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Academic Preparation Kit for Delegates


Brought t

o you by S

chima Lab

Foreword

itsch, Pre

sident of

The Hagu

e ‘13

Dear delegates, dear participants of the Hague 2013, with the Hague being just around the corner, it is time to turn to your academic preparation for the session. Most of you have already participated in an European Youth Parliament event and therefore know of the importance of preparation for a successful session. Not only does it give you the insight necessary to form an opinion on various issues, but also does it ensure that you are fit to discuss the diverse angles of your topic with your fellow committee members. But do not think that you are the only ones that need to prepare for your topics. Your chairpersons, equally, had to get closely acquainted with the topics, and as a result can offer you a first starting point in the form of a topic overview. On the following pages, your chairpersons not only explain your topic’s main conflicts, actors, and measure already in place, but also point you to crucial resources that you should consult with care. Ideally, your preparation will incorporate all or most of the following elements: Getting an overview of the most important EU institutions, their field of work and how they are relevant for your topic; Reading through the entire preparation kit, getting familiar with the entirety of the topics and thereby identifying areas where they overlap (they are plenty); Carefully and actively reading your committee topic overview; highlighting and consulting unfamiliar concepts and words; accessing the obligatory resources and links; Conducting your own research, talking to teachers and friends about your topic, and actively following the news in case your topic is covered in national or inter national media. As you know from your daily school or university studies, essays and books are never exhaustive, and nor is this preparation kit. Feel encouraged to continue your quest for ideas and knowledge on your topic, and feel free to bring any material – books, newspaper excerpts, pictures, school material – with you to the Hague. Your committee and chairperson will appreciate it a lot. I wish you an interesting and exciting month of research, preparation and discussion – I assure you that the energy you invest in your preparation now will bear fruit in form of engaging and enthusiastic debates in November. Good luck, Schima

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AFET I

ENVI II

AFET II

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Committee on Foreign Affairs I pages 4-7

Committee on Foreign Affairs II pages 8-11

Committee on Climate Change pages 12-14

Committee on Development pages 16-20

Committee on Enviroment, Public Health and Food Safety I pages 21-24

Committee on Enviroment, Public Health and Food Safety II pages 25-28

Committee on Industry, Research and Energy I pages 29-32

Committee on Industry, Research and Energy II pages 33-36

Committee on Industry, Research and Energy III pages 37-40

Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs pages 41-44

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Affairs I Written and facilitated by Hugo Dürr (SE) Dependence or interdependence: with Russia as the EU’s biggest importer of oil, uranium and coal, how should the EU balance its role as an advocate of democracy whilst ensuring the safety of its energy supply from Russia? Introduction and Explanation The European Union (EU) has its roots in energy, given that the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) treaties were two of the first three texts on which the European project was founded. Today, the EU imports almost 50% of the energy which it consumes, and this is projected to rise to 70% in about 15 years.1 A large part of its oil and gas imports will come increasingly from Russia; currently 36% of the EU’s import of gas comes from Russia while 70% of all Russian gas exports go to the EU.2 However Europe is about more than just trade, it’s also a project with human rights at its core. Key treaties at the foundation of the EU, such as the Treaty of Maastricht on the European Union (TEU) and the Lisbon Treaty aspire to guarantee social and economic human rights,3 while the European Social Charter, to which both Russia and the EU are signatories, guarantees the enjoyment of fundamental social and economic rights.4 Bearing this in mind, there is growing alarm over the contempt for democracy President Putin is showing in his decision-making and leadership style, and consequently many within the EU are uncomfortable with idea of continuing trade with the Russian Federation. With this apparent decline in democratic standards, how should the EU look to renegotiate their relations with Russia in the pursuit of a more democratic world? Disputes in the past between Russia and the Ukraine demonstrate how Russia is willing to use its energy exports to advance its own international agenda. Should the EU risk losing almost 50% of its energy imports by confronting Putin? Or should it wait, in light of the current economic predicament the EU finds itself in?

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Relevant Questions: Who are the EU’s other energy trade partners? What are the stances of other countries in the EU on Russia? To what extent do they differ? What are the alternative sources of energy available to Europe?

Obligatory Resources: EU-Russia Energy Dialogue 2000-2010: The first ten years: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/publications/ doc/2011_eu-russia_energy_relations.pdf “The EU should take a harder line on Russia’s democratic deficit”, The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/nov/26/eu-pull-together-on-russia PolicyMic, Russia Anti-Gay Bill, http://www.policymic.com/articles/48411/russia-anti-gay-bill-russiapasses-radical-family-values-bill-while-president-announces-divorce-on-tv

[1] Eurostat, Energy Productions and Imports, http://epp.eurostat. ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/ Energy_production_and_ imports [2] Europa, Energy, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/russia/russia_en.htm [3] Europa, EU Treaites, http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/ decision-making/treaties/index_en.htm [4] Council of Europe, European Social Charter, http://conventions.coe. int/Treaty/en/Summaries/Html/035.htm [5]“The EU should take a harder line on Russia’s democratic deficit”, The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/nov/26/ eu-pull-together-on-russia [6]PolicyMic, Russia Anti-Gay Bill, http://www.policymic.com/articles/48411/russia-anti-gay-bill-russia-passes-radical-family-values-billwhile-president-announces-divorce-on-tv


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Main Conflict(s) At the heart of this issue is what some would consider Russia’s allegedly anti-democratic actions, looking particularly at oppression of the press, as well as the passing of Putin’s latest bill against the “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations”1. In today’s world, a statement such as this is likely to cause considerable discomfort among European decision-makers and invites us to rethink the EU’s relationship with the Russia. Freedom of the press and protection of minority rights are at the heart of the EU’s democratic values and are a requirement for all member states – however there is disagreement over whether these standards should apply to our main trading partners, and if so, to what extent. Those who are worried about the EU adopting an aggressive stance against Russia fear the possibility of retaliation; Putin has used the Kremlins control over Gazprom in the past to great effect.2 This shows how the dependence that the EU has on Russian energy is highly volatile. Could this happen again if the EU were to challenge Russia on their recent democratic record? The Russia – EU relationship has been fraught with difficulties over the years; key conflicts have included the differing views on access to energy markets following the adoption of new Russian legislation on the participation of foreign companies within its energy sector both in the EU and Russia, as well as the difficulties in reaching an agreement on a successor to the 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement,3 while also not forgetting Russia’s role in the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT),4 which establishes a multilateral framework for cross-border co-operations in the energy industry, after it had previously refused to ratify the Treaty.5 Those who advocate a strong approach point out that Russia is equally dependent on the EU and that the bloc should use its soft power in the area of energy policy to advance its democratic principles. However, many commentators and analysts have repeatedly pointed to the seeming inability of the EU to take a coherent stance in its energy relations towards Russia,6 an allusion to the division between the EU member states on the position that the EU should take.

Relevant Questions: What triggered the Russian decision to cut off gas supplies to Europe? Have there been any similar instances recently? Which political and societal aspects within Russia contradict the values promoted the EU as an advocator of democracy? What would the consequences be for both EU and Russia citizens if the EU chooses to take a strong stand on the issue of democracy in Russia? Conversely, what would be the consequences in case it decides to turn a blind eye on the issue?

Obligatory Resources: Article on the critical issues for the implementation of international pipelines: http://pipelinesinternational. com/news/critical_issues_for_the_implementation_of_ international_pipelines/083155/ Freedom House’s country profile on Russia: http:// www.freedomhouse.org/country/russia The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies archives on Russia-Ukraine gas disputes: http://www.oxfordenergy.org/tag/russia-ukraine-crisis/

[7] Law passed in the Russian lower house of parliament on June 30, 2013. [8] In the 2009 dispute between Russia and Ukraine, for example, Putin, at the time Prime Minister, instructed the head of Gazprom to reduce natural gas exports to the Ukraine, which in turn reduced the flow of gas to Europe, leading to the worst gas cut-off in a decade. Gas supplies to eighteen countries were disrupted and countries with limited reserves and a lack of alternative supply faced severe energy shortages, resulting in thousands being without heating during an especially cold winter. After 22 days, the dispute was resolved when Putin and his Ukrainian counterpart Yulia Tymoshenko negotiated a new gas deal that covered the next ten years, and thus gas flows to all European countries returned to usual. [9] Europa, Partnership and Cooperation Agreement,http://eur-lex. europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21997A1128(01):EN: HTML [10] Energy Charter Treaty, http://www.encharter.org/ [11] Andrei Belyi, Russsia’s Position on the Energy Charter, 27 April 2012

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Gazprom and the Russian government The Russian international gas giant Gazprom has had a monopoly on Russian natural gas exports since 2006. It also holds the world’s largest natural gas reserve and provides energy to the entire world, beyond Europe and the EU. The Russian state owns a controlling 50.002% of Gazprom shares, so it comes under considerable influence from the Kremlin. Thus, of the most influential characters in the EU-Russia relationship is arguably the Russian government headed by President Putin. With many claims to his name of anti-democratic actions, the President answers to few. In this line, Russia’s interest lie within increasing its presence on the international stage, thereby continuous strength consideration as an international stakeholder. Answering to Putin is his Minister of Energy, Alexander Novak. Non-governmental organisations - Russia Despite the crucial importance of human rights NGOs, there is still considerably little known about their institutional capacity and practices in Russia. While there is a high number of Russian human rights NGOs, including the Memorial Society, the Moscow Helsinki Group (MHG) and the Association of Regional Human Rights Organisations to list just a few, they have not yet unite into a movement attracting a great deal of press coverage or public support; at present they are unlikely to be capable of dramatically shifting domestic incentives that define Russia’s current human rights policy. The European Union Commissioner Oettinger and high representative Catherine Ashton, represents the EU in bi-lateral negotiations with Alexander Novak. EU policy on energy is a “shared competence”1 meaning that Member States also retain the right to determine their national energy policies and to lead bilateral energy relations with non-EU countries. However, the need for a consistent approach in securing energy supply from abroad is outlined in Art. 21(3) of the TEU: “[t]he Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect.” From the EC Summit on May 22nd 2013, the European Commission concluded that certain priorities are to be set for the near future, among them the supply of “safe and sustainable” energy to all EU homes, and that this energy supply was to come increasingly from the European internal energy market. This consequently results in a decreased dependency on external energy suppliers. It seems apparent that there is some divergence between Member States’ stances on EU-Russia relations. On the one hand, states like Poland and Estonia have always essentially viewed Russia as an unreconstructed menace; and, on the other, there are those like Greece and Italy who have seen it as important to cosy up to a major energy supplier and trading partner.  This boils down to the opposing prioritisations of economic or political modernisation. Russia prioritises economic before political goals, as does

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Member States such as Spain, Greece, Italy and France. Thus, these nations place the economic gains on cooperation with Russia primary to the political gains of the country. However, states such as Estonia, Sweden and Austria place greater emphasis on political modernisation, and thus see more of an issue in Putin’s leadership.

Relevant Questions: Is there any difference in the policies of Novak and Putin? What are their respective ideas on international cooperation and trade? What is the current situation with Gazprom concerning monopolisation and leadership?

Obligatory Resources: European Policy Institute Network, EU Energy Policy under the Treaty of Lisbon Rules - Between a new policy and business as usual, Jan Fredrik Braun, Working Paper February 2011: http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/ book/2011/02/EPIN%20WP31%20Braun%20on%20 EU%20Energy%20Policy%20under%20Lisbon.pdf Bloomberg, Gazprom Eases Stance on Monopoly as Putin Urges Competition, 28.06.2013: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-28/gazprom-eases-stance-on-lng-monopoly-as-putin-urges competition.html The Economist, Putin’s State of the Nation speech 2012, laying out plans for use of power: http://www. economist.com/news/europe/21568431-vladimir-putins-state-nation-address-new-ideology-political-ends The Economist, Russia’s wounded giant, 23.03.2013, http://www.economist.com/news/business/21573975worlds-biggestgas-producer-ailing-it-should-be-broken-up-russias-wounded-giant

[12] Shared competence is a term which refers to an area of responsibility overseen by both the member states and the EU institutions. [13] Treaty of Lisbon, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12007L/ htm/C2007306EN.01001001.htm [14] EC Summit on Energy and Taxation, May 22nd 2013, http://www. consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/137197.pdf [15] UACES, Russia’s Relations with EU Member States: Divide and Rule or Making the Most out of the Relations?, http://uaces.org/documents/ papers/1201/romanova_2.pdf


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Measures and Solutions The first major step towards a closer cooperation was the conclusion of the Partnership and Cooperation on Agreement (PCA) in 1994, which established a framework for political dialogue between Russia and the EU and promotes trade, investment and harmonious relations. However, in 2008, negotiations on a  new EU-Russia agreement  were launched at the Khanty-Mansiysk summit. The new agreement aims to provide a more comprehensive framework for EU-Russia relations, reflecting the growth in cooperation since the early 1990s, as well as to include a substantive, legally binding commitment in all areas of the partnership, including political dialogue, freedom, security & justice, economic cooperation, research, education & culture, trade, investment and, most relevantly, energy. These negotiations are being stalled until an agreement on trade and investment provisions is reached between the chief negotiators of the EU and Russia. Once this is concluded, negotiations on the new agreement will reconvene, and will focus on improving the regulatory environment by building upon the World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules and strengthen bilateral trade relations. Other possibilities, which reduce EU dependency on Russia, include the  Nabucco pipeline, a natural gas  pipeline  from the  Turkish-Bulgarian border to Austria. This would be another supplier of natural gas to Europe, and reduce dependence on Russia. The main supplier would be Iraq, but also involve Azerbaijan,  Turkmenistan, and  Egypt. Another suggestion is the Trans-Adriatic pipeline (TAP), a natural gas pipeline which has the advantage of being short in length: it is based on the construction of a 520 km gas pipeline, starting in Greece, passing through Albania and the Adriatic Sea, and finally arriving in the Italian region of Apulia, from where it can also supply the European markets. [16] Agreement on partnership and cooperation, Official Journal L 327, 28/11/1997 P. 0003 - 0069 [17] European Parliament, Motion for Resolution, 11.06.2008, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc. do?type=MOTION&reference=B6-2008-0298&language=EN [18] European Commission, Overview of FTA and other Trade Negotiations, 13.09.2013, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/ december/tradoc_118238.pdf

Relevant Questions: Should the EU leverage these alternative options to alter Russia’s attitudes towards democracy? Should the EU use these negotiations to further its democratic values? Should the EU look to develop its own energy resources, or work on finding more reliable, sustainable energy imports? Should an update to the PCA be the solution? What are the alternatives?

