HSC Background Guide

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REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL MODEL UNITED NATIONS The 14 th Annual Conference ~ December 2-4, 2010

Dear Delegates, Aaron Bothner Secretary-General University of Colorado Cassandra Wich Director-General University of Denver Adrien Anderson Conference Director University of Colorado Mathieu Ansell Chief of External Relations University of Toronto Nikki Rosychuk Chief of Staff University of British Colombia-Vancouver Mickey Ellenwood Under Secretary-General Substantive, Mains University of Colorado Sierra Sloan Under Secretary-General Substantive, Specials Brigham Young University !

I have the honor of welcoming you to RHSMUN XIV held this December in the beautiful state of Utah. The start of the conference marks the end of a long year of preparation from your directors and assistant directors—and the rest of the staff that has worked so hard to prepare such a challenging (and hopefully enjoyable) substantive program. I hope that this year’s conference will stand out among all the previous RHSMUN conferences, both because of the work we have put into it and the preparation on behalf of its delegates.

My name is Sierra Sloan, and I serve as the Under Secretary-General for the Specials Committees at RHSMUN this year. For those of you who are familiar with Model United Nations conferences, you will already be aware of the unique nature of specialized committees. For those who are not, you should be excited to be able to begin your MUN experience in one of the four RHSMUN specialized committees: Security Council, Historic Security Council, NGO Forum, or the International Court of Justice. Specialized committees give you the opportunities to dive even deeper into these challenging topics, often with smaller committees or even different rules that facilitate discussion. Our directors have worked hard to make RHSMUN 2010 truly “special” for you delegates. In order to make that happen, I hope that your level of preparation can meet their expectations, making each committee reach its full potential.

As for me, this year marks my 10th consecutive year attending RHSMUN – six years as a delegate and now four years as a staff member. I started my MUN career as a first-time delegate in the Security Council at RHSMUN, and have been addicted ever since. Besides MUN, I also attend Brigham Young University studying business management, music, Spanish, and global management—the variety keeps me sane and the topics keep me loving school. Variety is a strong pull in my hobbies as well. I love to do everything from ultimate frisbee, hurdles, water-skiing, piano, video games, read and write fantasy, and more. MUN still dominates as one of my greatest loves, and I look forward to RHSMUN every year.

The coming months will be filled with research preparation and position paper writing for you delegates. Please remember that your directors are available to assist you in any way possible, and that they would love to be contacted by their delegates. Do not be afraid to go the extra mile and truly put forth your best effort to make RHSMUN XIV the best conference ever. Your directors and assistant directors will be working hard, but they need your help as well to make this RHSMUN a perfect MUN experience.

Good luck, and feel free to contact me if you have any additional questions.

Sierra Sloan Under Secretary-General of Specials Committees specials.rhsmun@imuna.org 801.674.5465!

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REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL MODEL UNITED NATIONS The 14 th Annual Conference ~ December 2-4, 2010

Dear Delegates,

Aaron Bothner Secretary-General University of Colorado Cassandra Wich Director-General University of Denver Adrien Anderson Conference Director University of Colorado Mathieu Ansell Chief of External Relations University of Toronto Nikki Rosychuk Chief of Staff University of British Colombia-Vancouver Mickey Ellenwood Under Secretary-General Substantive, Mains University of Colorado Sierra Sloan Under Secretary-General Substantive, Specials Brigham Young University !

Hello and welcome to RHSMUN 2010! Although RHSMUN is known for its excellence, this year will be incredibly unique for you as delegates who have the opportunity to embark with me to the 1978 Historical Security Council. Not only do I look forward to meeting all of you, but also I cannot wait to see what new insights you could bring into a historical simulation.

This journey, I hope, will be as memorable for you as it will be for me.

This year will be my second year on staff at RHSMUN and my eighth overall RHSMUN. Last year I served as the assistant director for the African Union, which I absolutely loved. As someone who has traveled to both sides of the country for Model UN, I hope to bring a new level of excellence to your RHSMUN experience. I am here as a resource for you, so please do not hesitate to ask me any questions you have before the conference.

A little about myself, I am currently pursuing a double major in Political Science and Mass Communications at the University of Utah. Additionally, I am working towards minors in Campaign Management and Middle Eastern Studies, meaning I spend quite a lot of time in the fabulous new library on our campus. I eventually would like to get my masters in International Affairs. I am also am studying Arabic and fine-tuning my French skills. Most of days, you will still find me on campus after class, as I am a director for the Union Programming Council, a sports writer for The Daily Utah Chronicle and a member of the school’s Model Arab League.

As someone who plans on going into foreign policy analysis, I find this year’s Historical Security Council topics, the situation in Lebanon and UNEF II mandate, particularly relevant to the situation in the Middle East today. Despite a tendency by the media to emphasize events in the Middle East such as the Iran-Iraq Revolution and the Suez Canal crisis, the events in 1978 were extremely influential in shaping the political structure of the Middle East beyond just Lebanon, Egypt and Israel. I hope that you, as delegates, consider both these topics from a new perspective then how these events played out historically.

When reading the Background Guide, please note that in the appendix there is a glossary of terms for both topics. I highly encourage you to read the glossaries first, as they explain key religious groups and political parties that are essential to the topics at hand. Within the appendix you will also find maps of the Middle East and a timeline of events for both topics.

Delegates are recommended to bring copies of the appendix to committee.

Learn your country’s positions very thoroughly, bearing in mind the international atmosphere of the Cold War at the time. I hope to see some extensive debates on both topics, and maybe even some conflicting resolutions. Please take the time to research your country from a historical viewpoint, as no anarchic statements or research will be allowed. Good luck and see you all in December!

Kelsey Price Director, Historical Security Council hsc.rhsmun@imuna.org 801.718.6095

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Committee History Committee Simulation Policy Paper Guidelines INTRODUCTION The UN in the Middle East TOPIC A: THE CIVIL WAR IN LEBANON, JANUARY 1978 Introduction History and Description of the Issue Outbreak of Civil War Current Status Committee Mission and Goals Bloc Positions Research Questions TOPIC B: REEVALUATING THE UNEF II MANDATE, JANUARY 1978 Introduction History and Description of the Issue Current Status Committee Mission and Goals Bloc Positions Research Questions APPENDIX A: TOPIC A - Lebanon Maps Glossary of Parties and Terms Timeline of Key Events in Lebanon Lebanese-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, 23 March 1949 APPENDIX B: TOPIC B - UNEF II Maps Glossary of Parties and Terms Timeline of Key Events for UNEF Security Council Resolution 242 Security Council Resolution 340 WORKS CITED

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5 7 8 10 12 12 17 21 21 22 23 24 24 28 29 30 31 32 36 38 40 44 47 48 50 51 52

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HISTORY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (1978) Created under the United Nations Charter on 24 October 1945, the Security Council is one of the principal organs of the United Nations. Under Article 24 of the Charter, the Council’s primary responsibility is the maintenance of international peace and security. Its powers and functions (which will later be expanded on in greater detail) include the establishment of peacekeeping operations, the establishment of international sanctions, and the authorization of military action.

When the Council first convened on 17 January 1946, it was comprised of five permanent, vetowielding members and six nonpermanent members. The Council—which is in continuous session— increased the number of non-permanent members to ten in 1965. Members must always be present at the UN headquarters, a requirement adopted to address the inability of the League of Nations to respond to crisis situations.

Elected by the General Assembly, non-permanent members serve for a two-year term and are not eligible for immediate re-election. The permanent members consist of China, France, United Kingdom, United States, and Russia. In historic simulations Russia is replaced by its predecessor, the Soviet Union. The Security Council has an alphabetically rotating presidency in which each member serves for one calendar month.

Seeing that the purpose of the Security Council is to provide prompt and effective international action, UN member states agree to accept and implement all decisions made by the Security Council.

This agreement is provided for under the UN Charter, and means that only the Security Council can make binding decisions—so that nations are obligated to follow any decisions. Non-Security Council nations can, however, make suggestions to the Council agenda.

The Security Council also has the ability to appoint subsidiary bodies. These committees, working groups, and peacekeeping operations help to structure the work of the Council and make its operations more efficient and effective. These committees come to a close upon the accomplishment of the goals they were created for.

JURISDICTION Chapter Five of the Charter lays the “ground rules” for the Council, such as the election of members, voting procedures, etc. Articles 30 to 32 are especially important in crisis simulations as they allow for the adoption of new rules of procedure and allow non-members to participate in debate without vote when invited by Council members.

Chapters 6, 7, 8, and 12 detail the specific functions and powers granted the Security Council to carry out its overall mission. These functions and powers include investigating escalating conflicts that may reach the international theatre and recommending arbitration or settlement methods for such disputes. The Council determines whether a situation constitutes a threat to international peace or an act of aggression, with the ultimate goal to stop or prevent aggression by non-forceful measures (i.e. economic sanctions) or, at last resort, military action.

Before 1978, the Security Council had intervened in conflicts through the use of peacekeeping troops three times. The first formal military action the UN took was the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in 1956 in response to the Suez Crisis. Since its 5

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establishment, the mandate of the UNEF has been under the control of the Council. Under SC Resolution 186 in 1964, the first formal peacekeeping force was organized to stabilize the situation in Cyprus. Resolution 350 established the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force in 1974.

The Security Council as a response to member statesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; actions has used sanctions more commonly than military action. Such instances include the 1960 sanctions against the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic, the 1966, 1968, and 1972 sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, and the arms embargoes against South Africa in 1972 and 1977.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS Under Article 27 of the Charter, a draft resolution is adopted if nine or more of the fifteen Council members vote for the resolution, and if it is not vetoed by any of the five permanent members.

Procedural motions are approved with an affirmative vote by nine Council members (a simple majority).

Resolutions are legally binding if they are made under Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of the Charter. This is the case with all Security Council actions, making all resolutions binding to member states. The legally binding aspect of Council resolutions is defined under Article 24, as determined by the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice rendered on 21 June 1971 in connection with the question of Namibia.

Press statements may accompany both resolutions and presidential statements, carrying the text of the document adopted by the body and also some explanatory text. They may also be released independently of a resolution after a significant meeting. Under RHSMUN, press releases and directives will only be made during crisis sessions.

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COMMITTEE SIMULATION Historic Security Councils are unique in that they simulate historic rather than current events. They allow delegates to return to peak turning points in international affairs and attempt to address them in a more effective (and often alternative) manner than the actual outcome of historic events. By simulating past debates, decisions, etc. delegates can re-live rather than re-enact history. Essentially, delegates are allowed the possibility to avoid the actions and outcomes of previous policy makers.

In order for a Historical Security Council simulation to be effective, there is a strict cut-off date mentioned and no anachronistic statements, or any references to resolutions, policies, dates and events after the cut-off date, are permitted--because under the simulation, they have yet to occur.

Furthermore, delegates must research and adhere to the foreign policy of their respective memberstates during the time period, and not their contemporary policies.

For RHSMUN 2010, the Historic Security Council of 1978 will simulate as closely as possible the Security Council of 1978. This means that, as with the real Security Council, several special rules of procedure will be different from most other committees. In 1978, there are 15 members of the Security Council, five of which are permanent members and will have veto power. A vote of “no” on a resolution by any of these nations will result in the immediate failure of the resolution. In addition, because of the gravity of the issues that the Security Council faces, from a committee of 15, 9 nations must vote in favor of a resolution in order for it to pass.

