Indian International Law Series, Volume 1 (2020)

Annual Yearbook for the Works produced in the Indian International Law Programme

Volume 1 (2020) Abhivardhan, Editor

Š Internationalism – AbhiGlobal Legal Research & Media LLP, 2020.

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Volume: 1 Year: 2020 Date of Publication: December 31, 2020 Editor: Abhivardhan.

ISBN (online): 978-81-947926-2-8 ISBN (paperback via Amazon KDP): 979-85-609700-8-6 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the publisher and the authors of the respective manuscripts published as papers, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other noncommercial uses permitted by copyright law. For permission requests, write to the publisher, ad-dressed “Attention: Permissions Coordinator,” at the address below.

Printed and distributed online AbhiGlobal Legal Research & Media LLP in the Republic of India. First edition, Volume 2 2020.

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For the purpose of citation, please follow the format for the list of references as follows: 2020. Indian International Law Series. Prayagraj: AbhiGlobal Legal Research & Media, 2020. 978-81-947926-2-8, 979-85609700-8-6.

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Preface The Indian International Law Programme is a policy research programme started by Internationalism in May 2020. The purpose of the project is central to the idea that Indian Diplomacy after 75 years of phases and changes, would seek a new and different era, where the purposive construct of Indian Foreign Policy and Relations would not be limited to the old-school strategies and legal ramifications. In a multipolar world, it would be therefore important for a nation-state like India to explore and expand its legal, multilateral, and policy narrative, to render a positive and reformist change in the international system and community.

This is an Annual Yearbook for the Works produced in the research programme, which encumbers preliminary and some advanced analysis on the recent developments in the arena of Indian Foreign Policy and International Relations.

The Programme estimates on Indian Diplomacy in their updated frontiers – 1. Adherence and manifesting international law via state practices and international legal custom; 2. Reverence and instrumentalizing measures to conform with its role as a Stabilizing Power in the realm of international relations; 3. Role of India to preserve and reshape multilateralism under its multialignment policy; 4. Assessing India's role as a Civilizational-Constitutional State; 5. Transforming India's Strategic Soft Power Imperatives in an Intersectionality-Centric Information Society; I would extend my gratitude to Akash Manwani, Executive Board Member of Global Law Assembly and the Chief Innovation Officer of Indian Society of Artificial Intelligence and Law, Vaibhav Dwivedi, Deputy Director of the Research Programme, Aryakumari Sailendraja, Chief Operating Officer, Internationalism, Professor Sourabh Ubale, our Global Legal Innovation Advisory Member and Manohar Samal, Research Analyst at Internationalism for their inputs and suggestions for the policy research programme.

Abhivardhan Director Indian International Law Programme.

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Acknowledgments Dr Nanda Kishor Asst Prof (Senior Scale) at Dept of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education, India Dr Vignesh Ram Head, Political Risk & Intelligence Services Management (PRISM), COVINTS

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Table of Contents Introduction 1. Introduction to the Programme Discussion Papers.

2. India’s Restrictions on Public Procurement: An Analysis of Conformity with National Treatment Obligations under GATT Sathyajith MS 3. The History of Indo-African Relations in Context of the Growth of International Law Yashna Walia 4. An Impact Analysis of China’s Foreign Policy Imperatives on the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Yashvi Agarwal & Avishi Pateriya 5. Serbia-Kosovo Economic Normalization and Principled Realism in US Foreign Policy Mugdha Satpute & Prafful Tonge Reports.

6. Discussion Report on the Abraham Accords brokered between US, Israel and UAE in August 2020 Vasu Sharma, Avishikta Chattopadhyay and Pratham Sharma, Editors 7.Recommendations Report on the Roundtable on Indian Diaspora and the U.S. Presidential Elections 2020 Avishi Patreya and Yashvi Agarwal, Editors 8. Discussion Report on the Indo-African Ties and its Avenues in a Multipolar World Vamya Dhawan, Editor & Pooghuzhali R P and Mukesh M, Contributors 9. China’s National Security Law and Implications for HKSAR: An Overview Mugdha Satpute 10. Indo-Korean Relations: An Overview Avishikta Chattopadhyay and Mugdha Satpute 11. Normalization of the Israel-Morocco Relations: An Overview Yashna Walia 12. The Developing Israel-Bhutan Ties: An Overview Yashna Walia

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Policy Briefs.

13. The Indian Ocean Initiative and the Potential of Russian Cooperation Ridhima Bhardwaj and Mugdha Satpute 14. The Pulwama Attack Confessions: International Legal Remedies for India Manohar Samal 15. The Status Quo Issues in the US Peace Plan on Israel-Palestine & the Indian Analysis Akash Manwani and Mugdha Satpute 16. India-European Union Relations: Free Trade Agreement and Allied Issues Manohar Samal 17. China & the Central and Eastern European Nations: Shifting Dynamics and the Indian Repositioning Akash Manwani 18. Analysing the Effects of the Defense of Japan White Paper 2020 on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue Manohar Samal 19. The Long-Waving Chabahar Port Issue and India's Dilemma Ridhima Bhardwaj & Vasu Sharma 20. Is the Afghanistan Peace Process a Preventive Method or a Cure?

Mugdha Satpute

Indian International Law Series

Research Team Indian International Law Programme

Executive Team.

Research Members.

Abhivardhan Director, Indian International Law Programme

Vasu Sharma Research Analyst [Former] Aman Kotecha Research Member Avishikta Chattopadhyay Research Member Urvashi Arora Research Member Ridhima Bhardwaj Research Member Avishi Pateriya Research Member Yashvi Agarwal Research Member Yashna Walia Research Member

Vaibhav Dwivedi Deputy Director, Indian International Law Programme Dhakshayanee Srinivasan Programme Coordinator, Indian International Law Programme Prof Sourabh Ubale Assistant Professor (Marathwada Mitra Mandal's Shankarrao Chavan Law College, Pune) & PhD Scholar (University of Mumbai)

Research Analysts.

Manohar Samal Research Analyst Pratham Sharma Junior Research Analyst Nikita Mulay Junior Research Analyst Sathyajith MS Junior Research Analyst Pratik Dutta Junior Research Analyst Mugdha Satpute Junior Research Analyst Prafful Tonge Junior Research Analyst

Internationalism Editorials.

Aryakumari Sailendraja Editor-in-Chief at Legit by Internationalism Vamya Dhawan Editor at Legit by Internationalism Poonguzhali R P Senior Associate Editor at Legit by Internationalism Mukesh M Member at Legit by Internationalism

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1 Introduction to the Programme Abhivardhan Director, Indian International Law Programme abhivardhan@internationalism.co.in About. This Chapter is dedicated to elaborate upon the development of the Indian International Law Programme in Internationalism Research and the developmental feats achieved so far in 2020.

Indian International Law The Programme was designed with the very intent in May 2020 to put forward developmental considerations and policy innovations in the realm of international law and relations, from the Indian policy community. Our team at Internationalism is young and vibrant, and we are cautious about what we intend to cover and research.

Indian foreign policy requires improvement in many arenas that are in connection with. India’s contributions to international law date back to 1945, since the days when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 was being framed. India’s recommendation of the UNSC reform, assistance in UN Peacekeeping and the urge to lead the Global South group of countries signifies how the role of India as a part of the international community has changed. The role however is not limited to international organizations and summits. The Indic culture, which espouses faiths such as Hinduism, Jainism, Sikhism, Shintoism and Buddhism, to name a few, has cultural and aesthetic capabilities to shape the trend and potential of the multipolarity of the world order and reform multilateralism on a reasonable basis. The vision of Atmanirbhar Bharat as propounded by the Government of India under the premiership of Narendra Modi – which experts call ‘selfreliance’, is not just India’s motto, but a serious exercise to achieve better ways of negotiation and sustainability. In fact, we trust that India can guide the international community in upholding the values of a democracy – and transitioning better and reasonable idea-models on rule of law, innovation and confidence-building measures. From Vedantic Universalism to the Far East Policy, the Indian thinking quotient requires revisiting and ignition, which is the most of our concern in the Indian International Law Programme.

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Research Groups under Consideration The team of IIL Programme is divided into the following groups, wherein each group takes and handles their own issues (non-exhaustive) of interest.

• QUAD and ASEAN Leadership - QUAD and International Law Governance Models - QUAD’s Soft Power Potential - QUAD and Technology Geopolitics - Indo-ASEAN Relations - Indo-Taiwan Relations • India and Global Governance - India at the United Nations and other International Organizations - Reformed Multilateralism - Indic Traditionalism and International Law • India and South-South Cooperation - Indo-Africa Relations - Indo-Latin America Relations - India’s Development Diplomacy • Indic Constitutionalism and Traditionalism - Constitutional Morality and Anthropology - Indian Legal Education - Organic Secularism and Cultural Pluralism • Public Diplomacy and Innovation in India • Central Asia-Europe and Russian Studies - Indo-Russian Relations - Indo-European Relations - Indo-West Asia Relations - Transitional Justice Studies • Artificial Intelligence and Diplomacy - Disruptive Technology and Geopolitics - Information Warfare - AI Ethics Policy in India The works published by Internationalism Research in this annual book are a part of the Indian International Law Programme.

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2 India’s Restrictions on Public Procurement: An Analysis of Conformity with National Treatment Obligations under GATT Sathyajith MS1 1Junior

Research Analyst, Internationalism satyajith.ms@internationalism.co.in

Abstract. In a recent measure, India imposed certain restrictions on public procurement from countries that share land borders with it. This measure, on a prima facie reading, may appear to violate certain principles and norms of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This paper will make an attempt to analyse if the measure undertaken by India is in conformity with its national treatment obligations under the WTO framework. It will construct a paradigm of a potential dispute at the WTO regarding the measures undertaken and analyse the same with respect to India’s national treatment obligations under the framework. The paper will further study if India can claim certain exceptions to the obligations citing the circumstances under which the measures were undertaken.

Introduction The Government of India imposed restrictions on public procurement from countries that share a border with it citing security reasons and strengthening the security. (PIB, New Delhi, 2020) The government issued an Order by amending the General Financial Rules, 2017 to impose the restrictions. The Order particularly states that any bidder from countries that share a land border with India will have to register with a competent authority which will be constituted

by Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT). (Ministry of Finance, 2020) It also makes it mandatory to get clearance from the Ministry of External Affairs and Ministry of Home Affairs. This will apply to all new tenders prospectively from the date of this Order. In cases where the bids had already been invited, but the first stage of qualifier evaluation had not been completed, those bidders not registered with the competent authority would be deemed ineligible. If the bidding process had cleared this stage, then the tenders would have to be issued afresh or de novo.

It would be pertinent to analyse this measure vis-a-vis the framework of WTO

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and test its conformity with the latter. However, it would require a basic understanding of the WTO framework and its principles thereof.

World Trade Organization (WTO)

The WTO was established in January 1995 by the virtue of Marrakesh Agreement and can be said to be a culmination of international efforts for over five decades to establish a truly international trade organisation in order to cater to the growing needs of the international economic scenario. (Koul, 2018) It is said that the WTO has completed the unfinished agenda of ITO of Havana Charter. The preamble of the WTO explicitly states that the international economic relations should be conducted to ensure higher standards of living, provide full employment, expand production of trade in goods and services, optimal use of world's resources with the objectives of sustainable development in a manner consistent with the respective needs and concerns of members at different levels of economic development.

The WTO is a successor of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1947 (GATT, 1947). While the GATT, 1947 covered only goods, the establishment of WTO in 1995 brought in several other aspects within its scope. It expanded the coverage of the multilateral rules to include services and intellectual property.

GATT now stands alongside the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement) inter alia. (World Trade Organization) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994:

When the GATT, 1947 came into force, it enumerated certain core principles which even to this date is a guide the actions of WTO. They are as follows: (World Trade Organization) 1. Most Favoured Nation (MFN) rule 2. Reduction and binding of national tariffs 3. National Treatment Obligation rule 4. Prohibition of protective measures other than tariffs (subject to exceptions) While the Most Favoured Nation rule and the rule of National Treatment Obligation would be relevant to the measure undertaken by India, this paper would delve into the applicability of the latter and its jurisprudence thereof.

National Treatment Obligation in GATT The principle of National Treatment Obligation is enumerated on Article III of the GATT, 1994 and plays a fundamental role in the governing framework of the

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agreement. It is said to complement the MFN rule. The principle of national treatment puts the products manufactured domestically on equal terms with the imported products. (World Trade Organization) Article III envisages prevention of application of protectionist measures. The primary purpose of Article III is said to ensure that members don't apply internal measures to either domestic products or imported products to protect domestic production effectively.

(World Trade Organization) Article III of the GATT, 1994 creates an obligation for the members to ensure equality of competitive conditions for imported products in relation to the domestic products. It is said that the framers intended to provide the same treatment to the imported products and domestic products once the former has cleared the customs. (World Trade Organization) Commentators suggest that Article III particularly focuses on 'providing economic opportunities for importers through the elimination of discriminating governmental measures which are fair in international trade as against competition or antitrust law which focuses on firm practices or structural modification which may prevent or restrain or eliminate competition'. (Koul, 2018) Article III does not differentiate between quantitative or qualitative regulation to goods which are sold or purchased in the domestic market.

The first paragraph of Article III lays down the general principle of the entire provision by stating the purpose. It is to guarantee that 'internal taxes and other internal charges and laws, regulation and requirement affecting the internal sale, transportation, distribution or use of products...should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production’.

(Koul, 2018) (Appellate Body Report, WTO, 2001)It would be pertinent to note that the term ‘product’ in this provision implies ‘like’ products. In order to satisfy the test of ‘likeness’, the WTO DSB has developed certain requirements which need not be discussed in the paper since the potential contention would not be on the issue of ‘likeness’.

The specific provision which will be the matter of potential contention between the conflicting parties is Article III:4 of the GATT. Article III:4 reads as follows“The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product.”

The WTO jurisprudence on this provision has been of significance. The WTO DSB has come up with a three-tier test which must be satisfied to qualify as a

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contravention of Article III:4. (Appellate Body Report, WTO, 2001) They are- i) the imported and domestic products at issue are ‘like products’; ii) that the measure at issue is a ‘law, regulation, or requirement affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, or use; iii) the imported products are accorded ‘less favourable’ treatment than that accorded to like domestic products. The measure should satisfy all the three elements mentioned to qualify as a violation. In the present matter, it would be improbable to demonstrate that the notification issued by the government does not satisfy the three-tier test. While there exists some scope for the respondent to demonstrate that the notification does not satisfy the third element concerning ‘according less favourable treatment’, this paper does not analyze the same.

Derogation Provision under Article III:8

With this, it would be significant to note that it would be pertinent to look into Article III:8 of the GATT which deals with government procurement vis-àvis national treatment obligations. It is considered to be an exception to the national treatment principle by a few commentators. However, WTO jurisprudence considers it to be a ‘scope’ provision in itself as provided by the panel report of Canada –Renewable Energy/ Canada –Feed-in Tariff Program. It can be said that the scope of national treatment obligation under Article III is limited by the operation of Article III:8(a). Article III:8(a) reads as follows“The provisions of this Articles hall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements governing the procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for commercial sale”

It has been termed as a derogation provision i.e., derogation from obligations which are binding on Members with respect to other paragraphs of Article III. To put in an alternative way, if it can be demonstrated that the measure undertaken falls within the scope of Article III:8(a), it cannot be subject to any test under other paragraphs of Article III. In order to determine the application of Article III:8(a), there are three issues which are to be analyzed. Firstly, it should be seen if whether the challenged measures can be characterized as laws, regulations or requirements governing procurement. The measure undertaken by India was issued by the operation of two orders which came from the Ministry of Finance. The order clearly falls within the definition of law as provided in Article 13 of the Constitution of India.

Now, it would be pertinent to demonstrate that the said order has a direct nexus with procurement. The order imposes certain restrictions on bidders from participating in processes governing procurement of products. The order explicitly governs the conditions of procurement. Therefore, with a clear

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establishment of a nexus between the two, the first requirement for the application of Article III:8(a) is fulfilled.

Secondly, it is required to be shown that the procurements are by governmental agencies. The term 'governmental agencies' refers to those entities acting for or on behalf of the government in the public realm within the competencies that have been conferred on them to discharge governmental functions. It has been stated that the order takes into its ambit public sector banks and financial institutions, Autonomous Bodies, Central Public Sector Enterprises (CPSEs) and PublicPrivate Partnership (PPP) projects receiving financial support from the Government or its undertakings. Most of these entities are also considered to be a part of ‘State’ as provided under Article 12 of the Constitution of India.

Therefore, it would be preposterous to claim that those entities which are considered to be State do not satisfy the requirement of the term governmental agencies. In the case of PPP projects as well, it can be said that the entities are discharging public functions which are delegated by the government. PPP projects are only a different model through which the State discharges its functions to maintain efficiency. Hence, the second requirement of demonstrating that the procurements are undertaken by governmental agencies also stands fulfilled.

Thirdly, it is required to be shown that the procurement is in furtherance of discharging governmental functions and not necessarily for commercial resale.

This third requirement is problematic with a view that categorization of governmental function and commercial resale cannot be watertight. The cornerstone for interpretation has been Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which calls for a much more holistic approach to the interpretation of the provisions. It would be possible to discern the objective or purpose of the measure by analyzing the content of the same. The order issued by the Ministry of Finance states “orders have been issued requiring registration of bidders from a country sharing land border with India in order to be eligible to bid in public procurement”. (Emphasis intentional) The term ‘public’ is defined as “relating to or involving people in general, rather than being limited to a particular group of people”. Prima facie reading of the order in this context implies that the procurement undertaken is in furtherance of discharging governmental functions since the terms ‘governmental’ and ‘public’ are used interchangeably in certain contexts.

The three requirements are fulfilled at prima facie reading of the order. However, it would be pertinent to note that this may depend on the applicability of Article III:8(a) for specific contexts. This is due to the fact that WTO jurisprudence has also developed the concept of ‘competitive relationship’ between the subject matter of the law, regulation or requirement and the product being discriminated against. For example, if the government calls for tender to procure steel for building highways, the WTO jurisprudence states that steel and highways are to

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be in a ‘competitive relationship’ which is not the case. If Article III:8(a) cannot be applied, there is a potential violation of Article III:4. Several commentators have been critical of this approach of interpreting the provision. (The GATT Article III:8(a) Procurement, 2015) This approach was adopted by the Appellate Body in the Canada – Renewable Energy dispute. There is a need to revisit this approach and review the same. The interpretation narrowly construes the meaning and largely limits the scope of the provision. It would rather be feasible for the DSB to test the measure by looking into the ‘close relationship’ of the products in question. While even this may not cover different contexts, it definitely has a broader scope than the test of ‘competitive relationship’. (The GATT Article III:8(a) Procurement, 2015) Hence, it can be said that the measures undertaken by the government come within the scope of Article III:8(a) on a prima facie reading. In a potential dispute at the WTO DSB, India definitely can assert that the said the orders should come within the purview of Article III:8(a). While it is true that the Appellate Body is not functional, as far as the legality of the measure is concerned, it can be said that it is in conformity with Article III. This is further bolstered by the fact that there is a separate Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) which makes it mandatory for the members to follow national treatment obligations even in cases of government procurement.

The agreement was negotiated in the Tokyo Round (1979) initially and finalised in the Uruguay Round in 1994. It is a plurilateral agreement which is only binding on members that have accepted it. The agreement was revised in 2012 and came into force in 2014. (Koul, 2018) Since India has not consented to the GPA, it is not bound to follow the obligations prescribed under the same which includes foregoing the applicability of Article III:8(a) for government procurement. If the measure undertaken by India is considered to be a violation of national treatment obligations, it would potentially lead to an effective imposition of the GPA on non-parties which would be problematic in the light of the sharp divide which we are noticing within the WTO and international trade broadly.

Application of Security Exception under GATT In any case, even if the measure undertaken is considered to be a violation of India’s national treatment obligations under the GATT, with the context in which the measure was undertaken and the objective of the same should be considered.

Article XXI of the GATT provides for the security exceptions and is considered to be the most sensitive as the wording implies that every country is the sole judge on issues regarding its own security. (Koul, 2018) . The raison d’être of the security exception is to preserve Members’ freedom of action in areas relating to national defence and security. However, it goes without a saying that while pursuing

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security interests, GATT obligations cannot be thrown into the bin. The obligations under GATT may be placed on the backburner when a member pursues its security interests. The text of the provision is as follows“Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed so as to: (b) to prevent any (member country) from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests (i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived; (ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition, and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment; (iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations.”

WTO jurisprudence regarding the provision has not developed since the DSB has dealt with only a few issues regarding security exceptions. However, in a recent report, WTO panel in the Russia—Traffic in Transit dispute held that the panel may review the actions by utilising objective parameters. Further, it has to be noted that India could possibly resort to the third sub-clause for the application of security exceptions which provides or certain exigencies.

The context in which the previously stated measure has been undertaken would demonstrate if India can claim security exception. After countries expressing displeasure over the way in which China handled the Covid-19 outbreak, there were tensions along the Line of Actual Control. In June, around 20 Indian soldiers martyred at the border by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

India protested by unequivocally stating that China attempted to alter the status quo unilaterally. Subsequently, India banned over 119 Chinese-based apps citing security reasons and imposed restrictions on public procurement from countries which share a land border with India.

In this context, it is fairly clear that the conflict between India and China was not limited to political and economic differences. There were military stakeholders involved and the border clashes sustained for a fairly reasonable time as well. This view has also been stated in the panel report of Russia—Traffic in Transit wherein it has been stated that “While such conflicts (economic and political) could sometimes be considered urgent or serious in a political sense, they will not be ‘emergencies in international relations’ within the meaning of subparagraph (iii) unless they give rise to defence and military interests, or maintenance of law and public order interests”. The order which imposes restrictions on public procurement clearly states that it is on the grounds of defence of India and national security. This intent can be discerned from the context in which the measure was taken as well. This can be invoked regardless of the fact that China alleging that India is responsible since the mere existence of the situation is sufficient.

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Conclusion In the paradigm constructed, India surely has multiple options available within the WTO legal framework to justify its actions. Considering the fact that the context and the background also provide sufficient reasons to demonstrate that India’s actions were bona fide, India could overcome any dispute over the measures in the WTO DSB. While India has sufficient grounds and reasons to vindicate its measure under Article III:8(a), it can also demonstrate that the measure in furtherance of national security interests and defence matters. There is a greater burden on the Complainant to show that there has been a violation of Article III:4, which would probably be an exercise in vain. Therefore, in conclusion, it can be seen that there are sufficient legal assertions to vindicate the measure undertaken.

References 1. Appellate Body Report, WTO. 2001. Korea- Measures Affecting Imports of Beef (DS161). 2001.

2. Koul, Autar Kishen. 2018. Guide to WTO and GATT Economics, Law and Politics. New Delhi: Satyam Law International, 2018.

3. Ministry of Finance. 2020. DIPP. [Online] July 23, 2020. [Cited: October 26, 2020.] http://pibcms.nic.in/WriteReadData/userfiles/Annexure%201(1).pdf.

4. PIB, New Delhi. 2020. Restrictions on Public Procurement from certain countries. Press Information Bureau.

[Online] July 23, 2020. https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1640778.

5. The GATT Article III:8(a) Procurement. Davies, Arwel. 2015. s.l. : Journal of International Economic Law (Oxford), 2015.

6. World Trade Organization. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. s.l. : WTO.

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3 The History of Indo-African Relations in Context of the Growth of International Law Yashna Walia1 1Research

Contributor, Internationalism walia.yashna@gmail.com

Abstract. Discovery of different lands and subsequent colonization by Europeans had lasting impacts on international discourse. Europe prospered over the subjugation of people from other continents. To justify its cause, it developed such literature that can arguably be called ethnocentric. This paper seeks to highlight how these doctrines laid the basis of international law. Further, it highlights how India and Africa's common cause against discrimination and oppression led them to develop strong relations. It was their solidarity that helped them make their own contribution towards international discourse, the influence of which exists even today. This piece largely covers the time period until Jawaharlal Nehru’s demise. It seeks to underline the historical goodwill existing between Africa and India, which both can leverage to develop their partnership even further.

Introduction The world's understanding of international law is primarily derived from literature available in the first world countries. It was the scholarship available in these countries that laid the foundation of international political organisations.

Comparatively less research has gone into the historical international legal principles of the third world countries. India and Africa went through very similar issues after they were colonized. Both had to face racial discrimination and perpetual economic exploitation. It was their shared struggles that made both of them connect and charter their own course in history, regardless of the powers dominating over them. The below mentioned accounts shall demonstrate the dominating cultural influence over international law. Thereafter, India's relations with Africa shall be examined in vivid detail.

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History of International Law International law as a concept started developing before the advent of colonialism. It was a European discipline, written from the perspective of European people. Today, it can very well be argued that colonialism was central to the very formation of this discipline. The principal analytical frameworks of international law were established before any real examination of non-European people was done. Thus, the legal basis by which the lands of non-European people could be occupied was a secondary question to its scholars. They felt that there were ‘greater theoretical issues’ confronting the discipline (Anghie 2006).

If we consider the analytical school of law, we see how the jurisprudence of that time was ‘Europe-centric’. The central Austinian problem was about how order could be created amongst sovereign states. But, it simply didn’t extend sovereignty to the non-European people. Thus, the sovereignty doctrine systematically occluded the study of non-European states. It consisted of such mechanisms that expelled non-European states from the realm of power (Anghie 2006).

The jurisprudence of that time took a step even further. The above was a mere preclude to the ‘civilising mission’- the grand redeeming project of bestowing sovereignty on the dark places of the Earth. International law legitimized imperialism. It felt that colonizing non-European people was justified because they were barbaric and uncivilized. Once they were conquered upon and taught civilization, they could then be decolonized and given sovereignty. The mechanisms of ‘incorporation and transformation’ and ‘colonialism and decolonisation’ were pertinent. What is surprising is that using force against humans and taking away their right to self-determination was not seen as ‘barbaric’ (Anghie 2006).

While the traditional approach to International law states that an established sovereignty manages the problem of cultural difference, it is worthy to be noted that the concept of sovereignty itself emanates from this very problem (Anghie 2006).

Not only the analytical school, but also the schools of nationalism, positivism, pragmatism etcetera adhered to such inherent biases. As the Europeans started coming in contact with non-European people, they started developing international legal principles. Scholarship shows that even the non-European countries had such principles. They developed, understood and practiced their laws of treaties and laws of war (Anghie 2006).

Fransico de Vitoria demonstrated a rather complicated, and yet biased view in his work ‘On the Indians Lately Discovered’. This came in the context of Spanish claims to sovereignty over the recently discovered Americas (Anghie 2006).

Drawing upon naturalist and theological jurisprudence, Vitoria argued that the indigenous people were governed by their basic ‘natural’ law. This was in contrast

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to other scholars who had described them as ‘heathens’ and ‘animals’ who lacked cognizable rights. Vitoria argued that they used reason according to their own kind and had a certain method in their affairs. They had definite worship, laws, overlords, magistrates and the institution of marriage. They also had their own system of exchange (Anghie 2006).

Yet, he contended that their order was ‘deficient’ and unfit to found or administer lawful state in accordance with human and civil claims. They didn’t have ‘proper’ laws and could not control their family affairs (Anghie 2006).

He suggested that the Spanish establish a proper government in the Americas, as ‘trustees’ and ‘guardians’ of the uncivilized people, thus making themselves ‘agents of natural law’. War against such people was ‘perpetual’- their guilt or innocence simply didn’t matter. The rules of war were different from the ones in place had they been in conflict with a ‘civilized’ European adversary (Anghie 2006).

Thus, the indigenous people were left with a peculiar ‘in-between’ status where they were bound by law and yet, outside its protections. Vitoria acknowledged the order created by the non-Europeans, and yet called it deficient and justified war. He did not advocate for initial humane interaction with them, yet qualified the Spanish as their guardians and trustees. An apparently philanthropist approach of including them in a ‘correct’ universal order became the basis of transforming them. In justifying such an inhumane approach, the indigenous man was shown in contrasting ways. The spectrum started with the ‘hopelessly savage, violent man’, ranged to ‘backward, in need of guidance’ and ended with ‘economic man who is anxious to trade and yet is suppressed by his ruler’(Anghie 2006).

Vitoria’s work demonstrates how central commerce was to the concept of international law. Commercial exploitation necessitated war, thus the attempt to justify such aggression using international legal principles (Anghie 2006).

The 19th century saw the emergence of the ‘positivist’ school of jurisprudence.

Unlike the natural school which stated that all countries were bound by a natural order, the positivists laid emphasis on the state. The state was the exclusive creator of all laws and could not be bound by any law if it has not consented to it.

The positivists devised a series of formal doctrines to justify subjugation of the non-Europeans. They used explicitly racial and cultural criteria to classify the European states as civilized and thus, sovereign and the non-European ones as being uncivilized, non-sovereign and lacking legal personality (Anghie 2006).

We are now confronted with another paradox. The lands of the non-European were considered terra nullius – land deemed to be unoccupied or uninhabited.

Yet, treaties signed with native chiefs to acquire land were considered to be perfectly legal. The ability of natives to enter into such treaties in the first place is paradoxical. They had been given ‘quasi sovereignty’ to benefit the European position’s legality (Anghie 2006).

This sort of divided treatment could even be seen in countries not occupied by

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European powers. They had to presuppose European presence in their policy and adopt a system of unequal treatment where the Europeans would be governed by their own laws, not the law of the land. Countries which did not agree to follow this path gave an excuse to the Europeans to bring them under European governance (Anghie 2006).

European states even had ‘proper title’ to divide amongst themselves the land of the non-European; as is evident from the Berlin conference of 1884-85.

It was after World War I that the world opened its eyes to the racial and cultural differentiation being practiced. Various scholars and political figures denounced the international law of the 19th century for the ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ differentiation it created. However, this difference inevitably did trickle onto the economic parlance of ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’ countries (Anghie 2006).

The League of Nations was established after World War I. Its mandate was to create sovereignty for the third world countries. In doing so, it ensured that the political and economic interests of the Western World were never compromised.

The third world’s political sovereignty had to be consistent with their economic subordination. The western countries were immune from international scrutiny (Anghie 2006).

It was finally under the United Nations that the third world countries furthered and articulated their own views, as they started becoming independent and changing the system’s composition. Decolonisation became a major focus in this system (Anghie 2006).

Pre-Independence Indo-African Ties Africa-India relations are historical in nature. India’s links with Egypt date back to the 10th century. Enterprising Indian merchants traded with Africans through oceanic routes. Since then, there has been considerable Indian presence in Africa.

Indians were also part of the slave trade, and later, the indentured labour system.

Although less in number, Africans had also settled in India. Now known as Siddis, they’d arrived at the Bharuch port in 628 CE. Because of the abolitionist campaign of the 19th century, Africans liberated from the ships were channeled into three places- Bombay, Pune and Nasik. These Africans associated themselves with European culture, ideas and manners in contrast to the Siddis, who assimilated with the local culture (Dubey 2016).

India and Africa continued to be connected through several ways. Both had the presence of British colonial powers in common. Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian National Congress played a huge role in keeping both of the lands politically connected. Presence of Indian diaspora in Africa too helped to keep the lands connected (Dubey 2016).

Mahatma Gandhi was a victim of racism in South Africa and was deeply moved by the segregationist and expansionist traits of the European powers. It was him

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who started the first political formation in South Africa by establishing the Natal Indian Congress in 1894. He made a huge contribution to the cause of the Africans before arriving in India in 1915.

The Indian National Congress in its Calcutta session of 1928 decided to set up an overseas department in Africa so as to establish contact with political organizations and leaders in Africa. The Congress was opposed to the racist policies followed by the British in African countries. The Congress Working Committee (CWC) passed resolutions against such discrimination practiced in the Union of South Africa and Kenya (Dubey 2016).

From very early on, Jawaharlal Nehru was connected to the cause of African people. In 1912, he joined Gopal Krishna Gokhale’s fund raising campaign for Satyagrah in South Africa (Srivastava 1996). In 1927, he visited the Brussels Conference of Oppressed Nationalities where he met leaders from North and SubSaharan Africa. There, he emphasised on ‘joint deliberation’ and ‘join action’ by the Indians and Africans. In the Conference of Peace and Empire in London in 1928, he again emphasised on the African cause (Dubey 2016).

The Case of Abyssinia

Now known as Ethiopia, Abyssinia was a monarchical state led by Haile Selassie I. It faced aggression from Italy, led by its fascist leader Benito Mussolini. Known as the Abyssinian Crisis, it took place between 1934 and 1937 and posed as the first stern test of the League of Nations. It must be noted that both Italy and Abyssinia were part of the League of Nations. Indian leaders came out in support of Abyssinia that time (Abyssinian Crisis 2020).

Italy was vengeful for the defeat it suffered in Adowa in 1896. The Welwel Incident of November 22, 1934 further accelerated the ongoing tensions between the two states. On the pretext of the alleged assault on Italian inspectors, Mussolini felt they had the right to move much further from the SomaliaEthiopian border on November 23, 1934. Haile Selassia I denounced the invasion.

The League appointed an arbitration board and referred the two complainants back to back on September 3, 1935. However, these attempts failed to prevent the upcoming actions. On October 2, 1935- ten divisions comprising of 3,000 men invaded Abyssinia along with tanks and aviation. The armed conflict, now known as the Second Italian-Ethiopian war lasted till May 9, 1936. The consequences of this war were two- fold: Italy withdrew from the League of Nations and it paved the way for its diplomatic, strategic and political realignment with Nazi Germany (Abyssinian Crisis 2020).

Another facet of European powers emerged in context of this war from the HoareLaval Pact of 1935. This was a secret pact to be put forward by Britain and France to Italy. By this pact, most of Abyssinia was to be offered to Italy in exchange for a truce in the Italo-Ethiopian war. Put together by British Foreign Secretary Sir

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Samuel Hoare and French Premier Pierre Laval, it failed because a rapprochement could not be reached between France and Italy. When the news of the plan leaked out, both establishments had to bear the brunt of widespread condemnation.

Both Laval and Hoare had to resign from their respective positions (Hoare-Laval Pact 2020).

Jawaharlal Nehru refused to give his assent to the requests of having a meeting with Benito Mussolini while he was passing through Rome in 1936. In India, he organized a nationwide demonstration against Italian aggression in Abyssinia (Dubey 2016). In the Lucknow session of the Indian National Congress, he said that the war exposed the malice of the malice of colonial powers and their thirst for domination (Srivastava 1996). He admired the brevity of the Abyssinians and called it one of the first effective checks by Africans on advancing imperialism (Dubey 2016).

Other Connections

The Indian diaspora in England also established political organizations like the Transvaal Indian Congress in 1903 and South African Indian Congress in 1920.

Mahatma Gandhi became the link between them and the Indian National Congress. The Indian National Congress had sent several delegations to African countries in the early twentieth century to inspect and report on mistreatment and discrimination against indentured labour. They then established contact with their leaders and kept in constant touch thereafter. This group within the INC also created such pressure that the indentured labour system got discontinued. Indian diaspora in the countries of South Africa, Kenya and Mauritius initiated freedom struggles against colonial powers. Nehru advised all Indian leaders not to demand any special privileges over the native African (Dubey 2016).

Post-Independence Indo-African Ties After India became independent, it lent support to African Suffrage movements.

Decolonization and the end of racial discrimination became the key rallying points of Indo-African relations. India used the channel of Afro-Asia solidarity organizations and other such political formations to support the various liberation struggles taking place in Africa (Dubey 2016).

South Africa

In 1946, the ‘Ghetto Act’ was passed in South Africa. It sought to divide the residential areas according to racial differences. Jawaharlal Nehru, who had now become the Interim Prime Minister of India, approached the United Nations to

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lodge his protest against such discrimination. India moved a resolution to reprimand and intervene in South Africa under Articles 10 and 14 of the UN Charter. India supported the Franco-Mexican resolution of the United Nations General Assembly which proved to be a historic one. It expressed in strong terms its disapproval of the inhumane treatment meted out to the Africans, which was in derogation of the fundamental freedoms and rights which should be available universally. India itself took punitive action against South Africa by recalling High Commissioner and breaking economic ties (which were only restored when South Africa became independent) (Dubey 2016).

India’s focus against racial discrimination in Africa was mostly out of concern for its diaspora before India’s independence. However, post-independence, there was a shift towards advocating against discrimination for all, not just the Indians. Dr. Rajendra Prasad explained in his Presidential address that the cause had assumed greater significance and it was a question of racial domination and racial tolerance (Dubey 2016).

India activated 26 resolutions against discrimination in South Africa which were passed by the UN General Assembly between 1946 and 1962. India played a key role in formation of a Special Committee against Apartheid set up by the UN General Assembly. It provided all sorts of assistance and support to it. A special session of this committee was convened in New York on October 5, 1976 to pay a special tribute to India for its crusade against apartheid. This was the first time it had honoured a member state (Dubey 2016).

The expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth was also a product of the protests lodged by India and other like-minded countries. They stated that the presence of the racist regime of South Africa made it impossible for them to continue being a member of the Commonwealth (Dubey 2016).

Kenya

India supported the independence movement here as well. Even when Kenya was still a colony, it sent Aba Saheb Pant to Nairobi as an Indian High Commissioner to East Africa. He became popular and his house became the contact point for all freedom fighters in East Africa. The British Colonial government became alarmed by this and forced Jawaharlal Nehru to recall Pant from East Africa (Dubey 2016).

Namibia

The then Union of South Africa’s claim over Namibia had reached the International Court of Justice. It stated that Namibia was part of its full domain whereas it was only ‘mandated’ territory (Srivastava 1996). When ICJ deferred its judgement in 1971, the Indian Minister of External Affairs declared this question to be a ‘political’ one. India proposed a global meet on the Namibian issue in 1982, which was adopted by 130-0 votes in the UN. India accorded full diplomatic

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status to South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and pledged to extend all sorts of possible support to it. When Namibia became independent in 1990, both Indian Prime Minister V.P. Singh and opposition leader Rajiv Gandhi attended the celebrations at Windhoek (Dubey 2016).

Guinea-Bissau

Since 1446, Guinea-Bissau was under Portuguese control. During the 18th century, it was a major trading post for various commodities and African slaves (until slavery was outlawed). Not until the second half of the 19th century was the interior of this region fully controlled by the Portuguese. From 1951, this whole region began to be called as the ‘Overseas Province of Guinea’. A feeling of local discontentment had always been there, but it was in 1956 that the first liberation movement was founded by Amílcar Cabral and Rafael Paula BarbosaThe African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGCC). Its first major activity was a strike by dock workers in Bissau on August 3, 1959. The colonial police violently repressed it, killing 50 people. This led to a major growth of popularity of the PAIGC. Together with FRELIMO (of Mozambique), MPLA (of Angola), MLSTPC (of São Tomé and Príncipe), it formed the CONCPConference of Nationalist Organisations of the Portuguese Colonies during a conference in Morocco. This organization’s main goal was the cooperation of different national liberation movements in Portuguese colonies (Guinea-Bissau War of Independence 2020).

Open hostilities broke out in January 1963 when the PAIGC attacked the Portuguese garrison in Tete near the Corubal river (south of Bissau). The war that ensued was known as ‘Portugal’s Vietnam’. The jungles of Guinea and PAIGC allies near the border proved to be advantageous in providing tactical superiority to the PAIGC. In 1970, the Portuguese Air Force (PAF) began using the same inhuman weapons that the United States had used in the Vietnam War: Napalm and Defoliants (Guinea-Bissau War of Independence 2020).

In 1973, PAIGC unilaterally proclaimed the country’s independence in the village of Madina do Boé. India immediately granted recognition to them (Dubey 2016).

Finally, Guinea Bissau was granted full independence on September 10, 1974 after 11.5 years of armed conflict.

The Non-Aligned Movement

The Bandung Conference of 1955 and Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference of Cairo (AAPS 1958) helped India and African countries understand each other’s perspectives. Nehru emphasised in the Bandung Conference that Asia and Africa were ‘sister countries’ (Srivastava 1996). He said that Africa’s tragedy was larger than any continent’s, and that all must accept responsibility for it, even if they were not directly involved (Dubey 2016).

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In 1961, the Non-Aligned Movement was founded in Belgrade. Along with Nehru, the founding members were Marshal Tito, Sukarno, Gamel Abdel Nasser and Kwame Nkrumah. It seeked to provide India and Africa the third option of not being a camp follower. It would enable them to charter their own course during the Cold War rivalry. This summit formulated the rationale, strategy and actions for NAM members (Dubey 2016).

Nehru was the chief architect behind NAM. In the Belgrade Conference, his rationalization and vision of the utility of NAM were given careful attention.

Nehru championed the cause of Afro-Asian solidarity and Afro-Asian resurgence in international relations (Dubey 2016).

Material Assistance India not only provided full diplomatic support to countries, but also extended physical and material support.

In order to avoid the controversy that it was supporting one faction or the other in African suffrage movements, India decided to supply money through multilateral channels like bodies of Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (Dubey 2016).

India had spent around USD 1.2 million to assist the African Liberation Movement by 1969. By 1977, this amount increased to UDS 5 million. This increase demonstrates that the assistance to Africa wasn’t a promise by one leader that would change if there is change of government. The support remained constant regardless of who was in charge in India (Dubey 2016).

India provided material and technical assistance to the South African and Namibian liberation struggles. It also helped the African National Congress (ANC) and SWAPO to man their respective missions in New Delhi. As the External Affairs Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee pledged at the Conference of Commonwealth that India would definitely consider any request for arms made by the guerillas fighting against the white regime in South Africa (Dubey 2016).

The Lows in the Relations Although India and Africa did generally enjoy good relations, there were some small time periods where there were disagreements and lack of support.

However, India did give considerable thought to the concerned issues and went for a policy change so as to make the relations appropriate again.

Sometimes, India was accused of having a very legalistic approach towards African suffrage movements. Two of such incidents where India was so accused were that of the Mau Mau rebellion and the Algerian War (Dubey 2016). The Mau Mau rebellion was a revolt to fasten he pace towards Kenya's independence.

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Lasting from 1952 to 1960, it occurred due to various reasons including expulsion of Kikuyu tenants from settler farms, loss of land to white settlers, poverty and lack of representation to Africans. Even though the fight was against British colonial forces and white settler communities, it was largely fought between African loyalists and the rebels, thus giving it an image of a civil war (Bilow 2009).

The Algerian War of Independence against France was fought from 1954-62. It began after World War II when France did not fulfill its promise of granting selfrule to the Algerian people. The more serious fighting of this battle took place in and around Algeria from 1956-57 (Algerian War 2020).

During the Indo-China war of 1962, a very few African countries expressed their support to India and many were overtly unsupportive. This was because of China's aggressive armed and economic support to African freedom fighters (Dubey 2016).

In the second NAM conference in Cairo (1964), India had an insignificant role to play. There was a sharp difference of opinion between India and radical African countries. Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri advocated for peaceful resolution of disputes, whereas Kwame Nkrumah stated, '' As long as oppressed classes exist there can be no such things as peaceful coexistence between opposing ideologies. "In contrast to India's view that Cold War was the root of all tensions, Africans identified colonialism as the root of all tensions (Dubey 2016).

These instances indicated to India the extent of Chinese influence in Africa. So, India set out to reframe its African policy in the 1960s. Its strategy was to revitalise old relations and to forge reliable new relations. Every Chinese move in Africa was to be countered with Economic diplomacy. India was to take advantage of any leverage possible too, like the Sino-Soviet conflict (Dubey 2016).

Conclusions To conclude, it has been established that the international legal principles developed by European countries were motivated by the thirst of economic and political subjugation. Various arguments were raised, solely to justify the inhumane acts committed by the Europeans. Even when the first international political organisation- The League of Nations was established, it continued to provide benefit to them until its dissolution.

It has also been determined that Indo- African relations are quite deep-rooted. It was their shared set of struggles that inspired their cooperation which did not end even after India attained independence. India continued to support African suffragette struggles. After the decolonisation phase, the cold war was set to test their waters. Both worked in wonderful unison to fight to retain their prized possessions of the right to sovereignty and free will. In the face of disagreements, appropriate policy changes were made.

Thus, India and Africa's united efforts helped in paving towards a more egalitarian

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world order. Both can take advantage of this historical goodwill to develop better relations with each other in the present times.

References 1. ANGHIE, ANTONY, 2006, The evolution of international law: Colonial and postcolonial realities. Third World Quarterly. 2006. Vol. 27, no. 5, p. 739-753. DOI 10.1080/01436590600780011.

Informa UK Limited 2. DUBEY, AJAY KUMAR, 2016, India–Africa Relations: Historical Goodwill and a Vision for the Future. In : India and Africa's Partnership: A Vision for a New Future. 1. Springer (India) Pvt. Ltd. 3. SRIVASTAVA, PADMA, 1996, Jawahar Lal Nehru's Perception of Africa. India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs. 1996. Vol. 52, no. 3, p. 21-30. DOI 10.1177/097492849605200302.

SAGE Publications 4. Abyssinian Crisis. School History (viewed 9 November 2020). Available from: https://schoolhistory.co.uk/notes/abyssinian-crisis/ 5. Hoare-Laval Pact. Encyclopaedia Britannica (viewed 9 November 2020). Available from: https://www.britannica.com/event/Hoare-Laval-Pact 6. Guinea-Bissau War of Independence. Wikiwand (viewed 10 November 2020). Available from: https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Guinea-Bissau_War_of_Independence 7. BILOW, ALI, 2009, Mau Mau (1952-1960). Blackpast [online].

2009. [viewed 9 November 2020]. Available from: https://www.blackpast.org/global-africanhistory/mau-mau-1952-1960/ 8. Algerian War. Encyclopaedia Britannica (viewed 10 November 2020). Available from: https://www.britannica.com/event/Algerian-War

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4 An Impact Analysis of China’s Foreign Policy Imperatives on the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Yashvi Agarwal1 & Avishi Pateriya2 12Research Contributor, Internationalism yashviagarwal@rgnul.ac.in, avishipateriya@rgnul.ac.in;

Abstract. This is a Discussion Paper submitted by Yashvi Agarwal and Avishi Pateriya for the Indian International Law Programme.

