Bp 22 & checks 07March2016

BATAS PAMBANSA (BP) 22 A)

Acts punishable under BP 22 1)

Section 1, 1st paragraph: The “crime of commission”

Case:

2)

Danao v. CA, 358 SCRA 450 [2001] -1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value; 2. The accused knows at the time of issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and 3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.

Section 1, 2nd paragraph: The “crime of omission”

Elements:

B)

Validity/Constitutionality of BP 22 Case:

C)

1. The drawer had sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he drew the check; 2. The drawer fails to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the check for a period of ninety (90) days from date of the check; and 3. The check is presented to the bank within the 90-day days from date of check and dishonored for insufficiency of funds.

Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 - The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant of the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

Checks covered *Check: A bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand (Sec. 185, NIL) *The check should be drawn or issued “to apply on account or for value.”

Cases:

1) Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 - The language of BP 22 is broad enough to cover all kinds of checks, whether present dated or postdated, or whether issued in payment of pre-existing obligations, or given in mutual or simultaneous exchange for something of value.

2) Cruz v. CA, 233 SCRA 301 - Crossed checks or restricted checks are within the coverage of BP 22.

3) De Villa v. CA, 195 SCRA 722 - BP 22 applies to a check drawn in foreign currency.

4) Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 5) People v. Reyes, 228 SCRA 13 - BP 22 applies even in instances where the dishonored checks were issued in the form of a deposit or a guaranty and not as actual payment.

6) People v. Nitafan, 215 SCRA 79 (1992) - BP 22 is malum prohibitum which punishes the mere act of issuing worthless checks, whether as a deposit, as a guarantee, or in payment of pre-existing debt or account. It is not concerned with the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating thereto.

D)

Effect of payment on criminal liability Cases: 1) Lazaro v. CA, 227 SCRA 723 - Payment does not extinguish criminal liability

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*When payment of checks renders the prosecution for BP 22 no longer tenable Case:

Griffith v. CA, 379 SCRA 94, 106 [2002] - “While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we should not apply penal laws mechanically. We must find if the application of the law is consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. (When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law also gives it life. This is specially so in this case where a debtor’s criminalization would not serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it. The creditor having collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for payment of rentals, via auction sale, we find that holding the debtor’s president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after said collection, is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations.”

“In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks issued by petitioner has already been effectively paid two years before the informations against him were filed, we find merit in this petition. We hold that petitioner herein could not be validly and justly convicted or sentenced for violation of B.P. 22. Whether the number of checks issued determines the number of violations of B.P. 22, or whether there should be a distinction between postdated and other kinds of checks no longer detain us for being immaterial now to the determination of the issue of guilt or innocence of petitioner” (emphases supplied).

2) Navarro v. CA, 234 SCRA 639 - Payment of the value of the check either by the drawer or the drawee bank within five (5) banking days from notice of the dishonor given to the drawer is a complete defense. The prima facie presumption that the drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds or credit at the time of issuance and on its presentment for payment is rebutted by such payment.

E)

Effect of knowledge by the payee of the insufficiency of funds.

Case:

F)

Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 - Knowledge by the payee of the insufficiency or lack of funds of the drawer with the drawee bank is immaterial as deceit is not an element of an offense penalized by BP 22. The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check.

Notice of dishonor Cases:

1) Rico v. People, 392 SCRA 61 [2002] - A notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by the accused before one can be held liable under BP 22.

2) Domagsang v. CA, 347 SCRA 75 (2000) - A mere oral notice or demand is insufficient for conviction under BP 22. There must be a written notice of dishonor to the accused.

3) Oh v. CA, GR No. 125297, 06 June 2003 4) Caras v. CA, 366 SCRA 371 [2001] 5) King v. People, 319 SCRA 654 [1999]) - The absence of any notice of dishonor personally sent to and received by the accused is a violation of the right to due process and the failure to prove that accused was given the requisite notice of dishonor is a clear ground for acquittal.

6. Danao v. CA, 358 SCRA 450 [2001] - The prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficient funds in Section 2 of BP 22 cannot arise if the notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if there

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is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5day period.