Obligatory Resources: EU Press release on Khanty-Mansiysk summit http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-08-1008_en.htm?locale=en The EU Member States and the Quest for a Common External Energy Policy http://www.academia.edu/625392/ Between_Conflict_and_Convergence_The_EU_Member_ States_and_the_Quest_for_a_Common_External_Energy_ Policy EU-Russia Centre, ‘Can Russia play by the rules?’ http:// www.eu-russiacentre.org/our-publications/column/russiaplay-rules.html

Conclusion The question of human rights in other sovereign nations will forever be a troubling dilemma. As a major trade partner, should the EU take it upon itself to be an advocate of democracy, and if so, to what extent? Are there other options, perhaps in renewable resources, or even other trade partners? How much focus and resources should be placed on the EU/Russia Roadmap for Energy Cooperation 2050? An important issue to answer to is for how much longer the EU should turn a blind eye to the situation in Russia, and for how long can and should President Putin play by his rules. Alternative ways to secure energy supply have to be investigated, and its benefits as well as disadvantages weighted against Russian energy supply and the strings it comes attached with.

Key Terms

Coherence in External Energy Relations; Energy Charter Treaty ; Energy Dialogue ; EU/Russia Roadmap for Energy Cooperation until 2050 ; European Social Charter ; Gazprom ; Khanty-Mansiysk summit ; Partnership and Cooperation Agreement ; Security of energy supply.

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Committe Written and facilitated by Lara Lindlahr (DE)

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Deserted energy: After initial praise and wide range support, how should the European Union act towards the Desertec project in light of sustained uprisings in the Arab world?

Introduction and Explanation 500 x 500m² is the equivalent of almost 1% of global desert volume. The irradiating solar energy on that square equals the amount of energy that humanity consumes within one year. In other words, within 6 hours the world’s deserts receive as much energy as humanity requires for a year. These numbers however, only account for the energy consumption levels of today. By 2050, the world will have approximately 9 billion inhabitants, which is an additional two billion in comparison to the current population. DESERTEC1 is a project aiming at exploiting the vast potential of renewable solar energy worldwide and thus increasing energy supply, while taking each country’s different geographical conditions and social needs into account. The DESERTEC concept makes use of already existing technologies, i.e. photovoltaic that is already widely used to generate electricity. Taking a closer look at the Arab world, the deserted parts of the Middle East and North African (MENA) regions have huge potential for solar- and wind-energy production. Technologically, putting an effort into expanding DESERTEC in the MENA regions seems like a feasible solution to many environmental and socio-economic issues. However, the current political situation in the Arab world complicates the effort toward making DESERTEC a reality. The Arab world is in conflict over human rights, values and social disparities; one of the main causes of unrest is socioeconomic disadvantage. Yet DESERTEC is convinced that poverty and underdevelopment is a result of energy scarcity. Therefore it emphasises the need to implement its projects in order to develop local communities and society by making electricity accessible while simultaneously providing new jobs, education and opportunities. The project is also constrained by tensions and splits within the management of the operation: the DESERTEC Foundation (DF)2 recently split up with its partner, the DESERTEC Industrial Initiative (Dii), in a dispute over different views on the DESERTEC concept and Dii’s management3. Critics of the program are also concerned about the considerable cost of the project and are worried that they energy returns to Europe, if some of the energy produced is exported, will not be sufficient to make the investment economically viable.

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[1] Desertec Foundation, Website: http://www.desertec.org/en/concept/ [2] Desertec Foundation, Website: http://www.desertec.org/en/organization/ [3] Desertec Foundation, Wesite, Press release: http://www.desertec.org/en/press/press-releases/130701-desertec-foundation-is-leaving-the-industrial-consortium-dii/

Relevant Questions: With the Arab world dealing with uprisings against its governments and poor levels of public safety, should the EU foster DESERTEC projects or should nothing be done until the current situation in the Arab world eases? Should the EU provide its support for the processes of democratisation through DESERTEC? And if yes, how? What is the future of the DESERTEC Foundation? How should it operate being split from Dii?

Obligatory Resources: A promotion video by the DESERTEC Foundation on their vision: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QXx02iMsDqI An overview of the DESERTEC Concept: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/2639069/DESERTEC%20Concept.pdf DESERTEC focussing on the MENA region: http://www.desertec.org/global-mission/eu-mena/

Main Conflict(s) Political unrest in the region has caused a considerable divide over whether the project should continue to go ahead. A successful implementation of the project would require close cooperation between Europe and MENA countries, yet MENA countries were facing corruption and lacking cross-border coordination even before the outbreak of the Arab Spring. Many Europeans are now opposed to DESERTEC, fearing a dependency on MENA countries that are politically unstable. The Arab Spring also fuelled heated discussions about whe ther a tight cooperation with MENA countries should be considered in light of those countries trying but failing to integrate their economies and deepen their political stability. Additionally, implementing the DESERTEC project in MENA countries requires close cross-bor-


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der cooperation among MENA countries that is currently put on hold by disagreement over the Western Sahara.1 Critics like Eurosolar2, a European NGO that promotes energy gain from renewable resources, believe that DESERTEC is simply a “fata morgana” that may not live up to its expectations. Many argue that worldwide there have been examples, such as the construction of the undersea Eurotunnel that connects Great Britain and France, which show that big infrastructure projects often have overestimated benefits and underestimated costs. A case study by the Kiel Institute of Economy (IfW) revealed that costs for the DESERTEC project will most likely explode from the estimated 400bn Euros to approximately 900bn Euros3. According to the IfW a similar amount needs to further be invested by MENA countries themselves. Many critics are thus convinced that the project is not viable on an economic level and object to the whole concept. Many critics of DESERTEC also suggest that the project will not be of benefit for the poor population. In their opinion, DESERTEC is just “another big infrastructure project with an adverse impact on local society”4 and a project that is exploiting the world’s deserts. Those in favour of the project believe that a high level of investment will be made over an extended period of time, and thus will not have a negative economic impact on countries and stakeholders that financially support the project. They believe that the initial costs of 400 billion Euro for the final construction of the DESERTEC project by 2050 is comparatively low compared to the clean energy gain for Europe. Overall, 15-20% of clean energy produced by MENA will be exported to Europe. This interest group suggests that the EU supports the project as outlined in the DESERTEC concept. In addition to political tension in MENA countries and a debatable cost-benefit ratio, Dii is convinced that a new approach to DESERTEC is needed in the future. Instead of focussing on the export of clean energy to Europe, they believe that the produced energy should stay local. The nature of the relationship between Europe and MENA countries should, in their opinion, be of dialogue and the transfer of knowledge and not trade agreements. Furthermore, a big export-oriented project like DESERTEC increases the risk of a “Dutch disease” in MENA countries that trade energy gain. Such effect will complicate domestic market regulation. The flourishing export of one single good raises the local currency and consequently, the export of other natural resources gets too expensive and non-competitive on the global market. In conclusion, that are several reasons for why the interest group wants to keep the energy gain local. DF is convinced that exporting energy to Europe as

set out in their concept is still the correct approach. Despite splitting from the DF, Dii will continue working on the realisation of projects in MENA countries. Thus, with Dii initiating projects and supporting companies and investors in their work towards projects in the future, an operator for the concept is not lost entirely.

Relevant Questions: What are potential bad impacts of DESERTEC? Can they be resolved? If so, how? In what way should the EU provide support for the DESERTEC project? Should it provide support in the first place? Which approach should it take? Is the DESERTEC project utopian and too expensive? Are there alternative solutions to the project?

Obligatory Resources: Hermann Scheer, President of Eurosolar and general chairman of the World Council for Renewable Energy, on the DESERTEC project: http://www.hermannscheer.de/en/index.php?option=com_content&ta sk=view&id=256&Itemid=10 An interesting study by Germanwatch on the possible impacts of DESERTEC projects on human rights and livelihoods of the local population in the MENA region: http://germanwatch.org/fr/download/6439.pdf An informative article by EurActiv on current complications towards the DESERTEC project: http://www. euractiv.com/energy/desertec-abandons-sahara-solarp-news-528151 [4] Reuters, „Europe’s Saharan power plan: miracle or mirage?“, 23.08.2009: http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/24/us-energymaghreb-solar-idUSTRE57N00920090824?pageNumber=1&virtualBran dChannel=11613 [5] European Association for Renewable Energy (Eurosolar), Website: http://www.eurosolar.de/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view &id=150&Itemid=52 [6] Seenews, On Renewables: http://renewables.seenews.com/news/studyshows-desertec-to-cost-eur-900bn-375034 [7] German Watch, Study, „Desertec and Human Development at the Local Level in the MENA-Region“, page 7, http://germanwatch.org/fr/ download/6439.pdf,

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Main Actors Desertec Foundation (DF) & Dii GmbH The DF is a non-profit organisation aiming to support the systematic use of renewable energy in deserts worldwide as laid down in the DESERTEC concept and promote cooperation for the concept’s implementation. Their concept involves clean energy production in MENA countries which is exported to Europe via submarine connectors. In comparison, the Dii GmbH1 is focused on the regional progress of the DESERTEC project’s implementation in the MENA regions. CEO van Son recently stated that Dii will no longer focus on energy export to Europe. Subsequently, it became in their interest to encourage domestic markets and relations between MENA countries. MENA countries Regarding the Arab world, the political situation is complicated. Several MENA countries have are experiencing political turbulence and uprising. Reforms towards social and economic improvement are at different stages in different countries. Generally the young are suffering from high unemployment which is a key contributor to unrest; DF reckons that its projects can help spur economic development. European Union: ENP & EEAS The EU has already been involved in partially funding DESERTEC projects and other work through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The EU committee on Foreign Affairs is responsible for “the strengthening of political relations with developing countries, particularly those in the immediate vicinity of the Union, by means of major cooperation and assistance programmes or international agreements such as association and partnership agreements.”2 The EU committee is therefore seeking dialogue with MENA countries with a view to improving EU relations and local development. Additionally, there is the European External Action Service (EEAS), which is the EU’s diplomatic corps. It is supporting the EU foreign affairs chief, High Representative Catherine Ashton, in conducting the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). [8] Dii GmbH, Website: http://www.dii-eumena.com/ [9] European Parliament, AFET Committee, Website: http://www. europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/afet/home.html

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Relevant Questions: How does the DESERTEC Foundation operate? Who does the foundation involve in their work? What exactly is the Arab world? Which countries are part of it? How should the EU operate towards the DESERTEC project? Which EU institutions have competences?

Obligatory Resources: An article by businessGreen plus on the future of DESERTEC and the role of Dii: http://www.businessgreen. com/bg/feature/2291807/what-next-for-desert-energy The European External Action Service’s (EEAS) stance on energy for Europe: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ energy/

Measures and Solutions

With the DF and Dii splitting, the question about DESERTEC’s future implementation remains. Losing the membership of Dii does not necessarily result in a termination of the project. However, a winding-up1 of DESERTEC still is one possible option the DF has. On the other hand, the DF is convinced that their vision of exporting energy to Europe is still feasible. Several measures and solutions to previous challenges in implementing the project have already been implemented. The above mentioned European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)2 is designed to support social and economic development as set out in a bilateral Action Plan with short and medium term priorities. DESERTEC is actively discussing action plans towards solar-energy production with MENA countries as set out in their Whitebook.3 The action plans are jointly agreed on and provide each country with the possibility to choose how far it wants to work with the EU and in what areas. After initial criticism of the negative socioeconomic impacts the DESERTEC projects may have, the DF issued a set of criteria4 that provide governments and investors of public and private funds with


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Obligatory Resources: clear guidelines for the design of environmentally and socially responsible energy projects in desert regions by ensuring the participation of local people in projects’ planning process and their economic benefits. Furthermore, the DF initiated a platform for scientific and academic collaboration called the DESERTEC University Network (DUN)5. DUN is committed to developing know-how and implementing study programmes related to renewable energies. To further involve local students, RE-Generation MENA, a project whose objective is to focus on a greater involvement of Egyptian and Tunisian students in the EUMENA renewable energy sector, was launched. It aims to educate students with the skills to contribute to the democratic process by expanding renewable energies in Egypt and Tunisia. Another important project funded by the European Union and the German Federal Ministry of Environment is the Wind Energy, Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency in Morocco (WEREEMa)6. It aims to provide Moroccan companies and its government with the necessary expertise on renewable energy projects, especially focussing on wind-energy. Subsequently, the ‘al Akhawayn University’ in Ifrane already started a new study course called ‘Sustainable Energy Management’ complementing this project. Finally, the prime example of how clean energy from deserts is produced through Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) plants and then exported to Europe via a submarine connector between Tunisia and Italy is called TuNur7.

