Private Education Matters
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Contributors:
Grace Chan
Partner | San Francisco
Jordan Carman
Associate | San Francisco
Hannah Dodge
Associate | San Francisco
Christopher Fallon Partner | Los Angeles
Stephanie Lowe
Senior Counsel | San Diego
Madison Tanner
Associate | San Diego
Reece Martin
Summer Associate | San Diego
Discrimination
Trump Administration Settles Antisemitism And Other Discrimination Complaints With Columbia University, Brown University, And UCLA.
Over the last few weeks, the Trump Administration entered into several agreements with higher education institutions, including Columbia University, Brown University, and UCLA, to settle allegations of antisemitism and discrimination on campus. We summarize the agreements below, and you can read a more detailed description in LCW’s Special Bulletin.
In March 2025, the Trump Administration froze more than $400 million in Columbia University’s federal funding, citing allegations that Columbia failed to respond to antisemitism on campus. In May, the U.S. Department of Education (DOE) and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) found that Columbia had violated Title VI by acting with deliberate indifference to student-on-student harassment of Jewish students.
Columbia agreed to pay the federal government $200 million and an additional $21 million to settle an EEOC investigation into workplace harassment based on religion. Columbia agreed to make changes to address antisemitism; uphold merit-based admissions and hiring not based on protected categories; and update disciplinary policies, including prohibiting demonstrations and protests inside academic buildings and limiting the use of masks or face coverings during protests.
Brown University reached a voluntary agreement to restore federal funding and resolve three pending federal agency reviews. Brown agreed to adopt federally defined gender classifications in policies, programs, and facilities usage; not provide gender reassignment surgery or prescribe puberty blockers or hormones for transgender minors; address antisemitism and advance Judaic Studies; and maintain merit-based admissions. Brown also committed $50 million over ten years to workforce development organizations in Rhode Island.
UCLA settled a private lawsuit brought by Jewish students and a Jewish professor, which the Administration later joined, by agreeing to pay $6 million. UCLA promised to ensure Jewish students, faculty, and staff have full and equal access to programs, activities, and facilities, and to develop policies preventing protestors from blocking such access. The Administration then froze $339 million in UCLA’s federal research grants and issued a Notice of Violation of Title VI and the 14th Amendment, by finding that UCLA had acted with deliberate indifference in creating a hostile educational environment for Jewish and Israeli students. This suggests that the federal government may seek to broaden the scope of UCLA’s concessions beyond the terms of the current settlement.
September 30, 2025
9:00 a.m. - 10:00 a.m.
Negligence
Rhode Island Court Upholds $5.7 Million Verdict Against Coach After Student Suicide.
N.B. was a 15-year-old student and football player at Portsmouth High School, a public high school in Rhode Island. In December 2017, N.B. and a group of friends, while at a video gaming gathering, sent prank text messages and phone calls to their football coach, Ryan Moniz. The messages mocked the coach’s abilities and included references to wanting him removed from the team. Although the messages were not threatening or violent, Coach Moniz reported them to local law enforcement. The Jamestown Police initiated a criminal investigation and began looking into who had sent the messages.
At the same time, Coach Moniz launched his own personal investigation. He brought the issue to the School administration and began confronting members of the football team, suspecting them of involvement. At several team meetings, he displayed screenshots of the texts, told players he was considering resigning, and said he would only stay on as coach if the culprits identified themselves. While Moniz never publicly named N.B. as the source of the prank, several teammates inferred his involvement and began distancing themselves from him.
N.B. was eventually pulled from class and interviewed by the assistant principal and school resource officer. He admitted to sending the texts but refused to name others involved. He was suspended for three days. Upon his return, he learned that Coach Moniz would not accept his apology unless he named the other students. N.B. reportedly felt humiliated and increasingly isolated, as his friends avoided him, and he was excluded from team activities. On February 6, 2018, after another difficult day during which he again tried unsuccessfully to repair relationships, N.B. died by suicide at home. He left no note and had no known history of mental illness or suicidal ideation.
Richard Bruno, N.B.’s father, brought suit against multiple parties, including Coach Moniz, the principal, the assistant principal, and the Town of Portsmouth. He alleged that their mishandling of the situation and the School’s failure to deescalate or support N.B. directly contributed to his son’s death. The case proceeded to trial against Coach Moniz only.
Bruno pursued a wrongful death claim under Rhode Island law, relying on the “uncontrollable impulse” theory. Under this doctrine, which is recognized in Rhode Island, a defendant may be held liable for a suicide if their negligent conduct caused the decedent to suffer such extreme emotional distress or mental illness that they lost the capacity to resist the suicidal impulse. This exception to the general rule (i.e., that suicide breaks the chain of causation) does not require the plaintiff to prove that the suicide was foreseeable, as it focuses instead on the defendant’s role in creating the emotional or mental condition that led to the act.
The complaint alleged that Coach Moniz breached his duty of care by aggressively investigating the prank messages in a manner that humiliated and isolated N.B., rather than referring the matter fully to administrators or police. It further claimed that Moniz applied pressure on N.B. to betray his friends, refused to accept his apology, and escalated the emotional intensity of the situation, despite knowing that N.B. was a minor. The plaintiff’s theory was that Moniz’s actions cumulatively caused N.B. to enter a psychological state that led to his suicide.
At trial, the plaintiff presented expert testimony from a nationally recognized suicidologist, who explained that N.B.’s experience on February 6, 2018, created a state of “psychache,” a term used in suicidology to describe overwhelming psychological pain. According to the expert, the accumulation of stressors, social rejection, public humiliation, perceived loss of honor, and continued emotional pressure, combined to create a mental state in which N.B. was no longer capable of rational decisionmaking. Several of N.B.’s classmates also testified that they believed he felt cornered and socially destroyed by the way the situation was handled.
