaev brothers provides an alarming picture of the transformation of two young men, who grew up practicing a ‘moderate’ Islam within their families, and who then became more and more attracted to an extreme interpretation of Islam as they experienced the isolation and cultural distance and disconnect typical of immigrant communities in the West. For some time now Muslims living in North America and Europe have witnessed the transformations of young people who often grow up ignorant or oblivious to the teachings of Islam, and engage in acts contrary to Islamic ethics, but who then at some point in their lives experience an acute identity crisis arising out of the two cultural worlds within which they live, the home and the broader society. For example, at some point according to Tamerlan’s uncle, Tamerlan said that he felt that he did not fit into American society and once told a journalist ‘I do not understand Americans’. This search for identity renders these young Muslims susceptible to extremist viewpoints of Islam. Demagogues who peddle a puritanical and culture free version of Islam are extremely adept at recruiting such vulnerable young Muslims. Under their mentorship and spell these young Muslims become extremely conservative to the point of condemning members of their own families for not being Muslim enough and fellow Muslims at masajid for being guilty of innovative practices (bid’a). We all know of relatives, and other members of our community who change from being “normal, moderate” Muslims to ones who begin to condemn everything as bid’a (reprehensible innovations) and haram (prohibited) by adopting very literal interpretations of the Qur’an and Sunnah (traditions) of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). In light of this latest incident of young Muslims being arrested for engaging in violent acts, it is time that Muslims realize that there is a problem of extremism among certain segments of the Muslim community, and that they prey especially on young vulnerable immigrant Muslims. These extremist interpretations of 26

Muslim Youth and Extremism The Case of the Boston Marathon Bombers

Islam do not always translate into acts of violence, but they tend to be destructive of communities and engender attitudes of intolerance. How are we to understand this growing phenomenon of Muslim extremism among youth living in the West and more importantly what can be done to mitigate against it? In responding to these questions I would like to draw on the scholarly insights of the French expert on political Islam, Olivier Roy and that of the Chicago based Muslim scholar, Shaykh `Umar Faruq `Abd- Allah. Both of them have argued that under the impact of globalization contemporary youth, especially immigrant youth, face an acute identity cum cultural crisis.

Globalization & the De-Culturalization of Religion

For Olivier Roy, contemporary Muslim extremism is a phenomenon he calls a “born-again Islam” and a product of globalization and thus not surprisingly is located in the diaspora. In support of this contention he has suggested that: The current violence is not so much an import from the Middle East (where bin Laden’s networks are passive) as it is a product of Westernization, immigration, globalization and the society of the spectacle, with its disaster films and video games.1 In his book, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (2006), Roy argues that the spread of an extremist form of Islam in the West is not a reaction against the West but rather “a consequence of and [a]reaction to sociological changes” wrought by globalization. He believes that the new global context has led to a de-linking of Islam from any specific culture. According to Roy religious extremism has been gaining ground among a rootless Muslim youth -- particularly among the second- and third-generation migrants in the West -and this phenomenon is feeding new forms of radicalism, ranging from support for al-Qa`ida to the outright rejection of integration into Western society. In his latest book, Holy Ignorance: When Religion & Culture Parts Ways (2010) Roy has attempted to develop his thesis further by pointing out that the modern disconnection between faith communities and sociocultural identities provides 27

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a fertile space for religious extremism to grow. Instead of freeing the world from religion, secularization has encouraged a kind of ‘holy ignorance’ to take root, an anti-intellectualism that promises immediate access to the sacred and positions itself in direct opposition to contemporary pagan culture. Instead of a return to traditional religious worship and customary practice, Roy argues we are witnessing the flourishing of puritanical movements within all universal religions that seek to delink religion from culture and to promote the valorization of the individual.

Engendering an American Muslim Culture

ShaykhÙmar Faruq Àbd-Allah is one of a growing number of Muslim scholars who have raised the alarm about the destructive tendency of purging religions from their indigenous cultures and practices.2 According to Shaykh Ùmar Faruq Àbd-Allah people who advocate a socalled ‘culture-free Islam’ lose sight of the fact that culture is integral to the development of a healthy sense of self and community (i.e. identity formation and social cohesion). Culture is what gives a community its distinctive character, and cultivates the social skills through which we interact with each other and the world around us. Estrangement from one’s culture leads to fractured community life and a concomitant tendency towards self-centered forms of social and spiritual lives. The advice that Shaykh Ùmar Faruq Àbd-Allah offers immigrant Muslim communities is not to develop reactionary “counter cultures” but rather to engender an American Muslim culture. Acculturating Islam to the local context does not constitute compromising Islamic ethics, rather it entails embracing local cultural norms and practices that are not contrary to Islamic ethics, but which build towards for example, a Muslim-American identity, or a MuslimFrench identity etc. In other words, embracing wholesome local cultural norms and customary practices enables us to fashion a healthy sense of self and to be comfortable with who, where, and what we are. For Muslims living in the US, the challenge is to 28

Muslim Youth and Extremism The Case of the Boston Marathon Bombers

strike a wholesome balance between their identities as Muslims and as North Americans, and thereby develop a North American cultural expression of Islam. A North American cultural expression of Islam will then take up its rightful place alongside Arab, South Asian or Turkish expressions of Islam. While some scholars might consider all cultural expressions as innovations to be rejected (bidà) I concur with the viewpoint of Shaykh Ùmar Faruq Àbd-Allah and that of the great classical jurists of Islam such as Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi (d.1388) and Jalaluddin al-Suyuti (d.1505) that Islam does not a priori condemn innovation (bid’a) in and of itself. Only innovations that violate explicit and implicit teachings of Islam have been condemned. The process of adopting sound customary practices from local cultures was facilitated by Islamic jurisprudence through the technical process known as al-‘urf or al‘adah. All the major schools of Islamic jurisprudence (madhahib) recognize this process as an essential part of Islamic law. Furthermore all of them recognize that this did not mean a blind acceptance of all of the norms and traditions of other cultures pejoratively known as tashabbuh, consequently jurists distinguished between ‘urf al-Saḥih (wholesome cultural norms and practices) and ‘urf al-batil (cultural norms and practices that violated key principles of the Islamic value system). Moreover, one of the five maxims in Islamic law (alqawa` id al kulliyat al-khams) is that “cultural usage shall have the weight of law’ (al-‘ada muhakkama). This means that sound cultural practices have authority similar to that of textual evidences found in the Qur’an and prophetic traditions (ahadith).

Islam is a Culture Friendly Religion – The Story of the Abyssinians from the Ahadith Literature

Such a positive and embracing approach to cultural norms and practices is most poignantly illustrated in the life of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). To provide one example of this I would like to cite the following hadith narrated by Lady `Aisha (ra) and in greater detail by the companion, Abu Hurayra (ra). Both of these prophetic traditions can be found in the most authentic collections of Imam Bukhari and Imam Muslim. 3 29

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism

Abu Hurayra (ra) recalls that it was the days of Ìd-al-Adha and some Abyssinian Muslims decided to celebrate this joyous occasion in the African way. These earliest African converts to Islam began giving expression to their sense of joy by performing a cultural dance with spears to the rhythm of their leather beating drums in al-Masjid al-Nabawi i.e. in the Prophet’s masjid in Madina. According to the report of Àisha (ra), she informs us: “that the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) himself asked me if I would like to watch the African spear dancing. And I said yes.” The Prophet (pbuh) then took Àisha into the crowd and placed her on his back so that she had a better view and she fondly remembered her cheek touching his cheek while she keenly watched the African spear dance and drumming in al-Masjid al-Nabawi. Shortly thereafter Ùmar in al-Khattab (ra) entered the Prophet’s masjid and on seeing the dancing and drumming he was instinctively offended and he immediately picked up some stones and began throwing the dancers with it so as to get them to stop. As soon as the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) became aware of Ùmar’s protests he reprimanded him by saying: “Leave them alone, Ya ‘Umar” Moreover, the Prophet (pbuh) felt obliged to encourage the African dancers to continue by saying: “Carry on with your drumming and dancing, Ya Bani Arfida! Shaykh Ùmar Faruq Àbd-Allah, insightfully interprets the Prophet Muhammad’s (pbuh) intervention to rebuke ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab (ra) for stoning the Abyssinian as follows: “Ethiopians were not to be judged by Ùmar’s Arab standards or made to conform to them. The sons of Àrfida had their own distinctive cultural tastes and conventional usages. The fact that they had embraced Islam does not mean that they were also required to commit cultural apostasy or become subservient to Arab customs”.

Muslim Youth and Extremism The Case of the Boston Marathon Bombers

Mitigating Against Extremism Among Muslim Youth

There is an urgent need for Muslims to do much more in taking care of their youth, so that that they do not fall victim to extremism and wanton acts of violence. Muslim youth growing up in America have great opportunities but they also have to face and grapple with many broader social issues and moral choices that come into conflict with their Islamic worldviews. This cannot be easy for them. Our youth truly live at the cutting edge of the real and rapidly changing world. This grim world is complicated by the fact that current US foreign policy and in particular its global war on terrorism is engendering a belligerent environment that serves as a breeding ground for hatred and radicalism, the rise of extremist movements, and recruits for the bin Ladenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s of the world. This is further exacerbated by a growing phenomenon of Islamophobia i.e. an antipathy towards Islam that results in exclusion, discrimination, misrepresentation and stereotyping of Muslims. Hence we also have to acknowledge that very often it is not only religious extremism but also political grievances that motivate civilian attacks in the US and elsewhere in the West. Religious conviction and a sense of religious persecution may make many young Muslims more willing to fight back, but the motive is also anger over what is being done by the US and its allies to Muslims. It is against such a volatile context that we need to have more programs that reach out to young people in our community not to emasculate their energies but to channel them into constructive programs for social integration. By this I mean that young Muslims should embrace Islam as a natural way of life. They should be clear that Islam does not regard people as angels but as mortal beings who are fallible and have many shortcomings. In particular Islam does not require of young Muslims that their speech consist only of pious utterances, or that they listen only to the recitation of the Qurâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;an. Neither does Islam require that the actions of our youth consist only of prayer and fasting. Islam is a balanced and life-affirming religion. Moreover, righteousness in Islam is measured not just by how much you pray, or how often you fast or how you dress or what you eat, but most importantly, 31

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by how you interact with and live alongside your fellow humans beings. It is the latter attributes of righteous conduct in Islam that we must use to attract our youth to Islam – these include showing mercy and compassion to the lessfortunate in society, being fair and just in our home and work environments, being truthful and forgiving in our personal relationships and being humble and respectful in our interactions with other faith communities, and challenging global injustices through citizens movements. The Islamic center and its affairs should be a natural home for our youth. We need to inoculate our youth, to immunize them through education against extremism and terrorism. The best way of doing so is by empowering them with this life-affirming and more open understanding of Islam. There is a dire need to educate and make Muslims aware of the importance of their own history and cultural heritage as well as how their history and culture contributes to the national heritage of America. One suggestion is for parents to share relevant literature with their children that instill in them the values of cosmopolitism, anti-racism and anti-bigotry. Solidarity and dialogue with ‘others’ can go a long way in avoiding our own prejudices from rubbing off on our children. The challenge for Muslims living in North America and Europe is how to amplify the Islamic teachings on acculturation and to make it an integral part of the fabric of contemporary Muslim culture. In this regard, Muslims in North America and Europe have much to learn from Muslim minority communities living in South Africa and elsewhere. I am encouraged by the fact that since September 11, 2001, many Muslim leaders and institutions in America have been responding to this challenge in creative ways. In fact, it is exactly one such creative response from the Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center, to talk about the praiseworthy leadership of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. that Tamerlan Tsarnaev found objectionable. The fact that Tamerlan with his extremist views objected to a universal message articulated during a sermon at one of America’s most renowned Islamic Centers should serve as encouragement to other Muslim institutions in the US, 32

Muslim Youth and Extremism The Case of the Boston Marathon Bombers

for indeed, there should be no space for radical extremists in our masajid and Islamic centers. Our primary strategy towards combating Muslim and all other forms of extremism should be that of ameliorating the root causes that provide a fertile ground on which extremism can thrive. In our response we need to avoid apologia, conspiracy theories and simplistic analyses. Instead, we should attempt to understand the reality and root causes of extremism as a complex combination of a number of variables including the socio-economic and global political contexts. At the same time, we should be wary of interpretations of Muslim sacred texts that are used to justify extremist behavior. It is our responsibility to reflect on these texts and to ask questions of the morality of the reader offering these interpretations. More especially, we should challenge those interpretations that violate Islamic teachings of tolerance and respect for religious diversity. But the challenge of global peace and coexistence is not merely the responsibility of Muslims but indeed of all peace and justice loving people. The challenge that peace holds for Christians, Jews, people of other faiths and of no faith is to work towards the building of more welcoming environment and culture for immigrant groups. The growing phenomenon of Islamophobia and more generally xenophobia in North America and Europe is engendering a fertile ground on which radical extremists thrive. Interreligious activists from all faiths need to join the many voices all over the world that are questioning the wisdom of the current strategy pursued in the â&#x20AC;&#x153;war on terrorism,â&#x20AC;? and the drone killings and grievances it has wrought. In conclusion, for American Muslims the horrific events of the past few weeks must serve as a reminder of the critical need to continue to witness against terrorism and of a parallel commitment to assist in the nurturing of a more compassionate and localized and indigenous expression of Islam, especially among our youth. We continue to pray for solace and healing for the grieving families of the innocent victims of the Boston Marathon Bombings and all over the world.

Muslim Sectarianism in South Africa Symptom or Cause?

Muslim Sectarianism in South Africa Symptom or Cause? A. Rashied Omar

Paper delivered at the 5th Annual IPSA Wasatiyyah Symposium: “Dealing with Sectarianism: A Middle-Way Reflection”, Saturday 23 November 2013

growing number of scholars and commentators, including the principal of the Islamic Peace College of South Africa (IPSA) Shaykh Ighsaan Taliep, have warned that one of the critical challenges facing the global as well as local Muslim ummah at this time is that of sectarianism. According to Shaykh Taliep “The Muslim ummah is currently witnessing a dangerous rise in sectarianism and factionalism that seems to be palpable even to people of other faiths.” To underscore Shaykh Taliep’s concern it might be instructive to note that earlier this year, the United ‘Ulama Council of South Africa publicly announced an antishià strategy on the Voice of the Cape community radio station. Furthermore, the South African Human Rights Commission is currently investigating a litany of complaints of discrimination and hate speech directed at individual Muslims because they are Shiìtes or are perceived to be sympathetic to Shiàsm. In one case, the funeral prayers (salat al-janazah) of a foreign national who was brutally murdered was refused entry into a local masjid. In another case a Cape Flats man whose father had helped built the masjid and who has been patronizing the same masjid since his childhood was denied permission to solemnize his daughter’s marriage ceremony (àqd al-nikah) at this venue. In both cases the reasons for their repudiation was because the individuals were Shiàs or were perceived to be Shià sympathizers. Not only are these kinds of incidents of intolerance in our community of concern, but even more alarming are the growing number of intolerant voices and views being expressed on local internet and social network sites. These voices of intolerance often claim to be speaking in defence of ‘Ahl-al-Sunna wal 35

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism

Jamaàh’. From some of the views expressed on these sites, it would appear that there is an attempt to orchestrate a campaign of hate against local Shiàs or Shià sympathisers. This raises a legitimate fear that, God forbid, such an orchestrated campaign of hate and intolerance could escalate into direct physical violence as it already has in other parts of the world. How then should Muslims who embrace and understand Islam as a religion of the middle way (i.e. din al -wasatiyyah) respond to this scourge of sectarianism? It might be useful and expedient to begin by defining what we mean by sectarianism.

An Islamic Understanding of Sectarianism

Sectarianism,can be defined as bigotry,discrimination,or hatred of“the other”arising from attaching an exaggerated importance to perceived differences. Advocates of sectarianism usually believe that their own salvation requires that they aggressively purge their community from those they perceive to hold heretical beliefs. Within the context of Islam, it is my considered view that religious sectarianism is both a symptom and cause of an extremist mindset or worldview, which is the antithesis of wasatiyyah i.e. the middle way as advocated by the Glorious Qur’an. In other words, extremism breeds and feeds on sectarianism. At the same time, if religious sectarianism is left to flourish, the conditions become ripe for extremist views and actions to take hold. In support of my contention that extremism is the antithesis of wasatiyyah I would like to cite the following evidences from the two most primary sources of Islamic guidance. In surah alBaqarah, chapter 2 verse 143, Allah, the Sublime, proclaims:

We have made of you a community that is justly balanced (i.e. avoiding extremes) so that you may be witnesses to humanity (of being a community of the middle way) as the Messenger bore witness (to this golden mean) unto you (Q2:143) 36

Muslim Sectarianism in South Africa Symptom or Cause?

The Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) understood the above Qur’anic imperative and worked tirelessly against tendencies of extremism prevalent amongst even some of his own followers. He is reported to have repeatedly proclaimed: “The extremists will perish.” (Saḥih Muslim). In another prophetic tradition (hadith) the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) advises us as follows: “Beware of extremism (ghuluw) in religion, for it is extremism in matters of religion that has destroyed those before you. It is thus crystal clear that religious extremism (ghuluw and tatarruf) has no virtue in Islam and has been unequivocally condemned by both the Qur’an and the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). Hence, if extremism feeds and breeds off sectarianism, then we should be equally guarded against the growth of religious sectarianism. How then should we understand the genesis and growth of sectarianism (fitna ta-ifiyya) and extremism (tatarruf or ghuluw) from the worldview of Islam? The genius of Islam lies in its strict Monotheism - the belief in the Oneness of God. Islam teaches that the more we embrace diversity in God’s creation the closer we are to acknowledging the unity of God. It is essentially this creative paradox that escape Muslim sectarianists. Sectarianists seek to homogenize Islam and the world and eliminate diversity and pluralism. Their worldview is not that of unity in diversity, but rather that of uniformity and regimentation. Muslim sectarianists tend to be intolerant of both non-Muslims in general as well as fellow Muslims who espouse a different understanding of Islam. The latter are accused of working against the interest of Islam and consequently branded as hypocrites or worse are excommunicated. The language of Muslim sectarianists is thus pregnant with condemnatory terms such as, kafir (infidel), mushrik (idolator) and mubtadi’ (heretic) among others. It is this language that has the potential to incite extremist hatred and violent intolerance towards those who do not share their beliefs and interpretations. According to a number of contemporary Muslim scholars, including Dr. Khalid Abou El-Fadl, Shaykh Abdul Hakim Murad as well as local scholar, Shaykh Seraj Hendricks, this tendency of violent “othering” has found virulent support 37

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in the so-called wahhabi cum salafi movement during the last 200 years. Shaykh Seraj Hendricks during his keynote address at IPSA’s inaugural Wasatiyyah symposium in 2009 incriminates the wahhabi doctrine of al-wala’ wal-bara’ (i.e. the doctrine of loyalty and disassociation) as the source of this intolerance and sectarian behaviour. According to him, “This is a doctrine that defines both its proponents and the “other” in rigidly exclusivist terms and – in an archaic Calvinist sense – as reprobates.” During the past few years this small but active salafi wahhabi movement has exploited the changing political landscape in the Middle East to advance its religiously sectarian agenda.

