THE POLICING IN THE US: INTRODUCING THE CRIMINAL AND INTELLIGENCE ANALYST FOR EFFECTIVE POLICING

VARGAS1

THE POLICING IN THE UNITED STATES: INTRODUCING THE CRIMINAL AND INTELLIGENCE ANALYST FOR EFFECTIVE POLICING.

Joel Vargas JULY 25, 2012

VARGAS2

I. INTRODUCTION Many books and journals have been written about reforming the Intelligence Community (IC) but little has been written about the policing practices in the United States (US). Policing models in the United States have been under pressure are by government managers to reduce their policing costs, which absorb a considerable amount of their budgets. In other words, chiefs of police all over the US are forced to adopt practices from the private sector to cut costs. While it sounds like a great idea, policing in the US continues to be managed as it has been with policing models invented decades ago. Even with the invention of recent policing models, the implementation has not shown any real successes.

In many forms the police departments in the US take form similar to the military organizations. Police models represents the culture inside the police department that shapes decision making, structures and hierarchies, paramilitary mindsets, recruiting and hiring similar personnel that look like them, but nothing on effectiveness or efficiencies that would cut crime and costs significantly. In most cases, police departments that serve communities of 100,000 residents or less have not implemented intelligence divisions successfully. A problem found in traditional police models is that promotions of officers into a specialty division are based on time in the police department and not for the skills, education, and value for the division. This creates a real problem as the candidates coming into the more promising models are not the best qualified. Another issue when adopting a more intelligence-led policing model is that wrong association of the word “Intelligence� with espionage. This miss-association of the word causes police departments to avoid the word intelligence as much as possible, without considering its potential when it is properly implemented in a different context.

VARGAS3

The police models come down to the following programs: A. The Traditional Policing Model is observed in the majority of the cases in smaller towns in the US. The model is reactive that is the officers are trained to respond to calls, service the calls, and little smiles or contact with the community is seen from the police officers. This model is very militaristic. Police officers are mostly military or ex-military.

B. The Problem Solving Policing Model is focused on preventing crime and solving problems in the community. This model is better than the Traditional Model. However, the detective division in most police departments is overwhelmed with cases and little attention is given to the different programs that must be running in order to make this model effective.

C. The Community Oriented Policing Model is a model that brings the community involvement so community and police can work together to fight crime. This latest invention appears to be the alternative from the previous two models but has significant limitations and mainly because police chiefs have adopted the philosophy but forgot to train their personnel on ways to actually work the model effectively.

D. The Intelligence-Led Policing Model is a creation of the 911 attacks in New York. This program in many ways combines the Community Oriented Policing Model and Problem Solving Policing Model. However, this model brings intelligence to be the main driver of how police patrol and solve crime. This model has been actively in the field but has been the cause of a lot of criticism.

Policing in the US falls under any of the programs above or a mix of programs. While the programs are accepted by the community in the U.S., England is experiencing a shift from the costly policing programs and moving into a more effective model by outsourcing some of the policing to the private sector. In a recent interview by Chris Cubbage of the Australian and Hong

VARGAS4

Kong Security Magazines, Jay Grant, Secretary General and Chief Executive of InterPort Police Global Force, stated: The world has become smaller and communication channels have changed and made transnational crime which has no borders or jurisdictions. InterPort Police is to be able to bring information, intelligence, identity identification programs, management, counterterrorism, operational programs and exchanges to members all over the world. Mr. Grant says that police departments do not have to reinvent the wheel but actually just learn from what other police departments are doing well and InterPort Police offers the platform to meet these needs (InterPortPolice.Org).

Organizations such as InterPort Police should experience a tremendous opportunity in the global security market place as austerity programs and budget constraints continue to dominate how policing and security are performed in the world. Adding to Mr. Grant’s statement, the private sector strives to bring efficiency and cost effective programs in order to make a profit, a different paradigm not normally found in the public sector. These pressures in the UK are now putting more pressure in the US for police departments to re-invent their policing models and provide a superior service to the community.

