Livro da 3ª Conferência de Lisboa "Desenvolvimento em Tempos de Incerteza" by IMVF

ConferĂŞncia Conference Desenvolvimento em tempos de incerteza Development in an age of uncertainty

3 2018

ConferĂŞncia Conference Desenvolvimento em tempos de incerteza Development in an age of uncertainty

Com o alto patrocĂnio do Presidente da RepĂşblica Under the high patronage

3 2018

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DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

Índice Table of contents

Prefácio Foreword ................................................................................................................... 7 A 3ª Conferência de Lisboa The 3rd Lisbon Conference . ................................................................ 9 Programa Program . ................................................................................................................ 18

A SEGURANÇA SECURITY Terrorismo e Disputas Estratégicas Terrorism and Strategic Disputes Ivan Timofeev ............................................................................................................. 67 Mary Kaldor ................................................................................................................... 69 Ana Santos Pinto ....................................................................................................... 73 Debate...................................................................................................................................... 78

ABERTURA OPENING Guilherme d’Oliveira Martins ......................................................................... 29 Francisco Seixas da Costa .............................................................................. 31 Michelle Bachelet . ................................................................................................. 33 Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa ................................................................................ 35 O PODER POWER A Geopolítica na Caixa de Pandora Geopolicy meets Pandora’s Box George Friedman ..................................................................................................... 45 José Félix Ribeiro ...................................................................................................... 50 Fernando Jorge Cardoso .................................................................................... 52 Debate ..................................................................................................................................... 56

A GLOBALIZAÇÃO GLOBALIZATION Será a Globalização Reversível? How Reversible is Globalization? Montek Ahluwalia..................................................................................................... 89 Daniel Hamilton. ......................................................................................................... 93 Raquel Vaz-Pinto........................................................................................................ 99 Debate ................................................................................................................................. 108 O PLANETA THE PLANET A Instável Sustentabilidade do Planeta The Unstable Sustainability of the Planet Kitty van der Heijden ......................................................................................... 119 Victor Alcobia ........................................................................................................... 131 António Costa Silva ...............................................................................................137 Debate . ...................................................................................................................... 142

AS PESSOAS PEOPLE Classes Médias em Caminhos Divergentes Middle Classes on Diverging Tracks Alfredo Valladão . .................................................................................................. 151 Wang Yiwei . .............................................................................................................. 157 Bruno Cardoso Reis . ........................................................................................... 165

ENCERRAMENTO CLOSING Luís Amado . ............................................................................................................... 199 Fernando Medina .................................................................................................... 203

Debate . ...................................................................................................................... 168

O Clube de Lisboa The Lisbon Club ...........................................................................................223

A EUROPA EUROPE Dilemas e Tendências da Integração Integration Dilemmas and Trends Philippe Marlière .................................................................................................... 177 Federiga Bindi ........................................................................................................... 183 Marina Costa Lobo ................................................................................................ 187 Debate . ...................................................................................................................... 192

Biografias Short Bios . ........................................................................................................ 207

Organizadores e Apoios Organizers and Support .....................................................................224

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Conferência de Lisboa – 3 _ 2018 Lisbon Conference – 3

Conferência de Lisboa – 3 _ 2017 Lisbon Conference – 3

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

Prefácio Foreword Organizadas pelo Clube de Lisboa, as Conferências de Lisboa ofereceram mais uma vez, em 2018, uma agenda rica em temas atuais ligados à segurança e ao desenvolvimento, pretendendo consolidar uma imagem de Lisboa como polo central da discussão dos grandes temas internacionais que afetam a vida das nossas sociedades. A presença de S.Exa. o Presidente da República e o alto patrocínio da Presidência muito nos honraram nesta edição. A mensagem de Michelle Bachelet, antiga presidente do Chile e atual Alta Comissária das Nações Unidas para os Direitos Humanos, e o keynote speech de George Friedman, um dos especialistas em geopolítica mais conhecidos e conceituados do mundo, deram o mote para os trabalhos da conferência. Esta contou com cerca de três dezenas de oradores, que muito enriqueceram o debate com as suas intervenções e perspetivas. Na conferência foi também assinado um protocolo de colaboração entre o Clube de Lisboa e o g7+, organização intergovernamental de países frágeis ou afetados por conflitos. Privilegiamos, cada vez mais, a realização de atividades em parceria, pois só assim poderemos envolver todos os interessados em debates diversificados e mobilizadores. Este livro apresenta as intervenções e resume os debates da 3ª Conferência de Lisboa. Os textos resultam da edição dos discursos orais transcritos. As intervenções iniciais dos oradores e os debates destes com os moderadores são apresentados na língua em que foram proferidos, sendo os debates com a audiência resumidos em língua portuguesa. Agradecemos a todos os oradores e participantes, às instituições organizadoras, aos patrocinadores e aos colaboradores que tornaram possível a realização desta Conferência. Esperamos que continuem a acompanhar as várias atividades do Clube de Lisboa e marcamos desde já encontro para 2020, na 4ª Conferência de Lisboa.

Organized by the Lisbon Club, the Lisbon Conferences provided once again in 2018 a relevant agenda of current security and development-related themes, aimed at reinforcing Lisbon’s image as a central hub for debating major international issues that affect our lives and societies. The participation of His Excellency the President of Portugal and the high patronage of the Portuguese Presidency was a great honor for us. The message sent by Michelle Bachelet, former president of Chile and currently United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the keynote speech by George Friedman, one of the most renowned geopolitical experts in the world, set the tone for the panels and debates. The conference gathered around 30 speakers that enriched the discussions with their presentations and views. A cooperation protocol was signed at the conference, between the Lisbon Club and the g7+, an intergovernmental organization of fragile or conflict-affected countries. We value partnerships, because it is the only way of engaging all relevant stakeholders in diverse and mobilizing debates. This book includes the presentations and summarizes the debates of the 3rd Lisbon Conference. The texts result from the editing of the recorded oral speeches. The initial introductory speeches and the comments from the discussants are presented in the language in which they were delivered, and the debates with the audience are summarized in Portuguese. We wish to thank all the speakers and participants, the organizing institutions, the sponsors and the team that made this endeavor possible. We hope you will continue to follow the Lisbon Club initiatives and we expect to see you in 2020, at the 4th Lisbon Conference.

O Conselho Diretivo do Clube de Lisboa

The Board of Directors of the Lisbon Club

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

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A 3ª CONFERÊNCIA DE LISBOA THE 3RD LISBON CONFERENCE

Da geopolítica à segurança, da globalização à sustentabilidade do planeta, do desenvolvimento global aos desafios da União Europeia, foi assim o debate sobre o desenvolvimento em tempos de incerteza. From geopolitics to security, from globalization to the planet’s sustainability,

from global development to European Union’s challenges, all these issues were included in the debates about development in an age of uncertainty.

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O T programa da conferência e os debates realizados salientaram a imprevisibilidade como um fator constitutivo das relações internacionais, num contexto mundial de grande instabilidade na atuação dos principais atores globais e de fortes tensões no cenário internacional, pondo em causa equilíbrios que tínhamos por adquiridos e, muito em particular, colocando em risco os mecanismos multilaterais e a própria democracia. Na sessão de abertura, isso mesmo foi salientado pelo Presidente da República, que alertou para a existência de uma “tempestade quase perfeita”, provavelmente irreversível em várias áreas, que condiciona o desenvolvimento humano. As perspetivas geopolíticas foram debatidas na sessão sobre O PODER, onde se analisou o contexto mundial particularmente após a crise financeira de 2008, em que a interdependência se tornou um facto inegável e o nacionalismo continua a ser um elemento constante. Com a China a sentir o peso da concorrência à produção, com a Arábia Saudita a sentir a crise do petróleo, e com uma nova administração americana focada no “America first”, a Europa continua a resistir a um governo centralizado e a viver os problemas do seu processo de integração, incluindo a gestão do Brexit. Como salientou George Friedman na sessão, estamos num mundo em que as belas análises e papers produzidos em Bruxelas e em Washington se tornam irrelevantes, com a narrativa a escapar-nos por entre os dedos face à aceleração das dinâmicas e à transformação da realidade. E se esta não é a posição mais confortável para estar, mais desconfortável ela se torna ao alimentarmos a ilusão que controlamos o rumo da história.

