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The Atlantic Wall Linear Museum I • THE ARCHIVE edited by Gennaro Postiglione

dedicato alla costruzione della pace


The Atlantic Wall Linear Museum

proponent Sezione di Museografia DPA-Politecnico di Milano ITALY

PARTECIPANT MEMBERS

EXHIBITION

SPONSOR

The Raversijde Domain, Belgium Alex Deseyne

research granted by EU programme “Culture 2000” Directorate General Education and Culture

Museum Center, Hanstholm, Denmark Jens Andersen

design studiometrico/Lorenzo Bini Gennaro Postiglione Giulio Padovani

Paola Lenarduzzi, Milano ADV Birò, Castelfiorentino Litogì, Milano Saving, Milano studiometrico, Milano

DRAC (Directions Régionales des Affaires Culturelles), Région Bretagne, France Guillaume Lecuillier project leader Gennaro Postiglione DPA Politecnico di Milano, Itlay project leader partner Giulio Padovani co-organizer responsibles Andrea Bruno, Luc Verpoest Raymond Lemarie International centre for Conservation, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium Claude Prelorenzo, Andrea Santangelo GRAI (Groupe de Recherche sur l’Architecture et les Infrastructure), Ecole d’Architecture de Versailles, France coordination Daniela Canzi Ester Golia Lucie Moriceau

Dipartimento di urbanistica IUAV (Istituto Universitario d’Architettura di Venezia), Italy Guido Guidi Forsvarsbygg Tjeneste, Eiendomsavdelingen, Norway Janne Wilberg Alderney Society, Channel Islands, United Kingdom Trevor Davenport

production Saving S.r.l. graphic design Paola Lenarduzzi

WEB SITE www.atlanticwall.polimi.it production ADV Birò/Filippo Rossi graphic design Paola Lenarduzzi Raffaella Colutto

CATALOGUE CIOS (Channel Islands Occupation Society), Guernsey Branch, United Kingdom Paul Bourgaize

graphic design Paola Lenarduzzi Sara Bianchi production Litogì S.r.l. translation Sara Marinelli Jonah Hershowitz Marit Solvoll thanks to Riccardo Stefanelli Luca Basso Peressut Michele Polverino Lina Ruggiero Camillo Sangiorgio


Photographs & maps courtesy of © belgium The Raversijde Domain, Oostende (RD) CANADA National Archives of Canada, Alfred Hown Photography, Ottawa (NAC) DENMARK Rigsarkivet, Copenhagen (RA) Museum Center Hanstholm, Hanstholm (MCH) Løkken Lokalarkiv, Løkken (LL) Brix via Peter Willumsen, Fanø (BPW) Museet for Danmarks Frihedskamp, Copenhagen (MDF) Marineschule Mürwik, Flensburg (MM) Bangsbo Museum & Arkiv, Frederikshavn (BMM) Rudbjerg Lokalarkiv, Rudbjerg (RL) Tøjhusmuseet, The Royal Danish Arsenal Museum, Copenhagen (TM)

FRANCE Service Historique de la Défense: Département de la Marine, Vincennes (SHM) Service Historique de la Défense: Département de l’Armée de l’Air, Vincennes (SHAA) Service Historique de la Défense: Département de la Marine, Brest (SHMB) Institut Géographique National, Paris (IGN) Etablissement cinematographique et photogaphique des armees – Fort d’Ivry, Ivry sur Seine (ECPAD) Collection particulière, Caen (CP: CRDP) Fonds Rémy Desquesnes, collection particulière (CP: FRD) Central Photo Caen, Caen (CPC) Génie de Lille, Lille (GL) Bibliothèque national de France, Cabinet des Estampes, Paris (BNF) Institut National de l’Audiovisuel, Paris (INA) Centre d’etudes Edmond-Michelet, ville de Brive-la-Gaillarde (CEEM) Photo Romeo India, Le Rozel (PRI) Directions Régionales des Affaires Culturelles, Région Bretagne DRAC

GERMANY Bundesmilitararchiv, Freiburg (BMA/FR) Bundesarchiv, Koblenz (BA/KO) Archive Todt, Berlin (AT) Foto Bonn (FB) GREAT BRITAIN Guernsey Museum service, Guernsey (GM) Royal Court, Festung Guernsey, Guernsey (RC) Ordinance Survey, Southampton (OS) Channel Islands Occupation Society, Guernsey and Jersey (CIOS) Alderney Museum, Alderney (AM) Imperial War Museum, London (IWM) Ministry of Defense, Air Force Departement Photograph, University of Keele (MDAF) Priaulx Library, St. Peter Port, Guernsey (PL)

the NETHERLANDS Koninklijke Bibliotek, Den Haage (KB) NORWAY Forsvarets bygningstjeneste, Eiendomavdelingen, Oslo (FBT/E) Romsdalmuseet, Romsdal (RM) Kristiansand Kanonmuseum, Kristiansand (KKM) Uboot-Archiv (UA) Submarine Museum, Gosport (SMG) USA National Air and Space Museum, Archives Division, Smithsoman Institution, Washington DC (NAW)


The atlantic wall linear museum I

The Archive

II

The Atlas

III Guido Guidi Fragments


CONTENTs

The atlantic wall linear museum I • The Archive INTRODUCTION • Gennaro Postiglione

9

INTRODUCTION ESSAYS • Rudi Rolf | The atlantic rampart

45

• Remy Desquesnes | Organisation Todt, un êtat dans l’êtat

55

COUNTRY PRESENTATION • France | curator G. ����������� Lécuillier

63

• Channel Islands (GB) | curators P. Bourgaize and T. Davenport

113

• Belgium | curators L. Verpoest and A. Deseyne

175

• The Netherlands | curator R. Rolf

191

• Denmark | curator J. Andersen

225

• Norway | curators Britt-Alise ������������ ������������ Hjelmeland, ����� Hans Egede-Nissen, ���������������

259

Janne Wilberg, Marte Oftedal, Leif Johnny Johannessen;

for 095_N, G. Brendeland, O. Kristoffersen

CONTRIBUTES • Hans Egde Nissen | Atlantic Wall heritage: maintenance and decay

305

• Claude Prelorenzo | Le Mur de l’Atlantique dans la modernité

312

• Andrea Santangelo | Le mur de l’atlantique en representation

320

• Gennaro Postiglione | The Atlantic Wall: why a museum on European soil

330

• Giulio Padovani | Europe: subcutaneous geographies

3�� 38

• Paola Lenarduzzi | The AWLM web site

3�� 48

• Lorenzo Bini | The AWLM exhibition

3�� 50


PRESENTATION

The DPA (Department of Architecture) of the Politecnico of Milan (Italy), to� gether with the GRAI (Grouppe de Recherche sur l’architecture et les infra� structures) of the Ecole d’Architecture de Versailles (France), and the RLICC (Raymond Lemaire International Centre for Conservation) in Leuven (Bel� gium), has managed a research work within the EU programme “Culture 2000” concerning the Atlantic Wall - one of the last major defence lines of this century, built by German occupation forces in the period 1939-1944 along the coasts of France, Channel Islands (GB), Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Denmark and Norway. During this period more than 10.000 heavy concrete bunkers were built along almost 6.000 km of coast, a number impressive in quantity and in the cost and labour involved. Many prisoners were forced to work on the construction and lost their lives there, intersecting private stories with social history. The project underlines the Atlantic Wall’s architectural, aesthetic, and cultural landscape value as a transnational cultural heritage, preserving a shared memory on European soil - an heritage to be safeguarded and protected through the creation of The Atlantic Wall Linear Museum. The infrastructure, a unique example of its kind, is of great interest for many reasons, including the architectural quality of its vast building system, the ability of these objects to define a new aesthetic canon for modernity, and the relationships they have established with their natural and urban contexts – es� sential elements for interpreting cultural landscapes. These military fortifications, moreover, represent the most widespread building heritage at European level, preserving a public and collective memory of WWII. The state of abandonment of much of the Atlantic Wall jeopardizes both its existence and the values it represents. Preserving this collective memory and public history is essential for a Europe intent on building its own future Following are the actions promoted and fulfilled by the project. The Atlantic Wall Atlas

The publication of an atlas, presenting an historical documentation of maps of the areas concerned, is the first concrete step towards recognizing the infrastruc� ture’s value, and indispensable for the creation of a Linear Museum. The atlas also comprises a series of photographs proposing a critical analysis of the infra� structure and the relationship it has formed with its surroundings. A specific photographic campaign, by Guido Guidi, served both as a testimony and an interpretation of the structures.


The Travelling Exhibition

“The Atlantic Wall Traces: Cultural Heritage, Collective Memory and Common Roots for the Forthcoming Europe” presents, in a concise and evocative way, a selection of materials (maps and photographs) proposing critical interpretations which will stimulate the development of a collective, shared consciousness of the architectural, aesthetic and landscape dimension of this immense cultural heritage. The main objective of the exhibition is to oppose the process of the At� lantic Wall’s disintegration resulting from public neglect, and to reappropriate, on a European scale, its specific character as a testimony of “memory resistance” and as a possible monument for the creation of peace. The International Convention

“The Atlantic Wall Traces: Cultural Heritage, Collective Memory and Common Roots for the Forthcoming Europe” promoted a critical discussion of the work, research and objectives undertaken, and served as a forum for exchanging ideas and interpretations of the Atlantic Wall infrastructure. The diverse analytical ap� proaches and proposed papers by representatives, partners, participants as well as other outside parties involved, are included in the Atlas. The promotion of an Atlantic Wall Linear Museum, underlining a com� mon historical and cultural identity within the context of the European Union, is one of the main objectives of this convention. The Web-Gateway

“The Atlantic Wall Linear Museum” website is be the only place where objects, landscape and memory can effectively meet and relationships can be drawn be� tween a multitude of elements, emphasizing certain characteristics. As a didactic instrument capable of reaching a large audience, the WebMuseum represents a shared archive for conserving and displaying - following the strictest museum traditions - a heritage whose value and vastness contribute to legitimizing the existence of a Europe both geographical and socio-political.


Re-assembled map of Atlantikwall batteries and fortress engineers, 194445 (Maps of France, Belgium and The Netherlands © SHM; maps of Denmark, Germany and Norway © BMA/FR; map of Channel Islands © PL)




The Atlantic Wall Linear Museum Gennaro Postiglione project leader

Two years ago when, together with GRAI and RLICC, we submitted our pro� posal to the European Union to obtain co-funding for the project “The Atlantic Wall Linear Museum”, the state of the art seemed pretty chaotic and confus� ing: an archipelago of institutions, associations, working teams and so on, each acting at a national level, if not locally. So if, on one hand, the reasons for such a wide interest in The Atlantic Wall seemed evident, on the other, the reasons of its fragmentariness were obscure. As such fragmentation seemed paradoxical inasmuch as were evident the value and the unity of the immense infrastructure, we devoted most of our energies to attempting to systematise the multiplicity we were confronted with. The compilation of a catalogue-archive, realised starting from a standard template (obtained by simplifying the internationally recognised one), has been the first concrete research toward the construction of the future Linear Museum which takes into account the bellicose infrastructure in its transnational dimen� sion. The reasoned and critical cataloguing of a defined number of cases, ninetyeight sites in all, has been carried out thanks to the participation and responsibil� ity of local experts and institutions already operative in the field, scattered across the different countries traversed by the Wall: from the farthest, Norway, to nearer France, passing through Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and the Channel Islands. The selection of sites was followed by detailed research and the collection of historical documents, maps and photographs, which contributed to reinforc� ing the idea of unity concealed behind the realisation of the Atlantikwall. The materials are presented in different ways: on the website dedicated to the project (www.atlanticwall.polimi.it), in the travelling exhibition (“The Atlantic Wall Linear Museum: cultural heritage, collective memory and common roots for the forthcoming Europe”, opened for the first time at the Politecnico of Milan on 27 October 2005), and in this catalogue. Concerning the cartography, the research work conducted in the archives has, above all, brought about the realisation of the first European mapping of the Atlantikwall: a map obtained by compiling those belonging to diverse ar� chives, and assembled here for the first time. Notwithstanding the geographical and chronological differences, and the diversity of information contained in each sheet, this map is at the same time the sign and the symbol of our work: research aimed at sewing together heterogeneous, autonomous and separated elements. The work did not lack difficulties. For instance, while editing the cartographic atlas, together with the complimentary cooperation of several people and insti� tutions - all of them present at the final conference at the Politecnico of Milan 


(8 November 2005) - we encountered many obstacles dealing with military ar� chives. Perhaps it is a signal that indicates one of the themes that the research seeks to touch: Memory. Beyond its documentary and archivist spirit, this work is also not unaware of the embarrassing memory which lies in these buildings: a collective, shared memory, unresolved on a European level, and rather in some respects repressed. It is almost as if a gaze may rest on these objects only on the condition that the role of memory is alienated: memories and records which are nevertheless im� printed in their own physical structures and in their geographical locations. Slits that perhaps open through the crystallised gaze of Guido Guidi’s, the photog� rapher who, travelling along “the wall”, has arrested in some unforgettable snap� shots the fragments of history imprinted in each of the buildings. Entrusting a photographer’s sensitivity with the task of reading and condensing the complex� ity and vastness of the defensive system into a limited number of images has been one of the main acts of interpretation of the Vallo Atlantico (as we call it in Italy) . In fact, the snapshots restore the reality of the infrastructure, filtered through the gaze of the photographer, performing a reduction and a synthesis able to offer the visitor a privileged way to understand the complexity beyond and within the intricate defensive net. Not unlike so many warlike vestiges which invade many of our metropo� lises, emerging in the urban grid as uninvited guests, the Atlantic Wall bunkers show their incapacity, or unwillingness, to be absorbed or erased. They are frag� ments which escape any act of normalisation or planning, the reign of chaos and unheimelich, that disturbing memory, the Freudian “uncanny”; they are shreds of a past which cannot find its own emotional, functional, and spatial location, a result of a memory never elaborated and too simply removed. It is worth underlining and reinforcing with determination an absolutely negative judgment on war, on that war, and on who promoted that war and was its principle actor: Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich, whose actions stained with blood, suffering and horror, the same land where today many of us are trying to construct a shared future of peace. Therefore, it is also necessary to reinforce that involvement in these “embarrassing” warlike artefacts has nothing whatsoever to do with any attempt to rehabilitate those who created that war and those who believed in it. On the contrary, we emphasize that to transform the long Atlantic Wall into a shared monument is a real action, creative and positive, an extension of the mourning that also keeps alive the shared memories stored in it. What in fact are monuments, if not means to prevent men from forgetting, as well as artefacts from which to demand the task of preserving and passing on collective 10


values? This is, in fact, the primary purpose of the monument. This is the un� dertaking for those of us involved in the Atlantic Wall Linear Museum: A “wall” that exploits the architectonic and landscape value of the massive infrastructure in order to sew together public history and individual stories. Therefore, it is the organizers’ intention to submit this work to UNESCO, in order to overcome the fragmented approach to the Atlantikwall �������� and the ������ inter� est in its artefacts, an attitude that has often been useful only to further vested, and sometimes unclear, interests. Only by collecting and taking back what be� longs to us, can we battle the many attempts at instrumentalisation, bringing new life to a piece of our history, which is also, indissolubly, a piece of our body.

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Collection of Atlantikwall pictures from Bundesarchiv in Koblenz (© BA/K)

France Bild 146 – 1973 – 036 – 01 Originaltitel: “Batterie Todt”, heute bereits ein Begriff für den Feind: ein unbezinglicher Gegener Aufnahme : OT – Kriegsberichter Maier Fotograf: Maier Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Sammlung von Repro������������ – Negativen ��������� BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939������������������������������� – 1945}/Ee ���������������������������� {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}/ Ee 360 / 370 {Frankreich unter deutscher Besatzung (26.6.1940��������������������� – 5.6.1944)}/Ee ������������������ 374 {Atlantikwall}/Ee 374��������������������� – 90 ������������������ {Batterie Todt} Bild 146 – 1977 – 050 – 03 Originaltitel: Auf der Wacht. In dem gegen schwersten Beschuss gesicherten Geschützbunker erwarten die Verteidiger des Atlantikwalles den Angriff des Gegners. Aufnahme: OT – Kriegsberichter Maier Fotograf: Maier Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Sammlung von Repro – Negativen Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}/ Ee 360 / 370 {Frankreich unter deutscher Besatzung (26.6.1940 – 5.6.1944)}/Ee 374 {Atlantikwall}/Ee 374 – 90 {Batterie Todt} Bild 101II – MW – 1994 – 06 Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, Januar 1941 Datierung(voll): Januar 1941 Datierung(Jahr): 1941 Fotograf: Krönke Copyright: Bundesarchiv

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Bild 146 – 1986 – 104 – 10A Originaltitel: Schwerste deutsche Küstenbatterie in Bereitschaft. Aufnahme: OT – Kriegsberichter Maier Fotograf: Maier Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Sammlung von Repro – Negativen Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/ Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}/Ee 360 / 370 {Frankreich unter deutscher Besatzung (26.6.1940 – 5.6.1944)}/Ee 374 {Atlantikwall}/ Ee 374 – 90 {Batterie Todt} Bild 146 – 1995 – 083 – 21 Originaltitel: Millionen Kubikmeter Beton hat die OT für die Schaffung der stärksten Befestigungsanlage der Welt verwenden müssen, um die äußerlich teilweise fast bizarren Formen der Verteidigungsanlage gegen jede feindliche Invasion zu bauen. Ein ���� Leitbunker am Kanal. Aufn.: OT – Kriegsberichter Adam Fotograf: Adam Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Sammlung von Repro – Negativen BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/

Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}/Ee 360 / 370 {Frankreich unter deutscher Besatzung (26.6.1940 – 5.6.1944)}/Ee 374 {Atlantikwall}/ Ee 374 – 90 {Batterie Todt} Bild 146 – 1998 – 036 – 21A Originaltitel: Unüberwindlicher Wall am Atlantik In nimmerruhender Arbeit schufen die Männer der O.T. jenen gewaltigen Wall an Europas Westküste, an dem jeder feindliche Angriffsversuch zerschellen wird. Einer der unzähligen Bunker, die dicht an dicht die ganze lange Küste umsäumen. Agentur: Scherl Bilderdienst Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Sammlung von Repro – Negativen BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/ Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}/Ee 360 / 370 {Frankreich unter deutscher Besatzung (26.6.1940 – 5.6.1944)}/Ee 374 {Atlantikwall}/Ee ����������������� 374 – 10 {im Bau}