7. Ting v. CA, 344 SCRA 551 [2000] - “As adverted to earlier, it is necessary in cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, that the prosecution prove that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor. It is a general rule that when service of notice is an issue, the person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service (58 Am Jur 2d, Notice, @ 45). The burden of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence. Now, ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice. In criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cases, there should be clear proof of notice. Moreover, it is a general rule that, when service of a notice is sought to be made by mail, it should appear that the conditions on which the validity of such service depends has existence, otherwise the evidence is insufficient to establish the fact of service. (C.J.S., Notice, @ 18). In the instant case, the prosecution did not present proof that the demand letter was sent through registered mail, relying as it did only on the registry receipt issued by the mailing office and an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with Section 7 of Rule 13 (See Section 13, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). If, in addition to the registry receipt, it is required in civil cases that an affidavit of mailing as proof of service be presented, then with more reason should we hold in criminal cases that a registry receipt alone is insufficient as proof of mailing. In the instant case, the prosecution failed to present the testimony, or at least the affidavit, of the person mailing that, indeed, the demand letter was sent.

Moreover, petitioners, during the pre-trial, denied having received the demand letter (p. 135, Rollo). Given petitioners’ denial of receipt of the demand letter, it behooved upon the prosecution to present proof that the demand letter was indeed sent through registered mail and that the same was received by petitioners. This, the prosecution miserably failed to do. Instead, it merely presented the demand letter and registry receipt as if mere presentation of the same was equivalent to proof that some sort of mail matter was received by petitioners. Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not prove themselves; they must be properly authenticated in order to serve as proof of receipt of the letters (Central Trust Co. v. City of Des Moines, 218 NW 580).

Likewise, for notice by mail, it must appear that the same was served on the addressee or a duly authorized agent of the addressee. In fact, the registry return receipt itself provides that “[a] registered article must not be delivered to anyone but the addressee, or upon the addressee’s written order, in which case the authorized agent must write the addressee’s name on the proper space and then affix legibly his own signature below it.” In the case at bar, no effort was made to show that the demand letter was received by petitioners or their agent. All that we have on record is an illegible signature on the registry receipt as evidence that someone received the letter.

As to whether this signature is that of one of the petitioners or of their authorized agent remains a mystery. From the registry receipt alone, it is possible that petitioners or their authorized agent did receive the demand letter. Possibilities, however, cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt. There being insufficient proof that petitioners received notice that their checks had been dishonored, the presumption that they knew of the insufficiency of the funds therefor cannot arise.” (emphases supplied) 8) Lao v. CA, 274 SCRA 572 [1997] 9) Dingle v. IAC, 148 SCRA 595 [1987] 10) King v. People, 319 SCRA 654 [1999]

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11) Danao v. CA, 358 SCRA 450 [2001] 12) Rico v. People, 392 SCRA 61 [2002] - Knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit in the drawee bank at the time of issue for the payment of a check upon its presentment for payment is an essential element of the offense under Section 1 (first paragraph) of BP 22. *Notice of dishonor: registry return receipts do not in themselves prove receipt Cases: 1) Moster v. People, 546 SCRA 287 [2008] 2) Svendsen v. People, 546 SCRA 659 [2008] - Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not by themselves prove receipt—they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters claimed to be a notice of dishonor.

3) Suarez v. People, 555 SCRA 238 [2008] - The presentation of the registry card, with an unauthenticated signature, does not meet the required proof beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner received such notice, especially considering the he denied receiving it.

G)

Penalty 1) SC Adm. Circular No. 12-2000 dated 20 Nov. 2007 2) SC Adm. Circular No. 13-2001 dated 14 Feb. 2001 Case: Lunaria v. People, 570 SCRA 572, 11 Nov. 2008 - SC Adm. Circular No 12-2000 authorized the nonimposition of the penalty of imprisonment in BP 22 cases but did NOT de-criminalized BP 22 violations, nor has removed imprisonment as an alternative penalty.

H)

Venue Cases:

I)

1. Lim v. CA, GR No. 107898, 19 Dec. 1995 2. Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 3. People v. Manzanilla, 156 SCRA 279 - The venue shall be where all acts the material and essential to the crime and requisite of its consummation occurred.

Prescription: four (4) years Case: People v. Pangilinan, 672 SCRA 105, 13 June 2012

BP 22 CASES 1. The nature of BP 22 While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we should not apply penal laws mechanically. We must find if the application of the law is consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. (When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law also gives it life. This is specially so in this case where a debtor’s criminalization would not serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it. The creditor having collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for payment of rentals, via auction sale, we find that holding the debtor’s president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after said collection, is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations.

