The West Gate Bridge Failure: A Historical Lesson for Safer Construction Projects.

The West Gate Bridge Failure: A Historical Lesson for Safer Construction Projects

FIGURE 1: THE WEST GATE BRIDGE1

Abstract On October 15, 1970, the span 10-11 of the West Gate Bridge collapsed, killing 35 workers and becoming one of the major industrial accidents in Australia. The following paper investigates the safety measures used on the West Gate Bridge project by analysing the causes of the failure and aiming to draw a conclusion relevant to improving safety in construction. The investigation takes a holistic approach to the causes of the failure and assesses risk factors spanning beyond the direct technical cause of the failure. A theoretical framework from the area of safety in construction is utilized to establish a perspective on the causes of the failure. The perspective taken by this paper is that the collapse was a result of factors developed in the pre-construction stage that affected safety during the construction stage. Therefore, there was a gradual increase of risk as the project progressed. The effects of the initial mistakes resulted in poor stakeholder relations and a lack of safety in design as well as the use of unsafe construction means and methods. The final result was an unsafe site environment that caused a technical failure and led to incorrect managerial decisions.

To reach the aim of this research, it is necessary to understand the context of the overall project, the actual collapse, and the cost. Next, a theoretical approach is established, and the causes of failure are analysed to draw a conclusion.

Keywords The West Gate Bridge, Construction failure, Safety, Construction management, Safety in design.

Author Details Jakub Lewinski Student ID: 1059836 jlewinski@student.unimelb.edu.au 1

The West Gate Bridge, 2019, Digital photography, 1920x955, 2019, https://www.arcadis.com/en/global/what-we-do/our-projects/australia/west-gate-bridge-rehabilitationand-strengthening/.

Introduction On October 15, 1970, span 10-11 of the under-construction West Gate Bridge collapsed, resulting in the death of 35 workers.2 Two thousand tons of steel, with workers present on the span as well as underneath, fell from 45 meters.3 One of the biggest construction projects at that time in Australia4 turned into one of the most tragic construction incidents. The collapse is a historical event that shaped the Australian industry5 and is a valuable source of analysis for the purposes of understanding safety in construction and avoiding future incidents.

Therefore, this work analyses safety in construction based on a large-scale civil project like West Gate Bridge and aims to draw a relevant conclusion from the contemporary failure to understand how present and future construction projects can be made safer. To achieve this aim, it is necessary to answer a question—how could a technical direct failure have been avoided and prevented the dramatic aftermath? To answer this question, it is necessary to identify the indirect causes of the technical failure and define the casual relationships between the different risk factors that contributed to the direct cause.

To identify the relevant risk factors, it is necessary to establish the context of the investigated case by providing background information including the concept behind the project and its organizational approach. Also, a brief description of the collapse and its direct cause must be provided, followed by an assessment of the costs. Context helps us to understand the cost of an unsafe approach and provides information necessary to understand the casual relationships that led to the tragedy. A contextual explanation is followed by a theoretical view on safety in construction and an analysis of the specific factors that led to the West Gate failure. The tragic event was a result of multiple factors that gradually increased the risk on the project.

The initial mistakes were made at the pre-construction stages, which prove that the highest impact on risk is early in the project and that it depends on stakeholder relations, the role of the client, organizational culture, and safety in design, as well in erection methods.

There are several types of sources used in this research. Primary sources are photographs, sketches, reports, and engineering analyses from the time of the collapse and following investigations and studies. Present sources are academic papers analysing relevant bridge designs and safety as well as general safety theories related to construction. Other types of present sources are recent workers’ memoirs and interviews as well as popular articles. It is crucial to acknowledge that as current academic sources attempt to provide objective data, other sources like governmental reports or workers’ testimonies might be biased and represent union or governmental perspectives, among others.

Ross Warneke, “Flashback 1978: The West Gate Bridge Opens,” Online, November 15, 2018, Flashback edition, https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/flashback-1978-the-west-gate-bridgeopens-20181114-p50fzg.html.

3 Enza Gandolfo, “West Gate: Story of a Bridge,” Meanjin 78, no. 1 (September 15, 2019): 183–89, https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=sso&db=edsilc&AN=edsilc.25350727 8784397&site=eds-live&scope=site&custid=s2775460.

