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THE ETHIOPIAN LAW

of EXTRA-CONTRACTU.AL LIABILITY

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THE ETHIOPIAN LAW

of EXTRA-CONl�RACTUAL LIABILITY

by GEORGE ,.;c;;;:;;;:a-c KRZECZUNOWICZ .: *•

PROFESSOR OF LAW

SEP 8 0 ·1975

flAILE SELASSIE I UNIVERSITY

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Since 1944 E. C., \v·hen I V\1as appoi11ted to organize and teach i11 tl1e first La'vv School of the Unive1·sity College, i11itiated by His I1npe1·ial Majesty the Empero1·, I have bee11 a contin11011s witness to His unremitting eff01·ts to advance legal science, codification a11d edtLcatio11 in tlis Realm. I tl1e1·efore respectfully declicctte t/1is war/<, to HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY HAILE SELLASSIE I Cliancellor of our Unive1·sity

PREFACE I grateft1lly ackt10\vledge tl1e French Gover111nents' fi11a11cial aid a11d professor Rene David's ·perso11al assista11ce, wl1icl1 11ave enablecl. 111e to research in Paris the doc11111e11ts and ,vorks 11eedecl. for tl1e co111pletion of this volt1111e. I also wish to stress tl1at tl1e publication costs l1ave been covered fro111 a ge11erous gra11t of tl1e Forcl Fo1111datio11. Although E11glisl1 is 11ot my n1otl1er to11gue, I co11ld obtain 110 editorial assist ance fro111 011r overworked U11iversity Press office. As a res11lt, the langt1age a11d form of tl1is v.1ork a.re not J)erfect. In partic11lar, I beg to be excused for ID)i i11ability to disti11gt1isl1 between the Englisl1 a.11d tl1e America11 style. On tl1e otl1er ha11d, I was 1111able to collate a11d tlJJdate all notes a11d clata to keep 11p with the protracted delays, si11ce 1967, dt1e to tl1e Faculty procedures of review, approval, choice of J)ri11ti11g metl1od and printing concerrung this volume (not to 1uention losses of 111anuscript). A mini1n11m of style im1Jrove111ents in n1y work and its final appearance this Fall are largely d11e to last mi1111te l1el1J fron1 my· collea.g11e Katherine O'D011ova11. I ack110\vledge my ind.ebted11ess to Messrs. Nardos Lemrna a11d Mesfin Tadesse, who are the sole authors of tl1e Table of J..,a\vs i11 Appendix B. .,.1DDIS ABABA October, 1970

GEORGE KRZECZUNOWICZ

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VII '

TABLE OF CONTENTS BOOK ONE

INTRODUCTION TO EXTRA-CONTRACTIJ,..\.L LIABILITY Page PART I: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

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PART II: HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION: .First Period (before 1930):

A. General remarks B. The Fetba. Nao-ast 0 C. The customs • • •

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6 7 8

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10 10 10 11 11 12

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Second Period (1930 to 1960):

A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H.

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The transitional code of 1930 No dichotomy as to wrongs • Dichotomy as to redress • • Damages con1pensatory • • • • Prosect1tion private Moral concerns • • • • • • Specificity • • • • • • • • • • Minor points of interest

Third Period (the modern codes)

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PART III: SUPPLEMENT TO HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION: THE 1930 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CODE . . . Preface (the einphasis on damages)

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• • • • • • • • • • • First Part (punishments) Second Part (wrongs against the government) . . Third Part (wrongs against th e person)· . . . . . . . . . . y) ert op pr st ain ag s ng ro (w rt Pa th ur Fo . . . . . . . ) s'' law ll ma ''s of h ac re (b rt Fifth Pa

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17 17

18 20 21

26 28

CONTENTS

Page PART VI: DOCTRIN.AL INTRODUCTION 1. H.arnt

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Social Context:

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cl1t1rch A. Solidarity: oldtin1e protectio11 by fam,ily and B. Modern socialization of risks • • C. Strict personal li,tbility

2. Bases of Tortious Liability: A. B. C. D. E. F. G. T-I. I. J.

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• • Burde11 of }1arn1: wl1e11 shjfted • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • illegal Co11d11ct • • • • · Co11d11ct fat1lty • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • lial1ility: definitio11, jt1sti6cation, SCOJ)e Strict Strict liability: tl1e ''type of 11ctivity'' criteria • • • • • • • • • • • Strict liability: t]1c ''type of i11strt1111e11t'' cr1ter1a. • • • • • • • • • • Slrict lial)ility: tl1e ''n1ixed'' cr1ter1on • • • • • • • • • • • • • • l1�trm'' cr1ter1on • • • • • • • • • Strict liabi I ity: tl,e ''type of • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Strict lial1ility: defences, cooclt1sio11 Strict liabiIity t111der Sectio11 4: tl1e ''res1)oncl for otl1ers'' criteria •

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30 30

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PART V: METHODOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . .

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301

31 31

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34 37

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39 41

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46 47 48 50

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BOOK TWO COMMENTARY CODE . . . ON ARTICLES 2027-2037 CIVIIJ PART I: SOURCES OF EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY: ART!. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • CLE 2027 • A. (1) B. (2) C. (3) D. (4) E. (5-8) F. (9-1 I) G. (12)

Civil Liability (contract distinguished) • Damage • • • • • • • • • • • • • Cat1sation • • • • • • • • • • • Liability for Fault • • • • • • • • Liability · Irrespecti\re of Fat1lt •• • • Liability for Others • • • • • • • Functio11 of tl1is Article •' • ' • • •

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PART 11: GENERAL RULES ON LIABILITY FOR FA .ULT: ARTICLES 2028-2037 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Article 2028 - General Principle

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61 61 62 62 63 63· 64

64 65

CONTENTS

Page Article 2029 - Kinds of Fault

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I. 2. 3. 4. 5.

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l11trodttction • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • I11tent • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Neglige11ce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Positive Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Forbearance • • • • • • • • • • • • 6. Bases of Fatilt Liability, Ft111ction of tl1is Article . . . . . . . . . . •

..1\.rtic)e 2030 - Good Usage I. I11troduction

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. . . . . "' . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2. Tl1e Morality Test:

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• • A. Wilft1l i11te11t B. Reckless 11eglige11ce

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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4. Age or Me11tal Co11dition i11 ''1vforality'' Tests . . . : . . . . . . .

5. Age or Mental Condition i11 ''Good Usage'' Tests: . . . . . . . . • • A. Basic irrelevancy B. Harmdoers: 1nitigatio11 C. Victims: no n1itigation D. Victims: ordinary relief

67 68 70

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66 66 67 67

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3. Tl1e Good Usage Test: . . . . . . A. Reference to ''reasonable man'' B. Cot1t1otatioo of ''good'' . . . . . . . . C. Vagt1eness of sta11dard D. Applicability redt1ced or specified

70 70 71 71 72 72 72 73

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. . ." . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

74 75

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Article 2031. - Professio11al Fault

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E. F.

Over.lap • • • • Physical conditio11

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1. Rarity of Extra-Contractual Professional Faults

• • • 2. Con11otation of ''Profession'' · and ''Activity'': • A. Profession · . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •

Activity

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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3. Observance of Rules and Data: . . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • A. Observance of rt1les . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • . • • • • • B. Observance of scientific data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI

78 78 78 78 79

CONTENTS

Page 4. Negligen.ce:

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A. The ''reasonable practitioner'' criterion B. Distinctions . . . . . . . . • • • • Article 2032 - Intent to Injure

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80 81

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• • •

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l . Introduction: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • • • • A. Generalities • • • • • • • • B. I.ntent to i11jure is immoral • C. Function of tl1is Article 2. Rights: Abt1sed or Exceeded. ? A. B. C. D.

lnequ.ality in specific rigl1ts Abusing 011e's rigl1ts . . . Exceeding one's rigl1ts . . . Rigl1ts of ow11ership . . . E. ContTact11al rights • • • • • • • F. Procedural rigl1ts G. Absolt1te rigl1ts • • • • •

A.rticle 2033 - Diversio11 of Powers I. I11trodt1ctio11:

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82. 82 82 82. 83, 8383

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. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .

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86-

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89 ·

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A. Ordinary rigl1ts versus powers • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • B. Po,vers: ahsolt1te or limited? • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • C. Po\vers exceeded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • • • • • • D. PoV11ers abused . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Diversion of Po\vers in Private La\v: . . . . .

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A. ''F1111ctional'' powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. Sources of ''a11tl1ority'', holder's C. Contract11al powers excluded . . . . . . D. ''Bodily'' at1thority E. ·oiscretionary powers . . . . .

part . . . . . .

3. Diversio11 of Powers i11 Public Law:

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interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • . . • • • • • • . . • • • • • •

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A. Pt1blic i11terest 11nexceptionable . . . . . . . • • • • • B. Exa111pies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . ,._ . . . . . . . C. Practical insig11ifica11ce of remedy . • • • • • • • • • • ••

XII

84-

89· 89

90· 90 90· 9 0· 9 0· 91 91 91

•

92' .

•

-92, 92· 93,

co :NTENTS

Page Article 2034 - Purpose of Rights

•

1. Soviet Principle Co11trasted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

•

2. Articles 2032-2033 U11affected • • • 3 . A pplicabi li ty to Powers • • • • • 4. Non-ApplicabiJjty to ''l.egal'' P . ttrposes 5. Socio-Eco1101nic Pur1)oses . . . . • • Article 2035 - Infringen1ent of a la\v

1. Prior refere11ces

•

�

•

Ra11k • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Qttalification • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • P11rpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Excl11sior1 of tort lavv . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Excl11sion of contract law • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • F11nctio11 of tl1is Article • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

4. Coordin.atioo. Proble111s:

D. E. F.

•

A. The IJroble1n of ''vag11e'' 1avvs . . . . . . . . . . . B. J 11dicial specificati011: penal co11victions • • • • • • •

•

3. The Specificity Reqt1iren1e11t:

•

2. Connotatio11 of ''Lavv'': A. B. C D. E.

•

94 95 95 97

97 97 97 98

98 98

•

100

•

101

Solving coi1flicts with Pe11al Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Special r11les 11revail over principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • TJ1e ''reco11ciling'' 1netl1od • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ComJ)arative law origi11 of incompatibilities • • • • • • • • • • • S11ggestion de lege ferenc!a • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Margi11aJ observation • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

5. Ignora11ce of law:

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

•

A. Presumption of 1<110\vledge • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • B. Connotation of ''no exc11se'' . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • C. Pt1b]ication req11iren1ent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Article 2036 - Chain of Command 1. Scope of tl1is Article

•

• •

•

• •

•

2. Alternative Approaches to the. Problem: •••

XIII

•

101

102

104 105 106

106

- 106. 107

108

•

109

•

109

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

109

•

• •

CONTENTS

Page A. The ''rule of law'' approach . . . B. The ''blind obedience'' approach • C. The inter m · ediate approach • • • •

•

• •

•

110 1IO 111

•

111

•

112·

A. Burden of proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

•

112:

B. St1bjective standard

•

113·

5. The ''Un.lawfttlness'' Requiren1ent: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

113.

A. Powers exceeded • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • B. Act cri11li11aJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

113

6. The ''Pra.ctical Impossibility'' Defence: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

115

A. Con11otatio11 of ''impossible'' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • • • • • B. Solvi11g co11flicts with Articles 2066 and 2067 • C. Dt1plication of Art. 70(2) Pe11al Code • • • • • • • • • • • • •

115

7. Coordination Problems: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • A. ''Dt1ty to obey'' in military and civil service • • • • • • • • • • B. Conseqt1ence of discrepancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • • • C. St1ggestions de lege fere12da . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D. Reference • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

117 117' 118 118; 119

3. Meaning of ''Superior Authority'' 4. The ''Awareness'' Requirement:

•

Article 2037 - Non-Performance of a Contract

•

115:

116, I 17·

•

120·

•

120·

2. Wl1y Distingt1ish Contractual from Tortiot1s Liability • • • • • • • • A. Requisites for inct1rring liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. Consequences of inct1rring liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

120 1201 121

I . Breacl1 of Contractt1al Promise

•

3. Tracing the Demarcation Line: The Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Liability Factor A: ''contractual'' agreement • • • • Factor B: existence of contract . . . . . . Factor C: validity of contract . . . . . . Factor D: privity of contract . . . . . . Factor E: ''contractual'' obligation • • • • Factor F: tl1e effects of Article 2088 • • • •

XIV

of Exclusion of Tort . . . . . . . . . . . . . •

•

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . •

•

123,

123, 125 127'

128: 128, 130:

·CONTENTS

Page :PART III: DEFENCES TO ACTION OF LIABILITY FOR FAULT

I . Denia] or Avoid�tnce of ''Da1nage'' Allegation: A. Existence of tl1e clan1age • • • • • • • • B. Cornpe11sahility of tl1e damage • • • • •

•

133 133 133 134

•

2. Denial or Avoidance of ''Cat1sation'' Allegation: A. Existe11ce of the cat1sal link • • • • • • • B. Adeqt1acy of the causal link • • • • • • •

3. Denial or Avoida11ce of ''Fat1lt'' Allegation: A. Ex.iste11ce of the fault • • • • • • • B. Liability for the fat1lt • • • • • • •

•

135 135 135 136 136 139

APPENDICES Appendix .Appendix .Appendix Appendix

A: B: C: D:

Concordances • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Table of Esse11tial Laws Cited • • • • • • • • Model Case Decisions 10 Outline • • • • • Revised Translation of Title XIIl Civil Code

143 145 155 159

ESSENTIAL ERRATA 1, 2 Pa 00e 3 ' foot11ote 1' third to fot1rth line: instead of ''etl1io, pien'' read ''etl1iopie11'' Page 39, ( l ), i11 :fi11e: instead of read

''Swiss Civil Code'' ''Swiss Obligatio11s Code''

Page 54, (b), first li11e: instead of read

''page 48'' ''page 50''

Page 138, (iv), (x), first to seco11d }jne: instead of ''trespass toll to land a11d or goods'' reďż˝td ''trespass to la11d or goods'Âˇ Page 158, Art. 2142, I, third line: instead of ''Article 91(3)'' read ''Article 251(1)'' Ibid., 1, fot1rtl1 li11e: i11stead of read

''we sl1all correct'' ''\Ve l1ave corrected''

Ibid., 2, first li11e: instead of read

''is tl1at'' ''in tl1at''

Page 161, Synopsis, Cl1apter l, Secl'ion 1, Paragraph 2: ''Arts. 2066-89'' i11stead of ''Arts. 2038-65'' reacl Ibid., Section 2: i11stead of read

''Arts. 2038-65'' ''Arts. 2066-89''

Page 163, Art. 2042, (2), seco11d li11e: ''police'' i11stead of ''public authorities'' read Page J 77, .,L\rt. 2144, (3): i11stead of read 1 2

''st1ccessor'' ''s t1ccession''

Minute errors not affecting meaning are 11ot inclt1ded.

The "Revised Translation of Title XJII Civil Code" Appendix to this book, destined for the most frequent reference, was printed on the most slender, perishable paper. The resulting premature wear and tear of this vital Appendix may in tin1e-in the auth.or's view-call for its reprinting.

•

;

BOOK 1 INTRODUCTION TO EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY

PART

GENERAL INTROD.UCTION Tl1is work vvas first destined for use pri1narily by the Etl1iopian legal practi tioners and was tl1us to co11sist et1tirely i11 a ''by article'' Commentary. The interest evoked a1nong comparative and acade1nic lawyers abroad by tl1e Etl1iopian codifica tion of ''Extra-Co11tractual Liability'' law has induced me to modify the initial plan: a .Book 011e, introducing the reader to historical and doctrinal aspects of the Etl1iopian law of extra-co11tractual civil wrongs (alias ''delicts'' or ''torts''), and to metl1odological a11d linguistic problems of its expositio11, has 110w been made to precede the ''by article'' Co11une11tary, of which Book Two hopeftilly represe11ts but a first instaJI.n1ent. The legal scientists' interest in the Ethiopian law of extra-cot1tractual liability seems vvell fou11ded. Tl1is la\v, part of tl1e Civil Code of 1960, is u11iq11e in at least t\vo mai11 aspects.1 First, its lengtlz (135 Articles), quite unprecedented in coun tries of codified law: its largest European counterpart is the 31 Article Unerlai1/Jte Hand/1111ge11 sectio11 of tl1e German Civil Code of 1900. Sl1ortest is the chapter Des de/its et quc1si-delits of tl1e Fre11cl1 Civil Code of 1803, whicl1 contains but five art icles! This contrasts \vitl1 tl1e mass of both judicial precedents and statt1tes govern ing these matters i11 com.mon Ia,v countries, which are summarized in tl1e follow ing ''private'' codificatio11s: Jenks' 322 Articles 011 ''Obligations Arising from Torts'', in l1is Digest of Englisfi Civil LaM, and the American Law Institute's larger Re staten-ie11t of t/1e Lalv of Tort. The French Code's five articles, strfficient in Napoleo11's time, have becon1e sorely inadequate in an industri<tl age in which tort cases absorb up to . 25% of all litigation. Lacking adequate code-guidance, the French law of delict has in fact become largely ''judicial''. Wl1ile paying lip service to their Code's text, French judges necessarily play ''l1ide and seel<'' with the supremely abstract _ terms of its Articles 1382-1386. Tl1is l1as led to inconsistencies and reversals, which is hardly satisfactory. 011 tl1e otl1er hand, the unwieldy length of the common · law formulations is due to century-long recorded decision-making consolidated by a ''stare decisis'' doctrine, which is foreign to Ethiopia. Clearly, a middle-way was indicated for us. The le11gth and detail reached by the Ethiopian la\v of extra contractual civil wrongs is mt1ch greater than in other code countries, b11t much less than the size and degree of concrete casuistry reached ·by tl1e Anglo-Saxon torts laws summarized i11 the mentioned private codifications of England and tl1e U.S.A. The second unique aspect of the Ethiopian law of extra-contractual liability consists in the extreme originality of its co11tents. Its methods of, respectively, ''recep tion'', ''creation'' and ''formulation'' . of rules seem dist_ inct from those used in most otl1er codifications. Let us look at these three features in turn: 1. On both aspects, we draw upon R. David, "Un projet de code sur la responsabilite civile", in Estudos juridicos em honra de Soria,10 Neto (Pernambuco, Universitad de Recife, 1962) vol. 1, p. 23 I ff., and, incidentally, upon the same author's "Les sources du code civil ethio, pien", Revue internationa/e de droit compare, vol. 3 (1962), and "Le code civil ethiopien de 1960'1, Rabels Zeitschrift fur auslandisc/zes und internationales Privatrecht, vol. 4 (1962). Profe ssor R. David, of Paris University, is the drafter of the Ethiopian Civil Code. See also p.. 1 of his "Expose des n1otifs" in Doc. C. Civ/13 of the ,,1vant-projet de· code civil pour /'empire d'Ethiopie (unpublished, available since. 1969 in the Haile Sellassie I University Law Faculty · Archives).

-3.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

With respect to reception Afric,1n legal syste1ns can be rou� hly divide� into francophonic (predomina11ce of French legal influ.ence), a11gl�phon1c (predom1na�ce of A11glo-Saxon legal influe11ce) a11d eclectic 011es (no predo1n1nance; fr�e _ borrowing from several systen1s). At11ong the rare examples of eclectic laws, the Etl11op1an (1? 6�) and tL1e Egy·ptia11 (1948) codes are conspicuous. Tl1e latter, l1owever, seems to li1:11t its ''recei.ving'' cl1oices to a few Ron1anistic legal systems. Tl1e range of tl1e Et! n� pian legislator's selections is much wider. Apart from tl1e half dozer1 Ron1an1st1c legal syste1ns (including the Egyptian one) inspiring our codifiers, one also finds borrowings from the Conm1on Law; the ''Extra-Contractual Liability'' Chapter clearly reflects influences of both English and American law.2 On the other ha.nd, while the problems to be solved are often envisaged in the way s11ggested by the foreign syste1n co11cer11ed, their solutions are 111odified or si1111)lified to fit Ethiopian 11eeds (see ''Doctrinal Introductio11'', below). Son1etimes the Etl1iopia11 legislator creates a rule for 'rvhich no cou11terpart is found in a foreig11 system. This is either because he finds sucl1 ,ln origi11al rt1le to be suitable for th.e future, 3 or becat1se he wa11ts to co11ti11ue, in a new legal dress, the essence of some r11les fro1n tbe past4 that would other\.vise be co111pJetely obli terated by the Code's uniqt1ely ge11eral repeal of pre-code law under Article 3347. 5 As to tl1e originality of our legislative for111t1latio11s, it consists in the following tecl111ique: eacl1 article or 11un1bered sub-article contains no more than one, tisually concise, se11te11ce. Tl1is feat11re i11creases clarity and is cl1aracteristic of the whole Civil Code of Etl1iopia. I l1ope t11at tl1e above observations suffice to jt1stify the extension of tl1is work's introductory J)Ortio11. It remai11s for 1ne to jt1stif)1 111y empl1asizing these aspects of origi11ality or co11trast witl1 foreign systems, throughout tl1is volt1111e, rather than tl1e a.spects of a11,tlogy. Tl1e detailed a11d ofte1.1 peculiar provisions of Etlliopian tort law are fruits of reflectio11 o,1er tl1e trial a11d e.rror experiences of otl1er co11ntries in this field. Etl1iopia has fully utilized the adva11tage of a 11ew start over countries ]1an1pered by tl1e slow11ess of legislati,1e reforn1 processes. Our tort law is tl1us in ad vance, if 11ot of foreig11 tl1ougl1t, at least of foreign legislation. But graduate Ethiopian lawyers are ofte11 co11ditioned by their backgrou11ds of law study in, respectively, the U.S.A, E11gla11d, Canada, Fra11ce, Italy, etc. Even ot1r ow11 first gradt1ates of 1966-1968 "'ere, for lack of natio11al textbooks, trained 011 foreign materials. As a result, there is chaotic use of concepts not directly relevant to Ethiopian tort law, such as ''res ipsa loqt1itur'', ''assumption of risk'', ''antecedent dt1ty towards the plai11tiff '' (An glo-America11), or ''presumption of fault'', ''presu1nptio11 of liability'', ''force majeure'' 6 (Frencl1), ?ependin ? on the given practitione�'s background.7 This leads to hap hazard re-1ntroduct1011 of tl1e very defects which our legislator pt1rported to avoid. See, e.g., Articles 2030(2), 2038-2054 and 2069 of the Civil Code. See, e.g., Articles 2078 and 2086 of the Civil Code. See, e.g., Articles 2067, 2113-2117 and 2142 of the Civil Code. See G .. �zeczu1_1�wicz, "A New �cgislative Appro �cl� to Custom: the 'Repeals' Provision of the Eth1op1a� C1vII . C?�� of 1960. , Jou�nal of Et/z1op1an Studies, vol. I, no 1 (1963), "Code and Custom 1n· Eth1op1a , Journal • of Etl11opia11 La»1' vol · ?- (1965), p· 4?7, and "The Etl11op1an · C.1v1·1 code: its use,u I'. lness, Relation to Custom and Applicability" · .r .rJ"fir,can ' Journal 0'J Law, vol. 7 (1963), p. 172. 6. Fo_rce _M�j:�re is indirectly relevant where tending to disprove fault. It is irre levant in 01ost strict J1ab1l1ty cases (see p.. 49, below). 7. Or statute-drafter's background: for example, the English "publi·c nui·sance" t or t , wl11c • · 11 1as l . no coun terpart 1n · Eth·1op1an · su bstant1ve law, f 1gures, wrongly and misleadingly 10 · tile sche dule of forms of pleading of the Ethiopian Civil, Procedure Code c1965) bY a "common dra fted law" adept.

2. 3. 4. 5.

-4-

;

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Ethiopian codified law tl1us largely remains dead letter. It can start a ft1lly ''effective'' existence 011ly after 11ational la,v te.,Y.tboolcs are created. This task is extre mely and 11niquely difficult i11 'Ethiopia for reaso11s me11tioned below i11 the Metho d.ological l11trod11ction. N'evertl1eless, it 011gl1t to be pressed and given higl1 priority over teaching fron1 a n1osaic of largely foreig11 n1aterials. 8

•

8. Accordingly, the teaching loads of text-writers should be light.

-5-

PART HISTORICAL

IN'TRODUCTION

T111s part of the it1trodL1ction to o·ur subject co11sists i11 an a11alysis of a few salie11t legal features cl1aracterizing the gradual l1istorical emerget1ce of a distinct law of (extra-co11tractt1al) civil vvrongs in Etl1iopia over tl1ree periods: (1) before 1930 (tl1e statio11ary period); (2) fro111 1930 to 1960 (tl1e tra11sition period); (3) fro1n 1960 to tl1e present ti111e (the 1nodern codes). T11e disproportio11ate le11gtl1 of tl1e period before J 930 is explai11ed by tl1e statio11ary state of Etl1iopia11 law and society at least since tl1e introduction of tl1e Fetha Nagast law (see below) at a11 t111 Icnow11 date i11 tl1e 15th or 16th centl1ry, a11d by tl1e lack of earlier d,1ta.

FIRST PERIOD (before 1930 G.C.) A.

General

remarks

Tl1e early history of tl1e Ia,v of wrongs i11 tl1e Ro111ai1 e1npire and i11 Et1rope l1as been aJ)tly sL1111111arized b)' I(.\V. Ryan. The followi11g citation fron1 tl1is at1tl1or provicles a co11de11sed co111parative setting for our topic: ''In Ro111a11 la\.v, a11d i11 tl1e earlier lavvs of Western Et1rope (i11clt1ding E11gla11d), delictt1al actio11s ..,,,ere co11siclerecl as penal rat11er tl1an con1pensa tory i11 cl1aracter. It1 both systerns tl1e saLne J)rogressio11 occ11rred. In the first stage, t]1at of J)rivate ve11geance, the victin1 of tl1e wrong had the rigl1t in certain circt1n1sta11ces to avenge hi111self by i11 flicting s0111e l1ar1n on the autl1or of l1is ,vrong. Tl1is pl1ase was st1cceeded b)1 tl1at of volt111tary composi tion, a11d later by that of fixed co1upositio11s. A furtl1er stage ,vas reached 011ce tl1e state interve11ed to pt111isl1 offences co111n1itted agai11st i11dividuals as well as tl1ose co□1111itted against tl1e state itself . . . . I11 Engla11d, tl1e ap1)eal of tl1e private acct1ser, wl1icl1 w,1s a st1bstitute for tl1e earlier system of ve11geance was itself largely replaced in the cot1rse of tl1e ti1irteenth century on tl1e one side by tl1e proced.ure of [public] i11dictmec1t a11d 011 tl1e otl1er by the actio11 of treSJ)ass . . . . Once tl1e f11rther step was tal<e11 tl1at tl1e pro per re1nedy for treSJ)ass was the recovery of co111pe11sa tory dan1ages, tl1e differe11tiation betwee11 cri111e a11d tort [i.e. public and private wro11g] was con1plete.'' 1 As i11 ancient Et1ropea11 societies, so i11 the Et]1iopian societ)' before 1930 G. c. tl1e 11eat n1odern divisio� of legal wro11gs i1lto ''pe11al'' (pt1blic) a11d ''civil" (private) _ 011es was ·unknow11. W1tl1 fe,v exceptions, as tl1ose of religious sacrilege or acts i11juring tl1e E111peror . ancl l �is realn1 , wrongs now l<nown as ''1)e11al''(e.g. hoiiticide, rape or robbe:)') were private 111 tl1e s e11se tl1at t11ey were not prosecL1tecl by orga115 of _ Empire, but redressed at the 111sta11ce of tl1e victim or his bloocl-relatives w110 tl1e '\\'ere free to sue, not sue, or con1promise tl1e issues. On tl1e otl1er har1d, tlie' same

1. K.W. Ryan, Jntrodu ction to the Civil La,v (Sydney, The La,v Book Co. of Australasi a ' 1962), _ brackets p. 109. The words m are added.

-6-

1-IISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

wro11gs were penal in tl1e se11se tl1at tl1eir redress consisted eitl1er (1) in a vengeful punisl11ne11t as i11spireci by custon1s or tl1e Mosaic ''retaliatio11'' principles permeati11g tl1e Fetl1a Nagast, or (2) in exacti11g pay1ne11ts (in goods or n1oney) ,vhose fu11ctio11 ,vas propitiatory (amou11t s11fficie11t to buy off ver1gea11ce) ratl1er tha11 co111per1sa tory (a111011nt equal to dan1age). 111 tl1e above sense, tl1e ancient Etl1iopian law of \\1rongs was governed by a syste111 of /Jrivate pe11c1ltJJ: tl1e action was private, tl1e redress pe.nal, tl1e wro11gs 11ot dicl1oto1nized. We sl1all 110\v co11sider so1ne pron1i11e11t aspects of tl1is law under, respectively, tl1e provisio11s of tl1e Fetha Nagast and those of the c11stomary laws. B. Tl1e Fetha Nagast Readers i11terested in tl1e origins a11d nature of tl1e Fetha Nagast are referred to tl1e a1111otated E11glisl1 translatio11 of tl1at a11cie11t Ethiopian book of religio11s and sec11lar la\v by Abba Pa11los Tsad11a. 2 011r citatio11s are fro111 tl1is translation (empl1asis a11c.l pare11tl1eses, but not brackets, are 011rs). 3 1. Tl1e pri111arily JJe11al character of tl1e rerlress give11 by the Feth,:t Nagast is illt1strated by: (a) Provisio11s stressing tb.e right of ve!'1gec1nce, as for instance the follo\.ving: ''Tl1e ave11ger of tl1e blood 111ay kil] tl1e murclerer'' provided he first i11tro duces hi111 ''before tl1e j11dge'' for conden1na.tio11. - ''In case l1e (the killer) l1ad 110 i11te11tion to kil] . . . he may take reft1ge in tl1e place of God, but if tl1e ave11ger fi11ds ]1im outside [the place of refuge] ar1d kills him, l1e ,vill ii1cur 110 guilt. ''4 (b) Provisions de1no11strati11g tl1e propitiatorJ' (ratl1er than con1pensatory) cl1ara cter of tl1e pay1ne11ts prescribed, tl1e an1011nt of \VJ1icl1 is 11ot eqt1al · to (cf. Article 2091 Ci\1il Cocle) but higl1er than the da1nage i11flicted, for exa111ple the following: ''As for the use of dt1ress, if tl1e 011e wl10 11sed d11ress [to take son1etl1ing] is a ricl1 . n1an, he· sl1all pay five or fo11r times tl1e value (of what l1e took] as provided i n tbe 'tvfosaic law. . . . However, if be is unable to restore five or four times the value but is able to restore the double . . . he must .pay d.ot1ble'.' ; 5 - ''If tl1ere is a n1an who steals oxe11 or sheep and slaughters or sells them, l1e must make restitt1tion at the rate of five fold for one ox a11d four fold for one sh·eep . . . . If the stolen ox, ass or sheep is fo11nd alive in his possession, he sball make restitution two fold. for. 011e'' ;6 -:- ''A person who keeps an anin1al that does not . . belong to him tied up, a11d then kills i t for lack of food or for another reason, must pay dot1ble. One who takes possession by violence and re moves the bot1ndary, n1ust give back double of what he took." 7 '

The primarily · private character of the action brought in accordance witl1 the Fetha Nagast is illustratedi for instance, by the following passages: ''Notice that the _scope of this chapter concerns everyone \Vho desires to kill a person and kills l1im. His p11nishment is that be be killed or the family of the victim

2. The Fetha Negast, (Addis Ababa, Faculty of Law, Haile Sellassie I University, 1968). . 3. The basic work on the Fetha Nagast is Ignazio Guidi, Il Fetha !vagast o legislazione dei re (Roma, Casa editrice italiana, 1899) 4. Fron1 Chapter XLVII, p.295, al. 4, TI-I, and p. 294, al. 2, TB. 5-. From Chapter XXXV, p. 196, al. 1. 6. From Ch.aptef XLIX, p.302, I. 7. From Chapter L, p. 306, VII.

-7-

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

come to an agreement whether to accept blood-money or to forgive the murderer completely''. ''It is for the avenger to take the ransom or [to dem and] the condenIDation." 8 Note that the amou.nt of the bo� ld-_ money :� nsom is not pre-fixed and must be agreed upon in order to fulf 11 1 t� prop1t1atory function. Note also that it is not a public prosecutor but tl1e private accuser (tl1e victi1n's family as represented by the ''avenger'') that directs the ac_ti�n. Nevertl1eless and in contrast to primitive customs, the Fetha Nagast proh1b1ts, as a rule, the exercise of rights of vengeance tl1rough mere self-help. Such rigl1ts should be exercised through resort to courts of justice, which pass on the slayer's guilt. This attitude is illustrated, for insta.nce, by the following passages: ''The ave11ger of the blood may kill tl1e murderer, but be shall not kill him by his own power before produci11g him before the j11dge''. - ''One wbo avenges the blood may not kill his enemy with his hand; rather he must bri11g l1im before tl1e judge so that the latter may co11de111n the murderer to deatl1. No one is permitted [to kill anotl1er]; rather, l1e 111ust bring him (tl1e n111rderer) before tl1e j11dge, so that the latter 111ay adjudge him according to l1is guilt." 9 (l11cidentally, these are good samples of ancie11t skills in equi vocatio11). 10 3.

The Fetl1a Nagast is much concerned with ,noral guilt. Tl1is concer11 is illustrat ed, for instance, by tl1e followi11g passages: ''Twelftl1, wl10 falls upon anotl1er a11d causes bis death - such as one who slips and falls upon a pregna11t wornan and kills her, or one \Vho, in his sleep, lies upo11 a baby inadverte11tly and kills him while tur11ing over, or 011e who trips on a sto11e tl1at in tur11 rolls down from the high place upon a man and kills l1i111, sl1all 11ot be given tl1e judgment due to one who committed homicide. Tl1ese l1ave 110 respo11sibility and shall 11ot be a\varded any corporal punisl1me11t. II it is possible, tl1ey must be reconciled (witl1 tl1e victim's kins men); if 11ot, tl1ey must ·be sent into exile."1 1 Note that such exile i n case of failure of a reconciliation (whicl1 111ay be acl1ieved by means of 'blood-money or of pure forgiveness) has, by implication, protective rather than punitive pur poses: tbe i11voluntary slayer sl1011ld be out of reach of tl1e victim's kinsmen, wl10 are i11duced by n1orally unrefined customs to seek revenge irrespective of tl1e sla.yer's gtiilt. 12 C.

The customs

As born out by hearsay and/or the scant literature of tl1e subject, 13 custon1ary laws in the core of tl1e Ethiopia11 Empire i.e. its norther11 and central I1ighlar1ds 8. From Chapter XL VII, p. 294, al 2 ab initio, and p. 295, al. 4 in fine. 9. Ibid., p. 295, al. 4. 10. Picturesque details illustrating the traditional "private accuser" system can be gleaned from Samuel Gobat, Journal of a Three Years Residence in Abyssinia (London, I-Iatchard '-� Seeley, 1834), p. 3 3 5 ff. 11. From Chapter XLVII, p. 293, al. 4. 12. Although the law is no:,v dif1:erent, cases i11 which tl1e court instructs an involu11tary slayer to . move to a�otl1er region still occur_. See, e.g., Public Prosecutor v. Aberra Le,netcha, High Ct. Addis Ababa, 1957 E.C. , C1v1l. Case No. 533/57 (unpublisJ1ed). 13. Prin1arily =, (1� Carlo . C:onti Rossini , Principii di diritto consuetudinario de/'Eritrea (Roma, Tipo . ce, 1916) 1:Jn1 del rafia one d1tr1 p. 4 3 7 f!.'; (2) Mahteme Selassie Wolde Maskal, Zekre Neger � � _ (1n Amharic, Addis Ababa, Netsanet Pr1nt1ng Press• 1950), p· 107 ff•·, (3) "Consuet uct·tnt· g1u· r1·ct·1che d�I sera:"! R asser1�a di studii e!io i i, supp. to vol. 11 (Ron1a, Tipografia Pio x, �� 1953) . (4) Fehce p. 159 ff, Ost1n1, Trar rato dt d1r1tto consuetudinario de/' Eritrea (Asn1ara Officina . _ Grafica Corriere Er1tre o, 1956), whi. ch may be consulted for further bibliograp hy. we'd0 110 t re1 Y . 011 anthropology-oriented works.

-8-

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

,vere substantially in accord witl1 tl1e above mentioned principles of the Fetl1a Na gast concerni11g the penal cl1aracter of ve11gef11l or propitiatory redress for wrongs and the private cl1aracter of tl1e actions bro11gl1t in vie\v of sucl1 redress. The analogy seen1s to go 110 f urtl1er, i11 particular, it does not reach tl1e field of 1noral co11cer11s. Followi11g are son1e 111i11or ,t11d 111ajor custo1nary la\V depart11res fro1n tl1e prin ciples of tl1e Fetl1a Nagast (tl1is sacred 11on1ocanon, thougl1 forn1ally venerated, was not always well k110\vn or obser,1ed): 1. Mi11or departL1res from tl1e Fetl1a Nagast: (a) Tl1e rigl1t to ve11gea11ce see1ns to have bee11 doubled by a customary duty to exact it (\vhile tl1e Fetl1a Nagast e11couraged forgive11ess). (b) Tl1e propitiatory pay1nent for life-taking, wl1ere accepted, \\1as often in an an1ot1nt !)re-fixed by custo111 ratl1er tl1an separately agreed. (Such amounts were also fixed in detail with respect to otl1er ki11ds of bodily harn1). 2. 'Major departttres from tl1e Fetha Nagast: (a) I11 so111e areas, the avenger's actions were ''private'' to s11ch exte11t that l1e exercised l1is customary duty of retaliatio11 \vitl1out resorting to courts (the killer bei11g at 011ce considered as a perso11 \vl10 l1ad been sente11ced). 14 (b) Under custon1ary rt1les, tl1e rigl1t of \1engea11ce for an unpropitiated homi cide could, i11 the wrongdoer's absence, be exercised against anot}1er 111en1ber of l1is fa111ily. Far frorn bei11g condo11ed by tl1e Fetha Nagast, such practice co11fli.cts witl1 the Cl1ristian spirit colouring that document. I11 its abovecited Englisl1 version tl1is is shown. by tl1e words ''A father n1ust not die for his [so11's g11ilt] 11or a son for his father's'' (p. 290,TI-I). (c) Contrar)' to tl1e Fetl1a N'agast's aforementioned general concer11 \-Vitl1 ''moral'' g11ilt, tl1e oustomary rigl1ts to vengeance or propitiatory payn1ents were generally exercised witl1out sucl1 concern. Custon1ary liability was in most cases ''strict'', i.e. concerned chiefly not 111itli fai,It but with dam(1ge a11d its causation. 15 Before 1930, a11d notwitl1standi11g the Fetl1a Nagast, tl1is customary liability regardless of fault seems to have prevailed. eve11 \Vith respect to vengeful punishment and i11 tl1e I1nperial Chilot, as iJlt1strated by tl1e renowned tl1ough unpublished I1nperial judgeme11t described by Cl1arles Rey, 16 co11cer11ing a n1an who killed a11other by accidentally falling upon l1im fron1 a tree (not responsible if tl1e Fetha Nagast precept cited before note 11, above, l1ad been applied). In essence the En1peror while ad. mitting the innoce11t killer's responsibility for homicide, skilfully induced the victin1's kins111en to abandon their customary right to exercise ve11geance ''in the same way'', tl1at is by falling out of the tree onto the wrongdoer! SECOND PERIOD (from 1930 to 1960) A. The transitional code of 1930 This period is one of reforms and evolution. lt was initiated in 1930 and marked thro11gb.out by a comprehensive legal codification, the first since the Fetha 14. On tliis topic, see e.g. Kassa Beyene, Blood /vfoney Problems (Addis Ababa, Law Faculty Archives, 1967) (unpublished), p. 10 under "Logo Chewa Legislation". Note that in tl1is introduction we are considering only customs of the ancient christian Tigre and An1hara peo ples of the Empire to whom the Fetha Nagast was originally addressed, and not tl1e custon1s of other tribes sucJ1 as the GalJas (which are not fully a.nalogous). 15. By the way, with respect to private compensation liability is still. strict under our modern Civil Code of 1960 in the sphere of bodily harm: see Art. 2067 C1v. C. 16. C.F. Rey, The Real Abyssinia (Lendon, Seeley, Service & Co., 1835), pp. 129-130. Cf. P. Merab, Impressions d'Ethicpie (Paris, Editions E. Leroux, 1929), vol. 3, p. 218.

-9-

HISTORICAL INTR.ODUCTION

Nagast ha.d acquired authority. The ''Pe11 al'' �ode of 193� G.C., in spit� of its title, dealt with the wl1ole law of wrongs 1n both tl1e1r JJenal (repressive) a. n d civil (con1 pensatory) aspects. It I1as si11ce been replaced by tl1_e Penal Code � f 1957 and, in its ''ci, il'' aspects, by tl1e Ci,,il Code of 1960, wh1 cl! t:w o Codes inaugu rate what 111 ay be caJled the ''conte1npora.r)1'' period in tl1 e Etl11op1�n Jaw of _ wrongs. Our qt1otatio1 1s 17 to the Code of 1930 are from its E11glish version proclaimed �t Addis Aba.ba in 194 1. 18 111 Part Ill below (p. 17) ,ve }Jrese11t, in a supplement to tl11s l1istorical introduction, an exte11sive seJectio1 1 of excerpts fro1n the Code of 1930. The reader is invited to use it as a reference text for the following discussion. 1

B. No dichotomy as to wrongs

The Code of 1930 reflects a conti11t1i11g lack of a clear dichoto111 y between pe11al wro11gs (crin1es) a11d civil wro11gs (torts); indeed, no category of extra-contractual ci,1il wro11gs 19 11 ot bei11g offences see1ned foreseen by tl1 e Code or lesser legislation: extra-co11tractt 1 aJ da111ages could be dt1e on1)' wl1ere a pe11al offence was co1n111 itted. Tl1is defect seen1s to l1ave been re11 1edied, however, by tl1e cot1rts' po,ver to ''create'' offences by analogy or (i11 tl1e case of tl1e cl1 ief court) e,1e11 ,vitl1ot1t analogy, as evinced by tl1e followi1 1g provjsion 1111der paragrapl1 12 of tl1e Code's preface: ,:lf a11 e11tirely new case arises ,vl1jc}1 ca1 1 11ot be co, erecl by tl1 e \vordi 11g a11d i11terpretation, tl1e case s]Jall be brot1gl1 t a11cl clecided by tl1e cl1jef cot1rt''. T'he cl1ief court co11ld tl1erefore fi11 d a11 offence witl1ot1t basing it 011 a Cocle provisio11 , 20 witl1 tl1e view of granti11g dan1 ages u 11der paragraph 22 of tl1e Code's preface, v.1l1icl1 reads: ''If fi11anciaJ loss e11st1es as tl1e rest1lt of crime of c111J' .l<i11d, tl1e q11estio11 of tl1e 111oney will be verified by itself [ ?] a11d pay1ne11t 1nt1st b e n1ade''. I11cide11tal1y, a 111 oder11 survival of tl1is latter (cn1dely expressed ) princi1Jle is reflected i11 tbe elaborate Article 100 of ot1r modern Pe11al Code of 1957. 1

C. Dichoto1nJ1 as to redress

Notwitl1 sta 11 di11g the lack of a clear dichoto111 y between pe11 al wro11gs (of fending society) a11d civil v.1ro11gs (injuring i 1 1divid11als), a consistent dicl1 oto1ny l1 as been i 1 1trod11cecl ,vitl1 respect to redress: the punitive s� 11ctions are clearly dist inguisl1ed from tl1e con1pe11 satory ones. TJ1is is abr1ndantly demo11strated tl1 ro11gl1ot1t tl1e Code by provisio11s deali 11 g separately v.1 itl1 tl1e compensatory da1 11ages payable to tl1e victin1 a11d tl1e punitive f i11es payable (not as costs) to tl1 e state a11d other state-a.d111 inistered puoisl11nents. Indeed, the very preface of tl1e Code (paragraJJll 9) reads as follo\vs: ''For tl1ese reaso11s, it l1as becon1 e necessary to revise t] 1e law of da1nages a11d pt1nisl1me11ts''. Althot1gh the first e1 11pl1asis is l1ere 011 ''dain ages'', t11e mention o·f ''pt1nish111 ent'' as a quite separate category sl10,vs tl1 at tl1 e state now took a distinct interest in offences injt1ri11g i 11 di,,idt1als. D. Damages

compensator)'

Save for ''blood-n1oney'' (a bargai11abl� private pe 11 alty st1n1) for life-taki 11 g, wl1ose co11ti11 ui11g ''propitiatory''. fu11 ction of bt1ying off vengea11ce is cle,1r fro111 �he_ words ''or he shall pay blo�d-mo1 1ey'' in Article 406 (if tl1 e vengeance is 1ns1sted upo11 , no dan1ages are rece1ved), tl1e Code's la,v of dan1ages \Vas essentially 17. E1nphasis and brackets within the quotations are ours. 18. This version is out of print, but is available in 1-Iaile SeUassie I U11iversity Law Faculty Archives. . 19. Contractual ones were foreseen and redressed by both the Fetl,a Nagast aild. commer cial ad. judication in the capital. 20. Contrast Article 2 of the 1957 Penal Code.

IIISTORICAL INTRO.DUCTION

co1npensatory (vvitl1 the 111i11or exceJ)tion of Art. 231), since tl1e amot111t of dan1ages \Vas 110 1nore provided by words st1ch as ''five tin1es tl1e val11e of the robbed object'', or ''fo11r sl1eep for 011e'', or ''pay double'' (for lcilli11g an a.11i111al), or ''give back do11ble'' (for re1no\ 1i11g tl1e bo1111dary), 21 but 011 tl1e co11trary \.vas directecl at abo11t equivale11t]y .n1al<i11g good the l1arm inflicted, tl1ough th.is pri11ciple vvas not distir1ctly expressed.22 011ly a few J)rovisioos concer11i11g wro11gs against tl1e person i11troclt1ced appare11t variatio11s to the co1111 )ensatory principle by s11cl1 means as rough a11d ready pre-fixi11g of tl1e t111- per a11d lo\ver li111its of cla111ages a11d, .i11 the case of ''ab11se'' (i11s11lt), 111alci11g clam,1ges vary witl1 the ra11l< of tl1e J)erso11 ab used.23 I11cjdentally, eve11 t111cier ot1r differe11tly worded n1oder11 Civil Code of 1960, s0111e\vl1at sin1ilar rest1lts 111ay still be obtained e.g. l )y applying its Article 2109 or 2113 i11 co11junctio11 ,vitl1 Article 2116.24 E. Prosec11tjon private

111 accorda11ce 'rVitl1 J)ast traditio11, tl1e Code of 1930 brot1gbt no cl1ange to tl1e S)1ste1n \vl1ereby tl1e actior1 ancl proceecli11gs agai11st ao. offe11der wl10 i11jt1.recl perso11s cir propert)1, vvere bro11gl.1t arid directed by the private acct1ser ratL1er tl1a11 a p11.blic prosect1tor, 11ot\vitl1standi11g tl1at the En1pire w,1s 11o'rv sl1owi11g a distinct legislati,1e interest i11 repressi11g offc11ces against i11dividuals by n1eans of fi11es and otl1er pt111isl11ne11ts aJ)art fro111 exacting da1nages for tl1e victi111. Nevertl1eless, not only ''da111ages'', b11t also ''pt1r1isl1111e11t'' of offences agai11st i11dividuals still depe11ded on tl1e actio11 of tl1e co11cer11ecl inclividt1al (or l1is relati,,es). Prosecutio11s vvere offic ially pro1notecl 011ly wi tl1 res 1Ject to offe11ces agai11st ''tl1e Go\1ernn1ent '', now elaborately e11t1merated in the Seco11d Part of tl1e Code.

lYloral

co11cer11s

The Code's ''n1oral'' co11cer11s, i11l1erited fron1 tl1e Fet/1a 1Vagast, are expressed eit}1er in tl1e preface, or i11cidentally to partict1lar problen1s. Follo\v. ing are a fe,v exan1ples. Paragrapl1 15 of tl1e pref,1ce reads: ''Our Lorcl l1as saicl in the Gospel tl1at 11e ,vl10 kt. 10,vs 111t1cl1 s11.all be pt111isl1ecl 111ucl1 b11t l1e vvl10 k11ows . little shall be pt1i1isl1ed little." ParagraplJ 16 stcttes, a1nong otl1ers, tl1at ''it is 11ot rigl1t to pt1t1ish according to tlJe extent of the vvro11g but accordtng to tL1e a1uo11nt of understandi11g'' (tL1ese borrowings from the Fetl1a Nctgast are literal). Paragraph 20 provides tl1at a \vro11gdoer of bigl1 ra11k a11d k110\vledge 111t1st pay fines ''over ,:tnd abo.ve damages'' accordi11g to a scale wl1icl1 desce11ds vvitl1 decreasi11g rank and k1 1owledge. 25 Article 273 provides fines a11d. da1nages for a.bt1se (ins11lt) only wl1en it was perpetrated ''011t of co11te111pt in order to hun1iliate'' , (there is :no such qualificatio11 i11 Article 204-'� of our present Civil Code). Article 308 foresees 11p to three years i1npriso11111e11t for ''vvilf11lly'' inflicted serio11s injury whicl1 n1axi1nun1 . is increased to .five years jf the i11jury was premeditated (Article 309). On tl1e contrary, ·purst1a11t to Article 338 s11ch maxin1um is only six montl1s if the injL1ry was 11ninte11tio11al, bei11g caused by forgetft1lness or mistake or play or carelessness or la\:v-.uifri11gen1ent. Note, however, that tl1is mjtigation does not

See above) FIRST PERIOD, B, 1, (b). Jt is no\v distiJ1ctly expressed in A1·ticle 2091 of the Ci_vil Code. _ See para. 1·7 of the Code's preface and Article 273 of the Code. Provisions of the repealed 1930 Penal Code � ccasionally still sup_ p�y son1e corrobo� ating · evi dence as to the custon1 applicable under Article 21 16 of tl1e C1vrl Code. Regardmg the old Penal Code's influence on conten1porary assessments of �i� il damages, see .Nico/aclis v. . flighc 1vay Authority, Higb Ct., Addis Ababa, 1956 E.C., C1v1l Case No. 259(56 (unpublished). 25. For itnp.lenlentation of this principle with respect to recidivists, see Articles 43-142 of the Code,

21. 22. 23. 24.

ffiSl:ORICAL INTRODUCTION 26 Regardin,g t)i,rn ici? �, ll fu in e bl ya pa in ma apply to compensatory damages, which re ,g frr rel at u,u or e ng ve re d, tre ha , under Article 405 ff. only sucl1 killer as acts out of u!e-r;t t for e, ak s mi of � ult res � the � s wa g lin kil the can be sentei1ced to deatl1. If . .,1vd bJ, t,, bu le, exi . by or t en hm nJs pu or play, it was followed only b;' (small?] money'' damages remained due (Article 408 ). the in J icW ad rrtr co is t, en hm nis pu st, lea at to, ach pro l'' ap ora This eminently ''m 1ho � he t tha ect eff tbe to ion vis pro a by case of automobile accidents, as shown ing ard reg d . an rn bo the g win blo ut ho wit g vin killed a man merely th.rough dri t firs the y, usJ vio Ob ). 477 e ticl (Ar th dea to ced ten sen be ll the traffic law, sha h4:'ve o ms ch roa app � ' ral' ''mo e's � Cod The g. irin insp e orwer terr les at1ton1obi l1e<l been also contradicted by custom-influenced adjudic,ation, which sometimes rnJs-app the law and convicted killers even in circumstances d.enoting the absence of any fanlt. 27

Specificity

Apart fron1 these ''n1oral'' concerns, the Code of 1930 expresses 110 elaborate general tlzeories as to either criminal guilt or civil fault, which, besides, it does not distinguish from one another. A . separate general concept of civil fault (such as is developed in Articles 2028-2037 of our present Civil Code) v1as hardly necessary in a system where extra-contractual civil Jjability could apparently result only from a punisl1able offence. As to an offender's criminal guilt, it was, in spite of tl1e n1e11tioned ''moral'' pronou11cements in the Code's preface, not generally determined witl1 respect to all offences by prin.ciples contained in a Ge11eral Part, sucl1 as tl1at of our present Penal Code. Tl1is defect is illustrated, for instance, by tl1e aforen1entio11ed basic inconsistency of Article 477 �vith the approacl1 taken in Article 408 (and presun1ably with the spirit of tl1e preface). In spite of representing a1 1 ''ope11 end'' system through the above mentio.ned judicial power to create 1 1ew offences, the Code of I 930 is characterized by irs casuistry (specificity): indeed, its sl1ort general preface of 22 paragraphs is foll;\\'ed �y 486 specific Articles concerning kinds of punishn1ent, etc. (First Part), and offences against the govern.men� (Second Part), against persons (Third Part), against property (Fourth Part) a1 1d against ''sn1all'' laws (Fiftl1 Part). Tl1e above quadripartite classification of specific wrongs seems rational e110 ugh and is, in so1ne n1easure, reflected also itl our present Pe11al Code. More interesti�g for our s�b�ect is the co111 parison of tl1is classificatio1 1 ,vitl1 tl1e provisions enacted by. our C1,11l Code of 1960 on extra-co11tractual ci,,il liability for ''fault''. Indeed, \Vl1ile breacl1 o� _petty or other law � can be generally dealt ,vith tlJJder 1-\rticle 2035 of the_ C1v1l Code, the ''Spec1al Cases'' of faL1lt provided t1 1 1der E-\rticles 2038-2065 Civ. C:·, alt!1ough no� expressly so grouped, are e1 1 t111 1er,1 ted 1 11 sucll order that th. e first fifteen Articles (2038-2052) are ,vrongs aoi ii st tile - . (thougl1 2.052 i� hybrid), wl1ile tl1e last thirteen (2053-2065) p;i111arily affect pr�;:�� ted against tlie oo,,erri n1en, or pect1n1ary 111terests. As to wrongs . ,. t t1ev •1· . · commit · 1s 111ct pIace 1n a c 1v1l Code. ca1 1 l1ardly occupy a d·t· t:)

26. Incidentall y, liabil ity for bodil y injury under custom and under our p r es.e t c·tvil. C ticl e 2067) is even harsher, since it arises irrespective of fau lt · Cf · O 0te �-'O , b clo,,·. ode (t\r. . . . . . 27. This custon1-1nfluenced trend sttll persists• not\.v1thstan ding its flagran · .< t repugnancv io tli "c pr1::. " sent ..PenaI .Code . see, e.g., t 1,e 10 r IIO\V1ng unpublished cases: The Cr° 1Vil 1•• ,�«>rah-. ,,n .-lc!a,ns . Aba1,l,u, l-I1gh Ct., Assab, 1951 E.C., Criniinal Case No 1151 (s l clcfen e) Prosecutor v. Worku Jfcrbte A1ariam, 1-Iigh Ct., Addis Abab�' 1956 E · � · • Ci_ 7 : n11d Public 1111111:1! C::tse N o. 435/56 (non-neg)jgent "negligence"). 0

- 12 -

HISTORICAL INTROD'UCTION

I-1. Minor poi11ts of interest

We shall stress some sL1ch J)Oi11ts i11 the order of the Code's provisions: 1.

Pt1rsua11t to paragrapl1 I 8 of the Cocle's Preface and the i1nplen1e11ting provisions of Chapter Seve11 of the First Part, a perso11 abused, assaulted or serioL1sly i11jt1red by a poor n1an cot1ld get da1nages fro111 a special f i11es fu11d, wl1ile the ·poor ,vro11gdoer \Vas ''impriso11ed'' (whicl1 ,vo.rd, as defi11ed by Artjcle 5, 111e�1ns ''cl1ai11ed'') and made to work in order to repay the damages (a11d pay fi11es). Tl1ere is some co11ti11t1.ity between this original solt1tio11 a11d l-\rticle 101 of tl1e present Pe11al Code, vvl1ich e11ables a civil clai1nant joining penal proceedi11gs to recover da1nages from an in11Ject1niot1s offender throt1gh tl1e yield of l1is con1pt1 lsory vvork .

Except in tl1e case of t,1ki11g life a11d equivalent great crimes, th.ere ,vas no pt1nislm1e11t [a11d 110 da111ages to pay in the abse11ce of a dichotorny of ,,,ro ngs] for a \\1rongdoer carryi11g out l1is 1naster's order in the l1onest belief tl1at it vvas necessary a11d proper for l1jn1 to obey (Article 146). Con1pare this solution \1/ith tl1e 1nt1cl1 less le11ie11t pri11ciple e111bodied i11 botl1 Article 70 of the Penal Code of 1957 and Article 2036 of tl1e Civil Code of 1960.

Article 296 prescribed payn1ents of 15 to 50 dollars as ''da111ages'' in cases of battery leaving 110 n1ark 011 tl1e perso11 strt1ck; if there was a 1nark (not a m . ot111tin.g to tl1e ''serious'' injt1ry conte1nplated by Article 308 · ff.), the stun payable was 20 to 60 dollars (Article 297). Medical expe11ses a11d ·\vages lost, if any, \Vere con1pe11sable in additio11 to these so called ''da111ages'', ,vhich are 11ot esse11tially dissimilar fro1n tl1e 1noral da111ages due tinder ot1r JJrese11t Ci,,il Code for battery (Art. 2107), tl1e amo·u11t of wl1icl1 is as prescribed by ct1ston1 but limited by a maxi1nt1m of Etl1. $ 1,000 (Art. 2116 Civ. C.). 28 lncide11tally, the natl1re of ''blood-1no11ey'' (discussed above under D with. respect to life-taki11g) differs fro1n tl1at of ''moraJ'' dan1ages, because: (a) blood-mo11ey buys off vengeance, wl1ile moral damages do not affect punisl1me11t; (b) as a rtile, tl1e amou11t of blood-money wi1s not jt1dicially determined but agreed, wl1ile tl1e contrary is true of moral damages.

In all legal syste1ns, assessme11t of ''material'' damage in cases of per1nanent or incapacitati11g personal i11jt1ry is very difficult, since life and \1/age expect ancies are matters of mere conjecture. Our present Civil Code (Article 2102) circumvents this difficulty by granting the judges discretionary powers where an· exact assessn1ent, as required on the face of Article 2091, is impossible. Since the Etl1iopian judiciary of the thirties \Vas untrained, tl1e Code of 1930 restricts their discretion i11 tl1is respect by· setting various tough limits and standards of assessme11t in cases of ''serious'' (permanent) injury. 29

·It seems clear fron1 the express wording of Article 338 regarding serious injury and fron1 the whole co11text that tl1e Code of 1930 contains no provi sions for mitigation of compensatory damages such as those set out by Articles 2099-2100 of our prese11t Civil Code. 30

28. Note that in contrast to "material" damage, "moral" damage is done to the victim's feelings rather than his pocket. 29. See, e.g., Articles 312-326. See also Article 339 for the crude tests by which "serious'' in jury was to be recognized. 30. But since under Article 2067 of the Civil Code liability for bodily harm arises irrespective of fau_ lt, in this field damages can.not be mitigated even under the present law.

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ID'STORICAL INTRODUCIION

ea c n ; � id c si ba e tli , ay w ic ist su ca : � : :;,� Articles 374-380 reflect, in a crude ins ra St rc ho w t a tb e od C il iv C also in ,A.rticle 2,040 of the present liberty commits, as a rule, a redressible wro11g. rt' acts · Pa tl1 ur Fo · e's od C · e · th · · J11 · d e 1 v1c pro ty Of the ·vartous offences against proper 31 e us to ho s as sp t d 11 a ss, �� of steating, robbery, arson ("burning''), fraud, cattle�trespa . law t sen pre der un gs on wr le sab pen cl.early also amount to com

THIRD PERIOD (the modern codes) This period, which we call the conten1porary period, was initiated and i_s !11arked by the respecti\Je enactments of the Penal Code of 1957 G.C. and the C1v1l Code of 1960 G.C. \VhiJe the basic theoretical features of our contemporary law of extra contracrual ci\1iJ -..,vrongs (torts) will be analyzed in tl1e doctrinal (rath�r than the historical) introdu.ction to this commentary, a few of then1 must be briefly noted as best marking th.e end of the above discussed ''transitional'' period and the begin ning o .f the ''contemporary'' one: I. The Penal Code of 1957 no more constitutes tl1e law of wrongs in general, but that of penal wro11gs only. Civil \Vrongs are now gover11ed by the separate Civil Code of 1960, the extra-contractual 011es being dealt with by Title xrrr Cb. l, object of this con11nentary. A dichotomy of wro11gs into penal and ci,ril ones, Jacking in. t]1e previous periods, is thus introduced notwithsta11ding A . rticles 100 Penal Code and 2035 Civil Code, whicL1, taken togetl1er, merely mean that infringement of penal (or otl1er) Ia,vs is 011e kind of civil fault, among the m.any other kinds defined i11 Civil Code Articles 2028-2064. And e,,en \Vhen tl1e fault is civil by virtue of its constitutii1g a penal offence, Penal Code Artie.le 100 itself calls for the application of tl1e Civil Code as to its compensator)' conseq_uences (in joi11t or civil proceedings), rather than itself dealing ,;vith tl1em as was done under tl1e ''Penal'' Code of 1930. The dicbotom)' bet\vee11 Penal and Civil redress and the con1pensatory character of damages are continued while being n1a.de n1uch more explicit by a definitjon of the distinct purposes of pena133 and civil34 liability. 3. The aforementioned _system �f ''private'' prosect1tion of offe1 1ces against per sons or property, ,vhrch obtained in tl1e first two periods, was doo111ed since the trajning of public prosecutors started 011 a large scale in tl1e fifties. Under the Crin1inal Procedure Code of 1961 prosecutio11s are as a rule co11ducted �ot by the injured private perso1�s but _by ]Jt1blic officials.' Eve11 in' tl1e excep tJonal �ses ,vl1ere �n offence 1s . pt1111sbable 011ly upo11 private con1 plaint, it does �ot folio�, that the_ con1pla11 1�nt n1ay prosect1te pri,,ately. He shall be �utho �1 �ed to _do so o �Jy 1f tlJe 1�u�l1c prosecutor refuses to act on grounds of 1n �uff1c1ent ev1?ence (s1nce the v1ct111 of the offe 11ce 111a)' co11sider tlle same � _ _ 1 enc sufficient e, id � to try to avail l11n1self of Articles I 00 Perlal Code and . _ 203) C1v1l Code). 4. The Penal Code f 1957 is the i11heritor of tl1e loft)' 111oral concerns express . � and _ tl1 � P�11al Code of 1930 a11d persisteiltly resisted ed 1n tbe Fetba Nagast _ by custom and customary adJud1cat1011. Tl1e prese11t Penal Code's tlleories of 31. 32. 33 . 34.

See Articles 416, 432, 466, 442, 456, 460. See ;\rticle;; 2035, 2059, 2071 and 2053 of the Civil Cod�. Article 1 of the Penal Code. Articles 2090-2091 of the Civil Code, impliedly.

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HJSTORICAL INTR.ODUc1·10N

guilt a11d respo11sibiJjty are bt1t a refined develop111ent of tl1e e111bryo11ic prece1Jt expressed i11 both the Fetl1a Naga.st a11d tl1e for_1ner Pe11al Code tl1at ''it is not rigl1t to p11nis.h accordi11g to tl1e exte11t of tl1e wro11g bt1t according to tl1e amottnt of t111clerstandi11g''. This 111axi.n1 was expressed only witl1 regard to pt1nisl1me11t (1nitigated in proportion to g11ilt) and did not affect tl1e amou11t of ·'damages'' d11e 11nder the Pe11al Cod.e of 1930 The approacl1 of our present law of civil wro11gs is 111ore differe11tiated. It ad111its of no ''11pwarcl'' exce_ptions to the pri11ciple ''compe11satio11 eq11al to da111age'',35 as this wo11ld 1nean a return to the ancient private penalty· syste111 contrary to our 1nodern dichotomy be tvveen ''penal'' a11cl ''civil'' wrongs and redress. B11t it does ad1nit, witl1 respect to claims based on fa11lt, 111itigatio11s of con1pensatio11 i .n certai11 cases of 1111awa_reness of fault, or of acts of obedie11ce. 36 5.

Apart fro111 the n1entionecl ''mitigation'' provisions a11d the ''1norality'' test incide-ntally supplied u11der Article 2030(1) of tl1e Civil Code, '!- 7 tl1at Code sho\vs more concer11 for IJrotecting victi111s of l1arn1 by providi11g a test of liability for fat1lt regardless of the individttal wrongdoer's moral, i11deed mental co11dition, 38 a11d by tl1e liability apart from fault provisio11s anr1ounced in Article 2027 (2-3) 39 tha11 for refi11ed distinctions between moral a11d i1umoral co11dt1ct. Tl1is aJJproacl1 will be ft1rther analyzed in our Doctrinal I.11troduction. (below) and our comments 1111der the Articles co11cerned. Here we can 011ly stress tl1at our Civil Code's ''strict'' liability provisions reflect old c11stomary ideas (wruch, as will be see11, coi11cide with so1ne modern ones)40 rather than tl1ose of the Fetl1a Nagast and the two Penal Codes.

'6.

In co11trast to prior law 011r prese11t la\v of wrongs i11cludes botl1 a general theory of cri111inal guilt develoJJed at le11gth in the Ge11eral PG1rt, Pen.al Code and applyi11g ,vl1ere an offence defined i11 tl1e Special Part or special Iavvs l1as been con1mitted, a11d a ge11eral theory of extra-contractual civil fault, con.tai11ed i11 Articles 2028-2037 Civil Code. Tl1e civil theory is 1nore general than tl1e crimi11al in that it applies withot1t tl1e 11eed first to find a specific wrong 11nder _ Article 2035 or Articles 2038-2064 Civ. C. It is less general in that it may be excl11ded where special provisions provide liabilities apart from fault, 41 which provisions are 11un1erous.

As mentioned before, under ct1stomary laws repugnant to the Fetha Nagast, penal sanctions for u11propitiated l1omicide could be exercised against tl1e wrong doer's family. l11 accordance with Article 54 of tl1e Revised Constjn1tion of 1955, group liability (wl1ether or not family-based) is now completely absent from our penal law. For tl1e purposes of private compensation, ho\Vever, a

35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

Article 2091 of the Civil Code. Articles 2099-2100 of the Civil Code. And reflected in Articles 2032-2033 of tl1e Civil Code. Article 2030(2-3). And developed in Sections 2 and 4 of Title XIII, Chapter 1 of the Civil Code. Apart from tl1is sui generis coincidet1ce between tl1e old "customary" and the "modern., legis lative trends towards strict liability (as reflected, e.g., in Arts. 2066-2086 Civ. C.), we can observe a survivalf of a "code-repugna.nt" traditional practice: pt1blic prosecutors and courts happen to give efect to the "propi_tiatory" function (buying off tl1e. punitiv: retaliation) of agreed blood-money payments. On this, see a sun101ary of four unpublished �J1gh Court cases (Addis Ababa, Criminal File Nos. 370/55, 291/56, _300/56 � nd 31_2/56 E.C.) m Kas�a B�yene (cited above a t note 14), pp. 22-23. For a reaction against tl11s trend, see Nedd, Haile v. Advocate General (Sup. Imp. Ct., 1962), J. Erlz. Lmv, vol. 2 (1965), p. 42. ·41. See Article 2027(2-3).

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HIS-:PORICAL INTRODUCTION

le ic rt A s hi T e. od C il iv C ) (1 42 21 le ic rt A r still applies unde group lia etimes m so n, tio itu st in ry na o1 st cu a e, sid w la partly reflects, on th.e civil trends in 43 A few other ''mitigated'' survivals of ct1stomary called ''affe,rsatta''. 7. 11 -2 13 d 21 an 67 20 les tic Ar its ., e.g th e Civil Code are indicated by, ly ar cle en ev 42 21 d an 67 20 les tic Ar of se ca e Such l1 armless, an d indeed in th e tic ac pr al ion dit tra a tl1 wi k lin me lco we a ute useful survivals both constit 44 . ad ro ab ies nc de and converge with the most modern reforming ten bility 42

42. Without l imitation to family-member s. , n , a or "Ebuss" not n co in on d e all ,. t s · l "Aue , tio iati r va le subt with s A�so acl 1n ncerned 43. c I c with the r ul es an d proce?ur es regardin g collective lia bil ity for in 'uries J ne: by at1 i u11d� 1scoverecf " J I 19 � p. 249 ff.; Mahten1e wrongdoer. See E. Poletti, // corlice penale abissino (Mila no I-Ioep Selassie \-Voldc Ma skal (c ited a bove at 11ote 13) in ' a rt·cuar 1 _ ..1 e A_3 ffetsatta Procla,nation of · 1925 E.C. a s r eproduced therein ; and the min ute 'co lo rt il � c tio; 10 B.M. Sah l e Sel lassie , �l so � 1��,c · ' 6 Lt c ) 1 l a nn e n d. i n e nd 9 o n 19 o , (L S ata rosecutor v. X, I-Iigh Ct. The rlfers I _ . Addis Ababa, 1956 E.C., Criminal App'· N o· 8· 4�1c56 - , ' r e Pt.o'c'tucecl 1n S . ·Z·. p·ISI1 e r, E ::.tI11op1 . a11' · · I procedure: A Source Boole (Addis Ababa Cr1m111a • , �Ia1·ie S.e11 ass1. e .1. Un 1ver s,ty 1969) ? 4· P: ' . ' , . .. n. J bility a li l civi ds r towa ds ren t _n er mod the n O ups, ro g f e s o e 44. arez, I !11de111n1sat1011 dtt _ rairie generale de dommage cause par un membre inconnu d'un groupe d'e ter,... nine: (P�n:i aris, L1b droit et de jur isprudence, 1967) pp. 44-48.

- 16 -

. '.

PART

ill

SUPPLEMENT TO llISTORICAL INTRODUCTION Follo\ving is a selection of excerpts from the Etl1iopian Penal Cocle of 1930, to \vhich statute constant refere11ce is n1ade in the "Second Period" of our llistorical I11troduction, above. TJ1e "law of ,vrongs" problen1s (both punitive a11cl cornpensatory) of thi.s crucial transitional period are best, albeit crudely reflected in the very language of the Code. In the text below, the e1nphasis marks are ot1.rs. I�laile Selassie 1st, the Appointed of God, King of the Kings of Ethiopia We have revised and issued the following concerning crimes committed against the Govern111ent, against the person and against property, and concernii1g tl1e punishmei1t of all other criminals.

PREFACE

...

The reason why we have caused a revision to be made of tl1e law concerning da,nages for abuse and serious injury ancl co11cerning the pt1nishment of takers of life and all other criminals is because we have 11otecl 011 tl1e eightl1 page of the preface of the Fitha Negast the principle t1nderlying the orders of the Three tiundred which they give in the Fitba Negast in the words, "Act according to your observations of the conditions of tin1es and seasons". • • •

7. 9.

According to the custom of our cot1ntry c!a,nages and ptulisbment are constantly revised according to the conditions of the tin1es at1d seasons. . .. Damages ancl fines which in the year 1700 \Vere paid iL1 cattle, in tl1e year 1800 were paid in salt, in the year 1900 in dollars. :But since the year 1900, owing to the increase in the peOJ)le's knowledge, the wider spread of trade, the greater love of \Vork, the greater cheapness of tl1e dollar and the diminished profit \Vhicl1 is gained by the dollar, lhe damages and fine l1ave been of no profit to the injured 1nan v.1110 has been awarded damages and have been no d.eterrent a11d 110 bttrdeo to the offender ,vho has had to pay dan1ages. All the advantages of foocl and clothing which are 11ecessary for man's existence which \Vere formerly purchased for one dollar cost to-day up to five dollars in a district near to a tow11 and up to two dollars in the country at a distance fron1 a tov,n. For these reasons it_ has become necessary to revise the law of damages and punishments. ••

11.

12.

15.

•

But new cases have a way of coming tlp fron1 time to time, so if a new case is met with which is not described in this code, it shall be settled for the time being by those rules which cover it by their wording; if it is not covered by the \J{ording, the judge s/1all use his kno\vledge and settle it by examining what rule ,vill cover it by interpretation and meaning. If a.n entirely new case arises ,vhich cannot be covered by the wording and interpretation, the case shall be brought and decided by the chief court.

...

Ou.r Lord has said in tl1e Gospel that he who knows much shall be punisl1ed mucl1 but he wbo knows }jttle shall be punished little. (St. Luke, 12, 47.) • • •

16.

The Three Hu11dred, knowing that it is not right to pt1nisl1 according to the extent of the wrong but according to the amount of understanding, have distinguished bet\.veen a sen tence passed on a child, a drunken person, a lnadman and a forgetfuJ person and the sen tence passed on a grown person of full understanding, and accordingly the code is meant to agree witl1 tl1e Fitha Negast. (Cf. Fit. Neg. Pt. 47, p. 303.)

17.

Damages for abuse are to be decided according to the rank �f the person a?used and accor ding to the degree of the abuse; damages are not to be given to an ordinary man as t o

- 17 -

HlSTORICA.L INTRODUCTION a man of rank, nor dan1ages for sligl1t abuse as for viole11t abuse. Accordingly the rank of persons abused and t11e different kinds of abuse will be fou.nd hereinafter and are to be noted.. 18.

If tl1ere be a poor 01an who has no money ,1.,iU1 which to p�y a _ fi�e to tJ1e .court and dan1ages to the injured person on account of abuse, assault or serious 1nJury, th� Judge shall pay the m.011ey to t11e injured person fron1 the fines \vhich b� keeps as a special fun� and shall iruprisoo the person who caused the injury and make hu11 ,vorlc and so cause him to pay the clan1ages and fine. But the Governn1ent is under no obligation to pay from any other source tha.n the money fron1 fines ,vhich is kept.

When a poor n1an, Jacking money ,vith which to pay the court or to pay damages to tl1e injured person, J1as been imprisoned by the authority of the judge, the j�dge sb� ll rec�011 the value of his day's work and, si11ce he is being punished by working whrle he 1s in1prisoned, shall reckon each day of his imprisonment as money and shall d.educt it from the amount which be has to pay. In order that a man wJ10 J1 olds an official aJJpoi11tme11t n1ay be punished according to 20. his position and a11 intelligent man according to his knowledge, and in order that a crin1e \Vhich has been comn1itted with knowledge and effrontery n1ay not go unpunished with the payn1ent of dan,ages 011ly as in the case of an ordinary man or an unintelligent n1an, for J1is n1ore con1JJlete punishn1ent a fine shall be addecl over and above dan1ages accorcllng to the degree of rank ancl the an1ount of k1101vleclge, lo be paid out of the wealth \Vhich he has acquired, in order to provide for education and for the poor 1na11 \vho has no 1noney wi.th which to pay dan1ages; and this fine will be found writte11 hereinafter a11d is to be 11oted. 19.

22.

•• •

If financial loss ensues as the result of cri1ne of any kind, the question of tl1e 1noney will be verified by itself and payment ,nust be ,nade.

FIRST PAI{T ]'he Ia,v and nun1bcr of the punishments of crin1inals

FIRST Cl-IAPTER The number of purlishments of crin1inals. There are seven 1Junishme11ts for criminals which are prescribed at present. 1st section. The sentence of

2nd sectio11. 3rd section. 4th section. • 5th section. 6th section. .. 7tl1 secuon.

The The The The The The

sentence sentence sentence sentence sentence se11 tence

of of of of of of

death. flogging. in1prisonn1ent. fine. expulsion fron1 a district. confiscation. providing a guarantor against acts of violence.

The se11tence of im1Jrison1nent 111ea11s the detention of the criminal in chains for the prescribed length of tin1e, after sentence has been passed. . ..

A fine n1ea.ns 111oney ,,,hich is JJaid to the court after the judge bas detern1ined tl1e ainouot according to_ la�. �fter sentence of this_ punishment has been fi11ally passed, if the fines has not been paid \V1tb10 three 01onLbs, and 1f the goods whicl1 are found in l1is house inlteriterl lane/ being e,t':111pt :cl, are insufficient for the payn1ent of the fine, the punishn1e11t shall be changed to 1n1pr1sonment. If a fine be chan�ed to impriso11 n1ent, for the ordinary unsk:illed labourer one day shall be reckoned as equivalent to a quarter of a dollar· but if he be a skilleci labourer, the estimated value of his day's H 01·/c shall be reckoned. : .. 1

7. 11 .

A n1an sentenced to pay a fme sl1 all provide a guarantor ,vho will be responsible that he pays the fi11e. • • •

The sentence of a guarantor _against act_ s of vi<;>leoce. If one 01an threaten another, and the threatened 111an appeal to a Judge, o! if the Judge sus1Ject a ma.11 of being one wllo will cause trouble among the people and hnd true cause for his suspicion, 1·t 1·s necessary r, or · Ience to · st v10 · . be called. Th_e n1an \�I, � acts as guarantor shall not be held a gua, •a!1to1• again responsible for 01ore than t\vo years; but if tl1e cru11111al after two years is still an object

- 18 -

I-IISTORICAL INTRODUCTION of suspicion, the judge has l)O\.ver to cause another guarantor to be called. Also if a n1an accused of threatening or suspected of causi11g disturbance is unable to provide a guarantor, the judge l1as power to in1prison him for a period of not n1ore tha11 six n1onths until he find a guarantor. . . . This la\V of the calling of a guarantor against acts of violence is to be enforced on n1en \Vbo live 1,vithout occupation, as vagabonds and in poverty.

...

FOURTI·I CI-IAPTER

The Lav,, co11cer11ing possessions \vhich are 11ot confiscated in punish111ent. 25. It is laid down that the tools of a n,an \Vho has to pay a fine shall not be confi seated, that the the confiscation of his tools n1ay 11ot deprive hin1 of his livelihood.

26.

If the sentence clo�hi11g by his daily and those of his la\v; his tools and of a fi11e.

of a fine is passed on a n1an \vho lives by getting his daily food and \vork only, having 110 other n1oney sufficient for the livelihood of hin1self household, he shall be punished by imprison1nent as is laid do\vn by his daily food and year's clothing shall not be take,, away in payn1ent

• • •

28.

Fron, a farn1er whose only livelihood is far111ing a yoke of oxen with their irnplemeots and a co\.v ,vith its calf shall 11ot be be taken a\.vay in payn1e11t of a fine.

29.

Fro111 a trader \vhosc only livelihood is trade one pony ,vith its girths, one mule \Vith its saddle and one tent shall not be taken a\vay i11 payn1ent of a fine.

30.

Fron, a soldier \vbo is liable to go on active service or has to live in some other place where he is ordered, one pony \Vith its girths, one n1ule with its saddle and one tent shall not be take11 away.

31 .

Fron1 a JJriest a book which is the only 011e of its kind and the property \Vhich l1e uses in church sl1all not be taken away in payn,ent of a fine.

32.

Fron1 a writer his ,vriting materials shall not be taken away in pay1nent of a fine.

33.

But if all the tools \vbicl1 are in the possessio11 of any n1an who lives by ,vorking \Vith l1is hands are in duplicale or n1ore nun1erous tba11 that, as the judge sees and estin1ates then1, the duplicates or tbe excess shall be taken. away fron1 hin1 in payn1ent of a fine. Ho111e11er, in so far as it bas bee11 said that a n1an's tools shall not be taken· away from bin1 as has here been ]aid dow11, it only applies in the case of fines; if there be a liabi lity for bodily injury or co111pe11satio1z for taking a life or any other d.ebt, co11fiscation shall be enforced. Also if the injured party shall say, "l \.Vill not take away from you the tools jn your possession, but gi.ve 1ne 01oney fron.1 wbat you make by working \Vith your tools", a11d if the tvvo agree, it shall be as they agree. • •

•

SIXTl-l CI-lAPTER

The Jav;1 · concerning the punislu11ent of n1any crin1es. 42. lf a 111a11 wl10 has con1mitted crin1es of n1any different kinds be accused at one time of all Ll1e cri111es he has con1n1itted, tl1ougl1 according to the law a case shall be taken against him for each separate crin1e, fron1 these crin1es of which he is accused he shall be punished for the cl1ief 011e as laid down by tl1e law and not for each separate offence. But if there be any liability for 111oney he shall be .liable for it all . ...

SEVENTI-1

CH�.\PTER

The law of the JJt1nishme11t of the addition of viole11ce. 43.

The meaning of the additi.on of violence is the comn1ission by one man of two or more great crimes on one occasion or on several occasions against - tl1e perso11 or the property of one other ma11.

44.

If one man commit two or more cri1nes against another man, over and above the pu11ishment which is written in this law for the crime wl1ich he has committed, he shall pay the penalty for violer1ce wl1ich is written below. .

• • •

The la\v of the fine which shall be paid, over and above datnages, if the persons who commit offences in respect of these crimes are 1nen of ra11k who hold Office. [According to meticulous distinctions made in sections No. 52-142, the Ji'ne due decreases with decreasing rank and guilt.]

19 -

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

143. · · · From the ·tine which is added to the damages one fifth shall be taken in the first place and paid to the court and the balance shall be for the school for the poor. Tl1is mon.ey which is paid for what is called tl1e sc]1ool for t]1e poor shall accum�ate 144. for one year in the judge's hands. If a poor man \Vithout 1noney wl10 l1as caused s�r1ous injury to the person of another ma.n l1as no o.1ooey witl1 ,vhich to pay dan1ages, tl1_e Judge shall take fron1 the money which is said to be for the scl1ool for the poor and _ give the amoLtnt of the dan1ages to tl1e man whose person has been injured. After on.e year, if there be any money left, he shall give it to the school for the poor .... EIGI-ITH CHAPTER Tl1e Jaw co11cer11ing crimes which do not entail punishment. 145. There is no punishn1ent for tl1e man \Vho commits a crime in defendi11g l1imself a.gai� nst a strong n1an, if he thinks tl1at he is guarding and saviI1g l1is. life and honour, bis n1oney and fan1ily. Except in the case of taking life and great crimes wl1ich are reckoned as equivalent to the taking of life, there is 110 pu11ishn1ent for a cri111inal wl10 bas received an order fro111 l1is n1aster and carried out tl1e order. Even if the order were an in1proper one, if the person receiving tl1e order honestly ] 47. thought that it was necessary a.nd proper for l1im to obey his n1aster, there shall be no pun ishment for him .... 146.

•• •

NINTll ClIAP1'ER The law by which accusation and punishnJent are annulled. J 52. \1/hen a crin1inal v-,bo is accused of a1Jy sort of crime has died, the accusatio11 is annulled. Wl1e11 a n,an on whon1 sentence of punishn1ent has been passed has died, tbe 1Jun isn1enl is annulled. (Fit. Neg.) But if the action was taken in a matter of n1oney, the owner of the 1noney can bring a case against his heirs. • • •

SECOND PART

Concerning crime ,,bich is committed against the Government

...

TENTH

CI�IAPTER

Concerning cri1ne ,vhich is con1mitted by Governn1e11t servants and in Governn1e11t Offices. 224.

231.

237.

If a n1an ,vitboui having been appointed is found doing Gover1m1ent \-VOrk and prelet1dino that he has bee11 appointed, he shall be responsible for any c!a,nage that n1ay have accrued ancl shall be in1prisoned fron1 6 n1onths to 1 year and shall pay a fine fron1 100 to 300 (? 400) dollars. (Fit. Neg., Pt. 30, p. 193). •• •

A Gover1m1ent servant who buys goods at much 1nore tha.11 their price witI1 the idea of 111aking a profit for hin1self or someone else shall repay c/ouble the a111ount of n,oncy he paid over ihe price and shall be imprisoned from 2 111onths to 1 year. •••

If a Governn1e!1t servant who is . working i11. the Posts and Telegra1Jhs opens, destroys or takes away or 1n the abse11cc of its owner gives over to anotber n1an or n1akes known to another n1an a secret which be has seen ,vithin any letter or telegran1 or other article (colis) ,vbich has con1e closed, he shall pay the 0H111er for the article destroyed and ' shall be impriso11ed from 6 months to I year. �ut if the crime ,vhich has been co1nmitted cause injury to another n1an, he shall . 11npr1soned from I to 2 years.

238.

A Governn1ent servant who does his work in1properly with the idea of injuring another man shall be io1J)risoned from 3 months to 1 year and sl1all pay a tine from 50 to 200 dollars.

FIFTEENTI-1 CI-IAPTER Concerning the crime which is committed by damaging means of co1nmunication to the destruction of the safety of the public.

-20-

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

259.

A n1a.n \Vho damages a pt1blic traclc or a bridge over a river or dam or barrage for \vater or a carriage or n1otor road or the track of the rail\vay and does a11ything which may cat1se an accident to anotl1er person shall be imprisoned from 3 mont11s to 3 years and sl1all pay a fme fro1u 20 to 500 dollars.

260.

