Philosophy notes11

Unpacking Heideggerian Phenomenology Introduction In recent years the volume of nursing research making use of qualitative methodologies has increased dramatically. By choosing such methodologies insight has been provided into the human side of nursing, which has not been served well by the positivist paradigm. As offered by Birks, Chapman and Francis “The methodological approach utilized…must facilitate answers to the research questions(s), be appropriate for addressing the aims of the specific research….and fit the needs and abilities of the researcher”.1 Phenomenology is a complex methodology with many researchers finding the esoteric nature of the language both daunting and exclusive. Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology, whilst an extremely valuable resource for nursing researchers, is perhaps, one of the least understood or misunderstood methodology.2 Arguably this is because of the idiosyncratic way in which he used language. Consequently one of the main challenges in studying Heidegger is deciphering his language. Not only did he write in an exceedingly technical manner, but, he frequently invented his own terminology in order to highlight or explain a concept. Furthermore this difficulty is heightened by the translations and the lack of direct translatability of some of the phrases into languages other than German. Hence, drawing upon our extensive combined experiences in studying Heidegger this paper will explicate some of his terminology, offering our interpretations.3-6 Our intent is to assist other nurse researchers to develop an understanding of Heideggerian thought. Additionally we will demonstrate how we have applied the philosophy to frame a nursing research project.

The research question: An exemplar The research question, “What is the experience of nursing someone you know?” was conceptualized from the many experiences the researchers, as rural nurses, had encountered. Understanding gained through this research will provide valuable insights to experienced rural nurses, those new to the area and educators of

rural nurses.

Choosing a methodological framework Phenomenology relies on borrowing people’s lived experiences so that the researcher can better understand the meaning or the significance of the event.7 The wide-ranging applicability of phenomenology has seen it heavily employed in many areas or research concerned with human experience, including nursing, psychology, sociology and more recently education.8 Notable nursing studies utilizing phenomenology include Chapman,4 Davenport,9 Gullickson,10 Robertson-Malt,11 Walters,12 Taylor,13 Pearson et al,14James,15 Rather,16 Ferguson17 and McManus-Holroyd.18 In line with Heidegger’s thinking, it is not possible to interpret a text or work devoid of judgment(s). Therefore we make no apology for the components of Heidegger’s work that we have chosen to highlight, and integrate into our study, and furthermore those that have been purposefully downplayed or neglected. It must be stressed that the concepts we have chosen are used to couch our questioning and understanding of the data generated in our study.

Above all it should be remembered that the appraisal of Heidegger, in this context, is not entirely about the philosophy per se, but rather about meshing relevant philosophical standpoints into a usable, methodological framework, to guide and ultimately interpret nursing research.

People, their interactions and their lived experiences are the core of nursing. Whilst logio-positivism will always have a place in nursing, nurses have always displayed interest in seeking meaning from their work as evidenced by nurses’ willingness to share their stories. From the pooled anecdotes insights are gained and knowledge generated both of which can then be injected back into the profession. Interpretive research is simply the formalizing of this tradition.19 Considering hermeneutic phenomenology as a vehicle for exploring the experience of nurses caring for people with who they have a dual relationship is viewed as eminently befitting. As rural

nurses we are always engrossed in the world of rural nursing.

Furthermore as a people we are always immersed in the world of rural life. These entities are contributors to our Dasein, and as such we are unable to separate ourselves from these. We are not objects amongst the objects of rural nursing or living, rather we are at all times absorbed within the world of rural nursing and living.

Therefore the beauty of using Heidegger to underpin this study is that his philosophy permits and encourages the exploration and inclusion of preconceptions as legitimate components of the research.20 Hence our experiences, both as practitioners and as researchers are then woven together to produce a shared understanding of the phenomena, or a ‘fusion of horizons’, as Gadamer called it.21 The ultimate aim in expounding a shared experience is to look beyond the words, or the superficially accepted sense of the experiences, to broaden the understanding beyond the everyday reality.22 Asking the question ”what does this really mean?” is often a helpful start to this process.

The development of Heideggerian Phenomenology Phenomenology was one of the first genuine moves away from the positivist paradigm and into qualitative research, where the subjectivity of human experience became more valued.23 The father of phenomenology was a mathematician Edmund Husserl, who developed transcendental phenomenology.24 He believed that in order to generate valid data it was first necessary for the researcher to put aside any presuppositions that they may have in relation to the question. He termed this bracketing or phenomenological reduction.25,26 What resulted was data that was fundamentally epistemological in nature. That is, it provided a description of the experience, as he reasoned that raising awareness of a phenomenon equated with knowledge.27 Martin Heidegger, a student of Husserl, challenged this idea, by suggesting that the researcher is as much a part of the research as the participant, and that their ability to interpret the data was reliant on previous knowledge. Heidegger called this prior understanding fore-structure.28 He postulated that there is no such thing as

interpretive research, free of the judgement or influence of the researcher.

More to the point, he sees the researcher as Being-in-the-world of the participant and research question. What is vital, however, if the researcher does subscribe to the philosophical standpoint of Beingin-the-world attested to by Heidegger is that they are open and upfront with this viewpoint. In regards to bracketing, Heidegger’s message was simple; “Understanding is never without presuppositions. We do not, and cannot, understand anything from a purely objective position. We always understand from within the context of our disposition and involvement in the world” (Johnson, 2000, pp. 23).

Heidegger emphasized that there was no discernable difference between epistemology and ontology. For him, knowing is extrapolated from interpretation and understanding.

In other words we construct our reality, and therefore, comprehension from our experience of Being–in-the-world.

Hermeneutics and the Hermeneutic Circle The word hermeneutics comes from the Greek word hermeneusin, a verb, meaning to understand or interpret.29 Hermeneutics is the stream of phenomenology supported by Heidegger. Although originating as a method for studying theological scriptures, Heidegger redefined hermeneutics as a “…way of studying all human activities” (Dreyfus, 1994, pp.2). It is the basis for interpretation, with the aim of allowing the text to speak for itself.

