

On June 27, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Montgomery County Public Schools in Maryland likely violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by requiring elementary school students to participate in instruction involving LGBTQ+ inclusive storybooks without giving parents advance notice or an opportunity to opt out. The District had added more than 22 books featuring LGBTQ+ themes to its English Language Arts curriculum. When the new books were first introduced, the District allowed parents to receive notice and opt their children out of those lessons. In March 2023, the Board reversed this policy and eliminated the notice and opt-out options. The District cited concerns about high student absenteeism, infeasibility of managing numerous opt-outs, and potential stigmatization and isolation of individuals represented in the books.
A group of parents from diverse religious backgrounds filed suit, arguing that the District’s policy forced their children to engage with material that contradicted their religious beliefs, in violation of the Free Exercise Clause and Due Process Clause. The district court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the parents’ request for a preliminary injunction, finding that the parents had not shown a cognizable burden on their religious exercise.
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed and reversed. It found that the parents had shown a likelihood of success on their Free Exercise claim and were entitled to a preliminary injunction. According to the Court, the District’s policy substantially interfered with the parents’ ability to guide their children’s religious development and created psychological pressure on children to conform to beliefs contrary to those of their families. The Court also pointed out that the District continued to allow opt-outs in other areas, including health instruction under the “Family Life and Human Sexuality” unit. That inconsistency, the Court said, undermined the district’s claim that eliminating opt-outs served a compelling interest. The case now returns to the lower courts for further proceedings.
You can read more about this case in our Special Bulletin.
Mahmoud v. Taylor (2025) ___U.S.___ .
Jessica Lee is an Associate at Liebert Cassidy Whitmore, where she advises clients on labor and employment matters, including compliance, investigations, and workplace policies.
On July 14, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the Trump administration’s emergency request to stay a lower court order that had blocked mass layoffs at the U.S. Department of Education. The decision lifted a preliminary injunction issued by a Massachusetts federal judge and allowed the administration to move forward with plans to fire nearly 1,400 employees. The layoffs are part of a broader effort to cut the department’s workforce by half and eventually close the agency.
Judge Myong J. Joun of the U.S. District Court in Massachusetts issued the injunction on May 22, 2025. He found that the states, school districts, and unions
challenging the plan were likely to succeed in showing that the cuts would severely disrupt the department’s ability to carry out federally mandated programs. The First Circuit declined to stay the injunction, and the administration sought emergency relief from the Supreme Court. The high court granted the stay and allowed the layoffs to proceed while the case continues on appeal.
The Court issued its order without explanation. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, dissented. She argued that only Congress has the power to eliminate a cabinet-level agency and said the administration’s actions defied the constitutional separation of powers.
McMahon v. New York (2025) __ U.S. __, case No. 24A1203.
Kheloud Allos worked for Poway Unified School District from 2002 until her 2023 retirement. In 2006, she became a Senior Business Systems Analyst. In March 2020, the District allowed employees to work remotely due to the COVID-19 pandemic. When in-person work resumed, Allos submitted multiple doctor’s notes requesting full-time remote work, citing risks due to her age (65), high blood pressure, obesity, and a prior reaction to the Tdap vaccine. She also expressed concern for her elderly mother, whom she cared for.
Beginning in October 2020, the District conducted a series of disability interactive process meetings with Allos. The District granted Allos temporary accommodations, including partial remote work and use of a private office. The District and Allos had six meetings from 2020 to 2022, during which Allos accepted and rejected various in-person and remote hybrid work arrangements. The District consistently maintained that it lacked a remote work policy and aimed to return Allos to full-time in-person work.
In July 2022, the District and Allos agreed to increase her in-office time to 25 hours a week, and she could either work in office the remaining 15 hours or take vacation time. In addition, Allos would transition to full time inoffice work on January 3, 2023. If she failed to do so, the District would place Allos on administrative leave. On February 21, 2023, Allos submitted her intent to retire effective June 5, 2023.