The defense argued that Coach Moniz acted within the scope of his duties as a coach and teacher and had no intention of harming N.B. The defense maintained that Moniz never publicly named N.B. and had simply sought accountability in a situation involving anonymous messages. They also presented testimony from a psychiatrist who stated that N.B.’s suicide could not be causally linked to a single event and pointed to other factors in N.B.’s life, such as academic struggles and his strained relationship with his mother, as more likely contributors.
The jury found in favor of the plaintiff. The final judgment totaled $5.7 million.
In post-trial motions, the defense argued that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that no reasonable jury could have found Coach Moniz’s conduct to be the proximate cause of N.B.’s suicide. The Court rejected these arguments. It held that the uncontrollable impulse theory does not require foreseeability, and that sufficient evidence had been presented to allow the jury to find that Moniz’s actions directly contributed to N.B.’s emotional collapse. The Court credited the plaintiff’s expert testimony on psychache, as well as the testimony of N.B.’s friends and father, as adequate to support the jury’s conclusions.
The Court also ruled that the Town of Portsmouth could be held liable. Although the jury had not specifically found against the Town, the Court held that Coach Moniz was acting within the scope of his employment and that the Town had judicially admitted agency in its pleadings.
Bruno v. Mills (Super.Ct. June 20, 2025) 2025 R.I.Super. LEXIS 53.
Note: This case highlights how a sequence of decisions, especially in emotionally charged situations, can have serious legal and human consequences.
Arizona Supreme Court Holds Public High School Had No Duty To Student Injured While Jaywalking Off Campus.
A 14-year-old student, C.L., was struck by a car in August 2021 while attempting to cross a busy section of 59th Avenue in Phoenix, just before the start of the school day at Betty H. Fairfax High School, a public
high school operated by Phoenix Union High School District. C.L. had crossed the street from a cityowned dirt lot where some students were routinely dropped off by parents to avoid traffic backups at the School’s main entrance. While the School did not instruct families to use the lot or promote jaywalking, administrators were aware that some families did so, and took no steps to prevent it or warn of the associated risks.
On the morning of the incident, C.L. walked to school along the dirt lot, and attempted to jaywalk across 59th Avenue to reach campus. He was struck by a vehicle and suffered serious and permanent injuries. Through his father, C.L. filed suit against the School District, alleging negligence, gross negligence, and premises liability. He claimed that the School had failed to provide a safe means of access to campus and should have taken steps to prevent or mitigate the danger of students crossing in an unsafe location.
The trial court denied the District’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the School had knowledge of a foreseeable danger and may have had a duty to intervene. The Court of Appeals also declined to grant relief. The Arizona Supreme Court granted review to clarify the scope of a school’s duty of care to a student crossing the street with the intent to enter school grounds.
To prevail on the claims, the Court explained that C.L. must show that the District owed him a duty to conform to a particular standard of conduct. C.L. argued that the School-student relationship created a special duty under Arizona law, requiring the School to provide a reasonably safe means of ingress and egress to and from campus. He relied heavily on prior precedent recognizing that schools function as custodians, land possessors, and stand-ins for parents during the school day, and that this relationship may sometimes extend beyond campus boundaries in specific, limited contexts.
The District, in turn, argued that its duty of care did not apply because the student was off School property, was not yet under the School's supervision, and had not been directed to enter campus in that manner. The District also emphasized that the street where the accident occurred was public property over which it had no authority to control traffic or install safety infrastructure.
The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and ruled in favor of the District. The Court reaffirmed that a school’s duty to protect students from harm is generally limited to times and places where the student is within the School’s custody and control. In this case, C.L. had not yet entered school grounds, was not participating in any school-sponsored activity, and was not using an entrance or route that the School had encouraged or maintained.
The Court rejected the argument that the District had created an unsafe condition by failing to prevent jaywalking or discourage drop-offs in the dirt lot. It found no evidence that the School’s design or conduct contributed to the risk of harm. The danger, the Court concluded, stemmed from the student’s decision to cross a busy public street outside a designated crosswalk, a risk not created or controlled by the District.
The Court also distinguished this situation from prior cases in which a school’s conduct on its own premises had created off-premises danger. Here, the School had not altered the street or controlled traffic flow, nor had it directed students to cross in that location. While the School may have been aware of the jaywalking practice, the Court held that mere foreseeability of harm does not establish a duty under Arizona law.
Ultimately, the Court concluded that holding the District liable would impermissibly extend a school’s duty of care to risks arising during a student’s private travel to campus. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision, reversed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment, and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the District.
Phx. Union High Sch. Dist. No. 210 v. Sinclair (July 15, 2025) 2025 Ariz. LEXIS 216.
Note:
This case involved a nuanced set of facts that was decided under Arizona law. A different result may have been reached under California law, where foreseeability of harm can be a factor in deciding whether there is a duty of care for schools, due to the special relationship between schools and students.
Race Discrimination
Retaliation And Emotional Distress Claims Advance In Lawsuit Brought By Coach And Son Against Nevada Independent School.
Jelani Gardner is a former professional basketball player and experienced coach. In April 2023, Gardner signed a four-year employment agreement with Sage Ridge School, a private school in Reno, Nevada, to serve as Assistant Athletic Director and Head Boys’ Basketball Coach. He alleged that, during recruitment, he informed the School of his kidney disease and need for dialysis. According to the complaint, Sage Ridge agreed to accommodate his condition by permitting him to work remotely when necessary. Gardner alleged that during the recruitment process, the Head of School discussed with him the School’s “racial quota” of 80% white students and 20% black students, which would “facilitate community acceptance of the basketball team and of Gardner, as a black male.”
Shortly thereafter, Gardner relocated to Reno with his son, J. Doe, who was entering the ninth grade and was subsequently enrolled at Sage Ridge.
Almost immediately after enrolling, Doe allegedly encountered a racially hostile environment at Sage Ridge. As one of very few Black students on campus, he claimed he was treated differently by both peers and faculty. According to the complaint, this culminated during a school field trip when Doe was separated from the other students, placed in an isolated cabin, and subjected to surveillance and restrictions that were not imposed on his white peers. He was later accused of making inappropriate comments and gestures, which Doe denied. Doe alleged that these accusations were false or exaggerated, and that similar or more serious behavior by white students went unpunished. Following the field trip, Doe was suspended and, upon his return, received no academic support or structured plan to reintegrate. The School ultimately expelled him, which
the family alleged was racially motivated and inconsistent with how other students were treated.