Heidegger saw himself as an ontologist.30 That is, he aimed to ask the questions that would ultimately result in the uncovering of the meaning of being. He viewed humans as entities with the awareness and thus the ability to ask ontological questions . He contends that the only true way for the researcher to conduct a hermeneutic inquiry was to have prior knowledge, some forestructure to ensure that the questions asked were pertinent.31 A hermeneutic enquiry, in the tradition of Heidegger’s philosophy aims to elucidate the subjective, humanistic meaning of an experience or as noted by Mulhall32 employing the hermeneutic

circle augments the elucidation of Dasein. There is no attempt “… to reveal casual relationships, but rather to reveal the nature of phenomena as humanly experienced”.33 Rather the goals of hermeneutic research, in line with Heidegger thinking are to enter the world of the person and interpret the meaning they assign to the experience.34 The hermeneutic circle relies on the circular movement from the whole to the parts, deconstructing and then re-constructing the text, resulting in a shared understanding.35 In terms of this research we are endeavoring to answer the question “what is the experience of being a rural nurse caring for someone you know?” It must be stressed however, that it is the researchers who ask the text what does it mean to be a rural nurse living out the phenomenon in question. It is not the responsibility of the participant to analyze the situation, rather the participant simply describes, or recounts the experience. By utilizing the hermeneutic circle the researcher attempts to ‘read between the lines’ and uncover the true essence of the experience. Gadamer21 termed the understanding obtained when the researcher and the text meet as the fusion of horizons, and further notes that in the setting of phenomenological reduction a shared understanding is not possible. Also worth noting is the infinite possibility of the hermeneutic circle.36 Koch37 further elaborated by explaining that every time the text is re-explored, further possibilities are feasible.

Dasein The concept of Dasein is pivotal to the philosophical standpoint of Heidegger. Although not directly translatable into English, in colloquial German, Dasein means human existence with the entity to ask what is means to be.38 Similarly Johnson (2002) definedDasein as meaning there being. Dasein is the foundation upon which Heidegger built up the entirety of his thinking.

As Dasein is not static it can not be measured objectively (Stumf, 1994). Sheehan39 summarized by stating that “…Dasein is the answer to the questions about the meaning of being”.39 Wrathall40 agreed, concluding that everyone is Dasein or moreover that every

human is a meaningful being. Fundamentally Heideggerian phenomenology considers what it means to Be-in-the-world. The meaning is subject to context but always a possibility. Heidegger28 claimed that the aim should be to discover, or uncover “…the universal structures of Being as they manifest themselves in phenomena”.28 In-der-Welt-sein (Being-in-the-world) As explained by James15 Heidegger argued that we are not entities that exist parallel to our world. Rather we are, at all times, submerged in our world. Hence Heidegger coined the term Beingin-the-world, hyphenating the words as a way of emphasizing that there is no separation between our being and our world; they are as one.41 Dietsch42 concurred, noting that humans are inseparable from their world, and further that the ability to interpret the world relies on the marriage of the two.

To illustrate Being-in-the-world in the context of this enquiry consider that the nurse living in a rural community is always situated within in the world of rural nursing, regardless of whether at work or not. Hence our task, as researchers is to ask the text what it means to be a rural nurse in the world of rural nursing, faced with a patient known to the nurse.

Sorge (Care) “Caring is a fundamental function of nursing”,43 a concept which underlies every aspect of nursing. Nursing is built upon the foundation of human interaction. Neither a nursing, nor a patient experience happens in isolation. Heidegger28 summarized this sentiment, by declaring that to be with another is to care.

Additionally he claimed that everything one does can be understood as a way of caring. Further as alluded to by Benner and Wrubel,44 Heidegger identified caring in two ways. Firstly, as taking over others concern, and secondly, as empowering others via advocacy and facilitation.

Leonard (1989) purported that Sorge (care) is pivotal to Dasein, and in reality Dasein is not possible in the absence of caring.

Caring is symbolic of not only Being-in-the-world, but also being

connected to others, and furthermore believing that connectedness is of consequence. To provide comfort requires the “being-with” of Dasein; to be actively engaged in another’s lifeworld. In addition, an integral part of Dasein’s identity is centered on what or who, is cared about, and deeming these entities significant.45 The notion of connectedness is an area that will be explored in this study, by asking the text what does it mean to care for a patient known to the nurse?

Authenticity “To be authentic is to be aware of what is means to exist”.28 In terms of human interaction Krasner46 explained that an authentic relationship involves “…responding to the appeal of the presence of other Dasein”.46 In other words Dasein is not isolated but rather is absorbed within a relationship with others.47 Dasein may be described as the glue that binds a nurse and a patient. Consequently our study aims to uncover the Dasein that exists when a nurse cares for a person who they know. Also of interest is the authenticity of the relationship, both in terms of the previous relationship as well as the nurse/patient relationship. Ultimately the aim of a phenomenological study, such as this, is to let Dasein reveal and interpret itself.48 Befindlichkeit (Disposition) In line with Heidegger’s conviction that Dasein is relative to context, so too did he believe that Dasein is never devoid of a mood or disposition, for which he used the word Befindlichkeit.49 Regardless of the phenomenon, the starting point is always the mood in which the experience is lived. Moreover Heidegger affirmed that disposition arises out of Being-in-the-world. To further illuminate this concept Wrathall40 stated that moods “… come from a whole way of comporting ourselves and relating ourselves to the things and people around us”.40 In terms of the research in question, namely nurses caring for people they know, it is not necessarily the patient nor the patient’s condition that the nurse may hold some reservation. More accurately it is the nurse’s feelings in approaching the situation,

underpinned by Befindlichkeit that influences the experience.

Mood takes into account ideas preconceived in relation to experiences ofBeing-in-the-world; in this instance, the world of living in a rural community and working as a nurse.

Whilst being totally in control of the context is only a reality in idealism, humans are always in control of deriving meaning (Verstehen) from the situation (Johnson, 2000).

Temporality and Spaciality (Time and Space) Heidegger did not define time (Temporality) and space (Spaciality) as chronological, linear or measurable entities. Instead he declared that time for Dasein is infinite.45 Heidegger was adamant that time is the foundation of Dasein, or as described by Gelven,49 thatDasein is to always in time . To illustrate his point Heidegger asked the question: What does it mean to be in time? So important was the concept of time to Heidegger that he chose to refer to time as esctasis, a word derived from Greek meaning ‘to standout’.40Essentially Heidegger suggested that, when reflecting on a phenomenon chronological time did not matter. What mattered was what, or why, it stood out from the general flow of time.50 To exemplify this point one simply needs to think of a significant time either in history, such as 911, or in their life, such as the birth of a child, to understand how a time may stand out from the general flow, yet the date or time of day be rendered irrelevant. The same may be true of a nurse caring for a patient with whom they share a dual relationship. Whilst the time of day, nor the date may be recalled, the way in which this time ‘stood out’ may still be obvious because of the significance of the event.

