Education Matters
Discrimination
California Department of Education Finds Antisemitic Bias in Lessons on Gaza Conflict.
The California Department of Education determined that teachers in two San Jose-area school districts, Campbell Union High School District (Campbell Union) and Santa Clara Unified School District (Santa Clara Unified), engaged in discriminatory conduct against Jewish students. The Department ordered both districts to provide antibias and anti-discrimination training and ordered Santa Clara Unified to provide additional training on students’ rights against retaliation.
At Branham High School in Campbell Union, two teachers in an Ethnic Literature class presented content related to the Israel/Palestine conflict. Teacher A acknowledged conducting a lesson during a “community circle” that was not part of the approved curriculum. The discussion, under a broader theme of colonialism, asked students to consider whether Israel is a settler colonial state. The materials included a video of a rabbi wearing a Palestinian flag stating “A Jew is not a Zionist” and a reading from Paulo Freire’s “Pedagogy of the Oppressed.” The California Department of Education found that the lesson lacked a balanced perspective and could encourage antisemitism. The Department stated that, for the lesson to be unbiased, it would have needed to include a video reflecting a proIsrael viewpoint, which would have allowed students to form authentic responses to the questions.
Also at Branham High School, Teacher B did not question or comment on a student presentation titled “Genocide of Palestinians,” and later posted the presentation on a class social media page. The Department stated that the
legal issue was whether the teacher adequately responded to ensure a non-discriminatory and balanced learning environment. It concluded that the Teacher B’s failure to comment could have been interpreted by students as approval of the presentation’s thesis. Campbell Union had previously dismissed the complaint, but the Department found that the teachers’ actions violated state anti-discrimination standards.
The Department found two separate violations at Santa Clara Unified. In one case, a teacher assigned a genocide project and modeled the Gaza conflict as an example. The presentation described Israeli actions as “amount[ing] to the crimes against humanity of apartheid and persecution,” among other politically charged terms. Santa Clara Unified’s internal investigation concluded that the lesson was “poorly timed,” “controversial,” and “politically charged,” but found no policy violation. The Department determined that the content violated the Education Code’s protections against discrimination and intimidation based on religion, ethnicity, and nationality.
In the second incident, a teacher confronted a Jewish student about an Israeli speaker that the Jewish Culture Club had invited to speak. In front of other students, the teacher urged the student to disinvite the speaker, stating the talk would provoke antisemitism and reflect poorly on the student. Santa Clara Unified concluded that the teacher’s conduct was “objectively offensive” considering the power imbalance and the student’s Jewish identity, but it did not find clear evidence of discrimination or harassment. The Department disagreed, concluding that the teacher’s actions created a hostile environment and violated the student’s right to be free from discrimination and intimidation.
The Department ordered Campbell Union to provide at least one hour of anti-bias training for all English language arts and social studies teachers by the start of the next school year. It directed Santa Clara Unified to train all high school staff on students’ rights to be free from discrimination, harassment, and intimidation based on race, ethnicity, religion, and nationality. The Department also required Santa Clara Unified to take appropriate actions to protect the student complainant from retaliation.
Cal. Dep’t of Educ., Direct Investigations Office, Investigation Report, Case No. 2025-0008 (Apr. 4, 2025)(Campbell Union Investigation Report); Cal. Dep’t of Educ., Direct Investigations Office, Investigation Report, Case No. 2025-0010 (Apr. 10, 2025) (Santa Clara Decision of Appeal).
Ninth Circuit Finds Triable Discrimination Claim Where USPS Replaced An Asian American Woman With
a
Less Experienced White Man.
Dawn Lui, a Chinese American woman in her late fifties, began working for the United States Postal Service (USPS) in 1992 and became a Postmaster in 2004. In 2014, she became Postmaster at the Shelton, Washington Post Office. After her appointment, employees filed numerous complaints and grievances against her. In sworn declarations, Lui and her supervisor, Charles Roberts, stated that these complaints were false and motivated by Lui’s race, sex, and national origin. Lui reported being called “Asian b****” and “witch,” and a coworker confirmed hearing repeated comments that “Dawn can’t read or speak English and doesn’t understand it.”
