JHU East Asian Studies Forum & Review 2021-2022 by JHU EASFR

The Johns Hopkins University East Asian Studies Forum and Review 2021-2022

Sections: I. Public Health in East Asia II. Historical and Geopolitical Matters of the Twentieth Century III. Contemporary Social, Security, and Geopolitical Issues

Published by the East Asian Studies Student Advisory Committee, East Asian Studies Program, Johns Hopkins University, April 2022

Table of Contents Opening Letter…………………………………………………………………………………...4

I. Public Health in East Asia Disease Maps of the Third Plague Pandemic: New Epidemiological Reality of a Global Society Jeffrey Carrano…………………………………………………………………………….6 Doctors on Horseback: Healthcare of Pastoral Inner Mongolia in the 1960s Zyan Wang……………………………………………………………………………….52 Sociopolitical Movements and Public Health Campaigns: Visualizing Chinese Anti-Malaria Posters Shaohong Wang…………………………………………………………………..……...63 The Effectiveness of Public Policy Measures at Promoting Behavior Changes in Japan and Vietnam During the COVID-19 Pandemic Mira Anderson………………………………………………………………………...…73 The Stone Doctors: Working at the Intersection of Medicine and Christianity in Early 20th Century China Reshmi Patel…………………………………………………………………………..…87

II. Historical and Geopolitical Matters of the Twentieth Century China’s Great Famine of 1958-1961: The Key Role of the Chinese Communist Party Elizabeth Chatpar……………………………………………………………………….103 Cornerstone for Containment and Security in Asia-Pacific: A Comparative Brief on U.S. Presence in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan’s Post-War Industrialization and Democratization Qiqin Sun……………………………………………………………………………….115 Political Effects of Guerrilla Warfare in the Chinese Civil War: Maoist China and Guerrilla Governance Chris Park……………………………………………………………………………….132

“To be Educated is to be Anti-Japanese”: An Exploration of Korean Neo-Confucianism as the Antithesis of Japanese Assimilation Phoebe More…………………………………………………………………………....148

III. Contemporary Social, Geopolitical, and Security Issues Deviation From the Norm and its Gendered Consequences: How the Rise of Neoliberalism in South Korea Has Engendered Models of Patriarchy Cherise Kim…………………………………………………………………………….161 Housing Prices in South Korea: A Policy Brief Sophia Carson, Erin Kim, Sophia Perone, Noah Walch………………………………..178 Key Military Implications of the AUKUS Security Pact Daniel Mathew………………………………………………………………………….187 North Korea: Rogue by Definition? Claire McCrea…………………………………………………………………………..199 The Chinese Communist Party's Zhonghua Minzu Policy: A Double-Edged Sword Michelle Lee……………………………………………………………………………213 The Evolution of Civil Society in South Korea: How South Korean Civil Society Propagated Democracy Emma Brenner………………………………………………………………………….221 U.S. and Vietnam: Vietnam’s Human Rights Issues Taylor Nguyen………………………………………………………………………….228 Why Do Labor Movements in China Fail?–– The Case of Chinese Technology Workers Wei Zhou……………………………………………………………………………….240

3 Opening Letter The East Asian Studies Forum and Review is an annual publication of interdisciplinary undergraduate research with a regional focus on East Asia. The journal is supported by the Johns Hopkins University’s East Asian Studies Program and is produced entirely by undergraduate students. It aims to showcase undergraduate research and promote awareness and scholarly discussion of a vibrant, diverse, and increasingly prominent region of the world. The 2021-2022 East Asian Studies Forum and Review features a total of seventeen papers from seventeen Johns Hopkins University students. Submissions consist of course papers, senior theses, and independent research. The journal is divided into three categories: Public Health in East Asia; Historical and Geopolitical Matters of the Twentieth Century; and Contemporary Social, Geopolitical, and Security Issues. The first section, “Public Health in East Asia,” features papers that discuss the historical background and evolution of prominent public health figures, campaigns, and systems in East Asia. The following section, “Historical and Geopolitical Matters of the Twentieth Century,” observes and questions important events in East Asia’s history, from Mao’s Great Famine to the U.S.’ role in East Asia’s industrialization. Lastly, the third section, “Contemporary Social, Geopolitical, and Security Issues,” examines a range of modern social, political, and economic issues in East Asia. The third section underlines the relevance of East Asia as a region and the various matters that political scholars, researchers, and students must devote attention to in the future. We would like to thank not only all of the student writers but also our committee members, editors, and distinguished faculty members for making this publication possible.

Chief Editors: Emma Brenner Michelle Lee Editorial Staff: Irene Kang Grace Ma Noah Walch Amrita Mukunda Rei Schullenbarger Caitlin Betz Calista Huang

Section I Public Health in East Asia

Disease Maps of the Third Plague Pandemic: New Epidemiological Reality of a Global Society Jeffrey Carrano Senior Thesis April 2021 Professor Marta Hanson

Figure 1 An iconic graphic of the pandemic, the COVID-19 Dashboard is the most recent and one of the most well-known global disease maps. Screen capture taken on 2/16/2021.1

Prologue During the COVID-19 pandemic, global disease maps have proved a key resource for both international health organizations and the general public in understanding the nature of the crisis. Global disease maps depict health crises like COVID-19 as international concerns, necessitating multinational cooperation to limit the spread and fatality of the contagion. However, the threat of a single, planet-wide illness has only appeared within the past 150 years, with the beginning of the Third Plague Pandemic.2 Examining how a regionalized plague became understood as a pandemic and became mapped as the first global pandemic are not only

“COVID-19 Dashboard by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University (JHU),” Coronavirus Resource Center, Johns Hopkins University of Medicine, February 6, 2021, https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html 2 According to the source, the Third Plague pandemic represented the first fully global pandemic as a result of the active interconnectivity between each of the inhabited continents. Monica H. Green, “The Globalisations of Disease,” in Human Dispersal and Species Movement: From Prehistory to the Present, ed. Nicole Boivin, Rémy Crassard, and Michael D. Petraglia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 510.

7 important, previously unexplored historical questions, but are relevant for better understanding what complex work goes into the modern data-derived global tracking of COVID-19. Introduction In this work, I analyze global disease maps of bubonic plague before and during the Third Plague Pandemic to argue that cultural, racial, and national assumptions blinded public health bodies and medical practitioners to the dangers of infectious disease, even with the beneficial new technologies of the early twentieth century. Cartographers and medical journals increasingly published disease maps during the nineteenth century to portray the perceived geographic boundaries of health threats in Asia and Africa. For example, disease maps of plague before the 1894 outbreak in Hong Kong commonly appeared alongside similar graphics on other infectious diseases, like cholera and typhus. Just as often, physicians and cartographers categorized the plague alongside health concerns like alcoholism and mental disorders. In this way, disease maps were not intended to demonstrate the potential for the spread of disease from one place to another, but to provide warning for potential threats in an area. Consequently, plague and other diseases associated with specific regions or climates were thought to be bound by geographic factors. But as trade, travel, and communication began to connect every location on earth, diseases were able to spread. Empire-building created a new epidemiological reality. Previously, even the most infectious diseases were unable to pose a simultaneous threat to every population center on earth. This was due to two facts: the lack of sustained travel between each continent; and the speed of such travel across both land and sea. As the nineteenth century progressed technologically and geopolitically, formerly distinct regions gradually began to join together to form the beginnings of a global society. The travel of goods and people allowed infectious pathogens to move much faster than before, as follows historical precedent. The infamous Black Death plague pandemic that swept Europe and Asia in the fourteenth century and the pandemics of smallpox and syphilis that decimated the New World during the sixteenth-century Columbian Exchange both directly followed the massive increase in trade and movement of people to previously unconnected areas.3

Alfred W. Crosby, The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492 (Portsmouth NH, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003).

8 As a consequence of the rise of global trade, the nineteenth century was marked by several epidemics. Several of these are well-known, with familiar names like typhus and yellow fever. Over the course of the nineteenth century, the transmissions of these diseases impacted almost every group of people, killing millions worldwide. Plague, the disease now understood to be caused by the Yersinia pestis bacillus, was no exception to this trend. The Third Plague Pandemic started in Yunnan in 1855, hit Hong Kong in 1894, and eventually went on to kill over 12 million people worldwide. The Yersinia pestis bacillus had managed to embrace nineteenth-century technology just as successfully as the empires. Rail, ship, and road travel had brought great wealth to international markets, but they had also contributed to disease transmission and made containing outbreaks significantly more difficult. The more connected to the global network an area became, the greater the chance that a pathogen could make the jump across geographic and political borders. The unprecedented scale of infectious disease threats in the nineteenth century, in conjunction with the greater global flow of commerce, was concomitant with a similar surge in the scientific capacity to study such illnesses. The cholera pandemic of the 1820s devastated India, Europe, and North America. As a result, public health officials focused on identifying its origins, method of transmission, and prophylaxis. Consequently, the nineteenth century saw the first epidemic disease outbreaks where humans could physically observe the pathogen that affected them. By 1854, Italian physician Filippo Pacini isolated the Vibrio cholerae bacterium in India.4 Robert Koch replicated his success in Germany in 1884, identifying the bacillus as directly responsible for the disease. Though Koch and Pacini hailed from different countries, the medical communities of each nation had begun to coalesce into a broader international conversation surrounding infectious disease and public health. With this precedent, the outbreak of plague in Hong Kong in May of 1894 created a race to identify the bacteria that caused the disease, mainly between Japanese scientist Kitasato Shibasaburō and French scientist Alexander Yersin. Less than two months after Hong Kong reported its first plague cases, Yersin became the first person to isolate and observe the Yersinia pestis bacillus.5 The Third Plague Pandemic, then, became possible to track across the globe as a

D. Lippi and E. Gotuzzo, “The greatest steps towards the discovery of Vibrio cholerae,” Clinical Microbiology and Infection, Volume 20, Issue 3. March 2014: 193. 5 E. G. Pryor, “The Great Plague of Hong Kong,” Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Volume 15, 1975: 66.

9 nearly simultaneous phenomenon, whereas cholera had been more sporadic and dispersed as several distinct epidemic waves in the nineteenth century. It was in this way the first global infectious disease crisis mapped across the entire planet and studied by contemporary scientists using germ theory and bacteriology. As a result, notions of where plague and other infectious diseases could threaten, and by extension who they could threaten, changed. As we shall see, some persons were more susceptible than others due to their location and socioeconomic status. For that reason, global disease maps were the most common graphic used to visualize the geography of disease. Methodology In the history of medicine, academic works on epidemics typically divide their examinations into one of two distinct methodological approaches: the naturalist-realist approach and the historicistconceptualist approach. The natural-realist model examines disease through a backwards-facing lens, with our modern conceptions of bacteriology, germ theory, and transmission of communicable disease applied to understand how a disease acted and why. This is commonly referred to as “retrospective epidemiology.”6 Conversely, the historicist-conceptualist model attempts to examine how contemporary individuals conceived of the disease they observed. In this way, a pathological agent may be the same today as in the past, but the way societies were affected by them physiologically, culturally, and politically often widely diverges from today’s understanding. I use both methods to argue that although biomedicine produced a new understanding of plague, social and cultural assumptions still influenced the impact of the pandemic on different groups of people. The period of 1850-1900 radically altered biomedicine, with the abandonment of sanitarianism and miasma theory in favor of bacteriology. The cultural and social understandings of plague evolved concomitantly with these scientific advancements. A major element of this work will be the development of a narrative identifying the conceptual understanding of the phrase “pandemic plague” as a disease concept. When using the term “disease concept,” I refer to the examination of disease as an object of historical study. The identification of a disease and

Packard, Randall, “‘Break-Bone’ Fever in Philadelphia, 1780: Reflections on the History of Disease,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine, Volume 90, Issue 2. 2013: 197.

10 its consequences for the society it affects make it a social product, as does any concept in medicine. In this way, diseases can be studied through both the scientific method and the historical method. In order to address the foundations of the term “pandemic plague,” however, I must also define “pandemic,” “epidemic,” and “endemic.” These definitions were not yet solidified during the period examined in this paper and still are not entirely distinct. Indeed, to study the history of pandemic plague without an awareness of how it is socially defined and culturally meaningful would eliminate its importance as a historical development. The primary body of documents I examined are maps detailing plague on a global scale from 1856 to 1900. I aim to comparatively analyze the documents to discuss the development of new ideas about infectious disease and how those new ideas were integrated into pre-existing assumptions and conceptions. Global disease maps represent a combination of epidemiological analysis and rhetorical argument, and as such, they become uniquely beneficial in both the historical-conceptual and the natural-realist approaches to the history of epidemics. The maps I have collected are each created by cartographers with a background in biomedicine. The differences between European, East Asian, American, and Australian conceptions of pandemic plague are significant and deserve mention. However, few maps were created from the perspectives of colonized peoples due to the role of disease maps as a tool largely of imperial state administration. In order to cover the impact of the plague on the people living under imperial rule, especially in the British possession of Hong Kong, individual accounts of the plague and hospital records are the most reliable source base. I analyze these sources, including accounts by public health officials and citizens in Hong Kong and the plague’s effects on the city, in conjunction with medical reports on plague transmission, containment, mortality, and treatment as reflecting arguments pushed by the creators of each map. Importantly, these sources justify plague’s sustained existence in India, the Middle East, and China, using a racial explanation, resulting in unequal consequences for non-white populations in colonial territories. Furthermore, though the maps are nominally meant to address the existence of plague on a global scale, the information they possess applies most directly to the relationship between imperial homelands (namely the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) and outlying colonial possessions (namely India, China, Southeast Asia, and Oceania). Due to the origin of the outbreak in British-held Hong Kong, along with the majority of cases occurring in Oceania and

11 Asia, the later disease maps cover this region of the world in more detail. The greater death toll in this area also carries with it a larger impact on the work of public health departments in imperial territories like Australia. In some of the work I examine, authors produced written works alongside the disease maps. I analyze these sources as integral to the map, particularly in explaining the author’s intentions behind the production of their map and how they chose to emphasize certain factors of the pandemic. Historiography Current historians of medicine argue that disease maps possess multiple functions at the same time. When medical cartographers construct a disease map, the methodological decisions they make in the process become their argument. These “persuasive graphics” then support the goals of the individual or institution creating them. A cartographer that takes the time to depict roads between different towns argues that travel between those towns is relevant in the spread of contagion.7 By depicting a disease as an entity within a greater environment, researchers could more closely follow the relationship between the nature of a disease and the broader environmental factors that impact its severity and potential threat.8 Additionally, disease maps are visual graphics that distill large amounts of information into an understandable format. Therefore, when created for public consumption, disease maps become effective public health propaganda. Some academics argue that this role is inherently more effective as a means of public education than as a means of direct disease surveillance.9 However, I argue that disease maps contributed to heightened awareness and discussion of new scientific knowledge and epidemiological data in both the public and government and academic institutions by summarizing the argument of their creator. This is especially true by affecting opinions by government figures hundreds or thousands of miles from an outbreak. Disease maps provide a better understanding of a region than text alone, hence the greater focus on mapmaking

Marta Hanson, “Visualizing the Geography of the Diseases of China: Western Disease Maps from Analytical Tools to Tools of Empire, Sovereignty, and Public Health Propaganda,1878–1929,” Science in Context, Volume 30, Issue 3. September 2017: 223. 8 Thomas Koch, Cartographies of Disease: Maps, Mapping, and Medicine (Medlands, CA: ESRI Press, 2005). 9 Mark Monmonie, “Maps as Graphic Propaganda for Public Health,” in Imagining Illness: Public Health and Visual Culture, ed. David Serlin (Minneapolis: University of Michigan Press, 2010).

12 as empires expand. Analyzing the disease maps via their varied rhetorical functions, as Koch, Monmonier, Hanson, and others have explained, sustains this “change over time” argument. Furthermore, this paper discusses the rhetorical use of plague outbreaks and the presence of other infectious diseases in order to separate the West from the Middle East and East Asia. Nükhet Varlik coined the phrase “epidemiological orientalism,” describing the assumption by Western academics in the nineteenth century that all European plague epidemics originated in the Middle East, placing blame on the cultural and hygienic failing of the Orient for outbreaks.10 Varlik argues that this belief caused the West to identify plague as a civilizational disease. I go further, showcasing the way in which the emphasis on the Middle East as the epidemiological threat to Europe limited the ability of pre-pandemic public health officials to properly scrutinize plague elsewhere, especially in India and China. Epidemiological orientalism created a conceptual blindspot. European public health officials failed to extend the scope of medical surveillance outside the traditionally defined “Orient,” a metageographic concept that included the Levant and the Middle East, but not much further East.11 Pandemic Plague Historians use the phrase “pandemic plague” to designate periods of severe outbreak of bubonic and pneumonic plague. Both are caused by the Yersinia pestis bacillus. However, the former is transmitted by flea bites and the latter by respiratory infection via air droplets. But while contemporary physicians and administrative officials during the Third Plague Pandemic referred to it as such, the usage of this term to describe the Justinian plague or the Black Death is purely retrospective. The term pandemic in the English language was first popularized in the 1700s, being defined by a 1763 dictionary generally as an “incident to a whole people.”12 The association with epidemic existed from the beginning as the 1754 book Introduction to Physic and Surgery 10

Nükhet Varlik, “‘Oriental Plague’ or Epidemiological Orientalism? Revisiting the Plague Episteme of the Early Modern Mediterranean” in Plague and Contagion in the Islamic Mediterranean (Kalamazoo, Bradford: Arc Humanities Press, 2017), p. 57. 11 Martin Lewis and Kärin Wigen, The Myth of Continents, ch. 2 The Spatial Construct of Orient and Occident, East and West, 47-72. 12 An Universal Dictionary of the English Language etc. (Edinburgh: A. Donaldson, 1763).

13 details. But pandemic here is juxtaposed with endemic. The source divides all diseases into the category of endemic or pandemic, because unlike endemic diseases, “the pandemic[s] affect the people in general at one and the same time.” The source does not ascribe a cause for pandemics. This uncertainty surrounding the origin of pandemics continued into 1883, when Michael Creigton translated August Hirsch’s German medical handbook Handbuch der historischgeographischen Pathologie and published the first known instance of the phrase “pandemic plague” in all of English literature.13 Unlike the earlier text, Hirsch contrasts pandemic with epidemic. Hirsch explains that epidemic diseases mostly contain themselves to a single area of major outbreak, while pandemics have no limits on their spread. In his depiction of the sixthcentury Justinian plague, for example, Hirsch defines it as pandemic because it traveled “to the ends of the habitable world.”14 Hirsch’s discussion of the origin of pandemics challenges older assertions that plague and similar infectious diseases result autochthonously from fluctuations in air moisture, the physical characteristics of the ground, or temperature. He states that the observation of plague outbreaks from Egypt to the southern slopes of the Himalayas disprove the idea that “plague cannot exist as an epidemic outside 67-87 degrees Fahrenheit.”15 Instead, Hirsch connects the movement of corpses between India, the Middle East, and Persia with the outbreak of plague. He believes plague to be a disease brought by poor hygiene, filth, and human squalor. He generally agrees with the conclusion of his French contemporary Aubert-Roche that “civilization alone destroyed the plague in Europe, it alone will destroy the plague in the East.”16 Hirsch defines pandemic plague by challenging traditional beliefs about the natural limits of plague and its ability to sustain itself outside this so-called endemic area. However, he places this term in the contemporary debates of disease origin. Hirsch claims he is unable to conclusively argue that plague originates from the Middle East or India but stresses the importance of finding the homeland of the disease. Moreover, Hirsch warns that plague’s decline 13

August Hirsch, Handbook of Geographical and Historical Pathology, trans. Charles Creighton (London: The New Sydenham Society, 1883), 703. Note: Google Ngram is a free application that uses Google’s search engine to look for instances of words or phrases in textual sources dating back several centuries. It is worth noting that the earliest use of this term found by searching “pandemic plague” does not appear until 1885 in Google Ngram, with the second and third occurrences appearing in 1887 and 1888 respectively. However, these first three uses by authors other than August Hirsch use “pandemic plague” in a metaphorical sense, describing it theoretically as opposed to the explicit public health threat that Hirsch warns of. 14 Ibid., 495. 15 Hirsch, Handbook, 516. 16 Ibid., 535.

14 in Europe should not reduce vigilant measures against the disease, like individual hygienic practices and state-sanctioned studies of disease in the Middle East and India. But Hirsch still believes that every outbreak of plague in Europe is imported from the Middle East. Moreover, Hirsch focuses his discussion on how to protect European nations against the disease within this geographic framework. Consequently, he dismisses cases of plague in Yunnan and elsewhere as anecdotal, and not of particular threat to Europe. The choice to disregard plague in some places in order to emphasize the role of India and the Middle East instead displays the mindset that plague outbreaks only mattered when they could make the jump from the Orient, across the Mediterranean, and into the heart of Europe. Even his discussion of India as a source for the plague is based around the close trade and human migration connections he finds between the population of the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East, an extension of the epidemiological orientalist mindset.17 Endemicity and a search for the geographic source of plague remained a fixture of pre-1894 discussions of plague. The Earliest Global Plague Map The earliest surviving disease map depicting plague on a global scale did not appear until 1856. There is evidence that German physician L. L. Finke produced a world map of disease in 1792 that identified plague, but this map was never published, and it is now lost.18 Plague certainly existed in the early modern period, as seen in the 1722 outbreak that ravaged Marseilles19 and the Moscow plague of 1770-72 which killed up to 100,000 people.20 However, cholera and other diseases killed comparatively more in a shorter period, especially in Europe and India.21 As such, plague received less attention from biomedicine.

Nükhet Varlik, “‘Oriental Plague’ or Epidemiological Orientalism? Revisiting the Plague Episteme of the Early Modern Mediterranean,” 61. 18 Frank A. Barrett, “Finke's 1792 map of human diseases: the first world disease map?” Social Science & Medicine, Volume 50, Issues 7-8, April 2000: 916. 19 Kirsten I Bos, “Eighteenth century Yersinia pestis genomes reveal the long-term persistence of an historical plague focus,” eLife, Volume 5, January 21, 2016. 20 Alexander Melikishvili, “Genesis of the Anti-Plague System: The Tsarist Period,” Critical Reviews in Microbiology, Volume 32, Issues 19-31, 2006: 24. 21 PJ Imperato, GH Imperato, and AC Imperato, “The Second World Cholera Pandemic (1826-1849) in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies with Special Reference to the Towns of San Prisco and Forio d'Ischia,” J Community Health, Volume 40, Issue 6, December 2015: 1224-86.

15 It is only alongside more feared illnesses that Alex Keith Johnston produced his 1856 map “The Geographic Distribution of Health and Disease, in Connexion Chiefly with Natural Phenomena.” Though Johnston would have had knowledge of several historical plague epidemics, he limits the depiction of the disease to the Middle Eastern and Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire. One of the major factors to consider in Johnston’s map is the causal relationship he depicts between the environment of regions and the diseases present there. Johnston’s map appeals to Galenic/Hippocratic assumptions regarding the role of climatic factors in disease risk, coloring the different sections of the world based upon their climate, with corresponding text over similarly colored regions.

Figure 2

16 Johnston, Alex Keith. “The Geographic Distribution of Health and Disease, in Connexion Chiefly with Natural Phenomena.”22

Johnston centers the world around England, both metaphorically and literally. As a British cartographer working before the international agreement on the Prime Meridian in 1884, Johnston selects London as the middle of the map from East to West. But London acts as more than the location of the prime meridian. The author determines the prevalence and severity of diseases worldwide using England as an epidemiological baseline. In the Cape Colony, for example, Johnston shades the region the same as the British Isles and notes, “Diseases: same as in England except cholera.”23 This same standard applies to New Zealand and Southern Australia. With the exception of the Galapagos Islands and Papua New Guinea, all regions of the globe identified as healthy fit within the green “Sub-Torrid & Temperate” climatic zone. Johnston also emphasizes the lines demarcating the tropics of Capricorn and Cancer and the Arctic circle. He then uses these cartographic features to decide when a region goes from one climatic category to another, particularly in Africa and Oceania. Johnston then connects the map with three charts. Two of these charts examine the rate of British military deaths by consumption and rheumatism per assigned post while the third, creatively titled “The Value of Life,” compares the death rate of various cities and countries. In a subsection of the third chart, Johnston distinguishes rates of deaths of Europeans in foreign cities from overall death rates. This choice to emphasize the difference in susceptibility to disease extends mostly to Europeans. However, Johnston also annotates both North and South America with text stating that smallpox is “very destructive to the Indian tribes.”24

Alex. Keith Johnston, “The Geographical Distribution of Health and Disease, in Connexion Chiefly with Natural Phenomena,” J Public Health Sanit Rev., Volume 2, Issue 6, July 1856: T25–T71. 23 Johnston, “The Geographical Distribution of Health and Disease, in Connexion Chiefly with Natural Phenomena,” in: Alex Keith Johnston, “The Geographic Distribution of Health & Disease, in Connexion Chiefly with Natural Phenomena,” Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, 1856, accessed at https://exhibits.stanford.edu/blrcc/catalog/tb878ty6609. 24 Ibid.

Figure 3 A section of Johnston’s map. Note the word “Plague” covering Egypt, the Levant, Anatolia, and Bulgaria.25

The map, in total, correlates two major interconnected factors with the outbreak of disease: human behavior and climate. Because Johnston divides the map into different dietary portions according to their distance from the equator, he links the decision of people to eat a primarily meat or vegetable-based diet to the foodstuffs that are best available to them from their environment. Again, the author draws on the centuries-old concept from the “Airs, Waters, Places” chapter of the Hippocratic Corpus that diseases are mainly specific to their environment. Importantly, Johnston does not argue that the difference in death rate between Europeans and non-Europeans results from racial characteristics. Instead, he emphasizes the dietary and climatic differences. When applied to the corresponding chart denoting European death rates in foreign locales, the whole graphic suggests that travelers should take care to familiarize themselves with the diseases common to their destination. By doing so, they will learn “what each individual will be in danger of experiencing from the change of regimen.”26 Johnston’s understanding of disease as directly tied to the environment explains his decision to define the extent of illness by geographic boundaries. He marks each region with disease not based upon where cases have been reported, but where he believes they are endemic. Therefore, he produces this map with the intention to display the natural boundaries of each disease as a permanent fixture. “The Geographic Distribution of Health and Disease” attempts to 25 26

Johnston, “The Geographical Distribution of Health and Disease, in Connexion Chiefly with Natural Phenomena.” Hippocrates, “On Airs, Waters, and Places.”

18 demonstrate long-standing trends of disease outbreaks in space. However, Johnston also uses the term epidemic disease to describe the various illnesses of the Caribbean and Southern United States. Johnston uses epidemic to describe a category of disease that sweeps over the population at once, but because of their recurring nature, he classifies them as a part of the natural phenomena of the Caribbean. In essence, he defines yellow fever and dysentery as endemic epidemics, or infectious diseases that naturally sweep through the human population from time to time. This depiction of disease as naturally residing in a location extends to plague. As a result, Johnston does not label historical instances of plague in Western and Central Europe. Instead, he identifies the Ottoman Empire with plague due to his belief that the disease is endemic only in Egypt and the Levant. A key strength of Johnston’s map is his willingness to identify exceptions to what he identifies as larger medical trends when the data does not support its inclusion. For example, Johnston labels both the Galapagos Islands and Papua New Guinea as torrid zones of disease close to the equator, but describes the locations as healthy. These are the only non-temperate locations on the entire map that Johnston labels in such a way. Similarly, he ranks Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka) as one of the healthiest countries due to its low death rate, even though it is a torrid zone of disease close to the equator. Medical cartographers, like all medical practitioners, often conceptualize disease through their education, but they are at their core data analysts. The epidemiology they depict on their maps reflects information they trust to represent the medical reality of the world. Johnston’s willingness to adapt to data best shows itself in his portrayal of cholera, the only disease he depicts as moving. Though Johnston created this map with the intention to cover all major diseases, cholera immediately stands out as unique. Spreading from city to city and designated with dark red arrows, the disease travels across the entirety of Eurasia and hops across the Atlantic Ocean. So important is cholera to Johnston that he labels major cities in Europe with the date cholera first appeared. At first glance, this depiction of cholera contrasts with the methods Johnston employs to describe all other diseases. Yet even the red arrows of cholera eventually trace back to a single location, north-east India, which he marks as “Cholera endemic.”27 Consequently, the disease originates from a single environment in the same way that plague and the rest of the diseases do. The difference between how Johnston represents cholera 27

Johnston, “The Geographical Distribution of Health and Disease, in Connexion Chiefly with Natural Phenomena.”

19 and the rest of the diseases, however, is that he depicts cholera both spatially and temporally, while all the other diseases remain part of a spatially situated background. According to Johnston, plague outbreaks and other infectious diseases must initially come from a suitable environment. The depiction of cholera as a mobile entity across Europe, North Africa, Asia, and North America acknowledges the spread of infectious disease, but the author does not draw a connection to the role of humans in spreading the disease, be it via trade, travel, or transportation. Though Johnston published this map two years after John Snow’s famous claim that contaminated water sources caused cholera, his water-borne thesis of cholera remained controversial and contagion by human-to-human transmission was not even considered. Plague, then, only posed a threat to European health if and when the environmental conditions were favorable for an outbreak in the endemic region of the Middle East. If so, it could then possibly be brought back to Europe. The “Foyers” of Plague and the Effect of Bacteriology on Plague Cartography In 1884, Léon Poincaré, a professor at University of Nancy medical school, published Prophylaxie et géographie médicale (Prevention and Medical Geography). Like Johnston, Poincaré focused on what he defined as the “principle maladies” of the day on a global scale.28 Unlike Johnston, however, Poincaré chose to create a total of twenty-two world maps, each of which was formed through the production of a standardized projection of the earth and partially shaded in red, allowing for easy comparison. The understanding of how the human body falls ill had changed significantly in the 28 years between when Johnston published his map in 1856 and Poincaré published his maps in Prevention and Medical Geography. This can be seen in Poincaré’s introduction, where he uses both the language of miasmatic thought and bacteriology to explain the conditions that give rise to the illnesses he lists as “miasmatic maladies.”29 According to Poincaré, geographic conditions and cultural standards like diet and regime have the potential to exacerbate disease severity but do not spontaneously cause disease. Instead, Poincaré generally agrees with the newly established germ theory of disease brought about by microbiologists like Louis Pasteur and

28 29

Léon Poincaré, Prophylaxie et géographie médicale, (Paris: Libraire de l'académie de médecine, 1884), IV. Ibid., 11.

20 Robert Koch. In 1862, Pasteur disproved the theory of spontaneous generation,30 and in 1876, Koch had proven that a microscopic bacteria directly caused anthrax, a potentially fatal infectious disease.31 Experiments like these provided a new framework for understanding disease, as each disease theoretically could be ascribed to the presence of a bacteria,32 or many decades later, a virus. Despite these new bacteriological discoveries, however, Poincaré still depicted the connection between filth, human waste, and other unhygienic substances with outbreaks of epidemic disease. For this reason, Poincaré believed environmental factors still had a role to play in medical cartography. This can be seen in his map titled “Peste,” the French term for plague. Poincaré invests in the germ theory of medicine. He believed that a microbe is responsible for the spread of the plague, but he uses the sanitarian concerns of poor geographic conditions, diet, regimen, and hygienic standards common to the miasmatic theory of disease in order to find favorable environments for the development of outbreaks. The author suggests that each of these factors increases the possibility that an illness flourishes in an area. He even addresses claims that the plague is able to be spread through the air in a person-to-person theory of contagion. In short, Poincaré combines aspects of both bacteriology and miasmatic thought to argue that the state should play a more active role in surveilling frontier regions for potential disease outbreaks.

Guy Bordenave, “Louis Pasteur (1822-1985),” Microbes and Infection, Volume 5, Issue 6, May 2003, 553-60. Steve M. Blevins and Michael S. Bronze, “Robet Koch and the ‘golden age’ of bacteriology,” International Journal of Infectious Diseases, Volume 14, Issue 9, September 2010, 744-751. 32 By 1898, with the use of ultrafiltration to identify the origin of foot-and-mouth disease, Koch also demonstrated the danger of viruses in causing communicable diseases. Ibid., 750. 31

Figure 4 Poincaré, Léon. “Peste,” in Prophylaxie et géographie médicale.33

Poincaré’s methodology takes into account contemporary and historic outbreaks of plague. He divides the world into four categories, using progressively darker red shading to designate more recently affected areas. The heaviest shading, consisting of Anatolia, Persia, and parts of India, identify endemic regions of plague with a low number of active cases even in absence of an established outbreak. Slightly less shaded are China, North Africa, central Italy, and southeastern Europe. Poincaré defines these regions as having “suffered epidemics in our century,” but he does not believe they endemically host the disease.34 He defines the most lightly shaded regions, consisting of continental Europe, as locations where plague “was suffered in past centuries,” but which had not seen any cases in the nineteenth century.35 Finally, Poincaré considers the unshaded portions completely free of plague, with no active cases at present and no historic outbreaks. 33

Poincaré, Prophylaxie et géographie médicale, 312. Ibid., 313. 35 Poincaré, Prophylaxie et géographie médicale, 313. 34

22 When compared to the Johnston map, Poincaré’s “Peste” map identifies a far greater portion of the world with the plague. This is due to two reasons: the increased amount of data Poincaré was able to draw upon (in large part because of the expansion of European imperialism) and the methodological choice to include more than the perceived endemic regions of plague in his map. By choosing to shade portions of the map red based on their long-term historical connection to the plague, Poincaré gives greater urgency to fears that another outbreak of plague could strike again in any of those more lightly shaded areas. Additionally, both Poincaré and Hirsch mention that during the nineteenth century, a series of small-scale plague epidemics had broken out across India and Southern China,36 and the lack of proof that the disease had died out in the subcontinent led to including both India and Yunnan as new endemic sources of plague. Poincaré, however, uses the term endemic differently from Hirsch and Johnston. Poincaré pairs the term endemic interchangeably with the French word foyer, literally translating to hearth.37 Metaphorically, Poincaré assigns these regions as the home of plague, with the right human and environmental conditions to keep the plague alive there perpetually. However, the use of the term foyer alongside endemic by Poincaré suggests that neither term holds the same definition as endemic does in a modern context. Jean-Jacques Matignon, one of the most influential French physicians in East Asia at the end of the nineteenth century, defines regions of China and Siberia as foyers of plague on a non-permanent basis. During an expedition to study plague in Mongolia in 1897, for example, he claimed to have discovered one of these foyers which appeared only a little more than a decade ago,38 a remarkably small timescale. So while Poincaré and other French scientists understood endemic regions as consistent sources of plague, they were not permanent in the same way that Johnston uses the term endemic but rather predictive or probabilistic. The darkest shaded regions of the map, therefore, represent regions where an outbreak is most likely to strike, even if there is not an active epidemic in that territory. For example, India began to see fewer epidemics of plague after 1844,39 and neither Hirsch nor Poincaré had verifiable sources on the existence of plague in India before 1815. But Poincaré labeled the subcontinent endemic in order to suggest that active scientific observation should

Hirsch, Handbook, 508. Poincaré, Prophylaxie et géographie médicale, 4. 38 Christos Lynteris, “Jean-Jacques Matignon’s Legacy on Russian Plague Research in North-East China and Inner Asia (1898-1910),” Extreme Orient, Volume 37, 2014: 69. 39 Hirsch, Handbook, 511. 37

23 remain a staple of government policy in the region, stating “the observation must therefore be kept constantly alert.”40 Additionally, the perception of sanitary conditions influenced Poincaré’s decision to mark a region as endemic to disease. Hirsch’s dismissal of the ability of plague to develop autochthonously in favorable conditions did not prevent him from blaming the filth and poor hygiene for the spread of disease once it had appeared, dedicating an entire section of his book to a description of the plague as “intimately connected with want and filth.”41 The general consensus amongst Hirsch, Poincaré, and their colleagues, therefore, was that plague could be defined as a civilizational disease. If unhygienic places harbor plague, endemic locations of plague must have a sufficiently unhygienic human population to sustain continuous outbreaks of disease. And if an endemic region of plague was unhygienic, then they must be uncivilized. This understanding of plague supports a culturally biased view of medicine, where diseased regions are viewed as unclean and therefore uncivilized, and vice versa. Such theories would be employed again before, during, and after the Third Plague Pandemic to justify the actions of public health officials in several colonized regions, like the destruction of “infected” districts of Hong Kong in 1894.42 For Poincaré, disease maps constitute state surveillance and the first step to maintaining public welfare. When necessary, he believes disease maps should inspire direct action by authorities, whether that be the destruction of contaminated private property in France or imposing quarantines in the colonies. As a result, finding the location where plague originates endemically is less important to Poincaré than determining where plague most often strikes and where an outbreak is thus most likely to spread. State intervention, therefore, should be focused on minimizing both the occurrence of epidemic outbreaks and the ability of outbreaks to spread. Plague represents a secondary concern for Poincaré. Poincaré categorizes plague as a “miasmatic malady of exotic origin,”43 directly comparing it to yellow fever and cholera. While he dedicates nearly forty pages of his book to his discussion of cholera, and nearly twenty to yellow fever, Poincaré neatly fits his examination of plague into ten pages. He uses a dismissive

Poincaré, Prophylaxie et géographie médicale, 313. Ibid., 522. 42 “Pandemic Plague,” The British Medical Journal, Volume 2, Issue 2078, October 27, 1900: 1250; Pryor, “The Great Plague of Hong Kong,” 63. 43 Poincaré, Prophylaxie et géographie médicale, 256. 41

24 tone, opening the section with “The plague, which has wreaked such havoc in Europe and France in the past centuries, now seems to threaten us much less than cholera.”44 For Poincaré, including a discussion of plague supports his argument for state medical surveillance. By shading Europe red, he harkens back to the famous devastation of the Black Death as a warning. The author uses the historic memory of such a devastating pandemic to give his theories weight. But at the same time, Poincaré acknowledges that it is specifically the two other diseases—cholera and yellow fever—which pose the greatest threat to public health. The Last Static Epidemic? The 1892 Map of Epidemic Diseases The map, “Epidemische Krankheiten des 19. Jahrhunderts,” (Epidemic Diseases in the 19th Century) edited and explained in 1890 by Doctor Georg Gerland and published as part of Hermann Berghaus’ 1892 Physikalischer Atlas, partially bases its information off the work of August Hirsch [See Figure 5]. In his description of the map, Gerland thanks Hirsch for his work on identifying historic locations of epidemic disease,45 and bases portions of his map directly off Hirsch’s Handbuch der historisch-geographischen Pathologie. As in the Handbuch, Gerland’s map contrasts the terms “endemic” and “epidemic” as exclusive categories of disease in separate maps.46 He identifies endemic diseases, like malaria and pellagra, by either shading in portions of the world or by circling a region with different patterns of lines distinct to each illness. Gerland then identifies the epidemic spread of diseases using arrows and dates of initial outbreaks similar to how Poincaré and Johnston displayed the spread of cholera. For the first time, diseases like typhus and smallpox can be observed affecting different countries at different times. Instead of deciding to solely identify contemporary outbreaks of these diseases, Gerland focuses on tracking their spread to new areas. That is not to say, however, that Gerland has no stake in the earlier discussions on the origin of these epidemic diseases. He marks multiple points where the initial outbreak of an epidemic may have begun, but he states that the exact location is “often only presumed.”47

Ibid., 312. Georg Gerland, “Atlas der Völkerkunde,” in Berghaus’ Physikalischer Atlas, Hermann Berghaus (Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1892): 6. 46 Gerland, “Atlas der Völkerkunde,” 21:19. 47 Ibid., 6. 45

25 Unlike the maps of Poincaré and Johnston, Gerland identifies these possible sources of disease in a much more muted fashion. Gerland merely marks a purported origin with a small stylized drawing of a pathogenic microbe. His choice to minimize the portrayal of epidemic disease origin thus emphasizes the contagious nature of these diseases. Gerland connects the spread of an epidemic disease to a new location by pairing the tip of an arrow with the date of each initial reported outbreak. When he uses these tools to tie two distant locations together, Gerland identifies the path the contagion took in traveling from its source to its furthest reaches. As a result, the reader is given a fuller picture of not only where a disease exists, but also from where it came and when it came. Therefore, the map connects the past to the present in a way earlier maps failed to do.

Figure 5 Gerland, Georg, “Epidemische Krankheiten des 19. Jahrhunderts.” in Berghaus’ Physikalischer Atlas. Plague is represented by the dark purple lines mostly enclosing sections of the Middle East, China, and India.48

The exception to this methodological development, however, is plague. Plague is the only disease in the “Epidemische” map with no arrows denoting spread from one region or another, whether historic or contemporary. As the only static disease on the epidemic map, Gerland depicts plague more similarly to the endemic diseases of his map than to cholera or typhus. Additionally, though Gerland makes an effort to demonstrate the historical dangers of plague, he

Gerland, Berghaus’ Physikalischer Atlas, 21:19.

26 gives comparatively little emphasis to more recent outbreaks of plague. The great majority of India, Central Asia, and China are not designated as zones of active plague. Gerland chooses to de-emphasize plague in those regions in favor of North Africa, the Levant, and Anatolia. Correspondingly, Gerland dismisses the idea of increased medical surveillance of the areas that Poincaré had called for, and he makes no reference to China at all other than visually certifying Hirsch’s claim of active plague cases in Yunnan.49 Plagues in India and China posed only a local concern. The dismissive notion of plague as a local concern demonstrates the limited scope of public health before the 1894 Hong Kong outbreak. The “public” in question is generally limited to the home country of each author, or at most extends to continental Europe. None of the authors before 1894 demonstrate a vested interest in the health of the populations of the regions they label with epidemic diseases, unless the spread of those diseases to the imperial heartland is significant enough to spur governmental or military action. In these cases, public health is influenced by the conception of nationalism. A nationalist understanding of public health conceptualizes the citizenry of one country from another as epidemiologically separate, rather than as pieces of a greater, interconnected population. With this model, medical practitioners can limit the resources dedicated to observing epidemics in regions that are perceived to lack a direct connection to the nation. Even with the scientific theory of person-to-person contagious transmission of disease, Gerland’s map does not demonstrate concern regarding the presence of plague in geographically distant regions. Indirect transmission from the source, to an intermediary, and finally to the imperial heartland, is not considered, thus exemplifying Varlick’s conception of “epidemiological orientalism.” Additionally, in Gerland’s eyes, cholera, smallpox, and typhus still threaten public health to a greater extent than plague, and even if a deadly new epidemic of plague begins to surge across its defined limits, it almost certainly will originate in the Middle East rather than the Far East. The 1894 Hong Kong Outbreak Strikes When the first cases of a plague outbreak were recorded in Hong Kong in May of 1894, the medical authorities did not express surprise at the detection of the disease. An account of the 49

Gerland, Berghaus’ Physikalischer Atlas, 21:19.

27 plague published in 1913 stated that authorities were well aware of “an epidemic of plague...in Canton (90 miles distant) since February 1, 1894,”50 and multiple contemporary sources agreed that the cases in Hong Kong likely were due to the plague outbreak in Yunnan, which was active for several years prior.51 In 1894, the outbreak mainly affected Chinese citizens, with Chinese residents making up over ninety-five percent of cases and deaths. The plague, however, returned to the city in 1895, and sources assert the disease spread from Hong Kong to Macau, Fuzhou, Xiamen, and even Japan.52 By the year 1900, outbreaks of plague affected Egypt, Vienna, Oporto, Algeria, Capetown, San Francisco, Adelaide, and even London, almost ten thousand kilometers away from Hong Kong. Though the number of European deaths in Hong Kong remained low, the initial state and individual methods of controlling epidemic disease had failed to prevent a swathe of deaths among the Chinese population and the disease’s spread abroad. Plague as a Seaborne Disease By 1900, with every continent seeing active cases, individual actions and state prophylaxis policies intensified in order to address the threat. It is in this context that in October 1900, Dr. William G. Savage and D. A. Fitzgerald published their “Map of the World, Showing Places where Plague Has Occurred Since Jan, 1899.” Savage and Fitzgerald’s map and adjoining article detail the case study of a British sailor who had returned from an international voyage only to develop symptoms of bubonic plague and die once he returned home to England.

B. W. Brown, “Plague: A Note on the History of the Disease in Hongkong,” Public Health Reports Volume 28, Issue 12, March 21, 1913: 552. 51 Brown, “Plague: A Note on the History of the Disease in Hongkong,” 553; “Pandemic Plague,” 1249. 52 Ibid.

Figure 6 Savage, William G., and D. A. Fitzgerald. “Map of the World Showing Places where Plague has Occurred Since Jan 1899”53 Single-Underlined locations have plague cases directly related to international ship transport.

The authors chose to focus exclusively on contemporary cases of plague, displaying the spread of the disease from city to city and directly connecting the transportation of goods and people with the continuing pandemic. Even when the majority of cases center around India and East Asia, plague’s spread to Europe is emphasized. Unlike in previous maps, Savage and Fitzgerald include cities and regions where only a small number of cases are reported in order to depict plague as threatening. They mark London, Cape Town, and other cities even when the only active cases in those locations are those that are brought into the city on ships that are already infected. With the knowledge of the role of rats in directly transmitting the plague over 53

William G. Savage and D. A. Fitzgerald, “Map of the World Showing Places where Plague has Occurred since Jan 1899,” in “A Case of Plague from a Clinical and Pathological Point of View,” British Medical Journal, Volume 2, Issue 2078, October 27, 1900: 1233.

29 political borders, the authors’ methodology reflects their reasonable fear that any contaminated ship could start an outbreak. Their map shows several ports developing their own communitywide spread of plague from sailors docking while infected. In Savage and Fitzgerald’s map, plague moves in the same way that cholera, typhus, and other infectious diseases had previously been depicted. More specifically, it depicts the disease over the course of fewer than two years, and the authors draw little distinction between different political or geographical regions. This conflation strengthens the authors’ argument that the public health emergency threatened the whole world. And if the population of London is just as at risk as the population of Nagasaki or Brisbane, the entire British empire must act accordingly to prevent the unnecessary loss of lives. By representing the spread of plague through ports, Savage and Fitzgerald visually depict the major role that international trade and transportation play in worsening the pandemic. The authors also emphasize their fears surrounding human-to-human contagion and the related role of personal hygiene, stating that “where Chinese quarters exist,”54 plague spread first. Their argument for the role of human transportation in spreading the plague takes on a racialized fashion. Like the public health authorities in Hong Kong, Savage and Fitzgerald believed that Chinese individuals generally had poorer hygiene and, as such, were more likely to spread the disease. This belief would be used to justify actions against Chinese people living in diaspora, like the U.S. government’s extension of its 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, partially in response to a plague outbreak in San Francisco’s Chinatown in 1900.55 Similarly, Savage and Fitzgerald mention the migration of Indians from the subcontinent to the African Coast, directly blaming them for the spread of plague even when the role of fleas and rats had been established prior to the creation of the map.56 Across India, communities with persistent cases of plague frequently saw their homes forcibly evacuated and burned by British sanitary authorities.57 The only other

Savage and Fitzgerald, “A Case of Plague,” 1233. The racism faced by Asian, Pacific Islander, and Desi populations in majority white nations due to prejudiced beliefs regarding their role as carriers of disease is by no means a phenomenon consigned to history. Hate crimes against APIDA individuals in the United States have spiked since the first introduction of COVID-19 to the country in early 2020. For more information, see: Suzanne Nuyen, “Anti-Asian Attacks Rise During Pandemic,” National Public Radio, March 17, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/03/17/978055571/anti-asian-attacks-rise-duringpandemic-read-nprs-stories-on-the-surge-in-violen.; Joan B. Trauner, “The Chinese as Medical Scapegoats in San Francisco: 1870-1905,” California History, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1978: 70. 56 Savage and Fitzgerald, “A Case of Plague,” 1233. 57 “Pandemic Plague,” 1251. 55

30 group in some way mentioned as the transmitters of disease are Muslim religious pilgrims. The understanding of flea-rat-human transmission had already begun to influence the efforts of Public Health boards across the British Empire,58 but Savage and Fitzgerald’s choice to correlate non-white human travel with the transportation of plague demonstrates that racial bias continued to complicate the response. Western physicians saw foreign populations—specifically, nonWesternized populations—as unsanitary, and when combined with the understanding that plague thrived in settlements with poor standards of health, these public health officials quickly jumped to the conclusion that the plague was primarily spread by non-Europeans. These fears were compounded by the disparity in reported mortality of European cases of plague in Hong Kong, as low as 18.2%, while the reported mortality of Chinese cases was over 90%.59 Savage and Fitzgerald created their map to focus on the near future. This means that the two emphasized each present outbreak as a potential source for the disease to spread elsewhere. For this reason, the two chose to equalize endemic sources of plague with isolated cases popping up in the United States, South Africa, and elsewhere. The entire report they publish does not contain the words epidemic or pandemic a single time. Instead, the authors simply write the plague or the spread of the disease.60 This choice to not include the two terms suggests that the authors believed using the terms epidemic and pandemic would be unnecessary and would not strengthen their argument, as the British medical community had already agreed upon the pandemic nature of plague by 1900.61 Medical Cartography as Public Health Education During The Third Plague Pandemic Plague retained its place in the public consciousness long before 1894 mainly due to the historic suffering and devastation it inflicted during the Black Death. However, during the Third Plague Pandemic, the disease traveled to new regions of the globe that had never before experienced plague. Even the physicians who believed that plague had the potential to become a new

Brown, “Plague: A Note on the History of the Disease in Hongkong,” 551. James A. Lowson, “The Epidemic of Bubonic Plague in Hongkong, 1894,” Indian Medical Gazette, Volume 32, Issue 2, February 1897: 47. 60 Savage and Fitzgerald, “A Case of Plague,” 1233. 61 Ibid., 1232. 59

31 pandemic only considered the return of the disease to lands it had previously ravaged, not the potential to break new ground in the Americas, Oceania, and Africa. The first cases of plague reported in Australia in January of 1900—reports claim Adelaide as the site of first infection62—sparked intense discussions among medical experts about the potential future spread of the disease. The general public reacted with panic. Public health was still in its infancy in the colony, with some areas of Australia having no public health laws whatsoever until 1896.63 The arrival of plague accelerated efforts to mollify the general population by promoting education on the disease. Professor Anderson Stuart, giving a lecture in Sydney in 1900, states “knowledge of the disease allays anxiety” and “thanks…to the genius of Pasteur and his pupils and followers, we are not now stricken down with fear of the disease, but are full of hope and strong to fight it.”64 Australia, however, was not the only region seeing sustained transmission of plague for the first time during the pandemic. Large parts of SubSaharan Africa, North and South America, and the islands of the Pacific all experienced their first-ever documented outbreaks of plague during this period. Consequently, the public health systems of these regions, if they existed, were rapidly forced to adjust to meet the new threat. The Australian press seized on public concern to publish easily accessible information. On June 2, 1900, The Worker, a Brisbane-based newspaper, published their “Map Showing Parts of the World in which Outbreaks of Bubonic Plague have Occurred since 1894,” as part of a national push to face the pandemic that had reached Australia [See Figure 7]. The editors at The Worker believed that “as far as is known the plague has never in past times appeared south of the equator”65 and attempted to combat misconceptions and rumors.

