What is ‘is’?

Jose-Miguel Rosillo-Cevallos What Is ‘Is’?

Jose-Miguel Rosillo-Cevallos

Introduction

I will

argue that there is no best interpretation of ‘is’ for the argument

from opposites, since every interpretation is equally good.1 First, I’ll explain the argument from opposites. Then, I’ll show how each one of the three possible interpretations of ‘is’ – the existential, the predicative, and the veridical – works just as well as the other two. I hope to convince the reader that the key to evaluating the argument is instead to first recognize its essence, which amounts to the paradox presented by the distinction between, and affirmation of, the absolutist and relativist theses. Finally, I will suggest that the correct evaluation is one that reduces the value of the argument exclusively to its moral dimension.

1. Many is one “And since they are two, each is one?”2 With this question, Socrates effectively captures the essence of the argument from opposites. It is an

1

All citations are from Plato’s Republic, Book V, and the translation is by John M. Cooper. the beautiful is the opposite of the ugly, they are two.

2“Since

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Jose-Miguel Rosillo-Cevallos argument that affirms both the relativist and absolutist theses based on their mutual opposition.

The context within which Socrates presents this argument is his discussion of the ideal state. In particular, this is a part of the discussion about who the leaders of the ideal state should be3. Socrates tells Glaucon that the leaders should be those who take pleasure in learning things, and that those people are called philosophers4. Glaucon objects, however, that there are some whom he would say take pleasure in learning things yet who he would not call philosophers5. These are the lovers of sights and sounds, who see beautiful things but not the beautiful itself6. Socrates is thus motivated to be more explicit about who he means to refer to when he refers to philosophers7. In the process of clarifying the boundaries of his definition, he explicitly aims to show that those who see beautiful things should also see the beautiful itself8. The more general claim Socrates is looking to make is that knowledge is about what

Of course.

And since they are two, each is one?” (Republic V, 476-a) 3“Until philosophers rule as kings or those who are now called kings and leading men genuinely and adequately philosophize, that is, until political power and philosophy entirely coincide, while the many natures who at present pursue either one exclusively are forcibly prevented from doing so, cities will have no rest from evils, Glaucon, nor, I think, will the human race.” (Republic V, 473-d) 4“But the one who readily and willingly tries all kinds of learning, who turns gladly to learning and is insatiable for it, is rightly called a philosopher, isn’t he?” (Republic V, 475-c) 5“Then many strange people will be philosophers, for the lovers of sights seem to be included, since they take pleasure in learning things. And the lovers of sounds are very strange people to include as philosophers, for they would never willingly attend a serious discussion or spend their time that way, yet they run around to all the Dionysiac festivals, omitting none, whether in cities or villages, as if their ears were under contract to listen to every chorus. Are we to say that these people—and those who learn similar things or petty crafts—are philosophers?

No, but they are like philosophers.” (Republic V, 475-d-475-e) 6“The lovers of sights and sounds like beautiful sounds, colors, shapes, and everything fashioned out of them, but their thought is unable to see and embrace the nature of the beautiful itself.” (Republic V, 476-b) 7“And who are the true philosophers?

Those who love the sight of truth.

That’s right, but what exactly do you mean by it?” (Republic V, 475-e) 8“What about someone who believes in beautiful things, but doesn’t believe in the beautiful itself and isn’t able to follow anyone who could lead him to the knowledge of it? Don’t you think he is living in a dream rather than a wakened state? Isn’t this dreaming: whether asleep or awake, to think that a likeness is not a likeness but rather the thing itself that it is like?” (Republic V, 476-c)

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Jose-Miguel Rosillo-Cevallos is always and everywhere9, which is what the absolutist thesis claims. Yet his implicit aim, the more general claim that Plato is looking to make, is that knowledge is about what is always and everywhere as much as it is about what is sometimes and somewhere, not to mention what is never and nowhere.