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Bild 101II – MW – 2836 – 09 Archivischer Titel: Frankreich Fotograf: Stephan Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*} Bild 101II – MW – 2836 – 13 Archivischer Titel: Frankreich Fotograf: Stephan Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}

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Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*} Bild 101II – MW – 2026 – 05A Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, 1941 Datierung(voll): 1941 Datierung(Jahr): 1941 Fotograf: Dietrich Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}/ Ee 360 / 370 {Frankreich unter deutscher Besatzung (26.6.1940 – 5.6.1944)} Bild 101II – MW – 4054 – 08A Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, 1941 Datierung(voll): 1941 Datierung(Jahr): 1941 Fotograf: Engelke Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich* Guernsey

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Bild 101II – MW – 2269 – 12 Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, 1941 Datierung(voll): 1941 Datierung(Jahr): 1941 Fotograf: Bannemann (o) Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}/Ee 360 / 370 {Frankreich unter deutscher Besatzung (26.6.1940 – 5.6.1944)} Bild 101II – MW – 4028 – 19A Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, 1941 Datierung(voll): 1941 Datierung(Jahr): 1941 Fotograf: Hasert Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*} Bild 101II – MW – 4054 – 03A Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, 1941 Datierung(voll): 1941 Datierung(Jahr): 1941 Fotograf: Engelke Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}

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Bild 101II – MW – 4054 – 21A Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, 1941 Datierung(voll): 1941 Datierung(Jahr): 1941 Fotograf: Engelke Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*} Bild 101II – MW – 2932 – 23A Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, 1942 Datierung(voll): 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Engelmann Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}

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Bild 101II – MW – 3677 – 12 Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, 1942 Datierung(voll): 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Buchheim Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*} Bild 101II – MW – 3677 – 27A Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, 1942 Datierung(voll): 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Buchheim Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*} Bild 101II – MW – 3686 – 10A Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, 1942 Datierung(voll): 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Schwich Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}

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Bild 101II – MW – 3690 – 19A Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, 1942 Datierung(voll): 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Schaaf Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/ Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*} Bild 101II – MW – 3690 – 21A Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, 1942 Datierung(voll): 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Schaaf Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/ Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}

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Bild 101II – MW – 3704 – 13A Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, 1942 Datierung(voll): 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Schlemmer Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*} Bild 101II – MW – 3828 – 07A Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, 1942 Datierung(voll): 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Schmidt Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}

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Bild 101II – MW – 3828 – 19A Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, 1942 Datierung(voll): 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Schmidt Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}


Bild 101II – MW – 3829 – 15A Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, 1942 Datierung(voll): 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Weiß Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*} Bild 101II – MW – 3829 – 25 Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, 1942 Datierung(voll): 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Weiß Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}

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Bild 101II – MW – 4436 – 01 Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, 1942 Datierung(voll): 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Stephan Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/ Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*} Bild 101II – MW – 4467 – 29 Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, 1942 Datierung(voll): 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Böttger Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/ Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*} Bild 101II – MW – 6059 – 06 Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, 1942 Datierung(voll): 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Hasert Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/ Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}

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Bild 101II – MW – 6059 – 10 Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, 1942 Datierung(voll): 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Hasert Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*} Bild 101II – MW – 6860 – 29A Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, Sommer 1942 Datierung(voll): 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Tölle (Tröller) Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}/Ee 360 / 370 {Frankreich unter deutscher Besatzung (26.6.1940 – 5.6.1944)}/Ee 374 {Atlantikwall}/Ee 374 – 10 {im Bau} Bild 101II – MW – 6860 – 17A Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, Sommer 1942 Datierung(voll): 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Tölle (Tröller) Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee ��������������������������������� 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}

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Bild 183 – S68956 Originaltitel: Zentralbild II. Weltkrieg 1939 – 45 Die deutschen Küstenbefestigungen in dem durch die faschistische deutsche Wehrmacht besetzten Frankreich, 1942. U.B.z.: einen mächtigen Verteidigungsblock an der französischen Atlantikküste 4829 – 42 Datierung(voll): 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst – Zentralbild BildTyp: Fotografie Bild 183 – B22966 Originaltitel: Die Piesenbunker am Atlantik In einer gewaltigen Arbeitssymphonie entstanden an der Atlantikküste die riesigen Bunker – Bauten, die unseren U – Booten bombensichere Stützpunkte bieten. PK – Aufnahme: Kriegsberichter Tölle 6495 – 42 Okt. 1942 Archivischer Titel: Piesenbunker am Atlantik; La Pallice Datierung(voll): Oktober 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Tölle (Tröller) Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst – Zentralbild BildTyp: Fotografie

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Bild 101II – MW – 3706 – 26 Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, März 1942 Datierung(voll): März 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Kramer Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/ Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*} Bild 101II – MW – 3747 – 30 Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, April1942 Datierung(voll): April 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Kramer Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/ Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}

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Bild 101II – MW – 3815 – 22 Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, April 1942 Datierung(voll): April 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Stephan Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/ Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*} Bild 101II – MW – 3815 – 23 Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, April 1942 Datierung(voll): April 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Stephan Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine

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BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/ Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*} Bild 101II – MW – 3936 – 01A Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, April 1942 Datierung(voll): April 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/ Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}


Bild 101II – MW – 3936 – 06A Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, April 1942 Datierung(voll): April 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*} Bild 101I – 292 – 1276 – 12 Archivischer Titel: Frankreich – Nord, Sommer 1942; PK 698 Datierung(voll): 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Teschendorf Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}/Ee 360 / 370 {Frankreich unter deutscher Besatzung (26.6.1940 – 5.6.1944)}/Ee 374 {Atlantikwall}/Ee 374 – 10 {im Bau} Bild 101I – 292 – 1278 – 27 Archivischer Titel: Frankreich – Nord, Sommer 1942; PK 698 Datierung(voll): 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Teschendorf Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}/Ee 360 / 370 {Frankreich unter deutscher Besatzung (26.6.1940 – 5.6.1944)}/Ee 374 {Atlantikwall}/Ee 374 – 10 {im Bau}

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Bild 101I – 292 – 1279 – 07A Archivischer Titel: Frankreich – Nord, Sommer 1942; PK 698 Datierung(voll): 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Teschendorf Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/ Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}/Ee 360 / 370 {Frankreich unter deutscher Besatzung (26.6.1940 – 5.6.1944)}/ Ee 374 {Atlantikwall}/Ee 374 – 10 {im Bau} Bild 101I – 292 – 1280 – 27 Archivischer Titel: Frankreich – Nord, Sommer 1942; PK 698 Datierung(voll): 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Teschendorf Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien

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Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}/Ee 360 / 370 {Frankreich unter deutscher Besatzung (26.6.1940 – 5.6.1944)}/ Ee 374 {Atlantikwall}/Ee 374 – 10 {im Bau} Bild 101II – MW – 6519 – 11A Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, Juli 1942 Datierung(voll): Juli 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Vater Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/ Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee ����������������� 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}


Bild 101II – MW – 6860 – 25A Originaltitel: An der Atlantikküste Lastwagen bringen Unmengen von Material: Eisen, Zement usw. für die Bunkerbauten. PK – Kriegsberichter: Tölle Okt. 1942, La Pallice Datierung(voll): Oktober 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Tölle (Tröller) Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Bild 183 – J14235 Originaltitel: An der Kanalküste Einer der mächtigen Küstenbunker im Hafengebiet einer Stadt an der Kanalküste. PK – Aufnahme : Kriegsberichter Chevalier 17.5.43 Datierung(voll): 17.5.1943 Datierung(Jahr): 1943 Fotograf: Chevalier Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst – Zentralbild BildTyp: Fotografie

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Bild 101I – 298 – 1777 – 07A Archivischer Titel: Nordfrankreich, 1943/44; PK 698 Datierung(voll): 1943/44 Datierung(Jahr): 1943/44 Fotograf: Janke Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}/Ee 360 / 370 {Frankreich unter deutscher Besatzung (26.6.1940 – 5.6.1944)}/Ee 374 {Atlantikwall}/ Ee 374 – 20 {Befestigungen} Bild 101I – 719 – 0204 – 06A Archivischer Titel: Frankreich vor Invasion 1944; KBK, Ob. West – (lks.) General der Flieger Christainsen (Befehlshaber der Niederland) besichtigt einen Bunker Datierung(voll): 1944 Datierung(Jahr): 1944 Fotograf: Hähle Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/ Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}/Ee 360 / 370 {Frankreich unter deutscher Besatzung (26.6.1940 – 5.6.1944)}/Ee 374 {Atlantikwall}/ Ee 374 – 20 {Befestigungen}

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france and belgium Bild 101I – 751 – 0082 – 02A Archivischer Titel: Belg./Frankreich, Mai/Juni 1940; Staffel B Datierung(voll): Mai/Juni 1940 Datierung(Jahr): 1940 Fotograf: Bork Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 320 {Belgien} E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}/Ee 360 / 370 {Frankreich unter deutscher Besatzung (26.6.1940 – 5.6.1944)} Bild 101II – MW – 2083 – 25A Archivischer Titel: Belgien, 1941 Datierung(voll): 1941 Datierung(Jahr): 1941 Fotograf: Hasert Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 320 {Belgien} Bild 101I – 599 – B1043 – 31 Archivischer Titel: Frankreich, Kanalküste 1942/43; KBK Lw.z.b.V. Datierung(voll): 1942 – 1943 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 – 1943 Fotograf: Hornig Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}/Ee 360 / 370 {Frankreich unter deutscher Besatzung (26.6.1940 – 5.6.1944)}/Ee 374 {Atlantikwall}/Ee 374 – 20 ��������������� {Befestigungen}

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Bild 101I – 293 – 1464 – 29 Archivischer Titel: Nordfrankreich/ Belgien,April/Juli 1943; PK 698 Datierung(voll): April / Juli 1943 Datierung(Jahr): 1943 Fotograf: Lüthge Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/ Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}/Ee 360 / 370 {Frankreich unter deutscher Besatzung (26.6.1940 – 5.6.1944)}/ Ee 374 {Atlantikwall}/Ee 374 – 20 {Befestigungen} Bild 101I – 294 – 1523 – 18 Archivischer Titel: Nordfrankreich, Sommer 1943; PK 698 Datierung(voll): 1943 Datierung(Jahr): 1943 Fotograf: Müller, Karl Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/

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Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}/Ee 360 / 370 {Frankreich unter deutscher Besatzung (26.6.1940 – 5.6.1944)}/Ee 374 {Atlantikwall}/ Ee 374 – 20 ��������������� {Befestigungen} Bild 101I – 294 – 1523 – 21A Archivischer Titel: Nordfrankreich, Sommer 1943; PK 698 Datierung(voll): 1943 Datierung(Jahr): 1943 Fotograf: Müller, Karl Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/ Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}/Ee 360 / 370 {Frankreich unter deutscher Besatzung (26.6.1940 – 5.6.1944)}/ Ee 374 {Atlantikwall}/Ee 374 – 20 {Befestigungen}


Guernsey Bild 101I – 223 – 0042 – 13 Archivischer Titel: Englische Kanalinsel Guernsey Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 400 {Kampf gegen England}/Ee 410 {Englische Kanalinseln unter deutscher Besatzung} Bild 101I – 223 – 0046 – 11 Archivischer Titel: Englische Kanalinsel Guernsey Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 400 {Kampf gegen England}/Ee 410 {Englische Kanalinseln unter deutscher Besatzung}

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Bild 101I – 223 – 045 – 27 Archivischer Titel: Englische Kanalinsel Guernsey Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 400 {Kampf gegen England}/Ee 410 {Englische Kanalinseln unter deutscher Besatzung}

the netherlands Bild 183 – J15401 Originaltitel: Flakfestung im Meer Mitten im Kanal ragt aus der Tiefe des Meeres ein Castell wie eine Überrest aus grauem Mittelalter. In der Nähe aber entpuppt sich das scheinbar alte Gemäuer als eine moderne Festung aus Eisen und Beton, eines der mächtigen Vorwerke des Atlantikwalls, bestückt mit Flakabwehrwaffen aller Kaliber. PK – Aufnahme: Kriegsberichter Kreutzer 16.9.43 Datierung(voll): 16.9.1943 Datierung(Jahr): 1943 Fotograf: Kreutzer Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst – Zentralbild BildTyp: Fotografie

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Denmark Bild 101I – 754 – 0067N – 28 Archivischer Titel: Dänemark, 1940; Staffel D Datierung(voll): 1940 Datierung(Jahr): 1940 Fotograf: Kropf Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 200 {Nordeuropa}/Ee ������������������������������ 210 {Dänemark} Bild 101I – 754 – 0067N – 29 Archivischer Titel: Dänemark, 1940; Staffel D Datierung(voll): 1940 Datierung(Jahr): 1940 Fotograf: Kropf Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 200 {Nordeuropa}/Ee ������������������������������ 210 {Dänemark}

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Bild 101I – 754 – 0068N – 23 Archivischer Titel: Dänemark, 1940; Staffel D Datierung(voll): 1940 Datierung(Jahr): 1940 Fotograf: Storz, Dr. Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 200 {Nordeuropa}/Ee ������������������������������ 210 {Dänemark} Bild 101I – 755 – 0161N – 20 Archivischer Titel: Dänemark, 1940; Staffel D Datierung(voll): 1940 Datierung(Jahr): 1940 Fotograf: Thiel I Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 200 {Nordeuropa}/Ee ������������������������������ 210 {Dänemark} Bild 101I – 755 – 0161N – 25 Archivischer Titel: Dänemark, 1940; Staffel D Datierung(voll): 1940 Datierung(Jahr): 1940 Fotograf: Thiel I Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 200 {Nordeuropa}/Ee ������������������������������ 210 {Dänemark}

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Bild 101I – 755 – 0192N – 37 Archivischer Titel: Dänemark, 1940; Staffel D Datierung(voll): 1940 Datierung(Jahr): 1940 Fotograf: Bieling Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 200 {Nordeuropa}/Ee ������������������������������ 210 {Dänemark} Bild 101I – 755 – 0194N – 14 Archivischer Titel: Dänemark, 1940; Staffel D Datierung(voll): 1940 Datierung(Jahr): 1940 Fotograf: Bieling Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 200 {Nordeuropa}/Ee ������������������������������ 210 {Dänemark}

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Bild 101I – 758 – 0069 – 39 Archivischer Titel: Dänemark/Norwegen, 1940; Staffel Nord Datierung(voll): 1940 Datierung(Jahr): 1940 Fotograf: Lanzinger Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 200 {Nordeuropa}/Ee 210 {Dänemark} E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 200 {Nordeuropa}/Ee ������������������������������ 220 {Norwegen} Bild 101I – 759 – 0115N – 10A Archivischer Titel: Dänemark/Norwegen, 1940; Staffel Nord Datierung(voll): 1940 Datierung(Jahr): 1940 Fotograf: Ehlert Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 200 {Nordeuropa}/Ee 210 {Dänemark} E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 200 {Nordeuropa}/Ee 220 {Norwegen}

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norway Bild 101I – 600 – B1131 – 36A Archivischer Titel: Norwegen, Drontheim, April 1942; KBK Lw. z.b.V. Datierung(voll): April 1942 Datierung(Jahr): 1942 Fotograf: Meinhold Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 200 {Nordeuropa}/Ee ������������������������������ 220 {Norwegen} Bild 101I – 507 – B0102 – 27 Archivischer Titel: Norwegen, Eismeer, 1943; Lfl.5 Datierung(voll): 1943 Datierung(Jahr): 1943 Fotograf: Hirschfelder Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 200 {Nordeuropa}/Ee 220 {Norwegen}

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Bild 101I – 508 – B0131 – 14A Archivischer Titel: Norwegen, Herbst 1943; Lfl.5 Datierung(voll): 1943 Datierung(Jahr): 1943 Fotograf: Rümmler, Dr. Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/ Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 200 {Nordeuropa}/Ee 220 {Norwegen} Bild 101I – 508 – B0131 – 15A Archivischer Titel: Norwegen, Herbst 1943; Lfl.5 Datierung(voll): 1943 Datierung(Jahr): 1943 Fotograf: Rümmler, Dr. Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien

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Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/ Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 200 {Nordeuropa}/Ee 220 {Norwegen} Bild 101I – 509 – 0158A – 19A Archivischer Titel: Norwegen, Herbst/Winter 1943; Lfl.5 Datierung(voll): 1943 Datierung(Jahr): 1943 Fotograf: Engelmann Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/ Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 200 {Nordeuropa}/Ee 220 {Norwegen}


Bild 101I – 510 – B0210 – 06A Archivischer Titel: Norwegen, Herbst/Winter 1943; Lfl.5 Datierung(voll): 1943 Datierung(Jahr): 1943 Fotograf: Rümmler, Dr. Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 200 {Nordeuropa}/Ee 220 {Norwegen} Bild 101I – 510 – B0222 – 08A Archivischer Titel: Norwegen, Herbst/Winter 1943; Lfl.5 Datierung(voll): 1943 Datierung(Jahr): 1943 Fotograf: Zimmermann Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 200 {Nordeuropa}/Ee 220 {Norwegen}

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Bild 101I – 510 – B0222 – 14A Archivischer Titel: Norwegen, Herbst/Winter 1943; Lfl.5 Datierung(voll): 1943 Datierung(Jahr): 1943 Fotograf: Zimmermann Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/ Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 200 {Nordeuropa}/Ee ���������������� 220 {Norwegen} Bild 101I – 510 – B0222 – 17A Archivischer Titel: Norwegen, Herbst/Winter 1943; Lfl.5 Datierung(voll): 1943 Datierung(Jahr): 1943 Fotograf: Zimmermann Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/ Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 200 {Nordeuropa}/Ee 220 {Norwegen} Bild 101I – 512 – B0303 – 10 Archivischer Titel: Norwegen, Dez.1943/Januar 1944; Lfl.5 Datierung(voll): Dezember 1943/ Januar 1944 Datierung(Jahr): 1943 – 1944 Fotograf: Janz Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/ Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 200 {Nordeuropa}/Ee 220 {Norwegen}

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not identified place Bild 183 – 2005 – 0901 – 507 Originaltitel: Transport von Eisengeflechten für den Bunkerbau OT – Kriegsberichter: Maier 39 – 43 Archivischer Titel: Bau des Atlantikwalls Fotograf: Maier Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst – Zentralbild BildTyp: Fotografie Bild 101II – MW – 1944 – 08 Datierung(voll): 1941 Datierung(Jahr): 1941 Fotograf: Vorländer Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Marine BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/ Ed {Truppen – und Formationsgeschichte*}/Ed 100 / 200 {Heer*}/Ed 230 {Sanitätswesen}