During one grievance investigation, an interviewer asked Lui whether she had a personal relationship with Roberts. Lui attributed the question to the fact that Roberts’ wife is Asian.
Roberts reported concerns about Lui’s treatment to HR Manager Alexis Delgado. Roberts told Delgado that he believed that Union Representative Renee Pitts and others were targeting Lui based on her race. He stated that Delgado did not investigate and instead worked closely with Pitts to build a disciplinary case against Lui. Roberts also stated that Delgado and Labor Relations Manager Lacey O’Connell repeatedly questioned whether he and Lui were romantically involved. Roberts raised concerns with his supervisor, Darrell Stoke, and requested a meeting to discuss his concerns. However, Stoke invited Delgado to the meeting, preventing Roberts from addressing her conduct. At the meeting, Stoke and Delgado said they wanted Lui removed from USPS and asked Roberts to support the decision. Roberts stated that “it was made extremely clear” that if he did not propose a viable alternative to discipline, they would move him to another position so that a replacement would sign off on Lui’s discipline. Roberts recommended a downgrade, which he believed preserved Lui’s position.
Delgado and Stoke drafted a notice of proposed downgrade transferring Lui to the lower-paid Postmaster position at the smaller Roy, Washington Post Office. The notice, dated October 28, 2019, charged Lui with: (1) coercing a carrier to accept a schedule change that violated the union contract; (2) throwing a clipboard and kicking packages; and (3) bringing a non-employee into a restricted area during a workplace investigation. Roberts refused to sign the notice, stating the charges were false and racially motivated. USPS temporarily removed him. His successor, Carter Clark, signed the notice.
In November 2019, Lui filed an informal EEO complaint alleging a hostile work environment, discrimination, and retaliation. She also appealed the downgrade to Tacoma Postmaster Karen Bacon. Roberts stated that, before the appeal, he had shared concerns with Bacon about racial bias in the disciplinary process. On February 11, 2020, Bacon upheld the first two charges and confirmed the downgrade.
USPS reassigned Lui to the Roy office. USPS placed Robert Davies, a less experienced white man, in charge of the Shelton office with the title Officer in Charge. A new permanent Postmaster was not appointed until roughly two years later.
In March 2020, Lui filed a formal EEO complaint, reiterating the allegations of her informal complaint. Lui also appealed Bacon’s decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board. The Board affirmed her demotion, and she filed suit against USPS in federal district court. Lui alleged that USPS violated Title VII by (1) discriminating against her based on race, sex, national origin, and age by demoting her; (2) subjecting her to a hostile work environment involving racial slurs, false complaints, and biased investigations; and (3) retaliating against her for engaging in protected activity related to a workplace harassment complaint.
USPS moved for summary judgment, asking the district court to dismiss all of Lui’s claims. The district court granted summary judgment to the USPS on all three of Lui’s Title VII claims. The district court found that Lui failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, failed to exhaust administrative remedies for her hostile work environment claim, and failed to show a causal connection between protected activity and her demotion to support her retaliation claim. In the alternative, the court held that even if Lui had established a prima facie case of discrimination, USPS had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Lui’s demotion and that Lui had not presented evidence of pretext. Lui appealed.
First, the Ninth Circuit addressed Lui’s claim that USPS discriminated against her by treating her differently based on race. The Ninth Circuit applied the burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under that framework, a plaintiff must first present a prima facie case of discrimination by showing: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) qualification for the position; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4) circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. The district court had held that Lui failed to meet the fourth element because she was not replaced by a “similarly situated” individual. The Ninth Circuit disagreed and held that Lui satisfied the fourth element by showing she was demoted and replaced by a less experienced white man. The Ninth Circuit explained that Title VII plaintiffs can satisfy the fourth element either by showing that similarly situated individuals outside their class were treated more favorably or by showing that they were replaced by someone outside their class. The Ninth Circuit noted that some decisions cite only the “similarly situated” language without referencing the alternative means of showing circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination, which caused confusion.