A ma11 \Vho puts an obstacle on the rail\vay track or \vl10 loosens and takes up the rails or ,vl10 moves the signals or does anylhing else to cause a11 accident shall be in1prisoned fron1 6 n1onths to 3 years and shaJl pay a fine fro1n 50 to 500 dolJars. (Fit. Neg., Pt. 37, p. 225).

261.

:But if by reason of what J1e has do11e an accident is caused not i11volving loss of life, he shall be responsible for the dan,age and shall be imprisoned from I to 5 years and shall pay a fine from 100 to 1000 dollars. (Fit. Neg., Pt. 45, p. 291).

262.

If by reason of ,vhat he l1as done an accident is caused jovolving loss of lin1b or life, be shall be se11tenced accordi11g to the laws concerning the loss of limb and the Joss of life. • • •

SIXTEENTI-I C IIt\PTER Concer11ing the cri,ne \Vbich is con1mitted by a n1an existing as a11 idler without a master a.nd ,vitbout work and by a n1an existing as a beggar witl1out J1aving any j11fir111ity a11d by publicly saying what is untrue. 265.

If idleness is proved against an idler who bas no \vorlc or n1astcr or clwelJing place or means of subsiste11ce, l1e shall be arrestecl and handed over to the official in cl1arge of the l1ired \Vorkn1en a.nd shall \vork in chains fro111 1 month to I year. But if he fu1ds a 111a11 \Vho ,viii be his gucu·antor or if he fi11ds ,vork, l1e shall at once be released. But if no guarantor is found. by the tin1e he J1as bee11 in chains for 1 1nonth , the official in charge of the l1irecl v. orkn1en shall give hi1n only ,vhat is needed for food and shall set hin1 free after giving him tl1e n1oney "'hich he J1as saved tip for J1in1 as pay for l1is 'vvork and receivi11g a receipt in tbe presence of the judge. 1

266.

But if l1e be arrested a seco11d time, l1e shall be handed to tJ,e official in charge of the bjred workmen and shall work under his charge until evidence .is given of a change of character and a love of \vork. • • •

TI-IffiD PART Concerning crime ,vhiclt is con1n1itted against a person

• • •

FffiST CI-IAPTER

The law concerning the punishment and tl1e damages for abuse. 273. I-le wl10 abuses a man out of contempt in order to l1un1iUate him shall pay fine and da,mages as written belo,v. Damages

Fine

To an orclinary person . . ...... . ..... ..... . . .. . ..... . .. 15 15 To an officer in command of 50 and to a sbalaqa balambaras . .. .. . . .... .... . . . . . .. ........ ..... 18¾ 18¾ To an officer in comn1and of 100 to a sl1alaqa gerazmach . ... .. .. ... .... . ....... . ... . ..... . 22½ 221 /2 To an officer in command of 1000 and to a shalaqa qenyazmach .. ..... . . .. . . .... . .......... . . 37½ 37 ½ To a baJambaras who is a kings sl1alaqa .... . ... . . . . . . .... . ..... . . and to a shalaqa fitaurari 97½ To a gerazmach who is a King's shalaqa 112½ ....: . ·.· .... To a qenyazmach who is a King's shalaqa 127½ .. . ... . . .. . To a fitaurari who is a King's shalaqa i50 and to a sbalaqa dejazmach ... . .... . .... ..... .. . ... To the Kjng's d�jazmach ................•............. 200 To the ras's . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300 274. With regard to men who after receiving ran.k of these degrees have been deprived of it, their damages and tl1e fine shall be assessed according to their rank at the time they held an appointment.

- 21 -

HISTORICA,L INTRODUCTION 27S.

When a man has been in charge of the work of any office without being given the title of the rank, the damages and fine shall be reckoned according to tl1e rank of the offi.ce.

276.

A n1an who uses terms of abuse such as "dumb, deaf, blind, huncl1backed" or any infirmity resembling these wl1icl1 is a judgn,ent of God shall pay forty-five dollars damages. (Fit. Neg., Pt. 9).

277.

A n1an who abuses either a single person or his family with sucl1 violent abuse as to preve11t a marriage shall pay 45 dollars damages. (Fit. Neg., Pt. 24, p. 190).

278.

A rnan who in. abusing a.nother goes beyond hin1 and abuses l1is father and .mother who are not present shall pay 30 dollars dan1ages.

279.

A rna.n who abuses another in respect of appearance a11d character for which he is responsible shall pay 22½ dollars damages.

280.

A. man who abuses another by treating as deserving of abuse the appearance which God l1as created shall pay 30 dollars dan1ages. The fine which shall be added to the damages on account of the rank and l1onour of the person abused:

281.

A n1a11 who abuses the officials who are appointed over him to give l1 in1 orders shall, apart from dan1 ages, pay a fine from 20 to 200 dollars.

282.

If a servant abuses his master, he shall be imprisoned fron1 1 to 6 months or shall pay a fine from 10 to 100 dollars.

283.

Moreover there are n1a.11y n1en who, t11ough they hold no rank of office, are honoured and their 1 1ame is know11 by reason of their birth or work or for son1e sin1ilar reason; acc ordi11gly, on the ground t11at he has no ra11k of office, the judge, in order tl1at his damages may not be the same as those of an orclii1 ary n1an, shall make an estimate and cause dam ages to be paid from 30 to 100 dollars; or he shall pay this amount as a fine to the Go verru11ent.

284.

A man \vho abuses educated men ,vho are doing intellectual work, treating their work as deserving of abuse, shall pay a fine fro111 30 to 100 dollars or shall be i111prisoned from 10 days to 3 1nonths.

28S.

The fine which sball be added to the damages of the person abused on account of respect due to the place.

286.

A ording ording school.

287.

A n1an ,vho abuses ai1other in the King's court, apart from the dan1ages whicl1 J1e shall pay to the person abused, shall pay a fine froin 100 to 200 dollars according to the degree of the abuse and accordiog to tl1 e rank of the person abused.

288.

A man ,vho abuses another in the court of the Afa Negus and in the courts of shalaqas who are rulers of provinces and have the honour . of a drun1, fron1 ras to dej jazn1ach, and in tJ1e courts of judges who are entrusted ,vith the work of judging shall pay a fine from 30 to 80 dollars apart from damages to the person abused. (Fit. Neg. Pt. 43, p. 271).

289.

A ma11 ,vho abuses another in the court of any governor of a sn1all district or of a landowner with powers of justice or of a sub-governor shall pay a fi1 1e fron1 10 to 20 do llars, apart from dan1ages to the person abused.

290.

A n1an wl10 abuses another in the court of a chiqa shu1n or any ordi11ary judge shall pay a fine fron1 1 to 10 dollars apart fron1 dan1ages to the person abused. • • •

man who abuses another in a church shall pay a fine fron1 10 to 50 dollars accto the degree of the abuse, accordiug to the rank of the person abused and acc to the n1easure of his intelligence; and tl1e fine shall be given to a t11eological (Fit. Neg. Pt. 12, p. 100).

Tl·IIRD

CI·IAPTER

The punishme11t of a criminal who wilfully strikes or wounds a n1an. 296.

A n1a11 who strikes another, if there is no n1ark on the man struck, shall pay a fine from 15 to 50 dollars and shall pay as dan1ages to the n1an struck fron1 15 to 50 dollars·' or instead of the fine he shall be imprisoned fron1 10 days to 1 n1onth.

- 22

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

297.

If there is a n1ark on him, he shall pay a ·fine from 20 to 60 dollars and da1uages fron1 20 to 60 dollars to the n1an struck; or iI1 place of the fine he shall be in1priso11ed from 15 to 45 days.

298.

If he be \Vou11ded, he shall pay a fine from 30 to 70 dollars and da,nages from 30 to 70 dollars to the man struck; or in place of the fine he shall be imJJrisoned fron1 1 to 3 mo11ths.

299.

If the n1an struck ,vas severely \Vounded and lies up ill for not more than 20 days, after the genuniness of his illness l1as been inquired into, the striker shalJ pay, in e,r:cess of the dan1ages, expenses incurred for a doctor and for treatn1ent and the an,ount ,vh.ich he ,vould have earned in the time he has been off work; if J1e caused him to be laid up for n1ore than 20 but not n1ore than 30 days, J1e shall pay a fine fron1 5 to 105 dollars and da1nages to tl1e san1e an1ount, or instead of the fine l1e sl1all be imprisoned fron1 2 to 6 months; if he caused hin1 to be laid up for 40 days he shall pay a fine from 60 to 140 dollars an(l dan1ages to tl1e same an1ount, or instead of the fine he shall be imprisoned fro1n 3 n1onths to l year. • • •

FIFTH CHAPTER

The Ja,v of the punisl1111e11t of a crin1inal ,vho wilfully causes serious injury and the damages which he sl1all pay. 308.

A man who wiJfully causes serious [permanent] injury shall be imprisoned fron1 6 n1onths to 3 years. I-le shall pay proper dan1ages to the ma11 who l1as received the serious injury. I-Ie sl1all first of all pay the fee which the n1an wl10 has been seriously injured J1as paid to the doctor and the expenses of his treatn1ent, and the money which he pays to the doctor and for treatn1ent shall not be reckoned in the damages.

309.

If a n1an wl10 causes serious injury intended beforehand to commit tl1e crin1e of causing serious injury, he shall be itnprisoned fron1 1 to 5 years and shall pay proper dan1ages.

310.

But if a n1an after causing serious injury fails for any reaso11 to pay damages after it has been decided that he shall pay damages to the man ,vho has been seriously injured, his pun.ishment shall be fron1 1 to 10 years.

311.

In order tl1at tl1e extent of tl1e injury may be k11own, ,vhether the man who has been seriously i□jLtred is capable of doing work or is totally h1capacitated from doing work, the judge shall cause an examination to be made by a foreign-trained doctor living in the country or \\'here it is the custon1 by a J1ome-trai11ed doctor living in the country, and after the ex tent of the i11jury is kno\v11 shall decide the da.mages according to the amount of the injury.

312.

If the man wl10 has bee11 seriously injured is �otally incapacitated from doing work, the damages are to be assessed on the basis of the money wl1.ich he . used to earn in good health. .

313.

Though the man who has been seriously injured be not as he was before, if the serious ·injury does not cause him to cease work entirely, tlie doctor (foreign or home-trained) shall examine whether the loss of power is a half or a third or a quarter; if only half of l1is power has been lost, his dan1ages shall be half; - if a tl1ird of his power has been lost, his damages shall be a third; if a quarter of his power has been lost, his damages shall be · a quarter.

314.

If a man who has been seriously injured is not prevented by the serious injt1.ry from doing work, the crin1inal who has caused tbe serious injury shall pay from 50 to 500 dollars damages and his imprisonment shall be from 15 days to 6 months.

315.

A criminal who ca uses serious injury isoned from 5 to 10 years. If the roan the man who caused tl1e injury shall be pay damages from 1000 . to 5000 dollars; to the law.

316.

and so makes a man a eunuch s.hall be imprdies before 40 days as the result of this injury, sentenced to death. If lie does not die, he shall if· he dies, he shall pay blood money according

I}. man who causes serious injury to a cllild who bas not begun work shall pay from

3000 to 7000 dollars damages.

317.

If a man causes serious injury to a man who has no work at that time, he shall re. ceive damages reckoned according to the pay of an ordinary workman.

- 23 -

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 318.

If a 1r1an causes serious i11jury to a n1a.n fron1 50 to 60 years of age, the damages shall be redticecl by a quarter and l1e shall pay three quarters.

319.

If a man causes serious i11jury to a man from 60 to 80 years of age, the damages shall be reduced by a half, and he shall pay a l1alf.

320.

If a man causes serious injury to a man above 80 yea1·s of age, the damages shall be reduced by tl1ree quarters and l1e shall pay a quarter.

321.

If a ma.n receives a serious injury on a railway, a steam-boat or any otl1er machine for the transport of passengers and goods, in tl1e en1ployment of a n1inin� or tirn?er co11cession, in tl1e work of a factory, in the employn1ent of any other large concession or 10 �overnn1ent employ, the company or the owner of the work shall only pay dru11ages accord!ng to law. A Government servant who is seriously injured in Goveron1ent work sl1all receive from the Governt11e11t damages for the injury or provisio11 for this support.

An example sho,ving the assessment of damages. 322.

lf a n1a11 cut off both ha ads of a l1ired \vorkn1an, and that l1ired workman earned 7 dollars a month, the damages shall be assessed like tl1is. If tl1is n1a11 ear11ed 7 dollars in one 01011th, in 011e year be would earn 84 dollars. Since the n1an who is getting damages will receive the money in a lun1p sum, a quarter is to be deducted from tl1e money ,vl1ich l1e would earn in one year. A quarter of 84 is 22; and if 22 b e take11 from 84, 62 dollars ren1ain. f\ccordingly it is right to make one pay111ent as damages of a sun1 of money as princi1Jal v. l1ich v.•ill bring i11 interest at tl1e rate of 62 do!Jars a year to this n1an who has received the serious injury. Reckoning the interest at 9% tJer annun1, as JJrcscribed by law, the pri11cipal vvhicb will bru1g in 62 dollars interst per annum is 588¾ dollru·s, and so tl1is is ,vl1at the \.Vorkn1an ,vho has been seriously injured will receive. 1

...

A second example . 326.

•••

This does not apply only to the n1 an who is earning what are called wages; consequently a reckoning shall be n1ade of what a n1ercl1ru1t or a farn1er or a n1a11 en1ployed in any other ki11d of v.1ork is earning in dollars per annuo1, and damages sl1all be assessed in the n1an11er described above a11d payn1ent shall be made.

The law by ,vhich tbe punisl1me11t a11d damages for assault, woundi11g and serious injury are rem itted and din1nished. 327.

If a man begi11S a fight with ,veapons of war thinkii1g to defend hin1self and I1is family, and if 1l1e n1a11 who begins the fight v.1ith weapons of war since l1e is fighting ,vitb a violent man fires a gu11 or throws a SJJear and misses, and if the other, doing the san1e as I1is ene111y, fires a gun or throws a spear and causes serious injury or bits hin1 or wounds him since the intention of each was to kill and ,veapons of war J1ave bee11 used on both side�•' da1nages are cancelled out and there is no punishment.

328.

But . if the n1an w!10 began_ the fight denies . tl1 at he was the first to fire J1is gun or thro,v his spear and n1iss, and if there are no \Vit11eses 011 ibis JJoint, si11ce l1is serious· in jury is plainly visible, lie shall receive damages for a serious i1 1jury.

329.

If a violent n1an comes by night, breaking tl1rough the fence of a house where another man lives or destroying or climbing over the wall or digging througl1 the house-,vall or unlocking the door with a false key in his possession, and if the householder ,vith the int ention of defending l1in1self · and his property, causes serious injury or jf he' ,Strikes hin1 or \vounds him, he shall not be punished nor be responsible for da111ages. • • •

334.

If a 1nan finds anotJ1er co1nmitt.ing aclt1llery ,vilh his v,1ife in his house and he causes serious injury to his wife or to the man. whom he has found comn1ilti11g adultery, he shall be i1nprisoned from 1 to 6 n1onths but l1e shall not pay any dan1 ages.

335.

If a 01 �n. st �rts a peo l?le and 1s serious! � receive damages for his

_fi �l1t by n:ild abuse such as is custon1arily used bet\veen uncivilised 1nJured �r . 1s struck and ,vounded by a stone or a thick : stick he shall ; serious 1nJury after da1nages for the abuse have been deducted from it.

• • •

If a. man begi_ns_ � fight \Vith bad abuse which hurts, using an abomi11able nam 337. . e whicll 1s excessively hum1ltatmg and causes anger and passes on from the nian to his fan1ity, and _ if he is seriously injtu·ed, ho,vever much he feel the pai_ n of his serious injury, because the

- 24-

I-IISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

abused n1an feels the injury of the abuse like the pain, three parts shall be deducted fron1 the dam ages and he shall receive only one part; but if tl1ere \Vas no serious injury but only ass ault and \Vounclir1g, there sl1all be no damages. 338.

If a man cause serious injury or strikes another or getfulness or by mistake or in play or by carelessness he is the cat1se whereby a man is seriously injured or be imprisoned from 10 days to 6 n1onths but shall pay

\vou11ds him u_ainte11tionally by foror by not observing the law or if is struck or is \Vounded, be shall dru11ages in full.

Concerning serious i11jury The differe11t kinds of serious il1jury are described below. 1st. Co11cer11i11g the crO\VD of the l1ead. 3 39. lf tl1e bone is broken by a blo\v 011 tl1e CTO\\'Q of the head or the forehead. 2ncl. Concerning the eyes. lf one eye is destroyed. 340. If both eyes are destroyed. If tl1e eyelid is cut and does not properly cover tl1e eye. 3rd. Concerni11g tl1e nose. If the 11ose is entirely cut off. If the bone of the nose is broken and prevents proper breathing.

341.

.. . 11th. Concer11ing the leg. If one foot is broken or paralysed. 359. If both feet are broken or paralysed, the 1)unishme11t a11d the damages shall be doubled. 360.

lf, tl1ough tl1e foot is not broket1 or paralysed, the leg is broken above or below the knee and the bone protrudes.

3 61.

U witl1ot1t going out of doors or beginning \vork tl1ere is a rela1)se a11d tl1e knee ,vhich appeared to be cured is again dislocated.

362.

If tl1e te11dons of tl1e leg are broken or shortened a11d cause a 1nan to be lame, walking withot1t putting his full ,veight on l1is foot.

363.

If the l1eel is destroyed or contracted, causing the ma11 to walk \1/ith a stick \Vitb his leg l1aoging clown, so as not to put l1is foot on tl1e ground. • • •

EIGI-ITJ-I CI-IAPTER Concerning the crin1e \vl1ich is con1ll1itted by seizing a n:ia.11 by force, and by seizing and bin. ding and con1pelling bin1 to perform a11y kind of ,vork without bis consent.

374.

If a n1an compels anotlJer by force and by tl1reats to leave undone anything he ougl1t to do or to do anything which he ought 11ot to do, l1e shall be imprisoned fron1 6 n1ontbs to 1 year ancl sl1all pay a fine fron1 50 to 200 d.ollars. (Fit. Neg., Pt. 35, p. 212). •

• •

376.

A man who, tl1inking it is esse11tial for l1is o,vn profit, seizes anotl1er 1nan, sl1uts l1im up inside a house and detains hin1 or _binds bim shall be imprisoned from 1 to 2 years ru1d shall pay a fine 50 to 200 dollars. (F1t. Neg., Pt. 46, p. 308).

77.

If the rnan who was forcibly seized withot1t l1is consent ancl detainee[ or bound m_eet with an accident involvh1g serious iJ1jury, tl1e man who detained him by force or bound llim sl,all pay damages according to law fo_r th� seriot1s iJ 1 jury and shall be inJprisoned from 2 to 5 years or sJ1all be flogged and be 1mpr1soned forn1 6 moot�1s to 1 year.

380. · · · Io respect of the crimes wl 1ich- are describecl above, if the mar1 \vho v;,as seized and bound meet witl1 any financial loss by reason thereof, tJ1e man wl10 bou_nd l1im shall pay according to Jaw. TENTH CJ-IAPTER Concerning t11e crime whicb is committed by iJlicit sexual intercourse. A man who has illicit sexual intercourse \Vith a married won1an with her consent sha 11 388. be imprisoned from 3 months to 1 year and sball pay a fine fron1 20 to 50 dollars. (Fit.

- 25 -

msTORICAL INTRODUCTION

Neg., Pt. 48, p. 330). This sentence shall only be executed if the husf?and J?rosec�tes and proves that adultery has actually taken place; and the woman shall receive this punishment. 397. · · · Also if those who are forbidden to marry by Fitha Negast, have illicit sexual inter course with their natural and spi.ritual relations, they shall be imprisoned from 6 months to 1 year and shall pay a fine from 20 to 50 dollars. (Fit. Neg.). •• •

399 .

Unless the crimes specified above were done openly and the injured parties prosecute before the judge, the se.ntence of punishment shall not be pronounced.

400.

A man wl10 communicates syphilis or gonorrhoea in illicit sexual intercourse shall pay fron1 50 to 500 dollars damages and besides this he shall give the cost of n1edical attendance and nursing. TWELFrH CHAPTER

Concerning the sentence and punishment of a man who takes life. The sentence on a man who l1as taken life is comprised under three headings. 404. 405.

1st. If it is made clear by witnesses or by a n1ai1's own confession that the killing \vas d.one from hatred, out of revenge or in a sudden quarrel, he shall be sentenced to death.

406.

2L1d. Though the killing was done from hatTed, out of revenge or in a sudden quarrel, if it be found on exami11ation 11ot to be such as to deserve death, he shall be punished by imprisoi1ment or be shall pay bloocl1no11eJ1• 3rd. But if he killed a11otber man by so111ething which he tlirew at a bird or wild beast, after the circun1stances of the case have been investigated, he shall stay at the place pres scribed for him. lf the senten.ce is tl1at the killing does not deserve the death sentence, but only exile or punishn1ent, after it l1as been ascertained that there was no intention of killing but that it was tbe resuJt of a n1istake or forgetfulness or in play, if there be only punishn1ent or exile the laker of life shall pay n1011ey that the relatives of the dead n1an may not go witl1out any bloodmoney. After sentence of deatl1 has been passed on the taker of life in accordance witb the Fitha Negast and the Ki11g has confirmed the sentence, the people appointed for the purpose shall inflict the punishment of deatl1 on the appointed day and hour at the place prepared for the purpose. The relatives of a n1an who has died after being sentenced to death ·shall be permitted according to Jaw, if they ask, to take away the body for burial.

407. 408.

410.

411 .

•

• •

FOURTH PART

Concerning crime which is committed against property

FIR.ST

CI-IAPTER

. '

Concerning the crime which is committed by stealing. 416. A thief wl10 by day steals any kind of property or cattle \Vhich are 11ot his but belong to another man shall be imprisoned from 1 n1011th to 1 year. •• •

A thief who enters upo11 another man's land and steals crops whether they Jiave beeii reaped or not, whether they have been pulled up or not, or grain in a heap vegetabl grass, wood, worked stones _or �sh fron1 a pond or collection of water shall pay danla::� to the owner and shall be 1mpr1soned from 5 days to 1 year or sball pay a fi iie . fronl 5 to 100 dollars. A thief who steals l1orned _ cattle, maned cattle or beehives or fa.rm iniplenients shall 422. pay money to the owner, and 1f there was work for the cattle to do ruid the k 1ias been J1eld up, he shall pay damages and shall be imprisoned froin 3 months to 2 ; ��s.

421.

425.

• • •

If a man makes brass to resemble gold ru1d tin t � rese!11ble silver a11ct, asserting tbenl to be gold and silver, sells tl1em by fraud and by d1stract1ng the attention of tile buyer,

- 26 -

I-IISTOR.ICAL INTRODUCTION or by any fraud resembl ing th is deceives a man and selJs l1i m anything, this is stealing and therefore l1e sl1all return to the ow11er the money \Vi th interest and shall be in1prisoned fron1 2 to 6 months and shall pay a fine from 10 to 50 dollars. (Fit. Neg., Pt. 43). 426 •

431 •

If a man abstracts a11yth ing from a sum of 111oney \Vhich l1e has been sent and ordered to give to another n1an and keeps i t, this is stealing and therefore he shall repay \Vith inte rest the n1oney \Vl1 ich he abstractecl and kept and shall be imprisoned from 3 months to 1 year. • • •

I n the cases of stealing ment ioned above, the thief shall repay to the ow11er what he has stolen and i f he has h1curred any expenses he shall refund the expenses as they are estimated.

SECOND

CI-IAPTER

Concer11ing the cr in1e whicl1 is con1n1ittcd by stealing by hi ghway robbery or robbery with violence . .432. •

If a man \vhen stealing the n1oney of anotl1er man \.vl1ich is not his own uses viole11ce on the O\vner as well as taking away his n1oney, in proportion to the injury he shall be flogged and in1pri soned from 6 months to 1 year. THIRD

CI-IAPTER

Concerning tl1e crime wh ich is comm itted by swindling and fraud.

M2.

A man \Vl10 i11 order to obtain money for his own advantage by unla\vful sw i11dling removes it prete11d ing that it is his ow11 or who hands it over to another 111an or \vh·o guides thieves and causes then1 t o steal it or vvho after causing U1e stealing obtains a sig nature for tl1e rece ipt of the n1 oney shall pay a fine from 100 to 200 dollars and shall be imprisoned from 1 to 2 years. • • •

454.

If a man i11 good faitl1 puts his signature and seal on a blank sheet of paper and gives it to another n1an, a man \Vl10 writes untruly \Vords wl1ich bring injury ei ther to the person or property of the n1ari who signed it shall be in1pri soned fro1n 3 months to 2 years and shall pay a fine fron1 20 to 200 dollars. If the owner of the signature a11d seal suffer Joss of mo11ey, he shall be respons i ble in tl1e n1atter of the money.

.455.

I-le shall repay to the owner the money wl1ich he l1as stolen by robbery \Vi th violence, by fraud and by swindling sucl1 as are described above; and if l1e has incurred any expenses, . h e shall be reponsible for tl1e expenses as est imated a11d shall pay tl1em.

FOURTH CHAPTER Concerning the crime which is con1mi tted by breaking the law established tl1at tl1e rights of an owner of inherited land and tax-free land may not be violated.

A56.

A man who causes destrt1ction by lett ing loose horned cattle or maned cattle, without keeping any watch over them, o n the ulherited land or tax-free land of another ma.n which has been ploughed and had seed sown on it and on which are crops or on which any kind of work has been done in cultivation and planting shall pay the estimated an,ount of the destruct ion and shall pay a fine from- 10 to 20 dollars. (F it. Neg., Pt. 49, p. 313). •

••

A58.

Any man wl10 sells his i nherited land, alters i t, gives it away or hands it over to anoth.er person wi thout havii1g the transaction written down by the judge who has at1thority in that d istrict shall pay a fine from 100 to 2000 dollars; and their agreement is invalid and null.

A59.

If judges, officials with authority, police and officers of P<;>lice enter a man's house un lawfully and go beyond what the law allows them, and commit any unlawful act or act of violence over and above damages t11ey shall pay a fine from 5 to 100 dollars and shall be imp;isoncd from 5 days to 3 months, or they shall. be punished by either of the two punishments.

.460.

When a ma.n forbids entry into his l1ouse, any man who d isregards his words a.nd enters by force w i thout permission shall pay a fine from 1 to 10 dollars.

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HISTO.RJCAL INTRODUCTION •••

SIXTl·I CI-IAPTER Concerning tl1e crime wl1icl1 is committed by setting fire to any kind of t11ing. A man who wilfully sets fire to the house or crops or woods or any prope� ty b�long 466. ing to another person shall pay the estimated damages to the owi1er and shall_ be 1�pr1so� ed from 1 to 3 years. But if ,vhen he was burning hjs own grass or straw w1tl1out 111tend1ng to injure another man tl1e fire unexpectedly got beyond control and so l1e set fire to _the property of the other man, after the matter l1as been examined_ he shall 011ly pay ; be est1m ated damages and l1e shall not be liable to imprisonn1ent. (Fit. Neg., Pt. 50, p. -1). 467.

If a man sets off and causes to explode any kind of bursting and explosive material and if wl1en be sets it off aL1d causes it to explode he causes dan1age thereby to . the property of anotl1er man, an inquiry shall be made as to why he set it off and caused 1t to expl<;>de and l1e shall pay the estimated damages to the owner of the pro1Jerty and sl1all be im prisoned fron1 6 months to 1 year.

FIFTH PART 'fhe punishment of a man ,vho breaks sn1all la,vs •

477.

481.

483.

•

People who break tl1 e law which is in force for ,vheeled traffic and auton1 obiles on a public road or cause a collision betvveen 1vvheeled vehicles and automobiles owi11g to speed shall pay a fine fron1 5 to 10 dollars. If o,ving to this collision a n1an shall suffer serious injury, they shall pay dan1 ages for serious injury; if a 1nan should be killed, tJ1ey shall pay bloodn1oney. If anything shall be broken, they shall pay da1nages. But if he killed a n1an through driving vvithout blowing his horn and without regarding tl1 e la\v vvhich has been issued concerning tl1 e drivers of auton1obilcs, after the matter l1as been exan1 ined and proved l1e shall be sentenced to death, as if he bad a long-standing hatred for the dead man or a desire for revenge. • • •

If people on \vhom rests the obligation for the safekeeping of wild beasts and anin1als ,vhicl 1 attack and injure hun1 an beings d.o not keep them safe but let then1 loose, they shall be imprisoned from 10 to 15 days and shall pay a fi.ne from 10 to 20 dollars. If the wild beasts or animals which are let loose attack a person and cause serious injury, they shall pay blood1noney according to the law. (Fit. Neg.). •

•

When peo1)le have made an agreen1ent to accompany a man from one place to another or to transport his belongings or to act as l1is servants until his journey is co1npleted and vvithout any good reason fail to complete the obligations of their agreement they sl1�ll be imprisoned from 1 to 2 months and shall pay a fine from 20 to 50 dolJ;rs. (Fit. Neg., Pt. 30, p. 218). • • •

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PART IV DOCTRINAL I.NTRODUC fION1 ,.

Tbe doctrinal introdl1ction to our Co1n111entary pl1rports to set out, as far as feasible, tl1e general tl1eoretical foundations of Cl1apter 1, Title XIII of the Civil Code. The ca11tion ''as far as feasible'' poi11ts to tl1e extren1ely controversjal nature of our subject 111atter, wl1ich is well ill11stratecl by tl1e following ql1otation from I-I. De Page.2 'L'interprete q11i, a 11otre epOC{lle, pe11etre dans le domai11e de la responsabilite civile ne pe11t se defe11d.re, des ses premieres i11vestigati.011s, de se rappeler le vers celebre que Da11te place s11r la porte de l'e11fer: Lascic1te og11i SJJerc111za, l'Oi qit' e11trate, ''vous qui entrez, laissez to11tes espera11ce''. C'est qu'en effet, cette partie d11 droit offre ... .le spectacle le JJlus eto1111ant qt1i soit. C'est la n1atiere q11i, de 110s jours, est peut etre le pl11s freq11en11nent a1JIJliq11ee: c'est done logiq ue111ent eelle qui devrait 11011s offrir les sol11tio11s les plus stables et les JJl11s i11contestees. Et po11rta11t, c'est e11 la 111atiere de responsabilite civile que regne, a to11s JJoi11ts de vue et pour toutes Jes sources du droit-loi, doctrine, j11risprudence-l'a11arcl1ie Ia plus co111plete... Po11r la plUJJart des questio11s q11i se pose11t, ce 11e so11t, non seule111e11t en ce q11i concerne les difficultes de details, mais 1ue1ne qua11t aux principes qui do111iner1t tou te Ia matiere, q11'i11certit11des, controverses et me1ue co11tradictions.'3

Altl1011gh tl1e above rernarks ap1Jly pri1uarily to Belgia11 ancl Fre11cl1 law, a glance at the doct1·i11al writi11gs or case-re1Jorts of n1ost otl1er co1111tries will reveal a si111ilar obsc11rity, �tnarchy, co11troversies a11d contradictio11s a1nong ,vriters4 a11d. judges co11cerning tl1e very pri11cipies of tl1e law of tort (also called law of delict, or extra-co11tractual civil wrongs, or extra-co11tract11al civil liability, or, for short, extra-co11tractual liability). It woltld be out of JJlace for the ,vriter of an exegetic con1111e11tary5 to i11dl1lge u1 extensive doctri11al debate. We sl1alI give only a co11cle·11sed ex1Jositio11 of so111e tl1eoretically possible a·pproacl1es to tl1e problem of tortio11s liability. Regardi11g Ethiopia11 la'rv, we sl1all atte1npt 011ly as 1nany genera lizatio11s ,1s ,1re ,varrantecl by tl1e Code's tort JJrovisio11s in the legislative context. Ii 1 our work, v,1e are s01newl1at l1elped by tl1e revelation that Re11e David, tl1e expert drafter of our tort Ia,v took 11111ch i11spiration, as to w11at are tJ1e proble1us to be solvecl, fron1 R. Rodiere, 6 ,vl1ose work we shall cite as·Rocliere. For Rodiere's bibliograpl1y 1. A con1parative ]a'vV setting for some of tl1e problen1s e11visaged in tJ1is doctrinal introdt1ction n1ay be found in P. Catala and J.I-I. Weir, Delicts ancl Torts: A Stucly in Parallel (Nevv Orleans, Monograpl1 No. 2 oJ the I11stitute of Con1parative Law of Tulane University, 1965). See also the special issue of the Revue inter11ationale cle clroit co,npare, vol. 4 (1967), contain ing a collection of articles on Les problemes co11ternporai11s de la responsabilite civile clelictuel/e. It includes "La responsabilite civile da11s trois recentes codificatio11s africaines", by A. Tu.oc, 'vvho discusses the codification of civil liability law in, respectively, Ethiopia, Se11egal and Mada gascar. 2. fl. De Page, Traite elernentaire de droit civil beige (3d ed., BruxelJes, E. Bruylant, 1964) vol. 2, p. 857. 3. We assume some kno'vvledge of French by the reader. . 4. Who son,etimes just please themselves by stretchi11g the meaning of words to fit their doctrines. 5. See METfIODOLOGJCAL INTRODUCTION, be)o\v. 6. R. Rodiere, La responsabilite civile (Paris, Rousseau, 1952). See R. David, "Les sources dtl droit civil ethiopiert", Revue internationale de clroit con1pare (I 962), p. 505.

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DOCTRINAL fN"TRODUCTION

see tJ1e foot11otes in his book. In the abset1ce of Etl1iopian legal literature 011 tort* foreign autl1 ors sl1 all be cited where relevant to ou.r problems. They will be referred to as spari11 gly a.s possible witl1out damaging our text. For better con1prebe 11si_on, the rea der should give our doctri11 ,1I introd11ctio11 a second reading after . stud� 1ng the . ''by article'' com111e1 1taries ,,,_,11 icl1 follow the I11troductory Book. To avoid m1sco11cept1ons, tl1e reader should use, througl1out, our Revised Translation of Title XIII of the Civil Code, reproduced in Appendix D. The followi11g discussio11 starts wjtl1 a short first sectio11 on Harni in Social Context. Ir1 tl1e 11111ch lo11ger second section, tbe Bases of Tortious Liability are discussed u11der 111any sub-l1eadings (A-J).

1. ''HARM'' IN SOCIAL CONTEXT7 A. Solidarity: old time protection by family and church Altl1ougl1 n1ore resig1 1ed to suffering tl1an 1noder11 m.a11, eve11 i1 1 tl1e pre-i11 dus triaJ a.ge perso1 1s wl10 sustai11 ed har1n to their bod)' or goods did look for protec tio1 1. 111 tl1is field, the n1ocler11 de,1ices of insura11ce a11d/or social sec11 rity are n1erely i.J1trodt1ci1 1g 11 ew tecb11iq 11 es to tl1e protective functions wl1 ich, in the past, the extended fan1 ily or tl1e cb11rcl1. \VI1etber l1 ar1ned by a wro11g \\1ere f11lfilled by doer, or by a liability for l1is ow11 ,vro11g, or else by ai1 ''act of God'' (loc11st, sick11ess, etc.), ,L 1 11a11 could look to l1is relatives for support, or, laclcing pros1Jero11s relatives, to tl1e Cl1urcl1 for ,tl111s (i11 case of wro11gs, tl1e victi111 's f,1111 ily i11 t11rn exacted. vengea11ce or reparatio11 fro111 tl1 e wro11gcloer or l1is f,1n1ily). 8 Tbis ''i1 1s 11 rance'' f1111 ction of the fa11 1ily still receives i11 direct recog11 itio11 i11 Article 2558(2) of tl1e Ethiopia1 1 Civil Code, wl1ereby a co11tractual e1 11ployer's ''warra11ty of safety''9 ceases to bi11cl l1in1 v.1l1 ere tl1e i11j 11 red e111ployee c,111 get su1Jport fro1n l1 is fan1ily (tl1 e co11trary is provided for extra-co11tract 11al liability 1111 cler Article 2095(3)). The 111oder11 pl1 e1 10111ena. of recessio11 of fa111i.ly solidarity a11d weake11 i11g of ch11rch influe1 1ce are co1111no1 1 conco1nitants of eco11 omic JJrogress. In our Civil Cocle, tl1e recession of fa111 il)1 solidarity is reflected by Article 808, ,vI1 ich restricts the obliga tion of support to proxi1 11ate relatives only. Modern socialization of risks 111 several eco1 1on1 ically de,,elOJJed states, eSJJecially tl1 ose of socializi 11 g tendencies. (e.g. tl1e Scandinavia11 n1onarcbies), tl1e recession of tl1e protective f11nctio11 s of cl1urch a11 d fa 1nil)' 1 1 as bee11 con1 JJe11sated eitl1er by t11 e state's co11 1prel1e11sive ''social secu rity'' scl1e1nes, or by con1pt1lsory (or ge11erally 11sed) ins11 rance devices. I11 both cases tl1 e risks a11cl burde11 s of i1 1 diviclual l1ar111 are ''socialized'', tl1at is eve11 tuall)' eit1 1er distribitted (by tl1e state or other public boclies) an1011 g tax-paying citize11s ' or (by tl1e ins11 ra11 ce e11tities) a1nong premiu1n-pctyi11g ir1s 11reds. · B.

C. Strict personal liability 10 Tl1e aboven1e1 1tioned ''social distrib11tion of loss'' 111etl1ods ca 1 1110t be ,videly used in Jess developed cou11tries (s11cl1 as Etl1iopia), beca11se 1nost of tli e latter's citizens are too poor to pay bigl1 taxes or i1 1s11rance pre11 1i11111s. I 11 face of t1 1e risks. 7. Cf. Rodiere, pp. 1-4, and A. Tune, "Introduction", in Problernes conten1porains de la respons abilite civile de/ictuelle (cited above at nole 1), pp. 76J-762. 8. See J�llSTORICAL INTRODUCTION, above. 9. A re-phrasing of the i11ept English version of section-title preceding Article 2548. 10. See also p. 37, D, belo\V, * Delict ancl Torts, by Yohannes Berhane (Asmara, II Poligraf ico P.L.C. ' 1969), ai)peared after this. book went to_ press. ... .

- 30 -

DOCTRINAL INTRODUCTION

brot1gl1t by tl1e i11creasing 111ecl1a11ization of life a11cl tl1e 11011-solidarity attitt1cles of the l101r10 ecor10111ici1s, tl1e ti111e-gap bet\veen tl1e recessio11. of fa111ily or cl1t1rch soli darity and the eve11tual futt1re ap1Jeara11ce of co111prehensive social sec11rity or insu rar1ce scl1emes 111ay, as i11 Etl1io1Jia, be fillecl by e11largi11g tl1e f ield of strict _personal liabi _ lity, vvl1ereby certa.in ''fat1ltless'' persons are n1acle i11clividually liable for certain l1arms. 11 For son1e of those perso11s, this 1nay be partly explained by expedie11cy reasons: ow11ers or exploita11ts of da11gerot1s i11dustries (Article 2069), bL1ildings (Article 2077), 1nacl1ines a11d motorcars (Articles 2081-2), ma11ufact11rers (Article 2085), the State (Article 2126) a11d otl1er e111p.loyers (Articles 2029-30), are mostly better off tl1an tl1e b11llc of citizens a11d 1110.re able to co11tract a (volt111tary) liability insura11ce for tl1eir ovv11 protectio11. I11cide11tally, to a lesser clegree strict personal liability systen1s exist also i11 developed states, cooct1rre11tly vvitl1 social sect1rity a11d con1pul sory i11st1rance devices, wl1icJ1 latter co111prise, precisely, i11st1rances of i11dividual liability.

BASES OF TORTIOUS LIABJL1TY 12

A. Burden of l1ar1n: "'hen sl1ifted Sl1ot1ld 11arn1 al\vays l.ie \V]1ere it falls, or shot1]d its bt1rcle11 s0111eti111es be sl1ifted fro1n tl1e perso11 l1ar111ecl to another perso11 or e11tity (who co1npensates the perso11 har111ed)? If so, wl1e11? On tl1e plai1e of Contract la\v, tl1e burden of i11divid11al har111 ca11secl by breacl1 of co11tract is sl1ifted 011 to tl1e party i11 breac11 (Article 1771 (2) of the Civil Code). Tl1ere is 110 extra-contractual liability in sucl1 case (Article 2037). 011 tl1e pla11e of Fa111i]y ]a\v, certa.in harms n1ay pt1t a perso11 ''i11 11eed'' for tl1e purpose of 111ai11tenance claims u11der Articles 812 cu1n 807-808. On tl1e pla11e of Pttblic law, tl1e bt1rde11 of certai11 i11dividual har111s (e.g. disabli11g bodily i.njt1ry) n1ay to ,l certain exte11t be shifted to tl1e state or pt1blic bodies t1ncler social sect1rity sche111es (a11d eventt1ally distrib11ted amo.og tax-payi11g citize11s). In case tl1is is a pe11sio11 schen1e, the grant of the pe11sio11 does 11ot affect any extra-co11tractt1al 13 co111pe11satio11s due for tl1e sa111e 'harm (Article 2094(1)). Prest1111able reaso11: pe11sion schemes purport to protect victin1s, not authors of harm (cf. Article 2094(3)). On tl1e plane of private insura11ce law, 14 the burcle11 of certai11 inclividual harms may, wl1.olly or JJartly, be shifted _ to the inst1rance e11tity (and eve11tt1ally distributed a111011g pren1i11m-paying insureds). This does 11ot affect a11y extra-contrac tual compensations 15 dt1e for tl1e sa111e l1arn1 (Article 2093(1)). Pres11n1able rea son: insl1rance compacts are 1neant to protect tl1e party insured, not third ·party wrongdoers (cf. Article 2093(3)). Fi11.ally, on tl1e plane of extra-co11tractl1al civil liability, tl1e object of thjs con11nen tary, tL1e burden of certajn indiviclual l1arms may, regardless of any clai1ns u11der Article 808, or of any pubJjc pension or private insura11ce re1nedies, be shifted from tl1e

11 See Sections 2 and 4 of Chapter 1, Title XIII Civ. C. 12. For the text of the Ethiopian tort provisions discussed below, see _the code articles 2027-2161

reproduced. in Appendix D at tl1e end of t}1js volume. As to our references to "Comn1entary'' d" notes, they point to Book 2 of tl1is • volume. .. rticle 1790(2). 13. Or contractual: see A 14. See Commercial Code. 15. Or any for breach of contract: see Article 1790(2). •

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.LU

C/,)

DOCTRINA.L INTRODUCTION

barn1ed person on to another person, who must make good the ha� m. Wh.en and why sl1ould this be done? For t11e basic answers to the question when, we refer the reader to our Con11nentary notes under Article 2027. Further d.etails, are given in our notes under Articles 2028-2037 and will be given in commentaries on sectio11s 2 and 4 of Chapter I, Title XIII Civ. C. It re111ains for us to re-exam ine these provisio11s in ljght of general theory and also to search, in context, for tl1e answer to tl1e question v.1hy certain victims of harm are given extra-contr actual liability claims to be con1pensated by certain other persons? Assun1ing tl1e occt1rrence of harm (damage) and i. ts proper ''causation''. within the mea11ing of ot1r Comme11tary notes 2-3 under Article 2027, wl1at are, 111 the broadest sense, the tl1eoretically possible general criteria of tortious liability for sucl1 harm? Extra-contractual liability to pay compe11satio11 for l1arn1 may lie because of: The illegality of the harm-causing conduct (see B, below); or tl1e fa11lt in tl1e l1armdoer's co11duct (see C, below); or certain damaging facts for which a person is liable strictly, i.e. without fault 16 (see D, belov.1). We sl1all discuss these three l1eadings in turn. B.

Conduct

illegal

So111e of tl1e foreign doctrinal controversies on tbe importance ·of the ''illegality'' factor i11 tl1e field of extra-contra.ctt1al liability seem due to lack of agree1nent on tl1e 111ea11ing of ''illegalit)1'' (unlawfulness). A11tl1ors speak of illegality variot1sly as (1) violatio11 of certai11 absol11te rigl1ts or (2) i11fri11gement of specific laws, or (3) violation of pre-existing duties. .1-\Jtl1ougl1 these sub-headings may overlap, we n111st clisct1ss tl1em i11 tt1rn: (1) In anoient societies, certain rig/its, as e.g. those concerning tl1e integrity of one's bod)' or corporeal property, were often considered as so precious and absoli,te, tl1at even a11 i11noceut (non.-.fa11lty) infringement of them 17 by 1Jl1ysical in1pact created liability (to stiffer vengeance or pay) witl1ot1t e11qt1iries i11to tl1e qt1ality of the harmdoer's condt1ct. St1cl1 violation alo11e co11stit11ed a red ressible ''illegality''. Th.e resulti11g liability was strict 18 in tl1at it existed irrespective of fault. For examples, see any EL1glisl1 torts textbook 011 the l1istory of ''trespass'' 19 and, regarding Etl1iopian custo1nary law, our I-listorical I11trodt1ction.20 A 1nore explicit continuation of simila.r trends in n1odern doctrine is reflected in, e.g., B. Starck. 21 In modern law tl1is contin11ation was reflected in Article 403 of the Soviet Rt1ssian Civil Code of

16. Or illegality of the type mentioned under B(2), below. 17. {!11der th�. Ger�an Civil Code (Art. 823), b<:> th [au.It and infringen1ent of these (or other) right� availing e,ga 011111es are,. as. a rule, required ro create extra-cot1tractual liability for the ensuing har�1: fault alone or 1nfr1ngen1e11t a)one do 11ot sullice. On the qualificatio11 of this dou�le requ1 m t by 8�6 · and the erosion of _such requirement by decisions of Gernian � � cour s, . see . : acco, �61n1ttons ; avantes et dro1t applique dans Ics systemes romanistes'' Revue 1111ernat1011afe cle c/ro11 co,npare (196 5), p. 829 ff. 18. See p. 37, D, below. 19. Which has influenced the forn1ulation of Articles 2053-2054 of our Civil Code. 20. Above, p. 9, (c). 21. B. Starck, Essai d'une (heorie generate cle la responsabilite civile (Paris · l. 947)· . . s.ei.:: � also B: St�r_ck, "Doma1ne et fonden1e□t de l a responsabilite sans fau R0ds tetn, . ·t�" , R evue l11111est11e/ e/ c/e clro1t c1v1/ (1958), p. 475 ff.

�g-.

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DOCTRINAL INTRODUCTION

1922 22 and is e,1idenced by Article 142 of the iv1alagasy Law No. 65-003 of June 9, I 965. 23 In tl1e Etl1iopi,t11 Civil Code, it is clearly evidenced by Article 2067 in tl1e section on strict liability; tl1is Article ,viii be disc11ssed linder heading I-I, infra. (2) In s01ne moclern legal systen1s, clea specific lcti,,vs (e.g. traffic regulatio11s) are co11sidered as so strictly bindi11g, tl1at even a11 innoce11t (no11-faulty) infringe1nent of tbe1n creates a liabilit)' to 111ake good th.e l1arm tl1us caused ,vithot1t enq11iries into tl1e ql1ality of tl1e har111doer's cond11ct. Tl1is seen1s to be tl1e approacl1, for instance, of Fre11cl1 la,v,24 of tl1e Greelc Civil Code (Article 914) and of Article 2035 Etl1iopi�111 Ci, 1il Code. Tl1e proble1n is obsct1red by a11 abt1se of langi:1age25 w11ereby s11ch i11fri11ge111e11t is callee! fa1ilt irrespective of whetl1er tl1e violator's act ,vas reasonable witl1i11 tl1e 111ea11i11g of A.rticle 2030: indeed, the existe11ce of so1ne n1i1111te la\\' n1ay be generally ignored, a11d eve11 its conscio11s violation ma.y be reaso11able in son1e circl1111sta11ces. 26 It1cidentally, tl1ere is 110 sucl1 ficti tio11s llse of .la11g,1age i11 Ollr co11tract law, ,vhere a party's , 1iolatio11 of J1is co11tract-obligatio11s 1nakes l1in1 liable ''notwithsta11di11g tl1at J1e is not at fa11lt'';27 Sl1cl1 liability really is ''strict''. 28 One infringes laws a11d contracts at I1is ris.k . For tl1e cases \vl1ere i11frjnge1nent of eve11 a 1100-specific (vag11e) la\V 111ay constitl1te a fault becal1se of its specificatio11 in a pe11al jt1dgme11t, see 11ote 3, B, linder Article 2035, infra; i11 view of the ''g11ilt'' req11irement, it is 11ot a11 abl1se of lang11age to co11nect cri1ne witl1 fault. (3) Some ,vriters on tort proble n. 1s ap1Jroacb the question of illegality fron1 yet another angle: tl1ey spe,Lk of breacl1 of pre-existirzg cluties wl1icJ1, UJJart from A1·ticle 2035 the dl1ties in11 Josed by specific laws (in vvl1ich case in Ethio pia . or Articles 2038-2064 are st1fficie11t to gro1111d a re111edy), tl1ey clerive by 1nore or less arbitrary i11ference fron1 tl1e clecisio11al trends a11d t11e legal syste1n as a ,vhole: see, e.g., tl1e enun1eration of M. Planiol29 or of R. Savatier. 30 S11cl1 doctrinal e1111meratio11s of dt1ties seen1 l1ardly l1elpf11I: they �ire arbitrary, differ fron1 author to author, are necessarily inco1nplete, a11d at ti1nes overla1J witl1 tl1e ty·pes of illegality mentioned l111der (I) or (2), above. Plat1iol calls · ich their . violatio11 a fal1lt i11 order to partict1lr1rize tl1.e 1nea.ning of fal1lt, wh is not definecl il1 tl1e Napoleo11 Code. On the contrary, i11 the Etl1iopia11 Civil Cocle the general notion of fa11lt is st1.fficiently outlined in Articles 2027-2037, while A-rticles 2035 and 2038-2064 provide sufficient sanction f· or infringen1ent of specific dl1ties, wl1icl1 it is l1nnecessary to add to by doctri11al i11ve1Ttion. Incide11tally, e, 1e11 i11 Fra11ce Pla.n.iol's doctrine in tl1is. respect seems to be 22. For the English versio11 of this provision, see F.H. Lawson, Negligence in the Civil Lalv (Ox forcl, Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 214. 23. Journal Officiel of June 19, 1965. See A. Ortolland, "La responsabilite extra-contractuelle en droit malgache", Recueil Pena11t No. 712 (1966), p. 327. 24. See Rodiere, No. 1402. 25. Prevailing also in France. 26. Contrast Article 823 alinea 2 of the German Civil Code (translated in La\vson, cited above at note 22), wl1ich reqt1ires fault in addition to the law-infriogen1ent. 27. Article J 791. 28. On con1parative Jaw aspects of tl1is tecl1nique, see R. Constantinescu, Inexecution et faute contractuelle en clroit co,npare (Bruxelles, Librairie encyclopedique, 1960). 29. M. Planiol1 Treatise on the Ci11il La•v (11th ed., translation Louisiana State Law Institt1te, 1959), vol. 2, No. 865. 30. R. Savatier, Traite cle la responsabilite civile (Paris, Librairie generale de droit et de juris prude.nce, 195 l) vol. 1, No. 6 ff; see, e.g., Savaticr's enumeration of n1oral duties UL1der Nos. 27-34.

33· -

DOCTRINAL INTRODUCTION

ignored by the courts. It seen1s, on the contrary, that special f indi11gs of pre-existing duty towards the plaintiff are, naturally enough, a per�anent feature of ''precedent-bound'' conunon law adjudications in tort,31 which n.eed not influence jurists applyi1 1g Ethiopian law. Although t11e section.al subdivisio11s of Chapter I, Title XIII of the Eth iopian Civil Code reveal no comprel1ensi\,e treatmen� of the ''� leg�lity'' �actor in _ . 32 its mentioned three aspects, the influe11ce of the f 1 rst aspect 1s v 1s1ble 10 Article 2067 of Section 2, which deals with strict liability, while that of tl1e second aspect is reflected in Article 2035 of Section I, which deals v.1itl1 fault. Concl11ding on the ''illegality'' factor in tort· law, it seems that its discussions would s01n.etin1es gain in clarity were the mea.ning of such words as ''illegal'', ,claw-infringement'' etc. always precisely defined in eacl1 context: see e.g. ot1r defini tion of ''law'' in Comn1entary note 2 under Article 2035. C. Conduct ''faulty''33

Wl1oever com.nuts a fault is, as a rule, liable for the ensui1 1g har 1 11. 34 But wl1at is f::1ult? Some of the foreig11 doctrinal co11troversies 01 1 tl1e exact role of the ''fault'' factor in tl1e field of extra-co11tractual lia.bility see 1 11 dt1e to lack of agree111e11t 011 tlJe mea11i11g of ''fault''. Certai11 autl1ors speak of fat1lt prin1arily as (1) 1 11orally re1Jrel1ensible error of co11duct, otl1ers prin1arily as (2) socially rep rel1e 1 1sible error of cond.uct. 35 The adverb ''primarily'' denotes tl1at tl1e above app roacl1es 111ay be (3) con1bined in varying degrees: (1) It seen1s ge11erally ad1 1litted tl1at l1t1man conduct can11ot be 11zorally repreh e11sible u1iless a. particular 111at1's co11science can reproacl1 him with it. 36 M·aki11g n1oral blan1e a pre-req11isite of civil fault would therefore force the judges to co11dt1ct prol1ibitively difficult enquiries into the particvlar tortfeasor's ca 1Jacities a11d state of nli11d, sinular to those held by criminal courts to es tablisl1 ''guilt'' a11d ''responsibility''. Nonetl1eless, there are a few a11thors who seen1 to defe11d tl1e pre-requisite of ''1 11oral'' blame for deter1nini 1 1g fat1lt: see e.g. Saln1011cl 011 Torts. 37 Incidentally, in J.W. Salmo1 1d's view tort sa11ctio1 1s ain1 not 111erely at compensation, but prin1arily at repression-preve11tion of wrongs

31. See crjticism of this featw·e in Catala and Weir (cited above at 11ote 1), pp. 617 and 611613. Perl1aps less natur �lly, the Sene?ale�e Code of Obligations of 1963 (in force from July 1, 1967), defi.�es f �ult 1tsclf as a v1olat1on of a pre-exisli11g obligatio11 of any natuTe (Art. 119), thus . o ?ht �rat1og, 1t_ seem �, ?oth any _ . shade of distinction bet\veen fault and illegality, and the d1stmct1on, s<? �n:1phat1c . 1n Eth1op1an _ la,� (Art. 2037 Civ. C.), between contractual and . extra-cont �actual habihty. I r:ic1d �ntall 1, th•� basic discrepancy, u11welcon1e to supporters of of obh the _ ide � of un1for ?1 laws _ �at1�ns_ 1n Africa (see A. Tune, "La responsabilite civile dans _ trots recentes codifications afr1ca !nes , 1n the collective wor� cited above at note 1, p. 932), seems due 111erely . t � the doc �r1nal preferences of the foreign drafters involved. Should 110t perhaps the Co !nm1ss1on of Jurists of the Organisation of Africa11 Unity cou11teract such cent _ r1f ugal tendencies? 32. Because of the impreciseness of son1e of tl1e notions involved. 33. Tbe scope of t�e fo11owing discuss ion of "fault" is greatly redt1ced by means of references _ to our "by article" Co1n1ne11tary, infra. 34. See Coo1mentary note 1 under Article 2028. 35. For the vie\v constr11ing "fault" in the tec/111ica/ sense of "law-itlfringeinent" see p. 33' (2) ' above, and our Commentary notes under Article 2035. . 36. We 1nust here leave aside the })Ositive aspects of the "morality" notion ' w11IC · 11 nlay vary \Vl·th the tin1e a. nd the societies concerned. 37. 12th ed. by I-Ieusion (London, S,veet & Max\vell, 1957) pp. 19-20.

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DOCTRINAL INTRODUCTION

(a confusion \Vith tl1e aims of penal law; it seerns tl1at his views have not prevailed i n the courts). (2) A conduct is socially reprel1ensible where it is wrong (faulty, contrary to good 11sage) i11 tl1e vie\v of the average reasonable man of a given society. The following citatio11 from R.W. Ryan38 may help tl1e reader to grasp this notion (brackets a11cl footnotes 40-41 are ours): ''111 1856 Alderson B. 39 defined negligence as 'tl1e 01nissio11 to do so111ethi11g ,vhich a reaso11able 111an, guided ·upon tl1ose co11siderations whicl1 ordinarily regt1late the cond11ct of l11 .n1a11 affairs, would do, or doi11g somethi11g wl1.icl1 a prt1de11t a11d 1 reaso11ftble ma11 ,vo11ld not do'. Tl1is deliberate selection of an objective [social] ratl1er than a subjective [111oral] test . o.f neglige11ce is scarcely co11siste11t, it 1uigl1t be tbougl1t, with a tl1eory tl1at bases clelictual liability upo11 [moral] f. ault. But Jvir. J11stice O.W. I-Iolmes - 1vvbo co11te11ded that the general 11otion 11pon which con1111011 Ja,v liability in an action i11 tort \\1as founded was fa11lt or bla111e wortl1i11ess i11 son1e sense - conceded that 'wl1en men live in society, a certain average of co11duct.. . is 11ecessary to the ge11eral welfare... The law considers what ,vo11Id be bla1neworthy in the :1,1erage n1an, the man of ordinary i11telligence and prt1de11ce, a11d determi11es liability by tl1at'.40 Tl1.is describes ad1nirably the French - approacl1.41 Liability depends 011 fault... B11t it is practically impossible for a co11rt to know tl1e pb. ysical, me11tal and moral q11alities of tl1e c1efe11dant, and so it en1ploys ru1 objective standard sin1ilar to that of tl1e reasonable n1an''. By this sta11dard, a drivi11g error co1nmitted at tl1e wheel of a motor car by a weak, 11ervous wo111a11 is judged 11ot b)' l1er i11dividual capacity or i11capacity to avoid sucl1 failure, but by what a fairly strong, bala11ced and reasonable 1na11 dri·ver would have achieved in l1er place. TJ1js principle, acce·pted i11 Ethiopian law, bas far-reacl1i11g consequences. For their analysis, we refer the reader to our Conunentary note 3, A-C, under Article 2030 a·nd 4, A, under Article 2031. Here we must ask 011rselves 1,vhy does tl1e legislator impose such severe sta11dards on authors of har111? Tl1ere seem to be three policy reasons for it: (a) Tb.e first reaso11 regards tl1e practical need to mass of tort cases \vhich wo11ld be immensely obstructed were t11e ci,1il courts saddled \vith in each case enq11ir.ies into tl1e state of mind every defendant.

deal expeditio11sly with a complicated, delayed a11d tl1e necessity to condt1ct and i11dividu.al q11alities of

(b) Going beyo11d procedural expediency, we can fi11d more profound reasons for the severity of tl1e ''objective'' sta11dard o.f fat1lt. Life in society cannot continue lest everybody is able to re1y on a usual average of reasonable, careful condl1ct on the part of others. This is especially true of modern society. One \Vould hesitate to cross a street if motorists were entitled to

38. K.W. Ryan, lntroduction to the Civll Lmv (Sydney, The Law Book Co. of At1stralasia, 1962), p. 113. 39. In Blyth v. Birmingham FVaterH 1orks Co. (1856), 11 Ex. 781, 784. 40. D.W. Holmes, Tl1e Co11·1111on Lalv (Boston, Little & Brown, 1923), p. 108. 41. On the Roman-inherited concept of fault in abstracto (by an abstract, objective assessment), see e.g. lv1azeaud & · Mazeaud, Le�ons de droit civil (Paris, . Domat-Mo.ncl1restien, 1956) vol. 2, No. 448. For more insights, see N. Dejean de la Batie, Appreciation in abstracto et appre ciation in concreto en droit civil franrais (Paris, Librairie generate de droit et de jurisprudence, 1965).

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DOCTRJNAL INTRODUCTION

injure people by unusual driving failures dt1e to their individual weak,nesses in tern1s of strength or attention. (c) Even in terms of pure justice, there seems to be no reason wl1y a morally blameless harmdoer sbo11ld, be preferred to his i11nocent victim whom he has i 11 jured by violating the usual sta11 dards of reasonable co11 duct. (3) Most conte1 11porary legal systems use pri111arily the above described objective (social) sta11dards for assessi11g fault. Nevertl1 eless, subjective (1 nora1) factors play , an appreciable s1,1pp!e111e11tal role in relation to fault. Their role in Ethiopia11 law is analyzed i1 1 our Commentary notes, 42 to wl1icl1 , to avoid duplications, we refer tl1 e reader. The role of tl1 ese factors in foreig11 legal systems is also non-negligible. 111 two main respects, _ho,vever, Ethiopian law is, respectively, more severe and less severe than most foreign syste1ns. As sL1 ow11 below, it is (a) 1nore severe with respect to liability for fault and (b) less severe with respect to tb.e consequences of such liabilitj': (a) 111 striking contrast to all legal systems known to tl1is \Vriter, in Etl1 iopian law fault is, ordi11arily (i.e. unless otl1 er\vise provided), assessed \.Vitho11t any rega.rd at all to tl1 e defe 1 1daot's age or 111ental co11 clitio1 1. I-Ie 1 nt1st be declared liable for ''u11reasonable'' conduct 1 1otwit]1standing l1is utter lack of ''reason'' due to l1is being a baby or a 1nadmau. For further expla11 ,1tio11s, see our Co11 1n1ei1 tary. 43 According to Rodiere (No. 1407) ''declarer en faute une personne que l'on reconnait i11conscie11te de ses devoirs aboutirait a vider la 11 otion de faute de toute significatio11 n1orale." Tl1e very term ''fa11lt,'' \.VL1ere apJ)lied to tl1 e conduct of a baby or 1nad1 nan, sou11 ds false, since it has clearly bee11 en1ptied of any n1oral co1 1te 11 t. I 11 deed, foreig11 authors ofte11 disct1ss tl1e proble111 of the mad1nan's or iruant's liability under th.e beading of ''strict'' liabilit:y, wbicl1 applies irrespective of fault. 44 Had the Etl1 iopian legislator taken tl1 is approacl1 , tortious liability of tl1e i 11 sanes and infants ,vould l1ave been provided in Section 2, Chapter 1 of Title XIII Ci,,. C. Our legislator has, i11stead, p11sbed the operation of tl1e ''objective'' standa.rd for assessing fault to its logical extreme: since, fro.m the social (rat11 er tl1an 1noral) standpoint fault is a deviation from the average conduct \\1hich society is reasonably e11 titled to rely t1pon, moral blan1 e\vor tl1i11ess for such deviation is, ordinarily, so completely irrelevant tl1 at the i11 sane person's or i11 fa11 t's liability is provided for incidentally to the very definition of fault in Article 2030. 45 (b) Wl,ile so 11niquely severe in establisl1ing liability for fault, Etl1iopian law is strikingly lenient with respect to tl1 e co11seq11e11 ces of sucl1 liability. By \Vay of exception to tl1e pri 11ciple ''c �1:1pe11 satio11 equal to dan1 age'' (Article 2091), such co11 sequences 1nay be n1 1t1gated by redt1cing tl1e co1 11 pei1sation l 1 is f,tult. A1 1 d tl1 is re111edy of due wbe !e tl1e defendant was ''11naware'' _ can be invoked not only by a11 infant or mad 111an, but also by a defe11 dant \\1bo for reasons other than age or i11sa11ity ''was not in a state to 42. Notes: 2 under A rtic]e 2030; 2 under Article 2029; 1, B and 2, B under Article 2032; 1, A and D under Article 2036. 43 . Note 5, A, under Article 2030. 44. Se� e.g. �odiere, No. 1383, and Lawson (cited above at 11ote 22), p. 49. 45. Th is consistent general formula set:ms preferab]e to piecemeal leg islation 5 I1 .as the French Law No. 68-5 of Jan. 3, 196· 8, which inter alia an,ends Art . 489 · · k Cod e c' 1v1 • �le t o insane n1a e persons l .1abl e 1or i: 11arn1 caused by them. See Journal officiel of Jan. 4, 196 8.

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appreciate tl1e wrongft1l nature of l1is condt1ct'' a11d therefore vvas 111orally bla111eless.46 This provisio11, however, is also ''distributive''47 i11 tl1e se11se of being clependent on tl1e respective fortunes of tl1e parties. Tl111s, a plai11tiff who is poorer tl1an the n1orally bla1neless defendant ca11 op.pose a redt1ction of compensatio11 by i11voking sub-article (2) of Article 2099. For furtl1er explanatio11s, see ot1r Co1n1ne11tary. 48 Concl11ding 011 tl1e ''fattlt'' factor in tort Jaw, .it seen1s that discussions of this factor �vot1ld s0111etimes gai11 in clarity were the 1nea11ing of tl1e term ''fault'' al\.v,1ys precisely clefiL1ed in eacl1 co11text: see our notes under Articles 2029-2036. Tl1is is especially necessary \Vl1ere ''fat1lt'' is give11, as in Article 2035, 49 an artificial co1111otation regardless of the basic standard enacted by Article 2030, or wl1ere ''special cases'' of fatilt are f or1n11lated i11 tl1e Code, as under Articles 2038-2064. 50 D. Strict liabilit)

1 :

definition, justification, scope

Son1e of tl1e foreign cloctrinal co11troversies on tl1e role of tl1e ''strict liability'' factor i11 tort la \V see111 due to lack of clear agree1ne11t on the n1ea11i11g of ''strict''. It see111s tJ1at disct1ssio11s of tl1is factor \Vould someti1nes gain in clarity we.re the n1eani11g of the adjecti\re ''strict'' always precisely defined i11 each context. 51 In the context of Etliiopia11 tort la\v, an infant's or 111ad1na11's }jability t111der Sectio11 I . d, the ''strict11ess'' of a cannot be called ''strict'' (see above). 011 the other l1a n liability is i11capable of degrees in our la\V. With us ''strict'' always 111ea11s ''ir respective of fai,lt '' 52 i11 tl1e se11se tlJat: (a) the plai11tiff neecl not prove any fault on the part of the defendant; (b) tl1e defenda11t's proof of his ow11 faultlessness does not relieve hin1 of liability. 53 This definitio11 rids us of n1any false problen1s posed i11 f oreig11 legal syste1ns by co11fused terminology. The vague11ess of tl1e ''res ipsa loqt1itt1r'' co11cept is de111011strated by commo11 law writers on torts. 54 In Fre11ch doctrine, because of the traditional attachn1ent to the all-pervadi11g notion of ''fa11lt," the liability of so-called gi.1ard.ia11s of ''tliings'' 55 was rationalizecl as a ''prest11np tion'' of fa11lt, later as a ''presun1ption'' of liability, wliicl1 beca1ne, witl1 the time, ever l1arder to reb11t.56 Our codifiers have n1erc.ifully relieved 11s from a11y need for such fictio11-bou11d 111e11tal co11tortions by 11si11g the clear, bl1111t words ''irrespec tive of fault'' (strict) i11 the sectional l1eacli11g for Articles 2066-2089. We are there fore dispensed fro111 disct1ssi11g tl1e obsc11re doctri11al controversies which rage abroad arot1nd the co11ce.pt of legal presumptions of fat11t or liability, of varying force. After tl1us determining tl1at all the liabilities arising under Sectio11 2 of tl1e Extra-Contractual Liability Chapter are clearly ''strict'' \Vithin the �nentioned single

Article 2099 Civ. C. See Rodiere, p. 2, in fine. Note 5, B, under Article 2030. See p. 33, (2), above. . See, in the Con1mentary, our note 4 under Article 2027. Note that some authors use "causal" or "objective" interchangeably with "strict". The very words used in the l1eading of Section 2 of the Extra-Contractual Liability Chapter. See Article 2086(1). See e.g. R. Crabb, "Res Ipsa Loquitur and Article 1384 of the French Civil Code", lnter A,nerican Lmv Review, vol. 4 (1962), p. 256. 55. Article 1384 of the Napoleon Code. 56. On this point see e.g. Ryan (cited above at note 38), pp. 122-123, and the discussion of "faute dans la garde" in Mazeaud & Mazeaud (cited above at note 41), vol. 2, No. 539. 46. 4 7. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54.

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DOCTRINAL INTRODUC1"ION

n1 ean.ing of this ter1n, we 1nust add tl1at 1nost of the1n are also nearly absolute _ nt, in the se11se tl1 at Article 2086, apart fron1 n1aki11g d.efendant's faultless11ess 1rreleva _ 57 l1niforn1ly excltides 11ea:rly all otl1er d.efe1 1ces t]1at may be invoke�,. to. a varying extent, u1 foreig11 jLtrisdictio11s ! 58 This furtl1er l1nderscores tl1 e or1g111al1ty of our tort law in its effort at sin1plificatio11. After tl1us defi11 ing the liabilities incurred under Section 2 of the Extra-Co11 trac tt1al Liability Cl1 apter as ''strict'' and, in n1ost cases, ''nearly absolute'' (tl1 e sa_me is tru.e of ''liability for others'' u11 der Section 4), we 1nay ask 011.rselves w/1y Sect1on 1, \¥itl1 its severe, objective sta11 dards for assessing fa11lt was fo11ud i11s11fficient to protect victi1ns of barn1 in tl1e circu1usta11ces for which strict liability is now pro vided under Sectio11s 2 ai1d 4? The ans,ver seems to be tl1at, once t11e legislator has decicled to protect victi111 s l1arn1ed because of ''necessity'' oc by da1 1gerous industries, a1 1 i1uals, b11ildings, .111 acl1ines, 111otor cars, 11 1a11 11fact11red goods, e1nplo)1ees, 59 l1 e cot11d I1 ardly acl1 ie,;e this ai111 1111 der Sectio11 1, beca11se, e.g., s�11vage i11 necessity, co11 dt1cti11g ind11stries, owning and t1si11 g 1nachines a11 d n 1 otorcars, 111a1111facturi11 g goods, and e111 1)loyi11g people, so far f1�om bei11 g ''socially reprel1ensible''60 are, 011 the contrary, \\1elco111 ed by, a11 d. 11seft1l to society. A11d si11ce l1 arn1 fro111 s11cl1 activities or uses ofte11 occurs witl1 011t clefe11dant's fa11It even b)' the severest sta1 1 darcls of care, or without evidence of l1 is fault eve11 by the 111 ildest sta 11 dards of proof, tl1e victi 11 1s ca11 be well J)rotected only ''irres1)ective of fault'' of tl1e clefe 11 da11 ts. S11cl1 defe 11 cla11 ts are, besides, ust1ally of tl1e better sit11ated a11 d inforn1ed cl.:1ss a11cl tl111s n1ore able to cover tl1 e1nselves by insura11 ce. 61 l\tf ost conten11)orary autl1 ors 62 agree on tl1 e necessity to have large ''strict'' liability areas i 1 1 tl1 e law of Extra.-Co11 tractual Liability. Very fe\V agree, ho,vever, on wl,at tl1ese areas sl1011ld be. 111 this field, victi111 's i11terests ca11 11ot always pre vail over tl1 ose of l1 arn1 doers, as tl1 ey clo wl1 e11 tl1 e latter are at fa11lt (Article 2028). Tl1e legislative (or, i11 con1111 011. lavv systen1s, j11dicial) balanci11g of fat1ltless l1 ar 111 doers' clai111 s to 1111l1 a111 1)ered freedo1 n of actio11 (a factor of eco110111ic progress) agai 11 st faultless victi111s' clain1 s to sec11rity fro111 l1arn1 (a factor of social l1ar1nony), 111 ay or 111 ay 11ot res11]t i11 rules of strict liability. I11 broadest outli11 e, tl1 e main tl1 eoretica11)' possible criteria for strict liability are as follovvs. Strict liability 1uay depe11d 011 : tl1e kind of activit )' purs11ed by tl1e defe11 da11 t, :irrespective of tl1 e type of l1is i11 str11n1ents; tl1e tyi)e of i11 str11n1e11 t inflicti11 g tl1e l1 arn1 , irrespective of the kind of defe11da11 t's activity; the ki11 d of botl1 the defe11 da11t's activity and tl1 e i11 stru111 e11 t of l1 arn1 ; tl1 e type of h. arn1 st1ffered by tbe plaintiff, irrespective of all aboven1entioned criteria; the liability of another person, for \vl1 0111 a defe11 dar1t i s made answerable. Altl1011gh so111e of these five groups of criteria n1 ay overlap, \Ve sl1all discuss then1 i11 t11rn u11 der separate l1 eaclings, becat1se Section 2 e11 acts 110 basic criterion si111 ilar to tl1at providecl by Article 2030 Civ. C. i 11 tl1e Section deal ing ,vitl1 ''fa11 lt'' (fa11lt l1 as bee11 discussed 1111der a si11gle heacli11 g). The ab1111da11 ce of and overlappi11 gs bet\veen criteria for strict liability co11stit11tes a u11iqt1ely original feature of Ethiopian law.

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57. Save that of "victim's fault". 58. On tbe doct :in �I dis !inction 1?�t �ee 11 . merely o �j ��ti �e (strict) an � "ab. solute" liability, see e.g. _ M. Con1portt, La responsab1b{e c1vlle en Itabe , 1n Les proble111es contemporains cle fa res po11sabilite civile clelictuelle (cited above at note I), p. 842 in fme. 59. See Articles 2066, 2069, 2071, 2077, 2081, 2085, 2130. 60. See p. 35, (2), above, 61. Since they are liable irres1Jective of fault, tl1e "n1itigatio11" defet1ce based 011 "una\.vareiless of fault" (Article 2099) is obviously not at their disposal. 62. A notable Fre11ch exception is Mazeaud & Mazeaud, cited above at note 41.

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DOCTRINA:L INTRODUCTION

E. Strict liabilitJr: tl1e ''t)'l>e of activity'' criteria

Under the Etl1iopia11 Cj,,jl Cocle, tl1ree types of activity are providecl as grot1nds for strict liability to 111 ake good l1 ar1n caused by tl1 en1. They are: (I) deliberate inflictio11 of l1 ar 1 11 to avoid greater l1 ar1n (Article 2066)63 ; (2) creation of abnorn1 al risks of l1arm (Article 2069); (3) ov.1 11er's ''11 uisa11 ce'' activities on l1 is land (Articles 1225-1226). We sl1 all disc11 ss tl1ese tl1 ree categories in tur11 : (1)

Deliberate i11fliction of l1 arn1 because of 11ecessity to avoid greater harn1 (e.g. by destroyi11g your blanket to stop a :lire in 1 ny 11 ot1se) n1ay be fa t1ltless by tl1 e ''reaso11able 111a11'' sta11dard (Article 2030) a11 d tl1e social t1sef t1l11ess test (society is better off, o·n bala11ce, witl1 111 y hot1se a11 d without yot1r bla1 1l<et). For tl1is reason .Fre11cl1 la\vyers, locked as tl1ey are i11 the leg,11 straitjacket of ''fault'', ca11not easily fine! a. key to tl1e protectio11 of victi111s of '' 11ecessary'' acts. Their far-fetcl1 ed e11deavours ce11 tre 011 c611 cepts st1cl1 as ''private expropria tion'', or ''unjt1st e11 ricl1 11 1e11t'', or even 011 p11re fictio11s of ''fault''. 64 111 Etl1 iopia, we are 1nercifully dispensed fro1n sucl1 difficulties by l1aving 011 tl1 e books the clear strict liability provisio 1 1 of Article 206665 (as mitigated by Article 2103 "rith resJJect to harn1 to property). Tl1e Etl1iopian codifiers' simple approacl1 to tl1 e ''11 ecessity'' problein closely reflects tl1at of Article 52(2) of tl1 e Svviss Ci,,il Code, wl1 icl1 also in1poses a strict bt1t ''n1 jtigable'' liability on at1thors of ''necessary'' l1ar.m.66

(2)

Creation of ab11or111al rislcs of harn1 by activities called dangerotts tl1 at is of a kiI1d leadi11 g to ab11or111 al risks, gives rise, wl1 ere har111 ens11es, to strict liability by ,1irtt1e of Article 2069, which Article also provides typical exan1ples of sucl1 activities. This typology seen1s to be draw 11 fro1n An1erican case-.law dealj11g... witl1 activities labelled ''J1azardous'' or ''t1ltra-hazarclous'', wl1ich is well summarized i11 W.I..,. Prosser, 67 Ilandboolc of· tlze La1v of Torts. 68 I11 tl1 is con nection, two problen1 s call for discussion: (a) ''Dat1 ger vers11s profit'': autl1ors toyi11g with the idea of en1bracing all cases of strict liability for risk-creati1 1g acti,1ity i11 a si11 gle formula ca11 perhaps be rougl1 ly divided i11 to tl1 ose prin1arily advocating the test of da11ger of the activity a11d those pri111 arily supporting the test of clefencla11 t's ·profit fron1 tl1 e activit)' (i,bi err1olu111er1ti11n ibi 011i1s). 69 Tl1 e Ethiopia11 legislator has followed the first approach by accepting the test of clanger, but parted witl1 it by n1aki11 g this test not a11 all-embracing formula of strict liability but one of its l1eads. TJ1js n1 ay cause overlapping -of remedies, but is co 11sis-

63. Where the harn1 to be avoided is smaller than tl1at inflicted, tl1e barmdoer is at fault under Article 2030. 64. See e.g. Rodiere,. Nos. 1.409-1411. 65. For the opposite Englisl1 principle see, e.g., Saln1011cl. on Torts, (cited above at note 37), p. 3 6, and rf/in/ield on Torr, 17th ed. by J.A. Jolowicz (London, Sweet & Max,1/ell, 1963). 66. Inciclentally, our Civil Code's regt1lation of this problem is inapplicable to the "general average" acts governed by Articles 251-287 of . the .Maritime Code of 1960. 67. Among American authors, we choose Prosser for his virtue of not conftlSing !a,v with policy. 68. (3d ed., St. Paul (Minn), West Publishing Co., 1964) pp. 519-532 including, i� note ��' tl1e "_precttrsor'� Englisl1 case of Rylands 11. Fletcher (1868), and, on P·. 527, the co?tr�vers,al defin1t�o_ n of of Torts (1939. Cf. zcl. 1n the 1970 ed1t1on). ''ultra-hazardous activil-y" in para. 519 of the Restatement • 69. Tl1e bulk and scant clarity of the relevant literature prevent citations l1ere. Prof ot111d anal. ses of the respective approaches have recently been published by Italia11 \Vriters: see P. Trin1-. archi, Rlschio • e responsibilita oggettiva (Milaqo, Giuffre, 1961), and M. Con1porti, Esposizione al pericolo e responsibilita civi/e (Napoli, 1965).

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DOCTRINAL INTRODUCTION

te11t with our legislator's causuistic treatment of strict liability. A rare example of an all-en1bracing ·formula of strjct liability based on the ''increased danger'' test is provided by the Soviet Union's 1961 codification of the ''Principles of Civil Legislation''.70 There is no example of a comprehensive legislative or judicial formula based 011 defendant's ''profit'' purpose alone, but profit may play a lin1ited role. For instance, the charitable character of an ultra-hazardous activity 111ay constitute a defe11ce in some of the United States of An1erica. 71 The ''profit'' test is completely irreleva11t to the applicatio11 of Article 2069 of the Etl1iopian Civil Code. Presumable reason: like any enterprises, tl1e ''non-profit'' 011es can cover themselves by ins1ira11ce a11d, if owned by the state, by taxation. 72 (b) ''Legal autl1orizatio11'': contrary to some m11cl1-discussed trends in the com1non law, 73 but partly in accord \Vith French doctrine, 74 the liability in curred under our Article 2069 lies 11otwitl1sta11ding any legal a11tl1oriz,ttion for the dangerous activity concer11ed. Just as reasonable11ess and usef11lness to society, so is manifest ''legality'' of tl1e incriniinated activity irrelevant to the liability incurred under Article 2069. S11b-art. (2) of said Article forestalls the possibility of co11troversies sinular to tl1ose s11rrounding tl1is problem abroad. I11deed, if the dangerous activity is 11seful to 1nany or all75 (as, e.g., storing of explosives n1ay be for tl1e defence of all, a11d l1igl1 te11sion lines for the co11ve11ie11ce of 111any), ,vl1y sl1ould a cl1a11ce victim of s11cb activity alone carry tl1e burde11 of tl1e e11s11ing l1arm?

(3) Ow11er's liability for s11cl1 co11d11ct 011 l1is lc1;1cl as is exceedi11gly ob11oxious to 11eigl1bo11rs (1111isance) is provided by A.rticles 1225-1226 amo11g other legal restrictio11s 011 ow11ersl1ip, i11fri11ge1ne11t of wl1ich 1nay constitute a fa11lt in the ''tecl111ical'' se11se (Article 2035 c111n 1226 i11 fine), witho11t need to call in Article 2030 or 2032: see our Co1nn1e11tary 11ote 2, D(j) 11nder Article 2032, whicl1 note also co11tai11s an indispensable re-translation of the relevant Articles 1225-1226. 76 Tl1e liabilities inc11rred u11der Article 1226 (i11 :fi11e) cum 2035 are ''strict'' 011ly i11 a no11-tecl111ical sense: j11st as 11nder Article 2069, there is no need l1ere to prove defe11dant's unreasonable co11duct or bad jntention. If we infri11ge tl1e Code's for111al dicl1otomy by discussing Article 1225 (ct1m 1226) l1ere, it is beca11se its ''har111 to neighbourhood'' feature bri11gs it near to situa tions arising under above-discussed Article 2069, from ,vl1icl1 it sho11Id, however, be distinguisl1ed.77 For such disti11ction, we have a,,aiJable the follo\\1ing criteria: 70. Articles 88-89. For the English version see La1v in Eastern Europe, Docun1entation Office for East European Law of Leyden ·university, Leyden, Sythoff, No.7 (1963), p. 263 ff. On t11e Tay, ''.Principles of Liability diffi �ult!es of application of this al ,' .en1bracin � test see A. Er1, -Soon : and the Source of Increased Danger 1n the Soviet Law of Tort , The Internat1011al anc/ Co,nparative La1v Quarterly, vol. 18 (1969), p. 424. 71. See Prosser (cited above at note 68), p. 1019 ff. 72. As to future �isks that c�n �ot be . al �ays or fully so covered because of their size (e.g. tl1e _ nuclear ones, 1f created w1th1n Eth1op1a), they will call for special legislation. 73. See e.g. the U.S. and English cases cited in Prosser (cited above at 11ote 68), pp. 540-541. 74. See e.g. Savatier, (cited above at note 30), No. 40. 7 5 . l11 tl1e absence of social usefulness, creation of abnorn1al risks is contrary to the "reasona bleness" standard and tl1us an1ounts to fault under Article 2030. 76. Whose published English version is non-sensical. 77. In the U.S.A., pro?lerns .of distinction bet\ �een "nuisance", "ultrahazardous activity", "trespass", etc., cause great d1fficult1es: see Prosser (cited above at note 68).