Relevant Questions: What are the pros and cons of each approach? What approach do you favor? What alternative options are there? How do the recent developments within the foundation influence future options? What should be the role of the European Union in the future of the project? [10] Another word for liquidation or dissolution, which means that a company is dissolved and its remaining assets and property redistributed. [11] European External Action Service, Website: http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/ [12] Desertec Foundation, Whitebook: http://www.desertec.org/fileadmin/ downloads/DESERTEC-WhiteBook_en_small.pdf [13] DF, Concept: http://www.desertec.org/en/concept/criteria/ [14] Dii GmbH, objectives, Website: http://www.dun-eumena.com/about-dun/ our-objectives [14] Desertec Foundation, Press release, „ADEREE and DESERTEC work together for a green Morocco“: http://www.desertec.org/en/press/pressreleases/121025-01-aderee-and-desertec-work-together-for-a-green-morocco/ [15] Desertec Foundation, „The TuNur Project“ in Tunisia: http://www.youtube. com/watch?v=TqJPreSAFOM

An overview provided by the EU Institute for Security Studies on past, present and future EU energy diplomacy, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ Brief_23.pdf A critical article on the role of the ENP providing the example of Syria, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/aug/25/syria-european-neighbourhood-policy An article on critical opinions towards TuNur and rising scepticism of the MENA population towards the DESERTEC concept, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/competitors-and-local-opposition-threatens-desertec-solar-plan-a-892332.html An informative article on RE-Generation MENA and WEREEMa, http://europafrica.net/2011/10/10/twonew-desertec-projects-support-north-africa-regionaldevelopment/ An overview on several solar energy projects in Morocco issued by the European Parliament in 2013, http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2013/130515/LDM_BRI%282013%29130515_ REV1_EN.pdf

Conclusion The topic question is very much conflict based; conflicts about how to approach future energy gain, socio-economic side-effects, operational obstacles and bilateral agreements on renewable resources. A balance between the several interest groups needs to be evaluated while considering the current political situation in the Arab world, the current dispute resulting in the organisation’s split up and the discussion about the economic viability of the project. Moreover, the EU needs to define its role in the implementation of the project.

Key Terms DESERTEC, MENA regions, DESERTEC University Network, Solar heat power plants, Arab world, Arab Spring, Arab League, EU committee on Foreign Affairs, European External Action Service, European Neighbourhood Policy.

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Keeping up with Kyoto: With growing criticism on the EU’s Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) and the weakened European energy market, is the ETS a mere distraction to fighting climate change as some claim? What is the future of the ETS? Introduction and Explanation The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the world’s largest emission’s trading scheme. The EU was the first body to implement an ETS and they continue to pursue expansion. The ETS seeks to involve as much as Europe as possible, currently 31 European nations are part of the scheme, including the 28 member states. The scheme encompasses over 11,000 factories and is responsible for almost 50% of the EU’s emissions of CO2 and 40% of its total greenhouse gas emissions. The main idea of the ETS is to cap the amount of emissions of all industries within a nation. However, if a member of the ETS emits fewer emissions than the cap, the remaining amount can be auctioned off to other members, perhaps those who are struggling to remain below the cap. This is a reason for why there is growing criticism, with questions being raised regarding over-allocation and profiteering over carbon credits. This criticism is important to consider, as the EU must ensure that it meets its Kyoto Protocol targets, and in case of the ETS being deficient there is a risk that the EU will not reduce its emissions. The Kyoto Protocol is a protocol attached to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), which sets legally binding commitments on greenhouse gas emissions. Industrialised countries agreed to reduce their combined emissions to 5.2% below 1990 levels during the five-year period 2008-2012. It was agreed by governments at a 1997 UN conference in Kyoto, Japan, but did not legally come into force until 2005. [1] The ETS was thus implemented to bolster the Kyoto Protocol and help countries reduce their emissions at a rate they found feasible. However, figures suggest some members are not meeting their Kyoto targets e.g. Austria, Finland and Norway, leading to more criticism, and begging the question whether the ETS is actually just a distraction from the EU’s inability to combat climate change. Another important concept is the EU allowance (EUA), which refers to the carbon credits traded under EU emission trading scheme. One EUA represents one ton of CO2 that the holder is allowed to emit. Allowances are freely allocated to firms which can be traded in carbon market. The firms should surrender EUAs equivalent to their emissions at the end of each compliance period. Those companies that emit more than their permitted allowance has to buy the extra allowances from the open market, while those firms that emit less can sell the balance allowance units to those firms that are in need of the same. [2]

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Relevant Questions: Is the ETS increasing the chances of members achieving their goals outlined in the Kyoto Protocol, or in fact hindering them, and if so, how? Are the aims of the Kyoto Agreement feasible? Should nations be punished for not meeting their targets? Are the sentences for breaking the ETS sufficient for member states?

Obligatory Resources: [1] BBC: Concise definition of the Kyoto Protocol: ht t p : / / w w w. bbc . co. uk / ne w s / s c ie nce - e nv iron ment-11833687 [2] Definition of EUA’s with number of related links: http://www.powerplantccs.com/ref/glos/eu_allowance__eua_.html [3] Description of who is currently on target to meet their Kyoto Protocol targets: http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/2009/kyotowhos-on-target/


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Main Conflict(s) Critics of the ETS believe that the root of the problem, involving the EU’s slowing climate action, is to do with the Kyoto Protocol itself. A number of nations did not sign the Kyoto Protocol, most notably the USA. Bringing people to question the legitimacy of the protocol considering one of the largest producers of Greenhouse Gases (GHG’s) is not part of the agreement. Questions have also been raised over the validity of the ETS considering emissions can be auctioned off, critics of the ETS such as Sandbag [3] believe that remaining emissions should not be auctioned to ensure the ETS helps the EU to reach the goals of the Kyoto Agreement – furthermore, they believe that by allowing larger emitters of gases to simply buy leeway rather than change their habits, it defeats the whole point of having an ETS. Organisations such as Sandbag have reported that industries are given more credits than they need and therefore can sell the remaining credits at a windfall price thus they do not reduce their emissions and in fact profit from the scheme – whilst also allowing larger industries to maintain their high levels of emissions. [3] Furthermore, the recession has caused EUA prices to fall, making it easier and cheaper to buy credits. In spring 2006, the price of EU Emission Allowances collapsed almost to zero. This was during phase one of the scheme, which ran from 2005 to 2007. It could demonstrate the inherent unpredictability of the system and show that a similar collapse could happen again. [4] Whilst the EUA collapsed in 2006, people defend the ETS by stating that any crash or declines in the European Energy Market during 2005-2007 were due to the fact that the system was in ‘Phase I’. Phase I is the term given to the period of 2005-2007, the EU intended the phase to be a learning curve for those involved in the scheme. Supporters have assured industries that a collapse is not likely to happen again due to the amendments made to the ETS post2006. The ETS is currently in Phase III. [5]

Relevant Questions: To what extent is the Emission Trading Scheme acting efficiently and/or merely allowing industries to continue with their high levels of pollution? How can the EU progress to ensure there be stricter regulation of the European Union Emission Allowances system thus certifying: a. Industries are not over-allocated credits? b. Businesses do not solely profit? c. EUA prices do not collapse like in 2006? If necessary, how should the EU take a larger responsibility in putting pressure of nations such as USA and Canada to take action in reducing their emissions?

Obligatory Resources [3] Very extensive article opposing the effectiveness of the ETS: http://www.sandbag.org.uk/site_media/uploads/DM_ Point_Carbon_Article_1.pdf [4] Balanced look at whether the ETS is working: http://www.carbonretirement.com/content/eu-emission-trading-scheme-working [5] Report explaining some of the positive (and negative) outcomes of Phase I: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41049.pdf

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Relevant Questions:

Measures & Solutions When the ETS was established in 2005, the EU planned for it to undergo four phases to ensure maximum efficiency, the first phase ‘Phase I’ was considered a learn-by-doing period, whereas Phase II saw the first set of caps and limits to come into effect. The EU plans to continue with the next two phases which will implement further measures. For Phase III (2013–20), the European Commission has proposed new changes which include: the setting of an overall EU cap, with allowances then allocated to EU members; tighter limits on the use of offsets; limiting banking of allowances between Phases II and III; a move from allowances to auctioning. [6] Phase IV will run from 2021-2028. Proposed changed to improve the ETS during this period include: increasing the rate at which the overall emissions cap is reduced, from 1.74% each year; extending coverage to other sectors, such as household fuel consumption; limiting access to international credits; introducing a price floor for allowance auctions. [6] Alternatives: Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)  The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), defined in Article 12 of the Protocol, allows a country with an emissionreduction or emission-limitation commitment under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B Party) to implement an emissionreduction project in developing countries. Such projects can earn saleable certified emission reduction (CER) credits, each equivalent to one tonne of CO2, which can be counted towards meeting Kyoto targets. A CDM project activity might involve, for example, a rural electrification project using solar panels or the installation of more energy-efficient boilers. The mechanism stimulates sustainable development and emission reductions, while giving industrialized countries some flexibility in how they meet their emission reduction or limitation targets. Joint Implementation

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Under Joint Implementation, countries with commitments under the Kyoto Protocol are eligible to transfer and/or acquire emission reduction units (ERUs) and use them to meet part of their emission reduction target. [7]

Should the EU wait to implement these changes, considering the ETS is being criticised now? How can the EU guarantee that these proposed changes ensure that: a. Members achieve their objectives set out in the Kyoto Protocol? b. EUA does not collapse again? c. Resolves over-allocation and profiteering issues? How should the EU ensure these proposed changes do not come into effect too late?

Obligatory Resources

[6] Extensive description of the phase system as well as the alternatives listed: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ European_Union_Emission_Trading_Scheme#Phase_ IV [7] Official website for the Joint Implementation mechanism: http://ji.unfccc.int/index.html

Conclusion

With much criticism of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme there is obvious uncertainty of the future of the ETS. Climate scientists and papers raise serious concerns of over-allocation which mask the fact that larger industries are not changing their pollution habits and do not have an incentive to change. This causes the main concern which is the fact that members of the ETS are not on target to reach their goals set out in the Kyoto Protocol. Yet, should there be issues raised regarding the treaty? The fact that USA are not involved suggests that it lacks serious effectiveness, should the EU take a more active role in ensuring that the USA also change their pollution habits? Yet, much of the allegations of volatility and the ETS’ propensity to collapse have been evidenced by the events occurring between 2005 and 2007 (Phase I). The EU has always said that Phase I was a learning curve experience and the actions which happened have not been repeated. Should we put more trust in the idea that the ETS may become more stable? Furthermore, the proposed changes which will be implemented in Phase III and IV can surely only mean that the ETS will improve, and yet one may ask whether these changes are allegedly coming too late.

Key terms Emission Trading Scheme, UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol, Clean Development Mechanism, ETS Allowances System.


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“Energising Development”: With one in five people still ‘living in the dark’ and in the framework of the UN’s Sustainable Energy for All Initiative (SE4All), how can the EU fulfill its commitment to bring sustainable energy to everyone by 2030? Introduction and Explanation The United Nations’ (UN) Sustainable Energy for All Initiative (SE4All) is the primary international framework on this topic that intends to accomplish three central goals by 2030: to provide universal access to sustainable energy, to double the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix and to double the global rate of efficiency and performance in the energy sector. The European Union (EU) hopes that by reaching these goals access to sustainable energy will be “no longer a privilege but a right for all”, as Jose Manuel Barroso said speaking at the EU Sustainable Energy for All Summit in Brussels last June. Sustainable energy is the sustainable provision of energy which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs. Despite the noble targets of the SE4All initiative, it is still overwhelming that over 1.2 billion global citizens continue to live without access to electricity, and over 2.8 billion people worldwide use unsafe or unclean energy sources . Eradication of extreme poverty, as mentioned in the seventh of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDG), is undeniably a worthy and necessary aim, and access to sustainable energy may certainly play an important role in reaching it. Sustainable energy provision will allow schools and hospitals to improve their services through proper facilities such as electricity, and can potentially help to create jobs by allowing for better access to energy for business-es and therefore better offering of their services. Through these potential improvements, energy could actually increase the quality of life in target countries by allowing economies to grow, giving them tools with which they could fight, and ultimately eradicate extreme poverty. This topic will address the progression and success of this aim, and the question of how it can be advanced further and surely fulfilled through increased energy provision by the EU. The committee on development will address the following questions while taking into account what other benefits sustainable energy access may provide to these people:

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Relevant Questions: How should the EU further promote energy provision in developing areas? How should the EU work with partner states to ensure the best results? Is the EU doing enough to ensure the completion of the SE4All targets? If not, what is lack-ing?

Obligatory Resources: A video by the United Nations Foundation on Achieving Universal Energy Access : http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WMqO_85PLqQ Homepage of EUROPEAID, the EU DG responsible for development and aid: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/index_en.htm

bring sustainable energy to everyone by 2030?

[1] The UN programme SE4All homepage: http://www.sustainableenergyforall.org/ [2] Press release from the Launch of EnDev : http://europa.eu/rapid/ press-release_IP-12-372_en.htm [3] Wikipedia definition of sustainable energy : http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Sustainable_energy [4] World Bank estimates on predicted investment requirements for the future in the field of energy provision : http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTENERGY2/0,,contentMDK:22855502 ~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:4114200,00.html [5] Homepage of the UN MDGs : http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/


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Main Conflict(s) Regardless of the progress of the SE4All as well as many other initiatives, one fact remains: the goals of these initiatives are simply not going to be met with current investment rates, and about $35-40 billion a year is needed between now and 2030 to meet them, according to World Bank figures. In fact, it appears that levels of Official Development Aid (ODA) worldwide have even declined in re-cent trends . Furthermore, in the current global climate corporate responsibility takes second place to prof-it, which leads to a lack of private investment in supplying sustainable energy to areas in need of de-velopment of energy supplying infrastructure and research into new methods and techniques sur-rounding the provision of sustainable energy. Another issue under this topic is the management of current funds, and the relations between donor and partner states in deciding where money should be allocated. For many of the partner coun-tries, a lack of sustainable energy source is unfortunately not the only problem to be addressed. Often these are also states where transparency of ODA allocation is not always practised. Moreover, they may be countries of an underdeveloped nature democratically and governmentally, making interna-tional dialogue more complicated. Once these issues have been overcome, the most important question is what kind of energy sources should actually be utilised in such countries to provide sustainable energy to targeted popula-tions. While some e.g. Sunnymoney , argue that the phasing out of the use of kerosene bulbs and en-ergy sources is the way forward, and that they should be replaced with greener energies. On the other hand, it has been argued that these green energies are simply not yet adequately developed and there-fore not feasible enough to be truly deemed sustainable.

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Relevant Questions: What energies should the EU promote in these areas and why? Should energy sources be de-cided upon on a local, regional, or national level? How should the EU work with partner countries to ensure that ODA is distributed in the most effective ways? What more should the EU do with its own donations in ODA? Should, and if so, how, the EU encourage other stakeholders to invest in energy for the future in developing countries?

