Exploring Violence & the Culture of Martyrdom in Shi’ia Islam
Kelsey Price Introduction to Shi’i Islam Mid East Studies 4520 Safiullah Final Paper
2 Kelsey Price Introduction to Shi’i Islam Mid East Studies 4520 Safiullah Final Paper Exploring Violence & the Culture of Martyrdom in Shi’ia Islam
Exploring Violence & the Culture of Martyrdom in Shi’ia Islam
Following the September 11 attacks, there was a renewed sense of interest in American politics and media regarding the Middle East and Islam. While the media and academic focus on violence in Islam has largely concentrated on Salafabism, Wahabism, and other extremist Sunni sects, the relationship with Shi’ia Islam and violence, particularly terrorism, presents a unique study into the culture of religion in contrast with the culture of violence. Despite that the terrorist Islamist groups that are the focus point of media coverage are typically Sunni, Shi’ia culture dating back to the Battle of Karbala has been defined by a history of martyrdom and marginalization that, to a degree, has lead to form terrorism that rationalizes itself to an extent through religious culture, although not necessarily religious doctrine. Indeed, Shi’ia Islam and the prevalence of suicide terrorism as a practice in Shi’ia extremist groups is a unique paradox between religious doctrine which condemns the practice of suicide, whereas martyrdom, to knowingly die as a witness to a cause, is justifiable by some organizations and groups. Examining the relationship between any religious group and violence is difficult, in large part because it is hard to draw the distinction between religious culture and religious doctrine. Too often, especially in terms of Islam, a generalization is drawn that “Islam is a religion of violence.” However, such a generalization proves to be an oversimplification when examining
3 the doctrine within Quran, and indeed, is no more true than claiming “Christianity is a religion of violence” when examined within a historical context of normative social practices in the region and society of the time both are believed to originated from. Therefore, when examining the role of any violence in a religion, it is crucial to bear in mind that distinction is often a difference in language and practice, as opposed to a direct belief or doctrine. Shi’ia Islam is unique in that much of its religious culture is focused on injustice to the community and the martyrdom and sacrifice of its leader. Even prior to the Battle of Karbala, Ali, the first Shi’ia Imam was also a symbol of sacrifice and injustice. That Ali was denied initial leadership when Abu Bakr was named first caliph, as well his eventually murder by fellow Muslims, Ali is regarding by Shi’ites as being betrayed by friends and foes alike and has become symbolic of the inherent injustice in Shi’ia life (Moghadam, 125). The death of Ali would follow a series of events in Shi’ia history that solidified a culture of injustice and martyrdom that has been corrupted by individuals to justify acts of political violence. A so-called culture of martyrdom, or shahadat in Arabic, is a more central focus in Shi’ism compared to Sunni Islam, which is mostly attributable to the Battle of Karbala. In 680, Husayn, the son of Ali, and his followers fell at the orders ibn Sa’d, a Sunni caliph. At the battle, Husayn’s infant son, Ali al-Asghar ibn Husayn, was also killed. While historians disagree over to what extent Husayn knew of the likelyhood of his death, modern Shi’ia historian S.H.M. Jafri writes, as cited in An Introduction to Shi’ia Islam that [Husayn] realised that mere force of arms would not have saved Islamic action and conciousness. To him it need shaking and jolting of hearts and feelings. This, he decided, could only ne achieved through sacrfic and sufferings. This should not be difficult to understand, especially for those
4 who fully appreciate the heroic deeds and sacrifices of, for example, Socrates and Joan of Arc, both of whom embraced death for their ideals, and above all the great sacrfice of Jesus Christ for the redemption of mankind. (Momen, 32) As consequence of the Battle of Karbala, Shi’ia Islam as a whole has developed what Moojan Momen calls an “ethos of sanctification through martyrdom” (Momen, 33). According to Shi’ia traditiona and culture, Momem notes, that to at least some degree, all the Imams suffered martyrdom (ibid). This culture of self-sacrifice in the name of sanctification has become a cornerstone in Shi’ia rhetoric that turned into suicide terrorism in the twentieth century. has become the prototype of every struggle for justice, every suffering. The Battle of Karbala is such a central focus in Shi’ia Islam that academic Yann Richard remarked “That is where the heart of Shi’ism lies, in this agony which is at one and the same time a revolt and a sign of hope” (Moghadam, 129). In modern days, it is interesting to note the religious meaning of Shi’ia rites commemorated the Battle of Karabla that also emphasize the martyrdom theme. Throughout Ashura, the Shi’ia festival remembering the martyrdom of Husayn, there is an element of selfinflicted violence in some sects, despite condemnation from various spiritual leaders. During the Ashura ritual, some adherents shave their heads, wearing headbands inscribed with Quranic verses, and beat themselves on the head to the point of drawing blood. This tradition is found throughout early Christian and Islamic funerary rites (Picard, 30), and can also be seen as a symbolic representation of the suffering of Husayn. Most importantly, the element of this ritual that has been embraced in political violence and suicide terrorism is the self-flagellants,