Gardner claimed that his son’s treatment had a direct impact on his employment. After he raised concerns about the field trip incident and the investigation that followed, he alleged that School leadership instructed him to stop speaking out and to apologize to the families of the white students involved. Gardner was removed from his office, relieved of his assistant athletic director duties, and soon thereafter terminated. Gardner alleged that during his time at the School, the Head of School made racially insensitive remarks, including asking him what “Black people want to be called these days.”
Plaintiffs filed suit alleging twelve causes of action under federal and state law, including race discrimination, disability discrimination, retaliation, and emotional distress. They claimed that Sage Ridge failed to protect students from race-based harassment and punished both Gardner and Doe in retaliation for speaking out.
The Court reviewed the School’s motion to dismiss and issued the following rulings:
Title VI And Title IX Claims.
Plaintiffs alleged that both Gardner and Doe were subject to discrimination prohibited under Title VI (race) and Title IX (sex) because Sage Ridge, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit, received a Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan and had federal tax-exempt status. The Court rejected these arguments at the threshold. The Court explained that taxexempt status does not involve the receipt of federal financial assistance and therefore does not subject a private school to Title VI or Title IX obligations. Although Sage Ridge did receive a federal PPP loan, the Court found the timing dispositive: the loan was received and forgiven in 2020, and the events underlying the lawsuit occurred in 2023. Because the plaintiffs did not allege a more recent receipt of federal funds or demonstrate a nexus between the loan and the alleged
discriminatory acts, the Court held that Sage Ridge was not a covered entity. The Court dismissed these claims.
Title VII And State Law Discrimination Claims.
Gardner’s Title VII and Nevada fair employment claims alleged race-based discrimination but failed to differentiate among distinct legal theories, such as disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and retaliation. The Court explained that these theories have separate legal standards and must be pled with clarity. Lumping them together in a single cause of action made it difficult to assess whether the facts supported any one of them. However, because the defects were procedural rather than substantive, the Court allowed Gardner to amend and re-plead these claims in a more specific manner.
Retaliation Claims.
The Court gave significant weight to Gardner’s allegations that his termination closely followed his internal complaints about the race-based mistreatment of his son. It recognized that opposing discrimination against others, particularly close family members, may qualify as protected activity under Title VII, Section 1981, and state law. The Court also acknowledged that temporal proximity between protected activity and adverse action is often sufficient at the pleading stage to support an inference of retaliation. Here, Gardner alleged that he was told to stay quiet, that his responsibilities were stripped, and that he was terminated shortly after advocating for his son. Those allegations, the Court held, plausibly supported retaliation claims under all three statutes.
Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) Claim.
Gardner alleged that Sage Ridge failed to accommodate his kidney failure and retaliated against him for requesting accommodations. However, the Court dismissed the ADA claim because the complaint did not clearly distinguish among three separate legal theories: (1) failure to accommodate, (2) disabilitybased discrimination, and (3) retaliation. Each of these claims involves different legal elements, and the Court found that Gardner’s complaint did not give sufficient notice of what theory was being pursued. Nonetheless, the Court gave leave to amend, noting that Gardner had described a medical condition and some facts suggestive of an accommodation process.
Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress.
Both plaintiffs alleged emotional harm resulting from their experiences at Sage Ridge. Doe described racial isolation, forced apologies to white families, exclusion during school trips, and ultimately expulsion. Gardner claimed he was subjected to degrading treatment, including racially insensitive remarks by administrators, and being fired after raising concerns. The Court acknowledged that emotional distress claims require allegations of “extreme and outrageous” conduct. While courts are often hesitant to allow these claims to proceed, the Court here found that the alleged pattern of race-based mistreatment, combined with the alleged retaliation and disparaging comments, was sufficient to allow a jury to determine whether the conduct was legally actionable.
Negligent Supervision And Retention.
Gardner’s claim that the School negligently supervised or retained personnel was dismissed due to a lack of factual support. The complaint did not allege that the School had prior knowledge of any employee misconduct or failed to respond appropriately. The Court explained that Nevada law requires a showing that the employer knew or should have known of the employee’s unfitness. Because the complaint did not meet that standard, the claim was dismissed with leave to amend.
The Court ultimately dismissed five of the twelve claims, and allowed the retaliation and emotional distress claims to proceed.
Gardner v. Sage Ridge Sch. (D.Nev. June 17, 2025) 2025 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 114896.
Note:
This case highlights the range of legal claims a school may face following an employee termination and student expulsion, and the nuances that can arise when an employee is also a parent at the school. LCW will continue to monitor this case for more developments.
Ministerial exception
Ninth Circuit Finds That Ministerial Exception Shields Religious Nonprofit From LGBTQ+ Discrimination Claim.
Aubry McMahon, a practicing Christian in a samesex marriage, applied for a remote customer service representative (CSR) position with World Vision, Inc., a Christian humanitarian nonprofit organization. Shortly after World Vision extended a written offer, McMahon emailed to inquire about parental leave, disclosing that she and her wife were expecting a child and that she would be giving birth. Days later, World Vision rescinded her job offer, citing McMahon’s inability to comply with its Standards of Conduct, which prohibit sexual conduct outside the Biblical covenant of marriage between one man and one woman.