The absolutist and relativist theses are basic assumptions about the nature of ‘is’. They represent two possible stances on the kind of thing that ‘is’ is. The absolutist thesis, on the one hand, holds that ‘is’ is either always and everywhere or never and nowhere. In other words, the absolutist thesis is the view that ‘is’ is a constant. The relativist thesis, on the other hand, is the view that ‘is’ is a variable; that ‘is’ is sometimes and somewhere. The absolutist thesis, then, can be understood as a characterization of ‘is’ as something that is complete, whereas the relativist thesis characterizes it as something incomplete, something partial. The distinctive features of each thesis will become increasingly apparent as our discussion develops. For now, suffice it to say that they pertain to the fundamental nature of ‘is’ and that the absolutist thesis claims ‘is’ is necessarily either one or none while the relativist thesis claims ‘is’ is possibly many.

The superficial purpose of the argument from opposites is to show how an affirmation of the relativist thesis deductively leads to an affirmation of the absolutist thesis10. In other words, Socrates is trying to convince someone who rejects the absolutist thesis on the grounds that they affirm the relativist thesis that those are in fact grounds for affirming the absolutist thesis as well11. Yet even as Socrates argues for the absolutist thesis, he implicitly also argues for 9“Now

that these points have been established, I want to address a question to our friend who doesn’t believe in the beautiful itself or any form of the beautiful itself that remains always the same in all respects but who does believe in the many beautiful things…” (Republic V, 479-a) 10“What if the person who has opinion but not knowledge is angry with us and disputes the truth of what we are saying? Is there some way to console him and persuade him gently, while hiding from him that he isn’t in his right mind?” (Republic V, 476-e) 11“Consider, then, what we’ll say to him. Won’t we question him like this? First, we’ll tell him that nobody begrudges him any knowledge he may have and that we’d be delighted to discover that he knows something.” (Republic V, 476-e)

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Jose-Miguel Rosillo-Cevallos the relativist thesis, since the success of his argument depends on the truth of the relativist thesis. The purpose of the argument from opposites is therefore additionally to show how an affirmation of the absolutist thesis requires an affirmation of the relativist thesis. More generally, then, the purpose of the argument from opposites is partly to show that the absolutist and relativist theses are interdependent, a feature that is also employed as part of the argument’s method. The method uses the theses’ opposition as well, however, which leads to the conclusion that this is the other part of the argument’s purpose: to show that the absolutist and relativist theses are opposed to one another. Thus, the full purpose of the argument from opposites is to show how an affirmation of either one of the relativist or the absolutist theses requires and precludes an affirmation of the other.

The method of the argument from opposites consists of consolation and ‘gentle persuasion’12. Socrates addresses it to a ‘lover of sights and sounds’, who affirms the relativist thesis while rejecting the absolutist one; that is, someone who believes in things that ‘are’, but not in ‘are’-ness itself. The lover of sights and sounds denies that ‘is’ is anything other than particular things; he affirms that the nature of ‘is’ is such that it is only itself insofar as it is also something else, insofar as it also ‘is not’13. Glaucon, at Socrates’ requests, plays the role of lover of sights and sounds, thereby providing Socrates with a way of testing the argument. In other words, Socrates is trying to show that the argument from opposites can fulfill its superficial purpose, such that it is evident that a lover of sights and sounds would be convinced by it. Socrates explicitly mentions his strategy for accomplishing this, and it is important to note that he specifies that 12“What

if the person who has opinion but not knowledge is angry with us and disputes the truth of what we are saying? Is there some way to console him and persuade him gently, while hiding from him that he isn’t in his right mind?” (Republic V, 476-e) 13“Now, we said that, if something could be shown, as it were, to be and not to be at the same time, it would be intermediate between what purely is and what in every way is not, and that neither knowledge nor ignorance would be set over it, but something intermediate between ignorance and knowledge? Correct.

And now the thing we call opinion has emerged as being intermediate between them? It has.” (Republic V, 478-d)

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Jose-Miguel Rosillo-Cevallos the persuasion must be gentle. What he seems to be suggesting is that the success of the argument depends on the attitude the argument’s target audience takes towards the argument, which in turn depends on the attitude taken towards the target audience, such that whether the lover of sights and sounds is persuaded depends on whether they are persuaded gently. Although there is clearly a moral dimension to this approach, what is particularly noteworthy about it at this point is its pragmatism. A lover of sights and sounds, Glaucon, the reader, or anyone else for that matter, will not be persuaded unless they are open to being persuaded, and they will not be open to being persuaded unless they feel minimally respected14. We must not take Socrates’ qualification lightly: the fact that he adjures for gentility in persuasion is the key to understanding the true value of the argument from opposites. I will return to this idea when I present my final evaluation.

