The Johns Hopkins Undergraduate Law Review | Volume 5

DESIGNED BY,

YashasMallikarjun

Editor’s Note

DearReaders,

Iamthrilledtopresentthelatesteditionofour annualSpringJournal AstheEditor-in-Chiefof theJohnsHopkinsUndergraduateLawReview (JHULR),Iamproudtoleadthispublication dedicatedtofosteringengagingdialogueand stronglegalanalysis.

Thisissuefeaturesadiversearrayofarticles authoredbystudentsfromuniversitiesacrossthe UnitedStates Ourauthorsdelveintocritical contemporaryissuessuchastheintersectionof healthcareandconstitutionalrights,landmark SupremeCourtdecisionsongender-motivated violence,historicalperspectivesonlegalevolution post-MagnaCarta,thedevelopmentof internationalhumanrightsnorms,andthe advocacyforcivicvirtueinelectoral processesThroughtheircompellingpieces,we amplifyyoungvoicesandprovokethoughtful discussion,stayingtruetoourmission

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IamexcitedtoseeournewExecutiveBoardtake thehelmandcontinuetoguideJHULRtonew heights Thankyouforyourcontinuedsupport, andIhopeyoufindthiseditionbothenlightening andthought-provoking

StellaLee Editor-in-Chief JohnsHopkinsUndergraduateLawReview

JHULREDITORIALTEAM

StellaLee EditorinChief

Jacqueline Rosenkranz ManagingEditor

PhysicianAutonomy:How AbortionRegulationsInfringe onthe1stAmendment

KARINAKEWALRAMANI,GEORGETOWNUNIVERSITY

Abstract:

Women’s reproductive freedom has been affected by governmental intervention for over acentury.However,sinceDobbsv.JacksonWomen’sHealthOrganization,therehasbeen an increase in abortion-regulating legislation at an unprecedented rate. These policies not only restrict a patient’s access to healthcare under the guise of “promoting health and well-being,” but they also impose on a physician’s right to advise and inform their patients Though physician professional speech is not protected under the First Amendment, it has commonly been made analogous to commercial speech as they both sharethegoalofhelpingtheirclient orpatient makewell-informeddecisions However, in recent years local governments have infringed upon the physician-patient relationship by forcing physicians to spread ideological or inaccurate messages, thereby contributing to a misinformed citizenry and opposing the expressed state interest This paper will address how the physician’s role has evolved in response to changes in abortion precedent and shall highlight the increasing importance of their speech as abortion services continue to wane Through an examination of various abortion mandates across the United States, it can be seen how they may run afoul of the physician’s First Amendmentrightandpresentharmtothepublic

Aswithotherkindsofspeech,regulatingthecontentofprofessionals’speech“pose[s]theinherentrisk thattheGovernmentseeksnottoadvancealegitimateregulatorygoal,buttosuppressunpopularideas orinformation”Takemedicine,forexample “Doctorshelppatientsmakedeeplypersonaldecisions,and theircandoriscrucial”Throughouthistory,governmentshave“manipulat[ed]thecontentofdoctorpatientdiscourse”toincreasestatepower.

JusticeThomas,UnitedStatesSupremeCourtJusticeinNationalInstituteofFamilyandLife Advocatesv Becerra[1]

Introduction 1

InMarch2024,Idaho’sAttorneyGeneralreleasedastatementclarifyingIdaho’s2022statute criminalizingabortion Itexplainedthatanyhealthcareprofessionalwhoreferredapatientacrossstate linestoreceiveanabortionwouldhavetheirlicenserevoked[2]Thisstatementprovokedoutrageamong Idahoanphysicians,whopromptlyfiledsuitagainsttheAttorneyGeneralonthegroundsthathis interpretationwasunconstitutionalundertheFirstandFourthAmendments[3]Thefederaldistrictjudge grantedanemergencyrequesttoblockenforcementofthelawbasedonwhattheAttorneyGeneral opinedthelawcriminalized,statingthatitinfringedonaphysician’sFirstAmendmentrighttoprovide theirpatientaccuratemedicalguidancesothatthepatientcouldmakeafullyinformeddecision The IdahoAttorneyGeneral’sattempttocurtailphysicianspeechonamatterofsuchpublicinterestled manytoraisequestionsabouttheconstitutionalityofotherabortionregulationsacrossthecountry, especiallyinthispost-Dobbsv JacksonWomen'sHealthOrganizationenvironmentwheredifferent statesareenactingdifferentabortion-relatedlaws[4]Howmightastaterestrictionthatcontrolsa physician’sabortion-relatedspeechbelegalundertheUS Constitution?Isthereapointatwhichthe lineofconstitutionalityiscrossedinthelegislationofreproductiverights?Ifso,howwillcourtsdetermine whichstandardorcategorytoapplywhenFirstAmendmentrightsaresuspectedtobeinfringedupon?

Dothesespeechregulationsinfluencetheefficacyofcareforthepatient,andhowwilltheyaffectthe physician-patientrelationship?

Thispaperaddressesthesequestionsthroughtheexaminationofvariousabortionregulationsand mandatesacrosstheUnitedStates SectionIIofthepaperwillprovideanoverviewoftheUS Supreme Court’schangingopinionsregardingtheconstitutionalityoftherighttoanabortionandexaminethe changingphysicianroleswithinthiscontext Specifically,thissectionshallexaminehowmuchinputand advicebasedonaphysician’sexpertisetheycouldprovidetotheirpatientsateachmajorchangein precedence ThissectionwillalsodiscusstheevolvingSupremeCourttestsusedtodeterminehowa statemayconstitutionallyregulatetherighttoanabortionatanypointinthepregnancy SectionIIIof thepaperwillinvestigatethefeaturesandintentionsof“professionalspeech”andcomparethemtothe intentionsbehindcommercialspeech toachievetheFirstAmendmentaimof“enlighten[ed]public decisionmaking,” intheprofessionaladvicesetting[5]Itwillfurtherdiscusstheimportanceofthe physician-patientrelationshipandtheconsequencesoferodingthisrelationship Then,thissectionwill addresswhatconstitutesa“professional,”inthelegalsenseofgovernmentalregulationaswellasthe societalsense,andtheimportanceofapatienthavingaccesstoacommunityofestablishedexpert knowledge Thissectionfinallyoutlinesthedistincttypesofregulationsthatcanbeappliedto professionalspeech compelledandprohibited anddiscusseshowbothcanunconstitutionallyinfringe onnotonlythephysician-patientrelationshipbutalsoontheindividualautonomyofthephysicianand patienttoprovideandreceiverelevantinformation SectionIVprovidesadetailedevaluationofthe compelledregulationsonabortionspeechthatrunafouloftheFirstAmendmentandexplainswhy certainstates’statutesinfringeonphysicians’rightsastheyrequiretheforceddisseminationof misleadinginformationorideologicalspeech Finally,SectionVofthispaperwillarguethatmandating professionalspeechwithuntruthful,ideologicallegislationcanrestrictaphysician’sabilityandexpertise andviolatethestate’sinterestinpublichealthandoverallwelfare Itwillfurtherconcludethatwhile informedconsentlawsarebeneficialinfullyinformingthepatientpriortomedicaldecisionmaking,the broadeningofinformedconsentstatutesacrosstheUnitedStates,especiallyafterDobbswhenaccess toabortionservicesiswaning,canerodefaithinthemedicalcommunityandpresentharmtothe patient

II HistoryofReproductiveRights:LegislatingthePhysician’sRole Women’sreproductivefreedomintheUnitedStates,includingpatientaccessandtreatmentoptionshas gonethroughmanysubstantialtransformationssincethebeginningofthe1900s Attheturnofthe20th century,abortionwasmadeacriminaloffenseinmoststatesinaneffortbythepredominantlymale physicianstomakemidwivesobsolete,therebyguaranteeingthatwomenpatientswouldberequiredto consultphysiciansfortheirprenatalhealthcaredecisionsratherthanmidwives.[6]Theseanti-abortion regulationsandtherhetoricsurroundingtheprocedurewerefurtherescalatedbythecriminalizationof any“obscene”materials,includinginformationregardingcontraceptives,[7]sex,andtheterminationof pregnancy,aswellastheassertionofpowerbytheAmericanMedicalAssociation,theCatholicChurch, andthepredominantlymalephysicians[8]AfterabortionwasmadeillegalacrosstheUnitedStates,its accesswouldnotbecomelegalandrecognizedasarightundertheUS Constitutionuntilthedecision inRoev Wade(1973) Thisnearly100-yearperiodinvolvedafightforwomen’sreproductiverights through“legal,political,andreligious”advocacy,aswellaspeoplegainingagreaterunderstandingof medicalpracticesandthedesireforgreaterpatientautonomy[9]

ThelandmarkRoev.Wadedecisionwasthestartofanongoingconflictwithinthecourtsconcerningthe reproductiverightsofwomen.InRoe,theCourtrecognizedthattherewerecompellingstateinterestsin both“themother’shealthandsafetyandthepotentialityofhumanlife”[10]Assuch,theCourtdecided thatatthepointof“viability”withinthepregnancy,whichtheyconcludedwasattheendofthesecond trimester,thecontrollinginterestflipsfromthewoman’shealthtothepotentiallifeofthefetus,andthe statecouldbeginregulatingabortiontoprotectthefetusatthispoint[11]Beforethepointofviability, however,itwasuptothephysicianandthepatienttodeterminethehealthriskforthepatientandto guidethepatienttowardsthebestdecisionforherwell-being Thisestablishmentofphysicianand patientautonomyinthefirsttwotrimesterspreservedtheintegrityofthemedicalcommunityfrom overbearinggovernmentalintervention,andanyregulationsplacedonabortionsbeforethepointof viabilitywouldbesubjecttostrictscrutiny.[12]

Despitetheacknowledgmentofawoman’srightundertheUS Constitutiontoobtainanabortionthat theCourtrecognizedinRoe,somelegislationemergedthatlimitedanindividual’sabilitytolearnabout orhaveaccesstoabortionservices Forexample,inthe1974case,Bigelowv Virginia,anewspapereditor inVirginiawasconvictedunderastatestatutethatcriminalizedthepublicationofadvertisementsfor abortion-relatedservices[13]TheCourtruledthatthisstatuteinfringedonBigelow’sFirstAmendment right,recognizingthatcommercialspeechintheabortioncontext,suchasadvertisements,isgranted freespeechprotectionsundertheUS Constitution Furthermore,thisadvertisementcontained informationthatwasamatterof“publicinterest”;removingitfromthepaperwouldhavebeena disservicetothepublicandtheirrighttobefullyinformed.[14]

Thenextsignificantchangeinwomen’sreproductiverightsarrivedin1992withthePlannedParenthood ofSoutheasternPennsylvaniav Caseyruling,whichmovedpregnancyviabilitystandardssoonerthan determinedinRoeasaresponsetoimprovedmedicaltechnologyandmethods[15]InCasey,theCourt recognizedthatstatescouldpasslawsrestrictingabortionrightsaftertheearlierpointoffetalviability, andtheycouldmandatethewritteninformedconsentfromthepatientanda24-hourwaitingperiod beforeanabortionprocedure,alongwithotherrestrictions TheCourtnoted,however,thatevenafter thepointofviability,physicianscouldperformtheseproceduresifitwereamedicalemergency[16] Allowingmorestateregulationsregardingabortionservicesresultedinstatesalsorestrictingwhen,how, andwhereabortionservicescouldbeprovided,includinglimitinghowphysicianscouldpotentially adviseandofferabortionservicestotheirpatients.Thischangeinthecourtallowedanopportunityfor thestatestoimplementamorerestrictiveabortionpolicyandstrongerinformedconsentlaws Additionally,theCourtruledthatregulationswerenolongerreviewedunderstrictscrutiny,butrather underthe“undueburdentest,”whichrequiredalawrestrictingabortionservicestobeanalyzedonthe basisofwhetheritplacedasubstantialobstacleonsomeoneseekinganabortion[17]

PostCasey,in2018,theCourtappearedtoexpandaphysician’srightofspeechthroughtheNational InstituteofFamilyandLifeAdvocatesv Becerra Becerraconcernedthe“CaliforniaReproductive Freedom,Accountability,ComprehensiveCare,andTransparencyAct”,whichrequiredlicensedmedical clinicsinCaliforniatoprovidefamilyplanninginformation,includingabortion-relatedinformation,to theirclients.[18]TheCourtruledthattheactwasinviolationoftheFirstAmendmentasitburdenedthe physicianspeakerbyrequiringthemto“‘beaninstrumentforfosteringpublicadherencetoan ideologicalpointofviewtheyfindunacceptable,’”therebydecreasingphysicianautonomy.[19]However, somejusticesarguedthatphysiciansunderCalifornia’sActwerenotbeingforcedtodisseminatea messageinwhichtheydidnotbelieve Instead,thiswassimilartoanyotherdisclosureorinformed consentlaw,suchastherestrictionsandguidelinesoutlinedinCasey,[20]whichallowedpatientsto receivemoreinformationregardingfamilyplanningoptions Consequently,itallowedawomantomake themostfullyinformedmedicaldecision,whichwasofgreatersocietalvalueinprotectingpublichealth ratherthanpreservingtherightsoflicensedclinicstoselectivelyrevealtheinformationinwhichthe peopleintheclinicbelieved

Themostrecentmajordevelopmentinreproductiverightsarrivedin2022withthecaseDobbsv. JacksonWomen’sHealthOrganization,whichoverruledbothRoeandCasey.Thisrulingwasbasedon therebeingnohistoricalprecedentforabortioninAmericaandnoenumerationofthisrightinthe Constitution[21]Instead,accesstoabortionshouldbeleftuptothediscretionofthestatesandthe electedofficials Thiscausedwidespreadtriggerlawstoimmediatelygointoeffectthatoutrightly bannedabortionin13states SixmonthsafterDobbs,24statescompletelyoutlawedaccessto abortions,withevenmorepassingrestrictivelegislationregardingpatientautonomyandphysician speech

SincetheDobbsdecision,therehasbeenasubstantialriseinstatutesandlegislationthatlimitpeople’s accesstoabortionsandthephysician’sroleinreferringorhelpingpatientsreceiveone.Whilethestates maybeabletoplaceanyrestrictiononaccesstoabortionthattheydesire,people’srighttoinformation andtovoicetheiropinioncannotbeobstructedbytheseabortion-relatedstatutes Therefore,in determiningtheconstitutionalityofthislegislationthatimpactsphysicianspeech,thecourtsmust determineunderwhichlenstoevaluatethisspeech,whetherthatbepublic,commercial,orprofessional, anddecidehowtheregulationofthespeechinfluencespatients’accesstoinformationandoverall societalwellbeing

III ProfessionalSpeechintheMedicalSetting

A Establishmentof“ProfessionalSpeech”andtheProfessional-ClientRelationship Thecourtshaveyettoestablishprofessionalspeechasaprotectedcategorywithclearparameters undertheFirstAmendment;however,ithasbeenalludedtothattheserightscanbemadeanalogousto theprotectionsgrantedtocommercialspeech Establishedcommercialspeechdoctrinedeclaresthat “thefreeflowofcommercialinformationisindispensable”asitisamatterofpublicinterestthatthe consumerbewell-informed[22]ThisreinforcestheFirstAmendmentobjectiveof“enlighten(ed)public decisionmaking”asatenetofasuccessfuldemocracy[23]Inorderforthepublictobeproperly informed,thedisseminatedinformationmustbetruthfulandnot“misleading”[24]Toensurethatthe commercialspeechisaccurate,theUS Constitutionallowsstatestoissueregulationssuch“thatthe streamofcommercialinformationflow(s)cleanlyaswellasfreely”[25]Tosomeextent,thegoalsof commercialspeecharethesameasthoseofphysicianprofessionalspeech:toprovideaccurate, comprehensiveinformationtotheconsumer.Specifically,inthemedicalsetting,thephysicianshares informationsothatthepatientiseducatedabouttheirdiagnosisandinformedenoughtomakethebest medicaldecisionfortheirhealthandwell-being Theconsequencesofamisinformedmedicaldecision arearguablymoreharmfulthanthoseofadeceptivecommercialcommunicationbecausemost individuals’personalhealthisofgreatervaluetothemthaneconomicspending Thisfurthersupports theideathatthetransmissionofaccuratemedicalinformationfromexpertstopatientswouldbe necessaryforpromotingthewell-beingofthecitizenry

Therefore,anyargumentthatprofessionalspeechshouldnotbegrantedprotectionundertheFirst Amendmentisflawedgiventhatprotectingsuchspeechpromotesthesocietalinterestofproviding useful,andevennecessary,informationtothepublic,whichalignswiththepurposesofprotecting commercialspeech

Whilecommercialandprofessionalspeechbothcontributetoaninformedcitizenrythroughthesharing ofaccurateinformation,professionalspeechhascertaindifferentiatingpropertiesandshouldbe evaluatedasaseparatetypeofspeech Bothcommercialandprofessionalspeecharedifferentfrom traditionalideasoffreespeechbyanindividualbecausetheformertypesaremorefocusedonthe rightsofthelistenertogaincertaininformationasopposedtothelatterspeaker’srighttoexpresstheir belieffreely Intheanalysisofnon-commercialspeech,theopinionsexpressedbythespeakermay divergefromthoseofthelistener,leadingtopublicdebateandeventuallyamutualunderstandingof multipleperspectives[26]

Incommercialandprofessionalspeech,however,thespeakerholdsinformationthatisvaluabletothe listenersuchthatthelistener,whoistheconsumeroftheinformation,canmakeaninformeddecision. Wherecommercialandprofessionaldiffer,however,isthatcommercialspeechisprimarilyconcerned withthemotivationsofthespeakerandincreasingprofitsforthemthroughadvertisementand promotionofanitemtoaconsumerbase,therebyreceivinglowerlevelsofprotection Incontrast, professionalspeechcomesfromanexpertseekingtoaidaclientbywayofspecializedinformationand advice,whichmayormaynotberelatedtoaprofitmotive Inthissense,professionalspeechismore similartotraditionalnon-commercialspeechinthatbothdrawuponpersonalexpertisetoshare informationwithalistener Assuch,professionalspeechmaybegrantedgreaterprotectionsthan commercialspeech

Thequestionofwhoqualifiesasa“professional”oftenarisesindeterminingwhatconstitutes professionalspeech.[27]Lowercourtshaveusedthefollowingrationaletodefinea“professional”: whethertheyaresubjecttolicensingandregulation,providespecializedservicestoaclient,andcan speakwithinthecontextofaprofessionalrelationshipbasedontheirknowledgeorjudgmentdrawn fromtheirexpertfield[28]ThoughtheSupremeCourthasassertedthatthiscategoryistoobroadasit givesthe“Statesunfetteredpowertoreduceagroup’sFirstAmendmentrightsbysimplyimposinga licensingrequirement,”thisdefinitionisstillcitedinappellatecourts,asthelicensingofaprofessional groupisnecessarytoregulatetheaccuracyofinformationcommunicatedandthewell-beingofthe client[29]

Licensingmaybetheinitialstepinclassifyingaprofessionalgroup;however,thelatterpartofthe definition servicestoaclienteleandengaginginaprofessional-clientrelationship appearsmore meaningfultothecharacterizationandregulationofprofessionalspeechinamedicalcontext Oncea groupisestablishedasprofessionals,themembersarepartofaknowledgecommunitywithashared breadthofestablishedinformationdrawnfromcollectiveunderstandingand“exchangeofinsights withinthecommunity”[30]Thisintellectualdifferentialbetweentheprofessionalandtheirclientcreates anasymmetricrelationshipinwhichtheclientseeksoutspecializedadvicefromtheprofessional These professionalcommunitiesalsohavesharedethicalnormsandcommon“notionsofvaliditythatlimitthe rangeofacceptableopinionsfoundwithinthem”[31]Therefore,whileaprofessionalmayholdtheirown opinionanddoesnothavearesponsibilitytosharethatwiththeclient,theydohavearesponsibilityto informtheirclientoftheestablishedinformationwithintheprofessionalcommunitythatlaypeople wouldnothavetheexpertisetoknow.

Thecommunicationsbetweenaprofessionalandtheirclientarespecializedtotheclient’sneedsand groundedinafoundationoftrustthattheclientisreceivingtruthful,accurateadvice Foraphysician andpatient,themattersofhealthdiscussedareoftenconfidentialanddeeplypersonal,andthepatient mustbefullyconfidentintheirphysician’smedicaladvice,astheymaybeusingittomakeacruciallife decision

ThisrelationshiphasbeenoutlinedincasesincludingMoore-Kingv CountyofChesterfield,Lowev SEC, andRustv Sullivan,inwhichJusticeBlackmunillustratestherelationshipofbetweenapatientand physician:

Inoursociety,thedoctor-patientdialogueembodiesauniquerelationshipof trust Thespecializednatureofmedicalscienceandtheemotionaldistress oftenattendanttohealth-relateddecisionsrequiresthatpatientsplacetheir completeconfidence,andoftenverylives,inthehandsofmedical professionals.Oneseeksaphysician’saidnotonlyformedicationor diagnosis,butalsoforguidance,professionaljudgment,andvitalemotional support[32]

Thisspecialrelationshipcausespeopletoattach“profoundimportanceandauthoritytothewordsof advicespokenbythephysician”[33]Consequently,thestatehasacompellinginterestinensuringthe validityoftheinformationgivenbyphysicianstoprotectthehealthandwell-beingofthepatient However,thequestionremains:atwhatpointdoesregulationofphysicianprofessionalspeechinfringe uponthephysician-patientrelationshipandthephysician’sFirstAmendmentrightofautonomy?

B.RegulatoryFrameworksWithinProfessionalSpeech

Undertheprofessionalspeechdoctrine,stateshaveaninterestinregulatingandlicensingcertain professions,suchaslawandmedicine,tobestprotectsocietalwell-being Whilesomeproponentsofthe marketplaceofideastheorysaythatdiscourseofanykind includingfalsehoodsandfallacies leadsto robustdebateandtheprevailingoftruth,inaprofessionalsetting,itisnotworthriskingthewelfareof theclienttopreservethefreeflowoffalsespeech Thisviewpointisthebasisfordoctrinesof malpracticethatcanrevokeaprofessional'slicensetopracticeforviolating“strictstandardsofexpert knowledge”34Adoctorwouldcommitmalpracticeiftheytreatedoradvisedapatientinamanner deviatingfromestablishedmedicalnorms,asthisthreatenspublichealth.[35]

Asidefromclaimsofprofessionalmalpractice,regulationscanalsobeplacedonphysiciansforfailingto correctlyinformtheirpatientsofallviabletreatmentoptionsorpotentialhealthconsequencesofa medicaldecision,therebyviolatingtheimpliedtrustinthephysician-patientrelationship These regulationsonspeecharepermitted“giventhatprofessionalspeechliesontheaudience’sabilityto receiveinformationratherthanontheprofessionaltospeakastheychoose”[36]Sincetheturnofthe 20thcentury,therehasbeenanimprovementinattentivenesstoapatient’sautonomyandincreased transparencybetweenapatientandphysician,bringingaboutthe“informedconsentdoctrine”[37]The originsofinformed consentcanbetracedbacktoaNewYorkCourtofAppealscasefrom1914inwhich JusticeCardozoexplainedhowpatientscanhaveautonomyintheirmedicaldecisions:

Everyhumanbeingofadultyearsandsoundmindhasarighttodetermine whatshallbedonewithhisownbody;andasurgeonwhoperformsan operationwithouthispatient’sconsent,commitsanassaultforwhichheis liableindamages[38]

Sincethen,thedoctrinehasdevelopedtobeanimpositiononthephysiciantoreasonablyexplainin non-technicaltermstherisksandhazardsoftheirtreatmentordiagnosissothatthepatientiscapable ofmakingamindfulmedicaldecision.[39]

Informedconsentstatutesonlyaffectspeechasfarasthecontentofthephysician’sprofessional speechisconsistentwithscientificallysupportedadvicethatisacceptedwithinthemedicalcommunity andtheirestablishedsharedunderstandings

Thisfulldisclosureofadiagnosisandaplanoftreatmentwithinaphysician-patientrelationshipis necessarytomaintainpublichealthstandardsandensurepatientshavetheknowledgetomake autonomous,well-informeddecisions However,inrecentyearspriortoDobbs,evenmorestringent informedconsentstatutesinrelationtoabortionhavebeencreated,whichcriticsregardedas temporarytacticstoendabortionintheU.S.completely.

Forexample,SouthDakotaHouseBill1249of2005emergedasanattempttooverturnRoev.Wade,and itrequiredthatphysiciansdescribetherisksofreceivinganabortionandnottherisksofmaintaining thepregnancy40ThisbillraisedFirstAmendmentconcernsasitdid“notmerelycompromisetheability of membersofthepublictoreceiveaccurateinformation;italsounderminespublictrustthat professionalphysicianspeechwillreflecttheexpertiseofthe‘medicalcommunity’”[41]Therefore,it diminishedtheautonomyofthepatientbecausetheywereneitherwell-informednorweretheyableto relyontheirdoctortodisclosethetotalityoftheexpertknowledgetheypossessed Whileinformed consentstatutespromotetheFirstAmendmentaimsofinformingthenon-expertpatientand “enlighten(ed)publicdecisionmaking,”over-regulatingphysicianspeechcanhaveaharmfuleffecton thepatientbypreventingthefullacquisitionofmedicalknowledge.[42]

Regulationonprofessionalspeechcantypicallybesubdividedintotwosections:prohibitedand compelledlegislation[43]Legislationthatprohibitsspeechimposesalimitorbanonhowprofessionals cancommunicateandact,andcompelledspeechlegislationrequiresaprofessionaltodisseminate specificviewpointsorinformation Eventhoughtheydonotexpresslycompelspeech,informedconsent statutescanbestbecategorizedascompelledspeechregulationsastheyrequirethephysicianto providealltheapplicablemedicalconsequencesandoptionstotheirpatients Bothoftheseregulations cancrossconstitutionalboundariesiftheydemandthespreadingofinformationthatisinconsistent withestablishedknowledgeorfailtodisseminatecrucialprofessionalinsightsthatharmthepatient's decision-makingabilitiesand,indoingso,contradictthestateinterestofpreservingpublichealth.

