NORSK-BRITISK FORSVARSSAMARBEID «Russia’s Aero space Forces (VKS) have benefitted from a near decade of increased investment with upgraded types of combat aircraft and weapons entering the inventory»
«Big ticket defence aerospace pro grammes can take the better part of a quarter of a century to get from require ments capture to front-line service»
28 LUFTLED 3 2020
Two variants of the F-35 are being by European aircraft, the F-35A and the F-35B short take-off and vertical landing model. Designed from the outset to be low-observable, the aircraft offers a capable air-tosurface platform with a secondary air-to-air role. The F-35 was also being considered by Germany as at least a partial successor the Panavia Tornado but was ruled out on what would appear to have been political and defence-industrial grounds. The German air force Tornado is declared to NATO in the dualcapable role for nuclear deterrence. Given the survivability characteristics of the F-35, and that the B-61-12 nuclear free fall bomb is being integrated on the aircraft, to some at least it appeared an obvious choice. The then German Air Force chief supported the acquisition of a fifth-generation aircraft, clearly the F-35, and for his troubles found he was not to be extended in post by 12 months. Instead Berlin in April 2020 indicated it would order the F/A-18F Super Hornet to meet this role. The F/A-18E/F, while a capable multi-role fighter, is not a low-observable design and as such would be at greater risk in penetrating highly defended air space than the F-35. Nonetheless Berlin opted for the former, prompted by concerns in Paris that the selection of the F-35 by its FCAS partner would undermine the project. There remains a tension between operational and industrial drivers at the national and supra-national level among Europe’s remaining defence aerospace manufacturers which have and continue to risk a sub-optimal outcome in terms of European cooperation. For the front-line operator the intricacies of defence-aerospace cooperation are tomorrow’s challenge, more immediate is the problem of an increasingly abrasive competitor state on Europe’s eastern borders. Conventional deterrence today is provided by what is already in, or entering the inventory, rather than the promise of the next decade’s aircraft. As previously noted, European combat air power will be generated by a mix of ‘fourth’ and ‘fifth’-generation aircraft at least to the middle of this century. For the majority of the next two decades the only ‘fifth’- generation aircraft in the European inventory will be the F-35. The French-led next- generation fighter is not anticipated to enter the inventory until around 2040, while the UK’s Tempest target in-service date is 2035 or as close as possible thereafter. The F-16 European Participating Forces nations, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, and Norway will all transition to an F-35 only fleet. Italy and the UK, meanwhile, will operate the F-35 alongside the Eurofighter Typhoon likely at least until the early 2040s. In the case of the UK the F-35B provides the Royal Navy with the offensive air element of its carrier strike capability. The Royal Navy’s two aircraft carriers, HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales are sometimes viewed as providing a core military element of what the government terms ‘global Britain.’ For the near term the focus, however, may need more often to be far closer to home waters.
The deterioration of relations between the NATO alliance and Russia, while not a return to the Cold War, there is for instance no Warsaw Pact, is seeing the re-emergence of areas of previous strategic importance. These include the North Atlantic and the Norwegian sea. During the Cold War these were of particular focus for Oslo and for London within the Alliance framework. As a response to Russia’s growing assertiveness this is again the case today. COMMON PLATFORMS Unlike the Cold War, however, Norwegian and British combat air power now have platforms in common, notably the F-35 and the P-8A Poseidon anti-submarine warfare aircraft. Following the decision to scrap the Nimrod MRA4 maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare aircraft in 2010, the UK gapped this capability. Development problems with the aircraft, wider budgetary issues, and the perceived level of risk in accepting a capability gap in what had previously been deemed key, led to the MRA4 cancellation. While the Nimrod was a domestic programme, there was scant consideration given to a national or cooperative development programme when considering a successor.