This research will analyze a factor added to the Community Oriented Policing program that has been running for the last 3 years in Bensenville, Illinois, a suburb outside Chicago, Illinois (Western side of O’Hare Airport), and creates not a model per say, but creates the factor that makes the difference in any of the police models used in the US. This model introduces the criminal and intelligence analyst for effective policing.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW In order to highlight the Traditional Policing Model, a recent article published by The Raw Story, titled Report: Israeli model underlines militarization of U.S. Police, by Muriel Kane

VARGAS5

explains how the militarization in the U.S. of police forces is something being modeled by other countries in this case Israel. Kane explains that police departments in the U.S. are adopting the Israeli aggressive and ruthless suppression tactics (Kane, 2011). Kane states that New York has not only adopted Israeli programs but now works with Israel closely in other to develop their police departments into a “military-intelligence apparatus” (Kane, 2005). The traditional police model provides a false sense of security but the moment the citizen has the first encounter with the police a perception about police takes a different turn from safety to fear and oppression coupled with a lack of service. This model is costly.

In the paper titled Policing in the United States: Developing a Comprehensive Empirical Model, by L. Edward Wells and David N. Falcone, the authors discuss the community oriented policing model (COP) and provide a complete research on this model in the US and its problems while being implemented (Wells, 2005). Wells and Falcone performed a research and narrowed the premises of this model to three: (1) structural; (2) contextual or “Open Systems”; and (3) universal premise (Wells, 2005). After the extensive research that covered small to large police departments adopting this model, the authors came up to several conclusions. The police departments vary their implementations of alternative police models and they found out that the three premises above can not be used to measure a standard. The authors concluded that using these different premises failed to produce any meaningful results and concluded that it is impossible to find a standard model in police departments (Wells, 2005). This is more evidence that there is no standard in any police model.

In the program designed by the Bureau of Justice Assistance titled Intelligence-Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture, by Marilyn Peterson, the newest policy model was designed with the help of some of the brightest minds in law enforcement-post 911. Peterson

VARGAS6

writes, “effective intelligence operations can be applied equally well to terrorist threats and crimes in community, homeland security and local crime prevention are not mutually exclusive.

Officers ‘on the beat’ are an excellent resource for gathering information of all kinds of threats” (Peterson, 2005). The program consolidates two programs the community oriented policing models and the need to obtain intelligence from the community (Wells, 2005). An issue that came up in the NYPD, when a journalist discovered the NYPD and CIA were running a program that showed significant flaws when the activities moved to the espionage side. The NYPD case will not be studied in this paper but it is recommended for further study.

Privatization of police activities is something being explored in the United Kingdom (UK). This also must be explored in the US as it brings certain benefits. In article by The Economist Online published on July 2, 2012, titled The thinning blue line, the article discusses how controversial the privatization of police to the private sector has become in the UK. The article details how Lincolnshires is hiring G4S to provide civilian police services. In total a 575 of them are being transferred to do this work (The Economist, 2012). The article also discusses how budget cuts is changing how policing is done and that the private sector can use specialty skills they have and bring efficiencies into the police department not found in the public sector (The Economist, 2012). The concept is a new concept. The US is watching closely as they also encounter their own money problems. The author writes “police numbers do, in some circumstances, matter. So more fundamental reforms must be in order” (The Economist, 2012).

The additional factor is in consideration is the sharing of resources from police departments so they don’t all have to have duplication of personnel. This is a great idea s they can all share in the costs. The introduction of the private sector to perform activities normally by personnel inside police departments is the right move.

VARGAS7

III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK While the police models provide a possible ways in which a police department can depart from the Traditional Policing Model, the research here will not focus on inventing a police model. The policing models in general provide different variables from the originally proposed police model design. This poses a significant challenge for any research to provide a workable definition or standard for these models. This research will not discuss extensively the different theories and models but actually will introduce a factor that can be implemented in any environment, in any police structure, in any police model. This research will answer the question: Is the introduction of a criminal and intelligence analyst the missing factor for effective policing?