Sectarianism and the Arab Spring

The so-called Arab Spring first began in January 2011 when a despot, Zainul Abidin Bin Ali, was swept from power by a pro-democracy movement in Tunisia. It was followed by the downfall of oppressive and autocratic regimes in three other countries, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. The Arab Spring now threatens totalitarian regimes in Syria, Bahrain, and elsewhere in the Middle East. Unfortunately, the negative outcome of the Arab Spring has been that it has provided an opening for Muslim sectarianists to insert themselves into the new space that has opened up through democracy to propagate their obscurantist views. The Arab Spring has triggered and ignited a long-standing and deep-rooted schism between Sunnis and Shiìtes in the Middle East into an open war. In Bahrain we have a Sunni autocratic regime oppressing a majority shite population, while in Syria we have a despotic regime aligned to Shiìsm tyrannizing its largely Sunni population. It is my contention that this Sunni-Shiìte conflict in the Middle East appears likely to not only intensify but expand beyond the borders of Syria and Bahrain to other parts of the Middle East and beyond. We have already seen it tragically spilling over into Pakistan and elsewhere in the world. In an interview on Voice of the Cape’s Open Lines during Ramadan, Mawlana Zakariyya Philander, director of Discover Islam, asserted that “international sectarian issues were now making its presence felt in South Africa and is threatening to undo the 38

Muslim Sectarianism in South Africa Symptom or Cause?

sterling work this country’s citizens have done over the last nineteen years in setting an example of how to co-exist in a democratic dispensation in a diverse society.” In the final part of my paper I want to make reference to a historic document, “The Amman Message”, in the context of grappling with growing sectarianism. This document provides a framework for mitigating against the threat of Muslim sectarianism.

The Amman Message (Risalatu `Amman)

In July of 2005, a historic gathering of the foremost Muslim scholars in the world took place in Amman, Jordan. This unprecedented gathering representing 50 different countries including South Africa, brought together 200 leading scholars including Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the late Shaykh alAzhar, Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, Shaykh Ali Gomaà, Shaykh Abdullah bin Bayyah, Mawlana Taqi Usmani, Ayatullah Ali Hosseini Sistani and Ayatullah Ali Husseini Khameni. This representative gathering of the foremost contemporary Muslim scholars issued a three-point declaration. First, it recognized eight legal schools of thought as legitimate madhahib in Islam. These included all four Sunni legal schools as well as the Shiì Ja`fari, Shiì Zaydi and Ìbadi schools. Second, it forbade Muslims from excommunicating adherents of any of these eight recognized Muslim legal schools. And third, it outlined the preconditions for the issuing of religious edicts (fatwas), so as to prevent the circulation of illegitimate edicts (fatwas). The Amman Message in particular calls upon Sunnis and Shiàs to rise above differences that separate them and to emphasize the commonalities that unite them as a single ummah. The Amman Message binds Sunni and Shià Muslims not to declare each other as infidels (kafirs). Last but not least, the Amman Message calls for immunizing our communities against sectarianism through education. It encourages institutions, organizations and individuals to educate Sunnis and Shiàs about the actual history and evolution of Sunni-Shià relations. The full Amman Message and those who 39

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endorsed it can be found online at: ammanmessage.com. It is noteworthy that Shaykh Ebrahim Gabriels undersigned and endorsed the Amman Message on behalf of the South African `Ulama. I urge each one of you if you who have not done so already to consult this document and study its contents. More importantly, I call upon our local `ulama to disseminate this message and provide the necessary leadership to curb the growing trend towards religious sectarianism in South Africa. I am convinced that the vast majority of ordinary Muslims are not supportive of the current trend of sectarianism that is being fomented by certain individuals. Muslim scholars and leaders in particular, have an especially onerous challenge of not allowing misguided individuals who act in a thoroughly reprehensible and depraved way to undermine the middle way of Islam (wasatiyya).

Mitigating the Toxic Political Theology of ISIS

Mitigating the Toxic Political Theology of ISIS A. Rashied Omar

Khutbah delivered at Claremont Main Road Masjid, 14 October 2014

he global Muslim community is currently witnessing an unprecedented level of extremism that is causing untold suffering and mayhem. In Syria and Iraq in particular geopolitical events have dehumanized large sectors of those societies and have created an environment that violates all civilized and religious norms, especially the principle Islamic norms of preserving human life, honouring human dignity and affirming freedom of belief. It is estimated that close to 200,000 people have been killed in the three-yearold civil war that has been raging in Syria alone. In addition, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that 6.5 million Syrians or one in three Syrians have fled the country. To put that into perspective, it would mean that the equivalent of the entire population of the Western Cape has either been killed or has now fled Syria. Particularly, since the middle of 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or the Levant (ISIS/ISIL), currently calling itself the â&#x20AC;&#x153;Islamic Stateâ&#x20AC;? (al-dawla alIslamiyya), have targeted Christians and Yazidi minorities in Iraq for extermination because of their religious beliefs. However, it is Muslims who do not subscribe to the austere and harsh interpretation of the Islam of ISIS who have been and continue to be the major victims of their brutality and barbarism. Never before in our recent history has the commitment of the Muslims to a more peaceful, humane and just world order been challenged as it has been in recent times. In light of this distressing situation I would like to reflect on the current crisis of extremism and sectarianism in the Middle East and elsewhere. While I fully acknowledge that there are multiple factors that have contributed in 41

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varying degrees to the current crisis, including the United States of America’s illegitimate invasion of Iraq in 2003 as well as the decades of political tyranny and authoritarianism by governments in the Middle East, I would like to identify five key elements of the political theology that underpins and fuels the current wave of Muslim extremism that we witnessing. I will also suggest possible ways in which we can mitigate the spread of what I describe as the toxic creed of ISIS. The first component I want to identify is the central pillar on which ISIS’s ideology is structured, the quintessential core doctrine of Islam, namely the concept of tawhid. All Muslims agree that the power and allure of Islam lies in its strict Monotheism - the belief in the Oneness of God. How that manifests onto the rest of creation and humanity in particular is where the rigidity and intransigent beginnings of the ISIS political theology starts to align. For ISIS, tawhid is a concept that shuns diversity and requires uniformity, similitude and acquiescence. Their literal and dogmatic adherence to the critical Islamic concept of tawhid incites them to actively seek to homogenize the world and all Muslims and to eliminate pluralism and diversity. The second element of ISIS’s political theology advocates a severe version of a doctrine known as al-wala’ wal-bara’, the doctrine of loyalty and disassociation. According to a local scholar, Shaykh Seraj Hendricks of the Azawiya, “[T]his is a doctrine that defines both its proponents and the “other” in rigidly exclusivist terms and – in an archaic Calvinist sense – as reprobates.” He incriminates this doctrine as the source of the “violent” othering” of both non-Muslims as well as Muslims who offer alternative interpretations of Islam. It is in essence a theological principle that translates into the infamous phrase “you are either with us or against us.” The third component of ISIS’s political theology embraces a truncated and legalistic interpretation of jihad. This understanding of jihad is partial towards a fiqhi-jurisprudential interpretation while neglecting the ethico-moral dimensions of jihad. For ISIS, jihad is synonymous with qital – both meaning warfare. Furthermore, jihad is understood not merely as defensive warfare but also as a preemptive means of establishing the rule of Islam. 42

Mitigating the Toxic Political Theology of ISIS

The fourth element of ISIS’s political theology is that ISIS has skillfully tapped into the prevalent yet contentious Muslim yearning for the re-establishment of a Muslim Caliphate, which became extinct after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1924. Since ISIS regards themselves and their in-group as the only true example of Islam in practice, they have declared their caliphate unilaterally and without any concern for consulting Muslims globally. The fifth component of the political theology of ISIS is that it draws on the symbol of the black flag. This symbolism can be found in some prophetic traditions (ahadith). In other words, ISIS’s symbolic use of a black flag represents an apocalyptic worldview in which the end times are imminent. Many of the young men who travelled to Syria and Iraq appear to have been swayed by this “doomsday narrative”; namely that the conflict in Syria and Iraq is a prelude to the fulfillment of this prophecy of the End of Time.

Mitigating the Toxic Political Theology of ISIS

The five elements that I have identified above do not constitute the only ones advanced and utilized within the creed that ISIS has developed. But I regard these five elements as the key dimensions of what I would like to describe as the toxic political theology of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). It has and continues to provide the religious legitimation for the brutal murder of scores of innocent human beings and the violent destruction of heritage sites and historical treasures in Syria and Iraq. It is thus critical that we develop ways of responding to this lethal theology and to mitigate its destructive potential. At the outset Muslims must acknowledge, no matter how distressing it is, that we do have extremists within our ranks and that they do employ Islamic texts and symbols in legitimating deadly conflicts. We therefore need to strongly reject far-fetched conspiracy theories, such as the belief that the ISIS leader, Abubakr al-Baghdadi is a Mossad created agent. Even if this dubious and implausible suggestion is true – the underlying theological arguments that are attracting followers and driving the destructive machinery of ISIS are drawn from Islamic sources – not ideas created by Mossad. The focal point of our discussions should be on why so many young Muslims are attracted to this harsh and unforgiving understanding of Islam. 43

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism

I would like to propose four strategies that should form an integral part of a cogent response that mitigates the toxic political theology of ISIS.

1. Freedom of Belief in Islam

First and foremost we need to respond to ISIS’s perverted interpretations of the central Islamic principle of tawhid by reaffirming an understanding Islam that teaches that the more we embrace diversity in God’s creation the closer we are to acknowledging the unity of God. It is essentially this creative paradox that escape Muslim extremists. In contradistinction to the extremist perspective, the most primary source of Islamic guidance, the Qur’an, regards differences in religious beliefs, perspectives and viewpoints, as being natural and an essential part of the human condition:

Let there be no compulsion in religion (Q2:256)

A denial of the right of others to hold beliefs and views that are different and incompatible to one’s own is tantamount to a denial of God himself:

If your Lord had so desired, all people on the earth would surely have come to believe, Do you then think you can compel people into believing? (Q10:99) The challenge, which Muslim extremists present for mainstream Muslims, is to amplify the Qur’anic teachings on religious pluralism and work hard to make it an integral part of the fabric of contemporary Muslim culture. 44

Mitigating the Toxic Political Theology of ISIS

2. Safeguarding the Sanctity of Life in Islam

Second, we need to respond to ISIS’s brutal beheadings and other acts of barbarism, by reminding ourselves, and others, that we are compelled by our faith in, and commitment to Islam to protect, defend and preserve the sanctity of all human life. The safeguarding of human life is one of the supreme objectives of Islam. Therefore, as conscientious Muslims and responsible citizens we cannot remain silent in the face of wanton loss of human life in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world. Muslims must not become weary of stating again and again loudly and unequivocally, that acts of extremist violence and barbarism are contrary to the teachings of Islam. The sanctity of human life is a supreme value in Islam and nothing is worth the cost of a human life. ISIS’s heinous acts of murder and violence are dishonourable and betray any expression of faith in Islam. In Islamic ethics, the end does not justify the means.

3. Islamic Education of Youth

Third, we need to address the attraction that ISIS’s simplistic and exclusivist ideology has especially for young Muslims. Amongst the key contributing factors that make this ideology attractive are a lack of Islamic literacy, cultural alienation and global Islamophobia. The lack of Islamic literacy means that Muslim youth lack the ability to understand complex issues and so simplistic theological and jurisprudential solutions become attractive. In his book, Holy Ignorance: When Religion & Culture Parts Ways (2010) Oliver Roy points out that the modern disconnection between faith communities and sociocultural identities produces culturally alienated youth. Their search for identity renders these young people susceptible to extremist viewpoints of Islam. Demagogues who peddle a puritanical and culture free version of Islam are extremely adept at recruiting such vulnerable young Muslims. The challenge for mainstream Muslims is to counter their rhetoric by promoting a deeper Islamic literacy that opens up spaces for engagement with complex theological debates as well as contemporary socio-cultural issues. 45

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism

Addressing Islamic literacy and cultural alienation of youth is complicated by the fact that current US foreign policy and in particular its global war on terrorism is engendering a belligerent environment that serves as a breeding ground for hatred and radicalism and the rise of extremist movements such as ISIS. This is further exacerbated by a growing phenomenon of Islamophobia, that is, an antipathy towards Islam that results in exclusion, discrimination, misrepresentation and stereotyping of Muslims. Hence we also have to acknowledge that very often it is not only religious extremism but also political grievances that attract some of the youth to extremist groups like ISIS. It is against such a volatile context that we need to have more programs that reach out to young people in our community not to emasculate their energies but to channel them into constructive programs for social integration. We need to inoculate our youth, to immunize them through education against extremism and sectarianism. The best way of doing so is by empowering them with a life-affirming and more open understanding of Islam.

4. Non-Sectarianism and the Amman Message (Risalatu `Amman).

Last but not least, I want to advocate that all Muslims take responsibility for disseminating and imbibing the historic Amman Message (Risalatu Àmman). The Amman Message provides a framework for mitigating the threat of Muslim sectarianism. In July of 2005, a historic gathering of the foremost Muslim scholars in the world took place in Amman, Jordan. The Amman Message in particular calls for immunizing our communities against extremism and sectarianism through education. It encourages institutions, organizations and individuals to educate Sunnis and Shiàs about the actual history and evolution of Sunni-Shià relations. I am convinced that the vast majority of ordinary Muslims are not supportive of the current trend of extremism and sectarianism that ISIS epitomises.

Liberating the Ummah from its Obsession with State Power

Liberating the Ummah from its Obsession with State Power Rashied Omar

Khutbah delivered at Claremont Main Road Masjid, 1 January 2016

Introduction

he year began with the infamous Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris on 7 January that killed 11 people. On 26 June an attack on tourists at a beach resort in Tunisia left 38 people dead. On 10 October 102 people were killed in Ankara, in the worst attack in modern Turkish history. On 12 November two suicide bombers killed 42 people in a predominantly Shi’a neighborhood of Beirut. Paris experienced a second and even more deadly attack on 13 November in which 130 people lost their lives. Even before the dust had settled another attack took place in San Bernardino, California, on 2 December, this time 14 lives were lost. These were merely some of the events that involved acts of terror committed by Muslims in the name of Islam that received the most media coverage during the past year. Elsewhere, we also saw heightened conflict in Syria, where the West has been relentlessly bombing and marshaling forces to stop the insurgence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also referred to as ISIL). Israel has increased its threat to the sanctity of Masjid Al-Aqsa in its ongoing brutal occupation of Palestine. In Yemen, Saudi Arabia led a coalition of Arab states in attacks on Houthi Shi’ite forces, that have left over 20 million of the Yemeni population in need of urgent food, water and medical aid. Across the Arabian Peninsula, ISIS has been the primary perpetrator of numerous attacks on Shi’ite masjids and communities. In Africa, Boko Haram and Al-Shabbab have continued their wave of destruction carrying out mass kidnappings, suicide attacks on masjids and bombings of innocent victims. This is just a snapshot of the reality we are confronted with as the global Muslim Ummah at this juncture of our history.

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism

The often sensationalist media coverage of the deadly conflicts wherein Muslims are implicated, have further emboldened Islamophobes. Consequently, anti-Islamic rhetoric and sentiments have reached a new high point with US presidential candidate, Donald Trump, brazenly calling for all Muslims to be banned from entering the United States of America. Even more disturbingly, during the past year, we witnessed a record number of people fleeing war-torn Syria and other parts of the Middle East and Africa. Human rights groups have described the current situation as the largest refugee crisis since the Second World War. The UN Refugee Agency has warned that 2015 is likely to exceed all previous records for global forced displacement. The vast majority of these refugees are Muslims. The irony is that these Muslim refugees prefer to flee to the poorest countries in Europe rather than any Muslim country. Even more shamefully, is the fact that Muslim countries are the least welcoming of all nations to their fellow Muslims who are fleeing their war-ravaged countries.

How do we account for this abysmal state of the global Muslim Ummah?