“Pandemic Plague,” 1253; “Bubonic Plague,” The Wingham Chronicle and Manning River Observer (New South Wales), January 27, 1900. 63 Shirley Fisher, “The pastoral interest and Sydney's public health,” Historical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 78, 1982: 73. 64 Anderson Stuart, The Bubonic Plague, (Sydney: Premier’s Office, Sydney NSW, 1900): 1. 65 “Map Showing Parts of the World in Which Outbreaks of Bubonic Plague have Occurred since 1894,” The Worker (Brisbane, Queensland), June 2, 1900.

Figure 7 “Map Showing Parts of the World in which Outbreaks of Bubonic Plague have occurred since 1894”, The Worker, 1900. Note the choice to center the map around the Indian Ocean, rather than Europe.66

The editors chose to dedicate the entirety of the fourth page of their paper to this map. The amount of accompanying text is limited; however, the graphic alone serves the goals of the editors. As the first disease map of plague created explicitly for public consumption, the graphic presents the pandemic with three goals in mind: to explain the basic facts of the plague pandemic, to heighten public concern surrounding the new outbreaks, and to integrate Australia’s epidemic into a wider picture of the global pandemic. Like the map published in the British Medical Journal, The Worker’s map ignores older epidemics to focus entirely on contemporary outbreaks of plague. At the same time, the map lacks the arrows and time stamps characteristic of the graphic created by Savage and Fitzgerald. Limiting the complexity of the disease map makes the graphic more reader-friendly to the public. The only temporal consideration made is the note that the map covers the time period of 18941900, and a dot and cross denotes infected cities.67 Underneath the map, the editors explain that “there was ample justification for the prophecy published in the British Medical Journal a year or

66 67

“Map Showing Parts of the World in Which Outbreaks of Bubonic Plague have Occurred since 1894.” Ibid.

33 two ago that the plague would have a worldwide extension within four years.”68 The editors use the correct prediction of respected physicians to spin the fearful news of the spreading pandemic in a more positive light. The arrival of the plague to Australia’s cities appears less devastating if the event is expected and could be prepared for, even if the Australian public health system was new. Furthermore, gone is any indication of endemicity, for its inclusion would require an explanation of the term and an unnecessary complication of the map. The editors most likely never mention the term endemic because by 1900, all international trade potentially posed a risk to the Australian population. Even still, ships from China were doubly suspicious.69 The public in this case refers specifically to Australians, and this is reflected by the cartographer’s choice to center the map in the Indian Ocean. However, a local paper like The Worker serves only their community, and the perspective of The Worker’s map reflects the national character of Australia’s response to the plague pandemic. But whereas earlier maps used nationalist understandings of health to limit connections between distant regions, The Worker’s graphic uses a national public health concern to incorporate new regions into the sphere of global health. The map states that plague expanded from China to the rest of the world, “by the three continental systems.”70 So rather than dividing the globe into separate regions of infectious disease as Gerland did, the map places Brisbane’s outbreak in a greater understanding of the world as interconnected. The most significant feature of this map is its role as both a persuasive graphic and an educational tool. The editors considered the Third Plague Pandemic a centrally important topic to their readers. The purpose of the map is not to make public health experts out of the average reader, but to provide a few strategic concepts for every citizen to understand. These include the equal susceptibility of trade centers and ports to infection, the role of international trade in spreading contagion, and the responsibility of individuals in limiting the severest effects of the pandemic. Conclusion

“Map Showing Parts of the World in Which Outbreaks of Bubonic Plague have Occurred since 1894.” “Bubonic Plague.” 70 “Map Showing Parts of the World in Which Outbreaks of Bubonic Plague have Occurred since 1894.” 69

34 Each of the maps described in this paper conveys three things: the author’s understanding of the cause of plague, its transmission from location to location, and the author’s argument as to how society should respond to plague. In the case of Poincaré, the decision to shade in all regions with recorded cases of plague anytime in history makes the disease seem more immediately threatening to the nations of Europe, supporting his call for increased medical surveillance and proactive policies in the foyers of plague. Advances in both medical theory and technology were also reflected in the maps of successive scientists. But most importantly, the epidemiological reality of pandemic plague forced cartographers to acknowledge the global threat even “regional” diseases posed. The interplay between epidemic and pandemic, sometimes used to contrast each other, sometimes used interchangeably, speaks to the fluidity of the conceptual tools used to explain disease we now take for granted today. Hirsch’s work defined epidemics as localized to a single city or province, while later cartographers, like the one who created the map for The Worker, used epidemic as a reference to the greater levels of interconnectedness between previously discrete areas.71 By the late nineteenth century, researchers used pandemic to describe a wider variety of diseases. Whereas Johnston (1856) would only characterize cholera itself as a pandemic, later researchers like Hirsch (1883) and Gerland (1892) could use the term universally, with the understanding that almost any infectious disease had the potential to become pandemic.72 And though the term endemic did not differ significantly in its definition from 1856 to 1900, the significance of identifying the endemic locations of plague diminished year-over-year. Johnston’s map mentioned the endemicity of all diseases, yet by 1900, The Worker viewed plague endemicity as a footnote, saying they would only include it “if space would permit of going into details.”73 By this point, the fears about plague as a future potential outbreak that would spread to Europe via the Middle East no longer held much sway. Plague had struck in China, and from there it was taken by ships straight to the heartland of the global empires. And once the plague pandemic had spread worldwide, looking backward at where the plague began mattered less than looking forward to where the plague pandemic could spread next.

“Map Showing Parts of the World in Which Outbreaks of Bubonic Plague have Occurred since 1894.” Hirsch, Handbook, 533. 73 “Map Showing Parts of the World in Which Outbreaks of Bubonic Plague have Occurred since 1894.” 72

35 Global disease maps of plague began portraying the spread of plague across space, not the placement of plague within a space. The static disease that only posed a local concern to the unsanitary, undeveloped regions of the world—as portrayed by Johnston, Poincaré, and Gerland—broke their expectations by sweeping across “three continental systems”74 of Afroeurasia, Oceania, and the Americas, riding the steamships that traveled between every nation with unprecedented speed.75 Even Hirsch, who coined the term “pandemic plague”76 to warn of the potential threat posed by a new outbreak of the disease, did not foresee such a disaster. As The Worker map notes, the Third Plague Pandemic marked the first time modern physicians observed plague crossing the equator, surprising scientists. The representation of plague as highly mobile thus became the distinctive fixture of the two maps dating from 1900. The change in deciding how best to represent the existence of plague came as the disease became a major threat to the health and prosperity of global empires. The disease maps made during the pandemic also began displaying illness across time. Savage and Fitzgerald’s map most clearly demonstrates the depiction of plague temporally, with a well-defined timeframe for the map (January 1899-October 1900) alongside the arrows that depict the spread of the disease linearly from city to city. By contrast, Johnston’s 1856 map affixed each disease with a permanent, unchanging location. Moreover, it was not until after 1894 that cartographers attempted to predict disease outbreaks in the future, particularly into regions that had not experienced the disease previously. Savage and Fitzgerald’s map identifies the possible spread of plague west across the Atlantic to infect New York and the eastern seaboard of the United States, and their choice to identify all ports with cases of plague even when those cases originate from abroad shows concern that they represent the beginning of a new outbreak in each community. A key motivation for the methodological changes of global disease maps of plague was the advent of biomedicine and bacteriology through the work of Louis Pasteur, Robert Koch, and others. Though they did not predict the coming pandemic, Gerland and Poincaré argued that environmental factors like temperature and soil composition were not enough to cause plague to arise autochthonously. And though Poincaré uses some of the language of miasma theory to

“Map Showing Parts of the World in Which Outbreaks of Bubonic Plague have Occurred since 1894.” Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Ecological Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-first Century, (Lanham MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2007). 76 Hirsch, Handbook, 703. 75

36 explain the spread of epidemic disease, his emphasis remains on a viral contagion that can spread from person to person in a manner more similar to our modern understanding of plague than the environment-to-person pathway Johnston understood. Furthermore, as plague became a prominent concern, the work of researchers like Yersin and Simond allowed cartographers to show the means of disease transmission. Savage and Fitzgerald’s medical report on the sailor who died in Cardiff and the numerous Australian newspapers fearing the arrival of infected ships from overseas after the first outbreak in Adelaide77 illustrate that regions that had never before seen plague now feared it. The perceived connection between sanitation, civilization, and susceptibility to the plague weakened the ability of public health bodies to prepare for and respond to the pandemic. Many of the strategies employed during the Third Plague Pandemic centered on disinfecting or purifying a group of people or an object. Several authors mention the role of sanitary conditions in the uncontrolled transmission of plague, and they connect the endemic regions of plague with the label of unsanitary. Consequently, health bodies during the pandemic utilized the most severe measures on different ethnic or racial populations, like the Chinese residents of Hong Kong or migrant South Asians.78 The emphasis by Savage and Fitzgerald on securing England from “cases studied in the tropics”79 and the blame placed on Indian and Muslim travelers for the spread of the plague impacted non-white subjects far differently than their white counterparts. After all, parts of Australia had no public health services at all until two years after the outbreak in Hong Kong,80 and yet calls to incinerate infected houses in Sydney and Brisbane during their comparable plague outbreaks remained suspiciously absent. The viewpoint that non-white bodies and spaces posed a greater threat to public health was reflected in disease maps before the Third Plague Pandemic, and it determined the actions of the government in responding to a plague outbreak.81 Finally, it is important to reflect on the widening perspective of medical cartographers over the course of the nineteenth century when studying plague. Though Johnston creates his

“Bubonic Plague”; “Map Showing Parts of the World in Which Outbreaks of Bubonic Plague have Occurred since 1894.” 78 “Pandemic Plague,” 1251. 79 Savage and Fitzgerald, “A Case of Plague,” 1232. 80 “Pandemic Plague,” 1251. 81 Varlik, “‘Oriental Plague’ or Epidemiological Orientalism? Revisiting the Plague Episteme of the Early Modern Mediterranean,” 66.

37 map with an exclusively English perspective, Savage and Fitzgerald and The Worker create their graphics with the influence of Australian, American, and Japanese researchers studying in Africa, India, and East Asia. As the world grew more interconnected, the medical community began to see more clearly the international ramifications of what previously were considered local or isolated public health crises. This development culminated in the discovery of the mechanism of plague transmission, with Alexandre Yersin and Kitasato’s work in Hong Kong, Jean-Paul Simond’s discovery of the role of rats in India, and Rothschild and Jordan’s identification of the Xenopsylla cheopis flea in Egypt. The Third Plague Pandemic shocked many biomedical practitioners—not because a new outbreak of the plague had started—but because it had proven to be far more transmissible overseas and spread at a faster rate than any other previous pandemic, especially compared to cholera and yellow fever. The estimated death toll for the Third Plague Pandemic easily stands at over fifteen million,82 and though the majority of those deaths occurred in China and India, these deaths proved to be a major lesson for the new bacteriologists and biomedical practitioners about to enter the twentieth century. In the history of biomedicine, therefore, global disease maps are best understood as an integral tool to persuade action on a national and international scale. Epilogue While our world struggles to emerge from the COVID-19 pandemic, we should look to the methods we have used in the past to identify the origins, transmission, and interventions of infectious disease. To fully eliminate the coronavirus and to protect against the threat of future pandemics, we must recognize that public health involves the communities of all nations, and our methods must be proactive, forward-thinking, and equitable. After all, the epidemiological reality of the nineteenth century, where infectious agents could newly travel around the world at a rapid pace, seeking out new areas to flourish, has only been strengthened by further technological progress and economic integration. The public health experts of the Third Plague Pandemic grappled with the interconnected epidemiology of the modern world. And as we see

John Frith, “The History of Plague - Part 1: The Three Great Pandemics,” History, Volume 20, Issue 2, April 2012: 15.

38 during our present pandemic, disease maps like the Johns Hopkins COVID-19 Dashboard still play an essential role in conducting medical surveillance and increasing public awareness.

39 Bibliography: Primary Sources: An Universal Dictionary of the English Language etc. Edinburgh: A. Donaldson, 1763. Berghaus, Hermann, and Oscar Drudge. Epidemische Krankheiten des 19. Jahrhunderts [map]. Scale not given. In: Berghaus, Hermann; Drudge, Oscar. Berghaus’ Physikalischer Atlas. Gotha, Germany: Universität Greifswald, 1892. Section 7, Page 21. Accessed at https://digitale-bibliothek-mv.de/viewer/image/PPN638136172/21/LOG_0021/. Brooks, Richard. An Introduction to Physic and Surgery London: J. Newbery, 1754. B. W. Brown, “Plague: A Note on the History of the Disease in Hongkong,” Public Health Reports Volume 28, Issue 12, March 21, 1913: 551-557. “Bubonic Plague.” The Wingham Chronicle and Manning River Observer (New South Wales), January 27, 1900. Accessed at https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/168018603. “COVID-19 Dashboard by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University (JHU).” Coronavirus Resource Center, Johns Hopkins University of Medicine, February 6, 2021. https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html Dudgeon, John, and Pekin M.D. “Diseases of China, Their Causes, Conditions, and Prevalence, contrasted with those of Europe.” Glasgow Medical Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Apr. 1877), pp. 174-203. Accessed at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5899546/. Hippocrates. On Airs, Waters, and Places. Translated by Francis Adams. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1881. Hirsch, August. Handbook of Geographical and Historical Pathology. Translated by Charles Creighton. London: New Sydenham Society, 1883. Johnston, Alex Keith. “The Geographical Distribution of Health and Disease, in Connexion Chiefly with Natural Phenomena.” J Public Health Sanit Rev. Vol. 2, No. 6 (Jul 1856), pp. T25–T71. Accessed at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6004209/. Johnston, Alex Keith. “The Geographical Distribution of Health & Disease, in Connexion Chiefly with Natural Phenomena. (with) Fever districts of the United States & W. Indies, on an enlarged scale.” [map]. Scale not given. In: Alex Keith Johnston, “The Geographic Distribution of Health & Disease, in Connexion Chiefly with Natural Phenomena.” Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, 1856. Accessed at https://exhibits.stanford.edu/blrcc/catalog/tb878ty6609. Lowson, James A. “The Epidemic of Bubonic Plague in Hongkong, 1894.” Indian Medical

40 Gazette, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Feb 1897), pp. 45–59. Accessed at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5148360/. “Map Showing Parts of the World in which Outbreaks of Bubonic Plague have occurred since 1894” [map]. Scale unknown. In: The Worker, Brisbane, Queensland. June 2, 1900. Accessed at https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/70829160?browse=ndp%3Abrowse%2Ftitle%2 FW%2Ftitle%2F191%2F1900%2F06%2F02%2Fpage%2F6667470%2Farticle%2F70829 160. “Pandemic Plague.” The British Medical Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2078 (Oct. 27, 1900), pp. 1247-1255. Accessed at https://www.jstor.org/stable/20266180?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents. Poincare, Léon. Prophylaxie et Géographie Médicale. Paris, Libraire de l'académie de médecine, 1884. Savage, William G., and D. A. Fitzgerald. “Map of the World Showing Places where Plague has Occurred since Jan 1899.” In “A Case of Plague from a Clinical and Pathological Point of View.” British Medical Journal. Oct 27, 1900;2(2078): 1232-1236. Accessed at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2463689/?page=1. Stuart, Anderson. The Bubonic Plague. Sydney: Premier’s Office, Sydney NSW, 1900. Secondary Sources: Barrett, Frank A. “Finke's 1792 map of human diseases: the first world disease map?” Social Science & Medicine, Volume 50, Issues 7-8, April 2000: 915-21. Blevins, Steve M., and Michael S. Bronze. “Robet Koch and the ‘golden age’ of bacteriology.” International Journal of Infectious Diseases, Volume 14, Issue 9, September 2010, 744751. Bordenave, Guy. “Louis Pasteur (1822-1985).” Microbes and Infection, Volume 5, Issue 6, May 2003, 553-60. Bos, Kirsten I. “Eighteenth century Yersinia pestis genomes reveal the long-term persistence of an historical plague focus,” eLife, Volume 5, January 21, 2016. Braudel, Fernand. “History and the Social Sciences: The longue dureé.” Translated by Immanuel Wallerstein. Fernand Braudel Center, Volume 32, Issue 2, 2009: 171-203. Cantor, Geoffrey. “Charles Rothschild, conservationist.” Journal of Modern Jewish Studies, Volume 17, Issue 2. September 29, 2017: 191-206. Crosby, Alfred W. The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492

41 Portsmouth: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003. Echenberg, Myron. Plague Ports: The Global Urban Impact of Bubonic Plague,1894-1901. New York: New York University Press, 2007. Fisher, Shirley. “The pastoral interest and Sydney's public health.” Historical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 78, 1982: 73-89. Frith, John. “The History of Plague - Part 1: The Three Great Pandemics,” History, Volume 20, Issue 2, April 2012: 11-16. Green, Monica H. “The Globalisations of Disease.” In Human Dispersal and Species Movement: From Prehistory to the Present, ed. Nicole Boivin, Rémy Crassard, and Michael D. Petraglia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 494-520, ISBN 9781107164147 Hanson, Marta. “Visualizing the Geography of the Diseases of China:Western Disease Maps from Analytical Tools to Tools of Empire, Sovereignty, and Public Health Propaganda,1878–1929.” Science in Context. 2017 Sep;30(3):219-280. Imperato PJ, Imperato GH, Imperato AC. “The Second World Cholera Pandemic (1826-1849) in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies with Special Reference to the Towns of San Prisco and Forio d'Ischia.” J Community Health. 2015 Dec;40(6):1224-86. doi: 10.1007/s10900015-0089-y. PMID: 26377228. Koch, Tom. “1831, The Map that Launched the Idea of Global Health.” International Journal of Epidemiology, Volume 43, Issue 4, April 2, 2014: 1014-20. Koch, Thomas. Cartographies of Disease: Maps, Mapping, and Medicine. Medlands, CA: ESRI Press, 2005. Lewis, Martin, and Kärin Wigen. “The Spatial Construct of Orient and Occident, East and West.” In The Myth of Continents, 47-72. Lippi, D., and E. Gotuzzo. “The greatest steps towards the discovery of Vibrio cholerae.” Clinical Microbiology and Infection, Volume 20, Issue 3. March 2014: 191-95. Lynteris, Christos. “Jean-Jacques Matignon’s Legacy on Russian Plague Research in North-East China and Inner Asia (1898-1910).” Extreme Orient, Volume 37, 2014: 61-89. Marks, Robert. The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Ecological Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-first Century. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2007. Melikishvili, Alexander. “Genesis of the Anti-Plague System: The Tsarist Period.” Critical

42 Reviews in Microbiology, Volume 32, Issues 19-31, 2006: 19-31. Nuyen, Suzanne. “Anti-Asian Attacks Rise During Pandemic.” National Public Radio, March 17, 2021. https://www.npr.org/2021/03/17/978055571/anti-asian-attacks-rise-duringpandemic-read-nprs-stories-on-the-surge-in-violen Packard, Randall. “‘Break-Bone’ Fever in Philadelphia, 1780: Reflections on the History of Disease.” Bulletin of the History of Medicine, Volume 90, Issue 2. 2013: 193-221. Pryor, E. G. “The Great Plague of Hong Kong.” Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society Vol. 15 (1975), pp. 61-70 (10 pages). Accessed at https://www.jstor.org/stable/23881624?seq=4#metadata_info_tab_contents. Serlin, David, ed. Imagining Illness: Public Health and Visual Culture. Minneapolis: University of Michigan Press, 2010. Simond, Marc, Margaret L. Godley, and Pierre D. E. Moriquand. “Paul-Louis Simond and His Discovery of Plague Transmission by Rat Fleas: A Centenary.” Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, Volume 91, Issue 2. February 1, 1998: 101-4. Trauner, Joan B. “The Chinese as Medical Scapegoats in San Francisco: 1870-1905.” California History, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1978: 70-87. Varlik, Nükhet. “‘Oriental Plague’ or Epidemiological Orientalism? Revisiting the Plague Episteme of the Early Modern Mediterranean.” In Plague and Contagion in the Islamic Mediterranean. Kalamazoo, Bradford: Arc Humanities Press, 2017.

Doctors on Horseback: Healthcare of Pastoral Inner Mongolia in the 1960s Zyan Wang History of Public Health in East Asia Professor Marta Hanson

53 In 1965, a group of experienced medical professionals from Baotou University Hospital in China arrived at Darhan Muminggan United Banner, an Inner Mongolian district northwest of Hohhot, famous for its vast grasslands and centuries-long pastoral society. Among the trained doctors, were Liu Changying (刘长瑛) and her husband, who both worked at Batou University hospital.. Liu’s husband, who specialized in neurology, was assigned to a local hospital as a specialist. Liu herself, however, was sent deep into the pastoral area for her expertise in general physiology and emergency medicine. Liu and her colleagues traveled via train to the Banner’s central station, then boarded a military-issued truck to go deeper into the grassland. When the last sign of modern civilization disappeared behind them, they were welcomed by a group of herdsmen riding horses. Men and women rode alongside the truck like a fleet of freighters escorting a carrier while joyfully waving their riding crops and greeting the doctors, mostly in Mongolian and some in rusty Mandarin. Liu’s story only constitutes a small portion of medical workers who supported the healthcare system in rural China in the 1960s, yet it provides fascinating details and allows a peek into the bigger picture of medical reform under Mao’s regime. This paper examines the story narrated by Liu through oral interviews and aims to conduct further research on the related topics she mentioned. The topics covered by this research include the threats to public health in the pastoral area, the relationship between the doctors and the herdsmen, the historical-political context of the time, and its potential influence on the practice of medicine. Due to the limitation of existing sources, the paper does not cover all aspects of rural healthcare at the time but instead focuses on the personal recollection of experiences as the interview progressed. The Pastoral Tribes In the pastoral area lived a group of people whose major source of living came from livestock, including sheep, cows, and horses. In order to keep up with the changing seasons and feed their livestock, they moved alongside the growth of grass. To satisfy the need for frequent relocation, the pastoral people developed a type of round felt tent known as “yurts,” which were easy to take down and rebuild on the plain grassland. A community encampment could consist of up to a dozen yurts, with parental households near those of their children. As Liu recalled, the herdsmen were generally unaware of and uninterested in the outside world, as their centurieslong pastoral economy could sustain their basic needs, despite seeming harsh and

54 underdeveloped to the city-born doctors. The herdsmen were still extremely hospitable to the outsiders, which Liu thought to be the result of inexperience with foreign invasions. The lack of modern medical knowledge and adequate resources in the pastoral areas was astonishing. No public healthcare system existed—not even witch doctors seen in other rural areas. The sick and wounded were treated with the help of those who had similar conditions in the past and with the aim of providing comfort rather than curing as the body took its natural healing course. Local officials from the newly formed Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region had informed the pastoral people of the coming of medical aid, yet the herdsmen simply welcomed the doctors as friendly guests. Some herdsmen learned Mandarin from schoolteachers who, similarly to the doctors, had volunteered to come to the area. The communication between doctors and the locals relied heavily on translations and mutual learning of the languages, especially when it came to treating older patients. Nevertheless, the language barrier did not pose any significant difficulty as the two sides quickly developed efficient methods of communication, often involving simplified phrases and a combination of languages in sentences. The major threat to the welfare of local people was the lack of water and transportation. While the livestock could rely on water contained in the grass and small, dirt-filled streams that traversed the grassland, the people often had difficulty finding clean water sources and storing water for both consumption and cleaning. Water collected from nearby rivers was stored in a clay pot to precipitate out the dirt, then boiled for drinking. During winter, heavy snowfall brought extra sources of clean water, though the snowfall strained the already fragile transportation system. The lack of modern infrastructure prevented the introduction of gasoline, electricity, and machinery. Everyone, including the newly arrived city doctors, had to rely on horses for transportation. Liu shared the story of her fear of the horses’ height. Liu thus never learned to ride a horse, so to the end of her deployment, she rode a donkey that was no taller than her waist. Despite the drastic changes from their usual working environment, the medical personnel quickly assessed the situation and established a system of triage and treatment. The local herdsmen, receptive to the doctors’ work despite not understanding the underlying benefits, helped the team members settle into their new residencies and put up a temporary clinic room. Disease Controls

55 The most prevalent infectious disease in the pastoral area, as Liu recalled, was brucellosis. Transmitted via direct and indirect contact with infected animals, brucellosis can cause symptoms highly similar to those of the flu, including high fever, fatigue, and body aches. 1

In some cases, brucellosis evolves into chronic, debilitating complications. The major

transmission of brucellosis occurred in the spring season when the livestock, primarily sheep, began to give birth. Herdsmen aided the delivery processes without protective equipment and many contracted brucellosis through direct contact with animal blood. Because sheep do not usually show any symptoms when carrying brucellosis, the herdsmen assumed that the illness was related to the season, and little measure was taken to prevent or treat the disease. Having anticipated the prevalence of brucellosis in any pastoral area, the doctors confirmed their prediction by taking blood samples and sending them to nearby hospitals for analysis. Visiting door to door (or rather, yurt to yurt), they quickly identified the infected individuals and provided preliminary treatments. Educational meetings were held to inform the herdsmen of the nature of the disease and how to treat it. Wearing protective gear such as gloves and masks when aiding livestock delivery was advocated as the best way to prevent further transmissions. Though Liu claimed that they were able to eliminate brucellosis in the communities they worked in, studies of the broader epidemiology suggested otherwise. The first outbreak of brucellosis was recorded in Inner Mongolia from 1952 to 1967, and it was not effectively contained until the early 1970s.2 It is possible that the success in controlling brucellosis by Liu’s team was the result of lesser population density in the Darhan Muminggan United Banner, as the epidemiology map at the time indicates that the outbreaks were concentrated in larger town areas. Nevertheless, the study identifies spring as the season of the outbreak and admits the correlation between the breeding season of sheep and the brucellosis outbreak in rural populations, which matches Liu’s memory. Before the 1960s outbreak, local governments were largely ignorant to and uninterested in brucellosis. During the mid-60s, the authorities implemented a series of anti-brucellosis measures including mandatory protective gear, forced elimination of carrier livestock, and more

M.J. Corbel, Brucellosis in humans and animals (WHO Press, 2006). Dongri Piao, Lanyu Li, Hongyan Zhao, and Buyun Cui, “1952-2007年内蒙古自治区布杆菌病疫情分析 [Epidemic Situation Analysis of Human Brucellosis in Inner Mongolia During 1952 to 2007],” Chinese Journal of Control of Endemic Disease 28, no. 4 (2009): 420-23.

56 standardized diagnosis and treatments for the disease.3 The results of the actions were immediate: before the second outbreak in the 2000s, the total case number of brucellosis was reduced to 219 in the year 1992. With this considered, it would stand to reason that the sharp reduction of brucellosis in Liu’s area was also the product of a nationwide preventive program. Though not reflected in Liu’s interview, studies have shown that syphilis also used to be a major public health concern in the late twentieth century. Statistics from the 1950s indicate that patients in the pastoral area constitute over half of all syphilis cases in Inner Mongolia.4 The author attributes the unchecked transmission of syphilis and other sexual diseases to the polygamous sexual behaviors of the local people. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the central government issued a comprehensive program of syphilis elimination, which included mass examination, medical resource distribution, and sexual safety education. By 1962, the elimination program had entered its last stage toward total cleansing. It is possible that in 1965 the majority of syphilis outbreaks were already contained. And due to the isolation and small population of the area Liu worked in, cases of sexual diseases including syphilis were scarcely found. Another disease that frequently infected herdsmen was dysentery. As discussed before, water shortage greatly impeded the daily cleaning process, and the inability to secure a clean water source caused the transmission of many waterborne infections. Healthy adults were generally able to fight the infection on their own, typically over the course of a few days. However, children and the elderly were prone to complications such as dehydration and electrolyte imbalance, which proved fatal in some cases. Due to the limitation of resources, no solutions were devised for the water issue at the time, but the doctors made sure that the locals took extra precautions in preparing drinking water and provided corresponding treatments for those who suffered from dysentery. With the help of saline and antibiotics, symptoms that used to linger for days were significantly shortened, and the recovery from the disease was greatly accelerated with few lasting effects.

Yishi Zhang, Zhu Dai, and Senlin Jiang, “中国布氏菌病防治50年回 [Brucellosis Preventive Medicine In China: 50 Years Review],” Chinese Journal of Control of Endemic Disease 18, no. 5 (2003): 275-78. DOI:10.3760/cma.j.issn.1000-4955.2009.04.01. 4 Lena Yi, “内蒙古地区梅毒防治研究 (1950-1965) [A Study On the Control of Syphilis in Inner Mongolia (19501965)],” MS diss., Inner Mongolia University (2014). 3

57 As one of the few female doctors who volunteered to work in such harsh conditions, Liu encountered several cases of gynecological diseases, mainly uterine prolapse and vaginal infection following childbirth. Like people in many other rural areas, the herdsmen relied solely on experienced elders to aid the childbirth process. Because of the lack of transportation and communication between encampments, midwives did not exist as an occupation among the pastoral people. Unlike women in other areas who often shied away from doctors due to the cultural stigma of privacy regarding the female body, women in the pastoral communities were comfortable sharing their symptoms, especially when they knew the doctors could help them alleviate the discomfort. Children were also frequent visitors to the temporary clinics, and Liu treated several cases of mild bronchitis and other respiratory infections in children who all recovered quickly without complications. Isolation spared the pastoral area of many epidemic diseases that often prevailed in rural areas with denser populations. Nevertheless, living in proximity to livestock and having difficulty finding resources posed unique threats to public health. Liu’s team devised a system of treating minor diseases on-site and transferring urgent and complicated cases to larger facilities. Limited transportation continued to obstruct their efforts in putting the system to action and was not resolved until years after she left the area when modern infrastructure finally made its way into the grassland. Doctors on Horseback During the year in the pastoral area, the doctors often lived and dined together with the herdsmen families in the leather-fur yurts. However, the practice of medicine required a much more stable environment. The delicate equipment and bottles of medicines could not afford the frequent moving following the migrating climate. Doctors who were not stationed directly within the pastoral community resided in a makeshift clinic—a small, single-floor building made of brick and clay with only a few rooms. Since she was pregnant, Liu lived in the clinic for the majority of her year-long deployment. The equipment in the clinic house was far from the standard of any medical facility, with only the basic tools for taking vital measurements and a small pharmacy consisting of some medicine for common diseases. Some patients visited the clinic house to seek treatments. Others who were unable to travel due to sickness or age remained in their yurts and sent out house call

58 requests via their relatives. One or two of the on-call doctors, which often meant the entire staff, would carry corresponding equipment and medicine in a box and mount one of the horses in the clinic’s stable. The ride could take anywhere from minutes to half an hour until the doctor reached the patient’s location. The herdsmen learned to distinguish the doctors’ arrival by the slow pacing of the horse and the rustling noise of a clumsy dismount. Appropriately, the medical workers earned the name of “doctors on horseback,” which was later used to describe all doctors who supported the pastoral areas. Small and common diseases could be treated on-site, whereas more complicated and severe cases required proper equipment and specialists. Those patients were transferred to hospitals in nearby towns for further treatments. Liu recalled one night when she was on-call in the clinic and was awakened by the sound of multiple horses trotting towards the front door. A group of herdsmen brought in a middle-aged man who was clearly in distress. He exhibited the classic signs of a heart attack: chest pain, shortness of breath, profuse sweating, and palpitations. Liu and another colleague diagnosed him immediately and determined that he was too unstable to transfer. They treated the man with a bottle of nitroglycerin that they had on hand. Luckily, the patient survived the myocardial infarction and was sent to the hospital on a carriage—the only one within the community. Just as she thought the night was over, an anxious husband rushed into the clinic and, with his rudimentary Mandarin, took five minutes to tell the doctors that his wife was having trouble in labor. Liu and her colleague quickly rode with the husband to their residence and found that the wife also needed a transfer. With the only carriage already sent out, they had no choice but to carry the woman on horseback and, fearing that a bumpy ride would cause a hemorrhage, rode painfully slow toward the town. Two hours later, they finally arrived at the hospital, and a healthy boy was delivered in the operating room. This night was only one of the countless times that doctors worked diligently to save their patients from the worst possible fate, mostly successfully. At first, the herdsmen treated the doctors as city guests, but as time progressed and the number of cured patients increased, the good reputation of “doctors on horseback” quickly spread. The herdsmen deeply respected the doctors, and many patients and their families, lacking the language ability to express gratitude, would give their healers food instead. Some housewives went through arduous procedures to make fine milk products that were only provided to nobilities or those considered noble friends.

59 On one occasion, Liu received a khata, a ceremonial scarf symbolizing purity and compassion, from the elders in the community. One part of the healthcare program that the doctors and herdsmen never agreed upon was the standard of a healthy diet. People in the pastoral areas had no means to cultivate crops, and little edible plants were found on the dry grassland. The vegetable was nonexistent in the diet of the herdsmen. The city doctors who spent their life learning about the importance of balanced nutrition and were used to greens on their plates back home simply failed to adjust to the high protein meals in the daily life of the pastoral areas. Unable to bear the lack of organic fibers, the doctors dug up some edible plants nearby and cooked them to eat. The herdsmen were incredulously astonished and sincerely concerned when they found out what they were doing. “Humans should eat meat,” they told the doctors, “only livestock eats grass.” Liu and her colleagues tried their best to explain to the herdsmen the notion of nutritional balance and the danger of vitamin deficiency, but they laughed and responded, “I can single-handedly fight a wild wolf while you can’t even mount a horse. Don’t worry, we’re fine.” One year of deployment built a long-lasting friendship between the doctors and the pastoral people. When the time came for the exchange with new personnel, all members of the community accompanied the doctors to the edge of the encampment, reluctant for their departure. Those strong enough for long-distance travel rode alongside the military truck until the railway was in sight, just as they did on the day they welcomed their arrival. Liu and her husband kept in contact with some of their past patients even after they relocated from Baotou to Beijing.

The Bigger Picture In the 1960s, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was significantly impacting every aspect of Chinese society. Ulanhu, governor of Inner Mongolia at the time, and his supporters had already become potential targets of the Maoists by the year 1965.5 The persecution of political opponents ravaged all areas including Inner Mongolia, which devastated many lives and caused great turbulence among the people. The pastoral tribes, due to their isolation and self-

David Sneath, Changing Inner Mongolia: Pastoral Mongolian Society and the Chinese State, (Oxford University Press, 2004).

60 sufficient economy, were spared from most of the impact. Liu and her colleagues consciously avoided participating in any political events and refrained from making comments about the current situation. Also, because their work was under direct order from Mao, they escaped the usual scrutiny suffered by many other intellectuals. When asked about the effect of the political environment on the work of the doctors, Liu provided the simple response that they did not participate and repeatedly urged the author not to include this section in the paper. The volunteer work of Liu and her colleagues was only part of the larger plan of Mao’s 626 agenda which focused exclusively on advancing modern healthcare programs in rural China.6 Early in 1947, the Inner Mongolia Epidemic Prevention Committee was established to coordinate the effort of promoting hygienic modernity, including mass vaccination, educational propaganda, and personnel training.7 The committee coordinated the fight against bubonic plague in 1948 and redirected some energy into controlling the spread of measles, typhoid, and dysentery. However, even after the founding of the PRC, long into the 1960s, comprehensive healthcare was still relatively restricted to the wealthier city populations. Seeing that lives in rural areas were still threatened by the lack of professional doctors and a basic medical infrastructure, Mao issued a central order to redirect urban medical resources into less developed areas on June 26, 1965. Doctors from all around China were called to support their fellow comrades in need by volunteering in local hospitals, and some were directly stationed deep in mountains and grasslands among the people. The 626 agenda greatly propelled the development of the healthcare system outside the cities and produced a group of physician assistants trained specifically to work for the poor—the barefoot doctors. During her time in the pastoral area, Liu oversaw the training of many barefoot doctors who only possessed the basic abilities to take vital signs, administer over-the-counter medicines, and diagnose common diseases. The training of barefoot doctors followed the master-disciple relationship often seen in the teaching of traditional medicine. Students came from different social backgrounds and were mostly members of the local communities, farmers, or herdsmen themselves. Liu compared the

Xueying Chen and Ma Ji, “毛与村合作医制度的形成及其当代价 [Mao Zedong and The Formation of Rural Healthcare and Its Contemporary Influence],” Maozedong Thought Study 34, no.1 (2017): 28-33. 7 Dinuo Zhang, “建国前后内蒙古部地区的疫病流行与政府策 (1947-1954) [The Epidemic Spread In Eastern Inner Mongolia and the Government’s Responses Around the Founding of the PRC (1947-1954)],” MS diss., Inner Mongolia University (2017). 6

61 barefoot doctors to the field medics in the military who were not professional physicians but nevertheless essential and affordable to the local people. With the help of educational propaganda and the lingering effect of the patriotic hygiene movement, the 626 agenda made considerable progress in advancing public health in Inner Mongolia. The numbers of infectious diseases and related deaths significantly decreased and those of medical workers spiked. The healthcare program in rural areas was largely welcomed and appreciated by the benefitted population. Even throughout the 2010s, the central government continued to issue new protocols for rural healthcare while referring to the 626 agenda. Some have argued that hygiene movements in autonomous regions such as Inner Mongolia also serve as an example of the success of medical pluralism in a multiethnic nation.8 The long-lasting effect of the rural healthcare programs, both microscopic and macroscopic, is indisputable.

Jianli Wang, “内蒙地方公共生程的人类学 [An Anthropological Analysis of Public Health Progress in Inner Mongolia],” MS diss., Minzu University of China (2009).

62 Bibliography Corbel, M.J. Brucellosis in humans and animals. WHO Press, 2006. Piao, Dongri, Lanyu Li, Hongyan Zhao, and Buyun Cui. “1952-2007年内蒙古自治区布杆菌病疫情分析 [Epidemic Situation Analysis of Human Brucellosis in Inner Mongolia During 1952 to 2007].” Chinese Journal of Control of Endemic Disease 28, no. 4 (2009): 420-23. Sneath, David. Changing Inner Mongolia: Pastoral Mongolian Society and the Chinese State. Oxford University Press, 2004. Wang, Jianli. “内蒙地方公共生程的人类学 [An Anthropological Analysis of Public Health Progress in Inner Mongolia].” MS diss., Minzu University of China (2009). Chen, Xueying, and Ma Ji. “毛与村合作医制度的形成及其当代价 [Mao Zedong and The Formation of Rural Healthcare and Its Contemporary Influence].” Maozedong Thought Study 34, no.1 (2017): 28-33. Yi, Lena. “内蒙古地区梅毒防治研究 (1950-1965) [A Study On the Control of Syphilis in Inner Mongolia (1950-1965)].” MS diss., Inner Mongolia University (2014). Zhang, Dinuo. “建国前后内蒙古部地区的疫病流行与政府策 (1947-1954) [The Epidemic Spread In Eastern Inner Mongolia and the Government’s Responses Around the Founding of the PRC (1947-1954)].” MS diss., Inner Mongolia University (2017). Zhang, Yishi, Dai Zhu, and Senlin Jiang. “中国布氏菌病防治50年回 [Brucellosis Preventive Medicine In China: 50 Years Review].” Chinese Journal of Control of Endemic Disease 18, no. 5 (2003): 275-78. DOI:10.3760/cma.j.issn.10004955.2009.04.019

Sociopolitical Movements and Public Health Campaigns: Visualizing Chinese Anti-Malaria Posters Shaohong Wang History of Public Health in East Asia Professor Marta Hanson Spring 2021

Introduction Malaria is a parasitic infectious disease that spreads through mosquitos. Throughout history, malaria remains one of the most prevalent infectious diseases in China and the rest of the world. In the 1940s, an estimated thirty million people in China were infected with the disease each year, resulting in three hundred thousand deaths.1 To combat this global health threat, different countries, including China, and the World Health Organization launched public mobilization campaigns to eradicate the disease. In the case of China, the campaign to combat malaria was far from an isolated effort, but instead an integrated part of its national health movement: the “patriotic health campaign,” essential for nation-building and socialist construction of the newly-founded People’s Republic of China.2 Due to the close affiliation between the national health movements and the transformation of the nation based on socialist ideology, the anti-malaria campaign was inevitably subject to political influence and, by extension, the major political movements under the Chinese Communist Party. As a crucial venue of publicity, anti-malaria propaganda posters reflected the political environments and often explicitly or implicitly hinted at the ongoing social movements. In this paper, I will focus on the three anti-malaria posters between the 1960s and the 1970s and how different ongoing political and social movements are reflected in anti-malaria posters, a means of mass mobilization with implications beyond public health.

“From 30 Million Cases To Zero: China Is Certified Malaria-Free By WHO,” Who.Int, 2022, https://www.who.int/news/item/30-06-2021-from-30-million-cases-to-zero-china-is-certified-malaria-free-by-who. 2 “Chinese Public Health Posters: Public Health Movement,” Nlm.Nih.Gov, 2022, https://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/chineseposters/public.html.

The World Health Organization initiated a global stamp campaign in 1962 to emphasize the importance of malaria eradication.3

1960 Poster- The Great Leap Forward and People’s Commune

Title: Prevent and Treat Malaria 防治疟疾 Produced by the Health and Epidemic Prevention Station of Jiangxi Province, n.d., ca. 1960.4

Campaign, World, “World Health Organization : 1962 Anti-Malaria Campaign,” Postalhistorycorner.Blogspot.Com, 2022, http://postalhistorycorner.blogspot.com/2013/10/worldhealth-organization-1962-anti.html. 4 “Chinese Anti-Malaria Posters - Gallery Of Images,” Nlm.Nih.Gov, 2022, https://www.nlm.nih.gov/exhibition/chineseantimalaria/gallery.html.

66 The Great Leap Forward was a social production movement that took place in the People’s Republic of China between 1958 and 1960.5 It was a socialist construction movement that attempted to take advantage of the abundant local labor force and the vigorous enthusiasm of the masses to increase production (i.e. “leap forward”) in industry and agriculture without regard to the laws of the market.6 The movement eventually became unsustainable, and from the winter of 1960 onward, was gradually called off by the authorities. A direct result of the movement was the Great Chinese Famine, the worst famine in human history during which hundreds of thousands of deaths occurred. One of the key characteristics of society during the Great Leap Forward was the implementation of the commune system of collectivized agriculture. People’s commune, which began as amalgamations of collective farms, was a form of large rural organization introduced in 1958 in China. Unlike the original collective farms which were primarily engaged in agricultural activities, communes evolved into multipurpose organizations charged with the direction of local government and the management of all economic and social activity. Everything was shared in the commune: private properties were contributed to the commune; private dining was banned and replaced with communal dining; jobs were assigned; and wages were equalized.7 The poster features extensive cooperation between households, creating an image of harmony and active involvement in promoting a hygienic environment in the neighborhood. This poster emphasized the commune as a key social structure sharing responsibilities and benefits. A health message accompanies the image, written in the traditional form of Three-character text (san zi jing). The health message is easy to recall thanks to the rhymed text. The first paragraph of the document states: “malaria harms people, it comes from Plasmodium, spread by mosquitoes; after their bites, you get the disease, you feel cold, and then fever, headache and sweat, in July-August, easy to get the disease, once infected, four limbs weak, face yellow and spleen swollen, busy farming time, labor is lost.” Appealing to cultural heritage could potentially serve to unite the communities during the Great Leap Forward.

“China's Great Leap Forward - Association For Asian Studies,” Association For Asian Studies, 2022, https://www.asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/archives/chinas-great-leap-forward/. 6 Campaign, World, “World Health Organization : 1962 Anti-Malaria Campaign.” 7 “The Great Leap Forward And The People's Communes—Socialist Ideals And Practice,” Chinese Law & Government 29 (4) (1996): 46-60. doi:10.2753/clg0009-4609290446.

1963 Poster- Eliminate the Four Pests

Title: Prevent and Treat Malaria to Protect Labor 防治疟疾保护劳动力 Produced by Chengdu City Red Cross and Chengdu Health Propaganda and Education Institute. Printed by Sichuan People’s Printing Factory, 1963.8

The campaign to eliminate the four pests was the first campaign during the Great Leap Forward period in order to facilitate production and eliminate transmittable diseases. At the beginning of the campaign, the four pests were defined as rats, sparrows, flies, and mosquitoes. However, after this decision was unanimously opposed by zoologists, the four pests were

“Chinese Anti-Malaria Posters - Gallery Of Images.”

68 redefined as rats, cockroaches, flies, and mosquitoes in 1960.9 On February 12, 1958, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council issued the “Instruction on the Elimination of the Four Pests of Hygiene.” It was proposed that the task of eliminating flies, mosquitoes, rats, and sparrows should be completed in 10 years or a little less.10 While many infectious diseases have been eradicated or reduced in scope, “1 billion sparrows, 1.5 billion rats, 100 million kilograms of flies, and 11 million kilograms of mosquitos” were wiped out.11 The public health campaign was extremely successful. However, the intrinsic value of the sparrow in maintaining ecological balance was overlooked, resulting in an unmitigated, well-coordinated environmental disaster. The poster describes malaria’s regional names, how mosquitoes transmit it, its effects, and the damage it causes to health and labor. People use bed-nets, burn incense and herbs to keep mosquitoes away, and they spray insecticide, fill in ditches, and raise fish to eat the larvae. A key emphasis in this poster is the idea of eradication, exemplified by the multiple ways described to eliminate the pests. This idea coincides with the four pests campaign which encourages total elimination of the four pests and sparked a feverish trend among people of all ages to engage in the activity.

1972 Poster- The Cultural Revolution and Down to the Countryside Movement

Basil Ashton, Kenneth Hill, Alan Piazza, and Robin Zeitz, “Famine In China, 1958-61,” Population And Development Review, 10 (4) (1984): 613. doi:10.2307/1973284. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid.

Title: Actively Prevent and Treat Malaria

极防治疾 Produced by the Health and

Epidemic Prevention Station of Changzhou Prefecture, Hebei Province, n.d., ca. 1972.12

The “Cultural Revolution” from May 1966 to October 1976 caused the most serious setbacks and losses to the Party, the country, and the people since the establishment of the 12

“Chinese Anti-Malaria Posters - Gallery Of Images.”

70 People’s Republic of China. This “Cultural Revolution” was initiated and led by Mao Zedong. His main argument was that a large number of representatives of the bourgeoisie and counterrevolutionary revisionists had infiltrated the Party, the government, the army, and all walks of life and that the leadership of many units was no longer in the hands of the Marxists and the people.13 Only by implementing the “Cultural Revolution” and mobilizing the masses openly, comprehensively, and from the bottom-up to expose the above-mentioned dark side, could the power usurped by the capitalists be regained. “Down to the Countryside Movement” was a political movement in the history of the People’s Republic of China that took place from the 1950s to 1978, culminating in the Cultural Revolution, during which the government of the People's Republic of China organized tens of millions of urban intellectual youths (“Zhiqing”) to settle and work in the countryside and “receive re-education of the poor peasants.”14 The title of the poster is “Actively Prevent and Treat Malaria,” and the picture down below shows distinct characteristics of the Cultural Revolution. The woman carries both a medical aid box and a hoe, indicating her identity as a Zhiqing dedicating herself to better medical conditions in the countryside. The poster features an artistic style of socialist realism, dynamism, and optimism consistent with propaganda during the Cultural Revolution and the Down to the Countryside Movement. Under the colorful image, different therapies are depicted in preventive images, along with instructions about how to take specific doses of medication. This part of the poster serves to educate the public, as well as to convey a positive outlook for rural populations.

Discussion and Conclusion 1960s-1970s China witnessed the emergence and collision of a series of sociopolitical movements and campaigns which greatly influenced the knowledge, perceptions, and ideologies of Chinese people. Public health campaigns were also infiltrated by political and social transformations. This impact was exemplified by the anti-malaria posters during that time.

John F. Melby, and Tang Tsou, “The Cultural Revolution And Post-Mao Reforms: A Historical Perspective,” Pacific Affairs 60 (2) (1987): 314. doi:10.2307/2758148. 14 “Up To The Mountains, Down To The Villages (1968),” Chineseposters.Net, 2022, https://chineseposters.net/themes/up-to-the-mountains.

71 Particularly, the posters, published at different times throughout the decade, reflected distinctive ideas as they were drawn into the whirlpools of different movements. The politicization of public health movements takes different forms within different movements, providing perspectives on how health campaigns were publicized and perceived during that turbulent time.

72 Bibliography Ashton, Basil, Kenneth Hill, Alan Piazza, and Robin Zeitz. “Famine in China, 1958–61.” The Population of Modern China, 1992, 225–71. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-12312_9. “Chinese Anti-Malaria Posters - Gallery of Images.” U.S. National Library of Medicine. National Institutes of Health, July 21, 2011. https://www.nlm.nih.gov/exhibition/chineseantimalaria/gallery.html. “China's Great Leap Forward.” Association for Asian Studies, July 13, 2020. https://www.asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/archives/chinas-great-leap-forward. “Chinese Public Health Posters: Public Health Movement.” U.S. National Library of Medicine. National Institutes of Health, July 23, 2013. https://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/chineseposters/public.html. “From 30 Million Cases to Zero: China Is Certified Malaria-Free by WHO.” World Health Organization. World Health Organization. Accessed March 28, 2022. https://www.who.int/news/item/30-06-2021-from-30-million-cases-to-zero-china-iscertified-malaria-free-by-who. Melby, John F., and Tang Tsou. “The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms: A Historical Perspective.” Pacific Affairs 60, no. 2 (1987): 314. https://doi.org/10.2307/2758148. Philcovex. “World Health Organization: 1962 Anti-Malaria Campaign.” Postal History Corner, January 1, 1970. http://postalhistorycorner.blogspot.com/2013/10/world-healthorganization-1962-anti.html. “The Great Leap Forward and the People's Communes—Socialist Ideals and Practice.” Chinese Law & Government 29, no. 4 (1996): 46–60. https://doi.org/10.2753/clg00094609290446. “Up to the Mountains, down to the Villages (1968).” Chineseposters.net. Accessed March 28, 2022. https://chineseposters.net/themes/up-to-the-mountains.