In terms of space Heidegger once more considered the concept by asking: What does it mean to be in space? He did not mean space as a place per se, but rather by how it feels to be in a space.49 As an example, when one talks of ‘being in love’, love is not a geographical place, but rather a sense of being in a particular space. Where that space is, no one knows, yet the concept is universally understood and accepted. The same is true of Heidegger’s perception of Spaciality. It is not a particular space

that he refers to, moreover a sense of what it means to be in that space, and how that feeling influences experiences.51 In regards to this research we aim to examine and re-examine the text with the question ”what does it mean to be in the space of nursing a person the nurse knows”?

Heidegger28 advocated strongly that there is no such thing as a situation-less experience. He insisted that we are located within our own temporo-spatial circumstance, and that it is the context which influences the meaning of the event. In other words if the time and setting were to differ then so too would the experience, because every experience is context specific.

Acknowledging the argument against Heidegger In considering whether to adopt Heidegger’s philosophy to frame a study, some researchers are apprehensive, influenced by the controversies surrounding him. Essentially the debates surrounding Heidegger are centered around his involvement in Nazism.52 We emphatically agree that fascist, anti-Semitic beliefs have no place in nursing. In his defense, however and as noted by Johnson,48even philosophers are not spared the horror of wars, and as such philosophy and political views are not presented the luxury of remaining mutually exclusive. Whilst mindful of the warnings heralded, we nevertheless believe that many areas of Heidegger’s thinking remain relevant to generating thought in contemporary nursing research, regardless of his life choices. In the end the choice of philosophy is determined by it s relevance to a study, not simply by the philosopher as a person judged by a set of life choices.

Conclusion With a raft of approaches available, choosing an appropriate methodology when developing a research project is paramount.

Moreover it is vital that researchers are cognizant with the chosen methodology’s philosophical underpinnings. We believe that Heideggerian phenomenology is exceedingly valuable for informing nursing. Therefore throughout this paper we have selected and deciphered examples of the intricate expression as a

way of unpacking Heidegger’s thinking. Furthermore we have illustrated the applicability of these chosen concepts for nursing research, using our study as an exemplar. It is hoped that the greater understanding gained from this paper will motivate researchers to consider the suitability of Heideggerian hermeneutic phenomenology for future research.

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ISSN 1393-614X Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy Vol. 7 2003. ____________________________________________________ HUSSERL, HEIDEGGER AND THE INTENTIONALITY QUESTION Archana Barua AbstractRaising an ontological question regarding the meaning of 'a being' and also the meaning of an 'intelligent being', Heidegger identifies intentionality with the skilful coping of a social, norm bound, engaged and context dependent embodied being. This he describes in terms of a Dasein, a being-in-the-world, and its tool using activity with respect to social practices and norms. Unlike Husserl's, intentionality in Heidegger is primarily semantic: the necessary conditions of skilful coping are also the necessary conditions of intentional acts. The entire question of computers attaining Dasein-like character is largely dependent on whether these purposeful causal laws can also be formalized. While Dreyfus rules out this possibility, Mark Okrent successfully argues that there is nothing in Heidegger that rules out the possibility of computers attaining a Dasein-like character. While in full agreement with Mark Okrent, I have made an attempt at understanding the entire debate with more emphasis on the

implications of a Dasein attaining a computer-like character.

What I intend to do in this article is to make a comparative study of Hebert Dreyfus and Mark Okrent's philosophical observations as presented in two respective articles: 'What Computers Can't Do?' and 'Why The Mind Isn't a Program (But Some Digital Computer Might Have a Mind)?' In light of this, I have accepted Okrent's (1996, online) observation that the claim made by Dreyfus, 'that in the light of Heidegger's interpretation of 'intentionality', it is at least highly unlikely for digital computers to ever satisfy Heideggerian constraints, and thus count as thinking', is not strong enough. I have made an attempt to justify my observation, which is contrary to what Dreyfus has said (1997, p.108) in some occasions, that it is more difficult to accommodate machine intelligence in the Husserlian framework. On the contrary, Okrent has sufficiently justified that more than Husserl's,Heidegger's programme could accommodate machine intelligence into its fold. For the later part, I concentrate more on Husserl's 1893 phase of philosophical development.

Mark Okrent, in his article, 'Why The Mind Isn't a Program?' has referred to some of the Heideggerian constraints, which Dreyfus has considered as prime requirements for any thinking entity to undergo. These are: (i) the thinking entity must be 'in-the-world' which makes it a contextualized and an embodied entity, and (ii) the thinking entity must have a minimum understanding of how to cope successfully in the world environment. The skill and the practical coping ability, the 'know how', rather than theoretical, detached and disembodied reflection, are learnt by adopting successful social practices. This suggests that Heidegger puts forward a set of constraints for computational model of thought, which is acknowledged in the field of cognitive science. For example, Bechtel and Abrahamsen in Connectionism and the Mind: "Thus it provides hope of situating cognitive processing in the world, and so begins to elucidate what Heidegger may have

had in mind when he emphasized that our cognitive system exists enmeshed in the world in which we do things, where we have skills and social practices that facilitate our interaction with objects" (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 1991, p.126). Any thought model, to be similar to our conscious model of thought, must incorporate those essential requirements. This, Dreyfus seriously believes, is impossible for a digital computer, which manipulates formal symbols in accordance with a set of rules organized in a program, to ever satisfy the Heideggerian constraints.

Interestingly, Mark Okrent, while accepting the first part of Dreyfus's interpretation of a set of conditions provided by Heidegger on what it is to think, differs from Dreyfus's other observations that these conditions could not be satisfied by program-driven digital computers. Okrent strongly believes that there is nothing in Heidegger, which counts against the possibility of ascribing thoughts to computers. To reinterpret Heidegger in the light of his new findings, Okrent focuses on two basic questions: (1) what it is to be a thinker? And (2) which actual entities might count as thinkers? The first issue concerns the 'question of being', and the second concerns the matters of fact. What qualifies an entity to be a thinking entity is for Heidegger an issue of being, an ontological question that is necessarily tied to the question of the meaning of being. But how ought we to understand what it is to think? If we consider rationality to be the necessary and sufficient condition for an entity to be intelligent or as thinking, what motivates this is the recognition that some machines, manipulating formal symbols in accordance with a set of pre-defined rules, have proved successful in behaving in a rational manner. In this sense, such a machine qualifies to be a thinking entity. On the other hand, if what it is to think cannot be captured in any program, is it possible for a rational entity so defined to independently satisfy those other requirements laid down by Heidegger that a thinking entity must undergo?