IV. HYPOTHESIS In this research, I hypnotize that police models can not provide effective policing while they attempt to get away from the Traditional Policing Model, but what is needed is the introduction of the criminal and intelligence analyst for effective policing. Unlike the models, the analyst can be given training and development to support any policing model and can be the primer for crime reduction and effective policing.

V. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS The methodology that will be applied in this research while collecting information sources will be to deduce conclusions or deductive reasoning method. It will also use a mix research method, as the introduction of some real data compiled in Bensenville, IL will be used.

The variables are the following: the policing models currently in the US, the different variations from the proposed policing models, the relationship and adoption of mission statements from other dominant intelligence or law enforcement bodies that conflict with the mission, the

VARGAS8

communities and its demographics that must be addressed, and the lack of intelligence analysis to policing. Lastly, the focus on this research will be to aid communities with less than 100000 in population. The larger cities can adopt the same program to a larger scale. The problems seen today are affecting communities large or small in terms of policing are very much similar.

VI. BACKGROUND OF RESEARCHER/ANALYST In the last quarter of 2009, Joel Vargas, Freelance Security Contractor for Contingent Security Services, Ltd., was working in the Bensenville Police Department observing and creating significant research on police practices, while waiting for an assignment. Chief Frank Kosman invited Joel Vargas to stay and implement and develop Crime Prevention Programs. The opportunity appeared to be very attractive. The opportunity to work in a diverse community such as Bensenville and to develop and implement the programs and concepts would be of great value for the research, the town, and the government.

V. DEMOGRAPHICS OF BENSENVILLE Demographics in Bensenville: 20,703 population; 47.8% Hispanics; 42.8% White (NonHispanic), the rest black and other races (US Census, 2010). While colleagues in the Security and Intelligence industry questioned the sanity of Vargas, Vargas began the program and began to compile considerable amounts of data.

VI. THE PROGRAMS DEPLOYED In January 2010 the programs began to be implemented one by one beginning with the residential program. The programs currently have the following characteristics (other elements can be added or taken away from the comprehensive program): A. Residential and Multi-Family. A Customized Neighborhood Watch Program was created. As of July 25, 2012, the program has 450 residences and 55 groups.

VARGAS9 B. Business and Commercial Interests. A Business Watch Program was created to serve the businesses in town. These businesses employ about 25,000 employees daily (estimated). Currently the program has 210 businesses out of over 2000 businesses (estimated).

C. Multi-Housing. The town has about 35% of the residents into multi-housing properties. Historically these buildings also produce a high percentage of police services calls. A customized program was created called Crime Free Multi-Housing Program, modeled after a traditional program in force in many cities and towns. Only this is customized.

D. Student Watch Program. The town has two school districts. District 2 and district 100. A program was created to interact with teachers, employees, parents, clubs, and students. The DARE program was not one of the programs in force.

The goal was to interact with as many of these groups as possible and create networks of people.

E. Organizations Watch Program. Churches, Civic, Social Organizations, nonprofit organizations, etc., needed a liaison person with Bensenville. This program serves and facilitates anything they need. This program creates soccer leagues, launches educational programs with partnerships, assists organizations in any events, etc.

F. Transportation. Transportation is a key vulnerability in any homeland security program. Bensenville is on the western side of Chicago O’Hare International Airport (ORD). It serves close to 90,000, 000 passengers a year. A customized program was launched with the help of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and its Criminal Intelligence liaison Sergeant. The program coordinates a club of airport and airplane enthusiasts. There are 130 members and they come from 60 different towns. They also receive anti-terrorist training.

VARGAS10

The program also creates a network of Federal, State, Local and Security agencies in the US and other countries with similar interests to learn from each other. Currently DHS, TSA, Chicago PD, US Customs & Border Protection, RCMP, Federal Police of Australia, and several other countries. The programs require a significant amount of time to be spent analyzing intelligence, activity with the entire police department, communities, networking with other law enforcement and security agencies in the network.