Obligatory Resources: Video about the importance of trade, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eZig8UAFmKI A UK government summary explanaining the drawbacks of investing in developing countries, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/197851/exe-summary-investment-constraints.pdf

[6] World Bank estimates on predicted investment requirements for the future in the field of energy provision : http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTENERGY2/0,,contentMDK:22855502 ~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:4114200,00.html [7] A Foundation Centre Article on developmental aid decrease : http:// foundationcenter.org/pnd/news/story.jhtml?id=435200183 [8] A Solar Aid (charity) run project aimed to sell solar lights in various African countries :

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Main Actors The EU institutions already play a key role in this topic, and has undertaken many initiatives and pro-grammes to support the completion of the SE4All goals. For example, energy provisions to 500 mil-lion more global citizens by 2030 will be provided through the ‘Energising Development’ initiative, of which numerous Member States are donors. What is more, between 2005 and 2011, the European Commission and Member States combined have been responsible for over €2 billion in official devel-opment assistance for energy . While the EU is important, the UN is also a vital player as it is under the UN that that SE4All was established. The European External Action Service (EEAS) headed by the High Representative Catherine Ashton, acts as the prime connection between the EU and the UN, therefore holding a fun-damental position as crucial actors in this topic. As of the passing of the Lisbon Treaty and through the creation of the EEAS, the EU has developed a more united response to aid. Their position has fur-ther heightened in importance since the 3rd of May 2011, when the EU was granted the right to speak during the General Assembly of UN conferences. It does however retain observer status. Developmental aid, and consequently aid intended to fund sustainable energy, currently falls under the category of shared competence between the EU and its Member States, which means that while there are binding acts in the field on a European level, Member States retain the right to take further action should the EU decide not to act in the area, or in specific areas or projects within the area where no EU legislation exists.

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Relevant Qeustions: Is the role of the EEAS sufficient as it stands, or should they in fact be granted more power? Considering that the EU is committed to bringing sustainable energy to everyone by 2030, what should the EU undertake within UN, international structures, and in international nego-tiations to promote the importance of this issue and receive a global response?

Obligatory Resources: A European Voice (magazine) article discussing the position of the EEAS : http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/eeaslacks-clarity-on-development/73180.aspx Homepage of the UN sustainable development knowledge platform : http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/

[9]Homepage of EnDev, an impact-oriented initiative aimed at promoting modern energy technologies to homes and small businesses in 24 countries worldwide : http://endev.info/content/Main_Page [10]A European Commission booklet outling progress in the field of the SE4All projects : http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/energy/documents/ brochure_eu_energy2012.pdf [11] The homepage for the EEAS : http://www.eeas.europa.eu/

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Measures and Solutions Providing sustainability for all global citizens by 2030 is no small feat, and many steps have already been taken to go in the right direction. One of the prime aims set by the EU’s Agenda for Change is sustainable growth for human development. While addressing the issue of energy provision, other spin off developments can also be achieved. Job creation, improvement in health care and education services, infrastructure and agricultural machinery will all help to increase standards of living and quality of life in designated countries. The introduction of renewable energy will provide communi-ties with further independence from ODA and may even allow them to become self-sufficient or enter the global markets with their products and services. The Agenda for Change also outlines the need for grant and loan blending as well as other innovative financial instruments in tackling this issue. Another example of EU action is the ‘Paris-Nairobi initiative’. Launched in April 2011 as an intergovernmental initiative between France and Kenya, its aim is to provide clean and sustainable energy for all Africans by 2030. It is a positive example of tackling energy provision and climate change with one solution. The Paris-Nairobi Initiative is a testament to the fact that the EU and its Member States are committed to promoting a green economy using the natural capital of the state or region in question. In other developments the EU decided to place emphasis on dialogue, discussing the allocation of funds with partner states in the EU’s EUEI PDF (EU Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue Facility) project . As well as working with governments and other political bodies, the EU also looks at ways of attracting private investment to developing countries and regions. According to the International En-ergy Agency (IEA), a total of $48 billion per year until 2030 is required to provide sustainable ener-gy to everyone. In order to do so, the opportunities must be attractive for the businesses who, unlike the EU and other world players, may only be interested in gains from their spending. Crowd funding is another initiative that has been used in the past and that has proven to yield positive results, for ex-ample SunFunder . [12] Page five of this EC information booklet outlines the importance of good governance, democracy and human rights as mentioned in the Agenda for Change programme : http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/documents/agenda_for_change_en.pdf [13] Homepage of the EUEI PDF, an instrument of the EUEI which aims to increase dialogue between donor and partner states : http:// www.euei-pdf.org/ [14] Homepage of the International Energy Agency : http:// www.iea.org/ [15] Homepage of Sunfunder : http://www.sunfunder.com/

Relevant Questions: In what way should the EU interact with private investors to guarantee the best results? How should we maximise the off-spin benefits of sustainable energy to partner countries through ODA and private investment? And how can investors and the EU ensure that results will have a leverage effect with best re-turns?

Obligatory Resources A video by the United Nations Foundation on Achieving Universal Energy Access : http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WMqO_85PLqQ Homepage of EUROPEAID, the EU DG responsible for development and aid: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/index_en.htm

Conclusion Overall, it appears that progress has been made in increasing the availability of sustainable energy, particularly over the past ten years. However, as 40% of the world’s population still lives ‘in the dark’ and with current targets and investments not going to suffice, it is time for the EU and all global play-ers to prove they are committed to this cause and find efficient and sustainable solutions to what is truly a global issue and fulfil the goals of the SE4All, as well as its sub-initiatives and programmes.

Key Terms Agenda for Change, SE4All, private investment, EnDev, human development, trade, EUEI, GEEREF, Africa EU Energy Partnership.

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The future of Europe’s energy supply or a recipe for disaster? With Member States’ highly differing stances on nuclear power, how can the EU continue its path towards an emission-friendly supply, while ensuring the safety of its citizens? Introduction and Explanation By 2050, global electricity demand is expected to increase by about a factor of 2.5 from today. Nu-clear power plants generate about 30% of the electricity produced in the EU. There are currently 132 nuclear reactors in operation in 15 EU member states. Each EU country can decide whether it wants to include nuclear power in its energy mix. While the overall safety record of European nuclear power plants (NPPs) is good; no major accidents have ever taken place, EU citizens’ confidence in Europe’s nuclear industry hinges on continuous improvements of the EU nuclear safety and security framework, so as to ensure that it remains the most effective in the world and based on the highest safety standards. The challenges that nuclear safety and its governance face were highlighted by the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan following the earthquake and tsunami of March 2011. This event highlighted the point that nuclear reactors must be protected even against accidents that have been assessed as highly improbable. Events at Fukushima also revealed well-known and re-curring issues: faulty design, insufficient backup systems, human error, inadequate contingency plans, and poor communications.

Relevant Questions: What role should nuclear energy play in the European Union? To what extent is the European nuclear energy sector and debate influenced by international society and events around the world? Where do you see the opportunities of nuclear energy for the future?

Obligatory Resources: A short video of the European Commission (EC) on nuclear safety: ht t p : / / ec . e urop a . e u / av s e r v i ces / v i d eo / pl ay e r. cfm?ref=I079016 The website of World Nuclear News (WNN), providing free and accurate public information on nu-clear power in one place: http://www.world-nuclear-news.org A 45-minute documentary of Seconds from Disaster on the events in Fukushima: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fyIBlygNlcc A short video of CNN overviewing the decontamination of the Fukushima area after the disaster: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/05/world/asia/japanfukushima-hancocks/index.html

The Strategic Plan of the Nuclear Energy Agency: 2011-2016, p. 7 http://www.oecd-nea.org/nea/Strategic-plan-2011-2016.pdf

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Main Conflict(s) The current debate on energy in general is dominated by three topics: finding acceptable ways to supply the increasing demand for energy, ensuring the security of those energy supplies and minimis-ing the environmental impacts of emissions from the production and use of energy. These three topics apply for nuclear energy as well. Proponents of nuclear energy argue that nuclear power is a sustainable energy source, which re-duces carbon emissions and can increase energy security if its use replaces a dependence on imported fuels. They further argue that nuclear power produces virtually no air pollution, in contrast to the chief viable alternative of fossil fuel. They also believe that nuclear power is the only viable course to achieve energy independence for most European countries. They emphasize that the risks of storing waste are small and can be further reduced by using the latest technology in newer reactors. Specifical-ly for the EU the argument is made that the operational safety record is excellent when compared to other major kinds of power plants. Opponents say that nuclear power poses numerous threats to people and the environment and point to studies that question if it will ever be a sustainable energy source. These threats include health risks and environmental damage from uranium mining, processing and transport, the risk of nu-clear weapons proliferation or sabotage, and the unsolved problem of radioactive nuclear waste. They also contend that reactors themselves are enormously complex machines where many things can and do go wrong, and emphasize that there have been many serious nuclear accidents. Critics do not be-lieve that these risks can be reduced through new technology. Additionally, they argue that when all the energy-intensive stages of the nuclear fuel chain are considered, from uranium mining to nuclear decommissioning, nuclear power is not a low-carbon electricity source.

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Relevant Questions: Why do opinions on nuclear energy differ as strongly as they do? What arguments are used in the debate against/in favour of nuclear energy? Which role and importance does nuclear energy have in the individual EU member states? What are the main conflicts in the area of nuclear safety? Where to do you see the limitations of nuclear energy for the future?

Obligatory Resources:

An extensive Eurobarometer report on nuclear Energy and public opinion in the EU, requested by the DG ENER and published in 2010 (pre-Fukushima): http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ ebs_324_en.pdf Pearce, Joshua M., Limitations of Nuclear Power as a Sustainable Energy Source, 2012: http://www.academia.edu/1628854/Limitations_of_ Nuclear_Power_as_a_Sustainable_Energy_Source A page of Debating Europe, comprehensively reviewing the main arguments for and against nuclear power: http://www.debatingeurope.eu/focus/infobox-arguments-for-and-against-nuclear/#.UkFFexZZtSo The Greenpeace anti-nuclear campaign website: http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/nuclear/

[2] The main argument used in these studies is the fact that uranium, the element mostly used for nuclear fission, is also a resource that will be exhausted in the future. [3] The two most famous among them are the accidents in Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011). [4] The Wikipedia-page ‘Nuclear Power Debate’ gives a comprehensive overview of arguments used in the de-bate. Use this information with care though, as the debate is controversial and the page might be subject to sub-jective ideas instead of objective facts. Have special attention for the “Issues”-section, outlining the debate in 14 bullet points, 7 pro and 7 contra. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power_debate

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Main Actors International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an independent intergovernmental organisation, which reports to the UN General Assembly and the Security Council and provides a forum for inter-national communication and cooperation, promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and technol-ogy. It serves as the global focal points for nuclear cooperation, its main work areas being nuclear safety and security, nuclear science and technology and nuclear safeguards and verification. Euratom Treaty European nuclear policy is governed by the Euratom Treaty. Therefore, regular EU policy, for ex-ample on environment or the market does not apply to issues in the nuclear field. The nuclear policy is mainly in the competence of the member states. On the EU level, the Directorate-General for En-ergy of the European Commission (EC DG ENER) coordinates member states, industry and EU in-stitutions in cooperation on energy policy. The European Council is the locus for intergovernmental decisions, and is thus more important on the level of the member states. The European Parliament does not have authority in the field of nuclear policy other than the right to ask questions to the Eu-ropean Commission. European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC/Euratom) The European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom) is an international organisation with the purpose of creating a specialist market for nuclear power in Europe, developing nuclear energy and distributing it to its member states while selling the surplus to non-member states. It is legally distinct from the European Union (EU), but has the same membership, and is governed by the insti-tutions of the EU. The objective of the Euratom Treaty is to pool the nuclear industries of member states. Through the Treaty, the EU can ensure the safe and sustainable use of nuclear energy across Europe and help non-EU countries meet high standards of safety, security and non-proliferation. Even though European competences are limited, lobby groups still spend a significant amount of time and resources to try make European policy more beneficial for the nuclear industry. The most important lobby group is the European Atomic Forum (FORATOM), a Brussels-based trade as-

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socia-tion for the nuclear energy industry in Europe. Its main purpose is to promote the use of nuclear energy in Europe by representing the interests of this industrial sector. The anti-nuclear movement is a social movement that opposes various nuclear technologies, and consists of direct action groups, en-vironmental groups and professional organisations. Major anti-nuclear groups include Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, and the Nuclear Information and Resource Service.

Relevant Questions: With the high amount of actors involved on several different levels, who in the end has the main competence of decision on nuclear energy? To what degree has the EU the right to make decisions on nuclear energy, and should it remain this way?

Obligatory Resources: Article from Reuters outlining the divide between EU Member States on nuclear energy: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/08/14/uk-eu-nuclear-idUKBRE97D05N20130814 Executive summary of a Egmont Institute paper dealing with nuclear energy in the EU, indicating how strong opinions are on this topic: http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/07/eu/Nuclear. energy.in.EU-KVH.pdf The ‘Public Opinion’-section of the FORATOM website: http://www.foratom.org/facts-and-figures/public-opinion.html World Nuclear News (WNN) article on France’s plans for a transition of their energy mix, by for ex-ample capping the contribution of nuclear energy: http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-Nuclear_to_ fund_French_energy_transition-2309137.html Exxon Mobil stating that the world nuclear capacity will have to double by 2040 to meet increasing energy demands, WNN article: http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/EE-Double_nuclear_by_2040_says_Exxon-1309138.html

[5] Summary of the Euratom treaty, Europa, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_euratom_en.htm

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Relevant Questions: Are the measures currently in place sufficient to deal with the issue of nuclear safety? How should the use of nuclear energy be made safer in the future?