Prohibitedspeechlawsoftenrepresentthemostextensiveabridgmentofspeechastheylimitthe disseminationofinformation,therebyaffectingtheauthorityandutilityofthephysicianandthe autonomyofthepatient Inrecentyears,therehasbeenalargeuptickinprohibitedspeech“gag”laws inrelationtoabortion[44]In2019,theDepartmentofHealthandHumanServicesundertheTrump administrationadministereda“FinalRule”whichprohibitedTitleX-fundedclinicsfrompromoting, referring,orsupportingabortiontoaclient,andaphysiciancould“tellpregnantpatientsaboutsomeof theiroptions”but“theymayexcludeanyinformationaboutabortion”[45]Thisdirectlyharmsapatient’s abilitytomakeafully-informeddecisionregardingtheirownhealthbecausethephysicianwouldbe prohibitedfromprovidinginformationthatmaybecrucialinallowingapatienttounderstandtheir medicaloptions.InRustv.Sullivan,theCourtupheldaregulationonfederally-fundedfamilyplanning clinicsfromprovidingabortioncounseling,therebylimitingphysicianswithinthesefacilitiesfromfully assistingtheirpatients[46]WhilethemajorityoftheCourtarguedthattherestrictioninRustdidnot “significantlyimpingeuponthedoctor-patientrelationship”asthesefacilitieswerenotproviding“allencompassing”professionalservices,butratherlimitedserviceprovidersinagovernmentprogram,it stillholdsthatthepatientwaspreventedfrommakingafully-informeddecisionbecauseofthe impactedphysician-patientrelationshipandthewithholdingofpotentiallyrelevantexpertadvice[47]

Compelledspeechcanalsoeitherbeusedtofullyinformapatientandcontributetothoroughdecisionmaking,suchasmostinformedconsentlaws,ortheycanrequireaphysiciantoconveyfactuallyfalse informationoranideologicalmessagethatbelongstothestateasopposedtotheresearched understandingofthemedicalcommunity Forexample,inCasey,statelawrequiredphysiciansto provideinformationaboutabortions,thepossiblerisks,otheralternatives,andthecostofpregnancy andchildbirth[48]Thisinformationwas“truthfulandnon-misleading,”andassuch,wasdeterminedto beconstitutionalbecauseitcontributedtoaninformeddecisionbythewoman

Ontheotherhand,inPlannedParenthoodofMinnesota,NorthDakota,SouthDakotav Rounds,a statuteinSouthDakotarequiredphysicianstotelltheirpatientsthatabortionwouldresultinan “increasedriskofsuicidalideationandsuicide”[49]Thisstatutewasfoundtobeunconstitutional becauseitundercutsaphysician’sbestmedicaljudgmentanddiscretionbyrequiringthemtorelay informationthatissimplyuntrue,aslevelsofsuicidalideationwereproventobesimilarlylowbetween womenwhoreceivedandweredeniedabortions.[50]Theforceddisseminationofmisleadinginformation erodestrustinthephysician-patientrelationshipanddoesnotallowthephysiciantodrawupontheir ownmedicalexpertiseandknowledgewithinthehealthcommunity Instead,theymustrelyonthe speculativeopinionofthestate

Therefore,becausetheregulationofthephysician-patientrelationshipisnecessarytoensurethatthe patientisabletoreceivethewidestbreadthofaccurateinformationtomaketheirmedicaldecision,this regulationcancrossconstitutionalboundarieswhentheenforcedspeechisfictitious,misleading,or containsscientificallyunsupported,stateideology

IV:AbortionSpeechRegulation:DevelopingaMisinformedMedicalDecision A.CasesofInaccurateInformation

AsabortionbecomesanissueofincreasingimportanceinAmericancultureandhealthcare,thereisan increaseinstatestatutesbothlimitingandimprovingaccesstosuchproceduresandtheinformation surroundingthem Withanincreaseinlegislationcomesariseinconcernsregardingphysicianand patientautonomyandhowthesenewlawsandstatutesaffecttheintegrityofthemedicalpractice Therehavebeenmultipleinstancesinrecentyearsinwhichcompelledspeechstatutescontain inaccurate,misleadinginformation,therebyhinderingapatient’sdecision-makingabilitiesand infringingonaphysician’sabilitytospeakfreely,relyingontheirmedicalexpertise

Forexample,asof2020,Tennessee,NorthDakota,andOklahomapassedbillsrequiringphysiciansand abortionproviderstotelltheirpatientsthatiftheyweretoreceiveamedicationabortion,itcouldbe “reversed”[51]Thiseffectivelyforcedphysiciansandtheentiremedicalcommunity,includingthe AmericanMedicalAssociationandtheAmericanCongressofObstetriciansandGynecologists,to endorseapracticethatiswhollyunsupportedbyscientificevidence[52]Compellingphysiciansto essentiallyendorseanunscientificallyproven,governmentallymandatedmessageinthissenseerodes thetrustandconfidencewithinaphysician-patientrelationship

Notsurprisingly,thisrelationshipisbuiltuponhonest,ethicalcommunicationbetweenthetwoparties, anditwoulddeteriorateifphysicianswererequiredtomisleadtheirpatientsbypresentingfactually incorrectinformationthat“contradictsrealityandscience.”[53]TheselawsareaviolationoftheFirst Amendmentinthattheystraydoctorsawayfromtheestablishedreservoirofmedicalknowledgethat theyaresupposedtoemployinadvisingpatients Instead,theymustdeliveragovernmentalmessage thatthemajorityofthemedicalcommunityrejects,therebywithholdingvitalinformationfromtheir patientandconfusingtheirdecision-makingprocess Notonlydoesthisconflictwithconstitutionally approvedinformedconsentlawsbutitisalsocontraindicatedinthattheprocedureofinducingan abortionthroughhighdosesofprogesterone,theabortionreversalpill,hasnotyetmetclinical standards[54]ThiscontradictsoneofthegoalsoftheFirstAmendment,whichallowsforthefreeflowof informationtocreateaknowledgeableconsumerbase;itisalsonotalignedwiththestate’sconcernfor women’shealthandsafety Therearealso15statesintheUS thatnowrequirehealthcareprofessionals toprovideinformationonabortionreversalstotheirpatients,whichputsmoreandmorewomenatrisk ofharmbyrequiringphysicianstoprovidescientificallyunsupportedmedicaladvice.

Afurtherexampleoflegislationthatcompelsaphysiciantoprovidemisleadingmedicaladvicecanbe seeninstatessuchasMissouri,Texas,SouthDakota,andIndiana,whichrequiresphysicianstotelltheir abortion-seekingpatientsthat“objectivescientificinformationshowsthatafetuscanfeelpainator beforetwenty(20)weeksofpostfertilizationage”[55]Thisinformationmustberelayedtoallpatients, regardlessofthestageoftheirpregnancy;itisalsoscientificallyunprovenandmisleading

Thescientificcommunityagreesthatafetusdoesnothavethephysiologicalcapacitytofeelpain before24weeks,asthenervousandperipheralnervoussystemsarenotdevelopedenoughtoprocess paintransmissions56Additionally,somescientistsbelievethattheexperientialfeelingofpainrequires “consciousrecognitionofanoxiousstimulus,”whichcannotdevelopuntilthethirdtrimester57This mandatedspeechfailstonotethesecontradictionsandshows“norealefforttogivepatientsallthe informationthatmightinformtheirchoice.”[58]

Theseareonlyafewexamplesofcompelledspeechstatutesthatarenotbasedonscientificallyproven informationandarerequiredtobeprovidedbyhealthcareprofessionalsintheabortion-relatedspeech context Duetotheextenttowhichmedicaltechnologyandresearchareexpanding,itismorelikelythat apatientwillbedrawntoadangerousmedicaldecisioniftheycannotrelyonaccurateinformationfrom theirphysician Further,receivingunsupportedinformationwillerodethetrustbetweenpatientsand physiciansinthosestates’prenatalhealthcarecontext[59]

B.IdeologicalSpeechMandates

Statesalsohaveahistoryofcompellingphysicianstorepresentanddisseminateunscientifically proven,ideologicalviewpointsofthestate.Notonlydoesthisprohibitphysiciansfrommakingtheirown informedopinionsbasedontheircommunityofknowledgeandexpertise,butitalsolimitscollaboration anddiscussionamongprofessionalsastheyareallrepeatingthesameunsupportedgovernmental message Furthermore,patientsmaybeemotionallyaffectedbythisstateperspectiveinawaythatis notmotivatedbyactualmedicalevidence

TheSouthDakotaInformedConsentActof2005isaclearexampleofthespreadofanideological message Itdeclaresthatabortionmayonlybecarriedoutifthewomanisinformedthat“theabortion willterminatethelifeofawhole,separate,uniquelivinghumanbeing”[60]Whilethisstatementis writtenforthephysicians,theyhavetoproducethematerialforthepatienttoreadorhearthat containsthismandatedinformation itisnotgiveninastate-authoredpamphlet.[61]Whilethedistrict court“agreedthelawcompelledideologicalspeech,”theEightCircuitcontradictorilyheldthatsince “humanbeing”meant“anindividualmemberofthespeciesofHomosapiens,”itdidnotpromotean ideologicalmessageaboutthepointatwhichlifebegins[62]Insteadofrestingtheirdecisiononthis biologicaldefinitionof“humanbeing,”thecourtshouldevaluatetheFirstAmendmentimplicationsof thespeech’sabilitytoaffectthelistener thepatient whoseopinionmaybealteredbytheinsinuation oflifeinherentin“humanbeing”Moreover,thewords“separate”and“unique”seemtoimplylifeand developmentinthefetusthatisbeyondtheactualphysicality,furthersuggestingapointoflife This statutegoesbeyondtheinformedconsentlaw’sgoalofprovidingmedicaladviceandbeginstomakea philosophicalandmoralstatementregardingexistence.Itisnottheroleofhealthcareprovidersto presentthestate’sviewsnortheirowninregardtothesemoraldilemmasthathavenorelevanceto medicallyconsequentialinformationandarescientificallyunsupported[63]

Thesameideologicalissuecanbeseeninlegislationthatordersapatienttoundergoanultrasound24 hoursbeforeobtaininganabortionandtohavetheultrasoundaudiblydescribedtothembya physician Theselawswentintoeffectinmanydifferentstates,includingTexas Texas’informedconsent lawsmandatethatphysiciansengageinspeechthatdirectlypromotesthestate’sideologicalmessage andplaysavitalroleinthepatient’sdecisiontofollowthroughwithherabortion,especiallyconsidering thattheinformationdescribedduringtheultrasound[64]isnotinastate-publishedpamphletbutis articulatedbythephysicianregardingthispatient’sspecificcondition.[65]Whiletheideological languageinthisbillmaybemoreambiguousthantheSouthDakotastatuteinthatallofthe communicationbetweenthephysicianandpatientrequiredinthiscaseisscientificallyfactual,itcanbe clearlyviewedasideologicalinthebroadercontextofthestate’smoralcampaignagainstabortion

AstheoristRolandBarthesargued,photographicmessagingoftenrepresentsaconnotatedorhidden messagethatisshapedbyitsculturalandhistoricalcontext[66]ItisimportanttoconsiderTexas’s efforttowardslimitingaccesstoabortion

RepresentativeSidMiller,thebill’ssponsor,evenstatedthatitwasfinewithhimifthebilldissuaded womenfromreceivinganabortion,outwardlyadmittingtothepro-lifeintent[67]Furthermore,during thebill’ssigning,GovernorPerrynotedthatthismessagewasimportantinensuringthatwomen “understandthedevastatingimpactthatlife-endingdecisioncanhave”[68]Therefore,giventhe circumstances,onemayunderstandhowrequiringtheseaudibleultrasoundswasameasureto persuadethepatientagainstabortionbyappealingtohermaternalinstinctsandmoralconscience.

Moreover,ultrasoundsarenotanecessaryaspectofinformedconsentlawsanddonotcontributeto theknowledgeawomanneedstomakeaninformeddecisionregardinganabortion Thisisnotedinthe act,whichstatesthatwomenwhosepregnancyisaresultof“sexualassault,incest,orotherviolationof thePenalCode,”donothavetoreceivethe“verbalexplanation”ofthesonogram[69]Thisexceptionto thelawappliestoindividualsforwhomabortionispotentiallymoresociallyacceptablebecauseofthe eventsthatcausedtheirpregnancy Iftheinformationfromtheultrasoundwereactuallynecessaryfor theinformeddecision-makingofthepatient,therewouldnotbeexceptionsbasedonthecircumstances ofconception Therefore,thisisaviolationofphysicianautonomyasmedicalexpertsareforcedto disseminatethestate’sideologicalviewpointasopposedtoinformationthatwillgenuinelycontributeto thepatient’sdecision.

V:Conclusion

Asaccesstoabortionservicescontinuestowanethroughrestrictiveregulation,theroleofphysiciansin thedisseminationofabortion-relatedinformationbecomesincreasinglyimportantinorderforpatients tobefullyinformedabouttheirprenatalhealthcareoptions Inthissense,physiciansandother healthcareprofessionalsclearlycontributemoretoafunctioningsocietythatiswell-equippedtomake decisionsintheirbestintereststhancommercialspeakers Whiletheprotectionofcommercialspeechis necessaryforconsumerstomakevaluableeconomicchoices,thevoicesofexpertprofessionalsina communitywhoareabletodrawfromapoolofestablishedknowledgearemuchmoreeffectivein promotingstateinterestsofwell-beingandhealth.Assuch,professionalspeechshouldbegranted higherlevelsofprotection Theprofessional-clientrelationshipissimilarlymorevaluablethanthe relationshipbetweenabusinessanditsconsumerbase,asitismorepersonalandofsalientvaluetothe client’sindividualhealth Thestatemustworktopreservethetrustbetweenaprofessionalandtheir clientinthemidstofincreasingregulationonprofessionalspeech

Whileregulations,suchasinformedconsentstatutes,onphysicianspeecharenecessarytoupholdthis trustandprovidethepatientwiththetotalityofinformationrelatedtotheirdiagnosisthatisnecessary tomakeaqualitydecisionregardingtreatment,otherstatutesmayrunafoulofconstitutionality There havebeenmanyexamplesinrecentyearsofstatelegislaturesimplementinglawsthatinfringeona physician’sFirstAmendmentrightbymandatingthedisseminationofscientificallyuntrueinformation andideologicalstatemessaging Thesestatutesposeasubstantialobstacleforthepatientastheyare unabletoaccesstruthful,abortion-relatedinformationfromtheirphysician,whichisusuallytheironly avenueofmedicaladvice[70]

Asidefromtheseunconstitutionalcompelledspeechmandates,prohibitedspeechmandatescan similarlyinfringeupontheFirstAmendmentastheyforbidpatientsfromreceivingmedicalinformation fromtheirphysician TheyviolatetheCourt’sobjectivetofosterawell-informedpublicbywithholding informationthatmaybenecessaryforindividuals’health TheIdahoAttorneyGeneral,whoprohibited physiciansfromreferringtheirpatientsacrossstatelinesforabortion-relatedservices,providesone exampleofthistypeofmandate.InIdaho,anypatientwhosoughtanabortionneededtoresearchand findaclinicacrossstatelinesbecausetheycouldnotreceivetheseservicesinthestateduetothe installmentofthe“trigger”lawaftertheoverturningofRoe[71]Thisprohibitionofphysicianspeech placesanundueburdenonthepatientandprobablydissuadessomepatientsfromreceivingan abortioniftheydonothaveenoughtimeormeanstofindaclinicwithoutthehelpoftheirphysician

Therefore,byregulatingphysicianspeech,thestateindirectlypromotesanideologicalanti-abortion messagebecausepatientsmayfeelthattheydonothavetheoptionofreceivinginformationonthese abortionservices

Basedontheconsequencesofanill-informedpublic,regulationsonphysicianspeechthateitherlimit speechorcontributetothespreadofmisinformationandideologicalspeechareunconstitutionaland infringeuponthephysician’sFirstAmendmentright.Tomaintainasocietyofeffectivedecision-making regardingmedicalandhealthissues,itisnecessarytoprotectsomesenseofphysicianspeech autonomy,especiallyinthisclimateoftighteningabortionrestrictionsandincreasedpublicawareness ofabortion-relatedissues

[1]NationalInstituteofFamilyandLifeAdvocatesv Becerra,585US 12(2018)citingWollschlaegerv GovernorofFlorida,848F 3d1293,1328(CA112017)(enbanc)(W Pryor,J concurring) andTurner BroadcastingSystem,Inc v FederalCommunicationsCommission,512US622,641(1994)

[2]RaulRLabrador,(2023)

[3]PlannedParenthoodGreaterNorthwestvLabrador,1:23-cv-001420BLW(D IdahoMay,2,2023)

[4]DobbsvJacksonWomen’sHealthOrganizationoverturnedthefederalrighttoabortionin2022and grantedstatestheabilitytodeterminetheirownabortionaccess.SeeDobbsv.JacksonWomen’sHealth Organization,597US (2022).ThoughpollingsuggeststhatthemajorityofAmericansholdapro-choice stance,abortionhasbeenanissuethatisincreasinglyweaponizedinpartisanpolitics Assuch,thereis alargereffortfromeitherpoliticalfactionastheRepublicanpartyappealstosociallyconservative votersthroughpro-liferhetoric,andtheDemocraticpartytargetsyoungfeministsbytakingastronger standforreproductiverights Thisongoingconflictcreatesanatmosphereoftensionthatleadsto extremistlegislation

[5]VirginiaStateBoardofPharmacyv VirginiaCitizensConsumerCouncil,Inc,425US748,765(1976)

[6]BrandonBaker,TheHistoryofAbortionAccessintheUS,PennToday(Nov 1,2022)

[7]Thispaperwillnotaddressthelegislationthatregulatesandrestrictscontraceptives,andwillsolely focusonabortion-serviceswithastateinterestinboththehealthofthemotherandthepromotionof newlife.

[8]ComstockActof1873,18USC §1461;DineRanana,ScarletLetters:GettingtheHistoryofAbortion andContraceptionRight,AmericanProgress(Aug 8,2013)

[9]Ibid

[10]RoevWade,410US113(1973)

[11]Id,at160

[12]StrictScrutinyisaformofjudicialreviewthatcourtscanusetodetermineifalawisconstitutionalby testingifitisnarrowlytailoredtoserveacompellingstateinterest InthecaseofRoe,abortion regulationscannotbeenactedbeforethepointofviabilityunlesstheyarenecessarytoservethestate interestofwomen’shealth,whichisrarelyapplicable.

[13]BigelowvVirginia,421US809(1975).

[14]Id.,at821

15]PlannedParenthoodofSe Pa v Casey,505US 833,860(1992)

[16]Id,at844

[17]THEUNDUEBURDENSTANDARDAFTERWHOLEWOMAN’S HEALTHv HELLERSTEDT,Centerfor ReproductiveRights(July26,2018)

[18]NationalInstituteofFamilyandLifeAdvocatesv Becerra,585US (2018)

[19]Wooleyv Maynard,430US705(1977)

[20]NationalInstituteofFamilyandLifeAdvocatesv Becerra,585US (2018)SeeJusticeBreyer’sdissent [21]Thisideathattheremustbehistoricalprecedenceforarighttobeconstitutionalstemsfromthe Glucksbergtest.SeeWashingtonv.Glucksberg,521US702(1997).TheGlucksbergtestholdsthat e[\numeratedrightsfromtheDueProcessClauseofthe14thAmendmentmustbebasedinthehistory andtraditionofthiscountry,andcannotbecomeconstitutionaliftheydonothavethishistorical groundingThistestisfairlynarrowasitanchorsanyclaimofenumeratedrightstothepast Sincethe righttoabortionhasbeenhistoricallyillegal,itcannotbecomeaconstitutionalrightandmustbeleftup tothediscretionofthestatesaccordingtoDobbs ContrastinglytotheGlucksbergtest,theKennedy testfromObergefellv Hodgescontendsthatunenumeratedrightscanbeconstitutionalwithout historicalgrounding Theysimplyrequiretherightsinquestiontobefundamentalliberties Ifthe KennedytestwasappliedtoDobbsinsteadoftheGlucksbergtests,thedecisionwouldhavebeenmuch different.SeeObergefellv.Hodges,576US (2015).

NOTES

[22]VirginiaStateBoardofPharmacyv VirginiaCitizensConsumerCouncil,Inc,425US748,762(1976); ThiscasewasinstrumentalindeterminingtheapplicationoftheFirstAmendmenttocommercial speechasitstatedthatthestatecouldnotlimitpharmacists'righttoprovideinformationabout prescriptionprices,therebyassertingthatcommercialspeechisnecessarytoensurethepublicis knowledgeableenoughtomakeinformeddecisions.

[23]Id.,765

[24]Theregulationthatcommercialinformationmustbetruthfulandnon-misleadingstemsfromthe CentralHudsontestoutlinedinCentralHudsonGasandElectricCorp v PublicServiceCommissionof NewYork See447US557(1980) TheCentralHudsonTestis4pronged:advertisements(1)mustbelawful andnotmisleading,(2)cannotadvertiseillegaloruntruefacts,(3)mustsupportasubstantial governmentinterest,(4)andmustdirectlyadvancesaidgovernmentinterestwithoutbeingover extensive Thistestremainsthedominanttestincommercialspeechdoctrineandjurisprudence,and contributestothemaintenanceofaproperlyinformedpublic

[25]VirginiaStateBoardofPharmacyv VirginiaCitizensConsumerCouncil,Inc,425US748,772(1976)

[26]Freespeechcontributestothe“marketplaceofideas”whichreferstotheabilitytofindtruth throughtheunregulatedsharingofopinionandinformationfromadiversityofviewpoints.SeeJohn StuartMill,OnLiberty(1859).

[27]NationalInstituteofFamilyandLifeAdvocatesv Becerra,585US (2018)

[28]Kingv GovernorofNJ,767F3d2016(3dCir 2014);Pickupv Brown,No 2:12-cv-02497-KJM-EFB(ED Cal Sep 15,2015)

[29]NationalInstituteofFamilyandLifeAdvocatesv Becerra,585US (2018)

[30]ClaudiaE Haupt,ProfessionalSpeech,125YaleLawJournal40(2016)

[31]Id,at42

[32]Rustv Sullivan,500US173,218(1991)

[33]Ibid,at218

[34]RobertPost,Democracy,supranote51,at47.

[35]ClaudiaE.Haupt,ProfessionalSpeech,125YaleLawJournal(2016).

[36]RobertPost,InformedConsentonAbortion:AFirstAmendmentAnalysisofCompelledPhysician Speech,2007(April12,2007)

[37]Id,at961

[38]Schloendorffv SocietyofNY Hosp,105NE 92,93(NY 1914like128-132)

[39]RobertPost,InformedConsentonAbortion:AFirstAmendmentAnalysisofCompelledPhysician Speech,2007969(April12,2007)

[40]Id,at941

[41]Id,at979

[42]VirginiaStateBoardofPharmacyv.VirginiaCitizensConsumerCouncil,Inc.,425US748,787(1976).

[43]ClaudiaE.Haupt,ProfessionalSpeech,125YaleLawJournal(2016).

[44]“Gag”lawsrefertostatutesthatprohibitfreedebate,publiccomments,andoutwardexpressionof opinion

[45]AMAv Azar6:19-cv-00318-AA(ED Or Mar 5,2019)

[46]Rustv Sullivan,500US173(1991)

[47]Ibid,at192;DanielHalberstam,COMMERCIALSPEECH,PROFESSIONALSPEECH,ANDTHE CONSTITUTIONALSTATUSOFSOCIALINSTITUTIONS,147UPennLawReview772(1999)

[48]PlannedParenthoodofSe Pa v Casey,505US 833(1992)

[49]PlannedParenthoodMinnesota,NorthDakota,SouthDakotav Rounds,662F3d10725(8thCir 2011).

[50]Ibid.;AntoniaBiggsPh.D.etal,Five-YearSuicidalIdeationTrajectoriesAmongWomenRecevingor BeingDeniedanAbortion,AmericanJouralofPsychiatry,(May2018)

[51]AndrewBeck,ATennesseeLawRequiresDoctorstoLietotheirPatients We’reSuing,ACLU(Sep 2020,)

[52]KevinB O’Reilly,Doctorsbattlestatelawthatforcesthemtomisleadpatients,AMA,(June2019)

[53]Ibid

[54]MedicalAbortion“Reversal”isNotSupportedByScience,TheAmericanCollegeofObstetriciansand Gynecologists(2020)

[55]IanVandewalker,AbortionandInformedConsent:HowBiasedCounselingLawsMandateViolations ofMedicalEthics,19MichiganJournalofGenderandLaw2(2012)

[56]GestationalDevelopmentandCapacityforPain,TheAmericanCollegeofObstetriciansand Gynecologists(2020)

[57]RoyalCollegeofObstetriciansandGynecologists,FetalAwareness:ReviewofResearchand RecommendationsforPractice(March2010).