Bild 101I – 263 – 1597 – 16A Originaltitel: Generalfeldmarschall Rommel an der Biskaya. Besichtigung des südlichen Teiles des Atlantikwalls. Archivischer Titel: Rommel – Atlantikwall 1944; PK 696 Datierung(voll): 1944 Datierung(Jahr): 1944 Fotograf: Gauss Copyright: Bundesarchiv Bestand: Propagandakompanien Heer und Luftwaffe BildTyp: Fotografie Klassifikation: E {Zweiter Weltkrieg 1939 – 1945}/ Ee {Kriegsschauplätze und Feldzüge}/Ee 300 {Westfeldzug}/Ee 350 / 360 / 370 / 380 {Frankreich*}/Ee 360 / 370 {Frankreich unter deutscher Besatzung (26.6.1940 – 5.6.1944)}/ Ee 374 {Atlantikwall}/Ee ��������� 374 – 60 {Besichtigungen}

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44


INTRODUCTION ESSAYS

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46


The Atlantic Rampart Rudi Rolf

Artillery observation post with armoured turret of type 120 north of Oye-Plage, France. A feature of the Westwall constructions applied in the early days of the Atlantikwall is the clearly visable high position of the armoured turret above the body of the bunker, 1994 (© R. �������� Rolf)

Our notion of the Atlantikwall is a product of German and Allied propaganda. Emphasizing the length and strength of the Atlantic Rampart, Germany boasted of its immense defences against English aggression – defences which could pre� vent another ‘1918’.Having breeched the Atlantic Wall, as the English called the defence system, the Allies equally stressed the sheer invincibility of the system, thus suggesting their own military power that overran the Wall.Apart from the propaganda the Atlantic Rampart is very interesting from architectural and his� torical perspectives. The concrete constructions it was composed of represent designs that are unequalled by the fortification efforts of other nations, or by civil architecture in general. These bunkers show extraordinary free features in general design as well as a crude finish in surfaces. Historically the constructions of the Rampart belong to those remaining artefacts that bear witness to the last war in Europe. In a military sense the Rampart was the first fortification system in which functions were fully integrated, and at the same time the last major sys� tem to be built.Like all phrases of war propaganda, the term “Atlantic Rampart” came to signify far more than the defence system it initially referred to. From 1943 on, “the Atlantic Rampart” was, in the mass media, a collective term that stood for all German military constructions along the European coast between Finland and Spain. Actually, these constructions were built according to differ� ent programmes, in different times, by different organisations and for different purposes. Consolidation

After the conquest of Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and France in 1940, the German military forces were in a winning spirit. All efforts were given to the offensive, aiming at the defeat of Great Britain. Defensive activities were limited and consisted of taking over former enemy coastal batteries, and moving German naval batteries to the newly obtained ports and harbours. These batteries were for the greater part withdrawn from the coastal defence of the German North Sea islands and ports as well as the Baltic shores. A list of defence measures in Nor� way dated November 9th, 1940 shows a total of 52 equipped coastal batteries near Norwegian ports of which 29 were ex-Norwegian batteries. Of the remaining 23, four were armed with looted Russian guns, two with English guns, and one with former Polish guns. Sixteen batteries were given German guns, among others the 28 cm Batterie Husöen off Trondheim. These batteries consisted of three or four open gun emplacements, a firing control post, shelters and ammunition bunkers made of thin concrete, wood or brick. Along West European coasts similar activities took place. Former Dutch 47


and French batteries were restored and modernised, keeping their original arma� ment. Channel Batteries

In one area, however, things were different. For the planned invasion of the Brit� ish Isles, the Straight of Dover had to be crossed. In order to secure a future landing and to control shipping through the English Channel, the German navy installed so-called offensive batteries in the Cap Gris Nez area. Construction of these began as soon as July, 1940, even before a ceasefire with France was agreed. The Channel batteries comprised four medium 17 cm batteries and five heavy batteries, of which Batterie Siegfried was armed with modern 38 cm guns that could reach English soil. The guns of Batterie Siegfried (later Todt) were mounted in huge casemates with 3.5 m thick concrete walls and roof. The Old� enburg and Friedrich August were initially placed in open emplacements and casemated afterward. The Batterie Prinz Heinrich, open as well, stayed open until it was moved to Leningrad in 1941. The fifth battery, Großer Kurfürst, received shielded guns which were exchanged for armoured turrets in 1942. Apart from the installation of existing and new coastal batteries, con� struction was limited to the erection of air-raid bunkers for naval and dockyard personnel in Norwegian and French ports. The major fortress construction element of the D-, C- and B1series of the Westwall was the flat armoured plate. Depicted is the plate of type 7P7 of a type B1 7abunker in the vicinity of Mettlach, Germany, 1984������������ ���������������� (© ����������� R. �������� Rolf)

48

Maritime Operations

10-10-40 marks the beginning of an enormous construction programme, the products of which were featured as Atlantikwall elements some years later. In October of the first year of war in Western Europe it was decided to provide Norwegian and French ports with sheltered U-boat bases. U-boat bunkers with wet and dry repair pens were introduced in Brest, Lorient, St. Nazaire, La Pallice and Bordeaux, followed by Bergen and Trondheim in Norway. The designs of these bunkers were derived from two sources. The most remarkable were the Dombunkers of Lorient. These had the shape of concrete pointed barrel vaults in which U-boats (Unterseeboot, submarines) could be transported on rails. Similar Dombunker, or Cathedral bunkers, were construct� ed in the Pas de Calais area and in occupied Poland, where they gave shelter to railway guns (Pas de Calais) or entire trains (Poland). Most other designs, however, were based on pre-war structures, like the U-boat bunker in Bruges, Belgium, of 1917, and the pens of Heligoland that were built in 1938. They consisted of a series of parallel pens (up to fifteen in the case of the UBB in Brest), a transportation corridor crossing the rear of the pens, and repair


shops and stores at the rear end of the bunker. The amount of concrete poured for the U-boat bunkers was sometimes immense. The pens in Brest, for instance, took more than 500,000 cubic metres. According to the same scheme, pens for motor torpedo boats (Schnell� boote) and minesweepers began in 1940. The S-boat bunkers were, however, smaller, and initially were given lighter walls and roofs of 1.5 m-thick concrete. On two occasions, both in Cherbourg, existing French docks were vaulted with a concrete roof. Protection Against Raids

In June, 1941, Germany extended the war eastward, attacking the Soviet Union. In preparation for Operation Barbarossa vast quantities of troops, equipment, and material were withdrawn from the occupied countries in the west. After initial successes, German advances slackened by the end of the year. At the same time, the British carried out some raids against German strongholds, mainly in Norway. As a result of the prospect of a prolonged war in the east and the threat of raids, it was decided to provide defence in Norway with coastal batter� ies, manned by the German army. An initial total of 160 batteries, in addition to the existing naval batteries, were planned in March, 1941. The armament of these batteries consisted of field guns with calibres of 10.5 to 15.5 cm, mainly of French origin, placed in open emplacements, in addition to which brick shelters were erected to house the crew. Some months later, in October, 1941, a next step was taken in fortifying the German-held coasts. The Channel Islands, the only British soil to be con� quered by German forces, were to be altered into an ‘un-attackable’ fortress by means of permanent fortification. This included naval batteries, anti-aircraft bat� teries of the German air force, and extensive infantry defences to be constructed for the German army. In order to develop a construction programme two fortress engineers staffs were sent to the islands. Construction itself had to be entrusted to the Organisation Todt (OT), a party-connected super-contractor. Progress of the programme itself was slow. Almost a year later some 160 permanent works were finished together with 1,150 lighter constructions. Most of these perma� nent constructions were part of naval coastal defence and included the heavy Batterie Mirus.

The small observation cupola type 486P2, intended for Westwall constructions became only available for Atlantikwall constructions. This example is part of a tpe 105 in strongpoint 21a near Le Pointeau in the Loire mouth, 1995 ����������� (© R. �������� Rolf)

A New Western Rampart

The separate orders regarding Norway and the Channel Islands were soon fol� lowed by a general directive applying to the entire Atlantic and North Sea coast. 49


On December 14th, 1941, the construction of the New Western Rampart (Neue Westwall) was ordered, the name a reference to the original Westwall built along Germany’s pre-war western frontier. Again the term used was propagandistic rather than militarily correct. The elder Westwall’s concept was of a continuous line of anti-tank obstacles and bunkers that would provide defence and shelter up to the moment a counter attack was possible. The New Westwall, on the contrary, was not a line with mobile defenders, but a series of isolated static strongpoints defending ports. Unlike the situation in Norway, the ports themselves were to be defended by both infantry and artillery. New Fortifications

Two photos of the construction of the parapetted gun emplacements of battery Von Schröder in the isle of Heligoland in the last half of the 1930s. The ammunition for the gun was stored „below deck“, was hoisted up to the emplacement level, transported to the gun on rails and lifted into the barrel. This transport procedure was common in the heavy naval batteries of the Atlantikwall (������������������� © BMA/FR, ����������������� RH 32/v. 2093)

50

Since the rebirth of German fortifications in the mid-1930s, German fortress engineers tended to develop standard designs to be embodied in their defence systems. Imperial engineers had done so from the 1880s on in order to obtain a general standard of quality, to simplify the layout of fortresses and defence lines, and to make quantification of construction possible. The first fortification projects of the Third Reich, like the Oder-WartheBogen east of Berlin, still had an ad hoc character with unique constructions designed for one site only. By 1938, however, the application of standard designs had become common practice. During the construction of the Westwall in 19381939 the German army drew up several series of standard designs with walls and covers of increasing thickness. The first series had walls and covers of 60 cm, the later series were provided with a protection of 200 or 350 cm of concrete. These later standard designs were divided into a 100- and a 500-series with functions like shelter, ammunition bunker, gun garage, gun and machine gun casemate, headquarters, hospital, and observation post. These were designs of the German army, which supervised and manned the Westwall and even installed batteries with guns of naval origin. The German navy and air force developed their own series of standard designs. The Luftwaffe had a limited number of designs for its anti-aircraft bat� teries, while the Kriegsmarine made up several series in 1940. The naval de� signs fulfilled functions within the medium and heavy coastal artillery as well as within the anti-aircraft or Flak-artillery. The designs of both the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine were not brought up to the same construction strength as the Westwall designs of the German army, but had walls and covers of up to 1.5 metres of concrete. Strangely enough, the German army came up with standard designs for the Neue Westwall which were weaker than the 100- and 500-series of the


Westwall. A series of Verstärkt feldmäßige Regelbauten (standard reinforced field works) was distributed in February of 1942, in which only basic functions like shelter, ammunition bunker and machine gun casemate were represented. The layout of the new designs was also basic; only one or two small rooms were brought together within a square or rectangular ground plan. Within the Neue Westwall only essential functions like headquarters were to be housed in permanent bunkers, for which the fortress engineers responsible fell back on the older pre-war designs of the 100-series. Deployment of these was, however, limited. Of a total of 7,522 bunkers constructed by July, 1942, only 1,116 had a permanent character. Most of those were erected in the Pas de Calais area and in the British Channel Islands. Navy and Air Force

By the summer of 1942, the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe developed for the first time standard bunker designs in the construction strength of 2.00 metres of con� crete. The Luftwaffe began a new line of designs with functions within the Flak batteries - the L 400-series. The new gun emplacements, ammunition bunkers, searchlight garages, firing control posts, shelters and headquarters, were given a layout quite distinct from that of the Westwall designs of the German army. The gun emplacements are especially characteristic. The emplacements them� selves were square or octagonal and were constructed on a bunker in which in most cases a personnel room and an ammunition store were housed. Most of the L 400-designs lacked, however, an entrance defence, which made them not completely up to fortress standards. This was, however, achieved in the L 400A-series with corresponding functions. At the same time the German navy adopted the regulations of the army regarding construction strength. The navy already had developed several design series as part of its coastal and anti-aircraft defence: the S-series serving heavy coastal artillery, the M-series for medium calibre coastal batteries, and the Fl(a)series for Flak-batteries. In mid-1942 new designs were released in the same series, but with distinct naval features. The fire control posts for coastal batteries, both heavy and medium, had a bow-shaped layout and stepped superstructures. Clearly these features derived from ship architecture, as did the asymmetrical layout of shelters constructed beneath anti-aircraft gun emplacements. The em� placements, which had the same function as those of the air force and were often provided with the same armament, were circular or hexagonal instead of square or octagonal as the Luftwaffe preferred. Compared with air force and army types, the Kriegsmarine designs can be regarded as products of ship architecture, where 51


steel is replaced by 2.00 metre-thick layers of concrete. Another naval character� istic of the Kriegsmarine design is the low priority that was given to concealment. Some fire control posts are up to 20 metres high, while the coastal gun casemates were given embrasures with a field of fire of 120 degrees and an elevation of 45 degrees. The Atlantikwall

The German Atlantikwall proper was a giant construction programme launched in the autumn of 1942. Its purpose was to withstand allied raids and landings on the coast of German-occupied Holland, Belgium and France. Its defensive and deterrent capabilities were to be based on coastal batteries, field guns, anti-tank guns and machine guns, as well as a series of obstacles, wire entanglement, and field mines. The minutes of the conferences dedicated to the programme show that an allied landing or invasion was taken seriously and that a two-front war like the one that had brought defeat to Germany in 1918 had to be avoided at all costs. The investments in manpower, construction material and future troops were enormous. The goal of the programme was to construct some 15,000 heavy bun� kers by the spring of 1943, giving shelter to 300,000 men. The Neue Westwall, launched only some nine months earlier, seemed to be forgotten. In structure, the Atlantikwall was to be quite different from its unmentioned predecessor. Off� shore islands, U-boat bases and potential disembarkation harbours formed top priority in the programme, followed by minor ports and landing beaches. The major strongpoints were to be called Verteidigungsbereiche (defensive areas) and were to receive a circular line of defence provided with anti-tank hindrances and anti-tank guns. At first a dozen of these Verteidigungsbereiche were envisaged with a total of 5,000 bunkers. The other 10,000 works had to be constructed in the smaller strongpoints and along the “free coast”. Geographically the coastline between Germany and Spain was divided into sectors that would receive different densities of fortifications. Based on the probability of allied landings, the French coast south of the Loire had to be de� fended by an average of 3 bunkers per km, Normandy and Brittany by 4.3 per km, Holland by 8 per km, and the most endangered coast of Northern France and Belgium by an average of 11 works per km. In October, 1942, it became clear that the goal of 15,000 constructions by spring, 1943 could not be reached. Instead only 6,000 were said to be possible to realize, 3,500 for the smaller strongpoints, and 2,500 for the major strong� points, of which 750 were a secondary goal. Of the 1,750 aimed for first, the fol� 52


lowing numbers were earmarked for the next Verteidigungsbereiche: IJmuiden (120), Hoek van Holland (220), Boulogne (120), Le Havre (120), Cherbourg (180), Brest (160), Lorient (200), St. Nazaire (160), and La Rochelle (90). These Verteidigungsbereiche were built well into 1944, when they were given the sta� tus of Festung (“fortress”), indicating that they had to be defended to the bitter end. The 600-Series

Alongside the development of the Atlantikwall project a new series of stand� ard bunker designs was issued by the general of engineers and fortresses. This 600-series followed the 500-series of pre-war Westwall times, and provided the fortress engineers along the coasts with a variety of modern fortifications. One of the remarkable features of the series is the presence of “types” meant to function within coastal batteries of the German army. After Hitler’s instruction to man coastal batteries in Norway in 1941, the army had to build its own coastal batter� ies in the west in the summer of 1942. The bunker designs for this task resemble the designs the Kriegsmarine had developed since 1940. The range of functions within the new 600-series grew as sub-series were released. Initially the common functions of shelters, ammunition stores, gun casemates, gun garages, and observation posts became available, followed by a firing control post and special weapons bunkers. All these designs were to be executed in 2.00 metres of concrete; the special weapons bunkers even in 3.50 metres of concrete. In May 1943, by the time 6,000 of the planned 15,000 bunkers should have been constructed, a sub-series of designs of a different character was creat� ed. They were called Kleinststände, or “very small works”. Indeed these Kleinst� stände, in contrast to the bulk of the 600-series, were small, simple, and provided with only 1.50 metre-thick walls and covers. Clearly the release of the sub-series indicates that the delayed construction programme pressed the engineers to find radical solutions. From mid-1943 onward the Atlantikwall was to be filled in with Kleinststände or otherwise cheap designs. Fortress Engineers and Organisation Todt

Construction of the coastal defences was at first the responsibility of the Fortress Engineers Corps of the German army, navy and air force. Bunker designs were drawn up at the desks of their central offices. Decisions about the deployment of defences also were part of the tasks of the engineers. At the division level the for� tress engineers’ staff officer advised the division commander on what area had to 53


be defended by which fortifications. This procedure resulted in different choices and hence different constructions and characteristics per division sector. Apart from the army engineers, the navy and air force engineers also contributed to violating the intended uniformity of the Atlantikwall. Not only did their repre� sentatives differ in the choice of fortification designs, their local or regional influ� ence had grave consequences for the appearance of the Wall. Boulogne, a major Channel port, was given a disproportionate number of air force bunkers, while the group of bunkers granted to the navy in the whole Pas de Calais area can be called marginal in the context of its responsibilities. In Holland circumstances were reversed. There the navy had an appreciated status resulting in many naval constructions, while the air force hardly managed to have even a limited number of bunkers built. It has often been claimed that the Organisation Todt, or OT, was re� sponsible for Atlantikwall bunker design in general. In reality, the OT, a partylinked, non-military organisation, was called in as a contractor for construction work only. The actual construction of the Channel Batteries in 1940, most of the U-bootbunkers from 1941 onward, the Channel Island defences, and most of the Atlantic Wall defences of 1942-1945 was undertaken by the Todt organisation on orders of the supreme command, but with fortress engineers’ designs and ac� cording to fortress engineers’ stipulations. Only in the case of the construction of the so-called special installations did the OT act as designer. The V1, V2 and V3 sites in northern and western France show unusual construction features that differ considerably from those designed by the military organisations. With regard to the Atlantikwall, the OT was organised in parallel with the fortress engineers. Every army corps was supported by a fortress engineers staff and an Oberbauleitung of the OT. In Norway, the military and construc� tion organisation was somewhat less uniform. But also there, the Einsatzgruppe Wiking contributed to the construction work by dispatching Oberbauleitungen to the army corps. Collaboration and Forced Labour