Introduction One of the worst current human rights crises in the world is going on in Xinjiang, China. Xinjiang is a landlocked northwest autonomous region situated in China.

It is the largest administrative province of the Asian country, sharing its borders with countries like Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Mongolia, and Afghanistan. The province of Xinjiang has seen many conflicts since the early twentieth century. The history, ethnicity, and religion of the residents of this region have often been the cause of altercations. Xinjiang was given its name after the Chines Qing dynasty conquered it in 1884, and it officially became a part of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The first group of people to inhabit the province were from the west (Chunxiang Li, 1995). The Han dynasty came in 60 BCE (Whitfield, 1970), and the Uyghur Khaganate in the 8th century. Three regional kingdoms emerged with the decline of power of the Uyghurs and the Turkic Muslim Kara-Khanids Islamized the region.

The Xinjiang region was dominated by the Uyghurs, who once comprised more than 80 percent of the population of the region. Xinjiang is rich in resources like minerals and natural gas, and trade and agriculture in this region is also very profitable. With the development of this region the Han people migrated from other parts of China to Xinjiang. This move was also encouraged by the government (Ramzy, 2009). This happened in the Mao era. The population of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang came down to 45%. 40% population of the province is now Han Chinese (Castets, 2006). The Uyghurs consider themselves to be the native of the region, but the Chinese government refutes their claim. The government has refused to identify the Uyghurs as indigenous people. They are instead

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recognized as a national minority of the country, having no special rights on Xinjiang (Gladney, 2006). Differences arose between the Uyghurs and the Hans over who has a greater claim on the region. The two groups have clashed various times, such as the Kashgar attack (2008), the Ghulja Incident (1997), and the Urumqi Riots of 2009.

This paper entails to research and comprehensively analyse about the cause of the conflict, the sufferings of the Uyghurs, stand of countries on the issue. The paper also analyses whether the allegations hold some locus standi or not and if they do, whether banning the trade with Xinjiang will hold some grievous effects and loss to China and also to find out the opinions of different country states on the same.

History and Context of the Xinjiang Situation There is an unequal distribution of wealth and power in favour of the Han Chinese populace. The Hans also make the majority of the people in the government (Fuller, 2016). The Uyghurs feel ignored, and their community does not get back the wealth generated from the Xinjiang province. The Chinese communist government supports the Han over the Uyghurs (Fuller, 2016). The population of the Uyghurs is declining, they are being forced into detention camps, their human rights are being violated, and the government is making them do forced labour. the government of China, on the other hand, does not want to lose Xinjiang, their biggest province and a high-revenue generating region. It does not want to grant autonomy to the Uyghurs. The Xinjiang region is one of the most crucial places of the silk road route, making it an important destination for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of China. Therefore, China has many regions to hold onto Xinjiang and to increase their control over the province, which can only be done by the subjugation of the Uyghurs. The main goal of the Chinese government, for the past many years, has been to eliminate the threats of separatism and terrorism, from the region. The government considers the Uyghurs to be responsible for the instability and separatism in the Xinjiang province; and it does not seem to shy away from using any kind of force to achieve its goal.

The Chinese government has been trying to de-Islamize Xinjiang. The government regards many Uyghurs as extremists only because they are Muslim and have ties with countries like Turkey and Afghanistan. The Chinese government blamed the violent Urumqi riot of 2009 on the extremist Uyghurs.

Xinjiang’s increasing importance in the BRI project is another reason for the government’s intensified crackdown in the recent years.

Detention camps in Xinjiang

Under the veil of combating terrorism and extremism, the Chinese government

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has curtailed the religious freedom of this minority. Although China justifies its policies against the Uyghurs as countering terrorism, but its repressive policies are unjust and they lead to a gross violation of the basic human rights of this group. China has banned some 30 Muslim names for babies. Activities as peaceful as sending Quaranic verse in text to someone has been described as acts of extremism. Every activity of the Uyghurs is strictly monitored through surveillance cameras. Millions of Uyghurs have been detained by the government in detention camps, which the government officially calls as Vocational Education and Training Centres. They were established under Xi Jinping’s administration in 2014. These camps are extra-judicial and arbitrary (2019). Many mosques in Xinjiang, and other places of importance to the Uyghurs have been erased from the province. The satellite images show a significant change in the recent years. Images accessed by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) prove the point (ThePrint, 2020). The Uyghurs in these detention centres are taught to sing praises of the communist government. The detainees have to live in cramped places, sleep in turns and use the washroom in front of the cameras installed (Tursun, 2018). Even Uyghurs living outside China are not safe as they are harassed and threatened by the officials of CCP on social media. As China does not allow freedom of the press and media, it is very difficult to get information about these detention camps. It is one of the reasons why China is yet not facing a condemnation as severe as it should.

Forced sterilization of Uyghur women

In the recent years, reports of China expanding its crackdown against the Uyghurs have surfaced. There are also reports that claim that new detention camps are being constructed, forced labour programs are being extended, mosques, graveyard and other places of religious importance to the Uyghurs are being demolished. The Uyghurs are being forced to adopt Mandarin and their language is being discouraged by the government.

One of the cruellest measures being adopted by the Chinese government against the Uyghurs is the forced sterilization program. In order to curtail the importance and influence of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, the Chinese government is trying to reduce the population of the minority, so that it no longer remains a majority of the population in the Xinjiang province.

About half of the population of the Uyghur men have been captured without trial and put in detention camps. Therefore, only the remaining men can reproduce and take the Uyghur lineage forward. But the government has come up with methods to not allow that. The government is forcefully sterilizing the Uyghur women, so that the Uyghur population cannot grow and they can be totally erased from history. On the other hand, the Han Chinese are being encouraged to give birth to more children. By doing so, the government is reducing the Uyghur population, the most populous group in Xinjiang, and

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increasing the Han population. The government wants the Uyghurs to be totally eliminated and the Hans to take their place as Hans do not belong to a different culture, especially Islam, and they are subservient to the authorities.

The government is also making the Uyghur women whose husbands are in detention camps or forced labour, to share bed with the Han Chinese men (McCartney, 2020). The Uyghur women are being sexually assaulted. The Uyghur children are being separated from their parents. China is doing a whole lot of activities that are a violation of the Human Rights of the Uyghurs and some of them can even be classified as genocide. But nothing can be proved easily as China does not allow freedom of press and media, nor does it let any foreign authority to visit Xinjiang and examine the situation there.

Stance of State and Non-State Actors across the Globe Countries, activists and organizations taking a stand against China’s treatment of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities

Many human rights activists, institutions, and some big countries have opposed China’s inhumane treatment of the minority. Countries are also imposing sanction on some of the high-ranked government officials. The USA imposed a sanction on Chen Quanguo, the Secretary of the Xinjiang CCP (Brunnstorm, 2019). The UK also plans to take severe action against China for its treatment of the Uyghurs. 22 countries issued a joint letter to the 2019 session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) denouncing China’s detention of the Uyghurs and other minority groups (Watch, 2019).

Due to the efforts of the World Uyghur Congress, an independent investigation has been called to look onto the allegations that the Chinese CCP government is committing genocide. The World Uyghur Congress have taken the services of reputed barrister Sir Geoffrey Nice (McCartney, 2020). Only International Criminal Court (ICC) has the right to prosecute people or state for crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes and aggression. But China is not a signatory of the Rome Statute which established the court, hence, not bound by the jurisdiction of ICC (McCartney, 2020).

But the small step of putting a name to the crime being committed by the Chinese government would be a significant achievement for the Uyghurs.

More than twenty activist organizations and genocide experts are urging the United Nations Human Rights Council to come up with strategies and solution to stop China’s crackdown against the Uyghurs and other minorities. An open letter was signed by the Uyghur Human Rights Project, Genocide Watch, the European Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, and others that said that the Chinese government is using the veil of combating terrorism for its “systematic policies” of crackdown against the Uyghurs (Kashgarian, 2020).

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Countries like the UK and Turkey are a little less keen to take any severe action against China over the CCP government’s treatment of the minorities of the country. Turkey’s protest against China over the Chinese government’s treatment of the Uyghurs has weakened over the past year. Turkey is now borrowing a lot from China to come out of debt. Similarly, even the UK is not willing to take any severe measures like imposing sanction on China. this may be the case because of the fact that China is UK’s sixth largest export market (Dewan, 2020). Hence, it is very evident that countries are choosing their trade and economic benefits over the rights of the minorities suffering in China. The strongest response till date against Chinese government’s treatment of Uyghurs has come from the US. It has imposed sanctions on China and has implemented a bill to ban imports from Xinjiang to stand against forced labour.

Muslim-majority countries that support China and justification given by China for its actions

After 22 countries, mainly European, signed a letter to the UNHRC, condemning the treatment of Uyghurs in China, 37 countries came forward in defence of China. some of these included Muslim-majority nations like Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Pakistan, Syria. Although the world did not expect them to expressly go against China, it also did not imagine them to openly come out in Support of China and even defend the dragon’s policies against the Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities.

Even after numerous reports and pieces of evidence coming out, these Muslim countries stand with China. they have justified the crackdown policy against the Uyghurs and defended China by stating that the Chinese government is putting people in “re-education” camps to counter terrorism and protect the country and its people. These countries, just like the Chinese government, defended China by asking other countries to not make human rights a political issue. China says that there are no human rights violations and its policies to combat terrorism and extremism is its internal matter and other countries must refrain from meddling in its affairs.

The 37 countries that supported China did so because of the soft power that China exercises. Most of these countries have taken huge loans from China, and the Chinese government has invested in these countries to improve their infrastructure. Therefore, it would be not wise for these countries to go against China. these countries depend heavily on China for running their economy.

This move also shows that when it comes to protecting the economic interests of one’s country and standing for one’s community, the former is going to win. The image of Muslim Solidarity has also been smashed. This issue highlights how there is a solidarity between Muslims when it is convenient to them (Qiblawi, 2019). All these countries turned a blind eye to the suffering and plight of their fellow Muslims in China. China representative to the UN criticised the 22

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nations, who signed the letter condemning China, for interfering in the internal matters of a sovereign country. China also stated its achievements in the area of human rights. China’s supporter praised China’s handling of the Xinjiang conflict.

The 22 countries that signed a letter against China include the USA, the UK, Australia, France, Japan, Canada, Germany, and others.

It is clear that the countries that defend China are favouring it because of the favours they have received from China for their development. Pakistani government that does not let any opportunity slip through its fingers to humiliate India and raise the issue of Kashmir on global platforms, has been quiet about the Uyghurs in China. Pakistan says that it stands for the solidarity of Muslims and their rights, and has been at loggerheads with India over the Kashmiri Muslims, but has chosen to support its long-time friend and investor China over the Uyghur Muslims. The support of the Muslim-majority countries received by China can prove to be helpful for China (Eurasian_Times_Desk, 2020). The Citizenship Amendment Bill of India can also have an impact on separatism in Xinjiang (Eurasian_Times_Desk, 2020). The Muslims in India feel alienated with the passing of the CAA. This might also lead to the Muslims in Xinjiang feel insecure and the separatism in China may grow. If that happens, the Chinese government’s attempt to curtail every dissent against its ‘one-China’ policy and the communist party, might fail. Therefore, India’s actions, policies and its decisions on the Kashmir issue also have an important impact on its neighboursChina and Pakistan.

Importance of Xinjiang in terms of Trade and Commerce in China Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, occupying the north-western part of the country, is the largest province of China covering one-sixth part of its territory and is its one of the largest political units. “Sharing a common border with countries like Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, makes it a very vital and imperative Geopolitical unit for China. The region has historically been a pivot on the traditional silk route, facilitating trade, cultural exchange and an important link between diverse civilisations.” (Sehgal, 2017) Xinjiang is inhabited by around 56 ethnic minorities, Uyghur Muslims and the Han Chinese occupying most of the region. It’s importance for China’s trade and commerce can be well established by the fact that the region is rich in minerals and resources like petrochemicals, natural gas, tanned leather, food processing industry, handicrafts, textiles, rugs, staple cotton and a variety of fruits and vegetation. The region is very important for two of China’s massive bilateral projects, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Belt and Road Initiative proposed by the President Xi Jinping in the year 2015.

Xinjiang is strategically important for China for various reasons. Firstly, it has extensive natural reserves. “It has 122 kinds of minerals existing in more than

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4000 mineral sites. This constitutes 78 percent of minerals available in entire China. Xinjiang leads the nation in the deposit of beryllium, talc, cubric niter, feldspar, earth for making pottery and porcelain. The prospective coal reserves stand at 1600 billion tons that amount to one third of China's total reserves, Xinjiang has abundant oil and natural gas resources in its Tarim, Junggar, Turpan and Hami basins. The estimated quantity of its oil reserves is about 30 to 50 billion tons and that of natural gas is 1307 billion cubic meters” (Xinjiang and Central Asia: China's Problems and Policy Implications, 2006). The Tarim basin has abundant of natural gas reserves and energy resources. These resources are crucial for the flourishing growth of China’s economy. Seeing the open-door policy of China, Xinjiang serves as the supplier of raw materials to the coastal region where they are used in industrialisation. It has an excessive agricultural importance for China, given the large amount of land that it holds in its territory, which is more arable than any other. Forestry, production of fruits and animal husbandry are its main sectors, well known for melons, seedless grapes, good quality horses and staple cotton growth of about 1.6 million tons.

Secondly, the Geopolitical location of Xinjiang is of a great advantage for China as it facilitates network and transportation routes for foreign trades with its bordering countries, to bolster its economy. “Xinjiang extends China's reach to the borders of oil rich Middle East and simultaneously serves as a security buffer to China proper. It has historically shielded China from any invasion from Central Asian steppes. As it is sparsely populated, it provides a safe place for military manoeuvres and nuclear testing. Lop Nor, China's nuclear testing site is situated here. The ruling elite of China perceive their control over Xinjiang as an assertion of sovereignty” (Xinjiang and Central Asia: China's Problems and Policy Implications, 2006). Thirdly, In Central Asia, a strategically crucial area, Xinjiang provides China with a corridor to assert its control. Not only China, but also countries such as Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan border Central Asia. It has significant relations with India and Pakistan as well. And for its entrance into Eurasia, the United States sees it as of vital importance.

Fourthly, the importance of Xinjiang region in China’s two massive bilateral foreign projects, the China-Pakistan economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). A major part of the previous Silk Road passes through Xinjiang. The CPEC is a part of the large Belt and Road Initiative, whose goal is to both transform the economies of Pakistan and China by modernising its road, rail, air and energy routes and transportation system and also to connect the deepsea Pakistani ports of Gwadar and Karachi to Xinjiang. This will facilitate and bolster the transportation of energy and natural gas reserves to China and will also minimise the cost. “Through the BRI, China also looks forward to boost global economic links to its western regions, which historically have been neglected. Promoting economic development in the western province of Xinjiang, where separatist violence has been on the upswing, is a major priority, as is securing long-term energy supplies from Central Asia and the Middle East,

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especially via routes the U.S. military cannot disrupt” (McBride, 2020). It is estimated that China has invested around $201 bn. on these bilateral projects and is influencing different countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan etc. to invest in this initiative for better and fruitful economic growth.

China has a vast network of foreign trade with countries like Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, Pakistan, countries of the European union and the United States of America. Trade with all of these countries is very important for China’s economic growth, which is currently the second fastest in the world. And the Xinjiang region plays a crucial role in expediting china’s economic growth. But the controversies attached with the Xinjiang region, regarding the alleged forced labour and gross human rights violations of the Uyghur Muslim community, is becoming a great concern for the other trading partners of China. They are losing faith in the Chinese foreign trade policy of the Xinjiang region and certainly don’t want to be indulged in anything related to forced labour, genocide and crimes against humanity.

Xinjiang has a turbulent reputation regarding the treatment of the ethnic Muslim minority of Uyghur people in its region, which forms the largest part of its population apart from the Han Chinese. Despite of the autonomous status of the region, the Uyghur Muslim minority does not necessarily identify with the growing Han Chinese population in the region. They haven’t been acquiescent with the rule of the Chinese Communist Party. The so-called autonomy status has been strongly criticised and hated by the Uygurs. The desire of Uyghurs for more political independence, social change and religious freedom has been growing.

They're after self-determination. Due to this, there has been an upsurge in the outrage of the Uyghur Muslim Community and the ideologies of separatism and political liberty and independence has been increasingly disseminated by the professors and the scholars of the minority community. This has led to a growing fear of losing its territory of such vital importance to the Uyghur Muslims, in the Chinese Communist Party.

The Detention Camps and Controversies Related

Turkic speaking ethnic Uyghur Muslim minority forms the largest part of the population of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region along with the Han Chinese. “The region has had intermittent autonomy and occasional independence, but what is now known as Xinjiang came under Chinese rule in the 18th Century. An East Turkestan state was briefly declared in 1949, but independence was short-lived - later that year Xinjiang officially became part of Communist China. In the 1990s, open support for separatist groups increased after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of independent Muslim states in Central Asia. However, Beijing suppressed demonstrations and activists went underground” (BBC, 2014) According to the experts and the government reports, some 800,000 to 2 Million Uyghurs and other Muslims like the ethnic

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Kazakhs and Uzbeks have been detained since April 2017.

These detainees have been accused and charged of the crimes that have no legal avenues to challenge the detention. They are targeted for following their religion, having three children, contacting people from the twenty-six countries that China regards as sensitive (like Turkey and Afghanistan), sending texts containing Quranic verses etc. Basically according to the Human Rights Reports, their one and only crime is being a Muslim and religiously following their religion.

The Chinese Communist Party believes in regional and territorial unity of the people, hence the fear of separatism, religious freedom and political independence of the Uyghur Muslim community arises a sense of alarm in them and the need to supress every ideology other than that of the CCP is a criminal offence to them.

The detention camps that are buttered up by the Chinese Officials as “Education Camps” or “Vocational and Training Camps” are a site of gross human rights violations, crimes against humanity and genocide. Experts report that attempts to re-educate Xinjiang began in 2014 and were significantly extended in 2017. Observing satellite imagery, Reuters journalists found that between April 2017 and August 2018, thirty-nine of the camps almost tripled in size; they occupy a total area approximately the size of 140 soccer fields. Similarly, Germany-based Xinjiang expert Adrian Zenz, evaluating local and national budgets over the past few years, found that construction spending on security-related facilities in Xinjiang increased by 20 billion Yuan (around $2.96 billion) in 2017. They view these camps as a stringent way to eliminate anything and everything that may pose as a threat to china and its ideologies. Stories of atrocities incurred on the Uyghur Muslims includes forced pledging of loyalty to the CCP and renouncing Islam, torture to sleep deprivation, sexual abuse of women, sterilisation, abortions and high usage of contraceptives against a woman’s will. “In factories far away from home, they typically live in segregated dormitories, undergo organised Mandarin and ideological training outside working hours, are subject to constant surveillance, and are forbidden from participating in religious observances” (Xiuzhong, 2020). “Inside these training camps, detainees are subjected to political indoctrination, forced to renounce their religion and culture and, in some instances, reportedly subjected to torture” (Schmitz, 2018). “In the name of combating ‘religious extremism’, Chinese authorities have been actively remoulding the Muslim population in the image of China’s Han ethnic majority” (Xinhua, 2019).

According to verified reports, these detention camps or as the Chinese say ‘reeducation camps’ have entered into the next phase i.e. the detainees or the trainees have now been graduated. And hence this section of the Uyghur Muslim community is now working for the Chinese industry and factories in the Xinjiang Region forcefully, heating up allegations of forced labour, violations of human rights of the Uyghur minority and crimes against humanity. “This report reveals that Chinese factories outside Xinjiang are also sourcing Uyghur workers under a revived, exploitative government-led labour transfer scheme” (Xiuzhong, 2020).

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According to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, more than 27 factories in nine Chinese provinces use Uyghur Muslims as forced labour transferred from Xinjiang in the year 2017. Those factories are a part of the supply chain of eightytwo well-known global brands. It was estimated that at least more than 80,000 Uyghurs were transferred out of Xinjiang to work in these factories forcefully.

Some of those global brands are namely Amazon, Apple, Nike, Abercrombie & Fitch, Adidas, Acer, Asus, Google, Huawei, Calvin Klein, Microsoft, Samsung, Tommy Hilfiger, Toshiba, Xiaomi etc.

“According to the International Labour Organisation, there are 11 indicators of forced labour which includes abuse of vulnerability, deception, restriction of movement, isolation, physical and sexual violence, intimidation and threats, retention of identity documents, withholding of wages, debt bondage, abusive working and living conditions, excessive overtime.” (SAP-FL, 2012).

• Being strictly monitored by security personnel and digital surveillance tools and being subjected to intimidation, detention and threats.

• Being placed in a position of dependency and vulnerability, such as by threats to family members back in Xinjiang.

• Restricted freedom of movement like being fenced in the factories and high tech scrutiny and observation.

• Forced to live in isolation and segregated dormitories and also transportation via dedicated trains.

• Abusive and torturous working conditions such as political indoctrination, military style management, and ban on religious practices.

• Excessive hours, such as after-work Mandarin language classes and political indoctrination sessions that are part of job assignments.

“Chinese state media claims that participation in labour transfer programs is voluntary, and Chinese officials have denied any commercial use of forced labour from Xinjiang” (South_China_MOrning_Post, 2019). “However, Uyghur workers who have been able to leave China and speak out describe the constant fear of being sent back to a detention camp in Xinjiang or even a traditional prison while working at the factories” (Ling, 2019).

United States’ Uygher Forced Labour Prevention Act to combat the human rights violations in Xinjiang and the opinion of other trading partners of China on the same The United States’ House of Representatives has overpoweringly passed the ‘Uyghur Forced Labour Prevention Act’, to ban imports of goods manufactured in the alleged forced labour camps of the Uyghur Muslim community in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous region of China. The bill was passed in the House of

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Representatives in September this year, by a majority of 406-3 votes but it is still pending in the Senate to further be forward by the Trump Administration for the President’s assent in order for it be enacted as a law. Uyghur Forced Labour Prevention Act is being considered as the first national legislation anywhere in the world enacted to enforce Human Rights standards to end the import of goods made with forced labour. The Act has included all of its findings by the U.S.’ Congress in its Section-2. It indicates towards the China’s established extrajudicial mass internment camps that has been arbitrarily detaining as many as 1.8 million Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups subjected to forced labour, torture, political indoctrination and severe human rights abuses. The evidences of alleged forced labour in the Xinjiang region of China has been confirmed by the testimony of former camp detainees, satellite imagery, and official leaked documents from the government of the People’s Republic of China as part of a targeted campaign of repression of Muslim ethnic minorities.

Department of State of the U.S. in its Trafficking in Persons Report found out that “Authorities offer subsidies incentivizing Chinese companies to open factories in close proximity to the internment camps, and local governments receive additional funds for each inmate forced to work in these sites at a fraction of minimum wage or without any compensation.” It was also found that the products reportedly produced with the forced labour include textiles, electronics, food products, shoes, tea and handicrafts.

The policy enacted by this Act of United States, (116th_Congress, 2020).

• “Bans the import of all the products manufactured, wholly or in part, by forced labour from China, particularly from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

• Encourages the international community to reduce the import of any product made with forced labour in the Xinjiang region of China.

• To actively work to prevent, publicly denounce, and end human trafficking as a horrific assault on human dignity and to restore the lives of those affected by human trafficking, a modern form of slavery.

• To regard prevention of atrocities as in its national interest in order to prevent torture enforced disappearances, severe deprivation of liberty, mass internment, arbitrary detention and widespread use of forced labour.

• To address gross violations of human rights in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region through bilateral diplomatic channels and multilateral institutions where both the United States and China are members and with all the authorities available to the United States Government, including visa and financial sanctions, export restrictions, and import controls.”

“Unlike the United States of America, 39 countries like Germany, Japan, Canada, Haiti, Honduras, Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom and the countries of

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the European Union have signed a declaration to urge China to allow UN rights observers “immediate, meaningful and unfettered access” to Xinjiang, where at least a million Uyghurs are being held in what it says are vocational skills training centres, but critics call detention camps” (AlJazeera, 2020). Although, none of these countries or any trading partners of China have passed a legislation like that the U.S.’ but they are surely hesitating to further invest in China’s trade and import network of the Xinjiang Region. They are stringently trying to condemn these gross human rights violations and unfair practices and atrocities being incurred on the Uyghur Muslim community just on the basis of their regional orientation and beliefs. China has responded aggressively to these allegations disbarring any and every accusation related to the forced labour and the crimes against humanity done on the Muslim minority.

Conclusions Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China is very crucial and vital for China’s foreign trade and import and export business. It is central to Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Any conflict in this region can pose a great threat China’s sovereignty, global power and its flourishing economy. Prospered with such abundance of natural reserves and minerals, its agricultural importance and the textile, handicraft and the cotton industry render it as economically imperative for China. But, enveloped in such grievous and grotesque allegations of forced labour and human rights violations is not bringing up a respectable and reliable image of China. the European countries and other West countries are against China for exploiting the Uyghurs. The birth and spread of COVID-19 has also put China in a bad picture, and many nations are against it. Despite all that, some countries still continue to openly support China. these are countries that owe China humongous debts. China therefore also has significant soft power over such countries. But there still remains opposition for China from countries like the US. The act passed by the US banning all the imports from Xinjiang that are supposed to be manufactured form forced labour is a very refined and bold step towards a stand against human rights violations. It will be very harmful and bereaving for China to cope up with this unavoidable ban. It will affect China’s economy on a massive scale, even though China is adamant in figuring out a way to facilitate its trade and transportation other than through the west.

“The Chinese government should uphold the rights enshrined in its Constitution and laws, and should work to end its extrajudicial detention of the Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang. China can prosper more if it allows its citizens to freely determine the terms of their labour and mobility” (Xiuzhong, 2020). People found practicing forced labour can be punished under international and national laws. Companies referred to in this study should carry out immediate, rigorous

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measures to give human rights due diligence. It is important that affected employees are not exposed to any further damage.

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2. AlJazeera. 2020. 39 countries condemn China over policies in Xinjiang, Hong Kong. China News | Al Jazeera. [Online] October 07, 2020. [Cited: December 21, 2020.] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/7/germany-leads-charge-against-china-on-rightsabuses.

3. BBC. 2014. Why is there tension between China and the Uighurs? BBC News. [Online] September 26, 2014. [Cited: December 24, 2020.] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asiachina-26414014.

4. Brunnstorm, David. 2019. China warns U.S. over Uighur bill, raising doubts over early trade deal. Reuters. [Online] December 04, 2019. [Cited: December 23, 2020.] https://in.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-xinjiang/trump-comments-uighur-bill-hitprospects-of-us-china-trade-deal-idINKBN1Y72P6.

5. Castets, Remi. 2006. The Uyghurs in Xinjiang – The Malaise Grows. Open Edition Journals.

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7. Dewan, Angela. 2020. China's treatment of Uyghur Muslims sparks anger near new embassy site in London. CNN. [Online] October 05, 2020. [Cited: December 22, 2020.] https://edition.cnn.com/2020/10/03/europe/china-london-embassy-uyghurs-uk-gbrintl/index.html.

8. Eurasian_Times_Desk. 2020. India's Citizenship Bill Could Have Direct Impact On Xinjiang Separatism: China. The Eurasian Times. [Online] January 14, 2020. [Cited: December 20, 2020.] https://eurasiantimes.com/indias-citizenship-bill-could-have-direct-impact-xinjiangseparatism-china/.

9. —. 2020. Pakistan Concerned For Muslims In Kashmir But Apathetic Towards Chinese Uighur Muslims. The Eurasian Times. [Online] August 07, 2020. [Cited: December 22, 2020.]

10. 2019. Full Text: Vocational Education and Training in Xinjiang. XinhuaNet. [Online] August 16, 2019. [Cited: December 22, 2020.] http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/201908/16/c_138313359.htm.

11. Fuller, Graham E. 2016. The Xinjiang Problem. Institute for Security and Development Policy.

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12. Gladney, Dru C. 2006. Dislocating China: Muslims, Minorities and Other Subaltern Subjects.

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13. Kashgarian, Asim. 2020. Activists, Experts Call on UN to Recognize China's Uighur 'Genocide'. VOA News. [Online] September 17, 2020. [Cited: December 20, 2020.]

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Ling, Ye. 2019. Released from Camps, Uyghurs Subjected to Forced Labor. Better Winter.

[Online] December 12, 2019. [Cited: December 22, 2020.] https://bitterwinter.org/uyghurssubjected-to-forced-labor/.

McBride, James. 2020. China's Massive Belt and Road Initiative. Council on Foreign Relations.

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[Cited: December 21, 2020.] https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative.

McCartney, Micah. 2020. Uyghur activists hope for genocide ruling as tribunal takes up China's actions in Xinjiang: Taiwan News: 2020/09/16. Taiwan News. [Online] September 16, 2020. [Cited: December 20, 2020.] https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4008455.

Qiblawi, Tamara. 2019. Muslim nations are defending China's crackdown on Muslims. It shatters the myth of Islamic solidarity. CNN. [Online] July 17, 2019. [Cited: December 21, 2020.] https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/17/asia/uyghurs-muslim-countries-china-intl/index.html.

Ramzy, Austin. 2009. Why the Uighurs Feel Left Out of China's Boom. Time. [Online] July 14, 2009.

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SAP-FL. 2012. ILO indicators of Forced Labour. ILO. [Online] October 01, 2012. [Cited: December 21, 2020.] https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forcedlabour/publications/WCMS_203832/lang--en/index.htm.

Schmitz, Rob. 2018. Ex-Detainee Describes Torture In China's Xinjiang Re-Education Camp.

NPR. [Online] November 13, 2018.

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Sehgal, Maj Gen Vivek. 2017. China And Xinjiang. Indian Defence Review. [Online] June 04, 2017. [Cited: December 23, 2020.] http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/china-andxinjiang/.

South_China_MOrning_Post. 2019. China turns Muslim detainees into cheap labour, group claims. South China Morning Post. [Online] March 04, 2019. [Cited: December 23, 2020.] https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/2188511/china-turns-muslim-reeducation-camp-detainees-cheap-labour.

ThePrint. 2020. How China's project to de-Islamicise its Uyghur Muslims began and continues. ThePrint. [Online] September 26, 2020. [Cited: December 22, 2020.] https://theprint.in/opinion/how-chinas-project-to-de-islamicise-its-uyghur-muslims-beganand-continues/510928/.

Tursun, Mihrigul. 2018. Interview: ‘I Did Not Believe I Would Leave Prison in China Alive’. ‘I Did Not Believe I Would Leave Prison in China Alive’. Uyghur : Radio Free Asia, November 01, 2018.

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Human Rights Watch. [Online] July 10, 2019. [Cited: December 21, 2020.] https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/10/un-unprecedented-joint-call-china-end-xinjiangabuses.

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Xinhua. 2019. China Focus: Xinjiang determined in counter-terrorism, deradicalization, maintaining development. Xinhua Net. [Online] December 10, 2019. [Cited: December 21, 2020.] http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-12/10/c_138618363.htm.

Indian International Law Series, Volume 1 (2020) 44 28. Xinjiang and Central Asia: China's Problems and Policy Implications. Panda, Damodar. 2006.

02, s.l. : Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, 2006, Vol. 19.

29. Xiuzhong, Vicky. 2020. Uyghurs for sale. ASPI. [Online] March 01, 2020. [Cited: December 21, 2020.] https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale.

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5 Serbia-Kosovo Economic Normalization and Principled Realism in US Foreign Policy Mugdha Satpute1 & Prafful Tonge2 12Junior Research Analyst, Internationalism mugdha1042@gmail.com, tongeprafful21@gmail.com;

Abstract. This is a Discussion Paper submitted by Mugdha Satpute and Prafful Tonge for the Indian International Law Programme.

Introduction The “economic normalisation” deal signed between the Kosovar Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic marks another milestone between the two nation states which are entangled between disagreements and disputes on various fronts. The agreements signed at the White House, Washington DC, aims at opening up the economic corridors between the two nations and upbringing the regional prosperity.

The deal is of great importance considering the shared history between the two nations. Kosovo has disputed its recognition as an independent state since the late 90s. There have been attempts to recognize the state as an independent sovereign nation in contrast with the due disapproval and dissatisfaction from Serbia. There has always been a dispute between the two nation states over the recognition of one’s own independence from another. This has resulted in mass destruction and devastation of the people residing in the region of Kosovo and has spiraled it into an international call for help to get its share of sovereign identity.

Attempts have been made by both the nations and their respective administrations to try and negotiate a middle ground where both their intentions and expectations align with their view towards regional distinction and sovereign recognition. On 4th September, 2020, an economic normalization deal was signed between the two administrations aiming to establish trade links between the capital states of the two nations.

The world is at its highest in consideration of the democratic outlook. Given the history, it has always been disputed as to what should be the best form of

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governance and more than that, how the people and the nation can gain international recognition and importance regarding the same. Given the rise in democratic nations after the fall of consolidated power nations into smaller democratic, republics and peoples nations, it is of importance to point out that still today, there are nations which struggle to gain their sovereignty and international recognition and enter the mainstream society through world trade, cultural importance and its own undisputed existence.

Historical Background of Serbia-Kosovo Relations Serbia and Kosovo are situated in the Balkan Peninsula (South-eastern Europe).

Earlier, the respective territories were the part of a country called Yugoslavia also known as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, formed after the First World War. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia included the Kingdom of Montenegro, Kingdom of Serbia, and the territories of Austro-Hungarian Empire.

During the Second World War, Yugoslavia was occupied by the Axis powers, but after the war it was re-established as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the Allies. This new federation consisted of six republics - Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia (including the regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina, which were given the status of autonomous provinces) and Slovenia. The inclusion of diverse regions into a nation led to creation of tensions between various ethnic groups. Further, the rise of nationalist movements, protests and disagreement of the political leaders of the republics led to demand for independence by certain republic states. In June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared themselves independent, followed by Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, respectively. However, their independence was shadowed by wars between the Yugoslavian army and Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. The cause of these wars was the conflicts between the majority communities and the minority communities living in the respective areas. In April 1992, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia got dissolved. The remaining two republics – Serbia and Montenegro, thereby formed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia later on changed to the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2003. The Union ended in 2006 when Montenegro and Serbia formally declared themselves to be independent nations.

In the late 1990s, tension between the ethnic Albanians and the ethnic Serbs started rising. The Albanians constituted the majority population of the Kosovo province, where the Serbs were in minority, however the situation was opposite when applied to the overall population of Serbia. The members of Serbian minority of Kosovo were against the control of Muslim Albanians over the land which was sacred to the Serbs. Kosovo was the seat of the Serbian Orthodox Church as well as the site of the Turkish defeat of the Serbs in 1389 and the Serbian victory over the Turks in 1912, based on these facts, tensions increased

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between the two groups.

The emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1996, was followed by armed battle between the KLA and the Yugoslav-Serbian forces. The situation became very grave when the Yugoslav-Serbian forces started ethnic cleansing against the Albanians. The United Nations Security Council along with the Contact Group (an informal coalition of the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, and Russia) condemned such happenings, they imposed restraint on the use of arms but the violence continued. Diplomatic negotiations began in Rambouillet, France, in February 1999 but broke down the following month. On March 24, NATO began air strikes against Serbian military targets. In response, Yugoslav and Serbian forces drove out all of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians, displacing hundreds of thousands of people into Albania, Macedonia (now North Macedonia), and Montenegro. The NATO bombing campaign lasted 11 weeks and eventually expanded to Belgrade, where significant damage to the Serbian infrastructure occurred. In June, NATO and Yugoslavia signed a peace accord outlining troop withdrawal and the return of nearly one million ethnic Albanians as well as another 500,000 displaced within the province.

Subsequently the UN peacekeeping forces were deployed in Kosovo.

In 1999, the United Nations took the administration of Kosovo in its own hands under UNSC resolution 1244 which authorised international presence in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, until a proper administration to govern the sovereign state could be put in place. The maid demand of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), was to end the violence and destructive repression in Kosovo. This was considering the fact that Serbia did not recognise Kosovo’s independence in the first place and any plan made by the UN was straightforwardly rejected by the Serbian administration. Attempts were made to make Kosovo a complete independent state but in vain.

Kosovo remained under partial UN administration until late 2007 when it became a provisionally self- governed territory under the United Nations. However, the conflicts between Albanians and Serbs continued, following which Kosovo declared itself independent from Serbia in February 2008.

Kosovo is recognized as an independent country by almost 100 countries including the United States, and several members of the European Union, however, Serbia and its allies such as China and Russia haven’t acknowledged it to be an independent country.

The Components of the Deal On 4th September 2020, an economic normalisation deal was signed between the Kosovar Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic at the White House in the presence of the US President Donald Trump. This deal is perceived to be a strategic one, considering the conflicts between Serbia and

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Kosovo, along with the role played by the US throughout the decades. Serbia remained adamant on not recognizing the independence of Kosovo, but due to the geopolitical developments and pressures, it gave in to certain constituents of the deal. Besides, Kosovo also made certain compromises for this deal while maintaining good relations with its ally, the United States.

The elements of the Serbia-Kosovo agreement are as follows: • The agreement calls for economic cooperation between Serbia and Kosovo.

• Both the parties have settled on the rail, air, and transit agreements.

• Serbia and Kosovo are made to remove and prohibit the use of 5G equipment from manufactured untrusted vendors.

• Kosovo and Serbia agreed to work with the US International Development Finance Corporation and EXIM on memorandums of understanding to operationalise the Peace Highway, the rail link between Pristina and Merdare, the rail link between Niš and Pristina, financing to small- and medium-sized enterprises and other projects. (2020) • Serbia and Kosovo also agreed to work with the US on a feasibility study for the purpose of sharing [the disputed] Gazivode/Ujmani Lake, as a reliable water and energy supply. (Bami, 2020) • Kosovo and Serbia agreed to recognise diplomas and professional certificates given by each other.

• Through the agreement, Serbia agrees to suspend its campaign to dissuade other states from recognising Kosovo – but only for a year. In return, Kosovo agrees to refrain from applying for membership of international organisations.

(Jegic, 2020) • Serbia and Kosovo agreed to join the mini-Schengen agreement reached by North Macedonia, Albania and Serbia in October 2019.

• According to the deal, Serbia and Kosovo are required to work on the issues of missing persons, refugees and internally displaced persons from the 1990s Kosovo war.

• Serbia and Kosovo also agreed to designate the Lebanese resistance movement and political party Hezbollah a terrorist organisation in its entirety. (Jegic, 2020) • Also, both Serbia and Kosovo have mutually agreed to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Serbia pledged to shift its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and Kosovo will be establishing its Israel Mission in Jerusalem.

• President Trump also signed two separate documents with Kosovo and Serbia to ensure US investment as a stimulus for more economic co-operation between Belgrade and Pristina. (Bami, 2020)

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Impact of the Deal on the Status Quo As mentioned earlier, Serbia is not ready to acknowledge Kosovo as an independent country, but due to its needs, pressure from the US and certain international organizations, it is trying to develop relations with Kosovo.

However, since 2008, after Kosovo declared its independence, Serbia has been indirectly pressuring other countries to not recognize Kosovo as an independent nation. On the other hand, Kosovo has been trying hard to get internationally recognised by the United Nations and the European Union, to become a member of those organizations. And with the support of the United States, Kosovo is endeavouring to develop relations with other countries also. But due to the condition stated by Serbia, Kosovo will be getting more isolated from other countries as well as the international organizations.

This deal between Serbia and Kosovo can be called as a strategic one because while China and Russia are the allies of Serbia, Serbia made an agreement with Kosovo with the help or intervention of the US. We can say that, by one way or another Serbia is trying to get into the good books of the US, which is the opponent of its allies. Earlier, after the Second World War, the then Yugoslavia didn’t side with anyone, and it became a member of the Non-Alignment Movement. However, the drastic shift in the actions by the countries which were previously member states of Yugoslavia can be noticed now.

One of the elements of this deal prohibits both the parties from using any 5G equipment manufactured by untrusted vendors. Here, the US has exercised its power against China, which is actually termed as “untrusted vendors”, and it is banning the equipment manufactured by Chinese companies such as Huawei.

Thus, Serbia is put at the risk of deterioration of its relations with China. Also, through the normalization of commerce and transit agreements between Serbia and Kosovo, various American companies will be benefiting out of it.

Through this deal, Serbia and Kosovo have labelled the Hezbollah as well as the Lebanese resistance movement as a terrorist organisation and terrorist activity, respectively. However, both Serbia and Kosovo have nothing to do with Hezbollah and the events happening in Lebanon. We can say that the US has again exercised its power against another opponent but which is totally unrelated to the parties to the agreement. And such a decision might adversely affect the relations between certain countries and organizations with Serbia and Kosovo, even if not with the US, thus putting Serbia and Kosovo at a disadvantage.

One of the surprising outcomes of this deal is about Serbia and Kosovo agreeing to move their embassies in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and accepting Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. There are various points that need to be considered while analysing this move. We can say that, what Jerusalem is to Israel and Palestine, similarly Kosovo is to Serbia. And hence, Serbia as well as Israel are trying not to lose them. But, even if Serbia has not acknowledged Kosovo’s

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independence, several other countries have, on the other hand, Palestine is also recognized by certain countries but it is itself not existing as a sovereign territory, therefore comparison of both the situations gets complicated. However, Serbia and Kosovo have nothing to do with Israel, neither are they part of the middleeast, and nor do they have such relations with Israel to agree to the terms as given in the deal.

Since 2008, Israel didn’t give recognition to Kosovo, and neither did Palestinian leaders due to their relations with Serbia, but right after the announcement of this agreement, Israel and Kosovo both acknowledged each other. And this move has been highly criticized by Serbia. Also, the Palestinian leaders have expressed their disapproval towards both Serbia and Kosovo for accepting Jerusalem as a capital of Israel. An important point to consider is that both Kosovo and Palestine have experienced similar oppression, violence, and ethnic cleansing, which acts as a significant reason for Kosovo to understand Palestine’s present situation and support it, other than taking sides with Israel.

Still, this decision made by Serbia and Kosovo might be done for fulfilment of their economic interests by advancing cooperation with Israel, and also with the US. Israel and the US being the strongest allies, at least since Mr. Donald Trump became the President of the US, President Trump has been trying hard to control the geopolitical airs around and about the Middle-east. Hence, after the US brokered Israel-UAE normalization agreement, we can see Serbia, Kosovo, and Bahrain following the same footsteps. It can be said that, a major shift is swiftly occurring in the Middle East as former enemies reconstitute their relationships and join together to create a front against common foes. (Musmar, 2020) However, the European Union has criticized Serbia’s and Kosovo’s decision to accept Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and to move their embassies to Jerusalem, since Serbia and Kosovo are the first European countries to do so, while the EU collectively believes that resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict must be done first. The EU has been working on resolving the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo as they need to mend ties to qualify for EU membership. The world’s biggest trading bloc, already reluctant to take in new members, won’t consider candidates with open territorial issues. Serbia is nominally on track to join, while Kosovo is striving to become a candidate. The ultimate proof of statehood for Kosovo would be entry in the UN, but Serbia is relying on Russia and China to prevent that until a compromise is found. That gives the governments in Moscow and Beijing a foothold to increase their influence in the region. (Savic, 2020) Therefore, the Serbia-Kosovo agreement further complicates the cooperative as well as discrete functioning of the US, Israel, the European Union, Kosovo, Serbia, Russia, China and other direct or indirect subjects to the deal, with each other.

Not only the signing of the deal, but the way in which it will be implemented along the time will determine the changing dynamics of the existing relations.

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Conclusions Clearly the deal is just another attempt in the long list of negotiations undertaken to align the two nations and along with it, the neighbouring nation states into an economic stronghold and to pave way for further diplomatic relations with the nations. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu approved of the deal which also resulted in Israel recognising Kosovo as an independent state (Ahren, 2020).

As the agreement aims at increasing the economic relations and does not clearly make any advances over the disputed recognition of Kosovo as an independent state. Given the fact that still numerous UN member states do not recognise Kosovo as an independent state, it proves to be of more importance to strike any deal between the two nation states and the neighbouring nations. As the deal strikes to increase the economic relations between the nations and to open up talks on other fronts as well.

Even though both the nations aspire to be a part of the EU in its entirety, the EU and other aligning nations do not whole heartedly support this agreement and its implications (Kamat, 2020), it is sure to create a different discussion apart from the long-standing nation disputes and open up on other frontiers of immediate attention. Given the move to Serbia opening an embassy in Jerusalem is in clear opposition of the EUs requests. But the move to install embassy of both Kosovo and Serbian in Jerusalem has other implications too. Kosovo becoming the first Muslim majority country to do so and Serbian becoming the first European Nation.

Given the agreements (Israel-UAE normalization agreement and Israel-Bahrain normalisation agreement) signed back to back in a short span of time, we can say that the disagreements and the long-standing disputes between these nation states are closing fast and indeed taking an altogether stronger front against other potential disputes troubling the nations. The changing landscape in this region and the intensive diplomacy at works along within the nations states and mediation from other nations and international organisations is a clear sign that the international community wants peace and the economic flourishment of all nation states. The sovereign alignments and specific economic unions are only to make these agreements a definite need for the coming days.

References 1. Ahren, Raphael. 2020. How Israel justifies sudden recognition of Kosovo that has riled Serbia.

The Times of Israel. [Online] September 10, 2020. [Cited: October 25, 2020.] https://www.timesofisrael.com/how-israel-justifies-sudden-recognition-of-kosovo-that-hasriled-serbia/.

2. Bami, Milica Stojanovic & Xhorxhina. 2020. Kosovo and Serbia Sign ‘Historic’ Deal Under Trump’s Auspices. Balkan Insight. [Online] September 04, 2020. [Cited: November 11, 2020.]