The Effectiveness of Public Policy Measures at Promoting Behavior Changes in Japan and Vietnam During the COVID-19 Pandemic Mira Anderson Independent Study Professor Giovanna Maria Dora Dore

74 Introduction Personal protective behaviors such as social distancing and mask-wearing have played a crucial role in controlling the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the effectiveness of such behaviors depends on the ability of governments to persuade their citizens to adopt them. Governments have a wide array of tools at their disposal to encourage desired behavior changes, from “hard” tools like mandates to “soft” measures like information campaigns. Current research suggests that soft nudging in the form of clear and persuasive public health communication may be just as effective as hard lockdowns at prompting the public to alter its conduct.1 Studies show that individual compliance with health-protective measures is critical for slowing the spread of the virus. For example, West et al. (2020) argue that widespread adherence to practices like hand washing and social distancing significantly curbs community transmission of the virus.2 Using population-based panel survey data from eight different countries, Margraf et al. (2020) similarly conclude that adherence to behavioral nonpharmaceutical interventions is correlated with lower COVID-19 mortality rates at the community level.3 A large group of studies investigates the impact of specific behaviors on the transmission of the virus. For example, Eikenberry et al. (2020) create model simulations to demonstrate that masks prevent both illness and asymptomatic transmission. They further maintain that even “weak” masks can substantially reduce hospitalizations and deaths.4 Regarding social distancing, Wilder et al. (2020) use individual-level modeling techniques to underscore the utility of targeted sheltering-in-place paired with physical distancing to drive down infection rates.5 Governments possess a wide range of tools to persuade or coerce their citizens to adopt protective behaviors. Tummers (2019) points to four main policy instruments—incentives, bans and mandates, information campaigns, and nudges—that governments can employ to stimulate

Richard H. Thaler and Cass R Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (New York: Penguin Books, 2009). 2 R. West et al., “Applying principles of behaviour change to reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission,” Nature Human Behaviour 4 (May 2020): 451–459, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-020-0887-9. 3 Jürgen Margraf et al., “Adherence to behavioral Covid-19 mitigation measures strongly predicts mortality,” PLOS ONE 16, no. 3 (March 2021), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0249392. 4 Steffen Eikenberry et al., “To mask or not to mask: Modeling the potential for face mask use by the general public to curtail the COVID-19 pandemic,” Infectious Disease Modelling 5 (April 2020): 295, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.idm.2020.04.001. 5 Bryan Wilder et al., “Modeling between-population variation in COVID-19 dynamics in Hubei, Lombardy, and New York City,” PNAS, 117, no. 41 (October 2020): 25904–25910, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2010651117.

75 desired behavior changes.6 Introduced by Sunstein and Thaler (2008), a “nudge” is an intervention that “affects people’s behavior while fully maintaining their freedom of choice,” such as altering default conditions to make behaviors easier or portraying desired conduct as the social norm.7 This concept assumes a bounded rationality, the idea that individuals do not always make the most rational decisions, contrary to what many economic models assume.8 Dudás et al. (2020) highlight two types of nudges: system 1 type nudges oriented towards “automatic, heuristic” decision-making processes, and system 2 type nudges that influence “deliberative” decision-making processes.9 In the context of COVID-19, a common system 2 type nudge is public health messaging aimed to educate the public about the virus and encourage adherence to protective behaviors. Sunstein (2020) argues that such nudges can be most effective at promoting behavioral shifts when acting as “complements” to mandates and bans.10 Based on scholarly studies investigating the effect of COVID-19 nonpharmaceutical interventions on public behavior, individuals appear most likely to adopt protective behaviors when they possess a clear understanding of the virus and the effectiveness of specific policy measures. For example, assessing multinational survey data, Jørgensen et al. (2020) argue that “feelings of efficacy”—having a clear understanding of policies and feeling capable of following them—are the best predictor of compliance with government health measures.11 Van den BroekAltenburg and Atherly (2020) similarly assert that policy changes themselves do not affect behaviors as much as beliefs about the effectiveness of certain policies, as demonstrated by survey data from the Netherlands and Belgium.12 Conversely, Brzezinski et al. (2021) find that science skepticism predicted lower adherence to COVID-19 social distancing policies in the United States.13 Overall, these findings indicate that clear public health communication—in other 6

Lars Tummers, “Public Policy and Behavior Change,” Public Administration Review 79, no. 6 (October 2019): 925-930, https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13109. 7 Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness, 4. 8 Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Science and Public Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108973144. 9 Levente Dudás et al., “Nudging in the time of coronavirus? Comparing public support for soft and hard preventive measures, highlighting the role of risk perception and experience,” PLOS ONE 16, no. 8 (August 2021), 3, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256241. 10 Sunstein, Behavioral Science and Public Policy, 5. 11 Frederik Jørgensen et al., “Compliance Without Fear: Predictors of Protective Behavior During the First Wave of the COVID-19 Pandemic,” British Journal of Health Psychology (March 2021), 14, 10.31234/osf.io/uzwgf. 12 Eline Van den Broek-Altenburg and Adam Atherly, “Adherence to COVID-19 Policy Measures: Behavioral Insights from the Netherlands and Belgium” (SSRN 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3692644. 13 Adam Brzezinski et al., “Science Skepticism Reduced Compliance with COVID-19 Shelter-in-Place Policies in the United States,” SSRN (September 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3587990.

76 words, informational “nudges”—may be a crucial factor in promoting public behavior changes, perhaps even more so than stringent tools. Indeed, many scholarly studies point to the limited impact of full-scale, government-mandated lockdowns at reducing the pandemic’s growth rate, as many people circumvented their governments’ restrictions or had already altered their behaviors before the lockdowns.14 This paper seeks to expand upon existing research regarding the use of public policy to promote behavior changes during the COVID-19 pandemic. It compares the COVID-19 policies of Japan and Vietnam during the first 18 months of the pandemic and assesses the extent to which their respective publics responded to these measures, using quantitative mobility data and qualitative survey data. Japan and Vietnam were chosen based on their drastically different responses to the pandemic. Whereas Japan implemented entirely voluntary policies for citizens to follow paired with a coordinated public information campaign, Vietnam implemented some of the most stringent measures in Asia according to the OxCGRT Stringency Index. This study aims to assess whether these different public policy approaches yielded comparable behavioral responses from the public, as the existing literature would indicate. Country Overviews Japan identified its first case of COVID-19 on January 16, 2020, and the outbreak rapidly escalated by late March.15 In its efforts to manage the pandemic, the Japanese government did not impose a full-scale domestic lockdown. Rather, it followed a strategy of caution and restraint, relying largely upon non-compulsory measures and the voluntary self-discipline of Japanese citizens to control the spread of the virus.16 On April 16, 2020, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared a state of national emergency in all provinces.17 By mid-May 2020, cases had dropped considerably, and the Abe government lifted the country’s state of emergency. However, in mid-July 2020, when Japan began to experience a second wave of COVID-19, the

Jonas Herby, “A First Literature Review: Lockdowns Only Had a Small Effect on COVID-19,” SSRN (January 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3764553. 15 Michael Penn, “Working Timeline of Covid-19 in Japan,” Shingetsu News Agency, April 5, 2021, http://shingetsunewsagency.com/2021/04/05/working-timeline-of-covid-19-in-japan/. 16 M. Jae Moon et al., “A comparative study of COVID-19 responses in South Korea and Japan: political nexus triad and policy responses,” International Review of Administrative Sciences 87, no. 3 (March 2021): 651-671, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0020852321997552. 17 Ai Tashiro and Rajib Shaw, “COVID-19 Pandemic Response in Japan: What Is Behind the Initial Flattening of the Curve?,” Sustainability 12, no. 13 (May 2020), http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su12135250.

77 government did not reinstate the state of emergency, a decision that prompted numerous governors to declare a state of emergency in their own prefectures. In January of 2021, the country had reached the peak of its third wave, and Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga declared a second state of emergency. A third state of emergency was imposed in late April, as variant strains of the virus led to a resurgence in infections in many prefectures.18 Vietnam reported its first case of COVID-19 on January 23, 2020. In contrast to the Japanese government’s approach, the Vietnamese government used mandatory policies to control the spread of the virus and compel the public to adopt personal protective behaviors. It mandated the use of face masks in mid-March and imposed a nationwide lockdown on April 1. By early May, the national lockdown was lifted and restrictions were loosened, but the mask mandate was kept in place. An outbreak in the city of Da Nang led to the imposition of lockdowns in ten provinces in late July 2020. Targeted lockdowns were similarly imposed during the country’s third and fourth waves of COVID-19, in late January 2020 and late April 2021, respectively.19 Specific Measures Japan: Between January 2020 and June 2021, the Japanese government declared three states of national emergency. Under the country’s emergency law, the government cannot impose mandatory lockdowns. However, the Prime Minister and governors are extended the power to request Japanese citizens to remain at home unless they are among those citizens carrying out essential activities and can also request that non-essential businesses and facilities temporarily shut down their operations.20 Over the same 18-month period, some Japanese governors declared their own prefectural states of emergency, thus breaking ranks with the Abe government. Okinawa Governor Denny Tamaki and Aichi Governor Hideaki Omura announced COVID-19 emergency situations in their prefectures on July 31, 2020, and August 5, 2020, respectively. These governors were prompted to break rank because of the inaction of Prime Minister Abe,

Penn, “Working Timeline of Covid-19 in Japan.” Todd Pollack et al., “Emerging COVID-19 success story: Vietnam’s commitment to containment,” Our World In Data, March 5, 2021, https://ourworldindata.org/covid-exemplar-vietnam. 20 Tashiro and Shaw, “COVID-19 Pandemic Response in Japan: What Is Behind the Initial Flattening of the Curve?” 19

78 who sought to avoid another state of national emergency “given its impact on employment and daily lives.”21 In conjunction with declarations of states of emergency at national and prefectural levels, the Japanese government carried out an information campaign to promote the practice of social distancing. “Avoid the Three Cs” was an important element of the campaign. First adopted in March 2020, this slogan encouraged the public to avoid Confined spaces, Crowded places, and Close contact. The publicization of the supercomputer Fugaku’s groundbreaking digital modeling of COVID-19 transmission risk in social settings was another important aspect of the government’s public health communication efforts.22 Vietnam: The Vietnamese government implemented a mix of nationwide and localized lockdowns in suspected hot spots over the first 18 months of the pandemic. Under these mandatory lockdowns, Vietnamese citizens were not permitted to leave their homes unless performing essential activities. The first and only national lockdown was implemented on April 1, 2020. During later COVID-19 outbreaks, such as the surge in Da Nang city in July of 2020, the government imposed targeted lockdowns in affected areas.23 The government also took steps to limit people’s mobility and encourage protective behaviors even before confirming the country’s first COVID-19 case. For example, following the country’s Lunar New Year holiday, the government required that all schools remain closed from January 31, 2020, onward. In addition, the government recommended the use of face masks in early February 2020 and required them in all public spaces by mid-March 2020.24 Paired with its mandatory measures, the Vietnamese government spearheaded a public health awareness campaign to inform citizens of the dangers of the coronavirus. Beginning on January 9, 2020, the Vietnamese Ministry of Health made frequent cautionary statements to the public about the virus, from its addition of a COVID-19 prevention statement to all phone calls made in the country to its use of text messaging to keep the public up to date on the pandemic. In addition, the government made creative use of social media. For example, the National Institute 21

Penn, “Working Timeline of Covid-19 in Japan.” “Avoiding the Three Cs: A Key to Preventing the Spread of COVID-19,” KIZUNA, December 24, 2020, https://www.japan.go.jp/kizuna/2020/avoiding_the_three_cs.html. 23 Pollack et al., “Emerging COVID-19 success story: Vietnam’s commitment to containment.” 24 Ibid. 22

79 of Occupational Safety and Health collaborated with a well-known Vietnamese music producer, Khac Hung, to turn one of his famous pop songs into a public service announcement for handwashing.25 The government also used social norms in its messaging, stressing the responsibility of every citizen to adhere to the “5K”—face mask, hygiene, safe distance, gathering, and health declaration.26 Findings Mobility data: Figure 1. Japan Mobility

Figure 2. Vietnam Mobility

“Vietnam’s Khac Hung Tells Story Behind His Global Hit, ‘Washing Hand Song,’” Billboard Vietnam, April 26, 2020, https://www.billboard.com/music/music-news/vietnam-khac-hung-washing-hand-song-min-erik-ghen-co-vywatch-video-9366071/. 26 Pollack et al., “Emerging COVID-19 success story: Vietnam’s commitment to containment.”

80 Figures 1 and 2 chart average mobility in Japan and Vietnam between January 13, 2020, and June 5, 2021, respectively. The vertical lines represent country-wide closing (black) and opening (red) policies. Based on these mobility graphs, the non-compulsory and mandatory measures implemented by the Japanese and Vietnamese governments, respectively, appear to have contributed to the mobility reductions that have been observed in both countries throughout the pandemic. Between early January and late April 2020, mobility in Japan decreased by approximately 50%. A large part of this reduction occurred in mid-March of 2020, a few weeks before Prime Minister Abe declared a state of national emergency. It is likely that citizens adjusted their behavior based on rising COVID-19 cases and other COVID-19-related signals from the government, such as its request for all schools to close. Nevertheless, mobility remained at a low level until the lifting of the country’s first state of emergency in late May 2020, indicating that the measure played an important role in behavioral changes. During the same period, mobility in Vietnam also decreased by approximately 50%. This trend parallels the increase in restrictions that the Vietnamese government imposed on its citizens, ranging from the cancellation of large gatherings to closing the country’s borders to all international travel. Mobility did not return to its pre-pandemic baseline level until early May 2020, following the government’s decision to begin lifting restrictions, which indicates that governmental directives also contributed to mobility changes in Vietnam. In late August 2020, Japan experienced its second wave of the virus, which did not particularly impact mobility. This trend may be attributable to Japan’s lack of coordinated national response to the second wave and the consequent lack of clear public health advice for the public to follow. For example, while certain governors imposed their own prefectural states of emergency, Prime Minister Abe remained resistant to declaring a national state of emergency. In contrast, when Vietnam experienced its second wave in late July 2020 following an outbreak in Da Nang city, the government acted promptly and decisively, locking down the city on July 28, 2020, and imposing targeted lockdowns in ten provinces. Following these restrictions, individual mobility across the country dropped approximately 20% from its pre-pandemic baseline level. This reduction was smaller in magnitude than the drop at the beginning of the pandemic. However, the discrepancy is likely due to the imposition of targeted lockdowns rather than a nationwide lockdown.

81 In late November 2020, individual mobility began to fall in Japan as it faced its third wave of the virus. While this reduction may have initially been a reaction to rising case numbers, the second state of national emergency declared in early January by new Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga likely contributed to the sustained low levels of mobility that the country experienced until mid-February 2020. However, it is important to note that the decrease in mobility was around 30% lower than the one which followed the country’s first round of lockdown policies. This finding points to the diminishing efficacy of government measures in promoting behavior changes over the course of the pandemic. The same trend can be observed in Vietnam. For example, in late January of 2021, Vietnam experienced its third wave of the virus when a migrant worker in Hai Duong became infected with the U.K. COVID-19 variant. The outbreak led to the reimposition of targeted lockdowns in many northern provinces, with a resulting sharp drop in individual mobility occurring immediately afterward. Nevertheless, mobility returned to its original level by mid-February 2021 before the relaxation of existing restrictions, which suggests the decreasing influence of the Vietnamese government’s mandatory lockdowns on people’s behavior over time. Survey data: Survey data suggest that measures taken by the Japanese government effectively promoted certain health-protective behaviors. For instance, based on survey data from the Imperial College London’s Institute of Global Health Innovation (IGHI), Japan had one of the highest proportions of citizens who reported frequent face mask use in April 2020 (72%) and April 2021 (92%). However, the share of respondents who reported that they often avoided working outside of the home or going out remained relatively low in both periods. Correspondingly, among the countries surveyed, Japan had the highest percentage of respondents who disclosed a high unwillingness to self-isolate in both April 2020 (8%) and April 2021 (9%).27 In contrast, survey data indicates that Vietnam’s mandatory measures effectively promoted both face mask use and social distancing. According to data from the YouGov market research company, 80% of Vietnamese respondents reported that they wore a face mask in public places between March 2020 and June 2021. Additionally, the share of respondents who reported

“COVID-19 Global Behaviours and Attitudes: The Year in Review,” Imperial College London Institute of Global Health Innovation.

82 that they avoided crowded public places remained between 60% and 80% during the same period.28 While survey data suggests that Japanese citizens may not have modified their behaviors to the same extent that the Vietnamese population did, the public health communication efforts of the Japanese government appear to have played an important role in promoting certain behavioral modifications. A study that surveyed a sample of Japanese citizens about their perceptions towards government public health campaigns indicates that the “Avoid the Three C’s” campaign was “positively perceived as an effective measure” for combatting COVID-19, encouraging people to alter their behaviors.29 In particular, its “simplicity” was an important factor that helped “raise people’s awareness and understanding of the measure itself.30 Similarly, the government’s declaration of a state of emergency on April 16, 2020, encouraged people to adopt personal protective behaviors by raising public awareness about the virus and its risks. All the above measures were found to increase people’s sense of individual and social responsibility. Nevertheless, the data reveal important limitations in Japan’s public health communication efforts. In particular, the IGHI study found that Japanese citizens had the poorest perception of their government’s handling of the pandemic among 14 countries surveyed in April 2020 and April 2021. In addition, Japan had one of the highest shares of respondents who stated they had “no” or “very little” confidence in their country’s health authorities.31 In contrast, survey data on Vietnam reveals a widely positive perception of the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, according to YouGov population survey data, the percentage of Vietnamese respondents who believed that their government’s handling of the pandemic was “very” or “somewhat” good remained between 80% and 90% from March 2020 to June 2021.32 A study that interviewed Vietnamese focus groups found that the communication strategies pursued by the government were also positively 28

“Personal measures taken to avoid COVID-19,” YouGovAmerica, https://today.yougov.com/topics/international/articles-reports/2020/03/17/personal-measures-taken-avoid-covid-19. 29 Firman Budianto and Yuichi Nishikori, “Voluntary Behavior Modification during a Pandemic: Perceptions and Behaviors toward COVID-19 in Japan,” Makara Human Behavior Studies in Asia 25, no. 1 (July 2021): 19, https://doi.org/10.7454/hubs.asia.4140920. 30 Budianto and Nishikori, “Voluntary Behavior Modification during a Pandemic: Perceptions and Behaviors toward COVID-19 in Japan,” 19. 31 “COVID-19 Global Behaviours and Attitudes: The Year in Review,” Imperial College London Institute of Global Health Innovation. 32 “COVID-19: government handling and confidence in health authorities,” YouGovAmerica, https://today.yougov.com/topics/international/articles-reports/2020/03/17/perception-government-handling-covid19.

83 perceived and impactful. Respondents consistently evaluated governmental communication as clear and timely. Additionally, the wide variety of platforms that the government used to educate the public about the virus, from SMS messaging by the Ministry of Health to the handwashing song, raised people’s understanding of the virus and impacted their behavioral responses to the pandemic.33 Discussion Based on quantitative and qualitative data, the Vietnamese government was more successful than the Japanese government at promoting public behavior changes during the first 18 months of the COVID-19 pandemic. Japan’s non-compulsory measures and public health awareness campaign do appear to have encouraged certain health-protective behaviors among its population, such as mobility reductions and mask-wearing. Overall, however, the Japanese public displayed less willingness to modify their behavior and a much poorer perception of their government’s handling of the pandemic compared to citizens of other countries. In contrast, Vietnamese public policy measures were widely perceived as effective and timely, achieving consistently high levels of adherence to social distancing and mask mandates among Vietnamese citizens and low movement levels throughout the pandemic. The findings of this paper are consistent with prior studies conducted on the use of public policy to stimulate behavior changes during the COVID-19 pandemic. These studies point to clear and informative public health communication—informational nudging—as a crucial tool for encouraging the public to modify its behavior (perhaps even more so than mandates and bans) because it raises people’s understanding of the virus and the effectiveness of specific policy measures. Thus, while the Japanese government’s failure to promote personal protective behaviors may have partially stemmed from its looser restrictions, poor public health messaging likely played a larger role. The Abe government’s resistance towards imposing a second state of emergency in late 2020 and the subsequent decisions of governors to impose prefectural states of emergency led to disorganized and unclear communication that markedly impacted the attitudes and behaviors of the Japanese population. In comparison, Vietnam’s use of mandatory policies

Le Thanh Tam et al., “Receptivity of Governmental Communication and Its Effectiveness During COVID-19 Pandemic Emergency in Vietnam: A Qualitative Study,” Global Journal of Flexible Systems Management 22 (June 2021): 45-61, https://doi.org/10.1007/s40171-021-00269-7.

84 paired with clear and consistent public health initiatives was shown to be particularly effective at increasing public awareness about the virus and promoting behavior modifications.

85 Bibliography “Avoiding the Three Cs: A Key to Preventing the Spread of COVID-19.” KIZUNA, December 24, 2020. https://www.japan.go.jp/kizuna/2020/avoiding_the_three_cs.html. Brzezinski, Adam et al. “Science Skepticism Reduced Compliance with COVID-19 Shelter-inPlace Policies in the United States.” SSRN (September 2021). https://ssrn.com/abstract=3587990. Budianto, Firman, and Yuichi Nishikori. “Voluntary Behavior Modification during a Pandemic: Perceptions and Behaviors toward COVID-19 in Japan.” Makara Human Behavior Studies in Asia 25, no. 1 (July 2021): 12-22. https://doi.org/10.7454/hubs.asia.4140920. “COVID-19 Global Behaviours and Attitudes: The Year in Review.” Imperial College London Institute of Global Health Innovation. “COVID-19: government handling and confidence in health authorities.” YouGovAmerica. https://today.yougov.com/topics/international/articles-reports/2020/03/17/perceptiongovernment-handling-covid-19. Dudás, Levente et al. “Nudging in the time of coronavirus? Comparing public support for soft and hard preventive measures, highlighting the role of risk perception and experience.” PLOS ONE 16, no. 8 (August 2021). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256241. Eikenberry, Steffen et al. “To mask or not to mask: Modeling the potential for face mask use by the general public to curtail the COVID-19 pandemic.” Infectious Disease Modelling 5 (April 2020): 293-308. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.idm.2020.04.001. Herby, Jonas. “A First Literature Review: Lockdowns Only Had a Small Effect on COVID-19.” SSRN (January 2021). https://ssrn.com/abstract=3764553. Jae Moon, M. et al. “A comparative study of COVID-19 responses in South Korea and Japan: political nexus triad and policy responses.” International Review of Administrative Sciences 87, no. 3 (March 2021): 651-671. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0020852321997552. Jørgensen, Frederik et al. “Compliance Without Fear: Predictors of Protective Behavior During the First Wave of the COVID-19 Pandemic.” British Journal of Health Psychology (March 2021). 10.31234/osf.io/uzwgf. Margraf, Jürgen et al. “Adherence to behavioral Covid-19 mitigation measures strongly predicts mortality.” PLOS ONE 16, no. 3 (March 2021). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0249392. Penn, Michael. “Working Timeline of Covid-19 in Japan.” Shingetsu News Agency, April 5,

86 2021. http://shingetsunewsagency.com/2021/04/05/working-timeline-of-covid-19-injapan/. “Personal measures taken to avoid COVID-19.” YouGovAmerica. https://today.yougov.com/topics/international/articles-reports/2020/03/17/personalmeasures-taken-avoid-covid-19. Pollack, Todd et al. “Emerging COVID-19 success story: Vietnam’s commitment to containment.” Our World In Data, March 5, 2021. https://ourworldindata.org/covidexemplar-vietnam. Sunstein, Cass R. Behavioral Science and Public Policy. Cambridge University Press, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108973144. Tam, Le Thanh et al. “Receptivity of Governmental Communication and Its Effectiveness During COVID-19 Pandemic Emergency in Vietnam: A Qualitative Study.” Global Journal of Flexible Systems Management 22 (June 2021): 45-61. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40171-021-00269-7. Tashiro, Ai, and Rajib Shaw. “COVID-19 Pandemic Response in Japan: What Is Behind the Initial Flattening of the Curve?” Sustainability 12, no. 13 (May 2020). http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su12135250. Thaler, Richard H., and Cass R Sunstein. Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New York: Penguin Books, 2009. Tummers, Lars. “Public Policy and Behavior Change.” Public Administration Review 79, no. 6 (October 2019): 925-930. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13109. Van den Broek-Altenburg, Eline, and Adam Atherly. “Adherence to COVID-19 Policy Measures: Behavioral Insights from the Netherlands and Belgium.” SSRN (September 2020). https://ssrn.com/abstract=3692644. “Vietnam’s Khac Hung Tells Story Behind His Global Hit, ‘Washing Hand Song.’” Billboard Vietnam, April 26, 2020. https://www.billboard.com/music/music-news/vietnam-khachung-washing-hand-song-min-erik-ghen-co-vy-watch-video-9366071/. West, R. et al. “Applying principles of behaviour change to reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission.” Nature Human Behaviour 4 (May 2020): 451–459. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-020-0887-9. Wilder, Bryan et al. “Modeling between-population variation in COVID-19 dynamics in Hubei, Lombardy, and New York City.” PNAS, 117, no. 41 (October 2020): 25904–25910. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2010651117.

The Stone Doctors: Working at the Intersection of Medicine and Christianity in Early 20th Century China Reshmi Patel Women and Modern Chinese History Professor Meyer-Fong December 22, 2020

88 Dr. Mary Stone, born Shi Meiyu, practiced medicine in Jiujiang in the early twentieth century after becoming one of the first Chinese physicians trained in Western medicine at an American university.1 She founded the Elizabeth Skelton Danforth Memorial Hospital and trained the twenty nurses that worked there.2 After completing her medical training in the United States, Mary Stone’s younger sister, Phoebe Stone, became superintendent of the hospital while Mary Stone was overseas completing a fellowship.3 Mary and Phoebe Stone blended knowledge of Western medicine and Christian missionary practices with their familiarity with Chinese culture to become influential in both the United States and China. Utilizing this transnational circuit, they made great contributions to Western medicine in China and facilitated Chinese women gaining an education in this field. The Stone doctors were pioneers in the field of Western medicine in China: developing hospitals and schools, employing advanced medical and surgical techniques, and bringing more Chinese women into the medical field as students and nurses. Their work was well-documented by newspapers, their reports, and accounts from visiting physicians and missionaries. Both the medical community and ordinary citizens viewed the Stone doctors as leaders. Foremost among these English-language accounts are A Glimpse of the Heart of China by American doctor Edward C. Perkins and Notable Women of Modern China by missionary Margaret E. Burton. The former began as a collection of letters Perkins turned into a book to share what he learned of Dr. Mary Stone’s work at the Danforth Memorial Hospital after a visit in 1911.4 The latter consists of four biographies of Chinese women, including Dr. Mary Stone, that Burton wrote after a trip to China in 1909, during which she had the opportunity to speak with Dr. Stone and to examine personal letters and photographs. She shared several excerpts and quotations in her published book. Both sources emphasize how Dr. Mary Stone spread Christianity through the process of practicing medicine. Although their childhoods were somewhat nontraditional, the Stone doctors maintained close ties to their Chinese roots, which aided them in eventually opening successful medical

“Need for Women Doctors and Nurses in China,” Millard's Review of the Far East (1917-1919), March 16, 1918, 82, http://proxy.library.jhu.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/docview/1326713869?accountid=11752. 2 Edward Carter Perkins, A Glimpse of the Heart of China, (New York, Chicago: Fleming H. Revell company, 1911), 9-10; 62-64. 3 “Noted Chinese Women Doctors Manage Hospital Here,” The China Weekly Review, August 23, 1924, https://www-proquest-com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/docview/1319855861?accountid=11752. 4 Perkins, A Glimpse of the Heart of China, 9-15.

89 practices and gaining the trust of patients in their home city. In 1873, Shi Meiyu was born in Jiujiang, Jiangxi, 17 years before the birth of her younger sister, Phoebe Stone.5 They were born into a family that was part of a wider community of Chinese Protestants, with their mother the principal of a day school for girls and their father a Methodist pastor who led a chapel in Jiujiang.6 This Christian identity was central to maintaining close ties to Chinese community members even after many years spent abroad. Shi Meiyu’s parents did not bind her feet, as her mother was adamant about leaving her daughter’s feet unbound.7 Inspired by the work of American missionary Dr. Kate Bushnell, her father had Shi Meiyu educated by missionary Gertrude Howe to prepare her to attend medical school in the West.8 Shi Meiyu and Phoebe Stone both grew up bilingual, receiving lessons in English at a young age. They were fluent by the time they attended school in the United States.9 These decisions isolated Shi Meiyu from other children in her younger years, but the heavy influence of her parents on her early life contributed to her lasting connection with the Jiujiang Christian community. Evidence of this connection is her decision to wear traditional Chinese clothing for her medical school graduation ceremony from the University of Michigan, rather than the Western clothes she regularly wore to class.10 Even as Shi Meiyu was a devout Christian fluent in Western practices, she is quoted as discussing the capability and power Chinese women could attain if given the opportunity.11 Similarly, while Shi Meiyu opposed foot binding throughout her life, she believed that the practice did not signal the intrinsic inferiority of Chinese women.12 She took the name Mary Stone to help professors pronounce her name more easily, but always remained certain she would return to China to practice medicine after graduation.13 Much of Mary and Phoebe Stone’s success in developing Western medicine in China came from their being respected in the West and China and utilizing knowledge from both 5

Margaret E. Burton, Notable Women of Modern China, (The Project Gutenberg EBook, 2004), 161, https://www.gutenberg.org/files/14492/14492-h/14492-h.htm#Page_172. 6 Burton, Notable Women of Modern China, 161; Shemo, Chinese Medical Ministries, 6. 7 Perkins, A Glimpse of the Heart of China, 9; Burton, Notable Women of Modern China, 161-166. 8 Burton, Notable Women of Modern China, 165-168; Connie Anne Shemo, The Chinese Medical Ministries of Kang Cheng and Shi Meiyu, 1872-1937: On a Cross-cultural Frontier of Gender, Race, and Nation. Shemo, Chinese Medical Ministries, (Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press, 2011), 2. 9 Shemo, The Chinese Medical Ministries of Kang Cheng and Shi Meiyu, 1872-1937, 2. 10 James Tobin, “New Women of China,” Medicine at Michigan, (2010), 14. 11 Burton, Notable Women of Modern China, 212-213. 12 Shemo, The Chinese Medical Ministries of Kang Cheng and Shi Meiyu, 1872-1937, 47. 13 Burton, Notable Women of Modern China, 165-166.

90 regions. As documented by Dr. Perkins, Mary Stone arrived in the United States in 1890 and “graduated from the Medical School of the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor in 1894, leading her class.”14 Medical doctors such as Dr. Perkins and Dr. Danforth, as well as missionary organizations like the Woman's Foreign Missionary Society, thought highly of the Stone doctors and promoted their achievements. After seeing them excel in their studies, many in the U.S. expected them to succeed in their careers.15 Mary Stone, in particular, was thought to have great potential as she was one of the first Chinese women to become a Western-trained physician.16 In fact, Dr. I. N. Danforth, a prominent physician in Chicago, Illinois, was so impressed with Mary Stone that he helped her access coveted clinical training sites. He also provided funding for Mary Stone to return to Jiujiang and open the Elizabeth Skelton Danforth Memorial Hospital, named in honor of Dr. Danforth’s deceased wife.17 Even after returning to China, Mary Stone, and later Phoebe Stone, leveraged these American connections for the benefit of patients in China. Despite their focus on Chinese communities, this exchange was not one-sided. The Stone doctors educated American students through a series of trips and lecture circuits throughout their careers.18 In 1907, after deciding to get surgery for appendicitis at an American hospital, Mary Stone spent a few months in New York and Michigan attending lectures, clinics, and meetings, since many people were eager to meet with her. She also received funding for medical supplies for her hospitals in Jiujiang.19 Not long after, an English-language newspaper, Millard's Review of the Far East, published an article on Mary Stone’s year-long trip to lecture at various conferences throughout the U.S., including an address before ten thousand people at the world’s quadrennial conference of the Methodist Church.20 The intersection of religion with medicine in the early twentieth century aided their success in building social and financial capital. Aside from lecturing, Dr. Phoebe Stone managed

Perkins, A Glimpse of the Heart of China, 9. Tobin, “New Women of China,” 15; Perkins, Heart of China; Burton, Notable Women of Modern China. 16 “Need for Women Doctors and Nurses in China,” Millard's Review of the Far East (1917-1919), March 16, 1918, 82, http://proxy.library.jhu.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/docview/1326713869?accountid=11752. 17 Shemo, The Chinese Medical Ministries of Kang Cheng and Shi Meiyu, 1872-1937, 48. 18 The North - China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette, “CHINESE WOMAN DOCTOR’S TRIP”; “Dr. Mary Stone–China’s First Woman Doctor,” Millard's Review of the Far East (1919-1921), August 18, 1920, https://www.proquest.com/docview/1319896272?accountid=11752&parentSessionId=JaicF5JTiIpaJkpOogUdMCd %2FnsmeH3ETlCYLlC74EBA%3D. 19 Burton, Notable Women Modern China, 183-187. 20 “Dr. Mary Stone–China’s First Woman Doctor,” Millard's Review of the Far East (1919-1921). 15

91 an infantile paralysis epidemic in the Worchester Memorial Hospital and was praised for her work by physicians in the U.S.21 In addition to maintaining ties with American physicians, Mary and Phoebe Stone used their affiliation with foreign missionaries, particularly with the Women’s Federation of Missionary Service, to advance their work and expand the field of Western medicine in China. Missionary organizations supported the Stone doctors because they incorporated the practice of Christianity into their hospitals and schools. A number of Western missionaries in the early twentieth century believed it was important for Chinese people to be the ones to Christianize China, and Mary and Phoebe Stone’s work aligned precisely with this goal.22 The inscription of the copy of A Glimpse of the Heart of China found in the U.S. National Archives reads “Yours in His service” and is signed by Mary Stone.23 This theme of performing medical work while spreading Christianity continues throughout the source as all of the nurses that Mary Stone trained at Danforth hospital were Christian Chinese women.24 A photograph captioned “quite a number of the patients came at the summons of the bell” depicts a morning service with nurses and patients sitting in rows of pews in the room that doubled as the chapel and dispensary waiting room. Dr. Perkins writes that hymns were sung by patients and hospital staff while Mary Stone played the organ at the front of the room each morning after breakfast.25 In Jiujiang, Mary Stone shared a house and was close friends with missionary Jennie Hughes for much of her life, which further emphasizes her strong ties—both personal and professional—to Christian work. In addition to her work in China, Mary Stone gained prominence among American missionaries by taking multiple trips to the United States to participate in lectures and conferences, both medical and Christian. The Women’s Federation of Missionary Service sent telegrams to the U.S. President to bypass immigration issues related to anti-Chinese exclusion laws at the time when providing Mary Stone passage to and from the U.S.26 While building these relationships with Western physicians and missionaries was instrumental to furthering Western medicine in China,

“Noted Chinese Women Doctors Manage Hospital Here,” The China Weekly Review. Xi Lian, Redeemed by Fire: The Rise of Popular Christianity in Modern China (Cumberland: Yale University, 2010), 34, https://books.google.com/books?id=XmJwplZVK6EC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=true. 23 Perkins, A Glimpse of the Heart of China. 24 Ibid., 37-41. 25 Ibid., 45-46. 26 Shemo, The Chinese Medical Ministries of Kang Cheng and Shi Meiyu, 1872-1937, 165. 22

92 the relationships the Stone doctors formed with people in their home community—Chinese patients, nurses, and students—were just as strong. When Mary Stone arrived in Jiujiang in 1896 after completing her studies, a crowd of people gathered to greet her and Dr. Ida Kahn, the adopted daughter of Gertrude Howe who attended the University of Michigan alongside Mary Stone.27 However, Dr. Stone still had to put in time to gain the full trust of her community. She first operated out of a small, rented building in Jiujiang.28 Many in the community were initially hesitant to undergo operations. However, after seeing how Dr. Stone’s skillful surgeries benefitted patients, people came to Dr. Stone requesting that she operate on them. This was especially true of those who had tuberculosis who saw how her medical treatment lessened painful symptoms such as difficulty breathing.29 Danforth Memorial Hospital was constructed and ready for use by 1900, so when Edward C. Perkins and Margaret E. Burton visited about a decade later, Dr. Stone was already widely respected among Jiujiang residents.30 Both authors provide accounts that emphasize the admiration and trust Mary Stone earned, a testament to how critical maintaining close ties to other Chinese people was to establishing Western medicine in China. Burton shares an excerpt from a 1901 article in the North China Daily Herald, which describes Drs. Mary Stone and Ida Kahn making visits to rural areas of Jiujiang to treat patients. It reads, “Sometimes after a successful visit their chairs will be draped with a red cloth and the physicians will be carried home in triumph through an admiring crowd, and accompanied all the way by fire-crackers” and mentions that rural residents sometimes commented, “‘We are afraid of foreigners, but you can understand our nature,’” indicating they were open to being treated by the doctors due to their Chinese origin.31 Mary and Phoebe Stone thus bridged Western medicine and Chinese patients, gaining the trust of Chinese people in their community in a way that a foreign doctor likely could not have. In one notable account Perkins provides, Dr. Mary Stone traveled a long way to treat a woman who had been gravely ill for four days. Many neighbors were present in the room, impeding her ability to examine the patient, so Dr. Stone quickly used her authority as a doctor to insist that the men

Tobin, “New Women of China,” 15. Burton, Notable Women of Modern China, 182-183. 29 Ibid., 169-175. 30 Ibid., 172. 31 Ibid., 170. 28

93 leave the room and carried on with her examination after she was obeyed immediately.32 Perkins spotlights this incident to demonstrate that despite prevailing gender-based norms in the early 1900s, Mary Stone was highly respected as an authority figure. In addition to describing specific interactions, Perkins observes that Mary Stone’s strong leadership qualities garnered her much respect from nurses, patients, and foreign doctors and missionaries. She worked for years without taking a week off and was seen as a quick and calm decision-maker, not doubting herself in the most difficult patient cases.33 As Burton and Perkins demonstrate in their writings, the Stone doctors were uniquely able to expand Western medicine in China. As Chinese women, they were trusted by Jiujiang residents, whereas foreign doctors would have had more difficulty finding patients to accept their treatments. In all her years affiliated with missionary organizations, Mary Stone did not live with the American missionaries present in Jiujiang, but instead chose to live in a traditional Chinese home near Danforth Memorial Hospital, a decision that helped her integrate into and gain the trust of the Jiujiang community.34 The Stone doctors also chose to make themselves accessible to Chinese people who viewed them as an inspiration. From 1903 to 1904, Mary Stone was documented as having many guests at her house, including Chinese women, preachers and their wives, officials, and many others who had traveled to see her.35 Some years later, in 1926, Phoebe Stone left China for an overseas trip and was sent off by a large crowd of many Chinese people and some foreigners offering flowers and farewells.36 The Stone doctors integrated their medical practice into Chinese society, despite their Western and Christian influences. In addition to solidifying the field of medicine in China, Dr. Mary Stone had two goals she believed their medical work “could accomplish only if it were purely Chinese: first, that it should convince the Chinese women themselves that they are able to do things of which they have never dreamed,” and second, to show other nations that Chinese women were capable of great things when given the education and opportunity.37 Although the

Perkins, A Glimpse of the Heart of China, 57-59. Ibid., 71-72; 75. 34 Shemo, The Chinese Medical Ministries of Kang Cheng and Shi Meiyu, 1872-1937, 48. 35 Ibid., 74. 36 “NOTED CHINESE WOMAN DOCTOR’S TRIP,” The North - China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette (1870-1941), October 30, 1926, https://www.proquest.com/docview/1420007722?accountid=11752&parentSessionId=Yg7xPekgjfBzfQMBvKe4w8 NPqfcOfwau2nZNlnaamwU%3D. 37 Burton, Notable Women Modern China, 212-213. 33

94 training they received was Western, by running hospitals and schools strictly operated by Chinese women, the Stone doctors paved the way for Chinese women to lead the development of Western medicine in China, as opposed to foreigners or men. According to a report released by the Rockefeller Foundation in 1914, Chinese populations tended to object to female patients being treated by men, so women physicians and nurses were essential. This was a contributing factor to the Stone doctors’ success in centering Chinese women in their endeavor to establish an efficient hospital, capable of caring for a growing number of patients each year.38 However, while this need for female practitioners aided her goal, Mary Stone intentionally selected educated Chinese women to train as students and nurses to provide women the opportunities she believed they could thrive with. She was sure to emphasize that the hospitals she founded were run by Chinese women in her written work.39 The authors who described the Stone doctors emphasized the balance between their Chinese influences from birth and Western education. They highlight the role this played in garnering respect and support from both Western doctors and missionaries and Chinese residents. These factors led Mary and Phoebe Stone to open doors for Chinese women in medicine in two main ways: first, by solidifying Western medicine in China through operations sustained by Chinese women, and second, by turning attention to the development of a nursing profession in China geared toward Chinese women and modeled after the unique vision Mary Stone had for nurses.40 Missionary writings, local and foreign newspapers, and the Stone doctors’ own words all chronicle these processes of developing hospitals and training nurses. By blending Chinese and Western influences, the Stone doctors successfully implemented and institutionalized Western medicine in China. The first step in this process was building, running, and expanding Danforth Memorial Hospital starting in 1900, funded by a donation from Dr. Danforth.41 In her report for July of 1897, Mary Stone reported they had “2,352 dispensary patients, made 343 visits, and had thirteen patients in their little hospital” for approximately the past nine months.42 Thirteen years later, in 1910, these numbers saw a drastic improvement, with the new statistics being “3,679 dispensary patients, 59 in-patients, and 414 38

Rockefeller Foundation, Medicine in China (New York: University of Chicago Press, 1914), https://archive.org/details/medicineinchina00rock/page/n7/mode/2up; Burton, Notable Women Modern China. 39 Shemo, The Chinese Medical Ministries of Kang Cheng and Shi Meiyu, 1872-1937, 6. 40 Simpson and Foochow, “The Chinese Pupil Nurse,” 264-268. 41 Burton, Notable Women of Modern China, 171-172. 42 Ibid., 169.

95 visits” in only six months.43 By 1906, Danforth Memorial Hospital was a “large, finely equipped hospital for women and children, with a practice which was increasing so rapidly as to make constant additions to the hospital property necessary.”44 Developing the hospital was an effective means of applying Western medicine for the benefit of Chinese people, and her biographers report that this new institution played an important role in allowing Mary Stone to accomplish her initial goal of providing wide scale treatment specifically to women and children. In 1918, Dr. Phoebe Stone was appointed superintendent of the Danforth hospital while Mary Stone returned to America to pursue post-graduate work at Johns Hopkins University on a Rockefeller scholarship. As superintendent, Phoebe Stone implemented many reforms in the hospital. Such reforms were part of the Stone doctors’ efforts to make continual improvements to their medical practice and knowledge.45 For instance, they often requested books be sent from the U.S. on new research and specialized fields of medicine to stay up-to-date with the latest practices in Western medicine.46 Maintaining connections with American physicians enabled them to be confident they were providing the highest quality care and subsequently expand their reach. This level of care was in turn recognized by foreign physicians. Dr. Danforth, for instance, testified that Dr. Mary Stone was “performing the largest operations known to surgery, and that no Chicago surgeon [was] doing work superior to hers.”47 Perkins was similarly impressed by Dr. Mary Stone’s work. He commented on the large number of complicated cases seen in the hospital, including extensive infections, severe burns, and mass poisoning cases. He also mentioned the efficacy of outpatients obtaining medications directly from the hospital’s dispensary.48 Mary and Phoebe Stone went on to do similarly impressive work at additional hospitals. Together they opened the Bethel Hospital in 1920, which also had a high school for girls and boys, one of the earliest such integrated schools.49 In the following years, the Stone doctors worked in connection with the interdenominational Margaret Williamson Hospital and continued to open several more hospitals and schools.50 Mary Stone was also central in founding

Burton, Notable Women of Modern China, 172. Ibid., 182. 45 “Noted Chinese Women Doctors Manage Hospital Here,” The China Weekly Review. 46 Burton, Notable Women of Modern China, 204. 47 Ibid., 195-196. 48 Perkins, A Glimpse of the Heart of China, 46-47. 49 “Noted Chinese Women Doctors Manage Hospital Here,” The China Weekly Review. 50 “Dr. Mary Stone–China’s First Woman Doctor,” Millard's Review of the Far East (1919-1921). 44

96 the Chinese Red Cross, which highlights the magnitude of her involvement in transnational organizations.51 In addition to making advances for Chinese women as healthcare workers, Mary and Phoebe Stone took measures to ensure they were doing as much as possible for the women they served. To care for the largest number of patients, Mary Stone ran her hospital with economy, which she defined as “the art which avoids all waste and extravagance and applies money to the best advantage,” emphasizing that economy meant never compromising quality care of her patients.52 She also treated patients who could not afford treatment, relying on donations, from both foreign and local sources, and on generous payments from wealthier patients.53 On top of providing medical care, the Stone doctors and their nurses distributed meals, clothes, and medication to refugees and others in need.54 In this way, Mary and Phoebe Stone expanded Western medicine in China by focusing on improving the lives of people, particularly women, in their community, while utilizing foreign relationships and funding for support. They opened doors for Chinese women even more directly by implementing a system of nursing education starting with teenage girls. Dr. Mary Stone had a vision of Chinese women nurses as independent healers, always maintaining confidence in her nurses and treating them with a sympathetic attitude.55 A journal article written by missionaries Cora E. Simpson and R. N. Foochow in 1915, titled "The Training of the Chinese Pupil Nurse,” quotes Dr. Stone and aligns well with many of her ideas (although Dr. Stone builds on this article by training nurses to travel on their own). The authors believed that nurses should quickly become self-reliant and aimed for their role to be that of both nurses and “teachers to the women of China.”56 Throughout the 1910s, Dr. Stone practiced these ideas by training nurse-evangelicals to individually go to rural areas that lacked medical practitioners, so they could fill a need for medical care that those villagers would otherwise be unable to obtain.57 Since many Chinese nurses in the early twentieth century were associated with missionary organizations, Dr. Stone was able to obtain funding from the China Medical Board— 51

Tobin, “New Women of China,” 15. Burton, Notable Women of Modern China, 201-203. 53 Ibid., 202-203. 54 Ibid., 200-203. 55 Ibid., 205-210; Shemo, Chinese Medical Ministries, 200. 56 Simpson and Foochow, “The Training of the Chinese Pupil Nurse,” The China Medical Journal / Medical Missionary Association of China 29, (1915), 264-268. 57 Ibid. 52

97 a subset of the private American organization, the Rockefeller Foundation—to promote her mission for nursing in China.58 In addition to a solid funding source and support from missionary organizations, Mary Stone’s vision benefitted from environmental factors in China throughout the early twentieth century. In 1907, reformers praised her nursing school for contributing to the “new China” that women could be a part of, just as Mary Stone herself was held up as an example of a “new Chinese woman.”59 Shortly after, in 1909, Dr. Stone was able to secure funding from American doctors to build a house for nurses of the Danforth Memorial Hospital to reside in.60 Just over a decade later, in the years following 1919, the weak central state and wider interest in Western medicine allowed Mary and Phoebe Stone to serve a larger community alongside the many nurses they had trained. They incorporated a central missionary concept of “women’s work for women,” with the Chinese women nurses treating female patients, often in childbirth cases.61 Foreign funding for and Chinese acceptance of nursing were necessary for Mary Stone to begin implementing her vision, but their success would not have been possible without Dr. Stone’s work with the nurses themselves. Central to her mission was the process of selecting students, developing a curriculum, and managing hospital nurses to put training into practice. In a firsthand account from Dr. Stone, she describes how she taught her class of nurses, all Christian women, each day following prayers and the hospital inspection. She says, “I take young native girls in their teens and give them a thorough course of training such as they would get in America,” which often meant translation of entire medical books from English into Chinese and vice versa.62 In keeping with the Stone doctors’ practice of unifying missionary and medical work, Mary Stone developed curricula for schools that combined Christian and Chinese teachings.63 According to her biographers, Dr. Stone’s teachings translated well into the actual practice of medicine at hospitals. A photograph of Miss T—, the head operating nurse, captioned

Harold Balme, China and Modern Medicine: A Study in Medical Missionary Development (London: United Council for Missionary Education, 1921) 146, https://archive.org/details/chinamodernmedic00balm; Shemo, The Chinese Medical Ministries of Kang Cheng and Shi Meiyu, 1872-1937, 182; Simpson and Foochow, “The Training of the Chinese Pupil Nurse,” 264-268. 59 Shemo, The Chinese Medical Ministries of Kang Cheng and Shi Meiyu, 1872-1937, 76. 60 Burton, Notable Women of Modern China, 190-191. 61 Perkins, A Glimpse of the Heart of China; Shemo, Chinese Medical Ministries, 142. 62 Burton, Notable Women of Modern China, 195-199. 63 Shemo, The Chinese Medical Ministries of Kang Cheng and Shi Meiyu, 1872-1937, 202.

98 “clever in handling instruments and foreseeing needs,” highlights her competency. The head operating nurse assisted Dr. Stone in the most challenging cases, and Dr. Stone performed surgeries with only the assistance of her nurses whereas an American surgeon would have required at least one other physician’s help. This was a result of Chinese people often waiting until their condition was severe to come to the hospital, a practice that was customary even among groups that fully trusted Dr. Mary Stone and the Danforth Memorial Hospital. At the hospital, the twenty nurses Mary Stone trained functioned as a well-organized unit. As she wrote in an article in "Hospital Economics," Mary Stone used her five most knowledgeable nurses to manage younger nurses, subdividing them into departments such as accounting, the dispensary, upstairs patients, downstairs patients, and the operating room.64 Perkins captions an image of the twenty nurses “that devoted band of Christians,” to emphasize their ties to missionary work; the nurses are all in uniform and lined up for the photograph, underscoring their professionalism and cohesion as a healthcare team. These same nurses who were assigned to different hospital departments also took on the responsibility of traveling on their own to treat patients—especially to deliver babies—since Dr. Stone had faith in all the nurses she trained, supporting her belief in the capabilities of Chinese women with a formal education.65 Thus, using ties to Western organizations and familiarity with Chinese opinions on nursing, but primarily relying on the abilities of Chinese women themselves, Dr. Mary Stone was able to build a nursing education program that served as the foundation of the modern-day Jiujiang University and Jiujiang Medical School. Drs. Mary and Phoebe Stone were raised by Protestant parents who ensured they were on a path to receive a Western medical education from early on. By blending Chinese roots with relationships formed in the United States, Mary Stone was instrumental in developing Western medicine in China by opening hospitals and schools, and Phoebe Stone followed in her footsteps some years later. Their work was inherently Christian, as they incorporated religious and missionary practices throughout their daily treatment of patients and training of nurses. Through these methods, coupled with their passion for providing medical care to Chinese women and children, the Stone doctors paved a path for Chinese women to enter the growing field of Western medicine and run hospitals. As evidenced by numerous firsthand accounts of the

64 65

Burton, Notable Women of Modern China, 198; Perkins, A Glimpse of the Heart of China, 61-67. Perkins, A Glimpse of the Heart of China.

99 tangible impacts on Chinese women nurses and patients, Mary and Phoebe Stone were pioneers in Western medicine. They delivered the highest level of care through surgeries and patient visits and embraced their role as leaders by training Christian Chinese women to practice medicine themselves.