4 Rod Rees, West Gate Bridge Collapse: 40 Years On., Memoir (YouTube, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=li8SLxytnzA. 5 Pat Preston, Interview with the West Gate Bridge collapse survival Pat Preston. Focus: safety on site., Audio Recording, November 13, 2020.

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Overall context The West Gate Bridge Project The concept behind the West Gate Bridge was to connect the western industrial and residential suburbs with Port Melbourne 6 to ease traffic congestion on the existing road connections, reduce travel time, decrease disturbance on local streets, and improve the overall transportation network in Melbourne by connecting the city centre with the expanding western suburbs. 7 The image below represents the link that the bridge created.

FIGURE 2: WEST GATE BRIDGE SITE PLAN8

Linking western these industrial areas and reducing travel time would have a positive impact on the local economy while also improving the living conditions of people suffering from congested local streets. Overall, the bridge seemed like a necessity for the rapidly developing city. Critics of the project claimed that the bridge mainly represented the interests of the western suburbs’ industries rather than the broader public9. Nevertheless, the bridge became an icon of the city and a major part of the city’s transportation network.

The structure The structure is an up to 59.8m -and 2590 m-long box girder bridge consisting of five main spans supported by concrete piers and steel cables suspended off of steel towers. Each span utilizes trapezoidal steel box girders10 divided into half boxes connected during the erection.11 H.G. Wolfram and A.R. Toakley, “DESIGN MODIFICATIONS TO WEST GATE BRIDGE, MELBOURNE.,” Inst Eng Aust Civ Eng Trans CE 16, no. 2 (1974): 143–50, https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.00016335342&partnerID=40&md5=c420babb6230138b8b87646c767f784b.

7 Geoffrey Thompson, West Gate Bridge. Part One., Video Archive, vol. 1, 2 vols., West Gate Bridge.

(Australia: Cine Service Films, 1974), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XYjoTGrkmoA. 8 Wolfram and Toakley, “DESIGN MODIFICATIONS TO WEST GATE BRIDGE, MELBOURNE.” 9 Warneke, “Flashback 1978: The West Gate Bridge Opens.”

10 Wolfram and Toakley, “DESIGN MODIFICATIONS TO WEST GATE BRIDGE, MELBOURNE.” 6

Overall, the structure takes advantage of steel’s resistance to bending, providing long spans while concrete piers utilize the compressive strength of reinforced concrete to support steel spans. The sketches below show the overall design of the bridge.

FIGURE 3: ELEVATION, PLAN AND SECTION VIEWS OF THE BRIDGE12

FIGURE 4: BOX GIRDER ASSEMBLY DIAGRAM13

11

Sketch of the Collapse from the Inquest Files, 1970., 1970, Sketch, 1970, VPRS 24/P3 Inquest Deposition Files, unit 120, Public Record Office Victoria, https://prov.vic.gov.au/explorecollection/online-galleries-and-exhibitions/west-gate-bridge-collapse.

12 W.A. Fairhurst, “BOX GIRDER BRIDGES.,” New Zealand Engineering 29, no. 11 (1974): 303–7, https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.00016128799&partnerID=40&md5=9c12c416b71b6bd55946dc2c569489ed.

13 E. Ancich and G. Chirgwin, “Technical Risks to Major Infrastructure Development,” in IABSE Conf., Kuala Lumpur: Eng. Dev. World - Rep. (International Association for Bridge and Structural Engineering (IABSE), 2018), 54–67, https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.085050024082&partnerID=40&md5=ca64560c1f58b246dc80036823c335dd.

The failure.

On October 15, 1970 at 11.50 am, span 10-11 collapsed during its erection, killing 35 workers, and injuring many others. Men were trapped on the top of the deck, inside the boxes, and in the sheds underneath the bridge.14 According to eyewitnesses, a terrible noise occurred, bolts turned blue from the heat of the failing structure and started firing like gun bullets, and a fire started, fuelled by diesel stored on the deck, which contributed to more deaths and difficulties with the rescue15. Emergency action was also complicated by the fact that rescue services were not trained in this kind of disasters, which meant that workers had to rescue their own work colleagues by cutting steel with oxy and moving sections with cranes. 16 Lack of warning and preparation for rescue also contributed to the cost of the collapse. In summary, neither the site layout, nor workers, nor emergency services were prepared for such an event.