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

Indian International Law Series, Volume 1 (2020) 52 https://balkaninsight.com/2020/09/04/kosovo-and-serbia-sign-historic-deal-under-trumpsauspices/.

2020. Documents signed at the White House cover wider scope than expected. European Western Balkans. [Online] September 04, 2020. [Cited: November 11, 2020.] https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2020/09/04/documents-signed-at-the-white-housecover-wider-scope-than-expected/.

Jegic, Denijal. 2020. Trump’s Kosovo-Serbia normalisation deal is all about Israel. Aljazeera.

[Online] September 28, 2020.

[Cited: November 12, 2020.] https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/9/28/trumps-kosovo-serbia-normalisation-deal-isall-about-israel/.

Kamat, Dnyanesh. 2020. Israel’s deal with Kosovo and Serbia is window-dressing by Trump and Netanyahu. Times News. [Online] September 17, 2020. [Cited: October 25, 2020.] https://www.timesnownews.com/columns/article/israel-s-deal-with-kosovo-and-serbia-iswindow-dressing-by-trump-and-netanyahu/653486.

Kosovo Conflict.

Britannica.

[Online] [Cited: November 11, 2020.] https://www.britannica.com/event/Kosovo-conflict.

Musmar, Dr. Edy Cohen & Dr. Frank. 2020. The Serbia-Kosovo Agreement Is a Result of the Israel-UAE Agreement. Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA Center). [Online] September 16, 2020. [Cited: November 12, 2020.] https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/serbiakosovo-israel-uae/.

Savic, Misha. 2020. Why the Kosovo Conflict Remains a Problem for the EU. Bloomberg.

[Online] July 11, 2020.

[Cited: November 12, 2020.] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-11/why-the-kosovo-conflict-remains-aproblem-for-the-eu-quicktake.

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6 Discussion Report on the Abraham Accords brokered between US, Israel and UAE in August 2020 Vasu Sharma1, Avishikta Chattopadhyay2 and Pratham Sharma3, Editors 1Junior

Research Analyst, Internationalism C/O AbhiGlobal Legal Research & Media LLP Member, Internationalism C/O AbhiGlobal Legal Research & Media LLP

23Research

pratham@internationalism.co.in

Abstract. On August 13, 2020, the United States of America brokered a histor- ic deal between the United Arab Emirates and Israel, normalizing ties between the two countries and thus laying foundation for peace in West Asia. Research Members of Indian International Law Project and Members of the Global Legal Innovation Advisory on August 16, 2020, participated in a Round Table Discussion, to discuss the implications of the Abraham Accords on Indian Foreign Policy. This article reports the avenues discussed in the discussion.

Dr Nanda Kishor, Manipal Academy of Higher Education, Mr Vignesh Ram, Polintrisk, Nadeem Muddukal, Manipal Academy of Higher Education, Abhivardhan, Vasu Sharma, Pratham Sharma & Avishikta Chattopadhyay, discuss the development through virtual means.

Introduction On August 13, 2020, President Trump announced the USA brokered deal between UAE and Israel, thus normalizing ties between two countries and would allow the two countries to formally explore avenues of co-operation and convergence, thus beginning the process of peace between Arab World and Israel. Thus, UAE became third country after Jordan and Egypt, to establish diplomatic ties with Israel and subsequently, Israel delayed/ suspended its annexation plans. Important aspect of scrutiny and observance would be the countries following the bandwagon to normalize ties with Israel.

Reactions to the deal have certainly addressed how geopolitics in West Asia have changed and how the new partnerships in West Asia would continue. As expected, Turkey, Iran, and Hamas leadership were discontent with deal,

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highlighting the deal as betrayal to the Palestinian cause. On other hand, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Spain, Jordan and Egypt welcomed the deal and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi on the same day via Twitter welcomed the deal. Oman and Bahrain are two probable countries which could be the next to follow footsteps of UAE. India’s reaction to the deal was a positive simultaneously a cautious one as well because UAE is one of the few countries India enjoys a trade surplus in West Asia, Israel is the most important strategic partner for India considering defence co-operation whereas Palestine enjoys traditional but nominal support of India.

An integral part of this reactive diplomacy was how the right-wing and conservative settlers reacted to the deal. This particular group seemed not to accept the deal positively. As per the promises of PM Benjamin Netanyahu, these Jewish settlers provided the mandate to annex parts of West Bank, establish full Israel sovereignty over the disputed region and get more land in settlement of Israel.

History of the deal Certainly, the deal is historic in nature, but there is some amount of history to it. President of the United States presented his ‘prosperity to peace’ plan on January 2020, which claimed to be a realistic path to ‘prosperity, security, and dignity’ for Israelis and Palestinians. In the same month, there were several instances which depicted a filler for normalization of ties between UAE and Israel.1 Moreover, an early filler to co-operation between Israel and Arab World was when Saudi Arabia revising policy of citizens travelling from Saudi Arabia to Israel. Moreover, in January 2020, Israel allowed its citizens to travel to Saudi Arabia.

Among the Gulf countries in West Asia, Emirati has proven to be a dominant country. Covertly, Riyadh would be behind this deal because Saudi Arabia and UAE are trusted allies of the USA and Israel enjoys strong backing of Uncle Sam. Being the leader of Islamic Ummah, Saudi Arabia could certainly not be the first country to take such steps. But Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv enjoyed backdoor negotiations related to technology, intelligence sharing, etc.

Timing of the deal

The most significant part of the Abraham Accord is the timing of the agreement.

Events occurring in domestic realm of the USA, Israel, and the changing geopolitics in West Asia cater this deal as winning situation for many actors.

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President Trump has Presidential Elections around the corner and was facing domestic unrest as well. Until now, the deal has helped him bag the nomination for Noble Peace Prize by Norwegian Parliament for brokering the deal. Benjamin Netanyahu, who was experiencing domestic harassment certainly emerged as substantial Prime Minister of Israel because under his tenure, UAE became first Arab Gulf Country with dominant position in the region (considering economy and political power) and this deal could provide fulcrum to Tel Aviv to come out of isolation in West Asia. For International Community, PM Netanyahu has delayed his plans to annex parts of West bank thus, either bringing peace or delaying it.

For the Emiratis, partnership with Israel is fundamental to their ambitions in Libya and Yemen. Countering Iran establishes a new avenue of convergence for Israel, UAE and other Gulf countries which will follow. Israel combats Hamas and Hezbollah, which have essential backing Iran and UAE fights Houthis in Yemen, which had proven backing of Iran. Hence, containing political Islam of Iran could be one point of convergence, the other being countering Political Islam and ‘neo-Ottomanism’ of Turkey. UAE and Turkey are on opposing sides in Libya1. Furthermore, countering the emerging axis of Turkey-Iran-PakistanMalaysia could be another point of con- vergence for Saudi Arabia (custodian of two holy mosques of Islam), UAE, and Israel.

Geopolitics of West Asia is no more based on a strengthened leverage of Gulf countries due to their resources of oil. These countries have acknowledged the need to diversify economy and ties, which no longer are rooted to oil diplomacy2.

Thus, this deal could redefine the geopolitics in West Asia.

Playing of the words

Reactive diplomacy of the deal highlighted of nomenclature used in International community has different consumptions and meanings. Certain terms are meant for domestic consumption and rest are meant for international consumption. While Euro- pean Union acknowledged permanent suspension of Israeli annexation plan Israel adhered to using ‘temporary suspension.’ On other hand, USA simply considered ‘suspension’ of the plan.

Moreover, a difference in narratives of the deal were observed in USA and UAE, In Libya, Turkey supports the forces of Government of National Accords while on other hand UAE supports the Libyan National Army led by General Khalifah Haftar. GNA and LNA are on opposing sides fighting the ongoing civil war in Libya 2 A new axis of Turkey-Qatar-Iran-Pakistan-Malaysia is emerging to challenge Saudi Arabia’s domination over OIC. This emerging axis aims to represent a new face of Islamic Bloc.

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the outcome of the deal depends upon the common fields of interest and avenues of convergence. For President Trump, it was a ‘historic deal’ while for UAE it was a ‘roadmap’ and an incentive for opening embassies.

The Domestic and International Facets of the deal This ‘Abraham Accord’ has certain domestic and certain international facet. The Domestic realms imply how the deal would affect the conflict between Israel and Palestine. International facet implies how the Arab world has adopted to changing realities of West Asia, how a common enemy has bought Arab World and Israel together, and certainly which countries would follow on the suit3.4 An important regional (neither domestic, nor international but pertaining to region- al history) aspect to the deal is that, history of the deal can be dated back to the ‘Arab Spring’ when whole of the West Asia and North Africa (WANA) acknowledged that politics over Political Islam and pointing out enemies/ threats in the region might not be the real problem, but the threat to state, or the real problem lies inside the countries. Arab Spring had cleared the air that, citizens of the region needed to be treated and taken care of, from a neo-liberal perspective. As highlighted earlier, with changing geopolitics in West Asia, the need has been realized to diversify economy and provide citizens better quality if livelihood, instead of focusing on external rivalries and Political Islam, which are draining wealth of the nations in WANA. The Palestinian question has been treated as a moral and emotional issue by the en- tire Arab world ever since the dispute had come to light. It has never been merely a political dispute for the Arab’s and it is evident from their approach to the peace process with the Israeli’s. It is a very important aspect in the discussion in order to under- stand the psychology of the Arab leaders. The nature of the issue contributes to the approach that leaders have towards the dispute and how they deal with the possible solutions to the dispute.

The latest announcement of the deal between Israel and UAE has indicated that the entire Arab community is not on the same page regarding the Palestinian question anymore. It is clear from the years of negotiations that the Arabs have never treated the issue from an entirely realistic point of view and it did not seem to change any- time soon. However, UAE have changed that opinion of the world. They have be- come the third Arab country to have established cordial Bahrain was the second country to follow footsteps of UAE and became fourth country in West Asia-North Africa region to have diplomatic relations with Israel.

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ties with the Israeli’s and it has raised some eyebrows.

1. Dr. Nanda Kishor, had presented this point regarding the psychology of the Arabs with perfection and enlightened the forum with the same. He further expounded that the approach from Arabs need to change with due consideration to time. The dispute has continued for eight decades and has brought little to no relief for the Palestinians. According to Dr. Nanda Kishor, it is the time to be more pragmatic for the Arabs and relations with the Israeli’s have got to improve. The deal in- volving UAE and Israel represents the required consideration towards the disputes from the rest of the Arab communities. Moreover, the emotional aspect identified in the deal is minimal in nature and high rationality behind the deal can be observed.

The outcome and dividend of the deal would be based on pragmatism and realism.

2. Even though, the whole issue between Israel-Palestine is highly emotional, the need of the hour is a realist approach to it. The sole reason highlighting last point was because, even though rights of Palestinians are considerable in International Community, Palestine is struck with its historical identity and ideas. In colloquial language, Palestine does not intend to merge with Israel, but wants Israel to merge with Palestine. This attitude of Palestine along with violent nature of Ha- mas, has been taking Palestine into regression. On other hand, Israel which was formed in 20th Century has been able to progress further due to the sense of realism/ pragmatism it practices. For years, since Bill Clinton, all Presidents of USA had promised to open embassy in Jerusalem, but President Trump was the first one to do so. Due to emotional aspect of the conflict, Iran and Turkey have react- ed to deal as Arab World ‘back stabbing the cause of Palestine’ and ‘Hypocritical nature’ of UAE. But the deal holds large amount of realism to it because, certainly Israel and Arab Gulf nations are wo different poles of power in West Asia and co-operation between Arab World and Israel would in long term be fruitful for diversifying economy, trade and defence ties.

Third party interventions

Speakers in the discussion had highlighted how third-party interventions always create complexities in any bilateral conflict. question that often comes to light in relation to peace process in the dispute is about the mediating party or the international players that are essential for the success of the process.

Palestinians do not seem to be in a position to trust the Americans with the

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mediation and no other international player seems to be eager to step in and take on the Americans. However, Dr. Nanda Kishor believes that the Palestinians have been stubborn for far too long for any deliberation to work in relation to the dispute.

He further shed light on the fact that Americans have been dominant in the process owing to the divided house representing the Palestinians. The west hasn’t been oblivious to the differences between Hamas, Fatah and Palestinian Authority. He further explained that the extremist approach of Hamas has been adding fuel to fire when it comes to the negotiations as part of the peace process.

It seems to be an important factor considering the Israeli’s have been painting their fixation of ‘no statehood’ for Palestine in the name of Hamas and their extremism. In the opinion of our panelists, Palestinians need to get their house in order and represent a united front to the west in order to have progression in the deliberations.

Dr. Nanda Kishor has also emphasised in his explanation that completely relying on the mediator or a third-party to help in resolution of the dispute will not assist in unfolding the process as expected. The third-party cannot be expected to operate in isolation of self-interest and somewhere the interest of the parties originally involved can get affected. In this case, United States cannot be completely relied upon due to their own issues and thus Palestinians need to come to terms with the fact that the dialogue needs to primarily involve them and their Jewish neighbours as it is the most important step towards normalization of relations.

The position of India

The next segment of the discussion focused on India’s position with regards to the other nations. India’s relation with the rest of the Arab states have been quite smooth and Indian was capable of maintaining friendly relations with the Arab nations. The major question that arose was whether India’s relation with the two nations would see a change after the peace deal or whether and secondly since India harbours friendly relations with both the countries would it not be plausible for India to act as a media- tor and curb the differences harboured between both the countries. Although the idea of a country acting as a mediator in the differences of the other countries is quite common and this concept has increased since the increasing importance given to ADR in the world. However, the instance of a third country working as a mediator between two countries is not considered to be very plausible option for the mitigation of conflict between

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two countries. India has harboured very good relations with the two countries, especially in the defence sector. Trying to mitigate relations between other countries at the present juncture will not be plausible for India because of the other countries that may be linked to the conflict. For the overall growth of Indian sectors, it is necessary that India maintains a neutral position with every emerging power in the world and maintain peace and stability with the others present there. An important aspect highlighted in the discussion was the role India has been playing between Israel and Palestine. India has always abided by International Law and has been characterized as a solution-oriented country across stakeholders in International Community. Subsequently, India has provided scholarships to Palestinian students in order to educate them, provide them an environment of study which they might not witness in conflictstricken Palestine. This certainly depicts the responsibility of India as a ‘global citizen.’ Similarly, the library setup by India in Afghanistan revolves around the same. Hence, even though India might not intervene politically into these conflicts, but certainly takes measure to ensure peace and prosperity for all.

Dehyphenation One of the most important topics discussed was the concept of Dehyphenation which means dealing with two countries, having adversarial relationship between them, in an independent manner. The third country which decides to maintain good relations with both of the countries in a policy level would mean that the systematic understanding of the adverse relationship of both the countries. For example, if one country like US wants to maintain good relations with Pakistan and India which have averse historical background, the third nation would want to create a fine balance while dealing with both the countries. In the present scenario as well, the adverse relations between both the countries which are historical in nature needs to be given due consideration and dealt with utmost caution.

Conclusions In the concluding section of the discussion, it was admitted that the major factors affecting the sustainability of the deal and the possibility of further deals depends on the creation of an environment where the everybody thrives to a friendly surrounding.

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Key takeaways from the discussion 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

Abraham Accords have certain domestic, regional and international aspects to it. It has provided a win-win situation for President Trump and PM Netanyahu; it is bringing Arab World and Israel closer and would help them to co- operate on new avenues.

For, India it is an opportunity to strengthen its ties with Israel, UAE, Bahrain and USA and simultaneously practice de-hyphenation by providing educational opportunities for youth in Palestine.

Even though UAE and Bahrain have agreed on the Abraham Accords, the big ticket is Saudi Arabia, but obviously it would have played a major diplomatic role covertly.

Gulf countries have acknowledged the changing geo-politics, heretofore, geo-politics revolved around oil and political Islam, but now a combination of neo-liberal perspective and pragmatic relations is required in WANA. Proximities between Iran and Turkey may have been a point of convergence between Arab World and Israel. The support of Arab World to Palestine might not be the same as it earlier was. Hence non-Arab states would try to pitch in and commence beginning of a new asymmetric warfare.

It would be important to observe and assess the impact of this agreement on Syria and Lebanon, the two major conflict areas in WANA. The region of Israel and Palestine is a very complex one. Jews, Christians and Palestinian Arabs practice their faith simultaneously. All the foreign intervenors must understand this aspect of faith and religion to resolve conflict. Considering this complex homogeneity in Israel and rest of West Asia, accommodating homogenous diaspora in process of democratization might be a difficult. However, the process of democratization is a political system which might not be conducive to nature of governments in West Asia.

The term political Islam had different dimensions. As Nadeem Ahmed had pointed out, it is not a monolithic term. The Al-Nahda period (Arab Renaissance) was a transformational stage when Islamic community embraced the modern values of education without losing out the Islamic character. Largely this period is associated to cultural shock bought in by Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1789. When established in Iran, Political Islam there embraced anti-Sunni stand.

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7 Recommendations Report on the Roundtable on Indian Diaspora and the U.S. Presidential Elections 2020 Avishi Pateriya1 & Yashvi Agarwal2 12Research Contributor, Internationalism avishipateriya@rgnul.ac.in, yashviagarwal@rgnul.ac.in;

Synopsis. A comprehensive discussion about the political behaviour and the role played by the Indian Diaspora in the United States Presidential Elections, 2020. In addition to this, a discussion about the political participation of the India Diaspora in the country elections of the European Union, United Kingdom and Australia.

Vasu Sharma, Research Analyst at Internationalism moderates the Roundtable with Prof Dattesh Prabhu-Parulekar, Assistant Professor at School of International and Area Studies, University of Goa, Dr Vivek Mishra, Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs, Sylvia Mishra, Doctoral Research Fellow at King's College, London, Ishani Duttagupta, Veteran Journalist on Indian Foreign Affairs, Manohar Samal, Research Analyst and Mugdha Satpute, Junior Research Analyst.

Introductory Statements The Indian diaspora is a strong one with more than 17.5 million people. Of these, over 4.6 million are situated in the USA. A number as significant as this makes the Indian diaspora a substantial community in the upcoming US Presidential elections of 2020. This time we see many important people of Indian Origin or ancestry having prominent positions in the US elections. The nomination of Kamala Harris, a democrat and a person of Indian ancestry, for the office of the vice president, is a significant achievement for India. Although this is a big deal for India, this achievement is also a long-awaited one. The LM Singhvi committee created by Prime Minister Vajpayee, more than 20 years ago, emphasises the importance that the Indian diaspora in the US has in creating bridges between the Government of the two countries.

Despite this, not many Indian Americans may come into power, because most of the Indian Americans are in suicide in the non-swing states of the USA. Therefore, the political power of the Indian Americans may not be as much as that of the Hispanics and the African American community.

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Indian Americans continue to play a crucial role in the 2020 elections. People are approaching them from both parties. The Indian Americans have raised funds for both the democratic and the Republicans. Indians are seen as influencers, having a significant impact on their community. Also, their professional accomplishments make them an essential community of voters in these elections.

Some unique facts of the Indian Diaspora are that we are the oldest diaspora of the world, and the Indian diaspora is the most widely spread in the world. Also, reasons for Indians migrating to other lands have been various. These facts of the Indian diaspora make it very different from the other diasporas. The issue of the political behaviour of the Indian Americans must be seen in the context of political economies, that is, the political, economic integration with Global governance for the Indian Americans in the host land in comparison to the homeland.

Discussion & its Domains The Diaspora

The Indian diaspora Is the second largest in the USA after the Mexican diaspora.

The registered Indian Americans are about 1.5 million. This is a big reason why both the parties are trying to the Indian community, especially the Hindu Americans. The campaigns of both the parties are proof of this- with the democratic nominating Kamala Harris for the position of vice president and the campaign of Trump being supported by PM Modi. The democrats are using more than ten languages for their campaigning and Advertising, to reach out to people of maximum ethnicity. However, this progressive versus Nationalistic discourse of the democratic party might lose them some traditional voters from stateside Michigan and Florida.

The main discussion and deciding point are the questions of whether a democratic president or Republican president would be better for India and the Indian Americans. Biden has a positive history with India as he was the vice president during Obama's Presidency and asked Obama to strengthen American ties with India and also helped in the execution of the US-India Civil Nuclear deal of 2008. On the other hand, Trump has a robust connection with PM Narendra Modi. As a result, many Indian American voters are shifting from the traditional trend of supporting the democrats to supporting the republicans. This can also be seen as a result of the success of the Bush Presidency. One of the main achievements of President Bush was to establish strong political and economic ties with India and to carry out a successful civil nuclear deal of 2008. but these ties may not be enough for both the parties. The nomination of Kamala Harris for the position of vice president has received mixed views from Indian Americans.

Some view it as an achievement for the Indian American population as they would

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have better representation now, while others have questioned her credentials and ties with India. This has led to a fragmentation of the Indian American population. Trump also took many decisions and made policies that were detrimental to India, like his stance on H1B visas and trade disputes with India.

Taking a look at history, the Indian diaspora in the USA became more politically engaged in the late 1980s and early 1990s. They were able to strengthen their equities of Indian Americans in the US through caucuses, campaign financing and the spread of Indian culture and knowledge. A change in the political inclination of the Indian Americans can be seen with the election of Bobby Jindal to the US Congress in 2004. more Indian Americans are supporting the republicans than ever before. It is also an accomplishment for the Indian Government to successfully engage with two different administrations with different policies, namely, the Obama (democratic) administration, and the Trump (Republican) administration. Therefore, the Indian Government has been able to provide agency to the Indian diaspora in the US, which has led to stronger ties between India and the US. It remains to be seen whether this outreach program for the Indian communities would be beneficial for the parties or it would lead to fragmentation of the votes of the Indian American community. The number of Indian Americans having important and Central positions in the politics and administration of the USA is still very low. As compared to the USA, more people of Indian Origin are engaged in central politics in the UK and Canada. This election would determine whether Indians receive some prominent positions in the administration or the community of Indian Americans continue to be funding banks for the parties.

The immigration and visa issue: this issue may not have a tremendous impact on the results of the election because people who can vote are already citizens of America. Instead, other diverse issues concern the Indian American such as the issues of racism, economic issues, Labour Law issues, etc. Although Trump decisions on visa and im-migration have not been in favour of India, it is still very unpredictable whether this would lead to Biden Having an upper hand in the upcoming elections.

Fragmentation of the Indian Diaspora

With campaigns like 'Hindus for Trump',' Sikhs for Trump', or 'Muslims for Trump', It can be seen that the parties are trying to reach out to every fragment of the Indian diaspora. Democratic party E has been critical of the Modi government, especially on issues of article 370 and Kashmir, and the citizenship Amendment Act. The ultimate deciding factor can be the predictability, whether the unpredictability of Trump is better or the Indian Americans should stick to the predictability of democracy, as has been the history. Both parties are trying to woo the Indian American community, with Trump inviting PM Modi for his project of 'Naya Bharat', and Biden stating that the USA will support India in the

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India-China border issue. Issues like China are of more importance to India than the localised issues.

Shift in the Indian diaspora from Democrats to Republicans: with the advent of the Bush administration, a change can be seen in the political intonation of the Indian Americans. With the successful civil nuclear deal signed between USA and India in 2008, to the strengthening of ties between the two countries under the Bush Presidency. Even after the Iraq war, President Bush enjoyed great popularity and support in India. The eight years of the Bush administration changed, in a positive way, how the Amer-ican Indians look at the republicans. President Trump strong stand against terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan also let to him receiving support from India.

Religiosity in the Upcoming Elections

America being a predominantly Christian country, both the parties have always tried to have the backing of the Christians of the country. The issues of Catholics versus protestant and the black lies movement in the recent past have highlighted this issue. The administration of President Obama saw a lot of secularisation. The Religiosity in the upcoming election might not matter much to the Indian Americans as they want to see policies which are liberal and progressive rather than biased or coloured. However, reaching out to the Hindus in America might have a significant impact. Therefore, the leaders are trying to woo the Hindu community in America. Biden released a video which shows Hindu Americans supporting him. Tulsi Gabbard, a Hindu, has also emphasised reaching out to this particular segment of the electorate. The Christian lobbies had a significant role in strengthening the ties between the USA and India during the Regime of PM Vajpayee.

The Republican party is not a homogenous monolith. The various fragments of the party invoke and engage multiple aspects of religious faith.

It was further discussed how the parties are not just focusing on India. Kamala Harris has also spoken about the minorities in China and Pakistan. The democratic party has criticised the Indian Government over the issue of article 370 and Kashmir and the citizenship Amendment Act. This is not a big issue as the democratic party has always stood up unspoken for the protection of human rights. Trump has been very accomplished in bolstering the US India relations, especially through2+2 dialogue, COMCASA, and other defence and trade-related agreements. This incentivises the co-development of the technology and products in both nations.

The US India relation has reached such a level now that both the countries may not agree on everything, but they can't talk about the differences out and still support each other. The statements of Kamala Harris against the Modi government may not have a considerable impact on the elections as she is contesting for only the position of vice president, who derives its powers from the

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president. If Susan Rice gets appointed as the Secretary of State, it would be very beneficial for India. Susan has excellent relations with the Indian External Affairs Minister, Dr S Jaishankar.

The Indian Diaspora in Australia

It can be said that the Indian diaspora in Australia is not yet quite ready for a central, strategic political role in the country. A few Indian origin candidates have student elections but not won. The Indians living in Australia are probably more focused on their professional life. The Indian diaspora in Australia has achieved great success in the professional careers. More than 25% of the MBBS doctors in Melbourne are India. The number of students going to Australia is also increasing, but Indians still do not play a very central role in the politics of Australia. Before 2014, the extent of engagement between the two countries was not much. But that is not the case in the Modi regime. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made a significant effort to connect India with Australia on the political, economic, and cultural ground. The engagement of the two countries in areas like food, cricket, and the entertainment industry is more prevalent. The two countries have been successfully able to diversify their relations and not limit them to just political or economic ones. China's aggressive policy in the Pacific has also led to greater cooperation between India and Australia. There are people to people fo-rums working on building relations between the countries of two people. These initiatives allowed the emerging leaders of the two countries to discuss issues of bilateral importance. The cultural aspect also develops due to this initiative.

But India needs to work more to explore the avenues of convergence concerning the Indian diaspora in Australia from a political and strategic view. The relationship be-tween the two countries needs to be made more robust and permanent. This can be achieved by encouraging young researchers to study the diaspora of India in various parts of the world and to explore how India can use the diaspora to build stronger con-nections with countries. Also, India is one of the biggest exporters of generic medicines. This medical diplomacy or soft power that India enjoys should be used by it to make its ties with other nations more robust.

Conclusions Concluding the discussion, the speakers agreed on the fact that the future of the In-dia-U.S. international and bilateral relations completely depends upon the preference of the Indian Diaspora and whom they are choosing to represent them in the House of Representatives in the White House. It is imperative for the Indian-Americans to look forward to the election of Kamala Harris as VicePresident and that whether the election of a person of an Indian origin to such an

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authoritative position will turn out to be fruitful for India and for the Indian-U.S. ties or not. It will also be interesting to see whether the people prophesying about Nikki Haley and Kamala Harris standing for the next U.S. Presidential Elections, 2024 will be true or not.

To conclude, the support received by the parties depends upon how they carry out their campaign and how much are they able to win the support of various ethnic com-munities along with the domestic population of America. It also depends upon their multilateral policies for America to reach its pax American dream.

Recommendations and Key Takeaways • Whether the Indian Diaspora will unite or will be politically fragmented with respect to their political behaviour and their preferential voting towards the Democratic or the Republican Party.

• Whether the Indian Diaspora will be a ‘Swing Community’ in the upcoming Presidential Elections in the U.S., notwithstanding the fact that the IndianAmericans do not essentially live in those pre-supposed and recognised ‘Swing States’ of the U.S. like Florida, Michigan, New Hampshire, Ohio, Colorado etc.

• The hopes and the opinions of the Indian Diaspora with regards to their political lineage towards the democrats, because of the nomination of a person of the Indian ancestry, Kamala Harris, for the Vice-Presidential position.

• The increased campaigns and advertisements by both the Democrats and the Republicans concerning the Hindu-American community.

• The increased participation of the people of Indian origin in the political campaigns of both Joe Biden and Donald Trump. Public figures like Amita Jani, Sanjeev Joshipura and Sabrina Singh for Joe Biden and Samapat Shivangi and Harmeet Kaur Dhillon for Trump.

• The fact that the issues related to the India-China affairs vis-à-vis the IndiaChina border dispute is more imperative to the Indian Diaspora for their voting preference rather than the Immigration and the Visa issues.

• The deciding factor for the Indian Diaspora in terms of voting lies in the question that which party will be more supportive and cooperative to the government’s campaign of a new and robust India.

• The fact that the Bush administration was in reality the transforming point for the Indian Diaspora from the Democrats to the Republicans. Also, Trump’s personalised way of managing politics and with him being a person with whom it is easy to do business, has made the Modi-Trump relations and the IndiaU.S. ties much more persuasive.

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• Convergence and strategic relations among the Indian Diaspora and Australia has not been effective enough to let the people of Indian origin in Australia to take on any high-end authoritative political role or a role in the public life. • The slide remarks of criticism of the democrat Kamala Harris regarding the Kashmir issue and the Citizenship Amendment Act, should have been seen coming by the Indian Diaspora with regards to international and bilateral relations between India and U.S.;

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8 Discussion Report on the Indo-African Ties and its Avenues in a Multipolar World Poonguzhali R P1 & Mukesh M2, Contributors Vamya Dhawan3, Editor 1Senior

Associate Editor [Legit by Internationalism], Internationalism 2Editor [Legit by Internationalism], Internationalism 3Editor [Legit by Internationalism], Internationalism legit@internationalism.co.in;

Synopsis. This report is a follow-up to our 3rd Roundtable Discussion on IndoAfrica Relations with Abhishek Sharma, Observer Research Foundation, Michael Sunkanmi & Ruchita Beri, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence and Study Analyses, moderated by Vasu Sharma, Research Analyst, Internationalism We are grateful to our speakers in the Discussion for their valuable inputs.

Introduction The relationship between the countries of India and Africa began when the first ship from South Africa sailed to India and has evolved to India being the world's second-largest trader with Africa. The relationship is no longer limited to trade and has extended to health, education, peacekeeping etc. Africa is often perceived as an underdeveloped country by people but the truth is Africa underwent drastic suffering in the 'breadbasket case' and has made great progress since then in the economic level of its countries. The continent now stands as a runner-up in all fields and has made headway in its GDP, health, trade expansion etc. According to a report, the statistics of the economic output of Africa has tripled in the last few years. The Indian monetary Fund (IMF) predicts Africa will make up half of the 10 rapidly growing countries on an economic level and its GDP level has also increased more than twice in the decades between 1980 – 1990 as a consequence of the enlargement of tourism,

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markets, etc. More than the country's growth, the living standard of people has changed; nearly 40 per cent of the population has shifted from rural to urban lives and citizens face better governance, transparency, and democracy (Shaw, 2016). The healthy growth of the country has decreased the poverty level and thereby improving the middle-class citizen's life and demand for goods and services. The main objective of India is to build up energy resources for which Africa is one of the most resourceful countries, so India has tied a mutually benefited agreement with the African continent.

The Ancient Origins of Indo-African Ties The Indo African relationship has a long history with its seeds being traced back to the maritime activities between the two continents of Asia and Africa. The Greek accounts of Ptolemy talk about the maritime trade relationships between India and Egypt (Sanujit, 2011). It was also mentioned that when Romans expanded their empire in Egypt they learnt many things about international trade with Indians and the trade relation between India and ancient Egypt was enshrined in the period of Ptolemaic rule. There is an account of bilateral trade between India and Egypt using ports and the Red Sea. According to the great historian Strabo, Ptolemies had exploited much of the trading opportunities.

The Periplus Maris Erythraei describes a fortunate city of Eudaemon where the ships from both the countries of India and Egypt arrived for receiving cargos.

The Greek navigator of Ptolemy dynasty, the eudoxus of Cyzicus was the one who started the trade in 130 BC. The ports of modern Karachi Muziris, Korkai and Kaverpattinam were the main centres of this trade. The Greek-Roman merchants sold clothing, topaz, coral, glass, gold, cotton cloth, silk, yarn and indigo while Indians sold the Romans wheat, rice, cloth, oil and sesame from India (Stearns, et al., 2001). The ancient style of Indian architecture is also reflected in Egypt. When Romans occupied Egypt they further established development in the Indo Egypt trade with thriving Maritime tracks in Red sea through the Arabian Sea to South India.

Post-Independence Indo-Africa Relations The relationship between Africa and India during the British Empire had political and business dimensions as well in addition to the trade with Mumbai and other parts of India being central to the ivory trade (Bhacker, 1992).When India achieved Independence in 1947, racial discrimination protests in Africa

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were in full swing and as India aided them to resolve it, the Indo African alliance cemented. The world was still divided between cold war camps and many African countries and India opted for their joint support to the non-alignment movement (NAM). The African countries including Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, Yugoslavia along with India opted in the interest of decolonization and shared similar political and ideological influences where India was a role model as the leader of the non-alignment movement (NAM) (Pekkanen, et al., 2014). The Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru encouraged the liberalisation of African countries as they would not able to achieve domestic policies if they were backing the camp followers and separation. This move made India get stronger support from Africans for the future. The five main objectives of the relationship during the cold war are as follows; • To protest against racism • Non-aligned movement • To back the fights in the liberation • Economic statesmanship with security and peace-making within the south-south association • Active dissociation with the Indian diaspora (Dubey, 2016) The African nationalists were given full support by Jawaharlal Nehru and he encouraged all the movements and other policies of them. However, the Indian intrusion as a strategic role player was much constrained due to the financial weakness and inward-looking economic policies of Africa. As India had to follow Gandhi’s non-violent means for achieving decolonization against imperialism it could not provide military assistance to National Liberation movements against the British. India's role in South Africa was also limited by the resentment of Black African Nationalists which resulted in Indophobic attitude and the ethnic cleansing of residing in countries like Uganda. In the conference of Asian African conference of 1955 held in Indonesia, a certain resolution was finalized to be followed between African – Asian countries with the following objectives: 1. To promote trade and economic progression • To augment the cultural cooperation • Prolongment of human rights and self-determination of Africa (Banda, 2020), • This resolution was passed before Africans achieved independence, so India as a co-ordinator of this conference did not oppose any of the decisions and sealed an alliance with the African continent. It was only in April 2018 that India drafted South to South cooperation platform with an

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excellent basic framework of a bilateral relationship with the continent and this meet from April 4 to April 18 held in New Delhi was known as India Africa forum Summit.

Trade and Economic Relations

The trade relationship paved the way for the Indian companies to expand their reach into the African continent. The crude oil trades have reached a greater height and the Indian import share of oil could be raised to 80 to 90% in 2025 from the present level (Ujwal, 2015). The major countries which export oil to India are Nigeria, South Sudan, Egypt etc. The trade of crude oil with India has existed for many decades and has gradually expanded to chemicals and medicines amongst other things while in return India exports spices, textiles, wheat, tea, etc.

The commitment of India to Africa exists at a bilateral, multilateral, and regional level. The goals of both countries are to increase the capacity of trade(import and export), get the support of the government in private fields and increased engagement from the private and public sectors of India. In bilateral trade, India’s trade ratio with Africa is higher than the trade with the USA, nearly 5.3 billion in 2001 to 12billion in 2005 and 70 billion in 2013 and is expected to increase to 90billion in future years (Ujwal, 2015 p. 46). The exports statistics of India has grown by23.2% annually and of Africa by 32.2% (Ujwal, 2015 p. 47).

In the world economic forum meeting, the Indians and African industrialists had made a statement about needing to achieve 500US billion by 2020.

India has had many business collaborations with African companies and invested in the continent which is rich in its resource among which the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) has received 126 agricultural projects, 177 infrastructural projects and 34 energy projects. Bharti Airtel also purchased Zain Africa in 2008. India has consistently shown its growing spirit in regards to the relationship with Africa for the past 15 years with Africa as its fourthlargest trade partner after China, the European Union and the United States of America. In 2012, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry president had sent a business delegation to Ethiopia to meet its new Prime Minister for the reaffirmation of India's commitment to the growth and development of Africa. The Ex-prime minister Dr Manmohan Singh had earlier expressed that Africa had all the prerequisites to reach the pinnacle of international growth in the 21stcentury and India will work together with Africa to help achieve this potential.

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Education and Socio-Cultural Relations

Even in the context of education and socio-cultural activities, the relation between them is exceptional. The government of India has offered various scholarships to the students of African countries in Mumbai and Delhi universities. The funds for these were covered bythe Indian Technical and Electronical Corporation (Banda, 2020).To establish and strengthen the relationship and make more reforms for the surge and welfare of the nations, the representatives of the two nations often conduct annual visits. The Prime Minister of India Mr Jawaharlal Nehru was the first PM of the world to visit Sudan in 1957.

Political and Peacekeeping Relations

India has always stood up for human rights and a democratic government in Africa. When the African National Party announced the apartheid system, the Indian government severed its relationship with the African countries. It also raised its voice against the minority regimes of Portuguese in Africa and South Rhodesia even after the implementation of the Unilateral declaration of independence of 1965 (Banda, 2020).Despite these few hostilities, India still sent all its armed forces to help Africa during the Congo crisis for maintaining peace. The Indian government has always extended its hand for peacekeeping purposes by providing weapons and medical drugs. Currently, India is a member of the UN peacekeeping force across Africa.

India Africa Forum Summit

India and Africa's relations became multilateral through the agreement in IAFS 2008 to sustain the relationship thereby gaining economic advantage. It is an official meet for Indo African international relations. It happens once in three years with participation of 14 African countries and India. The elemental concern in this forum is international peace and security, good governance, trade, commerce, industrial and economic development. In this forum India ensured its support to the participating countries. The second forum meet happened in Ethiopia in its national capital Addis Ababa, with the participation of 15 countries and its last Summit happened in New Delhi again. This Meet is marked much significant as it determines the foreign relationship and economic collaboration of India with the African Continent.

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Challenges to the Indo-African Relations: An Overview Africa's domestic and external forces pose a considerable challenge for the Indo African relationship. India's external policies with Africa are influenced by many factors such as trade, capital flows, import substitution and economic growth. The unequal bargaining power of African economies with a fastdeveloping country like India, and the domination of commodity exports and the imports of manufactured goods, low levels of compliances in trade and foreign direct investment and its reliance on the developed countries cause hurdles for international trade and investment with India. Moreover, Africa's economy is still extensively dependant on agriculture with limited industrialisation. Rural and urban poverty and unemployment persist despite development. All these factors combined with poor governance and intraregional conflicts put a strain on the relationship with the African nations.

Both Africa and India witnessed the adversity of colonialism and its dark side of great exploitation by the English, following the industrial revolution in the west. This resulted in an economic bipolarity of the global north and global south. The industrial revolutions also caused concerns of climatic events in the western countries which forced them to exploit natural resources from the east.

The Global South-South relations were well established in mid-1950.Due to the fast-changing dynamics of the African countries, other countries such as India, China, Turkey etc. are trying to make engagements with them. China has been involved in UN peace and security purposes in Africa like India. They opened the first overseas base in Djibouti and carried out various activities in terms of selling arms and different types of equipment to African countries. They also launched the first-ever forum for peace and security. However, some lacunas need to be addressed. The Chinese economic engagement has not proved to be profitable for Africa but has instead caused losses and even incurred debts for some countries. For example, China engaged with Kenya in the establishment of an international port in Mombasa but due to an unknown clause in the trade agreement between those two countries on the project, the port of Mombasa is likely to go to the hands of China as Kenya had not returned 5 billion dollars which were given by China. Africa has a danger of loss in its relationship with China as it lays down its conditions that are very stringent for Africa. Despite this Africa has continued its relationship with China due to the need for development but it is looking for another partner that could fulfil these qualities. The question arises if India is capable of fulfilling that role. Due to the historical relationship between India and Africa, there always exists a balance

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of trade with India and the diplomatic relationship and the bilateral and multilateral agreements between them are considered to be more profitable.

The difference in India and China’s engagement is that India is completely standalone and not influenced by any other countries. For India, the goal of everyone is to stand as a reliable partner for Africa. Chinese approaches are, more traditional in nature i.e mostly focused on infrastructure development projects or resource extraction so, these infrastructures and FDI projects will definitely be lucrative in the short run. It may not be suitable for African or developing countries because of the Chinese lookout for quick and easy money.

The sustainability of such projects, in the long run, is questionable when we consider debt trap but since there is no evidence of assets being seized by Chinese entities so it can be inferred that every country has its own side of the engagement. India focuses on the core competencies while for China three things are important; firstly, the money, secondly, the political influence and thirdly, the elite level wealth creation. They also care about strong state relations. India’s agreement with Africa has always been driven by African needs and priorities. It focuses on strengthening the African economy and development partnership by opening up various training institutions for the youth. Unfortunately, Africa is still on the receiving side in this relationship, so we cannot change some choices of elements from political leaders but the citizens make demands on some of the issues that are neither better nor profitable. These issues have to be addressed and Africa needs to bring a superior offer to the table. The development model also has to be determined.

China advertises every single move they make in media and their diplomatists keep themselves engaged in social media and continuous communication with the civil societies while India does not advertise their moves with anyone. There is no Indian media channel in correspondence with Africa or vice versa and the diplomats of the country should also engage in more interactions. There is a smaller number of experts working in examining the Indo-African ties. We need people who are more aware of what India does to improve the partnership and students should be taught about Africa from a school level. In a diverse country, people need to be interactive with civil societies and enhance people to people partnership. Indigenous approaches such as models with mechanisms that can estimate the growth and development in Africa and make it more peoplecentred would be preferred.

At the present time, Africa is still dependent on other foreign countries for its development even though they have started looking inwards. Africa is blessed with enormous natural resources but due to blood leadership, the Africans have been unable to use the resources for the development. Therefore, external

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countries like India should impose certain conditions on investment and encourage African leaders to use their resources judicially as it will help Africa become self-dependent in the long run. Especially, in the Covid-19 era, countries around the world are looking forward to being self-dependant. India had also been planning this by reducing its dependence on other countries because of the extraordinary conditions which forced the reduction of trade. In India, the investments are not at the government level. The private sectors have importance and they decide on where and when to invest. Africa is the land of opportunities for private sectors. The incredible measures taken by the Africans in enhancing their own conditions have made others invest in their land. The health sector is where India gets visitors because the heath treatments or specialized treatments are expensive in Africa so half of the tourism is medical tourism. By making the partnership, Africa will stop being a mere recipient and both the countries will theoretically and technically be benefitted.

India is the country with the least diplomatic corps around the world. It has 39 western missions in Africa and has been planned to improve to 47 by 2021. There is a lack of MEA (Ministry of External Area) staff but the government has taken steps to consider several other services abroad to achieve the mission abroad. As India is a country with adequate human resources, knowledgeable people with information on economic matters will be helpful in enhancing our partnership with Africa. The defined pillars of model cooperation have already been implemented and India is still cooperating with Africa. Mr T.S Tirumurti, Secretary (Economic Relations), Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India in 2019, told that Africa's freedom from conditionality and restrictions are essential factors in Indo African International relations. India is the fifth largest investor in Africa and both countries are strategic partners in multilateral forums. Africa and India have jointly engaged in 59 billion dollars of annual commercial engagement in the international trade partnership. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi also stated Africa to be a priority in international relations. Many Indian companies have gone to Africa for the establishment of entrepreneurship and multilateral investments while many youngsters from Africa come to India for higher studies. India and Africa have always been pioneering states for the maintenance of peace and security India participated in the first peacekeeping mission in 1960 at Congo. The maritime laws are an area of key interest in African countries. Nearly 38 countries in Africa are coastal islands. India and Africa have been facing similar maritime challenges such as issues of piracy and maritime terrorism. Terrorism is a growing challenge in several parts of Africa including Nigeria for which India and Africa have always been in cooperation to give them vibrant importance. India trains

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6000 soldiers under United Nations peacekeeping force. It also supports African standing forces and has defence partnerships with countries like Nigeria, Zambia, Ghana, Uganda, Botswana and Mozambique. The defence conclaves have also played a role in sustaining peace and security. India exports boats, aircraft, arms and ammunition, vehicles, sport utility vehicles, gun systems and combat helicopters to Africa. But in order to bring true economic integration, India should shift manufacturing base to African countries and jointly produce defence and military hardware. If such a shift were to happen, it would bring a reliable partnership between the two nations. This will not only provide employment to Africans but also develop Indian brands in the African market.

The Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi proposed 10 guiding principles which reflect a change in the nuances and priorities of Africa in the view of India. Africa is an indispensable contributor of imports with nearly 11 % of 18% of imported crude oil coming from Nigeria. India also imports liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) from Mozambique, 90% of phosphate, Veblen goods like diamond and other gems from Africa. This is a witness to the diverse relations India has maintained with Africa. India also had Regional Economic Conclaves with South African countries such as Uganda, Nigeria, Zambia and few parts of West Asia and North Africa.

During the critical period of Covid-19, India has been providing health assistance to Africa through the export of Paracetamol hydroxychloroquine.

The global pandemic had endangered the environment and Indian medical institutions provided pharmaceutical commodities for African countries. India installed pharmaceutical institutions in Africa and played a significant role in the medical industry. Africa has past knowledge of dealing with infectious diseases such as Ebola using traditional methods that can be learnt by India and India can share its knowledge of yoga and allopathic medicines. A collaboration between Indian and African efforts to bring global medical institutes would be a nice initiative.

India and Africa had digital divide through projects of E-Arogya Bharti and EVidya Bharati network which was an extension of Africa's earlier projects which are very successful in its formulation in African countries and these projects were also connected to Cyber optical and 'tele-verification' Institution of Africa with Indian counterparts of guiding Research and methodology to conduct education courses as well. Digital division is one area in which India showed interest with two countries in Africa; one is Uganda another and another Rhodesia. The Indian transport industry also has investments in African countries and the railways is well handled by the Indians. Apart from

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this terrorism, climate change issues, the role of women are important factors Africa had aligned with India in its 2063 agenda.