In other words, a vote of eight in favor, none opposed, and seven abstentions, will still fail to pass because it lacked appropriate support from the committee. If fewer than 15 members of the Council are present during voting procedures, the “half plus one” rule will still be in effect for the smaller number of countries represented.

Because of these extra requirements, it is imperative that the Council work to build a consensus. If the Council is divided, it will be much more difficult for it to take decisive actions. This does not mean, however, that nations should abandon their own interests and policies outright in the pursuit of agreement; on the contrary, national policy is of paramount importance throughout debate. Each representative to the Security Council will be tasked with the objective of pursuing a resolution that benefits the citizens of the world and settles the issue without sacrificing the interests of his/her country.

Discussion in committee will proceed in two forms: formal debate and informal debate (commonly known as caucusing). During formal debate, a speakers’ list will be used, and the delegates on the list will be recognized to speak in order with a set speaking time. In addition to this form of debate, delegates can also motion for and enter into a recess of the meeting, in which the rules of procedure are suspended for a predetermined period of time while delegates can get up and discuss the issues with each other and work on creating resolutions, which will be the Security Council’s means of taking action. The structure and method of resolution writing is described in the rules section at the back of this background guide.

The difference between a regular Security Council and the Historical Security Council is the approach the committee will take. The HSC will replay the debates, negotiations, and decision making of past crises. We will revisit at the peak of conflicts in an attempt to address them in a more effective and feasible manner. There are strict cut off dates and no anachronistic statements 7

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are permitted, meaning that no statements are issued after the indicated date. The council will run as a constant series of updates, with the issues to be addressed as if the issues were occurring in current time. Delegates will be updated through the news, letters, private country updates, and speaker visitors.

The purpose of an HSC is to re-live, not necessarily re-enact, the crisis. Like in other committees, you are restricted by the foreign policy of the respective member states you represent. Do not forget to adequately adhere to the politics of the set time frame. While you are not re-creating the situation, you—excitingly—have the chance to re-write parts of history. Delegates must remember that in order to have an accurate simulation, you must maintain a strong delegation identity to uphold the foreign policy and protect the interests of their respective governments. We will begin with the events occurring on January 1, 1978. Your chairs strongly encourage you understand how all of the major events of the timeline relate to your specific country.

The unique nature of the HSC means that you are always in "crisis mode." Since the simulation is run as a constant crisis there are additional tools that you, as delegates, may use. On top of having the ability to write resolutions there are three other items you may produce: directives, communiqués, and press releases. Directives are a fast way to pass a portion(s) of resolutions, because they consist of only the operative clauses of a resolution, requiring a simple majority to pass, though veto rules still apply. Communiqués are confidential reports sent from an individual country (or sometimes groups of countries) to another agency. A member state can send a communiqué to a regional body (for example, the AU) or to their member government.

Communiques take a simple majority to pass, but do not fall under the jurisdiction of veto powers.

If the group would like to request a speaker to the council, a communiqué is the device one would use. Press releases are single statements that the group can release to the public if there is a need to curb chaos.

Above all else, our intention is to make this a fun committee because it is challenging and engaging as a crisis simulation. Most importantly, we hope you learn something about the character of modern war. If, for any reason, you feel unclear about our expectations or a part from the topic booklet, we highly encourage you to contact us if/when you have any questions. We wish you the best of luck!

POLICY PAPER GUIDELINES As in any other committee at RHSMUN, position papers are an essential part of the Historical Security Council. Each delegation is required to submit a position paper that clearly outlines their country’s historical policies on the topic at hand. Within the paper, the Research and Preparation questions provided at the end of the background guide should be answered thoroughly. Most importantly, the paper must be written from the historical point of view of the country you are representing in the Council.

EXPECTATIONS Since the simulation for this year’s Historical Security Council is set to begin on 1 January 1978, delegates must refrain from making any references to dates or events that occurred after that day.

Anachronisms are not allowed, and it is recommended delegates consider using sources from that time period to understand the topic from the perspective at the time, rather than a reflective perspective on past events. Furthermore, delegates are reminded that any solutions proposed within the paper should not be paraphrased UN resolutions on the matter.

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Sources such as Wikipedia or other non-academic or non-governmental sources are inappropriate for a position paper. Delegates should seek out sources that directly state a governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s policy, not its actions. Examples of appropriate sources would include statements by government officials, governmental publications, news stories, non-fiction books, and scholarly journals. Unacceptable sources would include organizations such as Human Rights Watch, which publishes government actions rather than policies. Although organizations such HRW are necessary to gain basic understanding of an issue, they should not be cited within a paper, as they are often assumed to have a bias.

Plagiarism is unacceptable. Any delegates found to have improperly cited sources or plagiarized could risk serious consequences.

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THE UN IN THE MIDDLE EAST AN INTRODUCTION

In 1945, the United Nations boldly declared that it was determined “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war... and for these ends . . . to live together in peace with one another as good neighbors” (UN Charter). The first true test of the Charter emerged in the Middle East from 1947-1948 over the question of Palestine; however, rather than preventing the local conflict from escalating, UN General Assembly Resolution 181 that created Israel set the tone for what would become a site of international conflagration. The partition resulted in an Israel without universally agreed-upon borders and Palestinians without a state of their own, and resulted in ongoing conflict between the Arabs and Israelis that has yet to be fully resolved (Sitkowski, 39). Since the partition, the UN, and the Security Council, has remained intimately involved in monitoring and mediating the situation in the Middle East through the UNTSO, UNEF, and various resolutions that have condemned the situation.

The complexity of the situation in the Middle East is defined not only by one overarching conflict throughout the region, but a combination of religious, ethnic, economic, and political conflicts that exist on both interstate and intrastate levels. The extent the role of the UN has played in the Middle East has varied at times, especially regarding peacekeeping operations, but ultimately it will be crucial in establishing a long-term solution in the Middle East.

Security Council precedent in the Middle East was established with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in 1956 following the Suez Canal Crisis. Former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld compared the role of the UN in the Middle East to that of a good nurse, rather than a surgeon, watching over a sick patient (Urquhart). Moreover, A good nurse is most useful in monitoring a patient, implementing the treatment prescribed by a doctor, and handling minor emergencies in the health of the patient. A nurse is not always trained to deal with major emergencies that require delicate medical operations. Carrying on the analogy to U.N. activities, that organization saw itself as useful only to supervise cease-fires or implement policies agreed upon by the disputants; U.N. initiative, innovation, and autonomy were limited. Peace observation, largely consistent with this nurse-like role, was ineffective in promoting the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and certainly proved inadequate to deal with the Suez Crisis . . . That crisis promoted a fundamental change in thinking about the U.N. role in mechanism for dealing with active threats to international peace and security (Diehl, 29).

The Historical Security Council simulation this year at RHSMUN will revolve around the situation in the Middle East in 1978. Although both topics on the agenda are vastly different in the nature of the conflict, it is crucial that delegates understand that despite the overall discord in the Middle East caused by Arab-Israeli relations, each source of conflict in the Middle East is different in nature, complicating the overall search for peace in Arab-Israeli relations.

The question between religion and government is one that cannot be separated from the Middle East. In Lebanon, the outbreak of civil war is tied to a confessional system that gives minority groups unequal democratic representation. Meanwhile, in the Suez Canal sector and the Sinai Peninsula, UNEF II continues to struggle with allegations of religious bias from both sides of the conflict.

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Although UNEF II and the situation in Lebanon are vastly different in terms of the nature of their conflictsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;one a war between nations and one a war within a nationâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;in part, both conflicts have aspects that are attributable to the unresolved question of Palestine. The question concerning Palestine is considered to be core source of conflict within the Middle East. Although often the focus on the Middle East is on the actions of a particular country or extremist group, reasons for their actions are usually directly linked to their position concerning the occupied territories. Indeed, the rise of extremism and religious terrorism in Egypt as well as Lebanon are result of ongoing arguments over the occupied territories.

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THE CIVIL WAR IN LEBANON, JANUARY 1978 TOPIC A

INTRODUCTION In 1975, religious and ethnic tensions combined with political unrest threw Lebanon into a violent civil war. Political parties developed paramilitary organizations, whose strength number at least 150,000 men (Rouleau, 234). Each of these paramilitary organizations is heavily indoctrinated politically or religiously, with most groups fighting on the basis their group is treated unfairly by the existing government in Lebanon.

The civil war has left Lebanon divided and fractionalized. Primarily, the Druze groups, an Islamist reformatory sect unique to Lebanon, are confined to the Mount Lebanon area 1 along with the Maronite Christians2. The Sunni and Shiâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;as are located in southern Lebanon near the Israel-Lebanon border.

Furthermore, since the creation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1964, and its subsequent establishment in Lebanon in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the IsraeliPalestinian conflict has continued to rage upon Lebanese soil (Friedman). The Lebanese political system, weakened by sectarian divide and inherent fractures, has been unable to contain the PLO or maintain order within its borders (Brynen), complicating the Lebanese conflict.

Although the League of Arab Statesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; peacekeeping force, the Arab Deterrent Force, has helped bring relative stability to the country, Lebanon remains in a state of dangerous civil strife.

HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE The history of Lebanon has been marked by both political discord and economic prosperity. With various power-sharing agreements between religious sects dating back to 1860, Lebanon has been shaped by civil wars, regime changes, and a series of interventions by external forces.

A country with a history dating to some of the earliest human records, Lebanon has been a refuge for a variety of religious and political groups. At the edge of the Mediterranean, Lebanon has been an economic stronghold of the Middle East since the Middle Ages and a crossroad between eastern and western civilizations. Prior to World War I, Lebanon was controlled by a number of groups, including the Phoenicians, Greeks, Persians, Arabs and the Ottoman Turks. This combination of a unique ethnic demographic, alongside a history of foreign rule, has made Lebanon an area ripe for political conflict that has often turned violent (Collelo). Furthermore, the influx of Palestinian refugees following each Arab-Israeli war has resulted in destabilization of the state as well as increasing Arab extremism in Lebanon.

1

A map of Lebanon can be found in Appendix A on page 32

2

Definitions and explanations of all ethnic and religious groups can also be found on the appendix.

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ADMINISTRATION UNDER FRENCH MANDATE Following the end of World War I and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the League of Nations mandated the five provinces of Lebanon be under the control of France and defined boundaries between Syria and Lebanon that previously did not formally exist. This system of establishing the victorious powers in WWI over former colonies was an attempt to prevent power struggles between the various ethnic and religious groups in the territories that had been liberated from German and Ottoman colonial authority (Matz, 54). Many of the colonies were considered to be incapable of self-rule.

Prior to the French mandate, Lebanon was defined as only Mount Lebanon and the immediate surrounding area. However, the establishment of Greater Lebanon under the League of Nations mandate system added many Muslim regions to Lebanon that were not part of Maronite Lebanon, including north Lebanon, south Lebanon, Biqa' valley, and Beirut. This created further fragmentation among the various ethnic and religious groups in the region. Under the mandate, Lebanon gained Muslim-dominated territory along the Syrian boundary. This change caused discontent among the Christian Maronites3, who in turn called for a sectarian government as way to liberate Christians from Muslim domination (Petran, 29). Within this plan, each religious group would have a reserved share in the government, so one group would not completely control the other. A commission by the French administration determined that the division of Syria increased factionalism even among Christian sects: In Mt. Lebanon . . . the Druzes and the Greek orthodox desired union with Syria because they were afraid of Maronite domination and also feared France. But so did the Protestants and some Christians who sincerely believed in Syrian nationalism . . .