On March 15, 2022, Allos filed a civil complaint against the District asserting violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and violations of the California Labor Code. Her FEHA claims included disability discrimination, failure to provide reasonable
accommodation, failure to engage in the interactive process, associational discrimination, and retaliation. She also alleged violations of Labor Code sections 6400 and 6401, which require employers to provide and maintain a safe and healthful workplace; section 6310, which prohibits retaliation for reporting unsafe conditions; and section 1102.5, which protects whistleblowers from retaliation for disclosing suspected legal violations.
The District moved for summary judgment, arguing: (1) public health immunity under Government Code section 855.4 barred all of Allos’s claims; (2) Allos failed to establish she had a qualifying disability under FEHA; and (3) she had not suffered an adverse employment action. Government Code section 855.4 immunizes public entities from liability for injuries caused by their discretionary decisions to prevent or control disease in the interest of public health. The District supported its motion with deposition transcripts, records of interactive meetings, and a physician’s declaration concluding that Allos had no vaccine allergy or contraindication.
Allos opposed the motion, asserting she had multiple disabilities and that her requests for remote work were reasonable accommodations. She did not address the District’s immunity defense under section 855.4.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the District. It held that section 855.4 barred the claims and alternatively found Allos failed to raise triable issues of fact on disability, adverse action, or failure to accommodate. Allos appealed.
The court of appeal first addressed the Districts argument that it had public health immunity under Government Code section 855.4. The court of appeal held that the District’s decisions to first allow remote work and later require in-person attendance, along with its handling of vaccine-related accommodation requests, were discretionary public health measures protected by section 855.4 immunity. The court of appeal rejected Allos’s argument that this immunity conflicted with FEHA and the Labor Code. It found she had waived most
challenges to the statute by failing to raise them in her opposition brief, and that her appellate arguments lacked legal and factual support.
The court of appeal next found Allos had not shown she was physically disabled under FEHA. Her claims of allergies, high blood pressure, and obesity lacked medical substantiation of a functional limitation. Her avoidance of the COVID-19 vaccine was based on personal fear, not an established medical condition. The record showed no contraindication, and the District’s expert confirmed she could safely receive the vaccine.
The court of appeal also rejected Allos’s argument that the District “regarded” her as disabled. The court of appeal explained that merely holding interactive meetings in response to an accommodation requests did not amount to an admission of disability. Because Allos was not disabled under FEHA, the District was not obligated to accommodate her.
The court of appeal rejected Allos’s associational discrimination claim related to her mother’s disability. The District had offered her leave options and did not take any adverse action. Her retirement was voluntary, and no evidence suggested the District forced her out of employment.
The court of appeal found no evidence that the District retaliated against Allos or violated the Labor Code. The court of appeal found Allos was not disciplined, demoted, or terminated, and rejected her claim that she was constructively discharged. The court of appeal also rejected Allos’s whistleblower claim under Labor Code section 1102.5 for lack of evidence.
The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the District and awarded the District costs on appeal.
Allos v. Poway Unified School Dist. ___Cal.App.5th___ .
In October 2024, LCW published a summary of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Adams v. County of Sacramento, a case involving Kate Adams, the former Chief of Police for the City of Rancho Cordova. On July 9, 2025, the Ninth Circuit issued an amended opinion clarifying its reasoning but leaving the outcome unchanged.
In 2013, Adam received two unsolicited text messages containing racist images. She forwarded the images to two coworkers during a casual text message exchange, adding, “Some rude racist just sent this!!” One coworker responded, “That’s not right.” The messages remained private and did not circulate beyond their original recipients.
Adams’ relationship with the two coworkers later deteriorated. In 2020, after Adams reported one of the coworkers for misconduct, that individual disclosed the 2013 messages during an internal investigation.