In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks issued by petitioner has already been effectively paid two years before the informations against him were filed, we find merit in this petition. We hold that petitioner herein could not be validly and justly convicted or sentenced for violation of B.P. 22. Whether the number of checks issued determines the number of violations of B.P. 22, or whether there should be a distinction between postdated and other kinds of checks no longer detain us for being immaterial now to the determination of the issue of guilt or innocence of petitioner (Griffith v. CA, 379 SCRA 94, 106 [2002]).

The mere act of issuing a worthless check, even if merely as an accommodation, is covered by BP 22. The agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to

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the prosecution for violation of BP 22. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment (LBP v. Ramon P. Jacinto, GR No. 154622, 03 August 2010).

2. Dishonor of check The fact that another check Carmen had issued was previously dishonored does not necessarily imply that the dishonor of a succeeding check can no longer cause moral injury and personal hurt for which the aggrieved party may claim damages. Such prior occurrence does not prove that respondent does not have a good reputation that can be besmirched (Solidbank v.

Sps. Arrieta, GR No. 152720, 17 February 2005).

3. Notice of dishonor: registry return receipts do not in themselves prove receipt Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not by themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letter, claimed to be a notice of dishonor (Alferez v. People, 641 SCRA 116, 31 January 2011).

Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not by themselves prove receipt— they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters claimed to be a notice of dishonor (Moster v. People, 546 SCRA 287 [2008]; Svendsen v. People, 546 SCRA 659 [2008]).

The presentation of the registry card, with an unauthenticated signature, does not meet the required proof beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner received such notice, especially considering the he denied receiving it (Suarez v. People, 555 SCRA 238 [2008]).

Notice dishonor A notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by the accused before one can be held liable under BP 22 (Rico v. People, 392 SCRA 62 [2002]) - The absence of any notice of dishonor personally sent to and received by the accused is a violation of the petitioner’s right to due process.

- The failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was given the requisite notice of dishonor is a clear ground for acquittal.

Caras v. CA, 366 SCRA 371 (2001); King v. People, 319 SCRA 654 (1999) Both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks Law would require not only that the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor.

Lao v. CA, 274 SCRA 572 (1977) Idos v. CA, 296 SCRA 194(1998) Ting v. CA, 344 SCRA 551 (2000) Danao v. CA, GR No. 122353, 06 June 2001, 358 SCRA 450: BP 22 and notice Procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by the accused (Ambito v. People, 59 SCA 69, 13 Feb. 2009).

The notice of dishonor of a check, which must be in writing, may be sent to the drawer or maker by the drawee bank, the holder of the check, or the offended party either by personal delivery or by registered mail (ibid.).

4. BP 22 punishes the issuance of a bouncing check What the law punishes is simply the issuance of a bouncing check not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating thereto—the only valid query, then, is whether the law has been breached, i.e., by the mere act of issuing a bad check, without so much regard as to the criminal intent of the issuer (Dy v. People, 571 SCRA 59 [14 Nov. 2008]).

5. Uncollected deposits, BP 22 and estafa Uncollected deposits are not the same as insufficient funds—the prima facie presumption of deceit arises only when a check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds (Dy v.

People, 571 SCRA 59 [14 Nov. 2008]).

The estafa punished under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code is committed when a check is dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds or closed account, and not against uncollected deposit (Dy v. People, 571 SCRA 59 [14 Nov. 2008])

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To be liable under Section 1 of BP 22, the check must be dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment (Dy v. People, 571 SCRA 59 [14 Nov. 2008]).

Like Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, BP Blg. 22 also speaks only of insufficiency of funds and does not treat of uncollected deposits (Dy v. People, 571 SCRA 59 [14 Nov. 2008]).

6. Prescription of BP 22 We agree that Act No. 3326 applies to offenses under BP Blg. 22. An offense under BP Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of the offense of BP Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof. (Panaguiton, Jr. v. DOJ, 571 SCRA 549 [25 Nov. 2008]) The filing of the complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. 22 (Panaguiton, Jr. v. DOJ, 571 SCRA 549 [25 Nov. 2008]).