In our analysis of the crisis facing the global Muslim Ummah we need to understand the challenges as a complex combination of a number of variables, including the socio-economic and global political contexts. Elsewhere, I have identified some of these key factors, including imperialist aggression, which has contributed in different measure to the contemporary Muslim malaise.1 In this khutbah, I would like to reflect on what I believe to be one of the main contributing factors to the current violent malaise facing the global Muslim Ummah. It is my contention that the Muslim obsession with State power lies at the core of the debilitating crises of extremism, sectarianism and political power struggles within Muslim societies. The key questions I would like to address are the following: Is the establishment of an Islamic State a necessary and essential part of our faith in Islam? What has been our experience of attempts at establishing Islamic States? Finally, can we conceive of a legitimate state, which is not necessarily ruled by Muslims but upholds key Islamic ethico-moral principles such as justice (adl), consultation (shura) and accountability (hisba) and operates within an ethos of compassion (rahma). 48

Liberating the Ummah from its Obsession with State Power

The Muslim Obsession with State Power

Resulting from my deep reflection on the question of the relationship between Islam and the state I have for close to two decades now been arguing that Islamic teachings contain very clear ethico-moral precepts that should guide not only our private lives but also the public sphere. However, these ethicomoral precepts that guide our public lives do not mandate any particular mode of governance or specific forms of political administration, but rather provide broad principles that should underpin good governance. Hence, the legitimacy and integrity of a state from the point of view of the teachings of Islam should not be whether it claims to be an Islamic State or that its rulers are Muslim, but rather it should be based on the extent to which the state enshrines and embodies the broad ethico-moral principles of Islam. To refute the claim of some Muslim scholars who contend that it is obligatory for Muslims to live in a Darul Islam, that is, a place ruled by Muslims and governed by Islamic laws, I have drawn lessons from the well-known history of the migration of the earliest Muslims to Abyssinia (al-hijra al-ula). In the fifth year of the Prophet Muhammad’s (pbuh) mission, in 615 of the Common Era, the persecution of his earliest followers in Makkah was so intense that the Prophet (pbuh) felt compelled to send several of them into exile to Abyssinia. The Prophet Muhammad’s (pbuh) advice to his followers was magnanimous and he counseled them with the following words: “If you go to the land of the Abyssinians, you will find there a king under whose command nobody suffers injustice. It is a land of sincerity in religion.”2 It is instructive to note that the religion of Abyssinia,which the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) was praising, was Christianity and the just and compassionate king he was referring to was a devout Christian ruler, namely, the Negus of Abyssinia. Close to one hundred of the Prophet Muhammad’s (pbuh) companions, who represented almost half of the entire Muslim community at the time, immigrated to Abyssinia where they found sanctuary and well-being under the protection of a Christian King. If it is indeed the case that Muslims are obligated to live in a Darul Islam 49

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one wonders why the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) did not instruct the earliest Muslim emigrants in Abyssinia to join him shortly after he had established the city state of Madina. On the contrary, the early Muslims lived in the Christian dominated land of Abyssinia peacefully for many years, and some of them did not return, even after the Muslims were in power in Madina. It is clear therefore on evidence from the sira of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) that it is not a requirement of Islam to live under a Darul Islam. This was also the view of many classical scholars of Islam, including the illustrious Malik ibn Anas, the founder of the Maliki School of Islamic jurisprudence.3 A number of contemporary Muslim scholars have reached a similar conclusion that the concept of a Darul Islam, represented by a Caliphate in pre-modern times and by an Islamic State in modern times, is not a fundamental part of the Muslim belief system. The first traditional scholar in modern times to launch a vociferous attack on the notion of a Caliphate was the Azhari Shaykh `Ali `Abd al-Raziq (d.1966). In his magnum opus, Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm (Islam and the Fundamentals of Government) he argued that the Caliphate had no basis either in the Qur’an, or the Tradition (sunnah) or the consensus among Muslim scholars.4 Consonant with this position, more recently, Asma Afsaruddin, Islamic scholar based at Indiana University, argued that; “[T]here is no evidence at all in the early sources that the Companions invoked a supposedly divinely mandated blueprint for an ‘Islamic Government’ or an ‘Islamic State’ in the election of the Prophet’s first successor.” According to her, the first generations of Muslims (al-Salaf alSalih), in applying the ethico-moral principles of Islam to the public sphere, innovated and experimented with different forms of political administration, some of which were highly successful and others which were problematic.5 Yet more recently, in a fatwa condemning the toxic theology and atrocities of ISIS, one of the most respected Muslim scholars of our times, Shaykh Abdullah bin Bayyah of Mauritania, challenged the view that there is agreement (ittifaq) among Muslim scholars that a Caliphate is an obligation upon the Muslim Ummah. Shaykh bin Bayyah argued that, “there is no religious duty to pursue the establishment of a Caliphate”. He furthermore argues that “for many 50

Liberating the Ummah from its Obsession with State Power

centuries, some Muslim lands were independent of the Caliphate and were still able to uphold the religion [of Islam], safeguard the law and sacred sites, and ensure peace and security.â&#x20AC;?5

The Myth of the Islamic State

Much of the current Muslim obsession with an Islamic state can be traced back to colonization of Muslim lands and the plundering of their resources during the past two centuries. With the gaining of independence, secular postcolonial regimes failed to bring about the emancipatory aspirations for a just and equitable social order in all Muslim majority countries. This has led to large-scale disillusionment with postcolonial secular regimes. In their disenchantment with secular parties the Muslim masses have turned to Islamist movements that offer the Islamic State as the panacea to the many social, economic and political ills of their societies. We have thus far witnessed three very different experiments in implementing the idea of an Islamic State, namely, the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in 1996 and the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq in 2014. In all three of the above examples, the most learned Islamic scholar is both the chief religious authority and the political head of state. In other Muslim majority countries, such as Saudi Arabia, the political head of state is not the most learned Islamic scholar. Despite their differences all three attempts at establishing a modern day Islamic State have failed to nurture compassionate and just societies and have instead spawned cultures of state violence. Of the three modern Islamic States, the 1979 Islamic Republic of Iran was greeted with the greatest enthusiasm by Muslim masses in many parts of the world. The optimism for a new era of compassionate justice was however short lived. In the first decade after the 1979 Iranian revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran imprisoned, tortured, and executed tens of thousands of Iranian citizens on grounds of their divergent political and religious beliefs. One of the most vocal critics of the violent excesses perpetrated by the Islamic Republic of Iran came from Ayatullah Hossein Ali Montazeri, one time heir apparent to Supreme leader, Grand Ayatullah Ali Khomeini. The banishment and persecution of Ayatullah Montazeri, the most learned Iranian Islamic scholar, was undoubtedly the greatest testimony to the betrayal of the compassionate justice ideal of the Islamic revolution.6 51

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The global Muslim response to the establishment in 1996 of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan by the Taliban, and to the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria by ISIS in 2014 was largely reticent and negative. The Muslim misgivings were certainly not misplaced. Both these Islamic states have been found guilty of grossly violating the Islamic ethico-moral principles of compassion, socioeconomic justice and open and transparent governance. While both the Taliban and ISIS are infamous for their use of extreme forms of public executions such as stoning and beheadings, the Taliban became notorious for its severe repression of women, and ISIS has gained notoriety for its legitimation of slavery.7 Ironically, all three these modern Islamic states have denounced each other as fraudulent “Islamic States”. Furthermore, Muslim majority countries where the political head of state is not the most learned Islamic scholar, are not regarded as legitimate ‘Islamic States’. They are considered to be secular states because the rulers are not Islamic scholars. In these countries, Shari’a law is often selectively applied to legitimate state rule. These Muslim countries ruled by secular leaders, too have failed in establishing just and equitable societies and rank high in global ratings of human rights violations. Moreover, their often draconian and repressive laws have contributed to the allurement of a ‘pure’ Islamic state amongst the masses within these societies.

Redefining the Islamic State as a Just State

I would like to re-iterate that by contesting the position of those who advocate that the establishment of a Caliphate or an “Islamic State” is a necessary and essential part of our faith in Islam, I do not profess that Islamic teachings are devoid of ethico-moral precepts or guidance in the field of governance and public administration. In fact, one of the most important ethico-moral values that should guide governance from an Islamic perspective is that of justice. For example, Allah, the Sublime, proclaims in the Glorious Qur’an, in surah alMa’idah, chapter 5, verse 8:

Liberating the Ummah from its Obsession with State Power

Be Just and Equitable: it is the Nearest to Piety (Q5:8) In this regard it is instructive to note that the famous fourteenth century Muslim scholar, Taqiyuddin ibn Taymiyyah (d.1328), believed that an Islamic State is a just state. Central to his definition of an Islamic State is a just economic order. According to ibn Taymiyyah, a just Islamic state is one in which workers are paid a just wage and the hoarding of wealth, monopolies and manipulation of prices are eradicated. Ibn Taymiyyah is so concerned with socio-economic justice that he argues that a state committed to economic justice, even if it has certain moral failings, is superior to a regime of what he calls “pious tyranny”. In support of his view, Ibn Taymiyyah asserts that: “Allah upholds the just state even if it is unbelieving (i.e. not ruled by Muslims), but does not uphold the unjust state even if is Muslim (i.e. ruled by Muslims).” It might be expedient to note that ibn Taymiyyah is highly regarded by socalled Salafis and Islamists of all stripes.8 It is our sincere prayer and hope that this redefinition of an Islamic State as a state in which socio-economic justice trumps all other ethico-moral precepts, be embraced by all who aspire to this ideal. For example, less than a month ago in December 2015, the newly elected president of Gambia proclaimed Gambia as an Islamic state in a bid to distance the country from its colonial past. It is our hope that this proclamation is about establishing and upholding a just and equitable state and not another example of ‘pious tyranny’ masquerading under the guise of an Islamic State. We already have too many examples of the latter.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is my considered view that there is an urgent need within the Muslim Ummah to create safe platforms and opportunities and spaces for Muslims to debate the contentious position of the need for an Islamic State and or Caliphate. I have sufficient trust that if such a debate and dialogue were to 53

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flourish, Muslim thinkers will be able to dismiss the idea that the establishment of an â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Islamic Stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; is part of the fundamentals of our Islamic belief system. Moreover, it will become apparent that the notion of an Islamic state does not resonate with our contemporary needs in a pluralistic and globalized world. Rather, the goal towards which the ethico-moral teachings of Islam beckon us, is to establish a just and equitable state in which the dignity of all citizens are protected, no matter the religious affiliation of the state rulers. Emblematic of this much needed dialogue and debate is a very recent book published in October 2015, by prominent US Imam, Feizal Abdul Raouf titled: Defining Islamic Statehood: Measuring and Indexing Contemporary Muslim States.9 Imam Abdul Raouf proposes that for a state to call itself Islamic it needs to conform to the highest human standards of justice, compassion and mutual consultation. I would like to encourage everyone to read this newly published book as a way of getting this important conversation going about the nature of an Islamic State.

9/11 and the Cycle of Violence in Our World Today

9/11 and the Cycle of Violence in our World Today Rashied Omar

Khutbah delivered at Claremont Main Road Masjid, 12th September 2016

Introduction

eptember the 11th. We recall that on this day, exactly fifteen years ago, on 11 September 2001, we witnessed the terror attacks on the United States of America – commonly referred to as 9/11.1 Fifteen years later the world continues to hold vigils and memorials for the nearly 3000 people who lost their lives and over 6000 that were injured in this attack.2 Without minimizing this catastrophe, we note the hypocrisy of the world in which we live today, that this human tragedy is constantly remembered but that terror attacks which are equally or even more brutal elsewhere in the world are seldom similarly memorialized.3 This begs the question: Are American lives valued more than the lives of human beings who are citizens of other countries? The US answered this question unequivocally when, in response to the attacks of 9/11, they unleashed a revengeful ‘Global War on Terror’ that today continues to kill and maim hundreds of thousands of innocent lives in many parts of the world. In this `Id al-Adha khutbah I would like to expose this global duplicity and injustice. I contend that since the 9/11 attacks in the US exactly fifteen years ago, many parts of the Muslim world have been suffering much less widely reported ‘9/11’s’ almost daily, without any global recognition of, or justice for, those who have been killed or maimed. In this khutbah I wish to recall the treacherous role the US has played in perpetuating a cycle of violence that has enflamed Muslim extremism around the world. I conclude this khutbah with first, some suggestions for how we should expose the duplicitous role of the US 55

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and its machinery of state terror, second, how we should seek justice for war crimes committed by state actors, and finally, how we can show solidarity with the victims of terror perpetrated by both state and non-state actors.

Remembering 9/11 and its Consequences

It might be expedient to begin by recalling that on September 11 2001, I was living in the US with my family when the most widely recognized skyscrapers in the world - the twin towers in New York, were attacked. I remember being overcome by a deep sense of anguish. In the hours and days following the 9/11 attacks, I went to bed each night praying that the misguided individuals who were responsible for the killing and maiming of innocent men, women and children, were not Muslims. In the mornings when I read and watched the daily news, I desperately tried to convince myself that the growing evidence against the so-called “prime suspect” Osama bin Laden and his terror group AlQa`ida, was being contrived with the active support of a complicit media. This is the affliction and distress that many Muslims have been suffering for the past decade and a half since that fateful September morning.4 While conspiracy theories about 9/11 are prolific from different quarters, some Muslims have a propensity to grasp at conspiracy theories when acts of terror are perpetrated by Muslims in the name of Islam. The consequence is often that everything gets blamed on ‘Western Imperial Forces’ and leads to a denial of what are also reprehensible acts perpetrated by Muslims in the name of Islam. Acknowledging the latter should not preclude us from also exposing the hand of Western Imperial Forces in giving rise to the extremist violence and destruction we witness in the Muslim world today.5 Moreover, the central theme of this `Id al-Adha khutbah namely, my criticism of the US response to the abominable attacks of 9/11, applies equally to Muslim extremists who justify their atrocities by contending that their terror is merely retribution for US Imperialist aggression. In fact, it is my contention that the response to violence with more violence by Muslim extremists, contradicts a clear ethical principle enunciated in the Glorious Qur’an. In surah al-Fussilat, chapter 41, verses 34-35, Allah, the Lord of Compassionate Justice, advises us as to how we should strive to respond to malevolent provocations: 56

9/11 and the Cycle of Violence in Our World Today

Good and Evil can never be equal to each other. Repel evil with what is better; and your enemy may become a close friend. The latter is only attainable by those who are forbearing in adversity and are blessed with God’s Grace (Q41:34-35) In the remainder of this `Id al-Adha khutbah, I demonstrate that not heeding the Divine wisdom contained in the above verses of the Glorious Qur’an has led to a vicious cycle of violence gripping large parts of our contemporary world.

The Invasion of Afghanistan

In response to the violence of the 9/11 attacks, the United States, rather than reflect on its aggressive foreign policies that precipitated the terror attacks, instead embarked on an even more violent ‘Global War on Terror’. The ‘Global War on Terror’ was officially launched on 7 October 2001, when the United States invaded Afghanistan with the aim of toppling the Taliban regime and capturing or killing Osama bin Laden and destroying his al-Qa`ida network.6 Fifteen years after destabilizing this country, and after tens of thousands of Afghans and hundreds of Americans and their allies have lost their lives, Afghanistan remains one of the most unsafe places in the world.6 To underscore this perilous reality, just more than one month ago on 23 July 2016, Afghanistan suffered its latest “9/11” tragedy when twin bombings on a demonstration of mostly members of a Shi`ite Hazara minority group in Kabul, killed over 80 and injured 260 people.7 The US led war in Afghanistan has also destabilized and wrought terror on the neighbouring country of Pakistan. Emblematic of the violence and terror that consumes Pakistan is that on 8 August 2016, Muslim extremists attacked the Government Hospital of Quetta, Pakistan, resulting in the deaths of at least 93 innocent people and injuring more than 100 others.8 57

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism

The Invasion of Iraq

Less than two years after attacking Afghanistan and still seeking revenge for 9/11, the US invaded Iraq on 20 March 2003. The US supported by coalition forces from the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland, occupied Iraq and toppled the Baàthist regime of Saddam Hussein. According to then US President George W. Bush and his chief ally, Prime Minster Tony Blair of Great Britain, the pretext for the war was “to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein’s support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people.”9 The influential medical journal, The Lancet, published findings of the John Hopkins School of Public Health, which put the number of deaths resulting from the war in Iraq at well over a half a million people from 2003 till 2006.10 In the aftermath of the US war in Iraq, no weapons of mass destruction were ever found and a destabilized Iraq became a fertile recruiting ground for alQaìda and other extremist networks. An official British inquiry into the UK’s role in the Iraqi war (also known as the Chilcot Report) was released two months ago on 6 July 2016. The Chilcot Report found the suggestions that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and that there was a connection between al-Qaìda and the Iraqi regime, to be blatant fabrications.11 More disturbingly, however, the Chilcot Report confirms a widespread view that the war in Iraq has and continues to have devastating consequences for the Middle East region as a whole. A number of scholars, including our very own, Dr. Shamil Jeppie, have argued that the emergence of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known by its Arabic acronym as Daìsh, can be directly linked to the US invasion of Iraq and its aftermath. In a post-tarawih talk delivered at this masjid in 2015, Dr. Shamil Jeppie contended that:

9/11 and the Cycle of Violence in Our World Today

Camp Bucca was a prison compound of thousands of prisoners where the Americans believed they were in control. But another story has emerged. This is where, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Amir of ISIS (Daâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;ish), was held for about four years. There strategies were plotted among the diverse prisoners, which included traditional Sufi and Salafi Sunnis and secular Ba`athists. This is where what we see today unfolding was conceived. The prison comrades from various backgrounds committed themselves to continuing resistance when outside.12

Drone attacks in Pakistan and Elsewhere

The revengeful war on terror in response to 9/11 by the US was not limited to Afghanistan and Iraq, but was indeed a global phenomenon. One of the chief ways in which this war on terror was globally prosecuted was via drone attacks. This was in fact the key tactic adopted by the successor to George W. Bush, namely, US President Barack Obama. Under his administration the number of drone attacks increased dramatically. The hegemonic view about the use of drones in warfare is that of a surgically precise tool that makes the world a safer place by enabling targeted killings of so-called terrorists without collateral damage. This narrative has proved to be patently false by a number of credible research studies. One of the earliest research reports to refute this claim is the Living Under Drones study produced by the law schools of Stanford and New York Universities. The research provides unequivocal evidence refuting both the US government and media claims that drones are pinpoint weapons with limited collateral impact.13 The Living Under Drones research shows a higher number of civilian deaths than official statistics suggest and also exposes the narrow framing of the effectiveness of drone warfare. The study shows the negative impact that drones have on civilians that live with the daily threat of strikes in their communities. Drones that hover in the sky twenty-four hours a day terrorize people and provoke high levels of psychological trauma and anxiety especially among young children. This terrorizing reality is integral to the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;collateral damageâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; that has resulted from this morally corrupt U.S. foreign policy.14 59

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism

Furthermore, according to the Bureau for Investigative Journalism, which tracks US drone warfare, between 2004 and 2016 the US launched 424 drone strikes on suspected terrorists in Pakistan. More than 4 000 people were killed, a quarter of whom were civilians. Over the past year the US has launched more than 400 drone strikes in Afghanistan, resulting in more than 2 500 deaths.15 Moreover, a growing number of credible research studies are confirming that the negative effects of drone strikes are fueling public resentment against U.S. foreign policy and that of its Western allies. Thus, an aggressive foreign policy ostensibly intended to counter global terrorism has instead had the effect of providing fodder for the recruitment and growth of Muslim extremist groups.16

State Violence Must Be Exposed and Condemned

Thus far I have only provided a broad overview and mere glimpse of the extremism, violence and terror spawned by the US led â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;War on Terrorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; during the past fifteen years since the attacks of 9/11. While I fully acknowledge that there are multiple factors that have contributed in varying degrees to the current crisis of violence and Muslim extremism, it is palpable that the revengeful US response to the tragic events of 9/11 is deeply implicated.17 Sadly, the mainstream media and many academic analyses of the crisis in the Middle East seldom highlight this important part of the root causes of Muslim extremism today.18 To be clear, the killing of innocent civilians is a war crime no matter who perpetrates it, and the guilty must be brought to justice in the international courts of law. More critically, however, is that the indiscriminate killing of civilians by state actors have in no way ameliorated the root causes of terror across the world and is part and parcel of the cycle of violence gripping large parts of the Middle East and the Northern Hemisphere. Indeed, what we are witnessing is a deadly and self-perpetuating cycle between the terror directed at civilians by Muslim extremist groups and the terror by powerful States on civilian populations. While atrocities committed by Muslim extremist groups dominate media headlines, reports on the brutality of state military machinery are muted. Yet, civilian deaths by state forces as this khutbah has illustrated are not isolated or unusual incidents, but a reality in the Middle East and North Africa since 9/11. 60

9/11 and the Cycle of Violence in Our World Today

Bombing and drone attacks by US armed forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, Somalia, Libya and Yemen have claimed thousands of civilian lives over the years. They have at times been assisted by British, French and German forces. A key ally of the US, Saudi Arabia’s vicious bombing of Yemen, which continues to this day, has indiscriminately killed thousands of women and children.19 Israel’s bombing of Palestinian enclaves has claimed thousands of civilian lives and destroyed civilian infrastructure. Then there are the bombings by the Assad military regime, assisted by Russia, against armed rebels in Syria, which has also claimed large numbers of civilian lives.20 The intention with this `Id al-Adha khutbah is not to compare tragic body counts resulting from violence perpetrated by Muslim extremists versus the US. Rather, it is to expose the duplicity of the US and its allies, as well as the global media, in their response to and coverage of violent atrocities perpetrated by state versus non-state actors. This duplicity ensures that we are never allowed to forget the tragedy of 9/11 (or London or Orlando or Paris or Nice for that matter), but are seldom reminded of the many “9/11” tragedies that have occurred far more frequently in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Palestine and elsewhere where state actors are implicated. In the final part of this, I would like to make some suggestions for first, how we should expose the duplicitous role of the US in fomenting extremism, second, how we can seek justice for war crimes committed by state actors, and finally, how we can show solidarity with the victims of terror perpetrated by both state and non-state actors.