Mark Okrent's rereading of Heidegger's work leads him to a different conclusion. Okrent believes Heidegger does leave open the possibility that some computers could actually think in spite of the fact that necessary requirements laid down by him for any intelligent being, 'being-in-the-world', 'skills', and social practices, are not a set of behaviours which can be defined in terms of formal symbols. Heidegger follows Husserl and Brenteno and defines consciousness in terms of intentionality. Here, unlike Husserl's identification of intentionality with the nature of the act, Heidegger concentrates more on the question of being. Heidegger accepts the basic requirement of intentionality as laid down by Husserl and Brentano, its object directedness, but with more emphasis on the question of 'being'. Ultimately the question of being is 'what is the most general way to understand and how it is possible to intend something?' (Okrent 1996, online) So what a 'thinking being' means is to be determined by investigating that which characterizes that type of entity. Heidegger has made a shift from an articulation of the question of being to an articulation of the character of intentionality. The crux of the question is: what conditions must be satisfied when some event is correctly described in intentional terms? The meaning of an intentional entity is related to the meaning of that general entity, that being, in Heidegger's terminology, Dasein, which has that intentional state and also some other states.

The essential character of Dasein is its 'being-in-the-world', acting purposefully in a goal directed way, and using tools as tools in pursuing its goals. In general Dasein does what it is socially appropriate for it to do, using tools as tools the way they should be used, which is defined by usual habitual practices, in a norm governed way. Dasein's 'being-in-the-world' involves a care structure, it is ahead of itself, being alongside other entities etc., which are necessary for having intentional states and these are expressed in several ways: cultivating and caring something, holding something, letting something go etc., the common

denominator of which is 'concern'. All of these are instances of the overt behavior of embodied persons, described in intentional terms.

Instead of making intentional states central from which overt acts are derived, Heidegger takes the intentionality of overt acts as primary and of inner states as secondary. So the necessary condition of a goal-directed intentional overt act is its practice, appropriately chosen, learning proper manner of tool use, and since engaging in a practical activity is a necessary condition for having intentionality, a person engages in a practical activity if he intends tools as tools by using them. For example, if it is correct to describe a certain event as hammering, that it is directed towards the goal of a nail being made fast, it is correct to say that the agent is treating the object being used as a hammer, and the entity as a nail by using it as a nail, so the primary way to intend hammer as hammer is by hammering it, by intending tools as tools. Now the question is: what are the necessary conditions for intending tools as tools? Rather than using them in an arbitrary manner, they should be used the way society prescribes a definite way of using them, ascribing a function which is a rule to use them.

Accommodating a wider scope for intentionality criterion in terms of Dasein and its tool using capacity, and identifying intentionality with that semantic meaning, Heidegger has waived the consciousness requirement and thereby there is no way in which the mind is a program in the sense that a program defines what it is to have a mind. This is not because programs are syntactic and a mind has semantics. All that Heidegger has to say here is the fact that what it is to think cannot be defined in terms of programs; however it does not follow that entities which act in a programmed way could not be counted as thinking entities. At this juncture, Okrent pursues the implications of a dialogue which Dreyfus initiated with the ghost of Alan Turing, the fact that Turing was willing to admit that "it is not possible to produce a set of rules purporting to describe what a man should do in every conceivable set of circumstances" (Turing 1950, P.441). From this above

premise it follows that no set of formal rules could ever specify what it is to have a mind in the Heideggerian sense of acting in accordance with some set of rules describing what should be done in every conceivable circumstance. So no set of formal rules could specify what it is to have a mind. Now the question is: could a machine be doing what it should, where what it should do is determined by social practices? Could such a machine have Dasein-like character?

From what Turing is willing to accept as a premise in the above argument, it does not follow that what a person should do can never be expressed in any set of rules. Dreyfus responds that it does not follow from the fact that the behavior of human agents follows causal laws that these laws could be embodied in a computer program. But it also surely does not follow that these causal laws could not be embodied in computer programs, and then a machine is surely expected to do everything that a person does in that similar situation, physically described. In that case the machine attains Dasein-like character; it is an entity, which has intentional states. Given Heidegger's views, this cannot be the case.

On the one hand his Husserlian background still keeps room for some form of consciousness as a requirement for intentionality, and that machines following formal rules cannot possibly be conscious. But this possibility could not be explored further as for Heidegger consciousness is not necessary for intentionality, rather in having intentions one must do what one should do and what one should do cannot be formalized, then one cannot argue from "A and B do the same things, physically described", to "doing the same thing intentionally described", since there could be no lawful relationship between these two, so from the fact that A and B do the same thing physically described, one can not infer "A and B both are Daseins" (Okrent 1996, online).

For Heidegger, intenationality requires a relation between an entity and the social practices; if one alters that social context, one is

altering the intentionality part, even if the physical description of the act remains the same. This logical independence of these two phases of description does not rule out the possibility of behavior of some entity satisfying both these descriptions. All one has to do is actually building such an entity which could satisfy both these descriptions, coming up with a set of rules which adequately describe our own behavior, which under another description is also skillful coping with environment by acting in accordance with social practices. Even if what qualifies a thinker as a thinker is not acting in accordance with rule manipulating symbols, it does not follow that some computers, or symbol manipulators, could not also be thinkers. What it is to be a 'thinking being', is an ontological question. The question of the being of a thinking entity is incompatible with the hypothesis that the mind is a computer.

Since this is not relevant, the later phase, whether some computers can also have a mind, is a logically separate question, even if the qualification for thinking is not that it behaves as some computers would, does not rule out the possibility that they would also behave the way a thinking entity should.

My second contention is regarding the non-computational model of intentionality provided by Husserl. In his ‘Philosophy of Arithmetic’ (1891), Husserl deals with the concept of numbers and also the psychological origin of the concept. He first describes the 'genuine presentations' of the concepts of unity, multitude, number, etc, and in the second part he defines the so-called symbolic representations. The genuine presentation is the same as the intuitive or insightful presentation in which the intended object is itself given. But this intuitive insight is restricted to a very small group of entities, as for a large set of hundreds or thousands of objects, the second presentation, of signs and symbols, is the only device. But the question is: how are these symbolic devices to be elucidated? This is the basic question of his ‘Philosophy of Arithmetic’. While there was no question regarding the arithmetical device resulting (objectively) in the truth, what he