he conference’s program and debates highlighted unpredictability as an inherent factor of international relations, in a global context of great instability in global actors’ interventions and strong tensions in the global arena. This brings into question the formerly prevailing balances and particularly puts at risk multilateral mechanisms and democracy itself. This was pointed out by the President of the Portuguese Republic in the opening session, in which he warned about an “almost perfect storm” probably irreversible in many areas, that jeopardizes human development. Geopolitical prospects were discussed in the panel about POWER. The world context after the 2008 financial crisis was analyzed, in which interdependence has become an undeniable fact and nationalism is still a constant feature. In a context where China feels the burden of competition to production, Saudi Arabia experiences an oil crisis and the new US administration is focused on “America first” (although protectionism in not new), Europa still resists to a centralized government and is immersed in its integration problems, including the Brexit process. As George Friedman pointed out in this session, we are in a world where the beautiful papers and analyzes produced in Brussels and Washington became irrelevant, and the narratives slip through our fingers in face of the acceleration and transformation of dynamics and realities. And if this is not the most comfortable position to be, the more uncomfortable it becomes as we feed the illusion of controlling the course of history. The interlinkages between extremist violence, economic interests and geostrategic disputes were approached in the

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A interligação entre violência extremista, interesses económicos e disputas geoestratégicas foi analisada no painel sobre A SEGURANÇA, numa sessão onde estiveram proeminentes as relações entre a Rússia e a União Europeia, marcadas pela recente tensão diplomática com o Reino Unido, em que as sanções à Rússia serviram essencialmente objetivos de política interna (tanto para o Reino Unido como para o regime de Putin). As respostas internacionais ao conflito sírio e a guerra ao terrorismo estiveram também no centro dos debates, com uma abordagem mais pessimista, quer pelo facto de o mundo ter estado à beira de um confronto militar entre EUA e Rússia, no caso sírio, quer pela descoordenação e visões diferentes no combate ao terrorismo, que passa mesmo pela divergência quanto à definição de terrorismo e de quem são os “inimigos”. A Síria e a Líbia foram referidos como expressão de um novo tipo de guerra, marcada por condições sociais anárquicas em que vários grupos manipulam a violência, espalhando ideologias baseadas no medo e tirando dividendos económicos. A dificuldade de gestão e resolução deste tipo de conflitos é evidente, na medida em que a abordagem militar e a clássica diplomacia não são suficientes, sendo necessárias abordagens assentes na criação de justiça e de legitimidade democrática, numa perspetiva de mais longo-prazo. No painel seguinte, referiu-se a necessidade de analisar mais em profundidade a relação entre A GLOBALIZAÇÃO e a difusão do poder no mundo atual: difusão de poder dos Estados para grupos diversos, para o nível supranacional, entre outros fluxos. A coexistência de um mundo centrado nos Estados, ligado às fronteiras, à soberania, às instituições centralizadas, com um mundo ligado por fluxos, o mundo das redes, das conexões e dos dados, das economias digitais, com impactos negativos e positivos, traz-nos diferentes tipos de desafios, em termos da segurança e do desenvolvimento. A gestão atual das migrações são um exemplo da aplicação de abordagens tradicionais/territoriais de segurança a uma realidade que diz respeito a fluxos e redes. Neste contexto, assistimos a um grande défice na governação global, com as instituições políticas não adaptadas à globalização, o que gera descontentamento e uma dissociação com as aspirações dos povos. A nova normalidade é não existirem certezas: os partidos políticos tradicionais fragmentam-se 14 _

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panel on SECURITY. The relations between Russia and the European Union were prominent in this session, marked by the recent diplomatic tensions with the UK, where sanctions to Russia fulfilled mainly internal policy purposes (both for the UK government and Putin regime). The international responses to the Syrian conflict and the war on terror were discussed, with a more pessimistic approach, either because the world has been on the verge of a US-Russian military confrontation in the Syrian case, or because of the lack of coordination and different views in the fight against terrorism, which even goes through the divergence regarding the definition of terrorism and who the “enemies” are. Syria and Libya are an expression of a new type of wars, characterized by anarchic social conditions in which various groups manipulate violence, spreading ideologies based on fear and drawing economic dividends. Syria and Libya are an expression of a new type of wars, characterized by anarchic social conditions in which various groups manipulate violence, spreading ideologies based on fear and drawing economic dividends. There is a clear difficulty in managing and resolving this type of conflicts, as the military approach and classical diplomacy are not enough, and an engagement based on the reinforcement of justice and democratic legitimacy are necessary, within a longer-term approach. In the next panel the participants mentioned the need for a deeper understanding about the linkages between GLOBALIZATION and power diffusion in the world today: transfer of power from the State to various groups, or to the supranational level, among other dynamics. The coexistence of a state-centered world (anchored in borders, sovereignty, centralized institutions) with a world connected by flows (organized around networks, connectivity and data, digital economies), has negative and positive impacts, and brings in various challenges both on security and development. The current management of migrations is an example of the implementation of traditional / territorial security approaches in a reality that relates to flows and networks. In this framework, we witness a major deficit in global governance. Political institutions were not adapted to globalization, and this in turn triggers discontent and a dissociation from the people’s aspirations. The new normality is a lack of

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

e a direita e a esquerda perdem-se em divisões internas, sendo a maior fratura atual entre aqueles que defendem a abertura e os que preferem o protecionismo e o nacionalismo. Outra questão é o impacto que a evolução tecnológica, a robótica e a inteligência artificial terão na recuperação da economia e na organização das sociedades. O sistema tem de funcionar de forma a que as pessoas não se sintam excluídas; no fundo, a pergunta de base para cada um é: “is globalization working for you?” Na sessão sobre O PLANETA, ficou evidente a insustentabilidade do modelo atual e global de desenvolvimento, em que continuamos obcecados pelo crescimento económico contínuo e exponencial, apesar das evidências científicas sobre a urgência de alteração do paradigma. Se é verdade que a União Europeia tem feito um grande esforço de diminuição das emissões de gases com efeito de estufa, nos maiores países em desenvolvimento essas emissões estão a aumentar, como é o caso da China e da Índia. A previsão é que as economias emergentes continuem a crescer, mesmo que o crescimento abrande nos países industrializados e o seu papel é, portanto, fundamental nas respostas globais às alterações climáticas, nas opções sobre os modelos de crescimento económico e sobre a matriz energética. Nestes países - mesmo estando a China e Índia entre os principais investidores nas energias renováveis e em fontes menos poluentes - a transição energética não se está a processar ao ritmo necessário para evitar consequências graves. É preciso mudar globalmente mentalidades, modelos de negócio, hábitos de consumo, bem como mudar a forma de organização das cidades, onde vive uma parcela cada vez maior da humanidade. A esperança é que se consiga acelerar esta mudança por razões económicas, ou seja, pelo facto de as energias menos poluentes serem, cada vez mais, uma aposta economicamente inteligente, que gera lucro, emprego e desenvolvimento. Neste contexto, é fundamental a intervenção pública – e as políticas só mudam se alterações climáticas e a poluição forem um risco para a economia. Todas estas questões estiveram presentes no painel sobre AS PESSOAS, onde se salientou a previsão de as classes médias serem formadas por mais de 3 mil milhões de pessoas em 2050, apesar de “a classe média dos pobres ser diferente da classe média dos ricos”. A classe média é que compra bens

certainty: traditional political parties are fragmented and both right and left indulge in internal divisions, while there is a major fracture between those who advocate for greater openness and those calling for more protectionism and nationalism. Another issue is the impact that technological developments, robotics and artificial intelligence will have on economic recovery and in the organization of our societies. The system must work in a way that people don’t feel excluded and the basic question for each one should be “is globalization working for you?” In the panel about the PLANET, the unsustainability of the current global development model became clear, as we still are obsessed with continuous and exponential economic growth, despite scientific evidence about the need for an urgent paradigm shift. While the European Union has developed considerable efforts in diminishing greenhouse gas emissions, emissions are rising in the largest developing countries, such as in China and India. Emerging economies are expected to continue to grow, even as growth slows in industrialized countries, are therefore they have a key role in global responses to climate change, in the available options on economic growth models and the energy mix. While China and India are among the major investors in renewables and less polluting energy sources, the energy transition is not happening at the necessary pace to avoid serious consequences. We need to globally change mentalities, business models, consumption patterns and also the way cities are organized, has an increasing share of the world population lives in urban centers. Hopefully this change will be accelerated by economic reasons, namely by the fact that less polluting energies are an increasingly cost-effective and economically wise investment, which generates profit, jobs and development. Public policies and intervention are crucial in this context – and policies only change if climate change and pollution are serious threats to the economy. All these issues were also addressed in the session on PEOPLE. More than 3 billion people are estimated to constitute the middle class in 2050, although “the middle class means very different things for the poor and for the rich”. Middle class is fundamental to buy consumer goods (durable or not) and today there is a mass production for a mass consumption,