Exposing the Treacherous Role of the US

First and foremost, we need to be vigilant and critically monitor media reports of terror and violence. Often the killing of innocent people by state actors, for example by US drones, go unreported or are callously referred to as collateral damage. Such reports seldom make it to the front page of the mainstream media and do not enjoy the same kind of sensationalized and sustained media coverage as the atrocities committed by non-state actors do. For example, five days after the horrific attack on civilians in Nice on 14 July 2016, which was of course widely reported, 73 civilians, including several children, were killed 61

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism

in a US Coalition led airstrike in Northern Syria. This violent attack by the US received scant global media coverage. It is instructive too, that in June and July, media statements released by CMRM condemning terrorist attacks in Orlando, Normandy and Nice were all published in our local newspapers, but our statement condemning this US attack in Syria was apparently received too late for publication and there was no available space.21 We should make it a habit to regularly consult alternative media outlets and sources such as Al-Jazeera and media group called Democracy Now. In this way we must strive to keep ourselves informed about all forms of terror and violence, whether perpetrated by non-state or state actors. When we do have concrete and reliable information about the state killing of innocent people that has not been covered widely in the media, it is important that we launch a robust media campaign to highlight such atrocities. We should expose state atrocities by issuing press releases to condemn these killings in the same way that we have consistently and unequivocally condemned acts of terror committed by Muslim extremists. We should issue these statements because our faith commitment compels us to consistently defend and uphold the sanctity of human life. The safeguarding of human life is one of the supreme objectives of Islam (maqasid al-shari`ah). The Glorious Qurâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;an is replete with references concerning the sacredness of human life (Q6:151; Q17:33; Q25:68). The most striking of these Qurâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;anic proclamations that underscores the supreme sacredness of human life is verse 32 of surah al-Maâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;idah, chapter 5, in which Allah, the Giver and Taker of Life (al-Muhyi al-Mumit), equates the unjust and wanton killing of one human being to that of the killing of all humankind:

If anyone kills a single human being without just cause it shall be as though s/he had killed all of humankind; Whereas if anyone saves a life, it shall be as though s/he had saved the lives of all humankind (Q5:32) 62

9/11 and the Cycle of Violence in Our World Today

Therefore, as conscientious Muslims and responsible citizens we cannot remain silent in the face of wanton loss of human life whether at the hands of Muslim extremists or state terror. We should never become desensitized to the devastating loss of human life and should all take collective and individual responsibility to raise our voices in condemnation of the killing of human beings. One such way in which we can do so is to write letters to the media exposing the under-reporting of terror committed by state actors. This strategy should form an integral part of a robust and comprehensive response to setting the record straight about the role of US foreign policy in fomenting extremism and terrorism in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world.

Seeking Justice for War Crimes

With respect to how we can seek justice for war crimes we can draw inspiration from Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu. Archbishop Tutu has been vocal in his call for Bush and Blair to be tried for war crimes. In August 2012, to show his disdain for Tony Blairâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s involvement in instigating the illegitimate and immoral Iraq war, he snubbed Blair by pulling out of a leadership summit in Johannesburg where both of them were scheduled to speak.22 I recommend that we should actively support the persistent calls from Tutu and other civil society organizations for George W. Bush, Tony Blair and other Western leaders to be tried at the International Criminal Court for war crimes committed in Iraq. This call has been re-energized since July 2016 with the release of the Chilcot Report. We can support this campaign for justice by signing petitions calling for Blair and Bush to be tried as war criminals.23

Solidarity with the Victims of State Terror

Last but not least, we should actively support relief efforts for the many victims caught in the cycle of violence perpetrated both by non-state and state actors. In this regard we are inspired by the sterling relief efforts of groups such as Islamic Relief, Doctors Without Borders and Gift of the Givers. By providing regular support to such groups we remind ourselves about the plight of the victims and our moral responsibility to end all forms of terror.

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism

Drone Warfare: Ethico-Moral Challenges

Drone Warfare

Ethico-Moral Challenges A. Rashied Omar

Input at Kroc Institute Symposium on The Ethical and Policy Implication of US. Drone Warfare, Wednesday February 3, 2016, University of Notre Dame, USA

have been asked to reflect on the response of the religious community to the ethico-moral challenges and dilemmas provoked by the use of drone warfare to target and kill individuals suspected of being involved in the militant activities of so called terrorist groups in Pakistan, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the Middle East. The hegemonic view about the use of drones in warfare is that of a surgically precise and effective tool that makes the world a safer place by enabling targeted killings of so-called terrorists with minimal disadvantages or collateral damage. This dominant narrative has been proven to be patently false both empirically and by a number of credible research studies. One of the earliest research programs that challenged the hegemonic and dominant narrative on drone warfare is the seminal study conducted by Stanford University’s International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic, in collaboration with the New York School of Law’s Global Justice Clinic.1 This important study published in September 2012 with the title ‘Living Under Drones: Death, Injury and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan’ has provided unequivocal evidence that refutes the prevailing US government and media narrative that portrays drones as pinpoint precision weapons with limited collateral impact.

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism

The “Living Under Drones” research findings have not only conclusively shown that the number of civilian deaths caused by drone strikes is far more than the official statistics suggests, but more importantly, the study has exposed the narrow framing of the effectiveness of drone warfare. It argues that this narrow framing fails to take account of the negative impact that drones have on civilians on the ground that live with the daily threat of drone strikes in their communities. The study, furthermore, provides clear evidence that drones that hover twenty-four hours a day above the sky, terrorizes people and provokes high levels of psychological trauma and anxiety especially among young children. This terrorizing reality of the consequences of drone warfare is integral to the ‘collateral damage’ that has resulted from this US foreign policy. It is not just the innocent civilians who get killed in the path of a drone, it also the countless terrified souls who live with the threat of daily drone strikes, that makes drone warfare a morally corrupt foreign policy. A number of subsequent publications, including that of Rafia Zakaria and Akbar Ahmed, have confirmed and supported the conclusions of the “Living Under Drones” research program. In an excellent chapter aptly titled: “The Myth of Precision: Human Rights, Drones, and the Case of Pakistan”, Rafia Zakaria has suggested that hundreds of innocent civilians have lost their lives or have been maimed as a result of drone attacks. To support her contention, she provides a chilling example of a contentious drone strike in Pakistan on March 17, 2011.2 According to an exclusive report by Agence France-Presse on the morning of March 17, 2011, the US Ambassador to Pakistan, Cameron Munter, was frantically trying to persuade the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to stop a planned drone strike. His protestations were however, summarily rejected by the CIA’s newly appointed director, Leon Panetta. The drone strike went ahead, despite the US Ambassador to Pakistan’s frantic efforts to stop it, and it resulted in the killing of four Taliban leaders and 38 civilians. The CIA claimed that all of the forty-two people killed by their drone strike on March 17, 2011, were militants. Pakistanis and villagers on the ground, however, insisted that the strike had targeted a village meeting or Jirga. In this context, the satellite image guiding the drone was that of a large gathering, the purpose of the gathering is not considered. Can you imagine, every time these 66

Drone Warfare: Ethico-Moral Challenges

civilians attend congregational prayer services or village meetings, or funerals, they must be aware that satellite images sent to the drones are recording large gatherings and at any time these gatherings can be taken to be meetings of so called militant terrorists. What defense do they have against this? Rafia Zakaria has also highlighted the disastrous socio-economic impacts of drone strikes on civilian life in Pakistan. Her research shows that the misery of civilian casualties coupled with the psychological trauma resulting from drones hovering above the sky have led to close to a million people to be displaced from their ancestral homes and have had to find a safe haven elsewhere. She usefully illustrates how this massive displacement of human beings as a result of drone warfare has exacerbated the ethnic tensions especially in Karachi between the Muttahida Qawmi Movement (MQM), which represents the descendants of Pakistan’s migrants from India, and the Awami National Party, which represents the ethnic Pashtuns. Almost all of the people displaced by drone warfare are ethnically Pashtun, the main ethnic composition of the Taliban. Rafia Zakaria’s conclusion furthermore supports the view of “the Living Under Drones” program that the killing of innocents and the negative effects of drone strikes are fueling public resentment against the United States foreign policy and that of its Western allies. These negative perceptions of the so-called war on terror, according to these research studies, serve as a recruiting ground for extremists such as the Taliban and Al-Qa`ida in Pakistan, Afghanistan and elsewhere. In 2013, a prominent scholar of Islam and former Pakistan ambassador to the US, Akbar Ahmed, published similar findings in his award winning book, “The Thistle and Drone Warfare: How America’s War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam”.3 Ahmed takes Zakaria’s argument further by contending that in the aftermath of 9/11, the use of drones as a leading military counterinsurgency weapon has not weakened but strengthened extremists. Drones, Akbar suggests, has transformed the war on terror into what he describes as a global war on tribal Islam. The US thus has to critically reflect on a foreign policy that was ostensibly implemented to counter global terrorism but has instead had the effect of fuelling anti-US sentiments in these drone strike territories and providing 67

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fodder for the recruitment and growth of extremist groups intent on its own violent counter-terrorism targeting the US and its Western allies. Yet more recently the release of the so-called “Drone Papers”4 as well as the U.S. airstrike on a Doctors Without Borders hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, that killed forty people have once again called into question the U.S. commitment to avoid civilian casualties and abide by ethical and international legal norms for the protection of civilians and aid organizations.5 The strongest evidence supporting the view that drone warfare is clouding the moral compass of its advocates can be found in the vocabulary of the drone program itself. “The Drone Papers” reveal that dossiers of targets are condensed into “baseball cards”, targets are called “objectives,” objectives killed by drone strikes are called “jackpots” and a completed drone strike is consolidated and memorialized in a “story board”. All these terms trivialize the terror of drone strikes and dehumanize their victims.6 As a direct result of the serious ethico-moral concerns raised about the legitimacy and effectiveness of drone warfare by these credible research studies, religious communities in particular, in diverse parts of the world have called for an immediate halt and stopping of drone attacks. On February 13, 2013, Nobel Laureate and anti-apartheid icon, Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu sent a letter to the New York Times in which he rebuked the US for its drone program. Tutu claimed that the program was privileging American lives over that of other human beings and that it threatened to undermine the moral standards and humanity of the US administration and its people.7 On February 13, 2014, the World Council of Churches (WCC) Executive Committee in Geneva released a statement in which they condemned the use of drones, saying that they pose “serious threats to humanity” and the “right to life” while setting “dangerous precedents in inter-state relations”.8 On June 1, 2015, the US based Interfaith Network on Drone Warfare sent an official letter to President Barack Obama and the US Congress, expressing grave concerns about Drone Warfare and calling for its immediate cessation.9 68

Drone Warfare: Ethico-Moral Challenges

The interfaith letter which was signed by 29 faith leaders representing the Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim and Sikh traditions, proclaimed that it was morally unacceptable that thousands of innocent people have been killed by US lethal drone strikes. The letter also raises concerns that targeted killings by drones lack transparency and accountability. Finally the interfaith letter argues that drone strikes do not make Americans safer, but rather aid recruitment by extremist groups. It urged the US government to put an end to this secretive, remote-controlled killing and instead promote foreign policies that are consistent with the values of a democratic and humane society. It also called on the United Nations to regulate the international use of lethal drones in a fashion that promotes a just and peaceful world community, based on the rule of law, with full dignity and freedom for every human being. While I commend this courageous stance by the Interfaith Network on Drone Warfare and support the substance and tenor of their position, I have serious problems with the concluding part of their letter to president Obama. How is it even possible, given the research that has pointed to the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;blindnessâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; of drone attacks, to regulate the use of lethal drones? Surely, the use of drone attacks in any context carries with it the prospect of collateral damage unacknowledged in the existing official narrative, and thus the only ethico-moral response must be to declare it an illegal and immoral form of warfare. In the final section of my input I would like to highlight five possible strategies religious communities have proposed that activists could adopt in protesting the continued use of drone warfare. 1. Encourage and enable more religious bodies to adopt statements and resolutions condemning the use of lethal drones in any conflict situation. 2. Create websites, Facebook, Twitter and other social media accounts that highlight the collateral damage of drone attacks, not only in terms of civilians killed, but also in terms of the psychological terror they engender on communities.

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism

3. Place articles questioning the morality of drone warfare in all publications and prepare sermon starters and worship materials for clergy. 4. Support nonviolent civil protest campaigns as a method of condemning drone warfare and join lawsuits contesting the legality of drone killings. 5. Write to elected representatives calling for a halt to drone attacks. In conclusion, it is fair to say that there is a growing consensus among progressive religious bodies from almost all religious denominations as well as civil society organizations that drone attacks are immoral and that they should be ended with immediate effect.

Boko Haram’s Kidnapping of Nigerian Schoolgirls A Violation of Islamic Ethics and Dignity

Boko Haram’s Kidnapping of Nigerian Schoolgirls

A Violation of Islamic Ethics and Dignity A. Rashied Omar

Khutbah delivered at Claremont Main Road Masjid,16 May 2014

ince the 14th of April 2014, the day of the kidnapping of over 240 Nigerian school girls by an extremist group calling themselves Boko Haram, there has been ubiquitous media exposure of the group’s atrocities that has provoked unprecedented global outrage. I would like to reiterate why it is important for us to add our voice of condemnation against these perverse acts done in the name of Islam, and to urge each one of us to better inform ourselves about these events so that we can also be critical readers of the media hype that inevitably arises from events such as these. First and foremost, we need to join the global community in condemning in the strongest terms this abhorrent and cowardly kidnapping and enslavement of the Nigerian schoolgirls by Boko Haram. We have demanded that the perpetrators release the girls immediately without conditions and refrain from harming them. Furthermore, we vehemently denounce in the strongest terms the claims by Boko Haram to be acting for the cause of or in the name of Islam. We believe that these actions are neither legitimate nor tolerable within the framework of Islam. The threat of selling the girls and “marrying” them off are outrageous and serves to further confirm Boko Haram and their deeds as demagoguery masked in religious rhetoric. These are not actions of Islamists, but heinous acts of sectarian thugs. Speaking out and fighting such evil is an obligation on all Muslims as confirmed by the Glorious Qur’an in surah al-Ma’idah, chapter 5, verse 8, where God, the Sublime proclaims:

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism

O Believers! Be steadfast witnesses for Allah in justice, and do not let the hatred of a people prevent you from being just. Be just; that is nearer to piety. And remain conscious of Allah; indeed, Allah is all-Aware of what you do (Q5:8) In light of the above it is clear that in Islamic ethics the end does not justify the means. The actions of Boko Haram are not only a violation of Islamic ethical principles, but also a depraved violation of the dignity of the kidnapped girls. We commend the almost unanimous condemnation by Muslims of the latest Boko Haram atrocity and exhort and advise all Muslims to do even more in supporting the spirited civil society campaigns and efforts to free the kidnapped Nigerian girls. Second, we call on the Nigerian authorities to use all lawful means at their disposal to return the abducted girls safely to their families. In this regard we note with concern and consternation that in a report released last Friday, May 9 2014 by the international Human Rights NGO, Amnesty International, they worryingly claim that the Nigerian security forces knew about Boko Haramâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s impending armed raid on a state-run boarding school in Chibok four hours before the kidnapping of more than 240 schoolgirls but failed to take the immediate action needed to prevent this mass abduction.1 Amnesty International based its report on an interview with a Nigerian army colonel, a lieutenant colonel, local officials and residents. The British newspaper, The Guardian, who reported on the same day that Chibok local residents alerted the local military about the attack, independently corroborated amnestyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s account. In one case a group of residents said they dispatched a motorbike rider to the nearest battalion but no reinforcements were sent in response. 72

Boko Haram’s Kidnapping of Nigerian Schoolgirls A Violation of Islamic Ethics and Dignity

These alarming reports from reputable sources have raised serious questions about the conduct and integrity of the Nigerian government’s efforts in dealing with the mounting threat of extremism. African scholars, such as Toyin Falazo, Mahmood Mamdani, and Shamil Jeppie, have for a long time argued that political elites in Nigeria exploit religious differences to advance their own political agendas. Small wonder then, that in a recent communication an expert on Islam and Muslims in Nigeria, informs me that most people in the north of Nigeria believe that, after a cell of ‘real’ Islamic extremists was eliminated in a 2009 crackdown, the remnants of Boko Haram have been reconstructed as a mere façade by those trying to manipulate conditions in order to create chaos in the predominantly Muslim north ahead of the 2015 presidential elections. Third, given the propensity for politicians to use religious difference for their own nefarious political agendas it is critical for all peace and justice loving Christians and Muslims not to allow the actions of misguided bigots such as Boko Haram to sow hatred and discord within our communities. In fact, it is noteworthy that some of the kidnapped girls are actually Muslim. At this difficult time we should stand united in showing even greater interreligious solidarity in the face of such overt and brash malevolence. We need to re-double our efforts to foster strong and judicious interfaith solidarity. We therefore call on all Muslim and Christian religious leaders in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa, to cooperate and support each other in rescuing the abducted girls and ending the wanton violence and indiscriminate killing that we have witnessed as well as isolate groups and actors from all sectors whose goals are to promote and encourage hate and sow discord. Furthermore, if the world could pool resources to search for a missing Malaysian plane, surely they could equally amass the necessary resources to find and rescue the kidnapped girls. It is our moral and collective responsibility first to liberate the girls and then find ways to stop this killing, strife and mistrust. In this regard we commend the offer by the International Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies led by the renowned Islamic scholar, Shaykh Abdullah bin Bayyah, to provide the intellectual and educational support needed to build an enduring peace within the psyches of the affected groups. We call on all religious institutions and organizations in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa to join hands 73

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so that peace with justice would manifest and violence would stop, in accordance with our Compassionate Godâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s proclamation in the Glorious Qurâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;an:

O Believers, Enter into Peace wholeheartedly for all (Q2:208) We also call on all peace-loving people to continue to work hard to address human rights issues affecting many minority communities so that legitimate grievances can be addressed in a peaceful and lawful manner, and extremists are sidelined. Last, but not least, we should not underestimate the power of prayer, solidarity and speaking out against injustice, oppression and tyranny. We believe that prayer draws human attention to things that need our attention, and that God hears our prayers, which can work to change human events and history. At this time of anguish and distress our thoughts and prayers are with the kidnapped girls and their distraught and concerned parents. We pray for their safe release and for Islamâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s highest virtue, that of rahma (benevolence), to prevail.