[58]IanVandewalker,AbortionandInformedConsent:HowBiasedCounselingLawsMandateViolations ofMedicalEthics,19MichiganJournalofGenderandLaw2(2012)

[59]Giventhatprofessionalandcommercialspeechsharemanyofthesameobjectives,thesame standardsofthedisseminationoftruthfulandnon-misleadinginformationappliestoboth Assuch, mandatingphysician’stospreadscientificallyunsupportedinformationnotonlyviolatesthegoalsof professionalandcommercialspeechoutlinedinCasey,butgoesagainstthestate’sinterestof protectingpotentiallifeandwomen’shealth SeePlannedParenthoodofSe Pa v Casey,505US 833, 882(1992)

[60]SD CodifiedLaws34-23A-101(1)(2012)

[61]JenniferM.Keighley,PhysicianSpeechandMandatoryUltrasoundLaws:TheFirstAmendment’sLimit onCompelledIdeologicalSpeech,34CardozoLawReview2347(2012-2013).

[62]PlannedParenthoodMinnesota,NorthDakota,SouthDakotav Rounds,662F3d1072(8thCir 2011)

[63]Priortotheinformedconsentlaw,SouthDakotapassedabillin2004banningabortions;however,it waslatervetoedbytheGovernor SeeHB 1191,2004Leg79thSess (SD 2004)(vetoedMarch9,2004; passedagainbyHouse,butfailedbytheSenateonMarch15,2004)Thisbillcontainedsimilarrhetoricas thesubsequentlawin2005including“itiswithinthepropersphereofstatelegislativeenactmentto resolvethequestionofthebeginningoflife,”(Sec2)andclaimsthatabortionprocedurescanincrease women’sriskof“depression,suicidalideation,[and]suicide”(Sec4) Assuch,thisbillisnotonly ideologicallyassertivebutexhibitsmisleadingandfictitiousinformationtopatient

[64]Texas’informedconsentlawmandatesanaudibledescriptionofdimensionsofthefetus,presence ofcardiacactivity,andthesoundoftheheartbeatbythephysician.SeeTex.Med.ProvidersPerforming AbortionServs v Lakey,806F Supp 2d942,975(WD Tex 2011)

[65]SeeTex Med ProvidersPerformingAbortionServs v Lakey,806F Supp 2d942,975(WD Tex 2011), vacatedinpart,667F3d570(5thCir 2012),171012(4)(D)

[66]RolandBarthes,ThePhotographicMessage,inaBARTHESREADER194,198(SusanSontaged 1982)

[67]82ndLegislativeSessionHouseFloorDebate TEXHOUSEOFREPRESENTATIVES(March3,2011) (statementofSen DanPatrick)

[68]AnnaM Tinsley,PerrySignsSonogramBeforeAbortionBillintoTexasLaw,McClatchyDC(May25, 2011,7:40AM)

[69]H.B.15,2011Leg.82ndSess.(TX2011-2012).

[70]Byprovidingasubstantialobstacleorburdenforthepatientthatoutweighstheirsupposedsocietal benefitandnotadvancingthestate’sinterest,thesestatutesareinviolationofCasey’sUndueBurden Test,whichisalowerlevelofscrutinythanthestrictscrutinyunderRoe SeeWholeWoman’sHealthv Hellerstedt,579US (2016);SeePlannedParenthoodofSe Pa v Casey,505US 874(1992)

[71]TheIdahotriggerlawthatcompletelybannedphysiciansfromgivingabortionsatanystageinthe pregnancy withacceptionsformedicalemergenciesandvictimsofrapeorincest–waspassedin2020 andautomaticallywentintoeffectuponthedecisioninDobbs Furthermore,in2023,theynarrowedthe bantolimitingtherapeandincestexceptiontosolelythefirsttrimester SeeAfterRowFell:Abortion LawsByState:Idaho,CenterforReproductiveRights(2023)

82ndLegislativeSessionHouseFloorDebate TEXHOUSEOFREPRESENTATIVES(March3,2011)

(statementofSen DanPatrick)

AMAv Azar6:19-cv-00318-AA(ED Or Mar 5,2019)

Baker,Brandon,TheHistoryofAbortionAccessintheU.S.,PennToday(Nov.1,2022).

Barthes,Roland,ThePhotographicMessage,inaBARTHESREADER194,198(SusanSontaged.1982). Beck,Andrew,ATennesseeLawRequiresDoctorstoLietotheirPatients.We’reSuing,ACLU(Sep.2020,).

BigelowvVirginia,421US809(1975)

Biggs,AntoniaPhD etal,Five-YearSuicidalIdeationTrajectoriesAmongWomenRecevingorBeing DeniedanAbortion,AmericanJouralofPsychiatry,(May2018)

CenterforReproductiveRights,AfterRowFell:AbortionLawsByState:Idaho,(2023)

CentralHudsonGasandElectricCorp v PublicServiceCommissionofNewYork,447US557(1980) ComstockActof1873,18USC §1461;DineRanana,ScarletLetters:GettingtheHistoryofAbortionand ContraceptionRight,AmericanProgress(Aug 8,2013)

GestationalDevelopmentandCapacityforPain,TheAmericanCollegeofObstetriciansand Gynecologists(2020).

Halberstam,Daniel,COMMERCIALSPEECH,PROFESSIONALSPEECH,ANDTHECONSTITUTIONALSTATUS OFSOCIALINSTITUTIONS,147UPennLawReview772(1999)

Haupt,ClaudiaE,ProfessionalSpeech,125YaleLawJournal40(2016)

HB 15,2011Leg 82ndSess (TX2011-2012)

Keighley,JenniferM,PhysicianSpeechandMandatoryUltrasoundLaws:TheFirstAmendment’sLimiton CompelledIdeologicalSpeech,34CardozoLawReview2347(2012-2013)

Kingv GovernorofNJ,767F3d2016(3dCir 2014)

MedicalAbortion“Reversal”isNotSupportedByScience,TheAmericanCollegeofObstetriciansand Gynecologists(2020)

NationalInstituteofFamilyandLifeAdvocatesv.Becerra,585US 12(2018).

O’Reilly,KevinB.,Doctorsbattlestatelawthatforcesthemtomisleadpatients,AMA,(June2019).

Pickupv Brown,No 2:12-cv-02497-KJM-EFB(ED Cal Sep 15,2015)

PlannedParenthoodGreaterNorthwestvLabrador,1:23-cv-001420BLW(D IdahoMay,2,2023)

PlannedParenthoodMinnesota,NorthDakota,SouthDakotav Rounds,662F3d10725(8thCir 2011) Post,Robert,InformedConsentonAbortion:AFirstAmendmentAnalysisofCompelledPhysicianSpeech, 2007(April12,2007)

PlannedParenthoodofSe Pa v Casey,505US 833,860(1992)

RaulRLabrador,(2023)

RoevWade,410US113(1973)

RoyalCollegeofObstetriciansandGynecologists,FetalAwareness:ReviewofResearchand RecommendationsforPractice(March2010).

Rustv Sullivan,500US173,218(1991)

Schloendorffv SocietyofNY Hosp,105NE 92,93(NY 1914like128-132)

SD CodifiedLaws34-23A-101(1)(2012)

Tex Med ProvidersPerformingAbortionServs v Lakey,806F Supp 2d942,975(WD Tex 2011),vacated inpart,667F3d570(5thCir 2012),171012(4)(D)

Tinsley,AnnaM,PerrySignsSonogramBeforeAbortionBillintoTexasLaw,McClatchyDC(May25,2011, 7:40AM)

THEUNDUEBURDENSTANDARDAFTERWHOLEWOMAN’SHEALTHv HELLERSTEDT,Centerfor ReproductiveRights(July26,2018).

Vandewalker,Ian,AbortionandInformedConsent:HowBiasedCounselingLawsMandateViolationsof MedicalEthics,19MichiganJournalofGenderandLaw2(2012)

VirginiaStateBoardofPharmacyv VirginiaCitizensConsumerCouncil,Inc,425US748,765(1976)

WholeWoman’sHealthvHellerstedt,579US (2016) Wooleyv Maynard,430US705(1977)

Reassessingthe14thAmendment: SupremeCourtDecisionson Gender-MotivatedViolence

IVYXU,HAVERFORDCOLLEGE

Abstract:

This research paper explores the intersection of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and gender-motivated violence, with a focus on the judicial interpretations by the Supreme Court Beginning in 1994, the implementation of The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) fosteredfederalresponsetodomesticviolence,aligningitsprinciplesofcivilprotectionwiththe14th Amendment’s goal of safeguarding civil rights. However, in the early 2000s, the Supreme Court rulings in United States v Morrison and Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v Gonzales significantly curtailed federal provisions concerning equal protection and due process This paper aims to examine the role of the 14th Amendment in gender-based violence, specifically focusing on the diminished federal capacity and increased state autonomy following the Morrison and Gonzales decisions ItarguesthattheCourt’srefusaltoacknowledgethebroadscopeofthe14thAmendment inthesecaseshasfacilitatedstate-leveldecisionsthatpotentiallyunderminetherightsofvictims.

This paper also briefly touches upon the Supreme Court’s approach to the 2nd Amendment, noting its more effective implementation of firearm restrictions in domestic violence cases This discussion serves to contrast the Court’s varying effectiveness across different constitutional realms, and to highlight the particular need for a more comprehensive legal framework that utilizes the 14th Amendment to protect victims of gender-motivated violence The recent VAWA Reauthorization Act of 2022 is recognized as a step forward, yet it is often considered insufficient in addressing the judicialgapsexposedbytheMorrisonandGonzalesdecisions

Introduction

TheViolenceAgainstWomenAct(VAWA)passedbyCongressin1994significantlyshapedthe legallandscapeinaddressingdomesticviolenceandsexualassaultintheUnitedStates VAWArecognizesdomesticviolenceasanationalcrime,issuesfederallegislationtoregulate state-leveljusticesystems,andaffordsprotectionstothevictimsofgender-motivated violence[1]TheenforcementofVAWAalignswiththespiritofthe14thAmendmentbyseeking toensurecivilrightsandlibertyofthevictims,whichwereformerlyconfinedtoonlystate actions However,thejudicialbranchseemslesscooperativeinpromotingvictimjusticeunder thisfederallegislation TheSupremeCourthasstruckdowntwosignificantcasesofgendermotivatedviolence,UnitedStatesv Morrison(2000)andTownofCastleRock,Coloradov Gonzales(2005),onthebasisofthe14thAmendment.Thesedecisionshavecurtailedthescope offederalprovisionsconcerningequalprotectionanddueprocessinthecontextofgenderbasedanddomesticviolence.

Gender-basedviolencecasesofteninvoketwospecificlegaldiscussionsunderthe Constitution:the2ndAmendmentandthe14thAmendment.WhilerecognizingtheCourt’s progressinenforcingguncontrolstodomesticviolenceoffenders,thisresearchpaperwill centeronhowlegaldiscussionunderthe14thAmendmentissubstantiallyobscured.Inregard totheCourt’sopinionofMorrisonandGonzales,Iarguethatbydenyingthefoundationofthe 14thAmendmentargumentingender-motivatedviolencecases,theCourtfailstoenforce enoughfederalprovisionsagainstthesecrimes.Thislackofactionallowsstate-leveldecisions topotentiallyrestrictvictims’rights.Afterpresentingthelimitationsineachcase,Iwilldiscuss potential14thAmendmentclaimstosupportthefollowingarguments:1)Civilrightsunder gender-motivatedviolenceprovisionsshouldnotbedeniedbasedonapublic/private classification,and2)Asdomesticviolencecomprisesasignificantportionofgendermotivatedcrime,thepropertyrightsthatarelinkedtotherestrainingordersfordomestic violencevictimsshouldbeconstitutionallyenforcedandprotected.

CongressionalEnforcementandGender-MotivatedViolence:UnitedStatesv.Morrison Gender-motivatedviolenceencompassesarangeofcrimesthatcausephysicaland psychologicalharmtothevictims.[2]Whilethejudicialdiscoursesurroundingthesecrimes oftenintersectswiththe14thAmendment,therehasbeengrowingconcernoverthe effectivenessofthisamendmentinguaranteeingthecivilrightsofthevictims.

VAWA,acapstonefederallegislationongenderassaultanddomesticviolence,representeda significantfederalresponsetothecrisisofviolenceagainstwomen,anditprovided comprehensivemeasuresforvictimprotectionandperpetratorprosecution.[3]Enactedin 1994,itmarkedaparadigmshiftinhowtheUnitedStatesaddressedtheseissuesbycombining legalactionswithsupportiveservices.VAWAintroducednewfederalcrimes,fundedvictim supportprogramslikesheltersandhotlines,andfacilitatedtrainingforlawenforcementand judicialofficialstoenhancetheirhandlingofsuchcases.[4]PeriodicreauthorizationsofVAWA expandeditsscopeastheyaddressedtheevolvingneedsofdiversevictimgroupsand communities.

GroundedonthereauthorizedVAWAin1996,Morrisonwasinitiatedbyafemaleuniversity studentwhoallegedrapebyfellowstudents.[5]Initsopinion,theCourtquestionedthe constitutionalityofapartofVAWAthat“providesafederalcivilremedyforthevictimsof gender-motivatedviolence.”[6]TheCourtdeniedthisfederalstatuteunderboththe CommerceClauseand§5ofthe14thAmendment.

Thelatter’srejectionwasbasedonconcernsthatextendingCongress’spowerunder§5would underminethe14thAmendment’sintenttomaintainthe“carefullycraftedbalanceofpower betweentheStatesandtheNationalGovernment”[7]CitingtheCivilRightsCasesof1883,the CourtarguedthatCongresslackedtheauthorityunderthe14thAmendmenttoregulate privateactsofdiscrimination[8]TheCourtconcludedthatdiscriminationagainstgendermotivatedcrimevictimswasnotanationwideproblem,andidentifiedthecivilremedyaspure privateconductthatnofederalregulationshouldinfringeupon

Bothformerjudicialopinionandauthorizeddatahaveshownthatadoptingaprivate/public classificationtodenythelegitimacyofthe14thAmendmentcanbedetrimentaltoprotecting therightsofvictims.AsJusticeHarlanarguedinthedissentoftheCivilRightsCases,the14th AmendmentshouldbeinterpretedtoempowerCongresstolegislatebeyondprivate/public distinction.[9]Harlan’sreasoningunderscoresthattheAmendment’sprotectionshouldextend toallformsofdiscriminationthatinfringeuponthefundamentalrightsofcitizens,which justifiesfederalinterventionincasesofgender-motivatedviolencethatareinadequately addressedatthestatelevel.ThisperspectiveisparticularlyrelevantincaseslikeMorrison, evenifthedeprivationofcivilrightsisbasedongender,ratherthanrace.Gender-based violenceshouldberecognizedasaformofsocietaldiscrimination,ratherthanbeing diminishedtoamereprivatedisputeorcivildamageissue.TheCourt’snarrowfocusin Morrisonrestrictsfuturejudicialactionsagainstdiscriminativegender-motivatedviolence. TheDepartmentofJusticereportsthatin1995,forevery1,000femaleresidentsaged12or older,fiveexperiencedsexualviolence.Amongthesevictims,only“28percentofrapeorsexual assaultvictimizationsagainstfemaleswerereportedtothepolice.”[10]Thisdataprovesthe insufficiencyoflocalinvestigationsongender-motivatedviolence.Evenworse,forthose28 percentofcasesthatarereported,statelegislationcouldfailtoprovideadequatecivil remedies.[11]AfterMorrison,thepossibilityofseekingreparationsfordamagethroughfederal legislationhasbeenforeclosed.

Underthismisleadingscopeofprivate/publicdistinctionformedbyMorrison,thecivilrightsof gender-motivatedviolencevictimsarenotadequatelyprotected.Asstateofficialscontinually failtoenforceenoughprovisionsagainstthesecrimes,somearguethattheycarry“pervasive stereotypesaboutwomenandthefamily.”[12]Thisrevictimizationcanbetiedtothelongstandingpatriarchalnormsthathavedeprivedthefundamentalrightsofwomen.Specifically fromalegalperspective,althoughtheReconstructionAmendments,ratifiedbetween1865and 1870,endorsedequalcitizenshiptoall,women’srighttovotewasnotgranteduntilthe19th Amendmentwasratifiedin1920.Allgender-baseddistinctionsdeservemoreattentionthat scrutinizesrootedissuesofsocialandpoliticalinequalities;thisjustifiesthecivildamage remedyasasocietalobligationthatneedstobeenforcedbyfederallegislation.

AlthoughonecouldarguethatthecivilremedyinMorrisonisnotadequatelysupportedby§5 duetotheambiguityaroundcongressionallegislation,theimportanceofanalyzingMorrison underthe14thAmendmentremainsevidentthroughtheEqualProtectionClause.Astheequal protectionargumentencompassesanaffirmativepower,itrequiresthestate“toexplainwhyit couldnotemploylessrestrictivemeans”ifdiscriminativeactsareperceived.[13]Thisprinciple isexemplifiedbytheCourt’sdecisioninLovingv.Virginia,alandmarkcasein1967that challengedracialdiscriminationinmarriagelaws.InLoving,theCourtappliedtheequal protectionclausetodismantlelawsthatinfringeduponfundamentalrightsandruledthat Virginia’slawprohibitinginterracialmarriagewasunconstitutional.

SinceLoving,theCourthasprohibitedstatesfromarbitrarilyusingracialclassificationsin mattersofmarriage[14]Similarly,inMorrison,theCourtshouldhaveacknowledgedthe unequaltreatmentofwomenthatresultsfromthestate’sfailuretofullyconsiderthesocietal impactsofgender-motivatedviolence

ThegoalofequalprotectionalignswithVAWA’s:topromotetheequalityofwomenby penalizingactsofviolence Thefederalcivilremedymeetstheequalprotectionrationale, whichoffersalegalavenueforvictimsofgender-motivatedviolencetoseekcompensatory andpunitivedamages[15]Byprovidingthisremedy,VAWAconfrontsstateactionsthat infringeuponvictims’rights,showcasingtheneedtoupholdcivilrightsbeyondthe public/privatedistinction,andultimatelyguaranteeingequalprotectionforallvictims.[16]

ProceduralDueProcessandDomesticViolence:TownofCastleRock,Coloradov.Gonzales

Domesticviolence,acrucialcomponentofgender-motivatedviolence,representsthe particularrealmofintimaterelationshipsandfamilydynamics.[17]FromMorrisontoGonzales, bothcasesinvokedadistinctionofstate-levelandfederalpoweranddeniedcertainrightsof gender-motivatedviolencevictimsunderthe14thAmendment.WhileMorrisonarguedthat federallawisnotentitledtointerveneindamageremediesofgender-motivatedviolence under§5,theCourtofGonzalesbaseditsclaimupontheproceduraldueprocessrightsof domesticviolencevictims.

InGonzales,theCourtquestionedwhetherthepropertyinterestofJessicaGonzales,the victim,whosechildrenweremurderedbyherhusband,wasconstitutionallyprotectedbya state-enforcedrestrainingorder.[18]ThecaseemergedwhenGonzales’childrenwere murderedbyherestrangedhusband,despiteherhavingarestrainingorderagainsthim. Gonzalesarguedthatthepolice’sneglectinenforcingtherestrainingorder,despiteher multiplecallsforpoliceintervention,constitutedabreachofherproceduraldueprocess rights.[19]Ina7-2decision,theCourtruledagainstthevictimandstatedthatproceduraldue processdidnotproclaimthisinterest.Thisrulingwassignificantasitdealtwiththecomplex interactionsbetweenstateresponsibility,federalconstitutionalrights,andthedeeply personalcontextofdomesticviolence.

Themajorityopinioncontainssignificantshortcomingsinprotectingdomesticviolence victims.TheCourtfirstcategorizedthepropertyinterestinvolvedinarestrainingorderasa ‘benefit’–implyingitisatangibleentitlementratherthananabstractneedordesire,which thevictimmightstruggletosubstantiate.[20]Followingthisclaim,theCourtarguedthateven iftheorderismandatory,thepolicearenotobligedtoenforcetheorder.Fromahistorical modality,theCourtstatedthat“awell-establishedtraditionofpolicediscretionhaslong coexistedwithapparentlymandatoryarreststatutes.”[21]Uptothispoint,theCourthad grantedfullflexibilitytostate-levelprovisionenforcementoftherestrainingorder. Intermsofthestateandpoliceadministration,thediscretionaryenforcementofrestraining ordersfundamentallyunderminesthepurposetosafeguardvictims.Thiskindofpolice discretiondoesnotcomplywiththeveryreasonwhyvictimsseekstateprotection.TheCourt adverselynarrowsthescopeofjusticeandpotentiallyexcludesessentialneedsforsupporting domesticviolencevictims,suchastheprovisionofbasicsafetyforthewomenandchildren experiencingtheviolenceandtheirfuturesocio-economicreparation.Theseneedsmaynotbe adequatelyaddressediftheyarenotrecognizedaspartofthemandatorystate’s responsibilities.Asaresult,theinadequatestateinterventioneliminates“proceduraldue processclaims

insituationswherestateshaveanylaworpolicyregardingdomesticviolence”[22]

Thedecisiontoeliminateproceduraldueprocessclaimsinsituationswherestateshaveany laworpolicyregardingdomesticviolencestemsfromacomplexjudicialinterpretationofthe 14thAmendment[23]TheCourt’srationalewascenteredaroundtheideathatthe enforcementofarestrainingorderdoesnotconstituteapropertyrightguaranteedby proceduraldueprocess Thisinterpretationiscontroversialbecauseitfailstoconsiderthe substantiverightsatstakeindomesticviolencescenarios,restrictingtheimplementationof therestrainingordertoamereformalityratherthanacriticaltoolforprotection Besidesthestate’slackofrestrainingorderenforcement,thejusticesystemalsofailsto understandvictimhoodcomprehensively,therebyestablishingfewerjudicialprotections againstdomesticviolence.FollowingMorrison,mostdomesticviolencecasesfallunderstate jurisdiction.Thisfocusoftentendstoshieldofficialsfromliabilityandobscurethestate’s responsibilitytoprovideeffectivejudicialandsocialremedies.Precludingthediscussionof domesticviolenceunderdueprocessclaim“isnotaconstitutionalrequirement,”butalimited decisionsolelymadebythejusticesystem.[24]Thisapproach,adeliberatejudicialchoice,not onlyconstrainsthescopeofdueprocessclaimsfordomesticviolencebutalsofailsto adequatelyrecognizeandaddressthecomplexitiesofvictimhood,leadingtosignificant judicialblockagesthatdiscardthefundamentalrightsofthevictim.

AnalternativeclaimtoGonzalescanbebuiltfromasubstantivedueprocessperspective. Ratherthanentitlingpropertyinteresttosolelyproceduraljustice,onecouldapproach Gonzalesbyconsideringtheenforcementofrestrainingordersasoneoftheunenumerated civilrights.Domesticviolenceisatypeofinterpersonalviolence“boundtotheinstitutionsof marriageandfamily.”[25]LongsinceGriswoldv.Connecticut(1965),theCourthasbroughtup thesubstantivedueprocessclaimthatrightstomarriageandfamilyrelationshipsare fundamentaltosocietyandtoindividuals,andshouldbeguaranteedbytheConstitution.[26] Therefore,inGonzales,thepropertyinterestsofreceivingstateprotectionsunderthe restrainingordercanbeinterpretedunderthisunenumeratedrightsframework.This approachwouldconsidertheenforcementoftheorderasessentialtosafeguardingthe fundamentalrightsofthevictim,therebysharingGriswold’ssubstantivedueprocessclaim.

GunControlandDomesticViolence

Ontheotherhand,theCourthasrecognizedtheseverityoffirearmpossessionindomestic violencecasesandcontinuedtostrengthenitsenforcement.18USC§922(g)(9),enactedin 1996,definesaspecificcategoryofunlawfulpersonsas“whohasbeenconvictedinanycourt ofamisdemeanorcrimeofdomesticviolence,”whileleavingthemeaningof“misdemeanor crimeofdomesticviolence”ambiguous.[27]TheCourthasmaderemarkableprogressin definingtheextenttowhichattackersshouldbeprohibitedfrombearingguns.In2009,the CourtunderUnitedStatesv.Hayesheldthatadomesticrelationshipisnotadefining componentofthepredicateoffense,therebywideningtherangeofconvictionsthatcould triggerthefirearmsbanunderthisstatute.FollowingHayes,UnitedStatesv.Castleman(2014) andVoisinev.UnitedStates(2016)eachclarified“misdemeanorcrime”asincludingindirect physicalforceandunattemptedassault.[28]Sofar,§922(g)(9)hasbeenpolishedto encompassabroaderspectrumofdomesticviolenceoffenses,whichreflectstheCourt’s commitmenttobetterprotectvictimsfromfirearm-relatedthreats.