The district court concluded that Lui had not met her prima facie burden. However, it also ruled that even if she had met that burden, USPS had presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the demotion, which was employee misconduct. The Ninth Circuit disagreed. The Ninth Circuit held that even if the final decisionmaker lacks discriminatory intent, an employer can still be liable for discrimination if a biased subordinate influences the final decisionmaker. The Ninth Circuit found that Bacon, who approved the demotion, conducted no interviews, admitted she did not know the complainants’ racial identities, and relied exclusively on documents prepared by individuals accused of bias. Bacon also disregarded warnings from Roberts about discriminatory motives. The Ninth Circuit concluded that a jury could reasonably find that Bacon’s decision was not independent. Therefore, the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the disparate treatment claim was improper.
The Ninth Circuit also vacated the district court’s ruling on Lui’s hostile work environment claim. It held that Lui exhausted her administrative remedies by contacting an EEO counselor within 45 days of receiving the notice of proposed downgrade. The Ninth Circuit further explained that discrete acts may contribute to a hostile environment claim when viewed as part of a pattern. Lui alleged ongoing discriminatory treatment culminating in the downgrade, and the downgrade involved actors who she had accused of bias. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the downgrade could reasonably be considered part of the hostile environment. It remanded for the district court to address the merits of the claim.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on the retaliation claim. To prevail on the retaliation claim, Lui needed to show: (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection between the two. Lui argued that USPS demoted her in retaliation for her role in investigating a sexual harassment complaint. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgement on the grounds that Lui failed to show a causal connection between her role in the investigation and her demotion. Bacon testified that she did not consider the misconduct charge related to the investigation and based her decision solely on the two other misconduct charges. The court found no evidence that this rationale was pretextual.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment on the disparate treatment claim, vacated and remanded the ruling on the hostile work environment claim, and affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the retaliation claim.
Lui v. DeJoy (9th Cir. 2025) 129 F.4th 770.
Ninth Circuit Dismisses Challenge to Inclusion of Caste in CSU’s AntiDiscrimination Policy.
Sunil Kumar and Praveen Sinha are two faculty member at California State University (CSU). They are both of Indian descent and adherents of Hinduism.
In January 2022, CSU’s implemented an updated interim anti-discrimination policy, which it finalized in 2023. The updated policy explicitly prohibited discrimination based on various protected categories, including race, ethnicity, gender, disability, and religion. As part of the policy, CSU clarified that caste, color, and ancestry were already included within the protected category of race
and ethnicity. The policy did not define “caste,” nor did it mention Hinduism. CSU issued a Q&A document explaining that CSU would analyze caste-based discrimination using the same framework as other forms of discrimination.
Kumar and Sinha sued Jolene Koester in her official capacity as Chancellor of CSU. They argued that the CSU’s decision to include “caste” as a protected category under its anti-discrimination policy unfairly associated Hinduism with a caste system, stigmatizing their religion and compelled them to self-censor religious discussions and practices. They brought claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, alleging violations of the Due Process Clause, Free Exercise Clause, and Establishment Clause. They sought declaratory relief to prevent CSU from enforcing the “caste” provision of the policy.
The trial court initially dismissed the Kumar and Sinha’s Equal Protection claim for lack of standing and later dismissed their Free Exercise claim for failure to state a claim. The Due Process and Establishment Clause claims proceeded to a bench trial. The trial court ruled in CSU’s favor, finding that the Kumar and Sinha lacked standing on the Due Process claim, and that the Establishment Clause claim failed on the merits. The Kumar and Sinha appealed the dismissal of their Due Process, Free Exercise, and Establishment Clause claims.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the Kumar and Sinha failed to establish standing, which requires a concrete and particularized injury that is actual or imminent. The Ninth Circuit applied a three-part test, which requires a plaintiff to demonstrate: (1) an intention to engage in conduct protected by the Constitution; (2) that the conduct is arguably proscribed by the challenged law; and (3) that there exists a credible threat of enforcement.