100 Works Cited Balme, Harold. China and Modern Medicine: A Study in Medical Missionary Development. London: United Council for Missionary Education, 1921. Accessed October 13, 2020. https://archive.org/details/chinamodernmedic00balm. Burton, Margaret E. “Notable Women of Modern China.” The Project Gutenberg EBook, 2004. Accessed October 13, 2020. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/14492/14492-h/14492h.htm#Page_172. Carter, Perkins Edward. A Glimpse of the Heart of China. New York, NY: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1911. Accessed October 9, 2020. https://catalog.loc.gov/vwebv/search?searchCode=LCCN&searchArg=11029247&search Type=1&permalink=y. “Dr. Mary Stone--China's First Woman Doctor.” Millard's Review of the Far East (1919-1921), Aug 28, 1920. http://proxy.library.jhu.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/docview/1319896272?a ccountid=11752. Lian, Xi. Redeemed by Fire: The Rise of Popular Christianity in Modern China. Cumberland: Yale University Press, 2010. Accessed October 9, 2020. https://books.google.com/books?id=XmJwplZVK6EC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage &q&f=false. “Need for Women Doctors and Nurses in China.” Millard's Review of the Far East (1917-1919), Mar 16, 1918. http://proxy.library.jhu.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/docview/1326713869?a ccountid=11752. “Noted Chinese Women Doctors Manage Hospital here.” The China Weekly Review (19231950), Aug 23, 1924. http://proxy.library.jhu.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/docview/1319855861?a ccountid=11752. “NOTED CHINESE WOMAN DOCTOR'S TRIP.” The North - China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette (1870-1941), Oct 30, 1926. http://proxy.library.jhu.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/docview/1420007722?a ccountid=11752. Rockefeller Foundation. China Medical Commission. Medicine in China. New York: University of Chicago Press, 1914. Accessed October 13, 2020. https://archive.org/details/medicineinchina00rock/page/n7/mode/2up. Shemo, Connie Anne. The Chinese Medical Ministries of Kang Cheng and Shi Meiyu,

101 1872-1937: On a Cross-cultural Frontier of Gender, Race, and Nation. Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press, 2011. Accessed October 9, 2020. https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Chinese_Medical_Ministries_of_Kang_C/zo hVoj_Xq5MC?hl=en&gbpv=0. Tobin, James. “The New Women of China.” Medicine at Michigan (Ann Arbor), October 2010. Accessed October 13, 2020. http://www.medicineatmichigan.org/sites/default/files/archives/fall2010.pdf. Simpson, Cora E., and R. N. Foochow. “The Training of the Chinese Pupil Nurse.” The China Medical Journal / Medical Missionary Association of China 29, (1915): 264-268.

102

Section II Historical and Geopolitical Matters of the Twentieth Century

103

China’s Great Famine of 1958-1961: The Key Role of the Chinese Communist Party Elizabeth Chatpar Eating in Early Modern East Asia Professor SJ Zanolini December 15, 2021

104 The cause of China’s Great Famine of 1958 to 1961 is highly debated and of immense historical importance because of its high death toll and permanent impact. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the party in power and responsible during the Great Leap Forward, maintains that the main cause of the catastrophic Great Famine was not a result of government actions but rather the result of a series of serious weather events.1 However, new scholarship has emerged, largely based on oral histories, that argues that the Chinese Communist Party and its leader Mao Zedong are primarily responsible for inducing the famine. Often, these historians contend that the government caused the famine for one specific reason. For instance, in the book Mao’s Great Famine, Frank Dikötter asserts that the government’s poor management and destruction of land and real estate is the reason the famine occured. In an article titled “Communal Dining and the Chinese Famine of 1958–1961,” Chang and Wen indicate that the consumption irrationality caused by the government’s communal kitchens created the famine. These sources all indicate government culpability. Moreover, the new information suggests the government’s role in inducing the famine is multifactorial. While the Chinese Communist Party maintains that the source of the famine was natural and unavoidable, the Great Famine of 1958 to 1961 was man-made, caused directly by the actions of Mao and the Chinese Communist Party. Specifically, Party politics, the desire to shift away from agriculture towards industrialization, and the establishment of communal dining halls were the primary causes of this famine. The Chinese Communist Party’s politics played a key role in causing the Great Famine of 1958 to 1961. Government officials, the cadres, focused their efforts on proving Party loyalty rather than managing their provinces properly. An important example is the high incidence of falsely reporting grain stock and living conditions. According to Yang Jisheng in Tombstone, a comprehensive book on the Great Famine banned in mainland China for its criticism of the CCP’s role in the famine, "The Great Famine occurred within a system that produced incentives for local officials to exaggerate production."2,3 Cadres would inflate the reports of grain harvests to demonstrate the success of the newly introduced communal farming, thus showing Mao Zedong their commitment to the Great Leap Forward and his vision for China.4 The repeated and 1

Mao's Great Famine. Directed by Cabouat, Patrick. Filmakers Library, 2012. Jisheng Yang, Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-162, First (New York, N.Y., United States: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012), 323. 3 Ibid., 321. 4 Vaclav Smil, “China’s Great Famine: 40 Years Later,” BMJ : British Medical Journal 319, no. 7225 (December 18, 1999): 1619. 2

105 widespread misrepresentation of grain stock became known as the “wave of exaggeration.” Believing the exaggerated reports of prolific grain productivity, the CCP raised export requirements in those provinces, leading to subsequent shortages and contributing to deaths during the Great Famine. According to Lin and Yang, two provinces especially prove this causality: Guangdong and Jilin. In both provinces, cadres accurately reported the grain stock resulting in lower export burdens, and these provinces had the lowest death rates recorded during the Great Famine.5 Reporting an exaggerated grain stock was a significant contributing factor to the Great Famine as it led to unrealistic grain export quotas and subsequent grain shortages. Another important way that CCP politics induced the Great Famine was their focus on maintaining China’s image as a fully self-reliant communist nation because it affected the way the Party made decisions. This need for the appearance of self-reliance came from Mao’s desire to “challenge [Khruschev] for leadership in Asia and Africa.”6 In addition to challenging the Soviet Union as a world leader, Mao believed being self-reliant was a key way to demonstrate the superiority of Communism. One of the key ways that this self-reliance induced the famine was through his grain procurement policies. To project the image that Communism was the way to modernize a nation, and despite being unable to feed his own people, Mao used grain purchased from international sources to fulfill orders that they were unable to fill through their own domestic production.7 This action was taken specifically to maintain the image that China was a strong Communist nation and to ward off any Western nations from thinking that China was weak. At the time, the President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, is quoted as saying that “we have no indication from the Chinese Communists that they would welcome any offer of food.”8 Thus, other countries and humanitarian organizations did not attempt to assist China because of the government’s reluctance to accept help. Despite a pre-existing food shortage already developing in rural China prior to the Great Famine, Mao Zedong continued grain exports to maintain China's image of strength, and this policy decision also contributed to the start of the famine.

Justin Yifu Lin and Dennis Tao Yang, “On the Causes of China’s Agricultural Crisis and the Great Leap Famine,” China Economic Review, China’s Great Famine, 9, no. 2 (September 1, 1998): 133. 6 Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958-1962, 113. 7 Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine, 112-113. 8 Ibid., 114.

106 Even with the increasing push towards centralization, the CCP actively shirked its responsibility to the provinces, which also contributed to the start of the Great Famine. According to the 2012 film “Mao’s Great Famine,” on March 25, 1959, Mao said, “it is better to let half of the people die so that the other half can have their fill.”9 At this time, the famine had not yet begun. In this statement, Mao implies that there will not be enough food to feed all citizens.10 Furthermore, Peng Zhan, the Secretary of the Central Committee Secretariat, said, “The dead in each province are the problem of that province, but deaths in Beijing are a problem for the People’s Republic Of China (PRC)."11 Here, Zhan succinctly explains how the CCP viewed deaths in the provinces, namely that they were less significant than those in cities, like Beijing, the CCP stronghold. As Yang Jisheng indicates in Tombstone, the CCP blamed the province cadres for falsifying grain stock records, even though the CCP rewarded them for doing so by praising them and displaying them as model provinces. Therefore, the CCP failed to accept responsibility for their actions in causing a grain shortage that led to the Great Famine. The CCP’s shift away from agriculture and towards industrialization was another key action that directly contributed to the start of the Great Famine. Between the diversion of resources away from rural China towards cities and the decline in production efficiency, the shift towards industrialization as proscribed by Mao Zedong led to the Great Famine because it dismantled the social structure in rural China. Mao Zedong made the decision to divert resources away from agricultural areas of China. Mao thought that too much of the countryside was dedicated to farming and that some of it could be industrialized, saying that “people in China on average cultivate three mu, but I think that two mu is enough."12 He believed reducing the amount of area farmed and using that area for industry instead would benefit the country. However, he was largely unaware of the falsified reporting at the provincial level. Specifically, according to Frank Dikötter in Mao’s Great Famine, an issue with the command economy was that “officials on the ground did not always know what they were doing, and they imposed decisions which turned out to be disastrous.”13 Thus, the

Mao's Great Famine. Directed by Cabouat, Patrick. Filmakers Library, 2012. Ibid. 11 Yang, Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-162, 336. 12 Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine, 136. 13 Ibid., 135. 10

107 declaration that two mu is enough to farm was largely uninformed, resulting in a decision that was not conducive to increasing the amount of food produced by the country. In addition to the change in the amount of space to farm, Mao also proscribed changes in the proportion of grains grown. These modifications in grain production came mainly from the aforementioned “wave of exaggeration.”14 Because grain stock seemed to be at an all-time high, Mao advocated for the reduction of growing fine grains like rice, which were time- and landintensive to grow and perceived to be in surplus. Instead, he ordered an increase in the farming of sweet potatoes, which were known to be easy to cultivate.15 The exaggeration of fine grain productivity compounded by the reduction in land allocated to its farming resulted in almost all of the fine grain produced in the countryside being exported to the cities to meet the governmental export quotas and feed the urban residents. Farmers were left with mainly sweet potatoes, which were considered a "poor man's food" that people were reluctant to eat.16 It is evident that Mao’s policy that reduced the growing of fine grains and increased the export to the cities led to a grain shortage in rural China and contributed to the start of the Great Famine, leaving rural China as the area hardest hit. Not only did the export of grain to cities lead to the grain shortage in rural China, it also led to a significant amount of grain waste. Cities often bought more grain than they needed and then had to sell and transport it back to the countryside, causing a significant amount of grain spoilage and further exacerbating the loss of grain in rural areas.17 This practice created a deficit that naturally contributed to the Great Famine since any surplus grain was wasted. Not only did agriculture suffer under state control, but also the fishing industry. The fishing industry was heavily impacted because equipment was confiscated or poorly maintained when the state took control of it shortly before the Great Famine.18 This intrusion led to fishermen leaving the industry, resulting in the loss of fish as a reliable main food source for many Chinese. The decline in agricultural production efficiency during the late 1950s caused by the shift to industrialization led to a significant reduction in actual food production, further contributing to

Lin and Yang, “On the Causes of China’s Agricultural Crisis and the Great Leap Famine,” 129. Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine, 137. 16 Ibid., 127. 17 Yang, Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-162, 322. 18 Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine, 143. 15

108 the Great Famine. Industrialization drew male workers from the countryside to the cities to work on steel and irrigation projects, leaving women, children, and the elderly to take care of the crops, leading to a 20-30% reduction in harvesting because there simply was not enough labor.19 Furthermore, the development of communes by the CCP caused a compounding decline in production efficiency. Peasants largely wanted to remain independent and not be collectivized, but they were forced into the commune system with no ability to opt out. As a result, there was little motivation to support the system.20 In addition, these communes were often poorly managed, or too large to be managed effectively at all, leading to a tremendous amount of inefficiency, further reducing the amount of food output.21 The decline in production efficiency and the diversion of resources away from agriculture in favor of industrialization disrupted the social structure and led to grain shortage. The greatest contributing factor to the Great Famine was the CCP’s establishment of communal dining halls because of their structure, poor management by the cadres, and inefficient consumption by the system. According to Chang and Wen, who study food availability and consumption efficiency, the amount of grain available in China in 1958 and 1959 were 20% and 13%, respectively, above the benchmark value China needed to sustain itself.22 This study indicates that food availability decline (FAD) was not, in fact, a primary cause of the famine because it began in 1959, and there was a surplus of grain that year. Instead, the famine began despite a grain shortage due to the aforementioned poor management of grain stock. Xue Muqiao, a Chinese economist and politician, estimated that the waste of food in the communal dining system accounted for 11% of the grain output in 1959, which can be attributed to the structure of the kitchen system itself.23,24 While there was not a decrease in the amount of grain actually available, there were misrepresentations of how much grain was available and where it was going in terms of local distribution to cities and international export. In addition to these disruptions to availability, the change in distribution was amplified by the development of the communal kitchens. Chang and

Yang, Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-162, 330. Lin and Yang, “On the Causes of China’s Agricultural Crisis and the Great Leap Famine,” 128. 21 Ibid. 22 Gene Hsin Chang and Guanzhong James Wen, “Food Availability versus Consumption Efficiency: Causes of the Chinese Famine,” China Economic Review, China’s Great Famine, 9, no. 2 (September 1, 1998): 159. 23 John Gittings, “Xue Muqiao,” The Guardian, August 16, 2005, sec. World news. 24 Chang and Wen, “Food Availability versus Consumption Efficiency: Causes of the Chinese Famine,” 163. 20

109 Wen note the appearance of communal kitchens in 1958 are coincident with the start of the famine, suggesting causality.25 After abolishing communal dining in 1961, the Great Famine ended in early 1962, further supporting that communal kitchens were a significant contributor to the Great Famine.26 The communal kitchens opened in the summer and the fall of 1958 and closed in the summer of 1961.27 In the fall of 1958 alone, the CCP established 2.65 million communal dining halls in rural China under the premise of increasing peasant productivity.28 However, the communal kitchens ultimately became a way to control the commune members, leading to resistance and peasants ultimately not wanting to participate in the dining hall system.29 In 1958, Liu Shaoqi, the Vice Chairman of the CCP, promoted the communal kitchens as a way to reduce the number of people cooking, thus increasing the amount of people available to work in other occupations.30,31 In addition, centralization theoretically allowed for a ten hour work day, further increasing productivity. The communal use of grain was also justified as a way to save grain; however, the longer work days led to people needing more food because they were engaged in heavy labor.32,33 As a result, the food did not last as long as the CCP leaders expected.34,35 Besides the structure of the communal dining system itself, the cadres themselves also made a significant contribution to the start of the Great Famine. Because of their desire to prove their loyalty to the CCP and the Great Leap Forward, the cadres did not feel comfortable reporting the issues they were having managing their kitchens and allowed their kitchens to suffer to look successful to the CCP.36 When Mao was informed by his aides that cadres did not feel comfortable disclosing their issues to Party leaders, he realized that the kitchens were being poorly run, but instead of investigating why they were being poorly run, he urged the “purging of

Chang and Wen, “Food Availability versus Consumption Efficiency: Causes of the Chinese Famine,” 163. Ibid. 27 Yang, Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-162, 174. 28 Chang and Wen, “Communal Dining and the Chinese Famine of 1958–1961,” 4. 29 Ibid., 177. 30 Yang, Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-162, 176. 31 “Liu Shaoqi | Chinese Statesman | Britannica,” accessed December 11, 2021, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Liu-Shaoqi. 32 Yang, Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-162, 177. 33 Chang and Wen, “Communal Dining and the Chinese Famine of 1958–1961,” 20. 34 Yang, Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-162, 177. 35 Chang and Wen, “Communal Dining and the Chinese Famine of 1958–1961,” 20. 36 Yang, Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-162, 181. 26

110 all ‘scoundrels’ within them.”37 Instead of helping with their predicament, the CCP further alienated cadres, leading to further mismanagement due to fears of being branded as disloyal to the Party and its ideals, including the communal kitchens.38 Ultimately, in June 1959, after more pressure from his aides, Mao suggested the following changes to the communal dining system: allocation based on individuals, distribution to households, voluntary participation and surplus returned to the individual.39 Unfortunately, none of these solutions worked, and the system remained flawed because of the cadres’ continued poor management. Another way that the cadres contributed to the start of the Great Famine was by poor management of the work points system. According to the film “Mao’s Great Famine,” some communes abolished money, and food was distributed based on merit and how hard you worked.40 Thus, if a person did not work, they could not get work points and were unable to buy food from the communal kitchen.41 This system made life miserable for all people except the cadres, who “lived well” according to Li Po, a Sichuan province resident who was a child during the Great Leap Forward.42 Furthermore, cadres were known to get preferential treatment by the communal kitchens and feasted on delicacies like meat and wine when they wanted to, even during the height of the famine. It was also within their power to deprive specific individuals of food should they wish to do so.43 The deception exhibited by the cadres’ in their desire to demonstrate loyalty and success to Mao as well as their poor management of the communal dining system were both factors specifically related to the communal dining system that contributed to the start of the Great Famine. Poor management by the cadres not only resulted in the aforementioned effects, but also led to consumption inefficiency. Shortly after the communal kitchens were founded, the dining halls were decorated with slogans such as “Open your stomach, eat as much as you wish, and work hard for socialism.’’44 Chang and Wen write about this time, ‘‘in their delirious joy, peasants stuffed themselves with vast amounts of pork flesh, each peasant eating and carousing,

Yang, Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-162, 191. Ibid., 182. 39 Ibid., 181. 40 Mao's Great Famine. Directed by Cabouat, Patrick. Filmakers Library, 2012. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Chang and Wen, “Communal Dining and the Chinese Famine of 1958–1961,” 21. 44 Ibid., 4. 38

111 “Why save? The government will provide. This is communism.’’45 Because of this attitude, which was encouraged by the slogans themselves, by the end of 1958, there were food shortages nearly everywhere, even in places like Sichuan province, where there was a bumper harvest that year.46 Similarly, commune members would eat more than they needed to, leading to a 3-month food supply being consumed within only 2 weeks in some places, indicating the kitchens were associated with consumption inefficiency that did not previously exist in rural China.47 This overeating had two main causes: peasants had not previously had the luxury of having seemingly endless amounts of food, and they were worried simultaneously about not getting their fill.48,49 Ultimately, many communal kitchens closed because they ran out of food, and since all pots, pans, livestock, and grain were collected from individual households and given to the communal kitchen, no one had anything to eat or any means to prepare food for themselves.50 As a result, the communal kitchens actually contributed to the start of the Great Famine because people were unable to manage their own food supply, leading to consumption inefficiency, which in turn caused many places to run out of food entirely. The cause of the Chinese Great Famine of 1958 to 1961 is still hotly debated around the world. To this day, the Chinese Communist Party maintains that weather was the cause of the Great Famine. Historian and policy analyst Vaclav Smil succinctly explains why this is not a possible explanation, writing, “Weather only exacerbated the suffering. Official accounts still blame the natural catastrophes for the suffering - but China's own statistics belie this explanation. Undoubtedly, the drought of 1960-1961 would have lowered grain supply in the worst affected provinces, but by itself it would have caused only a small fraction of the eventual nationwide death toll.”51

The extensive evidence summarized here refutes the CCP’s argument that weather was the sole cause of the famine. While weather certainly may have been a contributing factor, the role of the government was multifactorial and allowed the Great Famine to occur. Incompetent, corrupt local management coupled with poor national policy decisions like communal kitchens and the move away from agriculture to industrialization led to the social disruption that resulted in the 45

Chang and Wen, “Communal Dining and the Chinese Famine of 1958–1961,” 4. Ibid. 47 Chang and Wen, “Communal Dining and the Chinese Famine of 1958–1961,” 163. 48 Yang, Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-162, 189. 49 Chang and Wen, “Food Availability versus Consumption Efficiency: Causes of the Chinese Famine,” 163. 50 Yang, Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-162, 179. 51 Vaclav Smil, “China’s Great Famine: 40 Years Later.” 46

112 ‘perfect storm’ and the death of over 40 million people.52 It is important to examine carefully the true causes of the Great Famine, not only to address accountability, but also to prevent similar disasters in the future.

Vaclav Smil, “China’s Great Famine: 40 Years Later.”

113 Bibliography Cabouat, Patrick., and Arturo Mio. Mao's Great Famine. New York, NY: Filmakers Library, 2012. Chang, Gene Hsin, and Guanzhong James Wen. “Communal Dining and the Chinese Famine of 1958–1961.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 46, no. 1 (1997): 1–34. https://doi.org/10.1086/452319. Chang, Gene Hsin, and Guanzhong James Wen. “Food Availability versus Consumption Efficiency: Causes of the Chinese Famine.” China Economic Review, China’s Great Famine, 9, no. 2 (September 1, 1998): 157–65. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1043-951X(99)80012-1. Dikötter, Frank. Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958-1962. First. New York, N.Y., United States: Walker & Co., 2010. Gale Johnson, D. “China’s Great Famine: Introductory Remarks.” China Economic Review, China’s Great Famine, 9, no. 2 (September 1, 1998): 103–9. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1043-951X(99)80008-X. Gittings, John. “Xue Muqiao.” The Guardian, August 16, 2005, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.com/news/2005/aug/17/guardianobituaries.china. Kung, James Kai-sing, and Justin Yifu Lin. “The Causes of China’s Great Leap Famine, 1959–1961.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 52, no. 1 (October 1, 2003): 51–73. https://doi.org/10.1086/380584. Lin, Justin Yifu, and Dennis Tao Yang. “On the Causes of China’s Agricultural Crisis and the Great Leap Famine.” China Economic Review, China’s Great Famine, 9, no. 2 (September 1, 1998): 125–40. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1043-951X(99)80010-8. “Liu Shaoqi | Chinese Statesman | Britannica.” Accessed December 11, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Liu-Shaoqi. Mallory, Walter H. “Famines in China.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 152 (1930): 89–98. Smil, Vaclav. “China’s Great Famine: 40 Years Later.” BMJ : British Medical Journal 319, no. 7225 (December 18, 1999): 1619–21. Wu, Yiching Wu. The Cultural Revolution at the Margins: Chinese Socialism in Crisis. Cambridge, UNITED STATES: Harvard University Press, 2014. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/jhu/detail.action?docID=3301467. Yang, Jisheng. Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-162. First. New York, N.Y.,

114 United States: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012. Zhou, Xun. “‘Kitchen Knowledge’, Desperate Foods, and Ritual Healing in Everyday Survival Strategies during the Great Famine in China, 1958–62.” Asian Medicine 7 (January 20, 2012): 384–404. https://doi.org/10.1163/15734218-12341258.

115

Cornerstone for Containment and Security in Asia-Pacific: A Comparative Brief on U.S. Presence in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan’s Post-War Industrialization and Democratization Qiqin Sun Politics of East Asia Professor Erin Aeran Chung Fall 2021

116 I.

Introduction Dramatic changes after World War II appeared in a wide range of global affairs. The two

major alliance networks fabricated by the U.S. and Soviet Union generated lasting impacts on the world order. For decades, the U.S. alliance network in East Asia has utilized its role as a frontline for the U.S. to exert influence and restrict any threats to the current regional order. Nevertheless, this network was not consolidated immediately after WWII, as huge uncertainties overcame the regional order in East Asia. Since the late 1940s, when a total division between the Soviet Union and the West was ongoing yet gradual, the U.S. had enacted a series of foreign policies aimed at empowering potential allies in East Asia without provoking direct conflicts with the Soviet side. These foreign policies transformed diplomatic principles and underwent further changes due to the full-scale tensions caused by the Korean War, for the purpose of strengthening the regimes in its sphere of influence. Consequently, the U.S. played a great role in the political-economic development of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. This historical context is central to understanding U.S. interventionism in East Asia throughout the decades. The emerging voice in the U.S. administration on countering Soviet expansionism increased the risk of uncontrollable deterioration in the potential allies of the U.S. that would be less resilient to unrest. The urgent need for modernizing and improving the economic and military capacities of these brittle polities after WWII came to the forefront. Then, while Cold War tensions worldwide further stimulated the realist intentions in foreign policies, the rapidly changing context of global security also led to differences in U.S. concerns over time. Thus, considering the implications of containment strategy with a mobile chronological hint would be necessary for an effective examination of U.S. policies in different stages after WWII. Previous works of academia since the 1950s provide insight into the causes and consequences of U.S. intervention in East Asia. Such documentations, revelations, and evaluations of U.S. foreign policies are plentiful. This paper focuses on both reviewing these analyses and evaluating U.S. postwar policies. This short review spotlights how the U.S. facilitated industrialization and economic growth in these three regions, how the U.S. contributed to vastly different agendas and extents of democratization, and how certain limits and deviations occurred following the changing global security context. Given that Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan were all initially vulnerable to Soviet military threats and alliances with the U.S. were

117 likely necessary, this paper assumes that the U.S. was capable of directly propelling its preferred agendas even at the expense of these polities’ independent interests, though the U.S. had not often utilized that power. II.

U.S. Policies Toward East Asian Industrialization The diplomatic philosophy of economic support arose from the system agreed upon by

the Allies at the Yalta Summit. Known as the Marshall Plan, the U.S. Congress approved an economic aid program to help Western European countries restore economic capacities. The plan was a response to fear of Soviet westward expansion and influence after the USSR captured new satellites in Eastern Europe. Likewise, in the U.S. sphere of influence in East Asia, a number of barriers to economic development existed in the late 1940s, when military conflicts and colonial legacies trampled economic conditions. Typical obstacles to recovery and (re-)development included: the damage of industrial and urban facilities in Japan, the “largely agricultural” status of South Korea,1 and the hyperinflation in Taiwan due to irrational offerings of public debts and huge budget deficits.2 Without improvements to these situations, this frontline of the Western sphere could be readily crushed by hostile forces. As a result, the U.S. took huge steps to assist economic growth in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Policies consisted of financial, material, commercial, and political support. Direct economic aid and other forms of capital flow from the U.S. played an important role in reconstructing the allies’ economies and enabling the implementation of industrial policies. Moreover, U.S. economic aid and military assistance strengthened their defensive forces. In Taiwan, after the outbreak of the Korean War, the U.S. immediately initiated commodity aid programs to ease the financial chaos of the Republic of China (ROC) regime, which reached 10% of Taiwan’s GNP in 1951. Furthermore, the U.S. allowed Taiwan to sell these goods for revenue to reduce its budget deficit and halt hyperinflation.3 Such aid continued in the 1950s and served more than just to restore the market order—the prerequisite of

Tom Lansford, “Korea,” in Political Handbook of the World 2013, ed. Tom Lansford (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Inc.), 771-73. 2 Tsong-min Wu, “Taiwan’s Hyperinflation: 1945-1950,” Bulletin of Academia Historica 10 (December 2006): 155. 3 Gail E. Makinen and G. Thomas Woodward, “The Taiwanese Hyperinflation and Stabilization of 1945-1952,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 21, no. 1 (1989): 95, https://doi.org/10.2307/1992580.

118 industrialization—but also urged the growth of export-oriented industrial sectors by lowering “industrial production costs.”4 This aid diminished the chaos in Taiwan’s financial sector and paved the way for further development. Later, when tensions in the Taiwan Strait eased and Taiwan’s economy settled, U.S. assistance focused on commercial interactions. In the 1960s, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Taiwan consisted almost completely of accelerated funding from U.S. firms. Growing business opportunities led by U.S. offshoring in Taiwan also helped capture the inflows of more Japanese investments in the 1970s.5 The inflows of FDI improved the factor endowments for the development of Taiwan’s light industry and created the basis of economic capacities for Taiwan to search for its niche in the global trade network of capital- and knowledge-intensive products. Similarly, U.S. aid played a crucial role in sustaining industrial development in war-torn South Korea after 1953. By 1973, the U.S. had granted “a total of $11 billion”—the second largest value of U.S. assistance to a single country—to South Korea for the sake of “wideranging areas from defense to economic development.”6 In addition to dealing with the stress of defending against North Korea, it was difficult for South Korean citizens to maintain basic living standards without international humanitarian aid. Some other rehabilitation programs offered by the U.S. and UN also contributed to efforts to combat the stagnation of economic growth in South Korea. The United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) put forth a wide range of investment-based assistance with the goal to help repair and upgrade the infrastructures in South Korea after 1953.7 One scholar also praised the U.S.-funded education programs for the provision of “technical training” and supplying South Korea with a multitude of knowledgeable technocrats who played huge roles in both the Rhee and Park administrations.8 In Japan, U.S. aid played a similar, yet minor, role compared to its role in Taiwan and South Korea. From 1946 to 1952, the U.S. invested “$2.2 billion… in Japan’s reconstruction

Howard Yan, “Analysis of Taiwanese Economic History and Policies,” Berkeley Economic Review, accessed December 11, 2021, https://econreview.berkeley.edu/analysis-of-taiwanese-economic-history-and-policies/. 5 Minhua Chiang and Bernard Gerbier, “Foreign factors in Taiwan's economic transformation,” Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy 15, no. 2, (2010): 152-53, https://doi.org/10.1080/13547861003700182. 6 Sungjoo Han, “South Korea and the United States: The Alliance Survives,” Asian Survey 20, no. 11 (1980): 1075– 76, https://doi.org/10.2307/2643910. 7 Gene M. Lyons, “American Policy and the United Nations’ Program for Korean Reconstruction,” International Organization 12, no. 2 (1958): 191. 8 Michael J. Seth, “An Unpromising Recovery South Korea’s Post-Korean War Economic Development: 19531961,” Education About Asia 18, no. 3 (2013): 44.

119 effort,”9 a significant amount but not as much as in other vulnerable regions. This difference could be partly attributed to Japan’s more developed industrial foundations and SCAP’s task of disabling any economic support for militarism in Japan. At the same time, trade served as another key to the rehabilitation of the Japanese economy. Sidney W. Souers was one of those who had foreseen Japan’s potential for economic growth in its pre-existing industry through recovered trade.10 The turning point came when the Japanese industrial basis had distinguished itself from other Asian economies by embracing chances in the Korean War. Purchases by the U.S. had stimulated the demand for Japanese outputs despite Japan’s shrinking domestic market. As one scholar noted at that time, although these benefits were unequally distributed among industrial leaders and civilians and induced some unintended side effects, increasing industrial production and revival of exports to the U.S. brought considerable gains to the Japanese economy by effectively combating recession and restoring the production capacities for lasting growth.11 Trade hence became the driving force of the Japanese economy after recovery from wartime damages. Another common feature of U.S. presence in East Asian industrialization was selective political support in terms of the tolerance of protectionist behaviors, contradictory to the liberal principles backed by the U.S. The rapid economic growth and exporting capability of these East Asian economies in labor-extensive sectors might easily have resulted in bilateral trade imbalances if trade restrictions and exchange controls were adopted unilaterally by these new economic powers. However, the U.S. accepted many of their export-promoting practices, despite being perilous to U.S. interests. For example, in Taiwan, typical acquiesced efforts by the U.S. included managing the exchange rate, long-term export-favoring investment, and import restrictions.12 Likewise, the U.S. continued to fund South Korea during the period of industrial policy13 and tolerated bureaucratic intervention in financial decisions by banks. According to some developmental state intellectuals, such practices might have helped fuel the Japanese 9

Patrick Christy, “America's Proud History of Post-War Aid,” U.S. NEWS, June 6, 2014. Sidney W. Souers, “Recommendations with Respect to US Policy toward Japan (NSC13/2),” Harry S. Truman Library Documents, Record of the National Security, Committee-Meetings <Sheet No. TRUMAN-4847>, October 7, 1948. 11 Saburo Okita, “Japan’s Economy and the Korean War,” Far Eastern Survey 20, no. 14 (1951): 142, https://doi.org/10.2307/3024219. 12 Douglas Irwin, “How Economic Ideas Led to Taiwan’s Shift to Export Promotion in the 1950s,” NBER Working Paper 29298 (August 2021): 18-20, https://doi.org/10.3386/w29298. 13 Meredith Woo-Cumings, “South Korean Anti-Americanism,” Japan Policy Research Institute Working Paper 93 (2003).

120 export boom. Professor Chalmers Johnson was one of those who accredited the miracle in Japan to “administrative guidance,” in his famous publication about the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.14 In turn, the export-oriented growth in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan created the astounding East Asian Miracle. One remarkable difference in U.S. policy toward East Asian industrialization among Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan was the U.S.’ role in shaping their business patterns. Due to realistic concerns, the U.S. allowed corporate giants such as Keiretsu and Chaebols to survive and become the subjects of industrialization in Japan and South Korea, while it pressured the ROC regime to boost small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to align with U.S. economic ideology.15 This situation indicated the U.S.’ flexibility in its foreign policy and occasional tendency to concede its ideology to other initiatives. These characteristics of U.S. policy will be spotlighted more in the discussion of democratization in East Asia. In summary, the industrialization processes of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan exhibited the significance of U.S. participation in the expansion of industrial capacity and export sectors. The rapid establishment of the industrial foundations was the first and one of the most important steps that altered their developmental statuses. III.

U.S. Promotion of Democratic Institutions in East Asia Practicing true democracy—and the often attached doctrine of freedom—was an

idealistic symbol tightly grasped by Western countries. In the 1940s, however, true democracy was unprecedented in East Asia. The Charter of the United Nations, the enactment of which was actively facilitated by the U.S., openly included the goal to realize “respect…for fundamental freedom” in Article 1. Additionally, Winston Churchill, known for his anti-Soviet stance, impelled a steadier insistence on several democratic practices, such as “free unfettered elections,” which he claimed to be universal rights of all nations in his so-called “Iron Curtain Speech.”

Chalmers Johnson, “A Japanese Model?,” in MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1982), 305-24. 15 Yun-han Chu and Jih-wen Lin, “Political Development in 20th-Century Taiwan: State-Building, Regime Transformation and the Construction of National Identity,” The China Quarterly 165 (2001): 117-18, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0009443901000067.

121 Fostering democratization within the sphere of influence of the U.S. was essential to prevent the formation of Soviet-style totalitarian Communist regimes and secure its influence on newly decolonized lands. Theoretically, the U.S. might have been an active advocate for democratization in its sphere of influence in East Asia. The role of the U.S. in the democratization process, however, was more cautious and intricate—sometimes even regressive. For clarity, further discussion would distinguish between de facto policies and indirect roles of the U.S. in the post-war East Asian democratic movements, and interpret the contradictions in terms of security. First, the U.S. government determined the methodology of promoting democratic institutions country-by-country. On the one hand, the occupation forces in Japan aimed at a “topdown” democratic reform to wipe out the imperialist legacies in wartime Japan. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) mandated a list of radical reforms, including a thorough amendment to the constitution. Such amendments established the ground for civil rights struggles and democratic institutions in postwar Japan by a group of ambitious Western intellectuals.16 Moreover, the Tokyo Trials and purges of military-related personnel removed potential supporters of militarism from the government and economic systems and were predominantly ruled by SCAP, all as part of its effort to prevent the revival of Japanese militarism and imperialism.17 On the other hand, the U.S. acknowledged authoritarian regimes in South Korea and Taiwan as allied forces to serve more emergent needs of security. After 1946, the U.S. shaped an oppressive right-wing government in South Korea and helped train the police forces, who were used to suppress peasant and leftist movements in South Korea.18 The suppressive activities undertaken by South Korean officials were cruel and weakened the core values of freedom and humanitarianism in a true democracy. Widely-known regressions, ranging from anti-democratic amendments to the constitution to the use of violence against civil protests, were left unchallenged and contributed to South Korean political decay and ultimately benefited the military dictatorship. Simultaneously, the U.S. also chose to neglect the operation of martial law 16

Alex Gibney, The Pacific Century, narrated by Peter Coyote (1992; Annenberg: CPB Collection, 2016), https://www.pacificcentury.org/videos. 17 John W. Dower, “Gifts from Heaven,” in Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), 74-76. 18 Bruce Cumings, “The Passions, 1945-1948,” in Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), 199-201.

122 as well as the massive political censorship and persecution in Taiwan, simply for the purpose of maintaining political stability after the outbreak of the Cold War. The preservation of the unjust rule of Chiang Kai-shek at the time satisfied the interests of the U.S. by preventing the spread of influence of Communist China outside the First Island Chain. Conspicuously, such a realist dedication to an anti-Communist front has pushed the U.S. government to deviate from its acclaimed principles of democracy. The U.S. banned or restricted suspicious “communist” or “socialist” activities that the Soviet Union might take advantage of in these nations, even in the case of Japan. Instead of rooting out the conservative hindrance to progressive social dynamics, SCAP reversed its reformative efforts in many aspects. For instance, SCAP unpopularly restricted labor union movements in order to prevent Soviet influence.19 Increasing ties with the conservative bureaucrat-politicians serving in the pre-war period also facilitated the recovery of conservative powers in the parliamentary branches. It was unsurprising that the merger of the dominant conservative party with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) could be attested to the “reverse course”—a set of reverses in SCAP policies bringing back the right of rearmament to Japan, decelerating purges of pre-war conservative professional politicians, and eliminating chances for communist penetrations. Such changes marginalized the anti-militarization faction led by Shigeru Yoshida and solidified the power held by the conservative wing.20 The merger had created a long period of conservative one-party domination that undermined the importance of political competition and hindered many progressive agendas due to the LDP’s monopoly over legislative power in the National Diet. In general, the democratic doctrines of the U.S. sometimes conceded to the regressive demands of its containment policy by favoring authoritarian or extremely conservative regimes and oppressing emerging progressive forces. Nonetheless, the U.S. possessed both visible connections and occasional coordination with the various networks of pro-democracy resistance movements in East Asia, so as to prohibit the formation of absolute authority in its allies. Such a balancing strategy was clear in the U.S.’ foreign policies toward South Korea and Taiwan through the provision of refuge and channels

William T. Moran, “Labor Unions in Postwar Japan,” Far Eastern Survey 18, no. 21 (1949): 246–48, https://doi.org/10.2307/3024155. 20 Yong Wook Lee, “THE ORIGIN OF ONE PARTY DOMINATION: AMERICA’S REVERSE COURSE AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN JAPAN,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs 18, no. 2 (2004): 401.

123 for open communication. One well-known and ultimately influential instance of political refuge was when the U.S. had secretly negotiated with the South Korean government to rescue Kim Dae-Jung, who emerged as an important figure in South Korean democratization.21, 22 Such political refuge was also common in Taiwan’s localist protests, combining separationist and democratic ideals. Some key institutions, such as The United Formosans in America for Independence, and individuals, such as veteran democratic activist Peng Ming-min, had fled to the U.S. and continued their activities to appeal for external support. The survival of these entities generated visible influences on ambitious teenagers in their homeland when many of these individuals ultimately managed to symbolize the victory against authoritarian regimes. Additionally, U.S. politicians displayed interests in developing cooperative relations with the civil network of resistance and democratization. One event showing the strength of such ties was a hearing for martial law in the U.S. Congress,23 which denoted the existence of U.S. concerns about democratization in Taiwan, though pressurization and enforcement were restricted. In some cases, declarations and open claims by U.S. officials might have also catalyzed—yet not directly resulted in—civil society to push for social changes in East Asia. The State Department once had done so by aligning with the demonstrating public aiming to end the Rhee administration.24 From a concise review of U.S. engagement in East Asian democratization, some general patterns are observable. Most notably, the U.S. government prioritized security interests in East Asia, rather than ideological pursuits, when under external threats. Second, democratic principles still constituted part of the core values of U.S. foreign policies, especially after the internal crises of the Soviet Union emerged. Third, the policies adopted by the U.S. incorporated both continuations and modifications of its allies’ practice of adapting to the changing needs of security and ideology. Fourth, the U.S. had advocated and been involved in the formation of standard democratic organs in all three regimes (if the KMT regime in Taiwan could be viewed as an extension to its rule in mainland China), which partially enabled civil society to access 21

Henry Scott Stokes, “Kim Dae Jung Arrives in U.S. after Being Freed by South Korea,” The New York Times, December 24, 1982. 22 Donald A. Ranard, “Kim Dae Jung's Close Call: A Tale of Three Dissidents,” The Washington Post, February 23, 2003. 23 Richard C. Bush, “Congress Gets into the Taiwan Human Rights Act,” in At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations since 1942 (New York: M.E. Shape, 2004): 201. 24 John Kie-Chiang Oh, “Role of the United States in South Korea’s Democratization,” Pacific Affairs 42, no. 2 (1969): 168-69, https://doi.org/10.2307/2754396.

124 political bargaining through institutional frameworks and enlightened the public on the future possibilities of an effective democracy. IV.

Delineating the Restraints to Eternal Development While U.S. presence granted the prerequisites for political-economic development in

post-war Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, such external support was not omnipotent nor everlasting. Two facts could explain how U.S. foreign policy in East Asia might have slightly hindered its allies’ long-term development. One is that foreign policies could not replace domestic policies in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, and often failed to respond to social dynamics in East Asia. The other is that foreign policies functioned based on the needs of the U.S., instead of universal generosity. In some cases, during Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan’s pursuit of their own economic interests, U.S. attitudes were disappointing. For example, Western creditors, including the U.S. and organizations like the World Bank, refused to invest in the operation of Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO)—a state-owned enterprise that pioneered in Park Chung-Hee’s industrial construction plan and turned out to be a huge success due to the expected efficiencies of a state-owned project.25 The U.S. ultimately identified the booming exports of Japan as a threat to its own economic security and directly restricted bilateral trade with Japan. Support from the U.S. vastly diminished once its allies’ developmental statuses proceeded beyond basic standards of ensuring security. Another perilous economic issue was the export-oriented patterns of growth. Due to the patterns of FDI and policy assistance offered by the U.S., a large portion of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan’s national income relied on export revenue as the sizes of their domestic markets could hardly digest the current levels of output. A geopolitical implication of this issue was that their reliance on mainland China’s growing market coincided with the returning focus of the U.S. to Asia Pacific and obscured the rationality of their strategic positions amid U.S.-China tensions. This puzzle of choices for the U.S.’ East Asian allies might directly influence security and economic interests in the future.

Ha-Joon Chang, “Governments can pick winners,” in 23 Things They Don't Tell You about Capitalism (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Press, 2010), 127-28.

125 The U.S.’ role in shaping business structures in East Asia stimulated debates on whether state intervention in the domestic market was beneficial. As the U.S. pressured the ROC government to dismiss most monopolies or corporate giants in Taiwan, tax incentives rather than government-led private loans played a central role in Taiwan’s industrial policies and prevented the accumulation of nonperforming loans (NPLs), unlike the cases in South Korea and Japan.26 Hence, the collusive relationship between large corporations and the government in the financial sector was criticized for irrational offerings and raising the risk of a financial crisis, against the view of many developmental state intellectuals who emphasized the government’s role in economic coordination. Although this paper has already presented some outcomes of U.S. intervention in the democratic development of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, it would be helpful to also outline the secondary consequences of the pre-existing political patterns that were largely shaped by complex U.S. actions in these East Asian polities. Nowadays, Western scholars still criticize the performance of social justice in East Asia. Importantly, such critics argue that institutional frameworks might not naturally bring about a set of positive changes toward any universality of kindness. For example, Dr. Erin Chung pointed out the common phenomena of discrimination over immigrants, emphasis on ethnic homogeneity in immigration policies, and the rejection of “multiculturalism” when embracing immigrants in public life in her comparative study of the immigration politics of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.27 Thus, some progressive values emphasizing esteem, openness, and equality were not natural outcomes of the political systems pushed by the U.S., but rather are growing in the continuous transformations of thoughts in the wake of East Asian people’s social awareness and ambitions to realize universal merit. Abuse of corporate influence was also a common secondary drawback caused by the state-corporate collusion in East Asia. Cases of corruption and the formation of hidden social hierarchies were noteworthy in places where large corporations influenced economics and politics. The misconduct of these firms would unfairly raise their size even more and make the government weigh their interests over appeals from civil society. As American author Alexis Dudden noted, South Korea’s “dictators cemented their rule through cronyism and intimate

Jai S. Mah, “Industrial Policy and Economic Development: Korea’s Experience,” Journal of Economic Issues 41, no. 1 (2007): 87, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25511157. 27 Erin Aeran Chung, “Marriage and Migration” and “Multiculturalism with Adjectives,” in Immigrant Incorporation in East Asian Democracies (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 131-202.

126 relations with these companies, and development became the excuse to deny people many basic human rights.”28 Indeed, the U.S.’ decision to tolerate the survival of Keiretsu in Japan and to ignore Chaebols’ strengths in South Korea has been devastating in terms of equity. After all, an unsupervised exchange between economic resources and political power is worrisome. Though not elaborated on in this paper, other internal threats to the stability and effectiveness of democracy also provoked widespread worries in East Asia. For instance, there seemed to be a trade-off between political division and participation in electoral activities. In Taiwan, hot debates on topics such as its relationship with mainland China, group identity of the Taiwanese residents, and the future mode of economic development resulted in huge cleavages and great passions to vote, similar to South Korea’s situation. This situation indicates that the establishment of democratic institutions should be viewed only as a starting point of true democratization, which requires devotion, reflection, and even appropriation in East Asia. Currently, under the fast-changing regional order following the growth of new potential powers, namely China and India, new opportunities and challenges arose for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Moreover, the sudden outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic furthered the sense of uncertainties and risks. Will the economic integration with these developing countries help break through the limits in economic development? Will their democratic institutions change to adapt to the new needs of regional security? Will COVID-19 produce unfavorable and irreversible effects on international relations? Only time will tell. V.

Evaluation Although extensive effort has been placed on the investigations of U.S. presence in

East Asia, the discussion exhibited merely a biased, abridged version of political history. This section aims to discover problems with the methodology of evaluation and under-assessment of certain features resulting from the previously mentioned policies. As has been emphasized a few times, U.S. presence in East Asia stemmed from an uncertain background and remained ambiguous, especially in its attitude toward democratization. This situation, along with the broad coverage of three East Asian political entities with distinct cultural, economic, and political traditions, raised the difficulty in suggesting a general theme of

Alexis Dudden, “Revolution by Candlelight: How South Koreans Toppled a Government,” Dissent Magazine, October 23, 2017.

127 U.S. policies. Such an issue is responsible for some of the flawed and insufficient narration in the paper. To overcome any downsides, supplemental investigations might be conducted by accessing a greater amount of work differing from the paper in three facets: the sources of evidence, the chronological narration, and the interactions between the two processes covered. First, the sources of evidence have aggregated a wide variety of analyses, data, and historical facts. Nevertheless, comments, memoirs, and other subjective descriptions were deficient. Summarized sources might diverge from the real-life experiences of people living in the post-war era, and it might be important to include perspectives of civil society as to have an overview of the myriad of governmental and academic records. Moreover, the aim to develop dynamic analysis is feasible in terms of concluding general trends. Such methodology, however, might lead to an unbalanced focus. The timelines and lengths of the periods of establishing competitive industries and effective democratic institutions were divergent among Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Such differences can render it difficult to effectively compare or contrast these three cases. One consequence of this issue was the lack of exposure to Japan’s democratization after the Korean War, which had not turned out as dramatic as the changes in South Korea and Taiwan and thus received relatively less attention from academia. As a result, it is hard to generalize within such a short volume of discussions. Moreover, such an issue left a void in the chronological order of this paper, restricting the possibility of portraying a broader stage. External, linear, case-by-case historical narrations have an advantage over this paper when attempting to show the “whole picture.” Furthermore, this paper has viewed the process of development in economies and democracy as two related trends, but the discussion of their mutual influences has been limited. For example, the industrialization in Taiwan had created a new middle class, some members of which formed competitive local factions and actively participated in local elections.29 Their struggles urged the appearance of some talented politicians, dispersed power from the mainlandcontrolled central government to the local communities, and shaped the political culture in Taiwan, which could all be interpreted as signs of progress in terms of democratization. Again, these detailed processes might be referred to in other region- or country-specific assessments that could provide either critiques or agreements with the ideas in this paper. Undoubtedly, these

Tse-Kang Leng, “State-Business Relations and Taiwan’s Cross-Straits Economic Policy,” The Taiwan-China Connection (2018): 47-49, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429495816-5.

128 supplements can reveal more hidden features of U.S. presence in East Asia and reduce the imperfections from initial approaches of analysis. VI.

Conclusion Starting from the end of WWII, rapid economic and political development has been a

trend in most countries. What remains relative, however, is the magnitude of changes in each country. It is undeniable that the U.S. has facilitated economic and political developments in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. In terms of economic development, U.S. assistance and coordination, especially economic aid, played an irreplaceable role in the industrialization processes of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Other business cooperation and investment activities also fueled the upgrade of industries in East Asia in the global trade network. These achievements have surpassed the basic need of ensuring security. U.S. influence in their democratization, however, was more complicated and even self-contradictory in certain cases. Thus, these polities’ independent steps of political transformation after the Cold War had not been wholly optimal, and they had to discover chances for institutional and ideological changes that could fit with their own cultural, social, and political dynamics and embrace global perspectives on cooperation and openness. The change in the global security context, marked by the gradual fall of the Soviet economy and the growing strength of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, generates differences in needs, expectations, and actions. The natural process of decaying economic and democratic capacity resulting from the pattern of development promoted by the U.S. and some direct reversals in the U.S.’ agenda are of concern. How to counter the spread of institutional malfunctions in these developed economies and avoid reliance on the U.S., for the sake of people’s stable and decent living standards, is an inextricable question in public debates. As the balance of power may be going through even more unanticipated changes in East Asia, the interests of the U.S. and its allies should be reconsidered. New approaches are yet to come to the forefront to fulfill the supreme goals of human beings: peace and prosperity.