FIGURE 5: AERIAL VIEW OF THE COLLAPSED SPAN, 1970.17

Gandolfo, “West Gate: Story of a Bridge.�

Rees, West Gate Bridge Collapse: 40 Years On. 16 Tommy Watson and Danny Gardiner, The West Gate Bridge Collapse: 50 Years On, Zoom meeting, October 6, 2020, https://www.historyvictoria.org.au/event/the-west-gate-bridge-collapse-50years-on/.

17 West-Gate-Bridge-Accident-1970, 1970, Digital photography, 1970, https://devastatingdisasters.com/west-gate-bridge-accident-1970/.

14 15

FIGURE 6: SHORTLY AFTER THE WESTGATE BRIDGE COLLAPSE, FIRE STILL BURNING, 1970.18

FIGURE 7: COLLAPSED SPAN, GROUND VIEW. WORKERS CLEANING THE SITE AND INVESTIGATION IN PROGRESS, 1970.19

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Shortly After the Westgate Bridge Collapse, Fire Still Burning., October 15, 1970, Digital photography, October 15, 1970, VPRS 24/P3 Inquest Deposition Files, unit 120, Public Record Office Victoria, https://prov.vic.gov.au/explore-collection/online-galleries-and-exhibitions/west-gate-bridgecollapse.

19 Ian Ryan, Collapsed Span. Ground View., 1970, Digital photography, 1970, Photo Gallery, The West Gate Bridge Memorial, https://www.westgatebridge.org/node/138.

The failed erection The whole span was erected by lifting and joining two separate halves of box girders. Due to this method, there was a bowing in one half and a camber difference between the two halves.20 The problem started with an attempt to eliminate the camber difference between two half-girders by adding more load in the form of two eight-tonne concrete blocks.21 Adding additional weight to an unfinished structure was the first critical step. Additional weight caused buckling in the upper flange of splice 22 on the joint between two half girders.

Buckling was already a sign of failure,23 but the attempt to fix the problem continued by removing certain bolts. An engineer’s testimony below provides the details of the moments preceding the failure. Removing and then adding bolts continued until the steel structure could not resist the bending forces and failed.

FIGURE 8 TESTIMONY OF A SITE ENGINEER24

“Report of Royal Commission into the Failure of West Gate Bridge.,” Governmental, Royal Commission (Victoria, Australia: West Gate Bridge Royal Commission, 1971), https://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/papers/govpub/VPARL1971-72No2.pdf.

21 “The Error.,” Memorial, The Tragedy. (blog), 2020, https://www.westgatebridge.org/node/110.

22 Wolfram and Toakley, “DESIGN MODIFICATIONS TO WEST GATE BRIDGE, MELBOURNE.” 23 “Report of Royal Commission into the Failure of West Gate Bridge.”

24 “Report On West Gate Bridge Collapse. Report Of Events Leading Up To Collapse of West Side Steel Structure.,” Technical Report (Melbourne, Australia: Technical Committee set up by the city 20

The aftermath The cost of the failure was much greater than 35 workers dead and many injured. The tragic event left families broken and traumatized. Those who survived struggled to cope with the tragedy. Workers were fired a few days after the rescue finished and left traumatized with neither work nor counselling. The families of those who died also suffered financial hardship in addition to the trauma.25 Many fell into drinking and could not cope with the trauma.26 Most of the workers and families never recovered and still carry the trauma.27 The cost of death and trauma can’t be quantified, but no project is worth the life of its workers.

Moreover, the cost of lost time, materials, redesigning, and rebuilding was great. The new and stronger design imposed a great extra cost, with the taxpayers’ liability rising by 113 million dollars due to the failure. , The aftermath of the collapse helps us to see the true cost of the incident and to understand how important it is to prioritize safety in construction projects.

Overarching causes of the failure The following sections investigate multiple factors that contributed to the tragic failure. All of the factors are considered from the theoretical point of view of safety in construction. Thus, the first section will provide the theoretical approach, while further sections will investigate the causes of the failure leading to a conclusion.

Theoretical approach One of the major theoretical approaches to safety in construction follows the concept of dominos, where one negative event causes other negative events that eventually lead to an incident.28 This approach does not fully consider all possible factors that contribute to safety, and this casual process is not always linear, but there is usually a set of initial factors that affect further construction processes leading to an incident.