-40-

DOCTRINAL INT·Ro:OUCTION

(a) �ia�ilit� u11der Artiole 1226 is i11cide11tal to th.e law of property, lies for �ts _ 1nfr111geme11t, and attacl1es to the la11downer. Liabiljty under Article 2069 is 111c1?ental not to property but to abnor1nally da11gero11s activity, lies in spite of tts lavvft1l11ess, ancl attaches irrespective of Ia11d o\.v11ersl1ip. (b) Ar �icle 2�69 exa111plifies t1ltra-da11gerous ''activities'' (resulti11g in any har1u), while f\rt1cle 1225 provicles a typology of 11t1isa11ce ''har111s'' (rest1lti11g from any activity 011 defencla11t's la11d). It follows that so111e overla1Js may occ11r. In co11trast to Ethiopia11 la'VI', 1nost foreign systems do 11ot require that tb.e defe11dant to a.11 actio11 of n11isa11ce be tl1e la11downer. Tl1e prese11t day doctri11al French a11alogt1e of n11isa11ce is tl1e ''de1Jasse1nent des obligatio11s de voisinage''78; based on the mere fact of 11eigl1bourl1oocl, liabilities for such ''depassement'' are independent of tl1e law of property.79 011 tl1is point, English la,v is si111ilar.so 011 the practical co11seque11ces of tl1e Ethiopian reqt1iren1e11t of O\Vnersl1ip i11 tl1e defe11clant to tl1e actio11 of 1111isa11ce, see ot1r Co111D1entary note 2, D, under Article 2032.81 F. Strict liability: the ''type of instrument'' criteria

\Ve are here 110 longer co11cerned \vitl1 the kind or locatio1182 of the defend ant's acti\1ity, but witl1 th.e type of tl1ings i11strt11ne11tal i11 the plaintiff's l1arm.83 Where tl1i11gs beco1ne i11stru1nents of barn1, tl1ree broad approaches are possible to the proble1n of strict liability to be incurred for such l1arn1: (i) defe11da11t may be l1eld liable for har1n ca11seq_ by any tbi11gs i11 his charge (as, e.g., u11der Art. 1384 of tl1e Fre11cl1 Ci,1il Code), or (ii) l1e 1nay be held with respect to things that, bei11g da11gerot1s, req11ire special preca11tions (as, e.g., u11der Art. 178 of tl1e Eg;'Ptian Civil Code), or (iii) l1e n1ay be I1eld \Vith respect to s11ch types of tbjngs only as are restrictively ent11ueratecl by the legislator. The last 111e11tioned practical approach, avoic1i11g ge11eral formt1la.e, is tl1at of Etl1iopia a11d is a blessi11g to the judiciary. The Fre11ch-type for1n11lae are widely criticised as too S\,VCepi11g 84 and the Egyptian-type as too vag11e. 85 I11deed, wl1y sl1ould a j11diciary be left to struggle witl1 zo11es of t1ncertai11ty (are X-rays ''things''? are bicycles ''dangero11s''?) that the legislator can eli111inate by enwneration? Stich enumeration co1nprises, \.Vitl1 11s, anjmals (Articles 2071 -2), buildings (Article 2077), n1acl1i.11es (includi11g n1otor-vehicles: Articles 2081-2) a119 ma11t1fact11red g oods. 86 The restrictive character of this list is stressed by Article 2087. 78. See Savatier (cited above at note 30), No. 71. 79. Ibid, No. 70 - the defe11dant 11eed be neither owner nor even incuLnbent of lesser rigl1ts on ]and. But see P. Yocas, Les troubles du voisinage (Paris, Librarie generale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1966), p. 55 and note 14. 80. See H. Street, The .La111 of Torts (3d ed., London, Butterworth, 1963) p. 229 in fine, and 234 Sec. 7. 81. Of course, nothing prevents suing merely factual neigl1bours under Article 2030 for ordinary faults. 82. I.n nuisance: on defendant's land. 83. A volumino11s con1parative work l1as recently been written on this special topic: see Ferede Worku La responsabilite clu fait cles choses en clroits ethiopien et francais compares, Paris, Bibliotheque de la faculte de droit, 1967. (thesis, �pewritten). The autho� discusses also liability for ''dangerous activities". Our Lav, FacL1lty (Archives) has a copy of tl11s work. 84. Jn a notorious jibe at such forn1ulae, Professor Georges Ripert has observed that, in order to occur witl1out the participation of any thing, material harm would have to arise from a collision between integral nudists [not to speak of tenderer encounters]. See his note to arret Jand'heur in Dal/oz P., 1930, I. 57. 85. Cf. Rodiere, NOS. 1504-1507. 86. In ·the case of manufactured goods, the criterion of liability is "mixed" in tJ1at it also includes ''type of activity" tests. For this reason, we shall discuss it under separate heading G, .below.

-41-

DOCTRINAL INTRODUCTION

It sl1 ould be 11 oted tl1at ot1r legislator's selection is rational. In the field of moveables, he picks up only tl1ose tlu11gs which have a n auto11 omous ''1nov'ing'' force of their ow 11 , and therefore may caL1se har111 i11 spite of s·upervision. This ''auto no111y'' is th.e consequence of the pheno111enon of life (at1imals), or else of ma11 's capturing of otl1 er forces of natttre in self-moving devices (machines). Incidentally, risks frorn tl1ese devices, wI1 ere 11ot ''abnor111ally'' dangerous, need 11 ot overlap with those provided for by Article 2069. In tl1e field of i1nn1ovables, 87 tl1e legislator n1en tions 0 1 1ly buildings, that is, man-made strL1ctures fixed 011 to the la11d; there is no strict liability for mere ''land'' slides. Si1 1ce 1nan builds to ''i1 nmobilize'', harm done by tl1 e buildi11 g usually results fro1n its ''n1 ovi11 g'' co 11 trary to p11rpose, e.g., collapsing, whicl1 the owner must preve11 t at l1is risk. Before passing to discuss, it1 turn, our Code's provisions on strict liability for anin1als, buildi11gs a11 d 1nachines, 88 we 1nt1st stress a p:-;i.rru11 011 1 1t trait that is common to tbein. 89 111 all cases, a11d contrary to tl1e Fre 1 1cl1 sine-qua-no11 req11ire111e11 t90 of ''I.a garde'', whicl1 vague 11otio11 de11otes, rougl1ly, ''co11trolli11g'' J)O\Vers,91 i11 Etl1io pia tl1e perso11 invariably Liable t111der said pro,,isions is t/1e legal 01v11er of tl1 e given i11stru11 1ent of har1n. I -Ie is liable irrespective of ,¥l1etber he ''coi1 tr0Js'' that tl1i11 g and 11ses it, or, 011 tl1e co11trary, ]1as reli11q11isl1ecl Llse a11d co 11 trol to a ''1100owni11g'' holder, e.g., a borro,ver. This rL1le is convenie11t to the victi111 in that it ustially e11 ables l1in1 at 011 ce to reacL, a s0Jve11 t (asset-ow.ning) and ascertainable defe11dant.92 Wl1at abot1 t its i11co11ve11ience to the owner (tl1e defe11cla11 t)? Iii the case of macl1i11es (i11clt1di11g n1otor-cars), s11cl1 inco11ve11 ie11 ce is 111 itigated by (i), availabilit)' of i11s11ra1 1ce. J 1 1 tl1e case of ani111als or bt1ildings, i11 sura11ce of wl1icl1 is 11ot easy or 11sual, it is n1itigated by (ii) tl1e legc1l faculty of ''strrrender''.93 I 1 1 tl1 e case of a11i111als or n1 acl1 i11 es, it is 11utigatecl by (iii) tl1 e ow11er's rigl1t to re cover wl1 at l1e paid fro1n tl1eir 11 011-ow11i11g ''holder'', if a1 1y.94 Let us 110w tt1r11 to particL1lar a.spects of liability for harm caused by: (I} a11i111 als, (2) bL1ildi 1 1gs a11d (3) J11acl1i11es: (]) Strict liability for ]1ar111 ca11sed by c1ni111c1/s, provided i11 our Jaw b)' Articles. 2071-2072, is i11dispe11sable in 111ost agricultural societies a 11d l1 as ancient roots in 111a11)' cou11tries, i11 cl11di11 g Ro111 e a11d E11gla11cl. It is also co11 spicuo1 1 s in son1 e Etl1iopia11 cL1ston1s.95 Its rules in. Engla 11d are co111plicated by disti11ctior1s be twee11 ki11ds of a11in1als and degrees of ''strictness'' 111 tl1e liabilities i 11 cL1rred with respect to each ki11d.96 011 tl1e contrary, the olcl Roman 11oxa.l actio11 ''de pauperie'' (tl1e remotest ancestor of 011r Articles 2071 a11d 2074) applied equally·

87. See Article 1130. 88. See, respectively, Articles 2071-6, 2077-80 and 2081-4. �9. We 01nit here a more general comn1on trait whicl1 was discussed before: the near-absolute· nature of the liabilities involved (Article 2086). 90. Except for buildings: see Art. 1386 of the French Civil Code. 91. Sec J. Carbonnier, Droit civil (7th ed., Paris, Presses Universitaires, 1967), vol. 2, [)J). 664-665 .. 92. �n �ide1�tally, ownersl�ip of buildings i � ascertained through the presu1nption attaching to adm _ !n1stran �e title (Arl1cl� J 195), of anLmals �hrough tl �at �itacl�ing to 1nere possessiotl (Art icle 119-'), of !11otor-v �h1cles through th �t attaching to IJUbhc reg1strat1on (which stronger IJresumptioi1, rebuts that Jinked with n1ere possession). 93. Articles 2074 and 2078: see infra. 94. Articles 2073 and 2083: see infra. 95. See, e.g., the custon1s of Serae in "Consuetudini giuridiche del Se rae" , Rassegna di stucli t etiopici, supp. to vol. 11 (Roma, Tipografia Pio X, 1953). 96. See Street (cited above at note 80), pp. 258-268.

-·42 -

DOCTRIN.AL _ 1NT.RODUCT101. .J

with respect to all f 011r-footed a11i111als a11d \Vas exte11ded to i11clude also other a11ima1s.97 Its effect \Vas li111itecl by tl1e clefe11dant's right to s11rre11der t11e offen di11g a1limal, ,vbicb featL1re the Etl1io1Jia11 codifier, aln1ost alo11e a 1no11g modern legisl�ttors98, 11as reproclL1ced i 11 f\rticle 2074 Civ. C. 1v1ost otl1er civil cocles of Roman i11spiration, i11cl11di11g tl1e ve11erable Code Napoleo11 (i11 Arti.cle 1386), co11tain only tl1e b,tsic pri11ciple reflected .i11 011r Article 2071. 'vVe n1L1st 110w turn to exa111ine tl1e position of tl1e a11i111al's 11011-ow11in.g lzolcler if any.99 vVe sl1all discL1ss, i11 tL1r11, (a) 0L1r Code's defi11itio11 of ''holder'', and tl1e 111ere l1older's positio11 i11 relatio11 to (b) victin1 a11d (c) ow11er. Tl1e re1narks belovv apply also, 11111tatis 11111tandis, to tl,e ide11tical position. of holders of 111acl1ines and n1otor-cars 1111der Articles 2082-2083: {a) \Ve have tra 1 1s1ated tl1e French 111aster-text's ''gardie11'' as ''holcler'' (rather tl1a11 ''cL1stoclia11'') becat1se 01 1r Code's correspo11cli 11g definitio11 100 differs fro1n tl1e Fre11cl1 j11dicial defi.11itio 11s of ''gclrdien'', a11d s11bsta11tially coi11cicles witl1 the S\.viss j11dicial defi11itio11 of ''dete11te11r'' (l1older), as 011tlir1ed by A. von T11l1r.10 1 011r legislator relieves us fron1 tl1e co11troversies s111�ro11nding tl1e Fre11cl1 co11ce1Jt of ''la garde'', as a11alysecl by Maze,111cl & T1 1 11c, 102 \vl10 devote 59 p,1ges to tl1is 1Jroble1n alone! Tl1e Etl1io1)ian defi11ition of bolder omits tl1e French rel111ire 1nent of s0111e factt1al ''controlli11g'' po\.vers 103 · it1 tl1e ''gardie11'' a 11d i11cl11cles only a jur .iclical a11d ,111 eco110111ic elen1ent. With in Article 2072: {i) Tl1e ''juridical'' ele111e11t is s11pplied by sub-article (2), \:t,1 }1ose typ ology JJoi11ts to a legal relatio11: ''holcler'' of tl1e a11i1nal or 111achine is tl1e l1irer (Articles 2727, 2750), borrower (Arti ;le 27 57), ''work'' co11tractor (Article 26 I 0), clepositee (Article 2779) 104 (if paicl). Aside fro111 co11tracts l1e 1nay be, e.g., a ·11s11fr11ctuary (Article 1309). S11b-article (3) excl11cles tl1e ''e111ploy1ne11t'' relatio11 (t-\rticle 25 12): tl1e e111ployee is 11ot ''l1older'' of tl1e e111ployer's a 11u11al (or 111acl1ine: see Article 2082(2)). (ii) Tl1e ''econo111ic'' ele 1. ne11t \Vl1icl1 q11alifies tbe jt1ridical 011e, is s11pplied by subarticle (J): ''l10Ider'' of tl1e a11i111al or 111acl1i11e is he vvl10 l1as received it for l1is O\v11 be11efit. A clisi11terested bailee \Vith.i11 tl1e n1ea11ing of Article 2722 is tl1erefore not ''holder'' for the JJUrposes of Article 2072 (or those of Article 2082). ' (b) Tl1e 11on-o\:v11i11g l1older of a11i111als or 111achines is i111mediately liable towards the victi1n of l1ar111 ca11sed by tben1. Contrary to_ tl1e Fre11cl1 approach as

97. See R.W. Lee, The Elements of Ro111an La1v (2d ed., London, Sweet & Maxwel1, 1944), pp. 3 9. 8-399. Grazi11g tresJJasses were covered by the cognate action "de pastu". 98. Art. 2321 of the J_ouisiana Civil Code has a similar provision. This "suTrender" faculty ex ists also in some Ethiopian custon1s, e.g. those of Serae: see \Vork ciled above at note 95. 111 accordance, it see.ms, \.Vith traditional views, our Code's controlling Amharic version of Article 2074 limits the o\.vner's right to surrender tl1e offe11ding don1estic animal in lieu of damages to cases of non-bodiJy l1arn1. 99. See Articles 2072 and 2073: "100. as given in Articles 2072(1) and 2082(1), and elaborated in . . Article 2072(2). '101. A. von Tuhr, Partie generate clu code fecleral cles obligations, 2d ed. by E. Thilo (Lausanne, Imprimerie ceotrale, 1933), p. 358. ·102. Mazeaud & Tune, Trafte theorique et pratique de la responsabilite civile (5th ed., Paris, Mon chrestie11, 1958), vol. 2, pp. 123-181. I 03. W.bether labeled as garde "materielle" or "intellectuelle" - see ibid. J04 . Depositai1'. e; mistranslated as "bailee" i11 the publisl1ed Englisl1 version. Deposit is but one kind . of .b.ailn1ent. •

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DOCTRINAL INTRODUCTION

described by Savatier, 105 his liability is not alter11ative but cu1nulative with tl1at of the owner.106 (c) Towards the owner of the offending animal or machine the holder's liability is only ultin1ate, if any. He is liable to make good the owner's loss in case it is tl1e latter that has compensated the victim (Articles 2073 and 2083). Of course by virtue of Article 2091 tl1e owner's payment to the victim frees the holder fron1 his own obligatio11 to the victim under (b), above. In conclusion, it seems that it is the ''cumulative'' cl1.aracter of the liabilities of owner and n1ere holder, which is contra.ry to n1ost foreigi1 systems, that h.as enabled our legislator to simplify tl1e law by ignoring such vague tests as that of ''factual controlling po,ver'' (''la garde''). The questio11 ,vhetl1er tl1e owner ''holds'' tl1 e offending animal or machine (in tl1e se11se of co11trollit1g it) is irrelev ru1t to his liability. Tl1e questio11 ,vhether a non-owni11g person ''l1olds'' is both n.otiooaly simplified (see supra ) and of no ''strategic'' i1111Jorta11ce to the plain tiff, since t11e pt1rely juridical (not factual, or eco11omic) criterio11 of ''ownership'' will always suffice to provide lJ in1 with one liable defenda11t witl1 assets. As to the owner's cl1ances of ''recovery'' over (Articles 2073 and 2083) fro1n a 111ere holder, if any, these are no11e of tl1e plaintiff's concern. (2) A11 0\.\111er's strict liability for l1ar1n caused by l1is bi,ilclings see111s to be uok11own in tl1e co1n111on law systen1s. 107 It co11stitt1tes, witl1 variations, a featt1re of both old Ron1a.11 law and n1odern civjl la\.v systems, incl11di11g Article 2077 Etl:uopian Civil Code. Alone an1011g 111odern legislators, tl1e Et11iopian has reprodt1ced, in Article 2078, tl1e Ro1na11 i11stitution of ''noxal'' surrender of the bt1ilding 108 i11 lie1 1 of con1pensation. Tl1e Etbiopia11 legislator is also 11njque in expressi11g tl1e principle of strict ljability for harm caused by the building without any ft1rther reqt1irements 109 tl1 at tl1e harm be due to tl1e building's ''ruin'' and/or defects in its construction or mai11tenance. As a rule, tl1e victin1 ca1111ot sue a mere ''l1older'' of the building (contrast Articles 2072 a11 d 2082).110 I➔e ca11 recover 011ly from its owner. But the o\vner can so1neti1nes reco11p bis loss tl1 rough contractual actions agai11st tlJe builder (for defects in tl1e co11struction: Article 3039) or the occupier (for defects in the mai11teoa11ce: Articles 2953-4). In other words, i11 tl1e Ethiopian ·system tl1 e b11rden of provi11g suol1 defects, if a11y, is not on the victim clai1ning against the ow11er, but 011 tl1e owner claiming, i n turn, against the builder or te11a11t of tl1e buildi 1 1rr 0 (or, in fit cases, its seller: Article 2293 (2)). 105. Cited above at note 30, No 360. 106. See the word ''also" in Articles 2072(1) and 2082(1): towards the victin1 the 111ere holder is, witl1 the owner, a "jointly and severally" liable person (Article 2155). 107. Liability (1100-strict) of "occupiers" (whether or not o,vners) of "pren1isses" (\.vl,ether or not buildings) clearly does not fit here: see Street, (cited above at note 80), pp. 179-198. 108. See M �zeaud _& Tune (cited above at 1;1ote 102), No. 1045, a11d R. Monier, li1anuel ele,nentaire de clro1t ro111a111 (5th ed. of vol. 2, Paris, Domat-Moncl1restien, 1954). 109. Whi�I� are added in, e.g., the Civil C �des of France, Belgiu1n, Switzerland, Greece, Quebec, Lou1s1an�. Under The Fet!ta Nagast _(cited at _ note 2 to l:IISTORICAL INTRODUCTION), t�e requ1re1ne�t seen1s to b; that _prior warning of danger be given to the 0v.,ner (Chapter ? Cf. Art. _079 C1v. C.). XXXVIl, p. -1-. 110. But _l1e can sue t�e "occ�pier" i �. the special case of �nythiag fal)jng J,-0111 the building (Art1�le 2080)._ T �1s p�culiar prov1s1on seems to have ancient roots i11 the Ron1an action de effus1s vel de;ectrs (D1gestum IX, 3, 1) and a ren1otely anaJogous JJrovision of The Felita Nagast (Chapter XXXVII, p. 206). -44 -

DOC1'RIN1\L INTRODUCTJON

Incicle11 tally, dt1e to the deartl1 of cornpact to\vn districts in Ethiopia, the prac tical sig11if.ica11ce of strict liability for har 1 11 caused by buildi11gs is s1nall at prese11t. (3) Obversely, tl1e practical in1 porta11ce of strict liability for l1ar1 n caused by motor vellicles and other 111cLcl1i11es, provided by Articles 2081-2084, js great in this develo_pi11g co1111 try.111 N evertl1eless, two factors allow us to reduce tl1e space devoted to its disct1ssio11 here: (i) Industrial accide1 1ts due to 111 acl1i11es arise mostly in tl1e ''contractual'' context of en1ploy111 e11t a1 1d are governed by Articles 2548-2558, \Vl1icl1, by virtue of Article 2088, exclt1de tl1e applicability of Articles 2081-2084. (ii) We l1 a\1e alreacly cliscussed features comn101 1 with otl1er strict liabilities (cf. beacling D, above, on tl1 e ''absolute''natt1re of these Jiabilites), tl1ose co1un1on witl1 1111 ''instrumental'' liabilities (cf. l1eadi11 g F., above, 011 tl1e liability of the ''o\v11er'') and tl1ose commo11 \vith liability for har111 cattsed by a11 imals (''cu11111lati,1e'' ancl ''ulti1nate'' liability of the n1 ere ''l1 older''). It is per11 aps tl1ose cot11 n1 011 feat11 res tl1 at e11 ablecl our legislator to dispe11se \Vitb. special legislation gover11 ing 011ly n1otor-car accide11ts 011 the patter11 of, e.g., tl1e Swiss 11otor La\\' of March 1 5, 1932. 112 Ft1t11re conditio1 1s 1 11 ay, however, call for co111pt1lsory liability ins11ra11 ce and/or a f111 1d compe11satiog victin1 s of harm caused b)' unide11tified or i11s0Ivent n1 otorists. 113 Tl1 e follo'\\1iog t\vo featt1res disti11gt1isl1 liability for bar1 11. ca11sed by 111achi11 es and n1.otor vel1icles fron1 t11 at for l1arn1 ca11sed by arlimals (t11ese features are irreleva11t for l1arm causecl by buildi11gs, wllich can hardly ''collide'' or be ''stole11 ''): (a) The o\v11er is exempted fron1 strict liability for tl1e macl1ine-ca11sed l1 arm if, at the material time, the 1nachi11 e or n1otor vel1icle ''l1as been stole11 from l1i11 1'': see Article 2081 sub. 2114 ; (for the definition of ''t}Jeft'' see Art. 630 of tl1e Penal Code). Ot1r legislator does 11ot foUo'\\1 foreign systems, however, i11 extendi11 g tl1e ow11 er's exemption from liability to cover otl1 er uses of his 111achi11e by a11 1111a11tl1 orised person: The o\vner remai1 1s liable under A.rticle 2081(1) i11 cases of wl1at tl1e olcl Ro1nans called ''stealing of 11se'' 115 by, e.g., an 11 nfaitl1ft1l employee-driver, notwithstanding that tl1e owner-en1 ployer_ may, i11 terms of Article 2131 (1), be free fron1 ''vicario11 s'' liability for tl1e l1arm caused by such disho11est use of 11is motor vehicle. (b) At variance with several distinct foreign approaches to the problem of strict liability resulting from ''collision'' between two motor vehicles, our legislator l1 as enacted, in Article 2084, the simple rule of dividing eq11ally (half and half) the burden of the total damage from such

111. Jt is perhaps not sufficiently stressed i n legal literature tl1at tl1e principle of strict liability for harm caused by n1achines and motor cars, introduced in various countries after the industrial revolution is hardly itself revolutionary. The dangerous things of old were animals and buildings. 'I-Jarm caused by them created strict liability in ancient Rome and several other countries. Machines, which are surely more dangerous, could hardly be added to the list before they were born! See Yosiyu.ki Noda in proceeding� of Travau.-:r: de /'Association Henri Capitani (session of l-Jague of 1967, vol. 17, Dalloz, Paris). See English version in Lawson (cited above at note 22), pp. 222-224, 112. . 113. Cf. the French Law of Dec. 31, 1951, Article 15, quoted in Carbonnier (cited above at note 91), p. 581. 114. There is no need for a similar exemption for the owner of a stolen animal, who can usually relieve himself of liability by simply "surrendering" its legal ownership under Article 2074. 115. "Furtum us1LS'': see, e.g., Lee (cited above at note 97) pp. 371 and 378.

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'DOCTRINAL INTRODUCTION

collisio11. 116 Such a flat rule fa,cilitates the work of judge, counsel and insurer. This rule: (x) su,ffers an exception within the field of motor vehicles and (y) seems capable of extension beyond th,at field: (x) Th,e ru.le of Article 2084 is inapplicable to those motor vehicles which are called ships because they move on sea,. Faultless collisions between ships create no liabilities: in virtue of Art. 230 Maritime Code, ''the damage shall rest where it falls''. But since it is the sn1aller ships that suffer most harm, several international maritime co.nventions enact the probably juster ''half and half'' rule, which agrees with our Civil Code. (y) Tl1e rule of Article 2084 can perhaps be extended to coJJjsions between a11imals or arumals and n1otor cars, which are not governed by any speci fie provisions, by reasoning from Article 1907 as read in co11junction with Articles 2155 and 1677 (thu1k of the collisions, comn1on in Ethiopia, between ass or calf and motor-car, resulting in one-sided compensation by motorists ignorant of tl1e Jaw). Note that the ru,le of ''equal'' participation in the burden of the total damage from a collision applies 011ly to the ow11ers (or l1olders) of tl1e colliding vehicles, a11d tl1erefore not to other persons injured by tl1e collision. Such persons' clai111s brougl1t under Articles 2081-2 cun1 2155 re111ain unaffected by tl1e ''collisions'' provision. G.

Strict liability: the ''mixed'' criterion

We call ''n1ix,ed'' tl1e criterion for strict liability provided by Article 2085 be- . cause it uses botl1 tl1e ''type of thing'' and tl1e ''type of activity'' tests: The · instru111 e11t of harn1 must be a mant1factured i.e. man-made tl1ing (11ot merely one produced by nature and collected by man). The acti,1ity n1ust l1ave been, on the defendant's side, tl1at of manufacturi11g that tl1ing and supplying it to the· p·ublic 117 for profit, 118 and on the plaintiff's side, that of usi11g it in a normal wa)'. So far from being tl1e liable defendant, as in the aforementio11ed cases,. the ''ow11er'' or ''l1older'' is here usually the pl,Li11tiff, clainling a,gainst the person (physical or corporate) \1/l1ose ''01anufacturi11g'' activity had prodt1ced tl1e instruo1ent of bis l1arm. This harn1fu] thing cannot be an animal, wl1ich is produced by nature, but it can be a building' 19 or n1achine, which are manufactured. Indeed, tl1e owner of a motor-car liable to a victim of its invisibly defecti,,e steeri r 1g gear (norn1ally used) may, in turn, recover damages fron1 the 1na11ufactl1rer. The requiren1ent of ''normal use'' is n1ost releva,nt wl1ere t]1e defence labeled ''victin1's fault'' (Article 2086(2)) is unavailable to the ma11l1facturer: for insta11ce, e,,en faultless. driving of his ordinary 1notor-car by the victim of a11 accide11t (due to e.g. a steering gear defect) in the Etl1iopian I-Iighland Rally 111ay be dee111ed abnorma]1 use for the purpose of barri11g bis claim under Article 2085. 120 - -

116. For an old antecede!lt of this "half & l �alf" . rule, see M _osaic la\v (E,>:oclus, XXT, 35) and· The. Fetha !'�agast (cited at note 2 to H1stor1cal Introduction), Ch. XL\', p. 278, T.D, con cerning colhs1on between bulls. For a modern analogy, see Italian Civil Code, Art. 2094(2). 117. The ''supplying to the P :Iblic" test seenis . to exclude "strict" extra-contractual liability for. p�oducts that wer� supplied not to ultimate users but to another n1anufacturer for add1t1onal transformation (e.g. steel to a n1otorcar producer). 118. The ' _'profit" test ex �ludes, �.g., strict . Ii �bilit � of the Ethiopian Rehabilitation Center for de fects Ln the crutches 1t supphes for 1nvahds without profit. 119. Tl1e using of Article 2085 against _the builder may, . however, be excluded by the existenc� of a contractual remedy under Article 3039: see Article 2088. 120. \Vithout prejudice, of course, to clai,ms based on the n1anufacturer's or his eniployees' faults,.. if any.

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DOCTRINAL INTRODUCTION

Manufacturer's strict liability to ulti1nate t1sers (i.e. consumers) of his product seen1s h�rdly kno\vn i11 Ro111anistic legal systen1s. In the common law, it seems to l1ave its ren1ote and still ''negligence-coloured'' roots in tb.e Englisl1 ''Donoghue v. Stevenson'' case (1932). 121 It is only in tl1e U.S.A. that the manufactt1rer's liability to 11lti111ate co11st1n1ers l1as becon1e clearly ''strict'', altho11gl1 both its scope (\vhich prod11cts?) and its legal grot111cl are still widely controverted. A fasl1ionable ''gro11nd'' .is that of the origi11al co11tractual ''sales'' warranty ''runni11g witl1 the goods'' (by legal implication) to tl1e ulti.n1ate consu111er. 1 22 Prosser 123 deplores tl1is by sayi11g tl1at ''it \Vo11ld be far si111pler if it were said that there is strict liability .in tort, declared 011trigl1t, \Vitl1out a11 illusory contract n1ask." This is precisely what tl1e Etl1io_pia11 legislator l1as do11e for t1s (his ''scope'' test is also .a simple 011e):

{I) Altl1ough Article 2085(1) is analogot1s against defects) ancl Article 2085(2) ability'' of defects), our tort provision and inco111patible witl1 the ren1edies of fictional reaso11i11gs.

to Article 2289(a) (seller's warranty s.in1ilar to Article 2293(2) (''discover under Article 2085 is independe11t of contract law. 124 We have 110 need for

((2) \Vl1at is tl1e n1aterial scope of Article 2085- wl1ich 111an-made products are conten1plat ed by it? Tl1e ans\ver is clear. They are all within the purview of Article 2085. None of the contro,,ersial and uncertain distinctio11s made in the U.S.A in this respect 125 are part of our law. A man-n1ade product (manufactured good) _is e\rerything that is produced, transforn1ed or processed by man. For exan1ple ;i11 the f ield of foods cattle, water, honey, grains and fruits may be mere products of nature, but roast beef, le1no11ade, tej, bread, 1narmalade and ca11ned-foods are n1anufactured goods. H. Strict liability: the ''type of- harm'' criterion This criterio11 applies regardless of tl1e aforementioned criteria as to the type .of activity followed or instrument used wl1ich result in harm. It is tl1is harn1ful ;resz,tlt itself, if of a certain type, that constitt1tes tl1e test of strict liability here. ·The type of da1nage req11ired for this purpose in Etl1iopian la\v is ,, · bodily'' l1arn1, 126 ,as provided by Article 2067. This article reflects, in a happy convergence, ancient Ethiopian customs and the 11ltramodern doctrines (and statutes) mentioned above -.under heading B(l), \Vhich deals with ''illegality'' i11 the sense of infringing another's rights to his bodily i11tegrity. To avoid duplications, \Ve refer the . absolute . -reader to it. This ''illegality'' explanation . or, indeed, lack of any far-fetched . explanation will· n1ake no difference in the practical result, \vhich is the strict ·-liability provided by Article 2067. This Article is but the strongest one of a -number of provisions protecti11g bodily integrity: (i) Article 2038 cun1 2107, concerned -with the fault of battery, protects unwilling persons against even materially l1armless ·· bodily ·contacts; (ii) Article 2113 provides moral damages for bodily harn1; (iii) ,Article 18 protects persons willing to dispose of their body or a part of it: 121. Quoted in Street (cited above at note 80), p. 172 ff. 122. See Prosser (cited above at 11ote 68), {Jp. 543 and 678. ·123. Ibid, p. 681. 124. Wbicl1 \-Vhere available, exclude. application of tl1e tort remedy against the same defendant, e.g., against the manufacturer who sold the product to the plaintiff: see Article 2088. Thus, you cannot invoke Article 2085 against yolks\vagen . n1an�1facturers who have sold you a defectuous car through the agency of Sefer1a11. But this Art1cJe may be so invoked by other users of the car (sub-purchasers, hirers, drivers, etc.). ·\125. See, again, Prosser. ,�126 . As caused by the harmdoer's act of a·ny kind. The terms ''by his act" n1ay, ho\vever, be understood to exclude ''omissions" arid imply a non-remote causation of the bodily harm.

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DOCTRINAL INTRODUCTION

their acts of assent in this respect are, ordinarily, of no effect (void); (iv ) the Penal Code (Art. 543) punishes merely negligent in juring of another's body; (v) Article 57 Revised Constitution seems to bar cruel bodily punishments. Thus, Con stitution, Penal Code -and in the Civil Code ''Rights of Personality'' provisions, the · Section on fault, that on strict liability (the Article under discussion), that on moral damage -all contribute to a very rugh degree of protection of the ''bodily integrity'' interests in Ethiopia. We must now disc·uss the overlaps between the ''bodily harm'' remedy and some other ''strict liability'' remedies: (1) Where ''bodily harm'' is inflicted by acting in a ''necessity'' situation (Article 2066), pla.intiff may have botl1 remedies against the san1e defendant. (2) Where bodily harm results from a ''dangerous'' activit)r: (i) Article 2069 is available against tl1e person or entity commissioning or conducting such activity, while (ii) Article 2067 seems to be available only if tl1e harn1 resulted directly from a participant's ''act'', and only against s11ch partioipa11t. (3) Where bodily harm is caused by an animal or n1achine, Articles 2071-2 or 2081-2 are available against its owner and non-ow11ing holder (if any), wl1ile Article 2067 seems to avail only against s11ch person as actively directs, by his moven1ents, the anin1a.l or machine (e.g. the rider or driver: the l1arn1 is the11 ''caused'' b y both his 0\¥0 act and tl1e a11imal or machine). ¥/hat if s11ch person is an e1np loyee who, in virtue of Articles 2072(3) and 2082(2), is expressly exen1pted from strict liability for harm caused by the animals or machines wl1ich are in his charge? Eitl1er:

(a) Article 2067 qualifies tl1e ''employee'' exemption to bear only on non bodily l1arm. Policy: strength of the traditional reactions against ''blooddrawing'', or: (b) Articles 2072(3 ) and 2082(2) qualify the ''bodily harm'' provisions to bear only on situations not involving employee-rid.ers or drivers. Policy: i11 the presence of ''master-owner'' defendants with assets or ins11rance, faultless servants can be exempted from liability at no cost to the victim. Obviously, it will be for the _co11rts to choose and consistently follo,v one of the above alternatives (there are no others). The first solution, though possibly more '' juristic'' seems less ''just'' than the second 011e. We hope that the codification reports, when fully published, will support the second solution. I. Strict liability: defences, conclusion

Under beading D, above, we have stressed the nearly absolt1te character of most strict liabilities properly incurred under Section 2. The ad,,er·o ''properly'' points to tl1e exclusion fro1n tl1is domain of cases tl1at in,,olve eitl1er: (i) ''contractual'' relationships whose solution belongs to contract law, 121 or (ii)

127. Article 2088. In contrast to Common Law trends and i11 conformity with the French doctrine of "�on cu;111ul _" (see, e.g., N!azeaud .�, Mazeaud, cited above at note 41, No. 404, and E.N. _Lppt1011 entre la respons ab �l1te contractuelle et la responsabilite delictue/le, })aris, Li Ma�1ne. _ _ _ de Jurisprudence, 1957), contract and delict niove, in Et11iopia, ?ra1r1e generale d� dro1t et 10 mutually exclusive compartments: see our Commentary notes under Article 2037.

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.DOCTRJNAL INTRODUCTION

''disinterested'' relatio11ships whose soll1tion belongs to ''liability for fa11lt'' provisions. 128 !11 the ''proper'' cases therefore, the 011/y general defe11ce 129 ad111itted by 1-\rticle 2086 in cases i11vol\1ing dangerous activities, ani111als, buildings, 111acl1i11es, man11factl1red goods, is tl1at of ''victin1's fa11lt''. Slll)-article (J.) gives a11 ill11strative list of tl1e clefences prevale11t abroacl \Vhicl1 are exclt1clecl by s11b-article (2). 130 011 th.e other hand, ,1ltl1011gh ''legitimate defence'' is aln1ost ur1avoidably co1111ected with ''victin1's fal1lt," 131 tl1ese are not tl1e only defe11ces available under tl1e ''bodily har1n'' article (2067); "' 132 a11otl1er defe11ce is tl1at of bei11g ''ordered by law''. 1 11is defence would 1nal<e 110 se11se i11 Article 2086 \vl1ich concerns uses or activities that are precisely, by definition, lawf11l ! Co11trary to \vhat occurs i11 our Contract law (Articles 1791-1793), ''force 111cl} e11re'' is e;rc/11derl as a defence in all the strict liabilities conteinplated by Article 2086 133 (\vl1ile it is only inclirectly releva11t to .Articles 2066-2067, in tl1at its occu rrer1ce bars the possibility of tl1e deliberate or voll1ntary acts req11ired by said Articles). If, therefore, e.g., I an1 u11avoidably prevented by a neglige11t ad111i.n.istrative prol1ibitio11 :fro.n1 repairi11g n1y b11ilding and l1arm to otl1ers ensues from its collapse,l 34 I am liable (vvitbout prej11dice to my ultimate recovery lin<ler f\rticle 2156 fron1 tl1e pl1blic agency involved, since the causes of ]1arm l1ere are my buildi11g a11d tl1e adn1inistratio11's fault). This extreme and unique attitude of our lav1 contr asts \Vith that prevaili11g in forei gn j11risdictions and has tl1e following ,tclva11tages: (1) It helps plain.tiffs witl1out great inconvenience to defendants. Force majeure cases are so rare th.at tl1e exclusion of this defe11ce seen1s to l1ave l1a.rdly affected tbe size of ''liability'' insura11ce premiun1s in Etl1iopia. And i11 tl1e cases involving anin1als or bl1ildi11gs defendants are also protected by the ''surrender'' faculty. 135 (2) The exclusion of ''force majeure'' (and of otl1er defe11ces widely admitted abroad) by s11b-article (I) greatly sin1plifies tl1e administratio11 of justice. It is this argu1nent, co11: pled witl1 the ''insurance'' one, that seems to have ca11sed tl1e I11ternational Couve11tion of Rome (1952) 136 a11d the French Decree of 30 November 1956 137

128. Article 2089, whicl1 generalizes a trend comn1on to n1any systems (see, e.g., Mazeaud & Tu11c, cited above at 11ote 102, Nos. 1273-1288). This trend has a discordant offspring in the American "guest-passenger" statutes, which exempt disinterested 1notorists from liability lo the persons carried eve11 i11 case of fault unless such fault is "grave" in son1e sense or other (see Prosser, cited above at 11ote 68, p. 190). 129. On particular defences, e. g. that co11cer.11.ing stolen machin.es, see supra. .130. 'fhese excluded defe11ces an1ount to sho\lJiag eitl1er that the defendant is fau.ltless, or tl1at the essential cause of tbe damage: (i) is un.known, (ii) consists in a third person's fault, · or (iii) consists i11 an irresistible event (force 1najeure) that could 11ot be prevented. 131. The qualification ''aln1ost" points to the rare cases wbere an aggressor - victin1 is held · faultless on ground of reasonable mistake: this will not affect the defendant's "legitimate defence" ren,edy. 132. Such as, e.g., penal et1forcement laws. "Ordered by la,v" seenls to include "authorized by law" as, e.g., to IJractice n1edecine: see Commentary 11ote 4, B, (d), under Article 2031. 133. Consider, i11 context, the words "or that it was not within their power to pre\1ent l11e da1n age" (sub-art. 1) and "only" (sub-art. 2). The drafter's inten.t thus to exclude the "force-majeure" defence is revealed i11 Avant projet de cocle civil (cited above at p. 3, note 1), C. Civ/13, p. 24 . . 134. Cf., in contract law, Article 1793(b )_. 135. See supra, p. 42, 11ote 93. 136. See M. de Juglart, La co11ventio11 de Rome du 1 octobre 1952 relative au.;._ rlon11nages ·causes par /es aeronefs au;-c tiers a la stuface (Paris, Editions internationales� 1956); P. H. Sand "The · International Unification of Air I�aw", La1v and Cor,temporary Problems, Duke U11iversity School of Law, Durham, N.C. (1965), p. 405, and G. Rinck, Gefiihrdungsl,aftung (Gottingen, 0. Sch, wartz, 1959), pp, 1.6-18. 137. See Mazeaud & Tune, cited above at note 102, Nos. 1369-1393.

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DOCTRINAL INTRODUCTION

to enact provisions closely analogous to those of our Article 2086: cases involving damage by a. n aircra.ft (itself struck, e.g., by persons or property on the ground, the ensuing liabilities are, save absolute. Tl1e special cases arising under said convention or decree be u11iqt1ely useful in the interpretation of our general provis.ion 2086. 138

in the special lightning) to victim's fault, may therefore under Article

Concluding, we must consider the legal natt1re of the strict liabilities under discL1ssio.n. Professor Rodiere, whose previot1sly cited work has occasionally inspired our Code's drafter, 139 seems to consider 140 that (non-vicarious) liabilities which arise irrespective of fa ult in its normal sense, result fron1 breaches of what he calls ''obligations of security," which breaches can, in turn, be a11alyzed as faults by a tech11ical ''i11fri11gement'' test siinilar to that of our Article 2035. The very title of Section 2, Chapter I, Title XIII Civ. . C. sho\-vs tl1at the Etl1ioJJian legislator l1as ig11ored this tl1eory. Indeed, eve11 if perhaps admissible to explain our ''bodily ]1arn1'' provision, 11nder wl1icl1 a legal order or autl1orization constitutes a ,1alid defe11ce, such theory is completely ir1ele,1a11t to tl1e strict liabilities concerni11g tl,e activities or 11ses co11templated by Articles 2066, 2069, 2071, 208I and 2085 ,vluch are, by bypotl1esis, lawft1l, and i11 \Vl1icl1, by definition, fa11ltless bel1avio11r is po,verless to preve11t all l1ar111. Ratl1er tl1a11, first, i111agini11g a ''security obligation'' in11Jossible of foolproof performa11ce a11d tl1e11, i.n t11rn, calling its u11escapable violatio11 a ''fault'', v,ie can best call tl1e perso11s conte111plated by sai.d Articles st1bsta11tially /ega/14 1 ;,1si1rers of all persons against l1ar111 resulting fro1n tl1e circu111sta·oces specified therein. T1111s, it is not ,vl1en tl1e victi111 is l1arn1ed, b11t if a11d ,vl1en tl1e legal i11surer involved fails to indem11ify l1im, that ,ve ca11 speak of breacl1 of a 11 oblig,1tion. J. Strict liabili�1 1111der Section 4: tl1e ''respond for others'' criteria

Liability ''for otl1ers'' (vicarious) is, i11 Etl1iopian la\v, always strict 142 and absoli1ie \Vitl1 respect to tl1e vicario11s defenda11t, 1 43 provided tl1e legal oonditio11s of 11is liability 144 are satisfied. In tl1ese i11troductory notes, disc11ssio11 of this part of the lav.1 is li11uted to salie11t and esse11tial points. We shal1 consider, i n turn, vicarious liability for l1arn1s ca11sed by: (1) children, (2) State servants, (3) private en1ployees, (4) autl1ors: (I) Responsibility for ch;fclre11 under Articles 2124-2125 bas, in contrast to 1nany foreign jurisdictions, the followi11g largely origi11al a11d simplifying features:

138. Incidentally, said convention and decree attach liability to the aircraft's (ov.rner or) "exploitant", a notion 11earer our concept of "holder for J)rofit" that the Fre11ch one of "la garde" (see J). 43, supra). See C. Zv,ahlen, Regi111e juriclique et responsabilire des aeroclubs (Lausanne' Imprin1erie vaudoise, 1964), p.58. 139. See supra, p. 29, note 6. 140. Rodiere, No. J 566. 141. I.e. non-contractual (involu1;1tary). The future _liabiLites of sucl1 "legal" i 11surers (sucl1 as, e.g., _ motorcar owners) can be 1nsured against with contractual i11surers pursuai1t to Art. 865 fl'. of the Comn1erc! al Code. On the o!her ha_nd, there is the following analogy bet,veen "legal" and contractual insurers: botl1 owe 1nden1nity debts for l1arn1s which do i1ot arise fron1 breach of their obligations. 142. I.e. independent of fault or presumptions of fatllt. 143. Wh? . has, as a rule, 110 defenc �s independe �t �f those availing the first defendant (that a�1a1hng an einployer u�der Article 2131 (2) 1n f ine, at least coincides witl, the defence of his employee under Article 2097 or 2098). 144. See Commentary notes 9-11 under Article 2027.

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DOCTRINAL INTRODUCTION

(a) It is co1111)rel1et1sive i n tl1e sense that (i) it covers all extra-co11ntractual liabilities of the cl1ild and not merely those based ot1 fa11lt, 145 a11d tl1at (ii) there always exists, ,vitl1in the alter11atives provided, a perso1 1 answerable for tl1e cl1ild; (b) Among the alter11atively a1 1s,verable perso11s of father, mother, teacl1er, 1naster, employer, tl1ere also fig11res the perso11 ''i11 \Vhose cl1arge tl1e cl1ild l1as bee11 placed'' factt1ally. This J)erso1 1 may, or 1nay not, be tl1e cl1ild's ''legal'' guardia11 (see Articles 204-207, 210, 213). Jle may be a contractual paid caretaker or even grat11ito11s custodia11 of tl1e cl1ilcl ,vhich l1as been placed i11 his cl1arge .1 46 (2) Tlze State (or pt1blic age1 1cy: Article 2128) is a11s,verable, by vjrt11e of Article 2126, ffor 011ly st1ch faults of its JJt1blic serva11ts or e111ployees147 as co11stitute tl1e oficial Jai,lt clefi11ed i11 Article 2127(1). Tl1is concept see1ns derived fron1 tl1e ''faute de service'' 11otion of the Fre11cl1 law, 148 which law, hovvever, differs fron1 the Etl1iopian one i11 that it gra11ts innn11nity to ''fonctio 11naires'' gL1ilty of a mere ''fa11te de service''. Obversely, the Etbio1)ia11 legislator accu 1 11ulates tl1e civil liabilities of state ,111d ser,1ant for l1ar1n caused by the latter's ''official'' fal1lts. As i n other cases of vic,:1rious liability, Ollf legislator's aim here is 11ot to exe1npt the first defenda11t, but to add a vicarious one. Bt1t while so severe in his 1nair1tai11i11g tl1e pri11ciple of the servant's liability to perso11s inj1rred by bis fc:1ult (Article 2126(1)), ot 1r la\-v is mild witl1 respect to the conseq11e1 1ces of such liability: pt1rst 1a11t to Article 2157(2), the· cot11i 1nay, n1odifying the effects of tl1e rule of ''recovery over'' t111cler Article 2126(2), place (for ''equity'' reasons) part or all of the ulti1nate burden on the State alo11e. I11cidentally, tl1e same metl1od of mai11taining the principle of tl1e serva11t's liability to i11jured persons (Article 2136(1)), ,vl1ile mitigati11g its co11seq11eo.ces by autl1orizi11g tl1e co11rt to J)lace part or all of the ulti1nate b11rden 011 the e111plO)'er alo11e (Article 2157(1)), applies to the liabilities connected ,vith private en11 Jloyme11t wllich are discussed below. (3) Tf1e privc1te e1111Jloyer 149 (perso11 or entity) is, p11rs11ant to Articles 2129-2130, answerable for only such faults of his e1 11ployees 150 as co11stit11te the

145. E.g., tl1e chiJd · may own a11 anin1al and incur a "strict" liability under Article 2071. This suffices to make the fatl1er (Article 2124) or "otl1er guardian" (Article 2125) liable for the child. 146. Nor1nally, l1owever, the child's factual custodian is the same person as his legal guardian un der Articles 204-207 or 210, that is, his pare11t or 11ext relative. The latter's absolute liab ility for the child thus accords ,vith tl1e traditional Ethiopian concepts of "family solidarity". 147. For the definition of "public servant" see Public Service (Amendment) Order, Order No. 28 of 1962, Negarit Gazeta, year 22, No. 6. For the definition of "employee" see ibid, a11d (3), .below. Notwithstanding any differences with respect to administrative law, the pos ition of both categories -.vith respect to the liabilite:;; contemplated by Article 2126 is the same. This enables us to t1se "servant" as a cumulative term for public servants a11d emp loyees. 148. See Sava.tier (cited above. at note 30), No. 211 ff., and A. de 'Laubadere, Traite ele1r1entaire de droil acln1inistratif (3d ed., Paris, Librairie generale de d.roit et de jurisprudence, 1963-66), No. 845 ff. 149. On the historical and doctri11al roots of the employer's liability la,v, see Carbonnier (cited above at note 91), Nos. 185-186. The Ethiopian law follo,vs the French and English "strict" con.cepts. of employer's liability, which sharply contrast witl1 the "presumption of fault" based concepts of the German and the Swiss law (see Ryan, cited. ahove at note 38, pp. 132-136, and Art. 55 of the Swiss Obligations Code). 150. And representative organs or agents in the cases governed by Article 2129, since a corp'orate body, being "fictitious", cannot act otl1erwise than through them. '

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DOCTRINAL INTRODUCTION

J'utictio11al fai,lt defined in Article 2131, which differs. fro1u the aforementi� 11ed

''official'' fault (of state-servants) in tl1at, altl1ougl1 basically botl1 seem to incl ude a ''loyalty'' element, a well-intentio11ed e111ployee's breaking of a formal prohibition (e.g. to overload a lorry) does not release tl1e private employer from liability for the e11suing harm (Article 2131), wl1ile it would release_ �he State u11der the defi11ition of Article 2127(1). For the JJtlrJJose of determ1111ng for \\1l1ose ftrnctional faults tl1e en1ployer sha.ll be liable, we must now disc11ss the meaning of (a) ''employee'' (the inclusionary test), (b) ''independe11t v.1orker'' (the exclusio11ary test) and (c) the text of Article 2135 as an exception to the exclusionary test: (a) Our ''employer's liability'' law, otl1erwise roughly analogous to the French and the English., differs from botl1 in its deter111i11ation of the circle of persons wl1ose activities co1nmissioned by another perso11 may 1nake the latter vicarioL1sly liable in tort. Whereas i11 Frencl1 law tl1e i11cli1sio11c1ry test encompasses all relationships between a ''con11Tiettant'' (a perso11 ''con1mis sio11i11g'' and co11trolling another's acts) a11d ''prepose'' (tl1e actor), 151 the terms used in EthioJJian law 152 are ''en1_ployer'', ''salaried e111ployee'' a.nd ''e1n1Jloyee'', wl1ich ter111s poi11t simply to the contractt1al en1ployn1ent relation ship as clefi11ed in Article 2512. By way of exan1ple, a 1najor son, relative or frie11d wl10 gratuitously assists you in driving your car under your autl1ority n1ay n1ake you vicariously liable for l1is driving faults in. Fre11cl1 a11cl E11glish Jaw, 1 53 but 11ot i11 Ethiopian law, since l1e is 11ot your en1ployee witl1in tl1e n1ea11i11g of Article 2512. This p11rely juridical test relieves tis of tl1e co11troversies surroundi11g this proble111 abroad witl1 respect to t]1e degree of fact11al authority required. A11. u11paid assistant is never a,1 ''e111plo)1ee'' for the p11rposes of Articles 2129-2130. Neither is an assis tant ,vl10111 you ]1a,1e 111erely ''borro\ved'' from his legal employer. 1-his sin1plifies tl1e Jaw wit11out 111t1ch i11convenience to victims, si11ce the prima facie gap tl111s created is ofte11 filled, in our law, by the .11011-vicariot1s strict li,1bilities pro,1ided u11der Section 2. For instance, in tl1e above exa111ple, i11stead of being vicariot1sly liable for )1our relative's or frie11d's (or ''borrowed'' clriver's) fat1lt in l1is driving, you are directly liable irrespective of l1is fault for harm cat1sed by your car (Article 2081) \Vru]e so driven. (b) The inclusionary criterion of ''e1nployee," as defined in Article 2512, is supplemented in Article 2134 by the exc/1c1sio11arJ1 test of ''independe11t'' \Yorker or contractor, probably 154 poi11ting JJri111arily to the juridical definition of contracts for independent work 155 under Article 2610. Tl1e indepe11dt11t worker (co11tractor) for \Vhose faults the 1naster of tl1e '',vorks'' 156 (11ot of the ''-yvorker'') is not ans\verable can be, e.g., a b11ilding fir111 157 or another work-contractor as, e.g., a shoemaker, repairma11, labourer paid for felling

151. English lavv is similar, notwithstanding the apparentJy stricter connotation of its a11a)ogue for "commettant" (master) and "preJJose" (servant): see Street (cited above at note SO) ' J). 428 ff. 152. Wl1ich in this respect resembles the Swiss law: see Art. 55 of the S\viss Obligations Code. 153. See Rodiere, Nos. 1474-7, and Street (cited above at note 80), p. 431. 154. The stra �ge la_n?uage of Article 2134 (with its . . lack of a direct poiJ1ter to Article 2610) seen1 s ��e to J!S or1g1nal purpos � of 1n�rely .qua� �1ng a draft_ "liability for n1ere prepose" prov• 1s1on, ,vh1ch h �s been struc � _out . \V1thout not1c1ng that Article 2134 thus beconies "nebulous" I Sec Ava111-pro1er cfe cocle c111 1l (cited above at p. 3, note J), C. Civ/13, pp. 45-46. 155. This vie,v seen1s to accord witl1 that of tl1e Code's drafter: see ibid. 156. French counterpart: "maitre de l'ouvrage". 157. Articles 2611 and 3019.

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DOCTRINAL INTRODUCTION

a tree, 158 a taxi cabman, 159 an advocate, architect, consulti11g e11gi11eer, 160 etc., etc. Incide.ntally, \vl1at about employee-doctors? Altho1tgl1 tl1eir ''de pendence'' is often limited to merely administrative matters, tl1ey are 11ot independent contractors: Article 2651 n1akes tl1e en1ployer institution civilly liable for harm to patients caused by tl1eir fa11lts. Fi11ally, n.ote that non-liability for harn1 negligently cat1sed by your i11dependent work-co11tractor does not preclL1de your 11on-vicarious liability (for the same l1ar1n) based on Articles 2069, 2071, 2077, 2081 ! For example, your a11in1al, buildi11g, mac11ine, may have bee.n a co11current cause of the l1arm ca11secl by tl1e contractor, as when your motor-car engine explodes wllile neglige 11tly repaired in a garage: yo11 are tl1en liable under Article 2081 to any non-negligent victin1 of tl1e explosion (\vit11out prejudice to your ulti111ate indemnity claims u11der Article 2156). (c) Article 2 I 35 establishes an e,Yceptio,i to the abovementioned exclusio11ary test of vicarious lia.bility provided by Article 2134. Indeed, at1tl1ors of ''printed texts'' are mostl)' independent contractors. Nevertl1e.less, if they comn1it defan1atio11 161 in such text, either the p11blisl1ers (of the bool<), or tl1e editors (of tl1e article), or else the prit1ters (of the non-edited pa1npl1let), are vicariously liable for t11e author's fault. This will usually dL1plicate their direct liabilities incurred within the broad tern1s of Article 2044 (reproduction of defamation is defamation). Article 2135 is tl1us hardly indispensable. Tt reflects an original tecl1nique whose merit, if any, lies in empl1asisi11g tl1e \ rulnerable position of publishers, editors and printers. Tl1ese latter can also be civilly answerable pursuant to Article 2035 Civil Code cun1 Arts. 43 and 100 Penal Code. 162 (4) Wnat is, i11 our law, · tb.e legal t1att1re of extra-contractl1al liability ''for others''? Co11sidering its ''absoluteness'' 163 and its independence of ''profit'' criteria, 164 only two foreign doctrines seem \vorth our exa111ination: (a) that based. on the idea of ''representation'' and (b) that based on the notion of ''guarantee''. We shall discuss them in turn: (a) The idea that an employer, whether ''public'' or ''private'', is answerable for bis servants' official or fL1nctional faults because he is represe11tecl by them, stems fro111 the old Canon la\v maxim Qui facit per a/iurrz facit .fJer se, \vl1ich is based on tl1e fiction that the employer who acts thro11gh otl1ers acts himself, 165 ''action tl1rough oth.ers'' meaning action on orders either express or in1plied by the co11rse of employment. In the context of ·Etl1io pia11 Jaw, this theory calls for the following objections:

158. 159. 160. 161. 162.

Article 2610. Art. 561 of the Commercial Code. Article 2632. Artic!e 2044. The discrepancy betv,reen Articles 43 Penal Code and 2135 Civil Code n1ay perhaps, in such case, give ·rise to problems of a kind discussed in Commentary note 4 under Article 2035. 163. WhicJ1 precludes "presun1ption of fat1lt" based doctrines. 164. Which precludes the "ubj emolumentum ibi onus" theories. 165. On ·this maxim and its i11fluence on English La\V see Winfielcl (cited above at note 65), p. 733, and P. Arminjon, B. Nolde ancl M. Wolff, Traile de clroit co,npare (Paris, Librairie generale de clroi't et jurisprudence, 1950�52), vol. 3, No. 841. In French doctrine, the "representation" theory is supported, e.g., by Mazeaud & Mazeaud (cited above at note 102), No. 483.

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DOCTRINAL INTRODUCl10N.:-

(x) where the faulty act was ''expressly'' ordered, the emplo�er has indeed acted himself as instigator (Article 2155(2)): the resultwg liability is not vicarious but directly i11curred under Article 2028; (y) other faults committed in the course of employment, so �ar from neces sarily resulting from ''in1 plied orders'', may even be committed by breach of orders (Article 2131(2)); (z) the notion of ''acting on orders'' is hardly compatible with tl1at of t�e vicarious d.efendant's ultimate ''recovery'' from the first d.efe11dant (Arti cles 2126(2) and 2156); (xx) th.is notion is powerless to explain the liabilities incurred for others under Articles 2124-2125 (a-c) and 2135 by persons who are not their en1ployers; (xx.x) thus, wl1ile the ''represe11tation'' theory fits ''age11 cy'' situations in co11 tr act law (Articles 2199, 2189), it should 11ot be i1nported i11to extra contractual liability law. It is not merely useless. It is 111is]eading. (b) On page 48 above, we l1ad to reject Professor Rodiere's a11 alysis of no11-vicariol1s liabilities arisi11g irrespective of fat1It (in its norn1al sense) and to explai11 tl1e1n by tbe idea of ins11rance. 011 the contrary , l1 is expla natio11 of liability ''for others'' 166 (Rodiere, No. 1473) by tl1e idea of ''gu.a rantee'' see1ns substa11tially to fit the liabilities provided by Sectio11 4, Chap ter 1 of Title XIII Civil Code, as read i1 1 conju11ctio11 with our Contract law's essential provisio11s on gi1arantee. Tl1e vicariot1s defet1dant's position under Sectjon 4 is a11alogot1s to that of a joint gi1ara,1tor (Article 1933). His guara11tee is ''legal'', tl1at is 11on-contractt1al or involu11tary, which excludes tl1e releva11cy of s11cl1 provjsio11s as cleal merely \Vitl1 the contractual aspect of guarantee. 167 This legal guarantee benefits all persons. But wh.at is the obligatio11 tbe breac11 of \\1hicl1 (Article 1920) is guaranteed against? (x) In 11e,trly all cases, the duty breached by tl1e child, serva11t, employee, autl1or, is that 11ot to con11nit fa11lts co11trary to any or certain provi sions of Sectio11 1, whose observance by those persons is, generally or in the circun1stao.c es specified i11 Sectio11 4, legally g11aranteed by the person vicariously liable. (y) Since, ,vith respect to a cl1ild, the legal guara11tee applies to all liabili ties incurred by it, it may take effect witl1ot1t its fault, as, e.g., where tl1e cl1ild's m.ild a.nd well controlled dog bites so1 11 ebody (Article 2071). The pare11t's or other guardia11's ''legal gi1::1ra11tee'' tb.e11 co11cer11s tl1 e chjJd's ''legal insura11ce'' obligation to pay for the rest1lti11g l1 ar1n ! (Be fore tl1e dog l1as bitten, this obligation was merely co11ditional: cf. Article 1925(1)). As i11 contract11 al gt1arantee, 168 tl1e vicarious defe1 1da11t is released wl1en tl1e pri111 ary debt is discharged by tl1e first defencl ant. 169 Si1 1ce the forn1er's

166. Whic!1 i � limited to en1p]oyment relationshi �s, since liability of parents and apprentice-niasters 1s, 10 France, based 011 mere presumption of fault, and that of teachers on fault. 167. See, e.g., Articles 1922-1924. 168. Article 1926(1). 169. Article 2091.

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DOCTRINAL INTRODUCTION

liability depends on tl1e latter's liability, tl1e vicarious defendant can, like a co11tractual g11ara11tor, 170 raise the defences available to the first defendant. Another analogy co11cer11s t11e vicarious defe11daut's ultimate ''recovery'' rights. 171 Bt1t tl1ese recovery rigl1ts are, because of tl1e court's equitable powers 11nder Article 2157, son1eti1nes less con1prel1e11sive tl1a11 a contractual gi1arantor's inde .n1nity claim under Article 1940. This, and other n1inor discrepÂ ancies sl1ow tl1at tl1e above me11tioned basic analogies, although. generally helpful, cau11ot be extended undiscerni11gly.

170. Article 1926(2). 171. Article 21.26(2) and, more generally, Article 2156. All tl1ese analogies stem from the basic common feature: both the vicarious defendant (in tort) and the contractual guarantor are liable for ot/1ers.

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PART

METHODOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION Con1111enting on a text is explaining it. Sucl1 ex1)lat1ation ca11not be s11ccessful if it bears 011 a11 obsc11re and i11consistent text. Tl1is raises a real problem witl1 respect to tl1e object of 011r stl1dy, Title XIII of the Ethiopian Civil Code i11 the Eng.Iisb version (the otl1er Titles are less 1nisleading). It represe11ts a s11bsta11tially erro11eous tra11slatio11 fro1n a master-text drafted in Fre11ch.1 Th.at 111aster-text was intended to gover11 our subjectmatter through its Aml1aric and Englisl1 tra11slation. Unfort1111ately tl1e latter l1as bee11 grossly 1nisma11aged. Rather tl1an l1opelessly trying to rationalize tl1e i1111umerable errors of tl1e official E11glisl1 versio11 whicl1 is 11ot co11trolling, we correct tl1e1n 011 the basis of tl1e prevale11t opinion that the official A111haric ,,ersio11, v.1hich is autl1oritative, represe11ts a m11ch less repugnant re11deri11g of tl1e Fre11cl1 n1aster text (tl1e An1l1aric version differs fro1n tl1e Englisl1). 011r corrections ai1n at restoring tl1e n1eani11g, rather tl1a11 1nerely tl1e letter of tl1e master-text. Because of lack of legal ter1ns in Anll1aric, it is only after a consistent a11alytical commentary based on the 111aster-tex. t has been give11 th.at it will becon1e cle,1r whetl1er the authori tative A1nl1aric versiot1 is so111el1ow reco11cilable in every detail with tl1e n1aster-text, or wl1etl1er certain tra11slatio11 1njstakes n1ust, i11 SJJite of tl1e resulting inco11siste11cy prob]e111s, J)revail as law u11til legislatively amended. For tl1e above reasons, we draw tl1e reader's attention to tl1e REVISED TRANSLA TION OF TITLE Xlll CIVIL CODE, whicb is fottnd in Appe11dix D. Book Two of tl1is volu1ne, as is sl1ow11 by its title, co11sists pri111arily i11 a COM.tv1ENTA.RY ON ARTI CLES 2027-2037 CIVIL CODE. Eacl1 of tl1ese Articles is quoted and contains 1111mber refere11ces to 11otes placed u11der it. Tl1ese notes, i11 t11r11, co11tain n·umber references to foot-11otes. Note and foot-note references to a11y tort provision are to tl1e abovecited Re,,ised Tra11slatio11 of Title XIII Ci,1il Code (Articles 2027-2178). In tl1e Comn1entary, tl1e term ''tl1is CJ1apter'' sl1all sta11d for Chapter 1 of Title XIII Civil Code, ''tl1is Section'' for Section l of said Cl1apter, ''this Paragrapl1'' for Paragrapl1 I of said Sectio11, ''tl1is Article'' for the Article 11nder discussion. ''Title'' 111ea11s a Title of tl1e Civil Code, ''Section'' a Section of Title XIII. The ter111 ''tort'' (or clelict, or extra-contractual civil wrong) denotes, for ottr purposes, tl1e act or fact gi,,ing rise to extra-contractual ci,1i l liability,2 or tl1e bra11ch of law gover11i11g s11cl1 liability. D11e to the deartl1 of official conm1ents and so11rce reports3

a11d sigi1ificant

See Cocle civil de f'En,pire cl'Ethiopie (French edition with introductory note by Rene David) Librairie generale de droit et de jurisprudence, Paris, 1962. 2. Our definition is "rell1edial", that is, it defines tort by its legal consequence. TJ1is suffices for practical purposes. ';'1e disre .ga �d the _c ?ntroversial a.ad . hardly successful atte111pts by many authors to produce a , substantive defio1t1on of tort (to f ind a non-ren1edial con1n1on denon1inator for all torts). For a remedial definition in comn1on law tern1s, see Saln1or1d, op . cit, p. 1 4 . 3 . Tl1e �uccess \ve drafts _of , the Civil Code of 1960, the expert drafter's scarce and. fragmen . , tary exposes �es motifs on then1 a11d t �1e ra.re recorded parts of the discussions of the drafts �nd their an1endments by, . respectively, the Jn1perial Codificatio11 Commission and the Parhamen�, have not been _published so far, though some are no\.v preserved in our Law :acultY,'s �rcb1 �es. On tl�e resultu1g problems see, incidentally, G. Krz �czu11owicz, "Ethiopian Legal �du�at !on _ , J. Eth. Studies, Vol. I, No. 1 (1963), and G. Krzeczunow1cz, "Statutory Interpretation Ill Etl11op1a", J. Eth. La1v, Vol. I, No. 2 (196 4 ). 1.

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tv1ETHODOLOGY

case reports,4 tl1e_ �bsence of JJrior laws disti11ctly co11cerned witl1 civil wrongs,s and tl1e largely or1g111al c!1aracter of ot1r present Ia,v iL1 tl1is field 6 the writer's com1ne11ts in Book Two are pri1narily exegetic. Tl1ey deal sticces�ively witl1 (1) ! SOURCES OF EXTRA-CONTRACT { AL LIABILITY (Article 2027), (ll) GENERAL RULES ON LIABILITY FOR FAULT (Articles 2028-2037) a11d (III) DEFENCES TO ACTION OF LIAl31LITY FOR FAD.LT (cross-refere11ces). ''Conc�rdance'' 11otes to Articles 2027-2037 follo\v Book T,vo i11 Appe11dix A. A fu.rtl1er . 111stall111ent of _tl1e \on1111e11tary, to bear 011 tl1e law of co.n1pensation for damage, 1s tinder co11s1derat1on. Tl1e reader is 110,v i11vited to ]Jass to the study of tl1e Com1nentary, wl1ile 11sing tl1e appended ''Revised Tra11slatio11'', after ctirsory pert1sal, as a co11stant companion text for s11cl1 st11dy. Jn the Commentary, we are guided by the maxim La parole est rl'c1rge11t, ,1,,czis le sile11ce est cl'or. Where aJJpropriate, bare refere11ces and cross-refere11ces to pertinent Articles a11d context will induce tl1e reader to make his o\vn co11clt1sions.7

Some unpublished cases are cited in notes to the HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION, above. The very few published tort cases are available for pert1sal in the Journal of Ethiopian Law, appearing since 1964. This journal's publicatioi1 of certain questionable court opinions (without comment) was understood as approval and thus was harn1ful. A reproduction of then1 in our Commentary would amplify the ]1arm. Since tl1ese cases are still largely adjudicated by a judi ciary without formal legal training, such reproduction would impair the continuity and con sistency of tl1 e Com.1nentary, wl1ich purports to provide tl1e profession with an analytical tool for finding the meaning of tort provisions in the Code's context. In our system free of "stare decisis" this n1etl1od seen1s justified with respect to recent legislation: the judiciary's exceptional departures .from tl1 e legislator's will - if socially unavoidable - shotild at least be both conscious and covered by interpretive techniques preserving the Code's ottt\vard consistency (for examples of technically adn1issibl� meaning- op� io � see notes under A�ticles _20 ?5-2036, below and heading H in the "Doctrinal Introduction , above). As a rule, 10 Eth1op1a, law making belongs to the Emperor and Parliament, not the judge. (in California, where "stare decisis" co-exists with an old civil code, the latter has been practically nullified by confused judicial "precedent- n1aking"). On this, see G. K.rzeczunowicz, "Putting_ th� Le�al .Cloe� . Back", J. Eth. Law, Vol. 3, (.I 966) p. 626, and "The Present Role of Equity 10 Ethiopian C1v1l Law", J. Afr. Lalv, issue No. 3 of 1969, s.v. "Equity contra legetn". 5. S�e I-IlSTORICAL INTRODUCTION, above. 6.. See DOCTRINAL. INTRODUCTION, above. 7. Incidentally, this method is cost-saving. For similar reasons, we are not adding tables of cases and of works cited to the information already contained in the text of and notes to this volume. But Appendixes B and C contain, respectively, a-table of laws and two model-judgments. 4.

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BOOK 2 COMMENTARY ON ARTICLES 2027 - 2037 CIVIL CODE

.. .

â&#x20AC;¢

Art. 2027, 1

PART I SOURCES OF EXTRA-CONrfRACTUAL LIABILITY (Article

2027)

Art. 2027 - S011rces of extra-contractual1 liability (1) Apart fron1 ar1J; pro,nise of !1is, 1 a _person is lic1b/e for cla,nage2 caused3 to ot!1ers by !1is jc1i1/t.4 (2) Apart f,·0111 c1,1J1 fai1lt of !1is,5 a perso,z is liable, ,,vlzere t/1e lalv so provicles, 6 2 ca1.1secl3 to otf1ers by l1is activity1 or by ct tl1i11g8 i11 !1is possesfor da,11c1ge • • SlOll.

(3) Fi11ally, a person is liable H1 !1ere anotlzer person,9 for l•vl1011'z tl1e la1rv l'r1al(es l1irtz cinslverable, 10 i12cz1rs a liability basecl on fai1lt or providecl by la1rv. 11 , 12 COM1\1IENTARY (Notes 1-12) A. CIVIL LIABILITY 1 . While criminal liability pri1narily leads to punislunent of wrongdoers, tl1e object of civil liability is co1npe11sation of victims of harn1. Compe11sable da1nage may arise from breach of co11tract or from otl1er ca11ses. t\ccordi11gly, civil liability may be contractual or e;¥.tra-co11tracti1al. Co11tractt1al liability is att1:1cl1ed to a per son beca11se of tl1e 11011-JJerforn1at1ce of bis co11tract11al obligations (breacl1 of pro mjse) and is governecl i11 ge11eral by Title XII, Cl1apter 2, Section 4, Civil Code and in partic11Jar by such JJrov.isions of Book V Civjl Code a11d Book III.. Co1n mercial Code as happe11 to refer to 11on-performa11ce of a give11 ty·pe of contract. Extra-contractual liability is attacl1ed to a person beca11se of certain facts, apart from any breacl1 of co11tractt1al JJro1nise a·nd is governed by Title XIII, Chapter l Civil Code. f\.s generally provided by Article 2037 a·nd corroborated by Article 2088, r11les of extra-co11tract11al liability 11111st not be applied to breac·hes of contract, except of· course wb.ere s11cl1 r11les are incorporated by reference in the contract law. 1 .

EXAMPLE - A driver-owned taxicab overturns, injuring the cabn1an's pas senger ancl a pedestria11. Tl1e pedestrian s11es the cabman in. tort (extra-contr actt1al liability) under Article 2081, while the passenger is restricted to suing him in contract under Article 595 Commercial Code. It follo,vs that if the taxi cab's overturni11g was due· to another motorist's fault, this may exempt the cabman from liability towards the passenger (Art. 596 Comn1ercial Code), but not necessarily towards tl1e pedestrian (Art. 2086 Civil Code). Conversely, the rules of contractual liability are obviously not applicable to problems of extra-co·ntractual liability. B11t other rules2 governing contractual obliga-

l. 2.

Article 1790 is an example of such incorporation. i.e. other than rules of liability for breach of contract. '

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•

Art. 2027, 1-3

e levant, a l so er re , wh ied pl ap be ay n1 de Co l vi Ci · II t1ons genera�ly _ u nd er T·: t1e X cle . rti 77 e A 16 se us, '': ct Th ra nt co , a of t ou ise ar ot . n o as d to sueh obl1gat1ons · O p O I t bl bl 1 ap Y Iga Y s a ion on s . rea can 9 90 6-1 189 or 56 -18 51 18 44 -18 es 25 Artic l 18 arising out of extra-contractual liability. l oy er_ C, inc urs a. liability p em his for ari gh a g vin dri ile EXAMPLE _ B wh '2028-2030 by negljgent ly injuring pedestrian D. By v1rtue of les u11 der Art.c ' . 1· era '' d a sev 11 Y tl 1a n Y J01 bl ,,· are C and B . ), 5tl 215 and ) 6(2 0, 213 es l 213 . tic � r A. � . and l1 1;1� l suc �01 era of sev towards D. But since the meaning and consequences tual L1_abil1ty, they shall liability are not defined in the Title on E�tra-Contrac be as defined by Articles 1896-1909 of the Title on_ Contracts 10 Ge11eral (ren1e.. mber to read Article 1907 in conjunction with Article 2156). B.

DA.MAGE

2. Before a plaintiff can recover a non-nominal (cf. Ar_ticl� 2104) co1npensatjon. in Tort, be must show that he h.as suffered dan1age. Tl11s 1s a permanent prere quisite of all types of civil liability. 3 See Sectio11 3 of this Cl1a_pter _as to what constitutes con1pensable da111 age (e.g.''n1 oral'' dan1age to one's feel111gs 1s not com pensable except in tb.e cases provided for by Artic les 2105-2115 or else\vhere). EXAMPLE - As a rule, a penal offe11ce co11 stitutes a fa11lt by virtL1e of Article. 2035 (cf. Art.100 Penal Code). But there is ·no civil liability wl1ere no dam� age ensued, a.s, for i11stance, wl1ere a crin1 inal attempt (Art. 27 Pe11al Code) is discontinued before causi11g harn1. C. CAUSATION

3 . Before a plaintiff ca11 recover co111pensatio11 in tort, he n1ust show th.at the dan1age l1e l1as suffered was caused by the fact for which the defendant is sought to be 01.ade liable. Tl1is is tl1e second and last per111 anent prerequisite of all types of civil liabilitj1 • 4 It is a com 1non sense req11iren1 e11 t tl1at the causal con nectio11 be established 11 ot merely in fact, but also i11 law. In penal law, tl1e ''cau... sal relationship'' is defi11ed by Art. 24(1) Pe11al Code, which reflects tl1e theory of ''adequate'' or ''norn1 al'' causation. In civil law, we find no s11cl1 definition� The n1atter tl1us seen1 s left to tl1e d.iscretion of tl1e judges, wl1 0 111ay be influenced by tl1e Pe11al Code's definitio11 of ca11se (tl1is defi11ition \¥ill presumably al\.vays ap ply in the cases contemplated by our note 3, B, u11der Article 2035). EXAMPLE - B, wl1ile cutting meat for bis guest C, neglige11 tly cuts C's finger,. tl1 us conu1litti11 g a fault u11der Article 2030. C goes to tl1 e hospital to dress bis finger at B's expense. While C is tl1ere, a fire brealcs out a11d he dies. from suffocatio11. B's act is in fact a cause of C's deatl1 . But it is at least. arguable that B's act is not an adequate ca11se in law of C's deatl1 for ,vhich B should not be n1ade civilly liable (pursua11t to Art. 24 Penal Cod� , B \Vould certainl y be innocent of negligent 11 0111.icicle in ter1ns of Art. 526 Penal Code). Although ''ca.usation'' is not expressly defined i11 tl1 e Civil Code Article 2091 cum 2101 prov�des, by necessary implication, tl1at tortfeasors are iiable (subject P �sibilities) for i,11foreseeable dan1age caused only to ''re�uct101 1 of compensation'' .o by_ th_en1. This . p�esumably 1neans tl1 at 1f, in the above exa111ple, i 11 stead of a purely co1nc1dental d1st1nct subsequent harm fro111 an independe11 t cause (fire), the initiaD 3. 4.

Article 2102(2), incorporated in contract ·Jaw by Article 1790. Cf. Contract law, Article 1771(2). ·

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Art. 2027, 3-8 g dan1age to C's body (caused by B) bas itself unforeseeably expanded, resulttrifli � _ 111g 1n de,ltl1 . because of C's exceptional ''bleeding'' propensities (haemophilia), and/ or bad medical treatment, B is liable.5 D. LIABILITY FOR FAULT 4 • Extra-contractual liability can be of tl1ree kinds: (1) for fault, (2) irrespective ,of fault (stri �t) .or (3) for otl1ers (vicario11s). Principles of liability for fault are of _ge11eral appl1cat1on. A. perso11 is, as a rule, always liable if the damage caused by hir11 is cl11e to h.is fault. Liability for fa11lt is governed by Section 1 of tl1.is -Cl1apter. Liability for fault is 11ot restrictecl to cases provicled for by law, wl1ile strict liability for ]1,tr1.n ca11sed by certain tl1i11gs or activities and vicario11s liability .for acts of otl1er perso11s exist only ''where the law so provides''. Liability for .fa11lt therefore represents the orcli11ary la\v of tort liability in Eth.iopia, tl1e nvo .otl1er types of liability being exceptional. 6 Tl1e 011tli11e of what constitutes fault is given in Articles 2028-2037. Tl1e ge11eral (resid11ary) applicability of tl1ese Articles is not affected by tl1e following ''Special Cases'' Articles (2038-2065) \vl1icb m . erely give s01ne binding examples of \Vl1at sl1all or sl1all not be dee111ed a ''fault''. Specific legal offences are faults by virtue of Article 2035. B11t ''fa11lt'' consists .also, and primarily, in a failure to live up to ge11eral standards of conduct which .are not specifically defi11ed (see, e.g., Article 2030). For tl1is reaso11, o·ur E11glish -version of Title XTII Civil Code is a111ended throl1ghout to read ''fa11lt'' for ''of :fence'' (tl1e n1aster-text says fai,te). EXAMPLE - By inadvertence, a sl1opper breaks so1ne valuable glassware in a departn1ent store. I-le tl1us commits a fault without committing an offence. E.

LIABILITY

IRRESPECTIVE OF

FAULT

5. The words ''Apart from any fault of his'' (master-text: ''d'autre part'') 1nake :it clear tl1at st1b-article (2) of tl1is Article deals with a second and disti11ct type .of extra-co11tract11al liability. This liability is strict, tl1at is, arises irrespective of .defendant ?s fault. The JJlai11tiff 11eed not prove fault in order to recover co1npensa -tion fron1 the defenda11t. All l1e needs to prove is damage a11d its causation, ac ,eordjng to the provisions of Section 2 of tl1is Chapter. Defendant's proof of his . o\vn fa11ltless11ess is no defe11ce (cf. Article 2086(1)). 6. The words ''\vl1ere the law so provides'' (see above, 11ote 4) show that •tiability irres_pective of fault (strict liability) is exceptional. Plaintiff is dispensed from -proving fault · only in sitt1ations specifically provided for by law. These exceptionaJ ·provisions are contai.ned in Section 2 of this Chapter. 7. Activities . \Vhich may make one liable irrespective of fault• for· harm caused· ;are those resulting from a state of necessity (Article 2066), tl1ose _of a person who, 'by his act, inflicts bodily l1arn1 (Article 2067), and those that are ''dangerous'' ·within the meaning of Article 2069. 8. Things which may make one liable irrespective of fault for harm caused 1Jy them are animals (Article. 2071), buildings (Article 2077), macl1ines (Article 2081)

:-S. Tl1e above-discussed contingencies are unusual. In run of the mill cases, the occurence of ,6.

damage and its causation are son1etimes so obvious t11at t11e cot1rts do not analyze them distinctly, but stress only the- problems of fault (or strjct or vicarious liability) and compensation. The ,obverse is true of contract liability: see Article 1791.

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Art. 2027, 8-12 and manu.factured goods (Article 2085). Article 2087 sho\vs that the above er1umeration is restrictive.

F. LIABILITY FOR OTHE.RS 9. In certain cases, a person is made vicariously answera�le for_ act� of ai1other person. The word ''finally'' indicates that sub-article (3) of this Article 1 s concer1 1ed with a third, and last distinct type of liability. 10. The words ''for whom the law makes h.i.m ans\verable'' i11 dicate that ans werability (vicarious' liability) for others is exceptional. It exists 011ly with respect to relationships and fu1 1ctions speci-Jically enu.merated by la\v. This restrictive enumera tion is contained in Section 4 of this Chapter. 11 . In order for a plaintiff to succeed in an action of vicarious liability he must show: (a) that a first defendant 11as incurred a liability ''based. on fat11t'' (Section I of this Cl1apter), or ''provided by law'' (Section 2 of tl1is Cl1apter) where tl1 is is strfficient; (b) that the first defe11dant is liable to con1pe11sate the plai11 tiff pursuant to

the rules of Sectio11 3 of this Chapter (or is not actio11able 011ly by virtue of the ill1nunity fro111 suit provisions co11taii1ed i11 Article 2138. Cf. Art. 62 Rev. Constitt1tio11);

(c) tl1at the vicarious defenda11t's relatio1 1 towards the first defe11 dant is tl1at of a parent or g11ardia11 in ter1ns of Articles 2124-5, or of a 11 employer (state, corporation, individual) in tern1s of Articles 2126, 2129, 2130, or of a pt1blisher, edjtor or printer i11 terms of Article 2135; (d) that other conclitio11s of vicarious liability, as prescrjbed by Section 4 of tl1 is Chapter, l1ave bee11 fulfilled; (e) In the special cases governed by Article 2142(2), the ''first'' defendant need not be deternlined, as where a fault was doubtlessly con11nitted by '' 011e of'' yo11r cl1ildren, or a functio11al fault by ''one of'' your en1ployees (see Arti cles 2124 and 2130-32).

G·. FUNCTION OF THIS ARTICLE 12. In staten1ents of clain1 and jt1dgments, A1iicle 2027 11eed 11ot be invoked at all. The ft1nction of this ''openir1g'' Article is to i11troduce the reader to tl1e tripartite classificatio11 of tl1 e ''sot1rces of extra-contractu.al liability'', ratl1er tl1an. provide partict1lar bases of liability. TI1ese are found in tl1e respective sectio11s (1, 2 and 4) co11cerning the tl1ree types of liability a11 11ot1nced b)' tl1is Article. While under Section 2 and Sectio11 4 it is sufficient to i11 voke s0 111e or 011e of their particular provisions (e.g. Article 2081 or 21307 ) as basis for allegi11g, or decidin a 11pon a def �nda ?t's ! }ability, cl�i1�s and dec �sions based on fault sbot1ld in ever; case start with 1nvok1ng the principle of Article 2028. 8 In neither case is it neces sary to mention Article 2027. 7. 8.

After the first defendant is found liable. The relevant particular Articles of Section 1 (e.g. 2030 2035, 2038), invoked in addition, n1erely serve to substantiate the allegation tl1at a fault hds been conunitted for tt1e purposes of Article 2028.

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Art. 2028

PART Il GENERAL RULES ON LIABil,ITY FOR FAULT (Articles 2028-2037) Art. 2028 - General1 principle Jrfl/1oever,1 by l1is fc11,lt,2 cai,ses cla111age to a11ot/1er, sl1all 111c1!,e it goocl. 3

COlVJlVJENTARY (Notes 1-3) I . The principle merely announced by sub-article (I) of Article 2027 is here stated in an explicit and .unperative form. In contrast to criminal liability (cf. Art. 2 Penal Code), fault liability is general in that it is not restricted to infringen1ents of specific laws (see Article 2035) or of the ''Special Cases'' provisions under Para graph 2 of tl1is Section. On tl1e other hand, liability is imposed, as a rule, on whoever con1rnits a fault. 2 . This Section on fa11It liability is divided into two Paragraphs. Paragraph I, presently disc11ssed, lays down general rules delineati11g the mea11ing of ''fault'' for the purposes of this Article. Paragraph 2 provides furtl1er guidance by defining some special situations in wl1ich the courts ought to find that a fault l1as bee11 committed. T'hese situatio11s co11cern either \Vrongful invasion of anotl1er's ''perso nality'' interests (see primarily Articles 2038-2052), or that of his possessory and econo.mic interests (see prin1arily Articles 2053-2065). 111 otl1er words, while under Paragraph 1 the focus is on. tl1e defendant and the q11ality of his cond11ct, 11nder Paragraph 2 it is largely on the plaintiff and his interests tl1at are given n1andatory protection (the ''special cases'' of fault are classified largely according to the type of harm inflicted). 3. Where a fault has ''caused'' ''dan1age'' (cf. Article 2027, notes 2-3), tl1e damage shall be made good. This principle is qualified by the detailed rules as to the mode and extent of such compensation· which are found in Section 3 of this Chapter dealmg, respectively, with pecuniary compensation (Paragraph I) and other n1odes of compensation (Paragraph 2). 1

· 1. · Notes (l, 2, 3 etc.) to the subsequent Articles carry headings and, where appropriate, include sub-notes (A, B, C, etc.) with sub-headings. This facilitates perusal of lengthier comments. 1

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Arrt. 2029, 1-2 Art. 2029 - Kinds 1 of fault

(1) A fai.1/t may consist in an i11tentional2 act or in ,nere negligence. 3 (2) A faitlt 111aJ' consist i11 a positive act 4 or a forbearan ce. s• 6

COMMENTARY

(Notes

1-6) 1.

INTRODUCTION

Where a person is shown to have infringed general (Article 2030) or profes sional (Article 203 1) standards of conduct or a legal prohibition (Article 2035) not concerned witl1 ''intent'', he incurs a liability irrespective of tl1e precise kind of his fault, whether it be inte11tional or 1 1eglige1 1t (sub-article (1)), active or passive (sub article (2) ). The 11 umerous distinctio11s made abroad in tl1is respect are not pa.rt of Ethiopian law.1 2.

INTENT

Nevertl1eless, the concept of wrongful i11 te11t re1nains legally relevat1t in tort for tl1 e followi 11g purposes: (a) Tl1e presence of l1armful inte11 t (Article 2032) negatives any co11 te11tio11 tl1 at the ''usual standards of good co11duct'' (Article 2030) have been observed. A11 d aJtl1ough a perso11 wl,o exercises a rigl1t witl1i11 its legal lim.its is 11 or111 ally deem ed free fror11 fault, tl1is presu111ption may be destroyed a11d fault liability created v.1here l1 is primary intent was to irijure (Article 2032, note 2, B). (b) Wro11gful inte11 t, in tl1 e special se11 se give 1 1 it by Art. 58(1) Penal Code, is

ofte11 releva11t for establisl1 i11g tl1 e i11fringement of penal law, which i11fringement, i 11 tun1 , 111ay be a prerequisite of fault liability where Article 2035 is sought to be applied (see our note 3, B, under that Article).