VII. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS The analyst may be sworn or civilian. The fact that the police departments in their quest to change the culture and cut costs by reducing crime and providing the highest quality of service to the community may not require a complete change but the addition of the criminal and intelligence analyst. The following is the analysis of the results broken down in several sections: A. THE ANALYST There are a number of factors when deciding the right analyst for the job. In many cases, this discussion will focus on the hiring of a single analyst. The hiring of management will require similar qualities only experience in the management of groups of people. Depending on the size of police department, the analyst may also possess the ability to collect intelligence and create networks that bring intelligence. In Bensenville the analyst takes also the collection of intelligence as part of his job description. In November 2004, The International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, Inc. published a paper titled “Law Enforcement Analytic Standards� (Law Enforcement, 2004). The recommendation of this research suggests their suggestion can be followed. The paper states the following: 1) The analyst should have a four year degree and commensurate experience. Or no less than five years of previous research/analysis/intelligence-oriented experience with a minimum of a two year degree or no less than 10 years of previous research/analysis/intelligence-oriented

VARGAS11 experience with a two year college degree. The experience can be documented and the degrees can be in appropriate areas but the suggested ones are social sciences, English, journalism and criminal justice. Other areas can be business and social sciences degrees (Law Enforcement, 2004).

2) Previous law enforcement experience is not necessary. However, the ability to understand and as stated in number one and the ability to adapt to the criminal intelligence analysis is required.

3) Ability to understand demographics and subject himself to a six month program in which will include ride along with the different divisions of the police department, at least one 8 hour shift.

4) The analyst must be able to analyze police activity, trends, and forecast the needs for directed policing in certain areas. The analyst must be able to obtain a low level security clearance to access the criminal records database in the state. The good moral character and extensive background check must be also passed according to police standards.

5) The analyst must be able to set up networks as described above. The analyst must be able to communicate clearly, have excellent communication and people skills. Having experience publishing papers and journals is highly desirable. Possessing skills to network in the community and other professionals is required. It is recommended to learn about the analyst networks to identity the amount of social media involvement (personal and professional).

6) Public speaking and ability to create presentations are required. However, experience can be acquired. The analyst will present to community and professionals.

7) Lastly, the analyst must be able to either learn from his or her own networks, or become part of an existing network of analysts. Contingent Security Services, Ltd. provides a complete solution which includes: management of analyst(s), coaching, implementation, and development of intelligence networks on a flat fee. Contracts are flexible (contingentsecurity.com). There are programs such as embedding analysts into existing police departments or just contracting and training.

VARGAS12

In terms of education, American Military University provides a great number of programs such as bachelors and master degrees in the intelligence field and homeland security. It is highly recommended the analyst secures a higher level of education, while in the program.

The Society of Certified Criminal Analysts (SCCA) offers a certification but requires a 4 year college degree and a minimum of 10 years of experience (Law Enforcement, 2004). Further research is recommended in the area of how to bring a criminal and intelligence analyst especially if the police department never had one. In the article by Policing & Society titled “The effective analyst: A study of what makes an effective crime and intelligence analyst” Janet M. Evans and Mark R. Kebbell studied what makes an effective analyst. They discovered that the analyst must be recognized as effective. They add “The findings illustrate a change from the analyst being seen as a technical specialist to a growing understanding of the analyst as part of a support structure for decision-makers” (Evans & Kebbell, 2012). They also highlighted the need to implement sound recruiting, training and development as discussed in their findings. The system, training, and development of these individuals are necessary for a successful deployment. This paper does not expand into the areas of training and development. However, it provides the evidence of what an analyst can do given the right system and the right training.