IntermsoftheongoingUnitedStatesv Rahimi(2023),theCourt’srulingin2024appears promisinginredefininghowrestrainingordersareappliedtoperpetratorsofdomestic violence Thisfollowsthe2022decisioninNewYorkStateRifle&PistolAssociationInc v Bruen,whichstruckdownaNewYorkstatelawrequiringindividualstodemonstrateaspecial needforself-protectiontoobtainalicensetocarryaconcealedfirearminpublic TheRahimi casecouldbeviewedasaresponsetoBruen,specificallyaddressingconcernsaboutthe enforceabilityofrestrainingordersfordomesticviolenceoffenders

IntheoralargumentofRahimi,theSolicitorGeneralarguedfromboththeprincipleof responsibilityandoriginalistperspectivethatdomesticviolenceattackersmightcarry “unusualdangerbeyondtheordinarycitizen.”[29]Thisargumentpresentsthecriticalrationale forstate-levelfirearmpossessionlaws,illustratinghowdomesticviolencecrimesshouldnever beexcusedunderanytolerance.Overall,theevolvingjudicialdiscussiononthe2nd Amendmentinthecontextofdomesticviolencerepresentssignificantprogressinaddressing thiscomplexissue.

Conclusion

Thispaperaimstopointouttheinefficiencyinitiatedbystateinstitutionsthatultimatelyled toanationwidefailuretoprotectthevictimsofgender-motivatedviolence.InMorrisonand Gonzales,theCourtignoredtheessentialdiscussionsofthe14thAmendmentbylendingtoo mucharbitrarypowertothestate,therebyforeclosingfurtherjusticeforthevictimsunder equalprotectionanddueprocessclaims.

WhiletheoralargumentofRahimishowsapromisingsignthattheCourtwillrejectdomestic violenceattackerstobearfirearms,[30]ithasbeenalmosttenyearssincetheCourthasnot invokedprimarydiscussionsontheprovisionagainstgender-motivatedviolenceunderthe 14thAmendment.Eventhoughthepotentialharmstovictimsandsocietaloutputsbroughtby gender-motivatedcrimeshavebeenacknowledgedtoacertainpoint,mereprovisionongun controlisnotenough.Asthestateauthoritieslackthechecksandbalancestoeffectively protecttherightsofthevictims,itisessentialforCongresstoestablishfederalprovisions againsteverycauseofviolence.

TheVAWAReauthorizationActof2022wassignedbytheBidenAdministration,markinga significantstepintheongoingefforttocombatgender-motivatedviolenceandtoenhance protectionsforvictims.Itsproposalincludes“increasingculturally-specificresourcesand supportforsurvivorsandcommunities,”[31]whichmayaddressthediverseneedsofvictims fromvariedbackgrounds.However,ascaseslikeMorrisonandGonzalesdemonstrate,thereis anurgentneedforthelegalsystemtoevolvebeyonditscurrentlimitations,especiallyinits interpretationofthe14thAmendmentinthecontextofgender-basedviolence.TheSupreme Court’shesitancetoengagerobustlywiththeseissuesunderlinestheinadequatecommitment offederallegislationtofillgapsleftbystatejurisdictions.

[1]TheNationalDomesticViolenceHotline,“ViolenceAgainstWomenAct(VAWA),” wwwthehotlineorg/resources/violence-against-women-act-vawa/

[2]UNHCR,“Gender-BasedViolence,”wwwunhcrorg/us/what-we-do/protect-humanrights/protection/gender-based-violence

[3]TheNationalDomesticViolenceHotline,“ViolenceAgainstWomenAct(VAWA),” wwwthehotlineorg/resources/violence-against-women-act-vawa/ [4]Ibid

[5]Althoughthevictimreportedbeingassaultedbytwostudents,onlyMorrisonwasfound guilty SeetheOpinionoftheCourtinUnitedStatesv Morrison,529US 598(2000)

[6]UnitedStatesv Morrison,529US 598(2000)

[7]Ibid.

[8]Ibid.

[9]CivilRightsCases,109U.S.3(1883).

[10]BureauofJusticeStatistics,“FemaleVictimsofSexualViolence,1994-2010,”U.S. DepartmentofJustice,bjs.ojp.gov/press-release/female-victims-sexual-violence-1994-2010.

[11]Ibid.

[12]ChristinaR.Drum,Power,Legitimation,andDrawingDistinctions:Renderingof‘public’and ‘private’inUnitedStatesDomesticViolencePolicymaking(UniversityofNevada,LasVegas, 2004),https://ezproxy.haverford.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/dissertationstheses/power-legitimation-drawing-distinctions-rendering/docview/305073195/se-2.

[13]RevaB.Siegel,SerenaMayeri,andMelissaMurray,“EqualProtectioninDobbsandBeyond: HowStatesProtectLifeInsideandOutsideoftheAbortionContext,”ColumbiaJournalof GenderandtheLaw43,no.1(2022):67-97,https://ezproxy.haverford.edu/login?

url=https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/equal-protection-dobbs-beyond-howstates-protect/docview/2777765566/se-2.

[14]Lovingv.Virginia,388U.S.1(1967).

[15]MichaelR.Dimino,“Yes,Virginia(Tech),ourGovernmentisOneofLimitedPowers:United Statesv.Morrison,120S.Ct.1740(2000),”HarvardJournalofLawandPublicPolicy24,no.3 (2001):895-920,accessed[date],https://ezproxy.haverford.edu/login? url=https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/yes-virginia-tech-our-government-is-onelimited/docview/235204226/se-2.

[16]Ibid.

[17]U.S.DepartmentofJustice,“DomesticViolence,”www.justice.gov/ovw/domestic-violence.

[18]TownofCastleRockv.Gonzales,545U.S.748(2005).

[19]Ibid.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Ibid.

[22]LauraSingleton,RethinkingPrivateViolence:HowConstitutionsStructureStateResponses toDomesticViolence(TheUniversityofWisconsin-Madison,2013), https://ezproxy.haverford.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/dissertationstheses/rethinking-private-violence-how-constitutions/docview/1348977231/se-2.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Ibid.

[25]Drum,Power,Legitimation,andDrawingDistinctions.

[26]Griswoldv Connecticut,381US 479(1965)

[27]LegalInformationInstitute,“18US Code§922-UnlawfulActs,”CornellLawSchool, wwwlawcornelledu/uscode/text/18/922

[28]Ibid

[29]OralArgumentsTranscriptforUnitedStatesv Rahimi,SupremeCourtoftheUnited States,2023,wwwsupremecourtgov/oral arguments/argument transcripts/2023/22915 986bpdf

[30]Ibid

[31]TheWhiteHouse “FactSheet:Biden-HarrisAdministrationCelebratestheTwenty-Ninth AnniversaryoftheViolenceAgainstWomenAct”September13,2023 www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/13/fact-sheet-biden-harrisadministration-celebrates-the-twenty-ninth-anniversary-of-the-violence-against-womenact/.

Ballou,Kate “FailuretoProtect:OurCivilSystem’sChronicPunishmentofVictimsof DomesticViolence”NotreDameJournalofLaw,Ethics&PublicPolicy31,no 2(2017):355-382 BureauofJusticeStatistics “FemaleVictimsofSexualViolence,1994-2010”US Department ofJustice https://bjsojpgov/press-release/female-victims-sexual-violence-1994-2010 CivilRightsCases,109US 3(1883)

Dimino,MichaelR “Yes,Virginia(Tech),ourGovernmentisOneofLimitedPowers:United Statesv Morrison,120S Ct 1740(2000)”HarvardJournalofLawandPublicPolicy24,no 3 (2001):895-920 https://ezproxyhaverfordedu/login?url=https://wwwproquestcom/scholarlyjournals/yes-virginia-tech-our-government-is-one-limited/docview/235204226/se-2 Drum,ChristinaR Power,Legitimation,andDrawingDistinctions:Renderingof‘public’and ‘private’inUnitedStatesDomesticViolencePolicymaking.UniversityofNevada,LasVegas, 2004.https://ezproxy.haverford.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/dissertationstheses/power-legitimation-drawing-distinctions-rendering/docview/305073195/se-2. Griswoldv.Connecticut,381U.S.479(1965).

Liptak,Adam.“KeyTakeawaysfromSupremeCourt’sSecondAmendmentCaseonDomestic Violence.”CNN,November7,2023.www.cnn.com/2023/11/07/politics/takeaways-supremecourt-second-amendment-domestic-violence-rahimi/index.html. Lovingv.Virginia,388U.S.1(1967).

LegalInformationInstitute.“DomesticViolence.”CornellLawSchool. www.law.cornell.edu/wex/domestic violence.

LegalInformationInstitute.“18U.S.Code§922-UnlawfulActs.”CornellLawSchool. www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/922.

NationalCoalitionAgainstDomesticViolence(NCADV).“Statistics”.ncadv.org/STATISTICS. SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates.“OralArgumentsTranscriptforUnitedStatesv.Rahimi.” 2023.www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/argument transcripts/2023/22-915 986b.pdf. Siegel,RevaB.,SerenaMayeri,andMelissaMurray.“EqualProtectioninDobbsandBeyond: HowStatesProtectLifeInsideandOutsideoftheAbortionContext.”ColumbiaJournalof GenderandtheLaw43,no.1(2022):67-97.

Singleton,Laura.RethinkingPrivateViolence:HowConstitutionsStructureStateResponsesto DomesticViolence.TheUniversityofWisconsin-Madison,2013. https://ezproxy.haverford.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/dissertationstheses/rethinking-private-violence-how-constitutions/docview/1348977231/se-2. TheNationalDomesticViolenceHotline.“ViolenceAgainstWomenAct(VAWA).” www.thehotline.org/resources/violence-against-women-act-vawa/.

TheWhiteHouse.“FactSheet:Biden-HarrisAdministrationCelebratestheTwenty-Ninth AnniversaryoftheViolenceAgainstWomenAct.”September13,2023. www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/13/fact-sheet-biden-harrisadministration-celebrates-the-twenty-ninth-anniversary-of-the-violence-against-womenact/.

TownofCastleRockv.Gonzales,545U.S.748(2005).

UNHCR.“Gender-BasedViolence.”https://www.unhcr.org/us/what-we-do/protect-humanrights/protection/gender-based-violence.

UnitedStatesAttorney’sOffice.“FederalDomesticViolenceLaws.”U.S.DepartmentofJustice. www.justice.gov/usao-wdtn/victim-witness-program/federal-domestic-violence-laws. UnitedStatesv.Morrison,529U.S.598(2000).

U.S.DepartmentofJustice.“DomesticViolence.”https://www.justice.gov/ovw/domesticviolence.

England1215-1307:Courts,Due Process,andJusticeafter MagnaCarta

AVERYFARINO,NEWYORKUNIVERITY

Abstract:

In the Crypt of the United States Capitol building lies the Wyems copy of the Magna Carta, a replica of one of the four surviving documents of its kind from 1215 The Architect of the United States Capitol highlights that this document provided a written foundation for concepts of individual rights and liberties to be realized, ascribing the formation and tone of the American Declaration of Independence to its influence[1] American political memory holds fondly this document, its revolutionary ideals, and its influence on American independence But this causal, “revolutionary” framework for understanding and remembering Magna Carta is far from complete The first issuance of the Magna Carta was an episode in the already developing legal culture formulated by King Henry II (1154-1189) and had less immediate implications than often implied Assessing this document and the legal terrain which evolved in the century to follow must question if a centralized justice system arose in response to the 1215 agreement and to what extent medievalEnglishcommonersexperiencedthechangingidealsoffairness,liberty,anddue process that the charter stipulates. In such an analysis, it becomes clear that strengthening notions of due process in medieval England’s first century of Magna Carta reflected a long evolution of justice and truth, rather than flowing directly from the charter’simplementationoranewlystructuredcourtsystem.

HenryII

HenryIIislargelyresponsibleforestablishingthejudicialcultureofEnglishcommonlawthat servedasaprecursortoMagnaCartaeradevelopments,mostnotablythroughhisreformsof courtorganizationanddueprocess TheWritofRight(circa1188-90)wasHenry’sweaponof choice,institutinganappellatelevelprocedurethroughwhichtenantscouldbringgrievances totheirlord’scourt Thisroyalwritcompelledlordsto‘dofullright’bytheirtenants,andis emblematicofmoderndueprocess[2]Thisassertionoftheroyalcourt’scentralauthority bolsteredthenotionoflegalprotectionandexpandedthejurisdictionofthesehighercourtsto includethedomainoflanddisputes,whichwerepreviouslyreservedforlocalcourts Whilethe MagnaCartalaterrespondedtobarrons’grievancesagainstKingJohn,theWritofRightwas publicfacingandattemptedtoreducelocalabusesofauthorityagainstcommonersinthe nameofabenevolentmonarch.

HenryIIalsointroducedreformtotrialbyordealthroughhis1166AssizeofClarendon,which canbetracedastheoriginofthemoderngrandjurysystem.[3]TheAssizeheldthat accusations,whichthenledtotrialbyordeal,couldonlyoriginateintheeventthatajuryof twelveneighborsprovidedincriminatingtestimonyunderoath.[4]Thissystematizedmethodof accusationlaidthefoundationforjurytrialandthecentralroleoffairnessandduediligence inEnglishcommonlaw.Itisalsoimportanttonotethattheseearlygrandjurieswereanother enlargingfactorforroyalauthority.Henry’snewfoundabilitytoplacehisloyaljusticesand sheriffsamongtheseorganizations,withoutadirectpowerconflictwithbarons,emboldened theKing’sinfluenceinthejudicialsystem.[5]HenryII’sconsolidationofroyalauthorityand administrativecontroldeservescreditforitsmajorroleinthecentralizationoftheEnglish justicesystemanditscontributionstoestablishingawidespreadapplicationofdueprocess. Thisostensiblespiritoffairness,whileperhapsnotHenry’sexpressinterest,madepossiblethe laterlegalreformsofthetwelfthandthirteenthcenturies.

MedievalistSaraButlerfurthercorroboratestheroleofHenryIIandpre-1215reformsinthe developmentoftheEnglishlegalsystem.ChallengingtherevolutionarytaleofMagnaCarta, Butlernotesthatthenotionofdueprocesswasalreadyingrainedintotheregion’slegal cultureatthetimeofthecharter’sissue.[6]Butlermakestheseclaimswithreferencetothe centralroleofconsent.Inastrangesense,trialbyordealwaseasierforbothjusticesand jurorstorationalize,asitleftthefateoftheaccusedtoaninfallibleGod.Withthetransitionto jurytrialmandatedbytheFourthLateranCouncil,consentwasneededtoeffectivelyfillthis gap protectingthedefendant'snaturalrightsaswellasinsulatingjusticesandjurorsfrom theemotionalburdenofadeathsentence.[7]AccordingtoAmericanconstitutionalhistorian LeonardLevy,earlyEnglishjurytrialstendedtoincludeanumberofjurorsthatweremembers ofthejuryofpresentmentforthesamecase,intendedtoreducethedefendant’srightstoan unbiasedproceeding.However,theroleofconsentwassosacrosanctthatiteventuallyforced acompleteseparationofthegrandjuryandtrialjuryproceedingstoalleviatethisissue.[8] TheMagnaCartawasalsoprecededbyPopeInnocentIII’s(1198-1216)FourthLateranCouncil, whichwasconvenedinAprilof1215.Asidefromdemandingthetransitionfromordealtojury, theFourthLaterandelineatedfurtherrightstobeaffordedtolaysociety:plaintiffscouldnot overburdentheaccusedwithlaborandexpensesintheirtrial,excommunicationrequireddue process,andthoseexcommunicatedunfairlyhadarighttoappealtheircase.[9]TheFourth Lateran’sseventycanonsandtheMagnaCarta’ssixty-threechapterswereadoptedinsuch closetime,andoverlappedsosignificantlyintheirdedicationtojusticeanddueprocess,that itisimpossibletoexamineeitherinavacuum.

TheircommonalitiesandproximityalsoindicatethattheprioritiesofEnglishsocietymade possible,oreveninstigated,thepronouncementofsuchboldframeworks Itisalsointeresting tonotethatjuristsgratefullycreditedthePopewithhavingcreated[10]thesefreedoms the presumptionofinnocenceinparticular ButPopeInnocentdidnotestablishthispresumption ofinnocencejustasMagnaCartadidnotestablishdueprocessandjurytrial The institutionalizationofthesefundamentalrightsandtheirreachamongcommonpeoplewas disseminatedslowly fromthereignofHenryII,tothesemajordevelopments,andeventually totheturnofthefourteenthcentury,whenitwaswidelybelievedthateverypersonhada guaranteedrighttodueprocess[11]BytracingtheimplementationofMagnaCarta throughoutthereignswhichfolloweditsinitialissue,itbecomesmoreclearthatthemedieval Englishlegalsphereexperiencedapunctuatedequilibriumofliberalizationbothbeforeand afterMagnaCarta.

HenryIII

ExaminingMagnaCarta’seffectsoncommonsocietyrequiresinquiryintoitsenforcement mechanisms.UponenteringthereignofHenryIII(1216to1272),aproclamationimmediately informedthepublicthatMagnaCartawouldbereconfirmed.[12]However,the1216versionof theCharteromittedseveralchapters[13]thatwerepresentintheoriginalissue,which historianRalphTurnerbelievestobeaconsequenceofbothcivilwarsandFrenchsoldiers threateningtheEnglishterritory.[14]Inwhatcanbedescribedasamedievalrally-around-theflageffect,HenryIII’sbaronsandlocalauthorityfiguresrecognizedthatthecentral governmentneededtorecoveritsstrength inauthorityandincome inordertoprotectthe longevityofthekingdom.[15]However,thisdeferencetoHenry’sleadershipwasnotlonglasting.

WhilethekingdidobserveMagnaCarta’sprovisionsintimesofneed,healsovieweditasa forcedandunjustifiedusurpationofauthorityfromthebarons.[16]Thus,Henryevadedthe charterwheneverpossible,oftencorruptedbyhiscloseassociates.TheKing’sforeignrelatives mostnotablytheProvençalandSavoyardunclesofhiswife,Eleanor,andhisPoitevinhalfbrothers,theLusignans experiencedthemostlavishadvantages.Thiscorruptionwas accompaniedbyaninfiltrationofthejusticesystem,perpetratedbyjudgeswhocouldbe easilybribedinadjudicatingcasesforHenry’sfavorites.Thisinjusticehasbeenheavily documented;inalistofgrievancesagainstHenrythatwasproducedforKingLouisIXof France(1226to1270),itisnotedthat“‘afterthearrivalofcertainalienswhomtheking, scorninghisnativesubjects,drewtohiscounsels,nojusticecouldbeobtainedin[his]court againstthesemenoragainstcertaincourtiers.’”[17]Naturally,theseviolationsinfuriatedthe baronsandinspiredcriesforreconfirmationofMagnaCartaamongcommoners.Regardless, anyreformstothecharterwouldaffordbaronsnosubstantialremedyagainstabusesofthe monarch,soHenry’sreignalsobroughtinthefirstEnglishParliament.Thisenforcementgroup wascomposedof24baronswhoessentiallyuprootedroyalauthority,andtookonthenameof “madparliament”intheirshorttenure.Thegroup’sretributionevenconsistedofpunishing obediencetosomeofthemonarch’slegitimateordersascrimesagainstthestate.[18]Inthe tumultuouspoliticallandscapeofHenry’sreignonethingremainscoherent:ademocratizing publicwhoseconsistentcallsforreconfirmationandreformremindedtheKingofhisnew limitationsandthepeopleoftheiragencyassubjects.Whiletheremaynothavebeenaclear enforcementmechanismoftheCharter’searlyforms,itnonethelessbecameanembodiment oflibertythatbothlocalleadersandlaysocietyappealedtooverseveraldecades.

EdwardI

NotunlikeHenry,EdwardI(1272-1307)facedaseriesofneverendingconflict,bothinternaland international,whichforcedhimintomanyconcessionsandreforms Edwardwassimilartohis predecessorinhisopendisrespectoftheCharterandtheresultingpowerstrugglesbetween himselfandhisbarons Inonesuccessfulexampleofthiscorruption,Edwardbribedhisbarons toturnablindeyetohisoverburdensometaxesinexchangefortherighttolevytaxesontheir owntenets[19]Withareignhamperedbyquidproquonegotiations,itisthusshockingthat Edwardisrememberedasthe‘EnglishJustinian’Thisdisparityhighlightstheundueemphasis placedonbothmedievalleadersandpoliticalevents,ratherthanonindividuals,ininstituting thejudicialandadministrativereformsofthisage DuringEdward’sreign,layindividuals begantoappealtotheMagnaCartaincommonlawcourtswhenbringinggrievancesagainst theKingandhisofficials.ExemplifyingthegradualadvancementofMagnaCarta’sreachinto commonsociety,Edward’ssubjectsandtheirlegaladvisorsprovidednotonlyperfunctory mentionofMagnaCarta’sideals,asoccurredinHenry’sreign,butrathercitedspecific chaptersinmakingtheirclaims.[20]Thoughthislegalinfrastructurewasstilllargelyreserved forliteratesociety,MagnaCarta andmoreimportantlytheexpectationofdueprocess was nonethelessadvancedinEdward’sreign.AssistinginthisadvancementwasEdward’suseof MagnaCarta’sphraseologyinmuchofhisownlegislation meaningthatthewordingand historyoftheGreatCharterwouldcontinuetobecitedincourtsandstudiedbystudentsof thelaw.[21]Furthermore,thisperiodexperiencedasolidificationofcourts’jurisdictions,an enforcementoflawsvigorousenoughtodissuaderobbery,theformationofthejusticesofthe peace,andincreasedefficiencyoflocalpoliceregulations.[22]Itiscertainthatthefirstone hundredyearsofMagnaCartabroughtaboutsignificantchangesandjudicialreforms,but thisprogresscontinuedtooperatemainlywithintheparametersofexistingpowerdynamics andenforcementmechanisms.

ExtralegalEnforcement

AlthoughthejudicialspiritofMagnaCartacirculatedduringHenryIIIandEdwardI’sreigns,it isalsorelevanttoidentifywhopreciselyactedasthearbiteroftheCharter’smanyreforms.In spiteofamorecentralizedcourtsystem,aconsolidationofadministrativecontrolunderthe monarch,andanewlyformedparliament,enforcementlargelycontinuedtobecarriedoutby theChurch.TheMagnaCarta,eveninitsmostidealistforms,neverpresentedajudicialmeans ofenforcementagainsttheKings’violations.Instead,theoriginal1215issuecontaineda securityclauseinchapter61whichcharged25baronswiththisduty.[23]Thisprovisionstated thatanyfourbarons,uponbeingmadeawareofanybreakinthepeaceorlibertiesofthe Charter,could withthesupportofthecommunity dispossesscastles,lands,andfurther possessionsfromtransgressors.ThisprovisionwasanembarrassmentforKingJohn,who quicklydisavowedtheentireagreement.UponthefirstreissuanceunderHenryIIIin1216,this chapterhad,unsurprisingly,beenremovedentirely.

Theabsenceofchapter61leftonlyonealternativeforenforcement:excommunication.The Churchsupportedthe1225MagnaCartaand,initsaimtopreventanyfurtherviolations,it agreedtosentenceexcommunicationuponanyviolators.[24]Eveninanalyzingtheritual throughwhichtheKingsandbishopsconferredthispartnership,itisclearthatbishopswere centralintheMagnaCartaera’spoliticalculture.Ina1237greatassemblyatSt.Katherine’s chapelofWestminsterAbbey,theKingandbishopsmadetheirpledgebycandlelight, extinguishingthelighttosymbolizethecondemnedsoulsofthoseviolatorstheyplannedto excommunicate.

ThepapacyrepresentedatruespiritualfearforKings,barons,andcommoners;this ceremonialexchangecapitalizedonthatfearanddemonstratedastrongcommitmentof bishopsasquasi-judicialfigures Furthermore,Englishbishopshadanintuitivemotivationto threatenexcommunicationpubliclyandloudly,believingthataviolationofMagnaCarta threatenedthesanctityofthesoul[25]Thus,theirdramaticritualsweredesignedtoreacha wideaudience,whichfurtheralignedtheChurchwiththeexpansionofthejusticesystem MedievalhistoriansDawnOliverandST AmblerseemtoagreethattheroadfromMagna Cartawaslongandjagged,butAmblerismorereluctanttoacceptthisageasapreludeto theparliamentarystatebecauseofthisdecidedroleofbishoprics Thisperiod’sfailureto meaningfullyseparatethedueprocessoflawandtheocraticpowerstructurespresentsyet anothercautionagainstoveremphasizingtheroleofMagnaCartainEngland’spathtowards representativegovernment.