According to Adams’s complaint, the County told her that if she did not resign, the investigation would become public and could lead to media coverage portraying her as a racist. She resigned in 2021. Adams later sued the County and the Sheriff in federal court, asserting several claims, including First Amendment retaliation and conspiracy. The district court dismissed the free speech claims, finding that the texts did not address a matter of public concern. Adams appealed.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the free speech claims. It held that Adams’s speech was personal in nature and not protected under the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit applied the Pickering framework and concluded that Adams did not speak
on a matter of public concern. It emphasized that she expressed private frustration in a nonpublic context, and that her messages lacked any connection to public discourse, government policy, or misconduct. A detailed summary of that decision can be viewed here
The recently issued amended opinion reaffirms the original holding and denies rehearing and rehearing en banc, ordering that no further petitions will be considered in this interlocutory appeal. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings on claims not at issue in the appeal.
The Ninth Circuit’s amended opinion expands the court’s analysis. It applies the Pickering test in greater detail, examining the content, form, and context of Adams’s speech. It found that Adams expressed personal exasperation at receiving offensive material, not a broader viewpoint on public issues. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that Adams sent the messages privately to two coworkers in a casual, social conversation. It distinguished this case from others involving public or policy-related speech and concluded that Adams’s messages did not qualify for constitutional protection.
While amended opinion does not alter the outcome, it clarifies and reinforces the legal standard. The decision affirms that to receive First Amendment protection, a public employee’s speech must address a matter of public concern in both substance and intent. Private expressions of personal frustration, even about offensive subject matter, do not meet that threshold.
Adams v. Cnty. of Sacramento (9th Cir. July 9, 2025, No. 2315970) 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 17031.
In early 2019, the Oakland Unified School District and the Oakland Education Association (OEA) ended a seven-day strike and lengthy negotiations by signing a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covering July 1, 2018, through June 30, 2021. During those negotiations, the District publicly announced that it would close some schools to meet OEA’s wage demands and to satisfy the Board of Education’s cost-control objectives. Although the parties disagreed about whether school closures required bargaining, they executed the agreement.
In March 2019, the District adopted a resolution that prohibited school closures or consolidations unless the District provided a nine-month planning period. The District complied with that resolution when it closed several schools the following academic year.
After the CBA expired, the parties reached a tentative agreement in November 2021 to extend it through October 2022. In December 2021, the District adopted a new resolution that waived the nine-month planning period and directed the Superintendent to identify schools for closure starting in June 2022. On January 31, 2022, the Superintendent issued a proposed school closure list. Three days later, OEA demanded bargaining and objected to the District’s decision to waive the planning period.
On April 25, 2022, OEA notified the District that it intended to hold a one-day strike to protest the school closures and the District’s refusal to bargain. OEA members authorized the strike, and OEA carried it out on April 29, 2022.
On February 15, 2022, OEA filed an unfair practice charge with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), alleging that the District violated the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA) by refusing to bargain
over the school closures and their effects. PERB expedited the matter. On April 27, 2022, the District filed an unfair practice charge against OEA and asked PERB to enjoin the planned strike. PERB denied the injunction without prejudice but ordered an expedited hearing.
On May 3, 2022, PERB issued a complaint alleging that the District committed unfair practices by refusing to bargain over school closures. PERB issued a separate complaint against OEA, alleging that OEA violated EERA by striking without completing statutory impasse procedures. PERB concluded that the District violated EERA by failing to give OEA advance notice and a meaningful opportunity to bargain over the decision to close schools and its effects. PERB further concluded that OEA did not violate EERA by engaging in the one-day strike on April 29, 2022, because the strike did not occur during active negotiations, the District had already implemented the closures, and the District’s refusal to bargain provoked the union’s response.
The District petitioned the court of appeal for a writ of review. It argued that PERB erred by declaring OEA’s strike lawful and by excluding evidence of educational harm caused by the strike.