wanted to explore was the justification part, whether these devices are also (subjectively) justified, that is, whether the devices can be performed with evidence, rather than merely blindly or by vote. It cannot be denied that the devices applied in the art of calculation do indeed result in truth. The ‘Philosophy of Arithmetic’ aims at justifying them, which should be the aim of the 'true philosophy of the calculus', the desideratum of centuries. According to Husserl, calculation, and all other higher forms of mental life in general (cf. especially 1890, p.349f) etc. are based on "mental mechanisms" (Munch 1996, p. 199 - 210), "Arithmetical devices are neither typically applied with evidence, nor have they been invented on the basis of arithmetical insights: our mind, in using them, becomes rather like the working of a machine, which uses "blind mechanical" or "logical–mechanical" devices (1890, p.364); i.e., the unelucidated processes that we normally use, are the result of a kind of "natural selection". It is, he says, 'in the struggle for existence that the truth was won (1890, p.371).' The description of these natural devices is the first task of Husserl's programme for elucidating them. However, this description of the natural mechanical processes, according to Husserl, is only the first stage in the full elucidation of symbolic representations. In a second, constitutive stage, the stage of justification, a logical device parallel to the psychological mechanism (a parallelaufendes logisches Verfahren 1890, p.359ff.) is to be developed. In this stage abstract algorithmical equivalents will be developed as well as rules for testing and inventing them.' (Munch 1996, p. 199) Thus the theories advocated by Husserl in his pre-1890 theories of mind came close to the computational model of thought. However, the initial difficulty of providing a special theory of symbolic knowledge providing insight and illumination as necessary criteria was overcome by his introduction of 'intentionality' over intuitions.

In 1893 Husserl introduced a new concept, of intention or representation, which is contrasted with the concept of intuition.

Now intuitions are those phenomena that are given directly or

without mediation, while in the case of intention our interest is directed towards an object, which is not intuited at the same time.

Intentions or representations always intend a fulfilment, which is supplied by intuitions. Until this concept was introduced symbols served as surrogates, the signs are not numbers but they represented numbers because of the fact that the digits belonged to a sign-system that mirrors the structure of numbers. It is therefore, by virtue of the structure, the syntax, that surrogates mean something, otherwise these signs are blind. In representations as intentions, Husserl discovered a psychological bond between the sign and the intuition in which the represented object is given. The sign is no longer a blind object but an 'Anhalt', a hold for meaningful act. He defines representation in ‘Psychological Studies’ (1894) as 'merely intending', and the dichotomy of the ‘Philosophy of Arithmetic’ is broken. On the strength of this newly found intentionality concept, Searle argues that consciousness is necessary for semantic content and that syntax is insufficient for consciousness. As Dier Munch (1996) sums up, '…Thus Husserl anticipates not only a programme of cognitive simulation, but also its criticism'.

Let me recapitulate the basic requirements laid down by Husserl and by Heidegger which must be fulfilled by any entity to be properly regarded as thinking. Husserl's dissatisfaction with the mode of calculative rationality and the use of inauthentic concepts expressed a genuine urge on his part to safeguard the human dimension of thought. He saw danger in machine intelligence replacing human intelligence when thought was identified with efficiency and with speed and on 'economy of thought which does not require much human effort.' But with its inherent blindness, it allows a powerful thinking without insight and illumination, without any need for self-justification. This notion can be evident when expert computer systems sometimes behave in an absurd manner when they have been provided with insufficient data. For Heidegger, this 'blindness' belongs to the essence of science.

According to Husserl, for science to be true science, it must escape from the pressing demands of everyday praxis; for Heidegger, the entanglement of theory and praxis shows that for finite, human Dasein, there is no such thing as pure theory. "Whereas Husserl interprets the narrowing of science to mere calculation as a loss of the original ideal of science, Heidegger holds that the dominance of calculative thought reveals the very essence of science. Where Husserl speaks of correcting all these short-comings of science by a willful assuming of another attitude, Heidegger alludes to a completely other form of thought, which can neither be willed, sought after, nor mastered" (Buckley 1992). In the Heideggerian framework, Dasein is called to respond to Being and Being's giving of itself in our time is through revelation in the form of technology. In a very specific sense, then, Dasein can be said to be responsible for technology. "Rather technology is the Gestell, which itself enframes everything, including Dasein. For this reason, Heidegger is able to claim that the essence of technology is 'nothing human.' This framework is not possible without humanity, but it reminds something beyond complete human control" (Buckley 1992).

In his response to Being, Dasein is responsible for that which to some extent is beyond Dasein. Being responsible in this manner implies a fundamental vulnerability on Dasein's part. We are responsible only for that which we can predict and control. This is quite contrary to the traditional sense of responsibility that we are responsible for that which comes from us, not for that which comes from afar, irrespective of the fact that there are many unforeseen consequences of our actions, which are beyond our control. We are responsible for those people or things which are given to us, not only to those whom we can control or predict." To be sure, such thinking is often closely allied with talk about responsibility, but this is a pseudo-responsibility, a responsibility for that which I can control, but not for that that might place me under its spell. Far more suitable responses might be gratitude, or remorse – resuming

in the request for forgiveness. Without doubt, the great difficulty which many philosophers have with Heidegger's own involvement with National Socialism is not just the involvement itself, but Heidegger's quasi-calculative defence that nobody could foresee the course that National Socialism was going to take. Perhaps he genuinely could not. But this in no way lessens responsibility and the obligation of a correct response – which in this case could only be humility and remorse. Such a response was never forthcoming" (Buckley 1992). Dasein's sense of responsibility is to respond to what comes from afar and to assume the care for that which it cannot master. Husserl's centrality to self-responsibility and the centrality for self-awareness and consciousness in any intentional act make human intelligence different from machine intelligence. A responsible man, an entity which has a mind, is not just capable of having calculative and predicative ability, but to an insightful way in which one is engaged with a dialogue with oneself, seeking justification with the willingness to question oneself, to seek evidence for that which one believes.

There was need for this critical quest even in Heidegger as his ‘Being and Time’, published in 1927, still carried the legacy of Husserlian and also the Hegelian emphasis on the primacy of thinking. With his central focus on 'how to think?', Heidegger made experiments with thought and with truth though for him it was an exploration of another kind of thinking: 'To think is to confine yourself to a Single thought that one-day stands Still like a star in the world's sky' (Quoted in McCann, 1979).

What is distinctive in us as thinkers is our ability to ask questions in our search for meaning and authenticity of life and existence.