5 throughout this process chant “Allah Akbar.” The phrase, which means “God is great” has become a staple in Western portrayal of a terrorist before he commits his terrorism attack. Furthermore, the idea of martyrdom only became more solidifying in Shi’ia tradition entering the Dark and Middle Ages. After the martyrdom of Husayn, at least in Twelver tradition, all but one of the rightful Imams was murdered, fitting a pattern of suffering, repression and martyrdom (Moghadam, 130). It was also in the early Middle Ages that the first recorded instances of martyrdom culture being used a justification for violence dates to the eleventh and twelfth centuries in modern day Iran. Ismaili assassins created a network that planned systematic political murders through suicide missions for success, targeting Sunni rulers of the region as well as Christian crusaders. According to Shi’ia tradition, these assassins undertook their suicide missions with enthusiasm, and surviving a mission was considered shameful (Pape, 12). These early Ismaili assassins are a crucial demonstration of the transition of the Shi’ia view as no longer self-pitying. Their enthusiasm to die for the Shi’ia cause is reflective of the modern collective culture and view towards the death of Husayn in Shi’ia Islam. Although his death is still commemorated during Ashura, the tone has shifted in view. Martin Kramer explains that “[Hussein] is no longer pitied; he is a hero to be emulated for his willingness to battle against all odds and offer his life as a martyr for the just cause” (Moghadam, 131). While forms of suicide terrorism and martyrdom date back to the first century AD and are found throughout history, suicide terrorism in the modern connotative sense dates back to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the early 1980s. Suicide terrorism provided to be a more successful that other acts of violence conducted by Hezbollah, a militant Shi’ia group. The most famous of these, the 1983 Beirut Barracks Bombings, was a suicide truck bombing that killed 241 United States marines. More so than sheer size of destruction, the political results from the
6 Barracks Bombing was unparalleled. For the first time, a single incident resulted in direct and full withdrawal of all Americans forces from a country, which to Hezbollah, signaled a political success (NPR). Other prominent expressions by Shi’ia leaders and communities sanctifying political violence through martyrdom most famously include statements made by prominent Iranians, such as Ali Shariati, Ayatollah Taleqani, and Ayatollah Mutahhari, leading to, during, and following the Islamic Revolution of 1979 (Moghadam, 125). The paradox, however, of modern political violence and its justification through religion is that, suicide terrorism in particular, is now more prevalent among Sunni fundamentalist groups than Shi’ia extremists. Indeed, while martyrdom as a concept is found in Sunni traditions in addition to Shi’ia tradition, it takes a considerably more prevalent place in Shi’ia Islam (Fierke, 165) It is crucial to note, however, that given that just ten to fifteen percent of Muslims identify themselves as Shi’ia, the difference in numbers between Sunni and Shi’ia terrorist acts are due to direct number and size as opposed to portion. Fierke further notes that the practice of martyrdom and the idea of “creating martyrs” is post-Quranic, that is, it is not directly found in the Quran, as is more modern phenomena with political objectives and religious justification (Fierke, 169). In analyzing the cultures of suicide terrorism and martyrdom, it should be noted that while suicide terrorism has often been justified by its practitioners and proponents as religious martyrdom, terrorism is rarely a direct consequence of a religion. Indeed, religion and its cultural aspects, such as the concept of martyrdom, is not typically the cause of terrorism, but rather a tool utilized by terrorists to recruit and justify an action to reach their broader strategic objective (Pape, 4-5). Indeed, K.M. Fierke further notes that the distinction between suicide terrorism and martyrdom is a conscious difference in language in Shi’ia Islam. In justifying for a state to
7 retaliate, the term suicide terrorism constitutes a force who is outside politics, morally deviant, and is an object of violence. However, in contrast, martyrdom suggests the actor is in pursuit of justice within both the earthly political community as well as the divine other. Indeed, while each of the Abrahamic religions condemn suicide, martyrdom, to an extent, is glorified as a secure passage to heaven. Furthermore, in examining the traditions surrounding each group’s culture of martyrdom, it is possible to examine how martyrdom has evolved in each religion (Fierke. 15960). The idea of suicide and martyrdom and martyrdom stand in direct conflict with each other, despite an equal end result of death, in Shi’ia and Islamic tradition. They differ in that while martyrdom is committed as a witness to truth or is a viewed by the community as a testament to a religion, suicide is committed as way of escape rather than sacrifice. Furthermore, martyrdom is not necessarily suicide so much as the act of death as a witness to a truth or cause, but suicide may also be a means to that death. In contrast, on a religious level, suicide is against the majority of modern day religions. Abrahamic religions, including Islam, as well as Buddhism and Hinduism consider suicide a dishonorable act and offense against God, whereas martyrdom is the sacrifice of life as witness to the truth of God (Fierke 169). In the Christian tradition, Judas, out of shame of betraying Jesus hangs himself, whereas Stephen died a Christian martyr, stoned to death for his defense of Christ. In analyzing Shi’ism in relation to violence, martyrdom, and suicide terrorism, it is interesting to note the contradictions between written doctrine and religious justification. The Quran explicitly forbids suicide stating