On the Due Process claim, Kumar and Sinha contended that the policy was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to define “caste,” leaving them uncertain about what conduct is prohibited. The Ninth Circuit held that the Kumar and Sinha lacked standing because they did not demonstrate that any of their religious practices could be interpreted as caste discrimination or harassment under the policy. They had explicitly stated that they opposed caste discrimination and did not believe caste was part of Hinduism. The Ninth Circuit ruled that their fear of enforcement was speculative and insufficient to establish an injury.
On the Free Exercise claim, the Kumar and Sinha argued
that the policy burdened their religious practices by associating Hinduism with caste. The Ninth Circuit found that they failed to show any actual burden on their religious exercise. Their objection to the policy was ideological rather than based on a concrete restriction on their ability to practice their religion. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that disagreement with a policy’s language or implications does not constitute a Free Exercise violation absent a substantial burden on religious practice.
On the Establishment Clause claim, Kumar and Sinha alleged that the policy improperly defined Hinduism by linking it to caste, thereby stigmatizing their religion. The Ninth Circuit recognized that Establishment Clause standing can be based on spiritual or psychological harm but found no evidence that CSU’s policy expressed hostility toward Hinduism. The Ninth Circuit noted that “caste” is a broad social concept that applies across multiple religions and cultures and is not uniquely associated with Hinduism. The trial court had found, based on the trial record, that the policy did not disparage or define Hinduism. The Ninth Circuit held that this factual determination was not clearly erroneous.
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of all claims.
Kumar v. Koester (9th Cir. 2025) 131 F.4th 746.
Liability
Workers’ Compensation Was the Exclusive Remedy for Volunteer’s Fatal Injuries.
On March 24, 2021, the Dublin Unified School District (DUSD) held a food distribution event at one of its middle schools as part of the “Farmers to Families Food Box Program.” This program aimed to provide fresh food to families affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Catherine Kuo volunteered at this event.
While Kuo was loading a food box into the rear of one vehicle, another vehicle entered the parking lot and stopped behind her. A DUSD employee approached the second vehicle and instructed the driver to open the rear hatch so a food box could be loaded. The driver of the second vehicle suddenly accelerated forward. The vehicle struck Kuo and crushed her between the two cars. She died later that day.
Kuo’s family members and estate filed a complaint against the District. They asserted negligence and premises liability claims. The complaint alleged the District failed to implement or communicate safety protocols, failed to train or supervise employees coordinating the event, and created a dangerous condition of public property by not implementing adequate safety measures.
The District moved for summary judgment and asked the trial court to dismiss the case. It argued that Labor Code section 3364.5 barred the claims. Section 3364.5 allows a school board to deem volunteers employees under the Workers’ Compensation Act by adopting a resolution. If the board adopts such a resolution, the volunteer is entitled to workers’ compensation for injuries.
The District argued that when section 3364.5 applies, workers’ compensation is the sole remedy for injuries sustained while performing service under the direction and control of the district superintendent. The District submitted evidence that its board of trustees had adopted such a resolution in 2012 and confirmed that its insurance program covered injuries to volunteers. The District argued that Kuo’s fatal injuries fell within the scope of section 3364.5. Therefore, workers’ compensation was the exclusive remedy and plaintiffs’ could not bring negligence and premises liability claims against the District.
The trial court found that Labor Code section 3364.5 applied and granted summary judgment in favor of the District. It found that section 3364.5 covered fatal injuries and that Kuo’s death fell within the scope of the statute. Because workers’ compensation was the exclusive remedy, the court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs’ negligence and premises liability claims. Kuo’s family and estate appealed.
The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment. It held that Labor Code section 3364.5 applied and that the statute covers fatal injuries. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the statute excluded death. It explained that the plain language, statutory context, and legislative history supported a broad reading of “any injury” to include fatal injuries.