Islam and Peacebuilding

Islam and Peacebuilding A. Rashied Omar

Chapter Thirteen of Trialogue and Terror: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam after 9/11 Edited by Alan L. Berger (Cascade Books: Eugene, Oregon, 2012) The dramatic turn of world events at the dawn of the twenty-first century – including the abominable attacks on the United States of America on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent “global war on terror” – have served to reinforce a widespread, but inaccurate perception that the Islamic faith and Muslims themselves have an inherent predilection for violence and terrorism. Even conventional academic perspectives regard Islam as having a predilection for violence. Never before in recent history has the Muslim commitment to a more peaceful and human world being challenged as it is at this time. Against this backdrop, locating the Islamic definition of and role of Muslims in peace is critical. It is a task that I and an increasing number of other Muslim scholars and activists have undertaken and continue to undertake with great passion and commitment, since it counterbalances the current preoccupation with Islam and violence. A number of key questions undergird my research on the role of Islam in Peacebuilding: 1. How consonant or disparate is the Islamic definition of peace from that of the leading perspectives? 2. What are the complex causes of the erosion of peace in contemporary Muslim societies? 3. How should the core Islamic values of Compassion and Justice be configured in an Islamic theology of peace? 4. What concrete strategies and practices could Muslim peace activists adopt in pursuit of a more just and humane world? 75

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This essay addresses the above four questions and concludes with four modest proposals that may create the conditions for the recovery of the Islamic principles of peace and making it part of the fabric of contemporary Muslim culture. I argue that the complex justice struggles in which many Muslim social movements have been engaged during the past century have led to the erosion of the core Islamic value of compassion, and consequently, the loss of peace. It might be expedient to begin with a definition of peace.

The Peace Studies Definition of Peace and Peacebuilding

Like the end state itself, a consensus definition of â&#x20AC;&#x153;peaceâ&#x20AC;? is elusive. However, the Islamic perspective is perhaps best compared to that of scholars in the field of international peace studies, which has broadened and deepened the conventional understanding of peace defined simply as the absence of war (negative peace), into recognizing that the underlying conditions of a society, even absent overt violence, predicate the presence of deadly conflict. This idea, known as positive peace, originated in the work of the Norwegian peace scholar, Johan Galtung, and stresses the recognition of a more indirect, frequently hidden and insidious form of violence, called structural violence. This form of violence is less dramatic and often works slowly, eroding human values and eventually, human lives. Violence, it is argued, can be built into the very structure of the socio-political, economic and cultural institutions of a society and has the effect of denying people important rights such as economic opportunity, social and political equality, and human dignity. When children die of starvation or malnutrition, a kind of violence is taking place. Similarly, when human beings suffer from preventable diseases, when they are denied a basic education, housing, the right to freely practice their religion, an opportunity to raise a family, or to participate in their own governance, a kind of violence is taking place even when no blood is shed.1 The quintessential example of structural violence is apartheid South Africa. This vicious system institutionalized the oppression and dehumanization of people of color. It legalized racial discrimination, socio-political oppression and economic exploitation. Writing in support of such a view, David 76

Islam and Peacebuilding

Chidester (1997), contends that under the apartheid system, “…violence was everywhere. It was an integral part of the discourses, practices and social formations through which human beings struggled to be human.”2 This nuanced understanding of peace as a substantive value has been increasingly embraced among scholars, religious leaders, civil society, state actors, and the United Nations. With this understanding, the practice of peacebuilding extends beyond the laying down of arms to include addressing and transforming the underlying conditions of structural violence and social cleavages, to foster social integration at every level of society, with roles played by actors among the grassroots, civil society, government, and international organizations. The sought after end state is best described by John Paul Lederach and R. Scott Appleby as just peace: The dynamic state of affairs in which the reduction and management of violence and the achievement of social and economic justice are undertaken as mutual, reinforcing dimensions of constructive change. Sustainable transformation of conflict requires more than the (necessary) problem solving associated with mediation, negotiated settlements, and other elements of conflict resolution; it requires the redress of legitimate grievances and the establishment of new relations characterized by equality and fairness according to the dictates of human dignity and the common good.3

Positive Peace, Compassion, and Justice in Islam

An examination of the Islamic concept of peace reveals that it is closer to that of positive peace. This is underscored by the strong emphasis the primary source of Islamic guidance, the Qur’an, places on justice as a substantive value. The Qur’an uses two terms interchangeably to refer to justice: qist and ‘adl, meaning, “to give someone his or her full portion.” In fact, the Qur’an regards “actions for justice as being the closest thing to piety.” (Q5:6). The Qur’anic 77

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verses pertaining to justice are often specific about those areas of social affairs wherein lapses are most likely to occur, such as the trusts and legacies of orphans and adopted children (Q4:3; Q33:5), matrimonial relations (Q4:3; Q49:9), contractual and business dealings (Q2:282), judicial matters (Q5:42; Q4:56), interreligious relations (Q60:8), economic relations (Q11:65) and dealing with one’s adversaries (Q5:8). This strong emphasis on justice has led some Muslim jurists, like the renowned Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (d.1350 C.E.), to argue that justice is the raison d’etre of the establishment of religion. Modern scholars such as the Egyptian reformist, Sayyid Qutb, have been in the forefront of advocating the concept of justice as prerequisite for peace. The Islamic concept of peace is thus integrally related to the struggle for justice. It resonates well with the exhortation from Pope Paul VI in 1972 that “if you want peace, work for justice.”4 It is a clarion call to the redress of legitimate grievances. Yet, as important as justice may be in the comprehensive matrix of Islamic values, it is not the pre-eminent one. Rather, al-Rahman, or the Compassionate One, is undoubtedly the most important attribute of God in Islam. It is the equivalent of the Christian understanding of God as Love. One of the most well-known Qur’anic verses with which Muslims commence every action is bismillahir rahmanir rahim, translated as, “In the name of God, the Most Compassionate, and the Dispenser of Grace.” Compassion is so central to God’s existence that it embraces all that exists in the universe (Q40:7). The Qur’an describes the prophet Muhammad’s central mission as rahmatan lil ‘alamin, a source of compassion and mercy to the world (Q21:107). Therefore, a struggle for justice (jihad) that claims Islamic legitimacy must locate itself within an ethos of compassion, even over justice. The numerous struggles for social justice, starting with the anti-colonial wars of the first half of the twentieth century, the watershed Afghan war against the Soviet invasion in the 1980’s, and the continuing struggles against secular elites in the post-colonial period that have engaged many parts of the world with Muslim majority populations - have inevitably led justice to be the key hermeneutical key through which Muslims view Islam. This obsession with justice, as illustrated in the work of writers such as Sayyid Qutb, has in turn led to an erosion and exclusion 78

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of the central Islamic concept of compassion. The kind of wanton violence into which many Muslim struggles for justice have degenerated can in large measure be attributed to this phenomenon - justice struggles without compassion. Without compassion, struggles for justice invariably end up mimicking the oppressive orders against which they revolt. And compassion without justice likely leads only to more of the status quo of political, cultural, and social upheaval and pervasive overt and structural violence against Muslims by despotic regimes. Ironically, it is precisely here that the crisis of contemporary Muslims is located and consequently where the challenge of a credible project on Muslim peacebuilding resides. How can the central Islamic concept of compassion be recovered and reinvigorated such that it once again becomes part of the fabric of contemporary Muslim culture? This is indeed the critical challenge facing contemporary Muslims.

Proposals for Muslim Peacebuilding

I suggest four modest proposals that may create the conditions out of which a credible Muslim role in peacebuilding could be spawned. My suggestions emerge primarily from my own assessment of the current geo-political realities and the corresponding Muslim crisis of extremism. First, Muslims themselves must not become weary from stating again and again both loudly and unequivocally, that acts of wanton violence and barbarism are contrary to the teachings of Islam. And the news media must do more to make sure their voices are heard. In Islamic ethics, the end does not justify the means. Religious extremism has no virtue in Islam and has been unequivocally condemned by the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). He is reported in a hadith to have declared thrice â&#x20AC;&#x153;the extremists shall perish.â&#x20AC;? For contemporary Muslims this condemnation requires the acknowledgement, no matter how painful it is, that they do have extremists (mutatarrifun) in their ranks. This is, of course not unique to Islam; what is peculiar to Islam is that extremists appear disproportionately within their ranks, not least because of the proclivity of the media for sensationalism and spectacle (a proclivity upon which extremists have capitalized). Muslim leaders have an especially 79

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onerous challenge of condemning violent overreactions while still peacefully acknowledging, refuting, and struggling against the injustices that spawned such violence. This challenge is eased, however, by the overwhelming presence of compassion at the heart of Islamic tradition, but they must seize it and speak of it. Second, despite growing attention from both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars, there is a dire need for more rigorous academic studies of the potentially fertile sources of nonviolence and peacebuilding in Islam and Muslim societies. A search on the Library of Congress subject catalogue for resources on “Islam, Nonviolence and Peace” produces fewer than a dozen items. A similar search for items on “Islam and Violence,” by contrast, produces a plethora of materials. It is palpable that Islam and Muslim societies is a rather neglected area of peace studies and peace research. Reflecting on this bias in the current peace research agenda, Mohamed Abu-Nimer, in the most pioneering book to be published recently in the field Nonviolence and Peacebuilding Islam (2003) argues that by shifting the emphasis from war and violence to peace and conflict transformation in the study of Islam and Muslim societies it can contribute significantly to buttressing and reinvigorating courageous peace initiatives that are already currently in progress in many different Muslim settings.5 Not surprisingly, despite the paucity of publications directly on this topic, the field is rich and includes leading Muslim scholars from diverse countries and cultures, such as Abdul Aziz Sachedina (USA), Jawdat Sa’id (Syria), Mawlana Wahiduddin Khan (Pakistan), Ashgar Ali Engineer (India), Chandra Muzaffar (Malaysia), Chiawat Satha-Anand (Thailand), and Rabia Terri Harris (USA). Notwithstanding the sterling efforts of these courageous scholars the field of Islamic peace studies and conflict transformation remains inchoate and urgently needs much more attention. Resources such as quantitative and qualitative research will provide empiric support for strengthening the tenants of justice and compassion in Islam and model successes for peacebuilders to learn and adapt at every level of society. 80

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Ideally, such research may be used to inform and alter the actions of powerful nations, whose foreign policy is a central factor in the violence experienced in many Muslim countries. Third, there is an urgent need for the nurturing and training of a new critically minded class of â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;ulama (Muslim religious scholars). The established Muslim religious leaders in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan, have abandoned their role as the moral conscience of their societies by refusing to speak out coherently on the human rights violations and injustices that permeate their countries. Many of them, while speaking out apologetically against certain forms of injustices against Muslims, are providing religious legitimacy to despotic and oppressive regimes. Moreover, non-violent civil resistance campaigns are not tolerated in most Muslim countries and progressive religious leaders are either incarcerated or exiled. Drawing on the theoretical insights gleaned from the recent deluge of studies on the causes and prevention of religious conflict, the conclusion is unmistakable: Religion does not spawn violence independently of predisposing social, economic and political conditions, as well as the subjective roles of belligerent leaders. The studies of two historians of religion, Bruce Lincoln and Scott Appleby, have offered similar but independent arguments in support of this theoretical assertion. Appleby has for example proposed that because of the ambivalent nature of the sacred (that it can be interpreted in the service of peace as well as violence), the role of religious leaders is decisive. He contends that: â&#x20AC;&#x153;Corrupt, craven or merely indecisive religious leadership invites interlopers, claimants who would associate the energies and purposes of religion with their own.â&#x20AC;?6 In light of this finding, as well as the existing crisis in Muslim religious leadership, it is critical to support the emergence of a new generation of scholars who are well versed in both the traditional Islamic sciences and the modern social sciences. Peace education and conflict transformation skills grounded within the key Islamic principles of compassion and justice must form an integral and essential part of this formation and training for future Imams. A useful starting point might be to offer training programs and scholarships to enhance the knowledge horizons of existing Imams, especially 81

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the younger ones. Fortunately, a few such programs have begun, although their numbers and ranks need great expansion. Another key undertaking is fostering exchange programs between existing students from Muslim, Christian and Jewish seminaries. Lastly, peace advocates need to support the call for a public debate concerning the most effective means to counteract Muslim and other forms of extremism. A number of scholars have already pointed this out. For example, the renowned scholar of Islam John Esposito, has ominously warned in his most recent book, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (2002) that, “If foreign policy issues are not addressed effectively, they will continue to be breeding ground for hatred and radicalism, the rise of extremist movements, and recruits for the bin Laden’s of the world.”7 In line with this analysis, peace advocates need to support the call for a public debate concerning the most effective means to counteract Muslim and other forms of extremism. Interreligious activists from all faiths need to join the many voices all over the world that are questioning the wisdom of the current strategy pursued in the “war on terrorism,” and the injustices it has wrought. They also need to back the call for a serious reassessment concerning the controversial United States foreign policy that abets authoritarian Muslim regimes in the Middle East, and elsewhere, as well as its uncritical and too often unilateral support for the present policies of the State of Israel. The current political environment is not seeking to address or ameliorate the root causes of violence experienced among Muslims. On the contrary, it generates the very conditions that favor extremism.

Assessment

Returning to the initial question of how to account for the elusive nature of peace in many Muslim societies, my simple answer is as follows: the contemporary global order is not by any stretch of the imagination a just one. Islam places a strong emphasis on social justice as an integral part of its concept of peace. Muslim legitimization of violence does not occur in a sociohistorical vacuum, but rather within concrete human settings in which power 82

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dynamics are paramount. Against this backdrop, the Muslim pre-occupation with justice has led to an erosion of the core Islamic value of compassion. Extremists have a disproportionate influence within the ranks of Muslims and the global communications media have inadvertently became their ally. This paper has offered four concrete proposals that can make a modest contribution towards creating the conditions necessary for a more positive peace role for Islam to counterbalance the disproportionate yet awesome power of Muslim extremists. There exists a dire need for the followers of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, as well as all other traditions, to retrieve our common humanity and to end the horrific dehumanization that is currently taking place on such a wide scale. The challenge of peace for Muslims in particular is to develop a theology of healing and embrace (taâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;aruf) so eloquently described in the following verse of the Qurâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;an:

O Humankind! We have created you into a male and female and fashioned you into nations and tribes, so that you may come to know each other (not despise one another). The most honored of you in the sight of God, is those who display the best conduct. And God is All-Knowing, All-Aware (Q49:13)

Opportunities and Challenges for Islamic Peacebuilding after September 11

Opportunities and Challenges for Islamic Peacebuilding after September 11 A. Rashied Omar

Interreligious Insight: A Journal of Dialogue and Engagement, October, 2003

Three Vignettes

(1) On September 14, 2001, three days after the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, a group of around two hundred interreligious activists formed a human chain and encircled the Bridgeview masjid in the southwest suburb of Chicago, while their Muslim neighbours were performing their Friday jumu’ah prayers inside. That same evening the same group held a vigil with candles vowing to protect the mosque against any kind of revenge attacks. Reporting on the events of that day, the Chicago Tribune said: “Protestants and Catholics, whites, blacks, Hispanics carried signs with the Muslim greeting, “Peace Be Upon You, Assalam Alaikum,” and “Christians, Jews and Others Support Our Muslim and Arab Brothers and Sisters.”1 (2) On September 26, 2001, in response to reports of anti-Muslim reprisal attacks a number of Jewish and Christian religious leaders as well as several public officials gathered at the local Michiana Islamic Center to show their solidarity with Muslims. An open letter to the members of the Michiana Islamic Center undersigned by priests representing various denominations affiliated with the United Religious Community of St. Joseph read as follows: “Please be assured that we, the undersigned, as well as other members of the religious community of Michiana, are praying and working for a spirit of active respect and justice within the American society for all its diverse citizens. Our prayer is that God’s peace will surround you in these difficult times.” In the subsequent weeks, the masjid received a bouquet of flowers and regularly received Christian delegations to their Friday jumu’ah services. This scenario was not a unique experience to Michiana but was repeated all across the United States of America.2 85

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(3) On September 11, 2002, the first anniversary of the attacks on America was marked all over the country by interreligious services. The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) estimated that more than 100 local Muslim communities participated in interreligious commemorative events all across America. ISNAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s President, Dr. Muhammad Nur Abdullah, represented Muslims at the national interfaith prayer and remembrance service that was held at the Washington National Cathedral.3

Interreligious Solidarity and the Post September 11 Reality

These three vignettes underscore the widespread solidarity that many Muslims received from their non-Muslim compatriots in the aftermath of September 11. For those interreligious activists who have long campaigned that interreligious solidarity should be accorded a more prominent place in the programs of religious institutions, the irony of the post September 11 reality is painful. Interreligious activities have indeed ascended to near the top of the agenda of a number of religious institutions all over the United States, but it was triggered by an abominable attack that has only served to reinforce the widespread public perception that Islam is linked to violence in some special way. This paper argues that the dramatic turn of world events triggered by the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, has ironically led to an unprecedented interest among Americans in Islam and Muslims. This puzzling or confounding curiosity presents a renewed opportunity to counteract negative stereotypes about Islam and Muslims and to foster and deepen interreligious solidarity in the United States. The critical challenge however, facing interreligious advocates is how to sustain and transform this renewed interreligious solidarity and energy into a powerful grassroots interreligious movement for peace and justice. The paper proposes that one necessary pre-condition for an interreligious movement to become self-propelling and sustainable is for the interlocutors to identify and accentuate intrinsic reasons from within their faith commitments for promoting good relations with people of other religious traditions.