McMahon filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Washington Law Against Discrimination, asserting that World Vision had discriminated against her based on sex, sexual orientation, and marital status. The trial court initially granted summary judgment to World Vision under the church autonomy doctrine, which prohibits civil courts from interfering in issues that are fundamentally ecclesiastical. The trial court then reversed itself on reconsideration, holding that World Vision’s hiring policy was facially discriminatory, allowing the case to be resolved under neutral principles of law, without becoming entangled in religion. The trial court rejected World Vision’s constitutional and statutory defenses and entered summary judgment in favor of McMahon. The parties stipulated to $120,000 in damages.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the reconsideration ruling, holding that the ministerial exception barred McMahon’s claims. The ministerial exception is a legal doctrine grounded in the First
Amendment that prevents courts from interfering in employment disputes involving employees who perform key religious functions for a religious organization. Here, the Court emphasized that CSRs at World Vision are not typical administrative staff. The position required not only communication with donors and handling data entry, but also regular participation in prayer, attendance at weekly chapel and devotional sessions, and engagement in spiritual conversations with donors, including praying with and for them when appropriate. Training materials described the CSR as the “voice, face, and heart” of the ministry, and call recordings introduced at trial demonstrated that CSRs discussed World Vision’s mission, engaged donors in prayer, and helped deepen the donor's connection to World Vision’s faith-based mission.
World Vision presented evidence that it views its donor engagement as a form of ministry and considers spiritual transformation of donors to be as central to its mission as the transformation of the vulnerable communities it serves. While the trial court had focused on the administrative aspects of the CSR position, such as call metrics and sales scripts, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the religious duties of the CSR role were not merely incidental. In fact, they were at the heart of the job’s purpose and directly advanced World Vision’s religious mission of bearing witness to Christ through service and partnership with donors.
The Court also rejected McMahon’s arguments that the religious aspects of the job were either shared across all employees or optional. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that shared religious expectations do not diminish the significance of those duties when assessing whether a particular role qualifies for the ministerial exception. Similarly, the Court explained that religious job functions need not dominate the role for the exception to apply—what matters is whether the religious functions are vital to the organization’s mission.
McMahon’s claims, based on sex, sexual orientation, and marital status, would ordinarily be cognizable under Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020), where the U.S. Supreme Court held that Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. In Bostock, the Supreme Court reasoned that terminating an employee because of their same-sex relationship necessarily involves treating them differently “because of sex,” which Title VII forbids. However, the Ninth Circuit in McMahon did not reach the merits of that argument. Instead, it found that the First Amendment’s ministerial exception applied, and that this constitutional defense barred McMahon’s claims from proceeding. The Court emphasized that once the exception is triggered, it forecloses any inquiry into whether discrimination occurred, even under Bostock, because adjudicating the dispute would interfere with the religious organization’s right to select who performs vital religious functions.
The Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of World Vision.
McMahon v. World Vision, Inc. (9th Cir. 2025) 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 21345.
Note:
LCW covered this case previously. This case illustrates the limits of Bostock when applied to religious employers. While Bostock extended Title VII protections to LGBTQ+ individuals, the ministerial exception operates as a constitutional threshold defense that, when triggered, bars courts from reaching the merits of any discrimination claim, even one that would otherwise be viable under Bostock
Disabilities
Court Finds Private School Teacher’s Silence On Disability Bars ADA Claim.
La Salle Academy is a private Catholic high school in New York City. In 2018, the School hired Joseph Rosich, a Hispanic male who was 65 years old when he filed this lawsuit in 2024, to serve as a full-time science teacher. As part of his assigned duties, Rosich was responsible for overseeing homeroom, which began promptly at 7:40 a.m., with staff expected to arrive before that time. The School’s employee handbook stated that lateness was grounds for disciplinary action.
In November 2021, Rosich was involved in a car accident involving a deer, which he claimed resulted in a posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) diagnosis and triggered anxiety about driving, particularly in low-light or early-morning conditions. In November 2022, one year after the accident, Rosich sent an email to the School’s principal requesting a “ten-minute grace period” in the morning, which would allow him to arrive slightly later than required. He referenced his car accident and explained that driving in the dark was difficult for him following the accident. He did not mention a
diagnosis of PTSD, nor did he state that he had a medical condition requiring accommodation under the ADA.
Principal Bryan Daly responded that he could not authorize a grace period and recommended that Rosich explore alternative transportation options, such as the subway, to avoid lateness. Rosich replied that using the subway had not worked well for him, and reiterated his difficulty with early travel in the dark. The principal reiterated that timely arrival was essential for faculty, citing fairness to other teachers and the School’s operational needs. Daly emphasized that the School had historically held teachers accountable for punctuality and warned that continued tardiness could lead to consequences.
Despite this exchange, Rosich continued to arrive late several times, often by only a few minutes. He claimed that he was never written up for tardiness and believed the School was informally tolerating his lateness. However, in the Spring of 2023, Rosich was assigned to a science lab classroom with no working heat, which he viewed as a form of retaliation. He also received a new employment contract for the upcoming 2023-2024 school year, but the contract did not specify a salary, due to pending union negotiations.
On May 30, 2023, Rosich emailed School administrators seeking clarification about the missing salary terms, saying it would be “impossible” for him to sign the contract without knowing his salary or salary range. The School told Rosich he should contact the union with questions. Rosich did not return a signed contract and later that same day was informed that the School had interpreted his failure to sign as a decision not to return. His position was subsequently posted, and he was denied reemployment.
Rosich filed complaints with the state and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). He then filed suit in federal court, alleging various claims including under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and Title VII. The School moved to dismiss.
The Court granted the School’s motion and dismissed the case in full.
The Court first considered Rosich’s failure to accommodate claim. To state a claim for failure to accommodate under the ADA, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) they are a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the employer was aware of the disability; (3) the employee requested a reasonable accommodation; (4) the employer failed to provide the accommodation; and (5) the failure resulted in an adverse employment action or otherwise interfered with the employee’s ability to perform the job.
Here, the Court found that Rosich’s ADA claim failed at multiple steps of this framework. First, he did not sufficiently allege that he had a qualifying disability. While he claimed that he experienced difficulties driving in the dark due to a prior car accident, he did not allege that he had been diagnosed with a recognized mental health condition such as PTSD at the time he requested the accommodation. More critically, the Court held that Rosich never notified the School that he was requesting a workplace accommodation due to a disability. His emails to the principal referenced his prior accident and travel challenges but did not mention a medical condition or use language indicating a formal accommodation request.