(c) Absence of inte11 t to i11jure may be a justific,1tion in a special case of fault t111 der Paragrapl1 2 of tl1 is Sectio11: see Article 2045(2). (d) Under tl1e same Paragrapl1, prese11 ce of intent to i11j11re 111 ay be a bar to justi fication: see Articles 2046(2), 2047(2), 2048(2), 2049(1). (e) Under Article 2101(2), i11 tentio11 al fault preve11 ts a reductio11 of co111pensatiou. 2 Under Article 2159(a), i11 tentional fa11lt excl11des the application of Article 2157 (powers of equity). (f) Under Article 2106, i11tentiooal fault permits a11 award of 1 noral damages. (g) Inte11tional fa11lt overrides other faults in gravity for the purpose of ap1Jortio11me 11t of the da-1nages-burden under Articles 2160 and 2098. For the pt1rpose of tl1 e above cases (exceJJti11 g case b) wl1 at does tl1 e legislator n1 ea1 1 where he speaks of ''inte11 tional fat1lt'' or ''i 1 1tent to i11jure'' witl1out ex 1Jressly defining sucl1 co 11cepts? These words seem usually to iinply the f ollowi 11g co11r1ota tion: It is not enougl1 tl1at tb.e bla11 1able act be i11te11ded (e.g. the contacting of '

1. "Act" or "forbearance" are the pl1ysical, "intent" or "negligence" the n1ental elen1ents of fault; "negligence", however, is usually objectively assessed - see note 3, i 11fra. 2. For contractual da1nages, con1pare Article 1801 (2).

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Art. 2029, 2-5 another's body in terms of Article 2038). The at1tl1or of tl1 e act n1ust also i1 1te 1 1d the resulting l1ar111 (he must be n1otivated by a har 111 f 11 I purpose: cf. Article 2106)._ You can i11 tentionally step on a slippery bana 11 a peel without inte11 di 1 1g the rest 1lt1 ng l1ar1 11 to a bystancler (you slipped and k11ocked hin1 dow11: l1 e broke his watcl1). This l1arm l1as n1 erely rest 1 lted from a volt111 tary act, not fro 1 n a11 i 11ten tional fa1 1lt. A11otl1 er example: tl1e careless l1unter and the assassin botl1 inte 11d to sl1 oot, but only tl1e latter ''i11 te11 cls'' the res11lting i11 jury to a person. 3.

NEGLIGENCE

Tl1 e j11st n1e11tioned case of stepping 011 a banana peel (or hu11 ti11 g) without adverti11 g to tl1e likelil1 ood of ens11i 11g l1 ar111, is a typical example of negligence. In contrast to the restr.ictive principle ,vl1ereby penal liability for neg.ligence exists only in expressly specified cases (Art. 59(2), Penal Code), civil liability i1 1 damages for 11eglige11ce is general. Again, in co11trast to the Penal Code's restrictive defini tion of negligence a11d tl1e son1ewl1at s 11bjective sta11 dard by which it is meas11red (Arts. 59(1) and 48 Pe 1 1al Code), civil neglige1 1ce is not precisely defined, a 1 1d is nor1nally measured by the co111plete]y o�jective sta11 dard provided by Article 2030 vvitholtt regard to tl1e age a.11 d 111 ental co 1 1ditio11 of the tortfeasor. I11 deed, tl1 e per son liable for the consequences of his steppi 11 g 0 11 the banana peel 1nay be a cl1 ild or a n1adn1 a11 (see Article 2030, 11ote 5). 4.

POSITIVE ACT

•.

1 1 1 tl1e la11 guage of s0 111 e jurists, an ''act'' 1 11 ay be 0 11 e of co11unissio11 or omis sio 1 1. In order to make the distinction clearer, we ve11 t11 re here to call acts of comn1 ission ''positive'' acts, b)l contrast to acts of on1 issio11 whicl1 cot1sist i 1 1 a forbearance (abstention fro1n acti11g, failltre to act). ObviolIS]y, a fault co11sisti 11g in a (positive) act is co111111itted by doi11 g son1 etl1 i1 1g, as, e.g., by striki11g son1 ebody i 11 violatio 1 1 of Article 2038. 5.

FORBEARAN'CE

In terms of Article 2030, it makes no difference vvl1 etl1er the ''usual sta 11 dards of good condt 1 ct'' have bee11 violatecl by acting or forbearing. I11 both cases a fault is committed. Nevertheless, the courts do not easily admit that ''good condltct'' incl11 des (i1 1 tort) a requiren1e1 1t to act, disregard of \vl1 ich wol11cl constitute a fa·ult o .f on1ission. It may, therefore, be useful to discuss some ty·pical i11stances of such fault: (a) In co11 tract law, duties to act (by performi 11g the contract) a11d. the correspo11d ing faults by 0111ission ( 1100-perforn1ance) are predomi11ant. They are, however, irrelevant in tort (see Article 2027, 11 ote l ). Th11s, problems involving tl1e non performance of a professional duty to act- of doctors, ad.vocates, etc. - arise more often in a contractt1al co11text than in ter.1ns of Article 2031 (cf. note I under that Article). .

(b) Where tl1 e duty to act is legctl (specifically imposed by law), its infringement

by omission to act is clearly a fault in ter1ns of Article 2035. But more legal offences are com1 11 i,tted by acti11g (i11fringi 11 g a . duty to forbear), tl1a 11 by for bearing (infri 11 ging a duty to act). 1 11 the Pe 11_ al Code, Arts. 547 and 438_ cons-. _ fa1 lure to act (le d �elp or inform titute· exceptional exa1nples of -� ffence by � : . the Jaw)� D11ties to �tct are prov1 ded by traffic regulat1?ns which 11;11p ?se on the · drivers, e.g.; the duty to sound the horn at road-crossings, or to indicate chan- . - 67-

Art. 2029, 5-6

ges of direction. 111 the ''Special Cases'' Paragraph of this Section, duties to act are imposed by Article 2052. (c) An act which is faulty by infringement of the ''reasonable conduct'' standard imposed by Article 2030 may create, by the sa1ne . standard, a fresh d� ty to act to avert the ensu.incr0 da11gers to otl1ers. For 1nsta11ce, one who digs an invisible deep hole before his hot1se must fence jt or 1nake it visible to passers by. If he fails to do so and i11jury ensues, we can, i11differently, 111ake him liable for tL1e original act of diggi11g the dangerous l1ole, or for the subsequent failure to make it harmless (a forbearance). 3 By virtt1e of the same standard, even perfectly correct and apparent road-repair works may 11ot be left, at night fall, without lighti11g. Any activities creating risl<.s of harrn to otl1ers import duties to act to avert it. Omission so to act is a fat1lt 1111der Article 2030 (where tl1e risk created is abnor1nally dangero11s, the resulting harm is redressi ble, under Article 2069, even in the absence of fault). (d) A fa11lt of pure omission (non-con11ected witl1 a professional or legal duty to act or with a creation of risk) 1nay be committed by violation of Article 2032: e.g. one wl10, l1avi11g see11 a l1011se catch fire, 111eets its apparent o\vner a11d intentio11ally l1ides tl1is fact fron1 l1im, is liable for tl1e resulting har1n. 6.

'BASES OF FAULT LIABILITY, FUNCTION OF TI-JIS ARTICLE

111 a clait11 alleging or judgme11t affirn1ing a liability for fault, Article 2029 need not be i11vokecl as tl1e basis, or esse11tial basis, for the claim or decision: (a) The pri1nary basis for such decision is al\vays Article 2028. Tl1e second esse11tial basis is tl1e provisio,1 clefi11i11g tl1e fc1i1/t co1n111itted. Tl1ese deti11itional provisions in Sectio11 1 contain tl1e \vords ''con1111its a fa11lt'' (or, in the case of Article 2031, ''is liable'' (for fault)) a11d are excl11sively the follo\vi11g ones: Articles 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2035, 2036(2), 2038, 2040, 2044, 2050, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056(1 ), 2057, 2058, 2059, 2063, 2064(2).4 Our adverb ''excl11sively'' implies tl1at no claim or aJJirmative judgment (for plaintiff) may be grounded 011 provisions providi11g justifications,5 inm1t1nities, 6 le�al exct1ses,7 exceptio11s,8 _or otl1er defences.9 These clefensive provisions con ta111 words st1�h as ''c�mm1ts no fault'', . �r inct1rs ''no liability'' (i11 spite of fault). 10 In claims alleging fault these prov1s100s sl1011ld 11ot be n1entioned at all:

3. �nder The . Fetha Nagast �cited at no�e 2 �o lIISTOl�_ICAL INTRODUCTION), "those ,v110 _ , dig a well in the st�ee� �1tbout cove� 1ng 1t were punishable (ChaJ)ler XLVII, p. 293). _ . 4. As to, Article 2061, 1t 1s invokab le without 2028 since the tern1 "guara · tiilo · r·s" . t w1 , , . 10,vs sl 1a tl · · 1· b·1 1 · app 1es 1rrespecl1vc of fault, so that logically this nesses 1a L 1ty provision · sl1ouId .llave fi1gured under Section 2. 5. Articles 2039 and 2051. 6. Article 2048; see also 2137-8. 7. Article 2049. 8. Article 2060. 9. Articles 2034, 2036(3), 2037, 2041-3, 204.5-7, 2056(2), 2062, 2064(1), 2065. 10. 1 n the abs_ ence of such words, the defensive character of a provision may be discernible from mo re specific terms such as "no defamation" (Article 2045).

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Art. 2029, 6 the defences based on tbe111 are properly rebutted on poi11 ts of fact or law 011ly if and after raised in defe11cla11t's answer. 11, 12 (b) It is l1 opefully clear by no,v why expert plaintiffs or judges do not base their clain1s or affir111ative decisions on Article 2029. T/1 is Article cloes 1101 cle_fi11e fatilt. The function of tl1 is Article is to show tl1 at wherever the requiren1 euts of the above cited legal gro1111ds for a clain1 or j11dgment of liability for fault are satisfied, it is no defe11ce to say ''I did 11 ot act, I 011Jy abstained'' (for bearance) or ''I intended n . o harm, it was 1 11ere i 11 advertence'' (negligence). If and ,vhen the elen1e11t ''i.ntent'' or ''act'' becomes excl11sively releva11t, it is not beca·use it fig11res in the enumeratio11 of Article 2029 bt1t because it figures, as a req11ire 111e1 1 t of ''fat1lt'', u11der 011e of the definitional provisions mentioned under (a), above. For instance: ''i11te11t'' to injl1re is required under Article 2032 a11d is legally relevant in otl1er cases me11 tioned in note 2, above; a con trario, most cases arising tinder Articles 2030-2031 are concerned with ''negli gence''; it is clear from tl1e context that a ''positive act'', not an omission to act, is req11ired for the p11rposes of Article 2038; obversely u11der Article 2052(1) the verb ''fails'' normally denotes failures to act (a.mission, forbearance). It is,• •tl1 erefore, not necessary to cite Article 2029 in connection with the above prov1s1011s.

), 2047(2), 6(2 ), 204 5�3 icle 204 e Ar! rais �ld sho n atio am def iri nt jma cla a , Jaw of nt poi 1 1 . E g. in , 6(1) ), 204 5(2 icle , 204 Art vely ecti resp ed,. rais has ant end def the r afte and if y 0; 2048(2) onl . . 2047(1), or 2048(1). . . . . . w seen1s 1cb h _ e, re Cod cedu 1l Pro C1v 80 icle Art to e udic prej out with are rks ema 12. All the a bove · r 11en , 1 , ce · de'" cla·m f t t t l ·t· · en o s a en1 s 1a 1n1 as h sue s, d" _,ng cee pro g atin gin ori s ent to require that cloctim 91 (3)?). �everthea ppeat etc. alle ge only the material facts relied upon (but cf. A;rts _82 and tl1e Jssues of n. ked whe 1ly invo ssar 11ece are and fs brie . in ed ' · rais . be . · ay m · s 1s1on , ' prov .1 es�, I ega 1 ..7) • . 24 6 rts (A ng ari be t 1rs f the . at d me . fact and la �v are fra . '

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Art. 2030, 1-2

-----------------------·- -- - --Art. 2030 - Good usage 1 (I) A person comn1its a fault 1v/1ere he acts or forbears in a man11er or in cor1clitions 1,v/1icl1 offencl n1orality 2 or usi,al stanclards of good co11duct. 3 (2) In this respect, regarcl sl1all be hacl to the condi,ct of a reasonable man. 3 (3) U11/ess ot/1er1,vise provicled bJ, /ai,v, 4 fault shall be assessed 1rvithout regard to t/1e age or n-ze11tal conditio11 of tl1e person co11cerned. 5

-----------...-- ---------·

--------

co·

MEN1.4RY (Notes 1-5) 1.

INTRODUCTION

Thjs A1·ticle is of overridi11g i111portan.ce. l11 deed, if by virtLie of Article 2027 {r;t:te 4) liability for fault rules represet1t tl1 e orcli11 ary la\v of tort liability in Etl1io r1�:, tl1e ordinary sta11d�Lrd by wbicl1 faults are assessed is provided by tl1e prese11t /\ rticle u11der tl1e title ''good t1 sage''. 1 11 tl1e text (sub-article I), tl1e corresponding I r1... ncb ter 11 1 bo1111es ,1,1oeurs is re11clered by tis 111ore expJicitly as ''t1 st1al sta11dards : ·:I good co11dt1ct'', ,vl1icl1 is its f11ll 1nea1 1ing i11 ordi11ary la 11gt1age. 2. TI{E :tvl O RALITY TEST W}1ile ''t1st1al standards of good co11 dt1ct'' (see below, 11 ote 3) co 11 stitute tl1 e ,,: j�ctive yardsticlc witl1 wl1icl1 fault is ,lssessed i11 n1 ost cases, a11 d are primarily ' 11oted bj1 tl1e label ''good 11sage'', ;:1 st1 bjective criterion of fa11lt is added by the , ord ''111oralit)1''. Morality is 111ore tl1 a11 111 ere good 11sage. Tl1e ''i1n111 oral'' is tl1at \. itl1 \Vl1icl1 a partict1lar 111a 11 's co11scie11 ce ca11 re1Jroacl1 l1 im. Tl1 is .requirement is .:i11 1ilar to tl1e ''111er1s rea'' or ''gt1 ilt'' reqt1ire11 1e11t of tl1 e pe11al law, a11d i.11volves a11 e11q11iry into the JJartict1lar tortfeasor's state of 1 ni11 d. Tl1 e legal significance of tl1 e ''1norality'' req11ire 1nent is as follo\vs: A.

Wilful intent

l 11te11t to i11 jt1 re is i11 itself i11 1moral. Co11seq11e 1 1ces of st1cl1 inte11t: (a) Wl1ere a tortfeasor's fault is alre,1dy establisl1ed irrespective of i11tentio 1 1, e.g., by apJJlicatio11 of the objective ''good co11d11ct'' sta11dards, a plai11tiff 111ay in addition sl10'"' the prese 11 ce of \Vilft1l inte11 t for tl1e purpose of tl1e advantages 111e11tioned 1111der Article 2029, 1 1ote 2 (e - g). (b) Where ,,jo]ation of objective ''good condt 1 ct'' standards is not establisl1 ed, tl1 e prese11ce of intent to injure 111 ay alone s11ffice to create ''fa11lt'' Iiabilit)' (Article 2032). A1,.) ), intent to injt1re is a bar to legal justifications. 1 B.

Reckless negligence

Neg]ige11 ce is ciearly i 1n111oral 011ly wl1 ere it co11sists 11 ot i 1 1 111 ere i 11 adverte11ce b1 1t ru11 ounts, s11bjectively, to recklessness or disrega.rd of tl1 e clearly l<.11 ow 11 likeli hood o� l1 �r111 f11l co11s �quences wl1ich are, hovvever, 11 ot i11te11ded. 2 Disregard of known l 1kel1]1ood of serious har1n to others is i1nn1 oral a11d tl1 l1s co11stit11tes a faL1lt

1 . See Article 2029, 11ote 2 (a, c and d). 2. Con1pare Art. 59(1) of the Penal Code.

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Art. 2030, 2-3

eve11 vvl1 ere th.e objecti.ve good conduct stanclard3 J1 as 11ot bee11 violated'. For ex �1nple, th� average re �1.so1 1ab �e ow11er of a 11,tystack does 11ot t1st1ally take excep t1011al a11t1_-fire J)reca11t 1ons with respect to it. But wl1ere a pa.rtic11lar ow11er k 11 ows (due to l11s _o\v11 or anotl1er 1 11a11's eXJ)ertise) tl1at due to a deco1npositio11 process tl1e hay �tack 1s expos �d to self-con1bustio11 a11cl is lil<ely to spreacl fire to 11eigl1bouring . 1111 1t � a 111oral fa11lt if l1e fails to act to avert tl1 e da 1 1ger4 eve11 properties,_ he co n tl1ot1gl1 tl11s . da �1 ger 1n1gl1 t 1 1ot be obvio11s to a11 average reasonable haystack o\v11 er. Tl1e legal s1g1 11ficance of recklessness: (a) !}1 tl1 � r_are__borclerlin _e c �ses of tl1e abov _e descri?ed type reck.Iess11 ess creates fault l1ab1l1ty by v1olat1 on of tl1 e 111 oral1ty requirement. 011 tl1 e otl1 er ha11d, reckl �ss (gross) 11 eglige11ce bars tl1e ''aJ)ology'' excuse provicled by f\,tic1e 2049(1). Co11s1cler also tl1 e ,:vord ''gross'' i11 Article 2068 ancl the i 1nplicatio11 s of Arti cles 2099-21 0 0 (a co11 trario). (b) W!Jere fault is i11 a 1 1y \\1 ay established, tl1 e defendant's reckless11 ess in1 ports a11 additio11al conseqt1e11ce: for tl1 e pUf])OSe of ap]?Ortior11nent of tl1 e da111 ages-burden l1nder Article 2160, 2158 a 1 1d 2098, ''reck1ess1 1ess'' overrides other f. at1lts i11 gravity, ,vitl1 tl1 e exceJ)tion of intentio11al fal11t. 5 EitJ1 er vvilft1l i11 tent or criminal (reckless) .11egligence or such gross6 ''1noral'' faults as are de11oted. by, e.g., disl1 011esty, violence, sexl1al i 1 npudence, 1nay be legally re levai1t for those tort clai1nants wl1 0 wa 11 t to avail tbe1nselves of tl1 e speed a1 1d eco11on1y of pe11al proceclttre by in,1oki11g i11 frige111e11 ts of pe11al Jaw i11 conju11 ctio11 witl1 Articles 2035 Civil Code a 11 d 100 Pe11al Code. 3. TI-IE GOOD USAGE TEST A. Referenc·e to ''Reasonable Man'' Violatio11 of us11al st,:1ndards of good co11dt1ct (good usage) cl1 aracterize 1 11 ost ''fault'' sit11atio11s (tb.ey s0111eti1nes co11ct1r witl1 st1bjective ''morality'' infringe1ne11ts wl1ich, for the reaso11 s n1 entio11 ed, l1 acl to be a11alyzed separately). The ''good tisage'' con cept, i11 the explicit se11se give11 it l1 ere, provides tis ,vitl1 the ordi11ary yarclsticl< for assessi11g ''fat1lt''. It is i11separable fro11 1 tl1e reaso11able 111an conce1)t, ,vitl1 refe rence to ,vJ1icl1 ''good co11dt1ct'' sl1all be evaluated. !11 a way, we can use the 1 'reaso'11 able 1na11'' co11 cept also for assessi11g subjective ''1norality'' i11friI1ge1ne11 ts in tl,e obvious se11 se tl1 at a reaso11able 11 1ar1 of good co11duct does n.ot for1n \vilft1l or dishonest i11 te11tio11 s or disregard st1 cl1 seriot1s dangers to others a3 are clearly k11own to l1im. Bt1t the practical t1seful11 ess of tl1e ''reasonable 1nan'' point of re-· ference is \\,jth respect to tl1 e great mass of ca.ses wl1ere the defe11clant's state c,f ·n'lind is, tho11g]1 perhaps 1niscbievot1s, undiscoverab;e to plainti� .or, tl10:1gI1 -perlJa_ps non-mischievous, irrelevant for defe11ce purposes. Defe11 da11t s fzttilt 1s pr1ma, 1ly assessed through compari11g l1is co11 dt1ct to tl1e concluct . wl1 ich rL reaso�1able �1an _ would usually have fo]lowed i 11 the sa1ne external circumstances, 1rrespect1ve of the condition of defenda11t's mind.

3. See definition of this standard in note 3, below. 4. Cf. Article 2029, note 5, (c). 5. Cf. Article 2029, note 2, (g), a.ad see note 5, D-E, below. h as, e.g., those of charity. 6. Lawyers are not concerned ,vith "refined" moral duties suc 7. See note 5, A, below.

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Art. 2030, 3 B.

Connotation

of ''good''

A case may evince an apparent contradiction between the ''good'' and the ''usual'' within the ''usual stan.dards of good conduct'' criterion. Defendant is not necessarily absolved by showing that his conduct conformed to usage. Such defence will be inst1fficient wl1ere what he did was not good enough (careful e11ough) in the eyes of a reasonable man. For i11stance, it may be establisl1ed u.sage among lorry drivers (as disti11ct from ''reasonable men'' in general) to leave big stones on the l1igl1way after using them to block the supporting wheels wl1ile changing a pu11ctured wheel assembly. If this harn1s subsequent in11ocent motorists, the harm doer should be held liable because the usage he has followed was 11ot ''good'': the risk of l1arm to other motorists ,vas reasonably obvious. It is a case of 11egli gence by forbearance (omission) of tl1e type mentioned under Article 2029 in note 5, (c). C. Vagueness of standard The ''reasonable man'' is, of course, a fictio11al figure. This fiction purports to represent the Etluopian society's views, at a given time, 8 of what is usually proper or im1)roper, diligent or negligent. 9 In fact, the judge inevitably con1pares the defenda11t's co11duct to what he himself would l1ave do11e in defe11dant's place. Fault assessme11ts tl1us vary with. tl1e l1uma11 qualities of the bench. We are here far from tbe bea11tiful precision, so satisfactory to tl1e juristic 1uind, of co11tract law, where liability is i11curred by violating a co11crete pre-existi11g obligatio11 which is o\ved to a detern1ii1ed creditor and is regulated in detail by tl1e agreement and tlJe law. In tort, the general duty of reasonable care to avoid unjustified l1arm to others is owed to l1uma11ity at large, and its basic criterion of ''reasonable conduct'' is utterly a11d 11ecessctrily vag11e, sir1ce in 1nodern life circu111stances of barn1 and appreciations of co11.duct vary in·fiuitely. We 1uove away from the condi tions of prinlitive life, with its si1nple speci·fic lists of bodily har1n or trespass for wliich retaliation or fixed pe11alties were exacted witho11t tl1e 11eed to develop any general theory of civil liability. 10 In 111odern i11dustrial society people no more accept harm as merely calling for vengeance or ki11sl1ip-support, or as decreed by Provi dence. The cry for security is ge11eral. Anybody harmed i11 any way looks for full compensation and both legislators and courts 11 cater to this desire. Nearly a quarter of all co11rt cases in France arise in delict (extra-contractt1al liability). Tllis ''tort'' la.ndslide has not yet reached Ethiopia, b11t it will i11 tin1e, because it is tl1e ra11som of material progress with its attendant m11ltiplication and di,1ersification of risks of harm and the concurrent looseni11g of kinship ties. The generality and ada.ptability of tl1e standard provided by this Article will help tl1e judges to cope with tl1is momentous evolution. D. Applicability reduced or specified Tl1e ''reasonable co11duct'' criterio11 of fault is thus i11dispensable for dealing with the unfathomable future conti11gencies of l1armful behavio11r, and particularly l ·,

8. \Vhich is usually the time of the case-decision using the "reasonable man" concept. Of course the society's vi �ws vary from time . t? ti�1e. They vary also. from place to place, but th� appeal courts will naturally have a un1fy1ng influence on the required standards of "reasonability" (without prejudice to a defendant's "equitable" relief under Article 2099: see note 5, B, below). 9. '_'Foreign" examples of _\\'hat , is or is not deemed negligent, as contained in t11e bulky tort literature on our Jaw library s shelves, are nor legally relevant for tl1e Etl1iopian judge ' or the foreign tortfeasor-defendant in Etl1iopia. 10. See HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 11 . And insurance companies.

-72-

r\rt. 2030, 3-4 so in the great shifti11g m . ass of so-called general 11egligence cases. 12 On the other har1d, the need for legal predictability (with its preve11ti\,e effect on litigatio11) ]1as prom .J?ted 011r legislator, ,vl1erever possible, both to red·uce tl1e area of application of t�1_s vague criterion a11d to specify its 1neaning by further general and special prov1s1ons. A. s a result, Etl1iopia can 110w boast the world's largest official codification of tort law (tl1e smallest, witl1 its five A.rticJes, bei11g the French). Its detailed and often . original provisions are fr11its of reflection over tbe judicial ''trial and error'' experiences of countries witl1 insufficient tort legislation: (a) Firstly, t.he area of appl.icatio11 of the ''reasonable conduct'' criterion is red11ced b>' elimi11ati11g tl1e ''fault'' req11ire111e11t i11 the specific situatio11s ent1merated 1111der Sectio11 2 (see Article 2027, 11otes 5-8). It is fu.rtber red11ced by n1aking certai11 perso11s a11to111.atically answerable for fa11.lts of otl1ers in the specific situa tio11s en11merated under Sectio11 4 (see Article 2027, notes 9-11). The principles governing tl1ese n1atters l1a,,e bee11 disc11ssed i11 our Doctrinal Introductio11. (b) Secondly, tl1e 111ea11i11g of tl1e ''11nreasonable'' conduct criterion is specified by certain rules of general impact. Wl10 defi11itely disregarcls the rules of l1is craft or profession (Article 2031) or i11.fri11ges legal provisions (Article 2035) cotrunits a fa11It. A reaso11able n1an does 11ot, as a r11Ie, disregard tl1e precepts of lus profession. or infri11ge tl1e rules of Ia,v. Tl1e courts are not free to l1old that sucl1 co11d uct is proper ir1 ter111s of J-\rticle 2030. As to Articles 2032-2033,. they give 1nore precision to the subjective ''1norality'' require1nent disc·ussed in note 2, A, above. Finally, Article 2036 restricts judicial discretio11 i11 the appre ciatio11 of a subordi.r1ate's co11duct. In such ways, legal predictability is increased. (c) Thirdly, tl1e n1eaning of the ''u1rreasot1able'' co11d11ct criterion is f111tl1er specified by tl1e Special Cases Articles (2038-2065) with respect to partic11larized types of conduct· (certau1 i11vasio11s of tl1e plaintiff's personality, possessory or econo.n1.ic interests). Where battery, trespass, etc. occ11r in terms of tl1ose Articles, tl1e Courts are not free to hold tl1at s11ch cond11ct is proper in terms of Article 2030. The legislator l1as laid dow11 a11tl1oritatively that s11cl1 co1· 1duct constit11tes fa11lt. 13 It is thus possib.le to remedy the· vagueness of tl1e general criterion of: fault by providjng con crete solutions for certai11 rec11rrent sit11ations of a given type. The judicial discretion is tl1t1s curtailed to an extent co1npatible with the necessity of dealing witl1 a host of less typical situations by application of the basic Article 2030 or of Articles 2031-2033. 4.

AGE OR MENTAL CONDITION IN ''MORALITY'' TESTS

Jn assessing fault, age and mental condition (see note 5, below) are disre garded ''unless otherwise provided by la\v." The law does implicitly provide other wise where violations of tl1e subjective morality requirement are sought to be esta blished for one of the purposes mentioned directly or by reference in note 2, above.. Since ''immoral'' is what a man's conscience can reproach him with, clearly in dividual unconsciousness - due to infancy, senility or insanity - of wrong or harm, negatives any contention that defe11dant's behaviour was immoral because of his wil ful intent, recklessness or dishonesty. Age and mental condition are thus relevant for the assessment of faults against n1orality.

12. See Article 2029, note 3 and 5, (c). 13. Unless justified in tbe prescribed manner, in which case the courts ca.nnot deem it improper in terms of Article 2030.

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Art. 2030, 5

5. AGE OR MENTAL CONDITION IN ''GOOD USAGE'' TESTS A. Basic

irrelevancy

Wl1ere defe11 dant's fatilt is assessed by tL1e t1sual sta1 1dards of good conduo. t (�ood t1 sage) criterion or st1c� of its specified ra111i�c�tio1�s 14 as contai� no su�jec _ _ 6 15 t 1 ve ''n1 oral1 ty'' elements, h1s age or n 1ental co11d1 t1011 1s disregarded. . Tl11s 1s a mere co1 1seque11ce of the principle that defendant is at fat1 lt wl1er� his condu�� deviates fro 111 tl1 at of a reasonable man placed i11 the sa1 11 e exter11al circumstances. Tl1 is criterion is co1 11pletely objective. Tbe n1i11or's a11d i 11 sane1_nan's i 1 1capacities to incur liabilities i 1 1 co 1 1tract (Articles I 92-379) have 110 parallel 1n tort. '�'e are not con cerned witl1 the defendant's state of 111i1 1d, but witl1 wL1at a reaso11able citize11 in l1 is sl1oes wot1ld have done. Althougl1 for plai11tiff's purposes it may son1eti 1 nes be releva11t or accessorily advantageous to show that defendant's state of mi11d was miscbievous, 18 a defenda11t i11fringing the objective sta11dard of co11 dt 1 ct ca.nnot escape liability by sl1owing tl1�lt he did not n1 ean n:uscl1 ief 19 or even w,1s 111e11 tally i 11 capable of evalt1ati11g J1is acts. Defendant's evide 11 ce tl1at he Wl'.lS t 1 11co11 sciot1s of wrong or har111 becat1se of i 11fa11 cy, se11ility, dri11ks, drugs, i11sanity or other reaso11s, obviously does 11ot destroy plai11tiff's solely perti11 ent conte11tion that a. reasonable 1 11 a11 would have acted otl1erwise. Tl1 us, w]1 ere a 111ad 1 nan sets )101 1 r l1ot1se 01 1 fire or a baby bites off l1is carefttl nurse's :fi11gertip, tl1e)' are, tl1ot1gl1 1nora.lly guiltless a 1 1d free fro111 cri111 inal liability, liable i 11 tort for the cla111age done (altl1ot1gl1 it may be adn1ittedly a bit diffic11lt to visualise a reaso11able 111 ,111 JJlaced i11 tl1 e san1e external circun 1sta 11 ces as the ba.by). People must be able to rely 011 eacl1 otl1er's reaso11able bel1aviour a11 d be so111 el1 ow protected i11 sucl1 reliance, lest life i 1 1 society becomes. impossible. Protectio 11 of innoce11t victi1 ns of l1ar1n comes first. B.

1-Iarmdoers:

mitigation

So n1ucl1 co11ceded, it 1nust not be overlooked tl1 at tl1e harsl1 co1 1sequences of the above pri11ciple for in11oce1 1t l1 armdoers ca11, i11 fit cases, be n1itigated pur stiant to Article 2099: Wl1ere a l1arn1doer is ''u11able to appreciate tl1 e wro11gful natt1re of l1is co11duct'' a1 1d tl1 us is t1naware of tl1 e fault objectively co111n1 itted the cotirt 111ay, i11 accorda11ce witl1 eq11ity, reduce tl1e co1npe11sation awarded. Tl1e �ourt first proceeds to assess tl1e exte11 t of co111pensation co11formably to tl1e amount of damage caused (Article 2091), and tl1 en redt1ces it to fit tl1 e eq11ities of tl1e case. tl1e cot1rts e11joy discretio11 ary pow·ers, Tl, � word ''n1ay'' denotes tl1 at, i11 this field, _ by Article 2152. Ir1 order, ho,vever to avoid an \\ l1 1cl1 are ft1rtl1er stre11gthened exc ��tio11 � l re\1 ersal t1po11_ appeal (Article 2153), tl1e co11rt 111 t1st careft1liy n1otivate its dec1s1 on 10 terms of Article 2099 and context, beari11g in 11 1ind tl1 e follo\vi 1 1g poi11ts: (a) Article 2099 cannot ?e applied to tl1e ''finger-biti11 g'' case. 20 The court cannot reduce �he compe11� at1011 recover�ble fro1 n tl1 e u 11 aware }Joor baby, because liability for bodily harm arises tinder Article 2067 apart fro1 11 a11 y fault. 21 A, 1 y liabilities 1

14. Note 3, D,

15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21.

above. Note 4, above. Consider, ho-..vever, the minor's non-liability for inaccurate statement s (Arttc • 1e 2059) of n1ajority: Article 318. Compare Articles 317 and 350. Note 3, A, above. Note 2, above. Note 3, A, above. See sub-note A, above. Cf. Article 2027, note 5.

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Art. 2030, 5 arisi11g tinder Section 2 of tl1is Chi:tpter exclt1de tl1e possibiljty of applyi11g the ''un awareness of fattlt'' Article (2099). For tl1e pt1r1Jose of fixi11g tl1e a1not1nt of con1pe11sation i11 cases of strict liability it is irreleva11t \.vl1etl1er the at1thor of boclily l1arn1 or the O\.V11er of th.e l1ar111-cat1si11g i11dt1stry, ani1nal, buildi11g, 1nacl1i11e, motor car, n1anufacture (Articles 2067, 2069, 2071, 2077, 2081, 2085) is, or is 11ot, a cl1ild or a 1nad.111a11. (b) If tl1e fire-setti11g 111ad1n,t 11 or a cl1ild vvl10 injures (11ot tl1e fi11ger bt1t) the sl1a1111na of l1is 11t1rse is JJoor a11d wot1ld beco111e clestitt1te i11 co11seqt1e11ce of 1naking good tl1e dainage,22 \vl1ile tl1e hotise o\v.11er or tl1e 11t1rse is well off, tl1e court 111ay redt1ce the co1111Jensatio11 to a 110111inal c.1111ot111t. If, 011 th.e co11trary, the 1nad1na11 or tl1e cl1ild is rich a11cl tl.1e l1ouse ow11er or 11t1rse poor, the court 111a)' decide to gi�,111t 110 redt1ctio11. Betwee11 tl1ese two extren1es lie i11ter.n1ecliate sitt1,1tio11s, to vvl1icl1 the court n1a.y give i11ter111ediate solt1tions. 'Nhere a cl1ild clefe11da11t is joi11ed by l1is pare11t a11swerable u11der Articles 2124-2 1 25(a), the p,1rent's fi11a11cial sitt1atio11 1111:1y also be consiclered (see ft1J. 22). Note that these excL111ples do not exl1aust the operatio11al ral1ge of Article 2099. vVhere the parties' respective f111a11cia/ positio11s call for st1cl1 a steJJ, tl1e cot1rt 1nay reduce the co1npe11satio11 dt1e by any clefe11da11t \vl10 is 11r1aivare of fault dt1e to his i11abilit)1 to aJ)preciate it. A l1ar111doer t1nco11scious of l1is fault is o.fte11 11eitl1er a cl1ild or n1ad111a11, 11or tl1e ''reasonal1le ma11''. Degrees of 111e11tal capacity vary i11finitely. Tl1ey are irreleva11t for attribt1ti11g liability by tl1e objective sta11dard of fat1lt. But tl1ey are releva11t for deciding, i11 view of 111itigatio11, wl1etl1er or 11ot tl1e l1ar1ndoer was ctble to realize tl1at l1is condt1ct is fat1lty. }le \.vho is necessarily t111a,vare (a ''111e11tal'' co11ditio11) of fault is morally in11oce11t. His co11science is at ease. I-lis liability 1nay be socially desir,tble. As a concession to 111orality, 110,vever, l1arclsl1ip cases are re1nedied t111der Article 2099. TJ1ere is SCOJJe here for eqt1ital1Ie · decisio11s i11 tl1e Solo1no11ic 1n,l1111er. '\Vl1at of tl1e t)oor ilJiterate }Jeasa11t \vl10, i11adverte11tly ligl1ti11g a pipe t111der tl1e ''110 s111oki11g'' poster of a petrol store, cat1ses heaV)' da1nage by ·fire (the O\V11er's loss bei11g covered by a rich i11st1ra11ce co1111Ja11y, wl1ich sties the peasa11t i11 virtlte of Article 683 Co 1 11111ercial Cocle) ?23

C. Victims: no n1itigation In sub-11ote B, we were co11cer11ed witl1 a l1ar111doer's unavvare11ess of fatilt (Article 2099). Wl1at of a lil<e t111aware11ess 011 the part of a victi111 at fault? Tl1.ere are no a11alogous provisions for 1Jrotecti11g t1naware victi1ns of l1arn1. lvloreover, Articles 2086(2), 2097(2), a11d 2098 eXJJressly excltide or red·uce the compe11sation of a causes or co11tributes to l1is own da111age. A11cl except for victim wl10 by his fat1lt : the subjective ''good faitl1'' require1ne11t of Article 2097 (which bars disl1011est clai1ns), these Articles contai11 110 hi11t whatever which \VOllld enable us to assess ,1icti1n's fat1.lts otl1erwise tl1an by tl1e objective standard ge11erally laid do,-v11 by Article 2030 and \Vit11out regard to victim's age or me11tal co11dition. As a result; for instance,. a child irijured by a car because .l1e · was playing gan1es in the 111iddle of tl1e street or crossi1 1g it in spite of tl1e red. traffic ligl1t, 111ay remai:n witl1out con1pe11sation. · Indeed, for traffic (or otl1er) Jaw infringernents, even ignora11ce of law is no exct1se

22. A defendant will not become poorer if J1e is i11sured against liability, as e.g. an insane car:. . driver may be. Jn such case, or in case he. has rich parents, "the consequences of tl1e lia. biJity for the author of . the fault" are usually insigoi.ficant. 23. Mere unawareness of his fault would not · J1elp an inadverte.nt literate person in this case, since he tvoulcl be "in a state to appreciate the ,vrongful 11ature of l1is conduct" by reading the poster.

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Art. 2030, 5

(Article 2035). Car drivers must be able to rely on other street-users' normal, reaso nable behaviour, and be somewhat protected in such reliance 24 if traffic is to con tinue. D. Victims: ordinary relief

So much conceded, it n1ust not be overlooked that the harsh consequences of tl1 is conclt1sion for unaware victims of l1arm are ten1pered by tl1e generality of the ordinary principle that harmdoers are liable for faults committed (Article 20�8). Under traffic laws (Article 2035), and the general require1 nent of good conduct (Article 2030) and ·professional dri\1ing skill (Article 2031), a driver is bot1nd to keep a proper lookout a11d adapt his speed and driving to the cl1anging risks enco·untered.25 Wl1 en be sees children, or a poster warning of tlJeir presence, or a school, he knows that be cannot expect nor1nal bel1aviour, but sl1ou]d slow down and be able to stop in an emergency. His duty is analogous witl1 res1)ect to persons wl1on1 he recognizes or sl1ot1ld recognize as mad or drunk (swerving), or ignorant of traffic rules (tribesn1an's dress), or blind (white sticl(), or crippled (limp), or old (wl1ite hair), etc. If l1 e fails to act accordingly and harm . ensues, l1e is liable in spite of victi1n's fat1lt. Just as fault a11d its conseqt 1ences may be sl1ared between wrongdoers (Article 2160), so it n1ay be sl1ared between victim and wrongdoer (Article 2098). Tl1e effect of st1cl1 sl1aring i11 tern1s of Article 2098(2) is tl1at tl1 e compensation recoverable by tl1e victin1 shall only be reduced, and that in proportion to the respective fat1lts' effect and gravity. Tl1e word ''gravity'' inevitably in11)orts moral appreciations. It is grave, itn111 oral for a driver to disregard dangers arising fron1 the presence of yot1ng or disabled l )edestrians.26 It is hardly immoral for tl1e latter (except if drt1nk) to be t1nable to behave like a nor111al reasonable man. A measure of natural justice will tl1 l1 s be preserved tl1rot1gb tl1e 1noral ''gravity'' assess111ents of fault in tern1s of Article 2098(2), even thougl1 tl1is Article gives no regard to the parties' financial position (which. Article 2099 does).27 E.

Overlap

In exceptional cases, tl1e effects of Article 2098 and 2099 n1ay overlap. Plaintiff-victin1 may be invoking n1andatory Article 2098(2) against a defendant harmdoer ,vho prays for discretionary relief under Article 2099. In su.cl1 case Article 2099(2) may be applied, if at all, only after performing tl1e n1andatory assess ments under Article 2098. The incidences of sucl1 an 11nlikely case are perl1a ps. best left to the reader's imagination. F. ''Physical'' condition

The irrelevancy of the plaintiff's or defendant's age or mental condition in assessing his objective fault does not necessarily mean tl1at his purely I)l1 ysical disa bility (e.g., blindness or lameness) is equally irrelevant (altl1ough, ad 111ittedly age is an irrelevant pl1 ysical condition). This problem will one da.y be solved by th� courts. It �s not ?n � of imme ?iate urge �cy, . since ample possibilities of relief are alread )r available w1th1n the flexible remedies d1sct1ssed above under B and D.

24. Sub-note A, above. 25. Cf. Arts. 5 and 17 of Transport (Amendment) Regulations, Leg. Not. 279 of 1963.

26. l{ecklessness: see note 2, B, (b), above. inction between these t\VO Articles lies in the respective ternis "shall" 27. Another dist " 'and "niay ".· · · s d1s · . Ar1·1cIe 2099 ff. denote on Iy " ma � , used 1n cret1onary powers, while the apportionn1ents under Article 2098 "shall" (must) be made.

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;-\.rt. 2031, 1 Art. 2031 - Professional fault1 (1)

A perso,1 pr�ctising CL give11 professio112 or activity2 sl1all, irz tize practice of sz1clz profession or activitJ', observe tl1e rules3 gov_erning tl1at practice.

(2)

1-Ie is liczble 1v/1ere, after elite co11sicleratio11 of scie11tific data3 or rules re 2 3 /1is crcift, /1e appears to be gz1ilty of og11ized by the practitio11ers of c_ 1111pritcler1ce or 11eglige11ce4 co11stitt1ti11g defi11ite4 clisregarcl of duty. 3

COIVIlVIENT..L\.RY (Notes 1-4) 1.

RARITY OF EXTRA-CONTR.ACTUAL .PROFESSIONAL FAlJLTS

Tl1e co11cept of professio11al fat1lt is more important in contract law tha11 in tort law. Ma11y cases of l1arm caused by ''1111professional'' behaviour arise in the context of concrete contract11al relatio11ships rather than th.at of ge11eral clu.ties of care dt1e, i11 tort, to l1 t1manity at large. It is t.rt1e tl1at, as a rt1le, liability in contract arises irrespecti,,e of a11y fault (Article 1791). But Article 1795 111akes ao exce1Jtio11 for those co11tracts ,vl1ere the debtor 011ly undertakes ''to do his best," in \Vllicl1 case b.e is liable only in case of fat1lt. Where l1is u11clertal<ing ''to do his best�' co11cerns a professional activity, t11e ''best'' inclt1des the rules of 11is prof ession. This l1appens freq t1ently, for example, i11 tl1e ''hiri11g of intellectual work." contracts a·od ''medical'' co11tracts (Cl1apters 4 ru1d 5 of Title XVI): Articles 2636 and 2647 specifically i1npose a contractt1al liability for the disregardjog of JJrofess ional rules. But l1ow ca.n Stich Jiablity arise in an extra-co11tractual context, 1 so tl1at the elaborate Article 2031 may becon1e applicable? For private d.octors (not acting as employees of pt1blic hospitals), for instance, this will seldom l1appen. Even i11 tl1e tl1e case of a1i u11.coL1scio11s patie11t t111able to assent to the treatment, valid co11sent is often. give11 by a relative or friencl. 2 A·nd where an ·unconscious accide11t-victim i. s found alo11e, tl1e doctor givi11g emergency assistance l1in1self becomes an ''unauthorised age11t'', so that his liability for fa11lts will be governed by Article 2261 ff. Eve.n wl1ere the doctor's professio11al fat1lt ca11ses death, the surviving spouse's or desce11dants-ascendants' action in tort under Article 2031 (cum 2095) w.ill be barred by Article 2037 beca11se of the contractual action granted then1 by Article 2650. Taking the example of ariother well known profess ion, an advocate's professional liability is also hard to visualize outside the ·con tractual f ield: the advocates' liabilities towards their wronged clients will normally arise in terms of Article 2636 (the agency aspect of their duties being co,,ered basically by Article 2211, with third party protection afforded by Article 2194). After t h t1s illustrating the. difficulty to establish extra - contractual liability for professional faults, we shall p_roceed to ?i� c.uss its elen1en�, domain and applic� ,, ,, tions. Since contract law conta111s no deftn1t1on of professional fault , tl1e analysis below may be helpful by analogy also for those plaintiffs whose co1nplaints of professio·nal fault are brot1ght in the contracti,al field.

1. Cf. Article 2027, note J. Perhaps the. mos_t fre��et1tly od ccurinbg_l "extra-contractual" professional faults are those committed by motorists 10 d r1v1ng, an pu tc servants or employees (see Article 2126 : ff.) in officiating. �rt\cle _2643(b) is in d'?ub t b 2. Chapter on Medical Contracts. And whe!'l ti,,e applicability of d 1ng 1n terms of Artlc 1es e ent 1n n1ay b cons s d fr1�n the l"), entia "ess is t wha (with respect to 2647 thus becomes operative). 2264-5 (A • rticle .

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..\rt. 2031, 2-3

2. CONNOTATION OF ''PROFESSION'' AND ''ACTIVITY'' The don1 ain of tl1 is Article is wider tha11 its title seems to i11dicate. I11deed, its provisions apply to those wl1 0 practice a give1.1 professio11 or a.ctivity, while craft see1ns to denote the idea of the skill required for tl1e execrcise of either: A. Profession In the old days, the typical ''professions'' \Vere the ''liberal'' ones, for which trai11 ing was given in tl1 e medieval universities: theology, law and n1edicine. Tl1 eir practice was governed by elaborate la,vs a11d usages, violation of which was a fat1lt (as it n1 ight be today under Article 2035, or 2636, or 2031). Later, the term ''profession'' acquired a wider mea11i11g. It now seen1s to de11ote many otl1 er activities for tl1e proper exercise of wl1 icl1 special trai11 i11g, skill and k 11 0\vledge are reqt1ired. In this 11ew wider se11 se, tl1 e tern1 ''profession'' would en1brace most ''crafts'', whether ''Liberal'' or not, wl1 ether ''lear11 ed'' i.e. requirir1g a university trai11 i11 g or 11ot (tl1 ose not requiring it bei11g son1etimes called ''trades'': shoernakers, tailors, bakers, chauffeurs, n1echanics, etc.). B. Activity Tl1e above 11 1e11 tioned evolutio11 of tl1e meani11g of ''profession'' blt1rs the line betwee 1 1 it a11 d ''activity'' in tl1 e sense give11 below. I11 deed, tl1 e co11text a 11d the pooling of botl1 ter111s t1nder tl1e co111 111on label ''craft'' (art) in st1b-article (2) sl1ow that \Vl1 at tl1e legislator co11te1111Jlates l1 ere are not all activities but only tl1ose whose JJroper practice prest1p1Joses possessio11 of special skills. This n1 ay over lap \1/itl1 ''professio11'' in its wider rnea1 1i11 g. It also i11clt1des, however, tl1ose pursu its \vl1icl1 are 11ot professions i11 tl1 e sense that tl1 ey are not followed for a living or as a career. You 11 1ay practice riding a horse, or drivi11 g a bicycle or a. 1 11otor car 11ot as a profession, but for occasio11 al business or plea.st1re. Nev ertl1eless, tl1 ose activities, e\1 e11 wl1ere p11 rsued 110 11-professionally, pres11 ppose special skills and k11owledge, and thus fall witl1i 1 1 tl1 e conte1nplation of the present Article.

3. OBSER\TANCE OF RULES AND DATA Wl1e11 is 011e liable for ''professional fault'' ? First, wl1e11 he disregards the duty to follo\1/ tl1e rules recog11ized by the practitio11 ers of his craft; second, -v.1l1 e11 he disregar_ ds tl1 e dt1ty to consider tl1e scie11 tific clata recog11ized by tl1em: A. ObserYance of rules Rules governing a professio11 or activity may be of two ty_pes: (a) Sucl1 rules 01ay be enacted i11 the for111 of lc11-vs. I11 st1cl1 case, tl1 eir ,,iolatio11 constitutes a fault in terms of Article 2035, wl1icl1 alo11 e will s11ffice to create liability. For i11 stance, .wl1ere special he�ltb regt1 latio11 s l1ave beer1 i 11 fri11ged by a r:ie.111 ber of tl1 e profession of healtl1 offi,cers, or pl1 �r1nacists, or 11urses, a plain tiff 11 eed 11ot prove tl1at s11cl1 r11les were recognized by tl1 e practitioners of tl1e respective craft. All l1 e needs to sl10\V is tl1e violation a law i 11 ter 1ns of Article 2035, as, e.g., of a prol1 ibitio11 to dispense certai11 drt1gs \vitl1out n1 edical prescription (because of risks of l1 ar111 : cf. Art. 519 Penal Code).

(b) Instead of being in1posed by law,_ professio11al rules 1 11ay arise fro111 tI1 e ''usual standards of good conduct'' 3 applied an.d recognized by tl1 e practitio11ers of a.

3. Cf. Article

2030,

note 3,

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Art. 2031, 3 given craft. ''Practice'' is coterminous with i,sage, wl1icl1 · constitutes tl1e source ?f st1cl1 rules. Stich tisages 111ay be \Vritte11 do,vn, as they son1eti111es are, e.g., Jn tl1e so-callecl deontology codes governi11g the co11duct of doctors. When such \Vri�ten evidence is lacking (as is ofte11 tl1e case in Etl1iopia), or in addition to it, the cot1rts 1nay call ex: pert n1er11bers of the craft concerned, who describe the usual standards of co11dt1ct gover11ing tl1eir activity, ,vith a view to esta blishing wl1etl1er a give11 defe11dant l1as definitely disregarded his duty to observe tl1en1, tl1us co1111nitting a professional fat1lt. Bt1t before tl1is stage is reached, it is ofte11 necessary to exa1ni11e a series of preli1ninary problen1s, as sl1own by tl1e exa111ple below, wl1icl1 also illt1strates bow tort liability for professional fat1lt .111ay beco1ne irreleva11t by fLpplicatio11 of (1 ) contract Jjability, or (2) strict Ii.ability, or (3) law i11fri11geme11t liability, or (4) ''u11reasonable'' .conduct liability: . EXA M.PLE - A baker sells i1nproperly baked bread, wl1icl1 causes sick11ess or .deatl1 a111ong a large fa1nily. Tl1e clai111 of tl1e actttal bt1yer of the breacl lies i11 contract (see, e.g., Articles 2289 a11d 2300 (3)). Bti.t tl1e c.lai111s of l1is i11jured :relatives a11d, if l1e dies, of certai11 st1rviving relatives (Article 2095) lie in tort ,(there was 110 contract bet,vee11 them and the baker). Tl1eir clai111s, brought :t1nder Article 2085, 1na)1 be defeated by tl1e · bal<er sho,ving that tl1e breacl 's ,defect ''could l1ave bee11 discovered by a custo1nary examinatio11'' of it (stains, .111ouldi11ess). Liability ''irrespective of fat1lt'' under Section 2 111ay tht1s becon1e jn1possible to establisl1, so tl1at the clai1na11ts' prospects vvill de_pe11cl on the possibility of establis11i11g the baker's fault u11der Sectio11 1. Where tl1e manner of 11is baki11g was contrary to specific health regulatio11s, he 111ay be liable t111der A'rticle 2035 (see a, above). Othervvise, tl1e b,1ker's liability may arise under ,either Article 2030 or Article 2031. It \viJI arise u · nder Article 2030 vvl1ere h . is ·''baki11g'' fault WflS so gross as to be obvio11s to an average reasonable 111an ·•not bei11g an ex1 Jert of l1is craft; as, e.g., wl1ere, lacki11g p11re water for ·k11eadi11g tl1e dough, be 11sed tl1at of a refuse po11d. In st1cl1 case, it \Viii" not ,eve11 l1el1J l1i1n to say tl1at tliis is t1st1al JJractice an1011g other bakers. 4 It is ,only wl1ere the baker's fat1lt is not obvious i11 this se11se tl1at it beco.n1es 11ecessary ,to introdt1ce evide11ce clS to tl1e 11st1al standards of baking recog11ized by bakers. So.me s11ch evidence n1ay be fot111d i11 books on tl1e principles of baking. Otl1er .evide11ce 111ay be supplied orally by 111embers of the baki11g craft. Tl1ey may detect faults evide11t 011ly to tl1e expert eye: for it1sta11ce, tl1e wro11g proportion or quality of th.e leave11i11g p · o'vvder used, or the olclness, stale11ess, or i1npurity co11te.nt of the flour used for baki11g. B. Observa11ce of scientific data Wbere a skilled activity is , governed not merely by a set of en1pirical rules, ·but also by scientific data, the craftsn1.a11 concerned ,may i1ot disregard the duty ,eo·ntinuously to con.sider them, l<eepi11g abreast of tl1e state of research in his f ield. ·This is partict1larly in1JJOrtant i11 tl1e ''learned'' professions, ,vhic� presuppose a uni -versity training. W11ere a l1ouse crun1bles, or a patie11t d.ies, the a.rchitect or doctor will 11ot make o ·ut a successft1l defence by 1nerely showiJ1g that he has applied vvhat- . ,ever . he has . lear11ed in his student days. His procedures of building, of healing, must be in accordance \Vith the currently recognized scientific data concerning medicine or arcl1itecture. His _liability, l1owever, will mostly arise in co11tract (for ,doctors, see above, note l). In the case of tl1e architect, where he and the buil9ing

A. C{. Article 2030, note 3, B.

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Art. 2031, 3-4 contractor are one and the same person, his contractual warranty under � ticle 3039 is independent of fat1lt. Otherwise, he is contractually liable for faults in terms of Article 2636. Where, however, his unscientific buildi1 1g schemes have cau_sed damage to third persons, whose conti11 ge1 1t properties were injured by. the crumbling . of what he l1as b1tilt tl1eir claims will lie in tort t11 1der the present Article. But tl1ey will usually fi1 1d it 1nor; pra.ctical to invoke the l1ouse ow1 1er's liability (Article 2077): the_ house owner is easier to locate, and his fault need not be proved (tl1e owner n1ay, 111 turn, recover fron1 the builder).

NEGLIGENCE

A. The ''Reasonable Practitioner'' criterion Tl1e criterion of liability for infringing 1nerely professional rules ru1 d practices is less stringent tl1an that for infringi11 g legal rt1les. Breach of legal rules is a fault irrespective of dilige11ce (Article 2035). Obversely, breac11 of professio.nal r11 les not e11acted by law 5 must be ''definite'' and ''1 1eglige11 t''. TL1e dt1ty to follow professional standards 1uust be definitely a11 d 11egligeotly disregarded (wl1 ere tl1e disregard is ''wil ful'', it aJso violates the subjective ''n1orality'' require1nent of Article 2030, note 2). TL1is quaJificatio11 see111 s to be d11e to tl1 e sl1 ifti11 g a11d son1eti1 11 es ut1 certain nature of professio11al usage, as co11 trasted \vitl1 the fixity a1 1d certai1 1ty of legal rules. Eve11 scientific data 111 a.y be controversed. In order to establish tl1 e defend ant's fat1lt, plai1 1tiff sl1 011ld, therefore, sl1 ow tl1at a11 average reaso11able practitio.ner of defe11 da11t's craft \Vot1ld defi11 itely have acted otber\vise tl1a11 defe11 da 11t did, and would ha.ve co11sidered l1is co11d11ct as neglige11 t. We are tl1t1s brought back to the definitio1J of fal1lt discl1ssed. u11 der Article 2030. 6 In accorda1 1ce \Vith his overall policy of specifyi11g, wl1erever possible, tl1e 1neani1 1g o·f the ''reaso11able condt1ct'' criterio11 of fal1lt,7 the legislator l1ere see111 s to indicate that, i1 1 cases where fau It can11 ot be appreciated b)' tl1e average reaso11ab]e 1 11 an beca11se of tl1 e expertise i11 voI,,ed in tl1e acti,,ity concern.ed, refere11 ce sl1all be l1ad 11 0 n1 ore to tl1e reaso11able man i11 general, bitt to the average reasonable practitioner of tl1e defe11 dant's parti cular craft. There remains to be disct1ssed the situation of a clefendant \Vho, witl1 a maxi mum of care, exercised a11 activit)1 for which he possessed i11sufficie1 1t skill, stre11gtl1 or expertise. Tl1 is 'A1il1 11 ot sa,,e L1in1 fro11 1 liability incurred by virtue of co11 1paring his condt1ct with tl1at of a reasona�1e expert pra.ctitio11er. As a 111atter of policy, however, wl1y sl1 ot1ld be be held liable? Tl1e a11 swer is tl1 at a n1 ,1n sl1ot1ld not expose otl1ers to l1ar111 by engagi11 g in acti,1ities for '"1hicL1 l1e is 11ot qualifiecl. People 1 1 pt1rsuits reqtiiri11 g special expertise persons' other on o able e should i rely � � _ qual1ficat1 011s, wl11 cl1 these others cl1oose to follow. E.g., sa.ve i11 cases of emer gency, or of normally innocuous and gratuitous interference 8 a n1a11 s11ould not start ''healing'' people without possessing medical qualification�: where J1arn1 ensues he ma� be l1eld to th � standard of a qualified physician, and such liability may so�nd 1n t_ort wl1 ere h !s agreements to cure are, for Jack of legal autllority, in val1? by virtue ?f _A :t1cle 1 ?I 6 (he may perh.aps also be ''strictly'' liable under 1 1:g bodily harm where be has no legal authority for his act1nfl1ct for 06 '1cle t ? � � : _ 1v1t1es w1tb1n tl1e meaning of A.rt. 518 Penal Code). A person should not drive a

5. 6. 7. 8.

See noie. 3, A, (a), above. In note 3, A. See Article 2030, note 3, D, (b). Cf. Art. 518(3-4) of the Penal Code.

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Art. 2031, 4 motor car in the street without an expert instructor's assistance before l1 e · has acquired the q11,1lificatio11s possessed by expert clrivers. An amateur rider may be held fo � not possessi11g the expert rider's skill and strength which would l1ave en abled 11101 to l1 old back a bolti11g l1orse (note tl1at the victim i 1 1jured by the car or horse can also sue its possibly in11ocent owner by virtue of Article 2071 or 2081). 9

B. Distinctions In order to get a closer view of tl1 e general ''professional fault'' concept, it may be i11structive to co11trast it witl1 other kj11ds of fault in one and the same fact-situation. Suppose a lonely and l1eavily bleeding accident-victim, lying on the high\vay: (a) A11ybotfJ,, wl10 drives by, ignori11g tl1e bleeding man, n1ay be committing a fault u11der A.rticle 2035 by violating Article 547(1) Pe11al Code. (b) /1 lcty111a11 (in terms of medical knowledge) stops his motor car and tries to do his duty by taki11g the victim to l1ospital. Because of the sl1aky road, the victim bleeds to deatl1 before reaching medical aid. Tl1e layman does not know 'w·bat professio11als do, namely that a heavily bleeding person should not be moved before a provisional dressi11g of bis wound on the spot (be shou.ld ratl1er l1ave brougl1t a physician or dresser to the scene). But since any non professional reaso11able man might have done the same, he is not liable by the Article 2030 criteria. Neither can lie be made liable irrespective of fault under Article 2067: l1is act was ''ordered by law'' (Arts. 547(1) and 518(3) Penal Code). (c) A professional graduate of tl1e Gondar Health Officers School drives by. Instead of giving first aid on the spot, or calling for it, he carries tlie bleeding victim to a hospital, witl1 the san1e fatal result. He is liable by the Article 2031 cri terion. It is no defence for him to show that an average reasonable man would have done the same. W11ether in tort or in contract, he is held to the stand ard of a reasonable health officer, who would have acted otherwise. Incidentally, the ''liability without fault for bodily harm'' provision (Article 2067) should not be invoked agai11st healtl1 officers, doctors, etc., in connection with their services. The exen1ption from strict liability for acts ''ordered'' by law should indeed be constrt1ed liberally to include acts ''authorized'' by law and professional duties (compare Arts. 64-65 Penal Code where, however, the . exemption from liability is wider: it includes non-grave professional faults). Otherwise, doctors would soon. be prevented from continuing their indispens able services by a host of liabilities innocently incurred. They should be liable only· for faults.

9. Incidentally, liability for bad driving or riding .\Vill more easily sound in tort than that for . bad healing or building, wl1ich is more often contractual (see note 3, B, supra).

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Art. 2032, 1 Art. 2032 - Intent to injure• (1)

A person commits a fault where he acts witlz intent to injure 2 another with out 2 seeki11g personal gain. 2

(2)

A perso11 likelvise co11-1mits a fault where he co11sciously causes heavy dam a.ge to anotl1er i11 seeking personal gai,z disproportionate2 to suc/1. damage.

COMMENTARY (Notes 1-2) I. INTRODUCTION

A. Generalities Througl1 011t tl1e legal system there runs a trend of reprobation of \\1rongful in te 11 t. 1 11 the pe11 al law, it underlies the ordinary criterion of gtiilt, 1 other criteria being exceptional. 2 Although Liability in the civil law is ordi11 arily based on mere non-perfor 111 ance of cluty 3 or on a11 ''objective'' criterion of fault, 4 se,1eral provisio.ns deal separately witl1 i1tjurious or deceitful inte11t. In tort, Article 2059 applies to deceitft1l inte11t. 5 For tl1 e legal effects of intent to i 1tjt1re (prese11tly discussecl) see, in tort, Articles 2032, 2045(2), 2046(2), 2047(2), 2048(2), 2049(1), 2101(2), 2106, 2159. 6 B. Intent to injure is in11noral

Article 2030 provides, an1ong otl1er 1natters, tl1 at he wl1 0 acts in a way which offends 111orality co1nn1its a fault . Tl1 e prese 11 t Article specifies tl1 e main incidence of tl1is subjective criterio11 by providi11g that l1 e wl1 0 acts primarily witl1 intent to inj11re cornnlits a fault. TJ1e courts are 11ot free (notwithstandu1g ct1sto1nary approvals of, e.g., vengea11ce) to l1 old tl1at _ s11cl1 acting is not imn1oral i11 ter1 11s of Article 2030(1). U 1 1der A1·ticle 2029 we 11 ave enu1nerated i11 note 2 a variety of legal con seque 1 1ces that attacl1, in tort, to l1 ar111ful intent. We shall now discuss only the basic principle expressed in tl1e present Article.

C. Fu11ction of this Article As . in1plied by Article 2034, ''the foregoing provisio11 s'', i.e., the Articles 2032 a11 d 2033, are cl1iefly co11 cerned with tl1e ma11ner i 11 whicl1 a rigl1 t (or a ''power'') is 11sed. Before \\1e start, however, to analyze this problem of use and abt1se of rigl1 ts, \Ve 1n11st mention tl1 at in certain situations Article 2032 1nay perform a 1 1otl1 er function. I11deed, apart from negativing a defence ''I \Vas \Vithi11 1ny rigl1t'', harn1ful intent may also negative the arg11n1e11 t that ''I was witl1in the general linlits of proper co11duct traced by Article 2030." For exa 1nple, it may be tl1 at a n1 an does not infri11ge tl1ose limits by not trying to find and notify tl1 e house-owner every ti1ne l1 e sees a house 01 1 fire. But still, he 1nt1st not bel1 a,,e i 1 1 this way primarily with i11tention to harm, as ,vhe11, seei 11 g the owner, he consciot1sly on1its to warn llim of the :fire.7 Such conduct co11stitutes a fat1 lt under tl1is Article. Art. 58 of the Penal Code. Art. 59(2) of the Penal Code. Article 1791 ; Article 2035. Article 2030 (note 3). In other fields, compare Articles 143, 145, 541, 991(2), 1109, 1704, 2406(2), 2407(2), 2442(2-3), 2467. 6. In _other fields, compare Articles 1801(2), 1805, 1892(2), 2364(2), 2553(1), 2559(1), 3197(b). 7. Cf. Article 2029, 11ote 5, (d).

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

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Art. 2032, 2 2 RIG I-ITS: ABUSED OR EXCEEDED? A. Inequality in specific rigl1ts ":7he!her w � like it or not, or pretend the co11trary, tl1e basic co11 ditio11 of m�n 1s _ 111e9-ual1�y. I11eqt1ality exists both i11 fact and, in a special sense, in law. R1ght is n11ght 111 legal arn1ol1r. It st1bjects tl1e son to the fatl1 er, the 11 00-0\vner to the ow11er, the serva11 t to tl1e master, tl1e clebtor to the creditor. In ancient la\v, tl1 ose rigl1 ts were ofte11 c1bsoli1te i11 a ver)' real sense. The fatl1er could cl1 ain imprison or sell l1 is s011 , tl1 e creditor coulcl do the sa1J1e witl1 his defa11lting debtor: tl1e 111aster co11ld beat the serva11t (l1e ca11 still do it i11 Ethiopia under Article 2039(c) ), the O\V11 er co11ld i11jure trespassers or deprive neigl1 bours of \vater. Now ad,:1ys the · exte11t of s11cl1 rigl1ts is li111itecl, respectively, by tl1e ''abuse of right'' doctri11e (for tl1e ab11se of ''po\ver'' d.octri11e see Article 2033) or by legislation. TJ 1 e ''ab11se of rigl1t'' doctrine lin1its rigl1ts from witl1 011t by the overriding pri11 ciple tl1at they sl1 ould 11 ot be exercised witl1 the i11te11 t to injure (see B, below). Legisla tio11 li111 its tl1en1 fro111 \Vitl1in by red11ci11g their content (see C, below). I11cideutally, eve11 so redl1ced, i11 eq11ality i11 ''s1Jecific'' rigl1ts8· is a co11 ti11uing hall1nark of ''free'' society (tl1e very freedo1n of co11tract, of property, of testame11t, leads to i11equalities in legal 111 igl1t, i11 rigl1ts).

B. Abusing one's rigl1ts Ca11 a 1nan's act be botl1 1vit/1i11 a specific legal right he l1 as a11d still be co11trary to a general principle of tort law? Ca11 l1e be at fa11lt while merely ex.ercis i11g the attributes of a right vvl1 ich a.re gra11ted by tl1e legislator hi111self? A ce11tury ago, most la\vyers and co11rts abroacl were i11clined, i11 �1ccorda11ce with logic a11d the u1 di·vidualistic doctri11es the11 }Jrevaili11g, to a11 s\ver ''110'' to tl1is questio11. Later, with devices and i11sta11ces of 111.isuse of rigl1ts on the ir1crease, jt1rispr11clence a11d . the 1noder11 codes ha.ve evolved pri11ciples wl1 icl1 allow the cou.rts some control over extreme cases of 111is11se of rigl1ts. T.he princi1Jle of control is tl1is: I11divid11al rigl1ts are protected as 1011g as 11sed prin1arily for the advantage of tl1e individual concerned. B11t \Vl1ere, ratl1 er tl1a11 beir1g ·used 11;ai11 Iy for perso11al gain, they ary used. prin1arily ''vvitl1 i11te11t to i11j11re a11otl1 er'', a fault is co111.1nitted under tl1is Article.

We start, however, fro111 a restrictive pri11ci·ple: Article 2034 i111 plies tl1 a t the ·man11er in wl1icl1 a rigl1t is exercised n1 ay not be q11estio11 ecl except in case of inte11t to u1jure. A perso11, t]1erefore, i11 so far as he 1nerely ex.ercises a11 ordi11ary right w.itl1 i11 its legal Jimits9 is dee111ed fa11ltless unless l1is JJrin1 ary intent is ''to in-' ju,re''. This .1nay i11volve a plaintiff in difficult enquiries i11to the defe.nda11 t's state. of n1ind. In exceptional cases, defe11 da11t's miscl1ievous u1 tention will be evidenced by letters or vvitness�s. Ordi11arily, l1owever, plaintiff will be red11ced to seeki11g circumstantial evide11 ce of defendant's 1nalice. In tl1is, he is hel.ped by tl1e legislator. · A person ''commits a fau.lt'' where h� conscio11�l y. in�ures anoth� r �'witho11t s�e�i11g personal ga.in'': tl1 is n1 ay be clearest c1rc11n1stant1al ey1dence of his intent to 111.Jtire. In ·addition, tl1 e legislator gives_ a remedy even where s11cl1 . intent is less clear, namely where defenda11t by using �is right d?es J?ake a. perso11al gain, but st1ch gain is disproportionate (dispr�p�rttonately small) 1n. relation to. tl1 e ?eavy dru:nage be consciously causes to tl1e pla1ntrff. No fixed proport1011 or q11ant1ty betng prescribed,

8. As distinct from those generally granted by Articles 8 ff. of the Civil Code and 37 ff. �f the

Re·v. Constitution. 9. For the criterion of fault in using "powers", see Article 2033. '

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Art. 2032, 2

the interpretation of tl1e terms ''disproportionate'' and ''heavy'' is a matter for judicial discretion. In otl1er words, the court will ad1nit st1ch proof where it feels coovi11ced that, in the circumsta11ces of the ca.se, a given ''disproportion'' really denotes a primarily mischievous intention. 10 We shall, henceforth, refer to the use of a right with intent to i11jure in the abo,,e n1e11tioned sense as abuse of rigl1t. A n1an does n. ot abuse bjs right where he injures another incidentally to a lawful gainful activity, as, e.g., by fair 11. compe tition in business. He does abuse them where bis main purpose, as demonstrated directly or circumstantially, is not gain to himself but harn1 to otl1ers. C. Exceeding one's rights

A rigJ1t is not abused where it is specifically exceeded. You. cannot abuse what you 11ave not. Exceeding tl1e specific lin1its of one's right is acting witl1out a right. Yot1 can claim tl1at a right bas been abused only against son1ebody wl10 exercised i t witllin its specific legal limits. Wl1ere l1e steps beyoncl tl1ose lin1its, l1e infringes tl1e law and tl1e proper ren1edy to invoke n1ay be Article 2035, 12 ratl1er than this Article. In Ethiopia, se,1 eral i1nportant rigl1ts, as, e.g., ownership, are li1nited by a host of specific legal provisions. Violation of these provisons constitt1tes a fat1lt under Article 2035 witl1ot1t any need to establish an i11te11t to injure, wl1icl1 would be the require111ent were Article 2032 sot1gl1t to be apJ)lied. TJ1e latter Article, of difficult applica.tion, is tl1us, fortunatel)', of 11ot too 1nuch practical i1nportance i11 Etl1iopia. Nevertheless, for illustrative purposes and to J)revent t1ncritical acceptance of foreign precedents it n1a)1 be t1seft1I to disct1ss, in terms of Etl1iopian Jaw, son1e typical :foreign categories of ''abuse of rights''. TL1is \'Viii enable lIS to realize to wl1at extent Article 2035 (or, in case of contra.ctual rigl1ts, Article 1713) restricts tl1e relevancy of Article 2032 i11 tl1ese sitt1ations. Tl1e following discussion will refer to rights of ownership, contractt1al rigl1ts and proced·ural rigl1ts. D.

Rigl1ts of o,vnership

Abuse of ownership is a main category of ''abuse of rigl1t'' litigation abroad. This is due to sweepingly wide definitions of ownership in Roman-based legal systems, includi11g our o,:vn (Articles 1204-1206). In our system, however, this wide definition is follo\ved by an unusually large 11umber of legal restrictions (Articles 1207-1256), which seems to be i n keeping with the communal solidarity spirit prevailing in Ethiopian society. Below is an illuminati11g list of situations in which an owner exceeds his rigl1t rather than abuses it (notv,,1ithstanding tl1e title of Article 1225), the resulting l1arm being, therefore, usually redressible under Article 2035 rather than 2032: (a) Owner sha.kes neighbour's land by excavations on his own land (Article 1210). (b) O\vner in1pedes aircraft flights by structures higher than tl1e useful extent denoted by Article 1211. (c) Owner prohibits trespass which is ''necessary'' (such trespass is not a fault tl1ougl1 harm caused by it is compensable under Article 2066) for avertino � danger, repairi11g a wall, recovering lost things or ani1nals (Article 1217-1219).

10. On this point, compare Article 2063.

11. Cf. Article 2057. 12. Except, of course, where such limits and the renledies for their violation are contractual.

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Art. 2032, 2 (d) Owner prohibits tl1e installatio11 of water, gas or electricity lines in favour of other la11ds (Article 1220( 1 )). (e) O\vner reft1ses a rigl1t of ,:vay to an enclosed neighbour (Article 1221). (f) Owner denies to l1is neigl1bours tl1e domestic use of sL1ch excess of water as he ca1111ot t1se hiJnself for domestic purposes (Article 1233). (g) Ow11er pollutes ,vater to ,vhich otl1ers are also entitled (Article 1235; see also Article 1242(2) ). (h) O'tv11e�· violates any of tl1e elaborate rules about tl1e priorities in and modalities of t1s111g or discl1arging run11ing \vater (Articles 1236-1247). (i)

Owner prohibits certain irr.igatio11 works or aq·ueducts on his land (Articles 1249, 1252).

(j) Ovvner harms l1is neigl1bours by a so-called 11uisar1ce. Since tl1e relevant Arti cle 1225 is completely distorted i11 the English version, we .have to retranslate it as follows: (I)

In tl1e exercise of bis rights, the owner sl1all abstain from excesses harm ful to the e11joy1nent of neigl1bouring properties.

(2)

I11 particular, he shall not cause smoke, soot, unpleasant smells, noise or vibrations in excess of tl1e limits of good-11eighbourly tolerance.

(3)

For tl1e purpose of ascertai11ing sucl1 lin1its, regard shall be l1ad to local custom, the position of tl1e la11d, and the natt1re thereof.

Conseque11tly, wl1ere t h. e owner exceeds his rigl1t by doing on· his land some thi11g \Vhich disturbs the e11joyment of neigl1bo11ring properties .in excess. of the limits of good-11eighbo11rly tolera11ce, as ascertained by local custom and tl1e la11d's position, l1e is at fa11lt. Any do11bt as to \Vl1ether this rt1le is ''specific and e·xplicit'' enot1gl1 to satisfy tl1e reqt1ireme11ts of Article 2035 is dispelled by Article 1226 (also distorted i11 the translation), whicl1 sl1ould read: SANCTION - I-Ie wl10 is 11armed · or in da11ger of l1arm because of an owner exceed.i11g his rigl1ts n1ay require l1im to re-establish the for111er sitt1ation or act to prevent tl1e danger, without prej11dice to claims for con11Jc11scttio11. 13 For two · reasons , 110\vever, tl1e a:bove re1nedies may not be readily av�tilable . . Firstly, altl1011gh the clain1ant 1nay be a no11-owner, l1is claim under Article 1226 cum . 2035 lies only agai11st tl1e owner. If therefore - the clai1nant wants to sue tl1e neighbouring non-"o\vner te11ant, he may have to do it under Article 2032 by establisl1i11g. an ''intent to i11j11re'', or, perhaps, by arguing generally tl1at a tenant can have. no more rights tl1an · the ovvner from whom l1e holds. Secondly, it may sometini :es be prohibitively difficult to establish what is the exact limit of ''good-neighbourly tolerance''. It may then be more advantageous -,, out any direct or circumstantial evidence of ''intent to injure'' under .to . brin0 Article 2032. 14 EXAMPLES of nuisance:· (1) B practices target sl1ooting excessively near the bo11ndary of C's poultry farm, which scares and harms C's chickens. (2) .

13. Emphasis added. 14. This will also enable the claimant to demand "moral" damages under Article ·2106 (material harm may be lacking).

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Art. 2032, 2 B plays his radio during the night wl1 ich prev:11 ts ne�ghbouri�g advocate _ _ C from sleeping, or plays it excessively ! oudly 1� dart1me, . wl11�h pr� ve�ts C from working. (3) B's factory, situated 1n a pr11:11ar1ly res1dent_1al district, produces excessive s1noke, smells or vibratio11s, which l1 ar1!1s ne� gbbour C: _ smoke may dainage C's lungs, smell hurt his wellbeing, v1brat1ons his property. E. Contractual rights Cases of exceedi11 g one's co11tractual rights 11aturallf fall u11 d� r the rules . on 11 on-performance (breach) of co11 tracts. But even ab11s111 g such rights w1t� ou t exceeding tl1em need not lead to extra-co11tractual liability. A!thougl1 co11tractual r1gl1ts . do not see111 to differ, in: Ethiopia, fron1 otl1er legal r1gbts with respect to tl1e _ probibitioL1 to exercise tl1em prin1arily witl1 i11tent to injure, the relevant re1� ed1es n1 ay often be fou11d witl1in the contract law itself. 011 tl1e one l1a11 d, a particular provisioL1 of tl1 e co11 tract law may specifically reprove sucl1 intent of a contractant (see Article 2581). On tl1 e other l1a11 d, tl1e cot1rts may choose to solve other con tractl1al cases of ''inte11t to injt1re'' by a liberal application of tl1 e general ''good faitl1 '' require111e11t i11l1erent i11 Article 1713 ct1111 1737..[f tl1e cot1rts take this line the follo\vi11g proble1n will be solved n.ot in tort 15 but i11 contract:

A lessor abuses l1is 11011-exceeded rights wl1ere he exercises l1 is contractual rigl1 t to ter111ii1ate a lease of indeter1ninate d11ratio11 purst1ant to Ar. ticle 2966 (or not to renew one of deter111i11 ate dt1ratio11: Article 2965) ot1t of spite rather tha11 for personal gai11. For example, where a lessee l1 as ·fulfilled l1is dltty of trutl1f11lly testifyi11g against l1is lessor i11 a. civil suit or cri11 1i11al case, 16 Sl1cl1 lessor m11st not revei1ge hin1self on l1i111 by servi11g a 11 otice to quit 1111 der Article 2966 (with 11 0 gai11 to tl1e lessor, or s111all gai11 i11 proportio11 to l1ar1n do11e). Altl1ot1gl1 it is tl1 e wordi11g of Article 2032 tl1at wo11Jd 111ost closely fit s11cl1 a case, tl1 e co11rts n1 ay elect to see in sucl1 ab11se a violatio11 of tl1e ge11 eral ''good f,1itl1'' reqt1ireme11 t in l1erent i11 Article 1713 cu11 1 1732 of co11 tract la.\v. 17 F. Proced11ral rights

. (a) WJ1ile specific co11 tractt1al or property rigl1ts. reflect tl1e i11equalities i11l1 erent i11 an)' free society, the rigl1t to tt1rn to co11rts for deter111 i11 ation of legal clispt1tes belo11gs equally to everybody (as do tl1 e rights n1e11tio11ed u11der Artic les 8 ff. Civil Code and 37 ff. Rev. Co11 stit11tion). The rigl1 ts to accuse, st1e, defe11d i11 a suit, appeal, levy exect1tion, etc., are so essential to tl1 e eq11al pro tection of citize11 against 11.11lawft1lness or abuse of rights tl,at co11rts are so1neti111 es relucta11 t to ad111 it that tl1ese procecll1ral rights 111a.y tl1e1nselves l1 ave bee11 abu secl. The situation is clearest \:J;/here they l1 ave bee11 exceeded ratl1er tl1 a11 abt1sed, as wl1ere �he law l _1as bee11 infrin�ed i11 co1111ectio11 witl1 proceclure, i11 ,vhicl1 case _fat1lt 1s committed . u11 der Article 2035._ Tl1is n1ay l1aJJ J)e11 by violatio11 of certain. Pe11 �l Code pr ?v1sons. Exan1ples:_ !v11sleadi11g J11stice (Art. 440 Per1 . C.) by not1ficat1011 of a cr1n1e never co1n1111tted; False Acct1satio11 or Deiit111ciation (Art. 441 Pen. C.) of an i11noce11t; Fals � State111e11ts by a Party (Art. 446 Pen. C.) to tl1 e _ effect, e.g., tl1at a debt (\vl11cl1 \vas paid) is 11ot paicl; Provocatio11 a .11d . St1bor111ng (Art. 449 Pe11 . C.), e.g., of wit11esses; Misreprese11tatio11 in Pro ceedings (Art. 450 Pe11. C.), by, e.g., l1 idi11g a doct1me11t, etc. Any }1arn1 tl1ereby 15. See Article 2037. 16. See Articles 447 of the Penal Code and 2061 of the Civil Code. 17 . No t,1.,ithstanding the "li1nits of interpretation" i1nposed by Article 1733. Cf. Article 2037, note 3, E, (e).

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Art. 2032, 2 caused is reparable \\'ithout tl1 e 11eed to sl1o'v\1 that clefe11da11 t's primary in.te 11t \Vas ''to i 11jt1re'' rather seek a gai11. Incleed, 1111fot111 ded cri1 ni.□al proceedi11gs n1ay l1ave been tl1reatened a11 d bro11gl1 t, or incluced (Art. 449 Pen. C.) with a view tl1e acct1sed to J)ay a clebt or compro 11 1ise property rights (cf. Arts. to compel . 553 Pe11. C. a11 cl 1706 Civ. C.), tl111s bri11gi11 g a g,1i 1 1 to tl1 e accuser or st1bor ner. St1cl1 perversion of legal process vvill 1 1ot save hin1 fron1 liability u 11der Article 2035 (ct1m Art. 100 Pe11 al Code). In tl1is co11nection we n1t1st ren1e1nb er that tl1 e in1 mt111 ity for 11tterances 111ade in j11dicial proceedings (Article 2048 (1) ) bars only actions for clefa111 ation and not those brought on the abovemen tio 11 ecl gro1111ds 11ncler Article 2035. (b) Proced11rc1l rigl1 ts n1ay be abused witl1011t being exceeded, as vvl1ere a litigant kno\"1ing tl1at l1is clai111 or defe11ce is grou11 dless has used tl1 e dilatory legal devices of Civil Procedure si 11 1ply to postpone the fi11al disposition of the case (e.g. by a cl1ai11 of appeals). Tl1e 011ly possibility of redress is the 1 1 given by Article 2032. Tl1ere 11 1ay be, l1owever, two obstacles: (i) A defe11d�t 11 t may co11tend that l1 is Pri . 1nary intent was not to injure but to gain by tl1 e J)Ostpo11 e1ne11t of a11 expected 11nfavo11 rable judgme11 t. S11ch bad faitl1 should not be rewarded by immunity. First, where is, strictly spea king, l1is gai 1 1 if he expected a 1 1d eventt1ally got the t111f,1vorable fir1 al jt1de n1ent? Seco11 dly, eve 1 1 if we ad111 it tl1ere was a gain, jt is often ''dis _proportio11a .te'' to tl1 e amo1111t of har111 caused the other litiga11 t, whicl1 cir cun1 sta 11ce n1ay suffice to establish liability tinder sub-article (2) of Article 2032. (ii)

Plai 11 tiff i11voki11g Article 2032 n1 ay be 11t1able to establisl1 any l1 ar 1n after the (abt1sively delayed) f i11al j11dgrne 11 t in his favotrr l1as already i11clu.ded. rei1nburse11 1ent of I1 is costs a11 d fees expe11ses. Usttally, however, l1 e will be able to sl1ow so11 1e addito11al l1ar111 , as, e.g., surplus fees paid, ti1ne take 1 1 a\vay from profitable acitivities, moral da111ages for \vorry (Article 2106).