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Political Effects of Guerrilla Warfare in the Chinese Civil War: Maoist China and Guerrilla Governance Chris H. Park Modern Warfare Professor Carter Malkasian December 1, 2021

133 I. Introduction What impact did the Red Army’s guerrilla experience during the Chinese Civil War have on China’s domestic politics following the conclusion of the war? This paper will argue that the core natures of guerrilla warfare that helped the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) triumph over the Kuomintang (KMT) were transposed onto the party governance system. This reality was reflected in the CCP policymaking not only throughout the Maoist era between 1949 and 1976 but also during the post-Mao reform and opening-up period. Exploring the concept of “guerrilla governance” improves our understanding of why the Chinese party-state remained highly resilient as they carried out a massive overhaul of society, confounding skeptics who have periodically predicted its collapse. In this way, the guerrilla experience during the Chinese Civil War is the key lens to conceptualize Maoist China and the modern People’s Republic of China (PRC). This paper will first examine Mao’s guerrilla warfare tactics and how his theories— notably set out in On Guerrilla Warfare—were put into practice during the Chinese Civil War. Delving into this background is necessary to understand guerrilla warfare beyond a purely tactical sense. Second, this paper will draw out four core natures of Maoist guerrilla warfare. Third, it will analyze CCP policies under Mao: it will demonstrate not only how these policies reflected the natures of guerrilla practices, but also how the guerrilla-style governance was beneficial for the party. This paper finally will look at China’s reform era and present evidence that guerrilla governance continued as post-Mao China grappled with a rapidly changing country. Ultimately, this paper will illustrate that the natures of guerrilla warfare have been the remedy to the governance problems faced by the CCP and could very well continue to be the modus operandi of the party-state in China. II. Guerrilla Warfare in the Chinese Civil War Founding of the CCP, Red Army in Jinggangshan, and the Long March The CCP was founded in 1921 on the heels of the May Fourth Movement, a watershed anti-imperialist movement that popularized Marxism in China. The party had great success in working with the Kuomintang (KMT) under Sun Yatsen to organize a united front against the Japanese. This comity was short-lived. The rivalry between the CCP and the KMT led to fissures in the united movement. Chiang Kai-shek, who took over the helm of the KMT following Sun’s death, led a wholesale purge of communists from Shanghai and other areas under Nationalist

134 control on April 12, 1927. This incident became known as the Shanghai Massacre.1 The violent suppression that nearly wiped out the communists was a watershed moment for the CCP for two key reasons that are the central recurring themes of this paper. First, as most of the communist movements in cities were obliterated, the CCP had to go to difficult to reach the countryside and plan their rise among the peasants. Second, communists realized the necessity of a military force to bring about a political revolution they desired. In other words, politics and war were inherently connected.2 The Shanghai Massacre marked the beginning of the civil war between the communists and the Nationalists. The outcome of the war was far from preordained, especially as the KMT held significant political and military advantages for much of the conflict.3 The CCP also had significant internal divisions that would not be resolved until the party faced near extinction. As the communist movement dwindled in major cities, Mao Zedong—then just one of the communist party leaders—established a peasant soviet with an inchoate Red Army in Jinggangshan, a mountain range in the rural Jiangxi province. Mao clashed with the party center, which was dominated by Soviet-trained cadres like Bo Gu and Otto Braun, over two major points. First, Mao believed that peasants formed the basis for the communist revolution in China. Despite low levels of education and literacy, he believed that peasants were the true revolutionaries and that their ignorance could be addressed through training. He accordingly carried out political education of the largely illiterate Jiangxi peasants through revolutionary folk tales. Land confiscated from landlords was distributed to the peasants. This promise of land reform further led peasants to join the revolution.4 Conversely, the party center believed that the revolution needed to center the working class, adhering to the orthodox Marxist-Leninist view in the Comintern.5 For example, Yang Kemin, a party center inspector sent to the Jiangxi Soviet, expressed pessimism about generating “progressive thinking among the peasants” given their lack of education and warned of the dangers of the CCP becoming a “peasant’s party.”

Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, 6th edition (Oxford University Press, 2000), 545. Tien-wei Wu, “A Review of the Wuhan Debacle: The Kuomintang-Communist Split of 1927,” Journal of Asian Studies 29, no. 1 (1969): 142. 3 Odd Arne Westad, Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War (Stanford University Press, 2003), 7. 4 Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (Grove Press, 1937), 186. 5 Gao Hua, How the Red Sun Rose: The Origins and Development of Yan’an Rectification (Columbia University Press, 2019), 4. 2

135 Second, the party center and Mao also disagreed over military policy as Chiang’s KMT forces were launching encirclement campaigns on the Jiangxi Soviet. Mao advocated for a highly mobile and flexible warfighting strategy against the better-equipped Nationalists. However, the party leadership instead led aggressive positional warfare by, for example, pursuing an “initial victory in one or more provinces” to outright defeat the KMT.6 Traditional military operations were relatively successful in fending off Chiang’s forces until the Fifth Encirclement Campaign that began in September 1933. The KMT and Japan reached the Tanggu Truce in May 1933 that allowed Chiang to direct the full power of his forces to the Jiangxi Soviet. The Red Army continued to fight with Braun’s “short, swift thrust” tactic of pursuing decisive victory through a face-to-face confrontation.7 The CCP’s reliance on positional warfare and static defense was ineffective against KMT advancements. By October 1934, the Red Army decided to withdraw from Jinggangshan and began the fateful Long March, a year-long strategic retreat to the west and north from the Jiangxi Soviet that killed more than 90% of the party members. At the Zunyi Conference in January 1935, Bo Gu acknowledged the failures of the military strategy employed in Jiangxi Soviet, and Mao assumed leadership of the Red Army. By the end of the Long March, he became the unquestioned leader of the CCP.8 History bore out Mao’s conviction in guerrilla warfare strategy. Guerrilla tactics proved to be critical in leading to the success of the Red Army and eventually expelling the KMT-led government to Taiwan by the end of 1949. How Guerrilla Warfare is Fought As demonstrated in the previous section, guerrilla warfare was never the obvious strategy for communists but a product of a deadly trial and error. Developed under the context in which the communists were fighting superior adversaries, Mao defined guerrilla warfare as a “weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation.”9 According to Mao, guerrilla warfare involved three tactical characteristics. First, the guerrilla strategy was grounded in “alertness, mobility, and attack.” Troops had to 6

Snow, Red Star Over China, 187; Tony Saich, From Rebel to Ruler: One Hundred Years of the Chinese Communist Party (Harvard University Press, 2021), 85. 7 Chi-Hsi Hu, “Hua Fu, the Fifth Encirclement Campaign and the Tsunyi Conference,” China Quarterly 43 (1970): 35. 8 Benjamin Yang, “The Zunyi Conference as One Step in Mao's Rise to Power: A Survey of Historical Studies of the Chinese Communist Party,” China Quarterly 106 (1986): 262. 9 Mao Tse-tung, On Guerilla Warfare: Mao Tse-Tung On Guerilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Martino Fine Books, 2017), 42.

136 operate swiftly and take advantage of opportunities to apply elements of surprise.10 Offensive action was the sole focus of guerrilla warfare, and “fixed, passive defense” of the “rear installments” was not necessary.11 Second, a guerrilla unit did not seek a “decisive battle,” for its primary mode of warfare was to wear down the enemy in a protracted war of attrition.12 The final key characteristic of Maoist guerrilla warfare was to receive support from the masses and to “live among the people like fish in the water.”13 Inhabitants who were “inspired” by the party were armed and trained to be guerrillas, adding more manpower to the communist movement.14 Gaining the support of the people also was important because everyone in a guerrilla area contributed to intelligence gathering about the enemy that was so critical to military planning.15 Maoist guerrilla warfare diverged in many ways from the Clausewitzian tenets of war that philosophized warfighting based on campaigns of Fredrick the Great and Napoleon. Clausewitz notably underscored the need to “render the enemy powerless” by seeking decisive battles.16 Whereas Mao argued that the political objectives must “coincide” with the people, Clausewitz did not believe war aims had to match the people’s desires.17 Conceptually, however, guerrilla warfare was Clausewitzian in character. Mao understood that each era, as Clausewitz argued, required an “independent theory of war” and advocated for guerrilla warfare given the unique technological and political circumstances of the time.18 Clausewitz further believed that war is a “continuation of political intercourse carried on with other means.”19 This certainly was how Mao saw the Chinese Civil War in that politics caused the war, and the war would change politics. Natures of Guerrilla Warfare An analysis of Maoist guerrilla warfare, however, needs to go beyond discussing it in a purely tactical sense. To this end, this paper will identify four dominant overarching natures of guerrilla warfare demonstrated throughout the Chinese Civil War.

Mao, On Guerilla Warfare, 46, 97. Ibid., 52-53. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid., 93. 14 Ibid., 110. 15 Ibid., 22. 16 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed./trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1984), 75. 17 Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, 43. 18 Ibid., 49. 19 Clausewitz, On War, 87. 11

137 First, the party formed a special connection with the Chinese peasantry. Red Army Commander Zhu De famously quipped that the KMT “failed because such guerrilla warfare requires not only a thorough knowledge of the terrain of the battle area but also the support of the common people.” As they moved across China, the guerrilla Red Army operated under the “Three Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention,” a code of conduct revolving around being “courteous and polite to the people” in villages that the communist forces passed.20 Unlike KMT forces that exploited the peasantry, the Red Army was prohibited from confiscating property. Instead, the guerrilla soldiers were ordered to, for example, “be honest in transactions” and “replace damaged goods.”21 At the same time, cadres carried out political education of the inhabitants. Memoirs from the Chinese Civil War recounted how Red Army officers would come into villages and ask: “why do the landlords have so much land, while you have none?... It isn't fair. If we unite, we are bound to win. Join the Revolution!” This rallying cry motivated villagers to sign up for the Red Army.22 The communists would carry out such efforts in every village they reached, and—as Edgar Snow wrote in his famous monograph of the rise of the CCP—“millions of the poor had now seen the Red Army and heard it speak, and were no longer afraid.”23 Beyond preaching their vision, the Red Army carried out land redistribution policies.24 In this way, guerrilla warfare practices extended far beyond the warfighting on the battlefield. Land reform was a hugely powerful tool in generating support from the people for the CCP.25 Peng Duhuai, another Red Army leader, recounted how the peasants "dug up from the ground the grain they had hidden from the KMT troops” as “they wanted [the CCP] to win.” He further noted that the Red Army was merely the “fist of the people beating their oppressors” and could not have existed had the people not supported the communist cause.26 Peasants had a personal stake in supporting the CCP because if the communists were defeated, then land reforms could be reverted. The masses subscribed to the vision of the communists, and a revolution that started

Snow, From Rebel to Ruler, 279. Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, 92. 22 Sun Shuyun, The Long March: The True History of Communist China's Founding Myth (Doubleday, 2006), 10. 23 Snow, From Rebel to Ruler, 206. 24 Westad, Decisive Encounters, 114. 25 Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An (University of California Press, 2010), 60. 26 Snow, From Rebel to Ruler, 279. 21

138 with less than a hundred people in 1921 quickly grew to more than four million by the end of the civil war.27 Second, the party led mass mobilization campaigns to achieve its objectives in guerrilla warfare. The main mobilization strategy involved creating class categorization and division, and such intensification of domestic tensions delivered greater support for the communists. Mao notably ordered a mass campaign of “punishing traitors and settling accounts” in 1946 that called on the peasants to struggle against the “traitor” class of landed elites.28 Many party documents and directives—such as the “How to Differentiate Classes in Rural Areas” circulated in 1947 or “Regulation on the Classification and Treatment of All Social Classes during Land Reform” promulgated in 1948—also focused on defining class categories.29 These campaigns of mass mobilization were not simply top-down initiatives carried out by the party cadres in the vein of Soviet-style bureaucratic control. While the party maintained control of the direction of campaigns, landless peasants were installed in leadership positions and were called upon to “seize land from the landlord and realize land to the tiller.”30 The mass, mobilized to enact party policy, often organized spontaneous and autonomous movements.31 The party-instigated largescale campaign ultimately brought about a rapid promulgation of land reform in the areas it controlled. In this way, it was not just the party “making revolution.” Peasants also took an active role in the revolution.32 Mass mobilization campaigns based on class lines generated peasant support for the communists and co-opted the peasantry to the task of transforming society according to the communist vision. By defining the struggle in terms of class, the CCP also successfully dismantled existing power structures in rural societies and created a power vacuum in rural China that the party was able to fill.33 Party ideology—namely class categorization—permeated the peasantry from whom the guerrilla movement could draw political and military support. 27

Snow, From Rebel to Ruler, 222. Lifeng Li, “Rural mobilization in the Chinese Communist Revolution,” Journal of Modern Chinese History 9, no. 1 (2015): 103. 29 Ibid., 106; Mao Zedong, “How to Differentiate Classes in Rural Areas,” in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume I (The People's Publishing House, 1991). 30 Liu Shaoqi, “Directive on the Land Question,” Selected Works of Liu Shaoqui (Foreign Language Press, 1984): 373. 31 Carl Dorris, “Peasant Mobilization in North China and the Origins of Yenan Communism,” China Quarterly 68 (1976): 712. 32 Yung-fa Chen, Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 1937-1945 (University of California Press, 2021), 142-145. 33 Li, 105; Dorris, 707. 28

139 Third, guerrilla warfare was characterized by high flexibility. The Red Army had to be flexible given the immense amount of uncertainty it faced: guerrilla warfare was a means to counter uncertainty. Mao’s contention that “theory is based on practice and in turn serves practice” primed the guerrilla army to devise strategies from experimentation and practice.34 The party’s constant tinkering with its approach to land reform throughout the Chinese Civil War especially exhibited its adaptability. Uncertain and insecure about its ability to carry out a revolution in the countryside, Mao’s early efforts at land redistribution in Jinggangshan involved significant policy variations from place to place. Party organs at different localities were charged with implementing different land policies with mass mobilization.35 Skeptics of land reform, like Odd Arne Westad, cited such policy fluctuation as evidence of how land reform “probably did the party as much harm as good in its military and political struggle” against the KMT.36 This view, however, overlooked how experimental policymaking style was embedded into guerrilla practices as the party tackled the question of how to best achieve its objectives. In 1935, the CCP established its base in Yan’an after the Long March. At this new center of the communist revolution, the party began winning over large-scale peasant support and increasing its membership that shrank during the grueling Long March.37 The influx of new blood created a risk of disorganization in the guerrilla movement, a problem Mao warned would hamper military efficacy.38 Mao responded with the Yan’an Rectification Movement that aimed to “rectify” the party by mobilizing the masses in an ideological campaign to mold new members to fit the CCP. As the party faced a volatile situation that risked ruining the movement, rectification took the form of a live-learning process in which the Red Army experimented with the best way to carry out mass mobilization to drum up support for the guerrilla movement. Party members, for example, were ordered to write self-criticism journals after studying party documents, which were then collected and reviewed. The CCP, through these journals, better understood how

Mao Zedong, “On the Relation Between Knowledge and Practice, Between Knowing and Doing,” in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume I (The People's Publishing House, 1991). 35 Sebastian Heilmann, “From Local Experiments to National Policy: The Origins of China's Distinctive Policy Process,” China Journal 59 (2008): 6. 36 Westad, Decisive Encounters, 117. 37 Hua, How the Red Sun Rose, 324. 38 Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, 45.

140 widely Mao’s views were accepted and made adjustments.39 The trial-and-error approach assisted the party in devising an effective strategy for peasant co-optation.40 Fourth, guerrilla forces were constantly uncomfortable with the status quo. Mao saw that “contradiction or conflict in a society is ubiquitous and permanent” and believed in the need for revolutionary action to persistently address the contradictions.41 This rationale drove the guerrilla warfare waged against the Japanese and the Nationalists, and guerrilla soldiers had to be restless communists that upend the existing order everywhere they went. The CCP challenged the existing societal structures dominated by stronger powers, namely the KMT and the Japanese, in the Chinese Civil War. Guerrilla warfare served as the vehicle for revolutionary vision, helping the communists achieve their objectives despite their inferior position. Adopting “constant movement” as a basic tactic,” the Red Army was eager to test the existing conditions of war and persistently sought opportunities to change the situation.42 This approach helped the guerrilla Red Army make unexpected gains from a volatile situation. III. Guerrilla Governance China has been shaped by a myriad of competing and reinforcing ideologies over many centuries that molded its national character. This paper will argue that guerrilla-ism—seen through the four natures of the Maoist guerrilla campaign—was another ideology that had a lasting impact on Chinese society since 1949. Even as the party stepped into a governing role with the conclusion of the war, these four elements lingered on the CCP through the emergence of a guerrilla-like mode of governance. Hundred Flowers to Anti-Rightists The Maoist era was replete with evidence of the guerrilla governance approach. The policy cycle between 1956 and 1963 offers a particularly interesting case study as it was the earliest example of how guerrilla experience manifested in the party’s approach to governing. By 1955, the party was pursuing a rapid transition to communism and economic growth with the ambitious Draft Agricultural Program that, for example, transformed rural China by forming

Hua, How the Red Sun Rose, 423. Dorris, 719; Chen, 11. 41 John Bryan Starr, “Conceptual Foundations for Mao Tse-Tsung's Continuous Revolution Theory” Asian Survey 11, no. 6 (1971): 612. 42 Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, 52. 40

141 agricultural cooperatives. Mao feared resistance from the mass to this vision, especially as Khrushchev gave his infamous “secret speech” denouncing Stalin.43 The connection between the party and the masses had to be rekindled. In May 1956, the CCP launched the Hundred Flowers Campaign that invited the masses to identify the shortcomings of the party. Mao stated that a mass campaign “had been used to deal with the relations between the Party and the masses” throughout the Civil War and that the Hundred Flowers Campaign would serve as a “period of trial…to determine whether something is right or wrong.”44 The economy showed signs of overheating during this time as well. Party leaders thus revised economic policy with “Opposing Rash Advance,” or fanmaojin, that first lowered production targets and eventually decreased state investment in industries.45 Between late 1956 and early 1957, the party quickly changed course to adopt more measured approaches, both in the political and economic sphere, as it responded to results from more aggressive earlier policies. The Hundred Flowers Movement, however, soon became problematic for the party. Opening the party up to criticism threatened its authority as students and intellectuals began questioning the party’s right to rule. By mid-1957, the party realized the need to reverse and, once again, resorted to mass mobilization with the Anti-Rightist Campaign. According to memoirs recounting the campaign, the CCP marshaled ordinary people to identify and purge alleged “rightists” that offered criticisms during Hundred Flowers.46 Fanmaojin, too, became problematic as many Hundred Flowers rightists had criticized economic policies by echoing the opposition to rash advance.47 The party thus charted a different economic policy and introduced the Great Leap Forward that lasted from 1957 to 1963. Ambitious production targets were propped up by a society-wide campaign to achieve rapid industrialization and transformation to communism. Peasants who knew little about industrial production, for example, worked to produce steel with makeshift furnaces in their backyards. Local leaders charted creative paths to achieve goals set by party leaders. “Backyard furnaces” were just one product of local innovation, and these policy experiments further informed central planning efforts.48 43

Saich, From Rebel to Ruler, 39. Mao Zedong, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,” in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume V (The People's Publishing House, 1991). 45 Bo Yibo, Review on a Certain Number of Crucial Decisions and Events, volume 1 (Remmin, 1997), 526; Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun, China’s Road to Disaster (M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 29. 46 Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro, Son of the Revolution (Random House, 1983), 8. 47 Teiwes and Sun, 44. 48 Saich, 37; Macfarquhar, 3. 44

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From Guerrilla Warfare to Guerrilla Governance Mao considered war as an extension of politics in a true Clausewitzian sense. He also believed that “politics were also a type of war” and believed in the transmissibility of guerrilla tactics onto governance.49 Westad argued that the successes of the Red Army guerrilla experience led to the utilization of “methods of war…in promoting reform even in peacetime.”50 This section will compare the four core natures of guerrilla warfare against the mobilization campaigns of 1956 to 1963 to demonstrate that “guerrilla governance” best-described policymaking in the Maoist era. First, these campaigns illustrated how the experimental nature of guerrilla practices was carried over to governing. Policymaking often eschewed national uniformity and instead encouraged diverse and flexible responses to manage uncertainty. While the party retained control of setting policy objectives, the precise instrument of policy was left to local experimentation. In the Great Leap Forward, each locality was charged with devising innovative solutions, as opposed to party leaders carrying out centralized, top-down policy implementation. Through this decentralized process called “proceeding from point to surface,” the party considered policy a process of improvisation that would “shape itself in the making.”51 Second, a fundamental discomfort with the status quo undergirded the agenda-setting process of the party leaders. As discussed, Mao—and, therefore, the party—believed that contradictions were a permanent fixture of society, and constant revolution was required to prevent society from being stuck in a reactionary rut. Such disdain towards the status quo drove the party to adopt policy adjustments through various campaigns. The ferocious pace, magnitude, and variation of changes that adhered to Mao’s call for a “continuous and uninterrupted revolution” defined China’s policymaking style.52 The party’s oscillation between radically different policies between 1956 and 1963 thus can be attributed to this revolutionary DNA of the party. 49

Mao Zedong, “On Contradiction,” in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume I (The People’s Publishing House, 1991). 50 Westad, Decisive Encounters, 328. 51 Elizabeth J. Perry and Sebastian Heilmann, “Embracing Uncertainty: Guerrilla Policy Style and Adaptive Governance” in Mao's Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China, ed. Elizabeth J. Perry (Harvard University Press, 2011), 10, 18. 52 Stuart R. Schram, “Mao Tse-tung and the Theory of the Permanent Revolution 1958-69,” China Quarterly 46 (1971): 222.

143 Third, whatever policies were derived from the “experimental” and “revolutionary” approach, mass mobilization was the tool the party employed to achieve its objectives. Communist leaders believed that the best way to achieve their objectives, be it political or economic, was through these mass mobilization campaigns, and all major policies and programs in China were accompanied by a mass campaign that supported them.53 The Anti-Rightist Campaign, for example, mobilized the masses to address the problems from the Hundred Flowers Movement, an earlier mass mobilization campaign. The mass thus was key to attaining whatever policy goals the party decided to enact. The case study looking at the policy trajectory from Hundred Flowers to Anti-Rightists and from fanmaojin to the Great Leap Forward demonstrates how the legacy of guerrilla experiences was transposed onto governance through guerrilla governance style. This style of governing China was a necessity for the CCP because the inchoate party state—now charged with governing the country after years of waging war—faced a highly volatile situation. The state faced two key uncertainties: how to maintain the party’s right to rule over a vast country and how to deliver economic growth through its socialist vision. Party leaders were in an especially vulnerable position, especially as Marxist-Leninism of the Soviet Union provided limited guidance for the impoverished and largely agrarian China.54 Adopting a unique policymaking style was pivotal for the party to confront the daunting problems of uncertainty. Reform and Opening-up Even after Mao’s death, the revolutionary guerrilla precedents continued to inform policymaking as Deng Xiaoping led China in a vastly different direction under the banner of reform and opening-up. The key to economic reform was various decentralized “point-tosurface” policy experimentations driven by local initiatives. An initiative by Guangdong Province officials, for example, established the first Special Economic Zone (SEZ) that was governed by free market principles to attract foreign investment. Other provinces soon replicated the SEZ model following the initial success. Deng justified such radical reforms by citing the pre-1949 experiments with land reform in Jiangxi Soviet.55 Mass mobilization, although downplayed, also continued to have a role in state consolidation of legitimacy. Rectificationstyle movements in the reform era—like the “Three Stresses” campaign under Jiang Zemin or Xi 53

Saich, 37; James C. E. Wang, Contemporary Chinese Politics (Prentice Hall, 1985), 195. Roderick Macfarquhar, Politics of China (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 92. 55 Heilmann, “From Local Experiments to National Policy,” 26. 54

144 Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign—organized cadres en masse towards tackling corruption or any other policy goals adopted by the central government.56 Noted Sinologist Elizabeth Perry concluded that China’s “revolutionary inheritance” contributed to the “stunningly successful implementation of market reforms.”57 Continued guerrilla governance system tremendously helped the party in navigating the challenge of fundamentally breaking from the Maoist era and changing China. IV. Conclusion The core natures of the Red Army’s guerrilla experience during the Chinese Civil War were transferred to the policymaking process of the PRC. “Guerrilla governance” that emerged was critical in ensuring that the party maintained its legitimacy and delivered reforms in conditions of high uncertainty. The case study of party policies between 1956 and 1963 demonstrated how the natures of revolutionary guerrilla practices served as antecedents for the CCP’s approach to governance. Mass campaigns driven by policy experimentation and restless revolution punctuated the nearly three decades of Mao’s rule over the PRC. This paper further delineated how guerrilla governance tactics continued in the post-Mao reform and opening-up era. Guerrilla governance had several critical shortcomings. Mass mobilization campaigns like the Great Leap Forward led to environmental catastrophes, nationwide famine, and colossal human sufferings.58 Guerrilla practices, as this paper argued, were highly effective; however, when used towards flawed policy objectives, they became dangerous tools that caused calamitous outcomes. While the reform-era adoption of guerrilla governance successfully improved economic conditions and personal welfare, there have been negative consequences on individual liberties. As guerrilla governance, at its core, has been about effectively achieving party objectives, the party has often fallen short of the idealistic guerrilla tenet of goals aligning with those of the masses. Natures of guerrilla warfare and guerrilla governance nevertheless provide useful perspectives to analyze China. They first contextualize the seemingly inexplicable and erratic policy cycles during the Maoist period. Guerrilla governance also explains the successful 56

Andrew Mertha, ““Stressing Out’: Cadre Calibration in Reform-era China,” China Quarterly 229 (2017), 54. Elizabeth J. Perry, “Studying Chinese Politics: Farewell to Revolution?” China Journal 57, (2007), 6. 58 Baum and Teiwes, 82; Westad, 328. 57

145 economic growth and regime stability in China today. Had China adopted a more centralized approach, the rigid structures would not have permitted the party to make nimble adjustments that responded to on-the-ground realities.59 Difficulty in economic transition faced by former communist countries in Eastern Europe further substantiated the tremendous benefits that this unique policymaking approach conferred to the PRC as it undertook its own transition. Indeed, the benefits conferred to the PRC by guerrilla governance mirrored the ways the Red Army benefitted from guerrilla warfighting. It is an open question whether Chinese policymaking will continue to reflect this governance principle, but China’s guerrilla experiences during the civil war and its long-lasting effects are crucial to understanding party governance today.

Heilmann and Perry, “Embracing Uncertainty,” 10.

146 Works Cited Bo, Yibo. Review on a Certain Number of Crucial Decisions and Events, volume 1 (Remmin, 1997). Chen, Yungfa. Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 1937-1945 (University of California Press, 2021). Clausewitz. On War, ed./trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1984). Dorris, Carl. “Peasant Mobilization in North China and the Origins of Yenan Communism.” China Quarterly 68 (1976). Heilmann, Sebastian. “From Local Experiments to National Policy: The Origins of China's Distinctive Policy Process.” China Journal 59 (2008). Heng, Liang, and Judith Shapiro. Son of the Revolution (Random House, 1983). Hsu, Immanuel C. Y. The Rise of Modern China, 6th edition (Oxford University Press, 2000). Hu, Chi-Hsi. “Hua Fu, the Fifth Encirclement Campaign and the Tsunyi Conference.” China Quarterly 43 (1970). Hua, Gao. How the Red Sun Rose: The Origins and Development of Yan’an Rectification (Columbia University Press, 2019). Li, Lifeng. “Rural mobilization in the Chinese Communist Revolution.” Journal of Modern Chinese History 9, no. 1 (2015). Liu, Shaoqi. “Directive on the Land Question.” Selected Works of Liu Shaoqui (Foreign Language Press, 1984). Macfarquhar, Roderick. Politics of China (Cambridge University Press, 1993). Mao, Zedong, “How to Differentiate Classes in Rural Areas.” In Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume I (The People's Publishing House, 1991). Mao, Zedong. “On Contradiction.” In Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume I (The People’s Publishing House, 1991). Mao, Zedong. On Guerilla Warfare: Mao Tse-Tung On Guerilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Martino Fine Books, 2017). Mao, Zedong. “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People.” In Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume V (The People's Publishing House, 1991).

147

Mao, Zedong. “On the Relation Between Knowledge and Practice, Between Knowing and Doing.” In Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume I (The People's Publishing House, 1991). Mertha, Andrew. “‘Stressing Out’: Cadre Calibration in Reform-era China.” China Quarterly 229 (2017). Perry, Elizabeth, and Sebastian Heilmann. “Embracing Uncertainty: Guerrilla Policy Style and Adaptive Governance.” In Mao's Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China, ed. Elizabeth J. Perry (Harvard University Press, 2011). Perry, Elizabeth. “Studying Chinese Politics: Farewell to Revolution?” China Journal 57, (2007). Teiwes, Frederick, and Warren Sun. China’s Road to Disaster (M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 29. Race, Jeffrey. War Comes to Long An (University of California Press, 2010). Saich, Tony. From Rebel to Ruler: One Hundred Years of the Chinese Communist Party (Harvard University Press, 2021). Schram, Stuart. “Mao Tse-tung and the Theory of the Permanent Revolution 1958-69.” China Quarterly 46 (1971). Snow, Edgar. Red Star Over China (Grove Press, 1937). Starr, John. “Conceptual Foundations for Mao Tse-Tsung's Continuous Revolution Theory.” Asian Survey 11, no. 6 (1971). Sun, Shuyun. The Long March: The True History of Communist China's Founding Myth (Doubleday, 2006). Westad, Odd Arne. Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War (Stanford University Press, 2003). Wu, Tien-wei. “A Review of the Wuhan Debacle: The Kuomintang-Communist Split of 1927.” Journal of Asian Studies 29, no. 1 (1969). Yang, Benjamin. “The Zunyi Conference as One Step in Mao's Rise to Power: A Survey of Historical Studies of the Chinese Communist Party.” China Quarterly 106 (1986).

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“To be Educated is to be Anti-Japanese”: An Exploration of Korean Neo-Confucianism as the Antithesis of Japanese Assimilation Phoebe More Colonialism In Asia and Its Contested Legacies Dr. Huei-Ying Kuo December 13, 2021

149 In Korea, educational systems have long been an institution of national identity. One of the defining philosophies, and often the founding principle, of much of Korean education is Confucianism. Korea’s long connection with Confucianism, not only studying it but also thoroughly contributing to Neo-Confucian movements around the eleventh century, did not go unnoticed by Korea’s fellow Confucian neighbors. Japan would later capitalize on this connection. Apart from the base territorial and agricultural advantages of acquiring Korea as a colony, Japan viewed Korea as a part of the great Pan-Asian people because of their ties to Confucian thought. However, what would remain a major obstacle for Japanese attempts at assimilation and colonization was Korea’s strong national identity, which was with Confucianism, not in spite of it. Korea had, and continues to have, an independent identity within Confucian thought. This identity was a major component of the failings of Japanese colonialism. Just as well, it would be a defining political tenant of Korea successfully economically distancing itself from Japan in the postcolonial era. KOREAN NATIONALISM AND CONFUCIAN THOUGHT: While Confucianism had existed to some extent in Korea since the fourth century, not long after Confucius himself lived and died, it experienced a resurgence with the works of Korean Scholars like Toegye (Yi Hwang) and Yulgok (Yi I). The works of these two writers were instrumental to Korean Confucianism as it is known today, but they were also instrumental in developing Neo-Confucianism in 1500s Northeast Asia. As stated by Wm. Theodore de Bary, “The Neo-Confucianism introduced to Korea was highly specific… [as it] drew on a large body of tradition,” yet nonetheless it resulted in a revival not only in meaning but in energy surrounding Confucian thought.1 Togye himself is stated to have seen the problems facing the Choson rule as being solvable by “rejuvenating the philosophy and ideology of the nation.”2 Toegye and Yulgok’s writings’ influence on Confucianism was hardly new for Korea, and was often used to rationalize some amount of political upheaval. The first significant use of this Confucian political technique occurred with Chong Tojon, a predecessor of Korean NeoConfucian thought known for his primary role in overthrowing the Koryo kingdom in favor of

Theodore, Wm, and Jahyun Kim Haboush, The Rise of Neo-Confucianism in Korea, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 4. 2 Kim Hyŏng-Ch’an, Shon Yoo-Taek, Yoon Heeki, and Dara Seamus Fox, Korean Confucianism : The Philosophy and Politics of Toegye and Yulgok, (London; New York: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2018), ix.

150 Choson. Tojon believed that the “[re]learning of the ancients” should “renew the people.”3 Chong was not only a key figure in the movement against the old Koryo kingdom, but in “providing a workable legal framework for the concrete manifestation of ideal Confucian values” in the new Choson dynasty.4 Though not every Neo-Confucian scholar would advocate for a revolution of all established political systems, it was nonetheless a part of Neo-Confucian development and something that would be revived several times. Korean Confucianism became synonymous with using Confucianism to push for reform, rather than the maintenance of the status quo. The concept of shih-hsueh or sirhak best summarizes this idea which characterized a Confucianism deeply concerned with study “rooted in human values and… of practical benefit to human society.”5 It was concerned with practicality, rather than metaphysics. It is also important to note that this concept of Korean Neo-Confucianism sets Neo-Confucianism apart from other sources of Korean national identity, such as Korean Buddhism. With sirhak, there is a lack of the “emptiness” or purely philosophical nature of Buddhism. Rather, Neo-Confucianism is just as much a political tool, and was a tool of reform consistently applied in Korean history since its creation.6 The ideals of the aforementioned scholars would be applied to the Donghak Rebellion in the late nineteenth century. Donghak itself was an academic movement of Neo-Confucianism which arose in response to foreign influence, particularly from the West, though it also displayed discontent with foreign influence. Donghak praised a return to an authentic version of the Confucian “way” with Neo-Confucianism being a vehicle “for a Korean identity to insert itself.”7 Neo-Confucianism, for encouraging reform and a diversity of thought, as well as for having Korean scholars define its very existence, was once again an ideal vehicle for Korean Nationalism to reassert itself. The Donghak Rebellion, a peasant revolution in response to unfair taxation and laws from the upper classes, was constructed around this Neo-Confucian thought and thus overthrew established structures criticized for being too susceptible to foreign influence. This revitalization was absolute, against foreign interference, and a mere ten years before Japan

Theodore and Haboush, “Rise,” 38. Ibid., 73. 5 Ibid., 22. 6 Kim et al. 2018, “Korean,” xvi. 7 Theodore and Haboush, “Rise,” 17. 4

151 exerted control over Korean territory. The cultural backdrop in Korea at the time could not have been more ill-suited for Japan’s plans of assimilation. JAPAN’S PLANS FOR PAN-ASIAN ASSIMILATION: Japan, at the time of the Donghak revolution, had a unique relationship with Confucianism. Many of the parts of Neo-Confucianism most popularized by Japan showed a discontinuity with Neo-Confucianism in Korea or China. A prime example of this was the doctrine of taigi meibun “which asserted that the highest duty is to perform one’s allotted function.” In short, to remain loyal and obedient to one’s ruler.8 In reality, this was hardly mentioned by Chu Hsi (the original Chinese innovator of Neo-Confucianism) and proves to be a reflection of Japan’s agenda at the time within their study of Confucianism. Here, Japan’s Confucian ideals are in direct conflict with Korea’s chorui or “fidelity to principle” over fidelity to rule, often to the point of “self-martyrdom.”9 It is important to acknowledge as well that chorui expressed itself in other Confucian regions, while taigi meibun remained an entirely Japanese ideal. In terms of political structures, Neo-Confucianism as a whole was a “class phenomenon” at the very least for how they created a “professional scholar-official class.”10 This manifested itself very differently in Japan than it did in Korea. While the Korean, and indeed similarly the Chinese aristocratic Confucian classes, were centered around academies and granted a form of “intellectual autonomy,” Japan’s scholar class was entrenched in other political affairs.11 By placing Samurai as military leaders, feudal lords, and government officials, the figure was less focused on issues of “upper class consciousness” against a given ruler. This capability to go against the ruler was crucial in Korean Neo-Confucianism, and presented itself as a sort of check on the Choson king, accepted and sometimes nurtured.12 Nonetheless, Japan’s unique relationship with Neo-Confucianism reflects the diversity of thought in Neo-Confucianism, and its ability to “adjust… views on the primacy of moral relationships to [each country’s] social and

Theodore and Haboush, “Rise,” 24. Ibid., 23. 10 Ibid., 35. 11 Ibid., 33. 12 James B Palais, “Confucianism and the Aristocratic/Bureaucratic Balance in Korea,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 44, 1984, (2): 427. https://doi.org/10.2307/2719038.; Ramon Hawley Myers, Mark R Peattie, Jingzhi Zhen, and Joint, The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984). 9

152 political structures.”13 Although Japan’s adaptation of Confucianism was a valid form of NeoConfucianism, it would later prove to be incompatible with the Korean conception. Japan’s approach to assimilation carried a distinctly “moralistic tone” based on Chinese Confucian thought.14 The ideal of isshi dojin, for example, implied that all of the Asian peoples who shared culture with Japan and were to be under the jurisdiction of Japan would be treated equally. Within this was the idea of komin (imperial peoples). Komin were together a part of the imperial family, and within that remains a dearth of Confucian moral implications of the emperor’s duty to the community/family/people he is connected to. This familial obligation is also seen in the Pan-Asian discussion of academic and writer Aoyagi Tsuntaro, who saw Japan and Korea as “two long-separated brothers” who were “reunit[ed]” upon Korea’s annexation.15 This Confucian moral obligation is exacerbated by the fact that another founding principle of Pan-Asianism is dobun doshu or “same script, same race.” Japan posited that China, Korea, and Japan all shared enough Chinese characters (Kanji in Japanese, Hanja in Korean) to communicate regardless of base language, and subsequently were irrevocably tied in future endeavors (particularly in dealing with the West). This concept itself is tied to Confucianism, as the Confucian examination systems and the scholar’s high standing in society (therefore having a great deal of say in government or in upper classes) was the exact reason for the dissemination of Chinese characters into these societies. Pan-Asianism capitalized on Confucianism as a justification for colonization and assimilation. What this justification failed to ignore was the aforementioned differences between Japanese Neo-Confucianism and Korean Neo-Confucianism. At its core, Pan-Asianism pushed its praise of Confucianism thoroughly so that it could actively demolish all other tenants of Korean society. It stated that Confucianism was the best part of Korea and aggressively pursued total subjugation and assimilation with “hostility and contempt” towards the remainder of Korean culture.16 The problem remained that Confucianism, though traditionally the same concept, meant very different things to Japan than it did to Korea at the time of Japanese annexation and subsequent assimilation. Especially when recognizing the anti-foreign sentiments

Theodore and Haboush, “Rise,” 23. Patricia E. Tsurumi, “Colonial Education in Korea and Taiwan,” in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1985-1945, edited by Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, (Princeton University Press, 1984), 97. 15 Tsurumi, “Colonial Education,” 109. 16 Ibid., 105. 14

153 of the Donghak Rebellion and the fine differences between what Japan most valued in Confucianism as compared to Korean Neo-Confucianism, it becomes clear that the very idea Japan attempted to structure assimilation around was inhospitable to connecting the two cultures. KOREAN EDUCATION SYSTEMS: The Korean examination system is another prime example of the difference between Japanese and Korean Confucian structures. A variety of scholars acknowledge Korea to have a unique approach to the examination system not only in format but in the significance of the examination system to the entire population. Much of this has to do with Korea’s yangban class, a de facto hereditary aristocracy. While all manner of East Asian society had a hereditary aristocracy, Korea’s remains unique as a Confucian society that continues to value its hereditary aristocracy over the meritocracy of Confucianism. The “hereditary prerogatives” of the yangban allowed Korean society to remain truer to Chu Hsi’s teachings regarding ancestral shrines, as property lineage among the aristocracy was maintained where it was interrupted in the Sung or other dynasties.17 Yet nonetheless, the yangban class was solidly in power, both in wealth and in scholarly class. The yangban class maintained their high status through an “exclusive prerogative of admission” that differed quite distinctly from China’s more “open, egalitarian” examination system.18 In Korea’s countryside, the written examination system would be substituted with an oral exam, meaning that even while students from across the nation could be recommended for government service, just as in China, in Korea they were judged for “moral character.”19 This system resulted in an extremely subjective rubric that, in practice, was not impersonal and meant largely that only the yangban had scholarly power. The hereditary ruling class was “weakened” by the examination system, “not destroyed.”20 This is not to say that the practice of Korean Neo-Confucianism saw absolutely no value in education for the masses, which remained prevalent, though it would wax and wane in effectiveness just as in China.21 It is important to note that in Korea, yangban-run private education was kept separate from the education of the local population, known as the difference

Theodore and Haboush, “Rise,” 32. Ibid., 41. 19 Ibid. 20 Palais, “Confucianism and Aristocratic,” 427. 21 Ibid., 468. 18

154 between the sodang (private) and hyanggyo (public) school systems.22 However, through this system an idea of upward social mobility tied specifically to monetary wealth was established, unlike that of the meritocracy of Chinese Neo-Confucianism. It would reach a point in Korean Confucian society where virtually only the wealthy had access to the exam, something which was exacerbated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by “economic and social liberalization” allowing for wealthy merchants to buy their way into the yangban class.23 This was hardly the environment of Neo-Confucianism that Japan seemed to have been anticipating when it began its assimilation programs which believed concepts such as taigi meibun to be a given of a Neo-Confucian society. THE REALITY OF JAPANESE ASSIMILATION ATTEMPTS: The goals of Japanese education reforms were to “transform [Koreans] into loyal Japanese subjects equipped for modern but humble life and work.”24 Just as well, establishing formal education for the Korean people was seen as an “investment in human capital” that would eventually aid the “productivity” of the population.25 The advisors sent to Korea in 1904 were “alarmed” by Korea’s desire for education as well as an unanticipated “Korean consciousness.”26 The Japanese government did conclude that a source of this national consciousness was the private education system and failed to recognize its connection to Korean Neo-Confucian ideals, as they viewed the promotion of Confucian teachings as a solution to bring together Korean and Japanese cultural histories. As the Japanese government began to construct their own Korean education system for lower classes, they allowed the sodang schools to continue, with some edits to the curriculum to include Japanese language and the like. Nonetheless, this new education system did not have a significant impact on indoctrinating the population as it did not tackle the roots of Korean national identity. It is noteworthy that Japan did, quite successfully, improve Korean literacy rates nationwide. This achievement followed the intention of building a better-educated workforce, capable of reading and basic arithmetic, in order to produce a more efficient workforce. The

Tsurumi, “Colonial Education,” 294. Palais, “Confucianism and Aristocratic,” 463. 24 Tsurumi, “Colonial Education,” 294. 25 Ibid., 354. 26 Ibid., 296. 23

155 caveat to this increased economic output was the widespread popularization of Korean language newspapers. This movement towards the use of the Korean vernacular script gained popularity around 1905, with the previously mentioned “education for the nation movement.”27 In an attempt to prioritize Japanese language learning, the colonial empire would suppress, censor, or altogether remove Korean language newspapers from print. This was a major source of Korean discontent, to such a point that it was one of the first things restored following the protests of March 1st. The March 1st Movement demonstrated the reality that Japan only further fostered a Korean identity. The movement consisted almost entirely of students of all ages and all education systems, public and private. The “independence problem existed in the countryside…[and] the over-educated in urban areas,” and the colonial administrators struggled in identifying why.28 Upon reforming curriculums to ease nationwide protests, Korean and Chinese studies remained “a compulsory subject,” and student protests continued to break out through the remainder of Japanese rule.29 Japan anticipated a similar colonial education reception as had been seen in Taiwan, which on the whole saw the middle and upper classes as more accepting of Japanese colonial rule if they felt they had input in the governing. Instead, Japan was faced with “militant nationalism” from all classes, with students from cities and wealthier provinces often traveling “throughout rural Korea” teaching material “highly nationalistic in tone.”30 The proposed idea of Korean landlords relying on Japanese “overlords” the same way they did “Confucian bureaucracy” is largely false when considering the realm of student protests.31 Japanese scholars did not fully address Japan’s colonial history until the 1960s, and in the years since have come to several conclusions regarding the mismanagement of the Korean colony, some of which acknowledge the importance of Korea’s unique Confucian identity. Scholar Asada Kyoji posited that Japan’s land survey and redistribution heavily shifted their reception in Korea, questioning the extent to which “the landlord system within the colonies

Tsurumi, “Colonial Education,” 295. Ibid., 303. 29 Ibid., 304. 30 Ibid., 309, 307. 31 Bruce Cumings, “The Legacy of Japanese Colonialism in Korea,” in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1985-1945, edited by Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton University Press, 1984) 492. 28

156 [was] a means of political, social, and economic control.”32 It is certainly relevant to consider the formerly made point regarding the Korean yangban class and their status often as landed gentry. This system allowed Korea to stand apart from that era of Confucianism, particularly in their success in the maintenance of ancestral shrines, which could be considered a source of identity. Similarly, land was a primary form of wealth, which also had significance for the yangban class, especially in an era of change where merchants infiltrated their ranks. The Japanese, however, often saw wealthy Korean landowners as being on the periphery of land management and sometimes easily removed. This perception does consider indigenous Confucian structures, yet fails to consider Japan’s enforcement of differing ideologies. A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF NEO-CONFUCIANISM IN POST-COLONIAL ECONOMIC DISTANCING: Even in the post-colonial era, without the threat of Japanese rule, Neo-Confucianism continued to be a significant aspect of Korean national identity. Economic development grew to be a major focus of the country’s development. This focus is not, as many scholars would contend, in conflict with Confucian ideals. As argued by Chen Huan-Chang in his thesis, “The Economic Principles of Confucius and his School,” Confucian thought does neglect discussion of the economy. In dynastic China there existed a “Bank of Convenient Money” and a system of tied “money associations” which managed inflation and the devaluing of currency.33 Chen’s discussion connects to the aforementioned point of upward social mobility in the yangban class. Confucianism and economic development were certainly not mutually exclusive for Korea. Moreover, Korea’s postwar leadership did not ignore this fact of Korea’s cultural history. For instance, Syngman Rhee, prior to his role as de facto dictator, was highly involved in the Independence Association (Dongnip hyeophoe), an organization which, similarly to the Donghak Revolution, praised Neo-Confucianism over foreign influence. This ideal was reflected in Rhee’s primary political push to economically distance the newly independent Korea from Japan, so as not to be economically dominated and never truly detach from Japanese influence.34 32

Ramon H. Myers, “Post World War II Japanese Historiography of Japan’s Formal Colonial Empire,” in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1985-1945, edited by Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, (Princeton University Press, 1984), 462. 33 Keynes, J. M., and Chen Huan-Chang, “The Economic Principles of Confucius and His School,” The Economic Journal 22 (88): 584, 1912, https://doi.org/10.2307/2222270. 34 Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun : A Modern History, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005).

157 Similarly, President Park Chung-Hee pursued an economic development method that featured “Confucian tradition as one of the key elements of [the Korean] economic miracle.”35 Park’s infrastructure remodeling featured a “centralized authoritarian bureaucracy” as well as “the high valuation of learning.”36 Moreover, there is a potential parallel to be drawn between the economic and social status of the yangban class and the exclusivity of the chaebol families that Park aggressively fostered. Regardless, Neo-Confucianism would continue to be a deeply meaningful part of Korean national identity and was assuredly not abandoned in favor of economic development as encouraged by U.S. political influence, but rather incorporated into that economic advancement. As examined by Korea scholar Bruce Cumings, the student protests that were widespread throughout Japanese colonial rule continued to be a political tool against the U.S.-appointed dictatorships of the post-war era.37 Just as Neo-Confucian students had aided in the Donghak Rebellion, and sodang students marched in the March 1st movements, activism would often be seen in the student population. Even continuing into the eras of Syngman Rhee, Chun DooHwan, and up until the truly democratic elections of the late 1980s, students would sustain themselves as a powerful venue for political activism. CONCLUSION: There are numerous reasons as to why Japanese colonialism and assimilation attempts were largely unsuccessful in Korea. Just as well, it would be a disservice to Korean culture to list only one source for its strong sense of national identity. There are other cultural factors like Korean Buddhism, Shamanism, language, and art that are significant to founding Korean cultural identity. Rather, the intention is to shed light on the philosophy which Japan took to be a given in their assimilation techniques and to highlight the unique characteristics of Korean NeoConfucianism that persist in modern Korean society. To conclude, I would turn to the celebration of the 125th anniversary of the Donghak Rebellion, commemorating the event in 2019 for the first time, where South Korean Prime Minister Lee stated that the rebellion showed the power of

Tai-Hwan Kwon, “Population Change and Development in Korea,” Asia Society, 2010, https://asiasociety.org/education/population-change-and-development-korea. 36 Kwon, “Population.” 37 Bruce Cumings, “Korea, a Unique Colony: Last to Be Colonized and First to Revolt,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 2021, https://apjjf.org/2021/21/Cumings.html.

158 the people to change the nation. As The Korea Times commented, “The revolution was a pivotal symbol of the patriotic and creative humanistic spirit in Korea and paved the way for our modern democratic society.”38

Chong-dae Chloe, “The Anniversary of ‘Donghak Revolution,’” The Korea Times, October 16, 2014.

159 Bibliography Choe, Chong-dae. “The Anniversary of ‘Donghak Revolution.’” The Korea Times. October 16, 2014. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2018/10/162_166422.html. Cumings, Bruce. “The Legacy of Japanese Colonialism in Korea.” In The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1985-1945, edited by Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie. Princeton University Press, 1984. Cumings, Bruce. Korea’s Place in the Sun : A Modern History. New York: W.W. Norton, 2005. Cumings, Bruce.“Korea, a Unique Colony: Last to Be Colonized and First to Revolt.” The AsiaPacific Journal: Japan Focus. 2021. https://apjjf.org/2021/21/Cumings.html. Keynes, J. M., and Chen Huan-Chang. “The Economic Principles of Confucius and His School.” The Economic Journal 22 (88): 584. 1912. https://doi.org/10.2307/2222270. Kim Hyŏng-Ch’an, Shon Yoo-Taek, Yoon Heeki, and Dara Seamus Fox. Korean Confucianism: The Philosophy and Politics of Toegye and Yulgok. London; New York: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2018. Kwon, Tai-Hwan.“Population Change and Development in Korea.” Asia Society. 2010. https://asiasociety.org/education/population-change-and-development-korea. Myers, Ramon H. “Post World War II Japanese Historiography of Japan’s Formal Colonial Empire.” In The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1985-1945, edited by Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie. Princeton University Press, 1984. Palais, James B.“Confucianism and the Aristocratic/Bureaucratic Balance in Korea.” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 44 (2): 427. 1984. https://doi.org/10.2307/2719038. Ramon Hawley Myers, Mark R Peattie, Jingzhi Zhen, and Joint. The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984. The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica. n.d. “Chŏng To-Jŏn | Korean Neo-Confucian Scholar | Britannica.” Www.britannica.com. Accessed December 10, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Chong-To-jon. Theodore, Wm, and Jahyun Kim Haboush. The Rise of Neo-Confucianism in Korea. New York: Columbia University Press, 1985. Tsurumi, E. Patricia. “Colonial Education in Korea and Taiwan.” In The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1985-1945, edited by Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie. Princeton University Press, 1984.