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de consumo (duráveis ou não) e hoje há uma produção em massa para um consumo em massa, mas aquilo que ajudou a criar consumidores acabou por estragar o emprego. Só agora começamos a ver e a perceber alguns efeitos da revolução industrial tecnológica em curso, em sociedades fragmentadas e conectadas, nomeadamente sobre os padrões do trabalho e sobre o Estado social, questões amplamente debatidas nesta sessão. A forma como produzimos, consumimos e comunicamos está em rápida mutação, sendo necessário ter uma abordagem da realidade que vá para além do cálculo do PIB e da produtividade. No painel, foi também abordado o papel mundial da China, onde a expressão “crise” também significa “oportunidade”. Por fim, os dilemas e tendências da integração na EUROPA foram o tema central do último painel, onde se analisaram várias facetas do populismo que cresce nos vários países europeus, desde o populismo do norte da Europa, muito ligado ao tema da imigração, ao populismo forte do leste europeu, ligado a um novo nacionalismo. Os oradores interrogaram-se sobre se Bruxelas está a fazer o que é necessário para manter o projeto europeu, concluindo que a União Europeia não é menos democrática do que os seus países membros e que o futuro europeu depende dos governos destes últimos. Os efeitos negativos do Brexit, a forma como os Estados Unidos vêm a Europa, a evolução histórica de uma Europa espremida entre a Rússia e os Estados Unidos, as relações franco-germânicas e o novo papel da política externa francesa no contexto europeu foram igualmente debatidos. Na sessão de encerramento das Conferências, foi expressa a preocupação pela época de incerteza global e de retrocesso dos valores de afirmação identitária da Europa. O Presidente da Câmara Municipal de Lisboa afirmou a importância das grandes cidades europeias na luta contra o retrocesso dos valores e direitos, defendendo o papel das cidades como polos de defesa da diversidade e da inclusão. Este é o tempo de afirmação dos direitos fundamentais das pessoas, em que a reflexão tem de ser acompanhada da ação e em que a cidadania deve ser expressa ativamente.

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although what helped to create consumers also had negative effects on employment. We are only now starting to see and understand the impacts of the ongoing technological/industrial revolution in fragmented and connected societies, including on work patterns and on the welfare State. The way we produce, consume and communicate is changing rapidly, and there’s a need for new approaches that go beyond GDP and productivity measures. The global role of China was also discussed, where the word “crisis” also means “opportunity”. Finally, the integration dilemmas and trends in EUROPE were the central focus of the last panel. The various faces of populism rising in several European countries were addressed, from the North European populism linked to immigration issues to the Eastern European strong populism linked to a new nationalism. The speakers questioned if Brussels is doing what is necessary to preserve the European project, concluding that the European Union is no less democratic than its member states and that the European future relies on the hands of the national governments. The negative effects of Brexit, the way the United States perceive Europe, the historical developments of a European continent squeezed between Russia and the United States, Franco-German relations and the new role of French foreign policy in the European context were also discussed. In the closing session, concerns were raised about these times of global uncertainty and decline of the values that were crucial for European identity affirmation The Mayor of Lisbon stressed the importance of big European cities in fighting against the regression of values and rights, and underlined the role of cities as centers for tolerance, diversity and inclusiveness. This is the time to defend people’s fundamental rights, to turn ideas into concrete actions and to actively express our citizenship.

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

Programa 3MAI2018

Program 3MAY2018

quinta-feira

thursday

10h00 Opening

10h00 Abertura

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Guilherme d'Oliveira Martins Administrador da Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian Francisco Seixas da Costa Presidente das Conferências de Lisboa Michelle Bachelet Antiga presidente do Chile (mensagem de vídeo) Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa Presidente da República Portuguesa

Guilherme d'Oliveira Martins Trustee of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation Francisco Seixas da Costa Chairman of the Lisbon Conferences Michelle Bachelet Former presidente of Chile (vídeo message) Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa President of the Portuguese Republic

11h00 O PODER A Geopolítica na Caixa de Pandora

11h00 POWER Geopolicy meets Pandora’s Box

Quais as implicações da visão da nova administração americana sobre o papel dos EUA no mundo? Em que medida o ressurgimento de potências regionais afeta os cenários geopolíticos? A evolução política e militar no Médio Oriente, na península da Coreia, na Europa de Leste e nas fronteiras da Rússia indicia a eventual eclosão de conflitos regionais ou globais destrutivos?

What geopolitical implications arise from the “America first” positioning on global matters? How does the rise of old and new regional powers affect geopolitical scenarios? Do changes in the military and political situation in the Korean Peninsula as well as in Eastern Europe and Russian borders signal the likelihood of outbreaking of regional, global destructive conflicts?

George Friedman Fundador, Geopolitical Futures, Austin José Félix Ribeiro Consultor do Conselho de Administração da Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian Fernando Jorge Cardoso IMVF, Diretor executivo do Clube de Lisboa CHAIR Alberto Laplaine Guimarães Secretário-Geral, Câmara Municipal de Lisboa

George Friedman Founder, Geopolitical Futures, Austin José Félix Ribeiro Consultant, Administration Board of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation Fernando Jorge Cardoso IMVF, Executive Director of the Lisbon Club CHAIR Alberto Laplaine Guimarães Secretary-General, Lisbon Municipality

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DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

14h30 A SEGURANÇA Terrorismo e Disputas Estratégicas

14h30 SECURITY Terrorism and Strategic Disputes

Que cruzamentos se verificam entre a violência extremista, interesses económicos e disputas geoestratégicas? Como combater regimes totalitários e opressores sem que o seu fim leve à ocorrência de desastres humanitários e à instalação do caos? Como criar aliados para o combate ao terrorismo sem perpetuar, apoiar ou legitimar regimes ditatoriais?

Is there a tendency for violent extremism to collude with larger economic interests and geostrategic disputes? How can we fight totalitarian and aggressive regimes without causing humanitarian disasters or fuelling the creation of “chaos zones”? How can we build alliances to fight terrorism without supporting, nurturing or courting dictatorship and criminal regimes?

Ivan Timofeev Diretor de Programas, Russian International Affairs Council, Moscovo Mary Kaldor Professora, London School of Economics and Political Science, Londres Ana Santos Pinto Professora Auxiliar, Universidade Nova de Lisboa CHAIR Vítor Ramalho Secretário-Geral, União das Cidades Capitais de Língua Portuguesa - UCCLA, Lisboa

Ivan Timofeev Director of Programs, Russian International Affairs Council, Moscow Mary Kaldor Professor, London School of Economics and Political Science Ana Santos Pinto Assistant Professor, Nova Lisbon University Chair Vítor Ramalho Secretary-General, Lusophone Countries’ Capitals Union UCCLA, Lisbon

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16h30 A GLOBALIZAÇÃO Será a Globalização Reversível?

16h30 GLOBALIZATION How Reversible is Globalization?