8 Do not kill yourselves, for Allah will have mercy on you. Whoever does so out of aggression and injustice (towards himself), we will cast him into fire. Allah can do that easily (as cited in the Quran, An-Nisaa Verse, 29)
However, that is not to say that martyrdom is forbidden by the Quran, as Sura at-Tauba does promise a place in heaven to whosoever fight and die for God’s cause will receive a place in heaven, a concept, which should be noted, is not exclusive to Islam but is found in all Abrahamic traditions. In examining this strict forbidding of suicide in the Quran, it interesting to examine the rationale of groups such as Hezbollah in an attempt to reconcile their suicide actions with their religion. In an interview with TIME magazine, Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, a crucial leader of Hezbollah explained that Basically, it is haram (prohibited by religion) to kill oneself or others, but during jihad, which is a defensive or preventive war according to Islam, it is accepted and allowed, as jihad is considered an exceptional case…Allah continues did not identify a certain procedure to fight the enemy and defend the rights of the nation. (Moghadam, 138)
Indeed, martyrdom as a culture is not a unique concept to Shi’ia Islam, as Judaism too is often characterized as religion of martyrdom, in part due to the group’s long history of religious prosecution and also because of the belief in sanctification of the name of God, which includes
9 martyrdom. Since the conquests of Alexander the Great and forced hellenization of culture, which resulted in conflict with Jews who resisted attempts to adopted the Greek language. Throughout the Hellenistic period, there are examples of Jews being executed and dying as martyrs for crimes such as observing the Sabbath. Such a narrative of martyrdom continued throughout the religion’s history, such as the Spanish Inquisition and the Holocaust. However, unlike Shi’ia tradition, there is limited modern use of martyrdom as justification for extreme violence, such as suicide terrorism. While “suicide terrorism” is used largely to explain acts of political Islamic violence in the 20th century, it is crucial to reiterate that suicide terrorism is by no-means exclusive to Islam nor is it committed necessarily as an escape. Indeed, under the individual actor’s belief in their cause, it is martyrdom, and the difference between the two are largely defined by strategical and ideological differences between different groups. The Irish Republican Army’s use of forced proxy suicide bombs are not voluntary acts in a religious name or cause so are not martyrdom acts, compared to the death of Hossein Fahmideh, an Iranian boy who threw himself at an Iraqi tank during the Iraq-Iran war. His conscious decision and the proclamation of that as a witness to the truth of his cause, establishes it as martyrdom in the eyes of many Shi’ias. The separation and distinction, according to Fierke, is that “martyrdom is more directly recognizable as a social phenomenon in so far as one does not martyr the self for the self’s own sake, but for a cause” (179). Suicide, therefore is only martyrdom in as much as it is not for the individual bomber or soldier, but rather for the cause as a whole. Contemporary Christian examples would include the Archbishop Oscar Romero of San Salvador, who was assassinated at mass in 1980, or the millions of Jews or were killed for their faith during the Holocaust.
10 In addition to Hezbollah, the there are other instances of justification of violence through Shi’ia Islam that present a unique paradox of culture versus faith. Turning away from the Shi’ia concept of martyrdom itself, Shi’ia “jihad” operates, to an extent, as an extension of martyrdom. Shi’ia jihad, or struggle in Arabic, is, in a traditional sense, much more akin to a defensive struggle as opposed to an offensive attack. However, in modern day usage among Shi’ia Muslims, the term jihad has been no more famously used than by the leaders of the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Indeed, the 1979 leaders advocated an unparalleled politicization of Shi’ia Islam. Leaders, such as Dr. Ali Shariati justified the revolution by “Recalling the heroism and shahadat (martyrdom) of Hussein, Shariati called upon Muslims to resist the corruption of society with their lives, i.e., to seek the ‘‘red death of martyrs’’ rather than to die the ‘‘black death’’ of the cowards” (Moghadam, 133). Many Shi’ia extremists, in justifying their actions rely on the concept of martyrdom. To an extent, some academics has suggested that this phenomenon of modern day justification of violence through shahadat is simply a moral way to justify a political objective, others claim it helps the Shi’ia community, to remember its historical suffering, often at the hands of fellow Muslims throughout their history.
11 WORKS CITED "A Look at the History of Suicide Attacks." Interview by Renee Montagne. National Public Radio. NPR. 15 July 2005. Radio. Transcript. Fierke, K.M. "Agents of Death: The Structural Logic of Suicide Terrorism and Martyrdom." International Theory 1.01 (2009): 155. Print. Moghadam, Assaf. "Mayhem, Myths, and Martyrdom: The Shi'a Conception of Jihad." Terrorism and Political Violence 19.1 (2007): 125-43. Print. Momen, Moojan. An Introduction to Shiʻi Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shiʻism. New Haven: Yale UP, 1985. Print. Pape, Robert Anthony. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York: Random House, 2005. Print. Picard, Elizabeth. The Lebanese Shi'a and Political Violence. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1993. Print.