Finally the Moslems of Mt. Lebanon, like those of Syria proper, desired union (Howard, 130-1).

This increasing factionalism is further attributable to the ethnic differences even among Christians.

Within Lebanon the various Christian sects include Arabs, Armenians, Persians, etc. As a result, many of the Arab Christians were divided between their religious affiliation and ethnic identity.

Under French control, the Lebanese government was developed to civilize and modernize the region (Winslow, 64). Efforts by the French included the establishment of a new Lebanese civil service, electoral law, currency, and land tenure laws in an attempt to “[lay] the foundations of a new Lebanese administration” (Salibi, 166). However, initiatives by the French were met only by varying degrees of success, in large part due to the failure to address the needs of individual groups. For example, many groups such as the Druzes felt as if their religious beliefs were not as equally considered as the Maronites under the French system. As a whole the French tended to favor the Maronites while overlooking smaller religious groups such as Shi’as and Druze. The Druze revolts of 1925 in particular highlighted the widespread civil strife that existed within the country (Longrigg).

The key development in Lebanon under the French administration was the establishment of the Lebanese Constitution in 1926, which the French used as a response to Lebanese revolts demanding a representative government. The constitution called for seats to be distributed in an equal manner among all the various Muslim and Christian sects within the executive and legislative branches, in addition to any civil service positions. Also known as the confessional system, this strict balance of 3

See appendix

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power within the constitution was designed to maintain stability within the country, although the effectiveness of such a system has been contested by the majority of the small religious sects.

Regardless of actual country demographics, the confessional system established a strict balance of power between the religious groups (Republic of Lebanon).

However, the constitution left several aspects of government administration unspecified, which would create problems for the fragile democracy of Lebanon further down the road. Until the 1943 National Pact, it remained unspecified how the distribution of the seats under the confessionalism system would be divided (Republic of Lebanon). Furthermore, France remained in advisory and supervisory roles over the government. The French role in the Lebanese government remained so strong that the French government suspended the Lebanese constitution from 1932-37 and through the beginning of World War II (Collelo).

INDEPENDENCE AND THE NATIONAL PACT The movement for independence quickly gained speed in Lebanon after the collapse of the Vichy government in France. After pressure from the Lebanese population and the French General Georges Cartoux, director of the French Lebanon mandate, proclaimed Lebanese independence on behalf of the French government on 26 November 1941. Although the United States, Soviet Union, and other powers recognized the independence of Lebanon at that point, France continued to exercise its authority in the region on the claims that Cartoux did not have authorization to grant independence.

Despite the continued presence of the French, the first official independent elections in Lebanon were conducted 21 September 1943, when Bishara al Khuri, a Maronite, was elected as president and then appointed Riyad al Sulh, a Sunni, as the prime minister. Then on 8 November 1943, the Chamber of Deputies amended the constitution to eliminate all articles referring to the mandate or the powers of the French high commissioner, officially ending the French mandate over Lebanon.

Shortly following French-recognized independence, Khuri and Sulh agreed to what is known as the National Pact, an unwritten agreement designed to ensure and reaffirm the existing balance of power of the confessional system within Lebanon. Terms of the pact were designed to negate Christian fears of being overwhelmed by Muslims within Lebanon and surrounding countries, as well as Muslim fears of a Western-influenced state (Matz). Terms within the Pact included: 1. An independent, sovereign, and neutral Lebanon in which Muslims renounced

any idea of union with Syria (or any other Arab state) in return for Christian renunciation of separatism and special ties with France or any other power.

2. Muslim acceptance of Lebanon’s “Christian character” in return for Christian acceptance of its “Arab face.”

3. Sectarian allotment of seats in parliament on the basis of a six-to-five ChristianMuslim ration; “balanced” representation in the cabinet with the offices of president, prime minister, and speaker of the house assigned respectively . . . to the Maronite, Sunni, and Shi’a communities. In the cabinet, this meant in practice reserving specific ministries to certain sects (Petran, 33).

Within this system, the president is always a Maronite Christian, the prime minister is always Sunni Muslim, the speaker of the house is always Shi’a Muslim, and seats in Parliament and positions in the military are distributed in the interest of maintaining a sectarian balance. However, despite promises that the balance would be based on the states' actual demographics, this balance of parliamentary seats is based on a census taken in 1932 and has not been updated since. Additionally, the second condition of the agreement established the Lebanon’s dependence on the West and 14

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alliance with non-Muslim states, while acknowledging the state was predominately Arabian. Since the last census in Lebanon taken decades ago, the current balance of power grants unequal representation that no longer reflects the actual demographics of Lebanon, in large part due to the effects the 1948 war had on population movements in the Middle East.

Despite the intentions of the Pact and the Lebanese government to avoid conflict between the various religious sects, contentions over the government structure continued to arise following independence. With the religious Maronite minority in power, many groups began to question the political and economic motivations of the Lebanese government, suggesting the government was still a puppet of French interests.

ARAB-ISRAELI WAR AND INFLUX OF REFUGEES Following the ideas of equality and religious freedom upon which the state was originally established, Lebanon during the 1940s and 1950s was a haven of cultural renaissance and peace within the Middle East, as it was relatively isolated from the conflict surrounding the creation of Israel. With provisions of the National Pact calling for the neutrality of Lebanon in foreign affairs, the stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s role in regional politics became comparable to Switzerland in nineteenth-century Europe.

However, the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War in May 1948, as a result of the newly declared state of Israel, placed Lebanon in a unique position. Although the state did not play a large part in the conflict in comparison to other nations, such as Egypt, Lebanon deployed four battalions along the border but eventually withdrew them, enabling the Israeli army to capture a strip of eastern Lebanon in October 1948. The area remained occupied by Israel until 23 March 1949, when Lebanon signed an armistice that returned the land to Lebanon. Under the agreement, Lebanon and Israel gave mutual assurances that they would not embark on any military offensives against each other and would respect each otherâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s territory. The old Palestine-Lebanon border was accepted as the new "armistice demarcation line" but was not actively enforced as a legal political or territorial boundary (Collelo).

The aftermath of the Arab-Israeli War in 1948 resulted in further tension between the Christian and Muslim populations in Lebanon. Nearly 750,000 Palestinians were forced from or fled their homes, including 711,000 Palestinian refugees that were displaced out of Israel, according to a 1951 UN estimate (UN Conciliation Commission). Between 100,000 to 170,000 Palestinians entered Lebanon as a result of the creation of Israel (Collelo). With the exception of a few Greeks and Armenians, most of the refugees were Muslim, significantly shifting the ratio of Christians and Muslims in Lebanon closer to a 1:2.5 ratio. The presence of the refugees had significant impact on the politics and economics of Lebanon as well, creating further division among the state's various groups.

Naturally, the number of Palestinians entering Lebanon created a severe population shift that threatened the stable demographics of Lebanon. No longer was the nation a place of peace, but one in which a significant number of its population had been forced out of its home by the creation of Israel. As such, Lebanese relations became increasingly strained with all sides as it tried to maintain neutrality.

FIRST CIVIL WAR, EMERGENCE OF THE PLO AND THE CAIRO AGREEMENT Following the unification of Egypt and Syria to form the United Arab Republic in February 1958, Lebanese Druze and Muslim groups sought to make Lebanon a part of the new republic, claiming the separation in 1920 from Syria had destroyed the integrity of the Arab world. Moreover, the 15

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political struggles that emerged from the rivalry among Lebanese political and religious leaders represented a larger ideological struggle between Lebanese nationalism and growing Arabism, or the thought that all of the Arab world should be one state (Collelo).

The subsequent civil war in Lebanon resulted in a virtual collapse of the government that highlighted the need to address the changing social needs of the country (Salibi, 6). During that time the Palestinian refugees linked to the leaders of the United Arab Republic became increasingly more vocal about their pro-Arabism and often participated in rebellions against the Lebanese government.

Although the Palestinians had not yet formally organized into a political entity, the civil war’s end later that year reaffirmed that the Palestinian population had assumed a permanent role in Lebanese politics—an affirmation that would become increasingly obvious following the 1970 Cairo Agreement.

An agreement was formed between Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yassar Arafat and the Lebanese army, which allowed the PLO to conduct raids against Israel from inside Lebanon and other militant operations. Under the agreement, the PLO was granted full control over the refugee camps, and the PLO soon dominated politics in not just the camps but throughout southern Lebanon. The agreement essentially established a “state within a state” in Lebanon, further stratifying the tensions concerning Lebanese neutrality and the confessional system (Rubenburg, 137). This “state within a state” allows the PLO to conduct activities without government consent, making them autonomous from Lebanese law. As such, numerous attacks by the PLO on Israel have come from Lebanese borders, despite the fact these were not supported by Lebanon.

YOM KIPPUR WAR AND FRAGILE CEASEFIRE IN THE MIDDLE EAST Despite Lebanon’s commitment to noninvolvement in Arab-Israeli affairs, the 1973 Yom Kippur War had far-reaching repercussions for the fragile political system in Lebanon. With PLO’s presence steadily growing in southern Lebanon during the war, Shi’a groups became increasingly discontented with government administration because they felt disenfranchised by the Maronite controlled government. Furthermore, a series of Israeli Air Force raids against Palestinian refugee camps, that resulted in little response from the Lebanese army, further angered Muslims (Collelo).

On 10 April 1973 Israel launched a raid into Beirut, killing three major Palestinian guerrilla leaders.

The attack prompted widespread outcry from Lebanese citizens, with each fraction blaming a variety of groups for the lack of military inaction. The Lebanese military stated that it had not been informed of the raid until it was too late because the police in the area thought it was nothing more than a dispute among various Palestinian sects (Winslow, 173). In response to the military statement, Sunni Prime Minister, Saib Salem, accused Maronite Lebanese Army Commander, General Iskandar Ghanim, of purposefully not resisting the raids, and demanded that Ghanim be relieved of his duties. When Ghanim was not removed, Salem resigned, resulting in a series of prime ministers who refused to take any serious action regarding PLO presence in Lebanon out of fear of alienating members of the League of Arab States, especially Syria.

Following Salem’s resignation, President Suleiman Franjieh appointed Amin al-Hafiz prime minister on 25 April 1973. However, fellow Sunni leaders refused to recognize the appointment of al-Hafiz because of his pacifist position, which once again sparked widespread violence throughout Lebanon.

Just days after Halfiz’s appointment, police arrested three Palestinian men with explosives trying to board an Air France flight; four others were found with explosives near the American embassy. In retaliation, several Lebanese army officers were kidnapped by extremists and held hostage until the arrested Palestinian men held by the Lebanese police were released. By May, continual fighting 16

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between Palestinians and the Lebanese military began, leading to the eventual resignation of al-Hafiz (Wimslow, 174).

The explosion of fighting on 2 May lead Syrian President Hafez al-Assed to briefly dispatch troops from the Palestinian Liberation Army to Lebanon until a cease-fire agreement could be made.

Although a ceasefire was agreed to on the afternoon of 7 May, fighting resumed later that evening, accelerating factionalism between the state's sects. Other groups disenfranchised by the confessionalism system, such as the Communist Party of Lebanon and the Nasserites, soon came to the military defense of the Palestinian camps (Petran, 146). The involvement of non-Palestinian groups demonstrated the growing alliance between radical Palestinian groups and underrepresented minorities in the growing government resistance movement.