With respect to tl1e rig11 t to levy executio11 (clistrai11 goods) for clebt, 01 1e of tl1 e ''Special Cases'' provisio1 1s (Article 2063) in1plements tl1e sta11 clarcl laid dovv11 generally by sub-article (2) of Article 2032, wl1 ereby tl1is 111 ust 11ot be done to· a11 exte11 t ''disproportio11 ate'' to tl1 e gain co1 1ten1plated (the an1ount dtte). G. Al>solute rights In su·b-note A, above, we l1ave traced tl1e evolutio11 from the former ''absolt1te ness'' of certai11 rights to their prese11t limitations by legislation or ''abuse of right'' doctri11 es. The Etbiopia11 Civil Code reveals, ho\vever, at least two types of rigl1 ts which •are completely discretionary (absolt1te) in tl1 e se 1 1se of bei.11 g incapable of 1imi tatio1 1 by the ''ab11se of rigl1 t'' doctrine (by A_rticle 2032). They are, respectively, the rigJ1 t to invoke prescription (Article 2065) a11d tl1 e right to revoke a license (Article 1369). As to �tbsotute rigl1ts of the class called ''povvers'', they will b: dis cussed separately. 18 . (a) Tl1e cateaorical terms of Article 2065 whereby l1e who uses l1is right to i 1 1v oke presc;iptio,1 commits 110 fa11lt 19 exclt1de the applicability ?f Article 2032 to . such a sitt1ation. It is irrelevai1t whetl1 er the defe11dant who 111vokes usuGapt1011

18. Under Article 2033, note 2, E. 19. See also Article J 854 on the irrelevance of bad faith. •

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Art. 2032, 2 (Article 1168 ) or limitation of action (Article 1845) does or does not act in bad faith and with intent to injure or cause dan1age disproportionate to his gain. 20 The policy behind this principle seems to be that of cutting down litigati_on. At the price of an occasional injustice, situations established by lapse of time . _ are n1aintained. A claimant in co11tract or property law wl1 0 slept on h1s rights for ten or fifteen years is less wortl1y of protection tha11 is tl1e general interest of preserving legal security by preventing settled situations from being disturbed by the bringing of stale claims after a time so long that the problems of proper evidence may become t1nmanageable. In tort the limitation period is the shortest (2 years) because the evidential difficulties are here the greatest (oral testimony) and deserving victims anyway hardly wait more than two years with their claims. If they do, Article 2032 will not help them, its applicability being in1pljedly excluded by Article 2065. This does not, however, rule out liability for a fault con1mitted before prescription is invoked. Where the clai1nant in tort, contract or property law bad been lulled into inaction by defendant's inaccurate inform ations (as to, e.g., impossibility of prescription) relied upon. by l1i1n he may have a ren1edy under Article 2559. In such case defe11dant's liability \vill not be for abuse of tl1e rigl1t to invoke prescription, wl1ich remai11s u11cl1alle11geable, but for committing an earlier fault in terms of Article 2059. A.nd tl1e two years ]inlitation period for invoking this earlier fault will not start running before the ensuing damage, that is the prescription of the main claim, has n1aterialized (see Article 2143(1)). (b) Article 1369 provides tl1at a person wl10 l1as given a lice11se (gratuitous per mission not expressed as obligatory or irrevocable) 21 to use his lai1d in a part icular manner ca11 revoke it at any time. These categorical . terms seem to exclt1de tl1e possibility of c]ai1n.ing, under Article 2032, that fault is committed 'by st1cl1 revocation where tl1e intent is to injure ratl1er than gain. Tl1e policy bebi11d tl1is exclusion seems to be that of not d.iscouraging good-neigl1bourly belJaviour. A n1an per1nitting others to walk, or take water or \Vood or grass, or even to build a hut, or do some pasturing or cultivation on l1is land shot1ld not be penalized for his charity by liabilities attached to tl1e manner of revocation of suc}1 license, lest neighbours become afraid of helping each other. This, l1owever, does not rule out a liability based on a fault originated before the license is revoked, as wl1en the licensor's conduct l1as indltced tl1e licensee to rely 011 the contir1uation of the license, in wruch case the licensee may invoke Article · 2058 and claim compensation for an ur1tin1ely revocation or, in extren1e cases, a temporary retention of tl1 e advantages relied upo11 (Article 2123) (licensor's ir1tent to injure is here irrelevant). Landowners so.meti111es induce s _uch relianc � jn order to gain by the improven1ents effected by tl1e er1couraged licensee. Quite apart from problems of fault, however, they cann9t retain tl1e improvements witl1out paying the compensation imposed by tl1e ''unjust'' enricl1ment pr !nc�ple (Articl � 2162) or, wl1ere relevant, eitl1er th � reimbursement of expenses pr1nc1ples (Art1c �es 2168-217 I), or the com1)ensat10?- for accession principles . exl?ressed in Articles � 176 . and 1179. �l1e latter Articles seen1 to suggest tl1at reliance on some cont1nuat1on of tl1e license to plant or bl1ild 1nay be indl1ced �y the l �nd�wner's co �duct of conscio _usly tole.rating such lo11 g-term opera tions, which rmply the licensee's expectation of profit.

20. He is also not answerable under Article 2162, si11ce ]1is "enrichn1ent" is "justified" by Article 1168 or 1845. Cf. opposite solution under Article 2143(3). 21 . Cf. Article 2430.

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... �rt.2033, 1 Art. 2033 - Di,1 ersion of Powers.1 (1) .4 perso11 co111n1its a fai,lt 1v/1ere /1e drverts to !1is 01v11 advarrtctge JJ01vers cor1ferred 11porL hin1 i11 tl1e i11terest of· a11ot/1er perso11.2 (2) -1, JJublic servar1t co111111its a fc1i1lt i,11f1ere Ire diverts to his OH'l1 adva11tcige or tl1at of a partici,lar perso11, JJ01vers co,iferrecl i1po11 /1im i11 t/1e /Jltblic i11terest. 3

COMMENTAI{Y (Notes 1-3)

. I. INTRODUCTION

1\. Ordinary rigl1ts versus po'ff'ers

t-\rticle 2030 (note 2) provides, among others, that he who acts i.n a \vay whi cl1 o�·ends ?,10 �ality �01nmits a fault. Article 2032 l1as specified the mai11 consequence of tl11s subJeCtlve cr1terio11 by pro,;iding that be who acts \Vithin lus right but pri marily \Vitl1 i11te11t to injure ratl1er than gain, comnlits a fault. The profit motive, if any, is here a justification. The prese11t Article provides a f11rtber co11sequence of the morality criterio11: in 1nany of tl1e cases wl1ere tl1e right exercised is of the k111d called ''po,ver'', l1e who acts within bis !Jowers but IJrimari1y for his own gain and advantage, co11111uts a fault. �

But why sho11ld gc1i11 be moral (justificatory) u11der Article 2032 and immoral (blamable) under the present t\rtic]e? This difference is but a logical co11nterpart of tl1e difference in tl1e nature of, respectively, ''rights'' and f11nctional ''po\vers''. Indeed, while ordinary rights are meant to be enjoyed by tl1eir i11dividual l1older for l1is 01v.1 n ad.vantage, n1aoy rigl1ts of the kind· called ''powers'' (to affect tl1e le gal situation of otl1ers) are ''fu11ctional'' i.e. conferred in the i11terest of a person (or persons) other tl1an the one e11trusted ,vith their exercise. This category of rights . otes 2 and 3, · is encountered both i11 private and in public law: compare n below.

B. Powers: absolute or limited? In several a11cie11t societies (as, e.g., the Roman one), various legal povvers were · almost absolute (u11restricted). I11deed, tl1e developn1ent of a legal 11otion tl1at ''pow ers'' should . be exercised i'l1 the interest of others is comparatively rece11t. As of old, kings a11d governors were · ofte.n deemed to be ruling for their own. benefit. Al so· parental autl1ority over c]1ildren was exercised �itb a view to benefit the power _ wielding pare11t and his fa1ruly ratl1er than the ch1_l � b.1n1self. In mode� n . law, n1any types of juridical ''powers'' to affect the l� gal p�s1t1�n of others are limited by the ''diversio11 of powers'' doctri11e or by specific leg1slat1on: {a) TJ1 e· djversion (abuse) of powers doctrine limits ''fu1;1ctional'' powers �rom � ithout by the overriding principle that they 1nust not be diverted from the1r basic purpo . ose by being exercised with a view to persona] gain. {b) Specific legislation limits. tl1ese po�ers fro_m within by sub�itting the1!1 _ t9 detailed restrictions and thtis reducing their content. Exceeding such · l1nuts is a fault: see sub-note C, below. (c) Thus far, th�re is some analogy w'ith the m�tbods used for curbing misuse of ordinary riglits. 1 In addition, however, various kinds of · diversion (abuse) .

1•

See Article 2032, note 2, A.

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Art. 2033, 1-2

of powers are pu11ishable as crimes i11 the terms of, e.g., Penal Code Articles 414, 420, 753-4, 663-4. In the cases where a penal co 11viction has taken place, tl1ere is no need for tl1e plai11tiff to argue tbe civil law th.eory of diversion of powers under tl1is Article, since a specific pe11al offence is sufficient to ground civil liability for fault under Article 2035. 2 C. Po,vers exceeded In strict logic, legal powers are not diverted (abused) where they are speci fically exceeded. You cannot abuse what you have not. Exceeding the specific lin1its of 0 1 1e's powers (actiJ1g ''ultra vires'') is acting witho11t po\\'ers. You can cla in1 that legal authority bas been abused only agai11st somebody who bas exercised it withi11 its specific legal limits. Wl1ere he acts beyoncl those limits, l1e infringes the Ia,v and tl1e pro1Jer re 1 11edy to invoke may be Article 20353 rather than this Article. In addition, juridical acts in excess of authority are, as a rule, affected with nullity (see Article 401). D. Powers abused A 111a11's act can fall 1,vit/1i11 his specific legal po'rvers and at the san1e time be ''improperly ·n1otivated'', tl1at is co11trary to: (a) tl1is Article a11d/or tl1e 111entioned Penal Code prol1ibitio1 1s grounded on the diversio11 of powers doctrine (i111proper profit 1notive), or (b) Article 2032: it is a fault to exercise powers with i11te11t to injure somebody without gai1 1 to tl1 e J)erson or i11terest represe11ted, as where a public official, acting witl1i11 l1is ])Owers, l1arms a private e11e1ny, witl1011t profit to the state, by arbitrarily \\1ithdra'rvi11g l1is tradi11g lice11ce (imJ)roper intent to bar1n). Contrast tl1is case witl1 those 1111der note 3, B (a-b), below.

2. DIVERSION OF POWERS IN PRIVATE LAW A. ''Functional'' powers Private law ''po\\rers'' 111ay be gra1 1ted either djrectly by law, or by a juridical act (contract, testa1 nent, co11rt-order). From tl1e ter111s of tl1e ll1w or the act concerned, it is ofte11 clear tl1at tl1e legal at1tl1ority is ''conferred in tl1e i 11terest of another person''. Nevertl1eless, tl1is sl1ould 11ot be take11 for granted witl1out a11alysis, si 1 1ce it may occt1r tl1at ''po\\,ers'' are granted i11 tl1e excl11sive interest of tl1eir l1older. Such is tl1e position, e.g., i11 tl1e c �se of a . contract11al or legctl gra11t of a right, i11 the nature of a power, to tern11nate cera11 1 contra.els by 11otice, or otl1erwise unconditioii ally a11d unilaterally to alter the legal sitt1ation of a11otl1er witl1011t concer11 for I1is i11terest. 111 comJ11on t1sa.ge, l10We\1er, tl1e 'rvord ''po,vers'' de 1 1otes legal authority ''conferred i11 tl1e i11terest of c111other perso11'', or ''in tl1e pt1blic interest'' a 1 1d it is in this sense of ''f11nctional'' powers tl1at ,ve sh�tll co11tin11e to 1 1se it l,ere: B. Sot1rces of ''authority''; l1older's part interest Cl1apter l o � Title XIV 011 ''Represe11tation''4 starts by Providi 11 g, j 1 1 Article . 2179, tha.t authority (po\ver) to act 011 bel1alf of a11otl1er derives fro111 la\\' or con2. And si�ce tl�e mentioned P�nal Code provisio11s are more enlightening and elaborate tban this Article, it perhaps constitutes an unnecessary vague duplicatio11 of those lJrovisions. See, however, Article 2035, note 4, C. ·3. Except, of course, where such limits and the ren1edies for their violatio11 are contractu al.· see · Article 2035, note 2, E. 4. Wrongly translated as "Agency", which tern1 denotes only the contractual kind of representa tion - cf. th.e Code's French master-text.

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Art. 2033, 2 tract. The law, i n turn, 111ay provide for derivation of such powers fron1 testa n1ents, or fro1n j11clicial decisions. If tl1 e l1older of the a11tl1ority derived from these sour ? es has a Part ii1 terest in tl1 e affairs entrt1sted to him, tl1is does 11ot prevent . . appl1cat1011 of tl1� present Article. For instance, tl1e fact that a legal (Article 947), testan1e11ta.ry (A.rttcle 9Ll8) or jt1dicial (Articles 950-951) succession liqtiidator l1appens to. be a personally interested l1eir, does 11ot jt1stify sacrifice of the interests of co he1 �s a11cl of tl1e estate (entrt1sted to l1.iu1 ) to his own i11 terest..As 1 nade clear by Art �cle 961, l1is liability in tort 111ay be for (a) negligence (Article 961(1) cum Art1 ?les 2029-203 ?), or (b) i11fri11gen1 ent of law (Article 961(2) cum Article 2035); _ 1 st1cl ng lack � 1nfr111geme11t l1 e 111ay be liable for (c) diversion of powers to his ex clt1s1ve advantage (prese11t Article), as for exan1ple by cl1eap sa.les of succession 1110,,ables (Article l O 13) to fir1ns of wl1icl1 l1e is sl1areholder.

C. Contractual powers excluded TlJe prese11 t Article 011 cliversion of povvers does 11ot apply to abuses of co11 tractt1al po\vers of representatio11, called agency po,.vers. By virtt1e of Article 2037 ''011 Iy tl1 e rules relatit1g to 11on-perfor1na11ce of co11 tracts apply i11 such case'', becat1se di,1ersio11 (abl1se) of age11 cy powers co11 stitutes a co11 tractl1al breacl1 in tl1e terms of Article 2209 (I), ,vI1icl1 alone is applicable i11 sucl1 case.

D. ''Bodily'' aut.horit)' Private legal al1tl1ority over a11otlJer perso11 's aff,1irs may go beyo11 d tl1 e latter's pecu11iary interests. It may concer11 l1is perso11. Sucl1 is the case, for i11sta11 ce, witl1 the at1thority exercised by a gt1ardia11 over a cl1ild, pt1rs11ant to Articles 265-269. This i. 11 cludes eve11 tl1e JJO\Ver of light boclily .Pt1nisl1 1ne11t of tl1e child,5 wl10 m·ust st1b111it to it. But it resttl.ts fro111 the vvl1ole co11 text of the la,v of gt1ardia11sl1ip 6 that sucl1 po\vers are co11ferred 111erely i11 the interest of the n1 i11or, fro1n \.vlticl1 ai111 they shot1..ld. 11ot be divertecl. In s01ne ca.ses of .failt1re i11 duty, tl1e specific tort provi sion on tl1e d11ty to educate and. supervise (Arti.cle 2052) ,vill st1ffice to grou11d a gl1ardia11's liability \.vitl1ot1t 11eed to de1no11strate a cliversion of powers 1111 der the prese11t Article. . Tl1e cases wl1icl1, not bei11g coverecl by A.rticle 2052, \Vo11ld require such ,t de 1 11 011stratio11 , or else wot1ld fall u11 der Article 2035 by way of Article 548 Penal Code, are best left to tl1 e reader's fancy. 7

E. Discretio11ary po,vers 111 note I , B, above, ,ve have traced the evolt1tion from tl1e for.mer ''absolt1t eness'' of cert:1i.n .legal IJo,,vers to tl1 eir present day limitatio11s by specific legislation or by the ''diversion of ]JOvvers'' doctri� e. The EJ hioi:ian Civil Coe!� , l1oy; e,1er, _ reveals at least 011 e type of legal a11tl1or1ty wb1cl1 is still con1pletely d1scret10 11ary (absolt1te) in tl1e sense of being i11capable of lin1itation _by t�e present �rticle. Wi_t�. in the law of guEtrdiansJ1ip, a parent's powers over bis chLldre11 are given 'a pr1v1leged positi.on. 8 111 one case . this power is qui�� discr� t_ionary and. absolutely �ree _ from. a11y . in1 pact of tl1e ·'d1.vers1on of po�ers . doctrine: as p_r?v1ded by Arttcle 594(2), no appeal (for a11y reason) shall lte against the oppos1tton made by the

5. See Article 267(2) cun1 Article 2039(c). 6. See e.g. Article 231. 7. Incidentally, in v,1hose interest does Article �039(c) give �l1e n1 ast�r a power to beat1 �is ser vants? Is this 110t a power of the old-fasb1oned type d.tScussed 1n su b -note E , . be ow. 8. See Article 279 (as tempered· by tJ1e remediaJ possi bilities inherent in, respectively, Articles 231-233,

and 2052

o.r 2033).

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Art. 2033, 2 - 3

is y. is Th ent of tw age the ow bel ld chi a of ge ria r . 1na father or the mother to l p rna r. ate we e lut bso of t cep con � al � ion dit tra 1 e tl � 11 al to sio ion ces an except con Tl1 e pare11t is free to gratify his own interests by te1nporar1ly oppos111g an alliance wl1ich 1nay be advantageo11s to the cliild. tl1 e

3. DIVERSION OF PO\VERS IN PUBLIC LAW A. Public interest unexceptionable The concept of diversio11 of powers was first evolved by �dministr�tive lawyers. It seems 1nore rooted in public law, primarily concerned with. functional powers, tha11 in pri,,ate law, primarily concerned witl1 ordi.I1ary rights. The extent of variou.s types of official legal authority depe11 ds on the detailed distribution of state powers by public la\v. The principle that such powers are co11ferred 011ly i11 tl1 e public i11terest of the co1n1n11ruty or a sector of it is reflected, e.g., in the very term ''p11blic serva11t''9 and knows no exceptions. Tl1 e main h11rdle for claims ·bro11ght for excess or abuse of public a11tl1 ority n1ay be procedural: tl1e necessity to exb.aust adn1i1listrative remedies before goi11g to the civil courts. 10 Tl1 e basic sanction with respect to acts do11 e i11 excess of powers is provided by Articles 401-402. (nullity as against the interested party). As to t\rticle 403, it refers claimants to tort law· witl, respect to any clai111s i11 damages for faults of public a11tl1 ority holders involv ing a vicarious Liability of public bodies. 11 111 case of acts do11e in excess of powers (ultra vires), the releva11 t tort remedy is provided by Article 2035 12• Where the incri1ni11 ated act ,vas intra vires (withi11 the powers) b11t offends agai11st the ''diver sion of pov.,ers'' doctrine, tl1e resulting tort clain1 for damages, if any, should be brougl1 t under tbe present Article (unless it is brought in connection with a per tinent pe11al charge). 13 B.

Examples

The ,vl1ole problem of administrative faults , whicl1 , in terms of Article 2127, may be either ''perso11al'' or ''official'' (only in tl1 e latter case may the State (Article 2126) or public body (A.1iicle 2128) be liable i11 addition to the official at fault), is so i1nmense, tl1at e.g. i11 France it is taugl1 t as a11 auto1101nous appendix to the administrative law courses. La,v in this field is often an outgrowth of the relevant judicial and admi11istrative decisions. These are few and largely u11 reported in Ethiopia. All we can do, therefore, is to continue our elen1entary gloss on the short text. of tl1 e prese11t sub-article. Diversion of public powers is best explained by illustra.tion: (a) Tl1 e mayor of a city, acting witl1in his discretionary powers, refuses to OITTant a license to a frrm entering a business of a l<ind subjected to lice11sing grants. Tl1e fun, concerned find.s out that tl1 e refusal, far from being motivated by p�blic interest considerati ?ns, bas be �n promp�ed by the fact tl1at tlie 1nayor . _ himself, or one of his relatives, bas a similar b11s1ness and wants to avoid a loss �hich mi �ht be caused by . the apJ?licant�s co1npetition. Tl1 e povver to license is t �us diverted from pu?l1c to private _ interests. After ex11austing tl1 e ad t ninis trat1ve appeals channels, 1f any, tl1 e cla1m for damages \vill lie under tl1 e pre-.

9. See Legal Notice No. 269 of 1962. 10. This principle is reflected, for instance, in Sections 54-62 of Income Tax Decree No. 19 of 1956. 11. Under Articles 2126-2128. 12. In addition to the "nullity" sanction under Articles 401-402. 13. See note 1, B, (c), above.

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Art. 2033, 3 sent Article. �i11ce in1 proper moti,1e is l1ard to JJrove directly, the evidence brou ?ht 111ay _be c1rct1msta11tial: demonstrating tl1e existence of tl1e public and private 111terests involved and sl1owi11g l1ow tl1ey ''co11flict''. solt1(b) f!ere is another illustration of st1cl1 confJict of jnterests and its ''i111proper'' : t1�n . . by the public servant i .11 autl1ority: tl1 e official cl1arged witl1 delivering cl_r1v111g ?er1111ts on tl1e basis of discretionary aptitt1de tests, flunks 1nost of the fit cand1tates ,vbo l1apJJen not to lJe JJresentecl by a drivi11g scl1 ool in wl1ich the official concerned, or l1is relative, l1as a pecuniary i11terest. Tl1 e fit candidate wl1 0 l1as failed in tl1is \Vay n1 ay bri11g a clai111 for clamages, if a11y, ttnder tl1e prese11 t f\rticle. Of co11rse, tJ1 e clttendant difficulties of proof 11 1ay son1eti1nes be prol1ibitive. C.

(a)

Practical insig11ificance of remedy

\'\'11.ile a well-motivated act wl1icl1 is, by mistake, in excess of po,v: ers, n1ay constit11te an ''official'' fat1lt for ,vhich tl1e State or p11blic body is vicario11sly liable (Article 2127(1) ), a diversio11 of powers of tl1e kind ill11strated above r1ever leac!es to State liabilitJl (Article 2127(2) cun1 Article 2126(3) ). Tl1e in1pro perly 111otivated official, wl1 0 acts in bad faith. for his own ad,,antage witl1o·ut regard for the ]JlI blic i11 terest, is alone liable .in da111ages to the victi1n of l1is abt1se. This redt1ces the practical t1tility of the re111edy, since tl1e official con cerned n1ay be in1pecu11i.ous, and tl1us jt1dgi11e11t-proof.

(b) Tl1 e legal linlits to all sorts of pttb.lic po\vers are often so specific, tl1at a neecl to invoke t.11 e JJrese11t st1b-article will, in most cases, be obviated by tl1 e possi bility to ground a tort claim 011 Article 2035 by sl1owi11g that the po,vers concerned have been exceeded i11 so1ne partict1lar detail. This remecly, as \Veil as remedies based on ordinary or professional negligence of tl1e official concern ed (Articles 2030-2031) are ofte11 practically preferable, becat1se in such cases the plajntiff l1as no need a11d no interest to prove defenda11 t's bad faith or in1proper n1otive. Defendant's good faith is "presumed'' (Article 2127(3) ), which is profitable to the plai11 tiff si11ce it may e11able l1in1 to reach a solvent vica rious defendant, tl1at is, tl1e State or public body concer11ed (Article 2127(1) ·cum 2126(2) ). It will be for the latter body to disprove the ''goocl faith'' · presumptio·n by ,vay of defence, for i11stance by sl1owing that tl1e official l1as committed a diversion of po\\1ers. We tl1 us reach the paradoxical conclusion that the present sub-article, meant to help plaintiffs, may so1netimes be more profitable to the State as vicarious defendant. 14

•

d n t who is immu n e. to . a civi laction in terms of Article 14. With respect to a solvent d efena ( ab use ) of powers un d er, e.g., n 1 1 o s d er 1 v a pen a te a tr s n emo d to t ble 2138, it ma y be profia of the e by ly rtu l i ble m v a vi ci li hi g kin ma of se rpo pu the for , e d . Co l a Art 414 of the Pen exception of Article 2139.

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Art. 2034, 1- 3 Art. 2034 - Purpose of rights 1 Subject to tl1e foregoi11g provisions, 2 the 111a1111er in wfiich a riglzt 3 • �s used ': 'af 11ot be c/1alle11ged on tlze groi1nd that it is co11trary to t/1e economic or socza/ pi,rpose4 of t/1at right. COMMENTARY (Notes 1 - 4)

SOVIET PRINCIPLE CONRASTED

TL1e proble111 sol\1ed by this Article is perl1aps best illu111i11ated by contrasting its provisio11 with Article I of the Soviet Russian Civil Code of 1922, wl1ich provi ded as follows: Civil rig/1ts are protectecl by la,,v, e�Y.cept 1-v/zere tlzeJ' are exercised irz a 111cL11ner co11trarJ' to tl1eir econoniic or social pitrpose. Tl1e in1 plicatio11 s of st1cb. a pri11 ciple are aptl)' sumo1arized by P.H. La\vson: 1 ''. . . it is really a socialist doctri11 e. It in1 plies tl1at a 111 a11 's rigl1 t is 1 10 longer,. as it were, a spl1ere witl1i11 which l1e is sovereig11 , over wl1 ich l1 e Juay dispose accordi11g to l1 is O\V11 view of bis i11terests ... ; it is to be subject to tl1e co11 trol of society i11 tl1e perso11 of the jt1dge, \Vho exercises a veto over his. decisio11s i11 accordaL1 ce with wl1 at lze co11siders to be the purpose for wl1icl1 society bas co11 ferrecl tl1e right'' 2 • Stich a systen1 see111s to do away \Vitl1 legal certitude and 11 1ake the conte11t of rigl1ts depe11 d on prevale11 t J)olitical opi11 io11s, as i11terpreted or 11 1isinterpreted by the judge. 2. ARTICLES 2032-2033 UNAFFECTED Tbe fact tl1 at tl1e Etl1iopian legislator does 11 ot follo\v, i11 deed, expressly a11d e1 111Jl1 atically rejects tl1e above doctrine3 does 11 ot n1ea11 tl1at tl1 e purpose of rights. is alv.1ays irrelevant i11 deter1nini11 g whetl1 er tl1ey J1ave bee11 abt1sed. Tl1 e words ''st1b ject to tl1 e f oregoi11 g pro\1isio11 s'' 111alce it clear tl1at tl1 ose provisio11s (Articles 2032 a 11d 2033) - ,vJ1icl1 li111it rights or powers by tl1e prol1 ibitio11 to exercise tl1en1, respec tively, for the pt1r1)ose of har111ing otl1 ers, or of adva11 cing interests otl1er tha1 1 tl1 ose e11trusted to the perso11 in authority - ren1 a.i11 t1naffected. 3. APPLICABILITY TO ''POWERS'' Tl1 e \Vords tl1 at, i11 tl1is Article, exclude tl1e relevancy of ''social or eco1101111c purposes'', bear 011 the 111a1111 er of t1si11g rigl1ts, witl1ot1t SJ )ecifyi11 g ,vl1etl1er tl1is t. F.1-1. Lawson, Negligence in tire Civil Laiv (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1950), J). 18. The above

cited provisio �1 now stands _repealed together wi !h the Soviet-Russian Civil Code of 1922. Neverth �Iess, its essen�e cont1nucs to be reflected 1n the cocl _ification of 7:1,e Principles of Civil _ _ Leg1slarion of the Soviet U111011 (Law No. 525 of J 96 I), Section 5 of ,vh1ch reads as follows: "Civil right� are _protectec! by lav1, except wl1ere they are exercised in a 111anner ,vhich would be 1ocons1stent w1th the purpose of such rights in a socialist societJ' during the period of the establishn1ent of Con11nunism." [E1nphasis added]. On this, see �a,v [n Eastern Europe, series of Documentation Oll1ce for East EuroiJea11 La\v of Leyd�n Un1�ers1ty� _Leyden, Sythoff, No. 7 (1963), p. 263 ff. On equivalent provisions in the Sov1et-Russ1an C1v1l Code of 1964 or codes of other Soviet Union Republics• see ibid • No. 11 (1966).

2. En1phasis added. 3. See note 5, belov1.

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Art. 2034, 3-5 term includes 011ly or?i11ar)1 rig!1ts or also those of tl1e type called ''powers'' .4 In favour of the latter 1nterpretat1011 we can stress tl1at the opening words of this Article read ''sl1bject to tl1e foregoi11g provisions'' and not ''subject to tl1e provision .of Article 2032''. 4. NON-APLICABILITY TO ''LEGAL'' PURPOSES A careft1l analysis of tl1is Article's worciing will show that, i11 additio11 to the fi · eld c�vere? by. tl1e. '_'f oregoi11g prov.isio11s'' (where purpose is releva11t), there are other s1t �at1011s 111 \vb1ch the n1a11ner of l1si11g a rigl1t 1nay be cl1allenged as con trary to_ its _pl1rpose. Tl1is is tl1e case wl1ere tl1at pl1rpose has bee11 defi11ed, expres sly or 1n1pl1edly, b)' tl1e legislator himself, and therefore is not merely ''econom.ic and social'', bllt legal. Tl1e Article l111der discussio11 is only meant to preserve defen dants from arbitrary i11terfere11ce witl1 their rights by tl1e judges (\vl10 are prin1arily la\vyers, not eco11on1ists) ltnpredictably Sltbjecting defendants to \Vbatever n1ay be the political vievvs of tl1e day held by t}1e gover11111e11t or t]1e be11ch 011 what sl1ould be the socio-econo111ic pt1r_pose of tl1e challenged. rigl1t. It is 11ot n1ea11t to preserve tl1em fro1n predictable adjt1dication wl1ich merely aJJJ)lies such legal restrictio11s as to purpose as ,:vere e11acted, expressly or impliedly, by tl1e legjs]ator. Wl1ere these are infri11gecl, tl1e rigl1t is e.xceecled, and a fa11lt 1nay be comn1itted 11nder Article 2035. This is illl1strated belo,v with res1)ect to (a). fu11ctional J)owers and (b) ordinary rigl1ts . Specific legal restrictio.ns as to pt1rpose n1ay concern public la\v powers. The ge11eral ''pl1blic i11terest'' :p11r1)ose fro1n which st1ch po\vers 111 l1st not be diverted (Article 2033) 111ay be f11rtl1er specified by JJrovidi11g that tl1e object of a certain at1tl1ority js, for i11st;:t11ce, n1alarja eradic,:1tio11. Obviously, the official vestecl \.Vith sl1cl1 authority 111ay 11ot divert l1is powers from promoting mala.ria eradication to other, bo,:vever la11dable, pl1blic interest p _ l11-poses. A Code-L1ased exarnple: pt1r Sl1a11 t to Article I 464, JJowers to expropriate mt1st 11ot be used 111erely for tl1e pL1rpose o·f :fi11ancial be11efit to tl1e state (altl1011gh, e.g., po\vers to assess ,111d levy taxes shall be so ltsed). A11 exa111ple i11volvi11g private la\V po,vers: pt1rsua11t to Article 267 the gt1ardian's legi:11 po\ver to i11flict boclily pl111ishme1rt on a n1i11or 111ust 11ot be used for pl1rposes other tl1an the latter's education. (b) Specific legal restrictions as to purpose are l111t1sual witl1 res:pect to ordinary . rigl1ts, tl1e general JJurpose of "''hich is to be11efit their holders. ''Personal gai11'' is even a justify.it1g bl11wark against a.ctions brougl1t l111der Article 2032. So ,:vhat would be the poi11t of prescribi11g, in detail, what particl1lar egoistic pur poses tl1e individl1al be11efited is to foll?_ w? Egoistic_ 111.isl1s� of hjs rights is best curbed by 1n1:1ki11g tl1e111 less, that 1s, by reducing their conte11t, as l1as bee11 done, e.g., witl1 tl1e co11te11 t of O\vnership rigl1ts. 5 Exceptionally, sucl1 rest rictions are expressed i11 terms o� ''pl1.rpose'', as, for i1Jstance, lt!'lder Article 1232 wl1ich in certain cases, de111es tl1e · landow11er the use of 111s ,vater for plirposes ot'her than ''domes_tic''.. Since tl1_ is is n?� a �erely socio-eco11omic _but a legally clefined purpose, v1olat1on �f tl11s prov1s1on 1s an excess of the right of ownership and a fa.ult under Article 2035. 5.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC PURPOSES Having thus traced the domain of the- present Article by eliminating situations -which are not relevant to its operation, \Ve shall now illustrate, by examples:, the

4. See Article 2033, notes 1,. A, and 2, A. · 5. See Article 2032, · note 2, D.

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Art. 2034, 5

m.eaning of the rule that ''the n1anner in whjch a right is used may not be chal lenged on the grol1nd that it is contrary to the economic or social purposes [not being a prescribed '"legal' purpose] of that right'': (a) B, an abseotee-o,vner, leaves his large farm.la.nd uncultivated. Tl1e neighbouring poor peasants can neither produce enough food for themselves, 11or can they earn their liviI1g by cultivating B's Ia11d for him. Tl1ey sue B for compensation on the gro11nd that be abuses his rights by not exe1cisi11g them in accordance witl1 tl1e socio-economic purposes of farmla11d ownersl1ip, wl1ich is cultivation. Unless tl1e court can, under Article 2032, mfer an intent to injure (negligence is not enougl1), B can rebut their claims by invoking the present Article. Only the legislator can deal with such unjust situations by providing, for instance, tl1at uncultivated lands shall be expropriated. The judges' ''policy'' views are irrelevant to the case. (b) We can apply tl1e same reasoning to the position of C, an Addis Ababa bouse ow11er ,vho, i11 spite of not occupying l1is l1ouse, refuses to rent it, at curre.nt rates, to applicants wl10 can find 110 shelter. The applicants will not succeed in their clai1ns by merely invokjng that C has abused llis rights contrary to the socio-econon1ic purpose of bouse-ownersl1ip, which is residential use. Only· rlze legislator can impose sanctions upon such unsocial behaviour.

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Art. 2035, 1-2 - ---------------------

Art. 2035 - Infringement of a Jaw t, 2

(1) A p�1:so11 co1111nits a fa11lt 1,v/1ere lie infringes any specific3 and e�Yplicit 3 prov1s1011 of a lau,, ordir1arice or ad111inistrative reg11lation.2· 4 (2) lgnora11ce of t/1e lc11-v is 110 excuse. 5 COlYilYIENTARY (Notes 1-5) l.

PRIOR REFERENCES

We l1av� �lr�ady often referred to faults by infringement of Article 2035. We hav �. done it 111c1de11tally to explainir1g other provisions and delimiti11g the appli cab1l1ty of tl1e ge11eral ''objective'' (Articles 2030-203 l) and ''subjective'' (Articles 20�2-2033) criteria of fattlt. Instead of repeating ourselves and reprodt1cing l1ere prior conunents on and exa1nples of .fat1lt by infri11gement of law, ,ve refer tl1e reader to, e.g., the follo,ving notes: Article 2029, note 5, B; - Article 2030, 11ote 3, D(b); - .Article 2031, note 3, A(a) and 4, B(a); - Article 2032, 11ote 2, C, D(a-j) and F(a); - Article 2033, note 1, B(b) and C; - ,1.\rticle 2034, note 4. 2.

CONNO fATION OF ''LAW''

Article 2035, i11 its uniquely sweepi11g f ormttlation, s11pplies a civil sanction for the �vl1ole legal syste1n of Etl1iopia. Our tort law is, therefore, to a certai11 exte11t, not an independent bra11ch of law, bl1t a sanctio11 of any a11d all other laws (subject 011ly to tl1e req .uire1nent of ''specificity'': see note 3, belo\.v). T.his Article mal<es no d1sti11ctio11s \vl1atever as to rank, qualification or purpose of the provi sions in.fri11ged:

A. Rank With respect to rank, tl1e legislator obvi,1tes the possibility of a restrictive interpretatio11 of ''law'' to mea11 ''statute'' (Fre11ch ''loi'') only, by adding the words ·''ordinance'' and ''adn1i11istrative regulation'', ,vhicl1 terms are wide e11ol1gh to cover, in additio11 to constitt1tio11al. or statt1tory law, otl1er e11actments fro1n I111perial Orders do\vn to the 1nost n1i11t1te ad1ni11.istrative regulations. Since eve11 the lowest ranking �ules are included, it is sub1nitted that what Art. 92 Rev.ised Co11stitutio·n calls ''decree'' (a11alogous to tl1e French ''decret-loi'') should be, a fortiori, assi milated to ''.la,v'' for the purposes of the prese11t Article.

B�

Qualification

With respect to qualification o.f the provisions· . infringed, this Article 1nakes no d.ifference betwee.n, for i11stance, penal· and civil la\.v, or substantive a.nd . pro: cedural laws. Breach of a11y sucl1 la\V is, if har1n ensues, eqt1ally . redressible in tort, except in the case of civil laws providing their own sanctions whiol1 by imp lication exclude distinct tort ·remedies: see, e.g., Article 643 and its sanction in Article 669 cum 693; see also .Article 1104.

C. · Purpose Finally, with respect to purpose, . no distinction is inade according to whether · the legal provision . infringed was, or was not, destined · for the protection of · - 97 _.:..

Art. 2035, 2 r in ad er ro ab e to ad m ? ° es m eti m so is n tio nc sti persons or property. This di lt. . It is ,a�so fau o t _ s i11t 1ot a1:1 ly cal ati tom au t en gem rin e decid \vhether a given inf , 1 l1 ac a og att in ) _ . fme made by Article 793 Etl1iopia11 Penal C_ode (Petty O�ences ,, or arrest'' pu11isb111ent to sucl1 contrave11t 1 011s of r11les 1ss�ed. fo r tlie pr_otect1on of perso11s or property'' as are not otherwise pt1nishable (111 c1dentally, this se<?ms_ a departure from, at least, the spirit of Article 2 of �he same �ode). 11_ 1 Etl1 1 op1 a_n tort Ja\v, however, i11fringement of legal provisions 1s _a fa11lt 1 rre�pec t 1ve . of the1r p11rpose. The primary purpose, for insta11ce, of a _g1ve11 regt1lat 1 on_ saying that, after official road-testing for safety purposes, auto1nob1les_ 1nt 1 �t be reg istered at the mt111icipality, may be 111erely fiscal (the collecti11g of registration _fees). Nevertheless, wl1ere a road-tested b11t 0011-registered 1notor car, fa11ltlessly driven, causes harm, the ''11on-registratio11'' fa11It may be in.voked by tl1e victi111-clairnant who, having hin1self co1nn1itted a fa11It, will l1ave in vie\v of Article 2086(2) to grot111d his claim 011 defendant's fault ratl1 er tl1 a11 on Article 2081. It is a11other 1natter wl1etl1er, i11 tl1e cir111nsta11ces of the case, tl1e cot1rt will allow such a clai111 to stand, si11ce, i11 addition to fat1lt and da 1 nage, a third requireme11t, i.e., cai1satia,,, of the dru11a.ge by tl1e fa11lt n1t1st be properly de 1 11011strated 11nder 110 1natter \Vhich theory of ''causatio11 '' the judges choose to follow! 1 I11cleed, l1ow ca11 tl1e victi111 establisl1 tl1at he wo11ld not I1ave bee11 injured if the car l1ad been registered? D. Exclusion of tort lal-v If, at tl1e 011tset of tl1js 11ote, ,ve sa.y tl1 at tl1ro11gl1 Article 2035 our tort law provides a sanctio 11 for alJ other la\,1s, ,ve obvio11s]y do not n1 ean that infr ingen1e11t of co11d11ct sta11 darcfs e1 1acted by tort Jaw itself are 11ot sa11ctio11ed. But cLltbo1 1 gl1 tl1 eir violatio11 clearly also is an i1 1fri11 ge111e 1 1t of ]aw, Article 2035 need not be aJ)JJlied l1ere, beca11se the tort JJrovisio1 1s i11 q11estio11 tl1e 1 11selves directly pro vicle tl1at certai11 behaviour a11101111ts to fat1lt. Article 2035 tl11 1 s need 11ot be i11,,oked for t]1e p11rpose of clai111 s grot1 1 1ded 011 Articles 2030-2033, or 011 the ''spe cial cases'' Articles 2038-2064. The prese 11 t Article is si11 1i]arly irrele\,�lnt for claims gro11nded 011 Articles 2066-2085, altl1ougl1 the reaso 11 is here differe 1 1t: tl1is Article, concer11ecl \vith ''fa11lt'', is pointless for applyi11g pro,,isio11s on liability ''irresp ective of f�111lt''.

E. Exclt1sion of co11tract law For tl1 e purposes �f _ tl1e JJrese11t Article, tl1e ter111 ''law'' obvio11sly does 11ot . include co11tract ]a\v: thi s 1s a necessary co11clt1sio11 fron1 tl1e ter111s of Article 2037. 2 [I11cide11tal_Iy, the notio11 of tort law as a sanction of tl1e ,vl1ole legal system is so pervading tl1at, altl1ot 1 gl1 01 1r contract law has its ow 11 r11les 011 wliat is '' i1011 perfor1na11ce'' a11cl its effects, tl1e co111pe11satory effects of co11tract11a) 11011pert�or111a11ce _ are . gover 11ed (IJ11rsu8:nt to :'-rt 1 cle _1790 a11d subject to exceptio11s) by the tort _ section on comp�11sat 1011, �h1cl1 . sect1011 1s a la\v com1no11 to all cases of ,vrongful l1arm] . S�1mn1a�1 z1 11g . our d1scuss1011 so far, \Ve ca11 say tl1 at a.11 actio11 for fault, �•nd� r this Art_1cle, 11�� wl1ere any la\v otl1er tbct11 tort or co 11tract law 11as been 111fr 1 11ged a 11d, 1n adcl1t1011, tl1e req11ire1ne11ts of (s1Jecificity a11d) da111aoe ai1d causation 0 (Article 2028) are satisfiecl. F. Function of this Article �e11erally spea.king,. tl1 � present Article ain1s a.t restricting jtidical discretion in applying tl1e general cr1ter1 a of fault e111bodied i11 Articles 2030-2033. Speci-fic stan1. On "causation", see Article 2027, 11ole 3. 2. See also Article 2027, note 1, A.

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Art. 2035, 2-3 d �rds of con?tict e11acted by tl1e legislator J)revail over tl1ose \Vhic]1 \VOtild other _ wise be enJ01ned by tl1 e jt1dges in their cli.scretionary intert)retatio11 of Articles 2030-2033. The role of Olitside la\VS is, in tl1is res1Ject, son1e\vl1at si1uilar to that played by tl1e ''special cases'' J)rovisio11 s \Vitl1i11 tort Jaw itself. 3 Tl1e latter pro,,isions, l1ovvever, are . fe\v a11 cl fixed, \Vl1ile tl1ose e11acted outside tort Ja\V are a n1yriad, ru1d are co11t111t1ot1sJy addecl to. Pro1Jer apJJlicatio11 of extra-co11tractual liabilit)' by way of Article 2035 tl1t1s pre-supposes a11 UJ) to date k11 owledge of the vvhole legal syste111. Tort la\v ca11 at 11 0 tin1e be taught i11 isolation. Illt1stratio11 : Wl1e11 l1ar1n is cat1sed by a. car driver's infri11ge111 e11t of Sectio11 28(2)(b) of tl,e Tra11s1Jort (Amend me11t) Regttl�t1011 s of 19634 tl1rol1gl1 failt1re of I1is warni11g appliance, it is no defe11ce for 1111n to say tl1at l1 e cl1ec.ked tl1 e c,1r and committecl 110 fault in terms of Articles 2030-2031. 3. T IIE ''SPECIFICITY'' REQUIREMENT A.

The problen1 of Yague la,vs

I n order for i11fringe1ne11t of a law to an1ount auto111atically to a fal1lt, the provision allegedly i11fru1ge(I 111ust be specific and ex1Jlicit (clear) enot1gl1 . T11 e jt1st 111en tioned traffic la\V provisio11 tl1at a car driver's war11i11 g signals IDlISt be i11 \Vorking order obviot1s1y satisfies tl1is req11ire11 1ent. Tl1is is, also, obviously tl1e c,lse vvith the great bulk of concrete ;1dn1i11 istrative regt1latio11s tal<e11 JJt1rs11a11t to eitl1er legislative delegatio11 or I111·perial Orders 11 1 1der Art. 27 (an.cl 36) Revisecl Co11stitt 1 tio11 a11d clealing either witl1 protectio11 of perso11s or l)fOJ)erty5 or witl.1, for i11sta11ce, c11rre11cy, safety, tra11s port; co111111 unicatio11, taxes, ct1stom.s, p11blic hea.ltl1, food, forestry, police 111 atters, etc. 6 M:ost rt1les of J)rocedt1re are also specific eno11gl1 for the p11rposes of Article 2035. 'Bt1t tl1e 111ore the level of generality of .legal provisio11s rises, the 111ore tl1e a11ton1atic ,rpplicability of tl1is Article to tl1eir alleged i11frir1gen1e11 ts becon1es deb�1table. No clot1bt statutes, Codes, or eve11 tl1e Co11 stitt1tio11, contai11 provisions concrete e11011gh for tl1eir i11fringement to be dee1ned ,l fcllllt t111der tl1is Article: see, for i11 stance, th.e prohibition o .f ce11sorsl1ip of correspo11clence ltnder Art. 42 Rev.ised Co11stitt1tio11. Bl1t tl1is can11ot be true of J)rovisio11s so abstract a11 d vagi1e tl1at tl1ey are ope11 to widely co11 fljcti11 g i11 terpretatio11s, s11ch as, e.g., Art. 37 Revised Co11stitution witl1 respect to ''equaJ protectio11 of tl1e laws'', or Art. 43 Revised Co11stitutio.n witl1 respect to ''due process of la,v." Does it follo\v tl1at, jn st1ch. cases, all re1nedy in tort is excluded? By 11 0 111eans, si11ce i

(a) Firstly, a clai111a11t t1t1certai11 of l1is remedy under Article 2035 because of the '

vagt1eness of tl1e provisio11 infri11ged by defe11 dant, is free to invoke a11y per tinent re11 1edies t111der ot/1er tort Articles (e.g., 203 1-2033).

(b) Secondly, tl,e co11text of tl1e provision �nfringed_ may e�pre� sly refe! · judges to

t11e ''Extra-Co11tractt1al Liability a11d UnJust Enr1cl1 me11t T1tle or its parts, or else provide for liability i_r1 dan1ages for _ har111 without detern1i11ing �l1e extent _ _ of compensatio11, \V.bich co11st1tt1tes a11 .1mpl1_ed refer� n� e to tort law. Th1s. met}1 od _ is best illustrated by so11 1e of tl1e follow111g (unt1d1ly translated) C1v1I Code

3. Cf. Article 2030, note 3, D, (c). 4. Negarit Gazeta 23/5. 5. Compare Art. 793 of the Penal Code. 6. Compare Art. 733 of the Penal Code.

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Art. 2035, 3 (1-2), Articles: 7(3), 29(2-3), 45(2), 46, 138, 153(1), 171(3), 323(1), 561(2), 961 7 . -3) 4(2 167 ), 6(2 156 lt), fau 1149(1), 1198, 1226, 1234 + 1239 + 1250 (no 1 1tly specified icie suff be y ma n stio que in on visi pro ue vag ially rdly init (c) Thi ' the . 1ona1 ''du.e process'' u t t·t 1 ons C a in a judgment concerning non-tort issues (as, e.�., issue). This point, of primary importance, requires a separate treatment under sub-note B, below: B. J odicial specification: penal convictions

A fina l judgment performs, an1011g other functions, that of specifying the laws in issue by applyi1 1g them to a case, and providing irrebuttable. e�idence (res judi cata) of the law-it1fringements in issue. For tl1ese two reaso11s, It IS p� rhaps argu able that law infringeme11ts stated in final judgments should be considered faults under Article 2035. This 111ay be the case, for instance, with judgments of ''nullity'' given under Articles 401-402 (or Art. 122 Rev. Constitution in a ''due process'' case). Whatever be the 1nerits or demerits of this line of thought with respect to non-pe11al judgments, 8 it seems unescapable in relation to the penal ones when one reads tl1e present Article in conj11nction with Articles 100 Penal Code, and 2149 Cjvil Code. 011 the one ha11d, Article I 00 of the Penal Code, standing alone, would suffic.e to s11pport our conclusio11: tl1e term ''an offence'' is ge1 1eral, tl1e adjective ''appreciable'' (the correct counterpart of the French n1.astertext's ''notable'') points to a11.y certai11, non-trifli1 1g ''dan1age'', tl1e adverb ''particularly'' qualifies tl1e injuries cited as mere examples, sub-art. (2) enjoins application of the Civil Code, 9 s11·b-art. (3) foresees eitl1er joi11ed, or civil proceedings. On tl1e other hand, it is only because _pe11al co11 viction is conclusive evidence of tl1e existence of civil fault under Article 2035 that the legislator l1ad to expressly n1ake sure by n1eans of Article 2149 Civil Code tl1at penal acquittal or discharge shall not sin1ilarly be deemed conclusive as to non-existence of civil fault. 10 The above conclusions are of great in1portance since in practice 1nost cases of applicability of Article 2035 vvill be occasioned by pe 11al process. The Ethiopian Penal Code is so far-reacJ1i11g and comprel1ensive, that even infringements of any of the n1yriad of adn1i1iistrative regu1,1tions typified in Articles 793 and 733 Penal Code are punisl1able as petty oftences. It is true tl1at such administrative reg1.1lations and n1ost of tl1e penal offence defi11itions are sufficiently ''specific'' to satisfy the requireme11ts of Article 2035 for the purposes of civil liability even in tl1e absence of a penal charge a11d co11viction (pursuant to the principles of ''legality'' and ''sp ec! ficity'' set out under Art. 2 � en �l Cod�, tl1is Code contains no such vague cr1ter1a of offe11ce as those embodied 1n Articles 2030-2032 Civ. C. ,vit]1 respect

-------

7. Incidentally see, in co�tract_ l aw,_ Articles 1_790, 2�58(1), 2259(1), 2559(1-2), 2649(3). Apart froni the �r<;>blcm unde� d1scuss1on, tort law ltnks \V1th _oth_er la\v branches are further illustrated by C1v1l Code ArtJcles 317, 350, 403, 457, 573 (duplication of 2116), 1134(3), 1181(2), 1182(3), 11 83(�), 1481 1494(3), 1515(3), 1640(2), 1952(2 ), ?65�(1, 3) (duplicalio11 of 2095), 3146 (1) (du _ ? 62 Art by of the Rev. Co11st1tut1on, and by several Articles of t11e Penal . phcat10� of -� 55), Code, in particular Art. 100 (cun1 Arts. 154-159 Cri1n. Proc. C.). 8 . Initially vague legal JJrovisions may be innocenLly n1isunderstood. 9. � ontra:. Prof: !· G�aven,. the ex�ert ?rafter of tJ1e Penal Code, in a recent private coninJunica t1on. Hts or1g1nal rntent100, wlu� l� 1s not supported by the fii1aJ version of the Penal Code, seems to hav � been tl1at the C1v1� Code should not a1Jply ge11erally to the plainti rights, fT's spe calc to the cifi ula cal onl tion of the damages conte,nplated by Art. lOO of the }leoal ly y but Code. 10. See Avant-proje 1) ' C · Civ/13 , IJ· 54·• "Au con 1 ra,re ,un .111• . , ., above , atI p. 3, note , , t (cited l . orsqu • d1v1c. · · iu a ere co11c,a11111e au pena, 011 vo1t ,nal co,n,nent 011 pourrait · qu, 1·1 11, a co1111111s · sout enzr aucune Jaure."

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-- - - ·.--.

Art. 2035, 3-4 to fault). Nev�rtl1 ele·s s, . �ertain offence-definitions are . 11 ot very speci'fic.11 A1 1d i11 the case of qt11 te ''spec1f1c'' offe11ce-definitio11 s civil clain1a1Jts will still often prefer, ratl1 er tl1a11 . start civil proceedi11 gs, to i11cl11ce ancl joi11 penal proceedi11 gs becat1se of tl1 e reJ�t,ve speecl a11 d eco11011 1y of penal process and tl1 e possibi]ity to recover co111pe11sat1on eve.o fro1 n a judgme11 t-proof defet1da11t by vvay of Art. IO l Pe11al Code (throt1gl1 tl1e yielcl of l1 is co11 1pulsory work), not to spe,lk of tl1e cases \Vhere tl1 e pe1 1al way is tl1e only 011e ope1 1 to tl1en1 by virtue of Article 2139. 4.

1-\.

COORDIN.ATION PRO: BLE11S

Solving co11flicts ,vitl1 Penal Code

111 �1 ieV: of !his o,1erridir1g JJractical i1nporta1 1ce of penal lavv and process for tl1 e appl1 cat1011 ot tl1e : prese11 t Article, \Ve ca1 1not avoid l1 ere a cliscl1ssion of so11 1e extre111ely difficult proble1 11 s co11cer11ing the re]atio11 betwee11 t11e SJ)ecial Part of t11e Pe11al Code a11d t]1e Specia.l Cases of fault JJart of the Civil Code. We are saddled ,vitl1 tl1 e1 11 u1 111 ecessarily, si1.1ce t11 ey see11 1 to l1ave arisen tlrro u· gh i 11 adver te11 ce fro1 11 11011-coordination of the civil codification \.Vith tl1e penal 011 e in tl1 e field of '·Speci�LI Cases''. Si11 ce, i1 1 011r system, a pe1 1al 01Ie11ce is a11ton1atically a ci,ril fault, it \Vas essential to avoid overlap1Ji11gs and co11 tradictio1 1s bet,vee11 tl1 e Cocles co.ncer11 ed. S11cl1 co11tradictions exist and are sometin1 es clearct1t. S01neti1ues, tl1ey are n1erely pote11tial, dtie to tl1e 11.011 -ide11 tical worcli1 1g of certai1 1 in1 precisely overlappi1 1g provisio11s. I1 1 eit.I1er case, the questio11 is: 1n11 st a plai1 1tiff be rebt1 tted beca11 se of a defenda1 1t-raised co11 tradictio11 bet\vee1 1 the pe1 1al offence invoiced by plain.tiff 1111der the ''i11 fringe111e1 1t of la\.,,'' pri11ciple and ar1 exc11l1Jatory tort J)rov.isio11 ? By applyi11 g tl1e n1 axi111 ''/e�y specic1/is clerogat ge11erali'' (special rt1 ]es (of tl1e sa111 e ra11k) prevail over ge11 eral 011es), tl1 e co11rt \vill l1 ave to decide tl1at tl1e excttlpatory tort prov isio11 shall pre,1ail, tl1ereby e.f:fecti11g a11 exceptio11 to tl1e ge11eral pri11ciple that i11 fri11ge111 ent of a. la\v is a fal1lt. Tl1 is 11nless tl1e respective JJrovisions ca11 be reco11 ciled pl1 rs1ia11 t to anotl1er r11Ie of co11strt1ctio11 1 2 vvl1 icl1 provides tl1 at ''excep tio est strictae i11terJJretc1tio11is'' (exce_ptio11s 1u11 st be strictly i11 terpreted). WI1e11 tl1 ere is, tl1 erefore, a 111 erely JJOtential co11 tracliction res11lti11 g 1·ron1 a11 i1u1)recise cluplicatioi1 _or overlappi11g bet,vee11 tl1e pe1 1al a1 1d t J1 e civil provisio1 1, tl1e latter as far as possible sl1 ot1 ld be assig11 ed a 111 ea11i11 g reconcili11 g it \vitl1 the for1ner in orcler to avoid an exceJJtio11 to t]1e ge11 eral pri1 1ciple tl1at i11fri1 1gen1ent of la\.v is a f. a11lt. J3elo\v (B-C), we apply these two rt1les of i11 terpretation i11 tt1 rn. B.

Special rules prevail. over principle

Tl1e ''Special Cases'' of fault part of the Civil Code tl1t1s seems to create 111ore problems tl1 a11 it solves. 111 JJartic11lar, it civilly exculpates certain violators of - pe11 al law. Often instead of ]1elping the judge witl1 concrete guidance restricting l1is di· scretion,13 its provisio11 s will force him to perfor1n me�tal acrobacies. of t11 e � b� ve described lcincl, of wl1icl1 the rest1lts n1ay be l1npred1 ctable. Even 1f the existing exceptions prevailing over tl1e pri11 ciple of Article 20351 4 \Vere co11sciot1sly . desired, __ which seems i inprobable, tl1ey sl1 ot1 Id l1 ave bee11 f?r1n11lat�d expl1 c1tly, as, f o.� instance, in the following tern1s concer11ing battery, restraint of liberty and defa1nat1on:

11. See , e.g., some 12. On botJ1 rules, vol. J ( 1964), 13. See note 2, F, 14. Cum ·Art. 100 .

of the Penal Code Arts. cited in note 1, B, (c), ttnder ArticJe 2033. see . G.- Krzeczuno\vicz, "Statutory Interpretation in Ethiopia", J. Eth. LaH,, pp. 320_-3.22. above. of the Penal -Code.

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Art. 2035, 4 By ,vay follows:

exceptio11 to tl1e principle of Article 2035(1 ), it is provid.ed as

(a) Notwitl1 standing Articles 544(1) 794 and 552 Pei1al Code, a mere threat of battery [mere assat1lt] is not' a fault. [See Article 2038(3)] 15

(b) Notwitl1 sta11ding Article 557(1) Penal Code and the reStrictioi1s placed by Articles 49-50 Cri1ni11 al Procedure Code 011 the powers to arrest, � person _ who restrains the liberty of a1 1othe� having a good rea� on to b� l� eve that he coffilnitted a penal offence co1nm1 ts no fault. [see Article 2042]

(c)

Notwithstanding Articles 580(1) a 11d 245(c) or 582, Penal Code, 11 0 fau! t by defa1nation is con1n1.itted \.Vl1ere tl1e defenda11 t proves the trut11 of his imputatio11s. [See Article 2047] 17

(d) Notwitl1sta11di 1 1g Articles 574•(1) and 588(1) Penal Code, no fa11lt is co111 . n1ittecl by defan1j11g deceased perso11s otherwise tl1a11 by wa)' of an image u11der Article 30 Civil Code. [See Article 2044] 1 8 At the codificatio11's drafti11g stage, s11ch explicit for11111latio11s v.1ould have ill11n1i1 1ated tl1e inco11siste11cies involved i11 ti1ne for tl1 e legislator to reject the provisions co11cerr1ed. Ever1 if mai11tai11ed' their forn1 ,vould at least l1ave clarified the issues for j11dges. C.

,t I'

•'

1,he ''reconciling'' method

A11otl1er proble11 1 is created by tl1e overlappi 11 g provisions. It see1ns tl1 at tl1ese sl1011ld l1a.ve bee11 avoided p11rst1a11t to tl1e legislative pri11 ciple of ''econo111y of words'', ar1 d by reaso11 of tl1e 111e11tioned danger of unpredictable pote11tial contr adictions arising from siJ11ilar but 11011-ide11tical \Vordings in, respectively, the civil and tl1e penal provisio11s co11cer11ed. Eve11 Article 2033 \Vitl1 its ge11eral provision on ''diversio11'' (abuse) of p0\\1ers might l1ave been struck ot1t, since Arts. 414, 420, 753-4 and 663-4 Penal Code 11ot only enact a sin1ilar pri11ciple, but develop it in n1ore detail. 19 As to d1 1 1Jlicatio11 proble.ms co1111ected witl1 anotl1 er general pro,,ision, tl1e ''Cl1ai11 of Co1nn1and'' Article, they will be disc1 1 ssed below.20 These cluplica.tions between tl1e JJe11al offence-defi11itio11s a1 1d some ge 1 1eral provisio,1s on fat1lt 111ay be jt1stified on the ground tl1at it is 11ecessary to prese11t tl1 e ge·neral theory of fault completely ''in the rou11d'', since, in its major aspect (11on-specifi city and primarily objective sta 11dards), fa11lt differs strikingly from ''gt1ilt'' (while

15. But thjs clear version, which on1its the adverb "ordin.arily", is hardly desirable since it \Vould thwart. our "reconciling" atteo1pt under C, (a), below. Under The Fetha Nagast (cited at note 2 to l�[ISTORICAL_ INTRODUCT! ON), whoever "frightened another ,vitl1 a s,vord" ,vas, if death followed, punishable by beating and exile (ChatJter XLVIf, p. 292). bet� � en the penal a.nd the civil adinissibility of arrest it 111ay 16. Fron1 tl1is strange contradiction _ follow that anybody ca�, without c1v1I fault, a�rest e.g. pedestrians ,vho, coiitrary to Transport (A�endm�nt) Proclan1at1on No. 279 of 1963_, Sec. 62(2) (cf. Sec. 88), cross a road in a non straight hne. � ast �ut not leas_ t, tl�e s,veep1.ng tern1s "a penal offence" in Article 2042 seen1 hard ly compat1ble ,v1th the quahficat�on "fla�ranl or serious" j11 Art. 51 Rev. Coiistitution. (In _ c1dentaJly, co �t.rast also Art- 2043 C1v. C. with 77 Crin1. Proc. C. 011 bailor' }Jo, ver to arrest) s _ 17. 1-Ionorably re111sta�ed co11v1�ts, or persons_ unhappy in their married life , hav no l redr�ss where the1! reputat10� a��/or privacy are being destroyed on tho escotlius sav civi se e by res' proving an exclusive intent to 1nJ ure. 18. This ,vould be more explicit a11d accurate tl1an tl1e bare ad J·ective "ljv 1·ng" no w used 1·0 Article 2044 ! 1 9. See Article 2033, note 1, B, (c). 20. In notes u11der Article 2036. 1

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Art. 2035, 4 you can co.n1n1it a ''fault'' as deli11ed in Article 2030 you ca11 never conunit a ''g11ilt�' no! coupled witl1 a specific offe11ce). Tl1 � dt1plicatio11 s see111 less exc11sa?le . 10 tl1 e ''Special Cases'' of fau.lt provisio 11s, \.vhich precisely purport _ to l1m1t, 1n a fe\.v respects, tl1 e judges' discretion i. n tl1 eir application of the gener al standards of fa1Llt, a p11rpose which is already fulfi.lled, in a myriad of respects, by tl1e present Article. Sir1ce we are, ratl1 er u11 fortunately, faced with such d11. pli . cat10 ?�, we 1nust try, as far as possible, to reco11cile21 tl1e given ''S1J ecial Cases'' defin1t1ons ,of fa11lt ,vith tl1eir penal cot1nter1Jarts as to offence. But tlJe ''reconciling'' .rnet �od 111 ay also be usecl, and is easier to illustrate, i 1.1 cases of appare1 1t, but flexible, st1rface-contr,1dictio1 1 lJet\vee11 tl1e Penal a11 d tl1e Civil provisions involved.. EXAMPLES: (a) 1 1 1 1\rticle 2038(3), ''ordi11arily'' 1nigl1t perl1a1Js be construed to n1 ea11 ''i11 cases 1 1ot i11vol,1ing a conviction for criminal assault or intimidation under Art. 544, or 794, or 552 Pe 11 al Code'' . 22 (b)

!11 Article 2039(c), th. e justification ''11 1y floggi11 g tl1 e servant was reasonable corporal punisl11ne11 t'' 11 tigl1t perhaps be construed as creati11g, · by impljca tion, a legal right si111ilar to tl1at directly established by the law of perso.ns i 1 1 Article 267(2) ,vith respect to cl1ildren. In tl1 is way, we \:vould create a justification under Art. 64(b-c) Penal Code for the purpose of avoiding co11tradic tions between tl1e civil battery provisio11s and Art. 537 or 544 Penal Code.23

Alth.011gl1 tl1e sol11tions s11ggested above for reconcili 11 g civil provisio11s with tl1e pe11al 011 es may be controversed, at least the proble1ns to be solved were selected for their relative si1nplicity. Ma11y more could be produced, which are so intricate that \.Ve would 11ot eve11 venture to suggest a solution to them. Tl1 eir ·f1·ustrating and largely f 11tile discussion belongs, more properly, to ,t by article con1 mentary 011 tl1 e ''SJJecial Cases'' provisio11 s. We ca11 , at tl1 is stage, 011 ly s11b1nit that the bt1rcle11 laid 011 the j11dges is too 11:e avy. In 111 a11 y respects, far fron1 clarifying tl1e la\v, the ''Special Cases'' Paragrapl1 blurs its o·utlirte. 24 Neitl1 er can its exister1ce be f11Ily jt1stified by tl1 e legislative i11 te11tio 11 to visit battery, restrai11t of liberty, defa111 atio11, i11jt1ry to rights of spouses, trespass, with tl1 e sa11ctio11 of moral da11 1ages. The ''Moral D::1mage'' provisions co11 cerned25 co11ld have 111 ade direct refere11ce to the pe11al law (or property law) provisions i11 point, without 21. In accordance with the second ruJe of interpretation n1entioned in sub-note A, above. 22. Note that the strategic tern1 "ordinarily" does not figure in the published English version of the Code. 23. But J1 ow could we tben explain the fact that the rig]1t to c�stigate �e�vants .nowh_ere figures according to tort _ _ ·in the Code provisions governi11g contracts of employment, which . prov1s1ons Law itself (Article 2037), should alone govern master-serva_nt relat1_onsh1ps? I_f therefore Article 2039(c) imJJliedly creates a special right t? beat servants 1rrespe�t1ve of their ag�eement, the11 this, in turn, constitutes an in1plied exception to th�, rule ?f Article. 20�7. Doe� .•t follow that a servant refusing to sub111it to rightful "reasonable beati�g commit�, irrespective_ of contract, a fatilt by infringement of la\.v? Tl1e proper n1e�bod _ of creating legal rights to castigate .sen ants is to establish , within the la\V of pers?ns, an inferior. statt1s · of "servant". The pr_oper 1nethod _ to 1s as 1on. a . enact them for their sat1ct of creating contractual rights to castigate �ervants disregarding the "obedience" precept of Article 2525. _Tl1e only . improper, doubtful . m�thod of creating servant-castigation. right� is th_at used by _ this Code - rn _ Ar �lcl �. 2039(c) (1n_c1de11tally, consider i(s potentia.1 conflicts \Vtth Article 2067 w�1ch creates strict lt�bihty for bodily barm). Under any method, the constitt1tionality of such r1gbts may be. quest1oued under Arts. 37-3� of the Rev. Constitution. 24. Incidentally, there are also duplications with, e.g., property law: compare, for instance, Article 2053 with Article 1149. 25. Articles 2107, 2108, . 2109, 2110, 2112. 1

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Art. 2035, 4 in1 p.recisely duplicatiog or (inad.vertently) contraclictu1g tl1em i11 the ''Special Cases'' _ of fault Pa.ragraph. Or, better, the ''reverse'' reference method, used 111 person:S and f,1mily law, 26 could have bee11 generally e111ployed. D.

Comparative Ia,v origin of incompatibilities

AJtl1 ol1gl1 tl1 is Co11U11eotary is primarily exegetic, 27 we c�11not h.ere avoid � n excursio11 i11 to tl1 e wilderness of comparative law, wl1ich excursion alone car1 expla111 to tlJe startled reader how and \.Vhy the above-me 11 tio11 ed legal puzzles were allowed to arise. Tl1e pri11ciple that law i11fri11 gen1e11 t is fattlt l1 as rarely bee11 codified abroad, 28 but it is part of certai11 Conti11 ental legal doctri11es as a 111atter of co�rse. 29 Tl1 is js per11aps a co11 sequence of tl1e in1 portance of legislatio11 i-i1 cou11tries wl1ere tl1 e ordi11 ary or co1n 1 J1011 law is 11ot judge- 111ade bt1t statutory. Standards of co 1 1dt1ct enacted by tl1 e legislator prevail without restrictio 11 over tl1ose wl1ich judges 111 ay otl1er\-vise i111·pose. Tl1e situatio11 is different wl1 ere, as in E 1 1gla11 d, tl1 e con1J110 1 1 law is ''judge-111ade'', vi1l1 ile stat11tory law, bei11 g exceptio11 al, is resh·ictively interpreted. 30 Co11 seql1e 1 1tly, there is, i11 tl1e E11 glisl1 1avv, 110 autotnatic principle whereby tl1e victim of a cri111e 111ay sue i11 tort, 1111 less tbe J>e11 al statute i11 fri 11ged itself gives an action for dan1ages. 31 Tl1e i1 111)ositio 1 1 of a p11 11 ishme 1 1t 111ay eve11 be evide 1 1ce that a civil re 11 1ecly ,vas 11 ot inte11 cied. 32 Tl1ere is 110 co 111pelling 11eed for a pri 11ciple wl1 ereby i11 fri11 gen1 ent of Pe 11 al law is a1 1 to111atically a tort i11 a legal syste1n wl1ere a high stanclard jt1cliciary 11 as created, fro 1 11 tlJe accl1111ulated wisclon1 of ce11tt1ries of recorded ex1Jerie11 ce, a great 1 11ass of SJJecific torts and SJJecific dttties of care, ,vl1ich 1nakes it 1111 11ecessary for E11gla11d to e1 1act eitl1 er all-e111 braci11g de:fi 11 itio11s of ''tort'' or ''fa11lt'', or precepts equati1 1g lav,,-infringe 1 ne11 t wit11 f_ a11lt. 33 Professor R. David, tbe worlcl--k11 0,v11 co1npar,Ltist wl10 l1as do 1 1e ad111 irable work 011 tbe Fre11cl1 versio 11 of 01 1r Civil Code (tl1e E 11 glisl1 ,rersio 1 1 is distorted), l1as tried to adaJJt to Ethiopia tlJe best of 111any foreig11 legal syste1 ns. In tl1 is task l1e l1as largely st1cceeded, a11cl otir Code's title 0 11 Extra-Co11 tract11al Liability is, in a n1eas11re, a 1 11 odel of i_ts l<.ind.J4 But tl1 ere are i 11 sidio11s da 11 gers ir1 t11 is con1pa rative 111 et]1od of codificatio1 1 wl1icl1 so1neti111 _es does, and i11 tl1 is Title did res11It in tl1e joi 11 i 11 g o� incompatible provisio 1 1s._ Tl1is was 1 1ot obviot1s at tl1e drafti 11 g stage. _ Eve 11 tlus writer becan1e aware of rt only after a year of teachi11 0- tl1 is Title. Tl1 e 1nai 11 i11 con1 patibility is betweet1 tl1 e conti11e11t,1I borro\ved ''la,v i;fring1nent is (cu1n Art. 100 Pe11al Code) a11d tl1e ''s1)ecial cases'' provisio 1 1s fat1lt'' principle _ _ la.rgely der1vecl fro111 E 11 gl1sh co 1 nn1 on law wl1ich co 11 tai11 s no s11cl1 gerieral

26. e.g. in Articles 29(3) and 573. 27. For reasons set out in our METHODOLOGICAL I NTRODUCTION, supra. 28. It is expressed it1 Art. 914 of the Greek Civil Code; contrast Art. 823 of the Gern1a11 Civil Code. 29. See e.g. R. Sava tier, Traite cle la responsabilite civile (l>aris ' Librairie generale de droit et de jurisprudence, 195l), vol. 1, ch. 1, nos. 7-12. 30. Cf. G. Krzecztu10,vicz (v.,ork cited above at ftn. 12), p. 321, n. 40. oo, Londo11, SvJect & tvlaxweil, 196l) , p. 490_ 31. Sec Sal111011cl on Torts (13th ed. by 1Ieust 32. :1, �k1 1· 1son v.. f:1eiv�astle & Gateshe a_d r'V_ater1-vorks Co. (J 877), 2 Ex. D 441. No wonder that Jo111 -d er of c1v11 wit11 pena1 procee d 1ngs 1s u11k no,v11 i11 England. 33. A J)assage fron1 page 9 of Memorandum No. 3 of The La111 Societ;, se ·1:,,s n "PersonaI I nJL_ · i ries · Litigation" ( London, November 1967) reads as follov,1s. "The Counci�; [O1 1_1lC L av,1 So c i � ty ] be ld conf do 11ot· feel· that there shou erre d on any criminal ( court ti1e po,ver to 111ak e any f 1na l · · · · - m1na t1ot1 on ti1e c1v11 issues 1nvo1v1ng · personal injuTies aiid deter · they �ee·t ·ti11s · to · -her . b e so w· l1et or not the accused is co11victed ... " 34. See our DOCTRINAL INTRODUCTION, sui)ra.

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Art. 2035, 4

0 principle. 1�11e inco1npatibility l1as ,1lready been illt1strated. It remai11s for 11s to s110\v that, so far f �·o1n assimilati11g tl1e best of both syste111s, \Ve see111 to l1ave under111i ned the. \\'Ofk111g of tl1e n1e11tio11ed co11ti11ental pri11ciple \Vitl1011 t really j 1nporting tl1e legal \V1sdon1 of tl1e Co111111011 La,v. I11 l1is article ''Un projet cle cocle stir la respon.sab.ilite civile'', 35 Professor David �eve�ls tl1at, an1ong the ''special cases of fat1lt'' provisio11s, tl1e follo\vi11g ones are 1 �1sp1red by t�1e c;o11u11011 La\v of l�11gla11cl: tl1e prov.isio11s 011 batter)', restrai11t of l�berty (f�tlse 1111pr1so11111 e11t), clefan1atio11, injt1ry to rigl1ts of spouses (loss of co11sor t1u111), trespass to la11ct; trespa.ss to goods, i11accurate infor1natio11 (deceit). According t? tl1e s,1111e article, the precise sot1rce 11sed by the disti11g11isl1ed expert i11 l1is drltf t111g of tl1e above provisio 1 1s \Vas Je11/cs' E11glisli Civil Lc11v. 36 T11is is a IJrivate digest of the E11glish co.111111011 la\\' atte1111Jting to co11deose tl1e essence of its lead ing j11dicial rt1lings i. 1 1 the for111 of 11t1111 bere.d cocle articles, wbicl1 are followed by refere11ces to tl1e case-decisio11s i11 poi11t. Tl1ose decisio11s \Vould have beco111e sec.011d ary sot1rces for ilJ1u11i11ating ot1r o\v11 la\\1, had tl1is digest's provisio11s bee11 real ly ''re1)rod11ced'' i11 our Cocle. This, l1owever, l1as bee11 done 1nai11ly with respect to s0111e of tl1e l1 eadi11gs. TIJe rest l1as been varied at1d ampt1tated, tl1t1s depriving tis of tl1e Co1111non La,v's co1111otatio11s. Exa111ples: (a)

Battery: con1pare 1-\rtic.le 2038 witl1. Je11ks' n . 11n1ber 885. 1-\part fro11 1 otl1er cha.n- ges i11 tl1e worcli11g, our Article 2038, far fro111 saying tl1at assa1tlt (tl1reat of battery) is a fault, provides tl1e co11trary, tl1ereby co11traclicting botl1 Je11ks and 011r ·Pena] Cocle. 37

(b) vVitlli11 tl1e ''Restrai11t of Liberty'' (Je11ks' False Im_priso111ne11t) provisio11s co1npare Article 2042 with Jenl<s' 1111n1lJer 897. 111 the distorti11g curtail111ent of tl1e ]orig and gt1ardecl Je11l<s' provisio11, ''fel.011y'' (gravest cri111e) becon1es c1 pe11al o.ffe11ce i11 011r Article, tl1ereby co11tradictiog both Je 1 1ks and our Cri111i11c1l Proceclure Code. 38 (c) Closest to Je11J<s' are our provisions 0.11 clefamatio11. To Je11ks' 11t1mber 973 · ·v,,e owe 011r Article 2047 011 tl1e jl1stificatio11 of ''tr11tl1'', whicl1 partly conf\jcts vvitl1 011r Pe11al Code. 39 (si111ilar conflicts ca11not arise in EngJa11d i11 tl1e absence of, botl1, a. Code a11d a J:>ri'I1ciple tl1at pe1111I offe11ce is civil fa11lt). B1rt in spite of tl1is o,1erall sin1ilarity bet.,vee11 Jenks and 011r Code provisio.11s 011 defa111atio 1 1, c11a11ges of ,vordi11g a11d text-a1nputatio 1 1s deprive 11s of tl1 e 1nai11 e11ligl1te11ing distinctions of tl1e Co11u11011 La\\1• l::;-or this reason, e:g., the elaborate English coi1cept of ''pri,1ileged state111e11ts'' re111ai11s en1 brio11ic i11 our Civil Code (Article 2048), vv11ile tl1e co11ce1:>t of ''fair'' comn1ent or opi11io11 is c1epri,1ecl of tl1is essse11tial ,tdjective (Article 2046). 40 Etc., etc.

E. Suggestion de lege fcrenda Conc1tidi 1 1g 011 this· Sectio11 's English borro":ings, it seems clear tl1at their draf _ ting is defective. In additio11 to expressly excl11d111g, where appropriate, tl1e aplica-

35. In Estttclos juriclicos e1n honrc1 de Soriano 1Veto (Pernambt1co, Universitad de Recife, 1962), vol. J, p. 237. 36. (4th ed. by P.fI. ,vinfield & others, London, Bulter\vorth & Co., 1947), hcreina.fter quoted as Jenks. 37. See sub-note B, (a), above. 38. See sub-note B, (b), above. 39. See s-ub-note B, (c), above. t. 579(a). Ar , de Co l na Pe the d an 970-971, Sectio11s 40. Compare Jen/cs, '.

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Art. 2035, 4-5 41 our Jenk -i11spired provisions , de) Co al � Pen bility of Article 2035 (cun1 Art. 100 shol1ld have been worded in a way ,vhich wo1tld clearly s11_0� if or how much_ ?f tl1 e Com11 1on La,v's co11 11otations are i11clt1ded (special provisions sbotild be explicit, not sybilline. Such terms as ''ordu1arily'' in Article 2038 are har�ly illumi1:1ati?g). Even then, the law wot1Jd re1nain too u11wieldy for efficient appl1cat1on. For this reason we are rather in favour of abrogatit 1 g either a large par t of the ''Special Cases''' Paragraph, or the ''law-iufringen1ent is fault''. provisi�11 �nd Art. 100 Penal Code (the judges being left free to find vvhetl1er a �1ven law-111fringement amounts to fault i11 the ligl1 t of Articles 2030-2033). Tl1e legislator should express a preference a11d act accordingly. Judges or law-teachers ca1111ot easily ren1edy incon sistencies in tl1e law. At present, a clear o,1erall comme11tary on the ''Special Cases'' Paragrapl1 seenis to be impossible. Exposition is also i1npeded by the fact tl1 at some possibly Jenks-borrowed phrases were obviously f irst tra11slated or adapted in Fre11ob, and then, with. the rest of tl1e draft Code, back into (A1nharic a11d) Englisl1, witl1 presun1ably twice tl1e amount of distortio11 tl1 a11 tl1at resulti11g from a single tra11 slation.42 All tl1is in no way detracts fro111 the expert drafter's 1nerits. It 111erely sl1ows that l1 asty codification based 011 too 111.any legal syste1ns a11 d lang uages l1as its risks. These 1nay be accepted. But tl1e resulti11g defects sl1 ould, i n time, be acknowledged and ame11ded.

F. Marginal observation It remai11s to be obser,,ed that several of tl1 e ''Special Cases'' provisions see1n to be inspired not by tl1e Con1n1on La,v of E11gla.nd, but by Co11ti11ental legal systen1s: e.g. Articles 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2065 (as to Articles 2062-2064, tl1 ey seem to be of ''n1ixed'' origi11). I\1t1tatis mt1tandis, criticis11 1s JJarfly similar to those expressed above n1 ay perhaps be levelled at so111e of tl1ose cor1ti11e11 tal borrowi11gs i11 tl1e ''Special Cases'' Paragraph. Of tl1 ese, Articles 2055-2056, appare11tly derived from Frencl1 case-law, would probably have been n1ore 111eani11 gfl1l if set against Article 2037 in tl1 e ''General Rules'' Paragrapl1. As to, e.g., tl1e ''U11fair Con1petition'' provision (Article 2057), it is, according to tl1e expert drafter, borro\ved fro111 Greek law. 43 In its abstract, curtail�d form, this provision neitl1er in1ports a11y ligl1 ts fro111 . tl1e Greek law, 11or does it add to the n1ore detailecl and ei1ligl1.tening _ 671, 673, 674 of the Pe11al Code, wl1ose i11 fri11ge111e11t is a fault . prov1s1011s of �rt1cles by way of Article 2035 (cu1n Art. 100 Penal Code). It 11 1ay, however be jt1stified as ''tl1e'' principle referred to and elaborated 11pon by Articles 132-134 Co1 n11 1ercial Code.

5. IGNORANCE OF LAW A. Presumption of llno\vledge In tl1e admi11 istratio 1 1 o� j�stice,. we start fr?1n tl1e 1111 derlying prestllll }Jtioii that everyo11e knows t11e law. This 1s obv1ot1sly a fictio11 since, i11 a moder11 state law s are so 111any tl1at_ 11_0 one �11ows _or ltn�ersta11ds tl1e1n all. B11t tll is fictioi1 i� 11 ec essary, because 1t 1s pract,call� 11:npossible to ascertai11 i11 eacl1 case \Vlletl1.er tl1 e defendant k11ew tl1e lavv l1e 111fr111ged, a11d becat1se tI1e excuse of I·gora11ce, I·r . · .1te d abltse, re 11deri11 g legislation iiieffecti ve. Si,ice· a dm1tted, wou Id 1end .1tself to un111n

41. See sub-note B, above.

42. Tbis \vriter's present English version of Title XIII of th e Civil code rect1fi .• es onl err y ors .of th e English transla_tion from French. T h e expert drafter's initial Frenc h note f s rom tl1e English. Jenks are not available. 43. C. Civ. /13 of Avant Projet (cited above at p. 3, note 1) p. 14.

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Art. 2035, 5 011e is deem�d to know the exct1se for its breacl1. Tl1is Roman La"v, 011 e of \\1l1ich, .fgnorc1r1tia ii1ris 11011 exci1sat.

Jaw one jg11ores it at l1is risk. Sucl1 ig11 ora 1 1ce is no pri11 ciple has its origin i1 1 several maxims of tl1e faithft1lly reprodt1cecl in tl1is Article, reads in Latin:

B. Connotatio11 of ''no excuse'' f\t tl1is poi11t, it is 11 ecessary to 1nention Article 78 Penal Code (whose sub-article 3 poi1:t� to civil liability). Its pri11 ciple see111s sin1ilar to, b·ut 11on-ide11tical with that of the_ C1v1l Code. For tl1 e pt1rposes of Civil liability, ig11orance of law is ''no exct1se'', wl11le for pt1rposes of Pe 1 1al liability .it is ''J10 defence''. Tl1is latter ter1 11 is less stro.ng. It 111.erely n1ea 1 1s tl1at tl1 ere is 110 exen11Jti.011 from pe 11al convictio11. Tl1 erc n1 ay, how ever, b_e redt1ction of, or even exe1111Jtion fron1, pu11isl1n1 ent of an excusable offe 11der. For tl11s_ r_easo11, st1b-article (3) safeguards tl,e see111ingly stro1 1ger civil law pri 1 1ciple by prov 1 d1ng tl1at the perso1 1 i11 breacl1 of the law ''sl1all re1nai 11 civilly Liable for the injt1ry caused''. Tl1is 1nay l1appen ,:vhe11 , for instat1ce, traffic regt1lations .are i11fri11 gecl by st1ch JJerso11s u11a\Vare of then1 as, 11ot bei11g licensecl n1otorists, are t1nd.er 110 special duty to kno,v the Tra11 s1Jort (Ame11d.111e 11t) Procla1natio11 of 1963 .apart fro1n tl1e ge11eral presu.1111)tio11 tl1at tl1 ey know tl1e Ia,v. A11 illiterate tribes1 na11 ,vl10, by ,valking or1 tl1e right side of tl1e road contrary to Sectior1 61(2) of said Procla111atio11 , causes ,1 c,tr-c\river to s 1 nasl1 l1is car agai11st a tree, n1ay be exempted fron1 the p111 1ish1nent prescribed j11 Sectio1 1 88 by applyi11 g Articles 3 a1 1d 78(2) Penal Code, 44 b11t sl1all not be exe1n1)ted from liability in damages to the car-ow 11er, because ·under tl1e Civil Code there are no provisions to this effect. At this jt1ncture, a di ffi · culty 1 nay arise. Tb.e tribesman, or l1 is counsel, 111ay atternpt to clai.111, i.f not exemptio11 , at least redt1ctio11 of tl1 e da1nages under Article 2099 i 11 the Sectio11 011 Mode and Exte11 t of Co1npe11satio 11 . TI1e isst1e n1 ay then t1.1r11 11pon reconcili11 g tl1e meanu.1 g of ''110 exct1se'' witl1 t 1 1at of ''u11a"vareness of fat1lt''. M11st the (a) former be qt1alified by the latter, or tl1e (b) latter by t]1 e for1ner? '

(a)

If we say that ig11orance of tl1e law is no excuse except wl1ere defendant is unaware of it, tl1 is see111s ta11t�tn1ot1nt to ca 1 1celli11 g tl1 e principle a11d repl,tc i 11 g it by the opJJOsite prece1Jt ''jg1 1ora 1 1ce of lavv is an exct1se''. Tl1is wo11ld violate the following principle of ''positive'' interpretation: a provisio11 1nt1st not be paralyzed by a co11struction which n1akes it co1npletely it1effective. 45

(b) If, 011 the contrary, we say that unawareness of fal1lt is an exct1se except· where it consists in the ignora11ce of a (specific) rule of Jaw, then. \:Ve preserve the co11 sistency of our syste111: both rules remai11 effective and are reconciled. The dilemn1a 1nay, l1 owever, be e 1 1tirely sidetracked as irreleva'J1t if we interpret "'no excuse'' as mea 1ung n1erely ''110 exe1 nption from liability'' and. not ''no exct1se is t �e usual one, it · fron1 payi11 g full compe11satio11 ''. Altl1ough the latter_ meaning _ · may be deemed excluded 'by tl1e "vhol_e contex� of th1s Section, . which deals o�ly 46 . io ensat cotnp \:vitl1 not with liability and � I� is t11 e�efore s11bm1�ed that our trib esman should not be preclt1ded from 1nvok1ng4 Article 2099, wl11ch sho11ld re111ain 7 . law of nce ora igi1 ed tifi jt1s of es le applicab to cas '

44. For tlie sake of thjs example, which concer11s a petty offence, we assume that Art. 700 of the Penal Code does not exist. 17�7. icle er Art un sed res exp is ple nci pri s tl1i cts, � tra con to tion lica 45. In its ap� 46. Wh.ile a distinct Section, which contai.ns Article 2099, deals with compensation. 47. Compa,re o.ote 5, B, (c), uo.der Article 2030.