The court of appeal also found that the District properly adopted a resolution under section 3364.5. It rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the resolution was invalid because it did not use the word “deemed.” The court of appeal held that the statute did not require any specific language. It also rejected the argument that the District’s conduct showed it did not treat volunteers as employees. The court of appeal found that the statute did not require the District to notify volunteers that they were covered by workers compensation. The statute also did not required the District to show it had processed prior workers’ compensation claims for volunteers.
The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the District. It entered judgment for the District and awarded costs on appeal.
Kuo v. Dublin Unified School Dist. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 662.
Retirement
No CalPERS Benefits for Overtime or Holiday Pay for Employee on Leave.
Gerry Serrano was a homicide detective sergeant for the City of Santa Ana. In April 2016, Serrano was elected as president of the Santa Ana Police Officers Association.
While serving as president, Serrano went on a leave of absence. The MOU provided that the City would pay the Association president “full salary including any salary additives” while the Association president was on leave, and that the Association would reimburse the City 100% of the cost of the Association president. The MOU also noted that whether the Association’s president’s compensation was “PERSable” was up to CalPERS. The City continued to pay Serrano his sergeant’s salary and related pay additives that he earned while a homicide detective sergeant: detective premium; bilingual premium; educational incentive; holiday pay; uniform allowance; and a confidential premium – overtime pay.
In October 2020, CalPERS notified the City that the confidential overtime premium was not pensionable for Serrano because he was on a leave of absence.
The City appealed this determination, which Serrano joined. CalPERS subsequently reviewed the entirety of Serrano’s pay and determined, with the exception of the educational incentive, the pay additives were also not pensionable.
Serrano filed a petition for a writ of mandate. Serrano alleged that the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA)
required the City to give him a reasonable leave of absence to serve as a union representative “without loss of compensation or other benefits.” (Government Code section 3558.8.) Serrano dropped his claims to all add on compensation except confidential premium pay and holiday pay. The trial court denied Serrano’s petition. Serrano appealed.
The court of appeal affirmed the trial court. CalPERS law distinguishes between “compensation” and “compensation earnable.” Compensation earnable includes only the payrate and special compensation. If an item of special compensation is not listed in the CalPERS Regulation 571, then it is not included in the calculation of CalPERS retirement benefits. The Court noted that the MMBA does not define “compensation” or “benefits” and determined these terms would mean the same as defined in CalPERS law. The court of appeal held that the MMBA at Government Code section 3558.8 did not require all of the compensation Serrano earned as a police sergeant to be part of his pension benefit while he served as Association president.
The court of appeal concluded that the confidential premium was not pensionable under CalPERS law because it was a payment for overtime, and not for work during normal work hours. The court of appeal found that Serrano’s holiday pay was not pensionable because he was not required to work on holidays, as required by Regulation 571.
Serrano v. Public Employees’ Retirement System, 109 Cal. App.5th 96 (2025)
Legal Updates
U.S. Department of Education Seeks Public Feedback on “Deregulatory Ideas” for Title IV Student Aid Programs.
On April 3, 2025, the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Postsecondary Education announced that it will commence negotiated rulemaking on various programs authorized under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965. The Department invites public feedback on ways to streamline higher education regulations and federal assistance programs to create efficiencies for students, institutions, and key stakeholders, as well as ideas to improve the Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program, the Pay As You Earn (PAYE) Repayment plan, and the IncomeContingent Repayment (ICR) plan.
The Department will accept written comments that must be submitted through the Federal eRulemaking Portal at Regulations.gov. If you require an accommodation or cannot otherwise submit your comments via Regulations.gov, please contact regulationshelpdesk@gsa.gov or by phone at 1-866-498-2945. The deadline for public comment is 30 days after publication in the Federal Register.
More information on negotiated rulemaking can be found here.
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Mieko Failey is an Associate in the Los Angeles office of Liebert Cassidy Whitmore, where she provides advice and counsel to public agency clients on a wide range of matters from compliance to risk management.