Measures & Solutions The European Nuclear Energy Forum is a unique platform for a broad discussion, free of any taboos, on transparency issues as well as the opportunities and risks of nuclear energy. Founded in 2007, ENEF gathers all relevant stakeholders in the nuclear field: governments of the 28 EU Member States, European Institutions including the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, nuclear industry, electricity consumers and the civil society. In the EU, the European Council, in March 2011 concluded that “the safety of all EU nuclear plants should be reviewed, on the basis of a comprehensive and transparent risk and safety assessment (“stress tests”)”. These stress tests have been carried out ever since, and provide a basis for a new directive on nuclear safety. The European Commission has recently published a press release, outlining a proposal for a Di-rective to amend the current Nuclear Safety Directive. This proposal is a vital step forward on an EU-wide safety assurance system. The 2011 Japanese Fukushima nuclear disaster has led some European energy officials to “think twice about nuclear expansion”. Switzerland has abandoned plans to replace its old nuclear reactors and will take the last one offline in 2034. Spain has made similar decisions. Anti-nuclear opposition intensified in Germany. In the following months the government decided to shut down eight reactors immediately, and to have the other nine off the grid by the end of 2022. Renewable energy in Ger-many is believed to be able to compensate for much of the loss. An Italian referendum produced an overwhelming vote to keep the country non-nuclear. Belgium is considering phasing out its nuclear plants, perhaps as early as 2015. France, frequently considered as the nuclear commercial model for the world, has proposed cutting nuclear power’s electricity contribution by more than a third by 2025. Under the guidance of the Generation IV Forum (GIF), a global effort is being made to research new theoretical nuclear reactor designs. Current reactors in operation around the world are generally considered second- or thirdgeneration systems, with most of the first-generation systems having been retired some time ago. Advantages of the Generation IV reactors include: nuclear waste that remains

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radioactive for a few centuries instead of millennia; 100-300 times more energy yield from the same amount of nuclear fuel; the ability to consume existing nuclear waste in the production of electricity; and improved operation safety.

In which direction is the use of nuclear energy moving? Should it remain this way?

Obligatory Resources: Article from Deutsche Welle, outlining the future of nuclear energy in the EU through several arti-cles: http://www.dw.de/the-future-of-nuclear-power-ineurope/a-16772616 Very comprehensive website of the European Commission outlining European research on nuclear energy: http://ec.europa.eu/research/energy/euratom/index_ en.cfm Article published in 2011 in the Daily Beast, outlining national measures to cut back nuclear energy: http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/11/27/ post-fukushima-nuclear-power-changes-latitudes.html Article arguing in favour of 4th Generation Nuclear Power: http://ossfoundation.us/projects/energy/nuclear

Conclusion With highly differing opinions, and competences on different levels, the debate on nuclear energy is definitely not straightforward. Additionally, nuclear energy can be seen as something every citizen should have a say on. The two most difficult questions will be on the position towards nuclear ener-gy as well as safety, i.e. more or less NPPs in the EU, how to make them safer, and regarding the policy competence, i.e. how the EU can achieve common goals whereas the Member States have the power to decide? Is there common ground to be found between supporting Member States and the nuclear energy industry on the one hand, and opposing Member States, the anti-nuclear movement and

Key terms Nuclear power plants (NPPs), 4th generation nuclear power, Fukushima disaster, nuclear fission, Euratom, Energy mix. [6]Webpage of the European Commission outlining ENEF: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/forum/forum_en.htm [7] Information on the Nuclear Safety Directive; http://ec.europa.eu/ energy/nuclear/safety/safety_en.htm [8] Webpage of the EC DG ENER on nuclear safety, outlining the new safety proposal and including links to the actual proposal, a citizen’s summary and a press release: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/safety/safety_en.htm [ 9 ] http : / / w w w. ny t i m e s . c om / 2 0 1 1 / 0 3 / 1 5 / bu s i n e s s / e n e r g y environment/15power.html?_r=0, New York Times Arti-cle, 03/15/2013.


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Is fracking the future? With shale gas posing an attractive option for reliable domestic energy production, what stance should the EU take on the matter taking into account both potential implications for environmental integrity and implications for the development of carbon-free technologies?

Introduction and Explanation Fossil fuels reserves are declining and gas prices are rising. With so many sectors of the economy and aspects of private life relying on the use of fossil fuels and the impact of this consumption on the environment, the need for an energy revolution becomes clear. Whilst some are advocating the use of renewable energy sources, others have been researching ways to tap on different kinds of gas reserves, such as shale gas. Fracking, the technique currently used to extract this gas, basically consists of drilling deep underground and fracturing the shale by the high-pressure injection of the fracking fluid . Even though fracking, as a domestic source of lowcarbon energy, offers interesting economic and energetic perspectives, there are numerous threats to the environment and the health of citizens. These threats include the contamination of water aquifers that lie above gas reserves, release of methane, the causing of earthquakes, etc. Also, critics are concerned by the high amounts of water the process uses and investment being diverted from renewable energy, such as wind farms and solar power . Furthermore, the longterm economic profitability of such wells has been put into question . According to the European Parliament committees of ITRE and ENVI, “the emergence of exploration for shale gas in some EU countries should be backed up by ‘robust regulatory regimes’” . Currently, while the European Commission (EC) is working on a policy proposal, the legislation differs immensely from one Member State to another.

Relevant Questions: Is hydraulic fracturing to be considered clean and safe for the environment as well as for the citizens living nearby? What are the potential benefits of shale gas extraction in the particular case of Europe? Would the extensive use of fracking be likely to trigger an “energetic revolution” similar to what the USA experienced?

Obligatory Resources: Shale gas, video by AFP: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eqM0LeXF4Kc Hydraulic Fracturing 3D Animation, video by TrialExhibits: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fFUxq9UolN4 Presentation of the results of the public consultation “Unconventional fossil fuels (e.g. shale gas) in Europe, public consultation commanded by the European Commission, conducted from December 2012 to March 2013: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/energy/ pdf/Presentation_07062013.pdf

[1]Water, sand and a mix of various chemicals compose the fracking fluid. [2] The Guardian, “Fracking won’t endanger UK’s climate targets, says Ed Davey“, 09.09.2013, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/sep/09/fracking-shalegas-ed-davey-climate-change [3] Shale Shock Media, “Shale Promises or Shale Spin? A Conversation with Deborah Rogers”, 29.01.2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nxG4CpNSZTQ [4] See Obligatory resource one. [5]France, Luxembourg, Czech Republic and Bulgaria have imposed bans or moratoriums, although Britain, Ukraine and Poland have already issued permits.

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Main Conflict(s) On one hand, adversaries claim that the risks for the environment and population are too high, put into question the economic profitability and also emphasise the need for a greener energy grid. On the other hand, proponents deny the existence of dangers, often mentioning strict safety and security measures, present the extraction of non-conventional gas as an economic necessity and emphasise the urgency of an increased domestic energy production. Therefore, two main conflicts demand our attention. First of all, both sides do not agree whether fracking is to be considered a clean source of energy or not. Whilst it is indeed a low-carbon energy source, it has been argued , that emissions from the transportation and leaks of methane offset potential ecological benefits. Secondly, a reliable estimate of the risks implied is crucial for an educated decision upon necessary regulation. Contamination of ground water is especially controversial. Indeed, several studies and testimonies attest higher levels of methane in drinking water in areas around wells. Another question that needs to be settled is whether fracking would cause an “energetic revolution” similar to what the USA experienced, or not. The country has become almost self-sufficient in energy supply, the implementation of wells has made certain areas boom, and the American industry is benefiting from the energy prices, which are on the lowest level in the past decade . However, specific parameters such as stricter environmental regulation, geological aspects, geography and infrastructure cast doubts on the effect extensive use of hydraulic fracturing would have in Europe. Also, critics claim “the US shale boom will be shortlived and will not provide lasting energy security and cheap fuel” . Considering that the EC announced a policy proposal for 2013 , the question is how strict potential fracking regulation should be. If the EU does indeed like to pursue the path of fracking, proponents claim that very strict regulation might to further decrease the attractiveness and economic benefits of shale gas extraction in Europe . On the other hand, too loose a regulation is likely to allow for security threats and may face criticism amongst the EU citizens.

To what extend is hydraulic fracturing a danger to the EU citizens living in the area around it? Is it possible to avoid all potential threats and risks by safety measures? Do you think renewable sources of energy offer an efficient alternative to other energy sources as of yet?

Obligatory Resources: Unconventional Gas in Europe – Frack to the Future, article in the Economist http://www.economist.com/news/business/21571171extracting-europes-shale-gas-and-oil-will-be-slowand-difficult-business-frack-future Unconventional Gas: Potential Energy Market Impacts in the European Union, study by the Joint Research Centre, the EC’s in-house science service http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/downloads/jrc_report_2012_09_unconventional_gas.pdf Climate impact of potential shale gas production in the EU, report by AEA for the European Commission DG CLIMA http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/eccp/docs/120815_ final_report_en.pdf

[6] See for example, Nature,“Air sampling reveals high emissions from gas field”, Jeff Tollefson, 07.02.2012, http://www.nature.com/news/airsampling-reveals-high-emissions-from-gas-field-1.9982 [7] See for example, PNAS, “Methane contamination of drinking water accompanying gas-well drilling and hydraulic fracturing”, Osborn et al., http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/cgc/pnas2011.pdf [8] One of many videos of drinking taps catching fire: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4LBjSXWQRV8 [9] Euractiv, in German, “EU-Kommission: Kein Fracking-Dorado in Europa“, 13.06.2013, http://www.euractiv.de/energie-und-klimaschutz/artikel/eu-kommission-kein-fracking-el-dorado-in-europa-zu-erwarten-007628 [10] See page five of the obligatory resouce five. [11] Euractiv, “Big shale gas deal may not spark EU energy revolution”, 28.03.2013, http://www.euractiv.com/energy/shale-gas-faces-uncertainfuture-news-518765 [12] Vieuws, Joe Hennon, EU Commission Environment Spokesman, on Shale Gas, Video, http://www.vieuws.eu/energy/joe-hennon-eu-commission-environment-spokesman-on-shale-gas/ [13] Vieuws, Rapporteur Niki Tzavela Efd on the potential of shale gas and its environmental impact, Video, http://www. vieuws.eu/environment/rapporteur-niki-tzavela-efd-onthe-potential-of-shale-gas-its-environmental-impact/

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Main Actors European citizens Currently, the public opinion on fracking ranges from skeptical to very negative and this, unlike in the USA, might have an impact on policy-making in regards to this procedure. MEPs have argued it is necessary to start a long-term awareness raising effort about the benefits of fracking . The institutions of the European Union The Directorate-General for Energy has the mission to develop and implement a European energy policy taking into account strategic aspects, security and safety, guaranty of supply and the arrival of indigenous energy sources . The outlook on less energetic dependence , increased stability in production and other economic aspects, much in the interest of the ITRE committee, needs to be balanced off with leadership in green technologies, climate protection, safety and security, on which ENVI focuses, and a positive image of the EU among the population: a reasonable compromise needs to be reached by all those institutions. The member states Even though legislation differs, it generally is in the interest of every country to be able to produce energy, to avoid dependency and possibly strengthen energy exports. It is also in the interest of every government to improve their perceived image among the electorate. It is also important to remember that energy security is a competence shared by the EU and its member states.

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Relevant Questions: Would the extensive extraction of shale gas be more likely to reduce Europe’s greenhouse gas emissions or increase it? Which of its interests should the EU prioritize? Is the use of fracking coherent with the Energy 2020 Strategy and other EU strategies? If not, should it be coherent?

Obligatory Resources: Support to the identification of potential risks for the environment and human health arising from hydrocarbons operations involving hydraulic fracturing in Europe, report by AEA for the EC DG Environment: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/energy/ pdf/fracking%20study.pdf “Fracking won’t endanger UK’s climate targets, says Ed Davey”, article in The Guardian: http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/ sep/09/fracking-shale-gas-ed-davey-climate-change “Shale Gas could be ‘game changer’”, article on European Voice: http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/shalegas-could-be-game-changer-/77060.aspx

Fracking companies Companies such as Cuadrilla, Shell or ExxonMobil have an economic interest in the exploitation of shale gas in Europe . Furthermore, it is important to consider the influence of the fracking lobby on national and international levels. Non-governmental organisations NGOs such as Greenpeace of WWF have been trying to raise awareness about and fight the spreading of fracking for a long time. They claim that the supposed benefits of hydraulic fracturing do not outweigh the negative impact on climate and the many risks. Also, they emphasize that fracking does not represent a source of clean energy .

[14] Vieuws, Europe needs to educate people on shale gase benefits argues David Neslin, Video, http://www.vieuws.eu/energy/europe-needsto-educate-people-on-shale-gas-benefits-argues-david-neslin/ [15] European Commission, DG Engergy, Website, http://ec.europa.eu/ dgs/energy/mission_en.htm [16] See http://eurodad.org/files/pdf/520a34976f493.pdf and http:// www.euractiv.com/climate-environment/meaning-europe-energy-dependency-analysis-512294 [17] See http://fracking.velaw.com/?s=europe and obligatory resource four in “main conflicts”. [18] See Dangers of Fracking, Website, http://www.dangersoffracking. com and WWF Blog, http://blogs.wwf.org.uk/blog/campaigns/put-thebrakes-on-fracking/ [19] European Commission, Website, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strategies/2010/2020_en.htm

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Measures & Solutions Since 2011, the issue has been debated in the Parliament, in the Commission and in the Council. A number of different studies and reports as well as a public consultation, which closed in March 2013, have been conducted. Furthermore, resolutions adopted and the creation of a Technical Working Group endorsed. It has been announced that the Commission intends to present a proposal on shale gas, by creating new legislation or by amending existing regulation , later this year. One concrete approach is amending existing legislation so as to require environmental impact studies for nonconventional hydrocarbon exploration and extraction projects. However, the vote about this proposal was postponed on 11th of September 2013 . Other suggestions include measures to inform and educate the public about fracking, diversify European energy production to enhance synergies, limiting risks by regulation regarding the safety and security of wells, amending the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive, the Liability Directive , the Directive on the Management of waste from extractive industries or the Water Framework Directive. While not directly linked to the extraction of shale gas, the Conclusions of the European Council of May 22 2013 include statements relevant to the topic.