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A.rt. 2035, 5 C. Publication requirement Wllichever be the co1111otatio11 of ''no excuse'', the defendant cannot avoid liah> lity by arguing that, in additio11 to be himself being innoce11tly ignorant of the law i11fringed, any ''reasonable n1an of good conduct'' could l1ave been unaware of it i11 tl1 e give11 circwnsta11ces. Wl1ere the law was unwittingly infringed, the courts are not free to hold defendant faultless in tern1s of Article 2030. 48 Our tribes1uan will not be exculpated by sbow.iJ1 g that a sensible a11d well-behaved Etb iopia11 pedestrian could also be l111aware of the r. ule requiring t11at pedestrians sho u· ld keep to tl1e left side of the road. The sitt1ation is, l1 owever, different where knowledge of tbe rule was practically impossible to acquire for alJnost anybody at la.rge dt1e to its 11on-pl1blication. Such absolute in1possibility a111ot1nts to force maj eure. A contrario to Article 2086, this defence of ''force n1 ajet1re'' may be deemed a.vailable i11 st1itable cases of liability for fa11lt. An additional argu111e11t is tl1at it is at least q11estio11able whether a non-p11blisl1ed enactinent is effective la,v at all in view of the Establisbn1e11t of the Negarit Gazeta Procla111ation No. l of I 942 ai1d the Admi nistration of Justice Proclamatio11 N·o. 2 of 1942 and Article 88 Rev. Co11stitl1tion, wl1ich all req11ire tl1at all laws be pt1blished in said Gazeta. 49 Perl1aps the first of the (tbove argume11ts would alo11e suffice to exc11lpate ot1r tribesma11 if the section. reqt1iri11g pedestria11s to keep to tl1e left side of tl1e road were 01nitted. from tl1e p11blisbed Negarit Gazeta ,,ersion of tl1e above disct1ssed Transport Proclamation.

u in tern1s of Art. 59 with 697 of the Penal Co de: see Arts. 78 and 700 of the ��af g�� 49. This reqt1iren1e11t see111s infringed by Maritin1e Order No 1? 0f • , however, t)rescr1bes 195_3, \yl11ch at least conspicuous JJosting of maritime regulations 111 _ y ar . ·ti: 1e-1r apphcab1ht ea i.e. the J)orts. 48.

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Art. 2036, 1-2 Art. 2036 - Chain of command 1, 2 (I)

· The _fcict that arz act z·s ,.,o Jzorzty · 3 does not •11 ne on orders fi aut si1perzor ro111 r1ecessarifJ, 4 exculpate tl1e doer. .

(2)

Tlze doer co111111its a fai,lt lvhere he z1nclersta11cls4 tl1e illicit nati,re of tlze act, partict1lc1r/y i1 1 tlzat tlze order-giver exceecls !1is polvers 5 or that t/1e act orderecl is cri111i11al. 5

(3)

Tfzere is 110 fai,lt i,vlzere, i11 tlze circi1111stances of tl1e case, a11d partici,larly i,11cler tlze strict exige11cies of pz,blic service or r11ilitary discipli11e, 1l1e doer of tl �e act -i-vas placecl i11 a positio11 111aki11g it practically in1possib!e6 for /1in1 to d1sct1ss t/1e ore/er received or act otherwise tha,z he did.6 , 7

COIVIMENTARY (Notes 1-7) 1. SCOPE OF TI-IIS ARTICLE This Article adds notbi11g to tl1e five basic standards (1-\rticles 2030' 2031 ' 2032' 2033, 2035) by ,vhich fat1lt is assessed. It is n1erely co11cer11ed with tl1e following problem: I n what circu111stances can a subordinate exec11ti11g orders of bis legal superior be exc11l1)ated (held fa11ltess) where tl1e act ordered violates those standards? As will be show11 further 011, of tl1e t,vo a11swers to tllis question, tl1e first is imp lied in sub-article (2), a11d tl1e second is directly expressed in sub-article (3) of this Article. The justifica.ti.011s provided tl1erein apply only to subordinates actit1g in performru1ce of SJ)ecific orders, and not to those merely performi11g tl1e ge11eral duties of their office, in wl1icl1 case they re1nain liable for any fa11lts com111itted. 1 On tl1e otl1er J1ancl, the j11sti·fications 1111der tl1is Article are not available ,vl1ere to the st1perior's u11la,vf11l order tl1e executa11t acids an i11clependent fault of his own, sucl1 as exceeding the order or ca11sing additional harn1 by its in1p roper execution (e.g. ,vbere a soldier, on being wrongf11lly orclered to burt1 a l1011se, inte11tionally or negligently burns the whole village). Nor are tl1ey available wl1ere the order-giver is n1erely 011e's superior i11 rank and not in authority (e.g . a Prime Mi11ister interferi11g with decisions of a judge). In the notes below, we shall use tl1e term ''1111lawf11l'' or wrongft1l not in tl1e limited sense given tl1e terms ''i1ifringement of law'' for the purposes of Article 2035, 2 but in the sense of a violatio11 of any speci·fic or general standards or rules enacted either by 11on-tort leg.islation or by this Section. The tecl1nical term conveying this meaning is ''illicit'' (ratl1er tl1an ''illegal'') (see sub-art. (2) of this Article). 2. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM A ''chain of command'' relation exists between persons of which one has the ·right to command and the other · the d11ty to obey. This relation typically exi�ts within administrative and miJjtary departn1e11ts of the . government, wh� se . entire •structure is hierarchical, tl1at is, based on a long chain of legal subord1nat1on at various levels. A hierarchic� l s11perior's orde_rs sl1ould never be unlawf�l. !h�. super .ior's civil (e.g. under Article 2035) and, 1n case of offence, penal liability for

2126(2). le tic r Ar de un ble lia be y ma te Sta t11e , ion dit J. Article 2126(1). In ad 2. See Article 2035, notes 2-3. 3. Art. 69 of the Penal Code.

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Art. 2036, 2

givi r1 g unlawful orders is unquestio11abJe. But wl1 at _ is t11 e subordinate's J)OSitio11 in sucl1 case? In con1111 011 with no1 1-subordi11 ates, he 1 s ge11 erally botind to obey la,�� I1 1 co11 trast to 11 011 -st1 bordi11 ates, he is also specially bou11 d (purSLtant to, e.g., 1 111 11tary or pttblic service regulations) to obey l1 is SLII)erior's orders. It follows_ tl1 at,_ wl1 ere tl1 e order is t111 la\vft1 l, the st1 bordi11 ate ca11 011 ly obey the Ja,v by disobeying the order or obey the order by disobeyi11 g tl1e law. 4 \Vl1 at sl1ould he do in st1cl1 case?: (a) Always obey tl1 e law? � b) Always obey the order? (c) Obey tl1 e la,v in certai11 circt11 11stances, � 11� order 1 n otl1ers? These tl1 ree alter11 atives are discussed belo,v (with a 11111111nun1 of reference to comparative law): A.

The ''rule of law'' approach

111 tl1 e i11 terest of victims of unla"'ft1 l l1 a.rn1 , it ca11 be argt1 ed tl1 at law n1 ust always prevail over orders, a11 d tl1 erefore tl1 e existence of a st1perior's order should never constitute a defe1 1ce to a tort action agai1 1st tl1 e st1bordi11ate. TJ1is seen1s to be tl1e attitt1de of Englisl1 I,1,v, as reflected in Jenks : 5 ''p11blic officials 1 11ay be sued in tf1 eir JJrivate capacity for torts con11nitted by tl1e111 . . . with the authority of . tl1 e Crown; a11 cl tl1e order of tl1 e Crown ( as represented by tl1e st1bordi11 ate's hier arcl1ical st1_perior] is 11 0 defe11ce to st1ch actio11 ." Tl1 is J)ri11 ciple see1ns mitigated 01 1ly Vi1itl1 respect to court officers a11 d co11 stables. 6 OL1 ly a public service of uni quely l1igl1 quality, suc]J as tl1 e E11glisl1 one ofte11 is, ca11 bear \Veil with the severity to pttblic servants of tl1 is syste111. Its l1,1rsl111 ess co1 1sists in tl1 e fact that tl1e s11 bordi11 ate is ofte11 11 ot i1 1 a J)Ositio11 to k11 ow or cl1eck ,¥l1 etl1 er tl1 e order :. Sucl1 a syste111 ca1 1 worlc s111ootl1ly 011 ly \vl1 ere, as a 1natter of recei,,ed is li1,vfttl. fact, tl1 e respect for Ia,v a11d tl1 e sta11 dards of St,1te aci111 inistratio11 are qt1ite J1igl1 at all levels. B. Tl1e ''blind obedience'' approach

Obversely, it ca1 1 be conte11ded tl1 at for subordinates orders ougl1 t to prevail over l,1\vs, a11cl tl1 erefore tl1 e existence of tl1 e st1 perior's specific order, Vi1l1 icl1 was 111 erely exect1ted, sl1ot1ld 11 orn1ally co11 stitute a defe11ce to a tort actio1 1 against tl1 e st1bordi11ate. Tl1 is view was reflected, albeit witl1 qt1alifications, i r1 Article 146 ff. of 011r old Penal Code of 1930. It n1ay be defe11ded 011 tl1 e followi 1 1o grot111 ds: Tl1 e co11erent and effi.cie11 t worki11 g of pt.1blic a11d 11 1ilitc.1ry ad111 i1 1istratio; depends 011 read), f11lfil1nent of tl1 e ''obedi :11 ce'' duty by st1bordi11 ates, wl1 o sliould 11ot be allo,ved to paralyze tl1 e state 111 acl11 11 ery by cl1 alle1 1gi11 0 tlie correcte11 ess of tl1 eir superiors' orders, si11 ce tl1 ey are 11 ot in :1 positio11 to k i,;\V or utidersta11d all tl1 e legal, tecl111ical, political a11d military proble111s i11 volved i 11 tl,e decisio11 8 co11_ cer11 ed. It is tl1 e .co1 111na11 ding �uperior's respo11sibility correctly to ap·praise aiid appl� tl1 e . la\v, wl1 1le tl. 1 e ,,su�ord1nate :s duty �l10�1ld be Ii1nited to tiiiqtiestio11 ingly obey111 g 111s orders. Thrs bl111d obed1 e1 1ce'' JJr11 1c1ple (witl1 its coiicon1 it·:1i1 t exe111-. tio11 s fro1n liability), tl1 ough . pri1na �acie co �vi11ci 11 g, l1as been Lltterly disc;·edited by tl1 e fact tl1at tl1e n1ost revolt1ng Nazr war-cr11nes l1 ave bee11 perpetrated i 11 its nan1 e. .

4. Jn cid e 11tally, in this Article "orders" mean s sp e cific com n 1ands and n t tl,e I 111P �r·a , 1 ad11 11111· · · strative ordinan ce s e nacted pursuan t to Art. ?7 of t he Rev• Co n s t?t I u t·1011, · 1 c1, are 1a\vs. \V11 . . . 1· s01n u co o c n ge • J t f e n · o r d e e r s a u (1 1ly) , n o tw1thstand1 ng the nam e 0f " 01·ders ,, give · ' · n t 1 1e m 1n. official n o1ne n clature. 5. Work cited in ftn. 36 u nder Article 2035. Se e Jenl<.s, nu,nber 723 and the cas e s re.fierc·ed t·o, thereu nder. 6. Jen/(s, n un 1bers 731-732. Compare our Article 2064.

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Art. 2036, 2-3 With respect to pe 11al liability, it l1as beet1 forceft1lly bt1t t111st1ccessfully i 11voked by ! c!efe11�e atto�11eys in tl1e f a111 ous Nuremberg trials. Witl1 respect to civil lia �ern1a1 _ b1l1ty, 1 t 1� \v1clely reJectecl as too l1arsl1 011 tl1 e \Vro11 ged victi n1s (obversely to tl1 e .aboven1.e nt1011ed E 11 gl1sl1 approacl1, \Vhicl1 see111s too l1 arsh on s·ubordinates). C. The inter1nediate a1>proach I11 vie\-v of tl1 e excessi,1e barsl111ess eitl1er to subordinates, or to victi1ns \-Vro11 ged :by then1 , of tl1e positions respectively 111eotioned t111der A and B, abo,,e, the need :ar ?se _ for a tl1ird, i11ter1nediate approach. Sucl1 a n ap1Jroacl1 \.Vl1ile includi11g the :P_r1 11 clple that . la\-ys sl1 ot1 Id be obeyed i11 prefere11 ce to orclers, \.VOt1Id in certain .c1 rct1n1sta11 ces Jt 1st 1 fy �t subordi 11 ate wl10 l1as executed a11 t1nla.wft1l order. Tl1e 1 1eed ·to pre �e 11t la\-vless11 ess 11 1t 1 st son1 el1ow be reco11cilecl with tl1e 11.eed to preve11t a clogging of tl1e state-1 11acl1i11ery by disobedie nces grou11ded 11ot 011 kno\vledge of bt 1t 1 11ere 1111 certitude as to tbe orcler's t1 nl::1,vft1lness. TJ1is 11 1icldle •.ribed belo\-v. 7

approacl1

is take n by tl1e Etl1iopia11 Civil Code i 11 the v. ays desc 1

lvlEANING OF ''SUPERIOR AUTHORITY''

A first qt1estio11 co11 cer 11 s tl1e 111 eani11 g of ''st 1perior at1tl1ority'' for tl1e pt1rposes ,of tl1is Article. TJ1is tern1 is diffe rent fro111 tl1at of ''master'' \V]1icl1 \-vas t1secl by tl1e old Pe11al Code of 1930. 8 Wl1ile tl1 e te r.1n ''n1aster'' inclt1des st1borcli 11 atio11 rela :tio11sl1 ips of private la w, tl1e ter1n ''superior a11tl1ority'' probably excludes tl1e.111, jt1st as tl1 ey are exclt1ded fro11 1 the s11bordi11ation relatio1 1sl1ips contemJJlatecl by Articles 69-70 of tl1 e prese11 t Pe11al Cocle. Since the existe11 ce of ''st 1 perior o rders'' 11ever excuses a 1 1 o.ffe11der v.1b.o is a private st1bordinate fro1n a pe11al co11victio11, 9 it sl1ot1ld, a fo rtiori, never exct1se I1 i 111 f ro 111 civil liability i 11 dat11ages. It thus see 111s that tl1 e ,te r m ''stIJJerior at1thority'' co11 11 otes, i 1 1 tl1 is Article, 011/y relatio11 ships of pi1blic la \-v. 10 We shall therefo re proceed, ir1 tl1is Co n1111e11tary, 0 11 tl1e asst1m_ption tl1 at ''st1pe rior autl1ority'' and ''cl1ai11 of co111n1and'' (l1ierarcl1 ical order) de 11 ote 011ly relatio 11 sl1 i1Js .of public service or 1nilitary st1l1ordinatio 11 .11 Such exclt1sion of private st 1 borcli11ates fro111 tl1e protection of this Article is .not so harsl1 as it seems, si11ce tl1 ey dispose of several otl1er forrns of relief, namely: ;(a) Tl1 e private s11bordin a.te, st 1cl1 as a miI1or or a serva11t, who l1as obedie11tly but 1111 witti11gly inflicted wrongft1l bar1n, ca11 i11voke tl1e protection of Article 2099, ,vith effects so111e'vvl1at si1nilar to, though non-identical witl1 those clerived from Article 2036(2) v.1 ith respect to the public serv a11t. Wl1ile the latter is not liable at all if 11 ot aware of tl1e u11lawft1lness in qt1estion, tl1e forme r's relief u 1 1der Article 2099 is discretionary and partial, and the burden of proof is on the defe11da11t. 12

- 7. ·8. 9. �1 o.

And by Art. 0 7 of the Penal _Code in conspicuously similar ways. ( With respect to penal justifica tion of subordinates Arts. 146-149). Which necessarily denotes his civil fault (Article 2035). ·anee, We must however reinen1ber that the courts may try t o widen tl1is . connota tio1�. For ,· nst ( ) ) or 1 1 _1rect 2 te ( A e rt1c y d 2 crea ers d pow ent" ishm pun al por cor 7 6 in view of the "reasonable by in,plication (Article 2039(c )) over mjnors a�d servants (s�e Article 2035, note 4, C, (b) ). the judiciary n1ay consider that the compuls1on to �bey 1_ s l1ere so great as to co·ru1ote a "superior authority" relationship for the purposes of t111s Article. ( ddis Ababa, Fac :JI. For cognate arguments, cf . P. Graven, Introcluc )tio11 ro Eth iopian Penal La>v A ( ) 6 , p. 2 42 c. ulty of Law, Hajle Selassie I University, 195 )2 . Contrast note 4, A, below.

- Ill -

Art. 2036, 3-4 (b) The private subor jinate who bas inflicted wro�gful harm o_bediently and. wittin¥ 1y, but under compulsion, can invoke the protect101:1 of. Artic�e 2103 on necessity, with effects somewhat similar to, though ? ot 1de11 t1cal with the complete � x . culpatio1 1 of the public servant u.nder � t1cle 2036(3). 13 Indeed, under Article 2103, the relief is ''equitable'' and partial. (c) The moral gravity of wrongful obedience is so �� ucl! less th�n . �l1at of �� ng . ful command that the executant's s h. are 1n the ultimate,, l1 ab1 l1ty _ (as d!st1nct _ from the initial liability to victim) may be equitably reduc�d to an 1 ns1g111.ficant a111ount t1nder Article 2160 or even to nought under Article 2156 (e.g. where the ''necessity'' to obey wa; so overriding as to exclt1de fault com�letely}, with effects somewhat sim.ilar to, but non-ide11 tical with those of .Article 2036(3), wl1 ich exempts the defendant official from alJ lia�ility ancl not 011ly . the ultimate one. Here is an example coveri11g also the preceding st1 b-11 ote: A private servant who has n1isused tl1 e property of a neighbour contrary to Art. 644 (but see 71) of tl1e Pe11al Code a1 1d. purst1ant to l1 is 111aster's obviot1sly wro11gful but n1 enacing order, n1 ay (i) see the compe1 1sation dt1e fro.01 him reduced from $200 to $ 100 under Article 2103 and (ii) recover those $ 100 fro111 his master who alone is ultin1ate]y liable under Article 2156. Note that the ''public'' serva11t k11owi11gly executing t11tlawft1 l orders disposes of, but in view of l1 is special re111edies (coinprising also Article 2100) hardly needs, the mentioned general forn1s of relief available to t]1 e private st1 bordi1 1ate. 4. TI-IE ''AWARENESS'' REQUIREM.ENT A. Burden of proof While the pri11ciple tl1at la\v sl1ot1ld 1Jrevail o,,er orders is preserved by provid i11g that tl1e 111ere existe11 ce of a11 order ''shall 11 ot 11 ecessarily exculpate the doer'' of tl1 e act ordered, the words ''not 11 ecessarily'' 111t1st be stressed. With.in tl1e wl1 0Ie context, tl1 ey imJJly (a co11trario) that tl1 e st1bordi11ate who executes a11 tmlawful order i. s ''necessarily'' free fron1 fat1lt v;1l1ere the liability reqt1ire1nents of sub-article (2) are 11ot n1 et (the doer igr1ores tl1e 1111Ia,vft1111ess), or are 111et (tl1 e doer under stands the 1111lav.1ful11ess) bt1t a justi.ficatio11 t1ncler st1 b-article (3) is forthco11 1ing. A11 importa11t proble111 here co11cer1 1s the burde11 of JJro,1i11g tl1e i11dispe11sable liability requiren1ents of sub-article (2). Has tlJe plai11tiff to pro,,e the defendant's ''u11der sta11di11 g'', or tl1e defe11dant to prove his ''ig11orance'' of tl1 e wro11 g con1mitted? Under Article 70 Penal �ode ,vl1icl1 deals (mutatis mt1ta11dis) witl1 analogot1s matter, the burde11 of J)r ?of 1s 011 tl1e prosect1tor by virtt1e of Article 23(3) Pe11al Code. Under so1 11 e fore1g11 systems, tl1e burden of proof i11 Civil cases is 011 tl1 e defendant-subordinate wl10 l1as to establi.sh his ignora1 1ce of tl1e t111 Javvft1lness of the act ordered. 14 For tl1 e pt 1rpose of civil liability tl1is rt1le see111s e1 11i11e11 tly se11sible. Unfo �tt11Jately, l �c�i11 g st1 cl1 rl1le in Etl1 iopia, tl1 ere seen1s to be 110 basis for 11ot apply111 g tl1 e JJr1 11c1ple of Article 2141, JJt1rsuant to wI1 ic J1 bot11 of tl1 e liability req11ireme11ts, i.e., tl1 e illicit 11att1re of the act orclered a11ct tlie defer1da,1 t's aware11:ess of . its wror �gft1Iness wil ! l1ave to . be provecl bJ' JJ/c1;11 t(ff.15 Bitt v;,}iere clirect proof 1s Jacking, as 1t t1st1ally will be, c1 rcu1 nstantial evidence s11ould be liberally

13. See note 6, A, below. 14. Under the Egyptian Civil Code (Art.167), l �e must establist1 both llis ign.orance of the unla\vfulness and reasonable grounds for sucl1 1gn.orai1ce. 15. Wherea fter, of course, the burden of proving any justification unde r sub-art. (3) will be 00 the defendant.

- 112 -

Art. 2036, 4-5

ad 111ittecl. An exect1ta11t of cri1ni11 al orders vvill l1 arclly be presu,ned to ignore tl1at arso1 � anc� 111 tirder a.re \vrongft1l ! The very gravity of the offence ordered is circu111sta11tia� ev1dei1 ce of tl1 e st1bordinate's aware11ess of its wrongfulness. So is ofte11 l1is edt1cat 1 011 al backgrot1 11cl vvl1ere 1l1e offe11ce is not so evidei1t. B. S11bjectiYe standard Fro.m tl,e requiren1ent tl1at the exect1ta11 t ''t1IJderstand'' tl1e unlawful11 ess of tl1 e act ordered it is clear tl1at st1b-article (2) of tl1is Article provides t\VO exceptio11 s �ron1 otl1er ge11era � rt1les of liability for fault. Firstly, co11 trary to Article 2035(2), 1g 11ora11ce of lcl\V 1s }1 ere a defence (ancl is eve11 presumecl, since awareness of tl1e u11la\vft1l1:ess 111 1,1st be provecl: see A, alJove). Seco11clly, contrary to Articles 2030. 2031, obJect1,,e sta11 dards of assessing fat1lt are l1ere exclt1ded. It is irrelevant for t1 1e for1nal co111 plaint's pt111Joses16 wl1 etl1er a reaso11 able man follo\Vi 1 1g t1sual stand ards of good �011 dt1ct (2030), or a reaso1 1able adn1i11 istrator followi11 g ustial sta11d ards of profess1011al condt1ct (2031), wot1Id, or ,vould 11ot }1ave understood tl1e t1 11 lawful 11 ess co11 11nitted.17 The executa.11t can be liable 01 1ly \vl1 ere /1e t111clerstood s11c.h 1111lawf11l11ess. 18 Tl1e sta11darcl applied is st1bjective a11 d seems gerrna11e to tl1 e '' 1 nora lity'' requiremen.t additio 1 1ally contai1 1ed i11 Article 2030(1) a11 cl disc1 1 ssed i 11 note 2 1111der tl1at Article. Tl1is bri11 gs tis near to cri111 i11 al law 11otio11 s of gt.lilt and jt1sti fication, as reflected i11 tl1e clearly a11alogot1s wordi11g of Art. 70, Pe11al Code. 5.

Tf1E ''U.NLAWFULNESS'' REQUIREMENT

The ''illicit 11 att1re'' of tl1e act ordered 1 nt1st of cot1rse be proved before the problen1 of its ''11 11 dersta11cling'' 19 ca11 arise. As stressed i1 1 note I, above, tl1e adjec ti,1e ''illicit'' seeins to de11 ote i11 this Article botl1 acts infri11 gi 1 1g tl1 e legal provisions co11ten1plated b)1 Article 2035, a 11 cl otlJer acts a111ot111 ti11g to fa11lt 1L11der this Sectio11. This st1b-a.rticle 111 e11 tio1 1s, :it1 particular, the exceecli 11 g of I1is powers by tl1 e order giver or the crin1i1 1ality of tl1e act ordered, probably beca1 1 se i11 fact plai11 tiffs bring tl1eir actio11 s agai11 st the orcler-giver a 11d/or the st1borcli11ate n1ai11 ly 011 tl1ose two grou11ds. TI1 e seco11 d grot1 11 d 11ecessarily inclt1des tl1e first, since 11 obody l1as tl1e autl1ority to order a cri111i11 al act, wl1ile tl1 e first does 11ot t1ecessarily include tl1e second; e.g. it is 110 offe11ce to gi, 1e joy-rides to the s11perior's girl frie11 d i11 yot1r car, althouglJ tl,e superior exceecls l1 is powers ancl violates Article 751 Penal Code wl1e11 11 e orders you to do sucl1 a tl1i11g, wl1 icl1 is t 1 11co1111ected witl1 service matters. Yot1 n1 a)' be aware of tl1 is abt1se. Bt1t it ,vo11ld be abs11rd20 to n1ake you liable for fault, altl1ot1gl1 tl1e alter11ative form i1nparted to the text b·y tl1e adverb ''or'' would see 1n to require it. 21 A. Po,Yers exceeded 22 The problems regarding au �tl�cial'� excee�! 11g of his p11b!ic authority are, basi cally, part of tl1 e st1bject ''adm1n1strat1ve law . So are somet 1 mes, abroad, any pro-

( 16. Contrast irrelevancy for defence purposes under Article 2035 note 5, C). 17. N'evertheless, deviation from such standards ,nay be raised as circumstantial evidence of a given defenda11t's "awarenes": cf. sub-note A, above. -03r6ojet (cited l8. The expert drafter's different comments on tJ1ese points u1;1,der C. �iv/l 3f o f t:f 1va11�p above at p. 3, note J), p. 8, are 1101 supported by th e f 1nal version o Ar 1c e 19. Discussed under note 4, above. 20. Argument ac/ absurclun1: such abstirdity could not bave been intended by the legislator. 21 . See Article 2036(2). Its pt1blished English version has "and". 22. Cf. Article 2033, note 1, C.

- 113 -

Art. 2036, 5

s of powers'' es xc ''e in g tin ac by ed itt m m co r he et 1 l blen1s of ''administrativ e fault'' w , 33 11 ote_ 20 e!� rti (A ' rs' we po of 1 1 o rs� ive ''d �; by �r (Articles 401-403 cum 2035) ,, 1t111g to l_ cia u1 1 offi a�1 , ts ac by or le) tic Ar is (th rs � de or J A-B) or by obeyi11g u11la\\1fu 011 tl1e basis d, e ss_ cu clis lJ� 11a 11s are ts ep nc co se the ce an ). Fr fault (Article 2127 In nt case-reports of case-decisio11 s i11 co11rses on ad1ninistrative law. Lacki1Jg JJertine ss of the bare and detailed leo0"1slatio11 ' we can l1ere 011ly conti11 ue 011r cursory glo text 111 1der discussion. s 11ltra vires or where act f sel him r lde bo its ere 1 vvl ed eed exc y 1 1 rit c . is bli tho au :P be isst1es a1 1 ore/er witl1 out a11tl1 ority to do so. We are here, of course, co1!cerned 1 ree kmds: tl of be can It . ers pow e's 1 01 ing eed exc of 1 e 1 tly l 1 0 'vVit tl is second typ

(a) Tbe order n1 ay be uola.wfL1l because tl1e . order-gi�er d�es ,11 ot m��e it in . �he prescribed. for111, if a11 y. By way of except1 o'l1 to tl11s Article s pro,,1s1ons, ba11�ffs (wl1icl1 term see1ns J1ere to denote an)' officials ,,.,J10 exec11te coL1rt orders, 1 n cl11ding police officers acti11g i11 s11 cl1 ca.pacit) 1) co1 nn1it 1 10 fa11It \.\1here they execute coL1rt orders whicl1 (to tl1 eir k11 0,,.,ledge) are u11 Iawful for reasons other than tl1ose of ''for111''. Tl1e bailiff 1nust 011ly n1,1l<e s11re of the forn1al validity of tl1e order (see Article 2064) i11 that it includes tl1 e 1ne11 tions, signatL1res, etc., required by law. I-le is not otl1erwise li:1ble for co11scioL1s execL1tio11 of, a wro11gful coL1rt-order, except wl1 ere l1e exceeds tl1 e order or fails to observe the rul.es gover11 i11g the man11 er of its executio11 (s11b-article 2). Judicial autl1ority, if expressed j11 J)rescribed. for11 1, 11 eed 11ever be resisted by bailiffs. 0111· Civil Code thus e11 croacl1 es 11pon Adn1inistrative la.w matters: it conflicts with Regula tio11 71 (2) of Legal Notice N ·o. 269 of 1962 (Civil Service Regt1latio11 s), which e11joi11s public serva11 ts to disobey ''obviot1sly'' u1tlawf11l orders, withoL1t maki11g a11 exce 1Jtio11 for bailiffs. Altl10L1gl1 Article 2064 represe11 ts a11 earlier enactn1e11 t, it is of l1igl1er ra11k (1Jrocla111atio11) a11 d n1 ore special a11d tl1erefore prevails over saicl legal 11 otice with respect to tl1e bailiff's Civil (11ot disciJ)li11ary or Pe11 al) liability,. Its co11seqL1e11 ces see11 1 too sweepi11 g. Wl1 at abo11t a bailiff order ed by a 11 1ad j1 1dge, in. prescribed for111 , to do so1netl1i11 g obvio11 sly crin1 i11al? It is s11b111 itted tl1 at tl1e words ''J)rescribed form'' sho11ld be widely construed to i 11 clL1de the reqL1ire1ne11 t that tl1 e order be 011twardly relatecl to a service matter (e.g., a \Vc1rra11t of arrest or attacl1111e1 1t) clnd. 11 ot, for insta11ce, 11 1atters of tl1e ki11d mentio11ed u11 der (c), belo,v. (b) Tl1e order 1nay be u11la,vfL 1I because it deals \Vitl1 11 1atters ,vitl1in tl1 e (111aterial _ f perso11_s otl1 er tl1a11 the order-giver a1 1d not the or territ_ori_al)_ i�1risdictior1 o latter's Jt1r1sd1ct10 1 1. For 11 1stance, 1 t is not within a11 atbia da1 1ia's material jurisdictio11 .to iss11e a 11 other\vise jt1st_ified search warrant, ,vliicli power is re served to h1gl1er co1 1 rts. A11 order l1e 1ss11 es to sucl1 effect is tl1 erefore 11nlawful for lack of jurisdictio11 . BL1t if it is issued it1 JJrescrilJed for111 it see 11 1s tl1at a b�iJiff (if a�y) executi11g it witl1 full aware11 ess 1nay be free ' fro111 liability by v1rtue of_ Article 2064. �bversely, a gover 11 orate official ,vill 11ot escape Ii,1 bility wl1ere be knowingly executes his gover11 or's orders ir1 n1 atters beyo11d tl1e latter's jtirisdictio11 . (c) An order may be u11lawf11l in its object, tl1 at is, tlie act ordered. 111 certai11 c�ses, tl1 e �tct . ordered 1 11 ay be quite obvioL1sly u1 11 0 wa.y \-vhate,,er co1111 ected w1tl1 any. ser,�1ce n1 atter, as, e.g., �l1 ere_ t�: oi�der is to co111111 it raJ)e. It is _ to_ 1n1 ag111 e a h�1 d_ clefe!"ldant es�apu1g J1ab1l1ty 111 sucl1 cases, si ii ce bot11 tl1 e cr111 11nal1ty o� rape a�1 d �ts Litter 1rreleva11 cy to the service inatters ad111 j 11istered by the superior are _ 111ev1tably pate1 1t. After tl1 is JJrelin1i 11ary observ,:1tioii, let 11s stress that, as 11 1ent1 011 ed before, tl1 e cri111i1 1,1lity of tl1 e act ordered 11ecessarily denotes tl1 e 11nlawfulness of the order (i11 its object). Tllis topic is tlierefore best treated u11 der a separate I1 eading, as is do11e belo,v. - 114. -

Art. 2036, 5-6

B. Act critnina] 23 Although, as 111 e 11 tioned before, tl1 e ter11 1 ''illicit'' see1ns to de11ote a11 y 1111 lawful acts, includi11 g fa11lts t1 11 cler tl1 is Sectio11 , the req11ire11 1e 11 t that tl1 e cloer of tl1e act o�dered ''1111dersta11 d'' (a11d not 1nerely be t111 certai11 of) its 1111la,vfuless ,viii probably, ,v1th respect to tl1 e ''object'' of the order (see above), li 11 1it cases i 11 fact arising 11nder tl1is f\rticle to tl1ose i11 volving cri111 inal acts. I 1 1deed, tl1 e very term ''cri 1 ni 11 al'' is stressed i 1 1 the text. A 1 1cl eve11 a cri111i11al act will rarely give rise to an action uncler this Article or 1\rticle 70 Pe 1 1al Code wl1 ere its crin1i11 ,tlity is 11 ot obvio 11 s e11011gh to be clearly t111clerstood (cf. 11 ote 4, above) by tl1 e exect1ta 11 t of the order. An exect1ta11t ca11 l1 ardly fail to 11 11 dersta11 d tl1 at n1 t1rder or arso11 is n.or 1 11 ally crin1 i 11 al in peacetin1 e. Depe 1 1ding on l1 is backgrot111 d a 11 d circt1mstances, be 1nay son1etin1es fail to realize tl1 at a11 extortio11 (Article 668 .Pe11 al Code) is cri1 ni 1 1al. But a police1nan ordered by l1 is st1perior officer 11 1erely to e 11ter so111 ebody's lc1.nd (\vitl1 out bei 11 g leg ally e 11 titled tl1ereto) a11 d doi11 g it co11trary to Article 805(b) Pe11 al Code ,viJl rarely sl10,v a s11fficie11t 1 1 nclersta11 ding of tl1 is trifli11 g offe 11 ce for l1 im to be tl1 e succ essfttl object of a civil st1it 11 11der tl1 is Article a11 d ,vill anyway be justified 11nder Article 699(2) Pe 1 1al Code. A111 ong practical reaso11 s for 11 ot stii11 g 111 ere executa11 ts in trifling (or even serious ) cases is tl1eir habitual i11 1pec11 11 iosity a11d tl1 e protective f 1111ction of Article 2100. It is more profitable to cl1 arge tl1 eir 11on-protected a11d ust1ally 11 1ore solvent st1periors 11nder Article 69 Pe11al Code, with. a view to Civil recovery 11nder Article 2035 (cu111 Article 100 Pe 11 al Cocle). A11 d si11ce, if 011 e insists 011 st1i11 g the subordi 11 ,Ltes, tl1is sa111 e Article 2035 n1 ay be i11voked agai11 st sucl1 ''exec11ta11 t'' offe 11 ders as are liable p1 1 rs11a11t to ali11 ea 1 of A.rticle 70(1) Pe 11 al Code, the clitJJlicatio11 of tl1e latter's pro,,isio11 s i 11 tl1 is Article hardly serves a usef11l purpose in cases involving crinli 11al acts. We also l1 ave to stress, i11 cide 11 tally, tl1e close si111 ilarity bet\vee11 Article 2100, deali11 g witl1 eq11itable relief i 1 1 ''c]1 ai11 of co111 11 1a 1 1d'' cases, and alinea 2 of Article 70(1) Pe11 al Code co 1 1cer11 i11 g 11 1itigt1tio 11 of p 1111 isl1111 e11 t i 11 st1cl1 cases. A s11bordinate found pe11 ally liable t111 cler ali11 ea 1 of Article 70(1) Pe 1 1a.l Code a11 d/or civilly liable 11nder sub-article (2) of tl1 is Article 111 ay I1ave l1is punisl1 mer1 t and/or tl1 e com pe11 satio11 due fro111 l1 i111 red11ced for the esse 1 1tially icle11 tical reaso 1 1 of bei 1 1g found. to l1 a,,e acted fron1 a co 11 1pelli 11 g se 11 se of clisci1Jli11 ed obeclie11ce, as wl1 ere a d11tiful policen1 a 11 is pere.11 1ptorily ordered b)1 l1 is colo11 el to 111al<.e a11 d cloes make an arrest wilicb l1e u11 dersta11 ds to be 11111a\Vf11l (i.e. contrary to Art. 4 I 6 Pet1al Code).

6. THE '' PRAC·TJCAL IMPOSSIBILITY'' DEFENCE A.

Connotatio11 of ''impossible''

St1b-article (3) of this Article co11stitl1tes a 11 essential q11alification to tl1e above discussed provisio11 of s·ub-art!cle (2). Eve11 tl1ougl1 the subordi 11 ate l1 a�, 0! 1. �rder from superiors con1n1itted ,1 cri11 1111al act, a11 d 11 e perfectly 11nderstood 1ts 1ll1c1t nature, he is fr;e from fault if ''j11 tl1e circu111.stances of the case'' and partic11larly under disciplii1 ary con1pt1lsion, it was pr,1ctically �11 1poss�b !� for h im to d�sct1ss the ?r �er _ or disobey it. Si11ce in t]1 e absence of st1ch 1mposs1�tl1ty,. �ut 1�11l obedience for d1sc1p Jjnary reasons strffices 011ly to st�pport a _ defence . 111 n11t1� at1011 of damage� u11 der _ Article 2100 the e1npl1 asjs i11 tl11s sub-article, which provides a co1nplete JUSt1fica tion, must be on tl1 e additio11 al \vords ''cjrcu111stances of the case'' and ''practically

23.

Cf. Article 2035, note 3, B.

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Art. 2036, 6

e st in1 possible''. These words suggest that tl�e ci_rcu111stances of th_e cas . I;!u i �dica� � ct th.at the subordjnate was in such fear of 1mn1111 ent ba. n n as. to _ make it pra !cally that the rmpos impossible for him to disobey. Tl1 e adjective ''practically'' _1nd1 cates al or absolu�e. Inde�d, sic phy be not eed 1 1 y) obe sibility to disobey (necessity to i npu J�1 oo whJch co ral mo a y onl s ote den life of r g n fea eve actin at gu11point i11 a normal subordinate ·finds it impossible to resist, so that s11c� coerci on 0! 1. the part of a superior officer (wl1 0 may, e.g., in1agi11e hi1nself t? b� acting ur�der 1n1l1tary 11ecessity pursuant to Article 73 Penal C?d:) will usually_ Justi fy tl1e,�old1e�-e��c�tant pract1 e,al. impof the cr11 ne ordered to be done ' eve11 1f 1t be, e.g., a1 son. Tl1 e , ay, f?r 1nstan_c �, ossibility to disobey 1nay, however, take less drastic forms. I! � be connected with a fear of ru·rest in tl1e soldier, or of d1sn11ssal 111 the CIVll official. It is tl1 is fear of reprisa!, 24 rather tha11 a m�re ''se11se of duty'' . (which suffices for the purposes of Article 2100), tl1 at is mainly relevant for mak ing out this defence of ''practical impossibility'' to disobey. E.g., for au i �pecL1nious gov er111nent e1nployee fear of inunine11t dismissal or eve11 11 on-pron1ot1011 or transfer or discipli11ary fines may be a poter1t motive if be l1as a large family to feed. Tl1 is i111pulsio11 may perl1aps be co11 sidered s11fficie11t ,vl1ere the offe11ce involved is not murder or arso11 b11t, e.g., a 1 11ere trespass to la11d perempto1·ily ordered by l1 is gover1 1or to be co111n1itted co11trary to Article 650 Pe11al Code (and/or Article 2053 Ci,,il Code). It \.vould be idle to n1 11ltiply tl1 ese ill11strations, si11 ce everytl1i11g will depe11d 011 the coL1rt's sovereign appreciation of the infi11itely vario11 s circumstances of eacl1 case. It is 111erely s11ggested that co11rts will probably 11ever admit the jL1stificatio11 provided by this s11b-article i11 cases i11 ,,olvi1 1g s11cl1 a grave crime as, e.g., ge11ocide (Article 281 Pe1 1 al Cocle), ,vl1 icl1 tl 1e subordi11ate co11scio11s of its 11atL1 re should refuse to comnlit eve11 at s0111e risk to l1 is life, a.s was rightly stressed at tl1e post war tri,11s of Na.zi cri111i11als. 25 B. Solving conflicts witl1 Articles 2066 and 2067

Tl1e application of Article 2036(3) raises triclcy tl1eoretical problen1 s. Si11oe ''tl1ere is no fa11lt'' wl1ere a11 1111lawf11l order was acted 11po11 by tl1 e subordi11ate beca11se of a practical i1 11possibility to resist it, he is obviously free fro111 a liabiljty ''based on fa11lt'' (see Article 2028 a11d the headi1 1g of Sectio11 I). B11 t this justi ficatio11 n1ay be useless to a subordinate wl10, by tl1 e sa111e act, i11cL1rs a liability ''irres1Jective of fa11lt'' 1111 �er Sectio �1 2, \Vl1 ere plait1tiff is 011ly reqt1ired to establish the da.1nage suffered a11d its ca11 sat1011 by tl1e defe1 1da11t or l1is tl1inofatrlt beino i �rele,1 a11t. 1:1- pl_ai11t_ � 1nay tl111s try t � a,,ail l 1in1self of Article 2066 wl1icl1 pro� ,,1 d_es a strict l1ab1l1ty _for l1 a :111 done 111 a state of ''11 ecessity. '' It see111s that the _ Article 2066, l1 as failed to realize tl1at tbe cases of j11s l �g1sl�tor, wl1en adopt,ng _ 2036(3) nor1nall � a_ 111 011 t1t to st1cl1 st:1tes of ,,ecessit ;,. A literal t1fic �t101 ! 1111cler Art,cle _ appl1 cat�o11_ of Art �cle 2066 to . cases ar1s111 g 11nder Article 2036(3) ,vould tl1erefore re11der 1� 111 operattve. . T�e le¥1slator can J �ardl f ba,,e inte11ded, in 011e breath, to enact �1�1s �laborate �ust1ficat1 ?11 a11d �epr1ve 1t of all effect. Uiider tile pritlciple of _ po �1t1ve 111ter1>retat1 �1 � (Ar!c'cle 1737)-� we �111st avoicl, so far ,1 s possible, tl1 e �ss1gn1ng to legal . J)rov1s1011 s of a �1ean11 1g wb1cl1 ,,vo11ld re, 1der tli e111 i ileffective''. It 1s therefore s11 b1 n1tted tl1 �t t11e legislator n1 t1st l1ave i11 te11ded tl1 e ,vords ''tliere is no fa11lt'' to 1nean, in thi s co11text, ''tl1ere is no fault a11d 11 0 liability tIIlder Article

24. Con1pare The F_etha Nagast (cited ':t note 2 to lflSTORICAL INTR ODUCTION) ' Chapter )-.'"LVII, p. 289 1n fine, the words « did not fear hin," and context. 25. See note 2, B, above. 26. Tl1is principle of contract law applies, a fortiori, to conslruction of statutes.

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Art. 2036, 6-7 2�66'' .. Tl1is ad1nittedly forced co11struction will prevent _ fron1 being practically obliterated. d1sct1ss1on

tl1e

justification uncler

�v�n .1:1ore _ tricky i � the problen1 of reconcili11g tl1is sub-article witl1 the Section on L1ab1!1ty Irrespective of Fat1lt'' \vl1ere tl1e damage i11flicted by tl1e exec11tant ?f a.11 t111la.\vft1l order. co11sists i11 bocli/y /1c1r111.. Sttppose that a well-i11for1ned soldier 1s orclered, at gu11po111t, to flog a c0Jleagt1e wro11gly suspected of n1uti11y by his offi �er \Vho exceeds the latitude accorcled l1in1 by Article 73 Penal Code. Bodily l1arm having �nsued, tl1e f loggi11g soldier, tl1ot1gh justified 11nder both this s11b-article �nd Art�cle 70(2) Pe11al Code, is stied by the f logged soldier on tl1e basis of liability 1rresi)ec�1ve of .fat1lt 1111der Article 2067(1). The arg11n1ent used above to avoicl tl1e appl1cat1011 of Article 2066 is i11\ 1alid l1ere, si11ce application of Article 2067(1) does not re11der 2036(3) i11effective, bt1t 011ly qt1alifies it by lin1iting its effects to cases not involvi11g bodily l1ar111. lt follows tl1at tl1e f logging soldier remai11s liable 11nder Article 2067 in spite of being jt1stifiecl tinder Article 2036(3). C.

Duplication of Article 70(2) Pena] Code

This sub-article is q11asi-ide11tical witl1 Article 70(2) Penal Code. Esse11tially, only the ter111s ''practicall)' i111possible'' are 111issi11g fro1n the latter's text, but tl1e)1 are replaced by the words ''could 11ot'' (''disctiss tl1e order or act othervvise''), \¥l1ich seen1 to be to tl1e sa111e effect. Tl1e req11ireme11ts for the pe11al a11d civil justification indeed appe,Lr to be co11corda11t: tl1ere :n1ust exist a ''discipli11ary'' situation an(l, in additio11, a pra.ctical in1possibility to disobey tl1e orcler in the circt1mstances of tl1e case. TI1e pe11al a11d tl1e civil jt1stification ca11 tl1erefore easily be used i11 tl1e san1e se11.se i11 the cases ,vl1icl1 i11 fact arise, namely those wl1ere tl1e act orderecl \:Vas crin1inal (cf. 11ote 5, B, above). I11 such cases, tl1e civil liability aspect ca11 be clealt \Vitl1, i11differently, i11 joi11t proceedings and by way of Article 70(2) Pe11al Code, or by ,vay of. this Article. Tl1e st1b-article under disc11ssion indeed seen1s to be st1p erfJ11ous in tl1ese cases. Tl1is, unless it is used - contrary to tl1e principle of ''recon ciliation'' disc·ussed 1111der Article 2035 (11ote 4, C) - to pt1t a more liberal constrL1ction on tl1e ''civil'' j11stifica.tio11 than the 1)e11al cot1rts pt1t on tl1e (c1_t1asi identically worded) pe11al one, th11s obliterati11g tl1e rest1lts reacl1ed by way of Article 2035 cun1 Article I 00 Pe11al Code. I-Iopeft1lly, this will .not be do11e ancl discreJ)ant interpretatio11s will be preve11ted. Tl1e J)ractice of joining civil proceedi11gs to tlJe pe11al 011es (Article 100(3) Pe11al Code) n1ay co11trib11te to avoiding such cliscrepa11cies.

CO-ORDINATION PROBLEMS

''Duty to obey'' in military and civil service We 111t1st 110w consider the \Vl1ole ''chain of con11nand'' proble111 i11 perspective. The question of a s11bordinate's dt1ty to obey or disobey is dealt \vith by 111ilitary, administrative, penal and civil legislation. All these pieces of legislatio11 seem never to have been. co-ordi11ated. Article 34 of the Imperial Army Proclamation27 limits a soldier's dttty of obedience to ''lawft1l'' orders, wl1ich leads one to conclude, a contrario, that the soldier n1ust disobey t111lawfttl orders wl1ether or not such unlaw fulness is obvious to him. This wo11ld imply that, in case of any doubt, l1e should check the order's lawfulness be :fore obeying it. This again, if practised (it is not), could paralyze the ar1ny. Much bett� r, indeed �xcellent, is the draftin� of Reg11lation 71(2) of the Civil Service Regu.lat1ons, 28 which reads: ''The publto servant shall

27. Proc. No. 68 of l 944. 28. Leg. Not. No. 269 of 1962.

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Art. 2036, 7

obey the order of his superior. A public servant shall re�use to ob�y an order which is obviou.sly not i11 accordance with the law ... '' �h1s , formulation has the merit of drawing a clear dividing line between a subor?1nate s duty to obey the order and his duty to obey the law. The latter duty prevails only where the_ unla� . fuleness in question is obvious.29 In case of mere dou? ts, the _subordinate 1s entitled to asst11ne that the superior ''knows best'' a11d his order is lawful. A:nd it is st1bmitted that the ''obviousness'' in qt1estion sl1ould probably n_ot be assessed by the objective standard of wl1at is obvious to tl1e average public s�rvant, but by the subjecti,1 e standard of the incrin1inated official's own understanding of the unlawfulness involved, which is also the standard enacted by, respectively, Article 70(1) Penal Code and Article 2036(2) Civil Code (such ''understanding'' may, however, be established. by circumstantial evidence: see note 4, A, above). B. Consequence of discrepancy At this point, we must illustrate the practical ·consequences of the mentioned discrepancy (see A, above) between the ''Army'' and the ''Civil Service'' definition of tl1e duty to obey. Suppose a n1ar1 is unlawfully ordered to be f logged and is flogged by a subordinate unaware of the unlawfulness and therefore free from fattlt t1i1der sub-article (2) of this Article. But the victin1 sues the flogger, irrespective of fault, under tl1e ''bodily harm'' Article (2067 - compare note 6, B, above). If the flogger is a 11onn1i]itary man, he is justified by Article 2067(2), since bjs act was ''ordered by Ia,v'', namely the Civil Service Regt1lation 71 enjoi11 i11g him to obey any ''orders'' wl1icl1 are not ''obviously'' unla\vful. But if tl1 e f logger is a military mai1, L1 e is liable, since his act was in no way ''ordered by law'': indeed, the Army Proclan1ation (see A, above) enjoins hin1 oi1ly to obey such orders as are ''lawful''! This seems l1ardly a jt1st result in view of tl1e severe discipline which prevails i11 the Army.

C. Suggestions de lege ferenda Wl1ile the primary consequences of violating Article 34 of said Arn1y Proclamation, or Regi.1lation 71 of said Civil Service Regulations are disciplinary and are governed by SJJecial la,vs, the conseqt1ences of infringi11g Article 70 Penal Code or Article 2036 Civil Code are, respectively, punitive or compensatory and are governed by the general law of the la11d. Bringing tl1e Arn1y Proclamation pro\ ision on duties to obey i n tune ,vitl1 the Civil Service Regt1lation on this topic seems clearly des irable for the rea.sons mentioned above. As to the Civil Code's ''Chain of Command'' provision, its wording is, as has bee11 shown, somewl1at an1biguous. A re-drafting of the text, if desired, would l1ave, among otl1 er things, to bri11 g i t into outward harrnon)', perhaps in part by express refere11ces, witl1 said Civil Service l�eo·ulation 71 (after its extension to Military law) and with A.rticle 70 Pe11al Code (by way of Article 2035) a11d, last but 11ot least, v.1ith its own context (e.g. r\rticles 2066 and 2067; see note 6, B, above). In view of tl1e practical i11significance of the ''chain of comn1and'' problem i11 civil la,v, we sl1all leave tl1e re,1der to make l1is own detailed conclusions as to the best \'.Vay of redrafti11g tl1 is Article in the sense since cases (not an task). But easy wortl1 bringi 11 g norn1ally �ndicated above _ _ involve a . cr1m1nal offence (se � 11ote 5, B, above), perhaps a suflicie11tly workable short version of tl1e whole Article could run as follows: The .fact t/1at a11 act c �z1sing no, !-bodil ! l1ar111 is do11e by a pz.,b/ic servant o,-z . . orders fro1n hzs / !1erarc/11cal �uperior r .elrev �s (l1e doer fro,n a,1;, liability i,z cases _ lvl1ere such act zs 11ot cr1111111al, or zs cr11111nal bz,t 1101 pz111is/1able purs11a11t to Article 70 Pe11al Code. 1

29. Cf. note 2, C, above.

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Art. 2036, 7 Note tl1at most of tl1e aforementioned a1nbiguities would be clarified by this concise version, wltich \Vould sin1plif)' the administration of justice.

D. Refere11ce Tl1e ''chain of co111111a11d'' problen1 has been by no means exl1austed in these notes. It is 011e of great tl1eoretical difficulty, as shown by P. Graven in his Introduction to Ethiopia11 Penal Law. 30 Since this problem primarily concerns administrative and penal la\vyers, we l1ave refrai11ed fro1n a11alyzing some of its most i11tricate ar1d controversial aspects. Tl1e reader interested in tl1em is referred to the above mentioned book, i11 which the problem is discussed both generally and in tern1s of Ethio_pian legislation. The reader's attention is drawn, in particular, to alinea 2 on page 203, \vhere it is stated. that Article 2036(2) Civil Code is not pertinent to the interpretation of Article 70, Penal Code (in spite of si1nilarities be tween tl1ese t\vo provisions). TI1is is true enough, but the obverse is not true be cause by virtue of Article 2035 (and Art. 100 Penal Code) penal provisions are relevant in cases of civil liability and, as mentio11ed before, 31 conflicts between the effects of Article 2035 and those of other tort provisions should so far as possible be avoided by a ''reconciling'' interpretation of the latter provisions .

•

30. Work cited above at ftn. 11. See pp. 200-207. 31. at note 4, C, under Article 2035.

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A.rt. 2037, 1-2 Article 2037 - Non-performance of a contract 1 • 2

ntractual liability (I) A person does 110t com,nit a fault itivolving /1.is extra-co 3 ct. tra con a der u11 lvl1ere he fails to perfor111 l1is ob/igatio11s

(2)' 011/JJ the rules relati11g to 11011-perfor,nance of co11tracts shall apply in such case. 3

COMlVIENTARY (Notes 1-3) l.

BREACH OF CONTRACTUAL PR011ISE

TL1 e reader is referred to note l , A, under Article 2027. 111 this 1 1ote, we com n1 e11 ted briefly 0 1 1 the meani11g of the words ''extra-contractual liability'' ''apart fro1 11 any promise'' and we have pou1ted to Articles 2037 a11d 20_88 as corroborating tl1e pri11ciple that extra-contractual (tort) liability ca11 only arise from st1cl1 facts as do not 1nerely co11 stitt1te breaches of a bi11 di1 1 g promise. Si 11 ce st1ch promises are 1 1or111 ally part of a co11tract, Articles 2037 a11 d 2088 simplif)' matters by refer ing exclt1sively to co11 tracts, a11 d e,,e11 Article 2027, in its title, does not speak of ''extra-pro11usal'' bt1t of ''extra-co11 tractt1al'' liability. This is st1fficie 1 1tly accurate altbot1gl1 tl1 ere are u11 ilateral pro111ises \vhich, albeit not yet part of a contract, are already bi11di11 g a11d. gover11ed exclusively by contract law. Article 1691(1) pro vides a goocl exa11 1ple: a t111 ilateral offer ,vitl1 011t ti 111 e limit is binding during a rea.so11able ti111 e eve11 before its eve11 tt1al accepta11 ce incorporates it in a co11 tract. Bt1t since tbe sa.nctio11 for tl1 is r11Ie is i11effective11 ess of a11 y atten1 pts to revoke the offer before tin1ely a.ccepta 1 1ce, st1cl1 pro1 11ise is incapable of bei11 g breached (its u 1 1timely revocatio11 has 11 0 legal effect).1 For practical pt1rposes tl1erefore, \iVe may limit ot1rselves to distingt1ishi 1 1g between co11 tractual a11d extra-co11tract11al liabiljty. Bt1t H 1!1y distingt1isl1 (see 11ote 2, belo.w) a11 d l101v clisti11gt.1is]1 (see note 3, belo,v)? 2.

WHY DISTINGUISI-I CONTRACTUAL FROM TORTIOUS LIABILITY?

Wl1y sho11ld V11e bother to 1nake tl1is disti1 1ctio11 between contractt1al a11 d extra co11tractt1al liability? Do not both arise, as ,t rt1le, from breacl1 of d11ty (towards a determi 11 ed pron1 isee-creditor, or towards l1un1a11ity at large)? A 11 d do 11 ot both carry tl1 e co11se quence of co11 1pensation for da1nage (\vit11 ot1t J)rejt1dice to tl1 e co11_ of ''e11 force111e11t'' 1 or ''c,1ncellatio1 1'': f\rticle 1771)? Tl1 is tract lav. 's special remedies n1 ay be true e11 ot1gl1 . Nevertl1 eless, tl1 ere ren1ai11 st1fficient rlijjerences betv.,ee11 t11e r11 1es gover11i1 1g tl1 e tv.1 0 t�es of liabili!Y to jt1stify tl1 e traci11 g of a bot1 1 1dary-line betvvee11 tl1 �111 . We .shall .discuss th_e�e d1ffere11ces tinder the f ollo\-ving lieadi i1 gs: _ . A. Requisites for 1ncurr1 11 g a l1ab1l 1ty ; B. Co11 seqt 1 ences of itictirri 1 1g a liability. A. Requisites for incurring liability

�here ar � diff �re1 1c�s :�ith respect to: (a) tl1 e J)re-reqtiisite of ''ilotice'', (b) the capacity for 1ncurr111 g l1abil1 ty and (c-d) tl1 e n1odes of establisbi i1g liability: (a) Since torts ca11 not co11sist i11 breacl1 _of contract, tI1 e 11otice required by Article 1772 of contract law (see also Articles 1797-8) caiinot be a pre-requisite of extra-co11 tractual liability.

1 . As to the status of certain special obligations, sttcb as e 920 ff., from a testan1entary "charge", see Article 1677. .g. tl1ose ,vhicl1 result, under Article

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Art. 2037, 2 ( b) Ce.rtai11 perso11s are, becat1se of tl1eir age or n1ental condition, ge11erally dis abled fron1 perforn1i11g jt1ridical acts (t\rticle 193). The typical i11stance is that of the minor (Article 198) ,1vho, except i11 cases especially provided by law, cannot perforn1 jt1ridical acts. Since l1e is tl1erefore, as a rt1le, not bou11d by the co11tracts conclt1c!ed (Article 313 '· but see 315)' he cannot' ordi11aril·v .J ' be liable for tl1eir breacl1. Sucl1 contractual i11capacity has no cot111terpart in tort l,tw, which applies to mi11ors irrespective of tl1eir age (Articles 2030(3) and 317). As a rule, tl1erefore, tl1ere is 110 sucl1 tl1i11g as delictal incapacity of n1i11ors (or insa11es).2 ,( c) As a rule (Article 1791 ), breacl1 of a co11tractltal obligation is establisl1ed si1J1ply by sho\vi11g tl1at tl1e perfor111ance JJro111ised bas not 111aterialized, witl1out de111on strati11g tl1e pro111iser's fa.ult. T11 tort law, 011 tl1e co11trary, liability ,vitl1out fat1lt is a11 exceptio.11 a1Jplyi11g 011ly where tl1e law SJJecifically so provides (Arti cle 2027(2) ct1111 Sectio11 2 of tl1is Cl1apter). Conversely, as a rt1le (Article 2027 (1) ct1n1 2028), extra-co11tractual liabilit)' i s established by dem.onstratii1g defe11da11t's f,1t1lt witl1i11 the 111ea11i11g ascribed to that term by Articles 2029-2036 or tl1e ''s_pecial cases'' pro,1isions. I 11 co11tract law, on the co11trary, the require111e11t of demo11strati11g defe11da11t's fault is an exceptio11 (Article 1795) ,Lpplyi11g 011ly to cases ,1vl1ere the debtor 111erely t1ndertook ''to do l1is best'' or the la\v ''expressly pro,,ided . . . st1cl1 an. exce1Jtio11''. Tl1is is probably tl1e reaso11 for tl1e abse11ce, i11 contract law, of a11y clefi11itio11 of ¥.1l1at is ''fat1lt'', so tl1at i11 tl1e cases co11ten1plated by paragrapJ1 (a) of Article 1795 the judge will l1ave to ttse eitl1er analogy to tort provisions or discretion. 3 (d) Civil or Con11J1ercial Code pro,1isio11s 011 Special Co11tracts i11trodt1ce further disti11ct reqttisites for i11c11rri11g a liability4 ,vitl1 reSJJect to partict1lar contracts. Stich reqtiisites n1ay, still fl1rther, be varied (within legal li111its) by agree111e11t. B.

Consequences of incurri11g liability

Altl1ol1gl1 tl1e 111ai11 co11seqt1e11ces of inc11.rring liability i11 damages are co111.1no11 to contract a11d tort (Article 1790: to.rt law of da.n1ages applies also to co11tracts), this is ''witholtt prejuclice to tl1e provisions of tl1e follo1vvi11g 1-\rticles'' (a11d of spe cial rules i11 Book V Civil Code). We sl1all here discuss pri1narily sucl1 provisions as denote signif:ica11t differe11ces i11 tl1e co11seqt1e11ces of inct1rri11g, respectively, a contractl1al or an extra-co11tract11al liability for da1nage. {a) As a rttle (Article 1799), co11tractt1al compensation is eq11al 11ot to tl1e actual dan,age, blit to tl1e norn1al ?a111age �l11ch �ot1ld reaso11ably be expected to reslilt fron1 tl1e breacl1 (except 111 tl1e 1111l1kely circumstance v11here actual da1nage is less: Article 1800). On the co11trary, extra-contractt1al co1npe11satio11 is, as a rule (Article 2091), eg 11al to the actua� dam�ge i11flicted (wl1etl1er f?reseeable or not foreseeable, sa,,t11g 011ly tl1e cot1rt s equitable powers t111der Article 2101). On the other ha11d it is 11ot clear wl1etber Article 1799 exclucles, by i1nplica tion, the applicability of cer�ain equitable . juclic�al po":ers (Articles 2099-21�0) to contractual sitt1atio11s, wl11cl1 powers n11ght, 1f admitted, 11pset tl1e sect1nty of trade. The rigour of Article 1763 wo11Id argue, by a11alogy, agai11st such

I 8. 2. See, however, the special provision under Article 3 . be helped by specific provt1mes will so111e he (b) para. by t ted nipla conte • • s 3 . Wh.1 1 case · t ,e • • 1 e 1n " It contrary to the stand- , which sets a subJecttve s!a11 dar d o r 1au ISIOTIS: see e.g. Arti'cle ?524 ard of A rticle 2030. 2027. 4. See exan,ple given in note ], A, under Article

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A.rt. 2037, 2 applicability. The question is of minor interest, _being. irrelevant_ in th.e ord�nacy co11tractu.al cases contemplated by Article 1791 (1n which fault 1s not requ1, i;ed)�

�e , to n w� te ho in is _ ch ea br e th e er wh ), 01 18 � (b) By way of exception (Article , be ed all h as s. cr� 1� n io at ns pe m co al ctu ra nt co t, ul fa '' tional or due to ''gra,,e lly 1nflict�d. a . tu en ac be s ha ich wh e ag m da '' 1al rn 11o an th to cover tl1e ''greater ion sat l en tua mp ac co ntr -�o tra ex lt fau l na tio en int of ce sen , ab Conversely in the the ) am om 01 _fr 21 cle rti (A d ase cre de be s me eti '' som ay ''m rm l ha gfu for wron ount covering actual damage (Article 2091) towards that covering only such normal d.amage as could reasonably be expected to material_ize (incide_nt�lly, the end.-resu.lts of the respective in- and decreases can sometimes be similar Notice, l1owever, tL1e difference between· ''shall'' and ''may','). L

(c) As a variation on the ru]e of Article 1799, contractual damages for delay in payment of 1noney are ordinarily in the amount of the legal interest on the sum due (Article 1803(1) ), irrespective of any ''normal'' or ''actual'' harm in volved (but see the exceptions under Articles 1803(2) and 1805). There is no such rule in extra-contractual liability law. Example: A d.eparting person who, through i11a.dvertent mistake, takes and converts to his own use anotl1er's thousa11d do]lars, owes damages above that sum not in the form of 9% interest but i11 the amount of the harm actually caused (Article 209 I) as assessed at the time of judgen1ent (Article 2150), whicl1 an1ount may be n1uch higher tl1an 90 dollars per year of interest for delay (the victim may have gone bat1krupt or sick from worry). 5 (d) The provisions of Book V on Special Contracts (and/or sometimes the contracts. themselves) introduce further differences in tl1e rules of compe.nsation for harm: see, for instance, Article 2362 on methods of calculation of damages upon cancellation of a ''sale'' contract. Below is an example of the differences in volving anotl1er special contract, namely one of ''en1ployment'' (Article 2512) � An accidental machine-explosion injures the en1ployee in charge and a, pas�er-by . The passer-b_y sues �l1e machine-owner in tort (Article 2081),. g�tt1ng full . compensation (Article �091), while tl1e employee, being res tricted to suing 1n co11tract (except 1n cases under Article 2559)' gets only· the damages limited by Articles 2556-2558. 6 ( e) Limitatio11 of actions: while, unless otherwise specifically provided, actions ''based' on the non-performance of a cont�act_" may be brought wit11in te11 years from the date. when the contractual obligations concer11ed were ''due to be erform ed'' (1'.'r!1cles .I 8�5-1846), extra-contractual liability actions ''shall be br}ught by the victim w1th1n two yea�s fro1n tl1e . t�n1e_ wl1en be sustained the damage''" unless a penal offence carrying a longer lllllltation period is involved (Article 2143). . (f) Jt1risdictio11: wl1ile suits regarding breach of contract may, as a rul e, be ins · t·1· t he c_ourt of t h� . place ,vl1ere the contract was made or was to be· tuted 1n performed (Article 24(1) Civil Procedure Code), actions regard'1ng wrongs (tort s), . to persons or movables are brougl1t 1n tl1e court of t]ie p1ace w wrong; here ·tie . 1 was done (Article 27(1) Civil Procedure Code).

5. See, however, the possibilities in11erent in Article 2101. 6. See also the cases under note 3, E, below.

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Art. 2037, 2-3 (g) The rul�s (not yet �nacted in Ethiopia) which solve conflicts between foreign and national laws w1I � probably differ, as tl1ey do in n1ost countries, according to \Vhether tl1 e laws 111volved co11 cern contractt1al or extra-contractual liability. 3. TRACING TI-IE DEMARCt\TION LINE: THE FACTORS OF EXCLUSION OF TORT LIABILITY . . Tl1 _e a_bove n1ent �oned cliffere11ces in the requisites for and consequences of lia b1l1ty JUSt1fY a _precise den1 arcation li11e between cases of co11 tractual and extra co11 tractual liability, ,vl1icl1 ,vill 111 al<e it in1possible for litiga11ts to 111ake arbitrary cl1oices bet,veen t�e t,vo types of liability. I11 traci11 g sucl1 a Ii11 e, we 1nust travel beyond the domain of tl11s Article ,t11d Section. We sl1 all fou11d 011 Article 2037 for general pr?blen1� a11 d _ tl ��se involving fault, and on Article 2088 for certain special problen1 s 1nvolv1ng l1ab1l1ty ,vitl1out fault.7 I11 ligl1 t of tl1ose 1-\rticles and of the headi11gs o� both this _Chapter and Article 2027 (tl1e term ''extra-contractu,tl''), the _ marn questions gover111ng tl1e exclusion of extra-contrach1al liability i11 favour of contract Ia,v appear to be as follows: (a) Wl1en t]1 e wrong ,vas done, was there in existence a11 unexl1 austed valid contr act bet,veen plaintiff and defe11dant (or their ''autl1ors'') ?, 8 and (b) do tl1 e facts incri1ni11 ated constitt1te a breach of an obligation createcl by that contract (a ''contractual'' obligation)?,9 or (c) where strict liability u11der Articles 2069-2087 is i11 voked, \vas plaintiff (or his ''a11tl1or'') connected witl1 the instrumentality of ha.rn1 ''by virtue of a contract'' (Article 2088) ? 10 Extra-contractual liability is exclt1ded Vi1here questions (a) and either (b) or (c) are answered fully i n tl1 e affirn1a.tive. In tl1e d.iscussion below, the factors of exclu sion of extra-contractual liability ,vill be further subdivided. The factors of exclt1sion treated below - together w.itl1 related matters - under separate headings are: A. ''Co11tractl1al'' agreen1ent; B. Existence of contract; C. Validity of co11tract; D. Privily of contract; E. ''Contractt1al'' obligation; F. The effects of Article 2088. 1 1 Factor A: ''contractual'' agreement In order for a ''co11tractual'' agreement (a contract) to arise there must exist, in addition to a conunon object, an agreement to be boiu1cl by it (Article 1679). A.ltbough such consent to be bound is often presumed to exist from the surrot1nd ing circumstances a11 cl the t)rpically bi11 di11g nature of the transaction involved (e.g. sale), there are agreements ,vlJich typically lack this ele1nent. Thus, for instance, an accepted invitation to a bottle-party (the host offers a p�rty, the _ guest a b? ttle). _ The invitation or its accepta 1 1ce can be harn1fully and v1c1ously withdrawn without creating any contractual liability for it, which leav� s the field o_pen to an extra con.tractual liability under Article 2030 where applicab�e. Of course the damage done, if any, in such a case is hardly ever worth su1ng for. But there may be

7. 8. 9. 10. 11 .

Incidental discussions will also involve Articles 2055-6 and 2089. See Factors A-D, below. See Factor E, below. See Factor F, below. As collatera.I reading, see note 1 under Article 2031.

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Art. 2037, 3

more p ractical in sta n ces of agreements which, not being contracts, may lead to extra-con tractual lia,bility. We shall exa.n1ine, in turn , (a) pro1 nises to marry, (b) ''licenses'' a11d (c) certain ''gratl1itous'' promises. (a) Pursuan t to A r ticle 561, a si□1ple agree1nent by excha n ge o� promises to n1arry, does not con stitt1te a bi1 1di1 10 contract of bethrotal (tl1e pro1n1sers are n ot deem-- ed to co1 1te111plate a ''legal'� obligatio11). Breach of st1cl1 p�on1ise ca n not ther�- fore gi,1e rise · to the special co11tractt1 al liability 11t1 der Arttcles 57 !-574. This. leaves the field opet1 (see Article 561(2) ) to extra-contrac�aal_ claims (and/or unjust enrichme n t clainls under Article 2162 for, e.g., res�1tut1o n of prese n ts) whe n , e.g., the p ro1nise was broken i1 1 circurnsta11ces den?t111g an un·usu.al �nd unreason able i11co11 siderate11ess (Article 2030) of tl1e pro1n1ser a11 d the pro1n1see has st1 ffer. ed pecu11 iary losses through relyi11 g 011 tl1 e pron1ise. Co n trary to the conseque11 ces · of breacl1 of a betl1rotal-contract (Article 573), n1oral damages are 11ot due where tl1 e purpose of tl1e breacl1 of a 111a.rriage-pro n1 ise \Vas other tl1 a n l1ar1n to tL1e p romisee (see Article 2032 cun1 2106). (b) A license (gratuitot1s permission 11 ot expressed as oblig,ttory or irrevocable) ''to llSe la1 1d in a pa rticular 1na111 1er'', so far fro1u creati11g a real ''servitude'' rigl1t (Article 1369(1) ), does 11 ot eve11 give rise to a11y right of obligation: such arra11gen1e11 t is 1 1ot a co11tract (tl1e lice11sor is 11ot dee11 1ed to con template a ''legal'' obligation. Co111pare seco11 d Sllb-se1 1te11 ce i1 1 Aarticle 2430). A11d since tl1e lice11sor is SJ)ecifically at1thorized by ,1 Code provisio n to revoke such lice11se at a11y ti111 e (A rticle 1369(2) ), 11e ca111 1ot eve11 be st1ecl for \Vilft1l abuse of sucl1 rigl1t. I-le 1nay 1 1e,1ertl1eless be extra-co11tractLl�tlly liable wl1ere l1e l1ad to1·tiot1 sly 111 isled tl1 e lice11see i11to relia11ce 011 tl1e co11ti1 1t1ation of the lice11se (see Article 2058 a n d note 2, G, b, 11 11der Article 2032). (c) Fro111 tl1 e fact that a11 agree111et1t rep rese11ts a bargain, e.g., a pro1nise being give11 i11 excl1 a11ge for a11 otl1er J)ro1 11ise or perfor11 1a1 1ce, we can 11or111ally (but n ot al\\1 ays: see above re111arks 011 invitatio11 to bottle-party and on n 1arriage J) ro111.ise) iJ11 ply tl1at the inte11t to be bo111 1d to a co11tract was prese nt. Although. we ca11 not con clt1de, a co11tra rio, tl1at J)romisers i11 a g ratuitot1s agree1nent nor n1 all)1 do 11ot i1 1te11 d to be bou1 1d (i11deed, Articles 2427-2470 gove rn tl1e bi11d- i n g g ratt1ito11s co1 1tract called ''don atio n ''), ofte11 i11 tl1e circt1 111stances of the case tl1e co.11duct of a party shows, i11 ligl1t of prevaili11 g usage, tl1at he did 11ot i11tend to be ''legally'' bou11 d by his g ratt1ito11s pro1 nise. A ''lice11 se'' (see above) amou11ts to eve11 less tl1a11 s11ch a p ro111ise (it de n otes a. tole ra.1,ce ra.tber tba11 a p ro1nise f?r tl1� f11ture). B_ut 01 1e may, for i11 star1ce, agree witl1 a frie11d or stranger to give h1111 a g ratt11 tot1s ride o n a 111 ule or Jift i,1 a 111otor car t? a s.pe� ified desti11a�ion , witho�t tl1ereby i n te11di11 g to ass111 ne a legal obliga t1011 \v1 tb111 t� 1e mea�111g of Article 2427. !1 1 otl1er words, tl1e guest-passe11ger �11not sue l1 1s host 11 1 co11 t ract for 11 ot c�rryi11g hin1 to tl1e specified desti n a� . t!on o for otl1e� �amage. S11ch _J�ost-p ro 111se: c::10 ir1ctir only extra-c011 tractual ! ._ � l1ab1l1t?. A11d �his 1s . stro11gly �1t1gated 1 11 l11s case l))' Article 2089, pursua n t . �?1 cl1 he w1l!, be l1abl� 011 ly 111 case of fa11lt a11d 11 ot otI1 er,vise for dan1age ar1 s111 g out of the a n imal or tl1e n1 otorca r used l)y tI1e guest (c f· A1·ticles. 2071 a11d 208 I, a11d st1b-note F c-d below) W e 111tist, 1Jowever, re1ne111b er ' . ' · . ·J ext racontractual fault requ1recl to 1 11ak t 1 at t11 e· . e otir· host-pron11ser · 1·rable 1nay . · � · ' d a co11s1s·t 111 a ''b 1a1 th' stopp d1s e1nba. rki·ng tl1e gtiest · age or · duced h.1n1t . · after I 1av1·11g 111 . · . to reI y, to h1s detr1n1e11 t, on reacl1 11 1g a specific dest11 1at1.011 (Article 20 5g or 2059).12 .

!�

12. That is how son1e playboys act with girls who ,vere pron1is ed a safe redelivery l1 on1e,

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Art. 2037, 3 Tl1 e . sitt1 ati?11 is quite differe11 t where tl1 e transport-arrangeme11 t ainounts to a J)a1d c�rr1a�e co1 1tract withi 1 1 the 1nea11i11 g of Article 561 Co11 1n1ercial Code. Th.e. carrier 1s the11 1�es1Jo11sible for carryi11g the passet1 ger safely to clestination (Art1�le_ 5�8 Co�erc1al Code) a11 d is liable, irrespective of fat1lt, for eve11 fortui to11s 11�Jt1r1�� to h !111 (Article 595 Co11 1 111ercial Code). I11cide1 1tally, eve11 \vbere a ''gr::1t111to�1s . ca.r�·1age-arra 1 1ge111 e 1 1t is clee11 1ed to be a bindi11 g contract (e.g. be�a11se it 1s ,vr1tten, ,vhicl1 11 or11 1ally cle11 otes an i 11te11 t to be bound), the re qu1ren1e1 1ts . of liability will differ fro1 11 tl1ose in a 11 01 1-contracttial grat11ito11s tra11SJ)Ort. I 11deed, pursua 11 t to f\rticle 2089(2) tl1 e ow11 er or l1 older of the a1ii11 1al _or 11 1otor_ car is extra-co11 tractually liable for ai1y fault, \vliile u11 der a gratu1tot1s carr1age-co 11 tract I,e is 11ot liable if tbe fat1lt co.1n1nitted by hin1 is 1796). 11 ot ''gra,,e'' (Article fi'actor B: existence of contract

Obvio11sly, a co11tract cloes 11ot exist before it is 1nade or after it is exl1 austed. It does 11 ot follovv tl1 at the qt1estions f,1cing tis l1 ere are easy to soJ,,e. We shall disct1ss (a) tl1 e ''exact ti 111 e'' of co11tract-co11 clusio11, (b) ''pre-contractual 11egotiation'' proble111s a11 d (c) ''post-co11tractual period'' problen1 s.

(a) The exact

ti111e of co11 clt1sio11 of contract 1 11 ay be sttbject to coi1 tro,1ersy, to be

so111etin1es settled by wl1 at is '' 1 1or1nally in 11se'' (Article 1681) or by special provisions. For i11stc111ce, wl1 e11 a perso1 1 is boarcling a bt1s l1e is 11 or111ally t1 11 derstood to acce 1Jt the bus1na 11's offer (to tl1 e p11blic at tl1e b11s-stop) by co1 1d11ct, so tl1at tl1e co11tract exists as fro111 his pt1tting his feet on the steps (a11d t111til steppi11g off). As a res11lt, tl1e bus-company 111 ay be contract11ally liable for wl1 at l1 appe11 s to tl1 e passe1 1ger ''d11ri11g tl1 e jo11r11 ey or w}1jlst 1not1nti11 g or aligl1 ti11 g'' (Article 595 Co111 111ercial Code) ::1 1 1d 11 ot for what ·hap 1Je11s to J1 io1 be fore or after, v11l1e 11 l1 e is i11jured d11e to 11 eglige1 1t n1 ainte11 a11 ce of the bt1s statio11 (for wl1icl1 wl1oever 111 ai11tai11 s it, b11s-co1n1Jany or 1n11nicipality, 1nay be extra-contractually liable).

(b) Tl1e exact deter11 1i11 atio11 of tl1e com11 1enceme11t-ti1ne of a co11tract e1 1ables tis also to set aJJart tl1e JJre-co11trc1ct1,1al 11egotiation period, tl1 e liability incide11 ts of whjch are.' as a rt1le, ot1tsicle the scope of Co11 tract law. Examples: (i)

A fault i11 tl1 e 11egotiation for a contract (''culpa in co11 tral1 endo'') 1nay lead to its non-comJJletion (Article 2055). Th.e foreig 1 1 treatises' exa1nples of fault by ''u11reasonable revocatio11 of ?ffer'' are irreleva�t in Etl1iopian law _i11 which offers are irrevocable dt1rmg a reasonable t1n1 e (see note l , - abo�e). B11t a 111 ere declaratio11 of i11tention in the ter1 ns of Article 1687(b ), that is later re,,oked or fails to lead to a contract for lack of agreement on ''all the terms of t11 e negotiation'' (Article 1695(1) ) or of ft1Jfil1ne-nt of forinal req11ireme11ts u 11der, e.g., ,,Article 1725, ,,.1726, or 2877, be� ause of defendant's ''arbitrary withdrawal , may l1 ave induced otl1ers to 1ncur be recovered under expenses''. J 11 suc h a case the expenses i 11 c11rred can 13 icle 5). l? exc�ptio1 1al cases, 2�5 (Art ility the rules of extra-contractual liab _ 1 �ut pri or declaration of 1ntent 1 011 ) to acc�pt tl (wi l usa ref ht trig 011 an 1 1 eve 11 tracti:al fault u11 � ler Article co raext an ute stit con ay 1 n ed pos pro ct tra con a 2031 and/or 2035: this ,vill be the �ase_ where there 1s a professional and/ tl1e h y, s11c as enc dt1ty of erg 1n em e vic ser a 11se ref to 0t 1 1 y or 1e I dtit e. al Cod (2, Pen b) icle 547 Art by ed plat tem con ) tors doc g� c . g (e . als pro1ess1on

cle 3146) ) rti ,.7 (A fJa t ra nt co r, ve we ho "' cts ra nt co e tiv ra � 13. In the case of "adn1inist . · t au O e nc se ab e tJi in e on e iv at rn such a liability (plus an alte

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itself provides

Art. 2037, 3 Instead of leading to non-completion of_ !he co11�ra �t,_ a pre-contr�ct�a} fault may lead to its completion in co11d1 t1ons preJu_d 1cial to . th e Plaint1 ff . Where a party's consent to a contract has bee11 111 d· uced by . the other party's acts of fraud, duress or unconsci�nable cond_uct (Articles 1704, 1706, 1710), or in certain cases mere n�g11ge11�e (Article 1705), c_ontract . law provides the remedy of invalidation 111 Articles 18? 8-I 818. This does _ not pre,,ent tl1 e mentioned types of conduct from . con t1ttit1ng P; e-cont�a�: tual, tl1 at is, extra-co11tractual faults under, e.g., Article �_030 (the , n1or�l1ty criterion), 2035 (if an1ou11 tiog _to a_ penal offe11 ce) or 2031 (professional _ nature . of negligence in con.fide1 1tial relationships). Tl1e extra-contractual the ensui11 g clai1ns for con1 pensation is clearest where the re1 11edy of in validation is unavailable because, for i11stance, tl1e otl1er party's fraud ,vas not decisive in i11 ducing the plaii1 ti.ff to contract., b�t mer�ly cat1sed hio1 to accept disadvantageot1s accessory clauses. I11val1dat1011 be111 g thei1 b_arred by botl1 Article 1704(1) and Article 1697, tl1e 011 1y open remedy 1s to clai1 n da1 na.ges i11 tort. And eve11 a plai11tifl' w11ose co11se i 1t to tL1 e co11tract was decisively affected by the fraud (or a11other of tL1e me11 tio1 1ed ·bla111able acts) n1 ay cl1 oose to confir111 tl1e contract i11stead of i11\1�lidat!ng it (Article 1811), w]1icl1 choice, it is suggested, shot1ld not deprive l1 1 m of tl1e rigl1t to clain1 damages ii1 tort, if an)1• 14 More i11trica.te is tl1 e problem of extra-contractual liability ii1 cases wl1ere tl1 e contractttal rei11 edy of ii1valiclatiou pltts rei11 state111 ent (A1·ticle 1815) is invoked a11d a1Jplied. u11der Articles 1808-1818. Tllis proble1n will be treated separately i11 s1ib-11ote C (validity of contract), below. (c) A11 exact deter111ination of tl1 e ti11 1e ,vhen the co11 tract 11 as exl1a.t1sted its effects would e11able 011e to set aJJart the /JOst-co11trctcti1ctl period, tl1e i i1 cidents of wl1 ich sl1 ot 1 ld lie outside tJ1e scope of co11 tract law. Bt1t tl1 e ter 111i11atio11 -time is 1 nuch more difl1ct1lt to a.scertai11 t11 an tl1e co11 1111 e11 ceme11t-time of a co11tract. The latter usually creates a set of obligatio11 s (whetl1 er 111 a.ture or 11 ot) all at 011 ce, ,vbiJe tl1 e .ir respective exti11 ctio11 11 eecl 11 ot be si1nt1lta11ot1s bt1t may be variot1sly pro tracted i11to tl1e ft 1ture. For i11stance a co1 1tract of en1ployn1 e11 t 1na.y ,,,ell be tern1i11 ated i11 its n1 ai11 part by 11otice given for good cat1se t1nder A1·ticle 2575, wl1ile tl1 e accessory co11 tractual obligatio11 to keep tl1 e e1nplo),er's secrets ptir sua11t to Article 2533 sur,,ives for an idefi11ite periocl. As a rest1lt, even if tl1e former employee brea.cl1 es st1ch secrets in a. way \vl1 icl1 wot1ld other,vise an1ou11t, for insta11ce, to extra-contractual JJrofessional fault t111der Article 2031, 011 ly co11 tract Ia,v ca11 apply to his case. It fallows tl1 at I1 e i s 1 1ot liable for u11 foreseeable har1 11s 'but merely for sucl1 cla1nage as is '' 11.ormal'' i 11 terms of Arti�le 1799. A11:otl1 �r exa1nple o� a11 accessory co11tractt1al obligatio11 wl1icl1 survives �be ter111111 at1?11 of th� _1na1n transactio11 is JJrovided, e.g., b)' Art. I58 Com1nerc1al_ Code v.1l11cl1 prol1 Lb1ts tl1e . seller of a busi 11 ess fron1 co11 1peti 11 g v.1ith tl1 � buy�r �n tl1 e s�1ne trade and 11 e1gl1 bourhood (tl1 ere is a 5 years li init to tl1 is obl1gat1on). I11c1de11tally, 0 11 e 1nust be careful 11ot to co.11 sider sticJ1 breacl1 t? be a11 . extr -contract �al fault by yirtt1e of the ''i11frii1 ge111e11t of Ia.w'' J)rovi � s1on (Art1c]e _035), v.1h1cl1, as 111 ent1011 ed bef?re (i 11 11 ote 2, E, under Article 2035] does not concer11 contract law (of. wh1cl1 Co111mercial Code provisions . are a part. 1 cf. Article 150 Con1 n1erciaJ Code). It follo\VS tr�ct� co1 relat1i1 g to . t�1at contractual liability rules �lone apply to t11 e metltioiied after-sale coinpeti ti on fron1 the seller of a business. (ii)

14. Such confirmation often denotes the absence of any damage.

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Art. 2037, 3 Factor C: validit)' of contract A contract 111ay L1ave a periocl of ''outvvarcl'' existe11ce, \\'hereafter it is invali .clated at tl1_e reqtiest _of a. protected party (Article I808(1) ), or of any i11terested person (A1�t1cle 1�08(2) ). 1�11e rt1les gover11iJ1g tl1e effects of st1cl1 i11validatio11 aim 1:1t prevent111g. 1111J ust e11riclu11ent. Tl1ey provicle for rei11state111er1ts (Article 181 5 ), or co111pensatro11s to tl1e exte11t tl1at rei11state1ne11t is i111possible (Article 18 I 7). 15 Tl1e word ''dar11ages'' i11 f\rticle I 8 I 7(2) is so1newl1at n1isleadi11g. The Fre11cl1 version t1ses ''do111r11ages i11terets'', cle11oti11g, i11 tl1e cor1text, 1Jecu11iary co111pe11satio11 ai.Ined at preventi11g a11 e11ricl1111ent 16 ratl1er tl1a11 san.ctio11s of liability for f�tult. Indeed, _ ?otl1 p�rttes to at1 i11valid:1ted co11tract 111ay IJe faultless as, e.g., i11 cases of 111ere 111c,1pac1ty, or r1011-neglige11t 111istake, or clt1ress by a tl1ird perso11 11t1k11ow11 to tl1e o�l1�r IJarty (Article J 707( I)). Where,1er co11tract la,v pt1r 1Jorts to a ward tr11e da1nages d1st111ct fro111 tl1e ''rei11state111e11t'' re111edies of Article 1815, it expressly says so, as t1ncler Articles l 703 a11d l 707(2). ' 7 T!1ere is 110 reaso11 ,vl1atcver to cleprive tl1e victi.111 of his extra-contract11al re1 11edy for JJre-co11tract11al fat1lts of tl1e otl1er JJarty 1nerely bec,tuse, i11 cases of co11tr act i11v�lidatio11, s11cl1 victi111 diSJJOses of a co11tractual re1nedy ,vl1ose pt1rpose is a11 er1r 1ch111e11t-preve11ti11g reinstaten1e11t ratl1er tl1a11 da1nages for vvro11gful l1ar111. Tl1ese : may still be awarclecl i11 tort a .nd rnade to cover eve11 u11foreseeable losses. 18 It is i1111Jossible to provide suitable illt1strations ,vitl1out a11,1lyzi11g vario11s types of ,,itiated co11tracts, wl1icl1 is beyo11d tl1e scope of tl1is cox11mentary. B11t tl1e ge11eral discussio11 above s11ffices to strpport tl1e co11te11tio11 tl1at a11y releva11t extra-co11tr,1ctt1al re111edies 1nay be i11voked i11 aclclitio.n to tl1e co11tractual re111edy of i11,,alidation a11d rei11state111e11t \Vl1ere sucl1 i11validatio11 is cl11e to faults co111n1itted i11 pre-co11tr actt1al 11egotiatio11s. Incide11tally, tl1is proble1n n1ay freq11ently be devoid of practical interest beca11se in ordi11ary cases apJJlicatio11 of Article 18 I 7 ,vill often leave 110 outstanding da111age. B11t wl1e11 full rei11staterne11t of 011e party is irreconcilable \.vith that of tl1e other, tl1en, clearly, tl1e i11terests of tl1e bla111e,vorthy JJarty sl1011lcl be sacrificed to tl1ose of the bla111eless one 011 tbe basis of tl1e farmer's ''extra-co11tr act11al'' liability. 19 V✓h,1t abot1t l1ar111fu]ly 11eglige11t perforn1a11ce-acts by a party cli1rir1g tl1e c11rrency of a contract later declared i11vali.d? Si11ce co11tract11al liability reqt1ires tl1e existe11ce of a valid co11tract, it see111s tl,at tl1e rare cases s110,ving a11y re111,:1ini11g cla111age fron1 s11ch acts after applicatio 11 of Articles 1815-1817 can be properly argued 011 an extra-co11tractt1al basis. Tl1is 111ay happen, for i11sta11ce, ,vhere: A 1ni11or (Article 198), in order to repai.r his l1ouse, in goocl faith engages a contractor \V]Jo ](110,vs of l1is it1capacity (110 nustake). Tl1rol1gl1 professio11al negligence, the co11tractor dru11ages the l1ouse instead of repairing it. Tl1e contract is i 11validated a11d tl1e worl<s stopped t1pon application of tl1e mi11or's t11tor (Arti cles 314 a11d 1808). Clearly ''rei11stateme11t'' of tlJe minor is i11co111patible

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15. See also Article 1818 011 expenses. 16. Jn cases where reinstaten1e11t is in1possible by virtue of, e.g., Article 1164(1) and/or 1816. 17. But if the other contractant knew of the third person's acts of duress, then instead of getting in law to ges t J)ay dama � invalidation damages in contract lav, �see_ Article _ 1707(2)), he shall _ _ pre-conlractual negoha 1 ns 1)) 1i1 le 2030( (Art1� on cr1ter1 �? for having infringed the "n1ora]jty" (by availing 1,imself of acts of duress o � tl1e third person who n:iay be, e.g.! � co11111v1ng relative). Even 111 ore obvious are cases_ <? f direct acts of duress _a.n,ountJng to a cr1111111a� offen �e under Art. 668 of the Penal Code (c1vil fault b_Y. way ?f Article 2035), or of fraud either cri minal (Art. 656 of the Penal Code) or 1ne.rely c1v1I (Article 2059) 18. See note 2, C, (a), above. 19. Compare sub-note B, (b), (ii), above.