Executive Orders
Weekly Executive Order Roundups.
Since taking office, President Trump has issued a series of executive orders, several of which have direct implications for public agencies, including institutions of public education. In light of the volume and rapid issuance of executive orders, beginning in early February, LCW launched a weekly roundup of new executive orders that may impact public agency clients, including those in public education.
Our Week 8 Executive Order Roundup describes multiple EOs, including the following, which are likely to be of particular interest to educational institutions:
• Update: Federal Judge Grants Temporary Restraining Order on Enforcement of Portion of DEI Executive Order (March 27, 2025). On March 27, 2025, a Chicago federal judge granted a temporary restraining order barring the Department of Labor from enforcing part of a Trump executive order targeting diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives. The ruling prevents the Department of Labor from requiring grantees to certify that they do not “operate any programs promoting DEI that violate any applicable Federal anti-discrimination laws” for two weeks while the court considers a longer-term injunction. The judge’s order applies nationally, but its impact is limited to grantees that receive funds from the Department of Labor.
Our Week 9 Executive Order Roundup describes multiple education-related updates, including the following:
• Department of Education to Condition K-12 School Funding on Elimination of DEI Programs (April 3, 2025). On April 3, 2025, the United States Department of Education issued a notice entitled “Reminder of Legal Obligations Undertaken in Exchange for Receiving Federal Financial Assistance and Request for Certification Under Title VI and SFFA v. Harvard.” The notice advises that the Department may revoke K-12 public school districts’ Title I funding—federal funding for K-12 districts with a high percentage of low-income students— unless the districts certify compliance with federal antidiscrimination laws. Specifically, the notice states the Department’s position that “the use of Diversity, Equity, & Inclusion (DEI) programs to advantage one’s race over another” violates antidiscrimination law.
• U.S. Department of Education and Department of Justice Announce Title IX Special Investigations Team (April 4, 2025). On April 4, 2025, the U.S. Department of Education and Department of Justice announced the creation of a joint “Title IX Special Investigations Team” (SIT) comprised of investigators from across each Department’s offices. The stated purpose of the Title IX SIT is to streamline investigations into the uptick of Title IX claims that the Trump administration attributes to what it describes as the “pernicious effects of gender ideology in school programs and activities.” The Title IX SIT will enforce Title IX consistent with President Trump’s Executive Orders entitled “Keeping Men out of Women’s Sports” and “Defending Women from Gender Ideology Extremism.”
• Supreme Court Allows Trump Administration to Freeze $65 Million in Department of Education Teacher Training Grants (April 4, 2025). The U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, granted the Trump administration’s emergency request to vacate a Massachusetts federal judge’s temporary restraining order requiring the U.S. Department of Education to reinstate $65 million in teacher training grants to eight states (California, Colorado,
Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York and Wisconsin). The grants, issued the under the Teacher Quality Partnership (TQP) and Supporting Effective Educator Development (SEED) programs, support teacher preparation in underserved areas. The Department of Education terminated all but five of the existing 109 grants in early February because it found that recipients used the funds for unlawful diversity, equity and inclusion programs. The Supreme Court ruled that the district court likely lacked jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act, and the case instead falls under the Tucker Act, which directs disputes about contracts with the U.S. government to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. The Court also found that the states indicated that they have enough money to be able to continue their programs without the federal funding while the litigation moves forward.
benefits corner
IRS Explains Notice Requirements for Employers to Skip Furnishing Form 1095-C.
Applicable large employers (ALEs) have a new option to skip furnishing Form 1095-C to full-time employees and employees enrolled in an employer-sponsored selfinsured plan (eligible employees) if certain conditions are met. On December 23, 2024, President Biden signed the Paperwork Burden Reduction Act (HR 3797) into law. This law adds an option where ALEs do not have to automatically furnish Form 1095-C to eligible employees and instead, ALEs will be treated as timely furnishing the required Form 1095-C if they provide a notice to eligible employees informing them that they can request a copy of their Form 1095-C (Notice). Please see our Special Bulletin describing the Paperwork Burden Reduction Act (HR 3797) for more information.