The court of appeal rejected the District’s argument that EERA prohibits strikes over unfair labor practices. The court of appeal explained that EERA includes no express ban on such strikes and pointed out that the California Supreme Court has long recognized public employees’ qualified right to strike. Because EERA is silent on whether unfair practice strikes are allowed, the court of appeal emphasized that it must defer to PERB’s reasonable interpretation of the statute unless that interpretation clearly conflicts with EERA’s language or purpose.
The court of appeal reviewed the record and determined that PERB acted within its statutory authority when it concluded that the District violated EERA. It noted that the District failed to bargain over the school closures, implemented them without notice, and engaged in conduct that provoked the union’s response. The court of appeal affirmed PERB’s conclusion that OEA acted lawfully by striking in response to those violations.
The court of appeal then addressed the District’s argument that PERB improperly excluded evidence of educational harm. OEA had moved to exclude that evidence before the administrative hearing, arguing that the evidence related only to remedy, not liability. The administrative law judge granted the motion. The District argued that it intended to introduce testimony and documents showing loss of instructional time and adverse effects on students, particularly those receiving special education services.
The court of appeal agreed that PERB erred when it excluded the educational harm evidence outright. The court of appeal held that the evidence could have been relevant to determining the appropriate remedy, had the District prevailed on liability. However, the Court concluded that the exclusion did not prejudice the outcome. The court of appeal found that PERB properly dismissed the District’s unfair practice charge because the District committed prior violations and failed to bargain in good faith.
The court of appeal also concluded that the educational harm caused by OEA’s one-day strike mirrored the ordinary consequences of any legal strike. The District failed to show that OEA’s strike produced any unique or disproportionate impact. The court of appeal found that the District offered only general assertions about lost instructional time and failed to identify anything unusual about the April 29 strike. Because every public employee strike involves some disruption, the court of appeal rejected the District’s suggestion that this oneday strike crossed a legal threshold. The court of appeal found that such reasoning would effectively bar all strikes, undermining settled law affirming their legality under EERA.
The court of appeal denied the District’s petition for writ of review, leaving PERB’s decision intact and enforceable.
Oakland Unified School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2025) __ Cal.App.5th __.
Since taking office, President Trump has issued a series of executive orders, several of which have direct implications for public agencies, including institutions of public education. In light of the volume and rapid issuance of executive orders, beginning in early February, LCW launched a weekly roundup of new executive orders that may impact public agency clients, including those in public education.
Our Week 21 Executive Order Roundup describes multiple EOs, including the following, which are likely to be of particular interest to educational institutions:
• Executive Action: Dept. of Education Finds the California Dept. of Education and the California Interscholastic Federation in Violation of Title IX (June 25, 2025): On June 25, 2025, The U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) concluded its Title IX investigations into the California Department of Education (CDE) and the California Interscholastic Federation (CIF), finding that both violated Title IX’s protections against sex-based discrimination in educational programs. The investigations focused on the CDE and CIF’s policies which, consistent with California law, allow students to participate in sports and use facilities consistent with their gender identity. OCR determined that in allowing students who were assigned male at birth to participate in women’s sports and access women’s facilities, such as locker rooms and restrooms, CDE and CIF violates women’s rights under Title IX.
As a result of the noncompliance finding, OCR issued a proposed Resolution Agreement with CIF and CDE. The Agreement would require the CDE to notify all recipients of federal funding that operate interscholastic athletic programs in California to enforce biology-based definitions of sex in athletics and facilities, revoke any conflicting state guidance, and restore records and awards to athletes assigned female at birth who lost recognition due to the participation of athletes assigned male at birth. Additionally, the CDE must send
personalized apologies to affected athletes assigned female at birth, and collect annual certifications of compliance with Title IX from all schools and athletic programs. The Department warned of imminent enforcement action, including referral to the Department of Justice, if the CDE and CIF fail to comply within 10 days.
If the CDE and CIF enter the resolution Agreement with OCR, it will impose new compliance and reporting requirements on schools and nonprofits in California that receive federal funding and operate interscholastic athletic programs. LCW will continue to monitor the matter and publish updates.