160

Section III Contemporary Social, Geopolitical, and Security Issues

161

Deviation From the Norm and its Gendered Consequences: How the Rise of Neoliberalism in South Korea Has Engendered Models of Patriarchy Cherise Kim Belonging and Difference in Modern Korea Professor Reizman December 13, 2021

162 I.

Introduction In almost every respect, the South Korea of 1953 and the South Korea of today are

virtually unrecognizable from each other. What was in 1953 a newly-formed republic borne from the devastation of the Korean War is now a highly advanced industrial nation which holds both immense international soft power and the title of the world’s tenth largest economy. The economic changes in South Korea in the latter half of the twentieth century were hailed as the “Miracle on the Han,” with economists and policymakers alike lauding its unprecedented growth. Praise changed to skepticism, however, when the Asian Financial Crisis hit the East Asian region in 1997; for many onlookers, this shattered the illusion of South Korean prosperity as a “miracle.” Nevertheless, for others, the aftermath of this crisis presented a critical juncture at which to transform the previously protectionist, state-led South Korean economic approach into a model which was more conducive to the surge of global neoliberalism, which had been gaining rapid momentum throughout the previous decades. This change came in the form of the 1997 bailout loan provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to South Korea with a dramatic neoliberal restructuring of the South Korean economy as a precondition, leading to drastic reforms to the South Korean economic model. However, this rapid change did not translate to a revolution in the underlying ideals of its society. South Korean society’s deeply entrenched patriarchy, and the idiosyncratic manifestations of it, continues to constitute many legal systems, social norms, and policy decisions. As the IMF-mandated reforms began to take effect in South Korea’s economy and government, they sent tangible shockwaves throughout every part of society. Women were no exception to this. Thus, in this paper, I will argue that the rise of neoliberalism in South Korea and its effects have disproportionately impacted women, particularly those outside traditional heteropatriarchal norms. These negative impacts of societal ostracization, lower economic opportunity, and governmental negligence are rooted in Korea’s history of American intervention, where free-market capitalism favorable to America and other Western nations was implemented within an already rigidly patriarchal social structure. The rapid economic development, which took place throughout the late twentieth century, and the subsequent 1997 Asian financial crisis, brought about both continuities as well as changes in the roles, expectations, and destinies of women. In this paper, I will examine how these changes were brought about by a neoliberal economic order yet were still rooted in continuities of social

163 patterns. To do this, I will analyze the specific examples of marginalized women who face unique modes of oppression due to their existence outside of socially acceptable parameters, namely homeless women, LGBTQ+ women, and female sex workers. In each of these sections, I will discuss the idiosyncratic challenges faced by each throughout their history, as well as how these challenges evolved or were exacerbated by the introduction of neoliberal economic and social policymaking. Each group of women faces its own set of unique challenges in the status quo of neoliberalism, many of which are rooted in histories of patriarchal tradition. II.

Historical background It is impossible to understand the current state of South Korean economic, political, and

social life without examining the twentieth-century history of the peninsula. Following its liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, the Korean peninsula was quickly swept up into the emerging Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States set up the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) in 1945, creating a neocolonial relationship between the United States and South Korea.1 The goals of the USAMGIK included making South Korea “strong enough to be a stabilizing factor in Asia” and to “make the country a showcase of democracy in Asia.”2 To accomplish these objectives, the military government relied upon providing economic and military aid to what would soon become the Republic of Korea. This would lay the groundwork for a dependence on foreign aid in the subsequent decades. The Cold War power game between the United States and the Soviet Union throughout the following five years would eventually culminate in the Korean War from 1950 to 1953. These three years inextricably shaped the trajectory of the peninsula, as it was subsequently divided into North Korea and South Korea. The Soviet Union and the United States took over each respective new nation. South Korea held a high level of strategic importance to the United States at this time, as it was seen as a necessary bulwark against the Communist threat in China and a launching point for American objectives in the Asia-Pacific region. This only intensified

Soojin Pate, “Militarized Humanitarianism,” in From Orphan to Adoptee: U.S. Empire and Genealogies of Korean Adoption (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015), 21-40, doi:10.5749/minnesota/9780816683055.003.0002. 2 Su-Hoon Lee, “An Analysis of Military Expansion in South Korea, 1945-1980,” in Asian Perspective,, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall-Winter 1987): 264-284.

164 after the conflict, with the ever-present threat of Communist North Korea and, by extension, the Soviet Union, constantly lurking just over the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) at the 38th parallel. For the United States, this threat necessitated the buildup of a strong South Korean free-market capitalist state to counteract the influence of Communism in the region. However, the postwar nation-building endeavor was not left to the devices of an independent South Korea. Large influxes of foreign aid from the United States came pouring into the borders of South Korea for the purposes of its economic development. It was during the period from 1945 to 1960 that “U.S. aid not only came in greatest magnitude but also played the most influential role in South Korea's economy and in building its state organization.”3Another notable factor in this phase of South Korea’s economic development was the United States military. Between 1945 and 1960, U.S. military assistance totaled more than 1.8 billion U.S. dollars. This, along with the several army bases throughout South Korea which still maintained an active presence after 1953, cemented the U.S. military as a fixture in South Korea’s postwar development. Throughout the decades following the Korean War, South Korea underwent extremely rapid economic growth, the likes of which were present only in other postwar Asian developing states such as Taiwan and Japan. However, this growth was heavily backed by foreign aid, particularly from a United States still mired in a Cold War necessitating the buildup of overseas cachet. By 1982, South Korea held the status of “the heaviest borrower of all Asian developing countries with an estimated total external debt of 34 billion dollars.”4 Thus, we can see how the groundwork that the USAMGIK laid during the years prior to the Korean War, as well as the United States’ heavy-handed provision of aid to Korea in the years immediately following it, played a role in creating the economic conditions for South Korea to be heavily impacted just fifteen years later in the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. III.

Neoliberalism While the scope of this analysis was limited to South Korea, neoliberalism’s role in

worsening social, political, and economic inequalities is not. This is not a phenomenon exclusive to the Korean peninsula, or even to any singular nation. To put the events of post-1997 South

3 4

Lee, “An Analysis of Military Expansion in South Korea, 1945-1980,” 271. Ibid.

165 Korean economic reform into a broader context, the structural adjustment program which was applied to South Korea was also instituted upon many other nations throughout the late twentieth century. This fundamentally shifted global economics in the favor of global hegemons, namely the United States. Conditions such as trade liberalization and harsh cuts to government spending, particularly of social welfare programs, were fervently endorsed by prominent leaders of Western economies such as United States President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who instituted these reforms in their respective governments. This wave of economic change was also characterized by right-wing and reactionary politics, large tax cuts for the wealthy, suppression of organized labor, increased privatization of public resources, and outsourcing of industries.5 Economic liberalization via the IMF and World Bank’s structural adjustment programs, provided largely to postcolonial and developing states, was becoming all the more commonplace throughout the latter half of the twentieth century. They created plentiful, albeit oftentimes coercive and reluctantly joined, economic linkages between postcolonial nations and Western hegemons. In the case of South Korea, the nation was left reeling in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. With waves of foreign capital, upon which it had come to rely throughout its period of rapid industrial development, fleeing the country en masse following the rapid depreciation in the value of the Korean won, each carefully-laid brick of the South Korean economy seemed to be crumbling to the ground. The country eventually had to turn to the IMF, with whom it signed a standby agreement in December 1997. As a condition of receiving bailout funds, the government was forced to agree to restructure its system of massive family-run business conglomerates known as chaebols, banks, and government management of the economy. This restructuring was to be performed along the lines of free-market neoliberalism. In a country such as South Korea, whose economic landscape is dominated by these chaebols, the strengthening of privileges and weakening of regulations for the actions of private companies characteristic of neoliberalism set into motion a future of widening class stratification and increased social strife at the hands of corporate rapacity. IV.

The Role of Women

George Monbiot, “Neoliberalism – the Ideology at the Root of All Our Problems,” The Guardian, April 15, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/apr/15/neoliberalism-ideology-problem-george-monbiot.

166 Women are uniquely situated to contribute to the practice of nation-building in patriarchal societies. This can be seen in Nira Yuval-Davis’ “Gender and Nation,” where she discusses the role of women in the process of developing a state. Yuval-Davis describes patriarchal society as seeing women solely as part of the “private domain,” i.e. the home. They are not to have a role in the “public domain,” i.e. commerce and governance. However, they still engage in nation-building by being the “producers,” or rather, reproducers, of the nation.6 Their piety to their husbands/families and duty to bear children is paramount in their duties as national subjects. This is highly applicable to the context of South Korea, particularly in its postwar development. As a kungmin, or member of the Korean nation, one has an obligation to the continuation of its legacy. For men, this comes in the form of compulsory military service, while women carry the counterpart duty of producing new generations of Koreans.7 These duties manifest the ways in which patriarchal traditions are deeply entrenched within notions of nationbuilding. This is significant because in times of collective national hardship or distress, such as the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis, women are the first to be relegated back to their traditional role in the private domain. However, this can be detrimental to many women whose “private domains” fall outside the traditional norms of a heterosexual nuclear family. For women who are either unmarried or whose families/spouses do not have the means to support them, this deviance from patriarchal tradition can be extremely consequential. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the legal systems which necessitate reliance on male kin for survival. A prime example of this is the hojuje system, the system of family registration that prevailed in South Korea until 2008 when it was formally abolished. This structure dictated that every citizen had to be registered under a “family head,” who was expected to be the male head of the household. Despite the abolition of the hojuje system, the necessity of belonging to a family is still prevalent in legal and bureaucratic systems. This sends a very clear message with reverberations to today’s legal system and social norms: the heteropatriarchal nuclear family is the basic unit of society. As we

Nira Yuval-Davis, “Gender and Nation,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 16, no. 4 (1993): 621-32, doi:10.1080/01419870.1993.9993800, 628. 7 Tari Young-Jung Na, Ju Hui Judy Han, and Se-Woong Koo, “The South Korean Gender System: LGBTI in the Contexts of Family, Legal Identity, and the Military,” Journal of Korean Studies 19, no. 2 (2014): 360, doi:10.1353/jks.2014.0018.

167 will see in the following sections, the impact of this messaging affects each group of women I discuss in this analysis. V.

Homeless women Homeless women signify a microcosm of how neoliberalism and patriarchy intersect.

Following the crisis in 1997, there was a large and sudden uptick in homeless people, as many lost their jobs and other sources of financial stability. Women disproportionately faced this job loss in the wake of the crisis and subsequent economic restructuring. Mass layoffs by large companies in response to the crisis were common in the years immediately following it, and women were forced to leave the workforce in disproportionately high numbers. For example, in 1999, just two years following the crisis, the Korean Farmer Association Bank laid off almost seven hundred of its female employees whose spouses also worked at the bank. The bank resorted to coercion to do so, using measures such as telling women their husbands would be fired if they did not leave their jobs voluntarily or invoking the authority of their in-laws, who would berate the women for being inconsiderate of their husbands’ positions as the family’s breadwinner.8 Notably, the layoffs at the Korean Farmer Association Bank were also spurred by another factor outside of pure, undiluted sexism: the military. Men generally receive higher wages in South Korea due to their participation in compulsory military service, which also allots them a privilege in hiring practices. The South Korean military represents a model of institutionalized patriarchy; extremely male-dominated due to men being the sole subjects of conscription, it is a formative masculinity-developing experience for South Korean men. Women, however, are most often on the outside of this shared experience. They do not have the opportunity to earn the same hiring privilege, make the same connections, or participate in the shared experiences of masculinity. Women thus suffer in a male-dominated labor market as a result. At the Korean Farmer Association Bank, those who pressured female employees to leave their positions often did so by invoking the husband’s higher salary as an indicator of his primacy in their familial order.9 This exodus from the workforce exemplifies the view which states that women’s traditional role is within the domestic sphere and that men are considered the default 8

Jesook Song, “South Koreans in the Debt Crisis,” (2009), doi:10.1215/9780822390824. Chapter 2, “Family Breakdown” and “The Invisible Homeless Woman,” 54. 9 Ibid.

168 breadwinner in any household. The direct causality of the IMF restructuring to the involuntary mass exodus of women from the workforce displays how neoliberalism and its practical implementation within a patriarchal society not only uphold existing views of women and their roles in society, but also tangibly impact their ability to survive. Policymaking as a process is highly subject to the beliefs, traditions, norms, and prejudices which underpin its institutions. In a neoliberal state, the creation of social policy is predicated upon a “wide social consensus or moral authority drawn from civil forces to legitimize democratic state decision-making processes.”10 When there is some kind of societal consensus on how a certain group ought to be treated, the apparatuses of the state can justify making and enforcing policies to treat them accordingly. The public consensus around homeless women justified serial neglect and disproportionate barriers against them in post-1997 social policymaking. Within the discourse around homeless people following the IMF restructuring, there was a sharp divide between the “deserving homeless” and the “undeserving homeless.” The “deserving homeless” were worthy of receiving aid and sympathy from the general public: they were people who had simply lost their means of housing by pure unfortunate circumstance. Given the opportunity, these people would jump to return to work and reinstate their status as productive members of society. The “undeserving homeless,” on the other hand, were those with no perceived “desire to work” and who intended to live off the generosity of the state rather than generating value through their labor. The discourse around homeless women, as well as the lack thereof, fell into the latter category. They were characterized as the so-called “rootless,” who were homeless because of some inherent flaw such as immorality or laziness.11 Another view of homeless women can actually best be described as the lack of a view altogether; during the crisis, many refused to acknowledge that homeless women could even exist. Even from the beginning of the process of creating homeless policy, city officials in Seoul vehemently denied the existence of homeless women, even going “so far as to omit gender in their statistics of homeless people,”12 later claiming this was because the number of homeless women was statistically negligible. Harking back to Yuval-Davis’ argument, the overwhelming view of women as belonging to the “private domain” of the home is apparent in this. This denial was not simply of homeless people in general; it was specifically of homeless women. These officials had 10

Song, “South Koreans in the Debt Crisis,” 62. Ibid., 59. 12 Ibid., 58. 11

169 no problem acknowledging the male homeless population, and in fact, even extolled their misfortune by characterizing them as hardworking breadwinners who had become victims of pure circumstance rather than being “rootless” or “undeserving.”13 This shows a very clear divide in the epistemological approaches to male and female homeless populations. Women’s default relegation to the private domain of the home meant that a woman without a home was near-impossible to conceive of. If a woman did not have a home, the conclusion was that she must inevitably have some intrinsic flaw that caused her to fail at obtaining one. This rhetoric is also present when we examine the fact that in the following years, the overwhelming consensus about how to alleviate female homeless seemed to be adherence to the “normal family,” i.e. heterosexual marriage and a nuclear family. This is significant to our analysis because it demonstrates clearly the causal relationship between economic hardship, neoliberal reform, and subsequent reactionary attitudes which allow people to blame the elimination of traditional power hierarchies for socioeconomic maladies. The treatment of women in post-1997 welfare policy is a prime example of this causal linkage. Following job loss, what is the next available avenue for a woman without spousal or familial support? The answer which may typically come to mind is social welfare benefits. As a condition of the loan, the IMF and World Bank stipulated the implementation of a social welfare regime in South Korea. This change heavily disadvantaged women. Previously, the availability of any type of social welfare from the government had been extremely limited, as part of the government’s approach to rapid economic growth was building the capacity for “self-reliance” on the working population. However, these programs were, and continue to be, mainly based on “workfare,” in which recipients must still retain some kind of employment to receive benefits. There are also benefits guaranteed for those who are dependents of a male breadwinner; there are no such guarantees for unmarried women who cannot perform labor for whatever reason. As an individual recipient, the odds of receiving social welfare are “slim unless their status in the labor market starts to improve quickly,” particularly for female workers.14 Even those who demonstrated themselves to be “exemplary mothers” to the state could not access benefits without financial sponsorship from their closest male kin.15 These challenges demonstrate the

Song, “South Koreans in the Debt Crisis,” 58. Joo-Hyun Choo, “Neoliberal Governmentality at Work: Post-IMF Korean Society and the Construction of Neoliberal Women,” Korea Journal, vol. 49, no. 3 (2009): 28, doi:10.25024/kj.2009.49.3.15. 15 Jesook, Song, “South Koreans in the Debt Crisis.” 14

170 ways in which nontraditional family structures such as single motherhood were punished by the state; married women are prioritized over unmarried women in social welfare benefits, despite the fact that unmarried women are far less likely to have other sources of income in the event of job loss or loss of ability to work. Additionally, this speaks to how the idea of inherent human value as being predicated on productive ability is prominently interconnected to patriarchy. Homeless women do not generate value in the capitalist sense; they are not productive members of the workforce. They also do not generate value in the patriarchal sense; because they do not have homes—the traditional niche to which they are expected to return—they do not perform labor in this niche by taking care of the home and the children within it. Therefore, they are penalized in systems of social policymaking as the result of their existence outside of either capitalist norms or patriarchal norms. VI.

LGBTQ+ Women The status of the LGBTQ+ community at large has never been a positive or visible one

within South Korean societal discourses. This especially holds true for LGBTQ+ women, who face the inextricably intertwined binds of institutionalized patriarchy and homophobia. These binds come in the form of a lack of legal recognition of LGBTQ+ people in general, the difficulties which queer women face in the education system, and policies that incentivize heteronormative marriage and punish non-normative families. This makes it such that any deviation from either patriarchy or heteronormativity can have detrimental impacts upon the lives of LGBTQ+ women in South Korea; neoliberal policymaking has further punished this deviation by exacerbating already oppressive socioeconomic conditions. In Layoung Shin’s “Avoiding T’ibu,” she discusses the decline in the prevalence of masculine-presenting young queer women, a fairly popularly accepted subculture that emerged in the late 1990s. Throughout the early 2000s and late 2010s, this subculture declined in popularity. According to Shin, this reduction is due to the increased danger associated with visible queerness.16 This trend was the result of many different factors which made it more difficult to simply navigate through personal and professional life if one were to present as a visibly queer woman. One of these is the increase in discriminatory practices within the

Layoung Shin, “Avoiding T’ibu (Obvious Butchness),” (Queer Korea, 2020): 305, doi:10.1215/9781478003366011.

171 education system, where many schools began to institute invasive measures against any suspected homosexuality of their female students. Shin attributes these to the “increased visibility and proliferation of mainstream discourse on homosexuality”17 since the mid-2000s, as movements for LGBTQ+ rights surged in popularity throughout the years preceding the turn of the century. While there are no visible links between this specific phenomenon and the rise of neoliberalism, I contend that the tendency of neoliberalism to engender reactionary attitudes in the general public may very well have played a role in this event. This follows the trends of neoliberalism that existed in its development and application throughout the 1970s to 1990s: the rise in popularity of right-wing and reactionary political views, which can often rely on sexism, homophobia, xenophobia, and other exclusionary beliefs. The previous example of homeless women exemplifies how times of economic duress lead to the further marginalization of already marginalized groups. The denial of legitimacy heeded to women who had been made homeless by the IMF reforms—precisely the same way that “IMF homeless” men had—is emblematic of this. Like many other latent prejudices in the fabric of Korean society and culture, it stands to reason that the pre-existing oppression of LGBT people was exacerbated by the perceived socioeconomic decline faced by the Korean populace. This inflammation of oppressive attitudes is also evident in Shin’s discussion of how neoliberalism came to play a role in the societal treatment of LGBT peoples using the concept of “homonormativity.” This concept stipulates that neoliberalism’s emphasis on competition over communal cooperation and adherence to standard norms as a linear model for individual success have created norms of appearance, mannerism, and other means of “gender conformity” within LGBT communities.18 While this has mostly been applied in the context of Western capitalist economies and does not fit neatly into the working-class background from which most subjects of Shin’s study originate, it can still be indicative of the general trends towards conformity that neoliberalism has wrought upon the LGBT community. Additionally, the South Korean education system is heavily focused on career preparation in its curricula. With a post-crisis job market that was becoming increasingly rigid and required increasingly standardized appearances and lifestyles for its labor force, it is possible that visible queerness was seen as a liability for future members of this labor force and therefore discouraged and punished in schoolchildren.

17 18

Shin, “Avoiding T’ibu (Obvious Butchness),” 304. Ibid., 298.

172 Post-1997, the South Korean government promoted the heterosexual nuclear family as the “core of social well-being.” This was evident in the welfare policies they created. This view was also replicated in the private sector as the relationship between job security and heterosexual family became all the more intertwined. In practice, this preference for the nuclear family became highly discriminatory towards LGBTQ+ people as South Korea same-sex marriage was, and remains, illegal in South Korea. If an employee were to want to access benefits from their company, they would have to do so by entering into a heterosexual marriage and nuclear family structure. But even before doing this, they would have to overcome discriminatory hiring practices which often preclude them from these companies in the first place, erasing any and all potential visible markers of “queerness” to have a fair attempt at employment. For women who were already disadvantaged by their sex in a tight and competitive post-crisis labor market, the deprivation of benefits and the necessity of adhering to visible norms of heterosexuality likely exacerbated the difficulties they faced. VII.

Female sex workers I chose to discuss this group of women as the last in my investigation because their

history is emblematic of the power imbalances which characterize both patriarchy and neoliberal capitalism. They represent the prime intersection at which these two coincide to create ongoing forms of exploitation which build upon each other. Throughout their history, there are various loci at which women are ignored, punished, or exploited by capitalism for the sake of profit or political gain. Sex workers in Korea have had profound social, political, and economic impacts which have inextricably woven themselves through the legacy of Korean history, particularly throughout the twentieth century. Their industry has been historically characterized by heavy power imbalances, starting with Japanese colonization. Under Japanese rule, the former class of kisaeng, female entertainers whose duties of dancing and playing music for patrons were comparable to Japanese geisha and not explicitly sexual in nature, became the now-infamous “comfort women.” These women, the majority of whom were Korean, were forced into sexual servitude of the Japanese military starting in the 1930s. Their abuse and exploitation during Japanese occupation and World War II continue to be a point of contention between South Korea and Japan in their diplomatic relations to this day.

173 Even after liberation from Japan, though, the sex work industry did not disappear, and this was not for lack of available clientele. The United States quickly moved in to replace Japan at the helm of governance over the Korean peninsula, and the Korean War broke out not long after this. The war spelled out poverty, unemployment, and displacement for many Koreans, causing many women to turn to those who had money—American soldiers—for survival. This then quickly led to the mass institutionalization of prostitution, particularly around U.S. military bases, with the establishment of special districts and public systems of licensing sex workers. Surveys estimate that the majority of prostitutes in the 1950s, roughly 60%, worked within the vicinity of U.S. military bases.19 Once again, we see the intimate ties between the United States military presence in South Korea and patterns of postwar capitalist development. South Korea was quick to find opportunities for profit in the bodies of female sex workers to service American military men. This was through no random occurrence, but rather due to a high level of demand from these men. As will be discussed, this also began to lay the foundations for the active role of female sex workers in capitalist development in the years following the Korean War. It is within this role that the convergence of capitalist interests and exploitation of female bodies manifests and evolves throughout the timeline of South Korean development. Additionally, the discussion of female sex workers, particularly in regards to their relationship with the United States, would be remiss without mention of the relationships between American soldiers and Korean prostitutes. These relationships were oftentimes very close and prolonged, even romantic in nature. American soldiers in the special districts would maintain a “contract marriage,” in which a Korean woman was paid to maintain his household and become a surrogate wife to him. These unions also often produced mixed-race children, who were heavily stigmatized and continue to be discriminated against in South Korea in the modernday for their racially ambiguous appearance. The fact that the mothers of these children were often prostitutes did not help their situation. Their fathers, American GIs, most likely departed after the war, thus leaving the mother and child to fend for themselves. The mixed-race status of their children added another layer of marginalization for sex workers. According to Yuval-Davis, if membership in a national collectivity is dependent upon common ancestral linkages, then the sexual relationships that its members engage in are of interest to those who are interested in

John Lie, “The Transformation Of Sexual Work In 20th-Century Korea,” Gender & Society 9, no. 3 (1995): 316, doi:10.1177/089124395009003004.

174 preserving the “purity” of the race.20 These mothers often faced discrimination, unable to remarry due to the stigmatization of single motherhood and of having engaged in sex work. This left them with few social safety nets because, as we have seen, having male kin was the sole gateway for women to have legal and political legitimacy. When faced with the lack of a husband, father, or other male relatives, in addition to the added stigmatization of their very existence, these women faced immense challenges during the postwar period. Despite the obstacles they faced, though, female sex workers still played an indispensable role in South Korea’s postwar development period. This period was characterized by rapid industrialization and increased exports, which necessitated the buildup of capital in South Korea. After the war, the U.S. military maintained a continued presence on the Korean peninsula, though in far fewer numbers than they had been during active warfare. Throughout the 1970s, sex work became far more developed as an industry. The development of sex tours of South Korea was highly encouraged by the Korean government as a matter of national policy, mostly in hopes of attracting an audience of Japanese businessmen whose capital could then circulate within South Korea. The Korean government’s “single-minded desire for foreign exchange reserves” exploited women heavily via the exportation of women to countries such as the United States and Japan as prostitutes and mail-order brides.21 These industries generated immense amounts of profit and were particularly successful in achieving the Korean government’s goal of acquiring foreign capital. According to Lie, the “primitive accumulation of capital in Korea depended heavily on the exploitation of women's bodies.”22 The buildup of the sex work industry thus was critical to attracting foreign capital to South Korea. As discussed in section II, this aspect of the South Korean postwar economy was incredibly important to the meteoric rise of the country’s economic development; it also helped to lay the groundwork for the 1997 crisis. To put this into the context of neoliberalism, we must examine the modern-day state of female sex work in South Korea and how it has evolved. Within the realm of scholarship, studies of prostitution throughout the 1990s continued to focus on the “social psychology of “deviant” women” rather than the power dynamics between prostitutes, their clients, and the institutions which keep them pinned to the shadows and margins of society at large.23 In the twenty-first

Nira Yuval-Davis, “Gender and Nation,” 628. Ibid., 321. 22 Ibid. 23 John Lie, “The Transformation Of Sexual Work In 20Th-Century Korea,” 323. 21

175 century throughout the decades after the IMF reforms, prostitution has been made illegal following the 2004 anti-prostitution law known as the Special Law on Sex Trade. What was once Seoul’s most popular red-light district, Cheongnyangni 588, was a construction site as of 2018 after a mass eviction of sex workers by the Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) starting in 2016.24 Here, we see an apparent contrast from the model employed throughout the mid-to-late twentieth century prior to 1997. Where there was once state-led institutionalization and promotion of the sex work industry, there is now an attempt to eliminate this industry altogether and banish it to the realm of illegality. As seen with the oppression of LGBT people, this follows the general tendency of neoliberalism and conservative politics to go hand-in-hand with one another. It is also demonstrative of how because South Korea is now an economically developed nation rather than a developing one, it no longer needs to create economic policies with goals such as rapid primitive accumulation of capital in mind. Once the sex work industry was seen as having fulfilled its utility, neoliberalism became the catalyst for casting it aside. The economic model employed to build the South Korean economy was not initially neoliberalism, but rather a protectionist one characterized by heavily state-led growth. The type of exploitation faced by sex workers, though, was no different than in other forms of capitalism. The stark discrepancy between the immense economic value of sex workers for the Korean state and the severe social, political, and economic oppression they faced in their day-to-day lives makes clear how capitalist growth and patriarchy intersect in society. In a patriarchal society, female sex workers are ostracized due to their externality from the norms which dictate women’s function in society. They are not wives who care for homes or care for the legitimate children of their husbands but rather seen as promiscuous and deviant. The act of having extramarital relations with numerous men for the purposes of profit defies the ideal of a married woman who is loyal to one singular man, his family, and their children. By all the standards of what constitutes an ‘acceptable’ woman in a patriarchal society, they fail to demonstrate their utility. And yet, the exploitation of their bodies is fertile grounds for generating profit and ascertaining the goals of a developing state. The sex work industry is condemned by society for its promotion of deviance from patriarchal norms while being encouraged by the state for the economic gains it

Steven Borowiec and Faras Ghani, “Why Is South Korea Cracking down on Red-light Areas?” Human Rights | Al Jazeera, March 19, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2018/3/19/south-korea-sex-workers-hit-hard-bygovernments-crackdown.

176 produces. Female sex workers are thus condemned to live in this political crossfire, locked into a double bind of social stigmatization and economic exploitation. VIII.

Conclusion To conclude this analysis, I would like to emphasize and draw upon the most prominent

themes across all three groups of marginalized women. The first is the dependence of women on their families for survival in a legal system that posits the heteropatriarchal family as the most basic unit of society. This was evident in legal contexts such as the hojuje system, the systems which followed it, and the network of social safety nets, which render women tethered to their male kin to be given legal and economic recognition from the state. The second is a frequent lack of acknowledgment that these groups of women even exist in the first place, or the attempted suppression of their public visibility. Any form of deviation from norms is repudiated fervently within South Korean social and political systems, whether this comes in the form of the outright denial that homeless women can exist, the forcible repression of queer identity via punitive measures in education systems, or the continued disavowal of responsibility for the fates of female sex workers from even the time of Japanese colonialism onwards. The role of neoliberalism in exacerbating these events, particularly following the 1997 IMF crisis, cannot be understated. Throughout the examination of three different groups of marginalized women, each of whom diverges from norms of hetero-patriarchy in some way, the dimensions of this watershed event’s disproportionate effects on women in South Korea are made clear.

177 Bibliography Borowiec, Steven, and Faras Ghani. “Why Is South Korea Cracking down on Red-light Areas?” Human Rights | Al Jazeera. March 19, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2018/3/19/south-korea-sex-workers-hit-hard-bygovernments-crackdown. Cho, Joo-Hyun. “Neoliberal Governmentality at Work: Post-IMF Korean Society and the Construction of Neoliberal Women.” Korea Journal, vol. 49, no. 3 (2009): 15–43. doi:10.25024/kj.2009.49.3.15. Lie, John. “The Transformation Of Sexual Work In 20Th-Century Korea.” Gender & Society, vol. 9, no. 3 (1995): 310–327. doi:10.1177/089124395009003004. Monbiot, George. “Neoliberalism – the Ideology at the Root of All Our Problems.” The Guardian. April 15, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/apr/15/neoliberalismideology-problem-george-monbiot. Na, Tari Young-Jung, et al. “The South Korean Gender System: LGBTI in the Contexts of Family, Legal Identity, and the Military.” Journal of Korean Studies, vol. 19, no. 2 (2014): 357–377. doi:10.1353/jks.2014.0018. Pate, Soojin. “Militarized Humanitarianism.” In From Orphan to Adoptee: U.S. Empire and Genealogies of Korean Adoption, 21–40. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015. doi:10.5749/minnesota/9780816683055.003.0002. Shin, Layoung. “Avoiding T’Ibu (Obvious Butchness).” Queer Korea (2020): 295–322. doi:10.1215/9781478003366-011. Song, Jesook. “South Koreans in the Debt Crisis.” 2009. doi:10.1215/9780822390824. Lee, Su-Hoon Lee. “An Analysis of Military Expansion in South Korea, 1945-1980.” In Asian Perspective, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall-Winter 1987): 264-284. Yuval-Davis, Nira. “Gender and Nation.” Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 16, no. 4 (1993): 621– 632. doi:10.1080/01419870.1993.9993800.

178

Housing Prices in South Korea: A Policy Brief Sophia Carson, Erin Kim, Sophia Perone, Noah Walch Politics of East Asia Professor Erin Aeran Chung November 19, 2021

179 Executive Summary South Korea’s housing prices have been rising exponentially. Without an appropriate intervention, South Korea’s economy may face financial collapse, similar to Japan’s 1980s bubble burst.1 In this policy brief, we outline the explicit and underlying causes of this crisis and examine policies and policy proposals that have been enacted to fix the issue. More specifically, we investigate the root of South Koreans’ economic insecurity and President Moon Jae-In's failure to adequately decelerate housing prices by using demand-side intervention. In our third section, we elaborate on gender disparity and youth unemployment as causes of economic insecurity, as well as the scope of public housing. We propose to enact a series of policies that use public housing to decrease the price of jeonse and geographically diversify South Korea’s economy. Furthermore, we emphasize the importance of researching deeper into the housing market issue. Introduction Housing prices in South Korea (from hereon, Korea), particularly in its largest urban centers, have risen significantly. Since 2017, Seoul housing costs have risen by over 50%,2 an issue that can largely be boiled down to economic insecurity.3 Simply put, Koreans invest a large proportion of their assets in real estate to secure their retirements. With such high demand, prices can only skyrocket. Economic insecurity arises primarily from relatively low lifetime earnings, which can be traced to the gender wage gap and high unemployment rates.4 Additionally, land speculation involving the Korea Land and Housing Corporation (LH) empowers corrupt government officials to manipulate and inflate land prices.5 “Overheated”6 housing prices are indicative of a real estate bubble that may leave Korea vulnerable to financial collapse, which would be detrimental to regional stability. The concern, then, is how the government can effectively address the housing crisis. Contribution to Existing Knowledge/Extant Literature

Julian Ryall, “Is South Korea in danger of repeating Japan’s economic bubble collapse?” DW, February 9, 2021. Yong Kwon, “The Real Cause of Seoul’s Real Estate Bubble: Economic Anxiety,” The Diplomat, August 27, 2021. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Min-kyung Jung, “Is South Korea headed for asset bubble collapse?” The Korea Herald, Herald Corporation, August 25, 2021. 6 Ibid. 2

180 Since 2017, President Moon Jae-In has enacted over twenty regulatory policies— including higher taxes for multiple-home owners and tighter lending rules7—aimed at reducing housing prices.8 Yet, all such policies failed.9 During the President’s first year in office, the government tightened loan limits for homebuyers from 70% down to 40% of a property’s value in the majority of Seoul; limited debt payments to 40%; and increased capital gains taxes by 10%, among other policy changes.10 In 2018, as real estate prices rose further, the government promised the development of land for three hundred thousand new homes, as well as tightening mortgage rules.11 In 2019, the government established price caps on new developments in parts of Seoul. Nevertheless, these caps failed to stop the rising prices of apartments in affluent neighborhoods.12 In late July 2020, the government passed new jeonse laws— “jeonse” being a popular form of long-term leasing in Korea that institutes a lump-sum deposit to replace monthly rent. Such laws guaranteed a two-year extension to rental leases, and a limit on jeonse increases for this extension.13 This new law represents President Moon’s desperation to stabilize the real estate market and save face in regards to approval ratings. Prior to the enactment of this law, jeonse apartment prices in Seoul had risen for fifty-seven consecutive weeks according to data from the Korea Appraisal Board in 2020.14 Critics worry that these jeonse bills will incentivize homeowners to raise their jeonse deposit for prospective tenants, thereby continuing the problem. President Moon has promised to reapproach the housing crisis by increasing supply15 rather than curbing demand. The government has promised to build upwards of 132,000 new homes in Seoul through 2028 by “easing building height limits and converting military sites and other stateowned properties into residential areas.”16 Supply is expected to increase as regulations for redevelopment projects loosen.17 7

Jiyeun Lee and Jaehyun Eom, “Moon’s Real Estate Rules Weigh on South Korea’s Growth,” Bloomberg Quint, December 3, 2019. 8 Sang-hun Choe, “‘The Den of Thieves’: South Koreans Are Furious Over Housing Scandal,” New York Times, March 23, 2021. 9 Young-won Kim, “Moon admits failure of real estate policy,” Korea Herald, May 10, 2021. 10 “FACTBOX-South Korea tries to tame rampant real estate market,” Reuters, August 6, 2020. 11 Lee and Eom, “Moon’s Real Estate Rules Weigh on South Korea’s Growth.” 12 Ibid. 13 Bum-soo Kim, “New ‘Jeonse’ Laws Take Effect Friday, Guaranteeing 2-Year Renewal,” KBS World, July 31, 2020. 14 Ibid. 15 Ser Myo-ja, “Moon apologizes for botched real estate policy,” Korea JoongAng Daily, January 11, 2021. 16 “FACTBOX.” 17 Eun-jeong Kim, “Moon vows shift in real estate policy to increase home supply,” Yonhap News Agency, January 18, 2021.

181 Chung-Ho Kim and Kyung-Hwan Kim’s article “The Political Economy of Korean Government Policies on Real Estate” discusses a proposal similar to President Moon’s: allowing land-use conversion and development, while providing compensation for people who are affected.18 However, according to the Korea Economic Institute’s Korea View, the root of the housing problem is deeper: economic anxiety from socioeconomic disparities, as demand is driven by the belief that real estate is a safe investment vehicle.19 Our findings concur with those of Korea View and problematize the policy-based initiatives of President Moon because Korea has undergone a multitude of policies from presidency to presidency with little to no success, which suggests that there may be an underlying cause. However, we believe both the surface level issue as well as the root problem must be addressed expeditiously. Analysis and Discussion Economic insecurity stems from the general low earnings of Korean households. This may be attributed to gender disparity and youth unemployment. In 2020, Korean women earned 32.3% less than men.20 The gender wage gap, in addition to Confucian patriarchal values, makes it difficult for women to return to the workforce after giving birth, which results in lower household incomes. Koreans attempt to counter this low household income by investing in real estate. Moreover, as of January 2021, the de facto unemployment rate (the rate of unemployment/underemployment) of Koreans in the age group 15-29 was 27.2%.21 Young, unemployed adults are less likely to have the opportunities and work experience to have adequate incomes in following years and hence, fewer savings and economic security in the future. This economic insecurity has led to an increased demand, as over 75% of Korean household assets are invested in real estate, which in turn, cannot be sustained with the current number of properties.22 The anxiety that drives Koreans to invest in real estate corresponds with the elderly income poverty rate of 46%23: Koreans fear financial instability in old age. With these factors at play, housing prices in Korea have been rapidly rising, with a 5.36% on-year surge,

Chung-ho Kim, and Kyung-hwan Kim, “The Political Economy of Korean Government Policies on Real Estate,” Urban Studies 37, no. 7 (2000): 1157–69. 19 Korea View, “Seoul Housing Prices Speak to Larger Social Problems,” Korea Economic Institute, April 29, 2021. 20 “Female to male earnings ratio South Korea 2010-2020,” Statista, August 16, 2021. 21 Yon-se Kim, “High youth unemployment continues during Moon’s term,” The Korea Herald, April 22, 2021. 22 Kwon, “The Real Cause of Seoul’s Real Estate Bubble.” 23 Ye-eun Jie, “‘Start saving as early as possible for financial freedom in later years,’” The Korea Herald, June 14, 2020.

182 according to the Korea Real Estate Board.24 The increased difficulty of finding affordable housing has caused a growing interest in previously neglected neighborhoods of Korea, like Changsin. Proposals to convert unused spaces, like hotels, public parks, and military bases, into residential areas proved to be largely unpopular.25 Yet, despite the clear need for more affordable housing, the Korean government has done little to actually bring down housing costs. Gallup Korea’s Survey revealed that 58% of respondents viewed Moon’s presidency negatively, and as of April 2021, his approval ratings fell to 32%, mainly due to his unpopular housing policies.26 As of May, President Moon announced a shift in his approach to the housing crisis, and as previously mentioned, he has decided to focus on the supply side. However, this has always been the crux of the housing issue, and new housing and redevelopment of existing flats take time, a luxury that the Korean government does not have. Bokyong Seo and Yu-min Joo proffer a further conundrum for policymakers to consider when providing public housing.27 In the short history of public housing in Korea, the national or local governments have targeted poor families unable to pay rent elsewhere for relief via affordable units.28 Beginning in the aftermath of the global economic crisis in 2008, however, the target of these programs shifted from the impoverished to a group that Seo and Joo term the “less poor.” Composed mostly of young Koreans hoping to start a family, this sector—targeted by more contemporary and localized public housing efforts—made up a large part of the population of Seoul and surrounding Gyeonggi Province.29 While the government still assists the poor with public housing, Seo and Joo find a much more compelling case for housing targeted to the “less poor” in terms of both productivity and the larger effect on housing prices.30 Sang-hyun Chung et al. find a different dichotomy at the core of future affordable housing policies. They divide efforts into categories of “public housing” and “social housing,” and their paper focuses on the benefits of the latter.31 Social housing in Seoul, as defined by

Eun-jeong Kim, “Moon vows shift in real estate policy to increase home supply.” Steven Borowiec, “Commentary: A Home in Seoul Shouldn't Be This Unaffordable,” CNA, September 16, 2021. 26 Cheong-mu Yoon, “Moon's approval rating drops to another record low of 32 pct: Gallup,” Yonhap News Agency, April 2, 2021. 27 Bokyong Seo and Yu-min Joo, “Housing the very poor or the young? Implications of the changing public housing policy in South Korea,” Housing Studies 33 (2018). 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Sang-hyun Chung et al., “Past, Present, and Future of Social Housing in Seoul: Where Is Social Housing Heading to?” Sustainability, 12 (2020). 25

183 Chung et al., is a partnership of private and public entities to provide housing to low-middle income families at below-market prices.32 The important distinction that social housing is often provided by private entities is regarded by Chung et al. as a boon, “[targeting] moderate-to-lowincome tenants who earn a higher income than those in public housing.”33 Ultimately, Seo and Ju as well as Chung et al. note the necessity of expanding the beneficiaries of affordable housing projects beyond the most impoverished Koreans. We share this conclusion. However, we find the argument of Chung et al.—that social housing covers what public housing cannot—to be countered by Seo and Joo. Seo and Joo’s examination of localized affordable housing efforts aimed at the less poor demonstrates the ability of the public sector to cover larger swaths of the lower class than assumed by Chung et al.34 Chung et al. also fail to make a compelling argument that social housing would be more successful than wholly public housing at providing affordable prices, even finding that “the rent for social housing in Seoul is almost as high as that for private rental housing.”35 We concur with Seo and Joo that public housing targeted at middle-class young people would most effectively cool the housing market. Conclusions We find many of the policies enacted and proposed by various administrations in Korea to be lacking in efficacy and sufficient reach. Many such policies have already proven unsuccessful in curbing the excessive housing prices found in the Korean real estate market. Some proposals, such as that of Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon to deregulate the practice of redevelopment, are in line with our guiding principle of drastically increasing the supply of housing.36 However, more wide-reaching policy efforts must be developed in order to address an issue of this magnitude. We propose a series of policies and continued research that would address rising house costs but also the root cause of the dysfunctional real estate market in Korea. The failure of President Moon’s demand-side interventions has led to a consensus that an increase in the supply of housing would best ameliorate this crisis. We subscribe to this line of thinking, and, as mentioned previously, we agree with Seo and Joo that the public sector is best 32

Chung et al., “Past, Present, and Future of Social Housing in Seoul.” Ibid., 6. 34 Seo and Joo, “Housing the very poor or the young?” 35 Chung et al., “Past, Present, and Future of Social Housing in Seoul,” 9. 36 Jun-tae Ko, “Seoul City eases redevelopment rules in bid to tame real estate prices,” The Korea Herald, May 26, 2021. 33

184 positioned to go about this alone. Thus, the main goal of our proposition is to utilize public housing as a tool to drive down the equilibrium price of jeonse. Firstly, the growing practice of monthly rent must be curtailed. We find that a rent control price ceiling far below market price would effectively encourage housing providers to resume widespread use of jeonse instead of rent. A return to jeonse as the main means of payment would increase tenant security and reduce large-scale housing turnover. Additionally, the uniform use of jeonse would give local and national governments the opportunity to implement a program similar to Seoul’s 2007 Shift Housing program. This proposal would place public housing on the market at decreased (80% market value or lower) jeonse prices to those termed by Seo and Joo as the “less poor.”37 Jeonse leases would be offered at rolling availability with the hope to lower the private market price to remain competitive with public lease offerings. Continual public housing would be funded by the return on investment of the public jeonse collected by this system. This is not all that must be done, however. The burden of population on Seoul and Gyeonggi Province is likely unsustainable in the long run. Korea must actively pursue geographic diversification of their economy, for which we propose several interventions. The most wide-reaching intervention would be subsidies for large businesses who provide lucrative employment in Jeolla, Gyeongsang, and Gangwon. Tuitions at flagship universities outside of the Seoul metropolitan area should be lowered to encourage increased attendance. The government must also lead by example and expedite its move from Seoul to Sejong, bringing with it administrative jobs and much demand for housing no longer burdening Seoul’s market. Further research must be done into the root causes of the housing crisis, as it is not an isolated issue. The problems of gender disparity and youth unemployment are driving forces towards economic insecurity, which, in itself, is an underlying cause of the housing crisis. In other words, these are factors that are immediately linked to rising home prices, which is why many of the policies enacted by President Moon and others seem to target housing policies at the surface, whether it is through taxing or redeveloping. The implications of these findings for future research are that socioeconomic issues are deeply interconnected and their solutions require multifaceted approaches—those that consider the core struggles of everyday citizens.

Eun-cheol Park, “Seoul’s Public Lease Housing Policy,” Seoul Solution, July 24, 2017.

185 Works Cited Borowiec, Steven. “Commentary: A Home in Seoul Shouldn't Be This Unaffordable.” CNA. Accessed November 18, 2021. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/southkorea-housing-property-shortage-residential-homes-2179141. Choe, Sang-hun. “‘The Den of Thieves’: South Koreans Are Furious over Housing Scandal.” The New York Times. The New York Times, March 23, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/23/world/asia/korea-housing-lh-scandal-moonelection.html. Chung, Sang-hyun, Seung-je Kim, So-youn Park, and Jun-ha Kim. “Past, Present, and Future of Social Housing in Seoul: Where Is Social Housing Heading to?” Sustainability 12 (2020). “FACTBOX-South Korea Tries to Tame Rampant Real Estate Market.” Reuters, August 6, 2020. Accessed November 19, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/article/southkorea-economymiddleclass-idUSL3N2EV1G4. “Female to male earnings ratio South Korea 2010-2020.” Statista. August 16, 2021. https://www.statista.com/statistics/641812/south-korea-gender-pay-gap/ Jie, Ye-eun. “‘Start Saving as Early as Possible for Financial Freedom in Later Years.’” The Korea Herald. The Korea Herald, June 14, 2020. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20200614000119&amp;utm_source=hs_emai l&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_mfvGuWJ4c_HF7jVUGN7e4ocLvrEWG-pwCuIwXj_XFMZfAyY0stNaGqQMZE9YQpjo8Qow. Jung, Min-kyung. “Is South Korea Headed for Asset Bubble Collapse?” The Korea Herald. The Korea Herald, August 25, 2021. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210825000860. Kim, Bum-soo. “New ‘Jeonse’ Laws Take Effect Friday, Guaranteeing 2-Year Renewal.” KBS World, July 31, 2020. https://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&Seq_Code=155247 Kim, Chung-Ho, and Kyung-Hwan Kim. “The Political Economy of Korean Government Policies on Real Estate.” Urban Studies 37, no. 7 (2000): 1157–69. https://doi.org/10.1080/00420980020080071. Kim, Eun-jeong. “Moon Vows Shift in Real Estate Policy to Increase Home Supply.” Yonhap News Agency, January 18, 2021. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210118006951320. Kim, Yon-se. “High Youth Unemployment Continues during Moon’s Term.” The Korea Herald, April 22, 2021. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210422000380v. Kim, Young-won. “Moon Admits Failure of Real Estate Policy.” The Korea Herald, May 10,

186 2021. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210510000949. Ko Jun-tae. “Seoul City eases redevelopment rules in bid to tame real estate prices.” The Korea Herald, May 26, 2021. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210526000728 Korea View. “Seoul Housing Prices Speak to Larger Social Problems.” Korea Economic Institute of America. KEI, April 29, 2021. https://keia.org/the-peninsula/seoul-housingprices-speak-to-larger-social-problems/ Kwon, Yong. “The Real Cause of Seoul's Real Estate Bubble: Economic Anxiety.” The Diplomat. The Diplomat, August 27, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/the-realcause-of-seouls-real-estate-bubble-economic-anxiety/. Lee, Jiyeun and Jaehyun Eom. “Moon’s Property Rules Weigh on South Korea’s Growth.” Bloomberg Quint, December 3, 2019. https://www.bloombergquint.com/business/moons-real-estate-rules-have-had-consequences-for-korean-growth Park, Eun-cheol. “Seoul’s Public Lease Housing Policy.” Seoul Solution, Seoul Metropolitan Government, July 24, 2017. https://seoulsolution.kr/en/content/3449 Ryall, Julian. “Is South Korea in danger of repeating Japan’s economic bubble collapse?” DW, February 9, 2021. https://www.dw.com/en/is-south-korea-in-danger-of-repeating-japanseconomic-bubble-collapse/a-59064681. Seo, Bokyong and Yu-min Joo. “Housing the very poor or the young? Implications of the changing public housing policy in South Korea.” Housing Studies 33 (2018): 1227–1245. “Seoul Housing Prices Speak to Larger Social Problems.” Korea Economic Institute of America, April 29, 2021. https://keia.org/the-peninsula/seoul-housing-prices-speak-to-largersocial-problems/. Ser, Myo-ja. “Moon Apologizes for Botched Real Estate Policy.” Korea JoongAng Daily. Accessed November 18, 2021. https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2021/01/11/national/politics/Moon-Jaein-apologyNew-Year-address/20210111183700625.html. Yoon, Cheong-mu. “Moon's Approval Rating Drops to Another Record Low of 32 pct: Gallup.” Yonhap News Agency. Yoon Cheong-mu, April 2, 2021. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210402005100315.

187

Key Military Implications of the AUKUS Security Pact Daniel Mathew Independent Research January 23, 2022

188 Standing aboard the deck of the HMAS Canberra as the sun set across Sydney Harbor, former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull—accompanied by an entourage of Australian cabinet members—stood abreast of his French counterpart as he conveyed his vision of a free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific axis with France at the heart of the project. What he was referring to was a series of recently signed defense-cooperation agreements and a landmark $90 billion contract awarded to French defense firm Naval Group to build 12 state-of-the-art, diesel-powered, attack-class submarines.1,2,3 Three and a half years later, on September 15, 2021, at 10PM GMT, Turnbull’s successor, Prime Minister Scott Morrison, remotely reconvened with European leadership to formally announce the creation of Australia’s latest Pacific-facing security partnership.4 Except this time, floating on the monitor beside him wasn’t the French head of state, but rather British Prime Minister Boris Johnson joined by U.S. President Joe Biden, each of whom offered remarks on the new trilateral defense security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, called AUKUS. Decried as “The Betrayal of the Century” by the French press and widely criticized as undermining Australia’s reputation as a trustworthy, reliable partner, the scrapping of the French deal for AUKUS presents a clear sticking point in French-Australian relations.5 At the same time, the move carries implications for geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific region. The pact signals Western solidarity in the campaign for peace and stability in the South China Sea and reflects regional ambivalence toward a rising and increasingly assertive China despite robust trade relations. What does the AUKUS deal mean for U.S. military strategy in the South China Sea? How might China respond to what it sees as a growing threat in its backyard? What

“Macron Wants Strategic Paris-Delhi-Canberra Axis amid Pacific Tension,” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, May 2, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-france-idUSKBN1I330F. 2 Andrew Probyn, Stephen Dziedzic, and Andrew Greene, “Australia to Get Nuclear-powered Submarines, Scrap $90b Plan to Build French-designed Subs,” ABC News, September 15, 2021, accessed November 17, 2021, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-09-15/allied-naval-united-states-biden-australia-nuclear-submarines/100465628. 3 “France and Australia Can Be Heart of New Indo-Pacific Axis, Macron Says,” The Guardian, May 02, 2018, accessed November 17, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/02/france-and-australia-can-be-heartof-new-indo-pacific-axis-macron-says. 4 “Remarks by President Biden, Prime Minister Morrison of Australia, and Prime Minister Johnson of the United Kingdom Announcing the Creation of AUKUS,” The White House, September 15, 2021, accessed November 17, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/09/15/remarks-by-president-biden-primeminister-morrison-of-australia-and-prime-minister-johnson-of-the-united-kingdom-announcing-the-creation-ofaukus/. 5 Richard Ogier, “Subs: Australia's Reputation Overboard,” The Interpreter, October 11, 2021, accessed November 17, 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/subs-australia-s-reputation-overboard.