The outbreak and resolution of the Yom Kippur War later that year further accelerated the weakening of the Lebanese government’s control over the PLO. Syrian intervention earlier that year, as well as growing resentment over the outcome of Israel’s victory in the war, led to increasing Lebanese dependence on other Arab countries. In 1974, nearly 75 percent of Lebanon’s fruit and industrial exports were to its Arab neighbors, which also accounted for the majority of Lebanon’s tourism economy (Arab Economic Report). Lebanon was increasingly becoming dependent economically on Syria.

The events that led to the Cairo Agreement, as well as the violence in Lebanon in 1973, further threatened the existing balance of power in Lebanon. The PLO’s steady rise of power threatened the social, economic, and political power of traditional elites such as the Maronites and Shiites who felt increasingly displaced in Lebanese politics (Suleiman, 3). The combination of internal discord and increasingly vocal outside interests by Israel and Syria would render Lebanon in a state of total disarray at the smallest spark.

OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR VIOLENCE SPREADS THROUGH LEBANON Although there was a decrease in violent occurrences in Lebanon from 1973 (23 occurrences) to 1974 (10 occurrences), as a whole, the Lebanese political sphere was becoming increasingly unstable during the late months of 1974 (Winslow, 176). The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization observed that the situation in the cease-fire sector between Israel and Lebanon in particular was “marked by frequent incidents, including overflights by Israeli aircraft, firing incidents across the Armistice Demarcation Line and violations of Lebanese territorial waters by Israeli warships,” (Yearbook of the United Nations 1974) signifying the growing unease was not confined to Lebanon, but that its neighboring countries were becoming involved in the situation.

Conflict began to quickly escalate in the beginning of 1975, when demonstrators in Tripoli, Beirut and Sidon staged protests in response to the government’s attempts to modernize the fishing industry through the licensing of the new Protein Company Corporation. Many of the demonstrators feared it would put the poor, mostly Muslim, fishermen of Sidon and Tyre out of work. Fighting erupted between the Lebanese army and demonstrators on 26 February in Sidon, fatally wounding popular Sunni Muslim parliamentary deputy, Marouf Sa’ad. Although a ceasefire was brokered 2 May 1975 in Sidon, it set the scene for the effervescence of violence that would soon rise to civil war.

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On 13 April, a group of Phalangist militants attacked a bus of Palestinians from Beirut that was en route to a refugee camp at Tall al-Za’tar, killing 33 people. Fighting and skirmishes erupted in Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon (Petran, 166). In response to the violence, the Lebanese National Movement called for the expulsion of Kataeb Party (LKP) ministers from the cabinet and banning the LKP in government (Odeh, 132). Although Arab League Secretary General Mahmoud Riad secured a ceasefire on 16 April, sniper fire originating from the Phalangist areas of Beirut resumed the next day. This was in part because the League of Arab States and Lebanon had no control over enforcing the ceasefire with non-state actors (Salibi, 99). Within three days after the 13 April massacre, between 250 and 350 people were killed.

With violence quickly expanding to the various sects around the country, the need for action became immediate. The Lebanese National Movement (LNM) proposed a political program on 18 August that was not only a step towards a secular society, but one that would hopefully ease the conflict throughout the country. With the program, the LNM proposed: 1. to introduce proportional representation, make Lebanon one electoral district, 2.

3.

4.

5.

therefore eliminating the many small electoral units that ensure clan rule and enfranchising the large part of the population now disenfranchised; to dismantle the semi-feudal sectarian state machine by redefining the powers and prerogatives of the legislature and executive; to eliminate discrimination in naturalization; to reorganize the army on a nonsectarian basis, bring it under executive and civilian control, and confine its duties to the defense of Lebanon’s frontiers and independence; and, to elect a Constituent Assembly to conduct a national dialogue on these and other proposed reforms and draft the constitutional and statutory legislation to implement them (Petran, 172).

These calls for reform went mostly unheeded, despite the fact they proposed called for nonsectarianism in state affairs and an end to the sectarianism of the confessional system.

Fighting began just a week later in Zahle4, the mostly Greek Catholic capitol of Bekaa, a largely Shi’a province. After the killings of a Palestinian officer and young Syrian by Christian militia on 28 August, a series of violent attacks swept through the region. Businesses, particularly those that sold farming or agricultural goods from Greek Catholics, were targets of many bombings. Kidnappings of both Muslims and Christians occurred, and villagers in mixed religious demographics fought each other regularly (Petran, 176).

Soon, fighting spread to other areas. In September, a traffic argument resulted in Muslims from Tripoli abducting Muslims from Zghorta in retaliation. A sniper from Zghorta then stopped a bus on the way to Tripoli and killed twelve passengers. Northern Lebanon was immersed in violence, with continued bombings of Christian-owned shops leaving the commercial district of Beirut completely destroyed (Odeh, 145).

Finally, President Franjieh realized the need for military intervention. He gave into earlier demands from 1973 demanding the replacement of army commander General Ghanem. Replacing Ghanem with Colonel Hanna Said, President Franjieh created a buffer zone between Zghorta and Tripoli that lasted until mid-September (208). Despite the buffer zone, violence through the rest of 1975 continued to escalate, with well over 80 incidents of significant violent attacks reported that year 4

See map

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(Wislow, 176).

During this time, UN Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, noted that: The disturbances in Lebanon, which started in March 1975, increased in intensity during the following months and, from September onwards, there was a progressive collapse of the normal framework of security within which United Nations operations were carried on. Loss of life and damage to property were very heavy and all sections of the population, including Palestine refugees, were affected.

Damage was caused to [UN] schools and other installations and to shelters in refugee camps in and around Beirut. The fighting, in which rockets, mortars and artillery were used in addition to small automatic arms, disrupted the provision of services to the refugees in Lebanon, although these services were maintained at a surprisingly high level for much of the year in the north and the south of the country. Because operations were brought to a standstill in the port of Beirut, the main port of entry for supplies to Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic, these Fields were also affected until supplies could be rerouted. United Nations offices in Beirut remained closed for long periods because staff could not reach them safely and, as communications were also frequently disrupted, it became impossible for the [UN] to function effectively in that city (A/31/1, 13).

Despite the report of the Secretary-General, the Security Council itself did not pass any notable resolution that specifically addressed the civil war in Lebanon.

SYRIAN INTERVENTION Throughout the end of 1975 and the beginning of 1976, Syria and Israel became increasingly involved in the civil war. In reports to the Security Council, United Nations Truce Sueprvision organization noted an increased frequency of incidents occurring in the Lebanon-Israel sector of their deployment. Such occurrences included crossing or firing across the Armistice Demarcation Line as reported by UNTSO observation posts, flights over Lebanese territory. Furthermore, UNTSO noted that since the civil war, Israel continued to occupy five positions on the Lebanese side of the Armistice Demarcation line (S/11663/Ad.20) Beginning in June 1976, there were between 20-30 Israeli flights over Lebanese territory per month (S/11663/Ad.29), which threatened Syrian interests.

Syrian diplomatic involvement in the civil war existed in the second half of 1975 and the beginning of 1976, but had little success in mediating the conflict. Although Syria successfully organized a ceasefire following a left-wing offensive in the south on 20 January, little progress was made in agreeing to any substantial governmental reforms. Little headway was made by Syrian diplomacy to resolve the conflict because Syrian goals in stabilizing the conflict were to pressure Lebanon to accept Arab policies towards Israel rather than to promote governmental and constitutional reforms (Odeh, 158). At the same time, Syria was mediating ceasefire negotiations between the Christian and Muslim fractions and PLA troops in Beirut increased which further widened the divide between Muslim and non-Muslim fractions in the country (Winslow, 202). The ceasefire, although more effective in limiting major violence than past agreements, continued to see violations from all parties.

However, despite Syrian efforts to stabilize the conflict, violence had significantly increased by March, especially in southern Lebanon where the PLO was headquartered. The Lebanese Army itself became increasingly outspoken against the government, and dissident Muslim troops mutinied on 2 March to form the Lebanese Arab Army (LAA). With nearly 75 percent of the former army 19

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joining the newly formed LAA (Deeb, 89), the rest of theLebanese army essentially ceased to exist.

According to the LNM 5, the formation of the LAA indicated, “a new wind of revolution is blowing in Lebanon” (Jumblatt).

With renewed violence quickly engulfing a country that lost almost all government authority, Syria decided to intervene. Syria, who had allied itself with the Maronites in an attempt to restore the status quo, launched a full-scale invasion on 1 June 1976. Entering through the northern region of Akkar, approximately 15,000 troops advanced quickly to the Bekka valley east of Beirut (Rasler, 431). In days following the invasion it was reported: The Syrian intervention seems to have introduced further complications into an already complicated situation. There were two developments immediately preceding the Syrian move that might have . . .prompted it. First, the rather surprisingly active role the French wanted to assign for themselves in the Lebanon civil war. It is difficult to see the French purely in the role of "a peace keeping force" in the Middle East, in view of France's own actual and (during the Suez crisis) envisioned colonial role in the area. That proposal seems to have served as a useful sounding board for the later fact of Syrian intervention. Secondly, there have been reports of increasing clashes between factions among the Palestinian guerilla groups active in the Lebanese civil war, specifically between the Al Fatah, and the openly Syrianbacked Al Saiqa. The Syrian intervention might be one way of providing more strength to the Al Saiqa (Economic and Political Weekly, 822).

The Syrian offensive against the left wing, which consisted mostly of Palestinians, lasted until the Arab League’s Riyadh Conference in October of 1976. Although limited in scope, as the conference did not address the underlying problems in Lebanon such as the confessional system, Riyadh did resolve some of the surrounding security issues regarding the PLO. Under the conference, an immediate ceasefire was enacted, as well as the establishment of the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), which consisted of 30,000 troops (Petran, 215). Although this force was under the League’s control, Syrian forces already in Lebanon supplied the large majority of troops. Many Lebanese met the largely pro-Syrian ADF with resentment, but fighting in Beirut had significantly subsided by the end of November (217).

This ADF created several problems in regards to the framework of the UN beliefs regarding peacekeeping. Although the UN is a heavy proponent of regional organizations, ADF does not meet standards for UN peacekeeping. The force is not neutral nor does it allow for the established sovereignty of Lebanon to take charge of security. Furthermore, since the ADF was created using Syrian troops that entered Lebanese borders, without permission, it could be seen as a hostile entity towards the Lebanese government.

CURRENT STATUS As a whole, 1977 saw far less widespread violence than 1976 or 1975. Although there were periodic waves of intense fighting, it was isolated primarily to Beirut and southern Lebanon. The UN Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, noted in September that: . . . tension has persisted in the south of that country. While this very delicate and potentially explosive situation has considerable international implications in the 5

Lebanese National Movement, see appendix

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wider context of the Middle East problem, it continues to be handled for the most part on a regional basis, and the United Nations involvement has been confined largely to humanitarian assistance. The United Nations military observes continue to carry out their limited functions in circumstances of great difficulty and considerable danger. It is vitally important in the interest of both Lebanon and of peace in the region that the process pf conciliation between various factions involved in this area should evolve speedily and effectively. This process cannot succeed while the fighting continues in the south. I therefore appeal to all concerned to cooperate in the efforts now being made to secure a ceasefire (A/32/1).

The most recent reports of the UNTSO in November and December of 1978 to the Security Council regarding its efforts in southern Lebanon continued to note the exchange of artillery in the area. In its December report, UNTSO said that violence in the region was moderate at most times, but through November 8-11 there was a significant increase (S/11553/Add.47). In addition, there were increased incidents involving vehicle hijackings, denial of freedom of movement, armed thefts and forced entries, mined roads, and shootings particularly close to UN operations (S/11553/Add. 49).