Next, another theory considers dynamic relationships between different stakeholders and how human behaviours are influenced by those relationships. One example is that of a company culture that rewards fast progress where managers or workers can prioritize time and profits over the safety.29 Another example is that of bad relationships between different parties that contribute to a lack of control over the project. This theory is another lens used to see the investigated case.

In the case of the West Gate Bridge failure, there were multiple initial events at the preconstruction stage leading to bad stakeholders’ relationships, inappropriate construction methods, and poor site management. Initial mistakes led to delays, pressures, and conflicts between parties which all influenced the construction site and created an unsafe environment in which the incident could not had been avoided.

Coroner, October 1970), Public Record Office Victoria, https://prov.vic.gov.au/explorecollection/online-galleries-and-exhibitions/west-gate-bridge-collapse.

25 Rees, West Gate Bridge Collapse: 40 Years On. 26 Watson and Gardiner, The West Gate Bridge Collapse: 50 Years On. 27 Gandolfo, “West Gate: Story of a Bridge.”

28 Rita Yi Man Li and S. W. Poon, Construction Safety. [Electronic Resource], Risk Engineering (Springer, 2013), https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=sso&db=cat00006a&AN=melb.b5052 091&site=eds-live&scope=site&custid=s2775460.

29 Li and Poon.

Pre-construction stage Procurement Labour governmental opposition accused the governing Liberal Party of not approaching and financing the bridge project adequately, as a private company was meant to build it with borrowed money, with a governmental promise to repay the cost via tolls when the company completed construction. 30 Obviously, political rivals usually criticise each other, which means that the Labour perspective might not be correct but that, nonetheless, it is important to note that the procurement method established an environment wherein large a scale project with an unprecedented design was being constructed under time and financial pressure imposed on a private firm seeking profit. Conceptual risks, including cost competitiveness, are major risks in large civil projects and must be adequately assessed.31 At that point, the project could had still been successfully implemented, but the procurement method can’t be ignored in the whole chain of events.

Client and the design team The next potential risk to be considered in major infrastructure projects is the role of the client and the formation of the design team. 32 According to the governmental report, the Lower Yarra Crossing Authority, which was the governmental body responsible for the project, was not involved enough and did not supervise the builder closely enough,33 failing to establish adequate benchmarks. Comparison to other major failed infrastructure projects proves that at this scale, the client must be proactive and involved in order to ensure that objectives are met.34 The West Gate Bridge project lacked this control, which contributed to a higher risk.

The Freeman Fox & Partners design team hired by the authority was assessed as not competent enough. There was a lack of leadership in control of the design process, and multiple on-site engineers were not experienced enough to handle a complex project like this. 35 Also, the design team that continued the project after the collapse was more experienced and diverse,36 which proves that the project required a more competent team.

Therefore, the incompetence of the designers affected the project both at the design stage and later during the construction. Both the client and the chosen design team did not provide proper safety in design and management for a project of this scale and complexity.

Design.

A safe approach starts with an appropriate design that eliminates possible hazards before construction begins.37 The West Gate Bridge is an example of safety in design not being assessed and the design itself becoming a major risk. The history of box girder bridges proves Warneke, “Flashback 1978: The West Gate Bridge Opens.”

Ancich and Chirgwin, “Technical Risks to Major Infrastructure Development.”

32 Ancich and Chirgwin.

33 “Report of Royal Commission into the Failure of West Gate Bridge.”

34 Ancich and Chirgwin, “Technical Risks to Major Infrastructure Development.”

35 “Report of Royal Commission into the Failure of West Gate Bridge.”

36 Wolfram and Toakley, “DESIGN MODIFICATIONS TO WEST GATE BRIDGE, MELBOURNE.” 37 Allan St. John Holt, Principles of Construction Safety. [Electronic Resource] (Blackwell Science, 2001), https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=sso&db=cat00006a&AN=melb.b5522 046&site=eds-live&scope=site&custid=s2775460.

