Passport Control: An Examination of U.S. Policy on Jerusalem Michal Navoth, November 7, 2013 On September 30, 2002, President George W. Bush signed into law the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (“ACT”).1 Its section 214 is entitled: “UNITED STATES POLICY WITH RESPECT TO JERUSALEM AS THE CAPITAL OF ISRAEL.” Section 214(d) is the provision at issue and it stipulates: (d) RECORD OF PLACE OF BIRTH AS ISRAEL FOR PASSPORT PURPOSES. – For purposes of the registration of birth, certification of nationality, issuance of a passport of a United States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary shall, upon the request of the citizen or the citizen’s legal guardian, record the place of birth as Israel.2 An American citizen, Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky was born in Shaare Zedek in western Jerusalem in October 2002, just a few weeks after the Act was enacted. His parents, Americans citizens, invoked the new Act. His mother applied for a United States passport for Zivotofsky, inscribing his place of birth as “Jerusalem, Israel.” The State Department issued a passport in Zivotofsky’s name but listed his birthplace as merely “Jerusalem.” The Secretary of State did not enforce the provision, claiming that it impermissibly infringes on the President’s exclusive authority under the United States Constitution to decide whether and on what terms to recognize foreign nations. On September 16, 2003, Zivotofsky, “by his parents and guardians, Ari Z. and Naomi Siegman Zivotofsky,” sued to compel the Secretary to comply with the Act. 3 For almost a decade, the litigation has been “up and down the appellate ladder.”4 A unanimous three-judge panel of United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“court”) ruled on July 23, 2013 in the case of Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State (“judgment”)5 that it agreed with the Secretary”…and therefore hold that section 214(d) is unconstitutional.”6 The purpose of this survey is to review the judgment in relation to three aspects: 1. Without delving into the broad issue of separation of powers, can the United States President pursue a policy contrary to a statue enacted by United States Congress? 2. Designation of place of birth on passports is neither tantamount to the establishment of foreign policy nor to its implementation. 3. Even if the case raises the question of foreign affairs, which in our opinion it does not, in contrast to what was noted by the court, the Executive branch policy toward Jerusalem has not always been “a consistent policy of neutrality.”
1. Can the United States President pursue a policy contrary to a statue enacted by United States Congress? The court first addresses the issue of the President’s recognition power and refers to the argument made by the Secretary, the appellee. In support of his view that the recognition power is held exclusively by the President, the Secretary cites Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution, which provides, inter alia, that the President “shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers.” 7 The court points out rightly that “…the fact that the President is empowered to receive ambassadors, by itself, does not resolve whether he has the exclusive authority to recognize foreign nations…”8 It should be noted that the American Constitution does not endow the “foreign affairs” power to the President nor to any other branch. In fact, the Constitution makes no reference to “foreign affairs.” Nevertheless, it has long been established that the President has a special role in the conduct of foreign affairs.9 Similarly, the Constitution makes no reference to recognition. Historically, presidents have made decisions concerning recognition, beginning with President George Washington.10 The court relies also on precedents of the Supreme Court. The latter declared “more than once” that the recognition power lies exclusively with the President. 11 Among the cases mentioned, the court refers to Belmont and to Pink.12 Although the court was aware of the difference between Pink and Zivotofsky, it concluded that the difference does not distinguish the two cases: [u]nlike in Pink, here the legislation that conflicts with the President’s recognition power was enacted by the Congress, not a state. But, as we today hold, the President exclusively exercises the recognition power. The Congress, like a state, may not impermissibly intrude on an exclusive Executive power. Contrary to