B. THE ENVIRONMENT One of the most important parts in this research has been finding out what the right environment is for the analyst to produce results. In the Bensenville Police, there are several divisions: The Patrol, Records, Evidence, Detective, and Community Oriented Police Division (COP) (www.bensenville.il.us). Larger police departments may have their own criminal and intelligence division and be more complex structures. In Bensenville the analyst was placed inside the COP with direct report to a commander in the COP, direct access to the Commander in

VARGAS13

the Detective Division and the Chief of Police. Intelligence gathered of economic impact would be reported to the Village Manager. The patrol division would only receive certain information as recommendations but no directives from the analyst. Recommendations requiring directives will go to the Chief of Police and follow proper chain of command. Schedule can be flexible to accommodate day and afternoon shifts. The program requires a six months of preliminary information gathering on what is needed in the community followed by a total of 2 ½ years of development and implementation.

C. THE OBJECTIVES The research revealed that police departments’ objectives and goals are not all common.

Management may want effective policing, superior service to the community, at a reasonable cost. The common denominators were “serve and protect” and it appears stakeholders agreed with this premise. Therefore, the program produced the base line of security and crime prevention as the common denominator in the implementation of the community programs. With this in mind, the analyst can move into the criminal activity factor and statistics of what happens in the city or town. A minimum of six months and maximum of 2 years should be analyzed.

Appendix A provides a good idea of what crimes and calls for service to analyze.

For this research, a six months complete analysis of calls for service to the police department were documented and double checked for accuracy. See Appendix A. The program has already been in operation since January 1, 2010 so the numbers would need to be from the previous 6 months without the program. In this case, the analyst is trying to identify the calls that are crime prevention related. The analyst must be able to create the intelligence networks necessary to produce at minimum a 30% of the calls to be directed by the community networks created i.e. crime prevention calls. In this case, see Appendix B, shows Bensenville is

VARGAS14

performing at 54% crime prevention related calls compared to the two categories of crimes (crimes against the person and property crimes).

In the journal titled “Policing, Situational Intelligence & The Information Environment: A Report to Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary” by professor Martin Innes and Dr. Collin Roberts, they make the argument that the current police intelligence practices tend to focus on tow areas: 1) Criminal Intelligence and collecting data on the usual suspects and 2) Criminal Intelligence on currently presenting priorities and problems (Innes and Roberts, 2011).

In the Bensenville research it was found that by creating and nurturing networks in the community to collect intelligence it completely challenged the traditional paradigm and provided access into the unknown sources of intelligence not found by the traditional intelligence sources such as informants involved in crime and/or targets and brought the community to participate as sources for intelligence. The program as implemented in Bensenville did not change the structure of the police department or required a different police model. The research of 12 months and the six months included in this report show that the patrol division is going to calls generated by the community over half the time—producing a shift from reactive to proactive. This paradigm shift should be the primary driver of any deployment to measure reactive or proactive engagement.

D. THE NETWORK INSIDE THE EMPLOYER An additional element that the analyst must be able to exploit is the ability to recruit into the program sources of information and actionable intelligence from within the police department community. This research will just provide a glimpse of a huge possibility. The assumption is that the police structure and organization is going to be left intact. Therefore, the options are to recruit from the existing organization the right people to provide the intelligence necessary. Example, shifts from patrol, other divisions, and civilian employees can become part

VARGAS15

of a network. The information can be classified as actionable intelligence, rumors, and opinions.

The analyst must be able to gather this information and protect the sources as much as possible and reward them when it is appropriate. After implantation of the program, the analyst and the department may formalize the “Intelligence Unit” formed from different divisions and departments. Some additional sources of intelligence are from the civilian employees in other departments inside the employer such as public works and other personnel. The relationships must be nurtured and a connection uninterrupted must be implemented.