One last note on the argument from opposites, regarding the way my explanation of it relates to the way it is expressed in the dialogue. Recall that my explanation of it is firstly an identification of its most basic constitutive elements: the absolutist thesis, which portrays ‘is’ as a universal, and the relativist thesis, which portrays ‘is’ as a particular. Socrates expresses these elements in terms of the concepts of knowledge, ignorance, and opinion.

Knowledge and ignorance correspond to the absolutist thesis; opinion to the relativist one. Knowledge, says Socrates, is about ‘what is’, ignorance is about ‘what is not’15, and opinion is about ‘what both is and is not’16 and/or ‘what

14“What

if the person who has opinion but not knowledge is angry with us and disputes the truth of what we are saying? Is there some way to console him and persuade him gently, while hiding from him that he isn’t in his right mind?” (Republic V, 476-e) 15“Then, as knowledge is set over what is, while ignorance is of necessity set over what is not, mustn’t we find an intermediate between knowledge and ignorance to be set over what is intermediate between what is and what is not, if there is such a thing?” (Republic V, 477-a) 16“Apparently, then, it only remains for us to find what participates in both being and not being and cannot correctly be called purely one or the other, in order that, if there is such a thing, we can rightly call it the opinable, thereby setting the extremes over the extremes and the intermediate over the intermediate.”

(Republic V, 478-e)

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Jose-Miguel Rosillo-Cevallos neither is nor is not’17. The philosopher, he says, loves knowledge, whereas the lover of sights and sounds loves opinion18. The argument from opposites as Socrates explicitly presents it, then, amounts to a definition of philosophy as devotion to absolute being. And although his explicit purpose is to convince those devoted to relative being that they should turn to the absolute, the way he goes about doing so is a declaration of his implicit purpose, which is to demonstrate the simultaneous interdependence and irreconcilability of the absolutist and relativist theses, and thus a broader definition of true philosophy. Socrates hopes firstly to show that a recognition of either thesis entails a recognition of the other; that an identification of knowledge requires an identification of ignorance, and that their combination requires an identification of opinion, just as an identification of opinion requires an identification of knowledge and an identification of ignorance. In other words, ‘is’ entails ‘is not’, ‘is’ and ‘is not’ together entail ‘both is and is not’ and ‘neither is nor is not’, and ‘both is and is not’ and ‘neither is nor is not’ not only entail each other, they also entail ‘is’ and ‘is not’. These entailment relations are the heart of the paradox that drives the argument from opposites: the absolutist and relativist theses are as interdependent as they are contradictory. By explaining the argument from opposites as I have, I hope to make it very clear that this paradox is the key to the argument’s insight, while the kind of ‘is’ that ‘is’ is is ultimately irrelevant.

2. One is many

17“So

someone opines neither what is nor what is not?

How could it be otherwise?” (Republic V, 478-c) 18“Remember we said that the latter saw and loved beautiful sounds and colors and the like but wouldn’t allow the beautiful itself to be anything? We remember, all right. We won’t be in error, then, if we call such people lovers of opinion rather than philosophers or lovers of wisdom and knowledge? Will they be angry with us if we call them that? Not if they take my advice, for it isn’t right to be angry with those who speak the truth. As for those who in each case embrace the thing itself, we must call them philosophers, not lovers of opinion? Most definitely.” (Republic V, 480-a)

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Jose-Miguel Rosillo-Cevallos

There is a point in Socrates’ exposition of the argument from opposites at which he asks Glaucon, who is playing the role of lover of sights and sounds, whether one who knows knows something or nothing. Glaucon replies that one who knows must know something. Socrates then asks if the something that one who knows knows is something that is or something that is not. Glaucon responds that it must be something that is.19 Accompanying this last ‘is’ in Cooper’s edition of the text is a footnote that offers three different possible kinds of ‘is’ that this particular ‘is’ could be: existential, predicative, and/or veridical. Cooper claims Socrates could be referring to ‘any or all’ of these.20 The question for us is which kind is most appropriate for the argument. As I mentioned before, however, I argue that no one of these kinds of ‘is’ is any more or less appropriate than the other two. My basis for such a claim is the fact that the essence of the argument from opposites is captured so long as the aforementioned paradox is identified, which can be done equally well using any one of the three kinds of ‘is’. I will make this plain by expressing the argument from opposites in each of these three ways.