See also: People v. Pangilinan, 672 SCRA 105, 13 June 2012 7. The gravamen of BP22 The mere act of making or issuing a worthless check—whether as a deposit, as a guarantee or even as evidence of pre-existing debt—is malum prohibitum. (Ambito v. People, 59 SCA 69, 13 Feb. 2009) 8. Knowledge of insufficiency of funds Knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit in the drawee bank for the payment of a check upon its presentment is an essential element of the offense (Lao v. CA, 274 SCRA 572 [1997]).

9. Lack of valuable consideration The issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which were later on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution for violation of BP 22 (Dreamwork Construction, Inc. v. Janiola, 591 SCRA 466, 30 June 2009).

Presumption in the issuance of checks It is highly inconceivable that an experienced businessman would issue various checks in sizeable amounts to a payee if these are without consideration (Cayanan v. North Star International Travel, Inc., 658 SCRA 644, 05 October 2011).

10. Agreement regarding the issuance of the check irrelevant The agreement surrounding the issuance of the dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Dreamwork Construction, Inc. v. Janiola, 591 SCRA 466, 30 June 2009).

11. BP 22 & independent civil action - There is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

- The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action.

- No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

(Heirs of Eduardo Simon v. Chan, 644 SCRA 13, 23 February 2011)

CHECKS 1. The collecting bank is liable in accepting and encashing a crossed check from an individual knowing that the payee is a corporation

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Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Philippine Bank of Communications, et al., G.R. No. 141408, October 18, 2007 - A check is defined by law as a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand.

The Negotiable Instruments Law is silent with respect to crossed checks. Nonetheless, this Court has taken judicial cognizance of the practice that a check with two parallel lines on the upper left hand corner means that it could only be deposited and not converted into cash. The crossing of a check with the phrase “Payee’s Account Only” is a warning that the check should be deposited in the account of the payee. It is the collecting bank which is bound to scrutinize the check and to know its depositors before it can make the clearing indorsement, “all prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsement guaranteed.”

- The law imposes on the collecting bank the duty to diligently scrutinize the checks deposited with it for the purpose of determining their genuineness and regularity. The collecting bank, being primarily engaged in banking, holds itself out to the public as the expert on this field, and the law thus holds it to a high standard of conduct.

- In stamping at the dorsal portion of the check the word “all prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsements are guaranteed,” banks became general endorsers. Under Section 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, an endorser warrants “that the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be; that he has a good title to it; that all prior parties had capacity to contract; and that the instrument is at the time of his indorsement valid and subsisting.”

- One who accepts and encashes a check from an individual knowing that the payee is a corporation does so at his peril.

2. Cashier’s check/ Negotiable Instruments Law/holder in due course Bank of Philippine Islands vs. Roxas, G.R. No. 157833, October 15, 2007 Section 52 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides: SEC. 52. What constitutes a holder in due course. – A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the following conditions: (a) That it is complete and regular upon its face; (b) That he became the holder of it before it was overdue and without notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact; (c) That he took it in good faith and for value; (d) That at the time it was negotiated to him, he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of person negotiating it.

As a general rule, under the above provision, every holder is presumed prima facie to be a holder in due course. One who claims otherwise has the onus probandi to prove that one or more of the conditions required to constitute a holder in due course are lacking. In this case, petitioner contends that the element of “value” is not present, therefore, respondent could not be a holder in due course.

Petitioner’s contention lacks merit. Section 25 of the same law states: SEC. 25. Value, what constitutes. – Value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. An antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes value; and is deemed as such whether the instrument is payable on demand or at a future time.

In Walker Rubber Corp. v. Nederlandsch Indische & Handelsbank, N.V. and South Sea Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., this Court ruled that value “in general terms may be some right, interest, profit or benefit to the party who makes the contract or some forbearance, detriment, loan, responsibility, etc. on the other side.” Here, there is no dispute that respondent received Rodrigo Cawili’s cashier’s check as payment for the former’s vegetable oil. The fact that it was Rodrigo who purchased the cashier’s check from petitioner will not affect respondent’s status as a holder for value since the check was delivered to him as payment for the vegetable oil he sold to spouses Cawili. Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that respondent is a holder in due course of the cashier’s check.