E. THE PROFESSIONAL POLICE OFFICER This research would not be complete without the conversation about what a police department looking to enhance its ability to serve and protect should also consider to create a professional police force. The Intelligence Analyst can be the producer of rapid results but without developing a professional police force the results may be temporary. In the March 2011, issue of Harvard Kennedy School titled “Toward a New Professionalism in Policing” Christopher Stone and Jeremy Travis explain in detail what it takes to take a paradigm shift in policing. They say that leaders inside these police departments must be willing to adopt new ideas, policies and practices that look to the future and not stay in the past (Stone and Travis, 2011). This is an ambitious endeavor but one that should be explored. Tradition will not work 5 years from now as criminals interact with their victims with technology but the human contact more than ever continues to be the difference between high cooperation, low cooperation or no cooperation.

VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER STUDY

VARGAS16

Law enforcement is facing challenges like never before. Crime is changing and criminal are becoming more sophisticated. Today, a police department must have a criminal and intelligence analyst in their police department in order to meet the goals of their superiors. The professional analyst surveys, researches crime and also researches economic conditions to support the over all mission of employer/client (in the intelligence community referred as “All Sources Intelligence”). In the article titled “Why does public cooperate with law enforcement?

The influence of the purposes and targets of policing” by Aziz Z. Huq, Tom R. Tayler and Stephen J. Schulhofer, in the publications Psychology, Public Policy, and Law (Aug 2011), the authors address the issue of public perception and contexts in which different populations cooperate with law enforcement. They discovered that groups of people in communities cooperate in different forms depending if they are the target of police or not. This means the targeted person or community may cooperate but the police must be able to create the link so these groups can cooperate best (Hug and et al, 2011). In Bensenville, the Hispanic community did not trust the police, when the programs were launched. The initial phase of the program required some police operation in order to gain trust. Today Bensenville enjoys a significant level of cooperation from the Hispanic community in police cooperation.

An issue that is also requires further study is the anti-social behavior police officers may have in existence inside the police department structure. The research discovered that the patrol division showed the most anti-social behavior (ASB) and had considerable challenges adapting to change. In paper published in 2010 titled “Re-thinking the policing of anti-social behavior” by the Cardiff University, the researchers discovered evidence that anti-social behavior with police forces impact negative on victims and the public. Additionally, that most police forces do not practice relationship building in the community and only want the public to bring information

VARGAS17

but refuse to create bond with the community, thus limiting what could be obtained from the crowds (Innes & Weston, 2010). This ASB attitudes and behavior can also translate in discrimination against groups of people, co-workers, and the public they are there to serve. The criminal and intelligence analyst in Bensenville challenged the traditional police model and brought a significant shift in police operations, crime reduction, cooperation, and collaboration from the community. As a final thought, the analyst can produce results of high impact that reflect in a high level of what means to serve and protect, while creating the possibility for effective policing and a more radical transformation to policing in the United States.

VARGAS18

APPENDIX A CRIME PREVENTION UNIT 6 MONTH REVIEW (11/21/20/11 TO 5/21/12).

INFORMATION UPLOADED TO RAIDS ONLINE (CRIME MAPPING PROGRAM IN THE VILLAGE’S WEBSITE).