Estaremos a entrar numa fase de predomínio do nacionalismo protecionista e do bilateralismo em vez da concertação global e do multilateralismo? Estará o capitalismo clientelar a alimentar este rumo e a contornar e substituir as regras do mercado livre? Onde se enquadram a China e as outras economias emergentes e em desenvolvimento nestas tendências? Montek Ahluwalia Antigo Vice-Presidente da Comissão de Planeamento da Índia, Nova Deli Daniel Hamilton Fundador e Diretor Executivo, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Washington Raquel Vaz-Pinto Investigadora do Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais (IPRI-UNL) CHAIR António Rebelo de Sousa Presidente, Sociedade para o Financiamento do Desenvolvimento - SOFID, Lisboa

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Are we entering a new phase of protectionism and bilateralism and leaving behind multilateral, global understandings? Is crony capitalism feeding this course, circumventing the rules of the free market? How are China and other emerging and developing countries coping and dealing with these trends? Montek Ahluwalia Former Vice-President of the India Planning Commission, New Delhi Daniel Hamilton Founding Director, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Washington Raquel Vaz-Pinto Researcher, Portuguese Institute of International Relations (IPRI-UNL) CHAIR António Rebelo de Sousa Chairman, Development Finance Society - SOFID, Lisbon

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4MAI2018

4MAY2018

9h30 O PLANETA A Instável Sustentabilidade do Planeta

9h30 THE PLANET The Unstable Sustainability of the Planet

Estará a matriz energética mundial a mudar a ritmos adequados? As energias renováveis e as tecnologias não-poluentes estão a ganhar a competição económica e de rentabilidade contra as energias fósseis? Qual a verdadeira força e impacto global dos atores que negam a influência humana na aceleração das mudanças climáticas?

Are energy consumption patterns changing fast enough to save the Planet? Are renewables and non-pollutant technologies winning the cost-effectiveness competition against fossil fuels? How effective and influential are the players and interests that deny human responsibility on climate change accelerations?

Kitty van der Heijden Diretora Europa e África, World Resources Institute, Haia & Adis Abeba Victor Alcobia Diretor de Projetos, Beicip-Franlab, Paris António Costa Silva Presidente da Comissão Executiva, Partex Oil & Gas, Lisboa CHAIR Clara Carvalho Professora Auxiliar, ISCTE-IUL e Presidente do Grupo de Estudos Interdisciplinares África-Europa (AEGIS)

Kitty van der Heijden Europe and Africa Director, World Resources Institute, The Hague & Addis Ababa Victor Alcobia Project Director, Beicip-Franlab, Paris António Costa Silva Executive Chairman, Partex Oil & Gas, Lisbon CHAIR Clara Carvalho Assistant Professor, ISCTE-IUL, President of the Africa-Europe Group for Interdisciplinary Studies (AEGIS)

sexta-feira

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friday

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

11h30 AS PESSOAS Classes Médias em Caminhos Divergentes

11h30 PEOPLE Middle Classes on Diverging Tracks

Diminuição da pobreza absoluta e aumento da concentração de riqueza são duas faces do mesmo modelo ou resultam de diferentes políticas? Serão a abertura de mercados e a deslocalização compatíveis com a preservação dos níveis de vida das classes médias nos países industrializados? Como interagem estas políticas e realidades com o populismo e a xenofobia?

Are the decrease of absolute poverty and the increase of wealth of the top 1% two sides of the same growth model or are they a product of unrelated policies? Can opening markets and deregulation be accommodated with preserving living standards in mature economies? Are these factors and policies fuelling populism and xenophobia?

Alfredo Valladão Professor, Sciences Po, Paris Wang Yiwei Diretor, Instituto de Relações Internacionais, Renmin University, Pequim Bruno Cardoso Reis ISCTE-IUL CHAIR Paulo Telles de Freitas Presidente do Conselho de Administração, Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr - IMVF, Lisboa

Alfredo Valladão Professor, Sciences Po, Paris Wang Yiwei Director, Institute of International Affairs, Renmin University of China, Beijing Bruno Cardoso Reis ISCTE-IUL CHAIR Paulo Telles de Freitas Chairman, Institute Marquês de Valle Flôr - IMVF, Lisbon

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14h30 A EUROPA Dilemas e Tendências da Integração

14h30 EUROPE Integration Dilemmas and Trends

Após crises sucessivas que aprofundaram clivagens entre cidadãos, políticos e instituições da UE, o populismo parece estar a recuar e o crescimento dá sinais de retorno. Poderá a Europa renovar o pacto democrático com os cidadãos? Serão os dilemas do multiculturalismo e da assimilação resolúveis? Poderá a UE responder aos desafios estratégicos da Rússia, Turquia, China e dos EUA?

After successive crises that helped to deepen divergences between citizens and EU politicians and Institutions, now that signs of growth emerge will populism recede? Can Europe renew its democratic pact with its citizens? Can it confront assimilation vs multiculturalism dilemmas? Is the EU able to respond to a strategic encirclement by Russia, Turkey, China and the US?

Philippe Marlière Professor, University College of London Federiga Bindi Professora, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Studies, Washington Marina Costa Lobo Investigadora Principal do ICS Universidade de Lisboa (ICS-UL) CHAIR: Miguel Anacoreta Correia Presidente da Mesa da Assembleia Geral, Clube de Lisboa

Philippe Marlière Professor, University College of London Federiga Bindi Professor, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Studies, Washington Marina Costa Lobo Senior Research Fellow, ICS, University of Lisbon CHAIR Miguel Anacoreta Correia Chairman of the General Assembly Board, Lisbon Club

16h00 Debate

17h00 Encerramento

17h00 Closing

Luís Amado Presidente do Clube de Lisboa Fernando Medina Presidente da Câmara Municipal de Lisboa

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Luís Amado Chairman of the Lisbon Club Fernando Medina Mayor of Lisbon

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ABERTURA OPENING

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Guilherme d’Oliveira Martins Administrador da Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian

Trustee of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation

ivemos uma situação paradoxal, havendo, mais do que nunca, necessidade de Europa, de coordenação de políticas, de gestão de espaços e territórios e de partilha de responsabilidades. Presenciamos a multiplicação de uma atitude puramente defensiva, baseada no temor e no receio das diferenças. Como aconteceu nos anos 30 do século XX, em lugar da cooperação surge a reação protecionista, no momento em que se torna indispensável distinguir os diversos níveis de subsidiariedade. A dimensão local e a participação dos cidadãos devem ser incentivadas, uma vez que permitem um melhor acompanhamento e responsabilidade na administração dos recursos disponíveis. Os corpos intermédios devem-se tornar-se instituições de mediação, capazes de favorecer a participação e a partilha de responsabilidades; por exemplo, os orçamentos participativos devem constituir oportunidades para a adoção de prioridades que vão ao encontro dos mais legítimos interesses da comunidade e de uma integração equilibrada das pessoas e dos cidadãos. Urge compreender que, na expressão de Denis de Rougemont, o Estado hoje tornou-se grande demais e pequeno demais para responder à moderna realidade social. É grande demais porque o centralismo e a burocracia tendem a esque-

cer os problemas concretos e as especificidades dos microcosmos sociais que formamos; mas o Estado é também pequeno demais, uma vez que em questões como o meio ambiente, a prevenção das mudanças climáticas, a segurança, a defesa e a causa da paz, torna-se indispensável reunir esforços e garantir coordenações que favoreçam as complementaridades. O princípio da subsidiariedade não é, assim, uma abstração. Importa perceber o que deve ser resolvido na proximidade e o que exige coordenação e visão de conjunto, e que as lógicas nacional e supranacional têm de ganhar o seu espaço próprio. O reforço dos parlamentos nacionais é uma resposta necessária, de modo a que exista um encadeamento eficaz de decisões e os cidadãos possam ter voz ativa e senti-lo. A oposição entre democracia representativa e democracia participativa é um falso dilema, uma vez que a representação e a participação são faces da mesma moeda, como o são a liberdade e a igualdade, a igualdade e a diferença, os direitos e os deveres, ou a igualdade de oportunidades e a correção permanente das desigualdades. No fundo, a democracia só pode aperfeiçoar-se a partir das ideias de imperfeição e de perfectibilidade. Na União Europeia, volta a falar-se da “estratégia da porta de trás”, defendida por Jean Monnet em meados dos anos 50. Tratava-se de voltar aos desafios do funcionalismo e do gradualismo, depois da tentativa de andar mais rapidamente. Se é fundamental ter objetivos ambiciosos, também é indispensável