Relevant Questions: How should the EU regulate hydraulic fracturing? Through which type of legislation? What is the public opinion about fracking and how should this issue be addressed? In your opinion, is fracking the future?

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Obligatory Resources:

Story: Can Europe join the Shale Gas Revolution?, Video by ViEUws: http://www.vieuws.eu/energy/story-can-europe-jointhe-shale-gas-revolution/ European Parliament resolution of November 2012 on the environmental impacts of shale gas and shale oil extraction activities: http://w w w.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc. d o ? p u b R e f = - / / E P / / T E XT + TA + P 7 - TA- 2 0 1 2 0443+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN European Parliament resolution of November 2012 on industrial, energy and other aspects of shale gas and oil: http://w w w.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc. d o ? p u b R e f = - / / E P / / T E XT + TA + P 7 - TA- 2 0 1 2 0444+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN

Conclusion

In order to be able to address the question of fracking, it is essential to first have a concrete idea of the risks that the extraction of shale gas would imply. It is also crucial to be able to estimate whether it would be a step forward in the direction of a greener energy grid or a step backwards. The potential impact of fracking in Europe on the climate and more specifically on water consumption and emission of greenhouse gases needs to be assessed. Also, the economic profitability of non-conventional gas extraction in Europe and the potential effects on the EU energy market must be estimated as precisely as possible. Therefore, the benefits and potential consequences must be assed before it can be discussed which of the two outweighs the other. Tough it is certain that the EU Commission will issue legislation in the next few months, the stance the EU will take with this policy on shale gas is not clear yet and therefore still in the midst of the debate.

Key Terms Fracking, Hydraulic fracturing, Shale gas, Conventional and unconventional or non-conventional gas, Fracking fluid. [20] Vieuws, Can Europe join the shale gas revolution, Video, http:// www.vieuws.eu/energy/story-can-europe-join-the-shale-gas-revolution/ and Joen Hennon speaks on shale gas, http://www.vieuws.eu/energy/joe-hennon-eu-commission-environment-spokesman-on-shale-gas/ [21] European Parliament, News, “Shale gas impact studies postponed�, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/ content/20130906IPR18833/html/Shale-gas-environmental-impactstudies-vote-postponed [22] Eurlex, Directive on Safety of offshore oil and gas operations, http:// eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:178:0066:0 106:EN:PDF [23] European Union, Legislation summary, Waste management, http:// europa.eu/legislation_summaries/environment/waste_management/ l28134_en.htm [24] as laid out in the EU 2020 Strategy, the Green Paper, the 2030 framework for climate and energy policies, and the Roadmap 2050.


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Filling the policy gap between the Europe 2020 Targets and the Energy Roadmap 2050: With a new climate and energy framework on the horizon, what long-term policies and binding targets should the European Union introduce with a view to ensuring a secure, competitive and low-carbon energy sector beyond 2020?

Introduction and Explanation In response to the findings of the United Nation’s (UN) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the EU has begun to set targets on reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. Uniquely, it has done so within the context of strategies for growth in the European economy; namely the Lisbon strategy (2000-2010) and Europe 2020 (2010 – 2020). Within the ‘Europe 2020’ strategy are the 20-20-20 targets; a 20% cut in emissions of greenhouse gases by 2020, compared with 1990 levels; a 20% increase in the share of renewables in the energy mix; and a 20% cut in energy consumption. These targets are binding on Member States and a number of measures to reach those targets are now also binding due to the Energy Efficiency Directive. Thus attention is now turning to Europe’s energy policy post 2020. The EU has resolved to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 80 to 95% of 1990 levels by 2050 – effectively decarbonising Europe’s energy sector. The recently published Energy Roadmap 2050 lays out seven alternative options which can be pursued by policymakers over the coming years. While there is agreement that it is desirable for the EU to decarbonise, the challenge now facing to EU is to find ways of making this happen.

Obligatory Resources The failure of the Lisbon Strategy: http://www.voxeu.org/article/failure-lisbon-strategy The BBC analyse the context of the 20-20-20 targets: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7765094.stm Euractiv review the Energy Efficiency Directive: http://www.euractiv.com/energy-efficiency/energy-efficiency-eus-new-action-linksdossier-496252 Energy companies advocate a free market approach, rather than a government directed one: http://www.euractiv.com/energy-efficiency/energycompanies-reject-binding-news-511381 Does the Commission have Member states and the Public’s support? http://www.euractiv.com/energy/europe-2050-energyroadmap-quiet-analysis-509890

Relevant Questions: Why were the Lisbon Strategy targets not met? How does the Europe 2020 strategy differ from the Lisbon Strategy? Does the Commission have sufficient power to impose energy policy on the Member States, and should it have that power at all? Will the 20-20-20 targets be met? Is it possible to remain competitive while trying to decarbonise the energy sector? Bearing the roadmap 2050 in mind, what sort of targets should the EU set for 2030? How can the Member states reach those targets?

[1] The Commission itself explains how we got from Lisbon to ‘Europe 2020’: http://ec.europa.eu/education/focus/focus479_en.htm [2] A comprehensive summary of the ‘Europe 2020’ strategy can be found here: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm [3] This Directive establishes a common framework of measures for the promotion of energy efficiency within the Union in order to ensure the achievement of the Union’s 2020 20 % headline target on energy efficiency. More on: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/efficiency/ eed/eed_en.htm

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The 2050 roadmap lays out five different decarbonisation strategies and two strategies where Europe fails to decarbonise. The five decarbonisation strategies are: 1. High energy efficiency; this strategy focuses on reducing the amount of energy consumed by retrofitting buildings and upgrading public facilities, homes and making utilities’ more energy efficient. It is a less risky approach as the technology is available; however it is more costly than any other strategy and requires considerable political will. 2. Technologies compete openly; this is the second cheapest option available and requires little involvement from government. It is premised on the hope that the freemarket will find sufficient incentive to develop new technologies which would reduce emissions, once they have be incentivised to do so by government. However it assumes public acceptance of both nuclear and Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). 3. Renewable energy sources; sets a high focus on altering Europe’s sources of energy. It is a more costly approach though it has the added advantage of giving Europe independent sources of energy. This approach is estimated to have the greatest impact on consumer prices – driving them up more than any other approach, which could be bad for the competitiveness of the EU economy. 4. Technologies compete with restrictions on CCS; this approach is similar to option two however restricts research in the area of CCS. This inevitably gives nuclear a more central role. This is the cheapest option. 5. Technologies compete with restrictions on nuclear; this would mean a greater emphasis on CCS and restrictions on nuclear. The third cheapest option and avoids the politically sensitive issue of nuclear energy. On one hand, policy makers could decide that decarbonisation is unnecessary. Alternatively, the EU could decide in favour of binding targets and measures for member states looking towards 2030 which would put the union on track to reach it’s 2050 targets. However since energy is a shared competence of the EU, many feel that member states should come up with their own policies and strategies with little interference from the Commission. Others worry that the EU will suffer from carbon leakage; in the event that other countries and trading blocs refuse to set the same targets for their economies, European business will simply move to those countries which have fewer restrictions on cheaper, dirtier fuels. Thus carbon emissions would remain at the same level yet the EU economy would have become less competitive. On the other hand, the Commission estimates that transitioning to a decarbonised economy will create jobs through building new infrastructure and research.

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Relevant Questions: Should the EU set decarbonisation targets for the Member States? Should the EU enforce specific measures on the Member States? If so, and given the failure of the EU to enforce the Lisbon strategy, does the Commission need new powers to enforce policy? Does the EU need to decarbonise? Should the EU decarbonise in the absence of a clear commitment of other countries to reduce emissions and move towards greater energy efficiency? We have the 20-20-20 goals for 2020, but what emission targets should the EU set for 2030? What combination of measures should the EU adopt to reach those goals? Should these measures be binding on the Member States or should they have a greater degree of autonomy over energy policy? How can the EU decarbonise without adversely affecting the EU economy? Which measures could actually spur growth? Should we prioritise options which give the EU greater energy independence

Obligatory Resources

Concise infographic from the IIEA: http://www.iiea.com/blogosphere/eu-energy-roadmap2050-infographic Brief summary by the CEP: http://www.cep.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/Kurzanalysen/Energiefahrplan/PB_Energy_Roadmap_2050.pdf Greenpeace weigh in: h t t p : / / w w w. g r e e n p e a c e . o r g / e u - u n i t / e n / Publications/2011/2050-energy-roadmap/ A critical perspective: http://www.euractiv.com/energy/eu-energy-roadmap2050-seen-miss-news-509750 [4] The Commission accepts alternative combinations could also be viable; those listed are not mutually exclusive [5] Shared competence is a term, which refers to an area of responsibility which is overseen by both the Member States and the EU institutions.


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Main Actors The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) has so far failed to find a binding agreement for reducing emissions acceptable to the parties involved. Frustrated by this lack of progress, the EU’s 20-2020 targets are the most ambitious of any country or trading bloc in the world. Within the EU, the Commission sets the agenda; however with energy policy still a shared competence the Member States still also have a significant say. Often countries take issue with the EU’s proposal; for example Poland voted against a resolution of the Council authorising the Commission to look into 2030 targets for reducing emissions as they are fearful of the possibility of carbon leakage, unless there is progress at the UNFCC on creating a new agreement. Thus member states and the European Parliament play a key role in approving Europe’s energy policy. Also, business interests lobby Parliament heavily as many policies could have an impact on Europe’s competitiveness. There are also a number of environmental NGOs who engage in the legislative process.

Relevant Questions: Should the EU set such ambitious targets in the absence of an agreement of all parties to the UNFCC? What targets would be acceptable to both Member States and the Parliament? Are business interests simply unwilling to invest in new research and development to reduce emissions or do they have genuine concerns which should be listened to?

Obligatory Resources: The Guardian’s portal on the Doha negotiations: http://www.theguardian.com/environment/cop18-dohaclimate-change-conference

Key Terms UN Intergovernmental committee on climate change, Lisbon strategy, Europe 2020, 20-20-20 targets, Energy Efficiency Directive, Energy roadmap 2050, Energy efficiency, renewable energies, carbon capture and storage, nuclear energy, carbon leakage, energy decarbonisation, competitiveness, secure energy sources. [6] The UNFCC is an international environmental treaty negotiated in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The objective of the treaty is to “stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”. More at: http://unfccc.int/2860.php

Measures and Solutions Member states are already bound by the energy efficiency directive which imposes a number of energy saving measures on them up until 2020, along with the 20-20-20 goals enshrined in the Europe 2020 strategy. The ITRE committee also recently adopted a resolution on the Energy roadmap. While the roadmap prefers to focus on alternative solutions which are available to policymakers, there are still a number of conclusions. The resolution concludes that early action is of the essence and that Europe wide action would be preferable. It points out that reducing energy consumption will be essential, and that large infrastructural projects will create jobs. The report accepts that all options will have to play a part in the final solution; energy efficiency, renewable, CCS and nuclear – the real question is to what extent each should be used, how we should move to those proportions as chosen by legislators and how quickly it should happen.

Relevant Questions: Given that the report accepts that all options will have to play a part in the final solution; energy efficiency, renewable, CCS and nuclear –to what extent each should be used? How can we make those targets possible? How quickly should it happen?

Obligatory Resources: Summary of the Energy Efficiency Directive: h t t p : / / w w w. d c e n r. g o v. i e / E n e r g y / E n e r g y + Efficiency+and+Affordability+Div ision/ Energy+Efficiency+Directive.htm Summary of ITRE resolution, 14/03/2013: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary. do?id=1253916&t=d&l=en

Conclusion This topic has three key elements; one is the aim of creating a low carbon energy sector. However, the costs of doing so is reflected in the two other goals; creating an energy sector which is secure and competitive. Thus the challenge is to choose an approach which will create a low-carbon economy while also maintaining competitiveness against other regions (will the cost of doing business in Europe become unbearable under new measures for decarbonisation in comparison to other regions?) and simultaneously choosing a secure energy mix – one which can be relied on and which is not contingent on the vagaries of neighbours or the 31 weather.


S E T O N

Here you can write down everything that pops up in your mind regarding your or another topic .

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New fuel for the economy: with the economic crisis slowly behind us, is there a chance for Member States to increase their spending in Research and Development? Should the EU fo-cus more on research and development, especially when it comes to safeguarding sustainable energy supplies?

Introduction and Explanation In March 2007, EU leaders committed Europe to becoming a highly energy-efficient and low-carbon economy. To combat climate change, a problem recognised by all Member States, the EU set up the “20-20-20” targets. One of the key objectives of these targets is to raise the share of EU energy consumption produced from renewable energy sources by 20% above 1990 levels by 2020. In order to reach this goal, Member States must not only make sure the consumption of sustainable energy is secure but must also do research in the field of sustaina-ble energy sources in order to create a more sustainable energy sector. Research and Innovation have been placed ‘at the heart of the EU strategy’ to create jobs and growth for 2020. Therefore, Member States are encouraged to invest 3% of their gross domestic product (GDP) in Research & Development (R&D) by 2020, part of which goes to research in the field of energy. Although the European Commission (EC) believes that innovation can be a mechanism to help us conquer the crisis from 2008, the Member States do not seem to reach the target of spending 3% of their GDP . The question is whether and how the EU should attempt to convince the Member States of the importance of reaching this target, taking into consideration the possible future of sustainable energy. Related to this, the role of R&D as a potential tool in reaching the 20-20-20 targets should be considered.

[1] ‘Energy strategy to gies/2008/2008_11_ser2_en.htm

2020’:

Relevant Questions: What is the future of renewable energy? What place should R&D take in the EU today? What can the EU potentially win or lose by increasing R&D investments?

