More oxford books @ www.OxfordeBook.com a top-tier criterion of justice 49 to be inferior to <6,4,9>, which in turn is equivalent to <4,9,6> by the anonymity condition. It follows by transitivity that <5,3,9> is inferior to <4,9,6>, and so C1 must be ranked below C2. (This same result can be achieved on another path: The Pareto condition shows that <4,9,6> is superior to <3,9,5>. But, according to the anonymity condition, <3,9,5> is equivalent to <5,3,9>. Hence, by transitivity, <5,3,9> must also be considered inferior to <4,9,6> and C1 therefore be ranked below C2.) Stating the point in general terms: A top-level criterion of justice satisfying the anonymity and Pareto conditions will hold that one candidate social order is superior to another just in case there is some one-to-one mapping of individual well-being scores under the former into those under the latter such that, for all pairs, the first score is in at least one case higher and in no case lower than the second. When there are many affected recipients, the easiest way of comparing two candidates is by reordering the individual well-being scores each would generate by magnitude. (The anonymity condition requires that such a reordering should not alter the assessment.) This reordering yields the distributional profile associated with each candidate. Thus, the distributional profiles of the two ways of organizing the microsociety just discussed are <3,5,9> and <4,6,9>, respectively. Here is a more complex example involving the distributional profiles of three alternative public criteria: C4 <1,1,1,2,2,2,3,3,3,3,3,4,4,4,4,4,4,5,5,6,6,6,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,7,8,8,8,8,9,9,9,9,9,9,9, 9, 9, 9> C5 <1,1,1,1,2,2,2,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,4,4,4,4,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,9, 9, 9, 9> C6 <2,2,2,2,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,3,4,4,5,5,5,5,5,5,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,6,7,7,7,7,8,8,8,8,8,8,8,9, 9, 9, 9, 9> Employing such distributional profiles, one can see at a glance that the distribution C5 would produce is inferior to the two distributions C4 and C6 would produce, and also that the anonymity and Pareto conditions do not suffice to rank C4 vis-a`-vis C6. The preceding discussion simplifies by assuming that, irrespective of which social order is chosen, the same persons would exist. This assumption is false of real-world societies, where the choice of social order makes a difference to who is born. This might be no problem if at least a society’s population size were unaffected. But this weaker assumption, too, is false in the real world: The way a society is organized affects its birth and death rates. And there may then not be a one-to-one mapping of individuals across alternative ways of organizing society. Fore more urdu books visit www.4Urdu.com