189 consequences does “The Anglosphere’s affront” have for France and Europe writ large?6 This paper seeks to illuminate answers to these questions, positing acceleration of a Sino-American undersea arms race, a reactive doubling-down on European strategic autonomy, and an enhanced U.S. capability to compete strategically in the Indo-Pacific as key military implications of the AUKUS deal. Critics of AUKUS—on both sides of the Pacific—have raised the catalyzation of an ongoing undersea arms race between the U.S. and China as a consequence of the new trilateral security pact.7 Such critics argue that the AUKUS alliance upsets the strategic balance of power in the Western Pacific, threatening a vicious cycle of shipbuilding and anti-ship warfare systems development as each contender seeks to gain the upper hand on the adversary. In an essay adapted from his book To Rule the Waves: How Control of the World’s Oceans Shapes the Fate of the Superpowers, Brookings Institution senior fellow Bruce Jones asserts “[w]hether or not America has entered a new Cold War… it’s clear that the U.S. is in a new arms race with China.”8 Likening the Luzon Strait to the Fulda Gap of the Cold War and taking a lack of Chinese cooperation on the high seas as a foregone conclusion, he identifies vast undersea cable networks, global flows of energy and goods, and control of maritime choke points as among the critical assets at stake in the contest for primacy in the Western Pacific.9 Quoting the former President of the PRC, Jones acknowledges what Hu Jintao has called the “Malacca Dilemma,” in which “[t]he more China grows, the more it is dependent on the import of goods and energy by sea through chokepoints controlled by the U.S. Navy and its allies, like the Malacca Strait between the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra.” Chinese naval ambitions could thus be seen as a purely defensive reaction to growing perceived threats in waterways vital to Chinese interests. However, Chinese militarization of dredged-up maritime features in the Spratly and Paracel islands, construction of U.S. Navy vessel mock-ups in its northwestern deserts, and browbeating of the Australian government into addressing fourteen Chinese grievances render this claim

Ogier, “Subs: Australia's Reputation Overboard.” Lyle Goldstein, “The Unintended Consequences of the AUKUS Deal,” Defense News, October 29, 2021, accessed November 17, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/10/29/the-unintended-consequencesof-the-aukus-deal/. 8 Bruce Jones, “The Challenge of China's Rising Power on the Seas,” The Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2021, accessed November 17, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/the-challenge-of-chinas-rising-power-on-the-seas11631808521. 9 “Gap Fulda,” Encyclopædia Britannica, accessed November 17, 2021, https://www.britannica.com/place/FuldaGap. 7

190 doubtful.10,11,12 Growing great-power tensions in the Indo-Pacific have not flown under the radar of regional players. Notably, Malaysia expressed concerns that the new tripartite security pact could spark a nuclear arms race in the Indo-Pacific, echoing the sentiment captured in a statement issued by Indonesia’s foreign ministry relating “[deep concern] over the continuing arms race and power projection in the region.”13,14 If a defense agreement with Australia and the U.K. is Washington’s response to Beijing’s maximalist agenda in the South China Sea and increasingly aggressive posture toward Taiwan, the corollary to this is tighter Sino-Russian alignment, according to a news report published by the Global Times.15 The article articulates the concept of "no end, no forbidden zone, and no upper limit" in describing the strategic partnership of cooperation between the Chinese and Russian governments. Explicitly referencing the AUKUS security alliance, it calls for “[s]trengthening maritime joint military exercises and military-technical cooperation as a means to ‘make the map strong.’” The AUKUS deal thus risks a “[s]emi-permanent marriage between Russia’s military design genius and China’s industrial production acumen on large projects,” compounding the effects of an ongoing undersea arms race and posing a significant challenge to American counterbalancing of rising Chinese influence and military power in the region.16 While AUKUS may have initiated a military rebalancing among its adversaries, the deal has likely induced a political rebalancing among its allies. Specifically, the prioritization of European strategic autonomy among EU member states represents a plausible outgrowth of the

Steven Stashwick, “China's South China Sea Militarization Has Peaked,” Foreign Policy, August 19, 2019, accessed November 17, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/19/chinas-south-china-sea-militarization-haspeaked/. 11 Press, The Associated, “Satellite Images Show China Built Mock-Ups of US Warships, Possibly for Target Practice,” Defense News, Defense News, January 27, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/flashpoints/2021/11/08/satellite-images-show-china-built-mock-ups-of-us-warshipspossibly-for-targetpractice/?utm_source=Sailthru&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=EBB+11.09.2021&amp;utm_term= Editorial+-+Early+Bird+Brief. 12 Walter Russell Mead, “Opinion | Aukus Is the Indo-Pacific Pact of the Future,” The Wall Street Journal, September 27, 2021, accessed November 17, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/aukus-indo-pacific-pact-chinaaustralia-11632775481?mod=Searchresults_pos13&page=1. 13 Bloomberg.com, accessed November 17, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-18/malaysiasays-aukus-alliance-may-lead-to-arms-race-provocation. 14 Bloomberg.com, accessed November 17, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-17/indonesiais-wary-of-arms-race-after-australia-nuclear-sub-deal. 15 刘：中俄合作可增加更多海洋度, accessed November 17, 2021, https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/459zZZoD0bI. (translated into English with Google Translate) 16 Lyle Goldstein, “The Unintended Consequences of the AUKUS Deal.”

191 AUKUS deal. Australia’s decision to scrap its original contract for 12 French-procured conventional attack-class submarines in favor of AUKUS—which involved security cooperation across the cyberspace, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and underseas domains—left France holding the bag on what would have been Australia’s largest-ever defense contract: a $90 billion, 35-year megadeal symbolizing a legacy of friendship forged across decades of defense cooperation.17,18 French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian described the move as “a stab in the back.” He stated that France “had established a relationship of trust with Australia, [and that] this trust has been betrayed.”19 In an attempt to assuage French pique, President Biden distanced himself from the inception of AUKUS during a press conference with President Macron at Villa Bonaparte. Biden claimed that “what we did was ‘clumsy’” and that he had been “under the impression that France had been informed long before that the deal was not going through.”20 Biden’s political handwringing, however, did little to soothe exasperated French sensibilities. Neither did it relieve Australia from its contractual obligations. As Le Drian put it, “[w]e have contracts. The Australians need to tell us how they’re getting out of it… We have an intergovernmental deal... with precise commitments, with clauses.”21 While the Australian National Audit Office later confirmed that the contracts established rights, incentives, and protections, including contractual off-ramps, the sense of Australian betrayal of European loyalty lingered in the French national conscience. This feeling prompted Le Drian to join Minister of Armed Forces Florence Parly in issuing a joint communique advocating European strategic autonomy against a backdrop of ever-closer Anglosphere alignment. “The regrettable decision just announced on the FSP,” the statement reads, “only heightens the need to raise loud and clear

Joe Gould, “New Pact with the US and UK Is Set to Sink Australia's Historic Submarine Buy from France,” Defense News, Defense News, September 16, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2021/09/15/new-pactwith-the-us-and-uk-is-set-to-sink-australias-historic-submarine-buy-from-france/. 18 Gordon Lubold, “U.S. to Share Nuclear Submarine Technology With Australia in New Pact,” The Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2021, accessed November 17, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-forms-a-newsecurity-alliance-for-asia-with-the-u-k-and-australia-11631741734?mod=Searchresults_pos4&page=2. 19 “‘Stab in the Back’: French Fury as Australia Scraps Submarine Deal,” The Guardian, September 16, 2021, accessed November 17, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/16/stab-in-the-back-french-furyaustralia-scraps-submarine-deal. 20 “Remarks by President Biden and President Macron of the French Republic Before Bilateral Meeting,” The White House, October 29, 2021, accessed November 17, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speechesremarks/2021/10/29/remarks-by-president-biden-and-president-macron-of-the-french-republic-before-bilateralmeeting-2/. 21 Zoya Sheftalovich, “Why Australia Wanted out of Its French Submarine Deal,” POLITICO, September 16, 2021, accessed November 17, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/why-australia-wanted-out-of-its-french-sub-deal/.

192 the issue of European strategic autonomy.”22 The notion received further ballast from European Union foreign minister Josep Borrell, who argued, “[the AUKUS announcement] forces us once again to reflect on the need to make the issue of European strategic autonomy a priority. This shows that we must survive on our own.”23 By exposing European vulnerabilities vis-à-vis declining American commitment to EU security in its pivot to the Western Pacific, critics argue, the AUKUS agreement will accelerate European strategic autonomy; that is, Europe’s pursuit of strategic objectives and military capabilities independent of its partnership with the U.S.24 Advocates of European strategic autonomy contend the principle acknowledges related yet distinct American and European interests abroad, especially as they relate to China, where Europe is developing an approach prioritizing “engagement” with China, in contrast to the U.S. emphasis on deterrence.25 In such advocates’ view, the underhand blow dealt by the Americans merely represents the latest of a long train of European qualms casting doubt on U.S. security commitments to Europe, including the recent US withdrawal from Afghanistan.26 Moreover, greater strategic autonomy may help Europe avoid getting sucked into a U.S.-led Cold War with China. Hence, a key military implication of AUKUS may be a shift in the European Union’s political center of gravity away from the prevailing U.S.-defined North Atlantic defense architecture toward continental Europe. Balancing the undesirable effects of an accelerated naval arms race and shift toward European strategic autonomy is the potential future impact AUKUS could have as a force for peace and a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. We begin by homing in on the militarystrategic implications for Australia and, subsequently, widen the aperture of our lens to consider 22

Ministère De L'Europe Et Des Affaires étrangères, “Joint Communiqué Issued by Jean-Yves Le Drian and Florence Parly (16 Sept. 2021),” France Diplomacy - Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, accessed November 17, 2021, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/australia/news/article/joint-communique-issued-by-jeanyves-le-drian-and-florence-parly-16-sept-2021. 23 “Aukus: China Denounces US-UK-Australia Pact as Irresponsible,” BBC News, September 17, 2021, accessed November 17, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-58582573. 24 Written by Eldar Mamedov Share Copy Print, Written By Eldar Mamedov, Written By, Eldar Mamedov, Anatol Lieven, Anatol Lieven, Muhammad Sahimi, Muhammad Sahimi, Ethan Paul, Ethan Paul, Peter Van Buren, Peter Van Buren, and Eldar Mamedov, “Will AUKUS Ruckus Lead to Strategic Autonomy in Europe?” Responsible Statecraft, September 27, 2021, accessed November 17, 2021, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/09/25/willaukus-ruckus-lead-to-strategic-autonomy-in-europe/. 25 Benjamin Tallis, “‘Strategic Autonomy’ Is More Dangerous for Europe than AUKUS,” The Interpreter, October 26, 2021, accessed November 17, 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/strategic-autonomy-moredangerous-europe-aukus. 26 Emilian Kavalski and Nicholas Ross Smith, “Europe's Time to Find Its Superpower,” The Interpreter, October 19, 2021, accessed November 17, 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/europe-s-time-find-itssuperpower.

193 the broader consequences of AUKUS for the Indo-Pacific region. The AUKUS deal comes on the heels of a China-focused Australian defense overhaul, encompassing a commitment of $186 billion toward the establishment of world-class defense programs including radar surveillance, long-range missiles, and offensive cyber technologies in response to escalating tensions with China.27 AUKUS extends these gains, building on a century-old security alliance with the U.S. and U.K. and arranging for the procurement of a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines for Australia.28 The deal marks the first time the U.S. has shared its classified nuclear propulsion capabilities with an ally since the U.S.-U.K. Mutual Defense Agreement of 1958. The deal also promises to enhance Australia’s naval power.29 Years of escalating maritime pressure from China underscore the significance of the deal to Australia. According to an article in the Wall Street Journal, throughout 2020, Beijing levied a series of import restrictions and tariffs on Australian products in retaliation against the Prime Minister’s calls for an investigation into the origins of the coronavirus.30 The article documents further instances of Chinese badgering, including the detention of Australian citizens and demands that government officials and the Australian media refrain from criticizing China’s political system. The AUKUS deal thus stands as a symbol of Western solidarity in the face of growing pressure from China aimed at coercing regional actors into compliance. AUKUS vests Australia with the backing of U.S. and U.K. naval forces. Such military capabilities decrease the likelihood of Chinese-Australian confrontations on common waters. The AUKUS deal is likely to also carry implications for the Indo-Pacific region. For instance, the tripartite pact could serve as the model for future U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific, providing an on-ramp for countries like Taiwan and Japan to enter into closer security ties with the U.S. if China proceeds down the path of coercion-induced compliance.31 Moreover, AUKUS’s multi-faceted focus on emerging high-tech areas such as cyber security, artificial intelligence, and quantum technologies poses a barrier to China’s pursuit of naval dominance in 27

Rachel Pannett, “Australia Lays Out China-Focused Defense Overhaul,” The Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2020, accessed November 17, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/australia-lays-out-china-focused-defense-overhaul11593595679?mod=article_inline. 28 “Remarks by President Biden, Prime Minister Morrison of Australia, and Prime Minister Johnson of the United Kingdom Announcing the Creation of AUKUS,” The White House, September 15, 2021. 29 Joe Gould, “New Pact with the US and UK Is Set to Sink Australia's Historic Submarine Buy from France.” 30 The Editorial Board, “Opinion | A Smart Submarine Deal with the Aussies,” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, September 16, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-smart-submarine-deal-for-the-aussies-us-ukaustralia-china-france-aukus-11631830017?mod=Searchresults_pos2&page=2. 31 Walter Russell Mead, “Opinion | Aukus Is the Indo-Pacific Pact of the Future.”

194 the Indo-Pacific, placing the security pact among a broader set of American strategic initiatives aimed at sustaining the “fabric of deterrence” across the Indo-Pacific.32 Ultimately, AUKUS is likely to check China’s maritime territorial ambitions in the South China Sea through improved interoperability between American, British, and Australian militaries. For instance, the integration of nuclear-powered submarines—which, unlike their diesel-propelled counterparts, have effectively unlimited range and do not need oxygen—into Australia’s existing naval capabilities may help stave off China’s ambition to control Taiwan and dominate disputed maritime territory in the Western Pacific.33 A Taiwan scenario would likely involve a combination of advanced, leading-edge military platforms and systems such as amphibious attack vessels, fighter jets, and potentially even coordinates swarms of drones. Nevertheless, AUKUS’ commitment to expanding Australia’s submarine fleet with nuclear-powered vessels increases the U.S.’ forward-deployed military stance in the region, widening the potential arsenal of allied reinforcements the U.S. could call upon in the event of a militarized confrontation with China over Taiwan.34 A fourth, more speculative implication of the AUKUS deal is the potential for expanded nuclear proliferation among non-nuclear states, especially Iran. This critique argues that by agreeing to share its proprietary technology with Australia, the U.S. has set a precedent regarding the acceptable use of nuclear-powered reactors to drive military platforms. The law prohibits Australia from maintaining a civil nuclear industry, and all three heads of state stressed the point that the submarines procured would be conventionally armed and merely nuclear-powered. However, as Malcolm Turnbull—former Prime Minister of Australia—observes in his Address to the National Press Club, “[f]or Australia, a non-nuclear weapons state, using HEU in a submarine is not a breach of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation (NPT), but it does set a precedent which other currently non-nuclear weapons states, like Iran, will seek to exploit as a justification for producing HEU.”35 Accordingly, current non-nuclear states may begin or resume the development of highly enriched uranium (HEU) under the pretext of developing nuclearpowered, conventionally-armed platforms. The issue, however, is the inability of the

Joe Gould, “New Pact with the US and UK Is Set to Sink Australia's Historic Submarine Buy from France.” The Editorial Board, “Opinion | A Smart Submarine Deal with the Aussies.” 34 Lyle Goldstein, “The Unintended Consequences of the AUKUS Deal.” 35 “Address to the National Press Club - September 2021,” Malcolm Turnbull, accessed November 17, 2021, https://www.malcolmturnbull.com.au/media/address-to-the-national-press-club-september-2021#_ftn6. 33

195 International Atomic Energy Agency to require signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to submit reactor technology and materials used to power such platforms to IAEA inspections.36 In sum, the AUKUS deal conveys a range of implications that only time can unfold. At the heart of the deal is a deep and flexible partnership that marks a decades-old history of friendship between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Moreover, the deal positions the aforementioned countries at the forefront of the Western campaign to preserve the integrity of freedom of navigation principles in international common waters. At the same time, the deal presents a series of attendant challenges, ranging from the vexation of French sensibilities to the potential for an escalating arms race between the U.S. and China, to the potential for Europe to increasingly pursue a track of strategic autonomy in the wake of the U.S. pivot to Asia and waning commitment to European security. Moreover, the deal may herald a new model with which regional partners—such as Taiwan, Japan, and even India—may seek to engage with the U.S. in the face of growing military and economic pressure from China.

Shogo Akagawa, “AUKUS Pact Delivers Blow to Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” Nikkei Asia, October 21, 2021, accessed November 17, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Comment/AUKUS-pact-delivers-blow-tonuclear-nonproliferation-regime.

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North Korea: Rogue by Definition? Claire McCrea Nuclear Proliferation in Asia: Politics and History Professor James Person December 16, 2021

200 Introduction When I heard the term “rogue state” for the first time as a sophomore in college taking a course in international relations theory, there was no room for questioning or deeper consideration. The term was presented as a fact and accepted as a given—and to many realists, it might as well be. Three years later, the term continues to appear in the reading material assigned to me by professors. Throughout the past semester, the readings for my American foreign policy class have casually defined North Korea as an “outlaw,” a “rogue,” and a “pariah.” Once again, these labels are used without much deeper explanation but presented as scientific fact. The problem, however, is that terms like these are rarely simple. In fact, the origin of the “rogue state” theory and how the United States government has strategically used it to define North Korea are both complex and warrant further investigation. Rather than simply accept this characterization of North Korea as a “rogue” player on the international stage, we should question the justification for its use. Therefore, this paper examines and evaluates the rogue state theory and its application to North Korea. My research will consider: the origins of the theory and what motivates U.S. policymakers to give North Korea the label of rogue state; North Korea’s history and how it relates to its goals, concerns, and motivations; and whether the use of “rogue” to describe North Korea is fair, and if the term should even be used at all. The American government is the only government that has officially used the term rogue state; moreover, it has created a large umbrella under which it has categorized its most serious enemies—Iran, Libya, Cuba, Afghanistan, and more. For North Korea to be grouped in with these states and effectively named a primary threat to U.S. national security, therefore, is significant. Additionally, if—upon closer investigation—the application of this term is found to be flawed, it will have important implications not only for U.S. foreign policy itself, but also for the way that policymakers understand North Korea, its place in the world, and the motives that drive its behavior. While international security scholar Alexandra Homolar—whom I will reference in this paper—directly criticized rogue theory through her research, she did not consider in-depth the unique historical context in which North Korea exists that influences its so-called “rogue” behavior. In this paper, I aim to show not only that the rogue state theory is flawed, but that scholars and policymakers should have never applied it to North Korea in the first place—and that the Kim regime is just as rational as any other state actor.

201 Literature Review In order to understand the motives behind North Korea’s behavior—particularly in relation to its nuclear program—it is necessary to examine how its historical experiences have influenced its understanding of its place in the world. This paper will reference works such as No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security by Jonathan Pollack and North Korea: Markets and Military Rule by Hazel Smith, both of which provide narrative accounts and analyses of the development of North Korea’s nuclear program and the events throughout the twentieth century that shaped both its security concerns and sense of national identity. Both works identify historic events that played a role in convincing the Kim regime of the necessity to develop and maintain a robust nuclear arsenal. These events demonstrate the rationality of North Korea’s nuclear program and the legitimacy of its security concerns, suggesting that its “rogue” or “irrational” label is not justified. In addition to these secondary sources, I will also utilize collections of primary sources related to North Korea’s nuclear program. First, in “North Korea's Efforts to Acquire Nuclear Technology and Nuclear Weapons: Evidence from Russian and Hungarian Archives,” Balazs Szalontai and Sergey Radchenko provide a collection of documents that suggest that North Korea’s nuclear development was “influenced both by the nuclear policies of Pyongyang’s opponents—above all, South Korea and the U.S.—and the nuclear programs of its allies—China, the USSR, and the East European Soviet-bloc countries.”1 Next, in “The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Origins of North Korea’s Policy of Self-Reliance in National Defense,” James Person uses primary sources to explain how the 1961 military junta in South Korea and the Cuban Missile Crisis specifically precipitated North Korea’s shift toward obtaining nuclear capabilities as a means of achieving independence in national defense. Finally, I will also be using a selection of translated primary sources from the Wilson Center’s digital archive of North Korean nuclear history, as these documents demonstrate the regime’s motivations for developing its nuclear program in its own words. Rather than make assumptions about what drives North Korea’s behavior, this paper will directly examine the thought process of North Korean leaders and diplomats and how they responded to—and understood—specific threats to its security.

Szalontai Balázs and S. S. Radchenko, North Korea's Efforts to Acquire Nuclear Technology and Nuclear Weapons: Evidence From Russian and Hungarian Archives (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2006).

202 As previously mentioned, this paper will also rely on Alexandra Homolar’s analysis of rogue state theory. In “Rebels without a Conscience: The Evolution of the Rogue States Narrative in U.S. Security Policy,” Homolar argues that “the puzzle of how US post-Cold War foreign and defence policy came to be focused on ‘irrational’—but militarily inferior— adversaries can be understood through analysing how actors within the US defence community discursively constructed discrete international crises as the trigger for a major shift in US threat scenarios.”2 In other words, Homolar presents a critique of rogue state theory wherein the U.S. government applies the term “rogue state” not based on security concerns, but rather on political motives. The strength of Homolar’s argument is that she provides what many international relations scholars who use the term casually do not provide: context. Rather than accept the U.S. government’s argument at face value, she interrogates more deeply how changing U.S. domestic and foreign policy contexts also change the term’s usage and how it is applied. While Homolar does not consider North Korea as a specific case study in her research, her findings are sufficient to cast doubt on the U.S. government’s use of the rogue state theory to justify foreign policy in any context. What is a Rogue State? In this essay, I will be examining four main subjects: the definition of a rogue state; how historical events have impacted North Korea’s decision to develop a nuclear weapons program; how North Korea understands its place in the world and relates its security concerns to its ideology; how North Korea has responded to perceived threats to its security; and finally, the extent to which the rogue state label is justifiable in the North Korean context. At this point, it is clear that “rogue state” is a complex term with a controversial history—but what exactly does it mean to be “rogue” in the eyes of the U.S. government? While the term has been in use since 1979, its official application to North Korea would occur later in 1985 and gain further relevance in the twenty-first century.3 In 2003, then U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton claimed that

Alexandra Homolar, “Rebels Without a Conscience: The Evolution of the Rogue States Narrative in US Security Policy,” European Journal of International Relations 17, no. 4 (2010): pp. 705-727, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066110383996. 3 Robert S. Litwak, Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000).

203 “rogue regimes” were the greatest security threat faced by the United States and its allies in the twenty-first century. While giving remarks at a conference, Bolton claimed, “Whether the nuclear capabilities of states like Iran, North Korea and others are threats today, or ‘only’ threats ‘tomorrow,’ there can be no dispute that our attention is required now before the threats become reality, and tens of thousands of innocent civilians, or more, have been vaporized.”4 He ended his assessment with a warning for these so-called “rogue” states: “If [they] are not willing to follow the logic of nonproliferation norms, they must be prepared to face the logic of adverse consequences.”5 Though now largely forgotten, this speech signaled the U.S. government’s pivot away from traditional Cold War-era fears of Soviet aggression and toward this new threat of the “rogue state.” According to those who subscribe to the rogue state theory, these nations present a particularly dangerous threat to U.S. national security by virtue of its irrationality, refusal to adhere to international norms, and inability to negotiate.6 Whereas the Soviet Union could at least be trusted to follow accepted norms and make rational nuclear policy decisions, states like North Korea act irrationally, making nuclear deterrence and diplomacy useless. In other words, if successful deterrence requires one’s opponent to make a rational decision (i.e., recognize that the cost of nuclear retaliation is too high), rogue states like North Korea are, by definition, undeterrable. Furthermore, in the case of a regime with a serious human rights abuse record like North Korea, policymakers claim that this apparent “indifference to the domestic consequences of its actions in the international arena is believed to grant an oppressive regime greater freedom of action in its foreign policy conduct.”7 Now that rogue state theory has been outlined, it is possible to pose my primary research questions: is North Korea really a rogue regime? Are its nuclear provocations indicative of illogical, irrational, and unpredictable behavior? Based on the research and primary sources I have investigated, I hypothesize that North Korea does not fit the conditions to be classified as a “rogue” state. North Korea’s behavior (developing its nuclear arsenal, making provocative statements about its intentions, etc.) is a rational response to what it perceives to be threats to its

John R. Bolton (December 2, 2003). Ibid. 6 Homolar, “Rebels Without a Conscience: The Evolution of the Rogue States Narrative in US Security Policy.” 7 Ibid. 5

204 vital security interests. Furthermore, the rogue state theory itself is inherently problematic and should not be relied upon by foreign policymakers. North Korea’s Historical Experiences and its Nuclear Program The key to understanding the rationale behind North Korea’s behavior—especially in relation to its nuclear program—is examining the historical context in which the program itself was developed. According to Szalontai and Radchenko, the history of North Korea’s nuclear development and its cooperation with the Soviet Union “can only be understood in the context of the Cold War.”8 Kim Il Sung was constantly taking note of the Cold War dynamics that impacted his country’s security. If the reliability of the Soviet Union or China was in doubt—which it often was—North Korea’s sense of perceived threats to its security heightened and therefore so did its desire to turn to other methods of warding off foreign attack.9 Whereas the likelihood that its allies would come to its aid in the case of an American or South Korean attack varied depending on ever-shifting superpower relations, a robust nuclear weapons program would allow North Korea to pursue an independent path in protecting its national security.10 These security concerns were not merely the result of Kim Il Sung’s paranoia; according to Szalontai and Radchenko, “[North Korea’s] fear of being overtaken by other countries, above all, by South Korea, proved justified.”11 In 1960, North Korea learned for the first time that the United States had introduced nuclear weapons to South Korea.12 In fact, for three decades, “substantial nuclear assets were deployed in and near Korea and were fully integrated into US war planning.”13 North Korea not only faced this constant threat to its security, but also had to contend with the fact that it lacked its own form of retaliatory capability; in other words, without its own nuclear program, the regime had no way of deterring a U.S. nuclear strike.14 According to Jonathan Pollack, three concerns shaped Kim’s desire to develop a nuclear program: first, he doubted that his allies would support his military ambitions in the long term and recognized that any support from them was conditional; second, he was increasingly concerned by South Korea’s nuclear superiority and feared it would lead to a southern8

Balázs and Radchenko, North Korea's Efforts to Acquire Nuclear Technology and Nuclear Weapons: Evidence From Russian and Hungarian Archives. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 A. M. Puzanov (Washington, D.C., n.d.). 13 Jonathan D. Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security (Routledge, 2017). 14 Ibid.

205 dominated Peninsula; finally, he was already considering the process of leadership succession and viewed nuclear capability as a means of ensuring its success.15 Ultimately, Kim understood that in order to address all three of these issues, he would need to construct his own “impregnable strategic fortress” of nuclear weapons through which North Korea could independently defend itself from foreign threats.16 Besides these larger structural concerns, two events in particular had a significant impact on Kim’s sense of urgency surrounding nuclear development. First, in May 1961, South Korean General Park Chung Hee staged a coup d’état and led an anti-communist military junta into power.17 Feeling increasingly threatened by South Korea’s militancy, the North Korean Standing Committee of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party “called for measures to be taken to drastically militarize the state.”18 While this shift in policy entailed making changes to both North Korea’s society and its conventional forces, it also entailed a more rapid build-up of its nuclear capabilities. Next, in October 1962, the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis had a significant impact on Soviet-North Korean relations and dramatically weakened Kim Il Sung’s faith in his communist allies.19 North Korea viewed Moscow’s agreement with the U.S. to remove its missiles from Cuba not only as a “capitulation,” but also as evidence of the USSR’s unreliability as a superpower ally to smaller communist states.20 In other words, Kim understood the crisis as an indication of Moscow’s prioritizing “peaceful coexistence” over its ideology and allies.21 Relations between the two nations worsened in subsequent months as the USSR failed to deliver the weapons and machinery North Korea had requested—support it viewed as critical to its survival.22 At this point, the North Korean state assumed that it could no longer rely on the Soviet Union to uphold its obligations outlined in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance it had previously signed with North Korea.23 In December 1962, North Korea

Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security. Ibid. 17 James Person, “The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Origins of North Korea’s Policy of Self-Reliance in National Defense,” Wilson Center Digital Archive (The Wilson Center, October 2012), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/north-korea-and-the-cuban-missile-crisis. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 16

206 expressed its loss of faith in the Soviet Union by holding a plenary session of the Central Committee without informing the Soviets for the first time ever.24 It was at this session that the Party first outlined its new policy of chawi, or self-reliance in national defense.25 North Korea’s trust in the Soviet Union deteriorated even further in the 1970s as both China and the USSR began to improve their relations with the U.S., diminishing the leverage it held over Moscow’s and Beijing’s behavior.26 From these two experiences, North Korea drew one important conclusion: “[it] could depend on no one to uphold its fundamental strategic interests.”27 Pursuing a policy based on the principle of chawi was the only way forward—and that could only be achieved through the development of an indigenous nuclear weapons program. Historical context continued to shape North Korea’s understanding of nuclear weapons throughout the rest of the century and into the next one. In 1991, the Korean People’s Army expressed its sense of inferiority in terms of conventional forces; in a public statement, it argued that unilateral troop reductions on the North Korean side had created a power imbalance on the Korean Peninsula.28 This sense of military vulnerability was exacerbated by the U.S.’ decisive defeat of Iraqi forces in the 1991 Gulf War, demonstrating to North Korea the importance of military deterrence via nuclear weapons against a conventionally powerful state like the U.S.29 Furthermore, the 2011 overthrow of the Libyan regime and subsequent assassination of its dictator Muammar Qaddafi after it followed U.S. guidance and relinquished its nuclear weapons was perhaps the Kim regime’s most important historical lesson.30 In the last months of Kim Jong Il’s life, the Libyan crisis confirmed two things for the regime: first, that nuclear-armed states are never attacked; second, that if it wants to survive, North Korea can never give up its nuclear weapons.31 Trusting the United States and giving up its power of credible nuclear deterrence could only produce one fate—overthrow, destruction, and assassination. North Korea and its Place in the World

Louise Waldenström, “North Korea's Juche Ideology and Its Implications on Pyongyang's Relations with Washington, 1994-2004” (Swedish Defence Research Agency, February 2005). 25 Ibid. 26 Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security. 27 Ibid. 28 Hazel Smith, North Korea: Markets and Military Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid.

207 North Korea’s nuclear program was shaped not only by historical experience, but also by its understanding of itself, its ideology, and its place in the world. According to Jonathan Pollack, “Survivalism has long dominated the thinking of leaders in the North,” who view their nation as a “small, vulnerable system surrounded by far more powerful states unprepared to accord it requisite autonomy and international standing.”32 Kim in particular viewed himself as a “survivor in a hostile world.”33 This sense of victimization has been repeatedly exacerbated by the great power conflict in which North Korea has often found itself. During the Korean War, Kim dealt with feelings of insecurity and helplessness as he faced down the United States, a nuclear power, knowing that his only way of surviving a nuclear strike from the U.S. depended on the Soviet Union for nuclear deterrence.34 Kim Il Sung, whose own policy of juche or self-reliance had roots in the rejection of Korea’s former “serving the great” relationship with China, strongly resented his country’s dependence on its larger, more powerful allies to protect it from its enemies.35 Additionally, Kim also resented being caught in the middle of great-power conflict, especially when his nation’s defense depended on its machinations; in 1971, he claimed, “We are surrounded by three great powers and their influence can be felt.”36 North Korea’s position between these great powers—China, the USSR, and the U.S.— became increasingly uncomfortable as relations between the three nations changed. In the 1970s, for instance, warming Sino-American relations left North Korea feeling vulnerable and betrayed as it felt it could no longer rely on China for defense in the event of an American attack.37 Earlier, in 1967, Kim had expressed a negative view of the relaxation of East-West tensions: “A relaxation of tensions on one front cannot serve to improve the international situation as a whole but, on the contrary, will help the imperialists to increase aggression on another front.”38 Kim understood that as relations improved between China, the Soviet Union, and the U.S., the relative

Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security. Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 “A 20 December 1967 DVO Memo About the Attitude of the Korean Leadership Toward the Issues of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Washington, D.C., December 20, 1967, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/113/north-korean-nuclear-history/2. 33

208 importance on the global stage of North Korea’s existence—and therefore security—would decrease. Unfortunately for Kim, many of his fears would be realized in the later years of the end of the Cold War. After Gorbachev’s election in 1985 and China’s expansion of economic reforms in the years following, both Moscow and Beijing began to pivot away from North Korea and toward the United States.39 Furthermore, both nations’ decision to normalize relations with South Korea put North Korea at an acute strategic disadvantage. This confirmed once again it would have to act independently to preserve its security.40 Ultimately, North Korea’s concerns about its allies and its global position go beyond simple security concerns; its nuclear strategy is intrinsically tied to its ideology and understanding of its place in the world. As previously mentioned, one of North Korea’s top priorities is independence and freedom from having to “serve the great” in order to survive. Kim Il Sung understood that in order to achieve self-reliance in national defense—and break free from its dependence on fickle, great power allies—he would have to even the playing field.41 Whereas it would be difficult to match the United States and South Korea in terms of conventional military power, a robust nuclear arsenal would provide North Korea with a “trump card” in any conflict with larger powers.42 In Kim’s view, nuclear weapons would provide his nation with “a guarantee of economic, political, and military self-reliance.”43 Furthermore, Kim believed that having the power of nuclear weapons behind his regime would help North Korea gain the respect and prestige he felt it was owed.44 When pressed by Soviet diplomats to consider nonproliferation controls in 1962, North Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Pak Seong-cheol observed, The Americans hold on to Taiwan, to South Korea and South Vietnam, blackmail the people with their nuclear weapons, and, with their help, rule on these continents and do not intend to leave. Their possession of nuclear weapons, and the lack thereof in our hands, objectively helps them, therefore, to eternalize their rule. They have a large

Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security. Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Balázs and Radchenko, North Korea's Efforts to Acquire Nuclear Technology and Nuclear Weapons: Evidence From Russian and Hungarian Archives. 44 Ibid. 40

209 stockpile, and we are to be forbidden even to think about the manufacture of nuclear weapons? I think that in such case the advantage will be on the Americans’ side.45 North Korea therefore believed that if the U.S. had nuclear weapons and it did not, the global balance would be unfairly skewed, and North Korea itself would be robbed of its rightful place on the world stage. Additionally, Kim was also highly conscious of South Korea’s own nuclear development and worried about being overtaken by its southern counterpart both militarily and in terms of global prestige.46 According to Pollack, “Kim Il-sung viewed nuclear power as a talisman that would affirm the country’s standing as an advanced scientific and industrial power.”47 Ultimately, North Korea developed its nuclear program not only as a response to perceived threats to its security, but also as a means of maintaining military self-defense and breaking free from the influence of larger powers. Conclusion: Is North Korea Really a “Rogue” State? As demonstrated by both its historical experiences and ideological principles, North Korea’s decision to nuclearize is completely rational. Events like the Cuban Missile Crisis and the normalization of Soviet-U.S. relations made North Korea feel increasingly vulnerable about its allies’ commitment to upholding its defense obligations. These changes convinced North Korea that in order to survive, it needed to adopt the principle of chawi and take its defense into its own hands. Aware that it likely could not defend against a conventional attack from the U.S. or South Korea, the regime sought to obtain a means of defense that would provide a guarantee of security against its enemies: nuclear weapons. Besides basic security concerns, North Korea also sought to improve its standing in the world and avoid having its fate be dependent on the actions of other states. Ultimately, all of these concerns are legitimate and justified, and evidence suggests that nuclearization has helped North Korea allay these concerns and achieve its security goals. As Szalontai and Radchenko point out, North Korea’s nuclear threats often have clear purposes, such as coercing international powers into entering multilateral talks.48 The regime purposely 45

“Conversation Between Soviet Ambassador in North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and North Korean Foreign Minister Park Seong-Cheol,” Washington, D.C., August 24, 1962. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110598. 46 Balázs and Radchenko, North Korea's Efforts to Acquire Nuclear Technology and Nuclear Weapons: Evidence From Russian and Hungarian Archives. 47 Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security. 48 Balázs and Radchenko, North Korea's Efforts to Acquire Nuclear Technology and Nuclear Weapons: Evidence From Russian and Hungarian Archives.

210 portrays its behavior as unpredictable and recklessly aggressive in order to inspire stronger reactions from its enemies; its actions, in reality, are based on careful planning and coordination.49 These strategic provocations have often proved successful. According to Hazel Smith, North Korea’s nuclear program has helped it achieve one of its most important goals: “persuading the United States to treat North Korea as a sovereign, equal state.”50 Additionally, the country’s characterization as a nuclear threat has helped it receive special diplomatic treatment from the U.S. in comparison to other so-called “rogue” states; whereas other U.S. enemies are given the “pariah” treatment, North Korea’s status as a significant national security threat has earned it limited engagement with the United States.51 If North Korea’s behavior does not deserve to be characterized as irrational or unpredictable, why does the rogue state label remain prevalent? The answer lies in the fact that rogue state theory is based on political goals and not a fair assessment of North Korea’s behavior. In “Rebels without a Conscience: The Evolution of the Rogue States Narrative in US Security Policy,” Homolar argues that the “foundations of the contemporary US preoccupation with the problem of rogue states were formed in the elite political contests over competing narratives to define the nature of the post-Cold War era.”52 The purpose of the U.S. focus on rogue states, she argues, was to provide members of the U.S. defense sector with “a useful political resource to legitimate the protection of the U.S. defence sector from more severe budgetary reductions and radical institutional transformation.”53 Similarly, in his own assessment of rogue state theory, Robert Litwak points out that the rogue state label has always been used by agents who have something to gain from the “maintenance and orderly working of the international system.”54 Furthermore, the label can be applied and dropped and reapplied depending on domestic American politics.55 North Korea no doubt presents a legitimate threat to international security, regardless of how we choose to label the regime. The ultimate goal in any dealings with the DPRK should be denuclearization, peace on the Korean Peninsula, and the improvement of the human rights 49

Balázs and Radchenko, North Korea's Efforts to Acquire Nuclear Technology and Nuclear Weapons: Evidence From Russian and Hungarian Archives. 50 Smith, North Korea: Markets and Military Rule. 51 Litwak, Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War. 52 Homolar, “Rebels Without a Conscience: The Evolution of the Rogue States Narrative in US Security Policy.” 53 Ibid. 54 Litwak, Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War. 55 Ibid.

211 situation inside the country. In the end, however, these goals can only be achieved if the individuals influencing policy toward North Korea actually understand the motivations behind North Korea’s behavior and decisions. The rogue state narrative needs to be phased out of foreign policy decisions because, based on my findings, it is clearly wrong—especially when it comes to North Korea. If policymakers desire to find a way out of our current nuclear stalemate with North Korea, they need to consider more seriously what drives this strong desire to maintain a nuclear arsenal. If we can accept that North Korea’s nuclear provocations are rational and logical, we can respond to them in a rational and logical way. Ultimately, there is nothing rogue about North Korea. Like any state, its behavior is driven by one goal above all else: survival.

212 Works Cited “A 20 December 1967 DVO Memo About the Attitude of the Korean Leadership Toward the Issues of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” Washington, D.C., December 20, 1967. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/113/north-koreannuclear-history/2. Bolton, John R. “Nuclear Weapons and Rogue States: Challenge and Response.” Conference of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and the Fletcher School International Security Studies Program. December 2, 2003. “Conversation Between Soviet Ambassador in North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and North Korean Foreign Minister Park Seong-Cheol.” Washington, D.C., August 24, 1962. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110598. Homolar, Alexandra. “Rebels Without a Conscience: The Evolution of the Rogue States Narrative in US Security Policy.” European Journal of International Relations 17, no. 4 (2010): 705–27. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066110383996. Litwak, Robert S. Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000. Person, James. “The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Origins of North Korea’s Policy of SelfReliance in National Defense.” Wilson Center Digital Archive. The Wilson Center, October 2012. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/north-korea-and-the-cubanmissile-crisis. Pollack, Jonathan D. No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security. Routledge, 2017. Puzanov, A. M. “Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 22 March 1960.” Washington, D.C., n.d. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116170. Smith, Hazel. North Korea: Markets and Military Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Szalontai Balázs, and S. S. Radchenko. North Korea's Efforts to Acquire Nuclear Technology and Nuclear Weapons: Evidence From Russian and Hungarian Archives. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2006. Waldenström, Louise. “North Korea's Juche Ideology and Its Implications on Pyongyang's Relations with Washington, 1994-2004.” Swedish Defence Research Agency, February 2005.

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The Chinese Communist Party’s Zhonghua Minzu Policy: A Double-Edged Sword Michelle Lee Contemporary Chinese Politics Professor John Yasuda May 4, 2021

214 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has long derived its mandate to rule from having united the country through socialism. On the other hand, Xi Jinping has only recently begun selecting certain strands of traditional Confucianism to incorporate into party ideology.1 However, one tradition that has been a latent aspect of party policy even before Mao’s socialist revolution is the country’s adherence to the idea of Zhonghua minzu, or Chinese nation. In the 1950s, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) officially began its nation-building project and determined there to be fifty-six distinct nationalities: the Han core and fifty-five “minority nationalities.” A multinational state-building process is difficult and often leads to ethnic war and regime collapse, such as in former Yugoslavia.2 Therefore, when the Communists unified China, they claimed to be different from the Nationalists and gave “autonomy” and de jure equality to non-Han peoples.3 Now, the PRC is determined to assimilate these minority groups into its concept of the Chinese nation for fear of loss of control. Is this desire to maintain social order even within China’s contested territories a worthwhile priority? Could China’s nationalism be its downfall? In this paper, I argue that the CCP’s desire to uphold Zhonghua minzu creates governing obstacles and disadvantages which may one day outweigh the advantages. I demonstrate this argument by focusing on China’s border territories4 and discussing the drawbacks of China’s pursuit of Zhonghua minzu. I then show how the state has responded to these obstacles. I conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of China’s national project for the future of the party. Diversion of Resources The first consequence of the CCP’s insistence on preserving Zhonghua minzu in its contested border territories is the diversion of resources. China is the fourth largest country in

For instance, in “From Empire to Nation, or Why Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang Will Not Be Given Independence,” Pieke explains that the Confucianist principle of social harmony has been used to justify party rule as the CCP increasingly “presents itself less as a guardian of a sacred mission to transform China than as the custodian of peace, prosperity and the people’s livelihood, clearing the way for indefinite rule” (140). 2 John Yasuda, “Governing China’s Periphery,” Contemporary Chinese Politics (class lecture, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, April 8, 2021). 3 Frank N. Pieke, “From Empire to Nation, or Why Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang Will Not Be Given Independence,” in Knowing China: A Twenty-first Century Guide (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 125. 4 By “border territories,” I refer specifically to the Tibet Autonomous Region, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR). In my discussion, I focus only on these three territories.

215 size and the most populous country in the world. Governing more territory inherently equals a need for more party resources, time, and energy. In the Tibet Autonomous Region, ever since the central government sent Han Communist officials to tighten control over the region in 1959, there has been widespread local resistance. During the Cultural Revolution, Red Guards destroyed monasteries, temples, and works of art— all symbols of Tibetan culture.5 Thus, when Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978, he needed to make amends. Wanting to ameliorate conflict between the Han and Tibetan residents and preclude the risk of one minority group revolting and emboldening the others, he spent several years negotiating with the Dalai Lama. In May, 1980, Deng entrusted his protégé and general secretary of the CCP, Hu Yaobang, to give a sincere speech outlining six tasks to improve the lives of Tibetans. Moreover, a series of orders throughout the 1980s cultivated more Tibetan local officials and mandated that Han officials learn the Tibetan language.6 These efforts were all necessary to reduce hostilities, but to no avail. All of Deng’s time and energy spent working on the Tibetan issue did not succeed. There is still frequent military intervention to this day whenever local riots or protests occur, ensuring that an active military must be stationed in Tibet.7 Similarly, in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the army serves a dual purpose as both a military force and a business entity, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps.8 In the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region as well, there is a permanent barracks for the People’s Liberation Army.9 When Deng strengthened party control over these territories, he was not thinking about the long-term complications of governing them.10 Especially with Hong Kong, he was more focused on regaining Chinese sovereignty, in accordance with Zhonghua minzu. Since the handover in 1997, the party has had to expend more resources than expected to deal with governing the rebellious island. Whenever there are riots or protests that turn violent in these three territories (such as the 1989 protests in Tibet; the 1997 and 2009 protests in Xinjiang;

Ezra F. Vogel, “One Country, Two Systems: Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet,” in Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Vol. 10), (Harvard University Press: Belknap Press, 2011), 513. 6 Ibid., 517. 7 Pieke, “From Empire to Nation,” 127. 8 Ibid., 128. 9 Vogel, “One Country, Two Systems,” 503. 10 Yasuda, “Governing China’s Periphery,” class lecture.

216 or the 2014 Umbrella Movement, 2016 Mong Kok Riot, and 2019-2020 protests in Hong Kong), the party has to go in to suppress them. Lack of Legitimacy in Border Territories The second drawback of Zhonghua minzu is that when the party asserts its right to rule over these peripheral territories, it instigates rebellions that undermine its legitimacy. As Bovingdon has shown in his work on the private acts of resistance by Uyghers in Xinjiang, the CCP’s ideological project to convince the minority group that they are Chinese—and as such, the party is the sole legitimate representative of their interests—has failed.11 The verbal acts of resistance that Bovingdon documents illustrate a widespread rejection by Uyghers of Zhonghua minzu’s assimilationist agenda.12 Although locals may admit that the regime has brought dramatic economic development to the autonomous region, they repudiate Han rule over Uyghers and instead long for sovereignty. In Tibet as well, Tibetan locals and exiles in Dharamsala made demands to Deng for a separate political system from the rest of the country, a degree of autonomy that was not even offered to Taiwan. They went so far as to suggest the founding of a “Greater Tibet” that would consist of all the Tibetan minority areas in China.13 Similarly, in Hong Kong, localism has been on the rise. This faction differs from the pan-democratic camp in that it is a political movement focusing on the preservation of Hong Kong autonomy and identity. Localists take a strong antiChina stance that objects to “mainlandization” and Beijing interference in Hong Kong’s politics.14 All three of these territories make claims to independence, autonomy, and separatism, thus attacking the CCP’s legitimacy and mandate to rule. Damage to International Standing A final disadvantage of Zhonghua minzu is the damage it inflicts upon the country’s reputation. The most severe case among the three border territories is the party’s repression, imprisonment, and forced indoctrination of the largely Muslim Uygher minority group. In 11

Gardner Bovingdon, “The Not-so-silent Majority: Uyghur Resistance to Han Rule in Xinjiang,” Modern China, 28, no. 1 (2002): 42. 12 Bovingdon, “The Not-so-silent Majority,” 45. 13 Vogel, “One Country, Two Systems,” 518. 14 Ying-ho Kwong, “The Growth of ‘Localism’ in Hong Kong. A New Path for the Democracy Movement?” China Perspectives, (2016): 63.

217 response to these human rights violations and abuses, the U.S. joined the EU in March, 2021 in imposing travel and economic sanctions against top Chinese officials.15 Likewise, foreign nations such as the U.S. and Britain have long disapproved of Chinese treatment of Tibetans. As a dearly-beloved, English-speaking leader with international renown, the Dalai Lama attracted Western attention to the plight of the Tibetan minority group. He succeeded in garnering the support of U.S. congressmen, foreign NGOs, and human rights activists around the world.16 As for Hong Kong, President Trump has rescinded a number of economic privileges for the SAR and imposed sanctions on the officials who cracked down on the 2020 protests.17 China has taken many steps to consolidate control over these three resisting peoples, and the international community has noticed. The Party’s Response In spite of Zhonghua minzu’s drawbacks—increased expending of resources to govern these border territories, attacks against its legitimacy, and injury to its international reputation— the party has continued cracking down on these peoples. It has pushed ahead in what has been called “genocide and crimes against humanity”18 because of its obsessive fear of regime collapse. The CCP does not want to be repressive. Rather, their political calculus is: “If we don’t do this, will the country fall apart?”19 In addition to its deep fear of a potential loss of power, the party most likely still views the advantages of Zhonghua minzu as outweighing the disadvantages. In particular, China needs the capital, economic innovation, and technology Hong Kong supplies. When Deng visited Guangdong in 1974 to begin discussions on the handover, the focus was not the resumption of sovereignty, but instead on “how Hong Kong could help China in its drive to modernize.”20 Because of these two reasons, the party will continue its nation-building project until it has forcefully assimilated all of its minority nationalities, or until Han culture emerges supreme by virtue of time.

Pranshu Verma, “U.S. Joins Allies to Punish Chinese Officials for Human Rights Abuses,” The New York Times, March 22, 2021, www.nytimes.com/2021/03/22/us/politics/sanctions-china-uighurs.html. 16 Vogel, “One Country, Two Systems,” 520. 17 Yasuda, “Governing China’s Periphery,” class lecture. 18 Verma, “U.S. Joins Allies to Punish Chinese Officials for Human Rights Abuses.” 19 Yasuda, “Governing China’s Periphery,” class lecture. 20 Vogel, “One Country, Two Systems,” 488.

218

Implications of China’s National Project for the Future of the Party Unless the international community puts more pressure on China to cease its human rights violations, the state will likely not find the drawbacks of Zhonghua minzu as compelling as the benefits, nor as frightening as the possibility of regime collapse. Perhaps that is the CCP’s scariest nightmare: if the territories’ calls for autonomy inspire democracy among mainland China to a threatening degree. If these contested sovereignty issues can ignite an unparalleled level of yearning for democracy, a revolution from below could end one-party rule in China. However, current literature suggests that this is unlikely. Owing to Xi’s near absolute consolidation of power, his crackdown on corruption—at times repurposed to target his political opponents—and the overall tolerance of party rule that the CCP enjoys on the mainland, China is unlikely to democratize.21 Conclusion Today, China faces many challenges, one of which is its desire to uphold the abstract notion of Zhonghua minzu, coupled with its obsessive need for control over society. While the CCP’s wish to maintain rule over its contested territories is understandable, the policy of Zhonghua minzu has generated more governing problems for the state. It has led to the use of more party resources, crippled its legitimacy in border regions, and hurt its standing in the international community. While the cons do not yet offset the pros from the party’s perspective, the day may come when democracy germinates from these issues of autonomy and takes the regime by surprise. Ever since the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, scholars have frequently predicted China’s democratization, each time missing the mark. While democratization is indeed unlikely, its possibility has not yet been completely erased. The struggle for sovereignty and even democracy in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet only give people on the mainland more to think about. While some believe these separatists to be ungrateful,22 there must be people beginning to question the CCP’s way of governing, not only in these peripheral territories, but in the mainland

Carl Minzner, “Possible Futures,” in End of an Era: How China's Authoritarian Revival is Undermining Its Rise (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 166. 22 Vogel, “One Country, Two Systems,” 520.