Immediately after the war, stories circulated that the construction of the Atlan� tic Rampart was the result of forced labour and that it had become clear that vast number of constructions was sabotaged. Reality however, shows another picture. In western Europe and Denmark, construction work was, with excep� tions, voluntary and well-paid. In April, 1942, over 85,000 men worked for the Einsatzgruppe west of the OT, mainly employed in the construction of U-boat bunkers. In July, 1944, over 360,000 workers were involved in construction work 54


in Western Europe, of which 170,000 were building the Atlantic Rampart. In Norway, the situation was different. Of the 58,000 men working for the Einsatzgruppe Wiking in Norway, nearly 31,000 were prisoners-of-war, mainly Russians, or common prisoners. In the west, the construction work in the Channel Island of Alderney was executed by forced labour. The British inďż˝ habitants were evacuated and an OT labour camp erected. Apart from incidental involuntary work, construction generally was farmed out to local firms that did their job to the full satisfaction of the OT or fortress engineers. In many cases, the obligatory German supervision was minimised, in some cases even omitted. Rommel

In November, 1943, Field Marshall Rommel was appointed inspector of the western defences. After several survey trips from Denmark to Southern France he concluded that in order to be effective, the defence had to be concentrated on the beaches themselves. As a result a campaign was begun to provide the beaches of the west with field mines and a range of obstacles. These included concrete and steel tetrahedra, Czech hedge hogs, Belgian fences, and wooden stacks on which mines or shells were fixed. The Atlantikwall front was thus fixed around the water line. Because of this switch from concrete fortifications to field mine and improvised obstacles, it was declared that works under construction should be finished, but no new works could be initiated. The Invasion and its Aftermath

In June, 1944, the Allied invasion finally took place. After long preparations, the northern beaches of Normandy were assaulted by a massive fighting force. The magnitude of the invading and supporting forces was necessary to establish and consolidate the bridgehead. After this the hinterland had to be conquered, especially the port of Cherbourg, where additional troops and supplies had to be disembarked. Having conquered Normandy, the allies advanced on Paris and the northern and southern shores. In Brittany, U-boat bases were besieged until the end of the war. Further north the coasts were conquered up to the Dutch isle of Walcheren, where final battles were fought in October, 1944. The German engineers learned some lessons from the Allied breakďż˝ through. The strong view of the general of fortress engineers that all guns had to be casemated proved wrong, because the limited arc of fire, usually 60 degrees, prevented the full effectiveness of the casemated field guns. The problem was tackled by reintroducing open emplacements, and the possibility of placing guns under revolving steel or concrete turrets. Despite the loss of France, construcďż˝ 55


tion on coastal defences went on in Holland, the German North Sea and Baltic coasts, Denmark, and Norway. There new naval batteries were erected, and new anti-aircraft systems were laid out. New additions to infantry defence were lim� ited to personnel shelters, ammunition stores and anti-tank casemates. Partly these were built according to the designs of the new 700-series, again crisis de� signs with simple and sober features. The Atlantikwall in Hindsight

As a result of the supremacy of air power in warfare in the Second World War, permanent fortification became an obsolete means of defence. Relics and re� mains of once renowned defence systems remind us of the construction efforts and expenses that fortification has taken over the last centuries. Of the twentieth century systems, the Atlantikwall is geographically the most extensive, and visu� ally the most impressive of them all. The need felt by the Germans to casemate nearly all guns, the location of the elements along the European shores, and the outspoken character of the designs applied, give the rampart a unique position within the field of permanent fortification. Geographically the Atlantikwall was an international project. The rocky coasts of Norway and Brittany are scattered with the same standard designs as the sandy beaches of Denmark, Holland, and southern France. The unique character, historical value, variety of the constructions, and vastness of the terrains involved pose the question of preservation. Many parts of the Atlantikwall have been destroyed to make way for ports, housing projects and enlargement of infrastructure. What remains is just left to be. In some cases, however, action is undertaken to save the bunkers, to clear them of sand, soil, and paint, and to show the public the few monumental remnants of the Europe of adversaries and belligerents.

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L’ORGANISATION TODT, UN ETAT DANS L’ETAT Remy Desquesnes

Durant quatre ans, de 1940 à 1944, «la Todt», comme on la nomme à l’époque, fut présente sur tous les théâtres d’opération, construisant routes et ponts, bat� teries d’artillerie, abris pour sous-marins, hangars et pistes ’aérodromes, galeries souterraines, ouvrages fortifiés et bases de lancement de fusées, réparant ports, canaux, ponts et barrages hydroélectriques, mettant à écartement standard des centaines de kilomètres de voies ferrées sur le front de l’Est. Fritz Todt, l’in� génieur qui créa l’organisation portant son nom, avait même prévu, une fois la victoire acquise, de prolonger le réseau autoroutier du Reich jusqu’à la côte atlan� tique, de relier par une voie à grande circulation le cap Nord à Constantinople, de procéder à travers le Bassin aquitain au percement d’un ouvrage analogue au canal de Suez, joignant cette fois l’Atlantique et la Méditerranée. Jamais, depuis l’époque romaine, un programme de travaux aussi colossal n’avait été envisagé à l’échelle du continent européen. Bien que moins connue que la SS ou la Gestapo, l’Organisation Todt (OT) fut l’un des organes les plus redoutables de la machine de guerre nazie. C’est à elle qu’Hitler confiait, au printemps de 1942, le programme de construc� tion de 15000 bunkers sur le littoral de l’Europe de l’Ouest. A quel moment l’Organisation fondée par l’ingénieur Fritz Todt appa� raît-elle dans la hiérarchie administrative du Reich? Quel était le statut de cette nouvelle institution tout à fait caractéristique du régime hitlérien? Quelles étaient les rapports entre l’Organisation et les entreprises de travaux publics allemandes et avec celles des pays occupés? Quels sont les grands chantiers ouverts sur le front Ouest (France, Belgique, Pays-Bas) entre 1940 et 1944? D’où provenait l’abondante main-d’œuvre contrainte de construire des bunkers à la chaîne? C’est à ces diverses questions que répondra cet article consacré à l’un des hauts lieux de la collaboration économique dans l’Europe occupée.

Speer (à gauche sur le document) succèdera à Todt à la tête de l’O. T., au printemps de 1942. C’est lui qui introduira la standardisation dans la construction des ouvrages fortifiés (© IWM)

Une nouvelle institution

L’arrivée au pouvoir de Hitler en 1933 n’était pas un simple changement de gou� vernement, mais un bouleversement total introduisant en Allemagne un «ordre nouveau» c’est-à-dire une nouvelle philosophie politique, économique et sociale fondée sur des principes d’autorité, de dirigisme et de hiérarchie. Au plan éco� nomique, le régime national-socialiste n’avait nullement l’intention de supprimer l’entreprise privée comme l’avait fait Lénine en URSS, quelques années plus tôt1 . Le nouvel ordre économique imposé à l’Allemagne par Hitler, à partir de 1934, visait à substituer au libéralisme traditionnel un système hybride qui, tout en conservant les avantages de la libre-entreprise, faisait passer sous l’autorité de l’état les grandes branches d’activité ainsi que la répartition des matières pre�

1 K.D. Bracher, Die deutsche Diktatur-Entstehung Struktur, Folgen des Nationalsocialismus, Berlin, 1969, traduit en français sous le titre La Dictature allemande – Naissance, structure et conséquences du National-Socialisme, Ed. Privat, 1986, 194 p. Martin Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, Grundlegung und Entwicklung seiner inneren Verfassung, DTV, München, 1986, 328 p. (L’Etat hitlérien – l’Origine et l’évolution des structures du Troisième Reich), cité plus loin Der Staat….

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Cherbourg, bureaux de l’Organisation Todt, 26 June 1944 (© NAW)

2 Hans Umbreit, Der Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich 19401944, Harold Boldt Verlag, Boppard am Rhein, 1968, 360 p. cité plus loin Der Militärbefehlshaber…German military government over Europe – Economics controls in occupied Europe – OSS- Research an analysis branch – Washington, 1945, 155 p. App 1. Organization of the department for economics (Abteilung Wirtschaft) of the MBH –ParisDossier 1- BB 35-79-AN. 3 Xaver Dorsch, Organisation Todt in Frankreich u. in Deutschland, MS-B-670, 14, cité plus loin OT in Frankreich… Bundesarchiv-Freiburg. 4 En réalité, les travaux de fortification sur la frontière Ouest avaient commencé dans les semaines suivant la réoccupation de la Rhénanie (27 mars 1936). Au même titre que les constructions des autoroutes, ce programme de travaux militaires devait contribuer à résoudre le problème du chômage en Allemagne. Au printemps de 1938, après deux ans de labeur, il était clair que le Festungspionier (génie de forteresse de l’armée allemande), malgré le concours du Reichsarbeitsdienst (service du travail du Reich), n’arriverait pas à achever les travaux dans un délai raisonnable. Faute d’Organisation Todt, les travaux de fortification étaient, à cette époque, réalisés par voie d’adjudication par des entreprises civiles, selon les directives des autorités militaires.

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mières industrielles. Aussi l’Etat décidait-il de regrouper les centaines de mil� liers d’unités de production dispersées sur le territoire du Reich dans quelques dizaines d’unions professionnelles plus facilement maitrisables. Organisation et répartition devenaient les deux piliers sur lesquels reposait toute l’économie na� tionale-socialiste. Avec ces deux instruments, l’Etat pouvait contrôler et diriger l’activité économique tout en maintenant les avantages de la libre concurrence. L’économique étant désormais subordonné au politique, l’intérêt de la nation devait l’emporter sur celui des grands groupes capitalistes ou pour reprendre le slogan de l’époque Gemeinnutz vor Eigennutz (l’intérêt collectif avant l’intérêt particulier). Fini le temps où les grands trusts influençaient l’Etat, désormais, c’est l’Etat qui allait imposer ses directives au monde des affaires. Pour imposer son autorité aux entreprises et réaliser les objectifs am� bitieux fixés par le Führer, la nouvelle organisation économique prévoyait la mise en place entre le gouvernement et les grandes branches professionnelles, de courroies de transmission chargées d’une fonction de mobilisation, d’encadre� ment, d’impulsion et de contrôle. Par exemple, dans le secteur vital des travaux publics dont les 4000 entreprises avaient été autoritairement rassemblées dans le Wirtschaftsgruppe 16 (groupe économique n°16), Hitler fondait la Reich� sautobahn, l’agence chargée du programme de construction des autoroutes, à laquelle il substituera, plus tard, l’Organisation Todt2. Créée, à la fin du mois de juin 1933 et déjà confiée à l’ingénieur des ponts et chaussées Fritz Todt, l’un des premiers compagnons de Hitler, la Reichsautobahn devait remplir sa tâche avec succès. Après cinq années d’activité, l’agence avait réussi cette performance non négligeable d’avoir construit 3000 kilomètres d’autoroutes, d’en avoir mis 2000 autres en chantier et d’être devenue le plus grand employeur du Reich3. Lorsqu’au printemps de l’année 1938, il fut question de construire sur la fron� tière occidentale du Reich le Westwall, Hitler, impressionné par l’exploit réalisé par la combinaison mise au point par Todt pour l’édification des autoroutes, se tournait tout naturellement vers son ingénieur-miracle. Pour mener à bien ces travaux militaires de grande dimension sur un rythme accéléré, dont la réalisation avait été primitivement confiée au génie de la Wehrmacht, Todt mettait sur pied un neue Institution à laquelle il donnait son nom4. Reprenant, tout en l’ampli� fiant, le système inauguré avec les autoroutes, la nouvelle structure mise en œuvre n’était nullement conçue comme une administration traditionnelle ou comme une entreprise d’état mais plutôt comme un appareil de direction jouissant à l’intérieur du Reich, de larges compétences et d’une grande indépendance. Ni véritable ministère, ni entreprise publique, l’Organisation Todt dem Reichskan� zler direkt unterstellt (directement subordonnée au chancelier du Reich) était un


instrument d’intervention exceptionnel auquel était confié einen ganz speziellen planungs-und-Organisationsauftrag (une mission spécifique d’organisation et de planification5). Intermédiaire entre le gouvernement du Reich et l’industrie privée de la construction, la véritable fonction de l’Organisation Todt als staat� licher Auftraggeber (en tant que mandant de l’Etat) était de recruter au sein du Wirtschaftsgruppe 16 des entreprises compétentes, de passer des marchés avec elles, de ravitailler les chantiers en Baustoffe (matériaux de construction) et en Arbeitskräfte (main-d’œuvre) et de surveiller l’avancement de l’ensemble du pro� gramme de travaux. Lui incombait, également, le soin de résoudre les problèmes de transport, de ravitaillement et d’hébergement dans des camps itinérants des centaines de milliers d’ouvriers engagés sur ses chantiers. Considéré à l’instar d’un ministre ordinaire comme une Oberste Reichs� behörde (autorité suprême du Reich), Todt avait le pouvoir d’exercer, en vertu du décret relatif au service dû à l’Etat, des droits de réquisition près des entreprises privées de construction et près des ouvriers du bâtiment6. Au total, l’appareil créé par l’ingénieur de Hitler se présentait comme eine eigenartige Mischung von Behörde und wirtschaftlichem Management (un singulier mélange d’admi� nistration et de management économique)7. Responsable de l’exécution d’une mission militaire d’une importance particulière dont le caractère prioritaire était souligné par une subordination directe au Führer, échappant au contrôle de l’ad� ministration officielle, ne dépendant pour son budget que de la chancellerie du Reich, Todt disposait, au sein du gouvernement de l’Allemagne, d’une position exceptionnelle. Avec le Reichsarbeitsdienst (service du travail) et la SS, l’agence de construction fondée par l’ingénieur favori du Führer constituait…einer der bedeutendsten Sonderorganisationen des Hitler-Staates (une des plus impor� tantes organisations spéciales de l’état hitlérien). Véritable Staat im Staate (état dans l’état), l’Organisation Todt était un «organe typique de l’exécutif spécial extraordinaire placé directement sous les ordres du Führer et en marge du vé� ritable gouvernement du Reich»8. A la tête de cette organisation était placée une direction générale baptisée OT-Zentrale (OT-Z, Berlin) confiée, de 1938 à 1945, à l’ingénieur Xaver Dorsh. Comme Todt, Dorsh, l’un des plus anciens membres du NSDAP, faisait partie du cercle des familiers de Hitler. Après que Todt eut été nommé, en février 1940, Reichsminister für Bewaffnung und Mu� nition (ministre du Reich pour les armements et les munitions) l’Organisation Todt, tout en conservant d’importants pouvoirs et une relative liberté, devenait un département de ce ministère. Il en sera de même, à partir de février 1942, sous Speer.

Valognes, destruction du portique du dépôt de l’O.T., 21 juin 1944 (© BNF)

5 M. Broszat, Der Staat. … , 328. 6 K.D Bracher, La Dictature allemande… 446. 7 M. Broszat, Ibid., 331. 8 Ibid., 332.

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L’organisation Todt dans le territoire: l’einsatzgruppe west

Affiche invitant les ouvriers flamands à venir bâtir la Nouvelle Europe… sous domination germanique (© KB)

9 Franz W. Seidler, Die Organisation Todt-Bauen für Staat und Wehrmacht 1938-1945, Bernard u. Graefe Verlag, Koblenz, 1987, 299 p. Handbook of the Organisation Todt – MIRS – London – 1945 – 435 p., R. 50 I/1C – Bundesarchiv. Koblenz.

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Pour son déploiement sur le terrain, l’Organisation Todt, à l’instar de la Wehr� macht, devait mettre en place, sur chaque grand théâtre d’opérations, un com� mandement général auquel étaient subordonnés divers états-majors locaux. Sur le front Ouest (Pays-Bas, Belgique, France), ce commandement général était ins� tallé, à Paris, en octobre 1941. Il se substituait au bureau de direction dénommé OT-Einsatz-Westküste (zone d’intervention de l’OT-côte Ouest), situé, depuis la fin de l’année 1940, à Lorient, d’où il organisait la construction des bases sous-marines. Baptisé Einsatzgruppe West (ou EG. West, Groupe d’interven� tion Ouest), le nouvel état-major général, situé à Paris, était confié à l’Oberbau� direktor Weiss. Cet ingénieur qui avait dirigé la construction des grosses batteries d’artillerie lourde du Pas-de-Calais, au cours de l’été de 1940 était directement subordonné à Xaver Dorsh, chef de l’OT-Zentrale (Berlin), lui-même respon� sable devant Todt, puis Speer. Pour remplir sa tâche, le chef de l’EG. West dis� posait, d’un état-major central dont les divisions les plus importantes étaient la Leitung, le Baubüro, le Nachschub, la Frontführung et la Verwaltung. Avec ses multiples bureaux: Vertragswesen (contrats), Preisbildung (contrôle des prix), Firmeneinsatz (relations avec les entreprises) et Personalabteilung (département du personnel), la Leitung (direction) était la principale section. Encore appelé Technisches Büro, le Baubüro (bureau de construction) était un département technique chargé des questions de relevé topographique, d’arpentage, d’essai des matériaux, de creusement des galeries souterraines… . La section Nachschub s’occupait de ravitailler les dépôts de l’Organisation Todt en matériaux de cons� truction et en matériel de camouflage. Quant à la Frontführung (direction du front), elle devait résoudre les multiples problèmes (logement, cantines, habille� ment, organisation des loisirs…) des travailleurs de la zone avancée, regroupés dans divers camps. En plus de ces grands départements, l’état-major de l’ EG. West comprenait encore une section transport (travailleurs et matériaux), une section transmissions, une section médicale et un SS-Verbindungsführung (ser� vice de liaison SS), chargé de la sécurité et de la police (prévention des sabotages, contrôle du personnel, délivrance des laisser-passer pour pénétrer sur les chan� tiers, recherche des déserteurs…)9. Pour accomplir sa tâche, l’ EG. WEST avait divisé le littoral de l’Europe de l’Ouest en secteurs d’activité appelés Oberbauleitungen (directions supérieu� res de construction ou OBL). De taille variable, l’OBL constituait le secteur de base d’intervention de l’Organisation Todt sur le littoral, comme la division était la formation de base dans la Wehrmacht. En juin 1944, on comptait, sur les côtes françaises, une dizaine d’OBL. Chacune d’elles était divisée en Bauleitun�


gen (directions de construction), elles-mêmes subdivisées en un certain nombre de Baustellen (chantiers). Par exemple, huit Bauleitungen (cinq autour du point d’appui de Cherbourg et trois autres situées respectivement à Granville, Aurigny et Caen) composaient l’OBL-Normandie qui s’étendait sur 350 km de front de mer, entre Granville et Trouville. Chaque OBL était dirigée par un Oberbau� leiter, généralement un ingénieur des travaux publics, assisté d’un état-major bâti sur le modèle de celui de l’EG. West mais en moins ramifié. Subdivision de l’OBL, la Bauleitung (direction de construction) ne pos� sédait, en guise d’état-major, qu’un technisches Büro (bureau technique) confié au directeur de l’entreprise allemande la plus importante opérant dans le secteur. Il en était de même sur les Baustellen (chantiers)10. Firmes et grands chantiers