MagnaCartaandtheLocalCommunity

SomehistoriansandpoliticalscientistshaveanalyzedMagnaCarta’sagencyinEngland’s democratictransitionthroughitsphysicaltext.However,consultingthedocumentalonecould notcrediblypointtotheCharter’sprimarybeneficiaries.CharlesHowardMcIlwain,alawyer andacademic,makesthecaseinhis1914ColumbiaLawReviewarticlethattheChartercould nothaveintendedtoguaranteelegalprotectiontoallEnglishmen.McIlwaindissectstheLatin phrasesjudiciumparium[trialbyjury]andlexterrae[lawoftheland,alsointerpretedasdue processofthelaw]toestablishthisargument.[26]Naturally,thebaronsatRunnymede,with whomtheoriginalcharterwasagreedupon,didnotholdthesamepreconceptionsaboutlex terraeasmodernhistorians;tothem,the“lawoftheland”couldonlyhavereferredtopreexistingtrialproceduresandlegalprotections.Thus,theCharterwasnotuniversalnor expansiveandonlybecamesothroughanindirect,incrementalinfluenceofcommonsociety. Thislanguage-basedinterpretationseemstomirrorthedefactousageofMagnaCartainthe decadesfollowingits1215issue,particularlyintheEnglishshires.Witheachreconfirmation proclaimedbycountysheriffs,itstranslationintoFrenchandEnglish,anditsrecitationin courtsandchurches,theMagnaCartabecamepubliclyavailableinmanyways.Among membersofcountysociety,forwhomthebehaviorofsheriffswasacentralgrievance,Magna Cartaallowedforspecificprotections.Chapter42ofthe1217Charter,reiteratedin1225,strictly regulatedsheriff'sholdingsofcountycourtstobeconductedonlyoncepermonth.For example,in1226,thesheriffofLincolnshireviolatedthisprovisionandreconvenedthecourtfor aseconddayduetoalargenumberofcasesleftonthedocket.Thenextday,twoknights preventedanyfurtherproceedingsinthenameofLincolnshire’stypicalforty-dayintervalsand theMagnaCarta’sprotections.[27]Evidently,localcommunitieswereendowedwith confidenceandlegalstandingbyMagnaCartaevenbeforethereignofEdwardI.Thisslow diffusionoflegalempowermentseemstohavefirstoperatedwithinthelocaldomainsoflaw thatcommonsocietyhadcloseaccessto.

TheexampleofmedievalEnglishwidowsalsohighlightsthisnon-revolutionarycirculationof legalenfranchisement.HistorianJanetLoengardconcludesthattheMagnaCarta,whichheld extremelyfavorableandprogressiveprovisionsrelatingtothetreatmentofwidows’dowers, didnotimmediatelyprovideanymeaningfulprotectionsatthetime.The1225Charter’s seventhchapterallottedforwomenadowerof“athirdpartofallthelandofherhusband whichwashisinhislife,”butitwasunclearwhetherthisincludedlandthatahusbandowned beforethemarriage.[28]

RalphTurneralsoproducesmedievalplearollswhichindicateMagnaCarta’slackofclarityin theadjudicationofwidow’scases[29]InEdward’sreign,forexample,onewidowchoseto appealdirectlytochapters29and39 landrightsanddueprocess oftheCharter,and soughtprotectionfromanunlawfuldispossessionofherlandwithoutdueprocessratherthan citingchapter7[30]Widows,localknights,andcommoners,wereundoubtedlyinfluencedby MagnaCarta’ssymbolism,butitsspecificlegalprotectionswereevidentlylessforceful Magna Carta’srevolutionarytalecanbefurthercomplicatedbyitsslow-movingprogress;itwasnot until1311thatwidowswereunequivocallyentitledtoathirdofherhusband’slandheldatany timeduringtheirmarriage

Conclusion

ModerndayhistorianshaveonlyrecentlybeguntoarguethattheMagnaCartawasnotthe universaldeclarationofhumanrightsthatitisoftenrememberedtobe.[31]Agreatseparation existsbetweenwhattheMagnaCartameanttomedievalsocietyandwhatitmeansin contemporarypoliticalrhetoric.WhileEnglishandAmericanconstitutionalscholarslike LeonardLevycontinuetociteMagnaCarta’steleologicalutilityvis-à-visthedevelopmentof theircontemporaryjusticesystems,thisanalysisshouldrefrainfromtheuseofcausal languageinitsdiscussionofthishistoricalepisode.

Arevolutionisdecisive,rapid,andconsequential.ThisanalysisoftheMagnaCarta’s influencesonjurytrialanddueprocess,enforcementmechanisms,andextentintocommon societydemonstratesthattheChartermetnoneofthesecriteria.Withasolidframeworklaid byHenryIIandamoderateevolutionbetween1215and1307,theMagnaCartacanbeaptly describedasacontributingforcetothedevelopmentofthemodern-eralegalterrain.

MedievalEnglishsocietydidexperiencethechangingidealsoffairness,truth,andlegal protectionthatwereimplantedintheCharter,butthissteadyprogresswasafarcryfrom revolution.

Notes

[1]TheArchitectoftheCapitol anonlinearchiveofCapitolart,documents,andarchitecture writesthat“MagnaCartaforbadearbitraryarrestandimprisonment,establishedtherights toafairtrialandtosecurityofproperty,andguaranteedthatthenation'sgovernmentwas itselfsubjecttothesamelawsasitssubjects,”thusenfranchisingAmericancolonistswiththe sameideals Notonlydoesthisoversimplifiedaccountmisrepresenttherelationshipbetween thesetwoperiods,butitalsooverstatescertaincontributionsofthedocument’sprovisions See“MagnaCartaReplicaandDisplay,”inExploretheCapitolCampus:TheArtCollection

[2]MichaelNicholas,“KingHenryIIandhisLegalReforms,”inTheHistories6,no 2(2019):12-23

[3]RichardH Helmholz,“TheEarlyHistoryoftheGrandJuryandtheCanonLaw,"Universityof ChicagoLawReview50(1983),pp.613-627

[4]LeonardLevy,“TheDoubleJurySystem:GrandandPetty,”inOriginsoftheBillofRights, (2008):210-230

[5]Nicholas,“KingHenryIIandhisLegalReforms,”p.20

[6]SaraButler,“DueProcessandConsenttoJuryTrial.”inPain,Penance,andProtest:Peine ForteetDureinMedievalEngland,134-187(Cambridge,2021)pp.134-187

[7]Butler,Pain,Penance,andProtest,p.139

[8]Levy,OriginsoftheBillofRights,p.214

[9]Butler,Pain,Penance,andProtest,p.158

[10]TheideathatInnocent‘created’thepresumptionofinnocenceinthelawwentfurther thantheFourthLateran’scanons,butwasdrawnfromhispapaldecrees(decretals)tovarious figures.Forexample,inadecretaltoanItalianleader,Innocentwrotethataclericwitha papalmandatedidnotneedtoprovehimselfworthy,because“‘hemaybepresumedworthy unlessthecontrarymaybeshown.’”Thisreinforcesthat,evenamongauthorityfigures,these conceptionsofjusticeandindividuallibertyweredeeplyingrainedintheheartsandmindsof Europebeforebeingformalizedintolaw.SeeButler,Pain,Penance,andProtest,p.158

[11]Butler,Pain,Penance,andProtest,p.165

[12]J.C.Wells,MagnaCharta;Or,theRiseandProgressofConstitutionalCivilLibertyin EnglandandAmerica;EmbracingthePeriodfromtheNormanConquesttotheCentennial YearofAmericanIndependence(DesMoines,200),pp.119-158.

[13]Oneofthemostconsequentialomissions,here,wasofchapter61,whichcalledfora committeeofbaronstoenforcetheKing’sobservanceoftheCharter.The1216charterinstead suspendedthis“miscellaneousmatter”forcontinueddiscussionafterthekingdomwassecure. SeeTurner,MagnaCarta,p.81.

[14]RalphTurner,“TheFirstCenturyofMagnaCarta.”inMagnaCarta(Harlow,2003),pp.80111.

[15]Turner,MagnaCarta,p.80

[16]Wells,MagnaCharta,p.126

[17]Turner,MagnaCarta,p.92

[18]Wells,MagnaCharta,pp.123-124

[19]Wells,MagnaCharta,p.134

[20]Turner,MagnaCarta,p.108

[21]Theuseoflegislationtobringaboutreformsthroughstatuteallowedthisphenomenato takeplace.ThisisespeciallyevidentthoughtheProvisionsofWestminster,whichappealedto the1225MagnaCartatexttoextendcertainreformstotenants.SeeTurner,MagnaCarta,p. 107.

[22]Wells,MagnaCharta,p 134

[23]DawnOliver,“TheUnitedKingdom:FromMagnaCarta1215totheRuleofLaw,”inFirst FundamentalRightsDocumentsinEurope:Commemorating800YearsofMagnaCarta,(2015), pp 11-24

[24]ST Ambler,“TheChurchandMagnaCartaintheThirteenthCentury,”inMagnaCarta: History,ContextandInfluence,(London,2018),pp 41–50

[25]Ambler,MagnaCarta:History,ContextandInfluence,pp 46-47

[26]C H McIlwain,“DueProcessofLawinMagnaCarta,”ColumbiaLawReview14(1914),pp 27–51

[27]J R Maddicott,“MagnaCartaandtheLocalCommunity1215-1259,”Past&Present102 (1984),pp.25–65

[28]JanetLoengard,“WhatDidMagnaCartaMeantoWidows?”inMagnaCartaandthe EnglandofKingJohn,(Rochester,2010),pp.134-150

[29]Turner,MagnaCarta,p.109

[30]Ibid.

[31]NicholasMostyn,“MagnaCartaandAccesstoJusticeinFamilyProceedings.”DenningLaw Journal27(2015),pp.77–105

Ambler,S T “TheChurchandMagnaCartaintheThirteenthCentury”InMagnaCarta: History,ContextandInfluence,editedbyLawrenceGoldman,41–50 London:Universityof LondonPress,2018

Butler,Sara “DueProcessandConsenttoJuryTrial”InPain,Penance,andProtest:PeineForte etDureinMedievalEngland,134-187 Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2021 Levy,Leonard “TheDoubleJurySystem:GrandandPetty”InOriginsoftheBillofRights,210230 NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2008

Loengard,Janet “WhatDidMagnaCartaMeantoWidows?”InMagnaCartaandtheEngland ofKingJohn,Rochester:TheBoydellPress,2010

Maddicott,J R “MagnaCartaandtheLocalCommunity1215-1259”Past&Present,no 102 (1984):25–65.

McIlwain,C.H.“DueProcessofLawinMagnaCarta.”ColumbiaLawReview14,no.1(1914):27–51.

Mostyn,Nicholas.“MagnaCartaandAccesstoJusticeinFamilyProceedings.”DenningLaw Journal27(January2015):77–105.

Nicholas,Michael.“KingHenryIIandhisLegalReforms,”TheHistories6,no.2(2019):12-23. Oliver,Dawn.“TheUnitedKingdom:FromMagnaCarta1215totheRuleofLaw.”InFirst FundamentalRightsDocumentsinEurope:Commemorating800YearsofMagnaCarta,edited byMarkkuSuksietal.,11-24.Cambridge:Intersentia,2015. Turner,Ralph.“TheFirstCenturyofMagnaCarta.”InMagnaCarta.Vol.1sted.Harlow: Routledge,2003.

Wells,J.C.MagnaCharta;Or,theRiseandProgressofConstitutionalCivilLibertyinEngland andAmerica;EmbracingthePeriodfromtheNormanConquesttotheCentennialYearof AmericanIndependence,119-158.DesMoines:Mills&Company,2009.

SovereigntyandHuman RightsfromNurembergtothe ResponsibilitytoProtect

NOAHGORNSTEIN,WASHINGTONUNIVERSITYST.LOUIS

Abstract:

This article traces the development of the idea of conditional sovereignty The end of the ColdWargaverisetoaspikeinhumanitarianintervention,apracticewherehumanrights considerations sometimes prevailed over traditional ideas about state sovereignty This new,activistformofhumanitarianisminturnevolveddirectlyintowhatbecameknownas the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), formally codified by the United Nations in 2005 This article concludes that the end of the Cold War is not the actual genesis of R2P, however Rather, state accountability to the international community for individual rights and abuses may be traced to 1945 with the Nuremberg Trial of the defeated leaders of Nazi Germany The multinational tribunal’s introduction of individual criminal responsibility and Crimes against Humanity into international law jumpstarted a transformation in the very idea of sovereignty Propelled by later United Nations agreements, international tribunals, and military action all of which both incorporated and expanded on ideas from Nuremberg states gradually lost exclusive jurisdiction over their domestic treatmentofindividuals.

Introduction

In2005,headsofstateattendingtheUnitedNationsWorldSummitunanimouslyadopteda resolutionrecognizingtheir“responsibilitytoprotectpopulationsfromgenocide,warcrimes, ethniccleansingandcrimesagainsthumanity”[1]Thisconcept,knownas“TheResponsibility toProtect”(R2P),wasanormativeinnovationinitsframingofstatelegitimacyasdependent uponagovernment’streatmentofitscitizens Scholarstendtopointtothisideaof conditionalsovereigntyasoriginatingfromtheinternationalcommunity’sfailuretoprevent atrocitiesfromoccurringwithinstatebordersduringthe1990s[2]Yetideasaboutsovereignty beingconditionalininternationallawwerenotsuddenlyreimagined Thisarticleanalyzeshow thetensionbetweenstatesovereigntyandhumanrightsdevelopedininternationallaw between1945and2005.

Thisresearchbuildsonexistingliteraturethatfindsideasaboutstateobligationsforhuman rightsexpandedinaprocessthatbeganinthewaningyearsoftheSecondWorldWarand culminatedwiththeemergenceofR2P,atwhichpointsuchresponsibilitiesexplicitlyconflicted withestablishednormsofsovereignty.[3]Thenotionofpeopletraditionallyprotectedby sovereigntybeingsubjecttoscrutinybytheinternationalcommunitytosafeguardhuman rightswasfirstoperationalizedinthe1945trialofformerNazileadersinNuremberg,Germany bytheInternationalMilitaryTribunal(IMT).Atthesametime,thetribunal’slimitationofcrimes againsthumanitytoatrocitiesthathadoccurredwithinthecontextofanaggressivewar servedtostrengthenadifferentaspectofsovereignty:onethatconfinedinternationallaw’s jurisdictiontocross-borderrelations.Inthejudgment’swake,however,theerosionofabsolute sovereigntycontinuedduringthepostwarerathroughtheriseofhumanrightslawandthe expansionofinternationalhumanitarianlaw,subsequentinternationaltribunals,and humanitarianinterventionism.TheResponsibilitytoProtectdoctrinecanthusbeunderstood asanemerginginternationalnormwithrootsthattracebacktotheproceedingsat Nuremberg.

Theemergenceofthemodernnation-stateenshrinedanexpectationwithintheinternational systemthatsovereignstateswouldnotinterferewiththeinternalaffairsofotherstates.[4]As outlinedbyFrancisDeng,formerUNSpecialAdvisoronthePreventionofGenocide,the moderninternationalorderwascharacterizedby“asystemofmodernnation-statesinwhich thesovereignreignedsupremedomesticallyaswellasinthestate'srelationswiththeoutside world.”[5]Thisstate-centricvisionofsovereigntywasreflectedinearlyeffortstoestablishthe rulesofwarininternationallaw.Forinstance,theHagueConventionsof1899and1907were designedtoregulatetheconductofstatesintheirinteractionswitheachother.[6] Enforcementofthesewarcrimesruleswasreservedtostates,effectivelyomittingany individualliabilityforviolations.

ShiftingGoalpostsofStateResponsibilityatNuremberg

OnAugust8,1945,France,theSovietUnion,theUnitedKingdom,andtheUnitedStates establishedtheNurembergInternationalMilitaryTribunalthroughtheLondonCharter.The charterapprovedprosecutionforCrimesagainstPeace orwagingaggressivewar War Crimes,andCrimesagainstHumanity.Thesecrimeswereinnovationsininternationallawin thesensethattheyentailedindividualcriminalresponsibility.Ashighlightedbylegalscholar ChristianTomuschat,thisprinciplesuccessfullypenetratedtheinternationalnormof sovereignequalityamongstates.

PriortoNuremberg,noseriousefforthadbeenmadetoholdstateleadersaccountable No longerwasinternationallawrelevantonlyininteractionsbetweenconsentingstates,leaving thejudgmentofanygivenindividualtoorgansofdomesticlaw[7]ThechargeofCrimes againstHumanitywasalsoanewconcept AsdefinedinArticle6(c)oftheindictment,these crimesinvolved:

murder,extermination,enslavement,deportation,andotherinhumaneactscommitted againstanycivilianpopulation,beforeorduringthewar;orpersecutionsonpolitical,racialor religiousgroundsinexecutionoforinconnectionwithanycrimewithinthejurisdictionofthe Tribunal,whetherornotinviolationofthedomesticlawofthecountrywhereperpetrated[8] Throughphrasessuchas“anycivilianpopulation,”“before thewar,”and“whetherornotin violationofthedomesticlawofthecountrywhereperpetrated,”thisclauseappearstooutline thelegaljustificationfordeepintrusionsintosovereignexclusivityoverhumanrights.While ideologicallyfar-reaching,thecrimewasseverelylimitedinitspracticalapplicabilitydueto thestipulationthatsuchabusesmustalsobe“inexecutionoforinconnectionwithanycrime withinthejurisdictionoftheTribunal”(emphasisadded).[9]Thetribunalinterpretedthis restriction whichwasnotplacedoneitherCrimesagainstPeaceorWarCrimesinthe charter toimplythatCrimesagainstHumanitymustbelinkedtotheothertwocharges. AtrocitiescommittedagainstJewswithinGermanybeforethewar,forexample,werenot addressedbytheIMT.

Thislimitationwasintentional.RobertH.Jackson,aUSSupremeCourtJusticewhohelped draftthecharterandservedastheChiefAmericanProsecutoratNuremberg,directedthe prosecutiontopursuecrimesagainsthumanityonlywhensuchatrocitieswereconnectedto thewagingofanillegalwar.LegalscholarLawrenceDouglasconcludesthatthisdecisionby Jacksonwaspartlymotivatedbyadesiretoshoreupthetribunal’slegitimacybyfocusingon principlesofinternationallawthatdidnotconflictwithfamiliarconceptsofsovereignty. Despitethenewenforcementmechanism,theaggressivewarchargestillfellwithinthe relativelyestablisheddomainofregulatinginterstateconductininternationallaw,for example.Inthisway,Nurembergsimultaneouslystrengthenedandchippedawayatthe foundationsofstatesovereignty.[10]Whilecertainlynotsoughtbyeithertheprosecutionor thetribunal,CrimesagainstHumanitycarriedintrinsicsignificance.TheRobertH.Jackson CenterarguesthatNuremberg’sintroductionofthecharge“effectivelyfatheredaglobalized concerntowardscertainattitudesinwarand,byextension,fortherightsofallhumanbeings sufferingtheeffectsofcertainmodesofviolence.”[11]Thetrialbroughtthemoralsofstates whoparticipatedintheprosecutionintotheinternationalcommunitythroughinternational criminallaw.Thisprecedent,inturn,ledtoenforceableinternationalhumanrightsand humanitarianlawthatstrengthenedthepresenceofthesevalues.[12]

IdeasofuniversalhumanrightsintheCrimesagainstHumanitychargeweredivorcedfrom interstateconflictintheimmediateaftermathofthewar.Thisseparationwaspromulgatedby treatiesandcommitmentsadoptedbyUNmember-states.TheseincludedtheNuremberg Principles,the1948ConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide, andtheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(UDHR).[13]Notably,sovereigntyamongstates wasstillbeingbolstered,astheprincipleofnoninterventionhadbeenenshrinedinArticle2of theUNCharterin1945.Inotherwords,theimpregnabilityofdomesticjurisdictionwasbuilt intothegroundworkoftheinternationalcommunity.[14]Consequently,theUNcharter hinderedthedevelopmentofenforceableguarantees.

Absolutestatesovereigntywasnonethelessincreasinglychallengedbytheinternational community’sconcernforhumanrights aconcernstructuredupontheideasintroducedat Nuremberg

Lackingthenecessaryinternationalpoliticalconsensus,theglobalorderfollowingthe outbreakoftheColdWarlargelyhaltedthepost-Nurembergexpansionofjurisdictionalweight grantedtointernationalhumanrightsenforcement Whennationalsovereigntywasviolated forpurportedlyhumanitarianreasons,suchaswithVietnam’sinvasionofCambodiathat endedtheKhmerRougegenocide,widespreadcondemnationagainsttheinterventionbythe internationalcommunityfollowed[15]Thepreventionofhumanrightsabusesthatwere containedwithinstateboundariesfailedasajustificationforintervention.Thislackof legitimacyreflectedaninternationallegalsysteminwhichwagingaggressiveinterstatewar hadbeenrepudiatedwhileexpectationsofnon-interventionassociatedwithsovereignty remained.

Post-ColdWarEra:BreakingtheSovereigntyStalemate

TheendoftheColdWarcoincidedwithpublicrevulsionagainstatrocitiesintheformer YugoslaviaandRwanda.Theseshiftinggeopoliticalandpublicconsiderationsledtoagrowing recognitionbytheinternationalcommunityoftherighttointerveneinthedomesticsphereof othercountriesinordertopreventconflict-relatedhumanitariandisasters.Centralto understandingthisrealignment,however,isrecognizingthattheresponsetosuchatrocities foundnormativegroundingestablishedatNuremberg.Theemergenceofhumanitarian interventionismwasguidedbyprinciplesoriginatedbythetribunalin1945andembracedby theUnitedNations,eventhoughsuchideaslargelysatdormantduetoalackofpoliticalwill duringtheColdWar.WiththecollapseoftheSovietUnionin1991,thedecadesofglobal tensionbetweentheSovietUnionandtheUnitedStatescametoanend.Conflictswithin postcolonialstateswerereignitedinthistransformedlandscape.LouisArbour,theformerUN HighCommissionerforHumanRightsandChiefProsecutoroftheInternationalCriminal TribunalsfortheformerYugoslavia(ICTY)andRwanda(ICTR),synthesizedthesehistorical developmentsinthecontextoftheongoingdebateovertheroleofstatesovereignty: Theprincipleofnon-interferenceinasovereignState'sdomesticaffairscameunderintense straininthe1990s…astheRwandangenocide,theatrocitiesintheformerYugoslavia,anda proliferationofdevastatinginternalwarsunfolded.Itbecameincreasinglyclearthenthat sovereigntyinandofitselfshould,attheveryleast,nolongershieldperpetratorsfrompunitive measures.[16]

Examiningthis“principleofnon-interference”inthecontextofNuremberghighlightsa recurringdesiretodeployinternationallawasameansofjusticethattranscendsstateimposedbarrierstoaccountability.Aspreviouslynoted,theenforcementofpurportedly sharedprinciplesamongtheinternationalcommunitywhenjurisdictionhadyettobeexplicitly establishedwasadismantlingofstatesovereigntythatbeganin1945.However,attemptsto redresshumanrightsabuseswithinstatesworkedagainstanunderstandingofsovereignty fortifiedatNuremberg.Thesupremacyoftheaggressivewarchargehadreinforcedtheidea ofinternationallawbeinglimitedtointeractionsbetweenstates.

The“intensestrain”thatArbourdescribesasbeingplacedonthisframeworkofsovereignty waspropagatedbyavarietyofactorsandinstitutions.InternationalrelationsscholarMichael BarnettexplainsthatfollowingtheColdWar,“Nationalsecuritygavegroundtohuman security.”[17]

Inotherwords,securitywasnowunderstoodnotonlyinregardtointerstateconflictbutalsoin thetreatmentofpersonswithinstates Barnettfurtheremphasizesthatthisshiftin perspectiverangedfromtheUNSecurityCounciltoNGOstothegeneralpublic[18]Francis Dengelaboratesthatthisbroaderviewofsecurityledtoamoreintensefocusonhuman rights:“Humanrights,humanitarian,anddevelopmentalorganisations begantointensify theiractivitiesaswatchdogsovertheextenttowhichtheseuniversalstandardswereadhered towithinnationalborders”[19]Dengadditionallypointstothedemocratizationofnewly independentpostcolonialstatesasapost-ColdWardevelopmentthatfurtherchallenged previousideasofsovereignty,aspeopleincreasinglyfeltthattheauthorityoftheirleaderswas onlylegitimateifthoseleadersrepresentedtheirpersonalinterests[20]Withglobal interactionsnolongerfocusedonstrengtheningtherelativebalanceofpowerbetweentwo countries,securityreflectedmoreindividualizedconsiderationsandglobalizedactors.The resultingviewofhumanitarianismwouldserveasjustificationforincreasinglyambitious intrusionsintothesovereigntyofstates.

Initialattemptstoconfrontthesenewchallengestohumanrightswerefarfromsuccessful. EvenwhentheinternationalcommunitydidintervenewithUNpersonnelinplaceslikeSomalia, Rwanda,andSrebrenica,Bosnia,theseeffortswereinconsistentandultimatelyineffective,if notcounterproductive.AsGarethEvanswrotewhileservingasthepresidentofthe InternationalCrisisGroup,whiletherewasagrowingpoliticalwillattheinternationallevelto recognizeandconfronthumanrightsabusesthroughmilitaryintervention,failurestotake effectiveactionreflectedlong-standinghesitationsaboutintrusionsintointernalstateaffairs. [21]

Multinationalmilitaryactionwasnotusedmoredecisivelytopreventfurtherhumanrights abusesuntil1999.[22]AsoutlinedinaUSDepartmentofDefenseafter-actionreportto CongressonNATO’s78-daybombingcampaignagainstSerbianforces,oneofthemission’s mainobjectiveswasto“deterMilosevic[formerPresidentoftheFederalRepublicof Yugoslavia]fromcontinuingandescalatinghisattacksonhelplessciviliansandcreate conditionstoreversehisethniccleansing.”[23]Attackswerenotablyundertakenwithoutthe UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil’sapproval.Objectionswereraisedbyveto-powermembers ChinaandRussiathatsuchauseofforcewouldviolateYugoslavia’ssovereignty.[24]Yetthese protestsdidnotdetertheoperation.Thiscommitmenttoforcedespitepressurefrompowerful actorssignaledanincreasingbeliefbyatleastsomeinfluentialworldleadersinthenecessity ofhumanitarianintervention.