First, by using the existential ‘is’. I address this one first because it is the most fundamental of the three. There can be no properties of things (predicative ‘is’) if there are no things, and there can be no things that possess the property of truth (veridical ‘is’) if there are no things and properties of things. The existential ‘is’ is the ‘is’ that says ‘there are things’. If the ‘is’ in the phrase ‘something that is’ is the existential ‘is’, then the phrase is referring to something that exists, as opposed to something that does not exist. Immediately 19“Then

we’ll say: “Tell us, does the person who knows know something or nothing?” You answer for him.

He knows something.

Something that is or something that is not?

Something that is, for how could something that is not be known?” (Republic V, 476-e) 20“17. Because of the ambiguity of the verb einai (‘to be’), Socrates could be asking any or all of the following questions: (1) ‘Something that exists or something that does not exist?’ (existential ‘is’); (2) ‘Something that is beautiful (say) or something that is not beautiful?’ (predicative ‘is’); (3) ‘Something that is true or something that is not true?’ (veridical ‘is’).”

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Jose-Miguel Rosillo-Cevallos after affirming this, Glaucon asks rhetorically how something that ‘is not’ could be known, implying (assuming the ‘is’ is existential) that it is impossible to know something that does not exist. And immediately before affirming that, Glaucon responds to Socrates’ question about whether one who knows knows something or nothing – his reply is that one who knows knows something, and not nothing. Their conclusion, then, is that knowledge is necessarily about existence, and that knowledge about non-existence is impossible. But notice that the phrase ‘something that is’, if the ‘is’ is existential, is redundant, since ‘something’ is by definition ‘not nothing’, such that ‘something’ implies its own existence. Why, then, does Socrates ask what is essentially the same question twice? The simple answer, given his purpose, is that he is trying to show his interlocutor that by affirming that knowledge is about something, he is implicitly also affirming that knowledge is not about nothing. This entails that knowledge is in fact as much about nothing as it is about something, since its rejection of nothingness would be impossible without an initial, if only provisional, affirmation of it. In other words, a natural third question for Socrates to ask after Glaucon’s second response could’ve been “Something that is something, or something that is nothing?”, and then “Something that is something that is, or something that is something that is not?”, and so on ad infinitum. Glaucon failed to grasp the absurdity of Socrates’ second question, but only because he failed to grasp the absurdity of the first one. In other words, if Glaucon (remember: our token ‘lover of sights and sounds’ in this example) recognized the aforementioned paradox presented by the absolutist and relativist theses that together underlie the question of what knowledge is about, Socrates would have had no more work to do, and no more questions to ask. Does this mean ‘is’ must be of the existential kind? That depends on whether the argument also works if ‘is’ is of the predicative or veridical kinds.

For now, at least, we know it works with the existential ‘is’.

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Jose-Miguel Rosillo-Cevallos Next I ask if it works with the predicative ‘is’. The predicative ‘is’ is the ‘is’ that says ‘there are properties of things’. If the ‘is’ in the phrase ‘something that is’ is the predicative ‘is’, then the phrase is referring to something that is a property of something, as opposed to something that is not a property of something. Once again, the context of the phrase ‘something that is’ is significant: it is a response to the question of whether knowledge is about something or nothing, and it is subsequently justified with a rhetorical question of how knowledge could be about something that is not. What’s important to understand about the predicative ‘is’ is the nature of its claim, which involves understanding the relationship between properties and things. The properties of a thing are what make it identifiable. In other words, they can be said to constitute a thing’s nature; what makes it be itself. To say that something is a property of something, then, is to say that the first something makes the second something be what it is. Likewise, to say that something is not a property of something is to say that the first something does not make the second something be what it is. Hence, the nature of a predicative ‘is’ claim is that it is a claim about something that makes something be itself. When Socrates asks Glaucon whether one who knows knows something that is, he is asking whether knowledge is about what makes something be itself, assuming he means ‘is’ in the predicative sense. But something that makes something be itself is the fact that it is not made up of something that does not make it be itself. For Socrates to present Glaucon with the option of affirming that knowledge is about nothing is tantamount to his presenting him with the option of affirming that knowledge is about something that does not make something be itself. Both questions are absurd, yet thereby insightful. They represent the argument from opposites, and this because they capture the paradox at its heart: that the affirmation of only one of the absolutist and relativist theses (‘one but not many’, or ‘many but not one’) amounts to as much

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Jose-Miguel Rosillo-Cevallos of a contradiction as the affirmation of both (‘one and not many and many and not one’).

