Conflicting Expectations from the Geneva Document between the P5+1 and Iran Dore Gold, December 11, 2013 Vol. 13, No. 31
December 11, 2013
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Many questions have arisen about whether the P5+1 (U.S., Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany) and the Islamic Republic of Iran interpret the interim understanding reached in Geneva on November 24, 2013, in the same way. Indeed, at times it appears that they are not talking about the same piece of paper.
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From the remarks of Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Jarad Zarif on Iranian television, the Geneva document does not legally obligate Iran. Under these circumstances, Tehran’s freedom of maneuver in interpreting the language of the document will be greater.
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From the standpoint of Western security, one clear purpose of the diplomatic efforts in Geneva was to extend the time the Iranians need to achieve a nuclear breakout. While Iran would never admit that its secret ambition is nuclear breakout to achieve an atomic bomb, it judges that it will need very little time to recover its production capabilities of 20-percent-enriched uranium, once it no longer feels compelled to limit itself in accordance with the Geneva document. Both sides have very different expectations regarding the future of the sanctions on Iran. U.S. spokesmen argue that after the conclusion of the Geneva document, the core architecture of the sanctions remains firmly in place. In contrast, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani declared after the Geneva document was reached: The core architecture of the sanctions will be fractured following the implementation of this agreement. The Geneva document leaves the window open for future uranium enrichment by Iran. The Iranians see enrichment as their right. The U.S. speaks about a limited enrichment program under international restrictions and monitoring. In any case, the Geneva document unfortunately leaves open the possibility that in the future, Iran will not always be under international restrictions.
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