Intherealmofinternationalcriminalandhumanitarianlaw,theformationoftheICTYand ICTRbytheSecurityCouncilinresponsetoatrocitiesinBosniaandRwandafurthersignaled thiswillingnessoftheinternationalcommunitytointrudeintostateaffairs.Theseproceedings markedthefirstadhocinternationaltribunalssincetheNurembergandTokyotrialsandwere notablyinfluencedbytheirpredecessors.[25]Conceptsthathademergedininternationallaw atNurembergonceagainfoundtheirwayintotheindictments.Forinstance,theideaof individualcriminalresponsibilityirrespectiveofgovernmentaffiliationwasfirstintroducedin Articles6-7ofthe1945IMTCharter:

Thefollowingacts,oranyofthem,arecrimescomingwithinthejurisdictionoftheTribunalfor whichthereshallbeindividualresponsibility[applicablecrimesarethenlisted] Theofficial positionofdefendants shallnotbeconsideredasfreeingthemfromresponsibilityor mitigatingpunishment[26]

IndividualresponsibilityforinternationalcrimeswasreplicatedinArticles7and6oftheICTY andICTR’srespectivestatutes[27]ThesesubsequenttribunalsthusreflectedNuremberg’s missiontoholdleadersofcountriespersonallyaccountablefortheiractionsunder internationallaw There-emergenceofindividualresponsibilityunderinternationallaw reinforcedabreakdownofthetraditionaldistinctionbetweeninternationalanddomesticlaw InternationalhumanrightsagreementscreatedinthewakeofNuremberg’sintroductionof theconceptofCrimesagainstHumanitywerecornerstonesofthenewtribunals.TheGenocide Conventionof1948,inparticular,wasreflectedwithinthestatutes’criminalizationofgenocide regardlessoflocationorcontext.Byapplyingtheseprinciplesforthefirsttimeinan internationalcourt,theabilityofstatestodeploytraditionalideasaboutsovereigntyasa meansofprotectionfrominquiriesintointernalhumanrightsabusesbecamelessfeasible.It isworthnoting,however,thattheimportanceofsovereigntywasstillevidentduringthe tribunals’enforcementoftheICTYandICTRstatutes.IntheICTY’srulingonaninterlocutory appealbythedefenseinProsecutorv.Tadic,forinstance,thecourtheldthat“gravebreaches” ofArticle3ofthefour1949GenevaConventionscouldonlybeappliedinconflictsofan internationalnature.Throughthisacknowledgementthatthegravebreachesrequirement establisheduniversaljurisdictionforviolators,ICTYJudgeAntonioCasseseruledthat“The internationalarmedconflictrequirementwasanecessarylimitationonthegravebreaches systeminlightoftheintrusiononStatesovereigntythatsuchmandatoryuniversaljurisdiction represents.”[28]However,Cassesesimultaneouslyrecognizedthemeritsofdissentingviews thatgravebreachesappliedtointernalconflicts,suchasthoseexpressedintheamicuscuriae brieffiledbytheUnitedStatesGovernment:

[theamicusbrief]providesthefirstindicationofapossiblechangeofopiniojurisofStates. WereotherStatesandinternationalbodiestocometosharethisview,achangeincustomary lawconcerningthescopeofthe‘gravebreaches’systemmightgraduallymaterialize.[29] Thesensitivityofthecourttosuchargumentsisindicativeoftheshiftingopinionsinfavorof thereachofinternationalhumanitarianlawincludingnon-internationalconflicts.

Cassese’sresponsealsounderscorestheimportanceofnormsinapplyinginternationallaw, ashesignaledthatnoalterationstotherelevantstatutewouldbenecessaryaslongas internationalopinionsaboutthematterweretochange.Inotherwords,judicialinterpretation ofinternationallawisconditionalontheprominenceofunderlyingvalues.Thisapproach furtherimpliesthatbeliefsheldbyinfluentialactorsmustreachacertainlevelofacceptance byothersbeforetakingontheforceofanorm,atwhichpointsuchideascanmodifyor conflictwithexistingnorms.WhileCassesepointsto“Statesandinternationalbodies”asthe relevantsourcesforcustomarylaw,mappingthetrajectoryofideasaboutsovereigntyinforms amorecompleteunderstandingofhownormsarealteredaspublicopinioninforms institutionalconsiderations.

Inexpandingthereachofinternationallaw,thesetrialsalsorepresentedsignificant departuresfromNuremberg Intheabsenceofthepost-conflictmilitaryoccupationthat underscoredtheproceedingsatNuremberg,Article9andArticle8oftheICTYandICTR’s statutesaffirmedthe“primacy”ofthetribunalsovernationalcourts Anotherdifference betweenthetypeofconflictontrialwastherelevanceofconflictwithinstatebordersinthe formerYugoslaviaandRwanda Thisreality,combinedwiththegreaterinternationalfocuson humanrights,hadeffectivelysidelinedtheaggressivewarchargethatwascentraltothe Nurembergconvictions[30]Instead,criminalitywasassessedthroughcrimesagainst humanityandwarcrimes Thecomparativeemphasisofthesechargesishighlightedbythe introductionofnovelinternationalcrimesintheICTYandICTRstatutes Genocide,asdefined inthe1948convention,wasincludedasaseparatechargeinArticles4and2.Othercrimes againsthumanityoutlinedinArticles5and3includedpersecutiononethnicgrounds otherwiseknownasethniccleansing.Withinthesearticles,provisionsagainstimprisonment, torture,andrapereflectedexpandedliabilityforhumanrightsviolations.

Theevolutionofinternationallawalsocontinued,albeitsubtly,betweentheproceedingsof theICTY,establishedinMay1993,andtheICTR,inNovember1994.AsexpressedinJudge Cassese’sopinion,Article2oftheICTYStatutepunishing“gravebreaches”oftheGeneva Conventionsonlycoveredviolationsofthelawsofwarcommittedduringinternational conflicts.TheICTR,incontrast,explicitlycriminalized“seriousviolations”ofArticle3common totheConventionsandArticle4ofthe1977AdditionalProtocolIItotheConventions.[31]

Importantly,bothArticle3andArticle4extendedthelawsofwartoincludenon-international armedconflicts.[32]TheICTRthusgrantedexpandedjurisdictionoverwarcrimesby recognizinganewareaofinternationalhumanitarianlaw intra-stateconflict as applicabletointernationalcriminalproceedings.[33]

Furthermore,inoutliningtherequirementsforcrimesagainsthumanity,Article5oftheICTY Statuterequiresaconnectionbetweensuchcrimesandthepresenceofanarmedconflict, whereasArticle3oftheICTRstatutemakesnosuchrequirement.[34]Removinginterstate conflictasaprerequisitetocrimesagainsthumanityindicatedashiftawayfromthe Nuremberg-erecteddominanceofinterstateconflictoverhumanrightsconcerns.These changesreflecttheincremental,yetimpactfulexpansionofinternationallaw’soversightof peoplewithinstatebordersattheexpenseofsovereignstatecontrol.[35] Aworldthatwas“nolongerparalyzedbytheColdWar”waspromptedtorespondtothe atrocitiesofthe1990s.[36]Apushforhumanitarianinterventionandagreaterfocusonhuman rightsbyinternationaltribunalsderivedfromNurembergbyrevivingandrevisingthe InternationalMilitaryTribunal’sprinciplesandmechanismsofinternationaljustice. Consequently,thedegreeofstateprotectionfrominternationalreviewbysovereigntywas limited.Thesedevelopmentsshiftedinternationalfocustotheideaofreframingsovereigntyin linewithuniversalprotectionofhumanrights,wherebystateshada‘righttointervene’for humanitarianpurposes.[37]

Atthesametime,however,humanitarianinterventionremainedcontroversial AsBarnett notes,“Thepracticeofcompassioninvolvespoliticsandprivilegesthepowerofthe passionate”[38]Theideaofpowerfulinternationalactorsbeingabletousemilitaryforceat theirdiscretionledtogermaneconcernsovertheinnocenceofsupposedlyhumanitarian motives Ononesideofthedebatewerethosewhobelievedtherewasarighttomilitary humanitarianintervention Ontheotherwerethosewhoadheredtolong-standingprinciples ofstatesovereignty Thelattergroupincludedcolonizedstateswhowerewaryofintrusions duetotheirfragilityandsufferingfrompastinterventions[39]Dengsummarizedthistension as“governmentswhosedomesticperformancerenderedthemvulnerabletointernational scrutinyreactedagainstperceivedattemptstounderminetheirsovereignty”[40]Such backlashhighlightsthepervasivenessofthenormsofnationalsovereignty.These1990s humanitarianinterventionsfailedtofullylegitimizedeparturesfromentrenchednormsofnonintervention.

TheResponsibilitytoProtect

By1999,theconflictbetweengrowingconcernsoverhumanitarianinterventionandensuring respectforhumanrightshadfullymaterialized.Inresponse,UNSecretary-GeneralKofiAnnan presentedachallengetotheGeneralAssembly: Ifhumanitarianinterventionisindeedanunacceptableassaultonsovereignty,howshouldwe respondtoaRwanda,toaSrebrenica togrossandsystematicviolationsofhumanrights thatoffendeverypreceptofourcommonhumanity?[41]

HeedingAnnan’squestion,theCanadiangovernmentestablishedtheInternational CommissiononInterventionandStateSovereignty(ICISS),anexpertgroupthatthen publisheda2001reportthatintroducedtheResponsibilitytoProtect.[42]GarethEvans,the formerco-chairmanoftheICISS,elucidatedR2P’sformation:“Thecoreideaisverysimple. Turnthenotionof'righttointervene'upsidedown.Talknotaboutthe'right'ofbigstatestodo anything,buttheresponsibilityofallstatestoprotecttheirownpeoplefromatrocitycrimes, andtohelpotherstodoso.”[43]R2Prepresentedasignificantevolutioninthinkingaboutthe relationshipbetweenhumanrightsandstatestructures.Underthedoctrine,thebasisfor sovereignstatehoodispredicatedupontheabilityofastatetorespecttherightsofits individualcitizens.Withinthisredefinedunderstandingofstatelegitimacy,theinternational communitywouldbeobligatedtointervene,bothtopreventandreacttoatrocities,shoulda statefailtodoso.

Conclusion

Whilescholarshavepointedtothepost-ColdWarenvironmentthatledtoAnnan’schallenge astheoriginoftheResponsibilitytoProtectnorm,thereisaneedforamoreexpansive historicalview.Inordertoproperlycontextualizethetensionsbetweenstatesovereigntyand respectforhumanrightsbytheinternationalcommunityreflectedintheR2Pideaof conditionalsovereignty,onemustbeginatNuremberg.TheRobertH.JacksonCenter concludesthat“TherightofhumanitarianinterventiontoputastoptoCrimesAgainst Humanity–evenbyasovereignagainsthisowncitizens–graduallyemergedfromthe NurembergprinciplesaffirmedbytheUnitedNations.”[44]IdeasconceivedatNurembergthat wentontoshapeinternationallycodifiedhumanrightsprincipleshelpexplainhowthe completeauthoritythatstatespreviouslyenjoyedovertheirnationalaffairswasgradually penetrated.

Manydimensionsofconcernforinternationalhumanrightswerenotputintopracticeuntilthe 1990s Despitethisfact,theactionstakenbytheinternationalcommunitycontinuedapreColdWarprioritizationofindividualsovercountryboundaries Theconceptionofthe ResponsibilitytoProtectdoctrineformallyenshrinedtheideaofsovereigntyasentailinga responsibilitytoupholdinternationallyrecognizedconceptionsofhumanrights Ultimately, thisnormwastheproductofexpectationscatalyzedbythe1945InternationalMilitary Tribunal

[1]“TheResponsibilitytoProtect:ABackgroundBriefing,”GlobalCentrefortheResponsibility toProtect,January14,2021,https://wwwglobalr2porg/publications/the-responsibility-toprotect-a-background-briefing/

[2]SeeIbid;LouiseArbour,“TheResponsibilitytoProtectasaDutyofCareinInternationalLaw andPractice”ReviewofInternationalStudies,vol 34,no 3,2008, https://static1squarespacecom/static/522cc5b4e4b0a015e8d59b21/t/522d2a25e4b0bb402a8 0c85c/1378691621406/Arbour R2Ppdf,447;GarethEvans,“TheResponsibilitytoProtect:Ending MassAtrocityCrimesOnceandforAll”IrishStudiesinInternationalAffairs,vol 20,2009, http://wwwjstororg/stable/25735145,8

[3]SeeToveRosen(ed.),“TheInfluenceoftheNurembergTrialonInternationalCriminalLaw,” TheRobertH.JacksonCenter, https://www.roberthjackson.org/speech-and-writing/theinfluence-of-the-nuremberg-trial-on-international-criminal-law/,ExecutiveSummary.

[4]InternationalRelationsscholarsgenerallyattributetheemergenceofthisinternational systemtothe1648PeaceofWestphalia,whichendedtheThirtyYears’War.Others,however, contendthatthisviewisanachronistic,claimingthatsuchasystemdidnotdevelopuntilthe nineteenthandtwentiethcenturies.SeeAndreasOsiander,“Sovereignty,International Relations,andtheWestphalianMyth.”InternationalOrganizationvol.55,no.2,2001, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3078632.pdf,281-2.

[5]FrancisMDeng,"FromSovereigntyasResponsibilitytotheResponsibilitytoProtect."Global ResponsibilitytoProtect,vol.2,no.4,2010, https://heinonline.org/HOL/P? h=hein.journals/gloresp2&i=374.355.

[6]Rosen(ed.),“TheInfluenceoftheNurembergTrial,”1.

[7]ChristianTomuschat,“TheLegacyofNuremberg,”JournalofInternationalCriminalJustice, vol.4,no.4,2006,https://academic.oup.com/jicj/article/4/4/830/802420,837-8.

[8]“NurembergTrialProceedingsVol.1CharteroftheInternationalMilitaryTribunal(August8, 1945),”inTheAvalonProject:DocumentsinLaw,HistoryandDiplomacy(NewHaven,CT:Lillian GoldmanLawLibrary),https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp(accessedNovember16, 2022).

[9]“CharteroftheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,”TheAvalonProject.

[10]ForamorecompletediscussionoftheNurembergCharter,inparticularthecrimesagainst humanitycharge,seeLawrenceDouglas,“TheIdiomofJudgement:CrimesAgainstHumanity” inTheMemoryofJudgment:MakingLawandHistoryintheTrialsoftheHolocaust,38-64,Yale UniversityPress,2005.

[11]Rosen(ed.),“TheInfluenceoftheNurembergTrial,”5.1.1.

[12]SeealsoTomuschat,“TheLegacyofNuremberg,”838-9.

[13]Rosen(ed.),“TheInfluenceoftheNurembergTrial,”5.1.1.

[14]Atleastinsomeinstances.Article2.7oftheCharterstatesthat“Nothingshouldauthorise interventioninmattersessentiallywithinthedomesticjurisdictionofanyState.”SeeEvans, “TheresponsibilitytoProtect,”8.

[15]Evans,“TheresponsibilitytoProtect,”8.

[16]Arbour,“TheResponsibilitytoProtectasaDutyofCare,”446.

[17]MichaelBarnett,EmpireofHumanity:AHistoryofHumanitarianism.CornellUniversity Press,2011,163.

[18]Barnett,162-166.

[19]Deng,"SovereigntyasResponsibility,”359.

[20]Deng,359.

[21]Evans,“TheResponsibilitytoProtect,”8.

[22]Evans,8

[23]UnitedStates,DepartmentofDefense “Kosovo/OperationAlliedForceAfter-Action Report,”reporttoCongress,January31,2000,https://purlfdlpgov/GPO/LPS16504,xvii

[24]CatherineGuicherd,“InternationalLawandtheWarinKosovo”Survival41,no 2,1999, https://ismunicz/el/fss/jaro2010/MVZ198/um/Guicherd International Law and the War in K osovopdf),26

[25]Rosen(ed),“TheInfluenceoftheNurembergTrial,”ExecutiveSummary [26]“CharteroftheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,”TheAvalonProject [27]“UN,StatuteoftheICTY”InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross, https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/un-statute-icty(accessedNovember27,2022);UN, StatuteoftheICTR”InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross.

https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/un-statute-ictr(accessedNovember27,2022).

[28]DecisionontheDefenseMotionforInterlocutoryAppealonJurisdiction.October2,1995. AppealsChamber.InJohnC.WatkinsandJohnPaulWeber,WarCrimesandWarCrimeTrials: FromLeipzigtotheICCandBeyond:Cases,Materials,andComments(Durham,NC:Carolina UniversityPress,2006),522.

[29]WatkinsandWeber,523.

[30]Rosen(ed.),“InfluenceoftheNurembergTrial,”ExecutiveSummary. [31]WatkinsandWeber,WarCrimesTrials,541.

[32]“ProtocolAdditionaltotheGenevaConventionsof12August1949,andrelatingtothe ProtectionofVictimsofNon-InternationalArmedConflicts(ProtocolII)”,International CommitteeoftheRedCross,8June1977,https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp? documentId=AA0C5BCBAB5C4A85C12563CD002D6D09&action=openDocument.

[33]TribunalstatutesintheabovetwoparagraphsareexcerptedfromStatuteoftheICTY; StatuteoftheICTR

[34]WatkinsandWeber,WarCrimesTrials,542.

[35]TheestablishmentoftheInternationalCriminalCourtbythe1998RomeStatutemarked thecreationoftheworld’sfirstpermanentinternationalcourt.Reflectedinitsstatutewere proceduralandjurisdictionalelementsalongsideprinciplesofinternationalhumanitarianlaw oftheNurembergtrial,theICTY,andtheICTR.SeeRosen,“InfluenceoftheNurembergTrial,” 7.

[36]Rosen(ed.),7.

[37]Arbour,“ResponsibilitytoProtectasaDutyofCare,”447.

[38]Barnett,“EmpireofHumanity,”223.

[39]Evans,“TheresponsibilitytoProtect,”8-9.

[40]Deng,“SovereigntyasResponsibility,”356.

[41]KofiA.Annan,“'WethePeoples’:theroleoftheUnitedNations,21stcentury”UN DepartmentofPublicInformation,2000,https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/413745?ln=en,48.

[42]Evans,“TheresponsibilitytoProtect,”9.

[43]Evans,9.

[44]Rosen(ed.),“InfluenceoftheNurembergTrial,”ExecutiveSummary.

Annan,KofiA “'WethePeoples’:theroleoftheUnitedNations,21stcentury”UNDepartment ofPublicInformation,2000,https://digitallibraryunorg/record/413745?ln=en

Arbour,Louise “TheResponsibilitytoProtectasaDutyofCareinInternationalLawand Practice”ReviewofInternationalStudies,vol 34,no 3, 2008,https://static1squarespacecom/static/522cc5b4e4b0a015e8d59b21/t/522d2a25e4b0bb4 02a80c85c/1378691621406/Arbour R2Ppdf

Barnett,Michael EmpireofHumanity:AHistoryofHumanitarianism CornellUniversityPress, 2011

DecisionontheDefenseMotionforInterlocutoryAppealonJurisdiction October2,1995 AppealsChamber InJohnC WatkinsandJohnPaulWeber WarCrimesandWarCrimeTrials: FromLeipzigtotheICCandBeyond:Cases,Materials,andComments.Durham,NC:Carolina UniversityPress,2006.

Deng,FrancisM."FromSovereigntyasResponsibilitytotheResponsibilitytoProtect."Global ResponsibilitytoProtect,vol.2,no.4,2010,https://heinonline.org/HOL/P? h=hein.journals/gloresp2&i=374.

Douglas,Lawrence.TheMemoryofJudgment:MakingLawandHistoryintheTrialsofthe Holocaust.YaleUniversityPress,2005. Evans,Gareth.“TheResponsibilitytoProtect:EndingMassAtrocityCrimesOnceandforAll.” IrishStudiesinInternationalAffairs,vol.20,2009, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25735145. Guicherd,Catherine.“InternationalLawandtheWarinKosovo.”Survival41,no.2,1999, https://is.muni.cz/el/fss/jaro2010/MVZ198/um/Guicherd International Law and the War in K osovo.pdf).

“NurembergTrialProceedingsVol.1CharteroftheInternationalMilitaryTribunal”(August8, 1945).”InTheAvalonProject:DocumentsinLaw,HistoryandDiplomacy.NewHaven,CT:Lillian GoldmanLawLibrary.https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp Osiander,Andreas.“Sovereignty,InternationalRelations,andtheWestphalianMyth.” InternationalOrganization55,no.2,2001:251–87. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3078632.pdf.

“ProtocolAdditionaltotheGenevaConventionsof12August1949,andrelatingtothe ProtectionofVictimsofNon-InternationalArmedConflicts(ProtocolII)”.International CommitteeoftheRedCross.8June1977.https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp? documentId=AA0C5BCBAB5C4A85C12563CD002D6D09&action=openDocument. Reisman,W.Michael.“SovereigntyandHumanRightsinContemporaryInternationalLaw.” AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw,vol.84,no.4,1990, https://openyls.law.yale.edu/bitstream/handle/20.500.13051/5282/Sovereignty and Human Ri ghts in Contemporary International Law.pdf?sequence=2. Rosen,Tove(ed.).“TheInfluenceoftheNurembergTrialonInternationalCriminalLaw.”The RobertH.JacksonCenter. https://www.roberthjackson.org/speech-and-writing/the-influenceof-the-nuremberg-trial-on-international-criminal-law/. “TheResponsibilitytoProtect:ABackgroundBriefing.”GlobalCentrefortheResponsibilityto Protect.January14,2021.https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/the-responsibility-toprotect-a-background-briefing/.

Tomuschat,Christian “TheLegacyofNuremberg”JournalofInternationalCriminalJustice, vol 4,no 4,2006,https://academicoupcom/jicj/article/4/4/830/802420

“UN,StatuteoftheICTR”InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross https://casebookicrcorg/case-study/un-statute-ictr

“UN,StatuteoftheICTY”InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross https://casebookicrcorg/case-study/un-statute-icty

UnitedStates,DepartmentofDefense “Kosovo/OperationAlliedForceAfter-ActionReport,” reporttoCongress,January31,2000,https://purlfdlpgov/GPO/LPS16504

TheCaseforCivic RepublicanisminElectionLaw

NICHOLASCEFALU,GEORGETOWNUNIVERSITY

Abstract:

Despite being the most essential acts of expression, elections are not explicitly defined in the Constitution This has left wide room for judicial interpretation, leading to the Roberts Court’s problematic rulings in Rucho v Common Cause and Citizens United v FEC that greenlit the blatant abuse of the redistricting process for political gain and the unlimited useofcorporatefundstoinfluencepolitics ThesedisastrousrulingsstemfromtheCourt’s incorrect originalist analysis of the philosophies present at the founding, giving excessive weight to classical liberalism, which emphasizes maximum government non-interference in the public sphere, without proper consideration for civic republicanism’s commitment to pragmatism, and its consequently robust defense of elections regulations Through an exploration of the case law in the administration of elections, partisan gerrymandering, and campaign finance, this paper illustrates how a reintroduction of civic republicanism in election law has the potential to remedy many of the current issues while remaining withintheCourt’soriginalistlens.

I.Introduction

ElectionsarearguablythemostimportantactsofexpressioninallFirstAmendment jurisprudence Withoutelections,everyguardrailandrightenforcedbytheConstitutionstands tobelost,andwithouttheFirstAmendment,thisfundamentalbutunenumeratedrightstands tobetrampledon Thisgraveresponsibilityimposedonthehumbleballotboxbegsthe question,whyareelections,andmorebroadlyexpression,protected?Legalscholarshave beenquestioningthissincebeforethefoundingwithtwobroadschoolsofthought,expression assomethingofintrinsicvalueandexpressionassomethingofpragmaticvalue In contemporaryelectoraljurisprudence,theformerhasbecomebroadlydominant,institutinga puritanicalunderstandingofexpressionontomattersrelatingtotheadministrationof elections,partisangerrymandering,andcampaignfinance.Throughanexplorationofthe philosophicalhistoryandcaselawsurroundingthesetopics,itbecomesclearthatthis understandinghasbeenbroadlydetrimentaltotheelectoralsystem,andthattocounteract it,theSupremeCourtmustadoptasystemrecognizingthatexpressionisapragmatictool, allowingformoreappropriateelectoralregulations.Bydoingthis,theCourtwillbeableto addressthepracticalfailingsofthecurrentoriginalistreadingoftheConstitution,broadening ittoencompassthefullbreadthofthoughtatthefounding,andensuringthatelections continuetoservetheirfunctionasapragmaticsystemforaccuratelycommunicatingthewill ofthepeople.