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Art. 2037, 3

s 1� e1 ar S of aw ltl e (p th k or w 11t te pe 1n co in se ho w , with that of the contractor r i cle 2031 rt de A un ll.y a o. · · ct ra nt co atr ex --1 1·1·able tllil m i nor's 1ncapaci·ty) m.akes 1-.: . Ar t, I su re .- 1 e 2 091 · ttc __ a A� .. 20 26 cle i t Ar ., e.g r, de un y rather th an contractuall i ty. . bil l1a his of s ce en 1 1 eq 11s co e th 1 i r ve go rather than 1799 will Factor D: privity of contract By virtue of Article J 952(1) contracts prodtrce effects 011 ly betwee 11 . tl1 e co11tr acting parties, except as otl1erwise provided ii� this C�de. Tl1 e Cod� _provides oth_er wise by sttbstitt 1ti11g, for instance, the follo\v111g parties to the or1g11!al co11 tract1ng parties: J1 eirs (Articles 826(2) and 1986), assig11 ees or �t1brogees (Articles l 96� and I 968 ff.) a11 d. ''acceptir1g'' third party be11e'f1ciaries (Art icle_ � 959). T�1 ese subst1tute_d parties are so111 etimes called ''successors iJ1 title'' of tl1e or1g1nal p�rt ies, called ther_r ''autl1ors''. Only tl1 e original parties, or s11 ch parties as are s11bstLtuted t� tl1 e _ or1gi11al ones in accorda11ce with the Cocle, can be plai11tiffs or defenda11 ts 1n act1 011s for breach of co11tract (Article 1952(1) ). Pt1rst1ant to A_rti�I� 1952(2),. tl1is _ principl_e of ''privity of co11tract'' leav es intact extra-co11tractt 1al l1ab1l1ty prov 1s1011s, 10 parti cu'Jar those u11 der Article 2056: A J Jerso11 co1ru1 1its a11 extra-contra.ctual fa11Jt wl1 ere, by a concl11ct defined in Article 2056 (e.g. by e11gagi11g a11otl1er ma11 's e1nployee) l1e co11sciously in d11ces a breacl1 of a cor1tract (e.g. of e111ployn1e11t) to \Vl1ich l1 e is 1 1ot party, a11 d for tl1e breach of v.,]1icl1 , tl1erefore, he can11 ot be co11tractL1ally liable. To tl1e above si11 1ple illt1str,ttion of the principle tl1 at i11 order for the contr actual re1nedies to be 11 sed a11d tl1 e extra-co11tractt1al 011es (for t be sa.rne damage) excluded, tl1e obligatio11 breacl1ed 1n.ust be part of a co11tract a,,aili11 g beti,veen plain tiff and defe11da11t, ,ve ca11 add tl1 e following, 111ore i11tricate ex,1111ple: Io tl1e case of a 1 11ortal accide 1 1t to a passe11ger, for wl1ich tl1e contractt1.al carrier is liable u11der Article 595 Co1nmercial Code, 011ly l1is l1eirs (st 1ccessors in title), st1bstituted as parties (Article 1986), ca11 stte 011 the co11tract for l1ar111 st1fferecl by tl1 e victim (e.g. loss of ear11i11gs a 1 1d l1ospital expe11 ses be fore death). S11pposi t1g tl1 ere is 011ly 0 1 1e test,1n1 eL1tary L1eir (e.g. the s011), all tl1e other desce11 da11ts, asce11 da11ts a11 d tl1 e spoL1 se l11:1ve 110 co11tractua] cla.i111s for dama.ge do11e to the decede11t. Tl1eir clai1us, if a11 y, 1ntist be for da 1 11age to tl1emselves ai1d be st1bsta11 tiated i11 tort law. It ,vill not be suffi cie1 1t 111 erely to establish wl1at the l1eir does u11 der Co11 tr�1ct ]a\.v 1 1a111ely tl1at tl1e ?ecede11 t's accide11t _ I1ad occ_t1rred ''d11rj11 g tl1 e jour11 ey'' (Article 595 �oro111e�c1al Code)'. Not be111g parties to tl1e co11tract, tl1 ey ca11r1ot 1nerely 1n,1o ke i ts breach by a party. They h av e either to s110,v t11at defe,1da11t l1as co1n111 itted a_11 _ extra-co11tract11al fa11It 1 1 11der, e.g., Articles 2030-2031, or tl1at the 1nortal 111J�ry was ?011e by ''l1 is act'' (f\ 1·ticle 2067) or ''n1otorvel1icle'' (11ot otl1er vel11cle) (Article 2081). AJ1 cl tl1 eir clai1 ns if Stlccessftil \vill be Ji111ite? by tort law (Article 2095) to ''n1ainte11a11ce'', if '11eeclecl (Artie); 813(2) ). L_oo _ k 111 g at tl1e sa 1ne problem from the side of tl1e clefei,da,,t-carrier's lia b1]1t�, _,ve ca.11 say tl1 at. contractual a11 d extra-�ot1tractua.I liability exclude eacl1 otl1 e1 . 111 ca?es_ �011 cer11 111g tl1e. sa111 e da111age. Oiil)' til e ll eir (iil otir exa 111p1e tl1 e_ k illed v_1ct111 1 s son) n1 ay 111voke both liabilities because, i ll tl,e coi,tractti al act1011 , l1e � nv� kes the l1arm clo11e by breach of co11 tract to llis a.titlJ or (tl1e fa�her),_ wl1 tle 111 _tl1e extra-co11 tractual 011e be ii,vokes a differe 11ar111 (loss nt of n1 a1ntenance, 1f any), done by a. tort to I,in,self. Factor E: ''contractual'' obligation Fulfi1Jne11t of the above requirements tl1at tl1ere ''exist'' (B) a ''\'i:Llid'' (C) ''co11tract'' (A) ''privy'' to plaintiff and defe11da11t (D) is i i1 sufficiei,t to exclude atl extra- 128 -

Art. 2037, 3 contractual liability between them. Obviously if, ,vl1ile driving your motorcar, you inadverte?tly run do,vn your employee wall<ing off duty 011 the street, this normally has noth1ng to do witl1 your obligatio11s u11der yot1r existing valid contract of emp l �yme11t with h.in1 _(cf. Article 2554). You 111ay properly be liable in tort to pay h1n1 full co1npensauon u11der Article 2091 (instead of tl1e niggardly one which l1e would get for a ''work'' accident under Articles 2556-2558). In order tl1erefore for extra-cont�actual liability to be excluded, t11e obligation allegedly breacl1ed by defend ant (or l11s ''autl1or'') 1nust ]1a,,e been created by the co11tract ,vitl1in the meaning ?f �r�icle 1731(2-3) and, wl1ere appropriate, Article 1713. In other words, tl1e facts 1ncr1m1nated by plai11tiff must constitute a breach of an obligation ,vhich is truly ''contractual'' i n the abo,1e sense. We shall, in turn, give examples of obligations that are contractual eitl1er because tl1ey are determined to be so by the parties (t\rti cle 173 l (2) ), or as a result of 1nandatory provisions of contract law or of per missive provisions which are 11ot set aside by the parties (Article 1731 (3) ). Finally, we shall illustrate such ''i11cidental'' contractual obligations as are attached to the abo,1ementioned ones by custo1n or good faith (Article 1713): (a) Suppose a house is leased and the landlord undertakes in tl1e contract to have the l1ouse carefully guarded (obligation determined by tlze parties). Far from guarding it, the zabanya employed by the landlord joins a band of robbers ,vho carry away the tenant's belongings. Were the tenant reduced to i11voke the landlord's extra-contractual (vicarious) liability under Articles 2130-2131, he would recover notl1ing: obviously, tl1e employee-zabanya did not act '',vith the intention of carrying out his functions''. Fortunately for tl1e tena11t, since the l1ouse was not ''carefully guarded'', his clai1n has a clear foundation i.n the contract. The breacl1 of the contractual obligation of ''careful guard'', as determined by the parties, excludes the application of extra-contractual liability provisions (of Articles 21-30-2131). (b) In the above example, suppose that the parties, far from stipulating for ''care ful guard'', have, on tl1e co11trary, expressly exempted the landlord fron1 contr actual liability i11 case of· faults of his e1nployee-zabanya (i11 accordance with Article 1888(1) ). The zabanya, acting ''with the inte11tion of carrying out bis functions'', negligently n1istakes a robber for a la,vful visitor and Jets him in, whereafter the tenru1t is robbed. Since no contractual obligation is L--rreached here, the tenant n1ay try to invoke Articles 2130-2131. I-Ie will not succeed. Article 1888(1) clearly and expressly authorizes the parties to contract out of liability for en 1ployees' faults. Under tl1e principle of ''positive'' interpretation (Article 1737, by analog1 1) we cannot deprive the legislator's will of its effect by permitting the te11a11t to invoke the landlord's liability in tort. Another positive interpretation argui:nent ·may �oncer� the pa! t_ies' ,vill. Since the parties cannot have inte11ded to stipulate a11 1neffect1ve prov1s1on, they must be deemed to have impliedly referred also to Article 2147(2), wl1ich permits them to relieve themselves contractually of vicarious liability in tort. (c) A hotel di'5plays, at the entrance, a conspicuous notice: ·'Tl1e owner-manager disclaims any Liability for luggage-losses not due to l1is fault''. A paying cus tomer's suitcase disappears from his hotelroom in spite of tl1e manager's fault less supervision. Fortunate!� fo_r ! he cust� mer, be has a _ con�ractual _ claim, pro vided by /a 1v, which claim 1s l1m1ted_ (� 1cle _2664) but lies . irrespective of fault _ . (Articles 2663 and 2720) or of non-l1ab.1l1ty st1pulat1ons (Article 2669). The_ h �tel keeper's contractual liability for the custo_mer's loss excludes the appl1cat1on of tort law (e.g. of Article 2147(2-3) ) to his case. - An obvers� example: For failure to pay rent on time (see Article 2951), the lessor beats his lessee-lodger. - 129 -

Art. 2037, 3 Although this happens because of the lessee's breach of contract, the less�e can sue the lessor in tort under Article 2038 because the duty not to commit battery is not an1ong tl1 e lessor's contractual obligations as defined by Article 2896 ff (a,nd not varied by agreement). (d) Pursuar1t to Article 1713 contractual obli00atior1s include such incidental effects as are attached to tl1e1� by custorn. For instance, where � clinic's in-p�ti�nt catches p11 eu111 onia due to bis sick-room not being h_e�ted during a severe_ wu1 ter, evidence may sl1ow that the duty to mai 11tain a m1n1n1um ten1perature 10 such sick-rooms is custo1 narily implied iJ1 l1ospitalization contracts. The ensu1_ 1 1g con tractual liability of the clinic excludes tl1 e applicatio1 1 of extra- contractual liability provisions (tinder Article 1799, the clinic will be liable only for ''normal'' harm to tl1e patient). (e) Contractt1al obligatio11s may also ir1clude sucl1 incidental effects as are attached to them by 1/1e reqL1iren1e11t of ''good faitlz'' (Article 1713). It is i111possible to foresee how wide a 1nea11 i11 g tl1 e courts will attach to this vague term, in view also of Article 1732 wl1 ose scope seen1s restricted by the i11terpretation ''limits'' i111 posed by Article 1733 i11 tl1e i11terest of security of trade. Can the ''abuse'' of a quite clear, SJ)ecific contractt1al rigl1t by its exercise primarily witl1 ir1 te11t to i 11 jure be sanctioned by an extra-co11tractual liability pursuant to Article 2032, or will tl1 e cot1rts deal witl1 sucl1 problems i 11 co11tract law by vvay of Article 1713, wl1ich \\1ould. rule out the applicability of Article 2032? Tl1e reader is invited to reexami11e the case discussed in note 2, E, under Article 2032, witl1 a view to tl1e possibility that tl1e courts may solve it on basis of Article 1713, wl1icl1 \VOttld exclude the application of tort law to it. (f) Contractual restrictions of liability 1nay be enacted by the parties20 or by the law. An incide11tal example of such a restrictio1 1 by tl1e parties has been given under (b), above. Severa.I such restrictions are enacted by law. Article 1796, for example, provides tl1 at a ''gratuitous'' contract has the effect of restricting the promisor's liability for 11 on-perfor1nance to cases of grave fault (''grave'' fault is sucl1 as e\1en a man of little reason or n1orality may ha,,e avoided contrast Article 2030). Tl1is may happen where, e.g., somebody seriously under takes, in writing, to render a gratuitous service. Since he does not break his contractual obligation by committing ordinary faults, his extra-contractual lia But it is excluded by bility in such case is not excluded by Article 2037. the principle of positive interpretation, �'hereby the legislator's clear inte11 tion to restrict the liability mt1st not be defeated by invoki11 o Article 2030 whose �PP�?ation is_ ?ere impliedly excl�ded by Article 1796. Sin1ilarly, extra-co�tractual liab 1l1ty prov1 s1ons must not be 1 11�ol<ed to defeat tl1e legislator's purposes under _ Article 2722(2), ,vl1ereby a gratuitous custodian of chattel is not liable for more care tha11 that used by him witl1 respect to his own tl1ings (subjective standard). If you e 11trust valuables to a negligent friend wl1 0 leaves tl1en1 un locked and tl1ey are stolen together with bis own valt1ables 11 e committed no breacl1 of contract. This legislative restrictio11 of l1 is liabilit� n1ust not be de feated by invoking tort law. Factor F: the effects of Article 2088 Pursuant to Article 2088, extra-contractual liabilit)' is excluded in favour of contract law wherever tl1e victim was con11ected witl1 certai 11 instrumei1 talities of harm by virtue of a contract with the person who wotild otherwise be strictly --�------

20. Where this is not prohibited: see (c), above. Also, see Articles 188?-8.

_ , 13 0 �

Art. 2037, 3

answerable under Articles 2069-2086. The instrun1entalities of l1arm contemplated are dangerous industries (Article 2069), animals (Article 2071), buildings (Article _ 2077), macl11nes and n1otorvel1icles (Article 2081 ), manufactured goods (Article 2085). 21 \Vhere tl1e victi1n is harmed by one of tl1ose instru1nentalities in a way amou11ting to a breacl1 of contract, tl1e 11 tl1e exclusion of extra-contractual liability ma)' be justifiecl by argun1e11ts analogous to tl1ose disct1ssed above (Factor E: a, c and d), so . tl1at Article 2088, where relevant, n1erely provides a n1ore specific textual argument 111 favour of sucl1 exclusion. In tl1e converse case where, althot1gh the connection is ''by virtue of a contract'', tl1e ens·uing harm does 11ot entail a con tractual liability (tl1ere is 110 breach of contract), Article 2088 will, alo11e or in additio11 to a11y ''positive'' i11terpretatio11 argume11ts (cf. Factor E, f, above), provide a precise legal grot1ncl for exclt1ding also a11y of the extra-co11tract11al liabilities conten1plated by Articles 2069, 2071, 2077, 2081, 2085. Let tis now pass to illustrations: (a) Suppose an explosio11 occurs in a faultlessly conducted munitions factory. Perso1 1s injt1red by tl1is ''dangerous activity'' (produci11g and storing n1unitions) beca11se of a contractual connection with it have no extra-contractt1al clain1s t111der Article 2069. Tht1s, tl1e factory's employees 111ay have 011Jy tl1 e li1 11ited contractual claims under Articles 2556-2558, or have no clai1ns at all if tl1ey st1stai11ed tl1e har111 because of l<nowingly overlooking \Vritten instructio11s (Arti cle 2553(2) ).22 It seems tl1at even a contractual supplier of raw-n1aterials to tl1e factory who, just before the transfer of risk by delivery on tl1e pre1nises (Article 1758), looses sucl1 materials because of the explosion, cannot i 11voke Article 2069. Obversely, l1is injured driver, not being party to l1is n1aster's contract, can invoke said Article. (b) Tenants of rooms or flats w}10 are injured, in tl1eir goods or persons, by the building owned by their lessor, cannot invoke Article 2077 aga.i11st tl1e latter. Since they are connected with tl1e bt1ilding by virtue of contracts ,vith tl1e owner-lessor, tl1eir 011ly ren1edies are co11tractt1al ones, if a11y. See, especially, Arti cle 2905, ,vl1ereby da1nage caused by a defect in, for i11stat1ce, tl1e roof w'l1ich has crun1bled or is leaking, is con1pe 11sable 011ly i11 cases of fatilt, or its equi vale11t (no11-revealing a defect whicl1 the lessor knew or sl1ot1ld have l<now11 of). Ob,,ersely, Article 2077 is applicable (irrespective of fault) to clamage so caused to tl1e tena11t's visitors or servants, wl10 did 11ot co11tract \Vitl1 tl1e O\v11er. (c) A c11stomer inj11red by a l1orse during contractual ridi11g lessons can11ot invoke Article 2071 against tl1e instructor-owner of the animal. The customer's con nectio11 witl1 tl1e l1orse is ''co11tractual'' (in the sense of being provided by a contract). Unless otl1erwise agreed, his contract will be nor1nally understood to be of the type contemplated by Article l 795(a). I-Iis i11structor can therefore be liable only if a fat1lt is established against him. 23 Sin1ilarly, if your horse injures your servant or your ,,eterinary doctor on duty, they cannot i11voke Article 2071 ao-ainst you, but 1nust rely on the agreed or legal rules of tl1e contract whicl1 °has ''con11ected'' them with the anin1al. Obversely, if your horse injt1res a casual visitor or passer-by, they can invoke said Article.

21. An d no other things (Article 2087). 22. Tbese observations are without prejudice to any rights they may have under public law in cas e the factory is governmental. 23. Note that the fact that the riding less�n was gratuitous and_ non-contractu.al (no obligation intended.) would n1ake little practical chfference, bec�use Article 2089 would then exclude the application of Article 2071 in favour of the requirement of fault.

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Art. 2037, 3 (d) Similar reaso.nings ca.n apply to a motorvebicle. For the s� ke of clarity, they will be repeated. A customer injured by the �otorcar . durmg contractual dri ving lessons cannot invoke Article 2081 against the instructor-owner of the �otorcar. The customer's connection with the car is ''contractual''. His con tract will normally be understood to be of the type contemplated by Art icle l 795(a); his instructor ca.n therefore be liable only if a fault is establishe d against him. 24 Similarly, if your car causes harm to yolrr d�iv�r, or to an ind epe11dent mechanic or engineer whom you engaged to repair 1t, they cannot invoke Article 2081 against you, but must rely on the agreed or legal rules of the contract which has ''connected'' them with the car or machine. Obversely, a stranger injured by your car can invoke said Article. A person buying (or hiring, or warehousing, etc.) manfactured goods from the manufacturer and sustaining harm from their normal use cannot invoke Article 2085 against him. The buyer is restricted to his co11tractual remedies.25 On the contrary, other injured users of the product, wl10 did not contract with the manufac turer, such as sub-purchasers or relatives, can, where appropriate, claim full tort d.amages irrespective of any fault (Article 2085 c11m 2091 ). ''Manufactured'' is anytl1ing transformed by human effort, from the most complicated machines down to sucl1 simple products as clothes, furniture or processed food. If a buyer of, e.g., impure bread is injured by eating it, 26 he may, in case of contract-cancellatioi1, recover practically nothing (the ''current price'' difference: Article 2362), ui11ess at least ''gross'' negligence is pro,,ed against tl1e baker (Article 2364). On the co11trary, if his guests, servants, relatives, or a beggar he gave it to, or a person he sold it to, is injured by the same bread, norrr1ally used (no over-eating or disregarding an advisable diet), they can invoke Article 2085 agajnst the baker and, if tl1e bread's defect ''could not have been discovered by a ct1stomary exan1ination'', they will recover full damages under Article 2091 without the need to demonstrate any fault of the baker's. Similar reasoning applies to any . other products such as, e.g., automobiles. If your motorcar causes you physical or ''pecuniary'' (liabilities incurred under Article 2081) l1arn1 bec�use of . an accident caused by a manufacturing defect in the brak �s, your_ claim �gainst the dealer who sold you the car may be of the restricted �rnd �ent1oned above, :w11ile your broad ren1edy against the man ufacturer (if he 1s not the sell �r) 1s the �ne provided by Article 2085 (in this case your contractual connection regard1noO the car is not with the person ''legally answerable'' within the meaning of Article 2085).

24. If the driving lesson or a motorcar transport are gratu'I tous and non-contractual, the practical results may be sin,ilar: see preceding footnote. 25. These lie for breach of Article 2287 with 2?89(a). a rt_ "put right" defects (Article 2300), upon conh'act-c�: �f from tl1e selll!r's lin1ited faculty to e ation _damages greater than tl10s_e ass essed under Article 2362 (where the product · has a case of, at least, a gross negligence of the ·seller (A r��t ��e) can be awarded only 1n the 2 ). 26. See example under Article 2031, note 3, A, (b).

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Defences, 1

PART ID DEFENCES TO ACTION OF LIABILITY FOR FAULT The subiect iod�cated by tl1e above heading will pernut 11s to review some of tl1e matters covered earlier from the standpoint of defence. After tl1e plaintiff has brought an action based on the defendant's fault, 1 the 9uest�o11 of wl1etl1er and bo,v l1is clai1n can be opposed becomes of utmost practic�l 1n1portance to tl1e defe11 dant. Rather than i 11dulge in subtle doctrjnal con troversies as to the correct n1eaning of the term defence, 2 which would prevent tl1 e clear exposition we are aiming at, \Ve shall here understand by ''defe11ce'' any la,vful mea11s enabling a defendant to rebut, wholly or in part, plai11tiff's claim that defendant's fault has caused l 1 im a damage that defendant m11st compensate. 3 We shall theref ore be concerned with ''dan1age'', ''causation'' and ''fault'': (I) Tl1e requirement of a ''damage to plaintiff'' is comn1 on to all types of civil liability. So are mostly, but not always (see belo\\' note I, B, b), tl1e defences co11cerning this factor. (2) The requirement of ''causation of the damage by defendant'' (or, under Section 2 or 4, by tl1e facts or things n1entioned in notes 7-9 ff. to Article 2027) is also common to all types of civil liability. So are, as a rule,4 the main defences concerning this factor. (3) Obversely, the requirement of a ''fault of tl1e defendant'' and the defences conn ected wjtl1 tl1is factor normaJly do not concern the strict and vicarious liabilities incurred under Section 2 or 4. We shall now pass to analyze, in some detail, the defences connected with ''damage'', ''causation'', and ''fauJt''. I . DENIAL OR AVOIDANCE OF ''DAMAGE'' ALLEGATION A plaintiff claimi11g under Article 2028 ff. must allege that he has suffered a damage. Defences agai11st this allegatio11 should be looked for under Section 3, concer11ed witl1 compensation for damage. The plaintiff's contention that l1e bas suffered a damage may be denied or (admitted but) avoicled. 5 It may be ''denied'' by questioning (A) the existence of the damage. It may be ''avoided'' by question ing (B) tl1e compensability of the damage. A. Existence of the damage As a rule where there is no damage there is no compensation. 6 And wl1ere tortious dam�ge does occur, the compensation should be equal to the damage (Article 2091 ). This pri.r1ciple of ''equality'' seems to imply, among others, that damage

1. i.e. on Article 2028 in conjunction with any of the provisions enumerated in our note 6, (a), under Article 2029.

2. Cf., e.g., our note 5, B, under Article 2035. 3. Article 2028; cf. our notes 2-4 tinder Article 2027. 4. i.e. subject to qualifications concerning �he exclusion of the defence of force majeure by Article 2086. 5. As shown below, we use tl1e terms "deny" (nega1tive1 de �ence ) . and h"a_voi1d" (after _admission; affirmative defence) in a plain sense that need not c ose y f 1t the1r tee ruca connotat1on under the formal rules of English procedure. 6. Sec note 2 under Article 2027. .

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Defences, l d an (1) ), 93 (1) 20 94 les 20 tic Ar r de un . e.g (as d ide ov pr ise erw ld, e ott ere oth sav wh sh _ F . m ses fro los ed uc ded or 11g be1 y) an (if fits pro , be calculated ''per balance'' clear by or ( a faultless lt fau s ' ant e11d def by _ red i1tju exa111ple, if due to bei1 1g bodily _ ve st mo from the mu 1ff 1nt pla 7), 206 e ticl Ar der un g defendant's act in cases arisin y the n tha s les are s rge \Vere cha ng rdi boa ose wh al Ghio11 I-lotel to a hospit _ at the ury the 1n tnJ fro (e.g. ses los 1er otl his er cov to nt ficie 1, suf io1 is ce d Gh an the balan the n1edical expenses), then tl1ere remai11 s no material da1na?e to compensate . ( �his is without prejudice to any ''moral'' damages du.e un?er Article 21 I 3). �n add1t1on, tl1e dan1aoe mt1st be certain to exist now or occur 111 the future (Article 2102( 2) cum 2092). E.g., if defe11 da11t has, by battery and restra�nt of _ liberty (Arti�les 2038 and 2040), prevented plaintiff from atte11ding an exam1nat1on or an auct1?n, def enda11t ca·n put plaintiff to tl1e often prohibitively difficult burden . of proving �hat he would have certainly passed the examination or won the auction a11d profited tl1ereby (tl1is is without prejt1dice to a11y ''moral'' damages due under Articles 21072108 or ''non1inal'' darnages u11der Article 2104). B. CompensabiJity of the damage I11 son1e cases, altl1ot1gh the datnage is certain, the legal consequences attached to its existe11ce in t11e co11text of Article 2028 differ fro111 tl1ose expressed in the words '' ... sJ1all n1ake it good''. S0111e l1ar111s are, co11trary to tl1is pri11ciple, (a) not co111pe11sable. Otl1er harn1s are, co11trary to tl1e principle of Article 209 l, only (b) pc1rt!J' co111pe11sable. In tl1ese cases, clefenda11 t need n . ot ''de11y'' plai11tiff's con tentio11 tl1at l1is damage exists. He will ''avoid'' such contention, wholly or in part, by in,1oki11g tl1e provisions referred to below:

111ay be wl1olly avoided in tl1e followit1g cases: Damage to a.n (a) Co111pensation . insurer (Article 2093(2)) or pension-debtor (Article 2094(2)), tl1at consists in the n1aturity of tl1e wro11gfully ii1jured victim's i11de11111ity or pension claim, is not ciirectly con1pensable. 111 wrongful deatl1 cases dam:1.ge caused to relatives other tl1a11 tl1e sp_ouse, ascendant or desce11 dant is not compensable (Article 2096). Da1nage wl11ch could have bee11 but was not avoided by a claimant in bad �aith is not compen�able (Article 2097; imagine a bodily injured clain1ant ,vho, 1n the J1ope of a ltfe allowance from ri�l1 defendant, l1ad refused all med �cal aid). Moral da1nage (to plaintifl''� feelings) is not IJecuniarily co111pensable 111 cases otl1er tl1an those expressly provided by law (Article 2105) tinder, prin1arily, Articles 2106-2117. (b) Cornpe11sa�ion may be partly avoi�ed in _ the following cases: J11 wrongful d.eath cases (Art1cle 2095(2)), compensat1or1 1s not equal to the d,1111aoe but consists i11 a ''1:1aintena11ce'' allo,vance assessed u11cler Article 807 cu1n 812 ff. (Of course, tl1e p arties n1ay settle for a lump surn tinder Article 2148). Purstia11t to Article 2098 damage cause? by tl1e concurre11t faults of, resiJectively, tt1e victim a11d . the defendant, is_ onlY_ I? artly co1n·pensable.7 And, i il cases arising under , I Sectton , even a fat1ltless v1ct1n1 s da11 1ag� ''rnay'' (in tlle court's discre be tio n) 011ly partly compensated where tl1e defenda' nt \\'as Utla, v01·dably u11aware of h.1s s:-. · le 2099) or was aware bt1t overcon1e by a se �au1t (Artr� dutiful of ns e ,, obedience. (Article 2036(2) cum 2100) • As to compe Llsat· 1011 r1or ,,uni'r.orseeable darnage, 1t may be reduced pursuant to Article 21 o1.

7. Incidentally, under Section 2 which conceri1s faultless defendants the victim's fault may constitute a complete defence: see e.g. Article 2086.

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Defences, 2 2.

DENIAL OR AVOIDANCE OF ''CAUSATION'' ALLEGATION

After sl10\ving tl1at l1e has suffered damage, a plaintiff suing under Article 2028 ff. must allege that his da111age was ''caused'' by defe11da11t's conduct. Tl1e Civil Code neither �lefines causation, nor provides defe11ces connected \Vitl1 tl1is concept. The connotatton of ''c,:1usatio11'' is tentatively outli11ed in 11ote 3 under Article 2027. To avoid duplication, we refer tl1e reader to that 11ote. 111 thjs JJlace we submit t�at there a�e two \Va)'S of crossing a plaintiff's allegation of ''causatio11'' purpor ting to establ1sl1 a li:1bility under Article 2028: the contentiot1 that plaintiff's damage was caused by tl1e defe11clant 111ay be de11ied or (ad1nitted but) avoided. It 1nay be denied by questio11ing (A.) the existe11ce of the cat1sal link between defeoda11t's conduct and JJlaintiff's da.n1 age. Or, it n1ay be ''avoided'' by qt1estioning (B) the adeqt1ac)1 of st1cl1 cat1sal li11k: A. Existence of tl1e causal linli. Jun1ping to co11clusio11s by 1neans of a fallacious post l1oc ergo propter lzoc (tl1ereafter = thereby) argun1 ent constitutes a con1111 on enough error. Tl1e possibility to resist Stich error witl1 respect to tl1e existence of a causal link is best shown by an exan1ple. St1ppose tl1at plaintiff, exceeding the legal speed-li11ut as he dri\'es bis car, at night crashes i11to the ttnlighted rear of defend,1nt's lorry (wl1ich remains u11damaged). Invoking Article 2028, plaintiff alleges that the rest1lting damage to l1is car was caused by tl1e defendant's wro11gful failure to keep tl1 e lorry's rear ligl1ts on. (Because of tl1e faults involved, Section 2, including the ''Co llision'' provision of Article 2084, is inapplicable here). PJaintiff n1 ay establisl1 a prima facie case. He \vill be awarded part compe11sation t111cler Article .2098 u11less the defe11dant demo11strates an absence of cat1sality. Does the fact that tl1e coll ision l1appened after defendant's wro11gful failure to illt1minate bis Jorry necessarily n1ean tl1 at it l1 appened because of this omission, i.e., tl1at it would not l1ave l1appen ed \Vitl1out it (si11e qi,a 110n)? Clearly not. By sl1owing, for instance, tl1at at the material time tl1e lorry was strongly illu1ninated by a street lamp, defendant can put plaintiff back to the now prol1ibitively difficult bt1rden of provi11g tl1at l1e wo u.ld not l1ave crasl1 ed into the perfectly visible lorry, l1ad its rear ligl1ts been on. Indeed, wl1atever be a defendant's fault, he cannot be liable where tl1e existence of a causal ]ink between it a11d the damage is not distinctly establisl1 ed. 8 Tl1e only exception to tl1is principle is provided by tl1e ''group liability for an uncletermined wrongdoer'' provisio11 of Article 2142(1): pursuant to it, a group-member 1nay be ordered to pay for a damage without proof that l1e is the one who has caused it.

B. Adequacy of the causal link Tl,e principle tl1at a defendant_ c_a�not be liable without the existenc� of a causal link bet\\1een l1is fault and plaintiff s harm does not mean that the existence of such link will of necessity always make him liable. In most legal syste1ns some thing more is reqt1ired t? . make the �ausal link ''ade9uate'' for t!1e p �rposes. of liability. The Etl1 iopian C1v1l Cod� prov1 ?es no clear gu1danc� on tl11s point wl11ch, again, is best explained by an 1llustrat1on., Suppose that, 1n. the. above example, the plaintiff drove careft1lly, the defendant s lorry was not 1llun1 1nated by street lamps, and t]1e absence of rear lights _ 01;1 the l? rry was a _ r�al c�t1se of the collisi?n. Suppose that tl1e plaintiff, sligh_tly 1nJ_ u: ed 1n the co111sron, 1s ta�en _ to l1osp1tal and while treated tl1 ere is ser1ouly 1nJured by an earthquake, 11ghtn1ng, flood, riot: or robbery, which l1e would not have been witl1out the collision. The requ-

8. See also note 2, C (in fine) under Article 2035.

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n ay �e lio eS w m la qu in ed ' y' ac qu de ''a s it s, es el th er ev ired cau.sal link does ex·is·t in fa· ct.· N o o 1n d tw to s· ay y w n tr ca · t an nd e i ef d e • s th i h T for the purpose of avo1dmg liab111ty. 9 (a) By appealing to judicial con1mon se11se; p! 1�able to ay ap yw an s em se 1 cl l1i w e, od C (b) by analogy fron1 Article 24(1) Penal il 35 iv 20 C de m cu Co � od C l na P� � IO le ic rt A of civil cases arising by way id 3 ai l 78 na 3 Pe 5� s le ic rt A d ge 1n fr 1n s l1a (in our last example, the defenda.nt , c.) r et , he ?t et r� wh e, ak qu th ar (e ts en ev l fu Code). Clearly the mentioned harm e nc ue q e_ s of ns al co 1n or ''n t_ no e ar s, se ca e'' r . eu aj m ce or ''f or not classified as g rn r� to �o ac , e lly �h t� en c1d In . on s ht lig ar re 's rry lo a t a11 omission to pu s g n in io us rs nf ve co ish gl En e th , de Co l na Pe ) (1 24 French maste·rtext of Article ed ac by as pl re ''w be ld ou sh '' gs 1 i1 th of se ur co al terms ''Vi,ould, in the norm � uJ d]. �e res ar e ch th e_ uc od pr [to e'' nc rie pe ex e lif to r1ormally apt, according c ). ar1 on nh rsi ve At ing oll ntr co tl1e to ser clo be to o als ms (Tl1is formulation see 3. DENIAL OR AVOIDANCE OF ''FAULT'' �ALLEGATOINJ After showing tl1at defenda. nt's conduct has caused him damage, a plaintiff claiming under Article 2028 must allege tl1at tl1is conduct amounted to a ''fauJt''. St1ch co11te11tion may be denied or (adnutted but) avoided. It may be ''denied'' by questioning (A) the existence of the fault. It may be ''avoided'' by questioning (B) the liability for tl1e fault: A. Existe11ce of the fault The existe11ce of defenda11t's fault (''prima facie'' established by plaintiff) may be questioned in three ways: (a) by showi11g tl1e non-applicability of the plaintiff-invoked provision of Section 1 containing tl1e words ''commits a fault'' (or figuring under Art icle 2031), (b) by showing the applicability of such provisions of Section I as con tain tl1e words ''con1n1its no fault'' (or words to the san1e effect), (c) by trying to s110,v the pertinency of certain general justifications which are not expressly provided: (a) Defendant can show the non-ap. plicability of a11y of the provisions enumerated in note 6, a, under Article 2029 by de1nonstrating that any of tl1e requirements iobere11t in such provisions definition of fault is not fully satisfied in the case at bar; e. g. l)y showing that the ''usual'' or ''professional'' standards or rules of proper conduct are differe11t fro1n those alleged in the plaint (Article 2030(1) or 2031(1)); that, contrary to allegation defendant souoht :per�onal gain . (203�(1)�, or_ did not. seek it (2033); that the la,¥ he allegedly mfr1nged provides Justifications applicable to his case, or tl1at such law (save wber� ''specified'' by a penal judgin_ent) is riot ''specific'' enougl1 (2035(1 )) ; that b� did not r�ally u11der�tand the 1llegalit� of tl1e act ordered (2036(2)); that bis co?t�ct .with anothe� s body was not 1nte11ded (2038(1)); tliat bis locking of pla1ntiff rn a room did not prevent the latter from moving through a sec ond, unlocked door (2040(1)); that he defarned only plaintiff's fatl1er, who n a firm statement. Rea· son.. I n ·t 9. This is a tentat ive suggestion rather tha. ile I s fi rst d raft' t. . requi. red, i n � sec?11d alinea, that the causati Arli�I�t: now,, �um be red ?091 on of the da m age b e norm a1 . 1.e. ad equate (see Avant pro1et' cit ed above at - · ' p · 3 , no te I , C· c·IV/13 , p. ?7). . tin� .tb is · r q� i· �ment_ from the final version of Article 2091 tl1e legislator Throug11 eL'1 has pr�,er ,,e ��:�' c1v11 c? ur� s � 1.sc ret1onary power to assess causatio n . \Vhere they see fit to t n, the JU dges may relieve the tortfea sor f ro111 requ ire a d equa te causa 10 1-1ab1l1ty • •. fo r a st.1:bsequent . . har m rhat is purely coincidental in that the l"k I e l"l1 0 d of i t� occurre nce ,vas increase d nota not bly � � by his tort B ut the co urts' discretion is b0 t111 e by Article 210 l: mere t1nfores of the ity I eeab i e,'Kpunsion �f an already inflicted lJarni 1·s 0 0t a de,e r n ce to "cat.1sa1·i on" , btit _n1ay· be a part . f" . defen ce to ''compe nsability" (cf. supra 1 B (b) in 1. e). Where to draw the h11e be twee n this and the "coincidence" defence to "ca;satio�••·, U f!- �01� ably, the a 11s�ers _ �y vary rom case to m f · � foreign in do a r· J·u they as judge, to judge d n case · isd ic ions. Legal causation 1s incapable of foolproof definitio 11.

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Defences, 3

is no m ore a '' �i�i11g'' person (204-1); tl1at he l1ad no clear knowledge of the , l1��band s oppos1t1on to tl1e l1arbouring of l1is \Vife (2050(3)); that, as to super . vis1on�ciut1es, �ustom is differe11t fro1n that alleged in the plai11t (2052(1)); that stnc� �rt1cle 1217 gave l1im legal autl1ority to commit the ''necessary'' trespass 1n issue, he has committee! 110 fault under Arti.cle 2053; 10 that his a�a??o1ling t�e i 11tention to co11tract was not arbitrary (2055); tl1at the impo ss1?1l1 ty ment1011ed under Article 2056(1) was not ''substantial''; that the repu tat1011 of plaintiff's product has in fact not been compromised (2057); that _ _ _ pla111t1ff did 11ot ft1lly belie,;e i11 tl1e existence of tbe ''oste11sible'' sitt1ation (2058); 11 that defe11dant \Vas not in a position to k11ov1 that plaintiff \Vill act upon tl1e false inforn1ation and thereby suffer damage (2059(a)); that, due to price _ fl11ctt1at1011s, tl1e disproportionate amo1111t of goods distrained \Vas not ''unnecessary'' (2063); tl1at the prescribed cot1rt-order form is different from tl1at alleged (2064(2)). (b)

(c)

Defendant can show the applicability of the words ''commits no fault'' (or words to tl1at effect) under a provision of Section I by de1nonstrati11g that the facts of tl1e case at bar fully coincide with the requiremer1ts of any of the following provisions (wl1ich contai11 such words): Article 2036(3), 2037, any of the sub-articles of Article 2039, Article 2041, 2042(1), 2043 (''la\vft1lly'' implies absence of fault), 2045(2) (''no defamation'' denotes absence of this fault), 2046(1), 2047(1), 2051, 2062, 2064(1), 2065.

-defe11sive provisions me11tioned

Of the u11der (b), above, 011ly tl1at of Article 2036(3) (impossibility to disobey) is ''general'' in that it justifies a defendant who has consciously done any act a1nounting to fault u11der any otl1er provision of Section 1. Nevertheless, the defendant may try to sl1ow tl1e pertinency of certain ge11eral justificatio11s which are 11ot expressly provided in the Code: we shall in turn discuss (i) ''unavoiclable accident'', (ii) ''legitimate defence'', (iii) ''requirement of tl1e law'' and (iv) ''consent to l1arn1 or risk of l1arm'': (i)

No general justification worded ''who causes damage througl1 i111avoiclable accide,it commits no fault'' figures in the Code. There was perhaps no 11rgent need for such a provisio11. It is obvious that eve.n the reasonably diligent man or professional co11templated by Articles 2030-2031 cannot avoid unavoid able accidents. Most otl1er definitions of fault require or assume the presence of an intent to inj11re others, abuse powers, or commit certain prohibited acts, or else the presence of some negligence. These definitions imply that tl1e damage was avoidable. Still othe� (fortunately few) definitions do not imply that the damage was a,,oidable: the availability of the ''unavoidable accident'' defence is here debatable. On the one hand, since Article 2086(1) of Section 2 expressly excludes the defence of ''unpreventab!e damage'', we may consider it a contrario, as implicitly included tinder Section 1. 1 2 On the other hand, w'bat are we to decide where the accident was not completely ''unpreven table'' (force n1ajeure 13 ) but only ''reasonably'' unavoidable (a reason able man would not have avoided it)? Examples: (x) a pedestrian causes a traffic accident by his infringement through reasonable ignorance of the law which prohibits pedestrians from walking on the right side of the high way (see Article 2035); (y) a speaker commits defamation (Article 2044)

10. It follows that the compensation he owes for damage caused (if any) is due only pursuant to Article 2066 cum 2103 and excluding 2112. 11. Cf. our note 2, G, (b), u.nder Article 2032. ' . le 29. tic 20 Ar der , 6 un (a) te , no in en giv s son rea for 61, 20 12. Excepting Article ° on sati ate without cau equ e rov "ad disp to ant end def ent may enable the 13 s h · r · t"bl e. ov ab 5, B, 13 ge pa see t: ul fa of ion at eg all • n��d t� :��e: t�:

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Defences, 3

(ii) •

(iii)

(iv)

due to his reasonable belief in a false information; (z) a tresspasser (Article 2053) acts under a reasonably unavoidable n1 istake concerning the boundary line that he is the lawful possessor of the la,nd entered upon. In all th_ese cases the defendant has satisfied tl1e ''reasonable man'' sta11dard of Article 2030. But Artjcles 2035, 2044 and 2053 lay down other, more specifi_c sta.n dards, which, respectively, prevail in cases of infringement of law 14 an� seem to prevail in cases of defamation other tl1an those contemplated by Article 2045 (2-3). 15 As to trespass, the wording of Article 2053 is L1ardly compatible with a ''reaso11able mjstake'' defence against the injured landlord. Altl,ough tbe Code l1as no ''general'' provision on legitin1ate defence and men tio11s it only incidentally to ''battery'', a conjoint reading of Article 2039(b) of Sectio 11 I with Articles 2066(2)-2067(2) of Sectio1 1 2, and, in the Book on Goods, Article 1148(1), may support a suggestion that such a justification is generally available. In tl1 e absence of a Civil Code definition, tl1e n1eaning of ''legitimate'' defence may be glea 1 1 ed fron1 Article 74 Penal Code (remembering that in its Englisl1 version the French mastertext's ''legitime'' is mistranslated as . . . ''self''). Altl1ougl1 tl1e Code has no general provision worded ''wL1 0 performs acts reqi1irecl by /ai, v con1 n1its no fault'', and apart fron1 the obvious relevancy of tl1 is propositio1 1 for tl1 e fault-defi 1 1itio11s containi11g tl1e words ''without legal autl1ority'' (e.g. under Articles 2040(1), 2053, 2054), tl1is defence is impliedly but obviously available in all cases arisi1 1g under Section I : since it is a fault to infringe tl1 e law (Article 2035), a contrario obeying a law or lawful order cannot be a fa11 lt: the lawful executioner of a flogging sentence com n1its no ''battery'' under Article 2038, notwitl1standing that his justification does not figt1re specifically an1ong those enumerated under Article 2039. Obversely, neitl1er the brocard (x) volenti non fit i11iuria (wl10 consents to a harm suffers no wrong), nor tl1 e (y) assun1ptio11 of risk (of harm) defence, both fan1-iliar to Common Law S)1· stems, have any general relevancy in the Etl1 iopian law of extra-contractual civil liability (for penal liability, cf. Article 66 Penal Code). As to tl1e particular relevancy of ''vo1enti'', it is limited to a few provisions: (x) Since the definitions of the faults of ''battery'' (Article 2038), ''trespass toll to la 11 ? a.nd or goods'' (2053-2054) and ''injury to rights of spouses'' (2056) c?n�a1 ? the words ''against t�e will'' (of plaintiff), obvio11 sly ''volenti'' (pl a1nt1ff s consent, e.g.: to a kiss) pre,1ents fulfiln1ent of this requirement for �he existen�e o� such faults. I � all other cases l1owever, the only pertinent question 1s whether and 1n wl1at degree of gravity tl1 e victin1's con �ent_ to harm or tl1e def e11dant's acting 11pon it n1ay be c1een1ed fau1ty 1n ,,1ew of tl1e consequences provided by Articles 2097-2098. Neither consent to an .operation nor tl1e surgeon's con1petent acti 11g upon it are faults (cf. Article 18(2)). Obversely, botl1 tl1e victin1's cor1sent to abortion a 1 1d tl1e abortioner's acting upon it are fa 11lts (Arts. 528-9 and J 00 P�n �I Cod � cum 2035 Civil Code), so tl1at ''conse11t'' does not bar tl1e , 1 ct1m's �la1n1. I 1 1deed, the consenting victi111's fault is ustially, because cal the tl1an of for abortioner's purposes ·the of h �r distress, less grave . _ culating the compensation for bodily harn1, if any, ptirsuarlt to Article 1

14. See our notes under A.rticle 2035, in particular note 5, B. 15. Only wh��e "no particular person" was consciously "referred to" is absence of reasonable forcseeab1hty of harm a defence to clefa1nation. (Tl1is remark in no way affects the special defences provided by Articles 2046-2049)

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Defences, 3

2098 . Sin1ilar observations may apply to a victin1's consent to harmft1l . curative treatn1e11ts given in violation of Article 518 Pe 11al Code. � 6 � (y)

Inst�ad of co11senting to a clamage, a person n1ay assun1e t]1e risk of_ �ts occurre11ce. Assumption of risk has, by itself, no legal s1gntficance. Wl1etl1er or not it may an1ount to fat1lt depends· on its ''reaso 1 1ableness'' i 1 1 ligl1t of all the circun1sta11ces of each case. Any reaso11able city-dweller has to assu1ne risks to hi1nself from even careful crossi11g of streets, just as any reaso11able n1otorist l1as to create risks to otl1ers fron1 even careft1 l driving of I1is motor car. These acts, i111posed by tl1e 11ecessities of 1nodern life, are clearly no faults. Neitl1 er is a courageous n1an at fat1lt where l1e risks an injury in order to rescue a baby from being sta111peded by a l1orse. '\Vl1at about a conscious acceptance of a ''lift'' fron1 an obviously drunken rnotorist? Tl1 is is a f:1ult (unreasonable conduct) if tl1ere was no 11ecessity to accept tl1e risks of such lift: i11 such case tl1e victim's con1 pe11satio11 for harn1 ca11sed by the motorist's fault (see Article 2089(2)) \viii be reduced pt1rst1ant to Article 2098 (cf. 11ote I, B, b, above). But if tl1 e victim had to accept the dr11nkard's lift-offer because of an emergency (e.g. sudde11 sickness), tl1ere is no fault and he will get full compensation. Plaintiff's acceptance of the risks of such lift affects 11 either the existence of defe11dant's fault, nor his full liability for it.

B. Liability for the fault

A plai11tiff's irresistible den1011stration of defendant's fa11lt does 11ot always deprive the latter of furtl1er defences. Tl1is is \Vl1y the qualificatory \Vorcls ''as a rule'' had to be added in ot1r notes 4 under Article 2027 a11d 1 under Article 2028. For policy reaso11s tl1at are 1 1ot officially revealed i11 our system, tl1 ere are certain circumstances in \Vl1ich no liability or actionability attaches to a fault. We sl1all first set fortl1 tl1e exemptions from liability for fault provided under (a) Section 1. Secondly, we sl1all n1ention overlaps with tl1e proble111s of con1pensability of damage under (b) Section 3. Thirdly, ,ve shall deal with certain ''actio11ability'' barriers provided under (c) Section 5: (a) Under Sectio,z 1, the following ~J_ 1provisions provide exemptions fron1 liability for faults co1nmitted: (i) Tl1ere is no liability for the fault of clefamation committed by anybody while involved in parliamentary or j1 1dicial proceedings (Article 2048). It is in tl1e p·ublic i11terest that men1bers, parties, witnesses, officials etc., in volved i 1 1 such proceedings be able to speak out without fear of being sued for defa1natio 11. (ii) There is no liability for the fault of defamation in the press (neither in tentional nor grossly negligent) if an apology is pt1blished conformably to the requirements of Article 2049. Presumable reason: preventing petty litigation. (iii) There is no liability. for tl1e f a�lt of ''di�re�ard�ng a co�tractual relationship'' in the terms of Article 2056 rf the pla1nt1ff himself failed to take the me-

16. The abov e discussion is relevant to tort· cases only. ''Contractual" consent, if not invalid under Article 1678 (see 1696 ff.. 1716, etc.) obviously bars any tort claims for the resulting harm (whether bodily or other) to the consenting party.

- 139 ·-

Defences, 3 asures available for safeguarding the first contr�ct's effective p erformance (e.g. he failed to register his purchase ? f an tmmovable which was Fe sold to and registered for defenda� t: A: t1cle 1723). A presumable reason: preserving general reliance on public registers. (iv) There is no liability for the fault of false_ information committed under . e g.? where t� e 1!1. are. 0 the 20 Article 2059 where requirements of Article ? such in.formation was oral and it exaggerated somebody s_ qua�1�1ca�1ons 1n or? er to secure him a job. A presumable reason: prev� nt1�g l1t1gat1on regarding matters in which ''oral'' statements are customarily inflated. (b) We have previously discussed the problem of ''compensability'' of �amage. Pursua11 t to certain provisions of Section 3, the ''extent'' of the compensation due for tortiou.s damage may som.etimes be nil. This is practically equivalent to providing exemptions from liability for such damage. In contrast, however, to the exemptions from liability for fault provided by Section 1, the exemptions under Section 3 apply also to liabilities incurred without fault. To avoid repetitions, we refer the reader to note 1, B, (a), above. (c) Some of the defensive provisions concerning us here figure not in Section 1 or 3, but i11 Section 5. This is because they are merely procedural in the sense of establisl1 ing defences not against liability but against actions for com pensation. The defendant's obligation exists but is not ''actionable''. This seenlingly over-subtle distinction has the following practical consequence: payments volu11 tarily made by tl1e persons protected under such provisions discharge a subsisting ''moral'' ( or prescribed: Article 2143) obligation and, not being undue for the purposes of Article 2164, they are not subject to ''restitution'' (Article 2166). Here are some examples where the obligation ex ists but is not actionable: (i) Consider the inm1 uruty granted under Article 2138 of Section 5. It should be distinguished from that enacted by Article 2048 of Section 1. The im munity under Article 2048 applies to anybody involved in certain proceed in �s ? while the immunity . fron1 suit under Article 2138 applies only to n1 1n1sters, members of parliament and judges. Tl1 e former immunity is rest ri ��e_d t ? the fa �!� of de��mation, :Vhile the latter applies generally to lia b_1l1ti�s incurred 1n office . There . 1s, however, some similarity in tl1 e poli ?1es involved (se � sub-note B, a, 1, above): the policy bel1 ind Article 2138 1s tl1 at . of enabl1n � t_l1e legisla!ive, judicial and top executive state organs public interest without fear of purely civil (see Article 2139) the to act 1n _ tort su1ts. (ii) Tl1� ''�?tion'' for co�pensation can no �ore be brouglit wliere it is ''pre scr1,be� by_ the lapsing .o� th� le� al period of limitation. Altliougl1 defend �nt �. 1nv�k1ng of the_ I1mi�at1on 1s 11ot legally a fault (Article 2065), l1is l1a�1l1ty, if . a11y, survives_ 1n the form of a ''natural'' (nloral) obligation, wh1c� carries tl1e practical consequence concerning voluntary payments explamed above. 1-s (iii) Lest . Articles 2156-216 l_ be mis�nd e: stood, we must stress that they do not provide defences to actions of l1ab1_ lity brot1ght by victims of torti harm. otl s _ They merely regulate the ultimate sharing of tile burden of conlpen ion sat where more than one person is liable to make good th tly o1n e same arm · h U and severally: Article 2155 cum 1897).

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APPENDICES

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•

APPENDIX A CONCORDANCE-S Below are some foreign law concorclances for Articles 2027-2037 Civil Code. Note tl1at, �acking official so11rce reports, even close similarities between some of . and prior foreign laws do not necessarily reflect a legislatjve intent thes_e provisions to import tl1e con11otatio11s prevailing abroad. ''Op. cit." denotes \Yorks cited ·above in tl1e 'Doctrinal Introd11�tion at notes ?? ---, (Lawson), I 02 (.Mazeaud & Tt1nc), 68 (Prosser) and 30 (Savatier). , Article 2027 . �here are_ no ft1ll analog11es in foreign legislation. Compare, however, the dicl1oto m1es 1nl1ere11t 1n two dissi111ilar Afro-:tvlalagachy ·statutes ·enacted after the Ethiopian Civil Code: see Art. 118 ct1m 137 of tl1e Senegalese la\v No. 63-62 (14), Journal' officiel of A11g. 31, 1963; a11d Art. 140 cun1 142 of the Malagachy law No. 65-003, Journal Ojficiel of June 19, 1965.

. i\rticle 2028 A faitl1ful reproduction of Art. 134 Polish Obligations Code of 1934 (now superseded by an identical provision in the Polisl1 Civil Code of 1964, Art. 415). This provi sio11 clari_fies and simplifies the somewl1at awkward version of the same principle in Art. 1382 Napoleon Code. See Code civil (le la Repi1hliqz1e populaire cle Po/og11e (Warszawa, Wydawnictwo pra,vnicze, 1966). Article 2029 f n its con1prehensive coverage, this provision has no full analogt1e in foreign legislation. It seems to constitute a clarification arid elaboration of the principle implied in Art. 1383 Napoleon Code. Article 2030, sub. (1) Although the sweeping form11la of this sub-article underlies the thinking of many foreig11 writers and judges, it seems to have, so far, no close analogue in foreign legislation. For a part similarity, see Art. 1910 Mexican Civil Code. Article 2030, sub. (2) The ''reasonable man'' concept is a notorious device of the Common Law systems: see e.g. Bl_vth v. Birmi11gl1am Waterwo� k·s Co. (1856), 11 Ex. 781, 784, per Alderson B., cited in 011r Doctrinal Introduct1on, p. 35. Article 2030, sub. (3) No precise analogue in foreign I�gisla�ion.. Cl? sest is �t. 2377 Portugue� e Civil Code. For some parallelism in pract�cal IJ?I?l1cat1ons see, m Lawso� �op. cit.), the Eng Lish versions of Arts. 13 IO Austrian C1� 1l C� d�, 829 German C1v1l Code, 19} 1 IYlex.ican Civil Code and 2047 (al. 2), Italian C1v1l Code. Cf. also Arts. 54 Swiss Obligatio11s Code, 1386 bis Belgian Civil Code a� d I 64 Egyptian Civil Code (English version by Perrot Fanner & Marshall, Alexandria, Journal d.e commerce, 1949). A recent part-analogue: the French Law N?·. 68-5 of Jan. 3, 1968, Jour,zal Officiel of Jan 4, 1968, amending Art. 489 Code c1v1l. - 143 -

CONCORDANCES

Article 2031 Co ur de cassati0n ch en Fr e th of e ag ng la ry ve e th � . This provision closely reflects 7. I, 8, 193 ey, Str 10 ed ort rep as ), iv. in arret du 18 octobre 1937 (C Article 2032 6 , For cognate legislation, see Arts. 1295 (al.2) ,:\ustrian_ Civ�I Code 22 Ger�an in Lawson, op. c1t.). on rsi ve h lis ng (E de Co vil Civil Code an d 1912 Mexican Ci For cognate doctrinal trends and cases in France, consult Mazeaud & Tune, op. cit., 6th ed. (1965), Nos. 563-569. Article 2033, sub. (1) Tb.ere seem to be no analogues in foreign legislation. Article 2033, sub. (2) Reprodu.ces a fundamental principle of French Administrative law reflected in both doctrine and innumerable cases before the Conseil d'Etat. See any standard textbook (e.g. M. Waline, Droit adn,1inistratif, 9-th ed., Paris 1963) u.nder ''detourne ment de pouvoirs." Article 2034 No legislative analogue. This provision expressly ''rules out'' the approac.hes reflected in Art. l of the former Soviet Russian Civil Code of 1922 (see Comme·n tary note I under Article 2034) or, more recently, in Art. 5 of the Soviet-Russian Civil Code of 1964 and 1\rt. 6 of the Tchecoslovak Civil Code of 1964 (see English version in Nos. 7 and 11 of La�v i,! Eastern Ei1rope, cited above at ftn. l to Article 2034). Cf. also Art. 281 of the Greek Civil Code, in fi.ne, in Code civil hellenique , Athenes, Institut fran�ais d' Athenes, 1956. Article 2035 Close ana]ogues: French doctrine and cases (see Savatier, op. cit., Nos. 7-26). Remote analogues: Art. 823 (al. 2) Gern1an Civil. Code, Art 914 Greek Civil Code, and American case law (cited in Prosser), op. cit., pp. 191-201). Article 2036 No close analogues. For mixed factors of analogy and contrast see Arts. 841 German Civil Code, 167 Egyptia.n Civil Code, and I 67 (in fine) of' the a.m. Mala gach� Loi No. 65-003 of 1965. In Eoglish case Ia\\', cf. Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs (1866), L. R. I, H. L. at p. 111, per Backburn J. (see Jenks, cited above at ftn. 36 under Article 2035, No. 723).

Article 2037 There se �m to .be no an�logltes in foreign legislation. TI1 is Article reflects a _ Frencl1 doctr1n �l pr1nc1ple followed by most writers and the cou.rts in Frar1 ce: see _ Savat1er, op. c1t., No. 108 ff.

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APPENDIX B TABLE OF ESSENTIAL LAWS CITED 1.

OLD LAWS

1. Fetha Chapters (Parts)

Nagast

Pages

Chapters (Parts)

22 22 22 28 25

IX XII XXIV XXX

�-xv

XXXV XXXVII XXXVII XXXVIJ XLIII XLV XLV

21 44 44 27 2] 46 2.

116

102 8,68 7,8

26 27 7

Penal Code of 1930

Preface Para.

Pages

5 7

17 17 17 17 17 17 17

11 12 15 16

18 19 20 22 Articles

Pages

43-142 146 146-149 147 152 224 231 237 238

11 13,110 · 111

259

25 17

XLVI XLVII XLVII XLVIJ XLVII XLVII XLVII XLVII. XLVIII XLIX XLIX

Pages

20 20.

18 18

•

Articles •

.. •

.. '

20 11,20

20 21

- .145 -

260 261 262 265 . 266 273 274 275 276 277

Pages

21 21 21 21

21 11,21 21 22 2.2 22

TABLE OF LAWS

Articles 278

279 280 281 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 296 297 298 299 308 309 310 311 312 312-26 313 314 315 316 317 318

319 320 321 322 326 327 328 329 334 335 337 338 339 340

Articles

Pages

341 359 360 361 362 363 374 374-80 376 377 380 388 397 399 400 404 405 406 407 408 410 411 416 421 422 425 426

22 22

22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 13,22 13,23 23 23 11,13,23 11,23 23 23 23 13 23 23 23 23 23 24

431

432 442 454 . 455 456 458 459 460 466 '467 · 477 481

24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24

24 24 11,13,25 13,25 25

483

Pages

25 25 25 25 25 25 25

25 25 2S 25 26 26 26 26 12,26 10,26 26 12,26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 28 28 12,28 28 28

II. PRESENT LAWS Articles

27 36 37

1. Rev. CoMtitution of 1955 Pages 'Articles •

99,110 99 83,86,99

·37-38 42 43 - -146 -

Pages 103

99 99

TABLEÂ· OF LAWS

Constitution of 1955 (Cont'd.) Articles

51 54 57

Articles

I 2 3 10 10(2) 23(3) 24(1) 27 29(3) 43 48 58 58(1) 59 59(1) 59(2) 64(b-c) 64-65 69 69-70 70 70(1) 70(2) 71 73 74 78 78(2) 78(3 ) 100

101 146-149 245(c) 281 414 416 420 432 4J8 440

Pages

102 15 48

2. Penal

Code

Pages

Articles

Pages

62 88 92 122

64,100 108 97

1957 Articles

14 65,98,100 107 113,119 117 112 62,136 62 104 53 67 82 66 108 . 67,70 67,82 103 81 109,115 111 13,111, l I 2,115,118 115,118 115,117 112 116,117 138 108 107 107 14,53,62,71,87,100, I 01, 103,106,115,117,119,136, 138 13,101 111 102 116 90,93,102 16,115 90,102 16 67 86

441 442 446 447 449 450 456 460 466 518 518(3) 518(3-4) 519 526 528-9 537 543 544 544(1) 547 547(1) 547(2) (b) 548 552 553 553-4 557(1) 563-4 573 574(1) 579(a) 580(1) 582 588(1) 630 644 650 663-4 668 671 673 674 697

-147 -

JOO

.Pages

86 16 86 86 86,87 86 16 16 21 80,139 81 80 78 62 138 103 48,136 103 102 67 81 125 91 102,103 87 102 102 102 104 102 105 102 102 102 45 112 116 100 115,127 106 106 106 106

TABLE OF,i. kAWS

Penal Code of · 1957 (Cont'd.) Articles

699 700 733 751 7534

Articles

Pages

783 793 794 805

115 107,108 99,100 113 100

3. Civil Code of 1960 Articles

Pages

7(3) 8 18 18(2} 29(2-3) 30 45(2) 46 138

JOO 86 47 138 100 102 100• 100 1.00 82 82 100 100 74 121 121,127 51 51 51 91 91 91 95 91,103,111 91 121 128 121 74,100,121 74,121 100 74,100 90 92,100 114 100 100 82 124

143

145 153(1) ·171 'l 204-7 210 213 231 231-33 265-9 267 267(2) 279 313 313(2) 315 317 318 323(1) 350 401 401-2 401-3 403 457 541 561

P,ages

Articles

561(2) 571-4 573 594(2) 643 669 693 807 807-8 808 812 813(2) 826(2) 920 947 948 950-1 961 961(1) 961(1) (2) 961(2) 1013 . 1109 l 130 1134(3) 1148(1) 1149 l 149{1) 1 I 64(1) 1168 1176 1179 1181(2) 1182(3) 1183(3) 1193 1195 1198 1204-6 - 148 -

100,12� 124 IOfl,124 �I

• •

•

.. ..

97 97 9i 134 31 30,31 31,134 128 128 120 91 91 91 91 91 100 82,91 91 82 42 100 138 103 100 127 88 88 88 100 100 100 42 42 100 84

TABLE OF LAWS

Civil Code of 1960 (Cont'd.} Articles

1207-56 1210 1211 1217 1217-19 1220(1) 1221 1225 1225-6 1226 1234 1235 1236-47 1239 1242(2) 1249 1250 1252 1309 1369 1369(1) 1369(2) 1464 1481 1493(3) 1515(3) 1566(2) 1640(2) 1674(2-3) 1677 1681 1687(b) 169 I ( 1) 1695(1) 1697 1703 1704 1704(1) 1705 1706 1707(1) 1707(2) 1710 1713 1716 1723 1725 1726 1731(2) 1731(2) (3)

Pages

Articles

84 84 84 137 84 85 85 41,84,85 39,40 40,41,85,100 100 85 85 100 85 85 100 85 43 87,88 124 124 95 100 100 100 100 100 100 46,62,120 125 125 120 125 126 127 82,126 126 126 126 127 127 126 84,86,129,130 80 140 125 125 129 129

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- 149 -

1731(3) 1732 1733 1737 1758 1763 1771 1771(2) 1772 1790 1790(2) 1791 1791-3 1793(b) 1795 1795(a) 1796 1797-8 1799 1800 1801 1801(1) 1803(1) 1803(2) 1805 1808 1808(1) 1808(2) 1808-18 1811 1815 1815-17 1816 1817 1817(2) 1818 1825-44 1845 1845-6 1854 1887-8 1888(1) 1892(2) 1896-1909 1897 1907 1920 1922-4 1925(1) 1926(1)

Pages 129 86,130 86,I 30 86,107,116,129 131 121 120 31,62 120 61,62,98,100,121 31 63,77,82,121,122 49 49 77,121 131,132 125,130 120 .121 ,122,126,128,130 121 122 66,82 122 122 82,122 127 127 127 126 126 126,127 127 127 127 127 127 62 88 122 87 130 129 82 62 140 46,62 54 54 54 54

TABLE OF LAWS'

Civil Code. . of 1960. (Cont'd.) Pages

Articles

1926(2) 1933 1940 1952(1) 1952(2) 1959 1962 1968 1986 2027

2027(1) 2027(2) 2027(2-3) 2027-37 2028 2028-30 2028-37 2028-64 2029 2029-30 2029-36 2030

2030(1) 2030(2) 2030(3) 2030-1 2030-2 2030-3 2031 2031(1) 2031-3 2032 2032(1)

Articles

15,73,97,98 68,82,83,87,89,91,94,95� 97,102,109,113,114,136,144 68,82,83,94,97,144 2034 14, 15,33,34,37,38,50,62,63, 2035 64,65,66,67,68,71,73, 76,78, 79,80,81,82,84,85,86,87,90, 91,92,93,95,97,98,99, 100,101, 103, 106� 109, 110,l l l,113, 114,115, I 17,118,119,125,126,127,l33,l35, 136,138 102,138 2035(1) 113 20�5(2) 2035-6 57 73,102,109,113,118, 2036

2032-3 2033

54 54 � �

Pages

))

128 · 128 128 128 128 128 32,37,50,57,61,64, 65,67,70,73,74,77, 98,120,121,123,133, 135 121 121 15 33,56,57,59, 143 34,53,64,65,68,76, · 98,116,121,133,135, 136,139 62 12,15,31, 57,63,65

144

2036(2) 2036(3) 2037

2038

66,68,70,71,72,73, 82,97,133,136,137, 31,91 37,121 13,33,35,36,37,38 39,40,41,62,63,64 66,67,68,69, 73,75 76,78,79,80,81, 82,89,97,99,103,107, 108,109,113,121,123 124,126,130,143 15,113,127,136 4 121 69,93,97,99,113,128,l37 100 99,106 35,49,66,67,68,73,76,77 78,79,97,109,113,123,l25, 126,128,132,136,144 136 73,99 40,41,66,68,69,70,82,84,85 86,87,88,89,90,94,95,96,97 109,124,130,137,144 136

68,111,113,118, I I 9,134 136 68,I 12,116,117,137, 12,31,34,48,61,68, 77,86,91,98,103,106 120,123,130,137,144 47,64,67,68,69,105, 106,130,134,138 136 I 02,103 65 4 15,33,37,98 12,63,73 68,137,138 138 83,91,103,111 14,68,134 136,138 137 68 102,105 137 102,137 11,53,68,102,136, 137,138 66,68 68,82,137 138 68 68 107 135

TA.Bl.El OF :LA\iVS

Civil Co�c:·. of: 1960 (Cont'ci.) Articles

204�(2) 2046-49 2047 2047(]) 2047(2). 2oii8 2048(1) 2048(2) 2049 2049(1) 2050 2050(3) 2051 2052 2052(1) 2053 2053-54 2053-65 2054 2055 2055-56 2056 2056(1) 2056(2) 2057 2058 2059

Pages

Articles

66,68,82 139 102,105• 68,137 66,68,82 68,87,105,139 68 66,68,82 68,139 66,71,82 68 136 68,. 137 12,67,68,91 69,157 68,116,137,138 32,138 . . 12,65 68,138 68,100,106,125,137 106,123 106,128,138,139 68,137 68 68,84,106,137 68,88, I 06, 124, I 37• 14,68,74,82,124,127, .. 140 135 2059(a) 131 2059-86 68,140 2060 53,63,68,86, I 37 •2061 68,137 2062 106• 2062-64 68,84,87,137 2063 110,114 2064 68,137 2064(1) 68,137 2064(2) 2065 ··..', · ,· •. · :. . 68,87,88,106,137 38,39,48,50,63,84 2066 116,117,118,137 49 2066-67 138 2066(2)-2067(2) 98 2066-85 15 2066-86 . 37 "2066-89 9,12,13,16,33,34,47,49, 2067 ·... 74,75,81,103,116,117,118, 128,134 117 2067(1) 118 2067(2)

71 4,31,38,39,40,41,42,48, 50,63,68;75,131 40 2069(2) 123 2069-87 14,38,42,43,50, 51,53,63 2071 75,81,124,131 2071-72 4-1,42,48 2071-76. 42 · 43,44 2072 2072(1) , 43,44 2072(2) 43 2072(3) 48 2073 42,43,44 42,43 2074 , 31,38,41,44,53, 2076 63,75,80,131 2077-80 42 . 2078 4,44 ... 44 2079 ' 2080 44 38,50,52,53,61, 2081·· • 63,64,75,98,122, . . . 124,128,131,132 44,45 2081(1) '. 2081-82 31,41,46,48 , 42,45 2081-84 2082 43,44 2082(1) 43 2082(2) 43,48 2082-83 43 42,44 2083 . . ,·.. . . . .' .. 45,46,135 2084 31,38,46,47,50, 2085 . . 63,75,7:9,131,132 47 2085(1) 47 2085(2) 4,38,42,49,50,61, 2086 108,133,134 37,49,63,137 2086(1) 2086(2). 46,75,98 41,42,63,131 2087 45,46,48,61,120, 2088 123,124,130, l 31 . 49,123 2089 • · 125,139 2089(2) ' 14 2090-2091 11,13,15,36�44, 2091 54,62,74, 121,122, 128,129,132,133, 134,136 . • • • 2068 2069

�

- 151 -

TABLE OF 11.A WS

.) d t' n o C ( 0 6 9 1 f o e d o C Civil Articles 2092 2093(1) 2093(2) 2093(3) 2094(1) 2094(2) 2094(3) 2095 2095(2) 2095(3) 2096 2097 2097(2) 2097-98 2098 2098(2) 2099

•

2099(2) 2099-2100 2100 2101 2101(2) 2102 2102(2) 2103 2104 2105 2105-2115 2106 2106-2117 2107 2107-2108 2108 2109 2110 2112 2113 2113-2117 2116 2123 2124 2124-2125 2124-2125(a-c) 2124-5(a) 2125 2126 2126(1) 2126(2)

Pages

Articles

Pages

•

2126(3) 2126-28 2127 2127(1) 2127(2) 2127(3) 2128 2129 2129-2130 2130 2130-31 2130-32 2131 2131(1) 2131(2) 2134 2135 2136(1) 2136(2) 2137-8 2138 2139 2141 2142 2142(1) 2142(2) 2143 2143(1) 2147(2) 2147(2-3) 2148 2149 2152 2153 2155 2155(1) 2155(2) 2156 2156-61 2157 2157(1) 21-57(2) 2158 2159 2159(a) 2160 2162 2164 2165 2166

134 31,134 134 31 31,134 134 31 77,79,90,128 135 30 134 50,75,134 75 138 50,66,71,75,76, 134,135,139 76 37,38,72,74,75, 76,107,111,134 76 13,15,71,121 112,115,116,134 62,121,122,134 66,82,134 13 62 112,137 62,134 134 62 66,67,82,85,87,124 134 13,47,103 134 103 11,103 103 103,107 11,47, 134 4,16 l l,13, I 00 88 64 50,64 54 75 51 31,51,64,77,92 51,109 51,54,55,93, I 09 - f.52 -

93 92 92,114 51,52,93 93

93 51,92 51,64 51,52 38,62,64 129 64 51,52 45 50,54 52,53 52,53,54,64 51 62 68 64,93,140 93,101,140 112 4 16,135 64 122,140 88 129 129 134,140 100 '74 74 44,46,140 62 53 49,53,54,55,62,J 12 140 55 51 51 71 82 66 66,71,76,112 88,124 140 140 140 -

TABLE OF LAWS

Civil Code of 1960 (Cont'd.) Articles

2168-71 2179 2189 2194 2209(1) 2211 2259(1) 2261 2264-5 2287 2289 2289(a) 2293(2) 2300 2300(3) 2362 2364 2364(2) 2406 (2) 2407(2) 2427 2427-70 2430 2442(2-3) 2467 2512 2524 2525 2533 2548 2548-58 2553(1) 2553(2) 2554 2556-8 2558(2) 2559 2559(1) (2)

Pages

Articles

88 90 54 54,77 91 77 100 77 77 132 79 47,132 44,47 132 79 122,132 132 82 82 82 124 124 124 82 82 43,52,122 121 103 126 30 45 82 131 129 122,129,131 30 82,122 100

2575 2581 2610 2611 2620 2632 2636 2643(b) 2647 2649(3) 2650 2650(1,3) 2651 2663 2664 2669 2720 2722 2722(2) 2727 2750 2767 2779 2877 2896 2905 2927-2978 2951 2953-4 2965 2966 3019 3039 3146 3146(1) 3197(b) 3347

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6. Criminal Procedure Code . .

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7. Civil Procedure Code. of 1965 Articles

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APPENDIX

l\10DEL CASE-DECISIONS IN OUTLLNE ' . CASE I . Ori December _5th, l 969 a Volkswagen car struclc and seriously injured Abiyu \Vl11le l1e \Va_s crossing tl1e Pi,1zza in Addis Ababa. Tl1e accident happened beca11se tl1e brak �s 111 tl1e c�r failed to operate _properly. Tl1e Volks\vage11 was ten years old a11d its owner-driver, Berl1anu, had observed for son1e . ti1ne tl1at the brakes \Vere begi11ni11g to fail. Before tl1e accident, he had taken t11e car to the repair sho p operate ? by Fasil to have these bralces repaired. After inspecting tl1e car, Fas1l deter1J11necl tl1at the bralce-lini11gs needed repl,1cement, and l1e inserted ne\v ones. Tl1ro11gh inadvertence, however, Fasil failed to read the notice dn the box contain ing tl1e lini11gs, which stated tl1at tl1e linings l1e used were desig11ed for newer 1nodel Volkswagens a11d did 11ot work satisfactorily on Berhant1's 111odel. Fasil did 11ot road-test the brakes. Wl1en Berhanu took tl1e . car he noticed tl1at the brakes still were not working well but tho tight that was the best that could be done· on theold car and continued to drive it without further repairs. Tl1e accident took place two days after Fasil's repair of tl1e brakes. Abiyu is being treated in the hospital for septic wol1nds and severe bone frctures due to the accident. Since Berhanu is insolvent, Abiyu decides to sue Fasil for E $10,000 in damages. Abiyu alleges tl1rougl1 coun�el that Fasil is liable to him under Article 2028 or 2067 of the Civil Code. Although Fasil admits the above stated facts of the case, he pleads ''not liable''. . . JUDGMENT This is a case of bodily l1arm suffered by Abiyu, the plaintiff, wl10 was struck by a car due to a failure of its brakes defectively repaired by Fasil, the defendant. Plaintiff claims E. $ 10,000 compensatio11, without as yet setting out, in detail, the particulars of his damage. The facts of tl1is case are not in dispute. Defendant, operating a repair shop _ repair the br�kes of a cl�: nt's :ar and, due to �is inattention _ t,o �nderto_ok to _ _ 1nstrt1ctions visible on a spate parts box, his repatr work was defective.- The pla1nt1ff s injury resulted from a failure of the client-driven car's brakes occ·u.ring shortly after their defective repair by defendant. Plaintiff grounds his claim, i 1;1 the f�st - �lace, on Article 202� Civil Code._ It is _ the introductory article of the section on l1ab1l1ty based on faul_t. Since the published English version of tl1js section constitutes an erroneous translat1�n fron1 tl1e �od1fica _ not commit an offence 1n ord �r tion's French master-text, and since � defen�ant need to be held civilly liable, but a mere fault 1s suffic1e11t . for such p urpos�, the dec1n of the ic sio g har ver llin tro Am con the on y ivel l11s exc ed bas be l wil sion below Code. - 155 -

CASE-DECISIONS

In order that compensation be due, A.rticle 2028, invoked by plai1nti:f.i(, regli"iFies that a fault be committed , and a damage suffered, and that the da.mage be eau:secl by the fault. We shall now discu.ss those three requirements of damage, farUJlt ancl causation: It is obvious from the plaintiff's serious injury that damage has occurecd. Secondly, the defendant committed a mistake in his repair work. But we must determine whether this mi.stake amou.nts to fault. By virtue of Article 2029, fault may consist in mere negligence. By virtue of Article 2031, such negligence amounts to fault where committed by a professional man who imprudently disregards the rules governing the practice of his activity. Defendant, by running a repair shop, follows the profession of a car repair mechanic, whose duty of competent care is stricter than that of n1erely following the ordinary standards of reasonably good conduct imposed by Article 2030 on persons who d.o not act professionally. Since an average competent mecl1anic, acting with professional care, wot1ld have avoid ed the mistake made by the defendant. or at least would J1ave, in accordance with professional practice, road-tested the brakes before returning the car, the defendant must be held to have committed a fault. The third requirement is that tl1e damage be caused by the fault. The meaning of ''cause'' is nowhere defined in the Code. But even if we restrict the mea11ing of ''cause'' to events of which tl1e enst1ing damage is a non-remote and nor111al resuJt, since defective brake repairs normally lead to accidents, and the accident in issue, so far fro111 being remote, occured shortly after tl1e repairs, the defendant's fault must be held to have caused plaintiff's injury notwitlJstanding his client's inÂ tervening act of driving witl1out a re-checking of the brakes. .

Tl1e three requirements of Article 2028 being satisfied, it is 11nnecessary to consider Article 2067. Defendant sl1all pay damages in the provisional a1nount of E. $ 1,000 subject to subsequent final assessment under Article 2150(2-3). Defendant shall pay the costs.