The situation remains a continual threat to the Middle East and international security as a whole. It is imperative the Security Council address and evaluate the situation quickly.

COMMITTEE MISSION AND GOALS With ceasefire agreements continuing to fail, it is necessary the Security Council address the conflict in Lebanon. Under the UN Charter, the Security Council is required to investigate any situation threatening international peace, as well it recommends procedures for peaceful resolution of a dispute, and it calls upon countries to sanction nations that fail to meet Council decisions.

Therefore, it is the duty of delegates to further prevent the conflict in Lebanon from potentially threatening progress currently being made in the Middle East to reach a long-term peace settlement in the region. The Council’s mission must be to establish peace in Lebanon.

The Security Council, as it seeks to stabilize Lebanon, must take into consideration several issues more abstract than simply addressing the defects in Lebanon’s current confessional system. With the Arab-Israeli conflict remaining a continuing aspect of this conflict, it is necessary the Council assures that Lebanon’s national autonomy is maintained, despite the presence of the ADF as well as other non-state actors such as the PLO. Furthermore, the lack of a strong political system in Lebanon is partly to blame in the situation, so any long-term solution that is to be effective must address how the Lebanese state could be strengthened.

BLOC POSITIONS NATO The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has one of the largest agendas in the Middle East, both to prevent communist expansion and to further its own economic and political interests. The US promotion of the “Warning System” and refusal to recognize the PLO are examples of the active political agenda NATO promotes in the Middle East. Although the US is not able to contribute militarily due to recent involvement in the Vietnam War, other assistance continues to be provided.

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For example, the United States and Britain mediated the Syrian intervention in Lebanon in 1976 to facilitate occupation of the Lebanese territories. NATO conflict with the USSR continues to cause difficulties within the Security Council, leading to resolutions that fail to satisfy any bloc due to their lack of effective wording. In the Middle East, NATO is determined to prevent outside intervention in Lebanon from others such as the League of Arab States as well as members of the Warsaw Pact.

WARSAW PACT The communist Warsaw bloc has been a strong supporter of the PLO (Brynen). In keeping with that policy, the USSR has signaled support for the PLO during the current conflict. At the same time, however, it has refused PLO requests for arms and supplies and as yet has limited its support for the PLO to more symbolic measures (Brynen). Currently, Soviet policy can be seen in contrast to NATO policy; the Middle East is one more sphere in which the two powers are competing for influence and status (Brynen). Warsaw member supports opposition to Israel in the Middle East, even when doing so is financially and diplomatically difficult, and naturally this policy includes support for the PLO (Rickman).

NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT Members of the NAM are able to provide support for the Middle East due to their independent position. Austria, Finland, and Sweden, for example, were permitted to lend volunteers to give supplies to an isolated Israel in 1973. As a whole, NAM looks for the region to stabilize itself and is opposed to outside interference in Lebanon.

EAST ASIA As a developing bloc dominated by China, East Asia has a unique position on the situation in the Middle East. The economic and/or geographic ties that bind other regions to the conflicted area are largely non-existent, yet Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s position as a world power keeps its interest in the area. Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s support of the Palestinian and Arab movement against Israel has not gone unnoticed, nor its blatant support of the PLO. China continues to blame the Soviet Union for the continued chaos.

Antagonism between these two countries now reaches the point where Chinese support for governments directly relates to their degree of opposition to the social-imperialistic Soviet Union.

NORTH AFRICA Egypt and its neighbors have become increasingly dissident from the rest of the Middle East. The 1975 agreement between Egypt and Israel isolated Egypt from the Arabian Peninsula and the Levant or Eastern Mediterranean.

MIDDLE EAST With the exception of Egypt, the Middle East is increasingly in support of intervention in Lebanon.

However, the Middle East is divided on its support for the PLO. Jordan is adamantly opposed to the PLO while Syria supports them. Most states in this region, however, have contributed financially to the ADF.

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RESEARCH QUESTIONS 1. How can the Security Council strengthen Lebanese national sovereignty and territorial autonomy in context of the civil war and the ADF? 2. What has your country done in the past in the case of other civil wars (whether their own or another country’s)? Has your country intervened politically or militarily in a civil war?

3. What is your country’s stance on the PLO and whether or not it infringes on Lebanese sovereignty?

4. According to your country, to what extent should the ADF be involved in the situation in Lebanon?

5. What is your country’s stance on the Lebanese confessional system?

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REEVALUATING THE UNEF II MANDATE, JANUARY 1978 TOPIC B

INTRODUCTION The 1973 Yom Kippur War left the Middle East once again in a state of fragility and conflict.

Despite multiple cease-fire agreements between the Arab countries and Israel, outbreaks of violence were common. As a response, the Security Council created the United Nations Emergency Force II in 1973 to ensure that Egyptian and Israeli forces maintained the cease-fire according to their positions as of 22 October 1973 (Security Council Resolution 340).

Tensions in the region remained high with rumors of Israel developing nuclear cells, among other potential conflicts that continued to threaten the security of the area (Report of the Secretary General). The cease-fire also reflected heightened tensions between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War at this time. Disputes between the Soviet Union and the United States concerning the origins of conflict in the Middle East, as well as over the extent of military intervention in the region, continue to cause discord within the SC. The mandate of UNEF II was most recently renewed in October 1977. Under the SecretaryGeneral's 1977 report, it was noted by the UN that the effectiveness of UNEF II was greatly limited, in large part due to the problem of restrictions on the freedom of movement of personnel of certain contingents still existed in the region. Egypt and Israel both restricted the movement of troops from certain nations (depending on their perceived neutrality), making it difficult for UNEF II to move as quickly as needed. Conflict between military authorities in Egypt and Israel further limited the ability of UNEF II to function as an integrated and efficient military unit, which resulted in unequal treatment of contingents, despite the efforts of UNEF Commander General Rais Abin.

Much of UNEF II’s mandate continued to be defined by, what the French ambassador named as, the presence of the UN currently serving as "a pretext for maintaining the status quo or for a lack of action." In large part, UNEF II’s real and justified significance at the time in the Middle East only existed in combination with genuine and sustained efforts to seek a political solution in the Middle East.

HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE CREATION OF THE ORIGINAL UNEF As a sign of protest against French and United Kingdom imperialism, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal Company in July 1956. In response, the Security Council adopted a resolution in an attempt to dispel tensions in the area on 13 October, but just days later, on 29 October, Israeli forces launched an attack on Egypt in the Sinai peninsula 6 and the Gaza Strip. In response, British and French troops landed in the Suez Canal just days later. This prompted a General Assembly Resolution, 377, known as the “Uniting for Peace” resolution, to declare: Reaffirming the importance of the exercise by the Security Council of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the duty 6

A map of the Sinai Peninsula can be found in Appendix B on page 44

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of the permanent members to seek unanimity and to exercise restraint in the use of the veto, . . .’

Recognizing in particular that such failure does not deprive the General Assembly of its rights or relieve it of its responsibilities under the Charter in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security, . .

Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security (UN/GA/RES/377).

This resolution called for the first peacekeeping force, UNEF I, to supervise the cease-fire in the region.

As result, the mandate7 of the UNEF I made clear steps to establish the foundation for modern peacekeeping. Unlike previous peace missions where their own national commanders directed units, the UNEF I was under the field command of a neutral officer appointed by the UN. For the first time, troops were international in nature and purpose, rather than just in their function. Additionally, the UNEF I acted as an interposition force and physical barrier between hostile parties, which was a significant change from observer missions. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, its mandate clearly defined its objectives and purpose and excluded UNEF I from any role in reopening the canal or any negotiations that involved canal management. Since Egypt relied heavily on foreign trade, the canal was crucial for economic development. The deviation from fact-finding and conciliation functions of previous missions significantly altered how quantitatively a mission’s success could be measured.

TENSIONS CONTINUE Both sides of the conflict continued to raise complaints to the Security Council throughout the 1960s. In the latter half of 1966, in particular, the number of raids into Israel by Palestinians from Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria grew, as public discontent for Israel grew in Arab nations. In particular, Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the PLO made increasingly violent speeches against the Israelis. As a result, Israel appealed to the SC in October to condemn the attacks (Yost, 305). However, Cold War tensions between the US and the Soviet Union made it difficult for the SC to come to a consensus on any resolution because the Cold War blocs refused to come to an agreement on wording during the draft resolution stage The most strongly worded resolutions passed in 1966 condemned Israel following an attack in Jordan that left 18 dead and 45 wounded. Although the resolution condemned Israel for violating the UN Charter and of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan, the resolution did little else, merely stating “that actions of military reprisal cannot be tolerated and that if they are repeated, the Security Council will have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against the repetition of such acts” (UN/SC/RES/228). Essentially, the resolution did no more than simply state the UN disapproved of violence, and if there was more 7

Text of the mandate can be found at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/unga1000.html.

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violence the SC would reevaluate its position on the Middle East, especially in regards to Chapter VII, “Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression” of the UN Charter.

Tensions in the conflict quickly escalated, especially as Egyptian President Gamal Nassar expelled the UNEF I out of the Sinai in May 1967. Arab vocal threats toward Israel became increasingly more violent. President Nasser infamously stated, “We intend to open a general assault against Israel. This will be total war. Our basic aim will be to destroy Israel” (Nasser), and the Syrian Defense Minister declared, “I, as a military man, believe that the time has come to enter into a battle of annihilation” (Assad).

In response, Israel mobilized over 70,000 of its reserve army (Guiron), which forced Egypt and Jordan to sign a joint defense pact against Israel. Conflict escalated until the morning of 5 June 1967, where Israel, anticipating an attack from Egypt, launched a series of air attacks into Egypt (Camera), marking the start of the Six-Day War. By June 10, Israel completed its final offensive in Golan Heights after seizing both Gaza and Sinai, increasing the size of Israel by one-third. Over 10,000 Arabs and Israelis were killed in battle (Herzog).

The Six-Day War had many long-term effects on the region, but most importantly, it led the SC to adopt Resolution 242. Written six months after the cease-fire, 242 called for two key actions in regards to post-conflict management, stating: 1. … that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 2. Affirms further the necessity (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones (UN/SC/RES/242).

Resolution 242, in effect, sought to remove Israeli forces from territories occupied in recent conflict, leaving as to which territories or to what boundaries unspecified. Furthermore, it sought to remove illegal blockades by the Arab nations of Israeli supply routes. The resolution did not state any specifics and lacked enforcement measures.

However, despite the objectives of Resolution 242, little was resolved in the Middle East and the lack of any enforcement measures left many of the Arab nations feeling bitter and resentful towards the UN and the outcome of the war. The US refused to support anything condemning Israel, while the Soviet Union refused to agree to anything that blamed the Arab nations. Many Arabs found themselves unable to return to their homes in the newly occupied Israeli-territories, resulting in a growth in the number of militant Palestinian groups.

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Additionally, the wording of 242 was ambiguous in nature, leaving many of the specific clauses open to interpretation. The question of whether the resolution required Israel to respect the pre-1967 boundary lines remains in debate between countries as well as between government administrations themselves, especially within the US. Although the one version of the resolution states “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict,” the French version could be read and interpreted as “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all territories occupied in the recent conflict.” Semantics aside, the resolution is not self-executing, meaning any enforcement of the resolution is restricted to further negotiations and agreements that have not occurred between Israel and the Arab nations. The outcome of the Six-Day War, in many ways, resulted in an uneasy peace that would soon boil over in the coming years.