Without knowledge of a disability or a clear link between the condition and the requested
accommodation, the School had no obligation under the ADA to grant the request. The Court emphasized that an employer’s duty to engage in the interactive process is not triggered unless the employee provides adequate notice of both the disability and the need for accommodation. Because Rosich did not do so, and because the requested ten-minute grace period was not accompanied by any medical documentation or disability disclosure, the ADA claim was dismissed.
The Court also dismissed Rosich’s discrimination claims under the ADA, ADEA, and Title VII, finding that he had not sufficiently alleged adverse employment actions or discriminatory motive. The only adverse action the Court recognized was his assignment to an unheated classroom. However, Rosich failed to show that similarly situated younger or female teachers were treated more favorably, and his allegations that other older male colleagues were also mistreated were too conclusory and factually underdeveloped to support a claim. Likewise, Rosich’s claim that the School retaliated against him under the ADA for requesting an accommodation failed because the Court found he never engaged in protected activity—i.e., he never told the School that he had a disability or that his accommodation request was tied to a disability.
Rosich sought leave to amend, but the Court denied it as futile. His proposed amended complaint added details about his conversations with School leadership and his coworkers’ treatment but still failed to address the deficiencies in his original claims, including the failure to plausibly allege disability, comparators, or discriminatory animus.
Rosich v. La Salle Acad. (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2025) 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161523.
Note:
This case serves as a reminder that performance concerns often overlap with unspoken or emerging disability-related issues. While the Court here concluded that the School was not on notice of a qualifying disability, another court might reach a different conclusion where an employee references apprehension or travel difficulties stemming from a documented incident, such as a car accident.
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Court Orders
UC To Reconsider
Ban On Hiring Undocumented Students, Finds Fear Of Federal Enforcement Does Not Justify FEHA Discrimination.
In May 2023, the University of California formed a working group to consider whether it could employ undocumented students who lacked federal work authorization. At the time, UC employed undocumented students who had Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status, but refused to hire those without work authorization.
In January 2024, the UC voted to dissolve the working group without changing its policy. The minutes from that meeting reflected UC's concern that employing undocumented students might trigger federal enforcement action under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). The IRCA prohibits employers from knowingly hiring individuals who are not lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the U.S. or authorized for employment under federal law. Although no court had directly ruled on whether IRCA applied to state government entities, UC cited significant enforcement risk.
Subsequently, the California Legislature passed a bill that would have prohibited public universities from denying employment to students based on a lack of federal work
authorization, unless required by federal law. It would also have required public institutions to treat IRCA as inapplicable to the state. In September 2024, Governor Newsom vetoed the bill, citing potential civil and criminal liability for state employees.
In October 2024, petitioners Jeffry Umaña Muñoz and Iliana Perez filed a petition for writ of mandate, seeking an order compelling the Regents to abandon the policy. They alleged that the policy constituted an abuse of discretion and violated the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Under FEHA and its implementing regulations, an employer may not discriminate based on immigration status unless it proves by clear and convincing evidence that federal law requires it. Muñoz and Perez argued that the policy facially discriminated against undocumented students based on immigration status. The trial court summarily denied the petition.
Muñoz and Perez filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court, seeking to overturn the trial court’s denial. In response, UC noted uncertainty about whether IRCA applied to state employers and stated that a judicial ruling could benefit all parties. The California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the case to the Court of Appeal with instructions to issue an order to show cause.
The Court of Appeal asked UC to explain the legal basis for its policy and whether it believed federal law required the policy. UC did not argue that federal law required the policy. Instead, it contended that the policy was a discretionary measure based on litigation risk and did not constitute discrimination. UC emphasized that it hired undocumented students with federal work authorization, such as DACA recipients, and asserted that its policy was aimed at avoiding potential liability, not excluding individuals based on immigration status.
Muñoz and Perez argued that the policy discriminated against a subset of undocumented students based on a lack of work authorization, which they argued was a proxy for immigration status. They contended that litigation risk could not justify a policy that facially violated FEHA, and that UC had offered no evidence that federal law required the exclusion.
The Court of Appeal agreed. It found that UC’s policy facially discriminated based on immigration status and that FEHA required UC to show that such discrimination was mandated by federal law. Because UC had expressly declined to take a position on IRCA’s applicability and had not attempted to meet that standard, the Court of Appeal concluded that it had abused its discretion. The Court of Appeal rejected UC’s arguments under the bona fide occupational qualification defense and held that litigation risk alone was not a sufficient justification for a facially discriminatory policy.
The Court declined to decide whether the policy violated FEHA on its face. It explained that it did not need to reach that question because Muñoz and Perez had not fully developed the argument in their initial filings. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal held that UC could not justify a facially discriminatory policy based solely on litigation risk.
The Court of Appeal granted a writ of mandate, ordering UC to reconsider its employment policy under the proper legal standards. The Court of Appeal made clear that it did not require UC to adopt a particular policy, only that it could not continue relying on litigation risk alone to justify one that discriminates on its face.
Muñoz v. The Regents of the University of California (Aug. 5, 2025, No. A171410) ___Cal.App.5th___.
Note:
This case reinforces that under California’s FEHA, employers may not adopt facially discriminatory hiring policies based on immigration status unless clearly required by federal law. A generalized fear of federal enforcement is not a sufficient defense.
Fmla
Court Dismisses Second Disability And Retaliation Claims Brought
By Former HR Employee Against University Officials And Trustees.
Gloria Dickerson worked as a Principal Human Resources Administrator at the New Jersey Institute of Technology (NJIT). Dickerson was frequently absent from work on medical leaves, including under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). In July 2018, while Dickerson was on FMLA, she attended a colleague’s retirement party and danced. Upon learning this, Dickerson’s supervisor, Annie Crawford, the Vice President of Human Resources, allegedly remarked to others, “How can you dance on FMLA?” Dickerson claimed this comment was evidence of discrimination based on her disability and alleged that it set off a pattern of harassment, marginalization, and retaliation. Dickerson remained employed for nearly two additional years after the comment, continued to utilize medical leave, received full compensation, and did not suffer a demotion or formal discipline. She was ultimately terminated in July 2020.