30 31

the design to be very problematic. Renowned bridge engineer W.A. Fairhurst’s analysis of 7 major box girder bridges, including the West Gate Bridge, proved that five imposed major risks (including three failures), mainly due to higher stresses than were originally calculated. 38 Another problem was the scale of the West Gate Bridge design. Box girder design is more suitable for spans up to 76 meters, while each West Gate Bridge span exceeds that length, including a 112-meter-long collapsed span that imposed problems in estimating stresses and providing efficient erection.39 Finally, the mathematical theory behind the design has been deemed questionable and is not considered entirely suitable for box girder designs,40 requiring double-checking by a competent engineer.41 Also, the process redesigning the West Gate Bridge to add extra support and stiffness 42 proved that the design required a better estimation than the original approach. In summary, the design itself proved to be one of the major risks that initiated the chain of events leading to the collapse.

Initial risk factors An analysis of the design stage proves that the procurement method, the client’s role, and the design team’s formation led to an incompetent design team that was faced with an already problematic design concept. Following, the risk factors generated during the initial stages affected the process of construction.

Construction stage Stakeholders relationships Because team formation and client involvement affect the risk on big infrastructure projects,43 relationships between all parties during the construction phase become another risk factor.

The relationship between parties on the West Gate was very poor and contributed to the lack of control over the project, thus increasing the risk. There was a lack of collaboration between the parties, poor communication, and poor coordination. Exchange of information was done in an untimely manner, and there were cases in which different parties withheld information. 44 The poor role of the client also contributed to a lack of collaboration and proactive culture. The authority did not solve problems and did not establish a spirit of teamwork from the start.45 An example of poor project management was the change of the steel contractor during the construction stage. Due to a lacking behind the program and poor competence, the original steel contractor was dismissed, and a new contractor took over the erection without prior experience in this kind of project while already being pressured to catch up with the program.

Other problems were industrial disputes and union actions, especially after the new steel contractor became involved. Unions acted due to safety issues and conflicts over demarcations.46 Union actions affected the pace of building, which put more pressure on the Fairhurst, “BOX GIRDER BRIDGES.” Fairhurst.

40 Wolfram and Toakley, “DESIGN MODIFICATIONS TO WEST GATE BRIDGE, MELBOURNE.” 41 Fairhurst, “BOX GIRDER BRIDGES.” 42 Wolfram and Toakley, “DESIGN MODIFICATIONS TO WEST GATE BRIDGE, MELBOURNE.” 43 Wolfram and Toakley.

44 “Report of Royal Commission into the Failure of West Gate Bridge.”

45 Wolfram and Toakley, “DESIGN MODIFICATIONS TO WEST GATE BRIDGE, MELBOURNE.” 46 Preston, Interview with the West Gate Bridge collapse survival Pat Preston. Focus: safety on site.

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contractors, but workers cannot be blamed for decisions over which they had no influence.

Moreover, the authority did not manage to resolve those disputes in a constructive manner.

As the project team, including the client, did not established proactiveness and collaboration during the pre-construction stage, those mistakes translated into pressures, conflicts, and poor communication during the erection. That situation negatively affected stakeholders’ relationships and became another domino in the chain of failure.

Erection method The essential element of safety related to the span failure was the erection method established by the designers. To decrease the risk of a project, safety should be a principal element in the design of erection methods.47. As mentioned before, box girder designs with spans over 76 meters impose special challenges in terms of efficient erection. Failure during the erection of the span 10-11 proved that safety was not built into the design and erection plans.

Comparison of the failed erection method and new methods after redesigning the bridge present the issue of safety in the means and methods.

FIGURE 9: FAILED ERECTION METHOD, 1970.48

47 48

Holt, Principles of Construction Safety. [Electronic Resource].

Sketch of the Collapse from the Inquest Files, 1970.

FIGURE 10: NEW ERECTION METHOD49

Extra temporary supports for the new method present more safety-conscious means and methods. Another important fact was that for the first method, all sections were adjusted under full stress, while the second method allowed for adjustments in unstressed conditions.50 The unsafe erection method was not the only symptom of the incorrect site management, as there were other issues.

Site Management Overall poor site management was another risk factor. In general, site management on the west side, where the collapse occurred, was lacking control and resources. On-site engineers did not have detailed work layouts and lacked foremen to control the workforce.51 Also, safety was one of tasks that on-site engineers performed,52 which meant that there were no safety designated personnel, which resulted a diminished emphasis on safety. One example of not prioritizing safety was the placing of workers’ amenities under the collapsed span.53 Furthermore, pressure imposed on on-site managers influenced their judgment and priorities. There were no safety committees or safety officers, and workers were not safetyconscious, lacking knowledge, training, and resources like appropriate PPE.54 An additional problem was that any safety issues raised by workers could only resolved through labour

Wolfram and Toakley, “DESIGN MODIFICATIONS TO WEST GATE BRIDGE, MELBOURNE.” Wolfram and Toakley.