The language in the Paperwork Burden Reduction Act states that the Notice to employees must be “clear, conspicuous, and accessible (at such time and in such manner as the Secretary may provide) ....” It was initially unclear what type of notice would suffice to allow an ALE to skip furnishing Form 1095-C because the Secretary of Treasury had not issued any information.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) recently issued awaited guidance on the “time” and “manner” required for such Notice. (See IRS Notice 2025-15.) The IRS will apply the time and manner requirements from Treasury Regulation section 1.6055-1(g)(4)(ii)(B)(1)-(3). Under these requirements, the Notice must:
1. Post a clear and conspicuous notice in a location on the ALE’s website that is reasonably accessible to full-time employees;
2. State that employees may receive a copy of their statement upon request;
3. Explain how employees may request a copy of their Form 1095-C;
4. Include an email address and a physical address where employees can make a request for their Form 1095-C;
5. Include a telephone number that employees may use to contact the ALE with questions; and
6. Be written in plain, non-technical terms and with letters of a font size large enough to call a viewer’s attention that the information pertains to tax statements reporting health coverage. For example, a website that includes words on the main page reading “Tax Information” and a secondary page that includes the statement “IMPORTANT HEALTH COVERAGE TAX DOCUMENTS” in capital letters.
The Notice must be posted on the ALE’s website by the due date for furnishing Form 1095-C, including the automatic 30-day extension (i.e., 30 days after January 31). The notice must remain on the ALE’s website through October 15 of the year following the calendar year that the Form 1095-C covers (or the first business day after if it falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.) For Form 1095-Cs covering tax year 2024, the required posting period would March 3, 2025 to October 15, 2025.
If an employee requests their Form 1095-C, then the ALE must furnish the Form 1095-C to the employee no later than: (i) January 31 in the year following the calendar year the Form 1095-C covers; or (ii) 30 days after the request date.
The IRS only recently issued this guidance on February 21, 2025. Since the start date ALEs would be required to post the Notice (March 3, 2025) has passed, it is now too late for ALEs to follow the IRS’s guidance on the time and manner of the Notice to skip furnishing Form 1095-Cs for this year. Any ALEs interested in utilizing the option to skip furnishing Form 1095-Cs in the future should follow the IRS’s guidance on how, when, and where to post the notice and what to include in the Notice for future years.
See IRS Notice 2025-15 for more information, available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-25-15.pdf.
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Consortium Call Of The Month
Members of Liebert Cassidy Whitmore’s consortiums are able to speak directly to an LCW attorney free of charge to answer direct questions not requiring in-depth research, document review, written opinions or ongoing legal matters. Consortium calls run the full gamut of topics, from leaves of absence to employment applications, student concerns to disability accommodations, construction and facilities issues and more. Each month, we will feature a Consortium Call of the Month in our newsletter, describing an interesting call and how the issue was resolved. All identifiable details will be changed or omitted.
Question: Answer:
A Community College District client asked LCW whether there are any restrictions on the number of consecutive days full time employees can work. The client acknowledged that employees are entitled to overtime, but asked if there are other labor laws that impose a limit on the number of consecutive days that employees can work.
The LCW attorney informed the client that there is nothing in the Fair Labor Standards Act nor the Education Code imposing a maximum number of consecutive days that an employee may work. The attorney pointed to several relevant laws. Under Education Code section 88030, a workweek can be no longer than five consecutive days. The District must pay overtime for any work required on the sixth and seventh consecutive day. Under the Education Code and the FLSA, all hours over 40 hours per week are considered overtime. Education Code sections 88026 and 88027 also provides that everything about eight hours in a day is overtime. Finally, Education Code section 88020.5 provides that if an employee’s normal schedule does not include Saturday and Sunday, then the District needs the employee’s consent to change the schedule to Saturday or Sunday.
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