In Dickerson’s first lawsuit (Dickerson I), she brought suit against NJIT and Crawford, alleging that the “How can you dance on FMLA?” remark reflected discriminatory animus, created a hostile work environment, and resulted in a retaliatory termination. NJIT moved for summary judgment, arguing that the single comment was insufficient to support a claim under either the ADA or New Jersey’s antidiscrimination law, and that Dickerson could not demonstrate an adverse employment action or causal link between her disability or protected activity and her eventual termination.
The Court agreed. It held that even if the comment was inappropriate or unprofessional, a single offhand remark, unaccompanied by further harassment or tangible changes in job conditions, does not constitute severe or pervasive conduct under the applicable legal standards. The Court noted that Crawford’s comment was to clarify the nature of Dickerson’s condition in light of recent absences. Moreover, Dickerson’s own continued use of FMLA leave for nearly two years after this comment, without any interference or denial of benefits, undermined her claims.
The Court found no evidence that the remark affected her responsibilities, salary, or working conditions. Her hostile work environment claim failed for lack of severity, and her retaliation claim failed because she could not identify any materially adverse employment action connected to her complaint or her medical condition. The Court also dismissed all claims against Ms. Crawford individually, because New Jersey law does not permit individual liability without an underlying violation by the employer.
While the motion for summary judgment was pending in Dickerson I, Dickerson filed a second lawsuit (Dickerson II) against a broader group of NJIT officials. This time, she named NJIT’s Board of Trustees, the University President, General Counsel, and another HR professional as defendants. The allegations in Dickerson II were largely a restatement of the same factual narrative from the first case, with some new language accusing the defendants of treating her “like a slave,” denying her promotions, and subjecting her to a hostile work environment. The new suit added vague references to age discrimination and claimed a deprivation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Dickerson filed this second case in 2024, more than four years after her termination.
The Court dismissed Dickerson II in its entirety, with prejudice. First, the Court found that the second lawsuit was barred by the doctrine of res judicata (claim preclusion), which prohibits parties from re-litigating claims that have already been decided or could have been raised in an earlier proceeding. Although Dickerson named new defendants in the second suit, the Court found that they were all agents of NJIT or served in a common legal interest with NJIT. Since the allegations arose from the same set of facts already litigated in Dickerson I, the Court concluded that Dickerson II was simply an attempt to re-litigate issues that had already been dismissed.
The Court also found that Dickerson’s service of the complaint was deficient. She failed to follow the proper procedures for serving summonses on government officials and entities, and even after being given opportunities to correct the deficiency, she did not cure it.
In addition to these procedural defects, the Court held that the complaint in Dickerson II was too vague and conclusory to survive. It did not allege specific
discriminatory acts or adverse employment actions, and it failed to plausibly connect the named defendants to any unlawful conduct. Even if her claims were not barred by res judicata, they would still fail on the merits due to lack of factual detail and legal sufficiency.
The Court also ruled that her claims under federal and state law were time-barred. Under both the ADA and New Jersey law, employment discrimination claims must be brought within two years of the alleged adverse action. Dickerson filed her second complaint more than four years after her July 2020 termination, making the entire action untimely.
Dickerson v. New Jersey Institute of Technology (D.N.J. July 29, 2025) 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144802.
Note:
This case underscores the importance of handling employee concerns professionally, including when an employee is taking medical leave.
new to the Firm!
John Louis Chiappe is an Associate in our Sacramento office, where he provides labor, education and employment law expertise to our clients.
Hoaithi “Y.T.” Nguyen is Senior Counsel in Liebert Cassidy Whitmore’s San Francisco Office. Y.T. has over 15 years of experience in employment litigation, labor relations and investigations.
Selena Farnesi, an Associate in Liebert Cassidy Whitmore’s Fresno office, brings extensive litigation and policy experience to LCW’s public sector practice, with a focus on education, employment, and administrative law.
business&facilities
Employer Statements About Arbitration Agreements Cannot Be Misleading.
In Velarde v. Monroe Operations, LLC, et al., a California Court of Appeal clarified that employer arbitration agreements may be unenforceable if signed under coercive circumstances and in reliance on misleading statements regarding its terms.
Monroe Operations, LLC, doing business as Newport Healthcare (Newport), a national behavioral health company, hired Karla Velarde in 2020. On her first day, Newport provided Ms. Velarde a stack of 31 onboarding documents, including a five-page arbitration agreement. The HR manager told Ms. Velarde to sign the documents “as fast as possible,” and completion was required for her to start work. Ms. Velarde expressed that she did not understand the agreement and was hesitant to sign it. The HR manager told her it was required to start work and would allow the company to resolve issues “without having to pay lawyers.” Relying on those statements, Ms. Velarde signed. Newport later terminated Ms. Velarde.
After Ms. Velarde was terminated, she sued Newport, alleging discrimination, retaliation, and whistleblower violations. Newport moved to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion on the grounds of unconscionability. Newport appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, finding both the execution and substance of the agreement unenforceable under the circumstances.
The Court found Ms. Velarde had no meaningful opportunity to understand the agreement. She was rushed, given no time to consult counsel, and misinformed about the agreement’s effect. Ms. Velarde’s
signature was not the result of a voluntary or informed agreement.
The Court highlighted the fact the agreement terms did not match what was represented by the HR manager. Ms. Velarde was told dispute resolution would be informal and inexpensive, when in reality, the agreement provided a process that mirrored formal litigation. The Court emphasized the complex legal terms, procedural rules, and fee arrangement made the agreement “so one-sided” as to only benefit Newport.
The Court emphasized that whether Newport meant to mislead Ms. Velarde was not the issue. What mattered was the effect of the misrepresentation.