Other than India, the United States & the United Kingdom also had better relationships with Africa as first-ever UK-Africa summit was held earlier this year. Japan also has a cancer hospital in Kenya. International solar alliance in which India and France have been members is a really good initiative. Solar energy is much vital and outspoken concept common to both tropical countries like India and countries in Africa.

Africa is not a monoethnic continent. It has 54 independent countries and 1.2 billion population with 2.5 trillion Gross Domestic Product every year.

Countries in Africa are with good political stability with many elections conducted in recent years. Many progresses in the indicators such as good governance been made by countries of Africa. The African continent is a sole reservoir of 50 % of the whole world's resources and 90 % of Platinum. Four of the countries in Africa produce about one-fifth of world chromium and 60 % available land for mining. The countries in the African continent such as South Africa Rhodesia have been champions for economic development. South Africa also had a project of adoption of Neem as an operation. India also has a relationship with Africa for agricultural development with nearly 7 vocational training and incubation centres of India being installed in seven different countries in Africa and 5-foot incubation industries have also been installed in 5 different countries in Africa. Soil research initiative in 2020 by Indo African partnership will also be successful.

Right from the ancient period, India and Africa have had a good partnership.

The continent of Africa and India has three-thousand-year-old cultural ties and it is a historical fact that in 750 BC, Babylonians had trade with Dravidians of India. India has been a good partner to Africa with its consistent support to abolish racial discrimination. India and Nigeria have been significant cooperatives in medical, therapeutic and defence partnership. We need more consolidated pillars to bring higher strategic cooperation.

Conclusions As broached before, the relationship between India and Africa exists since the precolonial era. The shared oppression under the British and the cold war played a paramount role in cementing the alliance of Indo Africans. Africa has tried to sustain the alliance with western countries like the US, UK and Japan and in the recent decades, China has also made a partnership with the African

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countries. A partnership requires cooperation and balance of trade and India greatly exhibits these qualities. The IAF summits were conducted to strengthen the Indo- Africa relations. The Africans were great exporters of crude oil and leather amongst other things required by India and this trade slowly expanded to maritime, peacekeeping, pharmaceutical, etc. India has also advocated for social and economic reforms in Africa. The present COVID-era had a great impact on all international relations but it also brought an opportunity for India and Africa to widen the horizons regarding their medical collaboration. The IAFS – 4 is being planned to reconstruct the Indo African alliance. There is a hope that the cooperation between India and Africa will reach a fruitful outcome in the post-covid-19 era.

References 1. 2016. Africa's importance to India. India Inc. [Online] 12 08, 2016. [Cited: 12 10, 2020.] https://indiaincgroup.com/africas-importance-india/.

2. Banda, Paul Chiudza. 2020. India - Africa 1947 to the present. Diplomatist analyzing international relations. [Online] 08 26, 2020. https://diplomatist.com/2020/08/26/india-africa-relations-1947to-the-present/.

3. Dubey, Ajay Kumar. 2016. India–Africa Relations: HistoricalGoodwill and a Vision for the Future. [book auth.] A Biswas Ajay Kumar Dubey. India Africa partnership- a vision for future. s.l. : springer, 2016, 2.

4. Ujwal, A S. 2015.India Africa forging a strategic partnership. New Delhi: Brookings India, 2015.

5. Bhacker, M. Reda. 1992.Trade and Empire in Muscat and Zanzibar: Roots of British Domination. s.l. : Routledge, 1992. ISBN 0-415-07997-7.

6. Pekkanen, Saadia M., Ravenhill, John and Foot, Rosemary, eds. 2014.Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia,Oxford. s.l. : Oxford University Press, 2014. ISBN 978-0-19-9916245..

7. Sanujit. 2011.Cultural links between India & the Greco-Roman world. s.l. : Ancient History Encyclopedia, 2011.

8. Stearns, Peter N. and history., William Leonard Langer. The Encyclopedia of world.

2001.The Encyclopedia of world history. s.l. : Houghton Mifflin Harcourt., 2001. 0-395-65237-5..

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9 China’s National Security Law and Implications for HKSAR: An Overview Mugdha Satpute1 1Junior

Research Analyst, Internationalism mugdha1042@gmail.com

Synopsis. This report is an overview of the enactment of China’s National Security Law and its implications for HKSAR by Mugdha Satpute

Introduction On 30th June 2020, the Chinese Parliament passed the ‘The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’ unanimously. This law restricts and limits the functioning of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) and jeopardizes the freedom of its people. The Joint Declaration signed between the government of United Kingdom and the government of China led down the rights and liberties of residents of Hong Kong, but it is now overpowered by the Chinese government. Since last few years, the people of Hong Kong are frequently holding large scale protests and expressing their opposition towards the laws and actions of the Chinese government. Last year, a new extradition law was introduced by China which authorised extradition of people who were accused for crimes from Hong Kong to the main land China. This proposal threatened the special status of Hong Kong and the liberty of its people, as a result of which, it had to face protests by the Hong Kongers for nearly half of the year. The increasing dominance of China and its interference in the functioning of Hong Kong is constantly being observed internationally, and various countries along with the international organisations have expressed their disapproval towards it. The recent developments have questioned the existence of Hong Kong as a part of China as well as a separate entity.

Historical Background of China and HKSAR Today’s Hong Kong includes the Hong Kong Island, the Kowloon Peninsula and the New Territories, which earlier were under the Chinese control. In the 19th century, as the British colonies were expanding, British drug traffickers started illegally smuggling

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opium in China, which led to the First Opium War in 1842. During this war, China lost the Hong Kong island to British. This newly gained authority by the British led to the Second Opium War which started in 1856 and ended in 1860. As per the Convention of Beijing, China ceded the Kowloon Peninsula to the British. On July 1, 1898, the British Empire negotiated the Second Convention of Peking with China, and leased the New Territories region for 99 years. During the Second World War, Hong Kong was acquired by the Japanese Empire, but later on the British continued controlling it. (History TV, 2019) In the meantime, the British authorities established new administrative mechanisms along with independent executive, and judicial systems in Hong Kong. It got developed as a manufacturing hub and prospered as one of the Asia’s economic powerhouse. Its overall functioning was based upon the British systems. Hong Kong paved the way for British trade in China and the South-east Asian region.

But as per the lease, the British government had to return the territory of Hong Kong back to China in 1997. So, in the beginning of 1980s both the governments started discussing and negotiating the future of Hong Kong after its return to China. In 1984, the U.K and China signed the Sino-British Joint Declaration under which Hong Kong will be ruled by China from 1st July 1997, but it led down certain conditions. According to this joint declaration, Hong Kong will be part of the People’s Republic of China as a part of the “One Country, Two Systems” for next fifty years. Therefore, till 2047, Hong Kong will function as a capitalist economy and will follow democratic principles and not China’s communist principles.

HKSAR and its Status Quo

Based on the Joint Declaration (The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region), the Chinese government established the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region with executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication. The Basic Law also known as the mini constitution of the Hong Kong SAR was formed in accordance with the Constitution of the People's Republic of China and it included previously applicable laws (English legal principles). It provided the rights and freedoms, including those of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research and of religious belief. It also protected private property, ownership of enterprises, legitimate right of inheritance and foreign investment by law. Hong Kong is allowed to maintain and develop external economic and cultural relations with other countries and international organisations, but the People’s Republic of China controls over the diplomatic and defence relations.

The administrative system of Hong Kong SAR is controlled by the chief executive, who is responsible for implementation of the basic law, promulgating new laws, issuing executive orders, and signing bills and budgets. The chief executive of the

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Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is elected by an Election Committee of 1,200 people and appointed by the Central People's Government. The Election Committee is chosen by the representatives of various sectors in Hong Kong who only make up 6% of the electorate. (BBC News, 2019) The legislature is made up of a two-tier system, which consists of the Legislative Council (LegCo) and the district councils. The Legislative Council includes 70 seats, 35 of which are directly elected by the public, and remaining 30 represent the functional constituencies which are voted for by special interest groups including business, trade and banking. The elections for District Councils are held every three years. These district councils function at the local level, and act as a primary advisory. The district councillors are a part of the committee that votes for the selection of the chief executive of Hong Kong SAR. The legislature includes pro-Beijing/China members along with pro-democracy members. But due to the increasing influence and power of pro-China people, the prodemocracy people are being threatened and punished.

The previous judicial system is maintained in the Hong Kong SAR. The courts have the authority to independently exercise its judicial powers, free from any interference. But the National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) which is China's rubber-stamp parliament, holds the authority for interpretation of the law. It has interpreted the law in accordance with its ideology in previous cases, and has been changing the laws of Hong Kong as per its needs. Also, 50006000 Chinese soldiers are present in the territory of Hong Kong, but they can only intervene in Hong Kong if China declares an all-out state of emergency or war, at the request of the Hong Kong government, or for the “maintenance of public order and in disaster relief�.

Protests & Hong Kong and Context Protests are being held in Hong Kong since the last two decades against the constant interference and dominance of the Chinese government. These protests are against specific laws introduced by the Chinese authorities, or for holding of elections based on universal suffrage, or asking for independence from China and pro-democracy protests. These protests have lasted for months, thus pressurizing the Chinese authorities and gaining international attention. Most of the protests were started as non-violent and peaceful protests but later on it has led to violence, destruction, and intervention by the police forces.

In 2003, thousands of people protested against the introduction of an antisubversion law, which was later on removed. In July 2004, nearly 2,00,000 people participated in a demonstration protesting Beijing’s against election of the chief executive by universal suffrage.

In 2014, China backed out from its agreement to hold elections in 2017 based upon universal suffrage, and said that elections will be held consisting of pre-approved

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candidates by the Chinese government. This led tens of thousands of people to protest against the decision, suddenly stopping the functioning of city. The majority of protesters were students and youngsters. This protest is known as the ‘Umbrella Movement’, because protesters used umbrellas for protection from tear gas used by police. After few months, this movement stopped and the Chinese government didn’t act according to the requests of protesters.

In June 2019, the Chinese government indirectly through the leaders of Hong Kong introduced an extradition bill in Hong Kong’s government. The protests began by asking the government for full withdrawal of the extradition bill which allowed it to extradite those convicted of crimes to main land China. According to the protesters, this bill encroached their freedom and rights. As the stand-off with the government stretched on, peaceful mass marches increasingly descended into violent clashes with police - and the movement quickly grew to include five major demands: • • • • •

Fully withdraw the extradition bill Set up an independent inquiry to probe police brutality Withdraw a characterization of early protests as "riots" Release those arrested at protests Implement universal suffrage in Hong Kong (CNN, 2019)

The protests continued for months, with demonstrators storming the Legislative Council building in July and occupying Hong Kong International Airport the following month, as they morphed into a battle over Beijing’s deepening control of the city. Reports of police brutality, including excessive use of tear gas and rubber bullets, exacerbated tensions. (Foreign Relations, 2020) Lam withdrew the Beijing-endorsed bill in September, but protests continued asking the government for electoral reforms. The five months of violence and destruction has led the economy of Hong Kong into recession. The level of tourism has subsequently declined.

Carrie Lam, the chief executive of Hong Kong SAR, is a pro-China/Beijing person, and she has been supporting the laws introduced by the Chinese government which promote communist ideology. Beijing has termed these protests as the signs of terrorism. President Xi has praised the city police forces and Lam for severely punishing the violent criminals in accordance with the law.

On 30th June 2020, at 23:00 pm, an hour before the 23rd anniversary of Hong Kong’s transfer from Britain to China, the Chinese Government unanimously passed and implemented the national security law named as ‘the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’ in Hong Kong. The new provisions made applicable to the territory of Hong Kong SAR through this law are as follows: (The Hindu, 2020)

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• The criminal offences of secession, subversion of state power, terrorist activities and collusion with foreign and external forces to endanger national security are punishable by law.

• Serious offenders can receive life imprisonment as maximum punishment, or long-term imprisonment of 10 years and above for offences in all categories.

• Criminal acts under the category of foreign collusion include: inciting Hong Kong residents' hatred of the Hong Kong or Chinese government, electoral manipulation or sabotage, and sanctions against Hong Kong or China.

• Terrorism includes sabotage and damaging of means of transport, transport facilities, electric power or gas facilities, or other combustible or explosible facilities.

• Anyone who organises or takes part in acts aimed at splitting the country, regardless of whether they use violence or not, would be committing an offence.

• The convicted people will not be allowed to participate in any Hong Kong elections or to stand for public office.

• According to the law, China may take over the entire prosecution from arrest to trial for: complicated foreign interference cases, "very serious" cases and cases where national security faces "serious and realistic threats".

• The law states that certain national security cases could be held behind closed doors without juries in Hong Kong if they contained state secrets, although the verdict and eventual judgements would be made public.

• Hong Kong’s chief executive will appoint judges to hear and decide on the national security cases.

• The law gives police far-reaching powers to collect evidence, including tapping communications and spying on suspects. It can also request platforms and service providers to remove information and assist in investigations.

• The law empowers China to set up a national security agency in Hong Kong, staffed by officials who are not bound by local law when carrying out duties.

• Under the security law, the power of interpretation has been vested in the Standing Committee of the Chinese parliament. If the law conflicts with any Hong Kong law, the Beijing law will be applied.

• According to the law, necessary measures to strengthen management of foreign and external NGOs and news organisations in Hong Kong are to be taken.

• The law also applies to non-permanent residents of Hong Kong that commit offences under the law, even if they are not on Hong Kong soil.

• Companies that violate the national security laws will be fined and may have their operations suspended.

The implementation of law was done by its inclusion in Annex III of the Basic Law– a list of legislations “confined to those relating to defence and foreign affairs as well as other matters outside the limits of the autonomy of the Region.” By

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adding the security law to this list, it got enforced in the city (Hong Kong) by the way of promulgation– meaning automatically being put into effect. This security law has debarred the ‘one country, two systems’ framework. It threatens the rights and liberties of the residents of Hong Kong, as mentioned in the Joint Declaration. People are afraid that due to this law, Hong Kong will become a police state. This fear has led to continuous protests in Hong Kong, but now protesters are being detained under the security law, thus deterring the people of Hong Kong against any actions. The chief executive Lam has welcomed and fully supported this security law.

In recent years, the promotion of Communist ideology and Beijing’s narrative through media sources present in Hong Kong has been increasing. The Chinese government has been threatening the companies and businesses against supporting pro-democracy principles. Mysterious disappearances of Hong Kong booksellers, media executives, business tycoons, etc, along with wrongful conviction of people by the Chinese government has alarmed the residents of Hong Kong. China is not only dominating the politics of Hong Kong, but also the economic and judicial functioning of the city. The ownership of properties, companies and local markets by pro-China people is constantly increasing. Since the implementation of the national security law in Hong Kong, books about democracy written by the prominent Hong Kong pro-democracy activists and lawmakers have vanished from the city’s libraries. (NDTV, 2020) Also, due to the fear of getting arrested, pro-democracy leaders have disbanded their parties and organisations. Some of the prominent democracy activists have fled from the city. China is against the democratic and capitalist principles, but the increasing protests have challenged its authority. Also, China has accused the external forces and foreign countries for influencing the rising opposition to the Chinese government by the residents of Hong Kong. Thus, by implementing the security law and restricting liberties of people, China is trying to establish its full control over Hong Kong SAR.

Global Reactions to the National Security Law & Followed Actions The recent imposition of the security law in Hong Kong and the actions of Chinese government have alarmed the international organizations, foreign countries and human rights groups. It has disturbed the political and economic relationships between China, Hong Kong and other countries. The overpowering moves of the China’s communist government has been largely criticised all over the world. China is challenging the authorities of foreign countries and international organizations, with its selfish motive of expanding its influence along with its boundaries in the Asian and African region. The Chinese

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government has accused the western democratic countries for the present unrest and continuous protests in Hong Kong.

The United Kingdom has blamed China for breaching the Joint Declaration signed between the two countries. The UK PM Boris Johnson has offered to grant immigration rights to nearly 3 million people living in Hong Kong who have the British National (Overseas) passports. The European Union has deplored China’s decision, and has stated that it is discussing with international partners on possible measures to be taken against China.

The United Nations Human Rights Council had condemned the implementation of security law and has stated that any law for Hong Kong must respect the provisions of two international treaties: one on civil and political rights; the other on economic, social and cultural rights. (UN News, 2020) The United Nations experts have called on the international community to act collectively and decisively to ensure that China respects human rights and abides by its international obligations. (United Nations Human Rights, 2020) With the on-going trade war between the United States and China, the Trump administration has decided to revoke Hong Kong’s special trading relationships with the US. It has announced an end to the sale of military equipment and other technologies to Hong Kong as it can be used by the Chinese government. It has also imposed visa restrictions on the Chinese officials who undermine Hong Kong’s autonomy. A new legislation named Hong Kong Safe Harbour Act is introduced in the US senate. The Hong Kong Safe Harbour Act would directly support protesters by telling them that they can risk their lives in Hong Kong knowing that they have a backup plan in case they are targeted. (CATO Institute, 2020) Under this act, the residents of Hong Kong can apply for immigration to the US as refugees.

Canada has suspended its extradition treaty with Hong Kong and has halted the exports of sensitive military gear to Hong Kong over the imposition of national security law by China. Taiwan has established a new office to help the fleeing Hong Kongers. Australia is also considering providing safe haven to people of Hong Kong.

Taking into consideration the rising border tensions between India and China, India has urged the United Nations to seriously and objectively address the recent developments in Hong Kong. India's ambassador and permanent representative to the UN Rajiv K Chander, said that “Given the large Indian community that makes the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China its home, India has been keeping a close watch on recent developments. We hope the relevant parties will take into account these views and address them properly, seriously and objectively.” India has expressed its concerns since around 38,000 Indians live in the Hong Kong SAR. Last week, the government of India has banned 59 Chinese origin mobile phones apps in India.

The Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China is an international cross-party group of legislators working towards reform on how democratic countries approach

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China. The members of IPAC have condemned the imposition of national security legislation in Hong Kong by the China’s National People’s Congress. IPAC has asked its members to take actions against the China’s decision and to form an international lifeboat scheme for helping Hong Kongers to escape. (InterParliamentary Alliance on China, 2020) Also, the Free World Commission has called upon governments (Atlantic Council, 2020) • To demand the United Nations Secretary General to designate a UN Special Envoy to monitor and to report on Hong Kong.

• To offer protection to Hong Kong citizens in danger of persecution through an international “lifeboat” scheme organized by a coalition of democracies.

• To review and recalibrate relations with the People’s Republic of China, including efforts to reduce strategic dependency on China and reconsider aspects of the differential treatment afforded to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

The unstable economic condition of Hong Kong has crashed the global markets.

Various international companies are shifting their businesses from Hong Kong to other countries. The new security law gives the police censorship and surveillance rights, restricting the use of internet in Hong Kong. It has led to a battle over internet freedom between the US and China. This law will be imposing restrictions on the functioning of businesses in Hong Kong, and due to the current protests and Covid 19 pandemic, the working has stopped completely, therefore making losses. Thus, the imposition of security law in Hong Kong has attracted international criticism and sanctions against the Chinese government as well as the Hong Kong SAR.

The Dominance Factor for China The implementation of national security law in Hong Kong is just a part of China’s big picture of political and economic world dominance. It can be observed from the recent activities of the Chinese government that it is challenging the international opinions, and greatly spreading its influence. China through its communist propaganda and promotion of extreme nationalist behaviour is targeting its internal and external enemies. The authoritative imposition of the security law without asking the opinions of residents of Hong Kong shows China’s despotic will of dominance. With the excessive powers provided, the police forces in Hong Kong are crashing down the peaceful protests. They are not only injuring the protesters, they are also arresting and convicting them under the

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new law. China is ready to lose the financial hub status of Hong Kong just for gaining complete control over it.

Especially during this world-wide pandemic situation, China is moving its pawns into the strategic neighbouring territories thus disturbing the regional peace. The Chinese government is deliberately expanding its presence in the Indo-Pacific region, in the Indian ocean, its claim over Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Indian territory with the most recent standoff along the border at Ladakh between the Indian and Chinese military forces is rising tensions in the region.

China is also slowly taking over its neighbouring countries along with the African regions by increasing their economic dependence on the Chinese government. It is constantly promoting its intensive propaganda through news sources and social media.

In accordance with the security law, China is developing a global digital surveillance system to keep an eye on everyone around the globe. China’s actions depict that now its has stopped being cautions and has decided to become more aggressive, explicitly by increasing its political and military presence in the region. The Chinese authorities have been majorly violating the human rights of people through activities including extrajudicial kidnappings, repression of protests, alleged use of chemical agents against protesters, sexual harassment and assault of women protesters, suppression of religious and ethnic minorities (Uighurs, Muslims, and Tibetans), illegal detention of lawyers, pro-democracy politicians and other people, etc.

China’s continuous provocations have been greatly criticised by other countries and international organisations. As a result of China’s actions, it is having a trade war with the US, along with imposition of various international sanctions on it.

But there is less probability that such sanctions will stop China. When the world is suffering from the corona virus pandemic, China’s authoritarianism is threatening the sovereignty and peace of the countries around the world. The international organisations along with foreign countries are calling for collective actions against the increasing dominant behaviour of China. If China is not stopped right now, then it might become dangerous for all in the near future.

References 1. Atlantic Council. 2020. Free World Commission condemns Hong Kong security law. Atlantic Council.

[Online] 02 July 2020.

[Cited: 07 July 2020.] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/announcements/free-world-commission-condemnshong-kong-security-law/.

2. BBC News. 2019. Hong Kong: What is the Basic Law and how does it work? BBC News. [Online] 20 November 2019. [Cited: 05 July 2020.] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china49633862.

3. CNN. 2019. From an extradition bill to a political crisis: A guide to the Hong Kong protests.

CNN. [Online] 20 December 2019.

[Cited: 06 July 2020.]

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

Indian International Law Series 89 https://edition.cnn.com/2019/11/15/asia/hong-kong-protests-explainer-intl-hnkscli/index.html.

Foreign Relations. 2020. Democracy in Hong Kong. Council on Foreign Relations. [Online] 30 June 2020. [Cited: 06 July 2020.] https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/democracy-hong-kong.

2020. Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act Offers Escape to Persecuted Hong Kongers. CATO Institute.

[Online] 02 July 2020. [Cited: 07 July 2020.] https://www.cato.org/blog/hong-kong-safeharbor-act-offers-escape-persecuted-hong-kongers.

2019. How Hong Kong Came Under 'One Country, Two Systems' Rule. History. [Online] 03 September 2019. [Cited: 05 July 2020.] https://www.history.com/news/hong-kong-chinagreat-britain.

Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China. 2020. IPAC coordinates global response to HK security law. Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China. [Online] 01 July 2020. [Cited: 07 July 2020.] https://www.ipac.global/news/ipac-coordinates-global-response-to-hk-security-law/.

NDTV. 2020. Democracy Books Disappear From Hong Kong Libraries. NDTV. [Online] 04 July 2020. [Cited: 06 July 2020.] https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/democracy-books-disappearfrom-hong-kong-libraries-2257227.

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Joint Declaration.

Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau - The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. [Online] [Cited: 05 July 2020.] https://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/issues/jd2.htm.

The Hindu. 2020. Hong Kong national security law: five key facts you need to know. The Hindu.

[Online] 01 July 2020.

[Cited: 06 July 2020.] https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/hong-kong-national-security-law-five-keyfacts-you-need-to-know/article31959413.ece.

UN News. 2020. Hong Kong: Draft law on national security must comply with rights obligations. UN News. [Online] 19 June 2020. [Cited: 07 July 2020.] https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/06/1066682.

United Nations Human Rights. 2020. UN experts call for decisive measures to protect fundamental freedoms in China. United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner.

[Online] 26 June 2020.

[Cited: 07 July 2020.] https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26006&LangID= E.

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10 Indo-Korean Relations: An Overview Avishikta Chattopadhyay1 & Mugdha Satpute2 12Junior

Research Analyst, Internationalism avishiktachattopadhyay@rgnul.ac.in, mugdha1042@gmail.com;

Synopsis. This is an Overview Brief on Indo-Korean Relations by our Junior Research Analysts for the Indian International Law Programme.

Historical Background According to “SamgukYusa” or “The Heritage History of the Three Kingdoms” written in the 13th century, a Princess from Ayodhya (Suriratna) went to Korea, married King Kim Suro, and became Queen Hur/Heo Hwang Ok in the year 48 AD. Nearly 6 million Koreans are the direct descendants of the Indian princess.

Korean Buddhist monk Hyecho (or Hong Jiao) visited India from 723 to 729 AD and wrote a travelogue “Pilgrimage to the five kingdoms of India”, which gives a vivid account of Indian culture, politics and society.

Nobel Laureate Rabindranath Tagore also composed a short but evocative poem – ‘Lamp of the East’ – in 1929 about Korea’s glorious past and its promising bright future. (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2020) India was the Chair in 1947 of the Commission for elections in undivided Korea.

India sponsored ceasefire resolution was accepted by both NK and SK thereby ending the war. Although India has no specific geo-political or strategic interests in the Korean peninsula, India played a unique role throughout the Korean War. It was so significant that Korea still commemorates the noble support that India provided during the tumultuous times.

India chaired the UN Commission that was formed to hold elections in Korea. At the United Nations, India’s Permanent Representative to the UN and a member of the UN’s Special Political Committee, V.K. Krishna Menon took on the responsibility of finding a solution to the pressing issue of the future of the prisoners of war. (2020) India maintained a neutral position in the Korean War and had sent medical teams (The Role of India in the Korean War, 2010) and custodian force to help the prisoners of war. The 60th Para Field Ambulance (also known as 60 Para) commanded by Lieutenant Colonel AG Rangaraj was sent to the war-stricken country. The total unit comprised 346 men, including four

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combat surgeons, two anaesthesiologists and one dentist. (2018) In addition to that the final armistice between North and South Korea was signed in front of the Indian General KS Thimayya. India has therefore always been considered as the middle-man between DPRK and ROK. It is purported that Indian sponsored resolution was accepted by Korea to end the War. (2017) In the present time as well the DPRK and ROK have equal inclinations towards India being the mediator in resolving the disputes between the two countries.

Similarities in the Indian and Korean Cultures • The traditional Korean calendars are based on lunisolar calendar, depending on which the seasonal and traditional festivals are determined and celebrated.

Similarly, the Indian Hindu calendar is also based on lunisolar calendar. In India, most of the seasonal festivals and agricultural practices, along with traditional festivals are determined according to this calendar.

• The structure and functioning of both the Indian and Korean society are relatively similar. Both the societies emphasize on respecting elders, behaving according to pre-determined norms and manners. The hierarchy system exists in the Korean society, which can be in Indian social practices too.

• In India as well as Korea, each individual’s family name consists of three syllables/three words. In India, the first word is the name of that person, the second word is name of that individual’s father/mother, and the third word is their surname which is mostly father’s/husband’s surname, but it may also consist of mother’s surname. In Korea, the first syllable denotes the family name i.e., the surname, and the second and third syllable denotes the name of that individual.

Earlier, marriage between individuals of same family names were not allowed in South Korea as they are of same bloodline, but later on it was legally permitted.

This practice is similar to the ‘Gotra system’ in India, which doesn’t allow a marriage between two individuals of same gotra.

• Earlier Koreans had joint family system, in which it was the responsibility of the son to take care of his parents, and these families used have many children.

Whereas now-a-days South Korean people have nuclear families. Similarly, in India we still have joint family system, especially in the rural areas, and nuclear families in urban areas. Also, earlier Indians used to have many children, but now-a-days the number of children is mostly limited to two.

• In the family systems of both the societies, a structured nomenclature for each relationship is determined, which is absent in the western society.

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• Buddhism originated in India, and it is followed as a religion by 0.7% of the Indian population (according to the 2011 census). () Buddhism was first introduced in Ko-rea in 372 CE by Chinese monks. Later on, it became one of the majorly followed religion in the country, till the spread of Christianity.

According to 2015 statistics of South Korea, 44% of the Korean population has a religion out of which 35% follow Buddhism. (Korea.net) • Indian culture and Korean culture share similar traditions, such as the memorial ceremony for one’s ancestors. According to the Hindu religion, a traditional ritual of ‘Shraddha’ is done to let the embodied soul get liberated and to progress towards attaining the final liberation. It is a ritual to repay the debts towards demised ancestors, helping them in achieving peace. Similarly, a Korean traditional ceremony named ‘Jesa/Jerye’ is performed to demonstrate appreciation and respect towards their ancestors. They believe that taking care of one’s ancestors will make the ancestors more disposed to take care of and watch over their living descendants.

• The Korean language ‘Hangul’ and certain South Indian languages such as ‘Tamil’ and ‘Kannada’ are similar in nature. They have certain words in common, and also have similar grammatical structures.

Indo-DPRK Relations India and North Korea are both democratic republics according to their respective constitutions. The consular relations with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) were set up on 1 March 1962 and diplomatic relations on 10 December 1973. (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2019) However, relations between the two countries have been established from the time when India provided humanitarian assistance and third party talks to DPRK in the Korean War. The relations were further augmented when a number of bilateral agreements were signed between India and DPRK which mainly pertained to cultural exchange and science and technology agreements. However, the relation between these countries did suffer tumultuous times specifically owing to the nuclear deals of DPRK and its deteriorating relations with The United States of America.

The two countries are connected at various bases ranging from cultural to humanitarian and the governments of both the countries have been focusing on the increasing relations between both the countries through bilateral agreements of various kinds. Multi-ferrous bilateral agreements were ratified by both the countries between the period of 1973 and 2000 which includes agreements for cultural cooperation, scientific and technological exchange, protocol for cooperation between the two external affairs ministries and even the agreement for knowledge exchange between Indian National Science Academy and DPRK.

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Surprisingly, the goodwill between the two countries have been established much before the ratification of the bilateral agreements a fact which is oblivious to many. Apart from cultural proximity DPRK and India have had economic relations as well.

In 2017, following the directions of UN Security Council sanctions that prevent the trade of any item North Korea, India had decided to supply only food and medicines to Pyongyang. It is important from the point of view of international trade given the point that at that time India was the second largest trading partner after China. India had exported $111 million worth of goods in 2015-2016 to North Korea, and imported about $88 million, according to Indian government data. However, the ban imposed by USA on North Korea had taken a toll over the economic activities between the countries and India had banned all trade with North Korea, except for food and medicines.

India and DPRK have also been connected in the propagation of importance of traditional knowledge, especially traditional medicine. Furthermore, India has participated in several film festivals hosted by DPRK. The countries have also been active in cooperating for technological and educational exchange activities.

The Centre for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific situated in Dehradun has received almost thirty students DPRK students since 1996. Furthermore, DPRK foot-ball players participated in FIFA U-17 Championship held in India.

India constantly maintained a neutral position with DPRK. India has been constantly maintaining relations with the country when the entire world was against the country after its fallout with USA. As per 2019 report of Ministry of External Affairs “Relations between India and DPRK have been generally characterised by friendship, cooperation and understanding.” (2020) Furthermore, India gave DPRK, the status of ‘Most Favoured Nation’ and eventually a trade agreement was signed in 1978. (2020) DPRK has also maintained a friendly stand with India, including supporting of India’s position as the permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. The relations of the countries extend way beyond global timelines. They are connected by cultural, political and ideological proximities including both the countries being supporters of non-alignment.

Issues between India and DPRK

The relations between the two countries have recently been in turmoil owing to the number of reasons most significantly the one related to increasing nuclear exchange between Pakistan and DPRK. In 1990 a nuclear deal was signed between Pakistan and DPRK. It is even purported that the increase in nuclear strength of DPRK is a result of the its improved relations with Pakistan and that Pakistan is helping DPRK in building nuclear prowess. (2017) After the withdrawal of DPRK from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty the US

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intelligence agency was of the view that Pakistan was a key supplier of uranium enrichment technology to North Korea. (2006) The suspicion later turned true when Pakistani officials admitted to have transferred the said technology. The relations between DPRK and Pakistan reached the highest stage with the visit Benazir Bhutto to DPRK in 1993 which raised conjectures about the increasing cooperation between the two countries specifically with relation to coordination in technology related to the Weapons of Mass Destruction. This was a direct blow to the forever friendly stand that India held towards DPRK. After the period the relations between the two countries have been quite uneven with restricted visits of the representatives of each state to the other country. Furthermore, the relation between the countries also turned ripe after the UN Report alleging DPRK to have hacked Indian nuclear facilities and space research centres. (Asia Times, 2019) Cyberattacks were received in ISRO and Kudankulam NPP through the DTrack malware created by Lazarus group of DPRK.

Current State of Affairs

Despite all the tubulations in the relations between the two countries, the countries have been successful in creating a strong neutral ground for dialogue and cooperation. Both the countries have their respective embassies in the other’s capital city. However, there is a pervading silence in each of the embassies with scanter information being exchanged at each time. Atul Malhari Gotsurve who is the Indian ambassador to Pyongyang said that the situation in NK amid COVID 19 was normal. This is however the first time that he communicated with an Indian channel. In 2019, V.K Singh was the first Indian Minister to visit DPRK after the span of twenty years. Major achievements of the visit were the signing of the logistic support to navies and the talks over the defence education exchange. India also expressed its concerns over the nuclear proliferation of DPRK in Pakistan and its politico-economic tussle with USA. India’s major strategic standpoint with DPRK and the countries to the east is on the basis of the Act East Policy to enhance cooperation among the states.

Although DPRK and Pakistan have signed several nuclear and missile technology exchanges deal, which is a threat to India as well as RoK. India is one of the few countries which has sustained diplomatic relations with North Korea and continues to extend humanitarian assistance to DPRK. The Korea-India Friendship Association (KIFA) is one of the significant steps to ensure that cooperation is maintained among all the three countries. India also supports the Joint Peace initiative between ROK and DPRK based on the four noes (no isolation of North Korea, no regime collapse in Pyongyang, no war-like situation on the Korean Peninsula, and no nuclear proliferation pledged by North Korea) (2019) approach. India thus considers dual track approach establishing good relations with both ROK and DPRK.

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India-South Korea Relations Legal Changes

• An Indian academic Bonojit Hussain, who worked as a research professor at Seoul’s Song Kang Hoe University faced a racial assault in July 2009. While travelling with a female colleague through a public transport bus, a passenger assaulted Bonojit and his companion, and made derogatory remarks based on his skin color. Afterwards Bonojit filed a complaint with police, but they didn’t cooperate with him, and asked him to apologize to the assaulter. So, he approached the country's National Human Rights Commission a month later "to complain against police behaviour". (India Today, 2009) Hussain argued that his personal rights were infringed because the country did not have a law to punish racial discrimination. The matter went to court and the assaulter was indicted for racial abuse. (Hindustan Times, 2009) This case was a part of the reason which made the South Korean National Assembly to discuss an antiracism bill.

Economic Relations

Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) • India and Republic of Korea (South Korea) signed the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in Seoul on 7 August 2009, and it was implemented from 1 January 2010. As a result of CEPA, the trade and economic relations of both the countries started developing faster as compared to earlier economic interactions. Ac-cording to the trade deal, both the countries are to lower the import tariffs imposed on a wide range of goods for next eight years, and to create more opportunities for investments and trade in goods and services. India provides a huge market as a consumer as well as for production.

CEPA has led to opening of service markets in both the countries. In India it consisted of telecommunications, construction, distribution (retail excluded), transportation, industrial, accounting, building, real estate, medical treatment and energy distribution, etc. Also, the establishment of 10 Korean banks in India was agreed upon.

• During the Summit meeting in 2015, for upgradation and effective implementation of the CEPA, both the countries had established a Ministerial Joint Committee headed by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, India and the Korean Ministry of Trade. Regular meetings are held, and a Joint Future Strategy Group is formed for identification and development of more projects between the two countries.

Imports & Exports

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• The major items exported by India to South Korea are mineral fuels, oil, distillates (mainly naphtha), cereals, iron and steel, cotton, and organic chemicals. Naphtha is one of the most highly exported material.

• The main items exported by South Korea to India consists of automobile parts, tele-communication equipment, hot rolled iron products, petroleum refined products, base lubricating oils, nuclear reactors, mechanical appliances, electrical machinery & parts and iron & steel products.

• South Korea is an export driven economy to which India provides a huge market. South Korea has gained expertise in certain sectors such as ship building, nuclear energy, heavy electrical machinery, advanced technological equipment, etc, and it is interested in investing into such sectors of India.

According to the data of 2018, India is South Korea’s 20th biggest source for imports and 7th biggest export market.

Bilateral Trade The bilateral trade between India and South Korea in 2011 crossed $20.5 billion, registering 70% growth in the two years period. But since then the bilateral trade declined to $18.13 billion in 2014-15, $16.56 billion in 2015-16, $16.82 in 2016-17, and it recovered in the beginning of 2017, registering a growth of 30%. (2017) The trade relations between India and South Korea have grown in recent years with annual bilateral trade reaching $21.5 billion in 2018, crossing $20 billion mark for the first time. Bilateral trade in Jan-Nov 2019, according to the latest data of December 2019, was recorded as $19.05 billion.

South Korean Investments in India • South Korean Foreign Direct Investment in India according to the latest data of September 2019 is of $6.29 billion, as per the Export-Import Bank of Korea, of which $198 million was received in 2010, $452 million in 2011, $311 million in 2012, $342 million in 2013, $325 million in 2014, $314 million in 2015, $330 million in 2016 and $514 million in 2017, $1,053 million in 2018 and $340 million in January - September 2019. Major South Korean companies such as Hyundai Motor Group, Kia Motors, Samsung Electronics and LG Group have largely invested in India.

• Hyundai Motors has established an automotive plant in Tamil Nadu with a capacity to produce more than 6,50,000 cars annually. For the expansion of Sriperumbudur unit it has invested $1.05 billion, where manufacturing of electric vehicles will be done. Kia Motors, a sister company of Hyundai Group has announced a two phased investment of $1.6 billion to set up two manufacturing units in Ananthapur, Andhra Pradesh.

• Samsung Electronics has announced an investment of $780 million to expand its smartphones manufacturing factory present in Noida. This factory is the world’s largest mobile manufacturing unit. Samsung also has a factory in

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Sriperumbudur (Tamil Nadu) and has five Research and Development Centres in India. LG Electronics has established two factories in India, one in Noida and the other in Pune. It also has a Research and Development Centre in Bangalore. The LG Group has collaborated with certain Indian Groups for further investment and production in India.

• Youngone Corporation, a textile firm has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Telangana Government to establish a $ 300 million factory in Warangal with capacity of 10,000 jobs. Hyosung Corporation, global spandex leader, has announced to invest $450 million in a greenfield spandex manufacturing facility in Aurangabad Industrial City, Maharashtra with an initial capacity to generate 1000 jobs. Lotte confectionary has acquired a Gujrat-based unit of Havmor, and has in-vested in Chennai and Rohtak. South Korea has proposed to establish a Korean Industrial Park at Ghiloth in the State of Rajasthan. There are 450 South Korean firms functioning in the southern parts of India.

Indian Investments in South Korea • Novelis Inc., a subsidiary of Hindalco Industries Ltd., the flagship company of the Aditya Birla Group, acquired Alcan Taihan Aluminium Ltd. in January 2005.Novelis Inc. holds 68% share amounting to about US$ 600 million in Novelis Korea Ltd. Novelis’ total investment in South Korea is over $700 million.

• Tata Motors Limited, acquired Daewoo Commercial Vehicle based in Gunsan, Ko-rea for a total price of KRW 120 billion (approximately $102 million) in March 2004. Its cumulative investment now is over $400 million.

• Mahindra and Mahindra (M&M) in August 2010 acquired a majority stake in Ssangyong Motors, which is South Korea’s 4th largest manufacturer with an investment of $ 360 million. Its cumulative investment now has crossed $ 1.5 billion.

• Nakhoda Ltd, one of the largest Indian producers of yarn acquired Kyunghan Indus-try Company with an investment of $40 million.

• Also, Indian IT majors such as Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), L&T Infotech and Mahindra Tech have established its operations in South Korea, along with Indian Overseas Bank and State Bank of India.

Indian Chamber of Commerce in Korea (ICCK) The Indian Chamber of Commerce in Korea was established in January 2010 to help interested South Korean companies in doing business with India. It has been assisting the Indian Embassy in organizing various business-related events in South Korea.

Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry The Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry was established in June 2018 in

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Tamil Nadu. The main objective of the Chamber is to promote the rights of South Korean companies and to create job opportunities for Koreans, as there are 450 South Korean firms in the Southern India and nearly 6,000 Koreans reside in this region.

Korea Plus The Korea Plus is a strategic bilateral initiative between the Republic of India and the Republic of Korea to promote, facilitate and retain Korean investments in India. It was operationalized in June 2016. It is envisaged as the first reference point for the South Korean investors in India. Korea Plus acts as a one-stop agency for South Korean investors and works closely with the embassies, central and state governments, industry associations and corporates to generate leads and facilitate Korean investments. (2018) Korea Plus comprises of representatives from the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Energy of South Korea, Korea Trade Investment and Promotion Agency (KOTRA), and Invest India.

Analysis In the recent years, an increase in the interactions of India and South Korea can be noticed. These interactions have mainly resulted into the development of economic relations between the two countries.

South Korea is an export dependent country. South Korean products can be found in the markets of countries across the world. The two top export destinations of South Korea are China and USA. But due to the continuous trade war between these two countries, the export rate of South Korean economy is declining causing major loss. Also, China’s economic policies for South Korea consists of its political interests, which poses a threat to South Korea, taking into consideration the present situation in the Korean Peninsula. It has created tensions between the two countries. At the same time India provides the largest consumer market, and the Indian economy has greatest growth potential. Also, along with large consumer market, India also provides better deals for establishment and functioning of new manufacturing businesses. The cost of labour and the cost of production in India is relatively lower, which is very much profitable for the investors. Thus, the South Korean companies have a larger scale for manufacturing, production, and sales in India. And since major South Korean companies such as Samsung, LG, and Hyundai are already widely famous in India, it will be easy to access the Indian markets. The new initiatives launched by the Government of India such as ‘Make in India’, Skill India’, ‘Digital India’, ‘Start-up India’ and ‘Smart Cities Mission’ provide various benefitting opportunities to foreign companies, thus increasing Foreign Direct Investment in India. And already various companies are shifting their units from China and Hong Kong to India creating more opportunities as well as benefits for both the sides.

South Korea has had one of the fastest economic transformation from agriculturebased economy to one of the top exporters in the world. This transformation was made due to effective growth of innovation, technology, and research and development (R&D). South Korea’s policies opened their economy for foreign

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trade, it created strong business environment, and encouraged its domestic growth. Whereas, even if India is a developing country, it is hugely dependent on imports. And since various choices for selecting products is provided, the local/domestic producers in the country are getting removed from the markets.

Hence, India should learn from the South Korean economy’s structure and try to make reformative changes in India’s economic structure. But for the above reformative changes and improvements, effective and efficient functioning of the Indian commercial, industrial and economic agencies is required at domestic as well as international levels. India needs to emphasize and encourage innovation, and R&D, so that it will lead us to the desired results, simultaneously developing new technologies.

For example – India can try to increase its exports to South Korea by manufacturing demand-driven products, such as ayurvedic products (especially cosmetics), organic products, agricultural products (fruits, vegetables, flowers), etc. Since India is an agrarian economy, by making some qualitative changes and improvements, it can utilize this advantage for increasing exports. Also, India needs to intensify its marketing strategies in the South Korean markets, because of the present lack of Indian products’ advertisements, it is simultaneously negatively affecting demands.

South Korea’s choice for India is best explained in the words of Trade Minister Kim Hyun Chong who said, “India is a country that has no sensitive issues with us geopolitically, so has little risk of its economic cooperation wavering due to external factors. China, for example, created serious problems for our country over the THAAD issue, but with India there are no such variables.” (2018) As a result of which we can see the upgradation in the relations of both the countries, especially during the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and South Korean President Moon Jae-In’s governments’ interactions.

Political Relations and Agreements

• 1962 - The bilateral consular relations were established between India and the Re-public of Korea (South Korea).

• 1973 - These relations were upgraded to Ambassador level.

• February 2006 – President Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam had a state visit to the Republic of Korea. It started a vibrant phase in India – ROK relations. ─ It resulted in the launching of a Joint Task Force to conclude a bilateral Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA).

• 7 August 2009 - Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement was signed be-tween the India and ROK, which was implemented from 1 January 2010.

• 26 January 2010 – South Korean President Lee visited India as the Chief Guest of India’s Republic Day celebrations.

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─ During this visit, the bilateral ties between the two countries were raised to the level of Strategic Partnership.

24 – 27 July 2011 – Indian President Pratibha Patil had a state visit to ROK. During this visit, the Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation Agreement was signed.

March 2012 – Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh paid an official visit to Seoul for the Nuclear Security Summit and for discussing bilateral ties between the two nations. ─ During which the Visa Simplification Agreement was signed.

15 – 18 January 2014 – South Korean President Park Geun Hye had a state visit to India. ─ During this visit, the “Joint Statement for Expansion of Strategic Partnership” that was issued, unveiling a blueprint for further expansion in the relations between the two countries in political, security, defence, economic, scientific & techno-logical, IT, cultural and people-to-people relations. ─ During this visit of South Korean President Park Geun-hye to India: (2014) ─ Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Ministry of Science and Technology of the Republic of India and the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning of the Republic of Korea on a Joint Applied Research and Development Programme in Science and Technology. ─ The Implementing Agreement Between the Indian Space Research Organization and the Korea Aerospace Research Institute for cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space was signed. ─ Establishment of the India-ROK ICT Policy Forum was agreed on by both countries, in which cooperation on software and information security will be dis-cussed. ─ The MOU on Cyber Security between Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (Cert-In) and Korea Internet & Security Agency (KISA) was concluded. ─ MoU on the establishment of Nalanda University was signed. ─ 28 – 30 December 2014 – Indian External Affairs Minister visited South Korea and co-chaired the India – ROK Joint Commission Meeting. ─ 18 – 19 May 2015 – Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had a state visit of ROK. ─ During this visit, the bilateral relations between the two countries were upgraded to ‘Special Strategic Partnership’. ─ In the ‘Joint Statement for Special Strategic Partnership’, PM Modi and President ─ Park Geun Hye agreed to establish a 2+2 consultation mechanism at the level of the Secretary/Vice Minister of Foreign Office and Defence Ministry.