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haver uma preocupação de eficiência e de equidade, de equilíbrio e de partilha de soberanias. Não se trata de fazer uma nova nação europeia ou de replicar a experiência norte-americana, mas sim de construirmos uma União Europeia de direito, cuja legitimidade é dupla, envolvendo os Estados e os cidadãos. Infelizmente, desvanece-se a memória da tragédia da última guerra. O sistema atual de polaridades difusas obriga à procura de sinergias eficazes e o mercado, só por si, não resolverá os graves problemas com que nos deparamos. Impõe-se regressar ao planeamento estratégico e à adoção de medidas que permitam a realização de investimentos reprodutivos, sendo esta a única forma de romper o ciclo de empobrecimento. Temos de regressar à velha regra de ouro das finanças públicas, defendida por Alexander Hamilton entre os pais fundadores

sistema monetário europeu apressou a união monetária, sem a necessária contrapartida económica de investimento e de emprego. Com um orçamento comunitário ainda diminuto e insuscetível de realizar uma verdadeira coesão económica e social, tornou-se impossível completar pela economia a união monetária. Eduardo Lourenço tem repetido, com a lucidez que lhe conhecemos, que a Europa se define na sua relação com o que não é Europa, ou seja, só sabemos o que é Europa quando estamos fora da Europa. Na Europa, nós Portugueses temos uma experiência normal, é como a experiência de quem está em casa, e existe até uma pluralidade de casas que, mais ou menos, têm afinidades entre elas: isso é a Europa. Há ameaças, perigos, indiferença e acomodação, mas perante tantos sinais de incerteza,

Há ameaças, perigos, indiferença e acomodação, mas perante tantos sinais de incerteza, persiste a miragem positiva de uma Europa melhor. dos Estados Unidos, segundo a qual podem contrair-se empréstimos, desde que sejam para realizar investimentos reprodutivos, devidamente avaliados, com resultados demonstráveis em termos de coesão, de sustentabilidade e de emprego. O modelo europeu defendido por Jean Monnet e Robert Schuman abrangia a solidariedade atlântica, a partilha de soberanias, um gradualismo, funcionalismo e um sistema europeu de paz e segurança. A alternativa entre aprofundamento e alargamento colocou-se no final dos anos 80, antes da queda do muro de Berlim, mas o fim da Guerra Fria e do império soviético forçou a lógica do alargamento e da subalternização da consolidação ditada por esse aprofundamento. A crise do

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persiste a miragem positiva de uma Europa melhor. Contudo, a Europa que se fecha é incapaz de levantar voo. Importa tirar lições, procurando caminhos que permitam encontrar a defesa de um pequeno e eficaz núcleo de interesses e valores comuns. A crise europeia deve-se à ausência de um ideal mobilizador, à falta de uma coordenação política capaz de romper com a estagnação e de assegurar uma convergência social que permita aos cidadãos europeus sentirem-se não sé participantes, mas também incluídos num desenvolvimento humano justo, baseado na qualidade de vida, no bem-estar e também, essencialmente, no valor fundamental da Europa: o respeito pela dignidade humana.

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Francisco Seixas da Costa Presidente das Conferências de Lisboa

Chairman of the Lisbon Conferences

omeço, naturalmente, por agradecer, em nome do Clube de Lisboa, que organiza este encontro que tenho o gosto de dirigir, a amabilidade que o Senhor Presidente teve ao conseguir encontrar tempo, na sua carregada agenda, para nos honrar com a sua presença, nesta sessão inaugural da 3ª Conferência de Lisboa. Conhecendo-o, Senhor Presidente, sei que a sua adesão a um evento desta natureza, em cuja substância se situam temáticas que lhe não são indiferentes, é sincera e empenhada. Mas, nem por isso, deixo de reiterar o meu profundo agradecimento pelo prestígio que a sua presença hoje nos traz. Uma vez mais, queremos agradecer à Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, na pessoa do meu querido amigo Guilherme de Oliveira Martins, a generosidade do seu acolhimento. A Gulbenkian nunca nos falha, aliás, a Gulbenkian nunca falhou a este país. Uma palavra de reconhecimento é devida às diversas instituições que se prontificaram a ajudar à organização deste encontro, contribuindo das mais variadas formas. O seu nome está assinalado nos documentos que hoje distribuímos. Mas não posso deixar de destacar, dentre essas mesmas entidades, duas que, de um modo muito particular, sempre deram um contributo decisivo para que estas Conferências fossem possíveis:

o Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros e a Câmara Municipal de Lisboa. Finalmente, last but not least, quero deixar uma palavra de grande apreço pelo esforço de todos os oradores, alguns vindos de bem longe, e que, sem a menor retribuição financeira, e apenas pelo gosto de participarem neste exercício, aqui estarão a partilhar o seu saber connosco. A eles, muito em especial, muito obrigado. Gostava de dizer que as Conferências de Lisboa são uma espécie de “sopa da pedra”, feita de generosidades, de boas vontades e, quero também crer, do interesse genuíno em ir mais longe no debate de ideias sobre as grandes questões globais, em que todos estamos empenhados. Fazemos estas reuniões a cada dois anos, variamos a temática central, mas não temos alterado um conceito de fundo que aqui nos motiva: o desenvolvimento. Porquê o desenvolvimento, num tempo em que, por vezes, deixamos de ouvir a palavra com a intensidade que ela teve em períodos não muito distantes, durante os quais motivou iniciativas de grande vulto, à escala mundial, encheu bibliografias e alimentou doutrinas? Precisamente por isso. Precisamente porque continuar a lutar pelo desenvolvimento daqueles que, à escala global, não o partilham com os mais afortunados, tentar manter o conceito bem alto na agenda internacional de prioridades, é talvez o melhor testemunho de um espírito

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de solidariedade que desejamos que Portugal, e esta cidade saudavelmente aberta que é Lisboa, devem saber alimentar e aprofundar. O Clube de Lisboa, que, de forma totalmente benévola, promove estas Conferências, tem precisamente como objetivo contribuir para ajudar a transformar a capital portuguesa numa nova centralidade de reflexão sobre os grandes temas que atravessam a sociedade global. Chamámos a esta 3ª Conferência, “Desenvolvimento em tempos de incerteza”. Por definição, os tempos são sempre incertos, mas já houve tempos em que a incerteza era menor. Hoje vivemos dias em que as interrogações sobre o futuro, mesmo o futuro próximo, se acumulam. Desde logo, em termos do poder mundial, tema que vai ocupar o nosso primeiro painel. A atitude dos principais atores globais tem hoje “nuances” que induzem fortes tensões no ce-

nos “descontentes” da globalização, para utilizar a velha expressão que Joseph Stiglitz já usava em 2001. É precisamente uma reflexão sobre a globalização e sobre as dúvidas que alguns colocam sobre a sua irreversibilidade, que ocupará o nosso último painel no dia de hoje. Amanhã começaremos o dia falando da nossa casa comum, do planeta, das lutas da sustentabilidade, do clima e das transições energéticas que aí estão. E tentaremos, no saldo das incertezas que acumulámos, perceber como estão nas nossas sociedades, nestes tempos estouvados, para utilizar uma expressão que sei ser cara ao Senhor Presidente, as pessoas, nas suas angústias e temores, nas suas dúvidas e na sua crescente propensão para soluções limite, que põem em risco a democracia e os direitos. Nesse contexto, o destino das classes médias é uma pista para reflexão que está proposta neste debate.