The Velarde decision serves as a critical reminder to employers that arbitration agreements, even if legal in form, may be deemed unenforceable when presented in a coercive or misleading manner. Courts will closely examine both the content of the agreement and the circumstances under which it is signed, particularly when employees are required to sign as a condition of starting work.
To mitigate risk, employers should implement clear and consistent onboarding procedures that promote transparency. Employers should provide new hires with reasonable time to review onboarding documents and ensure that any representations made by HR accurately reflect the terms of the agreement. Most importantly, employers must take steps to confirm that employees are entering into arbitration agreements knowingly, voluntarily, and free of undue pressure.
Velarde v. Monroe Operations, LLC (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1009.
benefits corner
One Big Beautiful Bill Act Increases Maximum Contribution For Dependent Care.
The One Big Beautiful Bill Act, which was signed into law on July 4, 2025, makes a number of changes to employee benefits. One of the big changes is that the Act increases the tax-free contribution limit for dependent care flexible spending accounts (also known as dependent care assistance plans or “DCAPs”) from $5,000 to $7,500 (and from $2,500 to $3,750 for taxpayers who are married filing separately). The Act amends the Internal Revenue Code to permit a taxpayer to exclude up to $7,500 from gross income for dependent care expenses. Prior to the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, the DCAP contribution limit had not changed from $5,000 since the date it was established in 1986, except for the temporary increase to the limit during COVID-19 under the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021. The increased contribution limit of $7,500 will go into effect beginning with tax year 2026.
While $7,500 is the new limit set by the Internal Revenue Code, employers should also review the limits set by their own Section 125 cafeteria plan documents. Some cafeteria plan documents may set a lower limit, or may need to be revised if the employer would like to allow employees to make salary reduction contributions up to $7,500.
Moving Expenses Permanently Remain Taxable.
The One Big Beautiful Bill Act permanently eliminates the moving expense deduction and tax-free moving expense reimbursements. The elimination was originally passed in 2018 and was scheduled to last for an eight-year period until 2026. The Act makes the elimination permanent beyond
2026. As a result, when an employee relocates and moves for a job and their employer pays for or reimburses an employee’s moving expenses, the employee will not be able to exclude those expenses from their gross income. There remain specific exclusions and deductions for certain members of the Armed Forces and members of the intelligence community who are not also in the Armed Forces.
Employer Tax-Free Repayments Of Employee Student Loans Continues Permanently.
The One Big Beautiful Bill Act permanently extends the time an employer can pay for an employee’s qualified education loans through a Section 127 plan. Section 127 of the Internal Revenue Code (Section 127) allows employers to provide up to $5,250 per year in educational assistance to an employee, which may be excluded from gross income if it is provided pursuant to an educational assistance program (EAP) that meets certain requirements. In 2020, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) added a new, temporary provision that allowed employers the option to repay up to $5,250 of an employee’s qualified education loan per year through a Section 127 plan. This temporary provision was set to expire January 1, 2026, but the One Big Beautiful Bill Act extends it permanently. As a result, employees may continue to exclude employer payments for employee’s qualified educational loans up to the $5,250 annual limit beyond January 1, 2026.
To be a qualified education loan, the loan: (1) must be a loan for education at an eligible educational institution, including colleges, universities, vocational schools, or other postsecondary educational institutions; (2) must have been incurred by the employee for the education of the employee (not for the education of a family member, such as a spouse or dependent); (3) must have been paid or incurred
within a reasonable period of time before or after the employee took out the loan, although qualified education loans may be incurred by the employee in prior calendar years and prior to employment; and (4) must have been for education provided during an academic period for an eligible student.
Consortium Call Of The Month
LCW has four private education consortiums across the State! Consortium members enjoy access to quality training throughout the year, discounts on other LCW products and events, and unlimited, complimentary telephone and email consultation with an LCW private education attorney on matters related to employment and education law questions (including business & facilities questions and student issues!) We’ve outlined a recent consortium call and the provided answer below. Client confidentiality is paramount to us; we change and omit details in the Consortium Call of the Month.
Question:
An administrator reached out to LCW after a parent informed her that both of her children had completed legal name changes. The administrator asked whether the School needed official documentation in order to update their records, and whether a copy of that documentation should be kept in the student’s cumulative file.
Answer:
The LCW attorney advised that if a student has legally changed their name, the School should request a copy of the legal name change documentation, such as a court order or amended birth certificate, and retain it in the student’s cumulative file. This documentation becomes part of the student’s mandatory permanent record pursuant to California Code of Regulations, title 5, section 432, which requires that schools include a student’s legal name in their mandatory permanent record.
The attorney also advised that preferred names and pronouns may be reflected in unofficial school documents such as school communications, rosters, and directories. However, official and legal documents such as transcripts and financial aid documents must reflect the student’s legal name. The attorney advised that the School would need official documentation of the legal name change in order to include it on those official records.
lcw best timeline
AUGUST
Conduct staff trainings, which may include:
• Sexual Harassment Training:
A school with five or more employees, including temporary or seasonal employees, must provide sexual harassment training to both supervisory and nonsupervisory employees every two years. Supervisory employees must receive at least two hours and nonsupervisory employees must receive at least one hour of sexual harassment training. (California Government Code Section 12950.1)
• Mandated Reporter Training:
Prior to commencing employment, all mandated reporters must sign a statement to the effect that they have knowledge of the provisions of the Mandated Reporter Law and will comply with those provisions. (California Penal Code Section 11166.5)
• Maintaining Professional Boundaries
• Risk Management Training such as Injury and Illness Prevention and CPR
Conduct Board / Governance Training, which may include:
• Fiduciary Duties
• Legal Compliance & Risk Management
• Governance Best Practices
Distribute Parent/Student Handbooks and collect signed acknowledgement of receipt forms, signed photo release forms, signed student technology use policy forms, and updated emergency contact forms.