Opportunities and Challenges for Islamic Peacebuilding after September 11

Extrinsic Motivations for Interreligious Solidarity

The remarkable interreligious solidarity that ensued in the immediate aftermath of the attacks of September 11 may appear odd, especially since the atrocities were alleged to have been perpetrated by al-Qa’ida, a Muslim group, but it is certainly not unique. There are numerous examples of similar interreligious solidarity movements that emerged in the wake of terrible deeds committed by members of one religious against another all over the world. Having been intimately associated with the interreligious solidarity movement in South Africa, I can personally attest to what I prefer to call a “counterintuitive reality.” Notwithstanding the fact that the Apartheid crime against humanity was perpetrated in the name of a Calvinist interpretation of Christianity, which caused untold misery and suffering to the lives of millions of people of color in South Africa, the same country also spawned one of the most vibrant interreligious solidarity movements during the same period.4 Another striking example is the establishment of an interreligious council in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1997, shortly after the genocidal campaign perpetrated by Serbian Orthodox nationalists between 1992 and1995 that led to the brutal murder of tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims.5 How does one explain this “counterintuitive reality”? How does one account for the fact that in the midst of the worst kind of religious bigotry and barbarism, people of different faith traditions can also find solace and healing through interreligious solidarity? The answer to this question I contend vividly illustrates the ambivalent role of religion in conflict, violence and peacebuilding. For while on the one hand religion has and continues to be implicated in situations of deadly conflict, on the other hand it has and continues to provide hope and sustenance in the face of the worst kinds of indignity and human suffering. What makes it even more mystifying is the fact that this contradictory role of religion in conflict can occur almost simultaneously, and indeed does so in many instances. I would like to illuminate what I regard as rudimentary and undeveloped theological as well as academic accounts for this “counterintuitive reality” I have described here. The Indian Muslim peace activist, Mawlana Wahid al-din Khan (b. 1925) offers a creative and alternative reading of the oft quoted Qur’anic verses (94: 5-6) in which God promises that: 87

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‫ﻓَ ِﺈ ﱠن َﻣ َﻊ ا ْﻟﻌُﺴْ ِﺮ ﯾُﺴْ ًﺮا‬ ‫إِ ﱠن َﻣ َﻊ ا ْﻟﻌُﺴْ ِﺮ ﯾُﺴْ ًﺮا‬ Indeed, hardship is accompanied by ease, or relief, Indeed hardship is accompanied by ease, or relief (Q94:5-6) According to Wahid al-din Khan these verses have been misinterpreted by some exegetes to mean that relief comes only after an experience of hardship. He notes that the verse in question actually speaks of ease together with hardship, which means that adverse circumstances might themselves point to new openings.6 Such a theological interpretation of the interreligious solidarity that proliferated in the wake of the September 11 attacks did indeed surface. For example the American Islamic scholar, Shaykh Hamza Yusuf, in a direct reference to the unexpected outpouring of love and gratitude from other religious groups towards Muslims has courageously proposed that: “This has been an extraordinary year of blessing. There is often a blessing hidden in some of the worst events in our lives.”7 This Islamic theological interpretation of the counterintuitive post September 11 reality is not unique and resonates with similar accounts by religious peacebuilders in diverse contexts. A useful example of this can be found in the theological reflections of black Christians who were struggling against racial discrimination in Apartheid South Africa. They preferred to describe their struggle to rid South Africa of the scourge of racism with the powerful biblical concept of “kairos”, meaning a moment of crisis, of suffering and pain, but also a moment of hope and opportunity. By seizing that “Kairos” moment, black Christians in South Africa were able to transform their society from racial oppression and dehumanization towards hope and justice.8 The anthropologist and peace scholar, Cynthia Mahmood, has provided us with a cogent academic and empirical support for this counterintuitive reality. In her studies of the conflicts of the Punjab in India she concluded that: “It 88

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would not be too strong a statement to say that many Sikhs and Kashmiris have ended up “finding religion,” so to speak, through their own incarceration and torture.” Mahmood argues that oppressive conditions and situations of intense human suffering demand more than human resources and religion provide such resources. In her view, religion can and does provide a “humanizing” role in the face of terror.9 Here again the finding is not idiosyncratic. Religious activists in other conflict zones as diverse as South Africa, Palestine and Latin America have given similar accounts.

Intrinsic Motivations for Interreligious Dialogue

Now while the “counterintuitive reality” I have been accounting for thus far may provide us with a wonderful opportunity for interreligious solidarity, the key argument of this paper is that it is not a sufficient condition for sustainable peacebuilding. This is so because interreligious peacebuilding emphasizes and is dependent on long-term relationship building with a broad spectrum of religious adherents, rather than a kind of “quick fix” superficial solution to a crisis. The problem of the latter strategy has been usefully captured by the title of a discussion on religious tolerance, conflict and peacebuilding held by the World Council of Churches recently that aptly read, “Interreligious dialogue is not an ambulance.”10 I am arguing that while extrinsic motivations may be helpful in getting an interreligious dialogue started they are insufficient to sustain the movement in the longer term. In order for the interreligious movement to become selfpropelling and sustainable, it needs to find intrinsic reasons from within faith commitments for promoting good relations with people of other religions. Intrinsic motivations lie at the heart of genuine and sustainable interreligious solidarity. Intrinsic motivations however continue to be the most elusive goal for interreligious movements all over the world. But what exactly are intrinsic motivations all about?

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism

Intrinsic motivation deals with challenging questions of intentionality. Why and for what purpose are you motivated for the encounter with the “other”? Is the purpose merely instrumental? For example, does there exist a need for interreligious dialogue if there is no conflict or external problem to be dealt with collaboratively? Intrinsic motivations for interreligious solidarity, moreover deals with the difficult and challenging questions of evangelism and da`wah. Does one engage interreligious solidarity in order to convert the other to your faith? Can one get involved in interreligious solidarity with a clear conscience? Is the interreligious encounter legitimated by or compromising our deep-seated beliefs and theologies? These difficult questions cannot simply be swept under the carpet. They are of primary importance, because, unless they are clearly and unequivocally answered, we run the risk of having an outwardly agreeable dialogue that does not dispose of the mistrust and suspicion and in the end is superficial and does not lead us to the goal of peacebuilding. Building interreligious trust should be one of the most important goals of interreligious solidarity movements.

Jihad al-Afkar: The Contestation of Ideas

At this point, it may be useful and expedient for me to explicate intrinsic motivations for interreligious dialogue based on sound Islamic theological foundations. The foundations out of which an Islamic perspective on any topic should arise are nothing less than the authentic sources of Islam, the Qur’an and the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). Both the Qur’an and the Hadith embrace and affirm ikhtilaf, i.e. differences in belief, perspectives and viewpoints, as being natural and an essential part of the human condition. A denial of the right of others to hold beliefs and views, which are different and incompatible to one’s own, is tantamount to a denial of Allah himself. In Surah Yunus, chapter 10, verse 99, Allah, the Sublime, declares:

Opportunities and Challenges for Islamic Peacebuilding after September 11

If your Lord had so desired, all people on the earth would surely have come to believe, Do you then think you can compel people into believing? (Q10:99) Again, in Surah Hud, chapter 11, verse 118, Allah, the Sublime, proclaims:

Had your Lord so willed, He could surely have made all human beings into one single community: but (He willed it otherwise, and so) they continue to hold divergent views (Q11:118) Both of these verses establish the principle of freedom of belief and thought in Islam. At the conclusion of the first verse, the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) is himself reproved for transgressing this principle by being over-enthusiastic in convincing others with regard to the truth of Islam. Thus, the Qur’an stresses that the differences in beliefs, views and ideas of humankind is not incidental and negative but represents a God-willed, basic factor of human existence. The genius of Islam lies in its strict Monotheism - the belief in the Oneness of God. Islam teaches that the more we embrace diversity in God’s creation the closer we are to acknowledging the unity of God. It is essentially this creative paradox that escapes Muslim extremists. Furthermore, Muslims are obliged by the Glorious Qur’an to seek good relations with, and to act justly towards other peace loving religious people. In Surah alMumtahinah, Chapter 60 Verse 8, God, the Sublime, proclaims:

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism

Allah forbids you not, with regard to those who fight you not for (your) Faith nor drive you out of your homes, from dealing kindly and justly with them: for Allah loves those who are just (Q60:8) The challenge which the principle of freedom of belief and thought in Islam holds for Muslims is to develop clear ethics and find mechanisms to manage and deal with the differences of beliefs and theologies that exist. In the Islamic perspective of religious pluralism, human beings are called upon to excel in and celebrate the contestation of ideas, known as al jihad al-afkar. This generates intellectual and social vitality. The process of contestation spawns a rich variety of competing solutions for dealing with any particular problem, each of them valid in its own right. There is no moral judgment and vilification of partners/ opponents in the contest. The challenge, for contemporary Muslims, is to amplify the Qurâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;anic teachings on interreligious solidarity and work hard to make it an integral part of the fabric of contemporary Muslim culture.

Conclusion

This paper has argued that the tragic events of September 11, 2001 have ironically created renewed opportunities for interreligious solidarity in the United States. The paper has sought to identify a critical challenge, which interreligious activists need to face in order to transform this newfound interest and energy into a sustainable movement for peace. The interreligious movement in the United States of America has contributed to the difficult process of healing in the post September 11 period. It is my considered view however that in order for this interreligious movement to become sustainable and authentic intrinsic reasons needs to be nurtured. Why do we always need to wait for conflict and violence to overwhelm us before we feel the need to develop healthy interreligious and 92

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cross-cultural relationships? If intrinsic reasons were to precede external ones, the interreligious movement would not only be contributing to the resolution of existing conflict situations, but be going a long way towards preventing them occurring in the first place. In fact, a far more genuine and permanent religiopluralistic culture and ethos could emerge. This we believe to be the major challenge of the interreligious movement in the United States of America in the post September 11 era. The interreligious solidarity movement needs to transform itself from an ad-hoc body into a permanent body with a long-term relevance to the nation and the world at large.

Ta’aruf: Islam Beyond ‘Tolerance’

Ta’aruf

Islam Beyond ‘Tolerance’ A. Rashied Omar

New Routes, Volume 16, 2011 A Journal of Peace Research in Action, Life and Peace Institute, Uppsala, Sweden

uslims should not wish for a tolerant Islam any more than they should long for a tolerant, South African, American, Indian or European society. Rather, they should seek to bring about a pluralistic society in which we respect, honor, and engage each other through our differences and our commonalities.

Since the abominable attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States of America, there has been a vociferous public debate concerning the relationship between Islam and tolerance.1 A number of public intellectuals, such as Samuel P. Huntington and Bernard Lewis, have raised questions about the compatibility of Islam and toleration, and Muslims have been told time and again that their task as global citizens is to increase tolerance towards people of other religions and to achieve more tolerant societies.2 Some Muslim scholars and activists have responded positively to this challenge and have emphasized the great strands of tolerance and coexistence in Islam and Muslim history.3 Emblematic of this trend is the popular monograph, The Place of Tolerance in Islam, edited by the Californian based scholar of Islamic Law; Khalid Abou El-Fadl.4 Notwithstanding the many invaluable insights contained in this and other works on Islam and tolerance that are flooding the market in the post-September 11 period, in my view, the project of articulating an Islamic validation of the Western concept of tolerance is not at all helpful in promoting mutual understanding and it certainly is not the panacea to overcoming extremist tendencies within the house of Islam. While I fully appreciate the fact that these efforts of promoting a more “tolerant” version of Islam takes place against the backdrop of a belligerent post September 11 context in which Islam is constructed as inherently intolerant 95

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and predisposed to violence, and that tolerance is indeed a viable and valuable alternative to hatred of “the other,” I believe that in a longer-term vision, the tolerance project is limited. I contend that the persistence of Western scholars, policymakers, journalists and indeed interreligious activists in using tolerance as a cross-cultural category does not inspire us to reach the highest ideals of our respective religious traditions. In fact, the “tolerance paradigm” limits our visions in the critical task facing the world in the aftermath of September 11, namely that of “building bridges of understanding” between and across religious communities. I propose an alternative vision for interreligious peacebuilding which I would like to call “Ta’aruf: Islam beyond Tolerance.”

The Hegemony of Language

It might be expedient to begin with the question of language and terminology. One of the most critical challenges in interreligious dialogue is the question of language, in both its literal as well as symbolic forms. Global realities dictate that we live within the hegemony of the English language, which inevitably privileges those who are more proficient in English and disempowers less proficient or non-English speakers. This illustrates the power dynamics and partiality of hegemonic contemporary discourses on interreligious peacebuilding. In order to meet the subtle but powerful pressures on non-Western traditions to conform to prevailing discourses of “civility,” non-Western scholars often inadvertently shore up concepts and texts from their own traditions that appear to correspond to “fashionable” Western concepts. The challenge of interreligious discourse goes much deeper. Contemporary interreligious dialogue is not only biased by the language in which it occurs but is also conditioned by a powerful symbolic language, namely the predominant categories of thought which are rooted in Western Christian paradigms; grace, salvation, redemption, holy war etc. Even the word “religion” carries with it Westernized baggage suggesting the privatization and individualization of this important category. As explored by the cultural anthropologist, Talal Asad, ‘religion” itself is a modern concept which emerged in modernity and implies a contextually “secular” realm.5 This hegemonic bias of language is a pervasive reality and not only disadvantages non-Christian religious traditions but even non-Western Christian cultures and denominations. 96

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The persistence of interreligious interlocutors in employing categories of thought which are rooted in Western Christian paradigms, does not help in interpreting present – day developments within non-Christian religious traditions. In fact it obscures reality even further and remains as yet another obstacle in the critical task of “building bridges of understanding” between religious communities. It is vital for the proliferating global interreligious movement in general and interreligious interlocutors in particular, to firstly acknowledge and recognize this, and secondly to seek creative ways of redressing it. What I am essentially arguing for is that a deep sensitivity to, and appreciation of the differences in our religious languages, may assist us in building bridges of understanding between interfaith communities. In other words, to fairly interpret what sacred concepts and rituals symbolize and mean, we have to hear them in the context of their religious paradigms in a process of mutual illumination. Applying this challenge of asymmetries in language and conceptual categories to Islam, the Muslim feminist scholar, Riffat Hassan has pointed out that the popular Christian concepts such as “salvation” or “redemption” do not have Islamic equivalents. She has lamented this iniquitous dimension of interreligious dialogue by observing that “it has been the common experience of Muslims who participate in interreligious dialogue in the West that such dialogues are dominated by Christian concepts and categories, and Muslims are required to ‘dialogue’ in terms which are not only alien to their religious ethos but may even be hostile to it.”6 Taking this debate about language and categories as a point of departure, I was curious to discover to what extent the concept of tolerance resonates with the Islamic tradition.

Tolerance in Islamic Source Texts

The Jewish scholar of Islam, Yohanan Friedmann, has correctly demonstrated in a recent book, Tolerance and Coercion in Islam, that there is no precise Qur’anic equivalent to the term tolerance.7 In fact its linguistic equivalent, tasamuh, and its verbal derivative samaha are not found in the Qur’an. He has furthermore shown how modern Muslim scholars, such as the Syrian Shawqi Abu Khalil, have adduced proof-texts for the existence of the term tolerance (tasamuh) from the second most 97

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sacred source of Islamic guidance after the Qurâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;an, the hadith literature, commonly called the prophetic traditions.8 Friedmann argues that the interpretation of these prophetic traditions departs from earlier classical understandings of its meaning. For example, a prophetic tradition recorded in the authoritative hadith collection of Imam Bukhari (d.870 CE) that has been used to provide textual proof for the existence of the concept of tolerance in Islam reads as follows: The religion most beloved to God is the kindly upright religion (hanifiyya) (ahabbu al-din ila Allah al-hanifiyya al-samha).9 Because of the linguistic affinity of samha with tasamuh or samaha, the modern Arabic terms for tolerance, these prophetic traditions are understood by modern Muslim scholars as being supportive of the idea of Islamic tolerance toward other religions. In earlier commentaries, however, the same prophetic tradition was understood to mean that Islam is a lenient religion, which does most impose hardships on its followers, not in reference to Islamâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s attitude to other religions.10 Though samha is not a term from the Qur`an, and in the hadith literature it is used in reference to Islam being a religion of ease not of hardship, in the great classical dictionaries of the pre-modern period, one finds that samaha or samh actually has a broader connotation than what Friedmann presents. The Arabic word tasamuh is simply the sixth form of the root, which serves to make the action indicated in this verbal noun mutual or reciprocal. This sixth form occurs in the classical dictionaries and means being kind, generous, liberal, and reconciled with one another. Translating samaha or tasamuh as only tolerance actually restricts the much broader range of meanings contained within it. In addition to leniency, the following significations are applicable to samha: generous, liberal, and even reconciled. The fact that there is no linguistic equivalent for the term tolerance does not, however, imply that Islam does not accept the existence of other religions. On the contrary, the Qurâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;an stresses that the differences in beliefs, views and ideas of humankind is not incidental and negative but represents a God-willed, basic factor of human existence. A denial of the right of others to hold beliefs 98

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and views that are different and incompatible to one’s own is tantamount to a denial of God himself. Among the numerous verses of the Glorious Qur’an that supports such a contention are the following: verse 99 from Surah Yunus, chapter 10 and verse 118 from Surah Hud, chapter 11:

If your Lord had so desired, all people on the earth would surely have come to believe, Do you then think you can compel people into believing? (Q10:99)

Islam Beyond Violent Extremism

Thus, the Qur’an stresses that the differences in beliefs, views and ideas of humankind is not incidental and negative but represents a God-willed, basic factor of human existence.12 In the Qur’anic perspective of religious pluralism, human beings are called upon to excel and celebrate in the contestation of ideas, known as jihad-al-afkar. This generates intellectual and social vitality. The process of contestation spawns a rich variety of competing solutions for dealing with any particular problem, each of them valid in its own right. There is no moral judgment and vilification of partners/opponents in the contest. I maintain that this Qur’anic concept of seeing religious differences as an expression of the will of God is more vital than that of merely tolerating differences in religious traditions. But words are powerful vehicles in shaping our thoughts, and there are often many layers of meaning embedded in words, not least the popular English word tolerance. The Muslim scholar and editor of the volume Progressive Muslims (2003), Omid Safi, has pointed out that the connotations of the word “tolerance” are deeply problematic.13 In support of his contention he points out that the root of the term “tolerance” comes from medieval toxicology and pharmacology, marking how much poison a body could “tolerate” before it would succumb to death. After confronting this definition of the term tolerance, Safi rhetorically asks: “Is this the best that we can do? Is our task to figure out how many “others” (be they Muslims, Jews, blacks, Hindus, homosexuals, non-English speakers, Asians, etc.) we can tolerate before it really kills us? Is this the most sublime height of pluralism that we can aspire to?” The answers to these critical questions, is of course an unequivocal no! We don’t want to merely “tolerate” our fellow human beings, but rather to engage them at the deepest level of what makes us human, through both our phenomenal commonality and our dazzling cultural and religious differences. In short, 100

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according to Safi, progressive Muslims (and I would add all other Muslims) should not wish for a “tolerant” Islam any more than they should long for a “tolerant” American or European society. Rather, they should seek to bring about a pluralistic society in which we respect, honor and engage each other through our differences and our commonalities.