Vaste état-major technique chargé de réaliser les projets de construction de grande envergure du gouvernement du Reich, l’Organisation Todt avait été ini� tialement mise sur pied pour procéder à l’édification du Westwall. D’une excep� tionnelle densité, ce système défensif bétonné était érigé en quinze mois, grâce à la mobilisation de toutes les grandes entreprises de travaux publics du Reich, précédemment engagées dans la construction du réseau d’autoroutes, et à une abondante main-d’œuvre évaluée à un demi-million d’hommes11. Après l’ouver� ture des hostilités à l’Ouest, l’Organisation Todt allait délaisser les chantiers du Westwall et son personnel, groupé en Bautruppen (détachements de construc� tion), était, à la demande du haut commandement, mis à la disposition de la We� hrmacht. La mission de ces travailleurs mi-ouvriers, mi-soldats était d’effectuer conjointement avec les unités des Festungspioniere (sapeurs du génie de l’armée) diverses tâches, en arrière du front de combat. Il s’agissait de remettre en état des tronçons de voies ferrées détruites dans le nord de la France, de réparer les pistes des aérodromes, de dégager les épaves gênant la navigation dans les ca� naux le long de la frontière franco-belge et de nettoyer les ports de Dunkerque, Boulogne et Calais dont l’armée pouvait avoir besoin dans le cadre de l’opération Seelöwe12. Considéré par l’OKW comme étant l’un des éléments composant la Wehrmachtsgefolge (la suite de la Wehrmacht), le personnel de l’Organisation Todt était astreint à porter un uniforme, une arme et à subir toutes les contraintes de la vie militaire13. Face à cet embrigadement, l’Organisation Todt qui, depuis sa création et surtout depuis le début des hostilités, était devenue un refuge pour les membres des SA et du parti peu empressés d’aller grossir les rangs de la Wehrmacht et de troquer leur salaire contre une solde de fantassin, réagit avec vigueur. Elle profitait de l’occasion pour souligner qu’elle était eine zivile Bau-

Affiche de propagande vantant le caractère infranchissable du rempart du Mur de l’Atlantique surplombant le grand fossé de la Manche (© KB)

10 Basic facts about O. Todt – MIRS/MR/OT/3/45. WO 208/3184/ - PRO – Londres and Development of the O. Todt (1938-1945) – MIRS/MR/OT/4/45. WO 208/3184, 19 p. – PRO – Londres. 11 La moitié des 500 000 hommes était composée de travailleurs civils venant des chantiers des autostrades, l’autre moitié d’une main-d’oeuvre peu qualifiée composée de soldats du génie et de jeunes gens provenant du Reichsarbeitsdienst (RAD ou Service du travail volontaire). En septembre 1939, 11 300 ouvrages fortifiés étaient achevés, 12 000 en cours de bétonnage et 9 millions de tonnes de béton avaient été produites. Ausbau des Westwalls. M1- 14/351 – IWM, et Xaver Dorsh, OT in Frankreich… MS-B- 670, 14. 12 Kumpf (Dip. Ing. Walter), Die OT im Kriege, in Bilanz des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Gerhard Stalling Verlag, 1953, 289-290. 13 Die OT zählte zum Wehrmachtsgefolge (l’OT appartenait à la suite de la Wehrmacht), X. Dorsch, OT in Frankreich…, MS-B-670, 24. Les hommes de l’OT pouvaient utiliser les casernes, la poste et le réseau téléphonique de la Wehrmacht, X. Dorsch, Die Organisation Todt, MS-B-671, 10. BundesarchivFreiburg.

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14 Malgré les demandes effectuées par les autorités militaires pour que les membres de l’OT travaillant sur le front reçoivent une solde comme les soldats de la Wehrmacht, leurs voisins, der Lohn (le salaire) fur maintenu. Seul, écrit Dorsch, chef de l’OT-Z, un salaire et diverses primes pouvaient inciter les travailleurs à accomplir leur tâche. En aucun cas, la troupe armée n’est à comparer à une organisation bâtie sur le principe d’une entreprise privée, X. Dorsch, OT in Frankreich… , MSB-670, 25-26. 15 X. Dorsch, Organisation Todt. Die Vertreter des OT als Generalingenieure beim OKH u. bei den Heeresgruppen, MSP-037, 4 et 5 (Les représentants de l’OT comme ingénieursgénéraux près de l’OKH et près des Groupes d’armée). 16 X. Dorsch, OT in Frankreich. Einbau der schweren Batterien auf Cap Gris Nez. Unternehmen Seelöwe-Sommer u. Herbst 1940, MS-B-670, 31-35. (Edification des batteries lourdes du Cap gris Nez – Opération Otarie – Eté et automne de 1940). 17 X. Dorsch, OT in Frankreich. Bau der U-Boot, Stützpunkte, MS-B-670, 65-77 (construction des points d’appui pour sous-marins). Par la suite, avec le développement de l’U-Bootwaffe (arme sous-marine), on agrandit les constructions existantes pour fournir un abri à une centaine de sous-marins. En 1944, 50 mouillages seulement sur les 96 prévus étaient achevés, malgré la fabrication de 4.5 millions de tonnes de béton. 18 Bâties juste en bordure du rivage, les bases sous-marines, ouvrages très lourds, exigeaient que les fondations prennent appui sur la roche-mère recouverte parfois, comme à Lorient, par plus de 20 mètres de sédiments. Présentant des conditions géologiques et des conditions d’accès différentes, chaque U-Boot-Basis demandera, pour sa construction, une étude particulière. Il n’était pas question ici de standardisation, à la différence des ouvrages du Mur de l’Atlantique. Pour la fabrication du béton, voir X. Dorsch Wichtigste Bautypen des Atlantikwalles und für V. Waffen. Anlage 3 : monatliche Betonleistungen seit Beginn der Bauarbeiten – Angabe in 1 000 M3, in Ob. West (part one), in Geschichte des Oberbefehlshabers West, FMS-MS-T.121, 2204-2220 – Freiburg – (Principaux types de constructions du Mur de l’Atlantique et pour les armes V) – Annexe 3. Production mensuelle de béton depuis le début des travaux (en milliers de m3), dans le secteur de l’Ob. West (Pays-Bas, Belgique, France).

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Organisation (une organisation civile de construction) dépendant du ministère de l’Armement et des Munitions (Todt, puis Speer) n’ayant pas d’ordre à rece� voir directement du commandement militaire14. Une telle attitude, on s’en doute, devait provoquer des tiraillements permanents entre les deux autorités, jusqu’à la fin du conflit. Alors qu’en théorie, elle était le maître d’œuvre de l’armée et aurait dû, en toute logique, lui être subordonnée, l’Organisation Todt, enfant gâté du parti, devait s’arranger, grâce à l’appui de Hitler, pour conserver intacte sa liberté d’action15. Au cours de l’été de 1940, hormis les travaux de déblaiement dans le nord de la France, et la mise en place de dépôts pétroliers, l’Organisation Todt accomplissait un véritable tour de force en construisant en quelques semaines, sur les côtes du Pas-de-Calais, plusieurs grosses batteries d’artillerie lourde destinées à protéger la flotte de débarquement en Grande-Bretagne16. L’année suivante, l’agence de construction allemande réussissait une autre performance, cette fois au profit de la Kriegsmarine, en mettant en chantier, sur les côtes françaises de l’Atlantique, cinq U-Boot-Basen (bases sous-marines)destinées, initialement, à fournir un abri à une trentaine de submersibles17. Au début de 1942, le gros œuvre était, en partie, achevé dans les trois U-Boot-Stützpunkte (points d’appui pour sous-marins) de Brest, Lorient et Saint-Nazaire. Dans les deux autres, Bor� deaux et La Pallice, le bétonnage était en cours. Outre les multiples problèmes techniques à résoudre, ces travaux considérables de fortification avaient réclamé, rien que pour l’année 1941, la fabrication de plus d’un million de mètres cubes de béton18. A partir du printemps de 1942, tout en poursuivant son activité sur les chantiers des bases sous-marines et sur les aérodromes de la Luftwaffe, la grande tâche confiée à l’Organisation Todt était la construction de l’Atlantikwall ou for� tification du littoral de l’Europe de l’Ouest (Pays-Bas, Belgique, France). S’éten� dant à l’origine sur un front de mer long d’environ 4000 km zwischen Holland und den Pyrenäen (entre la Hollande et les Pyrénées), auquel viendra s’ajouter, en fin de 1942, le littoral français de la Méditerranée, la construction du nou� veau système défensif allemand était une entreprise d’une autre envergure que la fortification des 600 kilomètres de la ligne Siegfried19. Conçu à l’échelle du continent européen, l’Atlantikwall était plus comparable par ses dimensions, à la Muraille de Chine qu’au Westwall ou à la Maginot-Linie. Avec la mise en chan� tier du Mur de l’Atlantique, la Kriesgmarine et la Luftwaffe, jusqu’alors princi� paux clients de l’Organisation Todt, devaient céder leur place à la Heer (armée de terre) sur laquelle reposait l’essentiel de la défense du littoral. Pour réaliser ce vaste programme et respecter les délais fixés par le Führer (achèvement de la


phase de bétonnage pour le 1er mai 1943), l’Organisation Todt faisait appel aux plus puissantes entreprises de travaux publics et du bâtiment du Reich qui, pour la majorité d’entre elles, avaient acquis, grâce à l’édification du Westwall et des bases sous-marines, une grande expérience dans le domaine des constructions fortifiées. Entre ces grosses firmes parfois rassemblées en Arbeitsgemeinschaften (communautés de travail) et l’Organisation Todt, mandataire du gouvernement du Reich, le contrat le plus fréquent était le Leistungsvertrag (contrat au ren� dement): «A part quelques rares exeptions, écrit Dorsh, l’Organisation Todt a toujours travaillé avec des entreprises en utilisant le contrat au rendement, elle a toujours refusé l’exécution de travaux de construction en régie c’est-à-dire ef� fectués directement avec son propre personnel et payés par elle»20. A Nurem� berg, après guerre, le Dr. Flächner, avocat de l’accusé Speer, dira la même chose: «L’organisation Todt était une organisation civile… travaillant selon les principes de l’économie privée c’est-à-dire qu’elle faisait exécuter les travaux projetés par des entreprises privées, y compris les firmes étrangères installées dans les pays intéressés et ne faisant que surveiller l’exécution des travaux »21. Selon les clauses du Leistungsvertrag, l’Organisation Todt qualifiée de Bauherr (maître d’œuvre), s’engageait à approvisionner les Baustellen (chantiers) en matériaux de construc� tion et à fournir de la main-d’œuvre aux Unternehmer (entreprises contractantes). Parmi les plus grandes entreprises allemandes figurait la firme Philip Holzmann de Francfort-sur-le-Main. Cette firme qui, jadis, avait décroché le marché de la construction du Bagdadbahn sera présente sur tous les grands chantiers militaires ouverts en France, entre 1940 et 1944 (base sous-marine de Lorient, batteries à longue portée du Pas-de-Calais, stations de montage et de lancement de fusées V2…). Ayant déjà édifié des abris pour U-Boote dans les ports allemands de la mer du Nord, la firme berlinoise Polenski u. Zoellner poursuivra ses travaux avec la construction de la base sous-marine de Brest. Pour bâtir ses stations radar, ses plateformes de DCA ou ses pistes d’atterrissage la Luftwaffe ne travaillait qu’avec un petit nombre d’entreprises spécialisées comme la Strassenbauaktien� gesellschaft (abrégée couramment en Strabag) dont Goering, paraît-il, était le principal actionnaire. Sur l’Atlantikwall et sur les chantiers destinés aux armes secrètes, on trouvait les firmes berlinoises Sager u. Woerner, Julius Berger ou Wolfer u. Goebel… toutes spécialisées dans la construction des bunkers.

19 Hans Shuhmann, OT im Einsatz, München Verlag Knorr u. Hirth, 1943, 70-74. 20 X. Dorsch, O. Tod in Frankreich…, 19. 21 TMI – Nuremberg, Procès des grands criminels de guerre, T.XIX, 216-217.

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“Dänemark, Karte des Ausbaustandes, Stand 15.1.45.” (BMA/FR, RH 11 III/217 K-2)

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German Coastal Fortifications in Denmark 1940-45 Jens Andersen

denmark

A 8,8 cm anti-aircraft gun belonging to the German Air force positioned on the Northern tip of Fanø. The position is of fieldwork type without any concrete, the crew was accommodated in tents, late April 1940 (© BA/KO)

The German fortification of Denmark underwent furious development during the five-year occupation, from 1940-45. This is true in terms of extent of constructions, as well as concepts employed, and the geography. The speed of the development is obvious when one looks at the number of coastal batteries: by the time the Germans completed their plans for the Danish coasts in the summer of 1940, they had emplaced fifteen batteries; by the time of their surrender there were eighty. A strong fortification of the coasts of Denmark was not a goal in itself for the German Wehrmacht, who always tried to adjust the strength of the fortifications according to their assessment of the threat against the German control of Danish territory. The description of the development of the fortification, therefore, must be seen always in connection with the German grand strategy, the situation on the fronts and the threat estimate at any given time. The First Establishment of Coastal Defences in Denmark: April - August 1940

At 4:10 a.m. on April 9th, 1940, German troops crossed the Danish border in southern Jutland and landed in Copenhagen and Gedser in order to occupy the country. After two hours of skirmishes that cost nineteen Danish soldiers and gendarmes their lives, the Danish government decided to cease fire and accept the “protection” granted Denmark by Germany. Before the attack, the Germans had laid plans for securing important points on the Danish west coast. The securing of the coast with coastal artillery was generally the responsibility of the German navy. However, the guns of the naval coastal batteries had to be bolted to concrete foundations, so it would take several weeks before they could be ready for action. The gap was closed until then by using mobile batteries of the German army and air force. At Esbjerg three heavy anti-aircraft batteries were emplaced already on the 9th in order to protect the large harbour, and at Hanstholm an army field battery and a heavy anti-aircraft-battery were emplaced on the 10th to protect a mine-free passage through the mine barrage which been established across the entrance of the Skagerrak. On the morning of April 10th a naval reconnaissance staff left Kiel for Denmark. Its task was to find positions for already planned 17 cm batteries at Thyborøn/Agger and Hanstholm. After its arrival on the west coast of Jutland, work on the batteries started at once. The plans made prior to the invasion only covered the west coast of Jutland, which was the part of Denmark that was most endangered by British counterattacks. An overall plan for the fortification of the Danish coasts was not presented until one week after the attack. 230

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By mid-June 1940, the German navy had emplaced 15 coastal batteries and heavy anti-aircraft-batteries at the Danish coasts. The batteries were emplaced partly to protect important harbours (Esbjerg, Thyborøn and Frederikshavn), partly to provide artillery cover to barrages at sea (mines or nets) at Hanstholm and Skagen, Great Belt and the Sound. A large proportion of the ordnance used in the German batteries was taken from the Danish coastal defences. Except for the anti-aircraft-batteries and the batteries at Hanstholm and Thyborøn, the building pace of the permanent batteries was quite slow. Therefore, the establishment of the coastal defences at the Kattegat should probably be considered as a part of more long-term planning to secure German control of the entrances to the Baltic, rather than as a plan to fulfil acute needs. The permanent coastal batteries that were established in the early summer of 1940 were only lightly built. The only concrete of any substance used in the batteries were in the gun foundations. The battery crews were housed in wooden barracks. There were a few bunkers that were, however, built of wood or bricks. During the first year of occupation, from May 1940, the German army considered minimal the likelihood of English landings in Denmark, even raids, as it was expected that the British would find the risks too great compared to the possible gains. This estimate was based on geography: the long distance from the British Isles combined with the proximity to Germany, the harsh weather conditions and the lack of good harbours on the est coast of Jutland. In addition, in the balance of power, the German air force exercised absolute air supremacy in the area. At sea, the German navy did not consider the situation secured until the end of May. From then on, it was expected that the British primarily would try to interdict the supply lines to Norway and in the Baltic by laying mines from the air. In addition, they still had to reckon with the possibility of submarines penetrating into the northern part of the Kattegat, while activities with small surface vessels in the Skagerrak were considered possible, but unlikely. During the first part of the occupation, the army’s tactics were based upon “defence-in-depth”, with counter-attacks by the reserves playing a major role. At first the defence was, however, based to some degree on troops stationed at the coast supported by field-type fortifications. Already in June of 1940, the concept was revised because of the low threat estimate, so that until spring, 1941, only units of section size were stationed at the coast, and defensive positions played no role in the planning because of the emphasis on the mobile defence and counter attacks.

