Kocaeli Üniversitesi Uluslararası Felsefe Günleri: Spinoza 9. Oturum
A Pedagogy of Encounters: Spinoza’s Concept of “Common Notions” Emre Koyuncu Purdue University
The originality of Spinoza’s understanding of ethics cannot be thought independently of the theory of knowledge that underpins it. Spinoza kept updating his theory of knowledge throughout his works and presented the final version in his seminal work, Ethics. Here, Spinoza distinguishes three types of knowledge (cognito). The first type is the knowledge acquired through random experiences (experientia vaga), personal memories, and associations. Spinoza calls opinion (opinio) or imagination (imaginatio) these irregular fragments that reveal things only insofar as they affect us, rather than as they are in themselves. The second type of knowledge is rational knowledge (ratio). Rational knowledge pertains to “properties” of things and is attained through common notions (notiones communes). Unlike opinions, however, common notions do constitute adequate knowledge. The third type of knowledge, namely intuitive knowledge (scienta intuitiva), is the knowledge of singular essences. Spinoza’s distinction between rational and intuitive knowledge, both of which constitute adequate knowledge, is crucial yet complicated. As a guiding thread for our discussion of the differences between the two types of adequate knowledge and their significance for Spinoza’s notion of ethics, I would like to refer to a significant remark made by Deleuze on the issue in Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. In this monograph, Deleuze emphasizes on several occasions that it is first in Ethics that Spinoza presents the concept of common notions as part of his theory of knowledge. In fact, for Deleuze, the reason why Spinoza did not complete his Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect is precisely because its general framework could no longer hold together, once Spinoza wanted to introduce and develop the concept of common notions. Following Deleuze, we can begin our analysis by asking the following two interrelated questions: 1) Why does Spinoza distinguish two types of adequate knowledge in Ethics? 2) How does the concept of common notions function within the framework of the delicate relationship that Spinoza establishes between his theory of knowledge and ethics? We can argue that it is the middle terms that crystallize the originality of the philosophical maneuvers of Spinoza in the ontological triad of mode (modus), attribute (attributum), and substance (substantia) and the epistemological triad of opinion, common notions, and in-
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