“Soft” Tolerance

Other scholars, such as the contemporary Muslim ethicist on war and peace, Sohail H. Hashmi, are also acutely aware of the difficulty with the meaning of the word tolerance, but they have persevered with the term and attempted to nuance it by distinguishing between soft and hard tolerance and minimalist and maximalist definitions of tolerance.14 Such scholarly efforts are however ineffective since they do not correspond to the reality on the ground. The reality of tolerance in my own experience living under the racist apartheid system in South Africa is that what Hashmi and others have dubbed soft or minimalist interpretations of tolerance. In fact, the mere possibility of soft and minimalist interpretations of the concept of tolerance has lent itself well to being abused in that context. In the case of the apartheid regime, soft tolerance was used to justify a policy of separate development of people on the basis of pigmentation of skin. Under apartheid legislation “religious freedom” and “tolerance” of other religions were only tolerated in so far as it was willing to be relegated to the private realm and did not threaten structures of racism and segregation. In the racist apartheid perspective of tolerance, it meant that so-called racial and religio-cultural groups were encouraged to live separately and apart from each other in enclaves and so-called townships or “ghettoes.” Ironically, under this Christian Calvinist dominated regime, the government was willing to allocate sites for Muslim mosques and Hindu temples as long as they were willing to “tolerate” the so-called racial and religious other by living apart from them and minimize their interactions. It was euphemistically called separate but equal development. Of course, the system of apartheid was anything but equal. It was rather a policy of racism and bigotry justified by the idea of tolerance through 101

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separation. On the contrary, it was a policy of racism and bigotry justified by the idea of tolerance through separation. In my view the apartheid crime against humanity represents an instructive case for teaching us about the inherent weaknesses and difficulties of the concept of tolerance.15 The South African experience with this kind of tolerance is not epiphenomenal. It is typical throughout the world where toleration is the “positive model of human relationships. It may be better than intolerance, but it is prone to the problem of power-relationships, inequality and is only an abeyance of hatred.

Embracing Difference: An Alternative Vision

Is there an alternative and higher vision of interreligious and intercultural harmony that goes beyond the limitations of the idea of tolerance? I believe that such an alternative vision does indeed exist within all of our religious traditions. From the Islamic perspective I would like to offer the Qur’anic concept of ta`aruf, which literally means getting to know “the other,” or, as I have interpreted it, embracing “the other” as extension of another self. This idea is eloquently captured in Sura al-Hujurat, chapter 49, Verse 13, of the Qur’an:

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Qur’anic verse enjoins human beings to celebrate gender, cultural and other forms of diversity by way of ta’aruf (recognition/affirmation) of each other through intimate knowledge, and not mere toleration. Through this verse the Qur’an teaches that differences among humankind are not incidental and negative, but rather that human diversity represents a God-willed, basic factor of human existence. The Qur’anic concept of ta’aruf is an alternative vision to that of the tolerance paradigm and represents for me the litmus test of good religion: not how much I can tolerate “the other” but rather the extent to which I am able to embrace “the other” as an extension of another self. Such an alternative vision of ta’aruf is also supported in the second most sacred source of Islamic guidance after the Qur’an, the hadith literature. Imam Bukhari (d.870 CE) and Imam Muslim (d.865 CE) compiled two of the most widely respected and authoritative compendia of these traditions. These two works, named after their compilers, are sometimes referred to as the sahihayn, the “two most authentic” canons of hadith. They contain many overlapping reports. In one shared report, a companion of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), Jabir bin ‘Abdullah, recalls the following incident: Once a funeral procession passed in front of us. The Prophet (peace be upon him) stood up; we stood up too. We said, “O Prophet of God! This is the funeral procession of a Jew!” He answered, “Whenever you see a funeral procession, you should stand up.17 In a reinforcing report that immediately follows, two companions of Prophet Muhammad, Sahl bin Hunayf and Qays bin Sa`ad, recall that they were sitting in the city of Madinah when a funeral procession passed in front of them and they stood up. They were told that the funeral procession was of “one of the inhabitants of the land”—i.e., of a non-Muslim under the protection of Muslims. They relate: A funeral procession passed in front of the Prophet and he stood up. When he was told that it was the coffin of a Jew, he said, “Is it not a living being (soul)?18 103

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Interestingly some Muslims prefer to translate the latter part of this prophetic tradition as “Was he not a human being?”19 While this may not accurately convey the literal words of the prophetic statement, it does represent the spirit behind it. However, there is a profound implication in the literal words of the tradition. They remind Muslims that Jews, too, have souls that were breathed into them at birth by God. This interpretation resonates well with the Qur’anic verse 9 of Surah Al-Sajdah, chapter 32, which reads as follows:

[God] fashioned [the human being] in due proportion, and breathed into him something of His spirit. Then He endowed you with [the faculties of ] hearing and sight and feeling [and understanding]: But little thanks do you give! (Q32:9) This well-known Qur’anic injunction illuminates the egalitarian ethic contained in the prophetic tradition we have identified. This powerful ethic obliges Muslims not merely to tolerate but to honor the dignity of all human beings, and to look upon each and every human being—whether he or she is a Jew, a Christian, an adherent of an extra-scriptural religion, or as an agnostic—as carrying within her, within him, the breath of God. This message is central to the Muslim view of humanity: every human life, Muslim or non-Muslim, has exactly the same intrinsic worth, because as the Qur’an teaches us, each one of us has the breath that our God breathed into our being.

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Conclusion

This is how I understand the Islamic paradigm of ta’aruf; intimately getting to know one another, a pathway to embracing the other as another self, whether they may be Jewish, Christian, or of no faith. I believe that such an alternative vision can make a major contribution to a more peaceful and just world. The challenge for Muslims is how this core Qur’anic teaching on ta`aruf may be reinvigorated such that it becomes a central part of the fabric of contemporary Muslim culture. In particular, Muslims need to assert the concept of ta’aruf as an alternative to the concept of “tolerance” in interreligious dialogue and solidarity. This also imposes a challenge on all interreligious peacebuilders to go beyond a paradigm of tolerance to one that encourages the recognition and affirmation of “the other” through intimate knowledge, and not mere toleration.

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Beyond Ambivalence Peacemaking through the Prophetic Example

Beyond Ambivalence

Peacemaking through the Prophetic Example A. Rashied Omar1 and Rabia Terri Harris

t this difficult time in Jewish-Muslim relations, many of us share a cry of anguish. Are Jews and Muslims condemned to perpetual conflict and hostility? Or are there possibilities within their common sacred stories for developing a theology of healing? Our response is that hostility and enmity are constructed by human beings, and thus can be unmade by them as well. If we are to transform our relationship— for which there is dire need—the followers of Jewish and Islamic traditions must retrieve each other’s humanity and end the mutual dehumanization that is currently taking place. One small but important step is to recognize that all of our sacred texts and stories provide opportunities for justifying violence as well as healing; all of our sacred texts and stories display “ambivalence.” Arguing within the context of the Muslim sacred scripture, the Qur’an, Professor of Islamic Law Khalid Abou El-Fadl has provided a powerful response to this ambivalence. He contends: “The meaning of the text is often as moral as its reader. If the reader is intolerant, hateful, or oppressive, so will be the interpretation of the text.”2 The way we talk about our sacred stories affects the way we think and ultimately the way we act. All of our sacred texts and stories provide possibilities for intolerant as well as tolerant interpretations. What is needed is a reinterpretation of the narrative, so that healing and a transformed relationship with the perceived enemy become integral parts of a renewed spiritual vision. Yet this reinterpretation must be vital and transparently authentic. The movement toward reconciliation and the great-heartedness upon which it is based is complicated by fear: fear that the wellsprings of community resistance to injustice are under attack by insidious propaganda that seeks to “pacify” whatever is inconvenient. These fears are far from groundless—but we hold 107

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that they are irrelevant. For our study of our own tradition persuades us that generosity of spirit, which we find illustrated over and over in the life of the Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him), is the only foundation upon which a truly just society can be built. And we believe the arguments for this are convincing. Our first task is to acknowledge the fact of interpretive ambivalence, no matter how distressing that may be. Second we must muster faithful and coherent ways of dealing constructively with the texts, symbols, and rituals that display ambivalence. Third, and most importantly, we must base our arguments upon sacred stories that are unambiguously healing, lifting them up so that they stand out as beacons of hope and transformation.

We would like to offer two.

The second most sacred source of Islamic guidance after the Qur’an is the hadith literature, commonly called the Prophetic traditions. Imam Bukhari (d.870 ce) and Imam Muslim (d.865 ce) compiled two of the most widely respected and authoritative compendia of these traditions within Sunni Islam. These two works, named after their compilers, are sometimes referred to as the sahihayn, the “two most authentic” canons of hadith. They contain many overlapping reports. In one shared report, a companion of Muhammad, Jabir bin ‘Abdullah, recalls the following incident: Once a funeral procession passed in front of us. The Prophet (peace be upon him) stood up; we stood up too. We said, “O Prophet of God! This is the funeral procession of a Jew!” He answered, “Whenever you see a funeral procession, you should stand up.”3 In a reinforcing report that immediately follows, two companions of Muhammad, Sahl bin Hunayf and Qays bin Sa`ad, recall that they were sitting in the city of Madinah when a funeral procession passed in front of them and they stood up. They were told that the funeral procession was of “one of the inhabitants of the land”—i.e., of a non-Muslim under the protection of Muslims. They relate: 108

Beyond Ambivalence Peacemaking through the Prophetic Example

A funeral procession passed in front of the Prophet and he stood up. When he was told that it was the coffin of a Jew, he said, “Is it not a living being (soul)?”4 Interestingly some Muslims prefer to translate the latter part of this prophetic tradition as “Was he not a human being?”5 While this may not accurately convey the literal words of the prophetic statement, it does represent the spirit behind it. However, there is a profound implication in the literal words of the tradition. They remind Muslims that Jews too have souls that were breathed into them at birth by God. This interpretation resonates well with the primary source of Islamic guidance, the Glorious Qur’an. The Qur’an declares in verse 9 of Surah Al-Sajdah (Chapter 32) that:

[God] fashioned [the human being] in due proportion, and breathed into him something of His spirit. Then He endowed you with [the faculties of ] hearing and sight and feeling [and understanding]: But little thanks do you give! (Q32:9) This well-known Qur’anic injunction illuminates the egalitarian ethic contained in the prophetic tradition we have identified. This powerful ethic obliges Muslims to honor the dignity of all human beings, and to look upon each and every human being—whether he or she is a Jew, an atheist, or an adherent of an extra-scriptural religion—as carrying within her, within him, a part of God. This message is central to the Muslim view of humanity: every human life, Muslim or non-Muslim, has exactly the same intrinsic worth, because as the Qur’an teaches us, each one of us has the breath our God breathed into our being.

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Our challenge is to work hard to reestablish this core ethic as an integral part of contemporary Muslim culture and endeavor. Meeting this challenge demands that we transport the spiritual wealth of our sacred texts out of the realm of experts and into the public square. We need to demystify, “de-technicalize” religious communication—for while the apparatus of traditional scholarship has maintained the integrity of our received sources over many generations, it can also serve as a lock on the treasure-chest of truth. Too much reliance on experts disempowers the conscience of the person on the street, short-circuiting the basic Islamic claim of direct moral relations between the soul and God. So, while the work before us calls for scholars; it also calls for popularizers. Therefore, the second hadith we would like to offer will be told in a different mode, not as a citation but as an anecdote. (Scholars and the skeptical will want to know that it may be found in Saḥih Bukhari, 8:626, other versions or fragments are at 3:594, 3:595; 4:610, 4:620, 6:162, 6:337, 8:524, 8:525, 9:52, 9:524, 9:564; narrators are Abu Hurayrah or Abu Sa`id al-Khudri.) It seems that in Madinah, a Muslim got into a dispute in the marketplace with a Jew. “ Yes, by Him who made Moses the best of humanity!” swore the Jew. The Muslim was incensed. “How can you say that?” he exclaimed, “when Muhammad is here among us?” And he hit him! The Jew took his assailant before the Prophet. “AbulQasim,” he said, “am I not protected here? And see what your follower has done!” The Prophet became angry, which was as notable as it was rare. “How could you do such a thing?” he reproved the Muslim. “Don’t you know that the prophets are all equal, and that none is less than any of the others? I would not make such a claim even about Jonah. As for Moses, when I rise on the Day of Judgment I will find him already awake, and I won’t know whether he rose before me or whether he used up all his unconsciousness in his swoon on Sinai!” And he awarded damages to the Jew. 110

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End of story: moral follows. First, although the Muslim in his impulsiveness acted at least partly out of love, he was still wrong. Respect for the other has priority: that is the sunnah of the Prophet. Second, the justice of Madinah was such that a Jew did not hesitate to complain against a Muslim before the leader of the Muslims, and won his case: that is the social achievement of the Prophet. And third, the refusal to claim spiritual superiority demonstrated here: that is in itself the spiritual superiority of the Prophet. If Moses had been there, would he have acted any differently? “What is needed,” we have claimed, “is a reinterpretation of the narrative, so that healing and a transformed relationship with the perceived enemy become integral parts of the renewed spiritual vision.” The problem lies in anchoring our reinterpretation of the narrative in such a way that it will convince, and endure. For if we merely assert that we must choose the peaceful textual interpretation over the violent one, then we are offering no principle upon which that choice is to be based, other than that we prefer things that way. The problem with this kind of argument is that the proponents of violent interpretations prefer things their way, too—and if private preference is the only key, why shouldn’t they? But private preference, in Islamic tradition, is always accountable to divine preference. God as self-revealed in the Qur’an expresses likes and dislikes in humanly comprehensible terms. Even though these terms themselves are susceptible to semantic nuancing based on the preliminary assumptions of each reader, the range of plausible readings is not infinite. Thus, when the Qur’an declares that God loves the impartial or even-handed (al-muqsitin), it is not possible to read those words as proclaiming that God loves bias or self-interest. And when it declares that God does not love the corrupters of natural harmony (al-mufsidin), it is not possible to find there an authorization for its corruption. “Proof-texting,” the selection of particular passages to the exclusion of contradictory passages in order to justify one’s views, is an affliction of all scriptural traditions. However, due to the very texture of the Qur’anic 111

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revelation and the Prophetic reports, it may be a greater temptation to readers of these scriptures than it is to others. What we can turn to for the control of arbitrary proof-texting is broader intimations of intent. Thus 113 of the 114 surahs, or chapters, of the Qur’an begin with the dedication bismiLlah ir-rahman ir rahim, which may be rendered “In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Caring” or “In the Name of God the Benevolent, the Merciful,” or in a number of other permutations of understanding centering always on the quality of selfless, wise, and tender love: rahmah. We have called upon rahmah earlier under the name of generosity of spirit. bismiLlah ir-rahman ir rahim may not be read as dedicating the revelation, or our reading of it, in the name of the Vengeful, the Overpowering, the Punishing, the Excluding, or the Exacter of Retribution. So, 99.123% of the time, God’s preferred perspective is stated, and it is not a perspective of wrath. When we draw our conclusions as readers, do we consult with this preference of God? If not, where does our failure place us with regard to the divine will? Again, in the matter of hadith, the reader may pick and choose. We are free to construct a Prophet “in our own image” by our selection among texts: he will certainly serve us as a mirror and show us our own needs. But can we ethically avoid the understanding of the Prophet proposed by God in the Qur’an? Ma arsalnaka illa rahmatan lil-`alamin: “We have not sent you except as rahmah to the worlds.” We may not read this as meaning “as judgment over the worlds,” nor either as rahmah to the Muslims alone. Rather the Messenger stands for compassion toward everyone and everything. That, if we are Muslims, is the direct statement of God about who Muhammad was, and what he was working for. When we derive our principles from his acts, do we base them on the essence of his mission? If not, what does that failure tell us about how we are following him? Anas bin Malik reported: 112

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The Messenger of God (peace be upon him) said to me: “My son, if you are in a position to pass your morning and evening keeping your heart free from malice against anyone, then act accordingly.” He then said: “My son, that is my sunnah. Whoever loves my sunnah, in fact loves me, and whoever loves me will be with me in Paradise.” The great scholar Imam Tirmidhi transmitted it (Hadith #175). We have added the italics ourselves. And God knows best.