For Heidegger, the most vital question is the question of Being,' what it means for something to be?' Our encounter with the question of Being discloses the practical nature of thought in its intimate relation with historicity and existence. Heidegger sought to unveil the nature of thinking of the earth-bound man who is

ruled not by the image of the sun, not by the light of reason per se, but by the logic of life depending on idiosyncratic circumstances of the moment for insight and practical wisdom. Dasein is neither a subject against an object, nor a man differing from a machine or a computer, but an understanding of how to use tools as tools. Its membership to its kind is crucial than its personal or non-personal dimensions. As Dasein is a kind of equipmental understanding that appropriately deals with equipments using tools as tools, anything could attain a Dasein like status provided it has a coping ability with mechanical commitments to rules which are already codified either in the wisdom of a tradition or in a rule book. For Heidegger Being question is related to our ability to make sense of things, an ability to interpret. Being is not a phenomenon that could be grasped in intuitive insight. We conduct our activities with a vague understanding of Being which is in the horizon of our ability to make sense of making sense. Husserl saw the inherent blindness of machine intelligence which he sought to overcome with due recognition to the logical and the rational dimension of thinking within his transcendental Phenomenology. For him entities in their mode of being could be rendered present as a phenomenon through categorical intuition and in rational insight. This light of reason is not a distinctive mark of machine intelligence or of mindless everyday coping skills in the background of socialized context of everyday practices. For Husserl there is threat to reason, responsibility and to morality if there is complete replacement of transcendental with the ontological dimensions of phenomenology.

My initial question was: beginning with this outline of Heidegger's Dasein, could one ascribe Dasein like character to a cyber being?

For Dreyfus computers would never be able to act intentionally since it acts only in a programmed way and it would be impossible for a computer or for a cyber being to successfully cope with its environment unless all the variables of a context are programmed.

Contrary to what Dreyfus says, with the advances made in technology and also in the field of AI, a robot of the most

sophisticated construction could be programmed to display better coping abilities than humans. If that is what characterizes human intentionality then these robots are better qualified to be Heideggerian Dasein in terms of better coping skills, better than any human grandmaster could ever display. "Kasparov ultimately seems to have allowed himself to be spooked by the computer, even after he demonstrated an ability to defeat it on occasion. He might very well have won it if he were playing a human player with exactly the same skill as deep blue (at least as the computer exists this year). Instead, Kasparov detected a sinister stone face where in fact there was absolutely nothing. While the contrast was not intended as a Turing Test, it ended up as one, and Kasparov was fooled" (Lanier, online). That a machine could attain a Dasein like character is now no longer an issue for me. What I am interested in finding is what is that which is distinctively human, that which would have made Kasparov look for a human face which could not come from his opponent displaying all coping abilities and all the known techniques of a skilled player? Why that stone face of his opponent could make him so unsure of himself?

For me, this is related to a more vital question regarding another dimension of meaning of Being. My question now is, 'What makes our coping abilities distinctively human?'

We as humans have the capacity to learn from our mistakes, we can commit wrongs and can repent for those wrongs, we may continuously ask the being question in order to redefine our stand and to remake ourselves, the qualities which humans alone are required to possess in a match for equality between humans and machines. "This is what makes our being distinct, this specific style of coping. It is a style consisting of unknowns and knowns, of past and future, of stumbling not gliding. It is our combination of Heidegger's big words, disclosed and undisclosed that characterize our way of coping our being. Confusing gibberish it is, but in many ways it is confusing gibberish that dominates what we are and therefore is a major part of what it means to be a Dasein" (Frey

1999). For us the real defeat comes not from a machine acting smarter than us, it is a defeat that comes when we surrender our distinctively human style of coping imbibing a style that is alien to us. Heidegger's late philosophy was a move toward a mystical dimension, more for mechanical submission to the moods of the commune than to reflect and research, more with an urge to be seized than to seize, for a kind of conversion than rational persuasion. His ideal Dasein became more machine-like with blindness to those emotions, which are necessary for us to cope with a style that is distinctively our own. The real threat comes if Dasein attains a machine-like character wearing a mask of a sinister stone face which is a real threat to its own being and to its authentic mode of being in the world.

References Bechtel, W. and A. Abrahamsen (1991). Connectionism and the Mind. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Buckley P. (1992). Husserl, Heidegger and the Crisis of Philosophical Responsibility. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Dreyfus H. L. (1997). 'Being—in—the–world'. The MIT Press.

Cambridge.

Frey C.H. (1999). Cyber-being and Time,Website: http://www.spark-online.com/december99/discourse/frey.htm [Accessed 4 August 2003] Lanier J. Why the Deep Blues, Website: http://www.antifeminism.com/chess.htm [Accessed 2 August 2003].

McCann C. (Ed.) (1979). Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessment, Volume 1. Routledge.

Munch D. (1996). 'The Early Husserl and Cognitive Science'. In: Baumgartner, E., Hrg., Handbook - Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, mit Illustrationen von Edo Podreka, Dettelbach: Röll.

Okrent, Mark. 1996. 'Why The Mind Isn't a Program (But Some

Digital Computer Might Have a Mind)', The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy, Website: http://ejap.louisiana.edu/EJAP/1996.spring/okrent.1996.spring.htm l [Accessed 10 February 2003].

Turing, A. M. (1950). 'Computing Machinery and Intelligence.'Mind LIX: 433-460.

Copyright Š 2003 Minerva.

All rights are reserved, but fair and good faith use with full attribution may be made of this work for educational or scholarly purposes.

Dr. Archana Barua teaches philosophy at the Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati. Her major areas of interest are Phenomenology of Religion and Phenomenology and Cognitive Science.

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Centre for Thomistic Studies | Article Index | Recommended Books | Recommended Links Universitas, Number 9, September 2001 << Previous | Index | Next Article >> Phenomenology and Philosophy dgboland Š 2001 "Is it possible, as the Pope seems to try and do, to reconcile Thomism with phenomenology?" is a question that has recently been put to us. It would be useful first of all to define the terms of the question. As we may presume that most of our readers will have a pretty good idea of what Thomism is, the task of definition

principally relates to the word "Phenomenology". As most would be aware, it is the name for a philosophical movement that owes its origin to Edmund Husserl. It came to prominence in the early part of the last century and has had profound influence on the whole range of contemporary thought. It is obviously a movement of some significance even today.

So as not to be accused of colouring our definition of it, let us take over for this purpose, without necessarily accepting what is said in it, one of the many descriptions of Phenomenology that can be found simply by searching the internet.

Phenomenology "Phenomenology, 20th-century philosophical movement dedicated to describing the structures of experience as they present themselves to consciousness, without recourse to theory, deduction, or assumptions from other disciplines such as the natural sciences."