Map of Denmark showing the German coastal batteries, beginning of August 1940 (after original © K.Y. Andersen, J. Andersen)

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Emplacement of Heavy Batteries: September 1940 - February 1941

Old German 17 cm ship gun in open position at Hanstholm, July/August 1943 (© MDF)

The wooden huts, which housed the crew of the 17 cm battery at Hanstholm. The barracks lay some 300 m from the gun positions. The huts were camouflaged with false roofs to resemble Danish farm buildings (© MCH)

In the second half of 1940, after Germany had conquered Western Europe and driven Britain from the continent, it was unclear which way Germany was to turn her war effort - to the east or the west? Already in July 1940, Hitler began to consider an attack on the Soviet Union and ordered the armed services to prepare themselves for this for the spring of 1941. The reason for this order was that Hitler thought that Britain’s stubborn resistance reflected hopes that the Soviet Union would enter the war on its side. At the same time, however, Germany began diplomatic activities that aimed to strengthening the alliance against Britain by, among other things, including the Soviet Union. It seems that Hitler did not make his final decision until the middle of November, when it finally became clear that the Soviet Union would not join the anti-British alliance. The uncertainty concerning the future strategy had appreciable consequences for the German coastal artillery in Denmark. At the end of September 1940, the German naval high command decided to emplace two heavy batteries (38 or 40.6 cm) on Danish territory. One of the batteries was to be emplaced at Hanstholm to cover the Skagerrak barrage thereby strengthening German control of the entrance to the Baltic. The other was on the southern tip of the island of Bornholm in the Baltic to secure German shipping in that area. Shortly after, by Hitler’s demand an additional 30.5 cm battery, to be emplaced at the northern tip of Bornholm, was added to the plans. The work on the batteries on Hanstholm and the southern tip of Bornholm started in the beginning of November 1940. In order to carry out the large building project, an army fortress building staff was transferred to Denmark to subordinate the navy (Festungsbaustab Dänemark). In addition, the Organisation Todt set up two construction offices (“Bauleitung”). Unlike the earlier batteries, the work effort on the heavy batteries at Hanstholm and Bornholm was massive. In both batteries, construction started on four bunkers, each covering ca. 3000 m2. The bunkers were to contain a gun turret as well as rooms for ammunition, crew, and technical installations. Apart from the four gun bunkers, the batteries were to include a fire control post, two large ammunition bunkers, and a bunker for an electrical plant. Hitler’s definitive decision of December 1940 to attack the Soviet Union in the spring also had consequences for the German coastal defences in Denmark. The first thing that happened was that the 17 cm battery at Thyborøn was withdrawn, as it was to be presented to Bulgaria, Germany’s new ally in the coming campaign against the Soviet Union. At Thyborøn Danish 12 cm guns

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replaced the German guns. Another consequence was that in mid-February, 1941 the naval high command decided to stop work on the battery at Bornholm. The immediate reason was that the delivery of the guns had been delayed, but at this point the naval high command realised that the decision to attack was definite, and thus there was no longer any need for coastal batteries in Bornholm. Consequently, the work on Bornholm was throttled down, so that only two of the large gun bunkers were partially completed. In Hanstholm, the building project continued, however, and the battery was ready for action in the late summer of 1941. Coastal Defence in Denmark During Operation “Barbarossa” : March - November 1941

Inspection of part of the crew for a 38 cm gun at Hanstholm, summer 1941 (© MM)

The German attack on the Soviet Union, “Operation Barbarossa”, on June 22nd, 1941 would decisively influence coastal defence activity in Denmark. The tasks of the coastal artillery were expanded and divided into two opposite categories: 1) Increased protection of the coast facing the North Sea to reduce the risk that the British might exploit the thinning of the German troops in the west by carrying out offensive operations. 2) Blocking the exits of the Baltic for Soviet ships, which might try to flee to British ports after the German attack. The risk of British raids against the coast was underlined by the attack on Svolvær on Lofoten on March 4th. This attack caused the army commander in Denmark, who was not informed about the preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union, to ask for more coastal batteries and to strengthen the surveillance of the coast by posting small army troops at important points. Furthermore, a revision of the army’s concept of defence was undertaken, and from then on, an emphasis was placed on stationing units of up to company strength at vulnerable points along the coast, and on the preparation of defensive positions. The first step in strengthening the defences of the exits of the Baltic was taken in March 1941, when naval high command ordered the emplacement of a battery with Danish guns to guard the northern end of the German net barrage between the German coast and the southern tip of the Danish island of Falster. In the beginning of May construction of a battery with four Danish 12 cm guns started at Gedser, and after just a month it was ready for action. At the end of April, the army high command further allotted the Danish area ten new batteries, which were equipped with captured French 10.5 cm field guns. The batteries were so-called “army coastal batteries”, which were manned by army personnel and equipped with guns from army depots. 233

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Trial firing of 38 cm gun at Hanstholm, summer 1941 (© BMM)

Six of the batteries were emplaced on the west coast of Jutland to protect important civilian and military installations in the coastal area against raids. These batteries went into position on June 24-25th. The remaining four batteries were to be employed to block the inner Danish waters. The batteries were emplaced for guarding entrances of the Sound and Great Belts and the exit from the Great and Small Belts. These batteries were ready for action on June 23rd. In the late autumn of 1941, when the risk of a Soviet breakout was considered still more unlikely, these army coastal batteries were moved to the west coast of Jutland. The army coastal batteries were at first emplaced in field manner, but after a month, work began on a more permanent establishment of the batteries on the west coast. Concrete positions were poured for the guns and wooden huts were built for the crew. There was only small difference in the ways the naval and army batteries were arranged. However, the way the guns were emplaced differed considerably. The field guns of the army coastal batteries were fixed to turntables in the concrete positions.; the turntable would allow the guns to be traversed quickly in order to make the field guns more effective against moving targets at sea. Plans for a “New West Wall”: November 1941- December 1942

French 10,5 cm field gun emplaced on the Dike at Kappel on the island of Lolland, summer 1941 (© RL)

In the late autumn of 1941, Hitler realised that the original plan for “Barbarossa” had failed, and that the Soviet Union could not be defeated in 1941. Faced with the problem of moving troop reinforcements to the east without totally neglecting strategic considerations in the west, on December 14th, 1941 Hitler issued an order to fortify the coasts of Europe by creating a “New West Wall”: Coastal defences, fortified by heavy concrete bunkers, should have made it possible to repel any Allied attack using as few troops as possible. In March, Hitler’s intentions were confirmed with the “Führerweisung Nr. 40”, which among other things forbade any retreat from the coast in case of attack. In continuation of the Führerweisung, in the beginning of May 1942, the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or Wehrmacht High Command) once again declared Denmark an “area of operations” and placed it under command in matters concerning anti-invasion defences. From the New Year in 1942, the threat from an Allied landing in western and northern Europe in general was considered to be growing. The lack of reliable information about Allied intentions meant that German planners could not rule out attacks on any stretches of coast, not even Denmark. Of course this affected threat evaluation by the local commanders in Denmark, but their precise

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appreciation of the threat is unclear. However, it appears that it was not until late spring, 1942, that the OKM and OKW (Oberkommando der Marine, Marine High Command) entertained the possibility of an attack that was more than merely a raid against Denmark. The scenario was a landing in northern Jutland in support of an attack on Norway with the aim of cutting off the German supply lines. The relatively sheltered Bay of Jammerbugt was considered the most likely place for a landing. Such an operation, however, was considered less than likely because of the geography. Due to the low level of threat originally assessed for the Danish coasts, the plans for strengthening the fortifications were originally quite modest. The stützpunktartige Ausbau in Denmark was originally only planned to consist of field type works and semi-permanent concrete constructions. By orders issued to the central reconnaissance staff, which commenced operation in the beginning of April 1942, each of the existing batteries had to have their protection increased by strengthening the barbed wire entanglements and by the construction of a few machine gun positions and protective bunkers for crews. At six points on the west coast, single machine gun positions were to be constructed. However, at the same time as the reconnaissance was prepared and carried out in Denmark in March and April 1942, it seems that it was decided at a high level that “permanent” (ständige) Regelbau bunkers with walls of at least two metres should also be introduced into Denmark. By mid-April Albert Speer, the new minister of armaments, informed Hitler that for Ständige Ausbau Dänemark it was planned to pour 20, 000 m3 of reinforced concrete each month. The decision to build permanent fortifications in Denmark implied an expansion of the building organisation, which meant that the Organisation Todt once again was introduced in Denmark. In the beginning of March, the Organisation Todt established an “Oberbauleitung Dänemark in Copenhagen, and in the following months, four sector staffs were established in Jutland. To start the construction of permanent concrete bunkers was, however, more complicated than was that of field type fortifications. Much more preliminary planning and much larger amounts of building materials and transports were needed. Therefore, after the reconnaissance had been concluded in the beginning of May, the Commander-in-Chief (C.-in-C.) announced that the work could not start immediately due to lack of materials and fuel he stated that the supply of machines and labour was sufficient. In spite of these troubles, the work on the permanent bunkers started during the summer of 1942. The first phase of the building of permanent fortification Regelbau bunkers concentrated on furnishing each of the coastal batteries and the heavy naval anti

Map of Denmark showing the position of the Army coastal batteries, end of 1941 (after original © K.Y. Andersen, J. Andersen)

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The Army coastal battery at Blåvand. In the foreground, one of the new permanent bunkers, a Regelbau 502, is seen. On the dune top the dune the fire control post of the battery, constructed of wood, is seen. Autumn 1942 (© MDF)

aircraft batteries at the coasts of Jutland with bombproof shelters for crews and ammunition. The pouring of the first bunkers took place from the end of August and lasted to the winter of 1942/43. Especially in the case of the army coastal batteries, a high degree of standardization of the bunkers can be seen, as generally in this period they were equipped with two four-crew bunkers (Regelbau 501 and 502) and two ammuni­tion bunkers (Regelbau 134). During the summer of 1942, a number of infantry strongpoints were established along the west coast of Jutland in order to defend harbours or roads leading from the beaches into the country. At first, these strongpoints were only furnished with field fortifications and barbed wire. In contrast with to the coastal batteries, the reconnosaince of April 1942 does not seem to have taken into consideration permanent bunkers in the infantry strongpoints (except maybe at Skagen and Hanstholm). The German commanders in Denmark also wanted to strengthen the coastal artillery on the Danish west coast, especially in northern Jutland, but this was not a priority of the high command. If the coastal artillery in Jutland were to be strengthened, it would have to be done by transferring batteries that were already within the borders of Denmark. In June 1942, one of the field batteries of the 416

A French the 10,5 cm gun in the Army coastal battery at Thyborøn. The gun is mounted on a primitive turntable. In the background, the fire control post of the battery, a Regelbau 636, is seen. Summer 1943 (© MDF)

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Infantry Division was moved to the coast in the southern part of the Jammerbugt to function as a coastal battery. In addition, during the last months of 1942 two batteries with 12 cm Danish guns were moved from the eastern part of the country to positions south and north of Løkken. In addition, in the summer of 1942 the aerial defence of coastal batteries was considerably strengthened. The Second Phase of “West Wall” Construction in Denmark: August 1942 - September 1943

At the end of August 1942, Hitler ordered an increase in the construction of coastal defences in Denmark following “Westwall” principles, but the work was to be made with due regard for the present forces. This order seems to have resulted in a substantial expansion of the plans for the construction of heavy bunkers, particularly in the infantry strongpoints. By demand of the Armed Forces High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), in September 1942 the Commander-in-Chief of the army in Denmark presented a priority list for the construction work. This plan included construction of perimeter defences of the harbours of Esbjerg, Thyborøn, Hirtshals, Skagen, and Frederikshavn. At Hanstholm the infantry defences had to be prepared for a crew consisting of a reinforced batallion. The work on several infantry strongpoints and some coastal batteries were to be increased using armour parts. The protection of the crossings of the Limfjord River also had to be increased. While the construction of permanent bunkers in the old batteries started in June 1942, it did not start in the newly established infantry strongpoints until during the autumn of 1942: this constitutes the second phase of the “Westwall” construction Denmark. The earliest construction of Regelbau bunkers in infantry strongpoints took place in Skagen and Hanstholm. In Skagen, however, the extent of the work was moderate, and the work must have started no later than the beginning of September 1942. In Hanstholm the planning was much more extensive. The beginning of the work was, however, delayed by a fundamental relocation of the main defence line (Hauptkampflinie), which, after the reconnaissance of April, had been built to the east of the heavy battery. The field works of the defence line were basically complete, when the army C.-in-C. decided in August that the defence line had to be moved closer to the battery, as there were not sufficient troops in Hanstholm to man the positions. Therefore it was necessary to begin over again with the planning. The construction of the permanent Regelbau bunkers, then, must have started no later than the end of September 1942.

Infantry strong points with permanent bunkers planned, 1942-43 (after original © K.Y. Andersen, J. Andersen)

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5 cm tank gun some where on the west coast of Jutland. Twenty guns of this type were emplaced in Denmark at the end of 1942. The gun is mounted on a simple concrete foundation. Soon after the gun was moved to a more permanent position – either a Regelbau 600 or Regelbau 655 combined with a ring position, Bauform 65a. Summer 1943 (© MDF)

In the other parts of Jutland, the detailed planning of permanent bunkers in the infantry strongpoints started considerably later. On the stretch of coast between Thyborøn and Esbjerg the reconnaissance for the permanent bunkers at the strongpoints took place in the beginning of November, the same time that further bunkers for the coastal batteries were planned. The work progress in northern Jutland indicates that the reconnaissance there took place at about the same time. The work on the infantry strongpoints included, among other things, bunkers with embrasures for anti-tank guns and armoured cupolas for machine guns. As the individual strongpoints lay isolated and therefore risked being outflanked, a large proportion of the weapons were concentrated on the defence against attacks from the rear. At the end of 1942, landmines were introduced to reinforce the close defence of the positions, and during 1943, extensive mine fields were laid around most of the strongpoints. From the beginning of 1943, the local German commanders in Denmark began to envisage a proper invasion of Denmark. This was manifested especially by the army’s increased activity at Esbjerg, which was the only harbour in western and northern Jutland with the capacity to sustain such an operation. The OKW and OKM, however, still considered an invasion on the west coast of Jutland less likely because of the geography. Because of the changed assessment of the threat, from the beginning of 1943 the defence was divided into two focal areas: northern Jutland, and Esbjerg. During 1943, the attention was increasingly concentrated on Esbjerg. Compared with the plans for construction of infantry strongpoints that had been decided in the autumn of 1942, a considerable expansion can be seen on the northern flank of Esbjerg during spring and summer of 1943. From the beginning of 1943, both the army and the navy in Denmark concentrated their efforts on strengthening the coastal artillery in the Esbjerg area. During the first half of 1943, several fruitless attempts were made to procure extra ordnance for mounting by Esbjerg. In 1943 the fortification work seems mostly to have followed the plan laid, except that in the spring of 1943 a certain delay occured because of lack of iron for the construction work. Also it seems that new constructions were added to the plans for the individual strong point. So, already by the beginning of January the fortress engineers put forward a preliminary plan for extended planning (erweiterte Planung, 1943), which was to run until the building programme ended July 31, 1943. Some major changes and additions were made, however, to the existing building plans. In mid-summer 1943, the planned, permanent bunkers in the strong-

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points at Bovbjerg and Bjerghuse were suspended, and instead a new strongpoint was to be put in the programme. However, it was on the southern part of the west coast that the greatest changes were to take place from the end of 1942. In the spring and summer of 1943 four new infantry strongpoints were added to the plans: Vejers Strand, Børsmose, Henne Strand, and Nymindegab. These new strongpoints seems to have been incorporated into the plans almost immediately. The work on the strongpoints at the crossings of the Limfjord at Oddesund and Aggersund, however, seems to have been given less priority than one would have assumed according to the plans presented to the OKW in the autumn of 1942. So the work in these two strongpoints did not start until the autumn of 1943. Increased Fortification of Denmark : September 1943 - June 1944

Field marshal Rommel during his inspection of Hanstholm, December 1943 (© MCH)

From the late autumn of 1943, a number of new elements were introduced to the coastal defences in Denmark and more resources were added. This was a result of the demands by Hitler and the high command that the anti-invasion defences in Denmark and Western Europe should be strengthened considerably to be able to repel the expected invasion. During the second half of 1943, the assessment of the threat towards Denmark was revised. Because of the use of all available forces on the fighting fronts, Denmark’s proximity to Germany was no longer considered so discouraging to the Allies. On the contrary, it might rather encourage such an attack. Therefore, the OKW and the army especially feared a utilization of Jutland as a flanking area for an attack through Slesvig-Holsten. The difficulties posed by the distance and the state of the coast, however, meant that Denmark was not looked upon as a likely objective for the main operation. Therefore, during the fall of 1943 the OKW issued a number of orders demanding that defence readiness in Denmark be improved. But it was not until Hitler’s issue of “Führerweisung No. 51” on the third of November, 1943 that a real augmentation of the defences could be carried out, as Hitler therein formulated a new strategy according to which the preparations against the invasion of western Europe should have as high a priority as the fighting fronts. For the navy this meant that Denmark was allotted a battery with two 15 cm ship turrets from the battleship Gneisenau and two 10.5 cm batteries. The 15 cm battery was to be emplaced on the northern end of Fanø to cover the entrance to Esbjerg. Also, four of the batteries armed with 12 cm Danish guns could be rearmed with new German guns and guns taken from the Danish war ship Niels Juel. Three of the batteries thus disengaged were instead emplaced elsewhere. On Fanø, another battery, with 15 cm guns from the old Danish ironclad Peder 239

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Drawing showing the lay out of a ”F-Stand”. Ca. 500 bunkers of this type were built along the west coast of Jutland during the first half of 1944 (© RA)

Skram, was emplaced. In addition, the army coastal artillery was increased heavily at the end of 1943. This time Denmark was allotted 12 batteries (nine with Russian 12.2 cm field guns, one with German 15 cm, and two with 19.4 cm French guns). Three of the batteries were delivered without crews, and it was planned that in the long term their guns were to be used in rearming some of the existing batteries. Nine of the new army coastal batteries arrived in the country during the first half of January, and they were ready for action before the end of the month. In January 1944, it was decided to emplace a heavy battery with four 38 cm guns in two ship turrets to defend Esbjerg. The commencement of the work was delayed, though, as the army and navy did not come to an agreement about the exact position of the battery until June. The work, which was expected to last a year-and-a-half, began then in August 1944 at Oksby near Blåvandshuk. At the beginning of 1944, a new element was added to the coastal batteries. Thus, construction of bunkers for the main armament of the old coastal batteries, army as well as naval, was started. The guns were emplaced in bunkers (Regelbau 671) with a frontal embrasure, which reduced the gun’s arc of fire to 120 degrees. The construction of the gun bunkers was a high priority from the end of 1943 on, as the Germans no longer expected to have air superiority over the invaded coasts. They therefore had to choose between limiting the arc of fire or risking having the bunkers destroyed by bombardments from the air or the sea. Of course the emplacement of the guns in bunkers reduced the capacity of the batteries to defend themselves against attacks from behind, and each of the batteries were therefore allotted two extra guns which were emplaced in open positions. In the new naval batteries (Tversted, Bunken, Hals), which were built at the same time, only bunkers with very thin concrete walls (20 cm) were built. The new army batteries were even more humbly constructed, as only the gun positions and sometimes the ammunition rooms were constructed in concrete–the crews were accommodated in wooden huts as earlier. Only two of the new army coastal batteries (Tørring and V. Vedsted) were equipped with Regelbau bunkers, Regelbau 669, which were to protect the guns. Until the end of 1943, the coastal defence was based on a system of more or less isolated strongpoints, and the defence was therefore full of holes and without any depth. To remedy this problem, the construction of a defence line behind the coast, die zweite Stellung, began in November 1943. The new defence line was supposed to function as a blocking position, partly to catch Allied forces that had broken through the coastal defences, forming much of the basis for a German coun-

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terattack. The defence line ran 3 to 15 km behind the coastline. Furthermore, towns at and behind the coast were transformed into strongpoints by surrounding them with anti-tank ditches and barbed wire. The most radical change, though, was the abandonment of mobile defence in favour of a linear, static defence of the coast itself. During his inspection of Denmark in December 1943, field marshal Rommel felt the consequence of the ever-growing prominence of fortifications and the lack of powerful reserves. Rommel no longer believed that the German forces would be able to mount the powerful counterattack which had until then been a central element in the defence plans. Accordingly, the enemy was not be allowed to establish a beachhead. In consequence, the reserves were to be placed close behind the shore. From January 1944 on, a continuous line of positions were established on the part of the coast which was considered most threatened. The army determined that this was without a doubt the stretch of coast south of the Limfjord with Esbjerg as the central point. On the contrary, the area north of the Limfjord was given a low priority, as the defences in this area were still to be based on strongpoints and mobile response. The creation of a continuous system of fortifications could not have been implemented by just building more of the large and material-consuming Regelbau bunkers in the gaps between the strongpoints. The first step in creating a line of defence was to establish a continuous barbed wire obstruction along the foot of the dunes, which in some places was supplemented by minefields on or behind the beach. The backbone of the defence, however, was the F-Stand, which was a small bunker with 1 m-thick walls and an embrasure for flanking fire. The construction of such bunkers only consumed around 80 m3 of reinforced concrete, and the bunker was very plainly furnished. The F-stands were constructed in pairs, F-Gruppen, with the embrasure points each way along the coast and a single machine gun nest (Ringstand, Bauform 58c or 67) in between, covering the blind arc in the middle. On the coastal stretches on which this system was fully elaborated, the flanking positions lay at distances of about 500 m. The fortification line was with reinforced at intervals with Regelbau bunkers for the crews (Regelbau 621) and for anti-tank guns (Regelbau 680 and 676). Additionally, the navy started an extensive mining programme, which included a number of new types of weapons: shore and beach mines, alert mining, and remote-controlled mines in the harbours. These were means which had been considered at earlier stages, but were not enough of a priority to trigger development or deployment.