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─ The leaders agreed on strengthening cooperation on energy, electronics and shipbuilding industries along with investments in infrastructural projects in India. ─ The revised Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement was signed between the two countries. ─ Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Republic of Korea on Cooperation in Audio-Visual Coproduction was signed. Following were also signed: o MOU for Cooperation between the National Security Council Secretariat of the Republic of India and the Office of National Security of the Republic of Korea o MOU between the Ministry of Power of the Republic of India and the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy of the Republic of Korea concerning Cooperation in the field of Electric Power Development and New Energy Industries o MOU between the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports of the Republic of India and the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family of the Republic of Korea on Cooperation in Youth Matters ─ Framework of Cooperation in the Field of Road Transport and Highways between the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways of the Republic of India and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport of the Republic of Korea ─ MOU between the Ministry of Shipping of the Republic of India and the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries of the Republic of Korea on Cooperation in the Fields of Maritime Transport and Logistics. (2015) April 2015 – Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar visited South Korea to co-chair the Defence Ministerial Meeting.

6 November 2015 – Indian Minister for Science and Technology Dr. Harsh Vardhan visited South Korea to co-chair 3rd India – Korea Science and Technology Steering Committee Meeting.

15 – 18 May 2016 – Chief Justice of India T. S. Thakur, accompanied by Supreme Court judges visited South Korea to attend the Incheon Trade Law Forum.

8 September 2016 – PM Modi and President Park had bilateral meetings on the side-lines of East Asia Summit in Vientiane, Laos. They discussed about the progress made in the bilateral relations of both the countries.

27 March 2016 – South Korean Minister of the Defence Acquisition Program Ad-ministration visited Goa to co-chair the Joint Committee Meeting with Department of Defence Production and to participate at the Defence Expo India 2016.

14 – 16 April 2016- South Korean Minister of Oceans and Fisheries Kim YoungSuk visited India for the Maritime India Summit 2016 held in Mumbai.

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• 27 – 29 March 2017 – South Korean Vice Foreign Minister Lim Sung Nam visited India to review the bilateral relations between the two countries.

• 22 April 2017 - South Korean Minister of the Defence Acquisition Program Administration visited India to conclude a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in ship building as agreed during the visit of PM Modi to South Korea.

• 2017 – South Korean President Moon Jae In sent the former Culture Minister Chung Dongchea, as his special envoy to India; it was the first such instance in the bilateral relationship, and announced about the upgrade in the relationship with India equivalent to four traditional partners under the “New Asia Community Plus” framework.

• 14 – 16 June 2017 – Indian Finance and Defence Minister Arun Jaitely visited South Korea to conclude the talks on the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF), an MoU between the EXIM banks of two countries was signed, along with reviewing of ongoing defence relationship between the two countries.

• 9 – 12 April 2018 – The Indian Minister of Road Transport, Highways and Shipping Nitin Gadkari along with 30 Indian business delegations visited the RoK. ─ An MoU of Sea fares was signed between the two countries, and the IndiaKorea Maritime Forum was held.

• 8 July 2017 – PM Modi and President Moon had a bilateral meeting on the side lines of the G-20 Summit in Hamburg.

• 21 – 27 September 2017 – The Indian Minister of Commerce & Industry, Suresh Prabhu visited South Korea to participate in the 7th Asia-Europe Economic Ministers meeting and the 3rd Joint Ministerial Review of the India-Korea Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement.

• 8 – 11 July 2018 – President Moon paid a state visit to India. ─ During the visit he held talks with Prime Minister Narendra Modi on several issues, including the situation on the Korean peninsula and ways to boost bilateral trade and defence cooperation. ─ 11 MoUs/Agreements were signed between the two countries.

• 5 – 7 September 2018 - Shri Thawarchand Gehlot, Hon'ble Minister for Social Jus-tice and Empowerment, visited Seoul to participate in the "3rd ASEM Conference on Global Ageing and Human Rights of Older Persons” • 4 – 7 November 2018 - First Lady of the Republic of Korea Kim Jung-sook visited India as the Chief Guest at the Deepotsav event being organised by the State Government of Uttar Pradesh and the ground-breaking ceremony of the Queen Suriratna (Heo Hwang-ok) Memorial in Ayodhya.

• 21 – 22 February 2019 – PM Modi visited the ROK. (2019)

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─ During this visit PM Modi and President Moon held constructive talks on enhancing cooperation in trade and investment, defence and security, energy, space, start-ups and people-to-people exchanges. ─ India and South Korea signed six agreements to enhance cooperation in infrastructure development, media, start-ups, and combating trans-border and international crime. ─ An MoU was signed between the South Korean National Police Agency and the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs to enhance cooperation between the law enforcement agencies of the two countries and combat trans-border and international crimes. ─ The two countries signed an agreement to continue operations of Korea Plus organization. ─ The National Highways Authority of India and Korea Expressway Corporation signed an MoU to promote bilateral cooperation in road and transport infrastructure development projects of India, and facilitate technical and institutional knowledge exchange in the field of road and transport. ─ An agreement was signed on fisheries and aquaculture for strengthening cooperation by encouraging exchanges, organising training workshops and development and utilisation of marine science and technology in the fields of fisheries and aquaculture. ─ MoU on Start-up Cooperation was signed to promote collaboration among Start-ups and to set up of a Korea Start-up Centre (KSC) in India to commercialize ideas, technologies and designs of Start-up companies. ─ The Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) and Prasar Bharti agreed to facilitate the broadcast of DD India Channel in South Korea and KBS World Channel in India. ─ Another agreement was signed for releasing a joint stamp, commemorating Princess Suriratna (Queen Heo Hwang-ok), a legendary Princess of Ayodhya, who went to Korea in AD 48 and married King Kim-Suro. ─ PM Modi received the Seoul Peace Prize by the Seoul Peace Prize Foundation.

• 4 – 6 September 2019 – Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh visited Seoul to participate in the Seoul Defence Dialogue-2019 (The Ministers of different Indian Ministries and Chief Ministers of various Indian states along with their delegations have visited South Korea. These visits have been regarding investments in the states of India by South Korean companies, agreements between the two parties, to observe functioning of respective systems present in South Korea, etc.)

Analysis The political relations between India and South Korea have been developing

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profoundly since the last two decades. Both the countries have experienced state visits by the representatives and officials of the other country, during which various agreements in different sectors have been made. Also, in the recent few years we observe growing interactions between the states of India and ministries, and companies of ROK. Chief Ministers of various Indian states along with their delegations have been visiting and collaborating with South Korean parties. It is further on strengthening the bond between the two nations. Now, both the countries are leading more interactions and making deals in the previously unexplored areas, such as space, transportation systems, shipbuilding, etc. Due to such agreements India is getting aware with the advanced technical know-hows, which creates an opportunity for India to use this knowledge for its domestic growth and development. These political relations between India and ROK are leading to development assistance, enhanced trade, and multi-layered collaborations.

Another significance of the strategic political relations between India and ROK is that it creates a basis for international cooperation between the two countries by sup-porting each-others decisions, and standings while functioning as a part of an international organization. Since both the countries are situated in Asian continent, these relations strengthen the regional assistance and regional relations through collective functioning of the member countries of that specific region. Such organizations provide larger opportunities for development and cooperation. For example – South Korea is a member of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and it supported India’s bid for member-ship.

The basic building block of these enhanced relations between India and ROK are formed by the foreign policies of the two countries. India’s ‘Act East Policy’ implemented by the Modi Government is an improved version of the ‘Look East Policy’ launched in 1991. This policy is a diplomatic initiative to develop and strengthen eco-nomic, strategic and cultural relations with the countries of AsiaPacific region. South Korean President Moon Jae In launched the ‘New Southern Policy’ which aims to strengthen the economic and strategic relations with South-east Asian countries. Thus, the foreign policies of India and ROK have led to creation of collective interactions between the two countries. Both the countries are moving forward and establishing ties in all possible domains emphasizing on the people-to-people interactions and cultural exchanges. And according to the two countries, these interactions and exchanges shapes their social, political, economic and strategic perspectives of the other country.

India and South Korea face similar political and security issues, which creates larger potential for cooperation between the two. India and China constantly face conflicts in the border regions. Chinese troops are constructing roads along the Indian border in the Tibet region and the north-eastern border region. China also claims the Indian territory of Arunachal Pradesh and some parts of Ladakh as its own. It is also establishing its authority in the Indian Ocean Region by acquiring the ports and territories of countries like Sri Lanka and Maldives and has

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established its naval units. Also, recently Nepal has claimed the Indian regions of Kalapani, Limpiyadhura and Lipulekh situated in Uttarakhand as its own. Prime Minister of Nepal K.P. Sharma Oli represents the communist party, and China is a communist state. The Chinese strategy in acquiring the territories of other countries is that it provides large amount of loans to the neighbouring small countries, which later on these countries are unable to pay, and as repayment of these loans, China acquires territories of these countries and establishes its military units. Thus, India is nearly surrounded by China and its allies including Pakistan. South Korea is facing continuous threat from North Korea, and the tensions between South Korea and China are rising. North Korea is against the presence of American forces in South Korea, and it is threating the two countries by testing its nuclear missiles. USA has imposed strict sanctions on North Korea which even after the meetings between the leaders of the two countries, were not eased. So, with the help of China, North Korea is constantly pressuring South Korea and indirectly USA. At the same time, trade war is going between China and USA which is not declining any sooner. Also, there has been a nuclear missiles technology exchange between Pakistan and North Korea. Thus, India and South Korea are threatened by communist and communism-influenced countries.

In addition to the land conflicts, China’s dominance in the Indo-Pacific region and the South China Sea is causing conflicts between the countries functioning in that region and China. It is intervening in the territories of other countries in the ocean region, and is deliberately establishing and acting based on its own rules, neglecting the agreements made between all the neighbouring nations. China's maritime strategy is almost universally seen as a challenge to the present status quo in the Asia-Pacific region. Chinese activism; such as the declaration of an AirDefence Identification Zone (ADIZ) extending towards the Senkaku Islands, new fishing rules implemented on the Hainan coast, building runways and radar facilities on new islets in the South China Sea and, the PLA-Navy shadowing of passing naval vessels, are but a few of the methods Beijing has used to impose its will on the region. Moreover, China’s naval modernization has transformed its navy into one of the most formidable forces in the region. Skirmishes in the South China Sea are increasing in quantum and frequency and are making routine activity on the high seas (guaranteed under United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea UNCLOS) a fraught proposition. (2016) China is restricting the freedom of navigation by confronting the ships and vessels of other countries. South China Sea is the only way for naval trade among USA, Euro-pean countries and Asian countries. South Korea’s exports and imports are majorly done through this region, and the dominant presence of China posts a massive economic risk to South Korea. According to South Korea, it has a strategic interest in the disputed region of South China Sea as it consists of the key shipping lane through which majority of the South Korean trade is done. In the case of India, by acquiring ports and territories of the neighbouring countries like Sri Lanka, China is keeping a constant watch on India. It also has situated its

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naval units and submarines in the Indian Ocean Region. Hence, India, South Korea, Japan, USA, and ASEAN countries are worried about Chinese maritime activism. Still, India is very cautious of the decisions and actions made by China, and its impact on the neighbouring countries and India. A quadrilateral system has been created by India, Japan, Australia and USA to observe China’s activity in the Indo-Pacific Region, and to indirectly pressurize it.

Defence Relations

• September 2010 - Defence Minister AK Antony visited ROK. ─ During this visit important agreements were signed including MoUs on Defence Cooperation, and Defence Research and Development. ─ India agreed to set up a Defence Wing at its Embassy at Seoul, which opened on 26 October 2012. ─ December 2012 - Minster of National Defence of ROK Mr Kim, Kwan Jin visited India • January 2014 – ROK President Park Geun Hye visited India. ─ During this visit a bilateral Agreement on the Protection of Classified Military Information was signed between the two countries. ─ It was also agreed to hold a regular dialogue between the national security structures of the two sides.

• April 2015 - Defence Minister of India Manohar Parrikar visited ROK • 2017 - A contract between L&T of India and M/s Hanwha Techwin of ROK has been signed for production of one hundred tracked self-propelled 155mm/52 calibre artillery guns ‘K-9 Vajra’ for Indian Armed Forces. (Embassy of India, Seoul, Republic of Korea) • June 2017 - Defence Minister of India Arun Jaitley visited ROK. • July 2018 - ROK President Moon Jae-in visited India. He held a summit with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. In a joint statement the two leaders agreed to explore further possibilities to coordinate efforts in the defence and strategic spheres in order to benefit from each-others unique capabilities and experience and in this context agreed to enhance military exchange, training and experience sharing, Research & Development and to enhance defence industry cooperation.

• September 2019 - Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh visited ROK. • The Defence Ministers of the two countries signed two agreements: To extend logistical support to each other’s navies, and to deepen defence educational exchanges. (Observer Research Foundation (ORF), 2019) • February 2020 – South Korean Defence Minister and the South Korean defence industries attended the Defence Expo-2020 at Lucknow.

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─ There are regular and active exchanges of bilateral visits by delegations of India and ROK, from various military training establishments that include the National Defence College (NDC), higher command and management courses and training centre for United Nations peace keeping operations. ─ Officers from ROK attend the NDC & the Defence Services Staff College in India while Indian officers attend courses in Korea National Defence University & Joint Forces Military University.

• Several forums have been established between India and ROK for regular interactions between their respective Defence Ministries. ─ 2013 - The Defence Policy Dialogue (DPD) instituted at the level of Deputy Minister were established, and since then it has been upgraded to the level of Defence Secretary and will now be a part of '2+2 Dialogue', between the two countries. ─ Joint Committee Meeting (JCM) was established for conducting bilateral dialogues between Minster DAPA and Secretary (DP) for cooperation in defence industries and logistics. ─ Steering Committee Meeting (SCM) is a bilateral dialogue for joint defence R&D between DRDO & DAPA / ADD (ROK).

Analysis Since India and South Korea face similar political and security issues, the defence and maritime agreements between the two nations are advantageous to both. As mentioned in the analysis of the political relations, both the nations are constantly facing territorial military threats. To prepare for such situations, trainings and drills between the defence forces of the two nations will increase knowledge about different techniques that can be utilized during a war.

India is one of the largest importers of defence material in the world. Through cooperation between the defence material manufacturing industries of India and South Ko-rea, the technical knowledge of weapons manufactured, its process of production, how it is to be used, its unique qualities, etc is shared between the two parties. Also, the Indian private companies and industries get a chance to contribute to the country’s de-fence system, which actually consists of an individual military structure controlled by the central government. Through the initiative of ‘Make in India’, India has invited various South Korean defence material manufacturing companies to invest and manufacture their products in India. In South Korea a minimum of 2 years of military service is mandatory to all men.

Maritime Cooperation

Bilateral Maritime cooperation is an important aspect in the defence and security relations between India and ROK.

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• March 2005 - A Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Indian and South Korean coast guards.

• July 2006 - Joint coast guard exercises between the two countries.

• Navy and Coast Guard ships regularly visit each other’s ports and joint exercises are held between the two countries.

• India and ROK cooperated regularly in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.

• 2016 – ROK participated in the Maritime India Summit • 2017 - Three ROK Navy ships visited Indian ports and held exercises with the Indian Navy, while ICG Ship “SHAURYA” visited ROK. • 21 April 2017 - An Inter-Governmental MoU was signed between the Department of Defence Production, Ministry of Defence of India and Ministry of Defence Acquisition Program Administration of ROK to partner in naval ship building. () • 2017 - State-owned Hindustan Shipyard Ltd. (HSL) will collaborate with Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. Ltd. of ROK for defence production under ‘Make in India’ program.

• April 2018 - One Korean Coast Guard (KCG)ship visited India and participated in SAREX-18, conducted by Indian Coast Guard (ICG).

• The 9th High level meeting was held between the Commissioner General Korean coast Guard and his delegation along with the Director General, and ICG, while the Indian Coast Guard participated as an observer in MMEX (Multilateral Multi-Disciplinary Exercise) hosted by KCG (Embassy of India, Seoul, Republic of Korea).

• April 2019 - Indian naval ships Kolkata and Shakti visited Busan to participate in the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Field Training Exercise (FTX) as part of deployment of the Eastern Fleet to the South China Sea (Observer Research Foundation (ORF), 2019).

Analysis As earlier mentioned in the analysis of political relations, maritime relations between India and South Korea hold very much significance. Due to which regular Coast Guard ships visits to each other’s country is important along with organization of drills and trainings between the two naval forces. These drills help in understanding the new technical functioning of weapons and ships, along with how to do strategic planning. Also, agreements of shipbuilding have been made between the two countries, creating opportunities for private companies to collaborate and contribute.

The main focus of the India - South Korea maritime relations is the South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific Region. To tackle the problems formed by China’s assertiveness, India and South Korea need to function collectively, along with other South-east Asian countries.

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Sports Relations

• November 2018 - A Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Sports Ministers of India and South Korea on cooperation in sports. ─ The objective of the MoU is to establish a framework to facilitate and promote cooperation between the two countries on the basis of reciprocity and mutual benefit. (All India Radio, 2018) ─ The sports cooperation MoU includes the exchange of coaches, athletes and experts, as well as scientific and methodical materials, and the implementation of joint training programmes. ─ It will also encourage practical exchanges in elite sports, sports for all, sports for the disabled, sports science, anti-doping, taekwondo, kabaddi and other athletic events. (Hindustan Times, 2018) • 2016 – Kabaddi players from ROK participated in the 2016 Kabaddi World Cup, in India.

• Pro Kabaddi League (PKL) – South Korean Kabaddi players have been participating in the Indian PKL regularly.

Cultural Relations

• 1st July 2011 - The Cultural Centre of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations of India, ‘Swami Vivekananda Cultural Centre’ (SVCC) was established in Seoul.

• Another Indian Culture Centre is established in Busan based on a Public Private Partnership model. The Indian Culture Centre in Busan has been promoting Indian culture and undertake outreach activities in Busan and southern parts of Korea.

• The Indian Cultural Centres promotes bilateral cultural linkages between India and the Republic of Korea, by organizing cultural programmes, cultural seminars, work-shops and trainings engaging India-based Gurus professionals and trainers for Yoga, Hindi, Hindustani Classical Music viz; Tabla and Indian Dances such as Kathak, Odissi: Indian cooking classes, screening of Indian movies both at its premises and at public places such as libraries, movie halls and parks, etc. The centre also organizes special lectures on diverse aspects of Indian culture by involving renowned Korean scholars and academia.

Leveraging local talents on Indian culture, the centre has successfully introduced classes at its premises in addition to other Indian art forms and languages. (Indian Council for Cultural Relations) • 2015 - ‘Festival of India in Korea – SARANG’ is being celebrated every year, and now it has become a significant annual cultural festival of Korea. Through SARANG, SVCC introduces diverse Indian arts forms such as dance, music, yoga, Indian films, cuisine, arts and academic works for a ten-day period in

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different parts of South Korea in association with local hosts and organizations.

2012 - The Korean Cultural Centre in New Delhi, India was founded. It is dedicated to providing insights into the rich cultural heritage of Korea. The Centre organizes various workshops and training events, exhibitions, seminars, film screenings, Korean language classes, taekwondo classes, along with an annual Kpop Contest all over India. It also works on the School Program which is a special project for students in India to introduce Korea and Korean culture through diverse programs since 2013. (Korean Cultural Center) 13 – 14 April 2019 – Korea Festival was held at Mumbai.

Each year since 2016, an all India K-POP Contest is held in more than 15 cities of India. Regional rounds of these contests are held in these cities, and then the final round is held in New Delhi. Hundreds of Indian kpop fans participate in this contest, and the winners get to visit South Korea.

In collaboration with K-Pop High India, Pink Box Events, Kiwa India, Indo Korean Culture Group, etc, various Korean Cultural Festivals and Kpop Concerts of famous Korean artists such as KARD, LUCENTE, MONT, IN2IT, VAV, Alexa, Dabit, Yubin, Han Byul, and SNUPER were organized.

Hallyu (Korean) wave has been spreading very widely in India. Fanbases of various K-Drama actors and actresses, K-Pop groups, and Korean artists have been expressing their presence prominently through social networking sites, and by buying official albums and merchandises directly from South Korea.

Institutional Relations

• The Department of Hindi at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (HUFS) was established in 1972, and the Department of Indian Studies (Global Campus) in 1984. The two departments which annually admit 30 and 26 students respectively, play a leading role in Hindi and Indian Studies in SK. • April 1981 - The Tagore Society of Korea was established to promote the ideals that Rabindranath Tagore stood for. The Society comprises poets, writers, artists and scholars devoted to the exchange and study of culture and the arts between India and Korea. It publishes annual volumes on Korean-Indian Literature and Korean-Indian Culture written by both Indian and Korean scholars.

• 1991 - The Korean Society for Indian Studies Inc. (KSIS) was established with the aim to "conduct academic research on the region of India and South Asia, as well as, current events in the area; to disseminate the results to the Korean public and academia; and contribute to cultural exchange between South Korea and India.

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• August 2009 – MoU was signed between Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) and Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, for the establishment of Indian Chair on Indian Economics in Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.

• 2010 - The Indo-Korea Science and Technology Centre was established in Bengaluru as a collaboration between the Indian Institute of Science and the Korea Institute of Science and Technology (The Hindu, 2019) • July 2011 – A MoU was signed for reciprocal visits of journalists and media representatives to each other’s country.

• March 2012 – A MoU of understanding was signed between the FSI and Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA). Ten IFS probationers from 2011 visited ROK in 2012, and interacted with KNDA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

• Exchange of youth delegations – Through the Indian Ministry of Youth Affairs and South Korean Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, annual exchanges of youth delegations take place.

• The Government of India offers scholarships and fellowships to meritorious Korean nationals to study in recognized Indian universities and educational institutes.

• Ayush Scholarship Scheme offers courses in Ayurveda, Unani, Siddha, Yoga and Homeopathy.

• Kendriya Hindi Sansthan, Agra offers courses in Hindi language.

• ROK Government Scholarship – The government of South Korea offers scholarships to Indian nationals to study Korean language and literature at Masters and PhD levels at selected Korean universities. (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2014) • The Indian Art Museum houses articles and artifacts related to everyday life in India, religion and culture, collected from across the country by Padma Shree Dr. Kim Yangshik. The museum has a permanent exhibition room, a temporary exhibition room and a children’s room for activity-based learning about India.

(Embassy of India, Seoul, Republic of Korea)

Indian Community in South Korea • Around 12,000 Indian nationals are currently living in ROK which includes nearly 300 PIOs. • A large number of Indian scholars are pursuing post-graduate and Ph.D. programmes, mostly in pure sciences, in South Korea.

• Indian professionals working in the IT, shipping and automobile sectors have immigrated to South Korea. These professionals mostly work with companies like Sam-sung, LG, Hyundai, TATA Daewoo, and Tata Consultancy Services.

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• The Indian Embassy in South Korea has brought various Indian Associations in ROK onto a common platform as a part of a Coordination Committee, for closer coordination of Indians.

• Various associations of expatriate Indians living in ROK such as Annapurna Indian Women’s Association, Indians in Korea, Indian Student Association in Korea, Indian Merchants’ Association, etc., are present.

• The Indian Embassy, Coordination Committee, and these associations organize various cultural and social events including Diwali and Holi celebrations, to socialize with other Indian members and to stay in touch with the Indian culture. (2020)

India’s Act East Policy The Act East Policy (AEP) was launched by Prime Minister Narendra Modi during the East Asia Summit in Myanmar in November 2014. A similar foreign policy named ‘Look East Policy’ was launched in 1992 by the then Prime Minister Narsimha Rao. But due to the tensed strategic environment between countries and deteriorating condition of the Indian economy, LEP failed to function as required.

Through AEP, India is focused on developing multi-dimensional relations with East Asian Countries including the ASEAN countries, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Pacific island countries, etc. It is promoting the formation of economic, political, cultural, security, and strategic relations. The geographic, economic and security issues (also including maritime conflicts, terrorism and cyber-attacks), faced by these Asian countries is similar to the issues faced by India. Hence, the Government of India is trying to establish strategic relations with these countries and regional organizations so that they all can collectively work and solve these issues. The dynamicity of these relations has helped the member countries to develop and prosper. India’s one of the main motives is maintaining peace between the countries and in the Asia-Pacific region.

The north-eastern states of India lead a gateway to the South-east Asian countries. Thus, geo-centric projects are established between the neighbouring countries, for example, the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway, the Kaladan project (which will connect the ports of Kolkata and Sittwe in Myanmar), and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). India is actively promoting the connectivity with ASEAN countries. Also, since the implementation of AEP, the Indian officials have created and developed strategic diplomatic relations with countries that were earlier not having active relations with India. These state visits by the PM, President, Vice President, and government’s delegations have strengthen the new as well as the existing ties.

PM Modi defines India’s vision in the East Asian region as ‘SAGAR’ meaning

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Security and Growth for All in the Region. India is concerned about China’s assertive rise as a dominant military power in the territorial region as well as in the India- Pacific region. Which relatively creates threats to the maritime trade and security to the countries in that region.

India-Japan relations and cooperation are at its highest level, with collaborative function on various developmental projects. Now, India is emphasizing on enhancing better relations with South Korea, which is one of the important countries in the Asia - Pacific region. PM Modi and President Moon have agreed to establish tripartite partnership with Afghanistan. The collective impact of South Korea’s ‘New Southern Policy’, Japan’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’, and India’s ‘Act East Policy’ creates a synergic effect.

South Korea’s New Southern Policy The President Moon Jae-In’s government is focused on developing more consolidated partnership with neighbouring countries through its New Northern Policy (NNP) and New Southern Policy (NSP). The NNP intends to build stronger economic linkages with countries to Korea’s north, including Russia, Mongolia and Central Asian countries, along with the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Platform (NAPCP). The NSP, meanwhile, focuses on countries to Korea’s south in Southeast Asia and India. The two regional initiatives, as pillars of economic prosperity, are linked to the ‘Peaceful Korean Peninsula’ and to the ‘New Economic Map’ of Korean Peninsula. This new policy orientation is being pursued under the government’s broader strategy of promoting a ‘Northeast Asia Plus Community for Responsibility-sharing’ (NEAPC). (The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 2019) The NSP aims to develop its relations with ASEAN and India as key partners in the southern region, and to raise this partnership to the level of South Korea’s traditional four major diplomatic partners (USA, China, Japan, Russia). It stresses on developing values that can be empathized with others, and to build a mutually prosperous “people-centred” community. The NSP emphasizes on “3-P Community” including the community of people, prosperity, and peace. (Thi20) The South Korean government has established the Presidential Committee on the NSP for policy recommendation and co-ordination, along with the creation of ASEAN Bureau in its Foreign Affairs Ministry.

The US – China trade conflict is causing economic loss to the South Korean economy, as both USA and China are its major export destinations, along with presence of various South Korean companies in China is increasing tensions between these countries. Whereas this trade conflict is providing South Korea with an opportunity to develop its technology, and to increase manufacturing of its products in collaboration with the Indian and ASEAN partners, so that these products will be able to replace the Chinese products which are hugely available

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in the markets across the world. Also, India and South Korea have set a target of bilateral trade of USD 50 billion by 2030 and have concluded multi-billion dollars agreements in various different sectors. Thus, it can be said that the NSP does not merely aim to replace the U.S and China with new southern regions, but rather to expand its scope of cooperation while maintaining relations with the U.S and China.

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India - RoK Trade and Economic Relations. Embassy of India, Seoul, Republic of Korea.

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2019. India, South Korea sign 6 pacts, to step up cooperation in nfrastructure, combating global crime. The Economic Times. [Online] February 22, 2019. [Cited: June 21, 2020.] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-south-korea-sign-7pacts-to-step-up-cooperation-in-infrastructure-combating-globalcrime/articleshow/68108448.cms?from=mdr.

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11 Normalization of the Israel-Morocco Relations: An Overview Yashna Walia1 1Research

Contributor, Internationalism walia.yashna@gmail.com

Synopsis. This is an Overview Brief on Israeli-Moroccan ties for the Indian International Law Programme.

Introduction In a deal brokered with the United States’ help, Israel and Morocco agreed to normalize their relations on December 10, 2020. Morocco became the fourth country after UAE, Bahrain and Sudan to make such a move. Termed as a massive and historic breakthrough by Trump, it would be negotiated by White House senior adviser Jared Kushner and US envoy Avi Berkowitz before Joe Biden takes over. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that there would be a ‘very warm’ peace between the two countries (Morocco joins other Arab nations agreeing to normalize Israel ties 2020). Interestingly, Morocco had earlier rejected such a deal, with Prime Minister Saad-Eddine El-Othmani stating that it would embolden Israel to further breach the rights of Palestinian people (Bandaris 2020). However, others contend that Israel and Morocco have always cooperated with each other, albeit in a taciturn manner. According to them, the deal is a mere reiteration of their commitment in front of the world.

Historical Links Israel and Morocco are said to have had intelligence ties ever since King Hassan II took power in 1961. Israeli agents are said to have informed him of opposition leader Mehdi Ben Barka’s plan to overthrow him. It is said that after this, covert security cooperation started between the two countries (Israel-Morocco agreement follows a history of clandestine cooperation 2020).

The King is said to have allowed Mossad (Israel’s secret service wing) to establish a station in Morocco. Israel provided the Moroccans with weapons and trained

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them how to use them. It is also said that Israel helped in organizing Morocco’s intelligence service and supplied them with surveillance technology. Both the nations’ spies engaged in information-sharing (Israel-Morocco agreement follows a history of clandestine cooperation 2020).

It is also alleged that Morocco allowed Mossad to bug the meetings and private residences of Arab leaders when they met in Casablanca in the run upto the 1967 War (Six Day War) which revealed to Israel how unprepared Arabs were for the war. Mossad had a hand in the abduction and death of Moroccan opposition leader Barka. King Hassan and his government also became the back channel for secret meetings between Egyptian and Israeli officials which led to the 1978 Camp David accords (Israel-Morocco agreement follows a history of clandestine cooperation 2020).

In the 1980s, when Morocco gestured towards normalisation with Israel, it faced powerful backlash domestically as well as from the Arabs. So, it continued to maintain bilateral relations in a discreet manner (Israel-Morocco agreement follows a history of clandestine cooperation 2020).

The cultural and people-to-people ties between the two countries have always been strong. Morocco houses the largest Jewish community in the Arab world and even has an ambassador for Jewish affairs (currently held by Serge Berdugo).

Some 50,000 Moroccan Jews from Israel came to visit the country and usually, hotels are reserved entirely for them over Easter. Morocco’s revised constitution of 2011 states that its national unity stands enriched by its ‘Hebrew heritage’. The Moroccan diaspora in Israel can retain their Moroccan citizenship (IsraelMorocco agreement follows a history of clandestine cooperation 2020).

Israel’s first conspicuous foreign investment in the Arab world came in 2017 in the form of the setting up of a $2.9 million Subsidiary in Morocco by Israeli agricultural tech giant Netaflim. Between 2014 and 2017, both the countries engaged in $149 million worth of trade which made Morocco amongst the top 4 African countries Israel traded with. There is more than $30 million annual trade between both of them. As part of a $48 million deal, Rabat received three Israeli reconnaissance drones in 2020. Most recently, Morocco included its Jewish history into the school curricula (Israel-Morocco agreement follows a history of clandestine cooperation 2020).

Impact on Morocco The biggest thing that Morocco gains from this deal is United States' recognition of its claim over the territory of Western Sahara. It is a desert region where Morocco is pitted against the Algeria- backed Polisario front. A ceasefire was brokered between the two in 1991 by UN. Subsequently, a referendum for its independence was to be held, but the move was blocked by Morocco. In November this year, Morocco had launched a military operation in a buffer strip

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controlled by UN peacekeepers, as a consequence of which the Polisario front pulled out of the deal and threatened to have a full-blown military conflict (Morocco joins other Arab nations agreeing to normalize Israel ties 2020).

The recognition of its claims by the United States was too prized an opportunity to be missed, as 7 of its former presidents had maintained a neutral stance. A White House proclamation has now stated that the United States believes that an independent Sahrawi state was not a realistic option to solve the conflict.

Stating that Moroccan autonomy over the territory was the only feasible solution, it called for discussion between the parties involved (keeping Moroccan control as the only reference line). Washington would open a consulate in Western Sahara (Morocco joins other Arab nations agreeing to normalize Israel ties 2020).

This deal is said to have been proctored by Moroccan investor Yariv Elbaz who not only apprised Morocco about the US' intention to recognise its claims but also to make $ 3 billion worth of investments in the country. This effort was to be coordinated by the United States International Development Finance Corporation. Although a source in the Trump administration agreed to such a development, it denied its connection to the deal (Jakes, Kershner, Alami, Halbfinger 2020).

The Trump administration has also moved forward with $1 billion sales of drones and precision- guided weapons to Morocco. It includes four MQ-9B Sea Guardian drones made by General Atomics and Hellfire, Paveway and JDAM precisionguided munition made by Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and Boeing. A notice has been sent to the Congress about these potential deals, and it is unlikely to block it through resolutions of disapproval (Zengerle Stone 2020) Morocco has expressed its intention to facilitate direct flights for Israeli tourists to and from Morocco. It would reopen its liaison offices, which it had closed at the time of the Second Intifada. Economic cooperation would be further promoted.

Morocco has always been supportive of the Palestinian cause, so such move has an impact on its position internationally as well as on its internal dynamicity.

Domestically, the regime has highlighted its win over Western Sahara and positioned itself as a mediator between Israel and Palestine. As the deal was being announced in Washington, King Mohammed VI called the Palestinian leader Mohammad Abbas. He reaffirmed that his commitment to the Palestinian people remains unchanged (Jakes, Kershner, Alami, Halbfinger 2020).

The religious branch of the Islamist Justice and Development Party (which leads the government) denounced normalisation, while the party's leadership was less critical and more deferential. According to the 2019-20 Arab Opinion Index, 88% of the surveyed Moroccans opposed such diplomatic recognition and 70% of them deemed the Palestinian issue to be pertinent (Abouzzohour 2020).

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What the Deal Entails for the United States Trump did face denunciation domestically over the granting of recognition to Morocco’s claims over Western Sahara. Senator Jim Inhofe, the Republican Chairman of the U.S. Senate’s Armed Services Committee termed the decision as ‘shocking and deeply disappointing’(Morocco joins other Arab nations agreeing to normalize Israel ties 2020).

Trump’s motives behind this deal can be described as two-fold. He needs to appeal to the religiously devout and conservative constituencies in his bid to recapture the White House. The chances of this bid’s accomplishment are low.

Nevertheless, he is eager to add as many feathers to his cap before he relinquishes office. He can sell this as a foreign policy achievement and when he leaves, the Abraham Accords would be seen as his foreign policy legacy (Mezran, Khoury, Arbit, Lipner, Daragahi, Katz, Ferziger Azodi 2020).

It is unlikely that Biden would recline from this deal once he assumes office. Even though his foreign policy is expected to be different from Trump’s, it is likely that he would continue pursuing the Abraham Accords. Although Biden may restore monetary aid to the Palestinians and allow them to reopen their representative office in Washington, it is also unlikely that the US embassy would be moved back to Tel Aviv (Mezran, Khoury, Arbit, Lipner, Daragahi, Katz, Ferziger Azodi 2020).

Impact on Western Sahara According to various analysts, Trump has added fuel to the fire that already engulfs this region. He has disregarded years of UN diplomacy and ceded a territory without consulting the people belonging to it. It is hard to construe this as a genuine peaceful settlement (Mezran, Khoury, Arbit, Lipner, Daragahi, Katz, Ferziger Azodi 2020).

Representative of the Polisario front have heavily criticized this move. They have termed it as ‘strange but not surprising’. Terming it as a violation of their right to self-determination, they’ve said that it proves that Morocco is willing to sell its soul in order to maintain the illegal occupation of Western Sahara (Morocco joins other Arab nations agreeing to normalize Israel ties 2020).

This deal may further lead to armed action between Morocco and the Polisario front (which is backed by Algeria). Algeria, Morocco’s oil-rich and well-armed neighbour, hosts these Sahrawi rebels. It is also likely that a number of countries would recognise Sahrawi rule over that territory. Thus, the success of this deal would stand impugned if military confrontation ensues (Mezran, Khoury, Arbit, Lipner, Daragahi, Katz, Ferziger Azodi 2020).

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Impact on the MENA Region It was quite obvious that Palestine was going to be critical of this deal. Hanan Ashrawi, a veteran Palestinian leader termed it as an extremely immoral way of exploiting countries. He said that the Trump administration was “scrambling to do anything it can to extract concessions and benefits for Israel.” Moroccans have always been supportive of Palestinians, so they may see this move as a deep betrayal. But on the flip side, it is also upon Morocco to leverage its position to advance Palestinian issues. The king has used his position as chair of the Al-Quds Committee of the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) to advocate for Palestinian rights and he may continue to do so at his disposal (Mezran, Khoury, Arbit, Lipner, Daragahi, Katz, Ferziger Azodi 2020).

It is unlikely that Morocco would be isolated in its region. Also, the US has indicated that it expects more MENA countries to normalize its relations with Israel. Oman is most likely to strike such a deal. It is also anticipated that Saudi Arabia would consider such a deal after Biden takes over, although it would face strong internal opposition (Morocco joins other Arab nations agreeing to normalize Israel ties 2020).

India’s Reactions India has welcomed this normalization of ties and also reiterated its stand of twostate solution to the Israel-Palestine embargo through direct negotiations. India said that it enjoys good relations with both Israel and Morocco and supports peace, stability and development in the region (India welcomes normalisation of ties by Israel and Morocco, calls for talks with Palestinians 2020).

CONCLUSION The golden chance to get the US to recognise its claims, after 7 presidents maintained neutrality, was willfully appropriated by Morocco. Its success, however, lies on whether military action ensues.

It is unlikely that the UN or the European Union (EU) would change their position on the dispute. While the EU maintains strong relations with Morocco, it would try to strike a balance and back the UN peace process. However, it would be different for France as it holds the most sympathetic position towards Morocco in this dispute. It is very unlikely that France would condemn Morocco in any manner (Abouzzohour 2020).

What has inevitably been proven wrong through the Abraham Accords is the inference that proximity could be pursued towards Israel only after its dispute Palestine is resolved. The Arab states continue to dissolve their tensions with the Jewish country even though its embargo with Palestine has nowhere come to a closure.

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References 1. Morocco joins other Arab Nations agreeing to normalize Israel ties . The Indian Express [online] .2020.

[Accessed 27 December 2020].

Available from: https://indianexpress.com/article/world/morocco-joins-other-arab-nations-agreeing-tonormalize-israel-ties-7100425/ .

2. BANDARIS, MOHAMMAD, 2020, Morocco rejects normalization with Israel. Anadolu Agency [online].

2020.

[Accessed 27 December 2020].

Available from: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/morocco-rejects-normalization-with-israel-/1951337.

3. Israel-Morocco agreement follows a history of clandestine cooperation. TRT World [online].2020.

[Accessed 27 December 2020].

Available from: https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/israel-morocco-agreement-follows-a-history-ofclandestine-cooperation-42268 .

4. JAKES, LARA, KERSHNER, ISABEL, ALAMI, AIDA and HALBFINGER, DAVID M., 2020, Morocco Joins List of Arab Nations to Begin Normalizing Relations With Israel. The New York Times [online].

2020.

[Accessed 27 December 2020].

Available from: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/10/world/middleeast/israel-morocco-trump.html.

5. ZENGERLE, PATRICIA and STONE, MIKE, 2020, Exclusive-Trump administration moves forward with $1 billion Moroccan arms deal. Reuters [online].

2020.

[Accessed 27 December 2020]. Available from: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usamorocco-drones-exclusive-idUSKBN28L2TO. 6. ABOUZZOHOUR, YASMINA, 2020, Morocco’s partial normalization with Israel comes with risks and gains. Brookings [online]. 2020. [Accessed 27 December 2020]. Available from: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/12/14/moroccos-partialnormalization-with-israel-comes-with-risks-and-gains/.

7. MEZRAN, KARIM, KHOURY, NABEEL, ARBIT, CARMIEL, LIPNER, SHALOM, DARAGAHI, BORZOU, KATZ, MARK N., FERZIGER, JONATHAN H. and AZODI, SINA, 2020, Experts react: What the Morocco-Israel deal means for the Middle East - Atlantic Council. Atlantic Council [online]. 2020. [Accessed 27 December 2020]. Available from: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/experts-react-what-the-morocco-israeldeal-means-for-the-middle-east/.

8. India welcomes normalisation of ties by Israel and Morocco, calls for talks with Palestinians.

Hindustan Times [online]. 2020. [Accessed 27 December 2020]. Available from: https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-welcomes-normalisation-of-ties-byisrael-and-morocco-calls-for-talks-with-palestinians/storykP2XY6zflnFHzAD6lw3gwN.html.

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12 The Developing Israel-Bhutan Ties: An Overview Yashna Walia1 1Research

Contributor, Internationalism walia.yashna@gmail.com

Synopsis. This is an Overview Brief on the Israel-Bhutan relations for the Indian International Law Programme.

Introduction On December 12, 2020, Israel and Bhutan agreed to establish diplomatic relations. A signing ceremony was held between Israeli and Bhutanese ambassadors in New Delhi, India. They stated that the agreement came after several years of secret contacts between the two countries. They agreed to formulate a joint work plan in the areas of water management, technology, human resource development, agricultural sciences etc. Israeli Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi stated that it was an evidence of how Israel’s circle of recognition was expanding. Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, further disclosed that they were in contact with other countries too which wanted to establish diplomatic relations with them (Ayyub 2020).

Implications on Israel The establishment of Israel’s relations with Bhutan is being seen as a case of natural progression; and that it was always looking for a bigger part to play in South Asia’s diplomatic, security and commercial pie. It established full diplomatic relations with India in 1992 and ever since, it has been carefully treading on this territory. It meddled unobtrusively in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict, cleverly being on the Sinhalese side (Nayar 2020).

When Biden takes over America, he shall be dealing with an Israel which has a bigger role to play today than 72 years of its existence. It goes to show that Israel has evolved humongously from the time when its very existence was under constant threat. It sends a symbolic message to Israel’s rivals. Its deal with Bhutan

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was portrayed as an example of how Israel was being increasingly accepted (Kumar 2020).

Bhutan: Exordium & History The Kingdom of Bhutan is a Himalayan mountain nation which is one of the most isolated nations in the world. It is a country consisting of less than a million people, and is wedged between India and China. It has full diplomatic ties with only 53 countries and has embassies in only seven of them. It is famous for its gross National Happiness Index, where it benchmarks itself on happiness instead of economic growth (Israel establishes diplomatic ties with Bhutan 2020). Buddhism being the official state religion, animal slaughter stands prohibited. In an effort to preserve its virtually unspoiled environment, plastic bags and cigarettes are illegal. It is the only tobacco free country in the world (Kumar 2020) and maintains a carbon negative economy (Israel establishes diplomatic ties with Bhutan 2020). It benefits a lot from tourism, which has helped it to boost life expectancy, reduce infant mortality and increase the standard of living. It began allowing tourists only in 1970 and sought to keep a cap by imposing a daily fee.

TV and internet came to be permitted only in 1999 (Kumar 2020).

Bhutan was protectorate of British India and New Delhi inherited this relationship in 1947. The 1949 treaty of friendship modernized these bilateral ties, wherein India was responsible for its defence and foreign relations. Eventually, in 2007, a new treaty was signed and New Delhi was relieved of these responsibilities (Stobdan 2020).

Article 2 of the 1949 Friendship treaty assured Bhutan of India’s noninterference in Bhutan’s internal matters while India was to advise Bhutan on external relations. Bhutan was an incredibly loyal ally of India following its ethos of deep devotion to Gyagar (the holy land India). The Bhutanese king even escorted an Indian Prime Minister to the dais and waited at the foot of it to walk him/her back to the seat. This was a highly nuanced move, rare to be seen in international diplomacy. This unwavering commitment was also seen when King Jigme Singye Wangchuck personally led its troops to confront Indian insurgents from the Assam border. Bhutan backed India during its confrontation with China in 1962 and Pakistan in 1971. In fact it was the first, along with Mongolia, to support India’s push for Bangladeshi independence (Stobdan 2020).

Bhutan never played the China card unlike Nepal. What went berserk was that India started taking Bhutan for granted, letting its strategic sense erode. Indian policy makers have been accused of using the colonial type approach of giving economic aid in return for loyalty. Instead of providing economic subsidies, it should have enabled agreements and let market forces operate (Stobdan 2020).

When Indian lost the 1962 war, Bhutan must have felt frightful for its existence against Chinese dominance. The incorporation of Sikkim into India might also

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have led to doubt India’s intention. With the help of India, Bhutan secured membership into the UN in 1971. Eventually Bhutan started asserting its independent status and taking a divergent approach from India, be it siding with China and others on Cambodia Khmer Rouge issue at NAM’s Havana summit in 1979 or not following India’s stance on the issue of land locked nations at the UN. Bhutan also signed the NPT in 1985 and supported Pakistan’s Nuclear Free Zone South Asia proposal (Stobdan 2020).