OUTBREAK OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR Up until 1972, the Middle East remained in an uneasy peace. Although guerrilla attacks from both sides of the conflict continued, the cease-fire remained in place. The SC addressed the region in resolutions 269, 271, and 286. However, like in resolution 242, subsequent resolutions on the Middle East lacked both proposals to address the lack of enforcement of the 1967 boundaries or to establish long-term peace in the Middle East.

With tensions among Arab nations (particularly between Egypt and Jordan) threatening the unity of the Arab League, the Egyptian-Syrian surprise offensive against Israel was coordinated as an attempt to restore the balance of power among the Arabs as well as reclaim the land captured from the SixDay War. The offensive, launched on 28 September, was coordinated in secret in an attempt to catch Israel off-guard as the Israelis had caught Egypt off-guard in 1967.

On 6 October, the start of Yom Kippur, Egypt, after lining their side of the cease-fire lines with SAM batteries, launched an assault force across the Suez Canal and into the Sinai. Israel, who had earlier mistook the mobilization of Egyptian and Syrian troops as a defensive move, suffered heavy losses because they had not been able to sufficiently mobilize themselves. Egypt, who easily outnumbered the Israelis in tanks and manpower, quickly crossed the Suez Canal while Syria moved its forces into Golan Heights.

By 15 October, Israel had managed to force the Syrian front back to the 1967 cease-fire line. After, Israel fought to push the Egyptians back across the canal. Eventually Israel propelled itself into Egypt, less than a mile from the main highway to Cairo, before the UNTSO was able to impose a cease-fire on 24 October. However, the cease-fire was broken in a matter of hours, with Israel and Egypt continuing to engage in the southern sector. UNTSO managed to re-implement the ceasefire several hours later, allowing the SC to further consider the question.

CREATION OF THE UNEF II In 1973, under Resolution 340, the UNEF II was created to, first and foremost, observe the ceasefire in the sector. The resolution also called for these additional specific actions: 2. Requests the Secretary General, as an immediate step, to increase the number of United Nations military observers on both sides; 3. Decides to set up immediately under its authority a United Nations Emergency Force to be composed of personnel drawn from states members of the United Nations except the permanent members of the Security Council, and requests the Secretary General to report within 24 hours on the steps taken to this effect;

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4. Requests the Secretary General to report to the Council on an urgent and continuing basis on the state of implementation of this resolution as well as resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973); 5. Requests all Member States to extend their full co-operation to the United Nations in the implementation of this resolution as well as resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973).

Under Resolution 341, the SC further defined the role and obligation of UNEF II. The UN established that “the Force would use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the fighting, and in the fulfillment of its tasks it would have the cooperation of the military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). UNEF II was also to cooperate with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in its humanitarian endeavours in the area” (UN/ SC/RES/341). This resolution, although failing to address the ambiguity of the border issue in Resolution 242, allowed UNEF II to coordinate with other organizations, whereas it previously lacked the capacity to do so.

CURRENT STATUS The success of the mandate of UNEF II has been mixed. Because the conflict was largely dyadic in nature, traditional peacekeeping in maintaining the cease-fire has been relatively successful, compared to peacekeeping operations in multifaceted civil war areas such as Northern Ireland or the Congo (Diehl, 34). However, some argue the mandate is too specific in defining the role of UNEF II, limiting its ability to actively intervene in conflict. As solely a peacekeeping operation, UNEF II is limited in its ability to prevent conflict. Although UNEF II has been vital in defining the initial 1973 cease-fire agreement between Egypt and Israel, it has been limited in its ability to mediate the conflict, as it cannot directly mediate in any of the peace talks that are currently underway in the region. As UNEF II’s mandate currently stands, its operations are restricted to traditional peacekeeping methods.

Since the deployment of UNEF II, there have been no significant outbreaks of violence between Egyptian and Israeli military; however, clashes continue between non-governmental groups.

Crossing of the cease-fire lines from both sides remain common, and as UNEF II is only authorized to use force in defense, it lacks the capability to effectively ensure the line is not crossed due to the ambiguity of Resolution 242 (Ernst).

As of the most recent renewal of the UNEF II mandate in October 1977, the full strength of the peacekeeping operation currently stands at 4,297. The majority of the force, which is led by General Rais Abin, consists of contingents from Australia, Canada, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Poland and Sweden, as well as 124 observers from the UNTSO. Abin and UNEF II work closely with operations of the UNTSO (United Nations).

The most recent report of the Secretary-General noted that UNEF II has been struggling with problems due to restrictions on the freedom of movement of personnel from certain countries on both sides of the cease-fire line. Egypt continues to limit the movement of personnel from contingents from pro-Israeli countries and Israel limits those from pro-Arab nations. The SecretaryGeneral further stressed that “no differentiation could be made regarding the UN status of various contingents and that the SC should further consider the issue” (United Nations). Although 28

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complaints from both Israel and Egypt have been made, the Council has not formally considered the issue in any resolution or statement because of disagreements between the United States and USSR. In his most recent report of the UNEF II, Secretary-General detailed that although there had been no significant violations of the cease-fire or the Agreement, there continued to be numerous incursions in the buffer zone by both parties by land and air. Complaints from both Israel and Egypt concerning allegations of such incursions often went without assessment because, according to Abin, UNEF II currently lacks the technical capability and infrastructure to assess the complaints due to lack of funding.

In the most recent renewal of the mandate, the SC voted to extend the operation of UNEF II, intending to thoroughly review the mandate’s objectives and the efficiency of the force over the course of the year. Many nations noted upon the mandate’s renewal that UNEF II is not a permanent or long-term solution for peace in the Middle East, and as such, the SC should work towards establishing a framework for the mandate as to prevent the organization from drifting into a stalemate. More importantly it was noted that the UN and UNEF II should not serve as a pretext for maintaining the status quo in the Middle East, but rather the SC needs to seek to review the situation from a broader dimension than preventing further conflict, but resolving the conflict as well. Ideally, UNEF II could be used a propelling force in the peace process, Ideally, UNEF II would no longer merely reacting to conflict in the Middle East, but also would be used to circumvent potential conflict as well.

To date, numerous incursions in the buffer zone8 by both parties by land and air had been observed and reported to the Security Council since the most recent mandate renewal. Furthermore, a number of complaints from both parties alleging violations by the other side had been presented to the Force Commander and the Chief Coordinator. However, on most occasions it was noted that due to UNEF II’s inefficiency and its lack of ability, the UN could not fully assess such allegations.

Additionally, both parties continued to occupied territories of the other (contrary to the principal mandate of UNEF II).

COMMITTEE MISSION AND GOALS The UNEF II continues to struggle with identifying its role in the Middle East. It is necessary the Security Council review the mandate itself to evaluate the effectiveness of UNEF II in fulfilling its role in the Middle East. Although the mandate is largely effective, the Council has yet to address problems of neutrality as well as the operation’s ability to act offensively. The Council must address how to ensure UNEF II not only effectively cares out its mandate, but how the operation could be used by the UN to mediate the search for peace in the Middle East.

In doing so, the Council must consider the interests and positions of the great powers, especially in regards in the need for neutrality in UNEF II, the legal restrictions of the UN, as well as the impact of the conflict on human rights. Furthermore, it is necessary the Council maintain the ‘‘territorial integrity’’ of Member States involved by clearly establishing what borders are to be used when applying Resolution 242 to UNEF II’s mandate.

8

See Appendix for map “1973 War/UNEF II Area of Operations” on page 46.

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BLOC POSITIONS NATO A strong proponent of peacekeeping, NATO has remained a vital supporter of UNEF. When considering UNEF II’s mandate, NATO demanded at least one Warsaw Pact member provide troops to UNEF II at any given time.

MIDDLE EAST Unlike the division between Arab nations in regards to their policy on intervention in Lebanon, the League of Arab States is united on its policy towards the UNEF II and Israel. Arab nations fear the UNEF II favors Israel because the majority of peacekeeping troops are aligned with NATO. Furthermore, the Arab states interpret Resolution 242 as calling for Israel to return to the pre-1967 borders, therefore the Middle East believes Israel is in violation of the resolution and should be dealt with accordingly.

NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT Also a proponent of peacekeeping forces, NAM is a strong support of using peacekeeping to mediate peace talks regarding the occupied territories.

EAST ASIA Because of the lack of strong economic ties between East Asia and the Middle East, East Asia has contributed little to no troops to the peacekeeping forces, although they have made limited financial donations to UNEF I. China has in the past denied the UN’s authority to settle the question of settlement concerning the 1967 borders of Israel. Despite China’s limited role in contributed to peacekeeping, Japan and Indonesia have contributed substantially to UNEF II. The current force commander, Major-General Rais Abin, is from Indonesia.

WARSAW PACT The Soviet Union and the members of the Warsaw Pact treat UN peacekeeping operations with a considerable amount of suspicion (Bakradze), but believe they can be used a tool against the United States to maintain the balance of power they exert within the Middle East. Poland contributes the most troops of any Warsaw member to peacekeeping operations.

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RESEARCH QUESTIONS 1. What is your country’s position on peacekeeping?

2. Does your country contribute to UNEF II or any other UN peacekeeping forces? If so, in what capacity?

3. What is your country’s interpretation of Resolution 242, in particular the borders operative clause?

4. What steps does your country support to increase the efficiency of the UNEF II? 5. To what extent does your country believe UNEF II should be involved in the peace talks in the Middle East?

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APPENDIX A: TOPIC A - MAPS MAP OF LEBANON

Source: http://www.worldproutassembly.org

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RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN LEBANON

Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (http://www.internal-displacement.org/)

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UNRWA CAMPS MAP, 1793

Source: University of Texas Library (http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/history_middle_east.html)

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1949 ARMISTICE LINES “THE GREEN LINE”

Source: Mid East Web (http://www.mideastweb.org/1949armistice.htm)

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GLOSSARY: PARTIES AND TERMS SURROUNDING THE SITUATION IN LEBANON Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) – military intervention force created by the Arab league in 1976 designed to serve as an Arab peacekeeping unit in Lebanon. Consists primarily of Syrian troops.

Druze – a small but important sect in Lebanon; due to a charismatic and politically-savvy ruling family (the Jumblatts), the Druze population has always held more sway in Lebanon than its small population may otherwise warrant.

Kataeb Party – see Phalangists Lebanese Arab Army (LAA) – dissident Arab troops mutinied against the Lebanese Army, which was largely Maronite lead. Supportive of the PLO. Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) – although membership in the LCP is mostly Greek Orthodox and Armenian, the group is aligned with the mostly Muslim-LNM. Militia is known as the Popular Guard.

Lebanese Front (LF) – right-wing coalition of mainly Christian groups that was a counterforce to the Lebanese National Movement. Consists of the Kataeb Party, National Liberal Party, and the Marada Brigade Lebanese National Movement (LNM) – leftist coalition of pro-change groups in Lebanon that want constitutional reform. Consists of Druze, Sunni and Shi’a groups. Member groups include the Progressive Socialist Party, the Lebanese Community Party and various Nasserist groups.

Lebanese Social Democratic Party (LSDP) – see Phalangists Marada Brigade – militia group controlled by Franjieh, the president of Lebanon at the start of the civil war. Members of the LF. Maronites – an Eastern Catholic Church that is the primary Christian denomination in Lebanon.