Tentar manter o conceito [de Desenvolvimento] bem alto na agenda internacional de prioridades, é talvez o melhor testemunho de um espírito de solidariedade que desejamos que Portugal, e esta cidade saudavelmente aberta que é Lisboa, devem saber alimentar e aprofundar. nário internacional, pondo em causa equilíbrios que tínhamos por adquiridos e, muito em particular, colocando em risco os mecanismos multilaterais, corpo institucional que regulava o que pensávamos serem os caminhos irreversíveis do futuro. Essa instabilidade nas relações de poder conduz ao surgimento de novas ameaças à segurança, assunto que o segundo painel do dia vai abordar. A segurança, nas suas várias declinações, é uma questão essencial para a estabilidade psicológica das sociedades. É a falta de segurança, melhor dizendo, a perceção de insegurança que induz facilmente tropismos populistas e a captura das vontades para agendas radicais. Uma dessas inseguranças, bastante visível nas suas consequências políticas na maior potência do Ocidente, assenta

Terminaremos amanhã os nossos trabalhos falando da Europa, desse continente que, em termos de expressão organizada e eficaz de poder, recebe sistematicamente o Óscar para o melhor ator secundário. Onde estamos, na Europa? Ainda navegamos no mesmo barco ou só fingimos que pertencemos ao mesmo clube? O que é feito dessa Europa ética que pretendia ser uma espécie de benchmark para o mundo? Que é feito, por exemplo, da Europa farol das políticas de desenvolvimento, que durante tantos anos foi uma realidade? E aqui regresso onde comecei. “Desenvolvimento em tempos de incerteza” é, hoje e amanhã, o desafio que o Clube de Lisboa aqui vos lança. Espero que aproveitem o debate e que estejam atentos, no futuro, às diversas atividades que vamos promover. Teremos o maior gosto em vê-los por lá.

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Michelle Bachelet Antiga Presidente do Chile

Former President of Chile

uero saudar o Presidente Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, os organizadores e todos os participantes da 3ª Conferência de Lisboa. Quero felicitá-los por promoverem este espaço de reflexão e intervenção, que se tornou num importante contributo para que abordemos de forma mais coordenada os principais desafios da agenda internacional. Todos aqueles que desempenharam funções de responsabilidade sabem o quão importante é articular visões comuns, em particular quando as tarefas ultrapassam as fronteiras nacionais. E hoje este esforço é mais pertinente do que nunca, pois como indica o tema central da conferência deste ano, vivemos tempos de incerteza, em que o nosso mundo interconectado e acelerado nos coloca muitas interrogações, que experienciamos no nosso dia-a-dia. Contudo, há uma pergunta na qual devemos reter a nossa atenção. Que capacidade têm os dirigentes e atores políticos de garantir certezas e mostrar um rumo claro de ação? É aqui que reside grande parte do que os cidadãos esperam de nós, porque estão aborrecidos que lhe digamos que não depende de nós, e porque, para além disso, há sem dúvida oportunidades que estão ao nosso alcance.

A humanidade está atualmente a conseguir resultados muito significativos, nunca antes vistos, e não me refiro apenas aos extraordinários avanços tecnológicos, científicos e de comunicação, mas aos resultados de redução sem precedentes da pobreza, da fome, do subdesenvolvimento, bem como à expansão sem precedentes do acesso à educação, saúde e infraestruturas. No mundo, em mortalidade infantil em menores de 5 anos passou de 148 mortes em cada mil habitantes, em 1950, para 48, em 2012; o analfabetismo era de 44% na população mundial, em 1957, enquanto hoje 85% dos adultos sabem ler e escrever; em 1981, 44% da população mundial vivia com menos de 1 dólar por dia, enquanto em 1990 essa percentagem baixou para 37% e, em 2012, atingiu os 12%. Poderíamos continuar a referir exemplos que refletem a enorme melhoria da qualidade de vida dos nossos povos, ou pensarmos no caminho inspirador que estão a seguir as duas Coreias, ou ainda salientar o potencial da ação concertada a nível mundial para conter as alterações climáticas ou para impulsionar os Objetivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável. O mais importante é que saibamos ver as oportunidades que temos e as possibilidades concretas de perseverarmos no rumo correto, que é o do trabalho conjunto e da solidariedade internacional, da opção multilateral e da cooperação ao nível regional. Por outras palavras, a nossa confiança constrói-se com base no muito que podemos fazer quando trabalhos juntos.

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Os resultados demonstram a validade desta opção e é por isso que devemos insistir nesse caminho, de forma a podermos enfrentar os novos desafios e criar propostas para um desenvolvimento sustentável, para dar resposta às migrações e às suas causas, para regular os fluxos financeiros internacionais, para alcançar a igualdade de género e o respeito pelos direitos de todos e todas. Com paciência, mas sem nos desviarmos da busca de horizontes comuns. A cidadania – essa cidadania que exige

mais de nós, dirigentes – espera que possamos criar certezas e guiar este mundo marcado pela volatilidade e pela adaptação constante. Temos o dever de tentar fazer a diferença. Não me restam dúvidas de que os debates e troca de experiências que terão nestes dias resultarão em aprendizagens e em iniciativas de grande valor. Espero reunir-me convosco em breve, para podermos debater formas de construirmos juntos um mundo melhor.

Veja o vídeo. Aceda directamente através do QR Code, ou através do canal de youtube das Conferências de Lisboa: goo.gl/eUUpMY

N O TA

Tradução livre do discurso em castelhano.

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Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa Presidente da República Portuguesa

President of the Portuguese Republic

uero agradecer o contributo do Clube de Lisboa e destas conferências abertas aos ilustres oradores, na presença dos sempre bem-vindos Embaixadores de países amigos e de muitos e muitas que, nestes dois dias, se debruçarão sobre temas fundamentais da atualidade internacional. Que momento inspirador este início das Conferências de Lisboa, num dia particularmente afeito a este tipo de reflexão. Celebra-se hoje o Dia Mundial da Liberdade de Imprensa, o que significa da liberdade de pensamento e de expressão e, por isso mesmo, da liberdade no sentido positivo e negativo. No sentido negativo – como disse enquanto jovem constituinte na Assembleia que votou a Constituição Portuguesa –, a afirmação da liberdade

A Presidente Michelle Bachelet apelou àquilo que é o essencial: debatermos a realidade do mundo que nos rodeia, pensando nas pessoas de carne e osso, e sobretudo nos mais desfavorecidos, pensando no desenvolvimento para além de uma visão economicista ou financista, que tem norteado tantas das nossas sociedades, ou seja, olhando para as pessoas, porque são elas, em última análise a razão de ser da atividade económica, social e política. O tema escolhido para estas conferências é da maior relevância. É verdade que é usual falar-se na incerteza destes tempos; contudo, porque a alusão se generalizou de modo acrítico e todos nós nos recordamos de referências semelhantes formuladas noutros tempos, na nossa vida e mais amplamente na vida da nossa comunidade, importa tentar descortinar em que se traduz essa tão invocada incerteza. Recordemos, aliás, outra coincidência do mês em que

Podermos falar de uma tempestade quase perfeita, provavelmente irreversível em várias áreas, a condicionar o desenvolvimento humano. que permanentemente tem que defrontar o repto da independência perante os poderes políticos e económicos. Na sua dimensão positiva, na construção do desenvolvimento, na construção da justiça e na afirmação dos direitos fundamentais das pessoas.

estamos, pois também em maio de 1968, na Europa, se falou de incertezas que acabariam por vir, mais ano menos ano, em vários Estados europeus, e ultrapassando as expectativas da época, nomeadamente em termos de costumes, de comporta-