Obligatory Resources: EC on renewables: http://ec.europa.eu/news/energy/120608_en.htm 20-20-20 targets: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_ en.htm What is R&D? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Research_and_development

http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strate-

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Main Conflict(s) The private sector accounts for almost half of the renewable energy research in the EU (for public expenditure, see ‘Measures already in place’) . According to the European Commis-sion’s “EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard” (which gives data on private invest-ments), the EU is a top player in global research. 405 EU-based companies account for a total of €144.6 billion of R&D investments in 2011. Also, the EU private sector increased its in-vestments by 8,9%, which is only beaten by the US’ 9% increase . In recent years, a share of these investments was made in renewable energy: the EU increased the share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption from 8.6 to 12.7% and in electricity generation from 14.7 to 19.6%. However, more investments in renewable energy sources (RES) have to be made to reach the target of an overall 487 GW of renewable energy per year by 2020 . On top of the apparent need for investments in RES to reach the 20-20-20 targets, there are more issues in the energy sector that need to be addressed. The energy sector in the EU is heavily dependent on imports, for example 54.1% of the gross inland energy consumption in 2010 was imported and is this figure is rising. To sustain Europe’s competitiveness in growth and job-creating new industries and to create a secure supply of energy, the EU needs to pro-duce more of its own energy, according to the European Council . To make a shift in energy supply and consumption possible, the biggest challenge that has to be overcome is of a financial nature. The EC has predicted that there has to be a € 1 trillion investment in the EU’s energy system by 2020 , which is needed for existing energy systems such as electricity and gas networks. Member States’ investments should increase by around 70% to reach this goal. This is a challenge since finding financial support remains a problem, especially in the current unstable economic situation. Moreover, future expansion of the EU might cause an additional need for investment in energy, as countries with out-dated energy systems will join the EU. The current economic situation also has its effect on investments in R&D. The effects of the crisis were most felt in 2009, when EU private investments decreased by 2.6% . Alt-hough R&D in general is currently on a steady growth trend, the unstable economy is still a problem for investing in RES. There is a lack of certainty amongst investors concerning long-term investments. Additionally, some Member States have, for the sake of economic stabil-ity, introduced sudden cuts or caps in financial support, which have harmed ongoing projects in RES in those countries .

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Relevant Questions: What should be the EU’s stand on imported energy? Should the EU make a shift in energy supply? If so, how? Should investments in RES have priority over other possible investments? And if so, how can the EU guarantee that investments will be made by all Member States?

Obligatory Resources: Some questions about R&D: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-948_ en.htm All about EU energy supply: ht t p : / / e c . e u ro p a . e u / e n e r g y / g a s _ e l e c t r i c i t y / doc/20121115_iem_swd_0367_en.pdf Opinion on renewables: http://www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2013/05/lords-eumust-coordinate-europes-renewable-future Opinion piece on R&D in the EU: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/ search?q=cache:SW9eNC1lFpQJ:www.bruegel.org/ download/parent/16-europes-r-and-d-missing-thewrong-targets/file/1308-europes-r-and-d-missing-thewrong-targets-q-and-a-english/+&cd=13&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=nl

[2] ‘EU research spending on RES’: http://ec.europa.eu/research/energy/ pdf/res_spending_en.pdf [3] ‘R&D Scoreboard’; http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12948_en.htm [4] EU ‘Making the internal energy market work’: http://ec.europa.eu/ energy/gas_electricity/doc/20121115_iem_swd_0367_en.pdf [5] ‘EU energy policy’: http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/171257/ec04.02.2011-factsheet-energy-pol_finaldg.en.pdf [6] EC ‘Investment Needs’: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/financial_operations/investment/europe_2020/investment_needs_en.htm [7] EU ‘R&D Scoreboard’: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO12-948_en.htm [8] ‘Global trends in renewable energy investment 2013’: http://www. unep.org/pdf/GTR-UNEP-FS-BNEF2.pdf


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Main Actors Member States’ governments: The interests of the Member States can be mainly divided in two, at some points contra-dicting, parts. On the one hand there is the necessity of keeping up with the targets im-plemented by the European Commission to strive for a sustainable energy sector. On the other hand, Member States must take care of the stability of their own economies. Mem-ber States have made indications about their potential investments in RES in the National Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAP) . The investments differ amongst Member States, as the use of RES and a strong commitment to the reduction of greenhouse gases is only preferred by those Member States whose energy structure allow for such policies (depending on geographical characteristics, amount of dependency on coal or imported energy, balance between state- and market intervention etc.). Research sector: The research sector includes both the private and the public sector. In the private sector, the interests of the companies carrying out the research influence the nature of the research. In the public sector (universities, EU research funds, scientific institutions) there is little influence of external stakeholders, but access to financial support is a main issue. Energy industry: The energy industry can, for this particular topic, be divided into the renewable energy industry and the industry that specialises in other forms of energy such as gas and oil. For both of these industries, it is important to stay efficient, as they must together fulfil Eu-rope’s energy needs. For the renewable energy sector in particular it is important to explore their possible growth, since it is a young industry. EC: Joint Research Centre (JRC) & Intelligent Energy Europe (IEE): The European Commission can fund R&D initiatives through the JRC, which is a net-work of seven research institutes from across the EU. The JRC mostly works in the field of technological novelties. Furthermore, the EC funds renewable energy programs through the IEE, which offers financial support to organizations willing to improve energy sustainability.

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Relevant Questions: Should the EU coordinate the Member States’ activities in RES? What could be the benefits of renewables for the energy industry? Should R&D be carried out on a national or supranational level?

Obligatory Resources: EC Research: http://europa.eu/pol/rd/ NRAEP summary: https://www.ecn.nl/nreap/home/

[9] ‘Renewable Energy Projections’: https://www.ecn.nl/nreap/home/ [10]‘The EU Member States enad the quest for a Common External Energy Policy’: http://www.academia.edu/625392/Between_Conflict_ and_Convergence_The_EU_Member_States_and_the_Quest_for_a_ Common_External_Energy_Policy

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Relevant Questions: What would be a good balance between private and public investments in research?

Measures and Solutions

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Apart from the EU’s financial guidelines for investments in R&D and renewable energies, a handful of initiatives have been created to stimulate innovation in the renewable energy in-dustry. Horizon 2020 Horizon 2020 is the EU’s new programme for 2014-2020, which will combine all re-search and innovation funding currently provided through the Framework Programmes, the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme and the European Institute of Innovation and Technology. This means that most of the funding of research and innova-tion will now take place through one initiative. Horizon 2020 focuses on a broad spec-trum of research-related projects, including further developing the European Research Area and implementing Open Access . €3.17 billion of a total of €80 billion of the Hori-zon 2020 budget will go to research in ‘major concerns’, of which renewable energy is a part . European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) The EIT is a joint organisation (funded with €3.18 billion of Horizon 2020) that seeks to build a common ground for businesses, higher education and research centres. The EIT provides funds to so-called “Knowledge and Innovation Communities” (KICs), composed of three aforementioned partners that work together on a specific innovation project. The first pilot projects have shown that, to make the KICs successful, it will require a high level of trust among the partners and well-designed organizational structures and efficien-cy indicators . European Research Area (ERA) The ERA can be seen as the EU’s common market for research and innovation. It strives for more competitiveness in European research by bringing together the research institu-tions. According to there has been progress in the field of environment, but it the harmo-nisation between national governments is still weak and there is lack of long-term and high-level strategic planning . As all above initiatives require a large amount of investment from the EU and national gov-ernments, measures to make private investments more attractive to the private sector could also be considered. Research, especially in energy, can be very lucrative for private compa-nies. Private investments would be beneficiary for Member States, many of whom are indebt-ed and are required to reduce their respective debt to GDP ratios . However, the crucial ques-tion for the Committee to focus on, among others, is how to attract and coordinate private re-search.

How should private research in renewable energy be promoted? Is the current focus on R&D sufficient, and if not, to what extent and in which way should it be developed? To what extent should an increase in spending for R&D be considered? Who should carry the majority of the costs?

Obligatory Resources: Problems and recommendations on the ERA (pages 6 to 10) : http://ec.europa.eu/research/environment/pdf/era_ for_environment.pdf Interesting view on stimulating innovation: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=1591751 Open Access: http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/index. cfm?fuseaction=public.topic&id=1294&lang=1

Conclusion The EU has found itself in an investment dilemma. To reach the targets created in 2007, the R&D in renewable energy has to become a priority. However, keeping in mind the already high level of expenditure on energy in the EU, it is doubtful whether the EU will be able to increase investment in this sector, especially given the current indebted state of our economy. Will further R&D investments in renewable energy encourage growth or is this energy sector still too young to ensure its efficiency? What balance should the EU find between its econom-ic and energy needs?

Key Terms Renewable/sustainable energy sources, energy sector, Research and Development, European Research Area, Horizon 2020, energy supplies, energy investments, innovation. [11] EC ‘Open Access’: http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.topic&id=1294&lang=1 [12] EU ‘Research and Innovation’: http://europa.eu/pol/rd/ [13] ‘How to steer a multi-stakeholder Innovation Ecosystem’: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1591751 [14] ‘A European Research Area for the Environment’, pages 6 – 10: http://ec.europa.eu/research/environment/pdf/era_for_environment. pdf


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A renewable power plant in every home? In order to achieve the EU’s ambitious goals in the field of future energy production, what strategy should Europe adopt when developing its future energy grid? Introduction and Explanation The EU’s energy policy is very much focused on increasing renewable energy’s share of Europe’s total energy production. We know that the Renewable Energy Directive sets a target of a 20% share of renewable energy to be achieved by 2020. We can be encouraged by the Commission’s estimate that the 20% target is likely to be achieved - and perhaps even surpassed. However, the EU, or more specifically the European Council, has set itself an even more challenging task: the long-term objective of 80-95% CO2 emissions reduction by 2050. As it happens though, the two most popular and prospective sources of renewable power, solar and wind power, have a tendency towards fluctuation, which means that the amount of energy they produce varies considerably with time and is very hard to predict. The current European electricity grid often finds it difficult to cope with those fluctuations: for example, when wind starts blowing on Germany’s coast, the Czech and Polish grids suffer a lot from the sudden and unexpected surplus of electricity. This is one of the reasons why many national grid operators prefer more conventional sources of energy, such as coal or nuclear power, which are much more stable and predictable. This means that if we want to increase the share of renewable sources of energy - and the EU clearly does - there will have to be some major investment in the modernisation of the European energy grid. There is very little disagreement about this, although there is a fair number of alternative solutions, described in more detail below. One possible answer to Europe’s energy needs is the phenomenon of microgeneration. This is the smallscale energy production by individuals, business or small communities, using mainly renewable sources of energy, to compliment the main, centralised energy grid. Besides microgeneration’s very positive effect on environmental sustainability of energy production, it would also help substantially to decrease the pressure on electricity grids, as eventually less and less energy would need to be distributed through it. Unsurprisingly though, the wide-spread use of microgeneration is yet to be made feasible. This phenomenon is closely linked to the idea of decentralisation, which shall be discussed in more detail later on.

Relevant Questions: Are the EU’s long term renewable energy objectives achievable? If so, are they worth the effort and money? Does it still make sense to talk about national energy grids in today’s united Europe? Is it time to change our energy production paradigm and decentralise?

Obligatory Resources: A research on the practicability of microplants: http://w w w.kisarazu.ac.jp/kokusai/conference2012-12-10/Proceedings/1007008E_TakahashiKanji. pdf A comprehensive list of challenges which Europe faces today in the field of energy, drafted by the Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/energy2_en.pdf A very interesting, though perhaps completely relevant thesis on the issue of appeasing the market approach and the geopolitical struggle for energy security: https://www.coleurope.eu/sites/default/files/uploads/ page/edp_3_2013_metais.pdf

[1] Directive 2009/28/EC Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC. [2] The energy roadmap 2050, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/ energy2020/roadmap/index_en.htm [3]Examples of possible microgeneration plants include some very interesting projects, such as small-scale hydroplants, as shown brilliantly here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KMlUvVhM42k.

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Relevant Questions:

The arguments inherent to our topic are two-fold: technical and abstract.

Are we ready to decrease our comfort and standard of living in exchange for energy sustainability?

Speaking in terms of abstract arguments first, some people see problems with reorganising the energy market through political intervention. Libertarians, or people who generally believe that state intervention should be minimal, say that the state (or the EU) has no right to tell people how to generate the electricity they use. Others would respond to this criticism by saying that energy safety and protection of the environment are clearly desirable, and that if the market does not provide for those, we need to make political decisions. It is argued that the market would support cheap ways to produce electricity (coal burning, most likely), which is short-sighted and very damaging to the environment. Once this conflict has been solved, we can then discuss the relevant practical steps to take. The first conflict seems to arise from the discussion on whether we should decentralise energy production or not. Those in favour of this proposal say that such decentralisation would make our energy consumption much more sustainable, it would cut down the pressure on energy grids and, one day, might actually be cheaper than conventional ways of energy production. They say that the so called ‘Central Generation Paradigm’ is an outdated concept from the beginning of the 20th century and needs to be updated. On the other hand, certain groups and scientists have suggested that instead of investing money into the research of small power plants and renewable energies, which are by their very nature unstable, unpredictable and very importantly not readily available to everyone, we should focus more on the research of nuclear fusion or modern nuclear fission technologies, and of course other renewable sources. The big debate therefore is between decentralisation and improving the efficiency of the existing energy systems.

Do we want to invest into decentralisation of energy production, when the money could be spent on researching sources already available? Is it desirable for the Member States and the EU to intervene on the energy market?