• Executive Action: Department of Energy Set to Revise Title IX Regulations About School Sports: On May 16, 2025, the Department of Energy proposed changes to Title IX regulations that were slated to take effect on July 15, 2025, unless the Department received “significant adverse comments” during the comment period that ended on June 16, 2025. The Department has not yet indicated whether it received significant adverse comments on the proposal.
The proposed changes would rescind a requirement that schools receiving money from the Department of Energy allow students of both genders to try out for noncontact sports teams when the school does not have both boys’ and girls’ teams. The change would affect all students, both cisgender and transgender.
While it is uncommon for federal departments other than the Department of Education to propose Title IX-related rules, prior executive orders have curtailed the Department of Education’s activities. As a result, we may begin to see less directlyimpacted administrative agencies advancing policies that previously would have originated from the Department of Education.
On June 26, 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division launched a formal investigation into whether the University of California violated Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act by engaging in employment practices that discriminate based on race or sex. The investigation focuses on UC’s 2030 Capacity Plan, a strategic plan announced in 2022 that aims to increase enrollment by 23,000 students through measures such as expanding in-state access, accelerating graduation, and promoting diversity among students and faculty. In a letter to UC President Michael Drake , the Department of Justice said it has reason to believe the plan may have led to unlawful discrimination based on race or sex at some or all UC campuses and affiliated entities.
On July 1, 2025, the California Community Colleges Board of Governors approved regulatory action entitled “BurdenFree Access to Instructional Materials” was filed with the Office of Administrative Law and the California Secretary of State. This regulation becomes effective on July 30, 2025.
Pursuant to California Code of Regulations, section 52010, Districts may conform their policies and procedures to the regulatory requirements within one hundred and eighty (180) days of the effective date.
The approved final text is posted on the Chancellor’s Office Regulatory Actions Page.
On July 9, 2025, the California Community Colleges Board of Governors approved regulatory action entitled “Baccalaureate Degree Program ” was filed with the Office of Administrative Law and the California Secretary of State. This regulation becomes effective on August 8, 2025.
Pursuant to California Code of Regulations, section 52010, District may conform their policies and procedures to the regulatory requirements within one hundred and eighty (180) days of the effective date.
The approved final text is posted on the Chancellor’s Office Regulatory Actions Page.
In Tarlton & Sons, Inc. v. Great American Insurance Company, a California Court of Appeal found that, absent formal notice of cessation or clear termination, the statute of limitations on a bond claim may be indeterminate.
Oxnard Union High School District hired Fast Track Construction Corporation (Fast Track) to perform heating and air conditioning work. Fast Track obtained a public works payment bond from Great American Insurance Company (GAIC) and subcontracted with Tarlton & Sons, Inc (Tarlton) to handle the framing and drywall work. Tarlton began working on the project in April 2021.
A dispute arose between Fast Track and the District in August 2021. During the dispute, the District hired Viola, Inc. to “perform general contractor duties” on the project. Tarlton entered a subcontract with Viola and continued its work on the project. Tarlton alleged it never received formal notice that the District terminated Fast Track’s contract.
In April 2022, Tarlton submitted a $688,353.66 claim to GAIC against the $19,100,000.00 public works payment bond in connection with its work under the Fast Track subcontract. After failed negotiations, Tarlton sued GAIC, the District, Fast Track, and others for payment. GAIC alleged the bond claim was barred by the statute of limitations because Tarlton’s cessation of labor began when it stopped working for Fast Track in November 2021. The trial court agreed, concluding that Tarlton’s statutory period to commence an action to enforce a bond claim begins when the claimant ceases to provide work, but must be filed not later than six months after the period in which the claimant may give a stop payment notice. The trial court found that Tarlton’s stop payment notice period expired and affirmed its claim was time barred. Tarlton appealed.
In a public works project, if the owner records a notice of completion or cessation, claimants may serve the general contractor a stop payment notice within 30 days of the record date. If notice is not recorded, claimants may serve a stop payment notice within 90 days of the earlier date of completion of the work or cessation of labor.