II.Background

WhiletheConstitutiondoesn’texplicitlydescribethenatureofelections,itdoesprovidefor theiradministrationandregulationthroughCongressandthestatelegislatures.Thesepowers areprimarilyvestedinArticleISection4Clause1,knownastheElectionsClause,whichstates, “TheTimes,PlacesandMannerofholdingElectionsforSenatorsandRepresentatives,shallbe prescribedineachStatebytheLegislaturethereof;buttheCongressmayatanytimebyLaw makeoraltersuchRegulations,exceptastothePlacesofchusingSenators.”[1]Thisclause givesstatelegislaturesandCongressbroadpowertogovernelectionsprovidingstate legislatureswithprimarypowertocreateelectionlawwhilegrantingCongressultimate authorityoverfederalelections.Inaddition,theConstitutiongrantsthefederalgovernment limitedpoweroverstateelectionsthroughtheGuaranteeClausewhichstates“TheUnited StatesshallguaranteetoeveryStateinthisUnionaRepublicanFormofGovernment,and shallprotecteachofthemagainstInvasion;andonApplicationoftheLegislature,orofthe Executive(whentheLegislaturecannotbeconvened)againstdomesticViolence.”[2]Unlikethe ElectionsClause,theGuaranteeClauselacksexplicitlanguageregardingthescopeoffederal authority(i.e.whataRepublicanFormofGovernmentis)andthereforegivesCongressmuch lesscontroloverstateelectionsthanstatelegislatureshaveoverfederalelections.[3]

Together,thesetwoclausesformtheconstitutionalbasisfortheregulationofelections,giving statesbroadauthoritytoorganizeelectionsastheyseefitwithultimateauthorityoverfederal electionsrestingwithCongress,andstateelectionscontrolledentirelybythestates themselvessolongastheymaintainaRepublicanFormofGovernment.[4]

Numerousconflictsinelectionlawhavearisenasthesepowershavecomeintocontactwith thevariousrightsprotectedbytheConstitution’samendments,mostnotablythoseunderthe FirstAmendment.Unliketheenumeratedpowersofthefederalgovernment,theFirst Amendmentprovidesnegativerights[5]tothepeople,creatingbroadzonesofnoninterferencethatoftenbrushupagainstelectionregulations.

Theamendmentreads,“Congressshallmakenolawrespectinganestablishmentofreligion, orprohibitingthefreeexercisethereof,orabridgingthefreedomofspeech,orofthepress;or therightofthepeoplepeaceablytoassemble,andtopetitiontheGovernmentforaredressof grievances,”[6]explicitlyprotectingthefreedomofreligion,expression,andpeacefulprotest [7]Ofthese,thefreedomofexpressionhasmostoftencollidedwithelectionlaw,forcingcourts toadjudicatedifficultconflictsbetweenthegovernment'sinterestsineffectivelyregulating elections,andcitizens’expressiverights Asinmanyotherconstitutionalissues,thisconflict datesbacktooneofthefundamentalphilosophicaldisagreementsatthefounding,the strugglebetweenclassicalliberalismandcivicrepublicanism

Classicalliberalismiswidelyconsideredthemostinfluentialofthemanyphilosophiespresent atthefounding.CommonlyunderstoodasacontinuationofJohnLocke’sphilosophical tradition,itemphasizesanindividual’srighttoconductlifewithminimalinterferencefromthe government.Thisisaccomplishedbycreatinglargeswathesofprotectednaturalrights, libertiesthatallpersonshaveashumans,whichthegovernmentcannotinfringeupon.[8]In thisparadigm,theserightsareprotectedbecauseoftheirintrinsicvalueasbasicelementsof humanlifedistinctfromanybenefitstheymightprovide.AsappliedtotheFirstAmendment andelectionlaw,thismoralisticunderstandingofexpressionputsconsiderablepressureon howfaraperson’sexpressioncanbecurtailedinordertofairlyadministerelections. Consequently,asthedominantideologysincethefounding,classicalliberalismhasoften workedtominimizethegovernment’sregulationofelections,placingthefundamental importanceofexpressionabovethatofeffectiveelectionadministration.

Ontheoppositesidestandscivicrepublicanism,whichespousesamorepragmatic conceptionoffundamentalrights.[9]Unlikeclassicalliberalism,whichemphasizesrightsof non-interference,civicrepublicanismcentersaroundnon-domination,orfreedomfrom arbitraryauthority,amarkedlylessextensiveconceptionthatprovidesthegovernmentwith considerableleewaytoexercisepoweroveritscitizens.Whatexactlyfreedomfromarbitrary authoritylookslikeisheavilydebated,butitisgenerallyunderstoodtoincludetheruleof law[10]anddemocraticgovernance.[11]Importantly,unlikeclassicalliberalism,this fundamentalfreedomispragmaticratherthanidealisticandisdesignedtoachievethebest outcomesbyprotectingsocietyfromthewhimsofatyrannicalruler.Assuch,individual liberties,includingthefreedomofexpressionundertheFirstAmendment,areameansto achievebettergovernance,notendsinandofthemselves.Thisallowsforconsiderablymore electionregulationsunderacivicrepublicansystem,whererulesdesignedtoproducemore accurateandrepresentativeelectionresultswouldbegivensimilarifnotmoreimportance thanthefreedomofexpressionasastand-aloneright.Sadly,thismorelimitedconceptionof libertyfailedtowinoutduringtheratificationprocessandassuchhasbeenlargelyrelegated totheperipheryofAmericanjurisprudence.

III.CaseLaw

Despitethis,civicrepublicanism’shistoricalimportanceaswellasitslimitedappearances withincaselawleavethedooropenforareintroductionofitsprinciplesmorebroadlywithin electionlaw.ThisismostprominentintheAnderson-Burdick[12]lineofcasesthatrelatetothe administrationofelections,[13]inwhichtheCourthasadoptedasomewhatcivicrepublicanist stance.

Underthisdoctrine,thestategenerallyonlyneedstomeetalowstandardofjudicialreview[14] whenmodifyingpurelyadministrativeaspectsofelections,basedontheideathatstrictly scrutinizingeveryincidentalelectoralchangewouldimposeanoverlylargeburdenonthe government Inregardstoredistricting,theCourthaslargelysteppedawayfromcivic republicanism,vacatinganypowertoruleongerrymanderingoutsideofaracialcontext[15]by consideringpartisangerrymanderinganonjusticiablepoliticalquestionoutsidethereachof thefederaljudiciary[16]Finally,incampaignfinance,theCourthasheldthatrestrictionson “corporateindependentexpenditure”[17]representfundamentalinfringementsontheFirst Amendmentrightofexpressionandmustmeetstrictscrutiny,[18]effectivelyallowingunlimited amountsofmoneytobespentbywealthypersons[19]onelections Thisthreefoldsystem showcasesthepiecemealintegrationofcivicrepublicanismintoAmericanjurisprudence, playingacontrollingrolewhenwithinpurelyadministrativeaspectsbutovershadowedwhen expressionisvisiblyattheforefrontregardlessofthepotentialfordisastrouspractical implicationsasseeninpartisangerrymanderingandcampaignfinance.

A.ElectionAdministration

Themostpragmaticofthesecaselineshavebeenthoseregardingtheadministrationof elections.Centeredaroundtheideaofregulatingtheadministrativedetailsofelections,these casesleanheavilyintocivicrepublicanismundoubtedlybecauseofthedirectlinethatcanbe drawntotheElectionsClause’spowertoregulatethe“Times,Places,andManner”[20]of elections.BygivingCongress,aswellasthestatelegislatures,adirectmandatetoestablish thegroundrulesandorganizetheinstitutionsnecessarytoholdelections,theElectionsClause actsasaguidingprincipleforadministrativedisputesandmakesastrongcivicrepublican caseforwhylegislaturesneedleewaytoregulatetheseaspectsofelections.

Conflictsovertheadministrativedetailsofelectionshavenaturallyemergedthroughoutthe nearly250-yearhistoryofthefederalconstitution,buttheprinciplesthatguidemodern electionadministrationlawwereestablishedrelativelylateinSmileyvHolm(1932).Following the1930census,Minnesotawasallocatedninecongressionalseats,onefewerthanthestate hadheldpreviously.Thisrequiredaredrawingofthestate’scongressionaldistricts,whichthe statelegislaturecarriedoutbypassingabillthatwasthenvetoedbythegovernor.Thestate legislatureneverthelessproceededtodepositthebillwiththeofficeofthesecretaryofstateto beimplemented,provokingasuitdemandingthatallnewlydrawndistrictsberuledinvalid andnewmapsbedrawn.Whilethiscaseprimarilyfocusesontherolegovernorsplayinthe redistrictingprocess,[21]italsodescribesindetailthevariousotherlegislativepowers delegatedtothestatesbytheElectionsClause“inrelationtonotices,registration,supervision ofvoting,protectionofvoters,preventionoffraudandcorruptpractices,countingofvotes, dutiesofinspectorsandcanvassers,andmakingandpublicationofelectionreturns.”[22] Despitebeingfocusedontheredistrictingprocess,Smileysetthefoundationformodern electionadministrationlawbyprovidingadetailedaccountofthepowersdelegatedtothe statesbytheElectionsClause.

WhileSmileydelineatedthestates’regulatorypowersitfailedtoarticulateaclearlegaltheory astohowtheyshouldbeapplied,givingthestateslicensetobegintestingtheboundariesof theirnewlydefinedpowers.InBullockv.Carter(1972),plaintiffschallengedaTexasstatute requiringthatcandidateswantingtorunintheirpartyprimaryelectionspayfees“rangingas highas$8,900.”

[23]Sincethestatuteforcedpoliticalpartiestofundtheirprimaryelectionstheyhadto chargeexcessivefeestocandidatesseverelylimitingthepoolofpotentialnominees Recognizingtheimmenseharmthiswouldcausebygiving“theaffluentthepowertoplaceon theballottheirownnamesorthenamesofpersonstheyfavor”[24]tothedetrimentofthoseof moremodestmeans,theCourtcreatedthebeginningsofanewtest,whichtookintoaccount thegovernment’sstatedinterestandtheburdenthataregulationplacesoncitizens’rights [25]Inthiscase,theCourtruledinfavorofthecandidates,determiningthatthestate’s interestinprotecting“theintegrityofitspoliticalprocessesfromfrivolousorfraudulent candidacies”[26]didnotjustify“theimpositionoffilingfeesrangingashighas$8,900”[27] whichtend“tolimitthenumberofcandidatesenteringtheprimaries”[28]However,theCourt wasnotentirelyhostiletothethinkingbehindsuchastatute,assertingthat“notevery limitationorincidentalburdenontheexerciseofvotingrightsissubjecttoastringent standardofreview,”[29]butthatinthiscase,the“Statecannotachieveitsobjectivesbytotally arbitrarymeans;thecriterionfordifferingtreatmentmustbearsomerelevancetotheobject ofthelegislation.”[30]Thisleftspaceforwell-reasonedelectionregulationstowithstand judicialreviewprovidedtheywereproperlytailoredtothestatedinterest.

TheCourtwouldrevisitthistestonlytwoyearslaterinthe1974caseStorerv.Browninwhicha groupofcandidateschallengedaCaliforniastatutepreventingcongressionalcandidates fromrunningasindependentsiftheyhadbeenaffiliatedwithapoliticalpartywithinthelast twelvemonths.[31]Thestatutewasdesignedtoprevent“intrapartyfeuds”[32]inwhicha candidatethatlosestheprimaryelectionrunsarevengecampaignasanindependenttoget backatthewinningprimarycandidateinthegeneralelection,stealingvotersfromtheparty’s base.Inthiscase,thecongressionalcandidateshadonlyremovedthemselvesfromthe Democraticpartysixmonthsbeforetheelectionandassuchwereruledineligibletorunin districtcourt.TheCourtupheldtheirineligibility,stating“thatthestatutesservedasufficiently importantstateinteresttosustaintheirconstitutionalityanddismissedthecomplaints”[33] because“theburdensarejustifiedbytheState'scompellinginterestinthestabilityofits politicalsystem.”[34]Onceagain,theCourtrestatedthat“theremustbeasubstantial regulationofelectionsiftheyaretobefairandhonest,”[35]emphasizingthepointthatthe stateshavearighttoregulatetheirelectionssolongastheydon’timposeanoverlylarge burdenonprotectedrights.

ThecontemporaryshapeofthistestwasfinallysettledinAndersonv.Celebrezze(1983)and Burdickv.Takushi(1992)fromwhichtheAnderson-Burdicktest,whichcurrentlygoverns administrativeelectionlaw,derivesitsname.Asinpreviouscases,AndersonandBurdick relatedtotheadministrativedetailsofelections,Andersononanearlyfilingdeadlinefor independentpresidentialcandidatesinOhio,[36]andBurdickonaHawaiibanonwrite-in voting.[37]TheCourtruleddifferentlyinbothcases,strikingdownOhio’searlydeadlinein Anderson[38]andupholdingHawaii’sbanonwrite-invotinginBurdick.[39]Inbothhowever, theCourtsolidifiedthelanguageofthetest,statingthat“notallrestrictionsimposedbythe Statesoncandidates'eligibilityfortheballotimposeconstitutionallysuspectburdenson voters'rights”[40]andthat“Acourtconsideringachallengetoastateelectionlawmustweigh thecharacterandmagnitudeoftheassertedinjurytotherightsprotectedbytheU.S.Const. amend.IandXIV…againstthepreciseinterestsputforwardbythestateasjustificationsfor theburdenimposedbyitsrule.”[41]

Currently,thesetworulingsformthecontrollingprecedentinelectionadministrationlaw basedontheAnderson-Burdickbalancingtest,whichweighsthestate’sinterestincreating anelectionregulationagainsttheburdenitplacesoncitizens’rightsthoughwithgeneral deferencetowardsthestateinmostcases Thistest,groundedinbalancingtheregulationof electionsagainsttherightsofcitizens,advancesahighlycivicrepublicanlegaldoctrinethatis notablyabsentfromtheothermainareasofelectionlaw:partisangerrymandering,and campaignfinance

B.PartisanGerrymandering

UnliketheclearconstitutionalstandardstheElectionsClauseprovidesforelection administrationlaw,redistrictingoperatesinamuchmoreconstitutionallyuncheckedspace. ThepowertoredistrictisvestedinboththeElectionsClauseandArticleISection2Clause3, knownastheEnumerationClause,whichstates:

RepresentativesanddirectTaxesshallbeapportionedamongtheseveralStateswhichmay beincludedwithinthisUnion,accordingtotheirrespectiveNumbers,whichshallbe determinedbyaddingtothewholeNumberoffreePersons,includingthoseboundtoService foraTermofYears,andexcludingIndiansnottaxed,threefifthsofallotherPersons.The actualEnumerationshallbemadewithinthreeYearsafterthefirstMeetingoftheCongressof theUnitedStates,andwithineverysubsequentTermoftenYears,insuchMannerastheyshall byLawdirect.[42]

ThisclauseprovidesforthedecennialfederalcensusfromwhichtheapportionmentofHouse andstatelegislatureseatsisbasedandwhichwhencombinedwiththeElectionsClause,gives statelegislaturestheabilitytoredrawdistrictsbasedonthenumberofseatsapportionedto them.[43]Asredistrictingallowsstatelegislatorstoessentiallychoosetheirconstituents,the systemhasbeenabusedviagerrymandering,thecreationofdistrictsdesignedtofavorone party,sincethefounding.[44]ThelackofaclearstandardwithintheConstitutionhasled courtstolargelywashtheirhandsoftheissue,leaningintoclassicalliberalismtojustifynoninterferenceforfearofaccidentallyinfringinguponrightsdespitethedisastrouspractical consequencesofsuchastance.

ForasignificantportionofAmericanhistory,federalcourtchallengestostates’ apportionmentofseats,whetherconcerningfederalorstatedistricts,wereconsidered politicalquestionsoutsidethejurisdictionofthejudiciary.[45]Thisfinallybegantochangein Bakerv.Carr(1962)inwhichagroupofcitizenschallengedTennessee’sapportionmentof seatsintheGeneralAssembly,whichhadgoneunchanged[46]despitesignificantpopulation growthformorethansixtyyears.Unsurprisingly,thisledtodeeplyunrepresentativedistricts andessentiallylockedalargeportionofcitizensoutoftheelectoralprocessbygivingmore weighttothevotesofcertainvotersoverothers.Assuch,citizenssoughtrelieffromadistrict courtundertheFourteenthAmendmentbutweredeniedonthegroundsthatredistricting constitutedanonjusticiablepoliticalquestion.OnappealtheSupremeCourtreversed,holding thatchallengestoastate’sredistrictingprocessdidnotconstituteapoliticalquestion.The Courtsupportedthisbydefiningthebreadthofpoliticalquestionstobeissuesrelatedto foreignrelations,datesofdurationofhostilities,thevalidityofenactments,thestatusof Indiantribes,andclaimsmadeundertheGuaranteeClause.[47]Sincethecitizensmadeno claimrelatedtoanyoftheseareas,whichtheCourtfoundnonjusticiable“primarilyasa functionoftheseparationofpowers,”[48]

thelowercourtrulingwasreversed,makingredistrictingdecisionsbroadlyreviewablein federalcourt Whilethiscaseiswidelyconsideredoneofthemostimportantone-person,onevotecasesprotectingtheequalityofeveryperson'svote,BakerdidnotholdTennessee'smaps unconstitutionalbutrathermadethefederalcourtsaviablelocationtobringredistricting disputessignificantlyincreasingthebreadthofpotentialremediesingerrymanderingcases Broadlyspeaking,thepowertochallengeredistrictingdecisionssinceBakerhaslargelybeen exercisedagainstracialgerrymanderingusingtheFourteenthAmendmentandtheVoting RightsActof1965asgrounds Thishasledtoarelativelyrobustsystemofrestrictionsonracial gerrymanderingbasedonthreeprinciplesestablishedinThornburgv Gingles(1986): First,theminoritygroupmustbeabletodemonstratethatitissufficientlylargeand geographicallycompacttoconstituteamajorityinasingle-memberdistrict…Second,the minoritygroupmustbeabletoshowthatitispoliticallycohesive…Third,theminoritymustbe abletodemonstratethatthewhitemajorityvotessufficientlyasabloctoenableit…todefeat theminority'spreferredcandidate.[49]

This,alongwithseveralothercasesincludingShawv.Reno(1993),andCooperv.Harris(2017), [50]establishedapowerfulprecedentfortheCourttousestrictscrutinywhenconsidering mapswhereracialgerrymanderingisdeterminedtohaveoccurred.Unfortunately,this skepticismtowardsracialgerrymandering,basedonracebeingasuspectclass,doesnot extendtopartisangerrymandering.

TheCourthadformostofitshistoryavoidedstatinganofficialtestorpositiononpartisan gerrymandering,butinRuchov.CommonCause(2019)theCourtfinallyaddressedtheissue head-on.Twoconsolidatedchallenges,onebyRepublicansinMarylandandanotherby DemocratsinNorthCarolinaclaimedthattheirFirstandFourteenthAmendmentrightswere violatedbytheirrespectivestates’extremelygerrymanderedcongressionaldistricts.In Maryland,where54.0%ofvoterswereregisteredDemocrats,themapatthetimegavethe Democratsamajorityinallbutoneofthestate’seightcongressionaldistricts.[51]InNorth Carolina,where29.8%ofvoterswereregisteredRepublicans,themapatthetimegave Republicansamajorityintenofthestate’sthirteencongressionaldistricts.[52]ChiefJustice Roberts,writingfortheCourt,readilyacknowledgedthat“thesecasesinvolveblatant examplesofpartisanshipdrivingdistrictingdecisions,”[53]butdespitethis,theCourtheld partisangerrymanderingasanonjusticiablepoliticalquestionbecauseitwouldbeimpossible tocreateastandardforresolvingsuchclaimsthatis“groundedina‘limitedandprecise rationale.’”[54]Theplaintiffs’argumentsthattheCourtshouldestablishsomeformoftest,as providedforinone-person,one-vote,andracialgerrymanderingcases,wererebuffedonthe groundsthatitwouldbeimpossiblefortheCourttoconstructafairtest“intheabsenceofa constitutionaldirectiveorlegalstandardstoguideitintheexerciseofsuchauthority.”[55]As such,theCourtfullyvacatedthefederaljudiciary’sjurisdictioninpartisangerrymandering casesduetoitsnatureasapoliticalquestionreverting,atleastwithinapartisancontext,to thepre-Bakersystem.Indoingso,theCourtchosetoshielditselfbehindclassicalliberalism’s non-interferencedoctrinetoavoidadifficultdecisionwiththepotentialforsignificant practicalbenefitsontheprinciplethatinterferingcouldarbitrarilyinfringeontheabilityof statelegislatorstodrawdistrictsinanywaytheyseefit.

C.CampaignFinance

Similartoadministrativeelectionlaw,whiletheconstitutionalpowertoregulatecampaign financecanbereadilyidentifiedintheElectionsClause,theimplementationofthatpowerhas beenmarkedbycontroversy Ingeneral,campaignfinanceisregulatedtoadvancetwo importantinterests:controllinghowacampaignreceivesmoney,andhowacampaignspends money First,campaigncontributionsaregenerallylimitedtoacertaindollaramount,and disclosuresarerequiredaboveaminimum Thisisdesignedtodoublyensurecandidatesare notfinancedbyasmallwell-endowedportionofsocietyandtopreventtheappearanceof corruptionbyrequiringcontributionstobedisclosed Second,restrictionsanddisclosureson campaignexpendituresaredesignedtopreventcandidatesfromabusingtheircampaign fundsforpersonaluse[56]andagaintopreventtheappearanceofcorruptionbylimiting outsideexpenditures.Unlikeelectionadministrationorpartisangerrymandering,the ideologicalbasisofcampaignfinanceregulationismuchlessstable,withportionsveryclearly embodyingtheclassicalliberalhands-offapproachwhileothersleanintothecivicrepublican balancingmethodwherefundamentalrightsandpracticalconsequencesareboth considered.Assuch,contemporarycampaignfinancesitsontheedgebetweenclassical liberalismandcivicrepublicanismwithsignificantpracticalissuespushingthecourtstoallow morerestrictivestatuteswhileclassicalliberalism’spuritanicalunderstandingoffundamental rightspushesforincreasinglylaxregulations.

Unsurprisingly,consideringthedominanceofclassicalliberalisminAmericanpolitical thought,campaignfinancewentunregulatedformuchofAmericanhistorywithsubstantive rulesfirstappearingduringthe20thcentury.Amongthemostimportantofthesestatuteswas theFederalElectionCampaignActof1971(FECA)whichcreatedquantitativerestrictionson contributionstowardsandexpendituresbycampaigns,aswellasestablishingdisclosure requirements,[57]allofwhichwerechallengedinthe1976caseBuckleyv.Valeo.Theplaintiffs challengedseveralofFECA’sprovisions,amongthema$1,000restrictionontheamountof moneyaperson,definedas“anindividual,partnership,committee,association,corporationor anyotherorganizationorgroupofpersons,”[58]couldgivetoanyindividualcandidate,a $25,000annualcontributionceilingforalldonations,a$1,000limitonpersonalexpenditureto advocateforacandidate,varyingcampaignexpenditurerestrictionsdependingontheoffice sought,anddisclosurerequirementsformostcontributionsandexpendituresbycampaigns andpersons.[59]Thesechallengeswerebroughtunderthepretensethattheyviolatedthe FirstAmendmentbylimitingfreedomofexpressionandassociation.TheCourtwassomewhat receptivetothesearguments,strikingdowntheexpenditurerestrictionsasthey“necessarily reduc[e]thequantityofexpressionbyrestrictingthenumberofissuesdiscussed,thedepthof theirexploration,andthesizeoftheaudiencereached,”[60]butinlargepartupholdingthe restofthestatute.Campaigncontributionrestrictionswereupheldastheyeffectively advancedthestate’sinterestin“thepreventionofcorruptionandtheappearanceof corruptionspawnedbytherealorimaginedcoerciveinfluenceoflargefinancialcontributions oncandidates'positionsandontheiractionsifelectedtooffice,”[61]whilecausing“littledirect restrainton[thevoter’s]politicalcommunication”[62]sincetheCourtheldthevalueofa campaigncontributiontobeits“symbolicexpressionofsupport”[63]ratherthanitsactual contributiontoacandidate’svictory.Finally,theCourtupheldtheconstitutionalityofthe disclosurerequirementsforbothcontributionsandexpendituresthoughthiswasapointof minimalcontentiononwhichthepartiesbroadlyagreed,“[i]ndeed,appellantsarguethat ‘narrowlydrawndisclosurerequirementsarethepropersolutiontovirtuallyalloftheevils Congresssoughttoremedy.’”[64]

Inthiscase,theCourtestablishedthatthestatehasalegitimateinterestincreating campaignfinancestatutestopreventcorruption,ortheperceptionthereof,inorderto maintaintheeffectivenessofandpublicfaithintheelectoralsystem,andassuchwaswilling togivemoreleniencytostatutespurportingtoaddresstheseissues Outsideofthe contributions,theCourtwasquitehostiletoexpenditurerestrictions,indicatingthat legislatorsmusttakespecialcarethattheirstatutesarenarrowlytailoredtoachievinganticorruptiongoals[65]

Buckleyheldacontrollingroleincampaignfinancelawfornearly30years,butduringthat timepoliticalpartiesandtheirvariousassociatedorganizationslearnedtoevadeFECA’shard moneyrestrictions.[66]Consequently,CongresspassedtheBipartisanCampaignReformAct of2002(BCRA)whichsupersededFECAandsoughttocutdownontheamountofsoftmoney thatwasmovedthroughintermediariestoavoidtherestrictionsonhardmoneypresentinthe FECAregime.Todothis,BCRAlimitedsoftmoneytransferstofederalcampaigns[67]and restrictednon-partyorganizationsfromusinggeneralusetreasuryfundstofund “electioneeringcommunications,”[68]adecisionwhichwaspromptlychallengedinMcConnell v.FEC(2003)onthegroundsthatitviolatedplaintiffs’freedomofspeechandassociation undertheFirstAmendment.IncontrasttoBuckley,whereasignificantportionofthestatute wasruledunconstitutional,theCourtinMcConnellupheldthetwocentraltenetsoftheBCRA, softmoney,andelectioneeringlimits,citingonceagainthat“thepreventionofcorruptionor itsappearanceconstitutesasufficientlyimportantinteresttojustifypoliticalcontribution limits”[69]becausepublicfaithintheelectoralsystemisessentialforittofunctionproperly. Regrettably,thestrongdefenseofcampaignfinanceregulationsseeninthiscasewouldnot continue,astheCourtgrewincreasinglysensitivetotheburdenthatcampaignfinance regulationsplacedonFirstAmendmentliberties.