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mentos, de lideranças políticas. Não foi o caso português, que constituiu um caso específico, mas foi o caso de várias sociedades europeias. Por isso mesmo, cumpre olhar para as faladas incertezas de hoje. Limito-me a enunciar algumas dessas incertezas ou das vertentes que a determinam, que se me afiguram essenciais: a ampliação do espaço; a globalização para além da globalização; o alargamento e a aceleração vertiginosa do tempo (do tempo político, do tempo social, do tempo em termos de alterações climáticas ou naturais e também em termos de evolução energética); o ritmo da evolução científica e tecnológica, bem como das finanças e da economia; o desfasamento da Política e do Direito; o crescendo do desencanto das doutrinas e das ideologias; a emergência de novos protagonistas sistematicamente anti sistémicos e a crise crónica dos sistemas; a multiplicação dos discursos decorrentes de modos de comunicação sem comunicação entre si; o choque endémico entre o possível e as expectativas construídas acerca desse possível; a desafiante nova ordem internacional, definida precisamente por ser mais

imparáveis expectativas das pessoas e comunidades, por um lado, e a correspondente capacidade de resposta dos sistemas, por outro; na impressionante fragilidade e esvaziamento desses sistemas e das instituições, que é patente nas organizações internacionais, bem como nos sistemas políticos, partidários e sociais internos, entre a obsolescência e a submersão em novas necessidades e, sobretudo, em nova pressão mediática. Tudo isto numa ordem internacional em que já não vale nem a lógica bipolar que dominou longas décadas do século XX, nem a aparência monopolar de uma só superpotência de há alguns anos. Nem uma nem outra têm cabimento no mundo atual. Vivemos uma mescla indefinida e indefinível de quase aparente regresso à Guerra Fria, que não chega ainda a sê-lo e que, a vir a concretizar-se, não obedeceria às regras tácitas nem às pontes informais da que foi vivida no fim da segunda Guerra. A repetição do passado já não é possível hoje nem amanhã, o que por um lado é um alívio em termos de expressão universal, mas por outro lado é uma dor de cabeça permanente em termos de imprevisibilidades regionais. Falo, naturalmente, da

Muito do que encontramos hoje como travão ou obstáculo ao crescimento de renovação e de resposta aos desafios atuais por indefinível e imprevisível nos contornos regionais e universais; o papel crucial do ciberespaço também nos domínios da segurança e da defesa; a resignação à gestão do curtíssimo prazo - dia a dia, semana a semana, mês a mês - sendo uma gestão tática, atenta a miniciclos de toda a natureza e avessa ao distanciamento ponderado quanto a soluções, estruturas, factos e pessoas. Sinto estar ainda longe de ter esgotado a lista de fatores relevantes, mas só estes bastam para podermos falar de uma tempestade quase perfeita, provavelmente irreversível em várias áreas, a condicionar o desenvolvimento humano. Essa tempestade é, talvez, ainda mais evidente nalguns dos fatores que já citei e que vou sublinhar: na aceleração do tempo financeiro, económico e social; no galopante atraso da Política e do Direito quanto ao acompanhamento dos demais processos de mudança; no contraste entre renováveis e quase 36 _

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tensão entre a única superpotência de ontem e a outra superpotência de anteontem, convertida hoje em potência regional. Tudo isto cuidadosamente observado por uma terceira potência, para muitos em vias de se converter em segunda, mas sem pressa de substituir a sua projeção a longo prazo por conflitos dispensáveis no curto prazo. E ainda com a União Europeia a ter de ultrapassar a dolorosa e sempre lamentada separação do Reino Unido, bem como o seu entorpecedor compasso de espera iniciado há uma década (e a ter de o fazer sem demora); com os BRIC a não poderem perder tempo na afirmação externa; e, um pouco por todos os continentes, a sensação de que ou há um período minimamente duradouro de estabilidade de expansão económica, ou o desenvolvimento humano sonhado e projetado para 2030 conhecerá um adiamento indesejável. Neste contexto, para que haja mesmo desenvolvimento sustentável – e para que ele seja integral ou perto disso,

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atenuando desigualdades que convidam a radicalismos anti sistémicos e a guerras mais complexas, com o seu cortejo de migrações e refugiados -, precisamos de mais previsibilidade. O problema no mundo de hoje é a imprevisibilidade. Importa que haja mais racionalidade e consistência nas estratégias e táticas das potências, bem como dos países emergentes mais relevantes. Tal como já aqui foi dito, importa que haja um esforço coletivo - como aliás tem defendido e praticado o Secretário Geral das Nações Unidas – para evitar uma nova e mais aleatória Guerra Fria (ou realidade similar) e para travar escaladas de protecionismos, de egocentrismos e de fechamentos de toda a espécie. E já agora, no que nos toca, uma União Europeia mais unida, com crescimento e emprego sustentado e, sobretudo, institucionalmente mais preparada para os anos que aí vêm, em que débeis lideranças nacionais tornarão impossíveis fortes lideranças europeias. Não há como encontrar fortes lideranças europeias com sistemáticas fracas lideranças internas. Isto permitiria à União Europeia tornar-se mais presen-

plurais, uma evolução virtuosa exigirá sistemas políticos, económicos e sociais profundamente renovados. Há quem fale em “sistemas 4.0”, em paralelo com a visão própria da era digital, tal como se fala do comércio, da indústria ou dos serviços 4.0. Sobretudo, o que importa é que sejam sistemas simultaneamente flexíveis, mas suficientemente sólidos para não abrirem caminho aos populismos, às autocracias e às monocracias mais ou menos disfarçadas, que mesmo quando alegam que são a forma de afirmação de poderes fortes, acabam por criar confrontos internos e externos indesejáveis. O crescimento económico e o emprego, para serem duradouros, requerem estabilidade institucional a nível nacional, continental e mundial. E os sistemas jurídico-políticos, quando debilitados, esvaziados ou carecidos de legitimidade, podem, senão travar, pelo menos desincentivar esse crescimento e emprego. Muito do que encontramos hoje como travão ou obstáculo ao crescimento e ao desenvolvimento tem a ver com a desatualização, a incapacidade de renovação e de resposta aos desafios atuais por parte dos sistemas políticos, económicos e

e ao desenvolvimento tem a ver com a desatualização, a incapacidade parte dos sistemas políticos, económicos e sociais. te no mundo, mais forte no cenário internacional e, ao mesmo tempo, mais sensível às necessidades e aspirações dos seus cidadãos. Numa nota conjuntural, devo confessar-vos que os primeiros sinais vindos da Comissão Europeia sobre o Quadro Financeiro Plurianual, a começar em 2021, estão longe de representar um bom ponto de partida. Digo-o em termos de ambição, de imaginação e de visão de futuro, porque uma União Europeia que falhe na coesão interna, fala no essencial, ou seja, na união. Nas democracias plurais - que agora se passaram a chamar democracias liberais, como se houvesse democracias iliberais - por definição, o núcleo duro consiste nos direitos fundamentais das pessoas, e não nos processos ou mecanismos representativos e sua efetivação, pois o sacrifício mais ou menos sistemático de direitos fundamentais dificilmente é compatível com a qualificação democrática. Nas democracias

sociais, concebidos noutra Era e com dificuldade em adaptarem-se a esta Era. Porque o desenvolvimento humano integral vai para além do mero crescimento económico, ele exige qualidade nos sistemas sociais, inovação e qualificação, que são inseparáveis da liberdade, da criatividade, do pluralismo e da abertura todos os níveis. Acreditar no desenvolvimento humano integral com sistemas políticos e sociais rígidos, monolíticos e de verdade única, é ter desse desenvolvimento uma perspetiva muito empobrecida e empobrecedora. Se me permitem uma palavra sobre Portugal, é para relembrar que, entre nós, há consensos que são estáveis. É o que se passa com a Europa, com o Atlantismo, com a atenção ao Mediterrâneo, com o mundo lusófono, com a ligação constante a África e à América Latina, com a visão aberta sobre migrações e refugiados, ou com a aposta no multilateralismo, expri-