The six-month statute of limitations on bond claims begins when the applicable stop payment notice period ends. Thus, even if no stop payment notice is provided, the statute of limitations to file a bond claim begins either 30 days after the recording date of a notice of completion or cessation, or if no such notice was recorded, 90 days after completion of the work or cessation of labor.
The court of appeal considered whether a cessation of labor occurred on the District’s project and found that the date of cessation of labor was the date all work under the bonded contract concluded, not just the date that Tarlton stopped doing work under the Fast Track subcontract. The court of appeal emphasized that in the absence of a formal notice of cessation or clear project termination, the statutory clock to file a claim on a bonded contract may not begin.
The court of appeal’s holding demonstrates how the statutory period may be an issue of fact in disputes over public works projects lacking formal notice of cessation or completion.
Further, Tarlton highlights how a cessation of labor is not solely based on a claimant’s individual work. Rather, it must be determined by the date all work under the bonded contract was completed or subject to continuous cessation.
This decision serves as a reminder that ambiguity in project status and contractor transitions may open the door to extended liability periods and disputes. Districts involved in public works projects should review procedures to ensure clarity and timely communication.
Tarlton & Sons, Inc. v. Great American Insurance Company (Case No. B336550).
As we look ahead to the 2026 Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Plan cycle, now is the time for Community College Districts to begin reviewing and updating their existing EEO Plans. The California Community Colleges Chancellor’s Office requires districts to submit updated plans every three years, and summer 2025 provides an ideal window to begin this work.
Districts should ensure their plans align with the latest regulatory requirements, reflect current hiring practices, and incorporate updated workforce data and analysis. Early preparation will support smoother approvals and demonstrate your district’s ongoing commitment to diversity, equity, and inclusion in employment practices.
Need assistance with your EEO Plan update? LCW is here to help you navigate the legal requirements and develop a plan that meets both state expectations and your institution’s goals!
To view this article and the most recent LCW attorney-authored articles, please visit: www.lcwlegal.com/news
• Partner Alysha Stein-Manes was recently quoted in The Washington Post in a feature examining Columbia University’s groundbreaking agreement with the federal government, titled “Columbia agreed to a monitor, stoking fears about independence.” Her expert legal perspective offered a critical lens on the implications for university independence and compliance: “The scope of the data that is going to be available … is going to probably open up a Pandora’s box to question Columbia’s decisions about admissions and hiring, even if they are complying with … civil rights laws.”
• Co-Managing Partners J. Scott Tiedemann and Melanie Chaney were recently featured in “The Lawyer’s Edge” podcast where they speak about their proven approach to leadership succession planning, the secret behind the firm’s stability and growth and creating a culture that centers around its core values. Listen to the full podcast here: https:// thelawyersedge.com/podcast/tips-for-seamless-leadership-succession/
Members of Liebert Cassidy Whitmore’s consortiums are able to speak directly to an LCW attorney free of charge to answer direct questions not requiring in-depth research, document review, written opinions or ongoing legal matters. Consortium calls run the full gamut of topics, from leaves of absence to employment applications, student concerns to disability accommodations, construction and facilities issues and more. Each month, we will feature a Consortium Call of the Month in our newsletter, describing an interesting call and how the issue was resolved. All identifiable details will be changed or omitted.
A community college district contacted LCW regarding a confidential employee who had been transferred from several departments. In the employee’s most recent position, they had been put on a performance improvement plan. While on the performance improvement plan, the employee went on a leave of absence. When the employee returned, their supervisor was no longer employed by the district. The employee asked to be removed from the performance improvement plan because their supervisor who had placed them on the plan had left.
The LCW attorney advised that the employee should not be released from the performance improvement plan simply because they had a new supervisor. The improvement plan is about the performance of the employee and does not related to the supervisor. The employees new supervisor should implement the terms of the performance improvement plan.