Nasserism – political ideology that places emphasis on pan-Arabism. Seeks to have wider Arab policies within Lebanon. Member of the LNM. National Liberal Party (NLP) – party led by former Lebanese president Camille Chamoun that allied itself with other right-wing groups. Member of the LF. Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) – although originally created to be the military wing of the PLO, the PLA is largely in the control of various host governments, particularly that of Syria. It’s been used as a proxy force in addition to regular Syrian forces in Lebanon.

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) – an umbrella organization for various Palestinian militias; has a nominal political function, but is mostly a loosely organized grouping of Palestinian militias. Although aligned with the LNM, PLO’s primary objectives are not towards reform but rather the establishment of the state of Palestine and the destruction of Israel.

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Phalangists – right-wing Maronite Christian militia that have implicitly supported Israel. Seeking to keep status quo of confessionalism system. Members of the LF. Also known as the Lebanese Social Democratic Party and the Kataeb Party.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) – members of the PLO, PFLP is considered to be on of the more violent paramilitary organizations within the Palestiniancontrolled region of southern Lebanon Progressive Sociality Party (PSP) – lead by Druze Kamal Jumblatt (although recently assassinated); the group is also empathic towards Palestinians. Militia branch is the People’s Liberation Army.

Southern Lebanon Army (SLA) – a fraction of the Lebanese army that is largely Greek Orthodox.

Located in southern Lebanon the group is very pro-Israel.

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) – formed in 1948 to observe and supervision the ceasefire and conditions in the Middle East. Maintains sectors along in Lebanon-Israel, Syria-Israel, and Egypt.

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TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS IN LEBANON Date

Event Description

September 1

Creation of the State of Greater Lebanon by France under the League of Nations Mandate for Lebanon and Syria

1920 1926 May 23

Adoption of Constitution of Lebanon; declaration of Lebanese Republic

1932 Last official census conducted in Lebanon 1941 June September

Britain and France regain control of the Levant region General Catroux declare Lebanonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s independence

1943 September 21 October

Greater Lebanon achieves official independence; Khuri is elected as President Khuri and Sulh agree to National Pact, based on 1932 census

1945 March 22 October 24

Creation of the League of Arab States; Lebanon is founding member Creation of the UN; Lebanon is granted membership

1948 May 15 May 15

Creation of Israel Outbreak of First Arab-Israeli War

1949 March 23

Armistice Agreement with Israel

1958 May 8 July 15 October 14 October 23

The first Lebanese civil war begins US marines land in Lebanon at the request of Chamoun First civil war ends Last of US marines leave Beiruit

1964 May 28 December 31

Creation of the PLO; charter goal is to liberate Palestine through armed struggle Al-Fateh/PLO begins military operations in occupied Palestine

1967 June 5

Six Day Arab-Israeli War begins; Lebanon has no active role

1970 March 25-29 April 20 September

The Phalangist clash with Palestinian Resistance groups Cairo Agreement is signed by PLO Yassir Arafat and Lebanese army commander General Emile Bustani; establishes PLO as a state within a state Black September in Jordan

1973 May 2

Fighting between Palestinians and the Lebanese army erupts; results in Syria deploying PLA 38

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Date May 7 October 6 November

Event Description Cease-fire made and broken within same day Yom Kippur War begins; Lebanon does not participate, but PLO conducts raids into Israel from southern Lebanon PLO is recognized by the Arab summit as the sole legitimate representative for the Palestinian people

1974 September 18 September 25

In response to increasing violence, Lebanese government announces that all civilian licenses to carry firearms were canceled and warned that all violators, Palestinian as well as Lebanese, would be prosecuted Premier al-Suhl resigns but accepts position again, after process to select new cabinet begins

1975 February 28

March 2 March 5 April 13 October 15

Sidon fishermen demonstrate in response to the licensing of a new large corporate fishing company. Thousands demonstrate across country, Lebanese army fights with the demonstrators and critically wound the Sidonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s deputy, Marouf Saâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;d, who dies of his injuries Cease-fire begins with military and demonstrators in Sidon Thousands demonstrators fill streets of Beirut in support of the army against leftist political groups Phalengists attack Palestinian bus, killing 22. Start of civil war.

Arab League meets to discuss situation in Lebanon. Syria, Libya and the PLO boycott meeting

1976 January 22 March 2 June 1 October 18

Syria begins mediating ceasefire negotiations, specifically in regards to PLO adhering to past agreements Muslims troops of the Lebanese army mutiny to form the new Lebanese Arab Army, consisting of 75% of the regular national army.

No longer responded to government authority Syria begins sending 15,000 troops into northern Lebanon to intervene At the Riyadh conference, Arab League leaders sign a plan calling for ceasefire and the creation of the Arab Defense Force

1977 March 27 September 16 October December

League agrees to a six-month extension of the Arab peacekeeping forces in Lebanon Reports of heavy fighting in southern Lebanon, with reports of Israeli military providing aid to Christian groups fighting Palestinians Increasing demands from various groups for Palestinians to leave to Lebanon Scattered reports of small outbreaks of violence, particularly between Syrian peacekeeping forces and the National Liberal Party.

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LEBANESE-ISRAELI GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, 23 MARCH 1949 Preamble The Parties to the present Agreement, Responding to the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948,2 !calling upon them, as a further provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations and in order to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, to negotiate an armistice; Having decided to enter into negotiations under United Nations chairmanship concerning the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948; and having appointed representatives empowered to negotiate and conclude an Armistice Agreement; The undersigned representatives, having exchanged their full powers found to be in good and proper form, have agreed upon the following provisions: Article I With a view to promoting the return of permanent peace in Palestine solid in recognition of the importance in this regard of mutual assurances concerning the future military operations of the Parties, the following principles, which shall be fully observed by both Parties during the armistice, are hereby affirmed: 1. The injunction of the Security Council against resort to military force in the settlement of the Palestine question shall henceforth be so scrupulously respected by both Parties.

2. No aggressive action by the armed forces-land, sea, or air-of sillier Party shall be undertaken, planned, or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other; it being understood that the use of the term "planned" in this context has no bearing on normal staff planning as generally practiced in military organizations.

3. The right of each Party to its security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other shall be fully respected.

4. The establishment of an armistice between the armed forces of tire two Parties is accepted as an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace in Palestine.

Article II With a specific view to the implementation of the resolution of the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948, the following principles and purposes are affirmed: 1. The principle that no military or political advantage should be gained under the truce ordered by the Security Council is recognized.

2. It is also recognized that no provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either Party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question, the provisions of this agreement being dictated exclusively by military considerations.

Article III 1. In pursuance of the foregoing principles and of the resolution of theSecurity Council resolution of 16 November 1948, a general armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties-land, sea and air-is hereby established.

2. No element of the land, sea or air military or pare-military forces of either Party, including nonregular forces, shall commit any warlike or hostile act against the military or pare-military forces of the other Party, or against civilians in territory under the control of that Party; or shall advance beyond or pass over for any purpose whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Line set forth in Article V of this Agreement; or enter into or pass through the air space of the other Party or through the waters within three miles of the coastline of the other Party.

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3. No warlike act or act of hostility shall be conducted from territory controlled by one of the Parties to this Agreement against the other Party.

Article IV 1. The line described in Article V of this Agreement shall be designated as the Armistice Demarcation Line and is delineated in pursuance of the purpose and intent of the resolutions of the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948.

2. The basic purpose of the Armistice Demarcation Line is to delineate the line beyond which the armed forces of the respective Parties shall not move.

3. Rules and regulations of the armed forces of the Parties, which prohibit civilians from crossing the fighting lines or entering the area between the lines, shall remain in effect after the signing of this Agreement with application to the Armistice Demarcation Line defined in Article V. Article V 1. The Armistice Demarcation Line shall follow the international boundary between the Lebanon and- Palestine.

2. In the region of the Armistice Demarcation Line the military forces of the Parties shall consist of defensive forces only as is defined in the Annex (3) to this Agreement.

3. Withdrawal of forces to the Armistice Demarcation Line and their reduction to defensive strength in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall be completed within ten days of the signing of this Agreement. In the same way the removal of mines from mined roads and areas evacuated by either Party, and the transmission of plans showing the location of such minefields to the other Party shall be completed within the same period.

Article VI All prisoners of war detained by either Party to this Agreement and belonging to the armed forces, regular or irregular, of the other Party, shall be exchanged as follows: 1. The exchange of prisoners of war shall be under United Nations supervision and control throughout. The exchange shall take place at Ras En Naqoura within twenty-four hours of the signing of this Agreement.

2. Prisoners of war against whom a penal prosecution may be pending, as well as those sentenced for crime or other offence, shall be included in this exchange of prisoners.

3. All articles of personal use, valuables, letters, documents, identification marks, and other personal effects of whatever nature, belonging to prisoners of war who are being exchanged, shall be returned to them, or, if they have escaped or died, to the Party to whose armed forces they belonged.

4. All matters not specifically regulated in this Agreement shall be decided in accordance with the principles laid down in the International Convention relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed at Geneva on 27 July 1929.4 5. The Mixed Armistice Commission established in Article VII of this Agreement shall assume responsibility for locating missing persons, whether military or civilian, within the areas controlled by each Party, to facilitate their expeditious exchange. Each Party undertakes to extend to the Commission full co-operation and assistance in the discharge of this function.

Article VII 1. The execution of the provisions of this Agreement shall be supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commission composed of five members, of whom each Party to this Agreement shall designate two, and whose Chairman shall be the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization or a senior officer from the Observer personnel of that Organization designated by him following consultation with both Parties to this Agreement.

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2. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall maintain its headquarters at the Frontier Post north of Metulla and at the Lebanese Frontier Post at En Naqoura, and shall hold its meetings at such places and at such times as it may deem necessary for the effective conduct of its work.

3. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall be convened in its first meeting by the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization not later than one week following the signing of this Agreement.

4. Decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission, to the extent possible, shall be based on the principle of unanimity. In the absence of unanimity, decisions shall be taken by majority vote of the members of the Commission present and voting.

5. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall formulate its own rules of procedure. Meetings shall be held only after due notice to the members by the Chairman. The quorum for its meetings shall be a majority of its members.

6. The Commission shall be empowered to employ Observers, who may be from among the military organizations of the Parties or from the military personnel of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, or from both, in such numbers as may be considered essential to the performance of its functions. In the event United Nations Observers should be so employed, they shall remain under the command of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. Assignments of a general or special nature given to United Nations Observers attached to the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be subject to approval by the United Nations Chief of Staff or his designated representative on the Commission, whichever is serving as Chairman.

7. Claims or complaints presented by either Party relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred immediately to the Mixed Armistice Commission through its Chairman. The Commission shall take such action on all such claims or complaints by means of its observation and investigation machinery as it may deem appropriate, with a view to equitable and mutually satisfactory settlement.

8. Where interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of this Agreement, other than the Preamble and Articles I and II, is at issue, the Commission's interpretation shall prevail. The Commission, in its discretion and as the need arises, may from time to time recommend to the Parties modifications in the provisions of this Agreement.

9. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall submit to both Parties reports on its activities as frequently as it may consider necessary. A copy of each such report shall be presented to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the appropriate organ or agency of the United Nations. l0. Members of the Commission and its Observers shall be accorded such freedom of movement and access in the areas covered by this Agreement as the Commission may determine to be necessary, provided that when such decisions of the Commission are reached by a majority vote United Nations Observers only shall be employed.