Since 1979, the royalty in Bhutan started pressurizing New Delhi for boundary resolution and an ‘update’ in the 1949 treaty. Eventually, in 2007, Bhutan was freed from the obligations of seeking guidance in the matter of foreign policy and obtaining permission over arms imports. The new treaty only instructs both the nations to cooperate closely and not let their lands be used for each other’s derogation. After the voluntary abdication of power by the King to a democratically elected government, Bhutan gradually started to move away from an India- centric foreign policy (Stobdan 2020).

The real rift between New Delhi and Bhutan took place around 2013. A meeting took place between Bhutanese Prime Minister Jigme Yozer Thinley and Chinese Premier Wan Jiabao in Rio de Janeiro in June 2012. No substantive deal was made, only Thinley agreed to purchase 20 buses from China. However, this meeting deeply hurt New Delhi and it accused Thimphu of lack of transparency in the matters of their common security. India was concerned because of Chumbi Valley’s strategic sensitivity and its need to prevent China from committing further encroachment southwards (Stobdan 2020).

In an alleged act of punishment, New Delhi cut subsidies on gas and kerosene sales, among other such measures to Bhutan. Nobody in Bhutan was convinced that these were purely commercial decisions like Indian officials presented it.

Elections were to be held in Bhutan in July 2013 and critics interpreted it as a measure to rock the election process. They saw it as an act of rage over Bhutan’s ‘harmless’ bid to improve its relations with China (Stobdan 2020).

When Indian media reacted to Bhutan’s engagement with China, Kinley Tshering (former editor of Bhutan Times) said that they were, “spinning a yarn of conspiracy theories that are naïve at best and ludicrous at worst.” The Bhutanese expressed their dismay through various articles and blogs. They were condemning what they called India’s ‘carrot and stick’ policy (Stobdan 2020).

When the DPT (the party of Jigme Yozer Thinley) lost the elections, several conspiracy theories began to flourish. It was commented that the “World’s largest democracy could influence elections in the world’s youngest democracy.” Even within India, this was seen as an act of needlessly scoring a political self goal against a small sized, friendly state. The move was seen as “poorly conceived” and ‘counter - productive’ (Stobdan 2020).

China was all the quick to describe it as ‘coercion’ and ‘brazen interference’ in Bhutan’s elections. Liu Zongyi wrote in the Global Times that India’s intention was to not let Bhutan solve its border dispute with China (Stobdan 2020).

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India which had fully supported Bhutan’s bid to democratize itself was now being condemned of thwarting its election process. Former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal came to India’s defence and stated that it was Bhutan who was playing the China card and was exploiting India’s weaknesses like its internal problems, high level of tolerance, lack of consensus, sensitivity to accusations of hegemony among others (Stobdan 2020).

Eventually, both the countries succeeded in stopping the drift. When Narendra Modi became the Prime Minister of India in 2014, his first foreign visit was to Bhutan. This was part of his ‘neighbourhood –first’ policy (Stobdan 2020).

A major dispute erupted in 2017 over Chinese overtures into the Bhutanese territory of the Doklam Plateau. Different causes of this flare up have been given.

Some say that this happened because China was discovered building a road in the area, while others claim this was because the Chinese army destroyed Indian bunkers. The Doklam Plateau lies on the conjunction of the Chumbi Valley (of China), the Haa Valley (belonging to Bhutan) and Sikkim (an integral part of India) (Theys 2020).

This dispute, however, did not escalate into a physical stifle. It was marked by antagonistic rhetoric and verbal threats. When the status quo was said to have been restored, both India and China claimed victory. But it was said that the Chinese only had to go back 250 metres, while India had to give up patrolling where its two bunkers existed previously (Theys 2020).

India and China locked horns again at the Ladakh Sector along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in 2020. It was then that China tried to distract India by trying to bring up the Doklam issue yet again. A Chinese journalist tweeted a map of a new village two kilometers inside Bhutanese territory near the Doklam Plateau, sparking controversy. Bhutan contested this analysis and said that those satellite images were incorrect. India is urging Bhutan to settle its border issue with China so that New Delhi is able to define the trijunction area. Bhutan and China have had 24 rounds of bilateral talks. It is pertinent that Bhutan takes a strong stance before it is too late for negotiations (Basu 2020).

It is said that India believes that China is trying to follow its South China Sea strategy in Bhutan. This strategy pertains creating new settlements and then bringing in civilian population so that the matter becomes even more complex.

China first changes facts on the ground and then puts its territorial claims (Basu 2020).

Satellite imagery by a US based firm, Maxar Technologies, shows that China has been carrying out construction activities near Doklam (Griffiths Suri 2020) .Thus, this issue still remains an area of concern with the potential to come up again.

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What the Deal Means for India The Doklam issue remains of critical importance to India because of the Siliguri Corridor that lies to the south of Doklam. Known as the Chicken’s neck, it is a 22 km wide road which connects mainland India to its north eastern States. It also links India to Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan. If the Chinese military advances just 130 kilometres it could cut off Bhutan, West Bengal and the north eastern States from India. Thus, the resolution of this dispute is quite pertinent. However, it has opined by Phunchock Stobdan that India should not push Bhutan too much on this matter as it could worsen the situation (Basu 2020).

Also, it must be noted by India that although it enjoys great relations with Israel, Israel is expanding its presence in South Asia for its interests alone. Israel has good relations with China and is unlikely to pursue any agenda against it solely for India’s gains. Israel would like to establish relations with Pakistan and Bangladesh too. It is likely to happen sooner with Pakistan than Bangladesh, because Bangladesh is a democracy. However, the Constitution of relations with these countries is not going to pose any threat to India. What New Delhi must understand is that South Asian countries are looking for an alternative in their backyard so as to counter the sole influence of India and China, and Israel is providing them with this alternative (Nayar 2020).

What the Deal Means for China Bhutan was perhaps taken aback when China claimed the Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary (located in Eastern Bhutan) at the Global Environment Facility (GEF).

China described it as disputed territory, which Bhutan rejected at once, stating that it does not have issues with China in its eastern boundary (Bhonsale 2020).

When Tibet was taken over by China, downfall between the relations of both the countries ensued. Bhutan came to share a 470 kilometres long border with China. China has taken over the Tibetan perspective of dominance in the Himalayan Region. Tibet used to claim the entire Buddhist regions, that is, Bhutan, Ladakh, Sikkim and India’s North East as its own. China’s claim in eastern Bhutan was a perpetuation of Tibet’s attitude of treating Bhutan as a vassal state. This is a seen as a part of China’s ‘western development strategy’ (Bhonsale 2020).

After the last round of border talks were held in 2016, China kept in contact with Bhutan, pressurizing it to establish formal diplomatic ties as a pre-requisite of the resolution of border disputes. China thought that Bhutan’s election of a new party, the Druk Nyamrup Tshogpa (DNT), indicated an anti-India wave.

However, its assumption proved to be wrong as the Indian PM Narendra Modi visited Bhutan for the second time (Bhonsale 2020).

Bhutan has toed India’s line by not joining the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

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and showing support for Japan’s candidature for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. China perceives all of this as against its interests. However, what must also be noted is that Bhutan has been careful to not upset China and question its territorial integrity. Bhutan restrained Tibetan refugees to Thimphu and respected the ‘One China’ stand in the United Nations (Bhonsale 2020).

However, it has become harder for Bhutan to balance both India and China due to the deterioration of US -China relations. When the then US Deputy Secretary of State, John Sullivan, visited Bhutan, he stressed on the need to protect and enhance rule- based order in the Indo Pacific (Bhonsale 2020).

Owing to the above dynamics, China’s act of claiming the Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary was also seen by some as punishing an Indian ally (Bhonsale 2020).

Even though Israel is friendly with China, nevertheless the establishment of its relations with Bhutan can prove to be worrisome for China. This is because China had been increasing its involvement in Bhutan by emerging as a major supplier of many goods like garments, electronics and consumer durables. Now, Bhutan can turn towards Tel Aviv to fulfill its requirements, which may also include the latest technology in agricultural, communications and other areas. Also, Beijing had been investing in enhancing its cultural and social ties with Bhutan. It had rolled out scholarships for Bhutanese students and urged its tourists to visit Bhutan. It had been flying out top intellectuals, bureaucrats, academics and other professionals from Bhutan to China on visits. So, New Delhi, through its deft diplomatic maneuvering, encouraged Bhutan to establish people to people ties with countries like Israel and other European countries which were outside China’s sphere of influence (Mazumdar 2020).

Conclusions To conclude, the Israel- Bhutan deal is a sign of Israel’s growing circle of influence. The establishment of peace between it and the Palestinians no longer remains a pre-requisite for its connection in the world. As Israel is a friend of India and the United States, the deal does not pose as a threat to India in any manner.

However, considering that Israel is a friend of China too, it means that it would not necessarily be supportive of India in any of its overtures against China in South Asia. Sino- Bhutanese relations may further suffer a setback considering that Chinese investments would be diluted and its cultural influence would be countered. Bhutan is said to gain in terms of Israeli investment in its economy and Israel poses as an alternative to both China and India.

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References 1. AYYUB, RAMI, 2020, Israel and Bhutan establish diplomatic relations. Reuters [online]. 2020.

[Accessed 30 December 2020]. Available from: https://www.reuters.com/article/israel-bhutanidUSKBN28M0NK .

2. NAYAR, KP, 2020, Israel’s growing footprint. The Tribune [online]. 2020. [Accessed 30 December 2020]. Available from: https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/israelsgrowing-footprint-187328 .

3. KUMAR, AVI, 2020, Why Bhutan-Israel ties matter - comment. The Jerusalem Post [online].

2020. [Accessed 30 December 2020]. Available from: https://www.jpost.com/opinion/whybhutan-israel-ties-matter-comment-652667 .

4. Israel establishes diplomatic ties with Bhutan. TRT World [online]. 2020. [Accessed 30 December 2020]. Available from: https://www.trtworld.com/middle-east/israel-establishesdiplomatic-ties-with-bhutan-42300 .

5. STOBDAN, PHUNCHOK, 2020, India's Real Problem Lies in its Bhutan Policy, Not the Border. The Wire [online]. 2020. [Accessed 30 December 2020]. Available from: https://thewire.in/diplomacy/india-china-doklam-real-problem-bhutan .

6. THEYS, SARINA, 2020, Running hot and cold: Bhutan-India-China relations. South Asia @LSE [online].

2020.

[Accessed 30 December 2020].

Available from: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2018/01/25/running-hot-and-cold-bhutan-india-chinarelations-doklam/ .

7. BASU, NAYANIMA, 2020, India wants Bhutan to settle China border issue so it can define trijunction area near Doklam. The Print [online]. 2020. [Accessed 30 December 2020].

Available from: https://theprint.in/diplomacy/india-wants-bhutan-to-settle-china-borderissue-so-it-can-define-trijunction-area-near-doklam/554740/ .

8. GRIFFITHS, JAMES and SURI, MANVEENA, 2020, Satellite images appear to show China developing area along disputed border with India and Bhutan. CNN [online]. 2020.

[Accessed 30 December 2020]. Available from: https://edition.cnn.com/2020/11/24/asia/chinaindia-bhutan-doklam-intl-hnk/index.html .

9. BHONSALE, MIHIR, 2020, Bhutan: Walking on tight rope, balancing India and China. Observer Research Foundation [online]. 2020. [Accessed 30 December 2020]. Available from: https://www.orfonline.org/research/bhutan-waking-on-tight-rope-balancing-indiaand-china/ .

10. MAZUMDAR, JAIDEEP, 2020, Explained: How The Setting Up Of Diplomatic Ties By Bhutan With Israel Represents A Setback For China. Swarajya [online]. 2020. [Accessed 30 December 2020]. Available from: https://swarajyamag.com/world/explained-how-the-setting-up-ofdiplomatic-ties-by-bhutan-with-israel-represents-a-setback-for-china.

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13 The Indian Ocean Initiative and the Potential of Russian Cooperation Ridhima Bhardwaj1 & Mugdha Satpute2 1Research

Contributor, Internationalism Research Analyst, Internationalism ridhimab04@gmail.com, mugdha1042@gmail.com; 2Junior

Synopsis. This is a Policy Brief on Indo-Russian Ties and QUAD’s Maritime Avenues for the Indian International Law Programme.

Introduction For a protected, safe and sustainable maritime environment, Prime Minister Narendra Modi suggested an "Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative." The key objectives involve building collaborations between participants to enhance maritime safety; strategic use of marine resources; management and prevention of disasters. The Indo-Pacific's main emphasis is on oceans, which is also the common link between maritime nations like India, Indonesia, Singapore and Sri Lanka which also possess the strongest political roles in the Indian Ocean. (Siddiqui, 2019) The partner nations have proposed increased substantive collaboration in spheres involving connectivity, infrastructural development and safety concerns, particularly combating terrorism, data as well as maritime security, working towards establishing peace, harmony, stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. (Chaudhary, 2019) Over the last several years, the recognition of the Indo-Pacific as a unified strategic concept connecting the coastal waters of the pacific region with the Indian Ocean has received much attention and gained popularity with the change in the strategic centre of gravity towards this area.

The conceptualization of the Indo-Pacific implies different things from different perspectives. As for the US, it stretches till the western coast of India, since that is also the regional frontier of the jurisdiction of the US Indo-Pacific. For India, on the other hand, it covers the whole Indian Ocean as well as the Western Pacific region, as was also indicated by PM Narendra Modi during his keynote address at the Shangrila dialogue (2018). (Siddiqui, 2019)

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Role of US & India A healthy US-India cooperation is absolutely crucial for the future of the IndoPacific Initiative. The two nations are engaging with each other to tackle threats to national and international growth, and they continue to be highly committed to the prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region. The futures of the USA and India are intrinsically linked, with around $1.9 trillion in two-way trade.

The government, companies, and organizations of the USA are fuelling private investment and creating jobs in infrastructure, energy, as well as electronic commerce, reinforcing democratic society and systems, combating global threats, and investments in human capital throughout the Indo-Pacific region.

The US recognizes the ASEAN initiatives to ascertain that all Indo-Pacific nations possess equal role in deciding the area's future, irrespective of geographic importance. (2019) The US does not recognize China as a part of the Indo-Pacific framework, India has taken some steps to showcase it as an inclusive structure for the entire region, as also iterated by PM Modi at the Shangrila Dialogue.

Role of Russia & China The Indo-Pacific Initiative has also simultaneously been introduced with China's rapid growth, as a result of size and practices. Its territorial ambitions throughout the South China Sea, its conflict in the East China Sea as well as its enormous surge into the Indian Ocean by idealistic economic and strategic measures such as the Belt-and-Road plan have confronted the well-known international rulesbased association which appreciated the oceans as the shared legacy of humankind.

India has managed to remain out of many significant military training exercises whilst still being exceedingly cautious of its alliance with China. From the economic standpoint, ties with China, as the largest trade partner of India— then from a security standpoint, the tension in the Doklam Valley that led the two nations to an armed conflict, preceded by the informal Wuhan Summit, can be seen as attempts to improve the relations.

Therefore, although the Indo-Pacific Initiative is a US-led strategic effort and is yet to determine the appropriate way between its allies, China has taken a negative impression from it and in the meanwhile, has spread its maritime presence to Djibouti on the west side of the Indian Ocean, in which it has created a foothold to the eastern side of the Western Pacific, where it claims the land and sea features. (Siddiqui, 2019) The Indo-Pacific agenda is a strategic confederation, primarily seen by many as a counter-China effort. In this light, India is of the opinion that if Russia enters the Indo-Pacific structure it will no longer be somewhat a US-led bloc, which is something Russia has always protested about. India feels that it is "critically

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important" for Russia to enter the Indo-Pacific system to make it a group of "likeminded countries" in the real sense, i.e. nations who support freedom of navigation according to a rule-based order in attempt to settle the difficulties in a post-Covid environment.

Russia has also played a significant part between India and China and has managed to bring down tensions on both sides. India acknowledges that Moscow 's position in China's continuing unparalleled confrontation to the western part of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is "very helpful." According to an official, given Russia's own increasing diplomatic ties with China, the former did not stop assuring India of immediate need of arms' supplies if circumstances worsened. (Basu, 2020)

The Quad: Overview • In 2007, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe initially proposed the alliance of four nations – India, Australia, USA and Japan – also known as the quadrilateral security dialogue, or more popularly, the quad. The thought could not go forward, nevertheless, with Australia pulling out of it, presumably because of political pressure by China.

• In the Indo-Pacific region, India and Australia seem to be cautious of China's attacks on maritime safety and navigational autonomy. Such shared fears highlighted the need for improved naval partnership among the two countries, and thus the two began bilateral naval combat drills. When PM Modi visited Australia, the two nations entered into a security framework agreement, underlining the vitality of strategic partnership in the Indian Ocean. (Pant, 2017) • The United States had already moved throughout all angles to form alliances to prevent China's growth. The efforts to cooperate further with the East via Obama's 'Pivot to Asia' and now ties across the 'Indo-Pacific' represent all diplomatic measures that the US is undertaking. The four countries seek a shared platform of unchallenged maritime trade networks and protection as sovereign nations with mutual interests. Thus, the "quadrilateral" alliance was formed on November 12, 2017 with the intention of countering China's hostile behaviour in the Indo-Pacific region.

• All the four countries of the Quad acknowledged that an Indo-Pacific region which is safe, accessible, prosperous and egalitarian fits the long-term needs of all countries in the area and the rest of the world. Authorities from these nations also exchanged perspectives on highlighting the critical issues of terrorist activity and proliferation connections affecting the area, and also improving connectivity. (FE Online, 2018)

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An Overview on Eurasia Since the end of the cold war era and after the collapse of the USSR, Russia has lost its status of “superpower”. With the continuous direct and indirect conflicts with the US, Russia now has to depend on other nations and international collaborations to stay put as an authoritative nation. Hence Russia is promoting the concept of Greater Eurasia, which consists of Central Asian countries and the countries whose borders extend to the European Union. The development of Greater Eurasia composes Russia’s first foreign policy through which it will not be dependent on functioning of others and will have an opportunity to create and promote cooperation between institutions as well as its partners in a specific strategic region. Russia along with its partner states has formed the Eurasian Economic Union with an aim to develop cooperation Greater Eurasia by establishing regional projects.

The EAEU portrays Russia’s approach towards its partners wherein countries are equally represented in the governing bodies of the union. The EAEU is a project aimed at speeding up economic development and enhancing the sovereignty of its participants. (Timofei Bordachev, 2020) The EAEU emphasizes on multilateral cooperation especially based on the economic interests of its member states.

Earlier, India and China were the potential collaborators for the EAEU due to their consistent economic development and large availability of economic factors.

In 2015, the EAEU had a cooperation agreement with China, thus greatly enhancing the Russia – China relations.

With significant developments in the relationship between Russia and China, certain Central Asian countries and China’s neighboring countries are profiting from it, while some countries such as the USA and India are threatened by it.

China’s One Belt One Road project provides opportunities for the Central Asian as well as the Eurasian countries, wherein it promotes inter-connectivity and transportation between its member countries, along with offering China’s resources for achieving economic growth.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative The One Belt One Road (OBOR) project, also known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was launched by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. This initiative mainly focusses on improving connectivity and cooperation by expanding infrastructure and trade links between Asian countries, Africa, Europe, and China. Through this project construction and development of roads between the member countries will be done for improving economic transactions and providing resources for satisfying the economic needs of other countries. The BRI also includes the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) as a component which represents an ambitious Chinese vision to promote infrastructural development

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and connectivity, and stimulate economic integration across the Eurasian continent. (Richard Ghiasy and Jiayi Zhou, 2017) The strategic significance of this project is expressed through China’s continuous efforts along with other member nations for its development and functioning. But the basic idea of this project is for China gaining more authority and playing a dominant role in this internationally changing world affairs. It is emphasizing on ‘good of all’ while promoting BRI based on its economic, diplomatic, and geopolitical interests, thus challenging the major power holders of today’s world, that is the USA. Also, through SREB China is influencing the Eurasian countries which can be opposed by Russia in the near future. Thus, China is not only gaining authority and fulfilling its own interests, but also it is making all other countries depend on it, thereby achieving an assertive presence in the global stage.

The recent dominant actions taken by the Chinese government have been largely criticized and opposed by others, but still there are countries who are directly or indirectly supporting China because they have no other option due to their dependency and debt to China. Countries like Sri Lanka, Pakistan, the Maldives, Djibouti, etc, are stuck in China’s cash & debt trap which gives China an upperhand in demanding profitable projects for Chinese companies or even land and ports for establishing Chinese military bases in those countries as a return of the debt. Also, development of such infrastructure between and through international borders will create great risks and threaten the national security of nations.

India has strongly opposed the BRI/OBOR project of China whereas all other South-Asian countries including India’s neighboring countries are participating in it. India is against it due to the development of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is also a part of OBOR. These CPEC projects are passing through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which is actually a part of Indian territory, thus challenging and disturbing the sovereignty of India. The US has extended its support to India’s opposition to China’s ambitious OBOR initiative, saying it shares New Delhi's concern over the multi-billion-dollar project while questioning the economic rationale behind it. (2019) To counter this growing Chinese influence, the US is supporting India’s role through the Indo-Pacific initiative and the Quad.

While Russia has greatly supported and participated in the BRI, along with EAEU. In the recent times, there has been a considerable development in relations between Russia and China. Since Russia is no more a super-power, it is collaborating with China which aims to be a super-power in the near future, so as to directly oppose and threaten its traditional enemy, the US. Also, except its supply of military technology and armaments to others, Russia is completely dependent on other countries for its economic development, and it is majorly dependent on China.

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The Russia-China-India Trilateral The Russia – India – China (RIC) as a strategic trilateral group was originally shaped by the Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov in the late 1990s. The group was founded on the basis of “end[ing] its subservient foreign policy guided by the U.S.,” and “renewing old ties with India and fostering the newly discovered friendship with China.” (Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, 2019) Russia, India, and China are member states of various international organizations such as BRICS, East Asia Summit, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Thus, in recent years, on the side-lines of meetings of certain international organizations, the leaders or the representatives of the respective three countries have meetings and discussions. Leaders of RIC have held meeting during the G-20 Summit in Argentina, SCO meeting in Kyrgyzstan, and 2019 G-20 meeting in Osaka.

These meeting have gained significant attention in response to the present individual conflicts with the US. The supposed grounds of RIC are stated as the on-going trade war between the US and China, traditional rivalry between the US and Russia, removal of India from the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) list by the Trump administration along with continuous threats for imposition of sanctions against India and disagreements regarding tariffs between the two countries. But these grounds cannot be considered to be relevant, as the US is supporting the Indo-Pacific initiative which is against the over-dominance of China in the Indo-Pacific region including the South China Sea. Also, India, Japan, Australia, and the US have formed the Quad, for promoting free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region, which is opposed by Russia and China. Thus, each state is trying to gain geopolitical importance and influence over others.

Amid the increasing tensions between India and China in June 2020 over the military standoff at LAC in eastern Ladakh, and death of 20 Indian soldiers in a violent clash between the Indian and Chinese soldiers, a virtual trilateral foreign minister level meeting was held between Russia, India, and China. The on-going conflict between India and China was not directly addressed during the meeting, but the Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar obliquely referred to the responsibilities of the “leading voices of the world”, with one of them being to recognise the “legitimate interests” of partners. “…the challenge today is not just one of concepts and norms, but equally of their practice. The leading voices of the world must be exemplars in every way. Respecting international law, recognising the legitimate interests of partners, supporting multilateralism and promoting common good are the only way of building a durable world order,” he said. (2020)

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Adverse Effect of the US – India Relations on Russia – India Relations, and Vice-Versa The end of cold war has led to changes in the relations between various countries including those which were part of this war and others which were not. The last two decades have resulted into strategic development of India – US relations, thus side-lining the India – Russia relations. With the collapse of USSR, Russia has emphasized on developing itself in collaboration with potential countries such as China. If we take into consideration the rivalry and presence of danger between each of these four countries, we can understand why it is adversely affecting the individual bilateral relationships. Also, the US, Russia, and China are the permanent member states of the United Nations Security Council, over which India has no direct say. Therefore, India is directly or indirectly dependent upon the US and Russia, and is focused on constantly improving its relations with the two countries without going against the other.

Russia supplies military technology and armaments to various Asian countries, and has strengthen its relations with them based on it, especially its relations with Vietnam. But other than that, Russia is dependent on China for accomplishment of its economic and geopolitical interests. Directly or indirectly, these developments have led to stronger India – US bonds, and support. Earlier, India was Russia’s partner but due to changes in the international affairs, US is viewing India as its potential partner in the Asian continent against China. Also, by taking into consideration various projects launched by these countries such as BRI, Indo-Pacific strategy, the Quad, etc, the tensions between these four countries are continuously rising.

India’s frequent diplomatic involvements with the US has act as an improving factor in the US – India relations. Considering the large Indian diaspora residing in America and the annually increasing number of Indians moving to the US has created a major presence of Indian influence the US’s administration. With the regular exchange of high-level political visits between representatives of the two countries, their bilateral trade and cooperation is developing considerably. These bilateral agreements consist of multi-sectoral cooperation, such as in trade and investment, science and technology, cyber security, defense, etc. But the recent decisions made by the Trump administration might negatively affect the relations between the two countries.

The strategic partnership between India and Russia is based on their strong historical bonding, as well as their similarities in approaching national interests, foreign policies, international affairs, and geopolitical situations. The differences in both the countries actually can lead to a positive result of cooperation and development in various sectors such as industries and R&D (Research and Development).

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• During certain situations, the US has threatened various other countries with severe sanctions, straightforwardly opposing that country’s act. For example, despite the threat of US sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), India has remained firm on buying the S400 Triumf air defence missiles system from Russia (Nayanima Basu, 2020), thus making it a strategic deal and restricting the influence of the US. • Achievement of significant results depends on the diplomatic relations of the respective two countries. Such partnerships are going to play a major role in the near future of international relations, thus changing its dynamics, but for that the persistency in maintaining good relations is important.

References 1. 2019. A Free and Open Indo-Pacific- Advancing a Shared Vision. s.l. : Government of the United States of America, 2019.

2. 2020. At Russia-India-China Meet, India Talks of Need to Respect Legitimate Interest of Partners. The Wire. [Online] June 23, 2020. [Cited: August 04, 2020.] https://thewire.in/diplomacy/india-russia-china-ric-trilateral-meeting.

3. Basu, Nayanima. 2020. India wants Russia to join Indo-Pacific initiative to signal it’s not just a US-centric plan. New Delhi : The Print, 2020.

4. Chaudhary, Dipanjan Roy. 2019. PM Modi proposes Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative. New Delhi : Economic Times, 2019.

5. FE Online. 2018. Explained: What is Quad? Is it to contain China’s rise? New Delhi : Financial Express, 2018.

6. Nayanima Basu. 2020. India wants Russia to join Indo-Pacific initiative to signal it’s not just a US-centric plan. The Print. [Online] July 28, 2020. [Cited: August 04, 2020.] https://theprint.in/diplomacy/india-wants-russia-to-join-indo-pacific-initiative-to-signal-itsnot-just-a-us-centric-plan/468853/.

7. Pant, Harsh V. 2017. India, Japan, Australia, and the US: The Return of Asia’s ‘Quad’. s.l. : The Diplomat, 2017.

8. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan. 2019. Russia-India-China Trilateral Grouping: More Than Hype? The Diplomat. [Online] July 05, 2019. [Cited: August 04, 2020.] https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/russia-india-china-trilateral-grouping-more-than-hype/.

9. Richard Ghiasy and Jiayi Zhou. 2017. The Silk Road Economic Belt. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). [Online] 2017. [Cited: August 04, 2020.] https://www.fes-asia.org/news/the-silk-roadeconomic-belt/.

10. Siddiqui, Huma. 2019. India’s concept of Indo-Pacific is inclusive and across oceans. Ministry of External Affairs. [Online] November 08, 2019. [Cited: August 6, 2020.] https://www.mea.gov.in/articles-in-indianmedia.htm?dtl/32015/Indias_concept_of_IndoPacific_is_inclusive_and_across_oceans.

11. Timofei Bordachev. 2020. Greater Eurasia: Are There New Challenges on the Horizon? Valdai Discussion Club. [Online] February 17, 2020. [Cited: August 03, 2020.] https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/greater-eurasia-are-there-new-challenges/.

12. 2019. 'US shares India's concerns on China's One Belt One Road project'. The Economic Times.

[Online] November 22, 2019.

[Cited: August 04, 2020.] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/us-shares-indias-concernson-chinas-one-belt-one-road-project/articleshow/72184117.cms?from=mdr.

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14 The Pulwama Attack Confessions: International Legal Remedies for India Manohar Samal1 1Research

Analyst, Internationalism manohar@internationalism.co.in

Synopsis. On 14th February, 2019, the first condemnation statement in respect of the Pulwama attacks on the Indian army were released by the Ministry of Ex-ternal Affairs that condemned them and acknowledged that it was a State funded terrorist act by Pakistan (Ministry of External Affairs, 2019). In fact, India also reiterated the need for the international community to support the listing of terrorists as designated terrorists under the 1267 Sanctions Committee of the United Nations Security Council in that statement which would aid the effort in banning terrorist organisations from operating in Pakistan (Ministry of External Affairs, 2019). This was followed by denial which disclaimed the attacks from the Pakistani leadership and led to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs issuing another statement highlighting the lack of investigation in terrorist matters by Pakistan in the past as well (Ministry of External Affairs, 2019). Almost a year and a half after the attacks, Pakistan’s Minister of Information and Broadcasting admittedly celebrated the Pulwama terrorist attacks as one of the major achievements of the ruling Government in Pakistan (Statecraft Staff, 2020). Although an attempt was made to change the intent of the statements by a press conference after the release of such statements, the damage had already been done (Sareen, 2020). Therefore, this policy brief is dedicated towards highlighting the international law remedies available for India and to suggest various avenues which can be opted to pursue action against Pakistan at the international level using the international legal system.

The Attack and Its Aftermath Post-Confessions The four 1949 Geneva Conventions have few common Articles applicable to all four Conventions (ICRC, 2010). The common Article 2 for all four Conventions defines “international armed conflict” as a conflict which applies to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognised by one of them (Rulac, 2020). Looking at the subjectivity and emphasis on facts and

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circumstances of the situation, it is important to note that the situation of escalation between India and Pakistan post the Pulwama attacks, right up till the time of India’s airstrike on the aish- e- Mohammed (JeM) camp and the shooting down of jet aircrafts from both the countries, qualifies as an international armed conflict which lasted for two days, popularly also referred to as the “Two Day IAC” (Maton, 2019). In fact, the entire controversy that India’s exercise of right to self defense through airstrike on the JeM camp was not under justifiable parameters of international law can be put to rest after the confession made by Pakistan’s Minister of Information and Broadcasting due to the simple fact that, earlier the onerous task of establishing a relationship between JeM’s terrorist act in Pulwama with the Pakistani Government would have to be made, but after the confession, it seems to be clear that such act was a State- orchestrated or supported attack permitting the exercise of self- defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (United Nations, 1945).

The immediate action which India took against Pakistan after the Pulwama attack was the withdrawal of the “Most Favoured Nation” status (Suneja, 2019).

Considering that India and Pakistan’s trade volumes have been as high as 490 Million US Dollars (Muni and Pahigrahi, 2019), the withdrawal of this status and increase of customs duty to 200% on Pakistani origin goods has led to severe losses for Pakistan and has altered the relationship of both these countries with other countries in the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) (Muni and Pahigrahi, 2019). However, considering that India had also gained significant benefits from such Most Favoured Nation status conferred to Pakistan, it may not have been the perfect sanction against the Pulwama attacks. In May 2019, the United Nations Security Council listed the name of Mohammed Masood Azhar Alvi under the UNSC 1267 Sanctions List (UNSC, 2019) enabling the possibility of freezing the JeM leader’s assets being frozen, movement restricted and the placing of an arms embargo (Gulati, 2019).

After the confessions made by the Pakistan’s Minister of Information and Broadcasting, it has been reported that India is planning to pursue concrete legal action against Pakistan by approaching the International Court of Justice and furthermore, has also sought to initiate the appropriate procedure requesting the blacklisting of Pakistan by the Financial Action Task Force (OpIndia Staff, 2020).

As far as the Financial Action Task Force is concerned, Pakistan has been in its list of “other monitored jurisdictions” which is popularly referred to as the “grey list” from 2012 to 2015 and again from 2018 up till now (Sharma, 2020). Due to this, it has been unable to secure adequate foreign financing, loans from the International Monetary Fund and its debt ratings have been severely low in the international bond markets (Sharma, 2020). In the past, Pakistan was put under the “Call for Action against Non- Cooperative Countries or Territories” list of the Financial Action Task Force, popularly referred to as the “blacklist” from 2008 to

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2010 after the 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India (Sharma, 2020). However, the international scenario seems to have changed and looking at the fact that Pakistan needs only three countries to support it from evading being listed under the Financial Action Task Force’s Call for Action against Non- Cooperative Countries or Territories list (blacklist), its chances of being blacklisted after the Pulwama attack remains slim due to the strong support it receives from Turkey, Malaysia and China (Aiyappa, 2020). Therefore, solely pursuing the blacklisting of Pakistan by the Financial Action Task Force may not be a completely effective remedy since it has been witnessed that the international sanctions regime is extremely weak and the United Nations cannot take much active action when it comes to these aspects (Ashok, 2020). Thus, India’s application to the International Court of Justice after the Pulwama confessions would be a much more effective and better option to pursue for remedial purposes.

Decluttering International Law & Its Nuances In addition to Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, prevention of Statefunded terrorism also falls under the ambit of international customary law (Trapp, 2012). Nine out of ten times, countries indulging in terrorist financing do not accept responsibility and thus, the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001 popularly referred to as the International Law Commission Articles envisages the invocation of formal responsibility either by application before a competent international court or tribunal or by other related means and the adoption of counter measures. However, the adoption of countermeasures usually does not end up working completely in favour of the aggrieved nation unless such countermeasures are adopted almost immediately after such State funded terrorist attack and hence, invoking the jurisdiction of a competent international court is usually suitable. India is not the first country seeking remedy under international law against State- funded terorrism. In fact, the concept of making an application before the International Court of Justice against countries indulging in State- funded terrorism is an old phenomenon. However, such remedy has been rarely invoked due to great difficulty in successfully establishing such cases with sufficient evidence and applicable law so that the International Court of Justice does not have to dismiss the application on the grounds of non- liquet (Trapp, 2012). Out of hundreds of applications made to the International Court of Justice since its inception against State- funded terrorism, extremely few cases have been succesful and the most prominent example of this success is Libya’s acceptance of civil liability for the Lockerbie bombings (Trapp, 2012). One of the major reasons for this difficulty is also the lack of sound basis for the International Court of Justice to exercise jurisdiction in such issues (Trapp, 2012). In furtherance of this, it is important to note that India can only not place reliance upon Article 51 of the United Nations Charter for its arguments

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and also has to explore various other alternative provisions and strategies which it can use in its application before the International Court of Justice.

It is needless to say that the ad hoc consent jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice cannot be relied upon since this is a case of cross- border State funded terrorism and instead, the compulsory jurisdiction will have to be utilised. Both, India as well as Pakistan have signed declarations recognising the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (International Court of Justice, 2017 & 2019). In addition to the Article 51 and international customary law arguments, India can also raise arguments from the perspective of the Terrorism Suppression Conventions which is a compilation of thirteen international conventions and protocols that have been widely ratified (Trapp, 2012).

The remedies which India can seek from the International Court of Justice against Pakistan include a clear, unequivocal and official declaration of breach which affirms that the Pulwama attacks were State funded, reparation in the form of damages for the loss of life and property and complete information disclosure about the details of the attacks and the official action taken against such terrorist groups by the Pakistani Government. The Indian representation before the Court can also insist Pakistan’s compliance with Financial Action Task Force Recommendations and the standards laid down by United Nations Security Council Resolution SC/13754 (United Nations, 2019) and implementation under domestic law in addition to the declaration of breach, reparation and disclosure being sought.

In light of the aforesaid, it cannot be denied that representation before international courts and tribunals are usually complex and time consuming.

However, considering that the International Court of Justice has liberty in determining the value of evidence and that, films and photographs have been admissible evidence in the past along with written documentary evidence, it is highly possible that India’s case can strongly be presented due to the existence of an official statement made by the Pakistani Minister confessing to the Pulwama attacks and the fact that both countries have signed declarations for being bound by the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

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Trapp, Kimberley. “Holding States Responsible For Terrorism Before the International Court of Justice”. Journal of International Dispute Settlement. [online]. Volume 3, No. 2. (2012). Oxford University Press.

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Available from: <https://watermark.silverchair.com/ids006.pdf?token=AQECAHi208BE49Ooan9kkhW_Ercy7 Dm3ZL_9Cf3qfKAc485ysgAAAp4wggKaBgkqhkiG9w0BBwagggKLMIIChwIBADCCAoAG CSqGSIb3DQEHATAeBglghkgBZQMEAS4wEQQMv6uWJfFjNeqGN3KJAgEQgIICUUIQu xD3OQ4KY6k40ItKZIPmLIs7xyvYCfOdpgiORaTUqWEBawW1PbZmIRf5q6AknieyTM1Xjm6jvBMmOH-_zilrNu0UP81bSGyKSBX8Tfpu94OykyQQtKb84r2DIZloLB88dAwlztFXrBF6iVopAv_LJiGYcA7ql3PKSxAGOqdHLSjOlAsCt94O3u63iK eWbSx0wB57MeysGOKP_z1YdR6Y5WCem84OdMCtqUEQEK7OSMbRSGvcH3JZYZ4ug MljvKfHrCl4HeB4GbS7FEWyS2N6b7VoyE0doMlzA9CxljooKVWaeScHd7dAEjr24N_UEaz6ty ueHBlKeORDNgwNx0L2R9KkYwZ3YOoAXfiSbRPYsGxv9sHVNBV8tj4iES7H_Ufi5EAG7D BSJCwbDX1CDlQz3_yYDZjdDtKcMNytHWDQA1ssodExKG99U6bIXz3TqfKtFAkrNhp2H G7i1Gili4eVS1EJo5jdvBZPI0ZSpJorE7vZQ7RqTrq6vJnbFQ5pUvAJOrKjshkpF6ObsallW3vrUe H5kswPCQuOKBDKdeIshSt3hqUzjAsqDdyVUfqebKtp8PFx6du4oR3QONfBpzIoeY57M17K dtECK540AOJgo4DfdHfR_F61SXq_5ZWPCtSGO5xEDL7s9AyLJ9OR5xUB6ii8aUvkOBmgb hSTrT7oLqzn5NmzMT35w9j6xozpmP9PR88fnSTa6b2qaOj6LFIw50suAeCSJ6HAVcwlvEbe 8aIR5Gx67AXJ1EutBsi8aNCqrvJcR8gOc5WC2VAU>.

United Nations Charter, 1945. [online]. Available from: <https://www.un.org/en/sections/uncharter/un-charter-full-text/>.

United Nations Security Council. “Mohammed Masood Azhar Alvi”. United Nations Security Council. [online]. (01 May 2019). [12 December 2020]. Available from: <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/mohammed-masood-azhar-alvi>.

United Nations. “Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution Calling Upon Member States to Combat, Criminalize Financing of Terrorists, Their Activities”. United Nations: Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. [online]. (28 March 2019). [14 December 2020]. Available from: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13754.doc.htm>.

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15 The Status Quo Issues in the US Peace Plan on IsraelPalestine & the Indian Analysis Akash Manwani1 & Mugdha Satpute2 1

Chief Innovation Officer, Indian Society of Artificial Intelligence and Law 2 Junior Research Analyst, Internationalism akash.manwani@isail.in

Synopsis. The policy brief is a part of the Indian International Law Project by Internationalism.

Introduction The conflict between Israel and Palestine emerged in 1947 and since then it is going on till the date. Before the World War I, Palestine and the neighbouring region was ruled by the Ottoman Empire, and after the war it was under the control of Britain, authorized by the League of Nations. A British mandate was issued by the League for “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people”. () During this period, large number of Jew people started migrating from Europe and residing in the Palestinian region. In 1947, the United Nations proposed for partition of Palestine into two independent states of Palestine (Arabs) and Israel (Jews), with Jerusalem as an internationalized territory. The Palestinian Arabs opposed this plan, and in 1948 a war broke out between Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries – Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Egypt. Due to this war, more than 7 million Palestinian people got displaced and had to flee to other countries. In June 1967, Israel attacked Syria, Jordan and Egypt and expanded its boundaries by gaining more territories.

During this war, Israel acquired West Bank and Jerusalem from Jordan, along with Gaza from Egypt which consist of Palestinian people.

The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) formed the Palestinian Authority (PA), which functions as a semi-autonomous government governing the Palestinians living in the West Bank region. Gaza region was overtaken by the militant group named Hamas, which continuously launched rockets and carried out suicide bombings targeting Israelis. In 2005, Israel pulled out its military forces from the Gaza region but it still kept on controlling the West Bank. The

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constant conflicts between Palestinians and Israelis led to various uprisings and two intifadas. PLO and Hamas failed to create a coalition and the peace talks between PLO and Israeli government failed continuously. Also, Israel’s claim over the undivided Jerusalem which is to be Palestine’s future capital, has created religious struggle between the two, as Jerusalem is home to the holy sites of Islam as well as Judaism. And due to these wars, large number of Palestinians are living as refugees in the neighbouring countries, and they are pressurizing the Israeli government to grant them their right of return.

A two-state deal is been constantly proposed by the UN and other countries for resolving this territorial conflict, but the Israeli government is not ready to give its territory which it has occupied during the war to Palestine. Also, the Israeli government is not ready to accept the Palestinian Arab population as its citizens, since it will either have to lose its Jewish identity or its democratic structure, as the Palestinian Arab population is larger than the Jewish population, thus making Jews a minority. But as time passed, the settlements of Jewish communities in the Jerusalem and West Bank region started increasing continuously, thus dividing Palestinians and acquiring their land. Therefore, the major issues which are functioning as barriers for peace agreement are as follows: • Jerusalem • West Bank borders and Jewish settlements • Palestinian Refugees • Security of Israel

The Arab Peace Initiative In 2002, the Council of Arab States in its 14th Ordinary Session (al-bab) reaffirmed the June 1996 Resolution which confirmed the Arab countries’ resolve to peace in the Middle East with substantial commitment from Israel. The Arab countries, through this Summit, requested Israel to reconsider its policies, adopt peaceful means in the Middle East, withdraw from all the territories occupied since 1967, handle Palestine refugee problem and accept an independent sovereign State of Palestine. Finally, the Summit called for international indulgence and acceptance. The proposition was loud and clear, Israel would get the benefit of healthy diplomatic relations with neighbouring Arab and Muslim States in exchange of few obligations as mentioned above, in the interest of avoiding further bloodshed. This initiative “pleased” Israel when it was launched but Israel was sceptical about the hidden consequences. For instance, the initiative called for resolution of every dispute only if both the States specifically agree on a point which meant that nothing will be imposed on Israel. This naturally would have addressed the concern that in a situation where a consensus regarding swapping of territories with Palestine is arrived at, then Israel will not be forcibly flooded

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with millions of Palestine refugees. This would have been an ideal situation for dialogue but reading between the lines revealed that the Initiative also called for the resolution of dispute in accordance with the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (UNRWA) which proposed that “refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date.” (Times of Israel, 2013) Although initial interest into the Initiative was shown by Israel and its ally, the United States (U.S), it did not receive any consideration thereafter. Till date no effective steps have been taken, mostly because Israel cannot repose faith in its numerically larger counterparts, the Gulf Arab countries.

The US Peace Plan The recent development of relations between Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu and the President Donald Trump of the United States has played a significant role in the conflict between Palestine and Israel. The relationship between Israel and the US has been emerging as a special one since last few decades. The US has given Israel $118 billion in aid over the years, that is about $3 billion per year. In various critical situations, America has used its veto power in the United Nations Security Council for blocking resolutions made against Israel. (Vox, 2018) But during the administration of President Barack Obama, there grew tensions between the leaders of the two nations. PM Netanyahu sided with President Obama’s opposition party, thus leading to strong friendship between President Trump and PM Netanyahu.

In December 2017, after his state visit to Israel in May 2017, President Trump accepted Jerusalem as an undivided capital of Israel, and decided to move the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. This announcement was followed by President Trump’s Israel - Palestine peace plan in January 2020. This plan is named as “Peace to Prosperity – A vision to improve the lives of the Palestinian and Israeli people”. The said proposal intends to address the most critical issues regarding the conflict as follows: • According to the new map released by the White House, the state of Palestine will be formed, which will consist of some areas from the West Bank region and some from the Gaza region.

• Jerusalem will remain the undivided capital of Israel, and the future state of Palestine will be granted the far eastern regions of Jerusalem as its capital.

• The proposal redraws the boundaries of Israel. a. It recognizes the Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank region which is governed by Palestinian Authority, and adds it into the territory of Israel.

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b. It also gives Israel control over the Jordan Valley.

• The plan makes the future state of Palestine a permanently demilitarized state.

• The proposal provides three options to the Palestinian refugees – a. Absorption into the State of Palestine (subject to the limitations provided); b. Local integration in current host countries (subject to those countries consent); or c. The acceptance of 5,000 refugees each year, for up to ten years (50,000 total refugees), in individual Organization of Islamic Cooperation member countries who agree to participate in Palestinian refugee resettlement (subject to those individual countries’ agreement). (Vox, 2020) d. The proposal offers economic support to the future state of Palestine if this plan is accepted. () The US will invest more than $50 billion over ten years. e. For the economic growth, the West Bank and Gaza will be opened to regional and global markets, so as to receive investments in the infrastructure and transportation and to promote private sector growth. f. The education system, health care facilities, employment facilities and the quality of life will be improved. g. Palestinian governance will be enhanced by transforming the business environment, establishment of institutions will be done and the government operations will be improved.

This deal is negotiable for four years, till then the Palestinian authorities can study the proposal and make an ultimate decision.