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CASE-DECISIONS

CASE II On September 20, 1969, a group of seven sportsmen, Assefa, Bekele, Demissie, Es�ete, Gebre, I-Iaile and Ismail, 'Yent out l1 unting s11 ipe in a field in the Sendefa region. At tl1e e11d of the l1 unt late in the afternoon, Isrnail, who was expecting g�ies�s at hon1 e, took leave of tl1 e group and started walking towards the road, where �.ts Jeep st ?od. Theret1pon the remai11 ing six ]1t1nters fired a collective farewell salute into �he air. Unfortu11 ately one of tl1e cartridges so discharged rot1st l1 ave been defect1v �l)1 ''l1 0111e-111ade'', witl1 tl1e result tl1at a pellet, of quite abnormal shape, took an erratic course and fell into Jsn1ail's eye, wl1ich was destroyed. Since Ismail was 011e-eyed fro,n birtl1, he is now completely blind, and being a filing clerk, he will lose l1is livelil1ood. The above facts are admitted, but it has been impossible to determine wl1ich n1an sl1ot the defective cartridge. Ismail sues ''all or any'' of his six fellowhuntets for a life allowance of E . $3,000 per year. I-le alleges that they are liable for his injt1ry under article 2067 or 2028 Civil Code. They oppose l1is allegation. JUDGMENT THE CLAIM: This is a case of bodily harn1 suffered by Jsn1ail, the plaintiff, who claims com.pe11sation for an e),e-injury st1ffered at the hands of one of six hunters, all defenda11 ts in this suit. Ismail, acting through l1 is cot1nsel Jemal, bases l1 is clain1 on eitl1 er Article 2067, or, i11 the alternative, Article 2028 of the Civil Code. Tl1e applicability of. these articles in the instant case is denied by tJ1 e defendants. lsma1l's claim is for a life allowance of E. $3,600 per year. THE FACTS: The facts of tl1is case are not in dispute. After a hunt, Ismail lost his sigl1t because his only eye was hit by a pellet shot from a defective home-made cartridge fired by one of tl1 e group of six hunters, who were firing a collective ''salt1te'' into the air to mark tl1e termination of the hunt. THE LTABJLITY ISSUES:

Art. 2067 In order that compensation be dt1e to Ismail under Article 2067, which he invokes in the first place, he must show that a given person has by his act inflicted bodily harm on him. Altl1ot1�h fault is irr:Ievant for the purpose of this Article, both dainage and its ca�s�t1on . by a pa�t1ct1lar d�fend�nt must be proved .. The occurence of Ismail's eye-1nJury 1s not den1ed. But since 1t has not been established that any partjcular hunter caused that harm by his act, Ismail's claim fails insofar as i t is orounded on Article 2067. I::)

Art. 1.

2028

In the second place, Ismail invokes Article 2028. Since tl1e published Eng.lish version of .A..rticies 2028-2030 constit11tes an erroneous translation � f the codifi cation's French master-text, and since a defendant need not commit an offence in order to be civilly Jiablee, but mere fault is sufficient for such purpose,

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CASE-DECISIONS

ric ha ing Am oll version ntr co the on ly ive lus exc sed the discussion below is ba construe d in light of the master-text. t t, a th. firs a fault es, uir req 8 202 e ticl Ar e, du de ion In order tha t compensat . be committed; second, that a damage be sufef red; third, that. �his da��ge �e ail s eye -InJury 1s caused by the defendant's fault. Since the occ11rence of Ism ' ''• '" I '' t· c u '' d t' a an sa au 100 1 o f ents · irem requ obvious, we need only consider the

3. No doubt the unnecessary firing of a defective home-made _cartridge in the

immediate vicinity of human beings constitutes a fault by virtue of both the '' good usage '' yardstick of Article 2030 and the special standards of conducts imposed by Article 2031 on persons pursuing certain special activities. A ''reasona ble'' practitioner of hunti11 g would hardly have approved of such conduct.

Nevertheless, the occurence of this harmful fault does not in this case create a liability, because the faulty h11nter remains undertermined. None of the six defendants can be shown to have caztsed the harm by his fault. It follows that Articles 2028 cum 2030-31, standing alone, do not make out Ismail's claim.

Art. 2142

bis claim, Ismail should invoke Article 2142 of the not done, owing to the bad judgm ent of his counsel, granted the courts by Article 91(3) Civil Procedure correct this deficiency.

In order to substantiate Civil Code. This he has Jemal. Using the power Code, however, we shall

Since the p11blished English version of Article 2142 is erroneous is that it omits the essential words ''by the fault'', we shall again use the ·controlling Amharic version construed in light of the master text.

Article 2142 is to the effect that where damage is caused by the fat1lt of some body who, although unidentified, (I) is certainly 011e of a group of persons, the court may, (2) where equity so requires, order that tl1e damage b e made good by the group. The fault of the inidentified member of the hunters' group has been demonstrated above. As to the equity requirement ' it is satisfied by the following considerations: a)

Innocent Ismail has suffered and lost his livelihood tl1rougl1 tl1e fault of anotl1er;

Ismail's injury is indirectly due to the whole group's decisio11 to fire a coll ective salute;

The only_ per�ons who may . be i11 a position to find out and reveal \\,110 from th.e1r midst has comn1 1 tted tl1.e causal fault in iss11 e are tJ1 e hunters themselves. They 11ave presumably not tried l1 ard enougli to do it.

Conclusion

For the . above reasons, we find that the six defendants are liable to conl Ismail. Pursuant to the pen cor sat r e ct version of Articl e 2155 (tlJe Eng 1·1s11 ,,er 5·0 · 0 · • 1 · · · e I 1 ity 1s Jo nt and several with tl1 e 1s inaccurate), t 1 e1r 1·iab·1· effect as p rov 'd d by i 1 97 : eac]1 defendant is liable for the wl1ole debt unti· i. 8 Ar e tic le 1 . the latter 1s f11 lly . d1scl1 arged. - 158 -

CASE-DECISIONS

As regards tl1e ultimate contribution of each defendant, Article 2160 is irrelevant to this case. We must therefore look to Articles 1677 and 1907 (in its master-text version) cum 1908: the ulti,nate bt1rden of the debt shall be shared equally between the juclgment-debtors named below. THE AWARD: Since the moderate amot1nt of the plaintiff's claim for a life allowance of E. $3,600 per year l1as not been contested and the terms of Article 2154 support the ''Allowance'' form of redress in this case, tl1e said allowance is awarded to Ismail as against tl1e six joint and several defendants Assefa, Bekele, Demissie, Eshete, Gebre and Hďż˝ile, \Vho sl1all furnish gt1arantors or real securities for its periodical payment on tl1e follo\ving dates .... Tl1e defendants are notified that they may agree with the plaintiff (Article 2148) to substitute a lump sum settlement for this allowance. The parties shall bear their costs.

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APPENDIX D . . REVIS.ED TRANS.LATION OF TITLE xm Cf\'IL CODE

S)'NOPSIS: Cl1apter I. E.,'Cfra-co11trcrctt1al lia[Ji/itJJ ....................... Sectio 11 l . Liabi l ity based 011 fault Paragra1)l 1 1. Ge11eral ru les ........................ . Paragrapl1 2. S_1Jecial cases ......................... Sectio11 2. Liabi lity irrespective of fau lt ............... . Sectio11 3.· 1v1ode and extet1t of co1npe11satio11 Paragrapl1 I. Pect1 11iary ,co1npensatio11 ................. Paragra1Jl1 2. Otl1er n1odes of compe 11satio11 .......... Sectio11 4. Liabilit)' for otl1ers ......................... Sectio11 5. Actiot1 fo:r co1n1Je11sation .................... Chapter 2. Section . Section Sectio11

Art.

2027

Arts. Arts. Arts.

. 2028-37 2066-89 2038-65

f\rts. Arts. Arts. Arts.

2090-2117

U11ji1st er1ricl1n1e11t 1. Ge11eral pro,1isio11s ........................... Arts. · 11dt1e pa)1111e11t ............. · ................ Arts. 2. u 3. E-x1Jenses ....................... ; ........... Arts.

2118-23

2124-36 2137-61 2162-63 2164-67 2168-78

C lI.APTER 1. EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL LIABIJ.,JTY Art. 2027 - Sources of extra-contractual liability .

(1) Apart fro111 a11y pron1ise of 11.is, a persor1 is liable for dan1 age cat1secl to ot l1ers by I1is fault. (2) Apart fro1n a11y fault of his, a perso11 is liable, where t l1e law so provides, for dar1;iage causecl to otl1ers by l1is activity or by a t l1ing i11 J1is possessio11. (3) Fi 11ally, a perso11 is liable \Vhere anot l1er perso11, for \Vl10111 the la\v ·m.akes .l1i 111 a11swerabJe, i 11ct1rs ,1 liability based on fat1lt or provicled by l,tw.

s·ecTION 1. LIABILITY BASED ON FAULT Pc1ragra.p/1 I.

General ri,les

.Art. 2028 - General principle \Vl1osoever, by l1is fat 1 .lt, cat1ses da 1nage to another, sha ll n1ake it good. Art. 2029 - Kinds of fault (1) A fat1lt 111ay �onsist i11 ar1 inte11tio11al act or i11 mere negligence. (2) A fa·ult may co11sist in a positive act or a forbeara11.ce. I

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Art. 2030 - Good usage .. (1) A person co1nn1its a fault \VJ1ere he acts or forbears i11 a n1a11ner or in · conditio11s which offend 1norality or t1s11al sta11dards of good coneoct. (2) J 11 this respect, regard sl1all be had to the cond1:1ct of a reasonable 1nan. (3) Unless otherwise provided by l aw, fault sh.all be assessed witl1otLt rega:rd. to · the age or mer1tal condition of tl1e perso11 concer 11ed.

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TITLE XII[ CIVIL CODE

A rt. 2031 - Professional fault t�ie pr�0ti�@ oiF in , all sl ity tiv ac or 1 � 1 sjo es of pr e11 giv a g iJl . (1) A perso11 practis 1e th e rt1 les goverru11g tl1at pr ac tic e. r, se ob , jty tiv 1 ac sio or st1cl1 profes 1 e@ r� es or u1 ta io 9 tif g e11 sci of 1 � 1 jo � at ler sic 1 1 co e . du er (2) I-Ie js liable ,vl1ere, aft of de 1lt� p·ru gt1 1m be to 11ce rs 1Jea ap 11e fi, cra his of ers 1 1 niz ed by the practitio or 11egligence co11stitt1ti11g d�fi11ite disregard of dl1ty. Art. 2032 - ·Intent to injure (1) A . perso11 comm.its a fault w]1ere l1 e acts \-Vitl1 i11 tent to irtjt1re a11 otl1er w,itl1011t seel<i11g pe1·sonal gain. (2) A }Jerso11 likewise co111mits a fa11lt where l1e conscio11sly ca11ses l1eavy da1)1age to a11otl1er i11 seeki11g perso11al gai11 disproportionate to s11ch da1nage. Art. 2033 - Diversion of po,vers (1) A perso11 co111111its a fa11It ,vbere · 11e di,,erts. to l1is o,v11 advantage powers cor1ferred t1po11 hj1n i11 tl1 e interest of anotl1 er JJerso11. (2) A p11blic serva11 t co111111its a :fa11lt ,vL1 ere he di,;erts to l1is o.w11 adva11 tage or tl1at of a partjcular perso11, powers co11ferred · upo11 l1im i11 tl1e publjc i11 terest. ·Art. 2034 - I'tirpose o,f rights Subject to the foregoj11g provisio11s, the 111a1111er i. 11 wl1 jc]1 a rigl1t is 11sed n1ay 11ot be challengecl 011 the gro1111d tl1at. it is co11trary to tl1e eco110111 ic or social pur1Jose of that rigl1 t. Art. 2035 - Infringement of a Jaw (1) Pi perso11 con 1 .111 its a f�t11lt ·where lie -iruringes any specific and. exJ)licit provisio r1 of a la,v, ordi11ance or ad1ni11i11 istrative regi.1latio11 . (2) Ig11 ora11 ce of th.e la\-v is 110 exc11se. ;-\rt. 2036 - Cl1ain of command (1) Tl1 e fact tl1at a11 act is do11e 011 orders fro111 s1iperior a11thority does i1ot 11ecessarily exc11lpate tl1e d·oer. (2) The doer co111111 its a fa11lt \-\1l1ere J1 e 1111dersta11ds tl1e illicit 11at11re of tl1e act, partic11larly in. tb,:1t the order-giver exceeds I1 is J)O\Vers or tl1 e act ordered is crin1inal. · (3) Th. ere is 110 fa11lt wl1 ere, in tl1e circu111sta11 ces of tl1 e c,1se, a11ct J)artic11larly 1111der tlJe strict exige11cies of J)11bl.ic ser,,ice or 111 ilitary discipli11e, tl1e ?oer of _tl1at a �t w,1s pl2.ced it1 1:1 J)Ositio11 111al<i ii g it JJractically iii1� possible for 111111 to d1sct1ss tl 1 e orcler . receivecl or act ot11 er,vise tl,ari J1e did.

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Art. 2037 - Non-perforn1a11ce of a contract

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(1) A ·perso11 d?es 11ot coiJ1 1nit a f,ttllt i11volvi11 g 11is extra-co11tractt1,ll liability v1l1ere lie fails to perfor111 11is obligatio11 s t1ncler·· a. coJitract. (2) 01tly tl1 e r11les relati11g to non-perf or111c:1i1ce of co11tr::lcts s11a1i aJJply i1 1 s11ch case. •

f!aragrap/1 2. SJJecici/ cases Art. 2038 - Battery 1. PrinciJJle (1) A . JJerson co111111its a f a11l t \'' here l1 e i rite11tioiia]Jy inlposes a 1 1 o p u t 1c 11 t, co _ _ the body of 'anotl1 er per s011 aga111st tl1e l,1tter's \v ill. - 162 -

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TITLE XIII CIVIL_ CODE

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(2) Tl1e fa11lt is co1u11 1itted regardless· �f wl1ether 'tl1 e contact i11 11Josed is :perso� 11al, or by 111 ea11s or a tl1 i11g, a1 1i111 ate or i 11a1 1imate. · ' (3) Ordi11 ar1ly the 1nere tl1reat of battery does 11ot constitt 1 te a. fault.

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Art. 2039 - 2. Justification

N· o fatilt is co111111.ittecl vvl1 ere: (a) tl1e clefe1 1dant cot1ld 11ot reaso11 ably foresee tl1at the JJlaintiff would object to l1is act; . or (b) tl1e · act \Vas do.11e i11 a reaso11able n1anner, in tl1 e legitin1ate defence of 0 11 eself or another person, or to s,1fegt1arcl JJroperty of vvhich tl1e clefe11dant was possessor or la\vft1l l1older; or (c) tl1e act co11sists in reaso11 able oorporal pun.isl1me.11 t i11 flcted. by the clefe11da11t · 011 l1 is · cl1ild, \vard, pt1pil or do111estic serva11 t; or (d) tl1e plaintiff was a da 1 1gerous lu1 1atic ,vl1on1 it was necessary to restrai 11 .fro1n doi11 g ]1arm, a11 d tl1e act was do1.1 e i11 a reaso11 able manner; or (e) there are a1 1y otl1 er circt11ustances st1cl1 as to jt1stify tl1 e defe11 da 1 1ts' act in tl1e eyes of a. reasonable perso11.

Art. 20,io - Restraint of lilJert-y

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1. Principle

(I) A perso11 co111111its �t fat1lt \.Vhere, \vithot1t la\vful a11tl1ority, l1e restra.i 11 s tl1e liberty of a11other perso1 1, eve11 for a short tinJe, a11d prevet1ts l1 i111 fron1 11 1oving about as J1 e is entitled to. (2) I11 sucl1 case, the fault is con1J1litted notwitl1sta11ding that 110 co11tact is 111 ade ,vitb tl1e plai11tiff's body. (3) It is st1ffiGient for tl1e 1Jlai11 tiff to l1 a,1e bee11 con1 pelled to bel1 ave i 11 a certai11 ma1111er by tl1 e tl1 reat of a da 11 ger \.Vl1 icl1 lie l1 acl to l1eed.

Art. 2041 - 2. La,'i'ftil authority No fa11It is co1u111 itted \-vl1 ere tl1e restraint l1 as bee11 applied i11 a reaso11able 1na1 111 er to a JJerso11 placed by law t 1 11der the a11th.ority of tl1e defendant a11d for the pt1rpose of exercisi11g st1cl1 .lawf11l autl1ority. Art. 2042 - 3. Penal offe11ce ( 1) N o :fault is _ co1nn1 itted \V!1ere the perso.1 1 \.Vl10 l1as restrai11ed :tl1e liberty of a11other J1ad good reaso11 to believe tha.t tl1e latter had com111itted a, I pe11 al offe11 ce. (2) Ne,,ertheless, the restrai11 i11g JJerso11 is_ li,1ble if l1 e fails fortl1witb to ha11d perso11 to tl1e police. over tl1e restrained I '

Art. 2043 - 4. Bail

A J_Jerson wl10 J1as ·provided bail for ,:111other, g11ara11teeing to tl1 e autl1 orities that the Ja_tter \yill .reside in a certai11 JJlace, may .la,:\,fuJly restrai11 tl1 e liberty of tl1e perso11 on ·ba_ il vvhere l1e has gooc! reaso11 to believe tl1at be is _prepari11 g to �tbscond.

1. Principle ' Art. 2044 - Defa1natio11 _A perso11 com111its �t fault \Vl1 ere by l1is .vvords, l1is \vriti11gs or by other 111 ea1 1s be acts j11 sucI1 ,1. way as to ma ke a11 otl1er livit1g person detestable, contem _ ptible or ridic·ulot1s or to jeoJ JardLze his credit, his reputation or his future.

Art. 2045 - 2. Absence of intent. to · injure 1 1atio.11. 1 fa r de fo ite 1i.s ql re a t 11o is re tju i 1 to 1t . te1 i:n (I) The

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:ir¥ • � iia. ef _((lf'. �� g� s t}' IJ.'. arJ llaii iilll @, ileJ �l m i@ a:n . · (2) TiiJJjr0 shalhl be, 111.0111ijllb.el�ss, oc10 cl:efam. aJj1)! parGteli!J:ait JDO r e fi e [l to d' ©J1 urut t no d l1t1lerau1.ces or writing1 s, rhe aufllaor di person. . . . • . ,. r . l Jn be sha l1afule (3) 111 st1cl1 a case, the author ·of tl1e t1tteral1ces or wi;1t�ngs 1 av@ fo�e-seen tha.t l bly na so rea ld ot1 sl1 be ces tan only wl1 ere in the circt11ns n. rso pe er oth an to ·y jw 11 i e us ca 11ld \vo his words or writings Art. 2046 - 3. Matters of public concern (1) A persort com1nits no fault where he co11fines l1 i�self to expressin� _his OJ)i11io11 011 matters o .f pt1blic co11 cer11 , 11ot,vithsta11d1ng tbat �ucl1 op111 1011 oat1ses i11jt1ry to a11 otl1er perso11 by bri11 gi11g hi11l u11 der public bla1 ne. (2) 111 tl1is oas�, defc:1.111atio11 is collll11 itted 011.ly \vhere tl1 e defend�nt 'l1 as 1uade i111 ptLtatio11 s concerning tl1e 1)lai11 tiff \vl1 icl1 l1 e k11 e\v for certa1 11 to be false. Art. 2047 - 4. Truth of the alleged facts ' (I) No defa111ation is com111itted wL1 ere tl1e defe11da.nt addt1ces p�oof of the accuracy of his i1 npt1 tatio11s. (2) •In• tllis case, l1 e is not liable ttnless l1 e l1as actecl solely with intent to J llJ lire. '

Art. 2048 - 5. l1nmunity • (J) No liabilit)' is i11ct1rred i11 reSJ )ect of t1 ttera11 ces n1ade i11 parlia1nentary clebates or i11 tl1e cot1rse of jt1dicial J)roceedi11 gs. (2) A. person who reproduces sucl1 uttera11 ce·s accu�ately ,is 11ot liable unless l1 e l1as acted solely witl1 i11 te11t to i 11jt1 re. Art. 2049 - 6. Excuse (I) Wl1ere clef,11natio11 is coo1_n1itted by \Vay of tl1e press, tl1 e defenda11 t i11clu;s 11 0 li,1bility vvl1ere l1e has acted witl1 ot1t i11.te1 1t to i11jt1re or gross 11 eglige11cel, J)rovided tl1 at at the plai11tiJf's req11est l1 e pt1blisl1 ed fortl1witl1 a· withdrawal a11d apolog)'. (2) WJ1_ere tl1 e de�a111atio11 is co111 01itted by way of a_ periodical wl1icl1 appears at 11 1ter,,als of 111ore tl1 a1: 011e �veel<, t:11e plai1 1tiff 111ay reqt1ire the "'ithdrawal arid a.pology to be publisl1 ed 1111111 ecl1:1tely i1 1 a. perioclic,ll of I1 is cl1oice. (3) 111 . ot!1er �ases, . the vvitl1dra,val ancl apology sl1 all l)e ptiblisl1ed i r1 the per1od1?al 111 wh1c}1 the clefc11natory n1 atter vvas IJttblislled. Art. 2050 - Injury t,o the rights of spouses 1. Principle (I) A person co1n111 its a fault wbere, l<Ll0\\1 i11 g lier to be lJlarriecl, 11e or sbe i11 dt1 ces_ a ,vo111a11 to leave I1er husba11 d ,1gai11st tl1 e littsbarlcl 's \vill. (2) � . perso11 co1111�1i ts a fat1J_t wI1ere, k110V1,i11 g lii111 to be 11 1arried, lJe or sJ1e .rn dt1ces a 1 narr1 ed n1a11 to 1 e�tve l11. s ,vife agai 11 st tt1 e \.Vife's \Vill . (3) A perso11 co1n1nits a fat1lt \vl1 ere he receives ' Ji arbotir. s or 1· ed d arr t e �1. 1 11 s a 1 11 ·· , ·111a11 aga1·11 st tl1e \.VI ·· "0 . ·11 of · her l1 usba11 d a1 1d i11 k ilO\''led ,, ge O.f 111S · Op{)OSittOJl. Art. 2051 - 2. Justification r.:c�ttu· 1 t . 1·s co1nn11·tted 1·n tl1 e case ... No . i, prov1'decI 1· 11 A . rt. 2050 (3) \:vl1 ere: (�t) tl1 e -l1 t1sba1 1d a11cl wife l1 ave agreecl to live apart; or (b) the 11t1 sbancl l1 as bee11 gt1ilty of. b · rt1t· a·1·ity to his \vife o r tl1 e defe11 da 1t . 1 . 11 ad goocl rea.s01 1 to tiltn k so ail d llas received tl1e "''Oina11 o�t of l1t1111a11e. . 11ess. - 1 64, ....:._

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TITLE Xll1 CIVIL CODE

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Art. 2052 - Duty to educate and supervise (1) A perso11 co n1its a fa11lt ,vl1ere l1e fails tb take i11 respect of persons � entr11stecl to h.1s cl1arge or s11pervision by law or in co11for1nity with tl1e Ia,v the 1neas11res of ecl11cation a11d su.pervision ,vl1 icl1 may reaso11abl)' be · expectecl of l1i_1n, l1avi11g regard to tl,e circ11msta11ces a11d custom·s. (2) · f:Ie is liable wl1ere, as a consequence of l1is failure, dan1age is s11ffered by tl1e person in his cl1arge. (3) 1-Ie �s --liable wl1ere, as a co11sequence of his failt1re, tp.e person st1bject to lus st1pervision causes dan1age to a11otl1er person. Art. 2053 - Trespass to land A perso11_ con1mits a fa11lt wl1ere, witl1011t legal at1thority, be enters upon the land or into tl1e l1ouse of another, against the clearly expressed will of tl1e possessor or la,vful l1older of the la11d or house. Art. 2054 - Trespass to goods A person. con1mits a fault wl1ere, without legal autl1ority, l1e seizes goods agai11st the clearly expressed will of tl1e possessor or lawf11l holder of such goods. Art. 2055 - Pre-contractual negotiations A person commits a fa11lt wl1ere, l1avi11g clecl,lred bis intention of 1naki11g a contract at1d 11aving induced others to incur expense with a view to con cluding such co11tract with hi1n,. he arbitrarily aba11do11s his intei1tion. Art. 2056 - Disregard of . contractual relationship (1) Whosoever is aware of the existence of a contract between two persons co1nmits a fault wl,ere l1e co11cludes \vith 011e of those persons a co11tract wllich. renders s11bstat1tially i1npossible the performance of the first co11tract. (2) He is 11ot liable . l1owever, wl1ere tl1e perso11 co1nplaini11g of the breach of the first contract has failed. to take the meast1res wl1jcl1 wo11ld l1ave ensured the effective perf or1na11.ce of tl1at contract.

Art. 2057 ...,; Unfair competition A perso11 comn1its a fault where, through inacc11rate publications, or· by otl1er means contrary to good faith, l1e compromises the reputation of a prodt1ct or tl1e credit of a com1uercial establishm · ent.

· Art. 2058 - Ostensible situation

Where, by his declarations or conduct or forbearance, a. person induces third persons to belive .in tl1e existence of an ostensible situation, he com1nits a fault where, i11 breach. of good faith, be avails himself, again.st them, of the real situation.

Art. 2059 - Inaccurate information 1. Principle .. Whosoever, intentio11ally or 11egligently, · supplies inaccurate in.formation to anotl1er, commits a fault where: (a) he ki1ows or should know that the person to who.tn the information is supplied_ or another given. person, will ,act t1pon tl1e inforn1ation and 'l thereby suffer damage; or (b) he is bound by the rules of his profession to give accurate inforniation. - 165 -

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TITLE X111 CIVltL CODE

A.Ft. 2060 - 2. Exception • (1) The perso11 supplying tl1e inacctuate 111forn1 ation is not li.able w,n.ere �is infor1nation relates to the qualificatio11s, cond11ct, solve·noy� .or competemGe of another person and was 1nade v1ith the object of secur111g a p0sitioR, credit, mo1 1ey, or goods for that person. • (2) 111 s11cl1 a case tl1e a11tl1or of tl1e i11for1nation is liable only where he bas s1.1pplied it- i11 a writi11g sigi1ed by bD11. · Art. 2061 - 3. Witnesses (L) vVitnesses who testify to the occ11rre11 ce or 11011:occurrence of a given even� or to the existe11ce or non-existence of a give11 fact are guarantors of the acct1racy of tl1 eir attestation. (2) Tl1ey are liable to tl1i.rd parties l1avi11g acted oh the faitl1 of such attestation, v..1 ]1 ere jt is inaccurate. (3 ) 1--rot]1i11g a.ffects the rigl1t of \vit11esses i11 gooq faitl1 to bring a recourse agai11st ,vl1011 1ever led tbe111 i1 1to error. Art. 2062 - Advice or. recomme11dation A person comnlits 11 0 fat1lt where he co 11fi11es l1i1nself · to givi11g advice or 111akii1g a reco111n1endatio11 to a11otl1er. ' . . ., A.rt.. 2063 - ·oistraint A JJerson co1u1Jlits a fa·ult vv�1ere, i11 · 'order to sec11re. payP1ent of a debt du.e to l1i111, l1e 11f111 ecessarily distra.i11s good's l1e1d· by his debtor to a11 extent disproportior1ate to tl1 e a1no1111 t -of the debt.• • Art. 2064 - Executio11 of a court order (1) A bailiff co111111 its 110 fa11lt by .exec11tir . 1 g a co11rt order \Vhich is 1uade ill tl1 e IJrescribed form . • (2) · A ba.iliff co1n1nits a fai1lt \Vl1 ere the order i s 11ot · iri tl1 e prescribed form or l1e exceeds 'it or exec11tes it \Vithot1t observi11g tli.e rt1les of law. Art. 2065 - Prescription. . . .. . '; A JJerson co1111nits 11 0 fa11Jt by invol<i11 g 11s11captio11 or li1 nitation of actio11 ·wl:tich l1 as 01Jeratecl to bis be11 efit. .,

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. SECTION 2. LIABILITY IRRESPECTIVE OF FAULT A.rt. 2066 - Necessity ( I) A perso 11 - is liable ·for l1 ar111 ]1e clellberately c:111ses to · a,1otJ1 e 1� in order • . ,. to save . I1 i111self or· a tl1 ircl JJerso11 fro1n i11m1i11e11t d�tn1 age to JJerso11 or property. \ (2) No liability is i11c11rred w]1 ere tl1e i1n111i11er1t da.111 age is dtie to tile ,,ictiin's , · . · · · fa11lt. •. · · .. . . Art.· 2067 -:__ Bodily harm 1. Pri11ciple (I) 1-\ perso11 is.. liable w11 ere by llis. act he inflicts bodily J1 ar 111 _01 1 a 110tJ1er. (2) No liability is i11ct1rred wl1ere tl1e act ca11si11 g tl1 e har11 1 wa s orcle by red 1 law or \\ as done in legitimate defence, or w_l1 ere - the 11 arrn is dlle solely •· to tli.e ·victi1n's · fa11lt.

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-TITLE XJJI CIVIL CODE

Art . 2068 - 2. S11orti11g · activities

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!'f?

liability is incl1 rred wl1 ere, i11 tl1e exercis e of a sporting activity, 1 nJ11res �111 otl1 er ta k.i11 g part i1 1 t]1 e s a111 e activjty, or atle11 di11 g as a . provided th,1t tl1ere is DO 1nalice or gross i1J£i11 ge111e11 t of t1 1 e r11les of Art. 2069 - Dangerous activities I. Princi1>le ·

a J Jerso1 1, SJ Jectator, tl1 e SJJOrt. ·

(I) 'Yl1osoever . cre,1tes ::111 ab11 or111 al risk for otl1 ers , by 11 si11 g or s tori11 g explo:

s1 �e . or po1s011 ous Sl1bsta11ces , or by establishi11 g l1igl1 -te11s io11 electric tra11 s _ n11s s1 0 11 l111es, or by 111 oclif)1ing tl1e 11 atural lie of tl1e la11 d, or by co11d11 cting a JJect1liarJy dangero11s i11d11 strial activity, sl1all be Jiable YvJ1 ere th e da11 ger l1e l1a s createcl 111 aterialises, tl1 ereby ca11 sing damage to another JJersoi1. (2) The foregoing JJrovis io11 aJ JIJlies 11 otvviths ta11 di11 g that tl1e a11 tl1or of tl1 e da11ger is tl1 e . State or tl1 at l1 e l1as receivecl an al1tl1orisatio11 fro1n tl1e pttblic a11tl1 orites.

Art.

2070 - 2. Potential danger Sa\'e i11 tl1 e case of fa11ft, 11 0 liability is incurred where the vaJ.ue of neigl1boL1 ri11 g JJroperty is recluced i11 co11 seql1e11 ce of an ab11 or1 nal risk bei11 g created.

Art. 2071 - .LialJility for ani111als

1. O Vi'ner

Tl1e ow11 er of ,111 a11 i111 al is liable for dan1age ca11s ecl by tl1 e ar1.in1 aJ, 11 ol\.Vitl1standi11 g that .it l1 as escaped l1is co11 tr9l accide11 tal1y or tl1 e cl,1111age caused ,,vas 11 11 foreseeable. Art. 2072 - 2. IIolder (1) \1/h.osoever l1 as receivecl a11 a11 i11 1al for pl1r·pos es of perso1 1,1l be11 efit is also liable for · any da1 11age ca11sed by it, 1,,v]1ile i11 h.is J1 0Jdi11g . (2) I11 particular, tl1e l1olcler is a JJers o11 vvl10 l1 as 11 irecl or borrowecl tl1e a11 i 1 11al, or ]1as received it i11 orcl_ er to t,tke care of it, or for s0111 e otl1 er r eason. (3) A11 e111ployee atten.di11g to a11 a11 i11 1al, or usi11g it -011 bel1 alf of tl1e O\.V11er or a11 otl1 er person, is n.ot liable for cla1 nage ca11s ed by the a11 j 1 nal l111less · I s11cl1 cl::1111 age is dl1e to l1 is f,111 Jt. '

Art. 2073 - 3. "Ultimate liability (I) Tl1e ovvner ,,,1 1 0 ]1 as p aid co1n1Je11satio11 to the victi1n n1 ay recover fror11

the l1 older of the .a11i111al. (2) I1e 1 11 ay clai111 to be i11 den1nified:.. i1 1 full, lt� tless tl1 e dan1age· be due to ' J1 is fault or tl1 at of ,1 perso11 for wl10 1n l1 e 1 s a11 svverable. ' . . of a11imal by o,vne r Art. 2074 - 4. Sttrren<ler . (I) Wli ere cla111 a.ge is c,1l1sed b)' a clo111es tic ani111 al, its O\.v1 1 er .r.iay relieve of - tb.e a n . in1al to tl1 e -i1 1se1f of l1is lia.bllity by st1 rre11deri_ n g t1 1e _owr-1ers hiJJ bi , p erso11 _l1ar!ried. - n1ay 11 ot tl1 1 1 s_ reljeve J1 j 11 1self wl 1 ere �l1 e cla1uage vvas caused. by l1is (2) I Ie 1 0111 he 1s ans werable. vvJ for 1 1 rso pe a of ,1t 1 tl or ilt fat p for purpos es qf pleas11re (3) o 11 ty t11 ose ani1 naJs \vhicl1 it is ct1st�n1ary. to 1(ee s. . 1 c a11 rma1 t es n1 do be to l 'J.ec en de e ar n .i· or g� >

A.rt. 2075 - 5. Surre�der of �alue by l1older (l) The hoi<ler of tlie a.11 imal is ouly liable wl1e11 tl1 e . da.1J1 age was calts�d. 167 -

ll]J

to . its valtte at tl1e ti111e

1'ITLB XIII ClVilL CODE

(2) His liablity is not tl1ms li111ited where the damage was cau.sed by a.n animal other tl1an d.omestic or arises from his fault or that of a pers0:n for who111 l1e is answerable. Art. 2076 - 6. Victim's guarantee (1) In order to , secL1re coD).peusation \vhicl1 may be due to him the possessor or holder of imn1ovable property 1nay seize a11d retain another person's ani1nals \vhich oause harn1 011 that property. (2) ·He may kill tl1en1 where circ111nsta11ces require this in order to prevent st1bstantial da111age disproportio11 ate to the a11i1il�tl's value. (3 ) He sl1all i 1 1 botl1 events 11 otify the ow11er of the a11imals without delay or, wl1ere the o\\1ner is unk.I1ow 11 to l1im, take t11e 1 1ecessary 111eas11res to ascertai11 hi1n. Art. 2077 - Ba.ildings 1. Principle (1) The 0\\111er of _a buildi11g is liable for clamage caused by the b11ilding, . even Vi1l1ere tl1e dan1age ,vas 1mforeseeable. (2) The foregoi 11 g provisioi1 · is witl1011t prejudice to the owner's rights, if any, to reco,1er fro111 tl1e builcler, the occupier, or the perso11 whose fault bas ca11sed the da.n1age. •

Art. 2078 - 2. Surrender of b11ilding (I) Tl1e 0\-,111er 111ay relieve l1i111self of bis lia.bility by s1 1 rre11d.ering the ownersl1ip of tl1e b11ilding to tl1e person l1ar111ed. (2) 1-Ie 111ay 11ot tl111s relieve hi111self \�/here tl1e clamage was caused by his fa11lt or tl1at of a perso11' for whom he is a11swerable. A1�t. 2079 - 3. Danger of dan1age ' WJ1osoever is i 11 danger of dan1age by ,1 building' 1n:1y req1tire the owner to ta.ke tl1 e 11ecessary n1eas11res to avert tl1e danger. Art. 2080 - 4. Things falljng fron1 a building The occUJJier of a b11ildi11g is liable for da111age ca11sed by tJ 1ings fallu1 g from it. Art. 2081 - l\1acl1ines and motor ,,ehicles 1. O,vner (I) The O\'V11er of a 1nacl1ine or n1otor vehicle is liable for da1 naoe ca11sed by it, 11on,1itl1standing that tbe da111 a.ge \-Vas caused by a perso 1;� ,vho ,vas 11 ot autl1orised to· operate or dri,1e tl1e macl1ine or vel1icle. (2) I-le is not liable \vl1ere 11e proves tl1�t, at tl1e ti1 11e \:vl1e11 tl1e cta1 11 agc ,vas ca11sed, t}1e 111acl1ii1 e or vehicle l1ad been stole11 fron1 w 1 11. Art. 2082 - 2. I-Iolder or employee (I) Wl1osoe :er has _received the machi11e or \1el1i �le for JJ11rposes of perso11 aI bei1efit 1s also liable for da11 1,1ge cat1sed by 1 t, \vl1ile i ii J1 is lloldi tlg. (2) A11 e1npl oyee wl10 h,1s cl1ar�e of tl�e u 1acl1i11e or vel1 icle 011 beI1 aJf of tile perso11,_ 1s not liable for da111age cati sed by it, unless ow11 er or a11other _ s11ch damage 1s d Lte to his fa11lt. Art. 2083 - 3. Ultimate liability (I) The o,v11er \vho bas paid compe,isation to tl1 e ,,ictim n1ay recover . fronl tl1e J1older of tL1e n1achi11e or vel1icle. (2) I-Ie may claim to be inde1 1111ified i11 ft1ll, unless tl1e da111aoe be dtte to Ilis fa11lt or that of a perso11 for ,vl1om he is a11s,verable. 0 - 168 -

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Art. 208,l - 4. Collision bet,veen · vehicles

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(I) WJ1 ere t\vo 111otor ,,el1 icles colljde, eacl1 of tl1en1 is clee1ned to have contribttted eqt1ally to c,tt1se tl1 e accide11 t. (2) Tl1 e o,v11er of ea.cl1 vel1icle, or tl1e l1olcler a11 S\.Verable for it, bears l1alf of tl1e total a1not1nt of tl1e dan1 age caused by tbe accide11t. (3) Tli� provisio11 s of tl1is t\rticle shall not apply wl1 ere it is proved tl1 ,1t the . acc1de11 t \vas c,1t1secl, \.Vl10J1y or cl1 iefly, by tl1e fat1lt of 011 e of tl1 e drivers. Art. 2085 - l\1Ia11ufact11rcd goods (1) 1-\ person vvho 111anufactures goods and s11p1Jlies tl1e1n to tl:i e public for profit is li,1ble for da.i11age to a11otl1er perso11 rest1lting from the nor111al use of tl1ese proclt1cts. (2) No liability i s i11ct1rrecl \vhere tl1 e defect wllicl1 has cat1sed the da111 age cot1ld l1 a. v e bee11 discovered by a custo111 ary exa1ninatio11 of the prod11cts 11sed. . Art. 2086 - Exe111ption fron1 liability (1) The perso11 s legally a11 swerable i11 the case of the creation of a11 abormal risk, or for da111age ca11sed by a11 imals, btu.l.di11gs, macb.i11es, n1otor vehicles or 111 a1i.factured goocls, ca11not relieve tl1e.n1 selves of tl1 eir liability to tl1e victi1n by provi11g tl1at they l 1 ave con1 1nitted 11 0 fat1lt or that the cause of tl1e da111age. re1J1ai11 s t111k11ovv11, or tl1at it \Vas 11ot withi11 �l1eir JJOwer to preve11 t tl1 e c1a1nage, or tl1 at t] 1 e damage was ca11sed b)' tl1e f. ault of a third person. (2) Tl1 ey are relieved of tl1 eir li,tbiJity, wholly or JJartly, 011ly vvl1ere t11 e dan1 a·ge is caused solely or partly by tl1e fc1t1lt of tl 1e victin1. Art. 2087 - Otl1er tl1ings Except i11 tl1 e cases proviqed. t111 der the prece(li11 g 1-\rticles, tl1 e O\V11 er or holder of a tl1 ing is 11ot liable' for c1a1nage cat1secl by tl1at tiling, 1111 Iess be or a person. for wl1 on1 he is a11swerable has com111 itted a fault. Art. 2088 - Contractual relationsl1ip

(J) The , rules telati11g to liability arisi11 g 011t of abnorm,tl risks, or o tit of animals, b11ilclings or tl1 i11gs, ca1 1not be invoked by a persor1 wl1 0, by virtue of a contract made \.vitl1 tl1 e perso11 legally a11swerable, is connected ,vith tl1e dangerot1s activity, a1umal, building or thi11g which has cat1sed t11.e damage. '(2) In this case, tl1 e co11seqt1e11ces of the damage are settled i11 accord.ance with tl1 e rules governi11g st1ch co11 tract. · Art: 2089 - Disinterested relationsl1ip

(1) Tbe rtiles · gover11i11 g liabiljty arising out of_ a1li1nals, bt1ildings or · thi11gs can 110 t be i11voked by a perso11 vvho, even _ 111 tl1 e �b�euce of .a co�tract, tl1e a1111nal, bu1ld1ng or tl11ng w1tl1ot1t \.vas at tI1 e time of tl1e cla1nage �si11g _ tJ1 e owner or 11 0lder thereof · det1v1ng be11efit. from such use. ' u11 less he has committed (2) In s11ch a case, · the ow11er or l1older is 11ot liable ' a fat1lt. <

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TI'ifLR �II ClfVIL CODE

SECTION 3 . MODE AND EXTENT OF COMPENSATION

•

Paragrap/1 1 .

Pecuniary co1111;e11satior1

A . Atlaterial c!a111age

•

Art. 2090 - Modes of compensation the victim by 1g atu ens np co1 by d goo de 1na e is nag e, the a dai rul As (I) 111eans of a11 equivale 1 1t sum of n1011ey. . (2) Tl1e court n1ay, subject to tl1e liberty of � erso11� a 1 1d to the rights of . third par.ties, order i 1 1 liet 1 of or i11 �d? 1t10 1 1 to money damages other ap·propriate measures to make good or l1 1 111t tl1e da1nage. Art. 2091 - Extent of compensation Tl1 e co 1 npe 11 satio 11 dlte by the perso 1 1 legally liable is equal to the d.a1nage . ._ cat1sed to tl1e victin1 by the fact givii1g rise to the l1ab1lity. Art. 2092 - Future dan1age A ft 1 tt1re dan1 ::1ge which is certai 1 1 to waiting for it to materialise.

OCCll[

sL1al J · be

11 1ade

good without

AI:t. 2093 - Instired victin1 (I) Wl1ere tl1 e victi1n is i 1 1sured, he n1ay clai 1 11 compe 11satio11 for · tl1e dama.ge i 1 1flioted on . l1i 11 1 011 tl1e saJ 1 1e ter 1 11s as tl1ougl1 he had not beei1 insured. (2) rfhe i 1 1surer l1 as 11 0 i11depe 1 1de11t clai1n to be i 1 1de1n11ifiecl by the person liable for the fact \vhicl1 l1as caused the risk covered lJy the i11st 1 ra 1 1ce co11tract to 111ateririlise. (3) Tl1e i11st 1 ra 1 1ce co 11tract may, l1owever, provide for tl1 e st 1 brogatio 1 1 of the inst 1 rer to t11e ,1 icti 1 n's clairn ag,1i 1 1st. t11 e JJerso 1 1 liable. · Art. 2094 - ''ictim pensioned off (I) Wl1 ere tl1e · victi111 recei,1es a pe11sion as a res1tlt of tl1 e fact wl1 icl1 caused l1i 1 11 damage, he 1 11 ,1y clai 1n co 1 11pe11satiou for tl1e da111age infflictecl 011 him 0 11 tl1 e sa 1 11e ter 111s as tl1ot 1 gl1 be ,vere 1 1ot reoei,,i 11 g a JJe 1 1sio11. (2) Tl1e JJersoL1 payi 11 g tl1e pe 11 sio 1 1 has 1 10 i 11depe 11dent cb:1i 1 11 to be i 1 1de111 11 ified by tl1e perso 11 liable for tl1 e fact \Vl1 icl1 l1�s caused tl1e JJe11sio 11 to fall dl1 e. (3) 1�11e legal bo.11d joi11 i11g l1 j111 to tl1 e victin1 111 ay, l1 owever, provide for l1is s t1brogatio 1 1 to tl1e victin1.'s clai 111 �tgai 11st tl1e perso,1 liable . Art. 2095 - lVIortal accidents '

·I. Rigl1ts of certain ne,,t of lti 11

(I) ! 1 1 tl1e c3,se of liability for a. 11 1ortal accicle 1 1t, tl1 e s1Jot 1 se of tlie , ,icti 1 11 , l1 is asce 1 1da 11 ts a 1 1cl l1is cles �e 1 1clants have eacl1 a11 i 11 cl.e1Je 11 de11t claii n to Lie con1 pe11sated for tl1e n1ater1al cla1u,1ge tl1 ey l1a,1e st11Iered becat1se of }1is · eath. d (2) I 1 1 tllis case con11)e 1 1satio 11 · for tl1e da 111 age is d t1 e i 1 1 tl1e for111 a,1d 1 1att1re of a 111ai 1 1te1 1ance allowa11ce. (3) Tl1is n1a\nte 1 1a1 1ce allovva11ce is dt 1e 1 1otwitl1sta 1 1clii1g tli at tli e J)lai iltiffs IJa\,e • relatives. fro1n wl101n tl1 ey cot 1 ld clai 1 11 .1nai 1 1te11 a 1 1ce . .. �Art. 2· 096 - 2. Ot!1er persons ' No otl1er· perso11s �hall l1ave i11de1Je11 de11t cl�li 1 11 s to be con1pe11s becat1.se at ecl · ac cide11t, eve11 . wl1ere a pl,1i1 1tiff \.Vas f,1ctt1all ' of a n1or�al ) StlJJportecl bj' t1 1 e victi 111, or ·r11e l,1tter ,vas bo11 11 d to 11 1ai1 1tai 11 l1 i 111: •

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,· Art. 2097 - Goocl faitl1 (1) Con1 per1 satio11 for cla1n,1ge n1 ay 11 ot be clai111 ed co 11trary to good faith. · • · · · 11 co11 1pe11 sat1··011 for · victi1u 111ay 1 10 t cIa11 (2) TI1e tl1e dan st1st 1 aoe a1ne 1 so d 11 · 0 · . a reaso11able far ' , bY act·111 g 111 ' · as n1an11 er, l1e cot1lcl 11 ave avoidecl or li1nited st1cl1 da111 ,\.ge.

Art. 2098 - Fau!t of the

v.icti1n

(1) \Vl1e:e tl1e da11 1age is dt1e JJ::trtly to tl1 e fat1lt of the victin1, the latter s .ball

rece1_\1e partial co11 1pe11s�tio11 011 1 y. (2) I�1 fixi11 g tl1 e exte11 t to wJ1 icl1 tl1e pa111age sl1all. be m.ade good, all tl1 e circuinstances of tl1e _case are take11 . i 11to accot111t, i 11 parti.ct1lar ·t11 e- e.xte11 t _ to wl1 1ch tl1e respective faults l1 ave co11tribt1ted to causing· tl1 e dal'n�1ge a11d _ tl1 e gravity of eacl1 fa1tlt. Art. 2099 - Powers of equit-y 1. Una,vareness of fault (l ) Tl1 e cot1rt 1 11ay, \.V]1 ere .equity so req11ires, redt1ce tl1e coµipe11satio,n a\va1·ded vvhere tl1 e fault givjng rise to tl1 e liability .\vas co1 n111itted ·by a person \Vho was 11 ot i11 a st�tte to appreciate tl1e wro11gft1l 11 att1re of l1is co11 d.t1ct. (2) J11 this respect, regarcl shall be had to tl1e res1:>ective fi11a11 cial . pos1tio11 s of tl1e .1Jarties a,11d tl1e co11seque11ces, for the at1thor of. tl1e fttt1l�, of a ·lia.bility · 1n;;1ge good. to 1nake tl1e da I ' : • Art. 2100 - 2. Cl1ain of comn1and •

(I) 1'he cot1rt 1nay, wl1ere a . se11se of tl1 e .fau.lt to (2) I11 tl1.is respect, the-._d11ty.

wl1 ere equity so reqt1ires, reclt1ce tl1 e con1 1Je11satio11 avvarcled of tl1e duty of cliscipli11 e , or obedie11ce moved tbe autL1or � , co1nnlit it:· regard sl1 all be had to tl1e degree of i. n1 pera.tive11ess of 11

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2101 - 3: Unforeseeable clan1age (1) The co11rt 1nay, ,v: bere eq11ity so reqt1ires, redt1ce tl1e co111 pe11sation to be paid by a perso11 ,.vJ10 is liable for a d.a111 age wl1icb, i1 1 ·co11 seqt1e11ce of 11i1 foreseeable' c irct111 1sta11ces:, expa11ded beyo11d what could reasonably be expected. •, .1 (2) S11cl1 reductio11 n111st ne\1er be orderecl \.vhere tl1 e liability arises fro11 1 a11 intentio11al fat1lt. · 1-\rt. 2102 - 4. JDifficulty ·of assessment _(I) WI1ere tl1 e. ex· act an101111 t' of tl1e damage cao11 ot be ascertai11ed; ·the cot1rt fixes 'it· equitably, taki11g ·· i11to account the - ordinary course -of eve11ts and tl1 e 111 east1res talce11 by t11 e ,i11jt1red party. (2) Nevert11eless, n· o inde1 n11 ity sl1a1l be avvarded in respect of a damage of w11 ich tl1 e very existe11ce, a.11 d. 11ot only tl1e a111 ot1nt,. is 11ncertai11. . ' '. • Art. .2103 -- 5. Necessity. The cotirt fixes equitably ·1i1e-' a11 1oi1nt of con1 pe11 satio11 due from a per�on who, • witJ1 out com ·i niti.ng a ,fa11lt, ca11sed �an1 age to_ tl1 e. · pr_ operty of a11otl1 e·r 111 order to save hi1nself or a tl1ircl perso11. from an .1111 nu.nent damag� or d,1nger. . Art.

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Art. 2104 - Non1inal compensation 1

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Damages of a . pttrely 1 1 on1 i11 al· · ainou11 t ma)'_ b_ e a,vardecl ¥:here the actio� b�s . a_ vie w _ t? ,establisb1ng ·. that a r1gl1 t of the pJaJnttff bee11 brought solely \Vith _ bas bee11 infringecI, or tl1at a l1ab1l1ty has been lnc11rred -by tl1e de"f.en'c:lant.

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B. Moral Damage •

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Art. 2105 - Principle ng from lti su re rm ha al or m e tl1 od go e ak m (]) The author of a wro1 1g shall s. es dr re ch su r fo s ist ex re u ed oc pr the wrong wherever adequate : . s in ly e s on a c ed rd wa /a be y n1a rm (2) Pecu1 1iary compe11sation for moral ha expressly provided by law. , Art. 2106 - Intentional fault Where moral harm has been inflicted upon the plaintiff int�ntio 11ally, the co_urt may, by way of redress, order the defendant to pay an equ.1table con1pensatton to the plaintiff or to a charity named by the plaintiff. Art. 2107 - Battery Where tl1e defe11dant l1as i111posed upon the body of the plaintiff a contact wllich is u11pleasa11t or repulsive, the court n1ay, by way of mo_ral_ redress,. order the defe11daut to pay au equitaqle compensation to the pla1nt1ff or to a charity nan1ed by tl1e plai11tiff. Art. 2108 - Unlawful restraint of liberty Where the _plaintiff's liberty· has been unlawfully restrained by the defendant,. the court n1ay, by way of moral red.ress, order the defendant to pay an equitable compensatio11 to tl1e plaintiff or to a charity na 1 ned by the plaintiff. Art. 2109 - Defrunation Equitable compensation may be awarded by way of moral redress to the p,lai11tiff or to a cl1arity nan1ed by him, in the case of\ins11lt or defamation. wl1ere: (a) tbe i 1 1s11ltit1g or defamatory i1nputations are tl1at the plaintiff l1as com111itted a crime or offe11ce punishable 11n.der tl1e penal law; or (b) they te11d to sho\\1 tl1at tl1e plaintiff is in.competent or dishonest in the exercise of his professio11; or the that sl1ow to 1 nercl1ant, is i11solve11t; or a if plai11tiff, tend they (c) • (d) they te 1 1d to show that the plaintiff is sufferi11g from a co�1tagious disease; or (e) they tend to show that the plaintiff's 1 norals are shocki 11g. l

Art. 2110 - Injury to the rights of spouses.

Eqt11table compensation may be awarded by way of 111oral '- redress to tlie plaintiff or to a charity na1ned by hi1n, wl1ere tl1e defe 11dant has irij11red l1is or her righJs as a spouse. (Art. 2050). Art: 2111 - Abduction of cl1ild Equitable· cqmpensatio11 may be awarded by way of n1oral redress to the plaintiff or to a charity nan1ed by him, \\1l1ere tl1e defencla11t 11as been conde - mned u11der the penal law for havi11g abducted a chilcl wliicl1 is iii · the plaintiff's lawf ul custo�y. Art. 2112 - Trespass to land or goods Eqt1itable compensat ' arded ·by way of mo . io11 -n1ay be aw . ral red ress wl1ere the defenda11t has, against the clearly expressed will of tli e plai·nt1·ff · , e11 tered upon , . · · 1 11s · ;l and or 1nto I 11s ho us e or. seized goods of whicli the plaiilt the iff is possessor or 1awf u 1 1 10 1der. -172 �

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Art. 21 13 � Bodil ) }1arm or death ]�qt1itable co111J)e11satio11 n1ay .be a,vardecl by \vay of n1oral redress . to the victin1 of boclilv l1arn1 or, wl1 ere cleath e11st1es, to l1is fa1nily 1

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.Art. 21 I Li - Sex11al outrage

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(1) Wl.1ere ::1 perso11 has bee11 co11clen1ned 11ncler tl1e JJe11al l,1,v for ra1Je or sexual ot1trage, tl1e co11rt n1ay aware! the victin1 a11 equitable con1pe11sation by \.Vay of 111oral reclress. · (2) \Yl1erc a girl or, ,vo111,111 has bee.11 rapecl, equitable COffiJ)Cl1S,ttio11 111ay ,tlso be a\.v,trcled to the husba11 cl of tl1e wo111a11.. or to tl1e fa111ily of tl1e· girl.. 1-\rt. 2115 - Bodily har111 to wife

(I) Equit�tble co111:1Je11satio11 111ay be a,varclecl by \vay of n1oral redress to a husb8;11d agc1ir1 st a person ,vho, by inflicting bodily l1ar1n· on tl1e vvife, re11ders l1er co1n1Ja11ionshjp less 11seful or less agreeable to tl1e busbancl. (2) Tl1e action ,vh.icl1 the l1t1sband 111ay bri11g on tl1is ground is inde1Jendent l)f tl1e actio11 for co1n1Jensation \Vl1icb the wife 111ay bri11g in respect of tl1 c bodily l1arn1 st1stained. Art. 21 I 6 - Custon1

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(1) I11 fixing tl1e a111 oltnt of the equitable con11)et1satio11 lt11der the precedi 11 g

Articles, -a11d in establisl1i11g ,vl10 is qualified to act as represe11tative of tl1e fa11 1ily, tl1e cot1rt shall l1ave regard to local c11ston1s. (2) Tl1e court sl1all 11ot clisregard sucl1 custon1s u11less tl1ey are a11achror1istic a11 cl -111anifestly contrary to reaso11 or 111 orality. (3) The co111JJ_ensatio11 a,vardec\ for 111 oral cl.:1n1,1ge sl1all it1 11 0 case exceed one I tl1ousa11d Etl1io1Jia11 dol.lars.

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Art. 2117 - Representative of tl1e fan1ily 111 tl1e abse11 ce of ar1y ,tJJplicable local custo111 , tl1e f0Jlovvi11g ::1re alone consi dered as q11,1lified to represent tl1e fan1 ily: c�L) tl1e victi1n's 1111sba11cl Qr \1/ife; or (b) _f;:1iling Sttc.11 or ,v. l1ere I1e or sl1e is i11c,11Jt11Jle, tbe victi1n's e.ldest child ,:vbo is capable ttnder tl1e law; or (c) faili11g st1cl1 or ,,,J1ere l1e or sbe i11capable, tl1e victi111's father; or (d) failing s1tch or vvhere J1 e is i11ca 1)a.ble, tl1e victi1n's 1nother; or , · ( e) faiIi11g s11cli or w J1ere she is i11capable, the eldest o. f tl1e victi111's brotl1ers ,or sisters ,vl10 is capable u11der the lav.1• •

Paragrap/1 2. Ot/1er 111ocles of co11111e11satior1.

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Art. 2118 - Restitt1tion 1e restitution to tl1e plai11tiff of things wl1 ich l1ave · tl er orcl l sl1al rt· cou The (1) bee11 i inproperly taken a\v,1y fro1n l1i�1, a11 d of tl1 e i11cre.111e11ts ·yielded by the thi11gs si11ce th e date of sucl1 tak111g.. (2) \VJ1 ere tlie tl1 i11gs hav e been Jost or clestroyec� th. e defer1dant sl1all �epay i:e. Je□ ce ma to for 1e 1 d. s los 1s 1 e tl t tha ing nd sta 1 tl t,v 11o i ue, tl1eir v�tl 0�1 the �l1ings \.vl1icl1 l1e is 11se e xpe ed 11rr inc has 1t l�t1 e11c def , _ (3) WI1ere the 1 me11t sl1all apply l r1c t e11 Jt1s t111 to. t1g at1 rel 1s iot vis pro tl1e 11, 11r ret to reqtiired

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CIVI!L CODE

· Arrt. � 19 - Reparation in kin.ti (1) The cotirt may, where it thinks fit, orde� the tl1ing whioh has �eea des troyed or da1naged to be replaced or repaired at the expense of the pers-011; liable for the destr11 ction or deterioratio11. (2) In tl1is case, the court fixes tl1e way in wl1 ich tl1e thi11g is to be replaced or repaired. (3) This mode of co1npensation sl1all not be prescribed where the duty to compet1 sate falls on the State. Art. 2120 ·_ I-Ionour and reputation In the case of wrongs directed against tbe honotir or reputation of a person, the court n1ay order such p11blicity to be n1ade at tl1e defendant's expepse as is likely to counter tl1e effect of these wro11gs. Art. 2121 - Injunctions (I) The cot1rt 111 ay grant a1 1 i11ju11ci-io11 restraini11g the defendant from con1mitti11g, co11ti11 uing to co1nn1it or resu,ning an act prejudicial to tl1e plaintiff. (2) A11 i11jt111ctio11 sl1 all be granted only wl1ere there are good reaso11 s to believe tl1 at tbe act prejudicial to tl1e plai.11tiff is likely to be carried out ao.d the i111pe11 cli11g l1ar1n is of s11 ch a 11att1re tl1 at it ca1111ot be redressed by a pecu1uary bo111 pe11 satio11. •

Art. 2122 - Unfair com11etition In ihe case of 1111 fair competitio11, tl1e court m,1y e11join the c�ssatio11 of the practi�es co11 trary to good faitl1 wl1 icl1 are 11sed by tl1 e defe11dant . Art. 2123 - Ostensible situation Acts do11 e by tl1ird perso11s i11 . relying 011 a1 1 oste11sible sitt1atio11 111ay be declared dem11rrable ag£:ti11st tl1 e perso11 \Vl1 0, by l1is co11 d11ct or forbe.arauce, l1as created tJ1 e se1nbla11ce of st1 cl1 sitt1atio11 . SECTION 4. LIABILITY FOR OTIIERS Art. 2124 - Father's liability Tl1 e fatl1 er is ans\verable tt11de1· tl1e ci,,iJ lavv v.111.ere l1 is .n1 i11 or child iilCtirs a. liability. J Art. 2125 - Other gt1ardians of tl1e child Tl1e follo\vi11g perso11 s are a11swerc1ble i11 lieu of tl1 e father: (a) th� n1otl 1er, wl1ere sl1e exercises tl1e JJater1 1al ctt1 tl1. o.rit)' over tl1 e cl1ild � (b) tl1e perso11 i11 \Vl1. ose cl1 arge tl1e cJ 1ild J1as bee11 JJlacecl, wl1ere tl1 e cl1ild Jives 011tside tl1e fa111ily 11 0111e; (o) the -teacl1 er or J11 aster d11 ri11g the ti111e vvhe11 tl1 e cl1.ild is �tt scllool or · servi11 g a11 appre11 ticesl1ip; ' (d ) tl1 e e1nployer wJ1ere, tinder tl1e ter1 11s of tl1e follo"vi11_g Articles, 11e is a11 s\verable by re�1son of a liability i11ct1 rred by tl1.e cl1. ild. Art. 2126 - Liabilit 1,r of tl1e State 1. J>rinciple •

(1) A pt1blic serva11t or governme11t e1111Jloyee js in every goo� tl1e da1nage l1e causes to ct11otl1 er by his fat1lt. - 174 -

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(2) "\V.here tl�e fa11 1t is an official fa.·uJt, tl1 e_ victi1 n · may also clai Ln· -to be co1upe1�sated by tl1e_ St,1te, wl1 icl1 111 ay s1 1 bseq11eotly reco,,er fro1n the p·ublic serva11t or en1 ployee at fa·ult. ·, (3) TI1e State is 11ot a11 s'l-vercLble ,,,J,ere tl1 e fault_ conu1 1itted is a· pe.rso11al fa11lt.

A.rt. 2127 - 2. Official fault .. (1) ':- fa�t is d�e1ned to be a11 . official fault ,:vl1 ere tl1 e perso11 wl1 0. co1n1 11 itted _ it believed 1 1 1 good f:1itl1 tl1at l1 e actecl witlli 11 the scope of l1is powers ,111 cl i11 tl1 e pt1blic interest. (2) A f atilt is dce111 ed Lo be a perso11al fat;lt i11 otl1.er cases. (3) Sa, ri11g co11trar)1 · proof, tl1e. public serva11t or e .n1 r>Joyee is pres111ned to have . a.cted 1 r1 goocl faitl1. Art. 2128 - 3. Assin1i!ated cases Tl1e pro,,isions of Art. 2126 a11d 2127 sl1all a1Jply to the li,1bilit)' of public ser,,a11 ts or· e111ployees of a territorial subdivisio11 of tl1e St,1te or of a pt1blic service ,:vitl1 legal status. Art. 2129 - L_iabjlity of bodies . corporate Bodies corporate a11d properties witl1 spe•ciiic destit1atio11 are ans\\,erable 1111der tl1e ci,,il l,1vv \Vl1ere or1e of their re1 Jreseoatives, age11 ts. or s,1lariecl en11Jloyees i11 ct1rs a liability i11 tl1e cliscl,arge of l1 is .fu.11ctions.. . . f\rt. 2130 - En1ployer's liability '

1-he e1111JJoyer is a11s,.verable t111der tl1 e civil law wl1ere 011 e of l1 is eo1ployees inc1 1 rs a liability i11 tl1 e discharge of Jiis ft1nctio11s.

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A1·t. 2131 - Discharge of ftinctio11s (J) For the purJJose of Art. 2129 ,111d 2130, a liability is i11cl1rrecl in. tl1 e discb,1rge of f11ncti611s where the f,tulty act or forbearance w�1s co.n1. 1 nitted ,vitl1 the i11 te11 tio11 of carryi1 1g 011t st1cl1 fu11 ctio1 1 s. ' . . , (2) Tbe fact tl1 at tl1 e fat1lt)1 act or forbea.r,tnce w,ts ultra vires, or tl1 at its a11thor was for111 ally forbidcleu to co1u111 it it, does .not release the JJersou a11swerable for l1 i.111 1111der the civil Ia,v, 111 1.less the v�cti1 n k11 ew or ottgl1t to- l1ave k11 0\v11 of tl1at fact. Art. 2132 - Presut11ption (1) Wbere tJ1 e d,1n1 _age is ca11secl by the represe11 tative or age11t of a body cor porate, or by a saJariecl e111 ployee, at the place where or cluri11g tJ1e time vvhe11 l1e is 11orn1ally employed, l1 e is presumed to h.ave caused tl1e da1nage i11 the cliscl1arge · of bis fL1nctio1 1 s. (2) Proof to the co11trary is adn1 issible to reb11t s11ch persu1nption. Art. · 2133 - No11-discl1arge of functions Tl1 e liability js not incurred in tl1e discharge of fu.11 ctions wl1 ere such fu11 ctio11s , have 111 erely provided tbeir •, at1thor witl1 an opport11nity of com1nitting tl1 e faulty aet or- fo!bearance which caused the damage. •

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Art. 2134 -:-- Independent worker� o1itted by a11 other person . while A pers6�1 is no t. answerable for the fa_ ults coni _ _ 1s no-t ter the ere lat wh , cl to 1 l 11 t1 ed 1 u · req s ha � : . carryu1 g ot1t work wli.icl1 lie 1 s1derecl as l1aving retarned 1 be co to 1s d 1 a1 rity tho au r's n1e t fo. t}1e sti.bject tp his indepe11 de11ce. '

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Art. 213 5, - Defamation t�e · · o,rr et uj p,f rn na e tih of eli 11t · .r 1;; p,,.,1_ ti. 11;e . The 1nanag111g editor of the newspaper, • , · on atJ m.o fam e. de r fo law 1J c1v e th r de u11 ble era er sw sh is ok an of th e bo pit!tbli , mitted by tl1e autl1 or; of a text printed therein.

Art. 2 I 36 - Joint Jjabilities that a11other i11g nd sta ith tw no it air rep ll sha ge l n1a gfu da r of e on tho Th wr au (I) persoJ1 is a11s\ver,tble under the civil law for sucl1 dan1age. (2 ) The at1thor of the clamage and. tl1e person answerable ·for it u11der the civil law are jointly a 1 1d severally liable to 111 ake good st1ch dam age . (3 ) The persot1 a11S\�erable under the civil law 1nay dep1a 1 1d that tl1e at_Lt�o·r of tl1e da111age be 1 11ade a party to tl1 e _proceedi 1 1gs bro11ght by the v1ct1m for co 1 np _ e11satio11 . I

SECTION 5. ACTION FOR COMPENSATION

Art. 2137 - Legal in1munit)1 1. The Sovereign No actio11 for liability based. 011 a fatilt co1n 111 itted by Hi1n .may be brought agai11st 1-Jis Majesty tl1e Emperor of Etll iopia. Art. 2138 - 2. Ministers, me1nbers of parliament a11d jt1dges No actio 1 1 for liability 111ay be brot1gbt beca11se of facts co1111ected witl1 th.eir office a.gai11st: (a) a 111e1 11 ber of tl1e I111 perial Etl1 iopia 1 1 Gover11me11t; or (b) a 1J1eo1 ber of t11e Etl1 iopian Parlia 111e11t; or (c) a jt1dge of tl1e Etl1iopian cot1rts.

Art. 2139 - 3. Exception The provisio 11 of Art. 2I38 does 1 1ot appl>' ,vl1 ere tl1e perso11s protected tl1 ereby ba,,e bee11 co11den111ed under tl1e pe11al la\v for acts pertai 1 1i 11 g to tl1eir office a11d i11voked b)' the plai1 1tiff. 1 Art. 2140 Wl1 ere wl1on1 fi11aJJy

Reference to the adn1inistrativc law ·

the Stc1te is liable, tl1 e rules of ad111i11istrative law deter111i,1e ag�1inst the actio11 s11,lll be brougl 1 t a11d wl1icl1 depart 1nent or service .... sl,all asst1111e tl1e b11rde11 of tl1 e debt. '

Art. 2141 - Burden of proof Tl1e bt1rde11 is on tl1e victi111 to establisl1 tl1e an1ou11 t of tlie 11,1r 1 11 stistained a 11cl to prove tl1e circu 1nsta11ces wl1icl1 re1 1der the clefenda11t liable to 111ake it good.

author of damage Art. . 2142 - Undetermined , (I) Where da1 11a�e . l1a� bee1 1_ ca usecl by tl1e fa11lt of o11 e or otlier of se,,eral perso11 s a�1 cl 1t _1s 1 1nposs1ble to det�r111�,1� \v]1icl1 of tI1 e perso118 iil\'ol ,,ed . 1s the a11tl10 1, tl1e co11rt_ rnay, \vhere. eqt11ty so requires, order tile daii,age to ·be 1 11 ade goocl by tl1e grottJ) of perso11 s wl10 cotllcl ll ave caused it ancl � 11 1 011g \VJ10111 tl1 e a11tbor. of tl1e d,1 1n,tge is certai i,ly to be fotitld. (2) Wl1 ere ,L. perso11 is beyo11d doubt a11s\verabJe 1111 der tl1e cjvil Ja ,v th e fo r t111 deter111111 ecl a11tl1 or of tl1e cl,11nage ' tl1e cour· t 111 'J a,, orcle.1 s11cI1 perso11 to 11ia ·. ke ..,good t1.tle d::\01 age.

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Art. 2143 - Period of lin1itation (I) Tl1e acti.011 sl1all be brougl1t by the ,,i_ctirn \.Vitl1i11 l\VO years fro111 tl1e tin1e \V l1e11 l1e SllStai11 ed tl1e cla111c.1ge for \v]1icl1 l1e is clai.1ni11g co1npe11satio11 . (2) \.Vl1ere tl1 e dan1age is ca11sed by a pe11al offe11ce i11 res_pect .of wbicl1 tl1e pe11a.l l�LW prescribes a lo11ger JJeriocl of li111itation, tl1e latter periocl shall a1Jp.ly to tl1e actio11 for co1npet1satio11. (3) Notl1i11 g i11 tl1is Article sl1all affect ti1e rigl1L of tl1e victin1 to reclain1 tbi11gs o,v11 ecl l))' .hin1 , or to i11vok.e the provisions relati11g to 1111.j11st, e11ricl1111e11t (Art. 2162-2178). Art. 2144 - I-Icirs . (.1) The victi111's l1eirs n1 ay clai111 co111pe11satio11 for tJ1e 1naterial damage suffered by tl1e victin1. (2) Sa,,e ,,vl1ere otl1erwise providecl by la\v, tl1ey 1nay not clai111 co.n1 pensatio11 for tl1e 111oral d.an1 age s11.fferecl by tl1e victi.n-i 11nless a11 �tctio11 for co111pe11s,ttion for tl1e 111oral barn1 l1as bee11 i. nitiated by tJ1 e victin1 d11ri11g bis lifeti1ne. . . (3) Tl1e s11cces�or of the person liable for tl1e da111 age is liable ,1s l1 e l1in1 self ,vas to 111 ake it good. Art. 2I45 - \1ictim's creditors (l) The creditors of a perso11 111ay not excercise tl1eir debtor's actio11 · for co111 : p e11 satio11 for da111c:tge clo11e to l1 i111 \vl1 ere sucl1 da111 age is conn.ected with t11e debtor's perso11, bodily integrity or l1011our. (2) They m�1y,_ 011 tl1 e co11ditio11 s laid d.ow11 .in t\rt. ·1993, exercise tl1_eir debtor's actio11 \Vl1ere tl1e debtor has, after tl1e date 011 wl1ich tJ1 ey beca111e I1is creditors, st1ffered a da11�age affecti11g solely l1is JJecu,uary i11terests. Art. 2146 - Claim may• 11ot be assigned (1) Tl1e ,,.icti1n's · clai111 against tl1e 1 Jerso11 liable for the da1nage 111 E1y 11ot be assig11ed so 1011g as it l1 as not bee11 11pl1elcl by a judicial clecision a11cl the a111 ot111 t fixed. (2) It n1ay tl1 ere11po11 be assigned i11 accorda11 ce_ witl1 th.e provisions of Arts. 1962-1975.

Art. 2147 - Co11tractual Ii1nitation of extra-contractual liability • (1) A perso11 11 1ay · 11ot relieve l1i111self of liability for his fa11lt. (2) A perso11 111ay stip11late by co11 tract . that l1e ,-vill 11ot be _liable for faults coo1 1nittecl by a11otl1er person for whom �e is a11 swerable under tl1e civil lavv. (3) A person 111 ay stipulate by co11tract tl1at l1e will not be lial1le, except i11 _ the case o f. l1 is f�tult, for da1nage \.vb.1ch, tinder tl1 e provisions of this Title, is to be made good irrespective of fault. Art. 2148 - Corripro1nise After da111 age lJ,LS bee11 cat1sed, tl1e parties n1 ay agree that it shall not entail compensatio11 or may settle tl1 e ter.1ns of its compensatio11. <

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Art. 2149 - Effect of . penal on civil Jn decidirlg whetlier a. f,1t1lt has b·een co1nn1itted, tl1e col1rt is 11ot boui1d by an . acqltittaJ or discl1 arge pro11 ou11ced t111der the pe11 al ·· .law

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.Arf. ll SO - Date of. assessment of d;lmage y e da as th on tim on vic e tl1 by d ne tai s , su ge ma a e d. tl1 (1) The court assesses which it renders judgment. (2) Where it is impossible :fi.11 ally to assess the dam�ge on that _ d�te, the cqurt may give a provisiona� judgment and authorise an appltcat1011 for reconsideratjo1 1 of such decision. (3) The application for reconsideratiO]l must be inade within two years fro1n the date of the provisional judgment. Art. 2151 - Res Jod.icata assessment court's of (I) Except in tl1e case provided 11nder Art. the 2150, . . the damage shall be fir1al. (2) The victim may not bring a fresl1 . action for con1pens_atio11 for other damage be b.as suffered unless such damage was caused independently of that for which he l1as already claimed co 1 npei1sation. Art. 2152 - No appeal

1. Principle

No a1Jpeal shall lie against the judgment of the court of first instance relating to tl1e a1nou11t of co1npensatio 1 1.

Art. 2 I 53 - 2. Exceptions The provisio11 of Art. 2 152 shall not apply wl1 ere: (a) tl1 e court has considered circt1mstances wl1 ich it sl1ot1ld 11ot l1ave taken into accotmt or l1as failed to consider circu 1 nsta1 1ces wllich it should b.ave taken i11 to acco11nt; or (b) tl1 e an1ou11 t of compensation. fixed by tl1e court is 111anifeslly u11reaso11able or anger; or ancl. cot1ld 0 1 1ly l1ave been i1 1spired by prejt1dice . (c) st1cl1 amo1111t is due to a11 error of calct1lation 0 11 tl1e part of tl1e col1rt . • Art. 2 I 54 - AlJo,vance

(l) Where s11cJ1 1node of payn1ent is jt1sti.fied by tl1e 11atl1re of tl1 e da 1 11age or otl1er circt11nstances, the cot1rt may order the da111age to be 111ade good by mea.11s of a periodical allow,1nce. (2) In s1:ch case, the debtor shall JJrovide sec11rity for tl1e JJay11 1ent of' tl1 e allowa 11ce.

Art. 2155 - Joint and several liability .�

(1) Wl1 ere several perso11s are liable to make good · tl1e sa111e da111age t11ey are bou11 d jointly a11d severally. (2) In JJarticular, 110 disti 11ctio11. is 1nade betwee 1 1 i 1 1stigator, tJri 11 cij:,al a1 1d accomplice. (3) T he pe1:s0 1is liable to 111ake good tl1e san1e dama.ge are .bou11d joi1 1tly and severally regardless of whetl1e� tl1 e obligatio11 to 111ake good l1 as its source for one or other of tl1e1u 1n a co11 tract or i11 a11 extra. contractual . liability. .

1. Principle Art. 2156 - Sole fault . Wl1 ere solely one of the perso11 s liable l1as · co1111nitted a 1au r.- It·, I 1e sha u aI0 11 e 11ltimately bear the btirde 1 1 of the debt. ,

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TITLE XTII .CIVIL CODE

Art. 2157 - 2. Po,vers of equity (1) Where tl1e fault l1as been committed i11 tl1e discl1arge of l1 is functions by tl1e represe11tative or agent of a body corpor,1te or by a. salaried emp loyee, the cot1rt n1ay decide tl1at tl1e debt shall ulti1nately be bor11e, either \Vl1olly or partly, by tl1e body corporate or the e1nployer. (2) Where the fault co11sists i11 an official fa11lt co1nmitted by a pub]jc ser va11t or employee, the court n1ay decide tl1at the debt sl1all ultimately be borne, eitl.1er wl10Jly or partly, by tl1e State or its territorjal st1bdivision or tl1e pt1blic sevice concer11ed. Art. 2158 - 3. Elen1ents of decision (1) I11 111aki11g its decisio11, tl1e co11rt takes acco11nt of tl1e degree of gravity of tl1e fault con1111itted, a11cl of tl1e author's desire, if any, to carry out l1is ft111ctio11s to tl1e best of his abilities . (2) No regard sl1all be l1ad .to tl1e respective fi11a11cial positions of the perso11s • declared liable. ' Art. 2159 - 4. Restriction No ultin1ate divisio11 of liability sl1all be grantecl by tl1 e court where: (a) the act giving rise to tl1e liability was committed with intent to harn1; or (b) tl1e act is a penal offe11ce for whicl1 the a11thor has been duly convicted. • Art. 2160 - Shared fault (I). Wl1ere several perso11s J1ave contributed by their fa111t to cause the s�1111e damage, the the court fixes eq11itably tl1e proportio11 of the debt 11ltimately to. be borne by each or tl1ese persons. (2) In 111aking its decisio11, tl1e court sl1aJJ have regard to all the circun1stances, in partic11lar tl1e exte11t to which tl1e respective faults have contributed to cause tl1e damage a11d the gravity of each fault. Art. 2161 - Subrogation (1) Whosoever l1as paid tl1e whole debt altl1ough he is ultimately bo11t1d to bear 011ly a JJart thereof sl1all recover fron1 tl1ose liable with. 11im. (2) For the p11rpose of sucl1 recovery. he is s11brogated to the victi1.n's olain1s.

CHAPTER 2. UNJUST ENRICHlVlENT

SECTION 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 2162 - General Principle Whosoever 11as clerived a gai11 fro1n the \York or property of anotl1er without a cause justifyi11g st1ch gain� sl1all i11den1nify tl1e person , at wJ1ose ex : pense l1e has e11ricJ1ecl lti1nself to the e·xtent of tl1e latter's in1poverishineI1t, a11 d \.vithin the limit of -11is o\vn · enricl1n1e111. .

- Art . 21.63 - Loss of enrichment ( l ) Restitutio11 js not dlte, to tl1e extent to whicl1 th� defe11 dant ca11. show . m io11 for itut clai tL1e rest of e m ti_ tl1e at ed icb e11r ger lo11 no is be at i tl l1 the (2) Restitutio11 is· 11evertl1eless due wl1ere the. defendapt . has 1 :arted . wit . e11ricl1. me11t in bad faitl1 or w]1ere, at the ttme of �art�11g Wtth it he should 1. 101 11t t1t ke res n1a to 11cl . u · bo s vv� �e at �h are aw en be ve b.a L1sly to a tl1ird ito g ed atu err 11sf tra en . be s a b. 1t 1e1 hn � ric e11 st u j· u11 e tl 1 re. (3) vVhe t aga111st tl1e latter. gl1 ou be br 1y n1, 1 io1 11t tit res r fo i111 cla e th n, rso . pe ,- 179 -

A.u;t. 2164 -:- Undue payment ' (1) 'Whosoever !has paid wl1at be did· 11ot owe n1ay claim restittition of· iit. (2) l-{e may de1na11d restitutib11 of tl1e incre1ne11ts of 'tl1e thing, · 0r the legal interest 011 the mo11ey, from the date of the 1 )ayn1ent-, wheue the payee acted i11 ba.d · faith. • Art. 2165 - Absence of mistake Restitutio11 is 11 ot adt11itted wl1ere a perso11 cogniza11t of tl1e facts pays vo11111t- · airily w]Jat J1e kne\.V l1e did not owe •

A.rt. 2166 - Su.fficient cause (1) Restitt1tio11 is 110.t ad11J.itted where the payn1ent was n1ade in the performance of a prescribed or moral obligation. (2) Restitutio11 · s]1al1 nevertheless be ad111itted in s11cl1 case where the payor l1ad no capacity to alienate gratuitol1sly. Art. 2167 - No 'restitution . . ' ( 1. ) Tl1e receiver of tl1e l111dt1e pay111e11t owes 110 restitt1tiot1 \Vl1ere, as a co11seql1e11ce of tl1e pay1ne11t, he l1as i11 good faitl1 destroyecl or ca11celled l1js title, reli11quisl1ed the sect1rity for bis clai111 or allowed his action agaj11st tl1e trt1e _debtor to lapse. (2) 111 s11cl1 case, the perso11 who • n1ade tl1e 11nd11e payn1ent has legal redress agai11st tl1e tn1e debtor only. SECTION 3. EXPENSES Art. 2168 - Scope of this Section '\Vhere a persot1 is bo1111d to return a thi11g ,vh.ich l1as bee11 i11 l1is possessio11 for s0111e ti.I11 e, µjs rights and obligatio11s arisi11g 011t of a11y modificatio11s l1e 111a.y l1ave 111ade to s11ch tl1i□g are, 1111less otl1erwise provided by law or co11 tract, subject to tl,e follo,vi11g provisio11s. Art. 2169 - Necessar)' expenses Whosoever is bouncl. to 1nake restitl1tion shall be rei111bt1rsed of tl1e expc11ses . be l1 as incl1rred i11 · preve11ti11g tl1e loss or deterioratio11 of tl1e tl1 i11g, llilless s11cl1 expe11ses were 11ot 11seful or were re11dered 11ecessary by I1is o,v11 fault or tl1e fault of a perso11 for :wl1om l1e is a11swerabJe. .•

Art. 2170 - Maintenance The perso11 bou11d to 1nake restitl1tio11 is not e11titled to any i r 1cle11111it)' for the cpst of 1nai11taining tl1e thi11g or for tl1e taxes l1e I1as paid because of possessi11g it. Art. 2171 - Value added to the tl1ing (1) Where expe11ses i11ct1rred . on tl1e tl1i11g ha,,e increased its value the J)erso11 bq1111d to n1ake restit11tio11 is entitled to their rei1 11b11rseinent. ' (2) He 111ay, however, not clairn more than Sltch i11crease j 11 value, dtie to his expenses, as still subsists at the ti111e of restitt1tio11. ;, , . - 180 -

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TITLE 'XIII CIVIL CODE

1-\ rt. 2172 - Batl faith (l) Tl 1 e court 1nay, \vl1 ere eg11ity so reqt1ires, redt1ce or refuse tl1e inden1 njty as provided i11 f\rt. 2171 \vl1 ere, at tl1e tin1 e \V]1en l1e n1 acle tl1 e eXJ)ense, tl1 e cl efendant lc11 e"v or sl1 oulcl l1 a\1e k110,v11 of l1is cl1it)' to ret11rn tl1 e tl1 j11 g. (2) '"fl 1 e cot1rt 111 ay, \vl1 ere equity so requires, grant tl1 e plaintiff c.l periocl of grace 11 ot exceeding t\vo years for pay111 e11t of the inde111 r1ity JJrovided i11 Art. 2171. Art. 2173 - Jus tollcndi

1-\ l)erso11 bo111 1d to 11 1ake reslitt1tio11 1nay before restit11tio11 of the tl1 j11g re1uove ::111 ytl1i11 g lie l1as joi11ed to it, if it ca11 be separated ,vitl1011t ap1Jreciable da11 1age to tl1 e tl1i 11g. Art. 2174 - Rigl1t of rctc11tion

(1) Tl1 e perso11 bo11ncl to 1nake: restitutio11 111ay refuse to ret11r11. the thi11g 111 1til l1e l1as receivecl pa)1111 e11t of tl1 e i11 den1 11ity d11e to l1 i111 1111cler tl1 e foregoi11 g provisio11 s or 1u1til lie l1e l1 as received adeq11ate security for its payn1 e11 t 11pon liquid,ttio11 of the a1noun.t d11e. (2) Tl1 e right of rete11 �io11 n1ay, l1 owever� 11ot be i11voked by a tl1ief or by a perso11 ,vl10, a.t tl1e ti111 e \Vl1 e11 J1e toolc possessio11 of tl1 e thing, knew tl1at l1e l1 ad 11 0 valjd con.tractual or legal rigl1t to it. '

Art. 2175 - Deterioration

(1) Tl1e perso11 bot111 d to make restitL1tio11 shall i11cle111 11jfy the perso11 entitled ,vl1ere the for.mer l1 as ca11sed tl1e thing to deteriorate. (2) I--Ie is lia.ble even for sucl1 deterior�1tio11 of tl1 e thi11 g a.s vvas ca·used by force 11 1aje11re, if, at the ti1ne vvl1 e11 this occurred, l1_e knew that he l1a d 110 valicl contractt1a.l or leg1:tl right to the tl1i11 g.

Art. 2176 - Loss of tl1e tl1i11g (I) Tl1e pro,1isio11s of Art. 2175 apply in tl1 e case o .f total or partial loss of tl1 e thi11 g. (2) They also apply where for, a11y other reaso11 tl1 e tl1ing ca11not be rett11�11 eci in ki11d to tl1e perso11 e11 titled to it.

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Art. 2177 - Extent of inden1nity (I) The in de1nnity d11e is eql1al to the val11e of the th.ing at the tinie wl1 e.11 · it beco111es in1possible to rett1rn it in kind. (2) WJ1 ere tl1e JJerson req11ire d to 1nake restit11tion knew at tl1 at time . tl1 at l1e ]1ad . 110 valid co11 tractl1aI or legal right to tl1e tl1.i1 1g, additional comp.. e11satio1 1 1nay be dema1 1 d ed fron1 hin1. (3) In st1cl1 case tl1e perso11 . entitled to restitutio11 sl1all be placed · i11 the position he w�uld have bee11 in, ha d he retain.ed possessio11 of the thi11g.

· Art. 2178 - Increments

(1) The perso1 1_ bouncl to 1� 1ake restih1tion sl1 all retain tl1e collected increme·nts of tl1e tl1ing. . ·. (2) Fie· shall pay to the . p]ai11tifI their valt1e ,vhere · he laJew at tl1e tin1e of tak.i 11 g possession. of. the thi11g that be bad 110 valid contractual or. legal right to it.

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