51 “Report of Royal Commission into the Failure of West Gate Bridge.”

52 “Report of Royal Commission into the Failure of West Gate Bridge.”

53 Wolfram and Toakley, “DESIGN MODIFICATIONS TO WEST GATE BRIDGE, MELBOURNE.” 54 Preston, Interview with the West Gate Bridge collapse survival Pat Preston. Focus: safety on site.

49 50

action and work stoppage,55 which would affect the program and put more pressure on the managers.

In conclusion, inadequate erection methods, poor site management, and lack of safety prioritization became the next elements in the line of dominos. They were the result of incompetent project management and lack safety prioritization during earlier stages of the project. Also, conflicts and pressures on the project created an on-site atmosphere that influenced human decisions.

The last of the dominos All previously explained factors gradually added more risk and created unsafe site conditions that determined on-site decisions. The last decisions made before the collapse were the result of previous risk factors. The first wrong decision was made by adding an extra load and removing bolts to fix the camber difference. As buckling occurred, further work continued, and more bolts were removed, which did not help, and work continued by putting bolts back.

Even though the failure was apparent, decisions, some of them without backing calculations, 56 were made to keep workers on site. Lack of safety prioritization, overconfidence, lack of competence and an excess of pressure were obvious factors preventing managers from stopping the work. Those decisions, combined with technical issues of the design and erection, resulted in the failure. As the direct cause was a technical failure of the structure, the contributing risk factors spanned across multiple construction management and design aspects and were initiated at the initial stages of the project, gradually leading to the tragic outcome.

Conclusion The West Gate Bridge was a large public infrastructure project aiming to provide a major transportation link for Melbourne. Such projects use taxpayers’ money and are products of society, which means they bear a special collective responsibility to perform as well as possible. Safety on such projects must be the priority, as the cost of failure is great, as proven by the aftermath of the West Gate Bridge collapse. To provide the required safety, an approach necessarily must start at the initial stages of the project to avoid incidents bearing a high cost.

In the case of the West Gate Bridge, the procurement method was assumed to realize a large public project at a competitive price. That approach was followed by forming an incompetent design team faced with a challenging type of bridge design. This resulted in unsafe design and erection methods. An incorrect client role and a lack of collaboration led to conflicts, poor communication, and pressures combined with incompetent site management. The result of all the affecting factors was a site environment where the accident was not prevented and management’s decisions led to failure, resulting in deaths, a traumatized community, and great financial cost.

The analysis shows that steps taken at initial stages are crucial to determining safety during construction. On public projects at this scale, the financial aspects cannot be the main priority, and the role of the authority as a client must be proactive and generate collaboration and problem solving. Also, benchmarks must be established to check the competency of the 55 56

Preston.

“Report of Royal Commission into the Failure of West Gate Bridge.”

design team and contractors. Those initial steps should generate adequate safety in design and management that must be further checked to provide a safe site environment where decisions are made based on safety as a priority.

Acknowledgments I am very thankful to West Gate Bridge crane operator and union member Pat Preston, whom I met, and thanks for the help of the West Gate Bridge Memorial Committee for sharing his memories, opinions, and perspectives on the West Gate Bridge Project and the tragic failure via a phone interview that took place on 13 November 2020.

Bibliography Academic sources Ancich, E., and G. Chirgwin. “Technical Risks to Major Infrastructure Development.” In IABSE Conf., Kuala Lumpur: Eng. Dev. World - Rep., 54–67. International Association for Bridge and Structural Engineering (IABSE), 2018. https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.085050024082&partnerID=40&md5=ca64560c1f58b246dc80036823c335dd.

Fairhurst, W.A. “BOX GIRDER BRIDGES.” New Zealand Engineering 29, no. 11 (1974): 303–7. https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.00016128799&partnerID=40&md5=9c12c416b71b6bd55946dc2c569489ed.

Gandolfo, Enza. “West Gate: Story of a Bridge.” Meanjin 78, no. 1 (September 15, 2019): 183–89. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=sso&db=edsilc&AN =edsilc.253507278784397&site=eds-live&scope=site&custid=s2775460.