Husserl The founder of phenomenology, the German philosopher Edmund Husserl, introduced the term in his book Ideas: A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (1913; trans. 1931). Early followers of Husserl such as the German philosopher Max Scheler, influenced by his previous book, Logical Investigations (1900-1; trans. 1970), claimed that the task of phenomenology is to study essences, such as the essence of emotions. Although Husserl himself never gave up his early interest in essences, he later held that only the essences of certain special conscious structures are the proper object of phenomenology. As formulated by Husserl after 1910, phenomenology is the study of the structures of consciousness that enable consciousness to refer to objects outside itself. This study requires reflection on the content of the mind to the exclusion of everything else. Husserl called this type of reflection the phenomenological reduction. Because the mind can be directed toward nonexistent as well as real objects, Husserl noted that phenomenological reflection does not presuppose that anything exists, but rather amounts to a "bracketing of existence,"

that is, setting aside the question of the real existence of the contemplated object.

What Husserl discovered when he contemplated the content of his mind were such acts as remembering, desiring, and perceiving and the abstract content of these acts, which Husserl called meanings.

These meanings, he claimed, enabled an act to be directed toward an object under a certain aspect; and such directedness, called intentionality, he held to be the essence of consciousness.

Transcendental phenomenology, according to Husserl, was the study of the basic components of the meanings that make intentionality possible. Later, in Cartesian Meditations (1931; trans. 1960), he introduced genetic phenomenology, which he defined as the study of how these meanings are built up in the course of experience.

Heidegger All phenomenologists follow Husserl in attempting to use pure description. Thus, they all subscribe to Husserl's slogan "To the things themselves." They differ among themselves, however, as to whether the phenomenological reduction can be performed, and as to what is manifest to the philosopher giving a pure description of experience. The German philosopher Martin Heidegger, Husserl's colleague and most brilliant critic, claimed that phenomenology should make manifest what is hidden in ordinary, everyday experience. He thus attempted in Being and Time (1927; trans.

1962) to describe what he called the structure of everydayness, or being-in-the-world, which he found to be an interconnected system of equipment, social roles, and purposes.

Because, for Heidegger, one is what one does in the world, a phenomenological reduction to one's own private experience is impossible; and because human action consists of a direct grasp of objects, it is not necessary to posit a special mental entity called a meaning to account for intentionality. For Heidegger, being thrown into the world among things in the act of realizing projects is a more fundamental kind of intentionality than that revealed in merely staring at or thinking about objects, and it is this more

fundamental intentionality that makes possible the directness analyzed by Husserl.

French Phenomenology The French existentialist Jean Paul Sartre attempted to adapt Heidegger's phenomenology to the philosophy of consciousness, thereby in effect returning to Husserl. He agreed with Husserl that consciousness is always directed at objects but criticized his claim that such directedness is possible only by means of special mental entities called meanings. The French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty rejected Sartre's view that phenomenological description reveals human beings to be pure, isolated, and free consciousnesses. He stressed the role of the active, involved body in all human knowledge, thus generalizing Heidegger's insights to include the analysis of perception. Like Heidegger and Sartre, Merleau-Ponty is an existential phenomenologist, in that he denies the possibility of bracketing existence. See EXISTENTIALISM. Phenomenology has had a pervasive influence on 20th-century thought. Phenomenological versions of theology, sociology, psychology, psychiatry, and literary criticism have been developed, and phenomenology remains one of the most important schools of contemporary philosophy."

As may be seen from this short description, Husserl's original concept has taken flesh, as it were, in a variety of ways, some of which are hardly compatible with each other. What will be noted, for instance, is the curious way in which Husserl's intentional urge to go "back to the things themselves" originally is expressed in terms of essences and pure intelligibility but ends up, via Heidegger and Sartre, concentrating on pure existence and the absurdity of the human condition. We have to be careful, then, to distinguish Phenomenology from some of its offshoots. The effort to be completely authentic in our thinking can sometimes result in a kind of mental exhaustion.

Fortunately, Husserl himself has left us a description of what he was trying to do in the Inaugural Lecture he gave on the occasion of his taking up a professorship at Freiburg im Breisgau in 1917.

The lecture is entitled Pure Phenomenology, Its Method and Its Field of Investigation. Though his thought may have undergone some change of perspective after that it can be taken as representing his basic position. How thoroughgoing his project was may be gathered from his opening words: "A new fundamental science, pure phenomenology, has developed within philosophy: This is a science of a thoroughly new type and endless scope. It is inferior in methodological rigor to none of the modern sciences. All philosophical disciplines are rooted in pure phenomenology, through whose development, and through it alone, they obtain their proper force. Philosophy is possible as a rigorous science at all only through pure phenomenology. It is of pure phenomenology I wish to speak: the intrinsic nature of its method and its subject matter that is invisible to naturally oriented points of view."

Focused as it is on the objects of consciousness, phenomenology can best be appreciated by contrasting it with scientific psychology. Thus Husserl goes on to say: "The ideal of a pure phenomenology will be perfected only by answering this question; pure phenomenology is to be separated sharply from psychology at large and, specifically, from the descriptive psychology of the phenomena of consciousness. Only with this separation does the centuries-old conflict over "psychologism" reach its final conclusion. The conflict is over nothing less than the true philosophical method and the foundation of any philosophy as pure and strict science."

Generally, Husserl is part of a movement at the end of the nineteenth century to transcend the limitations of the materialist/empiricist approach to science and philosophy. It is the expression of a desire, as he puts it, to return to the investigation of the things themselves, rather than examining only their material conditions, extrinsic causes etc. In Aristotelian terms, the philosophers especially had been starved of knowledge of forms.

They had been concentrating on finding out everything about things except what they are intrinsically.

Interestingly enough, though in some respects a return to traditional scholastic concerns and aristotelian methodology, the new movement has tended to retain the language of empiricism.

Thus, "We are the true positivists", Husserl says in 1913 in his "Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy". Experience is not to be arbitrarily limited to sense data but extends to all objects that present themselves to our consciousness. This adaptation of terminology does have a positive effect. For it highlights the actuality and vividness of our awareness of the intelligible world. The sense of wonder and mystery that ought to mark our endeavours to understand reality seemed to have gotten lost in the over-concentration on the reductive analysis of the empiricists and the positivists, on the one hand, and the logical constructions of the rationalists and the idealists, on the other.