Furthermore, it bears emphasis that the disputed check is a cashier’s check. In International Corporate Bank v. Spouses Gueco, this Court held that a cashier’s check is really the bank’s own check and may be treated as a promissory note with the bank as the maker. The check becomes the primary obligation of the bank which issues it and constitutes a written promise to pay upon demand. In New Pacific Timber & Supply Co. Inc. v. Señeris, this Court took judicial notice of the “well-known and accepted practice in the business sector that a

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cashier’s check is deemed as cash.” This is because the mere issuance of a cashier’s check is considered acceptance thereof.

In view of the above pronouncements, petitioner bank became liable to respondent from the moment it issued the cashier’s check. Having been accepted by respondent, subject to no condition whatsoever, petitioner should have paid the same upon presentment by the former.

3. Forged checks/payable to “cash” Where the questioned checks were payable to ‘cash,’ appeared regular on their face and the bank found nothing unusual in the transaction, as the drawer usually issued checks in big amounts made payable to cash or to a particular person or to a company, the bank cannot be faulted in paying the value of the disputed checks (Security Bank v. Triumph Lumber, 301 SCRA 537).

Drawer is precluded from asserting forgery while the drawee bank can prove a failure by the customer/drawer to exercise ordinary care that substantially contributed to the making of the forged signature (Associated Bank v. CA, 252 SCRA 620).

4. Encashment slips are commercial law documents (Gina Domingo v. People, GR No. 186101, 12 October 2009).

5. Delivery Delivery as the term is used in Section 12 of the negotiable Instruments law means that the party delivering did so for the purpose of giving effect thereto (San Miguel Corporation v.

Puzon, Jr., 631 SCRA 48, 22 September 2010).

6. Presumption in the issuance of checks It is highly inconceivable that an experienced businessman would issue various checks in sizeable amounts to a payee if these are without consideration (Cayanan v. North Star International Travel, Inc., 658 SCRA 644, 05 October 2011).

The issuance of the check does not of itself operate as an assignment of any part of the funds in the bank to the credit of the drawer (RCBC v. Hi-Tri Dev’’t. Corp., 672 SCRA 514, 13 June 2012).

7. Manager's check A manager's check is one drawn by a bank's manager upon the bank itself; By its peculiar character and general use in commerce, a manager's check is regarded substantially to be as good as the money it represents (PNB v. Trial, 671 SCRA 440, 25 April 2012).

There are checks of a special type called manager’s or cashier’s checks. These are bill of exchange drawn by the bank’s manager or cashier, in the name of the bank, against the bank itself. Typically, a manager’s or a cashier’s check procured from the bank by allocating a particular amount of funds to be debited from the depositor’s account or by directly paying or depositing to the bank the value of the check to be drawn (RCBC v. Hi-Tri Dev’’t. Corp., 672 SCRA 514, 13 June 2012).

8. Reason for dishonor must be stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal Where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal, a mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for conviction under the law (Resterio v. People, 681 SCRA 592, 24 September 2012).

9. Payment of value of check The fact that the issuer of the check had already paid the value of the dishonored check after having received the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor should have forestalled the filing of the Information in court (Lim v. People, 742 SCRA 684, 26 November 2014).

It should be emphasized as well that payment of the value of the bounced check after the information has been filed in court would no longer have the effect of exonerating the accused from possible conviction for violation of the Batas Pambansa (B.P.) 22 (Lim v. People, 742 SCRA 684, 26 November 2014).

10. Intent in issuing a check is immaterial

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In cases like violation of BP 22, a special law, the intent in issuing a check is immaterial.

The law has made the mere act of issuing a bad check malum prohibitum, an act prescribed by the legislature for being deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Considering the rule in mala prohibita cases, the only inquiry is whether the law has been breached. 25 The lower courts were unanimous in finding that, indeed. Purificacion issued the bouncing check. Thus, regardless of her intent, she remains civilly liable because the act or omission, the making and issuing of the subject check, from which her civil liability arises, evidently exists. (Nissan Gallery-Ortigas v.

Felipe, 709 SCRA 214, 11 November 2013) 11. Institution of criminal and civil actions --- consequences of an acquittal on the civil aspect of the case The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the criminal case where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.

Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the act or omission imputed to him.

If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor (Ching vs. Nicdao, et al., G.R. No. 141181, April 27, 2007). ***** ŠLarry P. Ignacio *****