InCitizensUnitedv.FEC(2010),theCourtupendedasignificantportionoftheregime establishedinBuckleyandexpandedinMcConnell,rulingthatrestrictionsoncorporate independentexpenditures[70]wereanunconstitutionalburdenoncorporations'First Amendmentrights.Toreachthisconclusion,theCourtpulledinspirationfromseveralsources includingBuckleyinwhichtheCourtexpandedontheholdingthatrestrictionsonthe expendituresofacampaignorindividualwereunconstitutionaltoincludethoseoncorporate expenditures.PositingthatsinceFECAdefinedapersonas“anindividual,partnership, committee,association,corporationoranyotherorganizationorgroupofpersons,”[71]and theFirstAmendmentprotectsthespeechrightsofallpersons,theexpressiverightsof corporationsmustbeprotected,rejecting“theargumentthatpoliticalspeechofcorporations orotherassociationsshouldbetreateddifferentlyundertheFirstAmendmentsimplybecause suchassociationsarenot‘naturalpersons.’”[72]Expandingfurther,theCourtfoundthatthe FEC’ssystemofcivilandcriminalpenaltiesconstitutedasystemofpriorrestraintinwhich organizationswouldbeforcedtoseekpermissionbeforedisseminatinganelectioneering communication“analogoustolicensinglawsimplementedin16th-and17th-centuryEngland, lawsandgovernmentalpracticesofthesortthattheFirstAmendmentwasdrawnto prohibit.”[73]Drawingfromthesetwomainpoints,thepreviousrulingspreventingcorporate independentexpenditureswereoverruled,leadingtothesystemtodaywherecorporate politicalactioncommittees(PACs)canspendunlimitedamountsofmoneytoinfluence elections.[74]

Assuch,contemporarycampaignfinancelawhasflippeddecisivelytowardsclassical liberalismafteralongstreakofpragmaticcivicrepublicanism,placingabroadinterpretation oftherightsprovidedbytheFirstAmendmentabovepracticalconcernsaboutthehealthof theelectoralsystem

IV.Conclusions

Throughthesethreecaselines,thelimitedreachofcivicrepublicanisminelectionlaw becomesclear Inadministrativeelectionlaw,civicrepublicanism'spreferencetowards balancingthevariousinterestsathandisapparentintheAnderson-Burdicktest Inpartisan gerrymanderingandcampaignfinancehowever,civicrepublicanism’spragmatismisnotably lessvisiblewithRuchojettisoninganyabilitytoconsiderpartisangerrymandersinfederal courtwhilecampaignfinancehasslowlymovedawayfromtheoldercivicrepublican precedentinfavorofamorehands-offapproach.Ascivicrepublicanismhasretreatedin theseareasthenation’selectoralsystemhassustainedsignificantdamage,whetherthatbe throughabsurdlylopsideddistrictsinwhichpoliticiansneverneedtoappealtotheotherside, orthroughdecreasingtrustinpoliticianswhosecampaignsarebankrolledbybigbusiness.[75] Todealwiththesemountingissues,itisparamountthattheCourtreturntosomeformofcivic republicanisminitsjurisprudence,takingadministrativeelectionlawasamodelforhowto considerthepracticalimplicationsofadecisionalongsidethefundamentalrightsatissue.

Yet,beforediscussingthis,itisnecessarytoaddresstheCourt'smajorissuewithcivic republicanism,subjectivity.Sincethefundamentalnatureofcivicrepublicanismistobalance themanycompetinginterestsatplayinanycase,thecurrentmajorityhasoftenassertedthat itlackssolidgroundfromwhichtomeasurefairness.AsChiefJusticeRobertsputitinRucho, “Evenif[themajority]weretoacceptthedissent’sproposedbaseline,itwouldreturnusto‘the originalunanswerablequestion(Howmuchpoliticalmotivationandeffectistoomuch?).’”[76] StatedinplainEnglish,thisisaskinghowcivicrepublicanismwoulddrawthelinebetween whatislawfulandunlawful.TheChiefJusticeandthemajority,whobelievethattheCourt’s purposeistointerpretthelawastheframerswouldthroughoriginalismregardlessof practicalconsequencesincorrectlyassumethatacivicrepublican,supposedlystuckina landscapeoflegalrelativismentirelylackingstableprinciples,isunabletoanswerthat question.Unfortunately,thisunderstandingisentirelywrong.Civicrepublicans,farfrom lackingprinciples,sharemanyofthesameprinciplesasclassicalliberals,includinga commitmenttotheruleoflawanddemocraticgovernment,[77]onlydiverginginthattheysee theCourt’struepurposetobethepursuitofbettergovernance,notblindfaithtoabstract ideals.Fromthismorenuancedperspective,civicrepublicanscanconsiderboththeframers’ originalintentionsalongwiththepracticalimplicationsofacase,thusallowingfordecisions thatarebothprincipledandcompatiblewiththehealthofAmericandemocracy.Assuch,the majority’sattemptstoportraycivicrepublicanismaswithoutjudicialsubstanceareincorrect. Inaddition,civicrepublicanismisentirelycompatiblewiththeCourt’scurrentoriginalistlegal doctrine.Sincecivicrepublicanism,likeclassicalliberalism,datesbacktothefoundingera,it isnotonlyvalidbutintegraltocorrectlyunderstandhowthefounderswouldinterpretthe Constitutionandoffersafantastictooltomoderatesomeoforiginalism’smoreextreme tendencies.Byintroducinganelementofpracticalitytothehigh-mindedidealismofcurrent originalistelectionjurisprudence,civicrepublicanismoffersanopportunitytomakesignificant pragmaticimprovementsinbothpartisangerrymanderingandcampaignfinance.

Beginningwithpartisangerrymandering,theCourtcouldsignificantlyimprovethesituationby reopeningthefederalcourtsasavenuetoaddresspartisangerrymanderingclaimsand establishingalimitedtesttorejectoverlymanipulativemaps Reopeningthesecourtsisan absoluteimperativeaswithouttheabilitytochallengeelectoralmapsincourt,groupsthat havebeengerrymanderedoutofelectoralimportancewillhavenowaytoaffectchangeina systemdominatedbyoneparty[78]Relyingoncivicrepublicanism,theideaofpartisan gerrymanderingasanonjusticiablepoliticalquestioncanbecounteredbytheclaimthatthe purposeofelectionsistoaccuratelyrepresenttheinterestsofthepeople,andsince gerrymanderingtamperswiththatrepresentationitmustbereviewablebyfederalcourtsto ensurethatelectionscarryouttheirbasicfunction Turningtothedifficultiesofestablishinga testforpartisangerrymanderingtheCourtrightlyidentifiedthatdevelopingahardstandard forthenumberofseatsallocatedtoeachpartyispresumablyimpossible,butfailedtofully appreciatetheeasilyapplicablesolutionin“traditionaldistrictingcriteria,suchas maintainingpoliticalsubdivisions,[and]keepingcommunitiesofinteresttogether.”[79] Throughthissystem,itwouldbepossibletoestablishdistrictsthat,whilenotperfect representationsofthepartisanmakeupofastate,wouldatleastbeforcedtoconformtoa measurablestandardtherebyreducingthecapacityforpartisangerrymandering.By embracingcivicrepublicanism,theCourtwouldbeabletoensuremoreaccuratedistricts, leadingtomoreaccurateelectionsandthusamoreeffectivegovernancesystem.

Campaignfinancecouldberectifiedcomparativelyeasilywithareturntothepre-Citizens precedentrestrictingindependentcorporateexpenditures.Thejurisprudentialjumprequired bythisswitchwouldberelativelysmall,simplyextendingtheexistinglogicthathasupheld FECcontributionlimitsof$3,300to$5,000[80]fromPACstoindividualcandidatestoinclude independentcorporateexpenditures,whichwhilenominallyindependentofacandidate accomplishthesameaimasdirectlydonatingtoacampaign.Whilethelogicaljumpis relativelysmallthephilosophicalchangewouldbesignificant,requiringtheCourttointegrate civicrepublicanismintoitsoriginalistjurisprudenceandsuspenditsclassicalliberalviewthat speechbycorporatepersonsshouldreceivethesamemeasureofprotectionasspeechby naturalpersons.Shouldthishappen,theCourtwouldbeabletorestoresomemeasureof publictrust[81]intheelectoralprocessbyreducingtheperceptionthatcandidatesare beholdentocorporatebackers,consequentlycreatingamoreeffectiveandaccurateelectoral system.

Civicrepublicanismrepresentsauniqueopportunitytocounterthefailingsofthecurrent originalistsystemdominatedbyclassicalliberalism.Inpartisangerrymandering,civic republicanismcanprovideaguidetofixingtheoutrageousabusesoftheredistrictingprocess currentlycommonplacethroughoutthecountry.Incampaignfinance,itcanrestore confidenceintheelectoralsystembymakingthepeople’srepresentativesaccountabletothe people,notwealthydonors.Finally,forthecountry,civicrepublicanismoffersanopportunity toremedytheinaccuraciesofcurrentoriginalisminelectionlawandcreatealegaldoctrine committedtobalancingfundamentalrightsagainsttheirpragmaticimplicationsforthewider healthofAmericandemocracy.

1 “ArticleILegislativeBranch,”ConstitutionAnnotated,UnitedStatesCongress,Accessed November20,2023,https://constitutioncongressgov/browse/article-1/#I S4

2 “ArticleIVRelationshipsBetweentheStates,”ConstitutionAnnotated,UnitedStates Congress,AccessedNovember20,2023,https://constitutioncongressgov/browse/article4/#IV S4 Thisclausecontainsadditionalunrelatedlanguagedescribingprotectionsthe federalgovernmentisobligatedtoprovidethestatesagainstbothforeigninvasionand “domesticViolence”whichinitsarchaicusagemeantdomesticinsurrection

3 Inpractice,theGuaranteesClause’s“RepublicanFormofGovernment”guaranteeisrarely usedandhasonlybeendefinedtoincludeafewoftherightsprovidedbytheFourteenth Amendment’sPrivilegesandImmunitiesClause,suchastherighttopetitionforaredressof grievancesandequalitybeforethelaw.

4.Moorev.Harper,142S.Ct.1089(2022).Theneartotalcontrolofthestatesoverstate electionsshouldnotbemisconstruedtomeantotalcontrolbythestatelegislatures exclusively,knownasindependentstatelegislaturetheory,butratherfulllegislativepowerfor thestatelegislaturescoupledwithjudicialreviewbystatecourts.

5.Definedasrightsthatspecifyareasthatthegovernmentcannotinterferein,ratherthan specificallyenumeratingallofthefreedomsprovidedtothecitizen.

6.U.S.Const.amend.I.

7.Whiletherighttofreelyexpressone'sreligionandpeacefullyprotestarebothprotectedby theFirstAmendmenttheyarenotwithinthescopeofthispaperandwillnotbeaddressedin detail.

8.ShaneCourtland,GeraldGaus,DavidSchmidtz,“Liberalism,”TheStanfordEncyclopediaof Philosophy,StanfordUniversity,Spring2022, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#RepLib.Thetermliberalismhasevolved considerablysincethefounding,comingtoencapsulateawidevarietyofpolitical,andethical ideas,butforthispaperitisbestunderstoodasapredispositiontowardsmaximumpossible non-interferencebythegovernmentinacitizen'slife.

9.FrankLovett,“Republicanism,”TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,StanfordUniversity, Fall2022,https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/republicanism/#WhaAboNonInt.Likeliberalism, republicanismextendstoawidevarietyofideas,butit’simportanttodistinguishcivic republicanism,asystemofgovernancedrawingfromtheclassicalRomantradition,from RepublicanismwhichisrelatedtotheideologyoftheRepublicanParty.

10.Theideathatpowermustbeexercisedthroughasystemofuniformlyappliedlaws.

11.Theideathatallpowerisderivedfromthepeople.

12.Andersonv.Celebrezze,460U.S.780(1983).Burdickv.Takushi,504U.S.428(1992).

13.Thisisasimplificationusedthroughout,meanttoconveydisputesfocusedontheminutiae ofrunningelections,suchasthequalificationsforgettingontheballotorhowvotingoccurs, todistinguishfrompartisangerrymanderingandcampaignfinancewhicharementioned later.

14.Thetestissomewhatmorenuancedthanthis,withabalancingcomponentthatratchets thescrutinyupordowndependingonthecircumstances,butingeneral,ithasbeen interpretedtogivestatesbroadpowerstoregulatethetime,place,andmannerofelections withminimaljudicialinterference.

15.Allenv.Milligan,143S.Ct.1487(2023).Thecourthasreaffirmeditscommitmenttofighting racialgerrymandering,butthisisbasedontheFourteenthandFifteenthAmendments,notthe First.

16.Ruchov.Common,139S.Ct.2484(2019).

17.52U.S.Cch.301§30118(2023).

18 CitizensUnitedv FEC,558US 310(2010)

19 Definedas“anindividual,partnership,committee,association,corporationoranyother organizationorgroupofpersons”18USC ch29 §591(repealed1980)

20 “ArticleILegislativeBranch,”ConstitutionAnnotated,UnitedStatesCongress,Accessed November20,2023,https://constitutioncongressgov/browse/article-1/#I S4

21 Smileyv Holm,285US 355(1932) Thecourtdeterminedthatwhenstateconstitutionsgive thegovernortheabilitytovetoregularlegislationthenthegovernormayalsoveto congressionalmaps

22 Ibid,366

23 Bullockv Carter,405US 145(1972)

24.Ibid.,144.

25.TheexactwordsoftheCourtwere“Noteverylimitationorincidentalburdenonthe exerciseofvotingrightsissubjecttoastringentstandardofreview…Theexistenceofsuch barriersdoesnotofitselfcompelclosescrutiny.Inapproachingcandidaterestrictions,itis essentialtoexamineinarealisticlighttheextentandnatureoftheirimpactonvoters.”Ibid., 143.

26.Ibid.,145.

27.Ibid.

28.Ibid.

29.Ibid.

30.Ibid.

31.Storerv.Brown,415U.S.724(1974).Thisconsolidatedcasealsoincludedachallengetoa requirementthatindependentpresidentialcandidatesobtainsignaturesequalto5%ofthe numberofvotersinthelastgeneralelectionwhichwasremandedtodistrictcourtonadviceto abstainandmovethecasetostatecourtwherethejusticeswerebetterequippedtointerpret statelaw.

32.Ibid.,735.

33.Ibid.,728.

34.Ibid.,759.Thestabilityofthepoliticalsystemisanabsenceofunrestrainedfactionalismor infightingwithintheparties.

35.Ibid.,730.

36.Andersonv.Celebrezze,460U.S.780(1983).

37.Burdickv.Takushi,504U.S.428(1992).

38.Thestatutewasstruckdownonthebasisthatitunconstitutionallyburdenedthe independentcandidate'sabilitytorunforoffice,andthatthestate’sinterestinpreventingthe sameintrapartyfeudingasinStorerwasmootaspresidentialprimariesarenotresolvedfora significantamountoftime,andtheintrapartyfeudingisallowedtocontinueforasignificant amountoftimeafterOhio’spresidentialprimary.

39.Thisstatutewasupheldonthebasisthatitrepresentedaminimalinfringementonthe citizen’srights,andefficientlyadvancedthestate’sinterestinpreventingintrapartyfeuding andunrestrainedfactionalismduringageneralelection.

40.Andersonv.Celebrezze,460U.S.788(1983).

41.Burdickv.Takushi,504U.S.433(1992).

42 ArticleILegislativeBranch,”ConstitutionAnnotated,UnitedStatesCongress,Accessed November20,2023,https://constitutioncongressgov/browse/article-1/#I S2 C3 Theclause continuesseverallinesfurtherthanquoted,describingtheinitialdistributionofseatstothe originalthirteencolonies,aswellastherulethatallstatesmusthaveatleastone representative

43 TheformandnumberofdistrictsarenotdescribedbytheConstitution,andassuchhave beenformedbyCongress Currently,thenumberofdistrictsislimitedto435bythe ReapportionmentActof1929,redistrictingoccursautomaticallyfollowingeverycensusbythe ApportionmentActof1941,andthenumberofrepresentativesperdistrictislimitedtooneby theUniformCongressionalDistrictActof1967

44.Thetermgerrymanderisaportmanteauof1812GovernorofMassachusettsElbridgeGerry andsalamander,createdtomocktheabsurdlyshapedstatelegislaturedistrictshehelped drawthatresembledsalamanders.JenniferDavis,“ElbridgeGerryandtheMonstrous Gerrymander,”LibraryofCongress,lastmodifiedFebruary10,2017, https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2017/02/elbridge-gerry-and-the-monstrous-gerrymander/.

45.Themeaningofapoliticalquestionisdefinedmorefullyinnote47,butitgenerallymeans issuesthataretoosubjectivetobeeffectivelydecidedbycourts.

46.Thestatuteinquestionisthe1901ApportionmentActwhichlinkedstatewideredistricting tothefederalcensus,butforsixtyyearsafteritspassagenonewlydrawnmapsmanagedto passineitherhouseofthestatelegislature.Assuchbythetimeofthissuit,theGeneral Assemblywaselectedfromdistrictsoriginallydesignedwhenthestatehad1.5millionfewer eligiblevoters.

47.Foreignrelations,datesofdurationofhostilities,validityofenactments,andthestatusof Indiantribesareallgivenpoliticalquestionstatusbecauseofthejudiciary’sdutytodeferto otherbranchesofgovernmentinthesecases.Forexample,inforeignrelationsandthedates ofdurationofhostilities,thepowertodealwithforeignaffairsisprimarilyvestedwithinthe executive,withthejudiciaryconsideringforeignentities“arepublicofwhoseexistencewe knownothing,”andwhichthecourtcannotengagewith.UnitedStatesv.Klintock,5Wheat. 144,149(1820).

48.Bakerv.Carr,369U.S.210(1962).

49.Thornburgv.Gingles,478U.S.50-51(1986).

50.Notably,allthreeofthesecasescamefromNorthCarolina,emphasizingthatlegislators willcontinuetogerrymandertheirdistrictsuntilasubstantiverestrictionisplacedonthem.

51.“EligibleActiveVotersonthePrecinctRegister-ByCounty,”MarylandStateBoardof Elections,TheStateofMaryland,October20,2018, https://elections.maryland.gov/press room/2018 stats/GG18 Eligible Active Voters by County .pdf.ThestatsforRepublicanandIndependentvotersare25.1%and17.9%respectivelyasof 2018.Thismapisalsostillinusetoday,givingDemocratscontroloverallbutoneofthestate’s ninecongressionalseats.

52.“VoterRegistrationStatistics,”NorthCarolinaBoardofElections,TheStateofNorth Carolina,December20,2018,https://vt.ncsbe.gov/RegStat/Results/?date=12%2F29%2F2018. ThestatsforDemocraticandIndependentvotersare37.8%and31.9%respectivelyasof2018. UnliketheMarylandmap,thisonewasstruckdowninCooperv.Harris(2017)forbeingaracial gerrymander,changingthecongressionaldelegationtoaneven7-7splitasof2023.

53.Ruchov.CommonCause,139S.Ct.2505(2019).

54.Ibid.,2488.

55.Ibid.,2508.

56 ForevidenceofthislooknofurtherthanformerrepresentativeGeorgeSantoswhospent, amongotherthings,$2,28152gamblinginAtlanticCity,$3,33281onanAirbnbholidayinthe Hamptons,and$6,000onclothingattheluxurystoreFerragamo DarehGregorian,“How GeorgeSantosallegedlyspenthiscampaignfunds,”NBCNews,accessedNovember16,2023 https://wwwnbcnewscom/politics/congress/george-santos-campaign-funds-how-spentwhat-to-know-rcna125531

57 Inaddition,italsoprovidedforthepublicfinancingofpresidentialcampaigns,aswellas theestablishmentoftheFederalElectionCommission(FEC)whichconsistedofaboardof governors,twoappointedbytheSpeakeroftheHouse,twobythePresidentprotemporeof theSenate,andtwobythePresidentforsix-yearterms,whichoversawtheenforcementof federalelectionregulations.

58.18U.S.C.ch29.§591(repealed1980).

59.Theplaintiffsalsochallengedtheaforementionedpublicfinancingschemeandthe structureoftheFEC,citingdiscriminationagainstsmallerpartiesintheformer,andclaiming thelatterwasrepugnanttotheAppointmentsClause,whichlimitstheabilitytoappoint officersoftheUnitedStatestothepresident,therebyinvalidatingthemixedappointment systeminuseatthetime.TheCourtwouldgoontostrikedownboththeseprovisions.

60.Buckleyv.Valeo,424U.S.19(1976).

61.Ibid.,25.

62.Ibid.,21.

63.Ibid.

64.Ibid.,60.Theplaintiffs’issuewiththissectionwasthatthesectionwasoverbroadand wouldpresentanundueburdenonsmallerpartieswithouttheresourcestofiletheenormous quantitiesofnecessarydisclosures.

65.Followingthiscase,FECAwasamendedtoremovetheexpenditurerequirements,except forcampaignsthatacceptedpublicmoney,andrestructuredtheappointmentsystemtobe consistentwiththeAppointmentsClause.

66.Thecontributionlimitsaswellasdiscloserequirementsarethehallmarksofhardmoney whichiscarefullymonitoredbytheFEC.

67.Thisprovisionlimitedtheroutebywhichpersonswoulddonatemoneytostateparties, whichthestatepartywouldthentransfertothenationalparty,allowingthedonatortoget aroundFECArestrictions.Additionally,thestatutelimitedtheactivitiesthatstateparties couldorganizeconcerningfederalelections,restrictingvoterregistrationdriveswithin120 daysofafederalelection,andget-out-the-vote(GOTV)eventsconductedinrelationtoa candidatethatwillappearinafederalelection,amongotherthings.“McConnellv.FEC,” FederalElectionsCommission,accessedDecember10,2023,https://www.fec.gov/legalresources/court-cases/mcconnell-v-fec/.

68.BCRAreplacedtheBucklydefinitionofpoliticaladvertisingas“communicationsexpressly advocatingtheelectionordefeatofparticularcandidates,”withthetermelectioneering communications,“whichencompassesany"broadcast,cable,orsatellitecommunication"that clearlyidentifiesacandidateforfederaloffice,airswithinaspecifictimeperiod(e.g.,within60 daysofageneralelectionand30daysofaprimary),andistargetedtotherelevant electorate.”McConnellv.FEC,540U.S.189(2003).Non-partyorganizationswerestillableto engageintheseactivitiesiffundsweredirectedthroughapoliticalactioncommittee(PAC) whichwouldbesubjecttoBRCArestrictions.

69.Ibid.,143.

70 Thismeansuncoordinated,unsolicitedexpendituresmadebyacorporationwiththe expresspurposeofadvocatingfortheelectionordefeatofaspecificcandidate

71 18USC ch29 §591(repealed1980)

72 CitizensUnitedv FEC,558US 343(2010) Thelegaltheoryofcorporatepersonhood,which grantscorporationsmanyofthesamerightsasnaturalpersons,hasalonghistoryintheUS, seeTrs ofDartmouthCollegev Woodward,17US 518(1819),SantaClaraCountyv SouthernP R Co,118US 394(1886),WheelingSteelCorp v Glander,337US 562(1949)

73 Ibid,335

74 Againnotethattechnicallytheseexpenditurescannotbecoordinatedwithapolitical campaign,butpracticallytheyachievethesamethingascoordinatedexpenditures.

75.72%ofAmericansthinkthereshouldbelimitsoncampaignspending,and80%think campaigndonorsandlobbyistshavetoomuchswayovermembersofCongress.AndyCerda andAndrewDaniller,“7factsaboutAmericans’viewsofmoneyinpolitics,”PewResearch Center,PewResearchCenter,October23,2023.https://www.pewresearch.org/shortreads/2023/10/23/7-facts-about-americans-views-of-money-in-politics/.

76.Ruchov.CommonCause,139S.Ct.2505(2019).

77.FrankLovett,“Republicanism,”TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,Stanford University,Fall2022,https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/republicanism/#WhaAboNonInt.Shane Courtland,GeraldGaus,DavidSchmidtz,“Liberalism,”TheStanfordEncyclopediaof Philosophy,StanfordUniversity,Spring2022, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#RepLib.

78.Whileitistruethatstatecourtsarestillopentohearinggerrymanderingcases,state judiciariesareoftencloselytiedtothepartisanmakeupofthelegislativeandexecutive branches,whichwilltiltexcessivelyonewayinastatewithsignificantgerrymandering.

79.Ruchov.CommonCause,139S.Ct.2500(2019).

80.“Contributionlimits,”FederalElectionsCommission,accessedDecember11,2023, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/candidate-takingreceipts/contribution-limits/.

81.Seenote75supra.

JOHNS HOPKINS LAW REVIEW