Drawing showing the principles of the employment of the machine guns in the flanking positions (Š RA)

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The fortification of Denmark after “Overlord” : June - December 1944

Old French 19,4 cm gun in open position in the Army coastal battery at Stauning. One of the guns of the battery was at the end of 1944 emplaced in a gun bunker, Regelbau 686, whereas work on one further had begun. Summer 1945 (© MCH)

Old German 8,8 cm anti-aircraft gun at Midskov at the North coast of Funen. Some of the guns emplaced at the Kattegat were of pre-World War I model like this gun, whereas others were brand-new (© MCH)

The Allied landing in Normandy on June 6th, 1944 did not put an end to German work on fortifications in Denmark, as the German high commands still considered that there was a threat against the Danish coasts. The reason was that they thought that the Allies still had a large force in England, earmarked for further landing operations. Therefore, work on the already-planned fortification on the Danish west coast continued, and new bunkers were even added to the plans. Among these were gun bunkers (Regelbau 671 and 686) for most of the army coastal batteries emplaced early in 1944. In addition, work on the new heavy battery (38 cm) was started at Blåvand in August. During August and September, the German navy actually considered the Kattegat the most threatened of the areas controlled by Germany. The reason was that the navy no longer was convinced that it was possible to hinder an Allied naval force from penetrating deep into the Kattegat. In these waters, large-scale landings could be carried out even during winter, which was not the case on the west coast of Jutland. One must also presume that the navy was well aware that an Allied landing here would have had more direct and immediate consequences for their sphere of operations than would a similar operation on the west coast. Therefore, in the late summer of 1944 the navy started to strengthen the defences of the Kattegat, which had until then been very sparse. An important element in this fortification was the emplacement of a large number of new coastal batteries–all the plans came to include 29 batteries of guns, in calibres ranging from 7.5 to 15 cm. Most of these batteries were emplaced before the end of 1944. Fire control posts and crew and ammunition bunkers were usually built in a combination of timber and thin concrete (20-40 cm). The crews were, when possible, housed in existing weekend cottages, and otherwise in wooden huts. At the same time that the navy moved its attention to the east coast of Jutland, Hitler issued an order that drew the efforts of fortification in another direction than the one desired by the army C.-in-C. in Denmark wanted. In connection with a general strengthening of the defences of the German Bight and northern Germany, it was ordered that blocking positions should be constructed in southern Jutland in order to stop an attack against Germany from the north. In southern Jutland work on three extensive blocking positions was started. The main element of the positions was an anti-tank ditch supported by field-type positions constructed in earth and wood for machine guns and artillery. The fortification of the west coast, however, still had absolute priority to the army C.-in-C., who stressed that the construction of the blocking positions should

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not delay the other fortification works. In any case, lack of materials such as concrete, iron, and tires caused considerable delays in the work on the bunkers on the west coast. Finally, in December the Armed forces high command ordered the army C. in C. in Denmark to transfer troops to the east coast of Jutland and to construct blocking positions behind the Kattegat coastline. The naval high command, on the other hand, still considered Danish territory threatened, and therefore in the first months of 1945 continued making plans to emplace a further twenty coastal batteries. However, only one of these batteries was actually emplaced. From the end of February 1945, the navy, too, had to downgrade the priority of the strengthening of coastal defences, due to more urgent tasks on the eastern front. Therefore, in the beginning of March 1945 the naval high command ordered three 7.5 cm batteries at the Kattegat to be transferred to the eastern front. Still, it was not until the end of April that Grand Admiral DĂśnitz ordered a massive transfer of weapons from the coasts of Denmark. From the end of March 1945, the German army commander in Denmark again began to consider seriously an Allied invasion of Denmark. The Allied forces had now penetrated so deep into Germany, that an attack across the Danish border from the south seemed to pose a greater threat than one across the sea. Therefore, the army started to prepare itself for stopping an attack from the south. Work on turning the front of the most complete of three blocking positions in southern Jutland was begun, and forces were transferred from western and central Jutland to the southern part of the peninsula where a new army corps was created. Guns for forming the new artillery detachments for the defence of the position were largely taken from the army coastal artillery. The battle, however, did not materialise, as the German high command chose to surrender in northern Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark before Allied forces reached Danish territory; the German occupation of Denmark officially ended at 8:00 a.m. on May 5th, 1945.

The position of the 38 cm battery at Oksby. Parts of the turret have been mounted, but a lot of work was still to be done. Summer 1945 (Š MCH)

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Curator of Danish presentation

Jens Andersen

BAUPROGRAMM

ACTUALLY BUILT

ACTUAL STATUS

what was programmed to be built

explain if it was “all built”, as from bauprogramme or something “unbuilt”, e.g.:only 2 of the 5/612 built, etc.

brief description of the actual status, e.g.: well/bad preserved, military area, etc.

all built

very well preserved

065_DK

Stützpunkt Marine-Flakbatterie Fanø-Nord

4/Fl 243, 1/Fl 244, 1/Fl 245, 2/Fl 246, 1/621, 1/622, 1/638

066_DK

Stützpunktgruppe Blåvand

Stp HKB

1/120, 2/134, 1/V 174, 1/Fl 277, 2/501, 2/502, 1/607, 2/621, 4/622, 2/633, 1/636, 1/645, 1/661, 4/671, 2/667, 4/674

all built

preserved, but strong coastal erosion

Stp Büffel

4/L 409A, 2/L 410, 2/L 411, 1/L 412, 2/L 413, 1/L 485, 1/L 487, 5/622

all built

well preserved

Stp Flakstellung Küste

2/L 409A, 1/L 410, 2/L 411, 1/L 413, 1/622

all built

preserved

Stp MFlak

1/Fl 242, 1/L 410

all built

preserved

067_DK

Stützpunktgruppe Søndervig

Stp. HKB 5./180

1/120, 2/134, 1/Fl 277, 2/L 409a, 4/501, 1/607,3/622, 1/628, 1/636, 1/635, 1/638, 1/645, 4/671, 1/674

all built

preserved, but strong coastal erosion.

Inf. Stützpunkt

2/600, 1/V194, 1/610, 6/622, 2/633, 1/634, 3/666, 1/668, 1/675, 2/680

all built

preserved, but strong coastal erosion. Blurred by summer house area

Lw. Stützpunkt

2/L 409a, 1/L 410, 1/L 413, 1/L 480, 1/L 487, 1/607, 4/622

all built

preserved, but strong coastal erosion.

068_DK

Stützpunkt Tørring

4/669

all built

well preserved

069_DK

Stützpunktgruppe Thyborön

Stp HKB

1/120, 2/134, 1/Fl 277, 2/L 409A, 4/501, 2/607, 3/622, 1/631, 3/635, 1/636, 1/666, 4/671

all built

only partly preserved due to strong coastal erosion

Stp Lama

1/Fl 241, 4/L 409A, 2/L 410, 1/L 411, 2/L 411A, 1/L 412, 2/L 413, 1/L 487, 1/600, 1/610, 1/621, 6/622

all built

only partly preserved due to strong coastal erosion

Stp Saelhundehafen

2/L 409A, 1/L 410A, 1/L 411A, 1/L 413A, 1/600, 1/666

all built

badly preserved, two bunkers removed, others covered

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WN Hafen

1/621, 4/622, 1/655, 1/656, 1/666, 3/668

all built

badly preserved, some bunkers removed

070_DK

Stützpunkt Agger Dorf

2/600, 2/607, 1/610, 7/622, 1/629, 2/633, 1/634, 2/666, 1/668

all built

no information

071_DK

Stützpunkt 2/MAA 118

4/S 80, 1/S 100, 15/Fl 242, 5/L 411A, 1/S 449, 4/S 468, 5/501, 1/621, 1/631, 1/633, 2/S ?, 1/SK

all built

preserved, now open air museum

072_DK

Stützpunktgruppe Aggersund

2/L 409A, 1/L 410A, 1/L 413A, 1/607, 1/610, 1/621, 5/622, 1/680, 2/681

all built

preserved

073_DK

Sperrbatterie Lökken-Nord

1/134, 4/M 160, 1/M 162a, 2/Fl 242, 4/M 272, 1/Fl 277, 1/L 411A, 1/607, 4/622, 1/675

all built

preserved, but heavy coastal erosion

074_DK

Artillerie-Stützpunkt Hirtshals-Süd

1/120a, 2/134, 1/V 174, 1/Fl 277, 2/L 409A, 3/501, 2/502, 1/607, 2/621, 4/622, 1/628, 1/636, 1/645, 1/661, 1/668, 4/671, 2/674, 1/676

2/621: only 1 built, 1/628: never built

very well preserved

075_DK

Stützpunktgruppe Skagen

 

Stp Hafen

1/621, 2/655

all built

all demolished

Sperrbatterie

1/134, 1/V 157, 3/M 151, 1/M 162a, 4/M 272, 1/M 283, 2/L 409A, 1/L 410A, 1/501, 2/502, 1/607

all built

preserved, but distrubed by coastal erosion

Inf. Stp

2/501, 2/506, 1/607, 8/622, 1/628, 1/632, 3/633, 1/638, 2/666

all built

preserved

FuMG

1/V 174, 1/622

all built

no information

Lw.Stp

2/L 409A, 1/L 410, 2/L 411, 1/L 413, 1/L 487, 5/622

all built

preserved, part of area closed as military area

Fernsuchanlage

1/L 480

all built

preserved

Leebstellung

9/621

9/621: only 8 built

bunkers preserved, but obscured by summer cottages

076_DK

Sperrbatterie Frederikshavn

1/134, 1/M 145, 1/M 162a, 1/V 174, 4/M 270, 1/L 409A, 2/622, 4/628, 2/635

all built

very well preserved

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DK 065 Stützpunkt MarineFlakbatterie Fanø-Nord Typology Stützpunkt (Strongpoint) Sub-section Stp. Gr. Fanö, Verteidigungsbereich Esbjerg Number and designation 4/Fl243, 1/Fl244, 1/Fl245, 2/ Fl246, 1/621, 1/622, 1/638 Address Fanø Locality •

The battery site is very well-preserved, with its space still undisturbed, far from any buildings. The battery site actually consists of two separate sites: one old, 1940-1943, and one new, 1943-1945. The old position is on a quite distinct dune ridge some 250 m to the southwest of the new one. The site consists of four gun positions and a firing control post with concrete foundations surrounded by earth walls. The guns were positioned in a somewhat irregular trapezoid shape with the firing control on the eastern, longer side. The wooden huts for the crews seem to have been placed immediately around the gun positions – of these, however, no trace remains. The newer position is northeast of the old one. The gun positions are Regelbau Fl 243 concrete

positions with attached crew quarters. The positions of the guns form a regular trapezoid with the firing control bunker in the middle of the longer, eastern side. To the rear of the gun positions, along a sunken road going north-south, are some supplementary bunkers housing ammunition, hospital, etc. Further to the south, some 200 m from the centre of the new battery position on both sides of the road, there are still visible some earthen walls for a large wooden hut and for the protection of vehicles. The battery lies in a dune area some 800 m from the nearest modern buildings. The landscape is dune heath mostly overgrown with grass and helmets. The dune top on which the old battery site lies

Camouflaged dome with 10,5 cm anti-aircraft gun (© BPW)

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is covered with a spruce plantation. The new battery site is very well-preserved, as it lies in the dunes far from any modern buildings. Preserved of the old battery site are the positions; the position in its entirety is, however, blurred by the dense spruce plantation. The battery was emplaced in April, 1940. At first a Luftwaffe 8.8 cm battery was placed in a field position with the guns emplaced behind earthen walls, and the crew accommodated in tents. In May, 1940 the Luftwaffe battery was replaced by a navy 8.8 cm battery. The guns were placed in the old positions on new concrete foundations. Wooden huts were constructed for the crew. The new battery was ready in the beginning of June, 1940.

In August, 1942 the 8.8 cm guns were replaced by ones of 10.5 cm. From the beginning of 1943 a new position with permanent bunkers was constructed ca. 200 m to the NNV of the old position. The first bunker, the firing control bunker, was poured at the end of February, 1943. In the beginning of December, 1943, the last of the eleven bunkers were poured. The guns were moved to the new position in January, 1944. The area is owned by the Danish state and there is full public access. During the last few years some of the bunkers of the new battery site (1/Fl 243, 1/Fl. 244 and 638) have been opened by a local society (“Fanø i Atlantvolden”).

A “Würszburg Dora” fire control radar (© BPW)

The battery site seen from the rear. In the foreground a wooden hut (© BPW)

Excerpt from: “Fest. Pi. Stab, NR. 12 Ribe. Anl. 13 (Esbjerg – V.Vested)”, orig. 1:100.000, 12 March 1944 (© RA, K697 272.3)

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DK 068 Stützpunkt Tørring Typology Stützpunkt (Strongpoint) Sub-section • Number and designation 4/669 Address Tørring Locality •

The well-preserved battery site lies on a hill and is thereby highly visible. The battery is placed on a hilltop just opposite the village of Tørring. The site measures ca. 250 m west-east. The main elements of the site are the four Regelbau 669, which lie in a curved line with embrasures pointing to the north. The two easternmost bunkers are totally visible from all sides, as they were camouflaged as houses. In contrast, the outlines of the two westernmost bunkers are camouflaged by earth. Behind the easternmost bunker an open concrete emplacement with a concrete track lead-

ing to the bunker is still preserved. It must be presumed that similar firing positions existed for the rest of the guns. Also behind the Regelbau 669 the remains of some thin-walled bunkers for the gun crews can still be found. The battery site lies on a hill top, ca. 25 m above sea level. The site lies ca. 200 m to the west of the village of Underbjerg (small detached houses). The entire battery site is farm land which is ploughed. Therefore, earthen field fortifications have not been preserved. Generally the strongpoint is well-preserved, as all of the permanent bunkers are still intact and accessible. However, the battery lies in

The front of the easternmost Regelbau 669. The bunker had been camouflaged as a house (© K. Stigaard)

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farmland, and therefore earthen field fortifications have not been preserved. Also most of the smaller and less thick-walled bunkers have been demolished. The strongpoint was established in January, 1944 when an army coastal battery was emplaced on the spot. Construction of the four gun bunkers started in the spring of 1944; the first was poured in June, the last in November. The establishment of the strongpoint at Tørring was due to the strengthening of the coastal defences along the Danish west coast beginning at the end of 1943. Thus, in January, 1944 the army coastal artillery in Denmark was strengthened with nine

batteries with 12.2 cm Russian field guns, two batteries of 19.4 cm French guns, and one 15 cm German K 39 battery. The battery at Tørring was supposed to strengthen the defence of the western entrance of the Limfjord. Only two of the new army coastal batteries were emplaced in bunkers of the type Regelbau 669. The strongpoint is privately owned.

A Regelbau 669 seen from the rear (© K. Stigaard) In the foreground an open position for a 12,2 cm gun. In the background the rear side of a Regelbau 669 gun casemate (© MCH)

Excerpt from: “Fest. Pi. Stab, NR. 5 Herning. Anl. 6 (Ringkøbing - Oddesund)”, orig. 1:100.000, 12 March 1944 (© RA, K699 272.5.a)

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DK 070 Stützpunkt Agger Dorf Typology Stützpunkt (Strongpoint) Sub-section • Number and designation 2/600, 2/607, 1/610, 7/622, 1/629, 2/633, 1/634, 2/666, 1/668 Address Agger Locality •

The strongpoint of Agger is typical for the strongpoints which the German army erected along the Danish west coast at the end of 1942 in order to defend roads leading from the beach into the country. Most of the bunkers of the strongpoint are still preserved. The strongpoint at Agger measures ca. 1000 m along the coast, and stretches ca. 1000 m into the hinterland. Immediately at the coast two bunkers with 5 cm guns (Regelbau 600) and an observation bunker were placed as well as a number of machine gun positions (Ringstand). The landscape of the strongpoint is partly lowland with some dune. On three sides the strongpoint is surrounded by water: to the west

the North Sea, to the north the lake Flade Sø, and to the south the KriK Vig (a part of the Limfjord). To those three sides the area is protected by dikes. Most of the area is built up. The bunkers are situated around and among the old original village. Generally the strongpoint is well-preserved, as most bunkers are still intact, although some are no longer visible and most are not accessible. The outlines of the strongpoint are blurred by the built-up area that has grown to the north and the east since 1945. The strongpoint was established in the summer of 1942 with field fortifications and barbed wire. The planning of the permanent fortifica-

Bunker, Regelbau 622, which has been completed, but is not yet covered with sand, 1946 (© MCH) Infantry observation bunker, Regelbau 666, at beach, 1946 (© MCH) Bunker for 5 cm tank gun, Regelbau 600. The emplacement at this the gun has been removed, 1946 (© MCH)

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tion started at the end of 1942; the first bunker was poured on January 3rd, 1943. Basically, the strongpoint was completed by the beginning of 1944. The last, a Regelbau 634, was poured on February 29th, 1944. The strongpoint was constructed in 1942 to secure the good road leading from the coast into the hinterland. The defence was solely to be carried out with infantry weapons, the heaviest weapons being two 5 cm tank guns. The stronghold had no defence against aerial attacks. The strongpoint is partly owned by the Danish state.