Incident Type

Totals

ACCIDENT HIT AND RUN Count

1

ACCIDENT INVOLVING I Count

39

ACCIDENT INVOLVING O Count

1

ACCIDENT INVOLVING P Count

67

ACCIDENT –NON-TRAFFI Count

1

ACCIDENT PRIVATE PRO Count

2

ACCIDENT PROPERTY DA Count

13

AGGRAVATED BATTERY-S Count

1

AGGRAVATED CRIMINAL Count

1

AGGRAVATED ROBBERY Count

1

AGGREVATED CRIMINAL Count

1

ARMED ROBBERY Count

3

ASSAULT Count

4

AUTO ACCIDENT PDO Count

341

BATTERY Count

38

BURGLARY Count

15

BURGLARY BUSINESS Count BURGLARY FROM MOTOR Count CREDIT CARD FRAUD Count

1 35 7

CRIMINAL DAMAGE TO M Count

20

CRIMINAL DAMAGE TO P Count

67

CRIMINAL DAMAGE TO V Count

28

CRIMINAL DEFACEMENT Count

31

CRIMINAL SEXUAL ABUS Count

5

CRIMINAL TRESPASS TO Count

5

DECEPTIVE PRACTICES Count

17

DISORDERLY CONDUCT Count

76

DISTURBANCE Count

19

DOMESTIC Count

17

DOMESTIC BATTERY Count

22

DOMESTIC TROUBLE Count

22

DRIVING UNDER THE IN Count

63

DRUNKENNESS Count

74

EMBEZZLEMENT Count

1

FIGHTS, RIOTS, BRAWL Count FORGERY Count

17 2

VARGAS19 FRAUD Count

18

HARASSMENT BY PHONE Count

37

HIT AND RUN Count

95

IDENTITY THEFT Count

21

INSURANCE FRAUD Count

1

LOUD NOISE COMPLAINT Count

213

MISCHIEVOUS CONDUCT Count

8

MISSING PERSON – UND Count

1

MOTOR VEHCILE THEFT Count

17

NEIGHBORHOOD DISTURB Count

21

NEIGHBORHOOD TROUBLE Count

25

NOISE COMPLAINT Count ORDINANCE ARREST Count OTHER TROUBLE Count

1 6 165

POSSESSION OF A CONT Count

1

POSSESSION OF CANNAB Count

3

PUBLIC INDECENCY Count

1

PURSE-SNATCHING Count

1

RECKLESS DRIVING Count

8

RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY Count RETAIL THEFT Count RETAIL THEFT-SHOPLIF Count

30 2 33

ROBBERY Count

3

SEXUAL EXPLOITATION Count

1

SIMPLE ASSAULT Count

1

SIMPLE BATTERY Count

1

SUSPICIOUS AUTO Count SUSPICIOUS INCIDENT Count SUSPICIOUS INCIDENT/ Count SUSPICIOUS NOISE Count SUSPICIOUS PERSON Count TEEN,DRUNK,FIGHTS,RI Count TELEPHONE THREAT Count THEFT FROM COIN OPERATED MACHINE Count THEFT FROM MOTOR VEH Count THEFT OF LABOR OR SE Count

167 83 5 67 153 4 13 1 17 3

THEFT OVER Count

49

THEFT UNDER Count

90

THEFT-FRAUD Count

2

THEFT-UNDER Count

6

VIOLATION OF ORDER O Count

1

VARGAS20

Grand Count

2455

VISUAL CHART DRUNKENNESS Count DRIVING UNDER THE IN Count DOMESTIC TROUBLE Count DOMESTIC BATTERY Count DOMESTIC Count DISTURBANCE Count DISORDERLY CONDUCT Count DECEPTIVE PRACTICES Count CRIMINAL TRESPASS TO Count CRIMINAL SEXUAL ABUS Count CRIMINAL DEFACEMENT Count CRIMINAL DAMAGE TO V Count CRIMINAL DAMAGE TO P Count CRIMINAL DAMAGE TO M Count CREDIT CARD FRAUD Count BURGLARY FROM MOTOR Count BURGLARY BUSINESS Count BURGLARY Count BATTERY Count AUTO ACCIDENT PDO Count ASSAULT Count ARMED ROBBERY Count AGGREVATED CRIMINAL Count AGGRAVATED ROBBERY Count AGGRAVATED CRIMINAL Count AGGRAVATED BATTERY-S Count ACCIDENT PROPERTY DA Count ACCIDENT PRIVATE PRO Count ACCIDENT -NON-TRAFFI Count ACCIDENT INVOLVING P Count ACCIDENT INVOLVING O Count ACCIDENT INVOLVING I Count ACCIDENT HIT AND RUN Count

74 63 22 22 17 19 76 17 5 5 31 28 67 20 7 35 1 15 38 341

4 3 1 1 1 1 13 2 1 67 1 39 1 0

50

100 150 200 250 300 350 400

VARGAS21

APPENDIX B Crime Prevention Calls During the six month period by the community.