Holt, Allan St. John. Principles of Construction Safety. [Electronic Resource]. Blackwell Science, 2001. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=sso&db=cat00006a &AN=melb.b5522046&site=eds-live&scope=site&custid=s2775460.

Li, Rita Yi Man, and S. W. Poon. Construction Safety. [Electronic Resource]. Risk Engineering. Springer, 2013. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=sso&db=cat00006a &AN=melb.b5052091&site=eds-live&scope=site&custid=s2775460.

Wolfram, H.G., and A.R. Toakley. “DESIGN MODIFICATIONS TO WEST GATE BRIDGE, MELBOURNE.” Inst Eng Aust Civ Eng Trans CE 16, no. 2 (1974): 143– 50. https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.00016335342&partnerID=40&md5=c420babb6230138b8b87646c767f784b.

Interviews Preston, Pat. Interview with the West Gate Bridge collapse survival Pat Preston. Focus: safety on site. Audio Recording, November 13, 2020.

Videos Rees, Rod. West Gate Bridge Collapse: 40 Years On. Memoir. YouTube, 2010. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=li8SLxytnzA. Thompson, Geoffrey. West Gate Bridge. Part One. Video Archive. Vol. 1. 2 vols. West Gate Bridge. Australia: Cine Service Films, 1974. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XYjoTGrkmoA. Live events Watson, Tommy, and Danny Gardiner. The West Gate Bridge Collapse: 50 Years On. Zoom meeting, October 6, 2020. https://www.historyvictoria.org.au/event/the-west-gatebridge-collapse-50-years-on/.

Governmental Reports “Report of Royal Commission into the Failure of West Gate Bridge.” Governmental. Royal Commission. Victoria, Australia: West Gate Bridge Royal Commission, 1971. https://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/papers/govpub/VPARL1971-72No2.pdf.

“Report On West Gate Bridge Collapse. Report Of Events Leading Up To Collapse of West Side Steel Structure.” Technical Report. Melbourne, Australia: Technical Commitee set up by the city Coroner, October 1970. Public Record Office Victoria. https://prov.vic.gov.au/explore-collection/online-galleries-and-exhibitions/west-gatebridge-collapse.

Photos Ryan, Ian. Collapsed Span. Ground View. 1970. Digital photography. Photo Gallery. The West Gate Bridge Memorial. https://www.westgatebridge.org/node/138.

Shortly after the Westgate Bridge Collapse, Fire Still Burning. October 15, 1970. Digital photography. VPRS 24/P3 Inquest Deposition Files, unit 120. Public Record Office Victoria. https://prov.vic.gov.au/explore-collection/online-galleries-andexhibitions/west-gate-bridge-collapse.

The West Gate Bridge. 2019. Digital photography, 1920x955. https://www.arcadis.com/en/global/what-we-do/our-projects/australia/west-gatebridge-rehabilitation-and-strengthening/.

West-Gate-Bridge-Accident-1970. 1970. Digital photography. https://devastatingdisasters.com/west-gate-bridge-accident-1970/.

Popular articles Warneke, Ross. “Flashback 1978: The West Gate Bridge Opens.” Online. November 15, 2018, Flashback edition. https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/flashback1978-the-west-gate-bridge-opens-20181114-p50fzg.html.

The Tragedy. “The Error.” Memorial, 2020. https://www.westgatebridge.org/node/110.

Sketches Sketch of the Collapse from the Inquest Files, 1970. 1970. Sketch. VPRS 24/P3 Inquest Deposition Files, unit 120. Public Record Office Victoria. https://prov.vic.gov.au/explore-collection/online-galleries-and-exhibitions/west-gatebridge-collapse.

List of Figures Figure 1: The West Gate Bridge Figure 2: West Gate Bridge Site Plan Figure 3: Elevation, Plan and Section Views of the Bridge Figure 4: Box Girder Assembly Diagram Figure 5: Aerial view of the collapsed span, 1970.

Figure 6: Shortly after the Westgate Bridge collapse, fire still burning, 1970.

Figure 7: Collapsed Span, ground view. Workers cleaning the site and investigation in progress, 1970.

Figure 8 Testimony of a site engineer Figure 9: Failed Erection Method, 1970.

Figure 10: New Erection Method