Lastly, I must see if the argument from opposites works with the veridical ‘is’. The veridical ‘is’ is the ‘is’ that says ‘there are things that possess the property of truth’. If the ‘is’ in the phrase ‘something that is’ is the veridical ‘is’, then the phrase is referring to something that possesses the property of truth, as opposed to something that does not. The veridical ‘is’ can be understood as a narrower version of the predicative ‘is’. Just like the predicative ‘is’, the veridical ‘is’ makes a claim about what makes something be itself. In particular, however, the veridical ‘is’ makes a claim about whether truth makes something be itself – if truth is a property of something, that something ‘is’ in the veridical sense; if it is not, it ‘is’ not. To say that something veridically ‘is’ is to say that truth is one of its properties. Similarly, to say that something veridically ‘is not’ is to say that truth is not one of its properties. Recall again the context of the phrase ‘something that is’. It is first a response to the question of whether knowledge is about something or nothing, and it is then a reason for the assertion that knowledge cannot be about something that is not.

Consider, however, that if knowledge is about something that possesses the property of truth, then knowledge is also about nothing, since nothing also possesses the property of truth; it is, after all, true that nothing is nothing, and that nothing is not something. In other words, nothing would not be itself if it weren’t for the truth afforded by the fact that it is itself. Furthermore, knowledge must then also be about something that ‘is not’, in the veridical sense – namely, falsehood. Falsehood is defined as that which does not possess the property of truth. Yet it is true that falsehood is falsehood; one of falsehood’s properties is the truth of its own falsehood. There is therefore as much of a contradiction in the claim that knowledge veridically ‘is not’ about nothing as there is in the claim that knowledge veridically ‘is not’ about

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Jose-Miguel Rosillo-Cevallos something that veridically ‘is not’, and this both because and despite of the contradictions of the claims that knowledge veridically ‘is’ about nothing, and that knowledge veridically ‘is’ about something that veridically ‘is not’. Hence, the argument from opposites works just as well if we assume the ‘is’ is of the veridical kind: as with the existential and predicative forms of ‘is’, the underlying paradox of the absolutist and relativist theses is apparent.

Conclusion

What are we left with? It is now clear that the argument from opposites is essentially a stalemate – in attempting to argue for an affirmation of the idea that ‘is’ is a constant, we are forced to affirm the idea that it is a variable, which is equivalent to the idea that it is not a constant. And we cannot claim that its variability is merely provisional, as though we could simply posit the relativist thesis in the argument’s premises only to reject it in the conclusion, since this would amount to rejecting the absolutist thesis in the premises, only to then affirm it in the conclusion. The fact is that ‘is’ is always and everywhere if and only if it is never and nowhere, and all this if and only if it is sometimes and somewhere. The argument from opposites is also the argument back to opposites. We find ourselves trapped in an endless loop of asking “And since they are two, each is one?” and then responding “And since each is one, they are two”. Insofar as the argument from opposites is sound, it is unsound.

On the surface, then, the argument fails, since it does not lead conclusively and invariably from the relativist thesis to the absolutist thesis; it also leads from the absolutist thesis back to the relativist thesis. The ‘lover of sights and sounds’ should therefore remain unconvinced. But should he also now be confused? Not if we reject the distinction between him and the philosopher, which we are now not only permitted, but obligated, to do.

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Jose-Miguel Rosillo-Cevallos Here we find the true value of the argument: in its endorsement of ‘love’ over ‘truth’. The lover of sights and sounds and the lover of wisdom are different in that the former is devoted to the relativist thesis whereas the latter is devoted to the absolutist thesis. But they are the same in that they both love.

If we distinguish sights and sounds from wisdom we are forced into contradiction. If, on the other hand, we eliminate the distinction, we are free from it. I suggest this is why Socrates prescribed consolation and gentility for his persuasive project: morality matters. He just wanted to have a conversation.

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