Azerbaijan's Geopolitical Landscape (Ukázka, strana 99)

of Turkey, was less outspoken about the Turkish military intervention.

Demirel believed that a military intervention by Turkey would be a political mistake,243 confirming that “I will never do that unless getting the support of great powers behind Turkey.”244 Generally speaking, despite the fundamental differences between the two countries, the Turkish government had tried to preserve its moderate position towards Armenia in order to save bilateral relations. Turkey was the second country that recognised the independence of Armenia in 1991, and it also reopened the historical railway between Kars and Gyumri, which was followed by unofficial links between the two governments for the creation of diplomatic relations and official border agreements.245 Later on, the Turkish government refused to establish full diplomatic relations with Armenia, partly due to its aggression against Azerbaijan and partly because Paragraph 11 of the Armenian Declaration of Independence—adopted by the Armenian Supreme Council on 23 August 1990—stated that “the Republic of Armenia supports international recognition of the 1915 Armenian genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia.”246 However, the governments on both sides tried to establish positive relations without full diplomatic recognition. In 1992, Hikmet Chetin, the foreign minister of Turkey, declared that his country was ready for the development of the diplomatic relations if Armenian forces withdrew from Shusha and Lachin. The Turkish government also agreed to sell 100,000 tons of grain to Armenia in September 1992, and signed a deal to supply Armenia with 300 million kilowatts of electricity annually while it was suffering from energy shortages.247 The agreement on selling electricity to Armenia was not acceptable to the government of Azerbaijan, because it would undermine the energy blockade which was Baku’s main means of political leverage. Azerbaijan took the position towards Turkey that “they claim to be our brothers, but give bread to our enemies.”248 Tofig Gasimov, the foreign minister of Azerbaijan, called the energy deal between Armenia and Turkey

243 Goldberg, “Moscow Sees War Threat if Outsiders Act in Karabakh”.

244 Shamkhal Abilov, “The Discourse ‘One Nation Two State’: The Position of Turkey in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, Journal of Caspian Affairs, 1 (2), 2015: 34.

245 Fiona Hill et al., “Armenia and Turkey: From Normalization to Reconciliation”, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 13 (4), 2015: 132-133.

246 Rovshan Ibrahimov, “Turkish-Azerbaijani Relations and Turkey’s Policy in the Central Asia”, The Caucasus & Globalization: Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, 5 (3-4), 2011: 17.

247 Bolukbasi, “Ankara’s Baku-Centered Transcaucasia Policy”, 84-85.

248 Cornell, “Turkey and the Conflict in Nagorno Karabakh”, 67.

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a stab in the back to Azerbaijan. Therefore, due to the strong reaction and criticism from Azerbaijan and the main opposition party in Turkey, Demirel’s government suspended the deal without implementation in November 1992.249 Furthermore, the intensification of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict—with significant military attacks by Armenia at the end of March 1993 and the occupation of the Kalbajar district of Azerbaijan on 3 April 1993—worsened relations between the two countries and placed Ankara in a difficult position. As a result, Turkey decided to close its land border with Armenia and to join Azerbaijan in an economic embargo against its rival.250 The summer of 1993 witnessed political disorder in the capital of Azerbaijan.251 Armenians used this turmoil as an opportunity to occupy other Azerbaijani territories in the east and southeast parts of Nagorno-Karabakh, which carried the conflict again into Nakhichevan. As a result, Turkey threatened Armenia with military intervention and began to deploy military units along its border with Armenia in September 1993, in order to show its intent in the event of an invasion of Nakhichevan.252 Statements by the Turkish political and military leadership significantly increased concerns on the Armenian side. Therefore, Armenia requested that Russia deploy its forces to the Turkey–Armenia border, in order to avoid a direct military threat by Turkey. Russia again backed Armenia in the Nakhichevan case and moved its troops to the border, showing its willingness to confront Turkey in the event of military intervention against Armenia.253 Generally speaking, even though Turkey showcased a pro-Azerbaijan position throughout 1992 and 1993, the country failed to provide tangible support to Baku in the Nagorno-Karabakh War.254 Therefore, it is worth considering why Ankara chose not to intervene in the conflict. Scholars have identified various internal and external factors that affected Turkish policy on the war, particularly in its early stages. These include the doctrine of Kemalism, the scope of differing opinions among the political

249 250 251 252

Bolukbasi, “Ankara’s Baku-Centered Transcaucasia Policy”, 85.

Aybars Görgülü, Turkey-Armenian Relations: A Vicious Circle, TESEV Publications, 2008, 11-12.

Abilov and Isayev, “Azerbaijan-Russian Relations”, 123.

Alec Rasizade, “Azerbaijan’s Prospects in Nagorno-Karabakh”, Mediterranean Quarterly, 22 (3), 2011, 82.

253 Dmitrii Trenin, Russia’s Use of Military Forces in Intra-State Conflicts in the CIS, Bundesinstitut fur Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 1996, 2009-2014.

254 Umut Uzer, “Nagorno-Karabakh in Regional and World Politics: A Case Study for Nationalism, Realism and Ethnic Conflict”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 32 (2), 2012: 249.

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leadership, Turkey’s relations with the West, the existence of Russia as a regional power, the so-called Armenian Genocide, Turkey’s domestic security in the early 1990s, and the reputation of Turkey in the West in respect to the Cyprus issue of 1974.255 It should also be added that there was never an official request from Azerbaijan for Turkish military intervention in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.256 Nonetheless, all these factors did not prevent Turkey from giving diplomatic support to Azerbaijan and engaging in various diplomatic initiatives, in order to elucidate and justify Azerbaijan’s stand in the conflict at the regional and international level.

Turkey made a concerted effort to bring the case to the agenda of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and was the main initiator of a meeting of the organisation in Prague on 28 February 1992, where the member countries confirmed the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.257 In 1991 and 1992, Turkish diplomats conducted various rounds of shuttle diplomacy, not only between the parties in the conflict, but also in European countries. In addition, Hikmet Chetin used Turkey’s connections to the West to draw the attention of the governments of Western states. He even personally raised the issue of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in a phone call to James Baker, Secretary of State of the United States.258 Moreover, Ankara also raised the issue in the UN Security Council, alerting the five permanent members of the organisation to Armenian aggression.259 In 1992, Turkey initiated a peace proposal, based on a “territorial swap” plan developed by Paul Goble, special adviser to James Baker.

According to the proposal, the territory of Armenia that connected Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan should be entrusted to Azerbaijan. In return, Azerbaijan should assign part of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia.

As a result, Azerbaijan would have direct land connection with Nakhichevan and Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh.260 However, neither party welcomed this plan. In the summer of 1992, at the Rome session of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Minsk Group was established with the aim of managing official negotiations to find 255 256 257 258 259 260

Cornell, Azerbaijan since Independence, 369-371.

Abilov, “The Discourse ‘One Nation Two State’”, 37-38.

Bolukbasi, “Ankara’s Baku-Centered Transcaucasia Policy”, 84.

Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, 368.

Pauw, “Turkey’s Policies in Transcaucasia”.

Paul A. Goble, “Coping with the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis”, The Fletcher Forum, 16 (2), 1992: 26.

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