This peace plan was happily accepted by Israeli PM Netanyahu, and the ambassadors from the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Oman were present during the peace plan unveiling event in the White House. Also, the UK PM Boris Johnson said that the plan “could prove a positive step forward”. A statement from the French foreign ministry stated that France welcomed the latest efforts taken by President Trump, and that it would have to study the proposal closely.

But the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the representative of Hamas, a militant group which is governing Gaza, have criticised and opposed this proposal. Also, the Lebanese militant group – Hezbollah said that the plan was an attempt “to wipe out Palestinian people’s rights” and accused some Arab states of being complicit in a “deal of shame”. (The Guardian) The League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and some members of the African Union have rejected the peace plan.

Analysis This peace plan proposed by Trump administration is lot more advantageous to Israel government and Israeli people than to Palestinians. This plan gives Israel

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full control over the occupied West Bank region which is actually governed by the Palestinian Authority, which was acquired by Israel along with Gaza during the war of 1967. Since then the Israeli authorities have allowed the settlements of Jews in West Bank region and along its borders. But it is internationally believed that these settlements violate the Fourth Geneva Convention which prohibits transfer of population into the occupied territory, while it is disputed by Israel.

Also, Jerusalem is an equally important spiritual place for both Jews and Palestinians, but allocation of majority areas of Jerusalem to Israel and just some suburbs located in the far eastern Jerusalem to the future state of Palestine is not justifiable. According to the UN Security Council Resolution 478, annexation of East Jerusalem by Israel is condemned, and it violates the international law.

Providing Israel complete control over the Jordan Valley where major centres of the Palestinian population is present threatens their lives. Israel defends itself by stating the urgent invasion risks by Jordan through the valley into Israel for acquiring the valley, whereas it can just appoint some military forces along the border of the valley with the permission of the Palestinian Authority rather than directly acquiring it. Through such annexations, Israel is majorly using all the natural resources present in these regions, which in reality must be used by the Palestinians. Israel is depriving Palestinians from basic facilities like access to water, etc.

The plan strictly prohibits the development of military and intelligence in the future state of Palestine, thus questioning the security to lives of Palestinians and existence of Palestine. It indirectly authorizes Israel with all the military powers along the borders as well as inside the state of Palestine. This point can be defended by stating that due to the constant threat of militant groups present in Gaza and their terrorist attacks, Israel has a right to protect itself. But even the Palestinians have the right to protect themselves from internal and external attacks such as from Israeli forces as well militant groups. The absence of military and national security will question the sovereignty of the state of Palestine. Also, it is stated that the Gaza region will be connected to West Bank through an underground road/tunnel, but will it really be feasible? Then what about the presence of militant groups in Gaza, how will they be removed?

This plan denies all the Palestinian refugees their right of return to their homes.

These refugees have fled to the neighbouring countries during the wars in last century, but not all of them are living in survivable conditions. At many places the refugees are mistreated and are not granted citizenships of that country, which actually must be granted according to that countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s rules. Also, whether they will ever get to be a part of this future state of Palestine is a question to be asked.

Very few of the neighbouring countries are ready to accept these refugees, or else most of the time they lose their lives while fleeing.

Many people have criticised this proposal as an economic plan rather than a peace plan. US through this plan is trying to money-coat the reality of the future state of Palestine. The irony of this plan is that it promises to establish

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infrastructure, transportation and markets at a place which lacks the presence of basic facilities and where the natural resources are already over-exploited. The plan invites new investments but with no proper protection and security, will any company or any country be ready to invest? And who will secure the effective and efficient utilization of these investments? These questions and lack of solutions act as barriers for the implementation of this peace plan. Neither it guaranties the credibility nor its practical implementation. People have also criticised the launching of this peace plan in the period of January 2020, stating that President Trump and PM Netanyahu have to face national elections this year in their respective countries, so just to gain more votes they have initiated this plan.

Current situation and time for Arab Peace Initiative’s mettle to be tested In order to understand why Arab Peace Initiative is specifically important today, one needs to understand the mechanics of the Israeli-Palestine Peace Plan which is also being termed as the “deal of the century” offered by the United States (U.S) under Trump Administration in January, 2020. This plan is a radical shift from earlier position of the U.S on the conflict. The plan addresses the conflict through several issues of statehood, Jerusalem as capital, settlements, Jordan Valley and refugees. On Statehood, the U.S has proposed demarcation of a big chunk of West Bank into two wherein the Palestine will retain double of what they hold today.

The acceptance of this demarcation would also lead to recognition of Palestine’s effective statehood. Palestine however, criticised this on the point that the Plan disregards the illegal occupation of Israel. With regards to Jerusalem, the Plan maintains that the old city must be an undivided capital of Israel wherein a part of East Jerusalem, the areas north and east of the proposed West Bank barrier should be the sovereign capital of Palestine. On the issue of Settlements, about 140 Jewish settlements have been established in the West Bank area with over 500,000 Israelis living there which remains unrecognized by the International law., There are major Palestine settlements around these Jewish enclaves with over 1.2 million Palestinians living in the West Bank area. The Trump Plan proposes that nobody will be uprooted from their homes and if any Israeli settlements end up in the Palestine area then those settlements will be connected to the mainland Israel via effective transport. While dealing with Jordan Valley, which covers 30% of total West Bank in land area, it is sparsely populated with only few thousand Palestinians and Israelis living there. It severs as a vital strategic buffer for Israelis from other Arab countries as the region is mountainous and hence the Plan proposes that Israel must retain its sovereign power over Jordan Valley. On the controversial issue of Refugees in the disputed West Bank, who cannot move freely, will be given a choice to be a part of the proposed Palestine or move to a third country. (BBC News, 2020)

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In May 2020, on the background of the Peace Plan and with the support of the U.S, Israel has proposed an Annexation wherein it will unilaterally proclaim sovereignty over major swathes of the Jordan Valley. This decision will lead to transposition of about 4.5% of Palestinians into the proposed annexed territory.

Israel has refused to term it as “Annexation” and has categorically stated that Israeli sovereignty will not be applied to the Palestinians residing in either Jordan Valley or West Bank. Israel specifically wants to act quickly on this plan since American elections are nearing wherein the outvoting of Trump might lead to withdrawal of the U.S support. International community by and large has been stiffly opposing the move of annexation fearing that such a step would gravely undermine the peace talks and in turn aggravate the conflict along the West Bank and Gaza Strip. (BBC News, 2020) Palestine has been vying for international pressure on Israel and maintains that dialogue is possible if based on United Nations Resolutions and Arab Peace Initiative. (Outlook, 2020) Other Arab countries, and specifically Saudi Arabia, are committed to a two-state solution, based on the Arab Peace Initiative. Most of the countries are pitted against the move, it is this Peace Initiative which can now take some real action towards normalisation. And with Netanyahu being adamant on the plan, the level of U.S support would determine the future of this annexation.

The UN’s Stance on the Israel-Palestine Issue The United Nations first proposed the partition of Palestine into two states in 1947, but later on it changed its approach due to the rising tensions between Jews and Palestinian Arabs for Israel and Palestine respectively. Since then, the UN has encouraged a two-state deal between the two nations, but based on the pre-1967 war borders. According to the UN, acquisition of West Bank and Gaza, along with other regions is illegal and it is in violation of the international law. UN has time and again passed ‘Israel – Palestine conflicts’ specific resolutions to find a mutually agreed peaceful deal, and has encouraged the two countries’ representatives to hold peace talks and to cooperate.

The goal of the UN is achieving the vision of two states — Israel and an independent, democratic, contiguous, sovereign and viable Palestinian State — living side by side in peace and security within secure and recognized borders, based on the pre-1967 borders, with Jerusalem as the capital of both States.

(United Nations, 2020) For maintaining regional and international peace and security, meaningful dialogue and negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians must be held. The UN has been urging other countries to the two-state solution to help both the parties back to a path towards a negotiated, peaceful settlement.

In November 2012, Palestine was given a status of ‘non-member observer state’ in the UN. With the due international recognition, Palestinian leaders have tried to pressurize Israel for the formation of the state of Palestine along with other

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territorial and refugee disputes.

The recent claim of annexation of the West Bank covering most of the Jordan Valley and illegal Israeli settlements by Israel has threatened the lives of Palestinians along with the future for negotiations and peace agreement. Through this annexation, Israel will be acquiring nearly 30% of West Bank region, and this plan is supported by the US. In response, Palestinian leaders have cut ties with Israel and the US. (United Nations News, 2020) The UN has been constantly urging Israel to abandon its annexation plan. This proposal especially during the pandemic has created fears of instability regionally as well as internationally.

Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable rights of the Palestinian People

The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) under its resolution 3376 (XXX) decided to establish the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable rights of the Palestinian People on 10th November 1975. UNGA expressed grave concern over the nonachievement of progress towards exercise of the inalienable rights by Palestinian people. In 1978, the General Assembly mandated establishment of a Special Unit on Palestinian Rights in the United Nations Secretariat to assist the Committee in its work, which was later on re-designated as the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Department of Political Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat.

The Committeeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s programme of work includes the convening of international meetings and conferences, including meetings with civil society, in all regions of the world, with the participation , inter alia, of political personalities, representatives of Governments and intergovernmental organizations, United Nations officials, parliamentarians, academics and representatives of the media, functioning on the various aspects of the question of Palestine. (United Nations, 2012) The Committee has continuously urged and supported all the regional and international efforts for pursuing peace negotiations along with resolving the Israel â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Palestine conflict.

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA)

In December 1949, UNRWA was established by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 302 (IV) to carry out direct relief and work programmes for the Palestine refugees. UNRWA human development and humanitarian services consists of primary and vocational education, primary health care, relief and social services, infrastructure and camp improvement, microfinance and emergency response, including in situations of armed conflict. (UNRWA, 2020) UNWA provides services such as schools and health centres, and administer its installations in the Palestine refugee camps. UNRWA has a camp services office in each camp, which the residents visit to update their records or to raise issues relating to Agency services with the Camp Services Officer (CSO). The CSO, in

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turn, refers refugee concerns and petitions to the UNRWA administration in the area in which the camp is located. Currently, it is providing services and protection to more than 5 million Palestine refugees, with the help of funds from United Nations member states.

India’s role in the conflict India has generally adopted its multi-alignment approach, wherein it maintained a neutral and cordial relation with both Israel and Palestine. Going back to January 2020, when Trump’s Peace Plan was announced, India through the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) had categorically mentioned that it “has been consistently supportive of Palestinian cause” and urged both the nations to consider the Peace Plan. India also endorsed the two-state solution for the conflict. (The Times of India, 2020) Later in March 2020, United Nations Committee led by the Chair (UNPR of Senegal) along with political coordinator of Mission of Palestine in New York had visited India to seek its support on resolution of Israel-Palestine dispute through negotiations and other peaceful means. India stands committed to resolving the dispute based on peaceful means and United Nations Resolutions. (United Nations, 2020) Furthermore, the Senior Diplomatic Advisor to Palestine President has strongly urged India to maintain its stance for the Palestinian cause and condemn any unilateral action which might affect the status quo of the current conflict. Palestine has reminded India that it needs to stand up to its legal and political responsibilities as a member of United Nations Security Council. (2020) India has refrained from issuing any statement on the present conflict. How India manages the balance between U.S and Israel’s expectations on one hand and Palestinian and Arab countries’ expectations on the other or will India adopt the “sometimes taking no decision is the best decision” policy, is yet to unfold.

References 22. al-bab. The Arab Peace Initiative, 2002. al-bab. [Online] [Cited: July 01, 2020.] https://albab.com/documents-section/arab-peace-initiative-2002.

23. BBC News. 2020. Explainer: Israel, annexation and the West Bank. BBC News. [Online] June 25, 2020. [Cited: July 01, 2020.] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-52756427.

24. —. 2020. What does Trump’s Middle East plan say on key issues? BBC News. [Online] January 29, 2020. [Cited: July 01, 2020.] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51299145.

25. History of the Question of Palestine. UNITED NATIONS. [Online] [Cited: June 30, 2020.] https://www.un.org/unispal/history/.

26. 2020. India should oppose Israel plan for annexation: Palestinian Ambassador. The Hindu.

[Online] June 30, 2020.

[Cited: July 01, 2020.] https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/india-should-oppose-israel-plan-forannexation-palestinian-ambassador/article31957997.ece.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

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35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

Indian International Law Series, Volume 1 (2020) 154 Outlook. 2020. Palestine denies media reports on dialogue with US. Outlook. [Online] June 29, 2020. [Cited: July 01, 2020.] https://www.outlookindia.com/newsscroll/palestine-deniesmedia-reports-on-dialogue-with-us/1880170.

Peace to Prosperity: Economic Framework. White House. [Online] [Cited: June 30, 2020.] https://www.whitehouse.gov/peacetoprosperity/economic/.

The Guardian. Trump unveils Middle East peace plan with no Palestinian support. The Guardian.

[Online] [Cited: June 30, 2020.] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/28/donald-trump-middle-east-peace-planisrael-netanyahu-palestinians.

The Times of India. 2020. India urges Israel, Palestine to consider Trump’s peace plan. The Times of India. [Online] January 30, 2020.

[Cited: July 01, 2020.] https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-urges-israel-palestine-to-consider-trumpspeace-plan/articleshow/73751441.cms.

Times of Israel. 2013. Why is Israel so afraid of the Arab Peace Initiative? Times of Israel. [Online] June 18, 2013. [Cited: July 01, 2020.] https://www.timesofisrael.com/why-is-israel-so-afraid-ofthe-arab-peace-initiative/.

United Nations. 2020. Briefing Security Council, Secretary-General Calls on Israel to Renounce West Bank Annexation Plans – Press Release (SG/SM/20141). United Nations.

[Online] June 24, 2020.

[Cited: June 30, 2020.] https://www.un.org/unispal/document/briefing-security-council-secretary-general-calls-onisrael-to-renounce-west-bank-annexation-plans-press-release-sg-sm-20141/.

—. 2020. Committee Delegation Visit to Delhi, India. United Nations. [Online] 2020. [Cited: July 02, 2020.] https://www.un.org/unispal/committee-delegation-visit-to-delhi-india/.

—. 2012. Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. United Nations. [Online] March 2012. [Cited: July 01, 2020.] https://www.un.org/unispal/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/InfoNote_Cttee-DPR-March2012_E.pdf.

United Nations News. 2020. UN chief urges Israel to abandon annexation plans. United Nations News.

[Online] June 24, 2020.

[Cited: June 30, 2020.] https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/06/1066972.

UNRWA. Resolution 194. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. [Online] [Cited: July 01, 2020.] https://www.unrwa.org/content/resolution194#:~:text=The%20United%20Nations%20General%20Assembly,not%20to%20return%20a nd%20for.

—. 2020. Who we are. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

[Online] 2020. [Cited: July 01, 2020.] https://www.unrwa.org/who-we-are.

Vox. 2020. Trump’s Israel-Palestine peace plan, explained. Vox. [Online] Vox Media, January 28, 2020. [Cited: June 30, 2020.] https://www.vox.com/2020/1/28/21083615/trump-peace-planmap-netanyahu-israel-palestine.

—. 2018. Why are the US and Israel so friendly? Vox. [Online] Vox Media, May 14, 2018. [Cited: June 30, 2020.] https://www.vox.com/2018/11/20/18080080/israel-palestine-us-alliance.

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16 India- European Union Relations: Free Trade Agreement and Allied Issues Manohar Samal1 1

Research Analyst, Internationalism manohar@internationalism.co.in

Synopsis. The policy brief is published under the Indian International Law Programme.

A Glance at Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Relations with European Union Relations between India and the European Union have not been of recent phenomenon and can be traced back to the 1960s where India established diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community (Ministry of External Affairs, 2013). The first cooperation agreement was signed in 1994 and the first summit was held in the year 2000. Since then, various bilateral agreements and Memorandum of Understandings such as the Science and Technology Agreement 2001 and 2007, Joint Vision Statement for Promoting Cooperation in the Field of Information and Communications Technology 2001, Customs Cooperation Agreement 2004, Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Employment and Social Affairs 2006, Horizontal Civil Aviation Agreement 2008, Agreement in the Field of Nuclear Fusion Energy Research 2009, Joint Declaration on Culture 2010 and Joint Declaration on Enhanced Cooperation in Energy 2012 (Ministry of External Affairs, 2013). The relations between India and European Union have not only been for conduct of trade, but also have extended over to political, parliamentary, civil society, cultural and educational spheres as well (Ministry of External Affairs, 2015).

India- European Union Free Trade Deal Background The European Union has been a significantly fruitful and colossal trading partner for India since the inception of their relations and in the year 2019 alone, 80 Billion Euros (INR 68 Thousand Crores) worth of trade in goods took place (European Commission, 2020). The European Union is the second largest destination of

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Indian exports which is as high as 14%, trade in goods between India and European Union have increased by 72% since the last decade, European Unionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s share in foreign investment to India is measured at 18%, European companies in India have generated over 1.7 million jobs directly and 5 million jobs indirectly and over 50 Billion Euros (INR 42 Thousand Crores) has been invested by Indian companies in the European Union since the year 2000 (European Commission, 2020).

Negotiations between India and European Union for a Free Trade Agreement commenced in June 2007 where the main goal was to create a far reaching and comprehensive Free Trade Agreement that would pragmatically benefit interests of both the parties (Traidcraft, 2008). However, vast areas of disagreement led to significant impediments towards the implementation of any free trade arrangement between India and European Union. The main areas of disagreement have been high tariffs on cars, wines and dairy products imported from European Union, liberalisation of visas for Indian professionals and trade disputes of India and European Union before the World Trade Organization (Khorana, 2016).

During the tenure of such negotiations, there were severe restrictions on foreign direct investment in the insurance and trade sectors in India as well. Moreover, complex registration requirements and non- liberal professional sector to curb international competition are also few reasons that have contributed to the failure of any developments in this area (Khorana, 2016). In fact, negotiations were completely stopped in the year 2013 and did not resume again till late 2017 (Basu, 2020).

Although a stalwart attempt was made during the 2017 Summit to bridge the gaps between the proposed Free Trade Agreement between India and the European Union, several difficulties were faced. European Union officials have shown concerns of rising protectionist tendencies in Indian policies, especially after the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic which has been seen as a barrier to provide relaxation in tariff (Basu, 2020). Furthermore, cancellation of all investment treaties in pursuance of the new Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 2016 in India with Europe and the reluctance of India to include sustainable development issues such as climate change and labour laws in the Free Trade Agreement have with paramountcy fueled the slowdown of negotiations between the two parties (Basu, 2020).

Present Scenario

The latest negotiations between India and the European Union on free trade arrangements and other pragmatic endeavours were held on 15 July 2020 in the 15th European Union- India Virtual Summit 2020 where India was represented

by Prime Minister Mr. Narendra Modi and the European Union was represented

by Mr. Charles Michel (President of the European Council) and Ms. Ursula Von

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Der Leyen (President of the European Commission) (European Council, 2020).

The following aspects were discussed and affirmed during the Summit• Strengthening strategic partnership based on common principles, democracy, rule of law, freedom and respect for human rights.

• Promotion of effective multilateralism and a multilateral order based on sound principles and rules with the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation.

• Reinforcement of international security, enhancement of preparedness for global health emergencies, strengthening global economic stability, inclusive growth and implementing sustainable development goals through cooperation in the international fora.

• Enabling global cooperation, solidarity, response capacities, preparedness, free information sharing and support to international organisations such as the World Health Organisation to ensure maximum preservation of lives and mitigation of negative socio- economic consequences of the coronavirus pandemic.

• Enhancement of mutual synergies in the field of healthcare through sharing of experiences, strength, capacities and collaboration and to ensure cross border incessant supply of essential raw materials, agricultural products and other goods and services.

• Increased development of trade and investment relations during the post pandemic economic recovery period to enable sustainable growth and jobs on both ends with a commitment to work towards ambitious, well balanced, mutually beneficial trade and investment and open markets.

• Enhancement of sustainable modernization, clean energy transition, circular economy, resource efficiency, technological leaps, convergence between regulatory frameworks for data security, global peace, security, disarmament, non- proliferation, gender equality and women empowerment in all spheres of life in India as well as the European Union.

• The implementation of the Joint Declaration on Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility (CAMM) was declared and the progress under the High Level Dialogue on Migration and Mobility was noted. These initiatives would help in increasing the amount of exchange programmes amongst researchers, professionals, students, tourists, business persons and also boost cultural exchanges, educational cooperation and facilitate the best results out of migration and mobility rules.

• Lastly, the “European Union- India Strategic Partnership: A Roadmap to 2025” for guiding cooperation between India and the European Union, EuratomIndia Agreement for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy amongst the two parties and a Joint Declaration on Resource Efficiency and Circular Economy were few of the major outcomes of this summit.

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Way Forward In consideration of the fact that India’s relations with the European Union have been pivotally fruitful on both ends, it seems to be clear that a free trade agreement will only further ameliorate the current regime of strong relations between the two. The success of the free trade agreement between the European Union and Vietnam has clearly showcased the viability of such relations (Ebbighausen, 2020). Significant reforms will be required on India’s as well as European Union’s part in order to ensure the success of the free trade agreement.

Strengthening laws and policies of intellectual property, labour protection, environment conservation, sustainability in all spheres, data collection and privacy and establishment of a resilient investor- state dispute resolution mechanism are few of the aspects which India will have to embark upon (Ebbighausen, 2020). At the same time, European Union will have to envisage some form of liberalisation for the Indian service sector to enter the bloc and liberalise visa policies for professionals and working individuals that travel to the European Union for business and work in various vocations (Ebbighausen, 2020).

In the absence of such forms of fulfilments from both the ends, any form of drastically positive initiatives that leads to swift implementation of a free trade agreement is unlikely.

As far as the Kashmir issue and the amendment in the citizenship law is concerned, the European Union has shown humongous faith in Indian institutions and courts to ensure weightage to international standards of human rights and these occurrences are highly unlikely to cause any form of obstructions in the implementation of a free trade agreement (Times of India, 2020).

Subsisting relations between India and other nations have been sublime in the pre-pandemic as well as the post- pandemic stage. The shifting era of increasing confidence amongst nations in India’s strategy of international affairs seems to be ushering India to play an active and vital role in the global order. In view of the proactive response against China’s influential and global dominance policies, decentralisation of China’s influence in global trade is being advocated by most nations having a strong part in the international order, especially the European Union who has been playing an energetic role in the introduction of initiatives such as the Inter- Parliamentary Alliance on China (Chakravarty et al., 2020).

Under such circumstances, successful implementation of a free trade agreement between India and the European Union will not only help decentralising China’s influence in Asia by permitting the European Union nations to step up to a higher pedestal in Asia, but also lead to several beneficial outcomes to India within its domestic sphere, as well as in the international sphere.

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References 1. Basu, Nayanima. “India, EU ‘Far Apart’ on Trade Deal, But to Revive Talks Today at First Summit in 2 Years’. The Print. (15 July 2020). [online]. [17 July 2020]. Available from: <https://theprint.in/diplomacy/india-eu-far-apart-on-trade-deal-but-to-revive-talks-today-atfirst-summit-in-2-years/460964/>.

2. Chakravarty, Arpan; Sharma, Pratham; Samal, Manohar. “Should India Join the InterParliamentary Alliance on China?”. Global Relations & Legal Policy. (July 2020). Volume 1. [online].

ISBN: 978-93-5407-220-8.

[17 July 2020].

Available from: <https://issuu.com/internationalism/docs/grlp_v1-1__2020__online_issuu>.

3. Ebbighausen, Rodion. “EU’s Agreement with Vietnam Shows how it Could Reach a Deal with India.” The Indian Express. (21 February 2020). [online]. [17 July 2020]. Available from: <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/european-union-vietnam-trade-deal-india6279157/>.

4. European Commission. “Countries and Regions: India”. European Commission. (07 May 2020). [online]. [16 July 2020]. Available from: <https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-andregions/countries/india/>.

5. European Council; Council of the European Union. “Joint Statement- 15th EU- India Summit”.

Press Release. (15 July 2020). [online]. [17 July 2020]. Available from: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/07/15/joint-statement-15th-euindia-summit-15-july-2020/>.

6. Khorana, Sangeeta. “The FTA: A Strategic Call for the European Union and India?”. European Council on Foreign Relations. (2016). [online]. [17 July 2020]. Available from: <https://www.ecfr.eu/what_does_india_think/analysis/the_fta_a_strategic_call_for_the_eu_and_i ndia>.

7. Ministry of External Affairs. “India- EU Relations”. Ministry of External Affairs. (July 2013). [online]. [16 July 2020]. Available from: <https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/IndiaEU_Relations.pdf>.

8. Ministry of External Affairs. “India- EU Relations”. Ministry of External Affairs. (July 2015). [online]. [16 July 2020]. Available from: <http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/IndiaEU_Relations_Website_Brief_-July_16__2015.pdf>.

9. Times of India. “India, EU to Work Towards Free Trade Pact”. Times of India. (16 July 2020). [online]. [17 July 2020]. Available from: <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-eu-towork-towards-free-trade-pact/articleshow/76989095.cms>.

10. Traidcraft. “The EU- India FTA: Initial Observations From A Development Perspective”.

Traidcraft.

(September 2008). [online].

[16 July 2020].

Available from: <http://www.indianet.nl/pdf/EU-IndiaFTAInitialObservations.pdf>.

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17 China & the Central and Eastern European Nations: Shifting Dynamics and the Indian Repositioning Akash Manwani1 1Chief

Innovation Officer, Indian Society of Artificial Intelligence and Law akash.manwani@isail.in

Synopsis. This is a Policy Brief for the Indian International Law Programme.

The Basics Contemporary diplomatic efforts of China towards the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries as well as the constant tiff between the West and China to exert influence cannot be neglected. Politics in the CEE should be part of the common discourse. The CEE and its relation with China is extremely important for the globe due to their upcoming markets, geopolitical strengths, ties to the European Union (EU) and the West in general. Interestingly, the CEE cannot be analysed and understood as a bloc. Unlike the EU, the countries in the CEE region are unique, hold diverging political views and have different perspectives. Each State in the region requires separate consideration and this review piece shall attempt to adduce individual State references wherever necessary.

Geopolitical dynamics

The Central and Eastern European (CEE) (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, Albania, Mo ntenegro, Serbia, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo) countries are usually misunderstood as a single monolithic bloc. China is also a victim of this perception where it has misevaluated the divergent peculiarities of these States. It has misinterpreted the bloc to be consisting of similar ideologies which would require lesser mobilization of resources. Some of the States like Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are devoted associates of the West, especially of the United States (U.S).

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These States thought it fit to remain allies of the U.S as they were under constant threat of interventions by Russia. China practically never considered the Russian factor in the region. Bulgaria and Croatia, on the other hand, follow a multialigned policy where they are more flexible in their approach towards both, the West and China. Hungary and Serbia clearly have pro-China governments where the human rights concerns are less important for the nation. Although Hungary seems to be in bed with China, its intentions are really to gain leverage for greater investments from the EU to fund its own infrastructure projects.

The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are the States that have legitimately shown support and solidarity for Tibet (Brînză, 2020).

Interestingly, a newly appointed Mayor of Prague refused China’s demand to send away representative of Taiwan from a New Year’s gathering. The Mayor, in a way refused to acknowledge the one-China policy. It ultimately led to severing sister city ties with Beijing and this is one of the many instances where smaller countries have stood up to China (Santora, 2019). Romania became one of the first countries to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the United States (U.S) against the implementation of Chinese 5G systems over security concerns of Huawei (Brinza, 2020). The U.S influence through NATO military protection in the area remains a strong point for the CEE countries to lean towards the West.

Romania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Latvia and Estonia have signed joint statements with Washington agreeing to restrict companies with state influence in order to maintain security standards against the Chinese 5G services. Poland had also arrested an employee of Huawei who was charged with spying.

Subsequently, Poland called upon the EU and the NATO to develop a joint statement on Huawei. On the other hand, Hungary has seen no reason for threats in partnering with Huawei and actively pursued 5G plans for its country (Wintour, 2020). The CEE countries, just like several other smaller states have found themselves between a hard place and a rock amidst U.S – China trade tensions.

China on the other hand has strategic and political interest in the CEE countries.

The region from Baltic to Black sea corridor is important to China for its trade routes. This territorial area forms the entry point for China to the West. Several road and port projects which stretch from Greece to Serbia and into Hungary, can actually act as a stepping stone to whole of Europe. All these considerations meant that China will greatly invest in these countries and accordingly, similar claims were made but they remain unfulfilled till date. From the $126 billion investments made by China in the EU between 2000 and 2019, less than $10 billion worth of investments were made in the CEE countries (Brînză, 2020).

Additionally, 75% of the total investment in the CEE region was only received by four states, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Hungary. Not only did the multilateral investment camouflage bilateral intentions, it came with certain contingent obligations like mandatory hiring of Chinese workers over locals for

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construction projects (Mitchell, 2020). These patterns were being acknowledged by the CEE countries and hence, they have taken a cautious approach with China despite of letting the Chinese presence in the region increase.

Chinese treatment towards the CEE region

The local business elites in the CEE states enjoy the benefits derived from the bilateral ties with Beijing. The elite political ties which influence the domestic economic policies are very much existing in the Czech Republic, Bosnia, Hungary, Serbia and Romania. For instance, China had reportedly allocated a high-profile ambassador to be placed in Bosnia who stimulated relations with local elites to extract key information. In 2017, Serbian Presidential candidate Vuk Jeremić took financial support to the tune of €1.3 million from the Chinese donors for his campaign. The Prime Minister of Romania, Victor Ponta’s term showed a sharp increase in Chinese investments into the country. Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary has also been seen stating that he has “friends in the East” and will not hesitate to turn to China if the West continues to be critical of him.

This hostility can be reasoned with allegations of CEE countries against EU’s double standards and policies towards the CEE region. What might be considered acceptable for the older EU nations might be a faux pax for the accessing members where resentment already exists due to uncertainty on accession date.

Although the CEE countries have actively accepted Chinese investments, the trend shows that very rarely these investments are materialized. There is no agreement on how, when and what kind of investments would take place and the whole narrative seems to lack concrete goals for multilateral trade thus proving it to be idyllic fantasy rather than a meaningful cooperation. For instance, Macedonia vouched for huge investments in tourism, Bulgaria aimed for investments in transport, Lithuania was supposed to receive €100 million in the next 60 years but all of this has only been conceptualized and the possibilities of implementation are bleak. The low-cost Chinese investment comes at a cost.

There exists lack of transparency in many of the Chinese projects wherein media is not allowed around the project site, Chinese are more concerned with completion and brand building rather than quality and deliverability, lack of involvement of the locals and, on the other hand, conducting all the activities in the interest of larger public approval, are some of the reasons why Chinese Investments are flashy and inexpensive (Hickman, 2019)

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The pandemic and changes it brought with itself The pandemic has resulted in uncovering several other personalities of China.

Russia, as a country, has always been notorious for furthering its political goals through misinformation, brute diplomacy and propaganda whereas at the same time, China was only considered as a business and trade agent till now. The COVID 19 pandemic has brought to light, not only the Chinese cover-up prepandemic, but also the irresponsible handling to contain the virus in the globe.

Other issues which became ever more apparent were soft power tactics, debt diplomacy, and territorial aggression. Today, China is increasingly being seen as a country which is interested in influencing public opinion. Presently, China is in the damage control mode, wherein it is trying everything from shifting the blame of the pandemic to mask diplomacy, in order to save its face (Visegrad Insight, 2020).

Mask diplomacy & the CEE

The twin aim of the Mask diplomacy mission of Beijing is to functionalize its soft power by restarting its own economy faster than others through enormous distributions, as well as placement of sanitary and medical equipment. In the post 1989 era, the CEE states have maintained staunchly close ties with the U.S but as the pandemic hit, responsiveness of China towards the globe on one hand, and inability of the West to contain the epidemic domestically on the other, has tilted the scales for several CEE states. The countries in the region, which follow a nonalignment policy, will mostly consider taking any aid that comes its way. Serbia and Hungary, notably are not only open to Chinese help but also looking to develop political affinity with Beijing. This stems from the ignorance of the West and more generally, a difficult road to accession to the EU. Although Serbia and Hungary can be considered as exceptions, the general narrative to exert goodwill in the CEE through these exceptions is fuelling intra-European debates about the constant struggle to balance influence where China is actually a counterpart (Bachulska, 2020).

There is not much leverage for the CEE countries during a health crisis where need of medical equipment is dire. While most of the developed West stated that essential consignments of medical supplies will be reserved for domestic use and purposes, China has been suspiciously generous in handing out most important supplies during the pandemic. China has sent in 100 tonnes of masks, respirators and other medical equipment to the Czech Republic. (Reuters, 2020). Slovakia received one million surgical facemasks and 100,000 rapid-result tests from China to replenish its medical supplies (Reuters, 2020). Hungary has received more than 3 million face masks, 100,000 test kits and 86 ventilators from China (Website of

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Hungarian Government, 24). Ventilators, surgical masks and six doctors were flown to Serbia to help it fight coronavirus (Reuters, 2020). In March 2020, China held a conference with the CEE countries and assured that China actively “stood at the forefront of the epidemic prevention, taken most comprehensive prevention measures and resolutely curbed the spread of the epidemic”. The conference also noted that China is ready to cooperate with the CEE countries in a transparent and responsible manner to curb the impact of the virus. (people.cn, 2020).

This generous support raised some eyebrows and allegations of severe transparency concerns were levelled. Huge amounts of medical aid which was made to local governments of the CEE countries were through influential local Chinese businessmen placed in those countries. Out of the major donations, the non-commercial donations represented a very marginal amount. The whole system of giving aid is positively being covered by the Chinese media outlet to change perspectives about China (Bachulska, 2020). In Czech, an enormous consignment of medical equipment and masks was traced to an influential member of Czech Chinese community. When the Police stormed in the warehouse, 680,000 masks and 28,000 respirators were found hoarded. The Accused, who runs the most prominent Chinese media outlet, the Prague Chinese Times, is believed to have very close ties to the Chinese Communist Party.

(Valášek, 2020). The Czech Republic intelligence agencies narrated their apprehension behind Chinese extending its hand for aid might be a camouflage to attain sustained medical supplier position in the country (Helena Truchlá, 2020).

Pandemic and the supply chain discussion

Opportunistically speaking, the COVID19 pandemic has triggered several slowmoving trends and uncovered vulnerabilities and dependencies of businesses on global supply chains. Reassessment has resulted European companies to seek repositioning of their production capacities being operated in Asia. Germany for instance, depends on global suppliers for 17% of its manufacturing (Pandey, 2020). This will highly reduce the risks associated with lesser control over the supply chains. Manufacturing in Asian countries, especially China, was advantageous till the production and labour costs were lower. The wages in China have increased manifold over the decade and highly efficient logistics have less to contribute in the context of the pandemic. The average manufacturing costs in China has increased 5.6 times from 2008 to 2014 and even if corresponding inflation is to be taken into account, the CEE countries seem to have a better deal. The CEE countries have more to contribute with rapid industrial production, due to their significantly lower wages than Western Europe and nearly similar wages to China. “Bulgaria remains well below the level of labour costs in China for production operations, Romania is comparable to China, and Poland

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and Hungary are not much higher” says Laurențiu Duică, Partner and Head of Industrial Agency at Colliers International (Emerging Europe, 2020). The CEE countries themselves are drifting away from China because they can. The postCOVID world could see several countries reposing their faiths in Czech, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Romania for production and in the Baltic for services (Balazs, 2020).

Analysis of 17+1 policy of China towards the CEE countries The inception of framework of the 17+1 Chinese-CEE cooperation took place in the year 2011, after the Polish President Komorowski’s visit to Beijing. This meeting led to increased imports, exports and trade between the countries. China eventually formalized similar deals during Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s visit to Warsaw where “Twelve Measures for Promoting Friendly Cooperation with Central and Eastern European Countries” (FMPRC) was released. Subsequently, several summits were planned and the idea of 16+1 emerged. Eventually with addition of Greece, it is today known as 17+1 policy of China towards the CEE. (Gorski, 2018)

Multilateral Bilateralism

As mentioned earlier, the CEE countries may be misunderstood as a bloc hence, the 17+1 initiative of China could actually be defined as a group of arbitrarily chosen nations. The CEE countries have remained neglected over the years hence this is China's effort to maintain communication with all the 17 States in the region, at once. This phenomenon can be explained as multilateral bilateralism.

The rationale behind this initiative could be to leverage China’s position with Brussels and Berlin. Specialists have long apprehended that this format is an empty shell which caters to Chinese benefits. This can be validated by enumerating importance of individual CEE states for Beijing (Bachulska, 2020).

China’s intentions with 17+1 policy is economic and political. In 2012, by deeply engaging with the neglected CEE countries, China wanted to pose itself as the “spokesperson of the weak”. The engagement with the CEE made even more sense because China considered these countries as a socialist bloc hence the communist past would help in chalking out more convergences. The idea of furthering help through multilateral channels is China's strategy to act as a superior power which helps nations. This asymmetric nature of the transaction leads to appropriate positioning of China in a way to help it promote Chinese model, solutions and values. The complexities involved, differences within the CEE bloc, diverse portfolios, selective investments and the difficulty for all 17 countries to agree to a common ground has led China to follow multilateral bilateralism. It is due to

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this reason that 17+1 has failed to set up its own secretariat or joint steering committee for coordination with China and other states together. There is one secretariat from the Chinese side which operates from Beijing and coordinator meetings are held between Beijing and the country where Summit is going to take place. Through this multilateral platform, China seeks to promote bilateral China-centric concerns like connectivity slogan, inland transport, maritime issues and people to people connectivity which has been the most important stakes for China (Szczudlik, 2019).

India and the CEE The role of middle powers cannot be underestimated in the post-COVID world.

Convergences rather than competencies are to be appreciated between India and the CEE countries. The Central Europe – India Forum (CEIF) was formed with the aim of “mutual flow of information and knowledge in the fields of research and technology, business and trade, civil society, politics and security between India and Central Europe and to contribute to strong and diverse relations among the represented countries including promoting cooperation, creating and fostering sustainable networks, and identifying new opportunities.”

The CEE has felt neglected due to India's deep engagement with only the West during the Cold War period. With the recent visit of S. Jaishankar (Minister of External Affairs, India) to Hungary to explore possibilities of further partnership with Visegrad group of nations amidst China’s 16+1 process for the region, India proposed advancing cultural, military and economic ties (Chaudhary, 2019). This has been a specific concern as Indian foreign policy towards the CEE countries has remained concentrated only to Visegrad bloc of nations (Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia). It is understandable as the V4 nations have had comparatively better economic performance. However, India could ramp up its influence if it directs attention to other potential partners. Geopolitically, a better integrative system could provide India better opportunities as the CEE countries are a part of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN – T). The TEN-T aims to develop Europe-wide network of railway lines, roads, internal waterways, maritime shipping routes, airports and so on. (European Commission ). From objective point of view, India’s multimodal network project, International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) which aims to connect India, Iran, Azerbaijan and Russia will be highly benefitted due to the logistical and political support of the CEE countries (Passi, 2017).

Consecutively, even the approach of CEE countries towards Asia has been limited to China. India’s potential as a major arms importer, in energy projects, harnessing clean sources, ICT sector and so on can mutually benefit both the parties. India’s convergence with CEE has seen minor achievements like common IT companies in both areas which could lead to sharing of Best Practices, establishment of SunPharma and Dr. Reddy’s Labs in Romania and other partnerships in the health

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sector. Hence, there are far more opportunities rather than competitiveness between both upcoming economies in the post-COVID world wherein a meaningful balance can be created in the area. (Observer Reserach Foundation, 2020)

Conclusions A leaked picture of Bulgarian PM sleeping with arms created much furore in the country. The PM blamed the Chinese drones for such privacy breach (Gotev, 2020). Romania called off the deal to build nuclear reactors with China (Necsutu, 2020). Latvia’s security assessment led to declaration of China as a cyber and espionage threat due to the risks posed by its ties to Russia (LRT English, 2020).

Several Parliament members from the CEE States have signed declaration condemning Beijing for introduction of National Security Law in Hong Kong.

(Hong Kong Watch, 2020). These individual instances coupled with unfulfilled promises, marginalization of some states in the CEE, China-centric multilateralbilateralism, and suspiciously generous attitude towards selected few will greatly impact the future relations between China and the CEE countries. With such discontent and resentment, the 17+1 policy is likely to see a shrink in participation and partnership efforts. The role of the EU cannot be undermined and its response to the shifting dynamics needs to be seen.

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—. 2020. Czechs get first batch of sorely needed gear from China to fight coronavirus. [Online] March 20, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-czechmasks/czechs-get-first-batch-of-sorely-needed-gear-from-china-to-fight-coronavirusidUSKBN2172TD. —. 2019. Prague city council moves to axe partnership with Beijing. [Online] October 7, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-czech-china/prague-city-council-moves-to-axepartnership-with-beijing-idUSKBN1WM1KS. —. 2020. Slovaks get facemasks, coronavirus tests from China to replenish supplies. [Online] March 20, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-slovakiamasks/slovaks-get-facemasks-coronavirus-tests-from-china-to-replenish-suppliesidUSKBN2163JB. Santora, Marc. 2019. The Broken Promise of a Panda: How Prague’s Relations With Beijing Soured.

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Tucker, Patrick. 2019. Was the Pentagon’s Blacklist of Chinese Companies Justified? Defense One. [Online] December 5, 2019. https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2020/07/waspentagons-blacklist-chinese-companies-justified/167286/.

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18 Analyzing the Effects of the Defense of Japan White Paper 2020 on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue Manohar Samal1 1

Research Analyst, Internationalism manohar@internationalism.co.in

Synopsis. The policy brief is a part of the Indian International Law Programme by Internationalism.

Introduction and Brief History of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue The Defense of Japan White Paper 2020, was released on 14th July 2020. It has addressed several issues that have arisen due to China’s activity after the outbreak of the coronavirus disease and around the Senkaku Islands. It has also gone forward with addressing other aspects related to Japan’s defense related interest.

Indirect references to strengthening of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue have also been made in the Defense White Paper (Singh, 2020). In order to understand the present and upcoming situation well, it is necessary to keep certain historical aspects and development of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in mind since both of them are inextricable and interdependent to each other in the Asia- Pacific region.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue popularly referred to as the “QUAD” is an informal strategic dialogue between Japan, India, United States of America and Australia to promote the concept of a free, prosperous and open Asia- Pacific region in conformity with international law (Drishti, 2019). Traces of initiation of efforts for the strategic dialogue can be traced to the year 2007 which collapsed due to Australia pulling out of the effort. Subsequently, the strategic dialogue was revived in the year 2017 after which the nations involved started convening on a bimonthly basis (Buchan & Rimland, 2020). Needless to say, the Quadrilateral

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Security Dialogue was founded due to the rising influence of China in the region which led to the opening of Pandora’s box as several security, trade- related and development threats were beginning to surface in the region (Drishti, 2019). Some of the prominent and well- known threats in the region include China’s increasing dominance over countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its territorial claims over the South China Sea (Drishti, 2019).

Blocs around the world have characterized the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in various forms where some believe that it could transform into the Asian version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the rest believe that it is a failed attempt of a common vision based strategic unity (Buchan & Rimland, 2020). However, it would not be wrong to assume that the strategic dialogue does have a significant amount of unexplored and fruit- bearing potential. This is mainly because of China’s coercive and influential post- 2015 activities that led to the development of mini- lateral networks within the dialogue nations (Buchan & Rimland, 2020). Evidence of this can be witnessed in the trilateral relationships that developed between India, United States of America and Japan (Ministry of External Affairs, 2018) and Australia, India and Japan respectively (Pubby, 2018). Unfortunately, considering the present state of things, it seems to be clear that the strategic efforts have not even hit the tip of the iceberg yet, let alone formulating efficacious strategies for addressing the issues in entirety.

The Senkaku Saga, Pandemic and the Defense White Paper Japan’s Defense White Paper 2020 addresses multifarious issues such as China’s interference with Senkaku Islands, China’s involvement in clandestine agendas during relief work after the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, Russia and North Korea’s activities affecting the borders of Japan and other developments which are capable of compromising and hampering Japan’s defense (Ministry of Defense, 2020). The dispute between China and Japan on the Senkaku Islands is not a recent phenomenon. China has claimed that the Senkaku Islands were discovered by them in the 15th Century and has been a part of their territory since the 16th Century. However, at the same time Japan has claimed that the islands were discovered by them in the 1800s and the island was not inhabited at that time (Chaudhury, 2016). Records show that the Senkaku Islands were incorporated in Japanese territory after its victory in the First Sino- Japanese War, came under American occupation after World War II and was returned to Japan in the year 1972 (Chaudhury, 2016). It is interesting to note that China had not made any claims over the island up till 1971, after which it has always claimed that the United States of America and Japan’s occupation over the island has been illegal (Chaudhury, 2016).

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Recent events post- 2010 have witnessed that China has slowly and gradually breached the geographical boundaries of the Senkaku Islands by sending military and fishing vessels and ships that has led to escalation of tension between Japan and China (Chaudhury, 2016). Moreover, an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) has also been set up by China as a move to showcase territorial claims (Chaudhury, 2016). Japan’s Defense White Paper 2020 has addressed this issue by raising concerns over the incessant navy and air force activities and looming threats by China around the Senkaku Islands (Ministry of Defense, 2020). The White Paper has gone forward and even addressed China’s island chain strategy, increased activity for capacity and operational building and militarisation of the South China Sea (Ministry of Defense, 2020). China’s island chain strategy is a naval strategic policy which is directed towards breaching three island chains in order to enhance expansion towards the islands in the Pacific Ocean (Caroll, 2020). One of the main reasons for Japan's concerns is due to the fact that the Japanese archipelago is located in the first island chain (Caroll, 2020).

Another pivotal issue which the Japanese Defense White Paper 2020 addresses is the response of nations after the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, especially China (Ministry of Defense, 2020), if seen in context with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. The White Paper states that China has indulged in clandestine propaganda while dispatching medical supplies and expertise to other countries.