11. The expenses of the Commission, other than those relating to United Nations Observers, shall be apportioned in equal shares between the two Parties to this Agreement.

Article VIII 1. The present Agreement is not subject to ratification and shall come into force immediately upon being signed.

2. This Agreement, having been negotiated and concluded in pursuance of the resolution of the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948 calling for the establishment of an armistice in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition frown the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, shall remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the Parties is achieved, except as provided in paragraph 3 of this Article.

3. The Parties to this Agreement may, by mutual consent, revise this Agreement or any of its 42

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provisions, or may suspend its application, other than Articles I and III, at any time. In the absence of mutual agreement and after this Agreement has been in effect for one year from the date of its signing, either of the Parties may call upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convoke a conference of representatives of the two Parties for the purpose of reviewing, revising, or suspending any of the provisions of this Agreement other than Articles I and III. Participation in such conference shall be obligatory upon the Parties.

4. If the conference provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article does not result in an agreed solution of a point in dispute, either Party may bring the matter before the Security Council of the United Nations for the relief sought on the grounds that this Agreement has been concluded in pursuance of Security Council action toward the end of achieving peace in Palestine.

5. This Agreement is signed in quintuplicate, of which one copy shall be retained by each Party, two copies communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the Security Council and to the United Nations Conciliation Commission on Palestine, and one copy to the Acting Mediator on Palestine.

DONE at Ras En Naqoura on the twenty-third of March nineteen forty-nine, in the presence of the Personal Deputy of the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine and the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization.

(1) U.N. doc. S/1296/Rev. 1, Apr. 8, 1949. For entry into force, see article VIII (1).

(2) 2 U.N. doc. S/1080; U.N. Security Council, Official Records, Third Year, Supplement for November 1948, pp. 13-14.

(3) Not reprinted here.

(4) Treaty Series 846; 47 Stat. 2021.

Accessed from: http://www.mideastweb.org/isrlebarmistice1949.htm

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APPENDIX B: TOPIC B - MAPS PRE-1967 BOUNDARIES OF ISRAEL

Source: Jewish Virtual Library (jewishvirtuallibrary.org)

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SINAI PENINSULA

Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency

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1973 WAR/UNEF II AREA OF OPERATIONS

!Source: US Military Academy History

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GLOSSARY: PARTIES AND TERMS SURROUNDING UNEF II Abin. Major-General Rais – Force Commander of the UNEF II from December 1976-September 1979 Al-Banna, Hassan – Egyptian Islamist leader, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Al-Futuwa (Al-Futtuwa) – Palestinian Arab militant group in 1948.

Al-Najada – Palestinian Arab militant group in 1948.

Al-Sa'iqa – (Arabic)"The Storm." Palestinian armed group created by Syrian Ba'athist party in 1966.

Arafat, Yasser – Leader of the PLO Fatah (Al-Fatah) – (Arabic) Palestinian radical movement founded approximately 1957, but officially founded about 1965. It has the declared aim of destroying Israel and replacing it with a secular democratic state. Fatah means victory in Arabic. The name is also a reverse acronym for Harakat Tahrir el Wataniyeha Filistiniyeh - Palestine Liberation Movement.

Fatah is the party of PNA chairman Yasser Arafat, and represents the moderate end of the Palestinian political spectrum. Their slogan is "Revolution until Victory."

Liljestrand, Lieutenant-General Bengt – Force Commander of the UNEF II from August 1975November 1976. From Sweden.

Siilasvuo, Lieutenant-General Ensio P. H. – Force Commander of the UNEF II from October 1973-August 1975. From Finland.

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TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS FOR UNEF Date

Event Description

May 24

British premier Winston Churchill says the Suez Canal will be in danger if Britain withdraws from Egypt.

October 8

Egyptian government announces that it will eject Britain from the Suez Canal Zone and take control of Sudan.

British warships arrive at Port Said, more troops are on the way.

1946

1951

October 21 1953 June 18

Revolution in Egypt. Young officers including Gemal Abdel Nasser overthrow monarchy and proclaim goal of modernization

1955 May 21 August 29 October 16

USSR announces it will sell arms to Egypt Israeli-Egyptian jets in fire-fight over Gaza Egyptian and Israeli forces skirmish in El Auja

1956 July 26 August 2 October 29 November 2 November 5 November 7 November 29

President Nasser announces plan to nationalize Suez Canal.

Britain mobilize armed forces Israel invades Sinai Peninsula UN Assembly finally approves a cease-fire plan for Suez.

British and French forces involved in airborne invasion of Egypt.

UNEF I created by the United Nations General Assembly Tripartite Invasion is officially ended under pressure from UN.

1959 August

Fatah founded. In the summer of 1959, according to a detailed account

by Thomas Kiernan, Yasser Arafat, Khalil al Wazir, Saad Khalef, Faruq Qadumi, Zuhair al Alami, Kamal Adwan, Muhamed Yussef an-Najar and others found the Fatah organization in Kuwait, with the aim of destroying Israel.

1964 Jan 13-17 May

First Arab Summit PLO founded

January 2

Al Fatah carries out first sabotage in Israel, against the Israel National Water Carrier.

After Syria fires on Israeli patrol, IAF bombards Syrian diversion project in retaliation. Four Israelis killed, heavier losses for Syrians.

1965 November 13 1966 May 25

USSR claims falsely that it has uncovered a Zionist plot to attack Syria.

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1978 HISTORIC SECURITY COUNCIL 2010 REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL MODEL UNITED NATIONS

Date

Event Description

November 9

Egypt and Syria sign defense treaty. This date is also given as Nov. 4. A secret codicil promised that Egypt would attack Israel in the south if Israel attacked Syria.

Israeli troops retaliate for the November 10 killing of 3 Israeli soldiers by a mine planted on a patrol road. The attack unexpectedly runs into a column of Jordan Legion soldiers, kills 15 Jordanian soldiers and 3 civilians

November 13

1967 May 14 May 18 June 5 November 22

First reports of Egyptian troop movements into Sinai.

Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser orders the United Nations Emergency Force to leave Sinai.

First wave of Israeli air attacks in Operation Focus; hits Egypt. Begin Six Day War UN Security Council resolution 242 (November 1967) called for Israeli withdrawal, establishment of peace

1972 September 5

Black September movement massacres Israeli Olympic team in Munich, triggering a systematic manhunt by Israelis for the assassins.

October 6

Egypt and Syria launch a coordinated attack on Israeli positions along the Suez Canal and in the Golan Heights. Egyptian troops cross the canal, secure a beachhead in the eastern portion of the Sinai Desert, breaching Israel's Bar-Lev line. Syrian troops defeat Israeli forces on Mt. Hermon in northern Israel.

Syria captures most of the southern portion of the Golan Heights.

Fighting continues despite the cease-fire. The United Nations Security Council passes Resolution 339, which restated the group's call for an immediate cease-fire and called for the dispatch of U.N. observers to the area.

UNEF II was established on 25 October 1973 with the mandate to supervise the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973)

1973

October 7 October 23

October 25

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1978 HISTORIC SECURITY COUNCIL 2010 REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL MODEL UNITED NATIONS

RESOLUTION 242 The Security Council, Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security, Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter 1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: (a) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; (b) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 2. Affirms further the necessity: (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones; 3. Requests the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible. !

Accessed from: S/RES/242 (http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/5317045.45021057.html)

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1978 HISTORIC SECURITY COUNCIL 2010 REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL MODEL UNITED NATIONS

RESOLUTION 340 The Security Council, Recalling its resolutions 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973 and 339 (1973) of 23 October 1973, Noting with regret the reported repeated violations of the cease-fire in noncompliance with resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973), Noting with concern from the Secretary General's report that the United Nations military observers have not yet been enabled to place themselves on both sides of the cease-fire line, 1. Demands that immediate and complete cease-fire be observed and that the parties return to the positions occupied by them at 16:50 hours GMT on 22 October 1973; 2. Requests the Secretary General, as an immediate step, to increase the number of United Nations military observers on both sides; 3. Decides to set up immediately under its authority a United Nations Emergency Force to be composed of personnel drawn from states members of the United Nations except the permanent members of the Security Council, and requests the Secretary General to report within 24 hours on the steps taken to this effect; 4. Requests the Secretary General to report to the Council on an urgent and continuing basis on the state of implementation of this resolution as well as resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973); 5. Requests all Member States to extend their full co-operation to the United Nations in the implementation of this resolution as well as resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973).

Accessed from: S/RES/340 (http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/8173471.0931778.html)

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1978 HISTORIC SECURITY COUNCIL 2010 REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL MODEL UNITED NATIONS

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Conciliation Commission. “General Progress Report and Supplementary Report of the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Covering the Period from 11 December 1949 to 23 October 1950.” United Nations. 23 October 1950.

Cooley, John K. “The Palestinians.” Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues. ed. Edward P. Haley and Lewis W. Snider. Syracuse University Press. New York. 1979 Deeb, Marius. The Lebanese Civil War. Praeger. New York. 1980 Diehl, Paul F. International Peacekeeping: [with a New Epilogue on Somalia, Bosnia, and Cambodia].

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1994 Ernst B. Haas, Why We Still Need the United Nations: The Collective Management of International Conflict, 1945-1985. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1986 Hanf, Theodore. Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon. tr. John Richardson. Center for Lebanese Studies. I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. London 1993 Howard, Harry N. The King-Crane Commission, Beirut, 1963. Print.

Jumblatt, Kamal at a press conference. March 8 1976.

Longrigg, Stephan H. Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate, London, 1958. Print.’

Matz, Nele. "Civilization and the Mandate System under the League of Nations as Origin of Trusteeship." Yearbook of United Nations Law 9 (2005): 47-95. United Nations. Web. <ww.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/matz_9_47_95.pdf>.

Rasler, Karen. “Internationalized Civil War: A Dynamic Analysis of the Syrian Intervention in Lebanon.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol 27, No 3. September 1983. pp 421-456.

Republic of Lebanon. The Lebanese Constitution. 1926. Print.

Rubenberg, Cheryl. Israel and American National Interest: a Critical Examination. Urbana: University of Illinois, 1989. Print.

S/11663/Ad.20-34. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. United Nations Truce Supervisions Organization. “Further Reports on the Status of the Cease-Fire in IsraelLebanon Sector.” January 2 1976.

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Salibi, Kamal S. Cross Roads to Civil War: Lebanon, 1958-1976. Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan, 1976. Print.

Salibi, Kamal S. The Modern History of Lebanon, London 1965.

Suleiman, Michael. “Origins of the Lebanese Civil War.” Lebanon: Crisis and Challenge in the Arab World. Ed. Fouad Moughrabi and Naseer Aruri. Association of Arab-American University Graduates. Detriot, Mich. 1977 United Nations. General Assembly “Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization.” A/31/1 Supplement No. 1. Official Records. GA 31st. New York. 1976 United Nations. Yearbook of the United Nations: 1977 Department of Public Information. New York.

1978. pp 198-206 Winslow, Charles. Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society. New York City: Routledge, 1996.

Print.

Yost, Charles. “How it Began.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Jan., 1968), pp. 304-320 Nasser, Gamal Abdel. President of Egypt. 26 May 1967 Assad, Haffez al-. Syrian Minister of Defense. 20 May 1967.

Urquhart, Brian. Hammarskjold. New York: Norton, 1994. Print.

Sitkowski, Andrzej. UN Peacekeeping: Myth and Reality. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2006. pp 39.

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