Incident Type

Totals

DISTURBANCE Count

19

DRIVING UNDER THE IN Count

63

LOUD NOISE COMPLAINT Count

213

NEIGHBORHOOD DISTURB Count

21

NEIGHBORHOOD TROUBLE Count

25

NOISE COMPLAINT Count OTHER TROUBLE Count

1 165

RECKLESS DRIVING Count

8

SUSPICIOUS AUTO Count

167

SUSPICIOUS INCIDENT Count

83

SUSPICIOUS INCIDENT/ Count

5

SUSPICIOUS NOISE Count

67

SUSPICIOUS PERSON Count

153

CRIME PREVENTION CALLS

990

COMPARING CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY & THE PERSON VS CRIME PREVENTION CALLS 11/21/11 TO 5/22/12 PROPERTY CRIMES CRIMES AGAINST PERSON CRIME PREVENTION CALLS

608 240 990

CRIME PREVENTION CALLS VS CRIMES 11/21/11 to 5/21/12 PROPERTY CRIMES 33% CRIME PREVENTIO N CALLS 54%

CRIMES AGAINST PERSON 13%

VARGAS22 This chart shows that 54% of the activity is for prevention against the two types of crimes.

CRIME PREVENTION CALLS VS CRIMES 11/21/11 to 5/21/12 CRIME PREVENTIO N CALLS, 990

PROPERTY CRIMES, 608

CRIMES AGAINST PERSON, 240

This chart shows the number of calls for service compared in numbers.

VARGAS23

REFERENCES Cubbage, Chris. Interview with Jay Grant. InterPort Police Global Force. www.interportpolice.org. Accessed on July 28, 2012.

Contingent Security Services, Ltd. www.contingentsecurity.com. Accessed on July 26, 2012.

Evans, Janet M. and Kebbell, Mark R. The effective analyst: A study of what makes an effective crime and intelligence analyst. Policing & Society 22.2 (Jun 2012): 204-219. Proquest Document. Accessed on July 7, 2012.

Hug, Aziz Z; Tyler, Tom R.; Schulhofer, Stephen J. Why does the public cooperate with law enforcement? The influence of the purposes and targets of policing. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 17.3 (Aug 2011): 419-450.

Innes, Martin and Weston, Nicola. Re-thinking the policing of anti-social behavior. Cardiff University. Universities Police Science Institute. HMIC, 2010. www.hmic.gov.uk.

Accessed July 7, 2012.

Innes, Martin and Roberts, Colin. Policing, situational intelligence & the information environment: a report to her majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary. Cardiff University, October 2011. Universities’ Police Science Institute. Accessed on July 7, 2012.

Kane, Muriel. Report: Israel model underlines militarization of U.S. police. The Raw Story.

Sunday, December 4, 2011, 20:52 EDT. www.rawstory.com/rs/2011/report-israelimodel-underlines-militarization-of-U.S.-Police. Accessed July 6, 2012.

Law Enforcement Analytic Standards. International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, Inc. Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative. November 2004.

Accessed on July 20, 2012.

Peterson, Marilyn. Intelligence-Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture. U.S. Department of Justice Programs Bureau of Justice Assistance. September, 2005. NCJ 210681. Accessed on July 7, 2012.

Stone, Christopher, and Jeremy Travis. Toward a New Professionalism in Policing. Harvard Kennedy School. Program in Criminal Policy and Management. National Institute of Justice (NIJ), March 2011. Accessed July 15, 2012.

The Economist Online. The thinning blue line. July 2, 2012. The Economist Newspaper, NA, Inc. London, 2012. Obtained in a search in ProQuest LLC, 2012. ProQuest document number: 1023122695. http://seach.proquest.com/docview/1023122695. Accessed on July 7, 2012.

US Census. http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/17/1705248.html. Accessed on July 28, 2012.

Wells, L. Edward and David N. Falcone. Policing in the United States: Developing a Comprehensive Empirical Model. U.S. Department of Justice Fund. August 2005.

Document number 210830. Accessed July 7, 2012.