This is mainly because the transmission of medical expertise and supplies has been coupled with creating disinformation and confusion which is capable of affecting supply chains, local economies and illicitly shifting the international order in favour of China (Ministry of Defense, 2020).

The White Paper explicitly states that in order to tackle these issues, Japan aims to improve production of naval assets and military weaponry and also focus on improving its “Three Pillars for Japan’s Defense” which includes strategic promotion of multi- layered and multi- faceted defense cooperation, responses in domains of space, cyberspace, electromagnetic spectrum and response to large scale disasters (Singh, 2020). This would include a wide host of developments and improvements in air power, maritime power, missile defense, maritime shipping lanes, technological capacity and military infrastructure (Singh, 2020).

Japan’s strategy in response to tackling its issues is not a meagre and ineffective declaration, but is strongly backed by adequate defense deals and pursuits. This is evident by the fact that even after the outbreak of the pandemic, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation (Japanese company) was awarded a contract to develop Philippines' air surveillance radar system and Japan launched its Space Operations Squadron which resulted in Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding to launch the third Hibiki class ocean surveillance ship (Singh, 2020). Moreover, Japan’s 2020 defense budget is a humongous 7.38 Billion Japanese Yen (699.2 Million US Dollars) out of which, 4.84 Billion Japanese Yen (459.2 US Dollars)

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has been dedicated to develop space- related projects such as the Space Situational Awareness Satellite (Space- based Optical Telescope) and enhancement of satellite communication systems and 2.53 billion Japanese Yen (240 Million US Dollars) has been dedicated to enhance cyber security by the improvement and development of cyber information gathering through artificial intelligence systems aimed at reacting to cyber warfare (Singh, 2020).

Defense White Papers are usually released by countries across the world either because their domestic legislation mandates it, in order for such White Paper to act as a watchdog over the defense related activities of that particular country or because such countries wish to use it as a strategic communication tool to shape and influence public perception and deliver messages to other nations. Japan’s first Defense White Paper was released in the year 1970 and since then, its purpose has evolved over time (Bosack, 2020). Simply, on even a bare reading of Japan’s Defense White Paper, 2020, it can easily be inferred that its purpose was different from its predecessors and the current White Paper contained various concomitants of a strategic communication tool that was aimed at delivering a message to not only China for its recent activities, but also to Russia and North Korea as well (Ministry of Defense, 2020). High chances exist that these nations may be compelled to respond to Japan’s Defense White Paper 2020 with either military posturing or diplomatic rhetoric (Bosack, 2020).

Impact of Japan’s Defense White Paper on United States of America, Australia and India It is indeed undeniable that Japan’s Defense White Paper, 2020 will affect the near future of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue albeit the fact that the White Paper does not mention it specifically. This is because the issues addressed and goals set in the White Paper and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue are in conjunction with each other. Thus, it is important to understand the separate relations of the United States of America, Australia and India with China in order to determine the effect of the Japanese Defense White Paper 2020 on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue as a whole and individual member countries as well.

Relations of the United States of America with China has evolved from tense standoffs to a combination of intensified diplomacy, international rivalry and intertwined economies (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020). The earliest stages of conflict between the United States of America and China can be traced to June 1950 during the Korean War followed by disturbances during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954, Tibetan Uprising in 1959, Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, Belgrade Embassy Bombing in 1999, U.S- Sino Spy Plane Standoff in 2001

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coupled with incessant and recurrent trade tensions between the two (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020). Interference of the United States of America in the South China Sea issue after 2015, and post- 2018 U.S. trade war with China has led to continuous escalation and disturbances between the two nations. The outbreak of the coronavirus disease and the United States of America’s move to oppose the national security law of Hong Kong led to further deterioration of relations since the United States passed an executive order that ended preferential trade status and enacted legislation to sanction businesses and officials undermining freedom and autonomy of Hong Kong (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020). Undeniably, the United States of America joined the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue to sever the rising influence of China in the AsiaPacific region since that was directly compromising the interests of the United States in the Asia- Pacific region. The release of Japan’s Defense White Paper 2020 could mean improvement in relations between Japan and the United States with rising cooperation in defense deals which will enable capacity building for Japan to hold its position and defeat China’s unguided maritime claims and also increase cooperation in infrastructure projects that will help in creating a more sustainable and transparent alternative than China’s One Belt and Road Initiative for Asian nations (Johnston, 2020).

Diplomatic relations between Australia and China were established in 1972 after which, a healthy relationship prevailed among them for a long duration of time which extended over to trade in mineral resources, strategic dialogue, human rights, climate change, disarmament and regional security (Smith, 2009).

However, the current state of things pristinely showcases that relations between the countries are not as healthy as they once used to be. Out of the colossal driving factors for a straining and deteriorating relationship, Australia’s decision to ban Huawei (Chinese company) from taking part in 5G rollout, Australia’s move asking for an independent inquiry to be conducted in China to trace the true origin of the coronavirus pandemic, China’s 80% trade tariff on Australian barley, China’s import ban on red meat from Australian abattoirs and Australia’s partnership with United Kingdom and Canada against China on the Hong Kong issue could be identified as the major driving factors for such tensed relations (Maasdorp, 2020). After the release of Australia’s Defense White Paper 2016, relations between Japan and Australia have deepened quickly (Bisley, 2016).

Therefore, it would not be surprising if Japan and Australia further strengthened their relationship to curb the rising influence of China after the release of Japan’s Defense White Paper 2020.

Indian and Chinese diplomatic relations began in the 1950s with the formulation of the Five Principles of Coexistence (The Hindu, 2020). The Five Principles of Coexistence, also referred to as the Panchsheel Agreement, included mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-

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aggression, mutual non- interference, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co- existence (Ministry of External Affairs, 2004). However, subsequent events have shown the redundancy of the Panchsheel Agreement. Although India and China had managed to remain large trading partners until recently, seventy years of relations has been filled with conflict and turmoil, majorly fueled by territorial disputes. This is evident from the Indo- China War in 1962, Second Indo- China War in 1967, rise in tension between the two in 2017 after China started building a road into Bhutan and the Galwan Valley Clash in 2020 (Duhalde, 2020).

Considering the fact that regular clashes have led to an outrage amongst the Indian population against China (Web Desk, 2020), various Chinese apps have been banned and trade barriers have been created by the Indian Government in respect of trade and commercial activities with China (Srivastava, 2020). In consideration of the fact that the Indian market has always been flooded with products manufactured in China, affordability of products will be affected and economic losses due to the sudden trade barriers and outrage in India against Chinese products will occur (Misra, 2020). Thus, after the release of the Japanese Defense White Paper 2020, it is important that collaboration between India and Japan is not only limited to the traditional defense sector, but also extended over to enhancement of the technological defense sector that are accompanied with lower costs, more flexible procedures and willingness to take risks to explore new possibilities so that the negative effects of sudden severance of trade relations between India and China can be compensated. Such improved relations with Japan will also help in creating a partnership on an economic model which is unique in terms of the value chain (Singh, 2020). It is also vital that Australia, the United States of America, India and Japan work together to form trade relations which are free of economic sanctions in order to avoid the allied security issues involved so that all parties can benefit and simultaneously ensure decentralization of Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s power and influence in the region.

Conclusions An indispensable factor of a healthy and resilient international community is the decentralisation of power as it leads to better internal sovereignty, prevention of conflict, responsible and accountable behaviour in the international sphere, increased ability to uphold international law and enhancement of social learning for individual nations (Faguet, 2014). Various reforms are required in the approach of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue such as the creation of a robust regional consultation mechanism (Drishti, 2019), agreeing upon a clearer objective, effectively counter non- traditional transnational threats (Singh, 2020), establish working groups on infrastructure and defense on an Asia- Pacific level and encourage joint operational commands (Buchan, 2020) which will further the goals of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the various Defense White

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Papers released by member nations, and in the natural course of things, lead to an open, free and prosperous Asia- Pacific Region.

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2. Bosack, Michael. “What to Make of Japan’s Annual Defense Report”. The Japan Times: Opinion.

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3. Buchan, Patrick and Rimland, Benjamin. “Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present, and Future of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue”. Center for Strategic & International Studies: Brief Report. (16 March 2020). [online].

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4. Caroll, Richard. “China has Almost Breached the First Island Containment Chain”. International Policy Digest: World News. (17 March 2020). [online]. [07 August 2020]. Available from: <https://intpolicydigest.org/2020/03/17/china-has-almost-breached-the-first-islandcontainment-chain/>.

5. Chaudhury, Shantanu. “The Senkaku Islands Dispute”. International Policy Digest: World News. (01 August 2016). [online].

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6. Council on Foreign Relations. “Timeline: U.S. Relations With China”. Council on Foreign Relations. (2020). [online]. [07 August 2020]. Available from: <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/usrelations-china>.

7. Drishti IAS. “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD). Drishti IAS: International Relations. (09 December 2019). [online].

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8. Duhalde, Marcelo et al. “Why India- China Border Clash in Galwan Valley Turned Into A Deadly Brawl”. South China Morning Post. (02 July 2020). [online]. [07 August 2020]. Available from: <https://multimedia.scmp.com/infographics/news/world/article/3091480/China-Indiaborder-dispute/index.html>.

9. Faguet, Jean- Paul et al. “Does Decentralization Strengthen or Weaken the State? Authority and Social Learning in a Supple State”. London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online: Working Paper. (2014). [online]. [07 August 2020]. Available from: <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/60631/1/Faguet_Fox_Poeschl_Does-decentralization-strengthen-orweaken-the-state_WP_2014.pdf>.

10. Johnston, Eric. “U.S. Ambassador Nominee Wants Japan to Play Bigger Alliance Role.” The Japan Times: National. (06 August 2020). [online]. [07 August 2020]. Available from: <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/08/06/national/us-envoy-weinstein-japanalliance/#.Xy0K7i2B1QI>.

11. Maasdorp, James. “Australia and China’s Relationship Has Become Tetchy Over the Past Two Months. Here’s How We Got To This Point”. ABC News. (07 June 2020). [online]. [07 August

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Ministry of Defense, Government of Japan. “Defense of Japan 2020”. Defense White Paper Digest.

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Ministry of External Affairs. “India- Japan- US Trilateral Meeting”. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India: Media Centre. (04 April 2018). [online]. [05 August 2020]. Available from: <https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29744/IndiaJapanUS+Trilateral+Meeting>.

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Misra, Udit. “Explained: Why China Trade Ban Will Hurt India More”. The Indian Express. (22 June 2020). [online].

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Pubby, Manu. “India Kicks Off Trilateral Talks With Japan and Australia; Joint Training, Naval Exercises on Agenda”. The Economic Times. (11 July 2018). [online]. [05 August 2020]. Available from: <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-kicks-off-trilateral-talkswith-japan-and-australia-joint-training-naval-exercises-onagenda/articleshow/47579881.cms>.

Singh, Anil. “The Quad and the Pandemic: A Lost Opportunity?”. The Diplomat. (05 May 2020). [online]. [07 August 2020]. Available from: <https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/the-quad-andthe-pandemic-a-lost-opportunity/>.

Singh, Gurjit. “Japan’s Defence White Paper 2020: An Enhanced Role Emerging?”. Observer Research Foundation: Expert Speak. (27 July 2020). [online]. [05 August 2020]. Available from: <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/japans-defence-white-paper-2020-an-enhancedrole-emerging/?amp&__twitter_impression=true>.

Smith, Stephen. “The Australia- China Relationship”. The Diplomat. (07 May 2009). [online]/ [07 August 2020]. Available from: <https://thediplomat.com/2009/05/the-australia-chinarelationship/>.

Srivastava, Shruti and Pradhan, Bibhudatta. “After Banning Chinese Apps, India’s New Trade Barriers With China.” NDTV. (24 July 2020). [online]. [07 August 2020]. Available from: <https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-builds-new-trade-barriers-with-china-amidborder-row-2268160>.

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19 The Long-Waving Chabahar Port Issue and India's Dilemma Ridhima Bhardwaj1 & Vasu Sharma2 Junior Research Analyst, Internationalism 2 Research Analyst, Internationalism ridhimab04@gmail.com, vasu@internationalism.co.in; 1

Synopsis. The policy brief is a part of the Indian International Law Programme by Internationalism.

Introduction In Persian the word ‘Chabahar’ means four springs, which refers to ‘springtime throughout the four seasons. Chabahar Port, located in Sistan - Baluchistan province, the only deep-sea port of Iran, one of the most important ports in Gulf of Oman and an entrance in Strait Hormuz, holds a strategic position for India and Iran. Although, India was offered the opportunity to develop the port in 2003, sanctions on Iran from United States had paused the agreement. However, in 2016, India agreed to develop the Shahid Beheshti Port (One of the two port compartments in Chabahar, other being Shahid Kalantari) and approved an investment of US$ 85 million for development of the port. Chabahar Port holds three advantages viz the gateway to Central Asia and Afghanistan, integration to the INSTC and the strategic advantage over the Chinese funded Gwadar Port in Pakistan, which is only eighty kilometres away. Chabahar Port and Gwadar Port are strategically important for India and China respectively considering trade and connectivity with other countries in the region. In December 2018, India officially took over the operation of Chabahar Port, with completion of first phase. (Baruah, 2019)

The Trilateral Agreement India, Iran and Afghanistan signed a trilateral transit agreement to ensure smoother transfer of Indian goods entering Afghanistan via Iran. It connects ports

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on India's west coast to the Chabahar port and encompasses the road and rail connections between Chabahar and the Afghan borders. ( India Cements Role in Iran with Chabahar Deal, 2016) The railway venture, that was being addressed between both the Iranian Railways and the state-owned Indian Railways Construction Ltd (IRCON), was intended to form part of India 's contribution to trilateral agreement between India, Iran and Afghanistan to create an alternative trade route to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

For the same, during Prime Minister Narendra Modiâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s visit to Tehran, in May 2016, to sign the Chabahar agreement with Iranian President Rouhani and Afghanistan President Ghani, IRCON formally signed an MoU with the Iranian Rail Ministry. This MoU was meant to build the Chabahar-Zahedan railway as â&#x20AC;&#x153;part of transit and transportation corridor in trilateral agreement between India, Iran and Afghanistanâ&#x20AC;?, under which IRCON pledged to deliver all services, regarding construction work and funding for the project of around $1.6 billion. (Haider, 2020) The Chabahar Trilateral Partnership is indeed a game-changing strategy. It is also the strategic path towards the powerful presence of India in Afghanistan and Central Asia, therefore, can be considered a result of a long-aimed strategic foresight of the nation. It is a big milestone for India in its Asia policy and global focus, which includes key trade concerns and energy security problems.

The agreement's Afghan aspect is important to India's security strategy, and thus the railway venture between Chabahar and Zahedan that will connect Zaranj in Afghanistan is extremely important. The project is expected to provide India with an alternate route bypassing Pakistan to connect Afghanistan. So, the project will focus on the core strategic standpoint of domestic security to enhance India 's authority and counter Pakistan's plans.

This sea-land route was the strategic pathway for linking to the International North-South Transport Corridor. Iran is a vital hub to this plan and thus pivotal for connecting India to Central Asia, Russia and Europe. Chabahar's two container berth creation not just promotes India 's trade but furthermore offers a significant presence in the West Arabian sea.

This Chabahar agreement and the railway project's economic view is to create an economic route by linking vital trading cities such as Tehran, Baku, and Astrakhan to India's economic centre, Mumbai. Hence, the railway plan upto Zahedan and beyond in Afghanistan is also a major part of the energy security coalition of India with Central Asia. In addition, the deliberate base in Central Asia and emerging collaborative patterns have provided India with the significant presence of Indian Air force in close vicinity of Pakistan in the area. (PN, 2020)

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The IRCON Contract As mentioned above, the responsibility of 500-kilometre rail linkage from Chabahar to Zahedan was given to IRCON. But in July 2020, according to some reports, the role was to be assigned to Khatam al-Anbiya constructions, a company belonging to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Due to sanctions from USA, countries cannot work with these designated entities, hence India had objections to this proposal. (Mohan, 2020) Moreover, development of Chabahar Port was already exempted from sanctions.

However, even though some reports have suggested that the contract was suspended due to lack of funds from India (Haider, 2020), this situation certainly depicts how bottlenecks in Indian diplomacy and bureaucracy still stage a challenge to New Delhi.

Irrespective of the reason, the reports on Sino-Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for 25 years, poses a challenge to New Delhi to rethink and strategize its policy towards Iran. Moreover, this situation can be considered as a ‘litmus test between Indo-Iran relations.’ (Balasaubramanian, 2020)

Chinese Interventions in Iran & Oman In 2017, foreign policy experts identified how disengagement of USA from West Asia could create a vacuum in the Arab World and how, Chinese investments and ‘economic forays’ through Belt and Road Initiative could ‘counter instability and boost economy in the region.’ Although India has been a closer partner in East for West Asian countries, since 2015-16 due to BRI and the accumulation of Chinese investments and soft power the project brings in, it was then identified that escalated Chinese activities in our secondary neighbourhood, would create a security dilemma for India. (Arun, 2018) China was part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) a deal between P5+1 (Permanent five and Germany) and Iran in 2013. What made China a different partner from USA was its policy of non-intervention in internal affairs of other country and respecting territorial sovereignty of countries in that region.

While USA always focused on military interventions and internal affairs of countries in West Asia, China focused on its ‘Geo-industrial’ policy.

The US$400 billion strategic partnership between Iran and China (which is yet to be finalised by Iranian Parliament) could be an outcome of insecurities and conflicts of both the countries with United States. Although this deal can be dated back to 2016, when the Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Iran, but the 18 page draft when accessed by New York Times, created concerns especially for India and USA. This strategic convergence could strengthen partnership between Tehran and Beijing with Chinese investments in energy, infrastructure, transportation and banking in Iran. In return, China, world’s largest importer of

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crude oil could, import oil at discounted rate from Iran. Defence co-operation, joint research and development of weapons between the two nations with ‘antiAmerica’ sentiments would be important juncture of the deal. (Shukla, 2020) China stands as largest importer of oil from Oman. Being part of the ambitious ‘Belt and Road Initiative’, in May 2018, the bilateral relation between China and Oman was leveraged to ‘Strategic Partnership.’ In 2016, both the countries agreed to develop the Oman-China Industrial Park in Duqm. China plans to invest around US$ 10.7 billion for development of the park by 2022. This huge foreign investment would be first of its kind in Oman. (Ramajunam, 2019) Due to an agreement with Oman in 2018, Indian Navy could access Duqm Port for maintenance purposes. (Chaudhary, 2018) Moreover, Oman has been oldest partner in defence co-operation from the region. Escalated Chinese activities could make Indian activities much more vulnerable in the region.

Interventions by the United States India's regressive relationship with Iran seems to be a consequence of US sanctions. These sanctions curtailed Iran's economic opportunities and weakened many of the nation's diplomatic ties. The economy of Iran is currently facing a tough time owing to both the pandemic and US sanctions.

The failure of the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan along with the US restrictions has hampered the economic relationship between Iran and India. Even after securing an exemption from U.S. sanctions for port expansion, India feared detrimental effects on its U.S. sector and the development of the Chabahar port project. Regardless of the failure of the JCPOA and the latest US sanctions, it is unlikely for India to participate in this initiative for such a time, while Indian officials are discussing a sanction waiver with the United States. (Roy, 2020) The sanctions imposed, especially the US's new 'Maximum Pressure' policy following its 2018 disengagement from the JCPOA, have transformed Iran's diplomatic and political perspective towards its own defence, and to protect itself from this disturbing exclusion by sanctions. India was able to successfully obtain the US sanction waiver for development of the port, due to its relations with the latter. (PN, 2020) In the railway project between India, Iran and Afghanistan, the postponement on India's end is a result of the uncertainty of US approval for the project. The government of India is seeking clarification from the US, but the issue is still complicated because of upcoming US presidential elections. India has also expressed it to Iran that it will join the project later, after the diplomatic situation stabilizes and is clearer by the end of the year.

This gives rise to situations which could be advantageous to China and could aid it in improving its dealings with Iran, thus, fulfilling its aims of having a greater presence in the Chabahar region. The announcement for China-Iran’s 25-year

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strategic partnership is coming at a time when the US is retreating from Afghanistan, India-US ties are strengthening and the relations between China and the US are still worsening. Hence, it can safely be concluded that this could be a part of the pressure strategies of China in order to pull Iran on its side.

IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA-IRAN PARTNERSHIP TO INDIAN AGENDAS Suspension of this contract not only affects Indo-Iran relations but also position of Afghanistan, since Chabahar Port was a strategic deal to bolster trade between India and Afghanistan and was to be integrated to INSTC (International North and South Trade Corridor), a Eurasian â&#x20AC;&#x201C; India trade corridor. This multi-modal trade and transit corridor between India and Eurasia could possibly counter the Chinese BRI. Russia, Iran and India are the main three pillars of the project. Even though the project was first agreed upon in 2000, much before declaration of Chinese BRI, INSTC still lacks a strong mechanism as BRI does.

Primarily, there are three important avenues (agendas) for New Delhi in West Asia i.e. the oil dependency on Gulf Countries, the Indian diaspora in the region and the remittances sent back to India by the Indian expatriate community residing in Gulf Countries. Internal turbulences and external factors have affected these avenues in past. Indo-Iran relations primarily stood on the oil trade and development of Chabahar Port. Although as of now only the contract given to IRCON has been suspended, what stands as implications are the increased Chinese activities in Persian Gulf. Indian Navy is the net security provider in the Indian Ocean region and conducts anti-piracy missions from Gulf of Aden to Arabian Sea. With Gwadar Port (Pakistan), Khalifa Port (UAE) , Military base in Djibouti and the Industrial Park in Duqm (Oman) the Chinese presence had already elevated in Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. With Iran-China strategic partnership, Indian activities in not only in Chabahar Port but also in the Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz could possibly be jeopardized.

Conclusions India continues to pose high stakes in Chabahar, and its trade relations could still eventually move to Afghanistan and Central Asia, regardless of who constructs the rail corridor. There seems to be, the concern of harm to its reputation from the perception that India yielded to sanctions imposed by the US. At the same time, the expanding significant strides of China into Iran may make Indian ventures quite unfeasible there. The chief concern is that Chabahar being the everlasting mark of the relationship that India and Iran share, might become collateral damage in a greater US-China conflict. (Haider, 2020) Until now Indian foreign policy in West Asia was affected by military interventions of Washington. As of now, the geo-industrial policy of China also would affect Indian interests not only in Iran but in the whole Persian Gulf.

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New Delhi must act towards keeping cordial and friendly relations with Iran.

With increased Chinese presence in West Asia, certainly it would become difficult for India to maintain bilateral relations in region. However, India could escalate ‘Medical Diplomacy’ in the region, something which could strengthen India’s relations. During pandemic, New Delhi had already rammed up the medical supplies, especially the export of the anti-malaria drug. (hydroxychloroquine and its ingredients) (Gupta, 2020) Due to ability of Indian pharmaceuticals to produce drugs and medicines at cheaper rate and ensure better accessibility and availability of healthcare facilities, New Delhi could certainly use a consolidated ‘Medical Diplomacy’ as a stronger imperative.

References 1. India Cements Role in Iran with Chabahar Deal. Kutty, Sumitha Narayanan. 2016. s.l. : LobeLog Foreign Policy, 2016.

2. Arun, Swati. 2018. China. [ed.] PR Kumaraswamy and Meena Singh Roy. Persian Gulf 2016-17: India’s Relations with the Region. s.l. : Pentagon Publishers, 2018, pp. 203-204, 2014.

3. Baruah, Dr. Rashmi. 2019. Chabahar Port: Why it’s important for India. Young Initiative on Foreign Affairs and International Relations. [Online] 1 September 2019. [Cited: 24 July 2020.] https://ifair.eu/2019/09/01/chabahar-port-why-its-important-forindia/#:~:text=The%20Chabahar%20Port%20is%20of,Pakistan%20being%20developed%20b y%20China..

4. Chaudhary, Dipanjan Roy. 2018. PM Modi's Oman visit: Indian Navy can now access Duqm port. Economic Times. [Online] 13 February 2018. [Cited: 25 July 2020.] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/pm-modis-oman-visit-navy-can-nowaccess-duqm-port/articleshow/62894357.cms?from=mdr.

5. Gupta, Shishir. 2020. India draws up Rs 1 billion Covid-19 medical assistance plan, targets 90 countries. Hindustan Times. [Online] 11 May 2020. [Cited: 25 July 2020.] https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-amps-up-covid-19-medical-assistanceplan-targets-to-reach-90-countries/story-0X1H8z1Zqi9piw6n4FDu8J.html.

6. Haider, Suhasini. 2020. Iran drops India from Chabahar rail project, cites funding delay. The Hindu.

[Online] 14 July 2020.

[Cited: 25 July 2020.] https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/iran-drops-india-from-chabahar-rail-projectcites-funding-delay/article32072428.ece.

7. —. 2020. Why is India out of the Chabahar rail project? The Hindu. [Online] 19 July 2020. [Cited: 19 July 2020.] https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/the-hindu-explains-why-isindia-out-of-the-chabahar-rail-project/article32126361.ece.

8. Mohan, Geeta. 2020. Real reason why India sits out of Iran's Chabahar-Zahedan rail link project. India Today. [Online] 21 July 2020. [Cited: 25 July 2020.] https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/iran-chabahar-zahedan-rail-link-project-india1702928-2020-07-21.

9. PN, Dr. Khushnam. 2020. India’s Interests and Position Remain Unabated at Chabahar. The Kootneeti.

[Online] 17 July 2020.

[Cited: 18 July 2020.]

Indian International Law Series, Volume 1 (2020) 184 https://thekootneeti.in/2020/07/17/indias-interests-and-position-remain-unabated-atchabahar/.

10. Ramajunam, Kanchana. 2019. China Factor to Watch Out for as India & Oman. Centre for Land and Warfare Studies. [Online] 22 December 2019. [Cited: 25 July 2020.] https://www.claws.in/china-factor-to-watch-out-for-as-india-oman-expand-strategicpartnership/.

11. Roy, Arijita Sinha. 2020. Chabahar Port: The Dysfunctional Trilateralism. The Kootneeti.

[Online] 16 July 2020. [Cited: 18 July 2020.] https://thekootneeti.in/2020/07/16/chabahar-portthe-dysfunctional-trilaterlism/.

12. Shukla, Srijan. 2020. The China-Iran strategic partnership, and how it can change geopolitics in the Middle East. The Print. [Online] 14 July 2020. [Cited: 26 July 2020.]

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20 Is the Afghanistan Peace Process a Preventive Method or a Cure?

Mugdha Satpute1 1

Junior Research Analyst, Internationalism mugdha1042@gmail.com

Synopsis. The policy brief is a part of the Indian International Law Programme by Internationalism.

Status Quo of the Peace Process in Afghanistan until August 2020 In February 2020 the US and Taliban signed a peace deal thus ending the longest war fought by America in the history. This agreement consists of certain conditions which are to be followed by both the parties so as to bring peace in Afghanistan. But the irony is that the Afghan Government was not included in it.

According to those conditions, the US and its allies are to withdraw their military forces from Afghanistan, prisoners of Taliban and Afghan forces are to be released, as well as talks between Taliban and Afghan Government are to be held. But these talks never took place due to constant conflicts between Taliban and the Afghan Government, as neither of them is ready to agree with the other.

As per the deal, Afghan Government is supposed to release 5000 Taliban prisoners in exchange for release of 1000 Afghan security forces captured by Taliban. Earlier, the Afghan Government refused to release the 5000 Taliban prisoners, due to which Taliban continued attacking the Afghan forces and civilians. Based on the recent developments, the Government has released 4,600 prisoners but the remaining 400 are hardcore prisoners who have committed brutal attacks in Afghanistan. France and Australia have asked the Afghan Government not to release those prisoners, also considering the present situation in Afghanistan, the Government itself resisted the release. Hence, Afghanistanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s President Ashraf Ghani summoned the assembly of elders, Loya Jirga, to decide whether to release those prisoners or not. The assembly agreed for releasing the prisoners to avoid continuous violence in the country. But the question is, what will be the outcome of this decision? How will it affect the intra-Afghan talks

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along with the international standings on the conflict? The decisions made by the Afghan Government and the conflicting situations that have arisen with Taliban have severe impact on Afghanistan’s neighboring countries, especially India, Pakistan, and China.

United States-Afghanistan Relations Immediately after the 9/11 attack in New York, the US invaded Afghanistan against the Taliban who were harboring the members of al-Qaeda including Osama Bin Laden – masterminds of the attack. The US along with its allies fought the Taliban and nearly removed it from Afghanistan during the early years of the war, but today about 70% of Afghanistan is under the control of Taliban.

According to the US Department of Defence, the total military expenditure in Afghanistan (from October 2001 until September 2019) was $778bn. In addition, the US State Department - along with the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and other government agencies - spent $44bn on reconstruction projects. The total expenditure of $822bn was made since the beginning of the war. (2020) This war amounted to be the costliest not only in terms of money but also in terms of human lives. Since 2001, more than 2,300 US soldiers have lost their lives and around 20,660 soldiers are injured. According to Afghan President Ghani more than 45,000 Afghan security force’s members have died since 2014, and according to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan more than 1,00,000 civilians have died or got injured since 2009.

While the number of soldiers and civilians of other countries killed by the Taliban is not included, we can say that large number of people are losing their lives every day. Also, during the war, the US economically supported Pakistan along with its intelligence agency ISI in identifying and eliminating the terrorist activities and the its members. The US used Pakistan as its base for the Afghan related actions.

Since the very beginning of the war, the US allowed Pakistan to wield too much influence over the U.S. strategy. The United States had stumbled into an informal, unspoken bargain, accepting help from Pakistan in the fight against al-Qaeda in exchange for tacitly enabling, while feebly contesting, Pakistan’s efforts to sabotage the American-led campaign in Afghanistan. (2020) Later on, the US government suspended its security assistance to Pakistan as all their activities backfired, and Pakistan didn’t actually act against the terrorists residing within the country.

Due to emergence of different insurgent groups such as Islamic State and al-Qaeda along with already existing Taliban, Afghanistan is leading towards severe instability. The recruitments of such groups are rising, along with funding for weapons and ammunition. In last few years, the US government deployed more security forces to control such insurgent attacks, and airstrikes but it didn’t result into a desired outcome. Many attempts were made to bring the US, Taliban and

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the Afghan government at a table for further negotiations but they failed. Thus, finally in February 2020, a peace deal was signed by US special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban political chief Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo as a witness at Doha.

According to the agreement, the US is supposed to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan in stages, and in return, the Taliban has to prevent groups like alQaeda from recruiting, training and fundraising, otherwise it will be posing a threat to the security of US and its allies. Taking into consideration the 2020 US Presidential elections, the Trump administration is emphasizing on the return of the US military personnel along with ultimately settling the Afghanistan peace agreement, thus aiming to gain influence and more votes. Perspectives of American people regarding the war and the peace deal have varied greatly. The duality of the war complicated the mindsets of people, since the war was financed through the taxes paid by Americans, they were against it as it incurred losses for them, but the war also signified the importance of curbing terrorist groups which caused attacks like 9/11. But the question is that who are the â&#x20AC;&#x153;real alliesâ&#x20AC;? of the US is not defined, considering the contemporary developments in bilateral relations between the US and India, and the earlier relationship between the US and Pakistan, this ambiguousness is creating complications in the relations.

Following the peace deal, the US government is in connection with the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan as well as the Taliban, and is continuously observing the state of Afghanistan peace process.

Pakistan & Afghanistan Relations: An Overview Even though Afghanistan and Pakistan are neighbouring countries which share close ethnic, religious, linguistic, economic, and geographical ties, they have a rigid bilateral relationship. In 1893, Afghanistan lost some parts of its territory to the British Empire which used to govern todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s India and Pakistan, in the Durand line agreement. Even after the partition of India, Afghanistan never accepted the division of its territory which was now a part of Pakistan. This divided territory consisted of Pashtun and Baloch people, who got separated from their communities due to the Durand line. This border dispute has caused serious problems in the bilateral relations between the two countries.

Due to the uneven and hilly geographical boundary, it is difficult for the security forces of the two nations to maintain surveillance over the complete border line, due to which people can easily infiltrate into the other country. These people not only include migrants or refugees, but also insurgents and terrorists who are absconding. Afghanistan harboured those who wanted separation from Pakistan, and Pakistan became a safe haven for the members of various terrorist and insurgent Islamic groups. Pakistan supported the Taliban and other such Islamic mujahidin groups, which formed a strategic relationship between them during

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the Afghan war. But after the invasion by the US, same relationship between Pakistan and the Taliban led to rise in tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, since the former was trying to remove Taliban from its regions while the latter provided protection to them. Pakistan blamed Afghanistan for disrupting Baluchistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and other Pakistani territories, thus supporting anti-Pakistan extremist groups. Along with the political and security issues, the two countries also face a dispute over the Kabul river water and the dam construction projects of Afghanistan on which the livelihood of their citizens depends.

Afghanistan’s relationship with India adversely affected its relationship with Pakistan, therefore the relations between the two countries directly or indirectly became trilateral. Pakistan’s Afghan policy is very much India-centric; Indian policy in Afghanistan is heavily influenced by the desire for a security and psychological advantage over Pakistan. Meanwhile, Afghanistan uses the Pakistan-India cards in a manner similar to Afghan leaders balancing Czarist Russia and British India during the “Great Game.” From the Cold War through modern-day, Afghanistan has varied in its closeness to India and Pakistan, with gains by one side coming at the expense of the other. (Ahmad Bilal Khalil, 2016) With the changing Afghan governments, their Pakistan policy and relations also changed. For a certain period both the countries worked together on tracking down insurgent groups active in the other country, intelligence sharing, combined military training, etc. But due to Pakistan’s failure in taking strict actions against the Taliban and in bringing them to the negotiating table, Afghanistan started focusing on its ties with India. Considering the present situation in Afghanistan, on one side the Afghan government is complaining against Pakistan about the cross-border rocket firings in Afghanistan and for allegedly sheltering and funding Taliban. While, on the other side, with increasing control and influence of Taliban over Afghanistan, Pakistan has acquired an indirect say in the functioning of Taliban based on their strategic relationship. Due to which, even the US is cooperating with Pakistan in the Afghan peace process. Also, with the developing Afghanistan – China relations, the direct ties between Pakistan and the Afghan government might improve.

Following the recent decisions, Pakistan has invited Taliban and Chinese leaders for talks in Islamabad to smooth the way for intra-Afghan negotiations aimed at bringing an end to the 19-year war that’s ravaged Afghanistan. (Kamran Haider, 2020).

China & Afghanistan Relations: An Overview China has maintained the relationship of calculated indifference and noninterference in the domestic matters of Afghanistan till the last decade. But with the emergence of China’s security concerns and availability of economic

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opportunities in Afghanistan, relationship between the two countries has now become a strategic and significant one.

China’s Xinjiang Province shares its border with Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The majority population of Xinjiang Province consists of Uighur Muslims, who are termed to be different from the original Chinese people.

Afghanistan is home to the Taliban and a number of other transnational terrorist outfits, and the restive Xinjiang region is claimed by Chinese authorities to be the breeding ground for the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism, plaguing their country. (Shubhangi Pandey, 2019) The radical and extremist Uighur Muslims are collaborating with the Islamic insurgent groups functioning in the neighboring countries, demanding separation and thus acting against China. These Uighur fighters have joined Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), or are sheltered at Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), thus posing threat to China’s domestic and national security. Due to the threat of militant infiltration, China wants to keep watch on its borders. China has offered Afghanistan to train its security forces in China, against the insurgent militants. It has emphasized on military cooperation between the two counties. Also, certain reports have stated that China has established its military base in the Wakhan Corridor region Badakhshan Province of Afghanistan and is contributing in construction of a mountain bridge in that region.

Afghanistan’s geographically strategic location in Asia has caught attention of China. It creates a linkage while connecting South East Asia, Central Asia, West Asia, Africa and Europe with each other, therefore acting as a main location for trade and transit. Also, the presence of various natural resources in Afghanistan generates opportunities for economic investments, resource extraction, infrastructure development projects and energy projects. Based on these factors, China’s interest and involvement with Afghanistan is increasing. Prior to 2016, Afghanistan was not included in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and it was solely focused on development of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and other combined projects. In 2016, Afghanistan signed a Memorandum of Understanding with China after which it was officially made a part of BRI. Today, China is the largest investor in Afghanistan, it has financed various infrastructure projects and various Chinese companies are involved in such development projects. The Sino-Afghanistan Special Railway Transportation, Five Nations Railway Project, and CPEC are some of the ventures functioning through cooperation between the two nations.

But the main concern of China is absence of security and stability in Afghanistan.

Due to which even though China is involved in Afghanistan’s domestic and international projects, the uncertainty over proper functioning creates obstacles in the development programs initiated. With constant violence and conflict, the

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infrastructure constructed and investments made by China are at loss. Pakistan is one of the closest allies of China, but its bad relations with Afghanistan may create disagreements and disrupt the cooperation. Since China has tactical leverage over Pakistan, it can pressure the latter for cooperation to a certain extent, as well as Afghanistan may use its “China card” against Pakistan.

However, China has been unable to fully integrate Afghanistan as a member state into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to provide impetus to the assemblage of a regional consensus to drive the Afghan peace process, or even utilize existing multilateral forums such as the Quadrilateral Group Cooperation (QGC) with an aim of providing diplomatic heft to the will of the Afghan government, and thereby a push toward reconciliation. (Shubhangi Pandey, 2019) China is connected to the Afghan government as well as to the Taliban. And based on this factor, China may play an important role in the peace talks between the two parties. China has maintained its bilateral relations with the Afghan government, involving economic, military, security and infrastructure development cooperation. Furthermore, a transactional relationship began to emerge given China’s need for the Taliban to deny Uighur militants safe havens and the Taliban’s need for China to play some advocacy role on its behalf. Starting in 2014, Taliban delegations began to publicly and regularly visit China, culminating in secret talks that China facilitated between Kabul and Taliban in Urumqi. (Yun Sun, 2020) Considering Pakistan’s and China’s influence over Taliban, along with Afghan government’s dependency on China, and the US’s withdrawal, China has indirectly gained an upper hand in Afghanistan’s domestic affairs which is advantageous for it against the Indian influence in the region. China is trying to mediate between Afghanistan and Pakistan by conducting trilateral dialogues. It is consistently making efforts in strengthening the cooperation and coordination between the two geopolitically important neighbouring countries. Following which, recently a meeting between the representatives of China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Nepal was conducted, which emphasized on maintaining regional peace and stability, improving relations, promoting CPEC and the transHimalayan three-dimensional interconnectivity network, between the four Central Asian countries respectively. Therefore, China’s involvement in the matters of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, and other countries, implies its ulterior motive of becoming a global power, while trying to limit India’s role and act as a competitor.

India & Afghanistan Relations: An Overview India’s relations with Afghanistan are dependent on the geopolitical situation in the Indian subcontinent. Afghan government’s inclination towards India keeps on changing based on its relations with Pakistan. But since last decade, India is

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being left out of the Afghanistan – Taliban - US negotiations and peace talks. In December 2001, for example, the Indian team led by special envoy Satinder Lambah arrived in Germany’s Petersburg hotel near Bonn, where the famous Bonn agreement was negotiated, to find no reservations had been made for them at the official venue. In January 2010, India was invited to attend the “London Conference” on Afghanistan, but left out of the room during a crucial meeting that decided on opening talks with the Taliban. (Suhasini Haider, 2020) In April 2020, the United Nations Secretariat held a meeting of the “6+2+1” group that includes six neighbouring countries of Afghanistan: China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; along with the United States and Russia, and Afghanistan, to discuss about the regional efforts needed to be taken so as to achieve peace and stability in Afghanistan. India was not invited to be a part of that meeting nor was it involved in the US – Taliban peace deal.

Considering the current situation in Afghanistan, India’s limited bilateral relationship with the Afghan government, and its resistance to the Taliban, India needs to formulate a beneficial Afghan policy since its more than $2 billion are at stake in Afghanistan. India’s assistance of more than $3 billion in projects, trade of about $1 billion, a $20 billion projected development expenditure of an alternate route through Chabahar, as well as its support to the Afghan National Army, bureaucrats, doctors and other professionals for training in India should assure it a leading position in Afghanistan’s regional formulation but in real the situation is different. (Suhasini Haider, 2020) Moreover, India is left out of the Chahbahar rail project which was going to create a direct link between India and Iran through Afghanistan. The deciding factor behind this incident as well as India’s stagnant relations with Afghan government is the growing Chinese influence and major Chinese investments in the region.

Nonetheless, the amount of threats posed to India’s domestic and international affairs by terrorist and separatist groups are increasing gradually. Even though the US has called upon India to contribute into the peace talks, India has expressed its opposition towards getting directly involved with the Taliban.

Pakistan’s undue influence over the Taliban, thus indirectly supporting anti-India sentiments, along with its issue with the Indian Union Territories of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh is against India’s diplomatic and security interests.

Although India supports the “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan controlled process”, but with the Taliban’s ever-growing presence in Afghanistan, it is getting quite hard for India to stick to its basic views. Therefore, following the recent developments, Indian Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar and Afghanistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Haneef Atmar discussed about the destabilising activities happening in Afghanistan, and how the development partnerships and connectivity linkages between the two countries can be improved. Frequent talks about the peace process are held between the representatives of India, the US, Afghanistan and other neighbouring countries.

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Conclusions The dynamics of Afghan issue involves different state and non-state actors, which can individually and collectively have a drastic effect on the functioning of Afghanistan. Each party involved will act based on what is in its interests.

According to the peace deal, the US will withdraw its security forces up to a limit and not entirely, thus holding certain authority in the country, ready to take action against those who are acting in bad faith for Afghanistan. Even if the probability of any such happening is the least, still while taking into consideration the current US – China conflict, it will be disadvantageous for the US to leave Afghanistan especially when the Chinese influence in the region is continuously increasing. Also, completely trusting Taliban with Afghanistan will be a huge mistake for the future of the world.

China’s anti-terrorism and anti-narcotics efforts are actually limited to itself.

Even if China may use its leverage over Pakistan, still Pakistan is neither independent nor determined enough to act against all the terrorist groups and their activities which are functioning throughout the country. For a moment it might seem advantageous to Pakistan but in the long run it will pose danger to the neighbouring countries as well. Considering the dependence of certain Southeast Asian countries on China, various Central and West Asian countries are also getting added to China’s equation. While India is the only country which is not ready to accept China’s bait, thus challenging its relations with other countries. However, since the security problems in Afghanistan are regionally rooted, China and India can do more to work bilaterally with each other and with Russia, Iran, and Pakistan to help stabilize and develop Afghanistan. (M. Ashraf Haidari, 2018) But such cooperation will be hard to achieve even if the regional or international organizations are involved in the process.

After the US withdrawal, which country will be able to play a significant role in Afghanistan is the question. With the alliance between China and Pakistan, along with their connections with Taliban, probability of their direct influence on the new (or to be) Afghan government and its functioning is greater in comparison to India. Also, since China’s growing involvement in Afghanistan portrays its objective of becoming an economic, geopolitical, and advanced global player, hence India needs to strategically change the affecting factors and perform a vital role in the Afghan peace process as well as its future functioning. India also needs to bear in its mind that whether it is an ally of the US is not clearly defined, so it has to look after itself and not depend on any other country. Also, considering the increasing Chinese aggression towards India, which is supported by Pakistan, India needs to get involved with other neighbouring countries so as to balance the lever of becoming a regional as well as a global power. India needs to find the equilibrium of its Afghanistan dilemma (Taliban and/or Afghan government) and act on it, since prevention is better than cure.

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References 1. 2020. Afghanistan war: What has the conflict cost the US? BBC News. [Online] February 28, 2020. [Cited: August 24, 2020.] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-47391821.

2. Ahmad Bilal Khalil. 2016. The Tangled History of the Afghanistan-India-Pakistan Triangle.

The Diplomat. [Online] December 16, 2016. [Cited: August 26, 2020.] https://thediplomat.com/2016/12/the-tangled-history-of-the-afghanistan-india-pakistantriangle/.

3. Kamran Haider. 2020. Pakistan invites Taliban, China to discuss Afghanistan peace talks aimed at ending 19-yr war. The Print. [Online] August 24, 2020. [Cited: August 26, 2020.] https://theprint.in/world/pakistan-invites-taliban-china-to-discuss-afghanistan-peace-talksaimed-at-ending-19-yr-war/488425/.

4. M. Ashraf Haidari. 2018. How China and India Can Help Secure the Peace in Afghanistan. The Diplomat.

[Online] August 7, 2018.

[Cited: August 26, 2020.] https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/how-china-and-india-can-help-secure-the-peace-inafghanistan/.

5. Shubhangi Pandey. 2019. Can China Drive the Afghan Peace Process? The Diplomat. [Online] May 18, 2019. [Cited: August 27, 2020.] https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/can-china-drive-theafghan-peace-process/.

6. . 2019. Understanding China’s Afghanistan policy: From calculated indifference to strategic engagement. Observer Research Foundation. [Online] August 6, 2019. [Cited: August 27, 2020.] https://www.orfonline.org/research/understanding-chinas-afghanistan-policy-fromcalculated-indifference-strategic-engagement-54126/.

7. Suhasini Haider. 2020. Afghan peace and India’s elbow room. The Hindu. [Online] April 30, 2020. [Cited: August 28, 2020.] https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/afghan-peace-andindias-elbow-room/article31466678.ece.

8. 2020. The Devastating Paradox of Pakistan. The Atlantic. [Online] March 2020. [Cited: August 24, 2020.] https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/03/the-pakistantrap/550895/.

9. Yun Sun. 2020. CHINA’S STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT OF AFGHANISTAN. War On The Rocks.

[Online] April 8, 2020. [Cited: August 27, 2020.] https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/chinasstrategic-assessment-of-afghanistan/.

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