OCTOBER 1ST THROUGH 15TH
File Verification of Private School Instruction
• Every person, firm, association, partnership, or corporation offering or conducting private school instruction on the elementary or high school level shall between the first and 15th day of October of each year, file with the Superintendent of Public Instruction an affidavit or statement, under penalty of perjury, by the owner or other head setting forth the following information for the current year:
• All names, whether real or fictitious, of the person, firm, association, partnership, or corporation under which it has done and is doing business.
• The address, including city and street, of every place of doing business of the person, firm, association, partnership, or corporation within the State of California.
• The address, including city and street, of the location of the records of the person, firm, association, partnership, or corporation, and the name and address, including city and street, of the custodian of such records.
• The names and addresses, including city and street, of the directors, if any, and principal officers of the person, firm, association, partnership, or corporation.
• The school enrollment, by grades, number of teachers,
Each Month, LCW presents a monthly timeline of best practices for private and independent schools. The timeline runs from the fall semester through the end of summer break. LCW encourages schools to use the timeline as a guideline throughout the school year.
coeducational or enrollment limited to boys or girls and boarding facilities.
• That the following records are maintained at the address stated, and are true and accurate:
The attendance of the pupils in a register that indicates clearly every absence from school for a half day or more during each day that school is maintained during the year (Education Code Section 48222.)
The courses of study offered by the institution.
The names and addresses, including city and street, of its faculty, together with a record of the educational qualifications of each.
• Criminal record summary information of applicants that have been obtained pursuant to Section 44237.
Plan Ahead for Back-to-School Trainings
Start the school year strong with LCW’s dynamic and practical professional development sessions, customized for the unique and evolving needs of California private schools.
Essential training topics include:
• Harassment & Discrimination
Prevention (Supervisory and NonSupervisory)
• Maintaining Professional Boundaries
• California Mandated Reporter Training
• The Art of the Performance Evaluation
• Leading from the Middle
• Board Governance 101
• And many more!
Available Live or On-Demand.
Schedule Now at info@lcwlegal.com
cases we are watching
• Four college students filed a class action antitrust lawsuit in federal court against more than 30 elite private colleges and universities, as well as application platforms and the Consortium on Financing Higher Education (COFHE), alleging that these institutions have conspired to unlawfully restrain competition through the Early Decision (ED) admissions process. The plaintiffs claim that the defendant schools, who are members of COFHE and users of the Common App and Coalition App, have collectively enforced a binding ED system that functions as a horizontal agreement not to compete for students, depriving applicants of the ability to compare financial aid offers and driving up the net price of attendance. According to the complaint, this arrangement disproportionately disadvantages low-income students, locks students into schools without legal recourse, and enables schools to coordinate admit lists and suppress financial aid offers, all while publicly mischaracterizing ED as contractually binding despite acknowledging privately that it is not legally enforceable.
• The Seventh Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of an Indiana public high school that had refused to continue accommodating a teacher’s religious objection to using transgender students’ chosen names. John Kluge, a high school music teacher, had been permitted to refer to all students by last names only but alleged that the School later revoked this accommodation due to complaints from students and staff. After Kluge resigned under protest, he sued under Title VII, claiming religious discrimination. Applying the U.S. Supreme Court’s clarified standard from Groff v. DeJoy, the Court held that there were factual disputes over whether accommodating Kluge’s beliefs would impose an undue hardship on the School. The Court emphasized that emotional discomfort and speculative liability under Title IX were not, on their own, sufficient to meet this burden as a matter of law and remanded the case for trial. LCW covered this case previously and will monitor the trial for updates.
• Derek Mobley, an African American job applicant over the age of 40 with a disability, filed a putative class and collective action against Workday, Inc., alleging that the company’s AI-driven hiring software disproportionately disqualifies applicants based on race, age, and disability in violation of Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the ADA Amendments Act, and Section 1981. The complaint claims that Workday’s algorithmic tools, which it markets to hundreds of companies, embed and perpetuate discriminatory bias by sorting, scoring, and recommending applicants in ways that disadvantage protected groups. Mobley alleges he applied to over 80 jobs using Workday’s platform and was rejected every time.
did you know...?
•The U.S. Department of Education recently issued a Dear Colleague Letter providing guidance encouraging state and local educational agencies (SEAs and LEAs) to enhance how they deliver Title I equitable services to eligible private school students under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). The letter highlights strategies for making equitable services more effective and efficient, including the use of pooling funds across districts, thirdparty providers, and SEA-level coordination when LEAs are unable or unwilling to meet their obligations. LEAs must consult with private school officials when designing service offerings and ensure services are secular, neutral, and nonideological. The Department also recommends expanding parental choice by offering a menu of services, including tutoring, expanded learning time, counseling, or take-home computers.
•The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) have initiated multiple investigations into George Mason University (GMU). The DOJ is investigating the University’s hiring practices under Title VII, based on allegations that GMU has engaged in race- and sex-based decisionmaking to align faculty demographics with student demographics. The DOJ also opened a Title VI compliance review into whether GMU discriminates on the basis of race or national origin in its educational programs. Separately, OCR opened its own Title VI investigation following a complaint from GMU professors who allege that the University’s diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) policies—from cluster hiring and “equity advisors” to tenure evaluation criteria based on identity—constitute unlawful racial preference and foster a racially hostile environment. OCR is also investigating whether GMU failed to address antisemitic harassment during the 2023–2025 academic years.
•The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) recently reinstated its Payroll Audit Independent Determination (PAID) program, allowing employers to voluntarily self-audit and resolve potential violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and, for the first time, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Employers who meet eligibility criteria and are not under investigation may work with the DOL to correct wage or leave issues and provide back pay or other remedies without litigation. The program imposes disclosures about prior complaints and certification of compliance, and participation does not shield employers from liability under other state or federal laws. While employers can avoid penalties and expedite resolution, employees retain the right to reject settlement offers and pursue their own claims. Schools should consult LCW before participating in the program. More information about the program can be found here.
Liebert Cassidy Whitmore