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Notes Islam, Conflict and Violence

1. This hadith of the Prophet Muhammad was quoted in Chittick, William C., trans. The Sufi Path of Love: The Spiritual Teachings of Rumi. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983): 151. 2. Safi, Omid, Memories of Muhammad: Why the Prophet Matters. (San Francisco: Harper One, 2009).

Muslim Extremism: Myth or Reality? 1. All translations are the authorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s.

2. Al-Nawawi, Abu Zakariya Yahya bin Sharaf. Riyad al-Salihin, Hadith No. 144. (New York: Darussalam, 1999). 3. The stereotype of a bellicose and inherently violent Islam, so pervasive in the media, has wide currency among Western policymakers. For two of the most popular academic accounts that depict Islam as inherently violent, see, Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong?: The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); and Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). There has also been an alarming amount of anti-Islamic propaganda published in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001. Two particularly sinister works that attempt to demonize all politically active Muslim individuals or organizations are: Steven Emerson, American Jihad: The Terrorists Among Us. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002; and Daniel Pipes, Militant Islam Reaches America. New York: W.W. Norton Co., 2002. Both works brand all American Muslims who are critical of Israeli policies as potential terrorist threats, and they incite suspicion against American Muslims by claiming that many of those Muslims are taking part in a secret conspiracy to promote terrorism in America. 115

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4. Such apologetic Muslim reactions often claim that “Islam means peace” while refusing to acknowledge that violent extremist groups to indeed exist within Muslim ranks. This off course is not unique to Islam and Muslims. 5. The Kairos Document: Challenge to the Church: A Theological Comment on the Political Crisis in South Africa. (1985) Rev. 2d ed. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans. 6. Khalid Abou El Fadl (2002), “The Place of Tolerance in Islam: On Reading the Qur’an-and misreading it.” Boston Review (2002). 7. Lawrence, Bruce, Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden (New York: Verso, 2005). 8. Al-Qurtubi, Muhammad ibn Ahmad. Al-Jami` li Ahkam al-Qur’an - Tafsir al-Qurtubi. Ed. Hani al-Haj. Vol.8 p.65. (Cairo, Egypt) 9. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997). Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 29. 10. Graham E. Fuller, “The Future of Political Islam,” Foreign Affairs March/ April 2002, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 60.

Muslim Youth & Extremism: The Case of the Boston Marathon Bombers

1. Oliver Roy, “Bin Laden: An Apocalyptic Sect Severed from Political Islam,” East European Constitutional Review 10, no. 4 (Fall 2001): 108–14. 2. Ùmar Faruq Àbd-Allah, Islam and the Cultural Imperative, (A Nawawi Foundation Paper, 2004). 3. Saḥih Bukhari, Saḥih Muslim, Kitab al-Ìdayn, Musnad al-Humaydi.

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Muslim Sectarianism in South Africa: Symptom or Cause?

1. As recorded in the sira literature of Ibn Hisham, al-Sira al-Nabawiyya. 2. For a further exploration of this view, Adil Salahi’s, Muhammad: Man and Prophet, (Islamic Foundation, 2008): 140-144. 3. Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought. (Islamic Book Trust, 1982). 4. Asma Afsaruddin, The First Muslims: History and Memory (Oneworld, 2008): 184. 5. For the full text of the fatwa see: bayyah.net/english/2014/09/24/fatwaresponse-to-isis. Accessed 21 December 2015 6. See Ulrich von Schwerin, The Dissident Mullah: Ayatollah Montazeri and the Struggle for Reform in Revolutionary Iran, 2015, I. B. Tauris. 7. For a useful perspective on contemporary Islamic State theory and experiments see: Noah Feldman, The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State (Princeton University Pores, 2012). 8. Taqiyuddin Ibn Taymiyyah, Public Duties in Islam: The Institution of the Hisba (Islamic Foundation, UK, 1982): 9.

Liberating the Ummah from its Obsession with State Power

1. For a further exploration, see “Muslim Extremism: Myth or Reality?” in this collection. 2. Ibn Hisham, al-Sira al-Nabawiyya 3.

Adil Salahi, Muhammad: Man and Prophet (Islamic Foundation, 2008): 140-144.

4. Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (Islamic Book Trust, 1982). 5. Asma Afsaruddin, The First Muslims: History and Memory (Oneworld, 2008): 184.

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6. Ulrich von Schwerin, The Dissident Mullah: Ayatollah Montazeri and the Struggle for Reform in Revolutionary Iran (I. B. Tauris, 2015). 7. For a useful perspective on contemporary Islamic State theory and experiments see Noah Feldman, The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State, (Princeton University Press, 2012). 8. Taqiyuddin Ibn Taymiyyah, Public Duties in Islam: The Institution of the Hisba (Islamic Foundation, UK, 1982:9. Translated by Muhtar Holland). 9. Feizal Abdul Raouf: Defining Islamic Statehood: Measuring and Indexing Contemporary Muslim States (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015)

9/11 and the Cycle of Violence in Our World Today

1. Reported from ‘Abdurahman bin Ya’mur and recorded in the Musnad of Imam Ahmad. 2. For an official account of the numbers killed and maimed as well as the course and causes of the events of 9/11 See: The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (Authorized Edition, 2004). 3. For a useful critique of the manner in which the 9/11 tragedy is appropriated and exploited for political purposes See: David Sampson, 9/11: The Culture of Commemoration: New Edition; (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016). 4. A. Rashied Omar, “A Muslim’s Anguish in the Midst of the Attacks on America,” In Boorhaanoel Islam (Cape Town: 2001). 5. Rashied Omar, “Muslim Extremism: Myth or Reality?” In Extremism: Dissecting a Phenomenon, Spring Symposium, International Peace College South Africa (IPSA), 18 October 2009. 6. Anand Gopal. No Good Men Among the Living: America, the Taliban, and the War through Afghan Eyes (London: Picador Macmillan, 2015). 118

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7. “Afghanistan Holds Day of Mourning After Bomb Blast Kills at least 80,” The Guardian, Sunday 24 July 2016. See: https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2016/jul/24/afghanistan-holdsday-of-mourning-after-bomb-killsat-least-80 (accessed 5 September 2016). 8. “Suicide Bomber Kills Dozens at Pakistani Hospital in Quetta, by Salman Masood.” New York Times, August 8, 2016. See: http://www.nytimes. com/2016/08/09/world/asia/quettapakistan-blast-hospital.html (accessed 5 September 2016). 9. For the full transcript of George W. Bush’s war ultimatum speech from the Cross Hall in the White House See The Guardian, Tuesday 18 March 2003. See: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/18/usa.iraq (accessed 3 September 2016). 10. For the Lancet medical journal study on estimate of number of people killed in Iraq between 2003-2006 See: The Lancet, Volume 368, No. 9545, p1421–1428, 21 October 2006: http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/ article/PIIS0140-6736(06)69491-9/abstract (accessed 3 September 2016). 11. The Report of the United Kingdom Iraq Inquiry was published on 6 July 2016 headed by Sir John Chilcot. The full text of the report can be found here: http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/ (accessed 3 September 2016). 12. Jeppie, Shamil. “The Ongoing Destruction of Syria and Iraq.” Post-Tarawih Talk Delivered at the Claremont Main Road Masjid, 11 July 2015. See: http://cmrm.co.za/the-ongoingdestructionof-syria-and-iraq-by-drshamil-jeppie/ (accessed 5 September 2015). 13. “Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians From US Drone Practices in Pakistan”, International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic, Stanford Law School and Global Justice Clinic, New York University Law School. September 2012. For the full report See: http://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Living-Under-Drones.pdf (Accessed 5 September, 2016).

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14. For a sobering account of the devastating impact of drone attacks in Pakistan See: Zakaria, Rafia, “Drones and Democracy” in GUERNICA: A Magazine of Art and Politics (August 3, 2011): https://www.guernicamag. com/daily/rafia_zakaria_drones_and_democ/ (Accessed 6 September, 2016). 15. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “Drone Strikes in Pakistan.” See https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/dronespakistan/ (accessed 5 September 2016). 16. Ahmed, Akbar. The Thistle and Drone Warfare: How America’s War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam (Brookings Institution Press, 2013). 17. For my expose of the Islamic religious and theological roots of the violence and terror of ISIS consult, Omar, A. Rashied. Mitigating the Toxic Theology of ISIS: `Id al-Adha Khutbah – Saturday 4th October 2014. 18. For an analysis that exposes the US role and its “War on Terror” in fomenting extremism in general and ISIS in particular, I recommend the book by veteran journalist Patrick Cockburn, The Jihadist Return: ISIS and the New Sunni Uprising (UK: OR Press, 2014). 19. Amnesty International Report 7 June 2016, “UN: Shameful Pandering to Saudi Arabia Over Children Killed in Yemen Conflict,” See: https://www. amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/06/unshameful-pandering-to-saudiarabia-over-children-killed-in-yemen-conflict/ (accessed 6 September 2016). 20. For a useful account of the manner in which the ongoing violence in Syria, Gaza and elsewhere in the Muslim World is changing the political landscape See: The Levant in Turmoil: Syria, Palestine, and the Transformation of Middle Eastern Politics (The Modern Muslim World), edited by Martin Beck, Dietrich Jung, and Peter Seeberg (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

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21. Claremont Main Road Mosque Website, “Press Statement – 21 July 2016 CMRM Deplores and Laments the On-Going Killing of Civilians by State Actors. See: http://cmrm.co.za/pressstatement-21-july-2016-cmrmdeplores-and-laments-the-on-going-killing-of-civilians-by-stateactors/ (accessed 6 September 2016). 22. “Archbishop Tutu Refuses Platform with Tony Blair,” BBC News, 28 August 2012. See: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-19400136 (accessed 6 September 2016). 23. To sign petition to try George W. Bush and Tony Blair for war crimes, for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, See: https://www.change.org/p/internationalcriminal-court-try-george-w-bush-andtony-blair-for-war-crimes-forthe-2003-invasion-of-iraq (accessed 6 September 2016).

Drone Warfare: Ethico-Moral Challenges

1. Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians From US Drone Practices in Pakistan”, International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic, Stanford Law School and Global Justice Clinic, New York University Law School. September 2012. For the full report see: http://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Living-Under-Drones.pdf (Accessed February 2, 2016). 2. Zakaria, Rafia, “Drones and Democracy” in GUERNICA: A Magazine of Art and Politics. (August 3, 2011). See: https://www.guernicamag.com/ daily/rafia_zakaria_drones_and_democ/ (Accessed February 2, 2016). 3. Ahmed, Akbar, The Thistle and Drone Warfare: How America’s War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam. (Brookings Institution Press, 2013). 4. The Drone Papers see: https://theintercept.com/drone-papers/ (Accessed February 2, 2016).

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5. Doctors Without Borders,“MSF Releases Internal Review of Kunduz Hospital Attack (November 5, 2015). See: http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/ article/msf-releases-internal-review-kunduz-hospital-attack (Accessed February 2, 2016). 6. Al-Jazeera, “Obama Misled The public on Drones (October 20, 2015). See: http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/10/obama-misled-thepublic-on-drones.html (Accessed February 2, 2016). 7. Tutu, Desmond, Letter in New York Times, February 13, 2013. See: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/13/opinion/drones-kill-lists-andmachiavelli.html (Accessed February 2, 2016). 8. World Council of Churches, Geneva. See: https://www.oikoumene. org/en/press-centre/news/use-of-drones-condemned-by-wcc (Accessed February 2, 2016). 9. InterfaithNetworkon DroneWarfare.See:http://www.interfaithdronenetwork. org/action/public-policy/13-letter-to-president-obama-re-targeted-lethaldrones-program.html (Accessed February 2, 2016).

Boko Haram’s Kidnapping of Nigerian Schoolgirls: A Violation of Islamic Ethics and Dignity

1. Amnesty International Report.2014. “Nigerian authorities failed to act on warnings about Boko Haram raid on school.” Amnesty International, 9 May 2014. Available online at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/ news/2014/05/nigerian-authorities-failed-act-warnings-about-bokoharam-raid-school/ 2. The Guardian. 2014. Nigeria had warning of Boko Haram attack but failed to act, says Amnesty. Available online at: https://www.theguardian. com/world/2014/may/09/nigeria-military-warning-boko-haram-attackamnesty-international

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Islam and Peacebuilding

1. For a further exploration of the understandings of peace, see: Johan Gultung. “Violence, Peace and Peace Research.” Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3, (1969), 167-91. 2. Chidester, David. “Comprehending Political Violence.” In Dealing with Diversity: Keywords for a New South Africa, eds. Emile Boonzaier and John Sharp. Cape Town: David Phillip, 1997. 3. Lederach, John Paul and R. Scott Appleby. “Strategic Peacebuilding: An Overview.” In Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World, edited by Daniel Philpott and Gerard F. Powers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010): 24. 4. For a further exploration see: Sayyid Qutb’s book, Social Justice in Islam. Translated by John B. Hardie. (New York: Islamic Publications International, 2000). 5. For more information see: Mohammed Abu-Nimer. Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003). 6. Appleby, R. Scott. 2000. Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation. Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 7. John Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002):

Opportunities & Challenges for Islamic Peacebuilding after September 11 1. Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah, Don Terry and Ted Gregory, “Muslims Witness Support Amid Anger,” The Chicago Tribune, 15 September 2001

2. Islamic Society of Michiana Newsletter, The Voice, Volume 2, Issue 13, October 5, 2001.

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3. ”Interfaith Prayer Marks Remembrance”, in Islamic Horizons, November/ December 2002, p.10. 4. For a detailed account of the South African interreligious solidarity movement, see Farid Esack, Qur’an Liberation and Pluralism: An Islamic Perspective of Interreligious Solidarity. (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 1997). 5. For an account of the genocidal war that raged in Bosnia from 1992-1995 see: Michael A. Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). 6. For a useful discussion of Wahid al-din Khan’s perspective on Islamic peacebuilding, see Muhammad Qasim Zaman,The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 181- 191. 7. Hamza Yusuf spoke these words at the 39th annual convention of the Islamic Society of North America. His words were recorded in a report of the conference published in Islamic Horizons, November/December, 2002, 24. 8. The Kairos Document: Challenge to the Church: A Theological Comment on the Political Crisis in South Africa. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1985). 9. Mahmood Cynthia Keppley, “Trials by Fire-Dynamics of Terror in Punjab and Kashmir”. In Death Squad - The Anthropology of State Terror, ed., Jeffrey A. Sluka. (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 70-90. 10. See: http://wcc-coe.org/wcc/news/press/01/07feat-e.html

Ta’aruf: Islam Beyond ‘Tolerance’

1. Emblematic of this trend is Yohanan Friedmann, Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 124

Notes

2. Emran Qureshi and Michael Sells have usefully shown how particularly after September 11 2001, Islam has increasingly been defined as an inherently intolerant religion. The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy (New York: Colombia University Press, 2003). An example of this is, Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations”, Foreign Affairs 72, 3: 1993, 22-25. Huntington subsequently went on to develop this thesis further in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the Modern World. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. 3. See Asma Afsaruddin, “Tolerance and Diversity in Islam,” Peace Colloquy Issue No. 2, Fall 2002 (The Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame). 4. Khalid Abou El-Fadl ed., The Place of Tolerance in Islam (Beacon Press, 2002). This volume began as a series of debates in the Boston Globe after September 11, 2001. 5. Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Disciplines and Reason of Power in Christianity and Islam. ( John Hopkins University Press, 1993). 6. Riffat Hassan, “The Burgeoning of Islamic Fundamentalism: Towards an Understanding of the Phenomenon.” In The Fundamentalist Phenomenon: A View from Within; A Response from Without, (Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1990), pp. 151-171. 7. Yohanan Friedmann, Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1-2. 8. Shawqi, Abu Khalil, al-Tasamuh fi al-Islam (Dar al-Fikr al-Mu`asir: Beirut, 1993). 9. Saḥih al-Bukhari, Volume 1, Book of Faith (Kitab al-Iman), Hadith Number 29. A similar prophetic tradition can be found in the Musnad of Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal. 10. Friedmann, Tolerance, 5.

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11. All translations of the Qur’an are my own and have been informed by the plethora of English translations that exist. Translations are inevitably interpretations and are therefore not to be regarded as the equivalent of the original Qur’an in Arabic. They provide mere glimpses of the original meaning of the text. 12. Al-Qurtubi, Muhammad ibn Ahmad. Al-Jami` li Ahkam al-Qur’an - Tafsir al-Qurtubi. Ed. Hani al-Haj. Vol.8 p.65. (Cairo, Egypt). The contemporary Egyptian exegete, Sayyid Qutb, presents a similar view in his Fi Zilal alQur’an, Vol. 5 (Cairo: Dar-al-Kutub al-Islami). 13. Omid Safi ed., Progressive Muslim (Oneworld Publications, 2003). 14. Sohail H. Hashmi, “A Response to the Place of Tolerance in Islam,” in The Place of Tolerance in Islam (Beacon Press, 2002). 15. I have discussed my experience living as a Muslim under apartheid toleration elsewhere; see “Islamic Experience of Religious Freedom in the South African Context” in Religious Freedom in South Africa, ed., J. Killian (University of South Africa, 1993). 16. All translations of the Qur’an are my own and have been informed by the plethora of English translations that exist. 17. Saḥih al-Bukhari, Volume 2, Book 23, Hadith Number 398. 18. Saḥih al-Bukhari, Volume 2, Book 23, Hadith Number 399. 19. See for example; the Indian Muslim scholar, Mawlana Wahiduddin Khan, “The Spiritual Goal of Islam” See: http://www.alrisala.org/Articles/papers/ goal.htm

Beyond Ambivalence: Peacemaking through the Prophetic Example

1. A. Rashied Omar is an Imam from Cape Town, South Africa and currently serves as Coordinator of the Kroc Institute’s Project on Religion, Conflict and Peacebuilding at the University of Notre Dame. 126

Notes

2. Khalid Abou El Fadl (2002), “The Place of Tolerance in Islam: On Reading the Qur’an-and misreading it.”(Boston Review, 2/25/2002) 3. Saḥih al-Bukhari Volume 2, Book 23, Hadith Number 398 4. Saḥih al-Bukhari, Volume 2, Book 23, Hadith Number 399 5. See for example, the Indian Muslim scholar, Mawlana Wahiduddin Khan, “The Spiritual Goal of Islam” See; http://www.alrisala.org/Articles/papers/ goal.htm

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