Obligatory Resources: Former president of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Klaus, argues that political steps to limit our freedom to shape our energy consumption habits are very dangerous: http://www.radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/klaus-ourblue-not-green-planet-at-risk-from-environmentallobby A case in favour of decentralising energy production: http://www.csicop.org/si/show/critical_thinking_ about_energy_the_case_for_decentralized_generation_of_ele/ A truly interesting company which tries to make decentralisation a more achievable goal. You can even purchase a share. http://www.mitie.com/services/energy-services/decentralised-energy An interesting article which links the question of decentralisation and energy security: http://www.carolinelucasmep.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/file/EnergySecurityBridget_Jun06.pdf ‘Advanced nuclear fission, and fusion offer the best hope but, unfortunately, none are ready for large-scale deployment. All need time-consuming innovations so we cannot afford to hesitate; research must be ramped up across the board and government must keep up the pace.’. Read more on: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/12/opinion fusion-nuclear-energy-future/index.html


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Main Actors We need to realise the distinction between the institutions of the EU, most importantly the Commission, and the Member States, as the issue of energy production is a shared competence. The EU therefore normally takes up the role of a coordinator and facilitator, but ultimately decision about energy production are made on national level and paid for by national governments. Joint initiatives, such as the European Technology Platform for Wind Energy, provide for cooperation between the private and public sectors by bring together representatives of the respective industries and policy makers. The Framework Programmes for Research and Technological Development is a whole myriad of funding programmes through which the EU supports research. The money at its disposal (ca â‚Ź80 billion) make it a very noteworthy institution. Universities and Research Centres, as it is usually them who come up with innovations which change the entire industry. It is surprising how many inventions students and professors have created alike at different universities. We also need to recognise the existence of interest groups and lobbyists. Some of them have a clear vested interest, meaning that certain policy decision would benefit them or their employers, whilst others (such as Greenpeace) argue on a matter of principle.

Relevant Questions: Is it right for energy production and safety to be a shared competence? Does there need to be a shift in the direction of more or less centralisation of energy related decision making? Does the EU need to cooperate more closely with the private sector? What should an arrangement between the two look like?

Obligatory Resources: An article by businessGreen plus on the future of DESERTEC and the role of Dii: http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/feature/2291807/ what-next-for-desert-energy The European External Action Service’s (EEAS) stance on energy for Europe: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/energy/

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Measures and Solutions Very few people would disagree when we say that Europe’s electricity grid needs modernising and perhaps extending in some parts of the continent. Nevertheless, there are some proposals which try to deal with the issue of electricity supply fluctuations. Firstly, co called demand-side management has been proposed. This means that we intentionally incentivise people to use more energy when more of it is produced, for example when there is a lot of sunshine, and less when there is a shortage, say during windless conditions. This would clearly solve the issue of fluctuations. Nevertheless, this approach has been rejected by many. There are basically two main objections: political and practical. Politically speaking, many people dislike the idea of politicians telling the citizens when to use electricity and when not to do so, as they fear an undesirable increase of state power. It is probably also true that such an approach would impinge on our comfort we have got used to, as we would have to adapt our habits to the weather conditions. Practically speaking then, one has to realise that it would be hugely difficult to put such measures into practice: not mentioning the fact that our energy needs don’t necessarily correlate with the weather, as we need more of it in autumn and winter, in the evenings and so on. Secondly, supply-side management has been called a sustainable solution. This translates into active power plant management, in other words managing the wind mills and solar panels to produce more or less electricity when more or less is needed. This would appear to be a very reasonable solution to the fluctuation problem, if it wasn’t for the high cost and strenuousness thereof. To switch off a solar panel or stop a wind mill means money lost, and it can even be harmful for certain plants. Thirdly, energy or electricity storage has been subject to increasing attention recently. There are many different storage options, each suitable to different conditions; examples include hydro storage , compressed air storage or advanced battery systems. It is very important to know that those systems are already being used. RWE for example uses so called ADELE system, a system based on compressed air storage, quite widely.

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Relevant Questions: Should we convince people to adapt their energy consumption habits through political means? Is it desirable? Is energy storage the right answer? If we rely on it too much, will we stop our investments into renewable energy plants?

Obligatory Resources: IEADSM, an agency which promotes the use of demand-side management: http://www.ieadsm.org Electricity Storage Association, which campaigns for more investment into research of energy storage technology: http://www.electricitystorage.org/about/welcome

Conclusion One of the answers to Europe’s energy needs and one of the ways to meet the long-term carbon emission criteria could be decentralisation of energy production. The problem with using renewable energy distributed through standard energy grids is that it is unstable and unpredictable, although solutions to those issues do exist. Ultimately therefore, we need to decide which direction we want to take: improving the already existing renewable energy plants? Investing more into decentralisation and microgeneration? Investing more into nuclear fusion and fission technology?

Key Terms Microgeneration, Decentralisation, Energy consumption management (Demand and Supply), Energy Storage, Microplants

[4] An excellent, though quite long, video explaining many possible energy storage systems and mechanisms: http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=3R7EzO3uBms [5] A very interesting and smart system, explained very well in this video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sa0vs8f0Gsg. [6] A good explanation by RWE, http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=K4yJx5yTzO4


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“Not In My Back Yard”? With the ever-growing need to invest in new energy infrastructure, how should we balance private property rights with projects aimed at building new energy sources? What role should citizens play in the future of the EU’s energy infrastructure?“ Introduction and Explanation In the light of the energy sector‘s shift towards new energy sources, energy production and transmission have become and are still becoming more important than ever before, so that governments, corporations and citizens alike have grown increasingly aware thereof. It is crucial to examine the more theoretical paradigms that underlie the problem posed by the question in order find suitable solutions. Today, our energy is usually produced not even close to where we consume it. While solar panels produce the best results in the southern European countries or even outside of Europe (Desertec) and wind turbines functioning better in higher altitudes and places with a higher Wind Power Density‘ , our energy output is increasingly transferred from one place to another at times over very long distances. The partial shift from ‘conventional‘ power plants (coal, nuclear) to renewable energy sources (solar, wind, water) poses both the problems of the construction of those means of production as well as the problems of distribution. Solar energy only produces energy when the sun shines, wind turbines when the wind blows, forcing us to extensively invest in energy infrastructure. To counter these problems we are and have to continue building enormous infrastructure projects as Günther Oettinger, the European Comissioner for Energy put it: “If we are to achieve our energy and climate goals of “20-20-20 by 2020” and ensure the transition to a low-carbon economy by 2050 while fostering growth and jobs, Europe needs to invest in the modernisation of the energy infrastructure in the next ten years.“ The problem being that in many cases these projects interfere with property rights of third parties. In these cases it is a question of how we interpret the powers of the state and our understanding of property rights. Yet we have to keep in mind the point of view of the third party, in most cases citizens or property owners. How can we encourage citizens’ involvement and possible opportunities for direct democracy and public participation in the planning of modern energy infrastructure?

Relevant Questions: What are the kinds of infrastructure projects that can cause problems as described by the question? Why are people upset about infrastructure projects being constructed ‘in their backyards’? How important is new energy infrastructure for the shift from conventional energy sources to renewables?

Obligatory Resources: The European Commission’s portal on energy infrastructure: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/index_ en.htm Investment needs in the European energy systems: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/financial_operations/investment/europe_2020/investment_needs_ en.htm Very informative article on eminent domain (or expropriation), its reasoning and practices in different countries: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eminent_domain

[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solar_cell_efficiency - „The efficiency of the solar cells used in a photovoltaic system, in combination with latitude and climate, determines the annual energy output of the system“ -“At more northerly European latitudes, yields are significantly lower“ [2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wind#Wind_power_ density - Wikipedia, Wind Power Density. youtube.com/watch?v=KMlUvVhM42k.

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Main Conflict(s) The main conflict of this topic is the clash between property rights and citizens’ well-being versus the interests of society as a whole and of corporations. The right to property is one of the European Union‘s most fundamental rights like the right to freedom of speech. This right underlies all economic activity and gives security to invest in the Union‘s economy. It is the utmost important prerequisite for capitalism. It usually is a right that cannot be violated . Today we know one exception to this rule: if a piece of property needs to be used to advance the public good it can be expropriated in case compensation is paid. This usually concerns infrastructure projects like road projects, airports or in our case power-grids that are essential to the functioning of a modern state. Currently, there are no uniform pan-European rules on how these cases are handled. Legislation on how to expropriate private property is a competence of the member states and can only be appealed to the European Court of Human Rights after the full legal scope has been used in the respective member state. Under this premise, a citizen could be forced to give up a piece of land or tolerate for example a utility pole on his property. This obviously poses problems. In case it comes to a forced expropriation this means that the respective third party did not want to sell their property. So in most cases the government or the respective country will end up with resistance. This in return poses the question of what rights or legal instruments a society should give to affected parties in order to counter the imminent expropriation. The dilemma is that depriving parties of one of their most fundamental rights is rightfully hard and can result in long and painful court battles and settlements that can delay and increase the costs of desperately needed infrastructure projects. In a nutshell, citizens’ involvement can slow down modernisation and infrastructure projects while making it easy for the state to disown is hard to combine with our view on property.

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Relevant Questions: Should the government be able to expropriate? If yes, under what circumstances? What is more important - the property rights of citizens or the public interest in modern and efficient infrastructure? How should they be balanced? How should one assess the polluting externalities (the implications one actions has one unaffected third parties) of energy infrastructure projects?

Obligatory Resources: A sample case outlining the problems of expropriation: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. do?uri=CELEX:61996J0309:EN:NOT In case C-309/96, Annibaldi, §23, the Court noted “… the absence of specific Community rules on expropriation…” and concluded from the wording of what is now Art. 345 TFEU that the national measure at issue “…concerns an area which falls within the purview of the Member States.”: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. do?uri=CELEX:61996J0309:EN:NOT Property rights as defined in different constitution: German Constitution, Article 14: http://dejure.org/gesetze/GG/14.html Austrian Constitution, Article 5: http://investment-portal.net/austria/gesetzeat/staatsgrundgesetz.html French Constitution, Article 17: http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/constitution.asp#declaration Browse by topics and choose Rights and Duties -> Economic Rights -> Protection from expropriation (choose desired country): https://www.constituteproject.org

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Main Actors A. Member States Ownership and property rights and legislation are a competence of the member state. The European charta of fundamental rights states the right to property but also states the right of the member state to disown in case of public interest (see ³). Yet the European Legislation also says: „The Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership.“ So the European Union does guarantee the principal right to property, but the member states are free to draw the finer lines and exceptions themselves. B. The European Court of Human Rights The one European institution that possesses power over matters of property and expropriation is the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). It is generally possible for a European citizen to take a matter concerning expropriation to the ECHR if he previously has used the full scope of legal action in his home country. C. Energy grid facilitators There are also the bodies that carry out the actual construction of infrastructure and run it afterwards. This is, depending on the member state and its common practices, either the state or more often private companies (or a combination of both) that administer and own both the means of production and of transmission. It is in this group’s best interest to be able to carry out their projects without obstacles so as to build as fast and costeffective as possible. Their role is both the financing, construction and maintenance of energy infrastructure and playing a key role in the shift towards new energy sources and their exploitation. D. Citizens The common citizen is usually a beneficiary of our energy infrastructure that provides him with energy at any time in virtually any place in Europe. For the citizen it is important that the supply of energy is steady, safe and reasonably priced. Yet as we have learned it can come to cases where citizens can be affected quite literally in their ‘back yard’ and might be deprived of some of their rights. A utility pole next to your house, wind turbines at the place where used to be plain lands or a power plant in your vicinity can be upsetting and can decrease quality of life. Differing from member state to member state, citizens have certain rights to review plans to violate their property rights and also the right to go to court and have the construction plans changed.

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Relevant Questions: How is expropriation done in your country? Is there a standard procedure? Should it be revised? Has the NIMBY movement been successful so far? What the dangers and opportunities of this movement?

Obligatory Resources: According to Art. 345 TFEU, “The Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership” An example of ,NIMBY‘ protests: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/electrical-resistance-nimby-protests-threaten-germany-senergy-revolution-a-757658.html Expropriation for Telecom Purposes - an in depth account in regards to Swedish law and procedure. Highly informative: http://www.scandinavianlaw.se/pdf/47-24.pdf

[3] 1. Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general interest. – Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ charter/pdf/text_en.pdf [4] Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. do?uri=CELEX:12008E345:EN:NOT

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Measures and Solutions There are two main ways to tackle this question. We have identified the two conflict parties: the constructors of infrastructure (government/companies) trying to build as easy, fast and cheap as possible, and citizens or third parties affected that are looking for more democratic participation and a say in huge projects that are planned far away from them. One way would be the more enterprise and progress friendly approach to give the government more powers to ultimately disown and leave little room for appeals. This would mean a faster execution of urgently needed infrastructure. The other way would be to increase the rights of affected citizens. For example, standardising the way appeals against infrastructure projects are processed could do this. Allowing citizens to have a say over the course of projects that are to be built in their neighbourhoods can also take fears and help to explain and clarify what will happen. Mediation is also an opportunity that can be applied in these situations. The European Union could in these cases act as a middleman or supervising authority working with the affected parties.

Relevant Questions: What is adequate compensation for expropriated property? In which way should citizens be involved in the planning process of infrastructure projects? What rights should citizens have in case they are subjected to expropriation? Should there be respective European Legislation?

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Obligatory Resources: Report on Public Participation in Europe and some of its countries. Gives Suggestions for future opportunities: http://www.participationinstitute.org/wp-content/ uploads/2009/06/pp_in_e_report_03_06.pdf http://www.bdi.eu/download_content/Marketing/Broschuere_BDI_Akzeptanzpapier.pdf Report on the future of infrastructure projects by an industrial lobby group (in German). http://www.irwaonline.org/eweb/upload/sep_web_ Compulsorycompensation.pdf A paper on compulsory purchase and compensation in the UK and Europe.

Conclusion The dilemma inherent in this question is the conflict between the constructors of infrastructure and the people affected by its construction. If we favour the constructors, we will build faster and help Europe achieve a sustainable energy infrastructure needed to cope with the challenges of the shift towards renewable energies. If we do so, we neglect the citizens that are affected in their property and quality of life. So how should we choose between progress and necessities and the well-being and fundamental rights of third parties? Should we choose between them in the first place? Acceptance within the affected population is key to building success and the energy future of Europe.

Relevant Questions: How do you see ownership? Should there be a pan-European approach or even the possibility of European legislation on this topic? Are there ways in which we can mitigate the effects of more citizen participation and still be able to build competitive energy infrastructure?

Key Terms Energy Infrastructure; Property Rights; Citizen Participation; expropriation; Public Participation; constitution; power grid; NIMBY; ECHR; eminent domain.

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NOTES

Here you can write down everything that pops up in your mind regarding your or another topic .

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Academic preperation kit the hague