Excerpt from: “Fest. Pi. Stab, NR. 3 Hansted. Anl. 4 (Thybøron - Bulbjerg)”, orig. 1:100.000, 12 March 1944 (© RA, K700)

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DK 072 Stützpunktgruppe Aggersund Typology Stützpunktgruppe (Strongpoint group) Sub-section • Number and designation 2/L409A, 1/L410A, 1/L413A, 1/607, 1/610, 2/621, 4/622, 1/680, 2/681 Address Aggersund Locality •

072_ Stp.Gr. Aggersund

Parts of the strongpoint of Aggersund are very visible, as the bunkers immediately around the bridge have been built on the surface due to the high level of ground water. The bunkers have been camouflaged with brickwork, small parts of which are still visible. The strongpoint group at Aggersund lies on both sides of the Limfjord and is built around both ends of the bridge. The northern strongpoint measures ca. 1600 x 750 m; the southern, ca. 1250 x 600 m. Immediately at both ends of the bridge are situated bunkers for anti-aircraft guns. Further to the north and south there is a defence line for the infantry. The strongpoint is situated in a very mixed area. Generally it is low, although it rises to the south. On the north side of the bridge, the

strongpoint lies in the outskirts of a built-up area. Generally, the strongpoint is well-preserved, as most bunkers are still intact – only one machine pit (Ringstand, Bauform 58c) seems to have been removed. However, the general state of many of the bunkers is quite bad due to the inferior quality of concrete. The outlines of the strongpoint are still quite clear, as only quite few new houses have been built since 1945. In August-September, 1942, the Luftwaffe emplaced three 2 cm air aircraft guns by the newly built bridge, thereby taking the first step to fortify the place. The construction of the strongpoint started in the beginning of 1943 with field fortifications, barbed wire and fields mine. Construction of fortification of reinforced concrete did not begin until the end of

Anti-tank wall at the southwestern entrance to Aggersund (© MCH)

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1943. The stronghold group was constructed to secure the important bridge crossing the Limfjord, one of only four, the others being Aggersund, Oddesund, and Aalborg (a road and railroad bridge). The bridge was put to use beginning in May, 1942. The Germans considered it especially important to secure the bridges across the Limfjord, because they considered an attack on Northern Jutland one of the most likely scenarios if the

Allied forces were to make an attack on Denmark. It was therefore important to secure the crossings over the Limfjord to be able to move reinforcements across it to Northern Jutland. Already in the autumn of 1942 a strong fortification of the area around the bridge was ordered, but the actual work on concrete fortification did not start until the end of 1943. At the same time, a somewhat larger strongpoint group was constructed at Oddesund, the place of another bridge crossing the Limfjord.

Regelbau L/409A at the Northern pierhead of the Aggersund bridge (© MCH) Regelbau L/410A and L/413 at the Southern pierhead of the Aggersund bridge (© MCH) Machine gun bunker, Regelbau 681, at the southern entrance of the strong point (© MCH) Plan

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DK 073 Sperrbatterie Lökken-Nord Typology Stützpunkt (Strongpoint) Sub-section Stp Gr. Lökken Number and designation 1/134, 4/M160, 1/M162a, 2/Fl242, 4/M272, 1/Fl277, 1/L411A, 1/607, 4/622, 1/675 Address Furreby Locality •

073_ Sperrbatterie Lökken-Nord

The battery site is very impressive and conspicuous as it partly lies on the beach due to coastal erosion. The way the bunkers lie fully visible on the beach gives the visitor a good impression of the layout of the original battery site. The battery stretches ca. 600 m along the coast. The original depth of the battery was ca. 200 m. Due to a coastal erosion of ca. 50 m since the war, the bunkers of the battery now lie partly on the beach. The first line of bunkers (now on the beach) consisted of the four gun positions (open as well as bunkers (M272)), the firing control bunker (M162a) lay in the middle of the beach. At the northern end there was a bunker for a 150 cm

search light (Fl. 277). Immediately behind the gun positions were situated the crew bunkers (M160). At each end of this row was a bunker for a light antiaircraft gun (Fl. 242). Situated further back, to the rear of the dune, are more crew bunkers (622) and ammunition bunkers (134, 607). In the low area behind the high dune was the barracks camp of the battery, together with the well bunker (675). As mentioned above, a part of the battery lay on the beach due to coastal erosion. The battery was, and partly still is, situated on a high dune, which is up to 24 m above sea level and stretched up to 100 m into the hinterland. Behind the high dune is an area with lower dunes. The rear side of the high dune

The fire control bunker of the battery, a Regelbau M 162a (© MCH)) The fire control bunker, Regelbau M 162a, seen from the beach (© LL)

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and the area further back is densely covered with weekend cottages. The general state of preservation of the battery site must be considered bad because of the coastal erosion. The part of the battery which lies behind the brink of the dune is not easy to detect, as the area is densely built up with summer cottages. The bunkers lying on the brink of the dune and on the beach are partly broken and filled with sand. The strongpoint was established in January, 1943 when four old Danish 12 cm coastal guns were moved from the Flakfort at Copenhagen and emplaced north of the village Løkken. At first the guns were mounted openly on concrete foundations. The construction of the first permanent bunkers (Regelbau) started in the

first months of 1943, and the first was poured in April. The battery position was basically completed by the end of 1943. However, in the beginning of 1944 it was decided that bunkers for the protection of guns (Regelbau M 272) should be built in the battery; this work was carried out during the summer and the second half of 1944. In February, 1944 the Danish 12 cm guns were replaced by new German 12.7 cm guns. The strongpoint is partly owned by the Danish state, and partly by private parties. The beach and the brink of the dunes are owned by the Danish state, and thereby also the bunkers lying in this area. The bunkers in the hinterland lie on private soil.

A German 12,7 cm gun mounted in a Regelbau M 272 (© MCH)

Excerpt from: “Fest. Pi. Stab, NR. 1 Hjørring. Anl. 20 (Blokhus - Tversted)”, orig. 1:100.000, 12 March 1944 (© RA, K701 273 7a)

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DK 074 Stp. Re n° 305 Holtzendorf Typology Stützpunkt (Strongpoint) Sub-section Stp Gr. Hirtshals Number and designation 1/120a, 2/134, 1/V174, 1/Fl277, 2/L409A, 3/501, 2/502, 1/607, 1/621, 4/622, 1/636, 1/645, 1/661, 1/668, 4/671, 2/674, 1/676 Address Fyrvej, DK-9850 Hirtshals Locality •

Artillerie-Stützpunkt Hirtshals-Süd

The battery site is very well-preserved with most of its space still undisturbed by modern buildings. The perimeter of the battery measured ca. 800 m southwest to northeast, and ca. 200 m to the rear. In the battery three phases of emplacing of the guns can be discerned. The earliest battery site was placed on the plateau at the foot the hill just west of the lighthouse. The guns positions were placed close to the brink, and the three them now lie broken on the beach. The barrack was situation on the same plateau a little further to the north. Later, in 1942, the guns were moved to the top of the hill, some 100 m to rear. The new gun positions, surrounded by small ammunition rooms, lie on the top of the brink with a mutual distance of ca. 30 m. A firing control bunker (Regelbau 636) was placed in the middle of this line, and be-

hind them lay a row of Regelbau 501/502 crew bunkers. In the area behind the crew bunkers a wide range of bunkers were later constructed. In 1944, four gun bunkers (Regelbau 671) were built into the brink of the hill. As the brink is 6 m tall, the three of them were built with special tunnel entrances. The strongpoint also contained other units besides the army coastal battery. To the north of the lighthouse were situated parts of a naval radar station, including two permanent bunkers (V 174 and 622). Also, the command station of the harbour captain (Regelbau 502) was placed in this area. An air observation post was placed in the eastern part of the battery (Regelbau 668). The battery lies on a hill, which goes up to 28 m above sea level. The hill has steep sides to the north, east and west, whereas it to the south goes into a humid plain. The top of the hill is covered with low dunes. The vegetation

The fire control post of the battery, a Regelbau 636a, 1945 (© MCH)

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consists mainly of grass. On the eastern part of the area there is, however, a small plantation of spruce. In the northern part of the battery’s extreme east side, detached houses were built after the war, covering part of the defence perimeter of the battery. In the southernmost part of the battery there is a large hotel with a parking lot. The strongpoint was established in June, 1941, when four old French 10.5 cm field guns were emplaced on the plateau at the foot of the west side of the hill. The guns were mounted openly on concrete foundations, their wheels attached to a primitive turntable that allowed the field guns to be passed more quickly. In June, 1942 the battery position was moved to the top of the hill, some 100 m to the south, in order to improve the close defence of the battery. Here new, open gun positions with small ammunition

rooms were built. The barracks were placed behind the new gun positions. At the same time the construction of the first permanent bunkers (Regelbau 134, 501 and 502) began. In 1943 the building of permanent bunkers continued, and the battery position was basically completed by the end of 1943. However, in the beginning of 1944 four bunkers for the protection of the guns (Regelbau 671) were constructed with the gun tubes mounted in pedestal mounts. Also, in the spring and summer of 1944, three more bunkers were built, two of which were ammunition bunkers (Regelbau 674) to the south and north of the new gun bunkers. Two further crew bunkers were planned (Regelbau 621 and 628). Of these, the construction on the Regelbau 621 began in September, 1944, but was never finished; no work seems to have been done on the Regelbau 628.

Würzburg Riese-radar mounted on a Regelbau V174 in the Northern part of the strong point. In the background a tower for radar location instruments is seen (© MCH)_001.psd: One of the four Regelbau 671 gun bunkers with a French 10,5 cm gun, seen from the front (© MCH) A French 2,5 cm Hotchkiss antiaircraft gun. The gun is emplaced in a field type position on a Regelbau 622 (© MCH) A Regelbau Fl. 277 built to house a 150 cm search light. From the late summer of 1944 the bunker functioned as a garage for a 8,8 cm anti-tank gun (© MCH)

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DK 075 Stützpunktgruppe Skagen Typology Stützpunktgruppe (Strongpoint group) Sub-section • Number and designation Stp Hafen: 1/62, 2/655; Sperrbatterie: 1/134, 1/V157, 3/ M151, 1/M162a, 4/M272, 1/M283, 2/L409A, 1/L410A, 1/501, 2/502, 1/607; Infanterie Stützpunkt: 2/501, 2/506, 1/607, 8/622, 1/628, 1/632, 3/633, 1/638, 2/666; FuMG: 1/V174, 1/622; Luftwaffe Stützpunkt, radarstation “Schackal”: 2/L409A, 1/L410, 2/L411, 1/L413, 1/L487, 5/622; Fernsuchanlage, “Wassermann (S)”: 1/L480, Leebstellung 8/621 Address Skagen Locality •

Skagen was one of the most central points in the German fortification of Denmark, from the beginning of the occupation of Denmark in April, 1940, until the end of the occupation in May, 1945. Therefore the development of the fortification of Skagen reflects the evolution of the German fortification in Denmark in general. Also, the fortifications are relatively undisturbed by later activities, so that most bunkers can still be found in the landscape. The strongpoint group is situated on the northernmost tip of Jutland – the Skaw. It covers an area of ca. 6000 m southwest to northeast, and ca. 3000 m north to south from the coast of the Skagerrak to the coast of the Kattegat. The strongpoint group consisted of four strongpoints and one resistance nest: 1) The infantry strongpoint covers an area of ca. 1000 x 500 m. The primary front of the strongpoint was turned to the southeast, the direction of the

town and harbour. Most of the bunkers lie in this part of the strongpoint. In the easternmost part of the strongpoint a naval radar station was stationed; 2) The coastal battery lay on the coast of the Kattegat between the infantry and the harbour. From 1944, the four 12 cm guns of the battery were housed in Regelbau 272 bunkers, and four other guns of the same type were emplaced openly on concrete foundations to the rear of the battery; 3) The resistance nest on the harbour was placed on the harbour area. It consisted of only three Regelbau bunkers, but included a greater number of machine gun positions. The road leading from the harbour into town was closed with concrete walls; 4) The air force radar station, “Schackal” is placed at the coast of the Skagerrak. The main position covers a distance of ca. 1000 x 300 m. The “Wassermann (S)”-radar of the station was placed in the infantry strongpoint. 5) The

The coastal battery seen from the beach. In the foreground the fire control bunker, M 162a, behind it a gun bunker M 272 (© MCH)

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“Leeb-Stellung” runs from the coast of the Skagerrak in the north to the coast of the Kattegat to the southeast. It primarily consisted of an anti-tank ditch, which was covered in intervals by small resistance points with machine gun positions and a few Regelbau bunkers for the protection of the crews. The fortification of Skagen began in April 1940 when the work on two coastal batteries was begun just northeast of the harbour. One of the batteries, the “Lützow”, was equipped with four 8.8 cm anti-aircraft guns mounted in twin mounts, while the battery was equipped with four 12 cm Danish guns. In August, 1940 the 8.8 cm battery was dismantled again. Also, on the tip of the Skaw at the end of April, 1940 the navy emplaced a radar for air warning. In the spring of 1942 the German air force built a radar position codenamed “Schackal” on the north coast of the Skaw. The radar station was at first equipped with two “Würburg Riese” sets aa well as a “Freya”. In the summer of 1942 work on permanent bunkers started in the battery. Also, in the summer of 1942 construction

of an infantry strongpoint began on the tip of the Skaw, to the east of the battery and the air force radar station. In December, 1942 two 5 cm tank guns were emplaced on the harbour, and a resistance nest was arranged. In the late autumn of 1943 began the construction of a fortification line, the “Leeb-Stellung”, covering the eastern flank of the strongpoint group between the Kattegat and Skagerrak. The work on an anti-tank ditch and barbed wire obstacles started at once, but permanent bunkers were not built on the line until the late summer of 1944.

Road blocks at the entrance to Skagen (© MCH) A Wassermann (S) radar of the “Schackal” radar station. The radar placed within the perimeter of the infantry strong point (© MCH)

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DK 076 Sperrbatterie Frederikshavn Typology Stützpunkt (Strongpoint) Sub-section Verteidigungsbereich Frederikshavn, Stp Gr. Frederikshavn-Süd Number and designation 1/134, 1/M145, 1/M162a, 1/V174, 4/M270, 1/L409A, 2/622, 4/628, 2/635 Address Understedvej 21, DK-9900 Frederikshavn Locality Bangsbofort

The battery site is very well-preserved. Furthermore it is the only site in which the guns are still in their original positions. The battery was a part of the strongpoint group “Süd”. The strongpoint group consisted of three main parts: the Sperrbatterie is placed in the middle with a heavy anti-aircraft battery; Flak- und Sperrbatterie Frederikshavn Süd lay to the southwest within the same defence perimeter; and to the north was a smaller strongpoint with its defence perimeter, housing the command bunker of the artillery commander of the area (“Ugruko”). Situated within the same perimeter as the Sperrbatterie and the anti-aircraft battery were

two other small units: the M 152 command post of the naval commander of Northern Jutland (“Marko”), and the naval radar station “Freiburg”, with, situated among the bunkers of the battery, a “Würzburg Riese” on a V 174. The defence perimeter shared with the AA battery measured ca. 800 x 300 m. The bunkers of the battery cover ca. 400 m north to south, and 200 m to the rear. Most of the battery is placed on the upper front of the hill, with the embrasures of the gun bunkers situated ca. 20 below the hill ridge. For this reason the crew bunkers are primarily of the types Regelbau 628 and 635, which are ac-

Danish 15 cm gun from the Danish warship “Niels Juel” mounted in Regelbau 270, summer 1945 (© AS)

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cessed from the sides. Also for this reason the bunkers for the crews are situated in the first line next to the gun bunkers and the earlier, open gun positions. The battery lies atop an 80-metre-high ridge, which rises almost 80 m above the marine foreland – some 200 m behind the coastline. There are very few buildings above ground in the area. The northern part of the area is relatively densely overgrown with hardwood trees. The area is fenced in. The strongpoint was established in May, 1940 when four old German 15 cm ship guns were emplaced on open concrete emplacements. The construction of the first Regelbau bunkers

started in the autumn of 1942 (a single Regelbau 134). Full work on the building of Regelbau bunkers did not begin, however, until the beginning of 1943. By the end of 1943, work on the battery was basically complete, but by the beginning of 1944 it was decided that four bunkers should be constructed to protect the four guns. Three of these bunkers were poured during the spring and summer of 1944, whereas the fourth (and northernmost) bunker was never completed. In 1945 the battery was taken over by the Danish navy, which used it as a part of the coastal fort of “Bangsbofort” until 1960. From 1949-52 the battery was modernized, which among other things, included the construction of three new positions for 40 mm anti-aircraft guns, and the modification of the firing control bunker for radar. The bunkers of the heavy anti-aircraft battery in the southwest corner are still in military use and are guarded and fenced in. The battery site is very well-preserved, with all bunkers still intact and three of the four guns still in their bunkers. The bunkers are in good shape, although some of them were modified around 1950-52 in connection with the modernization of the battery. Due to the military use of the area, it has not been disturbed by newer buildings in the area.

Danish 15 cm gun from the Danish warship “Niels Juel” mounted in Regelbau 270, summer 1945 (© AS) The Northernmost of the Danish 15 cm guns. In this case the bunker was never completed, summer 1945 (© AS) The wooden baracks of the battery built in 1940, summer 1945 (© MCH) Position with 150 cm search light (© MCH) 150 cm search light (© MCH) 1:333 (© R. Rolf)

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Atlantic Wall Linear Museum  

catalogue abstract