219 as well. If more people take a stance against the party, I would not be surprised if mainlanders cite the rhetoric and tactics of activists in these border territories as their inspiration.

220 Bibliography Bovingdon, Gardner. “The Not-so-silent Majority: Uyghur Resistance to Han Rule in Xinjiang.” Modern China, 28, no. 1 (2002): 39-69. Kwong, Ying-ho. “The Growth of ‘Localism’ in Hong Kong. A New Path for the Democracy Movement?” China Perspectives, (2016): 63-68. Minzner, Carl. “Possible Futures.” In End of an Era: How China's Authoritarian Revival is Undermining Its Rise, 161-189. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pieke, Frank N. “From Empire to Nation, or Why Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang Will Not Be Given Independence.” In Knowing China: A Twenty-first Century Guide, 121-143. Cambridge University Press, 2016. Verma, Pranshu. “U.S. Joins Allies to Punish Chinese Officials for Human Rights Abuses.” The New York Times, March 22, 2021. www.nytimes.com/2021/03/22/us/politics/sanctionschina-uighurs.html. Vogel, Ezra F. “One Country, Two Systems: Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet.” In Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Vol. 10), 477-522. Harvard University Press: Belknap Press, 2011. Yasuda, John. “Governing China’s Periphery.” Contemporary Chinese Politics. Class lecture, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, April 8, 2021.

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The Evolution of Civil Society in South Korea: How South Korean Civil Society Propagated Democracy Emma Brenner Korean Politics Professor Erin Chung March 11, 2021

222 In South Korea, civil society contributed to both democratic transition and consolidation. Yet, civil society’s active role throughout these periods does not equate with continuity in its actors, tactics, and agendas. This paper will examine the evolution of South Korea’s civil society over three periods: (1) authoritarian rule and democratic transition, (2) democratic consolidation, and (3) present day. I argue that while South Korea’s civil society continues to work largely outside the existing political structure through mass protests, civil society has evolved to (1) include a wider array of civic organizations and citizens, (2) promote targeted policy reform through democratic institutions, and (3) leverage online networks to form solidarity. These changes and continuities have deepened public awareness of democratic values. Yet, the diversification of aims and lack of institutional ties prolong civil society’s struggle to influence policymaking. Civil Society and Democracy It is necessary to stress the relationship between civil society and democracy. Contemporary political analysis deems civil society instrumental for democratic transition and consolidation. Author Larry Diamond defines civil society as “the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, largely self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of rules.”1 Civil society reinforces democracy as it provides channels through which citizens can voice their interests. Such channels can prevent the state from dominating society, check the abuse of power, and generate momentum for institutional reform.2 Employing this definition, I will explore how South Korea’s civil society has bolstered democracy. Authoritarian Rule and Democratic Transition (1970s-1987) Under Park Chung Hee’s and Chun Doo Hwan’s autocracies, civil society staged mass protests to end the authoritarian regimes and introduce democracy. Civil society’s actors were

Sunhyuk Kim, “Civil Society and Democratization in South Korea,” in Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy and the State, ed. Charles Armstrong (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 1. 2 Larry Diamond and Doh Chull Shin, Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 25.

223 largely students, laborers, Christians, and intellectuals.3 Although diverse in occupation and class, these actors maintained a unified goal of ending autocratic rule in South Korea and integrating pro-democratic reforms.4 To voice these issues, civil society staged massive, confrontational public demonstrations and rallies.5 The protests of 1980 and 1987 demonstrate key components of South Korea’s predemocratic civil society. Park Chung Hee’s regime had brutally repressed civil society, banning public demonstrations and amending the constitution to codify the President’s emergency powers. Thus, the end of Park’s regime in 1979 and the reinstitution of authoritarian rule under Chun Doo Hwan instigated democratic demands.6 In May 1980, students, religious groups, and intellectuals staged demonstrations demanding the resignation of Chun Doo Hwan and the end of martial law.7 In 1987, President Chun attempted to maintain South Korea’s autocratic structure by passing down power to former military general Roh Tae Woo.8 In response, millions of South Koreans protested Chun’s attempt and demanded democracy. Accordingly, Chun resigned and agreed to hold South Korea’s first democratic elections.9 Both the 1980 and 1987 demonstrations reveal that South Korea’s civil society during authoritarian rule represented a unification of various social classes to dissolve a common opponent, the regime. Thus, rather than operating within the framework of existing political institutions, South Korea’s civil society propelled the shift to democracy by building itself in opposition to existing political institutions. Democratic Consolidation (1988-2007) According to author Charles K. Armstrong, once a state has undergone democratic transition, it will move to democratic consolidation.10 Following the democratic transition of 1987, South Korea thus progressed to democratic consolidation. Diamond argues that democratic

Gi-Wook Shin, Paul Y. Chang, Jung-eun Lee, and Sookyung Kim, “The Korean Democracy Movement,” in South Korean Social Movements: From Democracy to Civil Society, eds. Gi-Wook Shin and Paul Y. Chang (London: Routledge, 2011), 23. 4 Shin et al., “The Korean Democracy Movement,” 27. 5 Ibid., 33. 6 Namhee Lee, “The Construction of Minjung,” in The Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 44. 7 Lee, “The Construction of Minjung,” 44. 8 Shin et al., “The Korean Democracy Movement,” 21. 9 Kim, “Civil Society and Democratization in South Korea,” 3. 10 Ibid., 2.

224 consolidation requires the “widespread acceptance, legitimation, and habituation of democratic norms and institutions behaviorally, attitudinally, and constitutionally.”11 After 1987, although South Korea’s civil society continued to stage mass protests, civic organizations emerged and began to push for policy reform through democratic institutions. These new tactics, actors, and agendas strengthened democratic consolidation by legitimizing the regime’s stability, routinizing the use of democratic institutions, and deepening public awareness of democratic values. A continuation from the period of authoritarian rule, civil society from 1988-2007 staged mass demonstrations to express their interests. For instance, in 1995, the Kim Young Sam administration announced that it would not pursue charges against Roh and Chun, who had been found to have engineered a military revolt. In response, civil society staged mass protests. Similar to the protests of the 1980s, the 1995 demonstrations centered around a unified goal. Participants sought to liquify South Korea’s authoritarian past to ensure that an authoritarian government could not re-emerge. This agenda marks a significant step in democratic consolidation, as democratic consolidation entails a democracy that is so broadly legitimate among its citizens that it is unlikely to break down.12 With exception to the 1995 protests, democratic transition largely stripped civil society of its unifying anti-government agenda.13 The fragmentation of civil society pressured groups to express new agendas through new organizations. Firstly, civil society channeled interests by organizing into groups. Intermediate and voluntary associations such as citizens’ groups, environmental organizations, and workers groups emerged. Secondly, such associations began to target specific issues and reforms. For example, the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement, established in 1993, promoted environment-friendly politics.14 This targeted approach differed from civil society pre-1987, when actors aimed to bring down the regime in its entirety. In addition to its actors and agendas, civil society changed its tactics. Organizations began to work through the existing political and legal framework. For instance, when the Kim administration refused to press charges against Roh and Chun, the Korean Council of Professors

Diamond and Shin, Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea, 44. Kim, “Civil Society and Democratization in South Korea,” 99. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid., 101. 12

225 for Democratization demanded a special law for prosecuting the coup’s leaders.15 Moreover, in the late 1990s, the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) mobilized to call for chaebol reform. The PSPD proposed initiatives to monitor chaebol companies and filed classaction suits against several chaebols.16 This signals a difference from pre-democratic civil society, as South Koreans began to leverage rather than reject political institutions. Civil society’s use of the political process strengthened democratic consolidation, as South Koreans not only accepted but also legitimized democratic governance. In turn, Korea’s democratic institutions became accountable for representing the needs of civil society. 2008- Present-Day While South Korea’s present-day civil society continues to consolidate democracy through mass demonstrations, it has expanded in inclusivity and mobilizes actors through the internet. Although these changes have increased public awareness of democratic values, civil society struggles to systematically engage with the government. The candlelight vigil protests of 2008 and 2016 demonstrate a continuation from civil society’s pre-democratic and democratic consolidation periods—the use of mass demonstrations. In 2008, President Lee Myung Bak finalized the US-ROK Free Trade Agreement which would allow the import of high-risk parts of U.S. beef.17 In 2016, news surfaced that President Park Geun Hye had been seeking policy advice from an unauthorized friend, Choi Soon Sil.18 In response to both events, South Koreans participated in mass protests. Furthermore, as in the 1980s, civil society operated with a unified agenda in the 2016 protests. Civil society mobilized with the singular goal of impeaching President Park.19 Although the mass demonstrations of 2008 and 2016 may resemble civil society of the 1980s, several new aspects emerged. Firstly, the 2008 and 2016 protests demonstrated greater inclusivity. In 2008, a coalition of civil society organizations called “The National People’s Movement Headquarters for impeachment for Lee Myung Bak” organized the initial rallies. The peaceful nature of the protests attracted groups from all social classes and occupations. For 15

Kim, “Civil Society and Democratization in South Korea,” 100. Ibid., 104. 17 Injeong Hwang and Charmaine N. Willis, “Protest by Candlelight: A Comparative Analysis of Candlelight Vigils in South Korea,” Journal of Civil Society 16, no. 3, (2020): 264, doi: 10.1080/17448689.2020.1794508. 18 Ibid., 266. 19 Ibid., 261. 16

226 instance, mothers, teenagers, and members of online clubs participated.20 Similarly, the 2016 protests united a broad coalition of NGO organizations and ordinary citizens. Civil society’s greater inclusivity represents a progression from the period of democratic consolidation, when civic organizations first emerged. Secondly, civil society began to mobilize participants via the internet. Civil society in 2008 and 2016 formed greater solidarity among a diverse group of South Koreans through online networks. This expanded inclusivity and solidarity indicate a vast public awareness of democratic values. Thus, South Korea’s modern-day civil society has shaped democracy by deepening democratic norms among the population. Nevertheless, present-day civil society’s consciousness of democratic norms has not produced a stable framework for managing state-society relations. Civil society suffers from a lack of leadership and unifying ideology. For instance, in the 2008 candlelight protests, participants did not have a single goal. Participants’ concerns over food security and education policy expanded to frustrations over President Lee and Korea’s relationship with the U.S.21 The absence of a central aim makes it difficult for groups to mobilize and work through institutions and political parties. Conclusion In this paper, I have demonstrated that civil society in South Korea has been crucial for democratic reform. Although civil society has remained consistent in its use of mass protests, it has evolved to (1) target specific economic, social, and political issues, (2) reform such issues through institutions, and (3) leverage the internet to include a wider array of civic groups and citizens. Civil society’s evolution in South Korea indeed reveals its capacity to deepen democracy. Nevertheless, civil society has much work to do before it has created an institutional platform for articulating its interests and influencing policymaking.

20 21

Injeong Hwang and Charmaine N. Willis, “Protest by Candlelight,” 265. Ibid.

227 Bibliography Diamond, Larry, and Doh Chull Shin. Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea, 1-72. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000. Hwang, Injeong, and Willis, Charmaine N. “Protest by Candlelight: A Comparative Analysis of Candlelight Vigils in South Korea.” Journal of Civil Society 16, no. 3: 260- 272. doi: 10.1080/17448689.2020.1794508. Kim, Sunhyuk. “Civil Society and Democratization in South Korea.” In Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy and the State, edited by Charles Armstrong, 53-72. London and New York: Routledge, 2002. Lee, Namhee. “The Construction of Minjung.” In The Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea, 23-69. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007. Shin, Gi-Wook, Chang, Paul Y., Lee, Jung-eun, and Kim, Sookyung. “The Korean Democracy Movement.” In South Korean Social Movements: From Democracy to Civil Society, edited by In Gi-Wook Shin and Paul Y. Chang, 21-41. London: Routledge, 2011.

228

U.S. and Vietnam: Vietnam’s Human Rights Issues Taylor Nguyen Southeast Asia and US Security Professor Ott November 16, 2021

229 History of U.S.-Vietnam Relations Vietnam-U.S. relations have had a dynamic, dramatic history that changes with every decade. The most recognizable and iconic event of this complex history is the Vietnam War. Washington formally deployed U.S. troops to Vietnam in 1964, the goal being to contain the spread of communism. After years of brutal warfare, U.S. forces eventually withdrew, and the Paris Peace Accords were signed. In 1975, North Vietnam invaded South Vietnam, unifying the country and forming today’s Vietnam. The death tolls for both countries were tragically high: 58,220 American soldiers, two million Vietnamese civilians, and one million Vietnamese soldiers. The additional use of chemical warfare, most notably that of Agent Orange, caused devastating effects on the environment and extended the terrible consequences of the war. After the war, the U.S. broke off diplomatic ties with Vietnam and imposed a full trade embargo. Evidently, U.S.-Vietnam relations were very cold. To make things worse, Vietnam launched a full-scale invasion of Cambodia in 1978, which triggered a reactionary attack by China. Vietnam, as a result, was subject to international isolation, with the exception of the Soviet Union. However, as the Soviet Union began to lose power and control over itself, Vietnam took actions to normalize relations1 with other countries, especially with the U.S. Vietnam engaged in extensive recovery missions, cooperating with the U.S. to return the remains of U.S. POWs. This led to the development of the Office in MIA Affairs in Hanoi during the George H.W. Bush presidency in 1991. Vietnam also withdrew from Cambodia, allowing countries like the U.S. to repair their relationship with Vietnam. Vietnam’s efforts were fruitful, and Washington lifted travel restrictions against Vietnam, opened an office in Vietnam’s capital, and eventually lifted the trade embargo. The two countries went on to sign important trade agreements, like the U.S. Vietnam bilateral trade agreement in 2001 and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).1 However, Vietnam remained largely wary of the U.S., with the 2006 political report of the 10th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam declaring that Vietnam would combat actions that actively limited its sovereignty based on faulty applications of “democracy” and “human rights.”2 In other words, Vietnam would not tolerate forced adherence to U.S. moral standards.

Eleanor Albert, “The Evolution of U.S.–Vietnam Ties,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 20, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/evolution-us-vietnam-ties. 2 Tomotaka Shoji, “Vietnam’s Security Cooperation with the United States: Historical Background Present and

230 Vietnam’s security relations with the U.S. have also been intensified, especially with the prevalence of the South China Sea issue with China—an issue that greatly concerns both countries due to the fear that China might dominate the entirety of Southeast Asia. One example of such intensification is the 2011 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Advancing Bilateral Defense Cooperation, which outlines the way the U.S.-Vietnam security cooperation will be conducted. The U.S. and Vietnam also began holding regular joint military training. In 2014, a Chinese oil drill started drilling in Vietnamese waters, promoting Vietnam’s worry about China’s ambitions and encouraging further favorability towards American aid. In 2016, President Barack Obama announced the complete lifting of the arms embargo on Vietnam, marking a significant stride towards a closer security relationship between the U.S. and Vietnam. It is important to remember, however, that Vietnam is still far from a reliable U.S. ally. In fact, Vietnam has oftentimes downplayed U.S.-Vietnam relations. For example, after the 15th anniversary of the U.S.-Vietnam diplomatic relations, Vice Minister Vịnh explained that Vietnam would “by no means become a U.S. ally” during a visit to China.3 Hence, the U.S. and Vietnam have developed a close security relationship, but not a close personal relationship. Status of Religious Freedom in Vietnam Vietnam has had a historical reputation for an abysmal human rights record and continues to have major issues concerning freedom of religion and speech. These issues are often the cause of debate while discussing the U.S.-Vietnam relationship, especially when those discussions aim towards deepening the two countries’ relations. For example, a U.S. House of Representatives meeting led by Congressman Christopher H. Smith criticized the abolishment of the U.S.Vietnam embargo, claiming that “the administration chose to reward one of Asia’s most repressive regimes with the region’s [worst] human rights record without getting any tangible progress on freedoms and liberties.”4 Smith, to present an example of the lacking human rights in Vietnam, called upon Vietnamese Pastor Rmah Loan, a former head of the Evangelical Church in Budak village. Pastor Loan recalled the restrictions the Vietnamese government put on religion: members must be approved by the government to ensure that nobody has a history

Future Outlook,” NIDS Journal of Defense and Security 19 (2018): 3-16. Ibid. 4 “The President's Visit To Vietnam: A Missed Opportunity To Advance Human Rights,” June 22, 2016, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg20530/html/CHRG-114hhrg20530.htm. 3

231 of opposing Hanoi; holidays require special permission from officials; and the word devil is forbidden because “devil” (ma quỷ) in Vietnamese can be reversed to say “mỹ qua,” which means that the Americans are coming. Similarly, he could not say that Christ is coming because the Vietnamese government would interpret this as the Americans are coming back. There is constant government supervision, and the pastor must always first thank the Communist Party and government officials before doing anything publicly in his Church.5 Pastor Loan is but one of many Montagnards who have faced religious restrictions. In 2015, the Human Rights Watch wrote an extensive report on the treatment of this group based on personal interviews. To summarize the accounts, many ethnic Montagnards practicing an “evil religion” were kept under constant surveillance. Some were beaten and tortured because they refused to renounce their religion, and others were threatened with arrest.6 A 2009 hearing before the U.S. Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission in the House of Representatives hosted by James P. McGovern brought up that “over 350 Montagnard Christians remain imprisoned for their beliefs” and are referred to as “political prisoners” rather than “religious prisoners,” which allows Hanoi to claim that they have no religious prisoners.7 Hence, Vietnam not only actively persecutes Montagnard Christians but also uses techniques to downplay such arrests to the international community. Other ethnic groups with different religious beliefs face the same persecution. For example, Khmer Buddhists are similarly restricted by the Vietnamese government in what they can read and teach. These Khmer Buddhists are constantly threatened with arrest or physical harm unless they abandon their faith (On the Margins 2015). The U.S. government currently places Vietnam on its CPC list (Countries of Particular Concern) for its religious freedom violations. Furthermore, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (U.S. CIRF) currently labels five people in Vietnam as prisoners of conscience. Overall, Vietnam’s religious rights can be summarized as scarce and afforded to only certain approved religious groups. Status of Free Press and Free Speech in Vietnam Nguyễn Bắc Truyển is a legal expert and founder of the Vietnamese Political & Religious 5

“The President's Visit To Vietnam: A Missed Opportunity To Advance Human Rights.” “Persecuting ‘Evil Way’ Religion,” Human Rights Watch, April 19, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/26/persecuting-evil-way-religion/abuses-against montagnards-vietnam. 7 “Status Update - Religious Freedom in Vietnam,” Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, August 18, 2020, https://humanrightscommission.house.gov/events/hearings/status-update-religiousfreedomvietnamov/events/hearings/status-update-religious-freedom-vietnam. 6

232 Prisoners Friendship Association, an organization that helps prisoners of conscience. He is the 2011 recipient of the Human Rights Watch’s Hellman/Hammett Award and a known advocate of human rights and religious freedom. He has also been known to give free legal advice to those affected by land grabs. Since 2017, Nguyễn has been in jail for “carrying out activities aimed at overthrowing the people’s administration.”8 This claim is known internationally to be untrue and a convenient reason to imprison Nguyễn. The Vietnamese government has also previously accused Nguyễn of spreading false propaganda, leading to his arrest in 2006 with a sentence of three and a half years. Nguyễn’s story is not a particularly special one in Vietnam, and the Vietnamese government is no stranger to arresting ideological opponents. 2015 was an especially worrying year for political freedom and freedom of speech in Vietnam because of the passing of the 2015 Vietnamese penal code. One of the most dangerous aspects of this penal code is Article 117, which makes it a criminal offense to fabricate information against the government, distribute information to “cause dismay among the people,” or cause “psychological warfare.”9 Violations of this penal code could include being a member of certain vocal groups that openly disapprove of the Vietnamese government like the IJAV (International Journalists Association of Vietnam), calling for the promotion of human rights, or generally disagreeing with the economic and political actions of the Vietnamese government. This article has famously been used to justify arrests against reporters and protesters. For example, reporters Nguyen Tuong Thuy and Le Huu Minh Tuan, along with nine other dissidents, were arrested for criticizing the government and sentenced to prison in January 2021 under the penal code. However, even before the passing of the penal code, Vietnam consistently took aggressive action to silence critical citizens. In examining the annual human rights reports the Human Rights Watch publishes from 2001 to 2021, there have been multiple reports of peaceful protesters and reporters being arrested, threatened, or put under intense surveillance by the Vietnamese government. Currently, Vietnam ranks 175 out of 180 for countries with the least press freedom by Reporters Without Borders,

“Nguyen Bac Truyen Arrested For Anti-State Activities,” Front Line Defenders, December 5, 2020, https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/nguyen-bac-truyen-arrested-anti-stateactivities#:~:text=Nguyen%20Trung%20Ton%2C%20Nguyen%20Bac,can%20carry%20the%20death%20penalty. 9 “The Criminal Code of Vietnam,” Derechos, November 27, 2015, http://www.derechos.org/intlaw/doc/vnm1.html.

233 and Vietnam’s highest ranking since 2013 was 174 out of 180.10 Overall, the Vietnamese public is largely restricted from voicing any political opinion that does not praise the government, and those who do are faced with dire consequences. On January 1, 2019, a new cybersecurity law in Vietnam went into effect that grants government authorities the power to block or delete data that infringes on “national security, social order and safety, or the lawful rights and interests of agencies, organizations and individuals.” It also permits them to inspect computer systems to better cybersecurity—essentially allowing the Vietnamese government to closely monitor the internet in their country. This law enhances the Vietnamese government’s ability to censor information and control independent sources of information from influencing their citizens. In an already heavily censored society, this law deals a heavy blow to freedom of speech activists in Vietnam and makes it significantly harder for activists and independent reporters to spread information. The law is extremely unpopular internationally and domestically, with almost 70,000 people participating in a petition to revise the law.11 Clare Algar, the director of global operations at Amnesty International, says the law means “there is now no safe place left [in Vietnam] for people to speak freely.”12 In addition, seventeen members of the Congressional Vietnam Caucus explain that the law is “a blatant effort by the Vietnamese government to crack down on online expression by enlisting the help of leading technology companies.”13 In sum, Vietnam is making efforts to silence the digital voices of critical Vietnamese citizens. U.S. and Human Rights in Vietnam Now we will more closely examine U.S. efforts to improve human rights in Vietnam. The U.S. has done little to progress human rights in Vietnam. Admittedly, there have been some conversations about human rights in the U.S. Congress, like the Congressional meeting hosted by Christopher H. Smith, earlier cited. However, as he says in the meeting, very few “tangible” developments have been made. The most concrete and legitimate action by the U.S. that has significantly affected Vietnam’s human rights issues was the signing of the Trans10

“Vietnam: State Violence v. Bloggers and Journalists,” RSF, accessed February 21, 2022, https://rsf.org/en/vietnam. 11 “Vietnam: Big Brother Is Watching Everyone,” Human Rights Watch, 28 Oct. 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/20/vietnam-big-brother-watching-everyone. 12 Ashley Westerman, “To The Dismay Of Free Speech Advocates, Vietnam Rolls Out Controversial Cyber Law,” NPR. NPR, January 1, 2019, https://prod-text.npr.org/2019/01/01/681373274/to-the-dismay-of-free-speechadvocates-vietnam-rolls-out-controversial-cyber-law. 13 Ibid.

234 Pacific Partnership. This agreement forced Vietnam to ratify the UNCAT (United Nations Conventions Against Torture), release political prisoners, and overhaul laws inconsistent with international obligations and commitments. However, there are people like Pastor Loan who still fear for their life in Vietnam. Not only that, but the Vietnamese government, on multiple occasions, has used violent force to disperse pro-environment marches and detain protesters for days without offering legal counsel.14 Moreover, in 2017, the U.S. decided to abandon the TPP, allowing Vietnam to once again easily practice human rights abuses. The U.S. and Vietnam, though, still engage in an annual Human Rights Dialogue, which features topics such as “freedom of expression, freedom of religion and belief, labor rights, rule of law and legal reform, multilateral cooperation on human rights, and individual cases of concern.”15 Considering the consistently low rating Vietnam receives in religious freedom and its inclusion as a country of particular concern, it can be concluded that these discussions do little to influence Vietnamese efforts to correct human rights issues. There has also been some attention regarding the Vietnam Human Rights Act introduced in 2021. This act is meant to “[prioritize] the protection of internationally recognized human rights and development of the rule of law in relations between the United States and Vietnam.”16 In other words, the bill determines the sanctions on Vietnam and the prohibition of funding for the Ministry of Public Security as strategies to encourage the Vietnamese government to enact human rights reform. There has been a previous version of this act introduced in 2002—The Viet Nam Human Rights Act—which passed in the House but never got through the Senate. Given the current and recent historical lack of action towards human rights in Vietnam, it is likely that this new act will not be passed either unless an egregious abuse of human rights occurs in Vietnam. In August 2021, during Vice President Kamala Harris’ trip to Vietnam, she claimed that she “raised issues of human rights abuses and restrictions on political activism in her conversations with Vietnamese leaders.”17 However, 14

“World Report 2017: Rights Trends in Vietnam.” Human Rights Watch, January 13, 2017. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/vietnam. 15 “U.S.-Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue - United States Department of State,” U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, November 9, 2021, https://www.state.gov/u-s-vietnam-human-rights-dialogue/. 16 “H.R.3001 - 117th Congress (2021-2022): Vietnam Human Right Act,” Congress, May 4, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/housebill/3001?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22employment%22%5D%7D&s=1&r=35. 17 “Harris Says She Pressed Vietnam on Human Rights Issues, Urged Dissidents' Release,” Los Angeles Times, August 26, 2021, https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2021-08-26/harris-says-she-pressed-vietnam-onhuman-rights-issues-urged-dissidents-release.

235 further developments on these conversations have been quiet. At the same time, U.S.-Vietnam security relations are growing stronger, as shown by the aforementioned lifting of the arms embargo by President Obama. The U.S. and Vietnam have also consistently engaged in Political, Security, and Defense Dialogues, and the U.S. has paid more than $162 million in active Foreign Military Sales with Vietnam. In 2018, Vietnam also participated in the Rim of the Pacific military exercise for the first time.18 U.S.-Vietnam relations are expected to improve, especially given China’s increasingly threatening actions in the South China Sea. The 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance supports this trajectory, declaring that the U.S. will deepen their partnership.19 Given the U.S. history of deepening its relationship with Vietnam, it is likely that the current situation of human rights in Vietnam will be neglected to accomplish the U.S.’ security and diplomatic endeavors. The 2013 Comprehensive Partnership between the U.S. and Vietnam perfectly expresses such a trend. After the signing of the Partnership, the two countries released a joint statement that referred to the two countries’ “narrow differences on human rights.”20 This quote shows that by ignoring human rights abuses, the U.S. was able to establish a friendlier political position with Vietnam. To conclude, the U.S. is somewhat vocal about human rights violations in Vietnam but has yet to commit any solid policies that demand better human rights in Vietnam. Proposed Action President Biden has emphasized his focus on human rights while pursuing diplomatic policies and relationships. Most notably, he has been vocal about human rights issues in China, declaring that the U.S. will “push back on China’s attack on human rights.” However, Biden has commented very little about the status of human rights in Vietnam. It seems that Biden, like the rest of the world, is too preoccupied with China to focus on relatively smaller countries like Vietnam. Though small, it is also important for the U.S. to maintain good security relations with Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries. Southeast Asia is an important region for the U.S. security-wise due to its proximity to the ever-powerful China. A good security 18

“U.S. Security Cooperation with Vietnam - United States Department of State,” U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, June 2, 2021, https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-vietnam/. 19 “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.” The White House. The United States Government, March 3, 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/03/interim-national-securitystrategic-guidance/. 20 Shoji, “Vietnam’s Security Cooperation.”

236 relationship with Southeast Asian countries allows the U.S. to sustain its bases and friendly ports in the region. Moreover, a good relationship also allows U.S. presence to persevere in the region so that China will not dominate the area. There is also economic importance, with the total trade between the U.S. and ASEAN amounting to about $362 billion.21 Vietnam has been a natural partner of the U.S. because the country has been consistently wary about China’s rise to power and, as a result, responsive to increased U.S. security aid. At the same time, Vietnam is careful to balance its relationship between America and China, never leaning too far on either side. The South China Sea incident, though, has shown Vietnam that China may be a far greater threat than the U.S. to Vietnam’s sovereignty. This gives the U.S. a unique opportunity in its foreign relationship with Vietnam, especially regarding the conversation about human rights: the U.S. can either continue focusing on intensifying security and policy relations with Vietnam or use the threat of China to more persistently demand improved human rights in exchange for increased security. Currently, the U.S. is pursuing the former method but still has the time and opportunity to more strongly demand human rights progress in Vietnam. The danger in such bold action, though, lies in Vietnam’s characteristically careful consideration of what course of action will best preserve the country’s sovereignty. Vietnam, like many other Southeast Asian countries, has an extensive history of being dominated by foreign powers like China and France. As a result, it is natural for the government to be preoccupied with maintaining power. Vietnam’s human rights abuses are driven by the fact that dissent and religion can be tools to overthrow the state. In Vietnam’s early attempts to establish a diplomatic relationship with the U.S., the country did so only because of the fading power of the Soviet Union and because it needed international allies. Vietnam accelerated security relations because China’s claim to the South China Sea was a threat to Vietnamese autonomy and power. Put simply, Vietnam is playing a calculated balancing game to ensure that it will not be dominated by one sole power. If the U.S. enforces its moral agenda, and the Vietnamese government interprets that as a more significant threat to its autonomy than China’s territorial claims, then the U.S. risks giving up an important ally in Southeast Asia to China. Nevertheless, close to nothing is being done about human rights in Vietnam. For all of Biden’s talk—and U.S. talk throughout its history with Vietnam in general about focusing on human

“Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),” United States Trade Representative, accessed February 18, 2022, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/Southeast-asia-pacific/association-Southeast-asian-nations-asean.

237 rights—there has been disappointingly little progress in Vietnam. Boldly acting in this foreign political climate is certainly dangerous and risky, but a lack of action guarantees the prevalence of religious, political, and speech suppression in Vietnam.

238 Bibliography Albert, Eleanor. “The Evolution of U.S.–Vietnam Ties.” Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, March 20, 2019. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/evolution-usvietnam-ties. “Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).” United States Trade Representative. Accessed February 18, 2022. https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/Southeast-asiapacific/association-Southeast-asian-nations-asean. “Harris Says She Pressed Vietnam on Human Rights Issues, Urged Dissidents' Release.” Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times, August 26, 2021. https://www.latimes.com/worldnation/story/2021-08-26/harris-says-she-pressed-vietnam-on-human-rights-issues-urgeddissidents-release. “H.R.3001 - 117th Congress (2021-2022): Vietnam Human Right Act.” Congress, May 4, 2021. https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/housebill/3001?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22employment%22%5D%7D&s=1&r=35. “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.” The White House. The United States Government, March 3, 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2021/03/03/interim-national-security-strategic-guidance/. “Nguyen Bac Truyen Arrested For Anti-State Activities.” Front Line Defenders, December 5, 2020. https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/nguyen-bac-truyen-arrested-anti-stateactivities#:~:text=Nguyen%20Trung%20Ton%2C%20Nguyen%20Bac,can%20carry%20 the%20death%20penalty. “On the Margins.” Human Rights Watch, April 29, 2015. https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/01/21/margins/rights-abuses-ethnic-khmer-vietnamsmekong-delta. “Persecuting ‘Evil Way’ Religion.” Human Rights Watch, April 19, 2016. https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/26/persecuting-evil-way-religion/abuses-againstmontagnards-vietnam. Shoji, Tomotaka. “Vietnam’s Security Cooperation with the United States: Historical Background, Present and Future Outlook.” NIDS Journal of Defense and Security 19 (2018): 3-16. “Status Update - Religious Freedom in Vietnam.” Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, August 18, 2020. https://humanrightscommission.house.gov/events/hearings/statusupdate-religious-freedom-vietnamov/events/hearings/status-update-religious-freedomvietnam. “The Criminal Code of Vietnam.” Derechos, November 27, 2015. http://www.derechos.org/intlaw/doc/vnm1.html.

239 “The President's Visit To Vietnam: A Missed Opportunity To Advance Human Rights,” June 22, 2016. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg20530/html/CHRG114hhrg20530.htm. “U.S. Security Cooperation with Vietnam - United States Department of State.” U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, June 2, 2021. https://www.state.gov/u-s-securitycooperation-with-vietnam/. “U.S.-Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue - United States Department of State.” U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, November 9, 2021. https://www.state.gov/u-svietnam-human-rights-dialogue/. “Vietnam: Big Brother Is Watching Everyone.” Human Rights Watch, 28 Oct. 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/20/vietnam-big-brother-watching-everyone. “Vietnam: State Violence v. Bloggers and Journalists.” RSF. Accessed February 21, 2022. https://rsf.org/en/vietnam. Westerman, Ashley. “To The Dismay Of Free Speech Advocates, Vietnam Rolls Out Controversial Cyber Law.” NPR. NPR, January 1, 2019. https://prodtext.npr.org/2019/01/01/681373274/to-the-dismay-of-free-speech-advocates-vietnamrolls-out-controversial-cyber-law. “World Report 2017: Rights Trends in Vietnam.” Human Rights Watch, January 13, 2017. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/vietnam. “World Report 2021: Rights Trends in Vietnam.” Human Rights Watch, January 14, 2021. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/vietnam.

240

Why Do Labor Movements in China Fail? –– The Case of Chinese Technology Workers Wei Zhou Inequality and Social Change in Contemporary China Professor Guowei Liang February 2022

241 Introduction With trillions of hot money flowing in, Chinese technology industries have been one of the most capital-intensive sectors in the world. Economic output from telecommunications, software, and information technology in 2020 was $587.4 billion, according to the Chinese Ministry of Statistics. While the Chinese technology sector expands acceleratingly, the number of workers within the technology sector also grows drastically. Meanwhile, the Chinese government is temporarily absent in the technology sector. Whether this absence is intentional, the lack of governmental and social regulations makes working conditions terrible for workers, as the technology sector is completely under the control of the capital. Indeed, experiences of overtime work, precariousness, and massive lay-offs have led to various protests, which are fruitless in actual workplaces in terms of organizing a union with huge bargaining power. The unsuccessful attempts of these protests are puzzling. Technology workers should be more advantageous than other working classes in China, given the relatively higher social status and cultural capital of technology workers.1 This paper will attempt to unravel this puzzle, starting by explaining the ascent of China’s technology industries and its relationship with state capitalism. Then, this paper will analyze how the organizational structure of technology companies, which is distinct from traditional labor-capital relations, mitigates conflicts between capital and labor through the combination of meritocracy ideology and pseudo-autonomy. Third, this paper will look into the case of the 996.ICU movement and discuss why this protest failed to continue defending the rights of technology workers. This paper will end by discussing future possibilities to change employment relations and labor agencies in the technology industry. The Great Transformation Adopting the state capitalism model of the Beijing Consensus, the great transformation of China’s technology sector is both statist and capitalistic. With governmental support, the development of the technology sector benefits from heavy investment and preferential policies. When the export-oriented economies slowed down, the Chinese government saw the diminishing marginal profit of low-wage labor. To maintain the growth of China’s economy, the Chinese government implemented economic policies to climb up the value chain and create a competitive

242 edge in the more profitable technology sector. The Chinese government even paved a road for domestic companies by banning U.S. technology giants like Google, Facebook, and Twitter. In recent decades, with the rise of technology companies like Baidu, Tencent, Alibaba, Pinduoduo, and ByteDance, this sector has become the robust engine for China’s economy. Compared to the statist element, the capitalistic factor contributes even more to the boom of China’s technology sector. Once the Communist Party embraced the capitalist economy, unleashed capital flooded into emerging market economies. Without regional or temporal restrictions, China’s technology companies have made themselves listed on major U.S. Stock Exchanges. Now, Chinese technology companies have attracted domestic and foreign investors from both the government and business world. No matter why these stakeholders are investing in the technology sector, they share the same interests that require companies to continue expanding, maintain the revenue rate, and optimize efficiency.2 One way for companies to maintain a high investment yield rate is to continuously extract surplus value from their employees.

Tech Industries and Tech Workers –– An Organizational Approach We will have to look at the organizational structure of technology companies to answer the key question of this paper: why do technology workers tolerate exploitation? This sector will provide an analysis of the company culture and labor relations of technology companies. These organizational strategies are different from traditional capital-labor relations in Marx’s literature but create a form of pseudo-autocracy for employees. This structure eventually mitigates technology workers’ class consciousness and pushes them into self-exploitation. Technology companies sell the ideology of meritocracy as a “company culture.” The boom of new technology grassroots tycoons fertilizes people’s dream about the possibility of becoming rich overnight. With successful stories of grassroots technology start-ups, technology companies offer employees the imagination that they can attain wealth through innovation and intellectuality. The idea is that the internet has eliminated the threshold for entrepreneurship as

Meng Liang and Xin Tong, “Wealth Creation Myth and the Order of Technical Symbol –– the Labor Relation in Chinese Internet Business,” Jiangsu Social Sciences, 2015, https://doi.org/10.3969/j.issn.1003-8671.2015.01.003.

243 long as one has “good business ideas.”3 Therefore, both employers and employees in the tech industry firmly believe the system is a meritocracy, where upward mobility is provided based on merit. The companies strive to impress employees with the image of meritocracy via organizational strategies. Meng Liang conducted ethnography in technology companies for four months.4 During her training period, companies strived to introduce employees to the company cultures ––“Dream,” “Equality,” and “Liberty.” By reshaping the cultural capital associated with being employed in technology, Liang argued that tech companies seize the “explanatory power” over cultural capital from employees.5 The goal of this “propaganda” of company culture is to reach a consensus that the economic capital of companies has power over the cultural capital of technology workers. Another important organizational strategy is to give tech workers what I term “pseudoautonomy.” Many technology companies promote a new labor relation characterized by the element of “partnership” between employers and employees. The models of this partnership labor relation include the equity/revenue sharing system, employee promotion system, and employee involvement in decision making. For example, the Alibaba Group has a stock-based compensation system in which employees will be granted stock ownership of Alibaba after two years of working. With a higher location in the hierarchical structure, employees will receive a larger share of stock when being promoted, and the promotion is based on individual performances.6 Baidu encourages group-based and task-based projects. Individuals and groups have relative autonomy in the decision-making of their projects, and there are limited hierarchical relations among groups.7 Liang’s experience in Company E also provided an example of “democratic” decision making: the name of a newly launching software was based on the voting result of employees.8 With a sense of autonomy, employees feel that they own their means of production and their products.

Xiaotian Li, “The 996.ICU Movement in China: Changing Employment Relations and Labour Agency in the Tech Industry,” Made in China Journal, July 25, 2019, https://madeinchinajournal.com/2019/06/18/the-996-icumovement-in-china-changing-employment-relations-and-labour-agency-in-the-tech-industry/. 4 Liang, “Knowledge Worker in the Internet Industry.” 5 Ibid. 6 Tong and Liang, “Wealth Creation Myth and the Order of Technical Symbol.” 7 Ibid. 8 Liang, “Knowledge Worker in the Internet Industry.”

244 Two other key elements of pseudo-autonomy are “time autonomy” and “technical autonomy”9 . Employers of technology companies do not have to work on fixed hours but instead on deadlines for tasks. Therefore, they are free to manage their time and skills to complete them. In Barrett’s study on labor relations at Webboyz, an employee told him that if he was working too much he felt justified in saying, “I’m going to take a day off or something.”10 Compared to labor workers in the service and manufacturing sectors, technology workers have the perceived “privilege” to decide when and how to make use of their labor, and therefore experience a lesser sense of alienation. Nevertheless, this form of autonomy is pseudo because it does not truly give workers the ownership of their means of production or products, but serves as a way to promote selfexploitation. Most technology companies follow the rule that the total share of employee-owned stock will not exceed 10% of the company's total share capital and many of them range from 5% to 10%. There is also a limit on individual holders who acquire the stock through the employee equity share system that the share must not cumulatively exceed 1% of the company's total share capital. Moreover, stocks held by employees are nontradable. Once employees decide to leave the company, the ownership of the stock returns back to the company.11 The law on equity/revenue sharing system innately functions to incentivize employees by selling them the ideology that workers can become the owner of their labor-power through years of loyal servings, building on the hypocritical claim of meritocracy and equality. The fact that employees can never truly gain the ownership of companies disenchants the ideology of meritocracy and equality. Though companies make them believe so, the truth is that employees can never own nor share the revenue of the companies solely through effort. Moreover, the autonomy in decision-making is restricted within the project level but not the administrative level. Employees may have the chance to engage in the daily decision-making process and make their voices heard through an internal platform. Yet, once finances tighten, the honeymoon period between employees and employers soon fades away. Three workers at

Rowena Barrett, “Working at Webboyz: An Analysis of Control over the Software Development Labour Process,” Sociology 38, no. 4 (2004): 777–94. https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038504045864. 10 Barret, “Working at Webboyz.” 11 Minghao Feng and Yi Zhu, “Employee Share Plans in China: Regulatory Overview,” https://content.next.westlaw.com/9-5074557?__lrTS=20210203133646079&transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true, 2020. https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/9-507-4557?contextData=(sc.Default).

245 Pinduoduo were fired the day after criticizing their company's toxic working culture online. Companies claim to be in a partnership with their employees, but the labor relations in technology companies are deeply hierarchical. The promise of “democratic engagement” exists only when employees follow these hierarchical rules. The time and technical autonomy, combined with the meritocracy ideology and promotion system, have become the engine of “self-exploitation.” The employee share of stock is too limited to serve as real capital, but workers are still incentivized to work longer hours to get promoted. Holding the meritocracy ideology, workers believe that they will climb up the social class as long as they work hard. Failure to be promoted is justified in a way that employees are not working hard enough. The promotion system accelerates internal competition among workers, enabling the capital to extract more surplus labor from employees without hiring the wages. Using the equity/revenue sharing system, capitalists increase the labor outputs per capita because workers compensate for capital deficiencies by effectively exploiting their labor force.12 This organizational structure creates extreme difficulties for organizing protests. First, according to the collective action theory, the hypermobility of technology industries renders organizing collective action impossible. When resignation has become a norm, and it is easy to get a job from other companies, contentious workers tend to choose resignation over direct confrontations. As a result, technology workers are highly fragmented without class consciousness. Second, according to the relative deprivation theory, because of the high wages and social status associated with this job position, technology workers are overall better off than many other labor workers. Though the working conditions of technology workers are harsh, people in other sectors, such as food delivering jobs, are working even longer hours with lower salaries. Thus, technology workers hardly feel a sense of deprivation. Conclusively, the organizational structure of technology companies and meritocracy ideology extract surplus value from their employees. However, technology workers are indifferent towards exploitation, upholding the idea that they own the means of production and their labor. Eventually, overtime work and precariousness, euphemized as “company culture,” have become a norm in technology companies. In 2015, precarious technology workers

Mario Candeias, “Die Neuen Solo-Selbständigen Zwischen Unternehmergeist Und Prekarität,” PROKLA, Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialwissenschaft 38, no. 150 (2008): 65–81. https://doi.org/10.32387/prokla.v38i150.482.

246 composed 30% of the R&D sectors of technology companies.13 The 996 Working System, which requires employees to work at minimum 72 hours per week, has been widely adopted by technology companies even though it bluntly violates China’s Labor Law. Beneath the glamour of the technology industry, the violation of workers’ rights is becoming omnipresent. Movements in Technology Sector And Why They Failed The end of the last section mentions the difficulty of organizing collective actions in the technology sector because of the organizational structure of technology companies. Albeit the difficulty, collective actions from the technology sectors have been budding in recent years. The most known one is the launching of 996.ICU in March 2019. Though this movement received enormous attention, the 996 working system is still widely adopted in China’s technology companies. This section will focus on the rise and fall of the 996.ICU movement as a case to discuss why this movement failed to lead to the change of labor relations in the technology sectors. I will argue that, similar to many previous labor movements, workers who protest in 996.ICU movement are alienated in the sense that “workers themselves are not able to participate in politics at the class level.”14 The discussion on 996 can be traced back to January 17, 2019. The CEO of the Hangzhou-based Internet company Youzan announced the implementation of a 996 working system for employees. Requiring workers to work from 9 am to 9 pm and from Monday to Saturday, this announcement soon provoked public criticism and was later investigated by the local labor bureau.15, 16 Though Youzan was the first company to formally announce this system, the 996 working system had already been widely implemented as an unspoken rule by technology companies. On March 26, 2019, an anonymous user launched the 996.ICU project on GitHub, a Microsoft-owned code-sharing online community with more than 20 million users.17

Tong and Liang, “Wealth Creation Myth and the Order of Technical Symbol.” Eli Friedman, “Alienated Politics: Labour Insurgency and the Paternalistic State in China,” Wiley Online Library, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, August 27, 2014, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/dech.12114. 15 Yingzhi Yang, “Chinese Developers Use Github to Protest against Country's 996 Work Schedule,” South China Morning Post, March 29, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/tech/start-ups/article/3003691/developers-lives-matterchinese-software-engineers-use-github. 16 Li, “The 996.ICU Movement in China.” 17 Ibid. 14

247 The 996.ICU Movement soon received support from Microsoft employees who petitioned Microsoft to keep the 996.ICU repository “uncensored and available to everyone.”18 Chinese tech tycoons later joined this debate, defending their position with the ideology of meritocracy. Alibaba’s founder Jack Ma said that the 996 schedule is a huge blessing to young employees at Alibaba, as it provides them with upward mobility.19, 20 Meanwhile, Richard Liu, the founder and CEO of Jingdong, told employees at its internal meeting that companies should fire “those who fail to make sacrifices for work; those who are not performing well; and those who are having a rather low price-performance ratio.”21 Moreover, Chinese browsers, including Tencent’s QQ browser, Alibaba’s UC browser, and Qihoo’s 360 browsers, have banned access to the 996.ICU repository, saying that the website contains “illegal or malicious information.”22 These words and actions of technology companies backfired. People created memes, stickers, and t-shirts related to 996.ICU. The 996.ICU repository on GitHub continued to expand the blacklisted companies imposing mandatory overtime work and malicious layoffs. Nevertheless, the impact of this movement remained limited, and even more companies implemented the 996 working system two years after the movement. With their relatively higher income and cultural capital, technology workers are supposed to have great bargaining power in collective action against the companies. However, no change has been brought up, even with the support of state media and the formation of solidarity with Microsoft. The use of the concept of “alienated politics” is helpful in unraveling this puzzle. Workers in the 996.ICU movement are antagonistic towards the 996 working system and tycoons who defend the legitimacy of this system. Out of resentment towards the 996 working system, technology workers launched the 996.ICU project to advocate technology workers to avoid and stay against companies who implement this system. They hope to restore their “time autonomy”—the right to choose whether to work overtime. If they do have to work overtime, they have to receive additional payment on top of their wages. Overall, the demand raised by 996.ICU is highly individualistic and economical, while no demand was made for the class level.

Caroline O'Donovan, “A Post about China's ‘996’ Workweek Went Viral on Github. Now Microsoft Employees Want to Protect It from Censorship,” BuzzFeed News, BuzzFeed News, April 23, 2019. 19 Li, “The 996.ICU Movement in China.” 20 Yasheng Huang, “Debating China's Economic Growth: The Beijing Consensus or ...” 21 Chauncey Jung, “Is 996 Truly a Blessing? Let's Hear What Richard Liu and Jack Ma Have to Say,” Pandaily, Pandaily, April 15, 2019. 22 Li, “The 996.ICU Movement in China.”

248 In other words, workers are alienated from their class and thus fail to form inter-class solidarity with others. Another key strategy of the 996.ICU movement was to guard workers’ rights by fledgling legal institutions and using the rhetoric of legal rights.23 The headline of the 996.ICU repository states that “the aim of 996.ICU is to advocate the practice of the Labour Law of the People's Republic of China.” Through legal means, technology workers attacked the violation of the Labour Law of technology companies. To demand higher wages, protestors legalized themselves by saying, “according to the Labour Law, employees who follow the 996 work schedule should be paid 2.275 times their basic salary” on the 996.ICU repository. However, what is missing is clear political demands of technology workers as a working class, either to improve the working conditions of workers or to abolish current organizational structures of technology companies. Workers are left to seek legal enforcement and economic compensation as individuals, so companies can easily co-opt protestors by providing material benefits or fire certain outspoken organizers. The Chinese state played a paternalistic position in this conflict and made technology companies the scapegoat for the “dirty work of capitalist growth.”24 The state government harshly accused the technology companies of violating the Labor Law and encouraged protestors to proclaim fidelity to the law and the central government.25 Nevertheless, protestors did not realize that the Chinese state had no incentive to hinder the state champions from further growth. Eventually, the central government condemned the technology companies for not respecting individual workers' rights without actually implementing policies to sanction those who violated the law. The 996.ICU movement may have succeeded in getting economic compensation, but it failed to unionize technology workers (Friedman 2014).26 The concept of “alienated politics” helps us understand the gap between the furious antagonism towards technology companies and movements towards compromise and collaboration at the center.27 Conclusion 23

Ching Kwan Lee, “Chinese Workers’ Contentious Transition from State Socialism,” in Against the Law: Labor Protests in China's Rustbelt and Sunbelt, 3–33, (Berkeley, CA: Univ. of Calif. Press, 2010). 24 Friedman, “Alienated Politics: Labour Insurgency and the Paternalistic State in China.” 25 Lee, “Chinese Workers’ Contentious Transition from State Socialism.” 26 Friedman, “Alienated Politics: Labour Insurgency and the Paternalistic State in China.” 27 Ibid.

249 Why did labor movements fail to form unions with huge bargaining power in China? The majority of literature on labor protests has focused on peasant farmers and migrant workers, but this paper chooses to study technology workers, working people who are relatively better off than proletariats and peasants. Nevertheless, given their relative privilege, technology workers still failed at forming a collective bargaining union. The analysis I provide has two folds. The first fold is the organizational structure and meritocracy ideology. The combination of them creates a pseudo-autonomy, resulting in the illusion that technology workers own the means of production and are working for their own economic well-being. Therefore, technology workers self-exploit. The second fold is a case analysis on the 996.ICU movement. The demands raised in this movement remain economical and individualistic and fail to form aggregated class-level political demands. Also, workers depoliticized themselves and legitimized their demands through legal institutions, hoping the state would play a paternalistic role, not realizing the true interests of the state align with those of the state champions. The alienated nature of this labor movement hinders the formation of a powerful union. The future for labor movements in China is not promising. The value of individualism and the tendency of depoliticization are growing among young generations. Most workers still prefer resorting to institutionalized channels when they feel that their rights, granted by a paternalistic state, are violated. With the advancing surveillance technology and centralization of power, the price for individuals mobilizing collective action is getting higher. Only when technology workers realize the exploitation mechanism behind the labor relations and mobilize themselves through a political way is there a possibility for a successful labor movement.

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