Memory of Central and Eastern Europe (Ukázka, strana 99)

which – in the vision of the conservatives – collides with any kind of EU-membership. The underlying problem is that in order to implement the ‘Fourth Republic’, the current narratives are being reshaped. Existing narratives that do not fit into the scheme are being concealed, denied, or questioned. Patriotic heroic narratives are being deliberately created and criticizing Poland is practically forbidden. This can be seen in the Instytut Pamęci Narodowej [Institute of National Remembrance, IPN] law, which criminalises statements about Poland.18 According to the Director of the Willy Brandt Institute in Wrocław, Krzysztof Ruchniewicz, there are four ways to implement the desired historical policy.19 First, one has to design public space with monuments and anniversaries which fit the ideology one wants to spread. The educational system is also very important: schools should teach the ideologically distorted image of history to the youth. To create a new reality and awareness, science should also be regulated by the ruling party. Last but not least, one has to adjust jurisdiction. In the meantime, these methods are tolerated and dealt with quite openly. Official discussions are only held with historians that represent the prescribed narrative. Universities and their professors get surveilled, sometimes dismissed, and new, patriotic history books find their way into schools. Even monuments are removed and replaced by others.20 The main danger of state-controlled memory is that uncomfortable truths are left out, while more positive memories are specifically brought up or are heroised.21 There are state-sponsored programs that are aimed primarily at young people which are supposed to revive patriotism and their love for the Polish nation. An example of this is the program “Patriotyzm Jutra” [Patriotism of tomorrow]. They organize patriotic festivals, concerts, meetings, and re-enactments of battles.22 The government and the ruling party, PiS, do not make a secret of this special 18 Ustawa o zmianie ustawy o Instytutcie Pamięci Narodowej – “Komisji Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, ustawy o grobach i cmentarzach, ustawy o muzeach oraz ustawy o odpowiedzialności podmiotów zbiorowych za czyny zabronione pod grożbą kary”, Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polkiej, Warsaw 14.2.2018, URL: http://ipn.gov.pl/pl/o-ipn/ ustawa/24216,Ustawa.html [accessed: 23.04.2022].

19 Ruchniewicz, K., “Zur Geschichtspolitik der PiS”, in: A. Rostek, Polska first. Über die polnische Krise, Bonn 2018, 204.

20 Lang, K.-O., “Auf dem Weg zur 4. Republik. Die Parlamentswahlen in Polen vom 25. September 2005”, 144.

21 Ruchniewicz, K., “Zur Geschichtspolitik der PiS”, 208.

22 Steffen, K., “Ambivalenz des affirmativen Populismus. Gründe und Abgründe der Lustration in Polen”, Osteuropa, Vol. 56, Issue 11–12, 2006, 29.

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instrumentalisation of history and their state control. In 2015, shortly after the presidential election, Andrzej Duda said: “To pursue history, politics is one of the most important activities of the President”.23 With this in mind, it is no surprise that historical debates are often led by politicians rather than historians. That is the reason why laws to regulate historical politics, such as the decommunization law or the IPN law have been passed. The IPN, as the leading institution of history, takes a very important part in this field and a decisive role in the governmental control of remembrance. This institution is supported and financed by the government.24 Since the founding of the IPN, the institution has been an instrument of the governing parties to steer the political history, but PiS takes it to another level.

The reasons behind this approach to dealing with the past are diverse and come from Polish history itself. Poland’s most common metaphor for their own identity is the term “Christ among the nations”, which was shaped by the national writer Adam Mickiewicz. Poland’s pain, selflessness and its role as a victim of aggression should also be pointed out.25 Catastrophes like Katyń, Wolyń and Smoleńsk, as well as foreign rule, which is accompanied by the oppression of national identity, strengthen the urge of self-assertion in this country. In fact, it is particularly strong in Poland. The suppression and censorship during the Cold War have led to long suppressed memories returning to the collective memory.26 In addition, the conservative forces in particular did not feel included during the redesign phase after 1989. This complex, which is based on the fact that they were not involved in the reorganisation of Poland, is a scar that goes deep and that ultimately led to the recent political situation.

Decommunization The current decommunization is based on the law named “On the prohibition of the spread of communism or other totalitarian regimes through 23 Duda, A., in: Saryusz-Wolska – Stach – Stoll, Verordnete Geschichte, 447. Translated by the author.

24 Leschnik, H., Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik in Polen von 1998 bis 2010, (Studien zur Ostmitteleuropaforschung, Vol. 42), Marburg 2018, 435.

25 Ruchniewicz, K., “Die historische Erinnerung in Polen”, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 5–6, 2005, 18.

26 Steffen, K., “Ambivalenz des affirmativen Populismus. Gründe und Abgründe der Lustration in Polen”, 222.

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the names of buildings, institutions and facilities of public use”27. It was published on the 1st of April 2016. The main message of this legal text is: 1. The names of buildings, facilities, and installations of public use, including streets, bridges, and squares, given by public authorities, may not be used for any commemorate persons, organizations, events, or dates that symbolize communism, or other totalitarian regimes, or otherwise propagate these political systems.

2. Names of people, organizations, events, or dates that symbolize the repressive, authoritarian and non-sovereign power system in Poland in the years 1944–1989 are also regarded as names that propagate communism.28

According to the IPN, there were approximately 1,000 street names to be changed prior to this bill.29 Mostly those named after former PZPR members (with 44 the absolute leader: Leon Kurczowski)30 and some more or lesser-known politicians. Furthermore, streets carrying the name of the People’s Army or the 1st of May were also renamed. The most commonly assigned names were: Witold Pilecki, Zbigniew Herbert, and Anna Walentynowicz.31 Most of the criticism they earned was for the renaming of streets into Lech Kaczyński Street. It is particularly noticeable that most of the criticism about renaming streets came from bigger cities. It can be assumed that in smaller towns and in the Polish countryside, people tend to be more conservative and vote for PiS. In big cities like Warsaw, Gdańsk or Wrocław, the population in general is more liberal, modern and well educated. Traditionally it is more difficult for 27 Ustawa z dnia 1. kwietnia 2016 r. o zakazie propagowania komunizmu lub innego totalitarnego przez nazwy budowli, obiektów i urządzeń użytecznośći piblicznej, Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Warsaw 01.04.2016, URL: http://prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails. xsp?id=WDU20160000744 [accessed: 23.04.2022].

28 Ibidem.

29 Frey, D., “O dekomunizacja rozstrzyga opinia Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej”, Rzeczpospolita, January 27, 2018.

30 Ferfecki, W., “Dekomunizacja: Nowi patroni ulic wygodni dla PiS”, Rzeczpospolita, June 21, 2018.

31 Frey, D., “O dekomunizacja rozstrzyga opinia Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej”, Rzeczpospolita, January 27, 2018; Pilecki was a Polish officer, who wrote the first report on Auschwitz and the Holocaust. After the war, he was found guilty by the Polish court of espionage. As a result, he was sentenced to death and was eventually rehabilitated after 1989; Herbert was a writer from Lwów and lived from 1924–1989.

Walentznowicz was a founding member of the Solidarność in the 1980s. She died in the aeroplane disaster in 2010 in Smoleńsk, Russia.

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