The very word phenomenon is taken from the heart of empiricism and given a new meaning. There is a world of difference between the phenomenalism of Hume and the phenomenology of Husserl. A return to things themselves beyond their superficial appearances has been signaled by the new approach of phenomenology. The use of his opponents' terminology by Husserl is somewhat disconcerting and naturally casts suspicion on his project in the minds of some Thomists. But many of the insights of Phenomenology, properly interpreted, can in my view be reconciled with Thomism. Like it or not, too, it may be that we have a better chance of getting the philosophy of St. Thomas across in a language that is familiar to modern ears than in the traditional scholastic terminology. This to me appears the clue to the present Pope's "leaning towards Phenomenology".

Nonetheless, there remain problems with accommodating Husserl's thought to Thomism. It seems that he never quite resolved the issue of Realism versus Idealism within his new system of thought.

Though he rightly recognised that this issue was to some extent a false antithesis, and that the fundamental reality of the objects of our experience is not an issue that confronts our consciousness, his

language does lend itself in certain cases to an immanentist interpretation. Thus, he says, in his lecture: "To begin with, we put the proposition: pure phenomenology is the science of pure consciousness. This means that pure phenomenology draws upon pure reflection exclusively, and pure reflection excludes, as such, every type of external experience and therefore precludes any co-positing of objects alien to consciousnessâ&#x20AC;Ś.. Consciousness is taken purely as it intrinsically is with its own intrinsic constituents, and no being that transcends consciousness is co-posited ".

He likens his project to that of Descartes. "The so-called phenomenological reduction can be effected by modifying Descartes's method, by carrying it through purely and consequentially while disregarding all Cartesian aims; phenomenological reduction is the method for effecting radical purification of the phenomenological field of consciousness from all obtrusions from Objective actualities and for keeping it pure of themâ&#x20AC;Ś. The actuality of all of material Nature is therefore kept out of action and that of all corporeality along with it, including the actuality of my body, the body of the cognizing subject."

Nonetheless, the return "to the things themselves", as a rejection of Idealism, is the basis of his thought. It remains to consider whether and how his project can be interpreted in realistic terms. I believe that what he was attempting can be explained in a manner compatible with thomistic philosophy. It is significant that Husserl speaks in terms of bracketing of existence when we wish to consider the very object of consciousness in itself. For St. Thomas says something like this, in De Ente et Essentia (On Being and Essence).

He distinguishes two ways in which we can consider the essence of a thing. The first way is to consider it is according to its proper notion, or absolutely. In the second way we can consider the essence as it has existence in this and that. Looking at the essence in this second way brings into play considerations pertaining to the conditions of existence of the essence, whether it exists in the real

or in mind. It is the essence, e.g. of man, considered in the first way that is said first of all of anything, e.g. of Socrates. It seems to me that this is the consideration that Husserl is trying to rescue from those philosophies that blindly immerse themselves in the material and accidental existence of things, like someone feeling his way around with his eyes shut. Those who close themselves in upon the world of essences considered solely according to their logical existence in the mind, such as the Idealists, are equally blind to what is staring them in the face.

The essence absolutely considered does not include existence, but, as St. Thomas is careful to note, neither does it exclude it. Husserl, too, was not concerned to deny the actual existence of the real world, but sought simply to focus on the sense of the world that everyone is aware of as actually existing. In thomistic terminology, the first objects of the intellect are the intelligible principles of things, their substantial rationes, natures, essences. But we know that there is more to the things examined than that. By conversion to the phantasm, i.e. the concrete image of the imagination, the intellect is able to rejoin this abstract concept to the accidentals that belong to its individual existence. Thus, we not only understand what Socrates is, a man, but also that he is a white man. Linked integrally with our sense awareness, our intellect also grasps things in their actual existence. Thus, in his time, Plato, when awake, could say that his friend Socrates actually exists. We are using Aristotle's theory of knowledge here, not Plato's.

The realism of knowledge, therefore, becomes a problem for the modern mind because of the loss of the distinction made by St. Thomas. The fact that our concepts, according to an absolute consideration, do not posit the existence of the things understood does not mean that we have no way of knowing if such things exist. It is a consideration only, necessary because of the abstract nature of our intellectual knowledge. That does not preclude the consideration of those same things, according to the way they actually exist, firstly in the material world in which we live (as individuals), and secondly, in the spiritual world of our minds (as

universals).

The return to things in themselves that Husserl is concerned with is the same as the consideration of the intrinsic principles of things of Thomistic philosophy. It presupposes the original "co-positing" of the existence of things. For one cannot consider the real essences of things that do not exist. But the consideration of such essences absolutely or "purely" abstracts from the conditions of their existence. So the problems within Phenomenology, both for Husserl himself and for his followers, are not about the realism or idealism of the objects of consciousness. They are primarily focused on how to understand the essences simply considered.

Because the essences of things in our world are not simple but complex misunderstandings can arise as to what is the nature of man, for instance, even when considered absolutely in itself or, in Husserl's language, as a pure phenomenon. It is divergence of understandings in this regard that differentiates the various positions taken by his followers. The change of focus, though an advance in philosophical terms, does not automatically simplify things. So we see mirrored in Phenomenology, as it were, the spectrum of positions that can be, and historically have been, taken with regard to the nature of being generally and of man in particular.

The language of this discussion has become quite exotic. For "old" ideas, such as essences, and the corresponding philosophical sciences, such as Ontology, have been resurrected and dressed in a new terminology that contains elements of the old terminology as well. At the same time, the consideration of things according to the conditions of their existence, and particularly the human "thing" according to its human existence, have been given interpretations that, on the one hand allow for the spiritual dimension, and on the other hand do not. It is not surprising that the latter should end up in absurdity.

We can, therefore, "take on board" to some extent the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl. So too can we accept the use of it made by one of his close associates who at the same time

was a wonderful witness to the Faith, namely Blessed Edith Stein.

But its use by such as Heidegger and Sartre is another matter. The direction it has taken from their thought has been towards a humanism that quite readily converts into atheism. That does not mean to say that they do not have valuable particular insights into the human condition.

However, an adequate treatment of their positions is beyond the scope of this article. Neither do I presume to comment upon the Pope's personal philosophy, as that would require a more complete knowledge of his mind than I have. I have no worries about its perfect harmony with the thought of St. Thomas. Nor would I be concerned if in some respects he makes use of the language of phenomenology. * Quotations from the English translation of the lecture are taken from the Internet resource on Husserl maintained by Dr. Scott Moore, Baylor University, Waco, Texas, U.S.A. dgboland Š 2001 << Previous | Index | Next Article >> Don Boland is a lecturer at the Centre for Thomistic Studies, in Sydney, Australia.

This article posted September 2001. It was published in Universitas, No. 9 (2001).

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