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mindo uma vocação – que continua atual – de plataforma de ligação entre culturas, civilizações, oceanos e continentes. Somos assim, continuamos assim, e assim agimos também agora, nestes tempos de incertezas: fazendo pontes e abrindo espaços, sem questionar alianças antigas ou recentes, mas olhando para além dos muros fechados do passado ou do presente. Numa palavra mais curta, leais mas independentes. Em suma, são múltiplos e preocupantes os fatores não só de incerteza, como de manifesto bloqueamento do desenvolvimento a prazo, em diversos planos da nossa existência coletiva. Detetá-los, sem ilusões nem minimizações, é essencial; equacioná-los e avançar com pistas mobilizadores é ainda mais importante. Por isso é tão estimulante e urgente a vossa reflexão nestas Conferências. Mas se me permitem um desafio, ouso pedir-vos mais. Que essa reflexão não se contente com o brilho das análises nem com a qualidade do orador que as for-

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mula, mas que antes vos convide – aos portugueses e a todos que a nós chegam e são recebidos de braços abertos – à ação cívica constante e a um empenhamento comunitário. Este é o meu profundo voto. Somos um povo com um saber de experiência feito, de quase nove séculos, e com a sensatez de termos visto tudo, ou quase tudo, muito antes de outros sequer existirem como nações ou como Estados. Há agora, mais do que nunca, que colocar esses dons e talentos ao serviço da ação, cá dentro e lá fora, na linha da aludida vocação de plataforma entre culturas, civilizações, oceanos e continentes. E seguindo os magníficos exemplos que temos de portugueses na cena internacional, estamos mobilizados, todos nós, para essa tarefa por todo mundo. Esse é o segundo passo cimeiro desta 3ª Conferência de Lisboa, que vos agradeço como iniciativa, como propósito e como compromisso, em nome de Portugal.

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O PODER POWER A Geopolítica na Caixa de Pandora Geopolicy meets Pandora’s Box

Quais as implicações da visão da nova administração americana sobre o

papel dos EUA no mundo? Em que medida o ressurgimento de potências regionais afeta os cenários geopolíticos? A evolução política e militar no Médio Oriente, na península da Coreia, na Europa de Leste e nas fronteiras da Rússia indicia a eventual eclosão de conflitos regionais ou globais destrutivos?

What geopolitical implications arise from the “America first” positioning on

global matters? How does the rise of old and new regional powers affect geopolitical scenarios? Do changes in the military and political situation in the Korean Peninsula as well as in Eastern Europe and Russian borders signal the likelihood of outbreaking of regional, global destructive conflicts?

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KEYNOTE SPEAKER

George Friedman Fundador, Geopolitical Futures, Austin

Founder, Geopolitical Futures, Austin

t’s always good to be in Lisbon. It’s a happy place. There are few happy places in Europe today, but this is one of them. Either you know something that the other Europeans don’t know, or you don’t know something that the other Europeans know. I don’t know which. I want to begin with two dates that are crucial in understanding this moment. One is 1992. Three things happened in 1992: the fall of the Soviet Union, the signing of the Maastricht treaty and the emergence of the United States has the only global power. Remember that until 1992 there was a Cold War and it did not always look like the United States would win it. The United States was obsessed by the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union was obsessed with the United States. With the fall of Soviet Union is was like, if in “Tug of War” someone suddenly cuts the rope... The United States was completely off-balance. It did not know how to respond, and it still does not know how to respond. We should remember that the British Empire begins with Britain being defeated by a Third World power that could never possibly do that: the United States. Nevertheless, despite this defeat, the British Empire emerges and dominates the 19th and the first part of the 20th century. It is almost inevitable when you look at Rome, or other similar empires, to see that the first stage of building an empire is not planned and the political system that is governing it doesn’t know what to do.

So, it should not be a surprise that one of the characteristics of the world today is that the only existent global power is very uncertain on how to respond to events. What are the things that matter to the United States? Where should it and shouldn’t it involve itself? These are uncertainties that will take a generation to work out. Therefore, we live partly in a world in which the organizing power is highly disorganized, and this is simply the process of unilateral global power. In 2008 something else happened that is extremely important: what I will call “the global export crisis”. From the 1980’s onward, the international economic system overbuilt its industrial plant. This was particularly true in emerging countries like China. Its industrial plant had to be larger than the domestic consumption, because this was how they would generate the capital to maintain it. And this was regarded as brilliant because it was believed those countries that could export the most were the most efficient, and those who couldn’t export were weak. But it ignored one basic problem, which is that the exporting power is a hostage to its customers. If its customers couldn’t buy, the industrial plant was paralyzed, at least to some degree. And in 2008, a financial crisis - the fourth since World War II - hit the world and destabilized it, starting with the United States and Europe, which were the great customers of China and could no longer buy as much as they had from them. And the Chi-

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nese, that were dependent on the continuous marginal increase of exports, suddenly staggered. Their basic model of neglecting domestic consumption and maximizing exports ran into a brick wall. They were, in effect, owned invisibly by the United States and Europe. As I usually say, Wal-Mart and Carrefour were the great powers that governed China’s future. And suddenly China had to find a new way to manage its system. After this, you also had another problem, which is that those countries that sold China primarily raw goods (like industrial minerals, oil, copper, etc) lost their market. And for a very long time it appeared to the commodities market that China would quickly go back to consuming at the previous level, and therefore the prices should continue to stay up. But they did not understand that China’s decision to consume or not consume was dependent on Europe and the United States. If these regions could buy, China would buy more goods. Finally, in 2014, it became apparent that the Chinese production capacity would not rise, primarily because, although the United States were slowly returning to normality, the Europeans were much

The second country that experienced this was Saudi Arabia, which was built politicly on oil because it could maintain the internal stability of the Saudi Kingdom with the careful distribution of wealth, thus stabilizing the tribal system within the Royal family. With the price of oil falling, the Saudis were no longer able to do this. Suddenly the Iranians emerged: dominant in Iraq, present in Syria, dominating Lebanon, operating in Yemen. You look at the map and Saudi Arabia, the heart of the Sunni Islam, is surrounded by a Shiite power. How deep and how powerful this power is, that is another question - but it certainly destabilized the Middle East. Thus, you have a situation where the Chinese had a financial problem, which always follows the decline of exports: how to manage bad debt? And they did not know how to do it because managing a non-performing loan (NPL) crisis normally requires somebody to be hurt: the creditors or the debtors, somebody is going to pay. And China, like any other country, didn’t want anybody to pay. But since they were going to have to pay, the country had to have a more powerful central gov-

We have never gone longer than ten years without a recession. And we will have another one because recessions more divided in their consumption patterns and much more limited in what they were going to do. And China was also now facing competition at lower costs, from Vietnam, Colombia and other countries, which meant that the Chinese were not going to regain the position they had before. And so, the price of oil, particularly, fell and this destabilized Russia in the sense that the promise of the construction of a normal modern economy, which had been neglected by Russia since 2001 for various political reasons, was not going to happen. Now Russia had to worry about its ability to maintain its national budget, something that was very difficult, and it had to dip into its reserves, and was still struggling with an important question: what had been a very powerful position, an exporter of energy, became a trap because energy consumption was not growing (in many places it was in fact declining). 46 _

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ernment to control the pain. And Xi Jinping, the president of China, emerges not of China’s strength, but of its weakness. If it was strong it wouldn’t need a dictator. But it’s not strong and it needs a central government that can stabilize it through an extremely painful period. For example, it must get rid of the corruption, and for that it needs a powerful leader who is not vulnerable to counter-action. In Russia, you had Vladimir Putin, who had promised prosperity and returning Russia to be a great power but was not quite reaching that prosperity and not quite being considered having a big power. So, it was doing things in Syria, partly because he can, and partly because he must do something to try and keep those promises. Of course, the greatest danger is Europe. The problem of Europe is Germany, which exports 50% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). That’s an extraordinary amount for the fourth

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larger economy of the world. We are not talking about the Czech Republic or Slovakia. We are talking about Germany! The largest single country consumer of German products is the United States (US) because the US is an import power (which has its own crisis) and the problem is that US is eventually going to have a recession. We have never gone longer than ten years without a recession. It’s been eight and a half years since the last one. And we will have another one because recessions are necessary and healthy to the economy: they get rid of weak businesses, they free capital for new businesses. They are, as any economist knows, part of the business cycle and a necessity - and thus we will have one in the future. The first thing the Americans will stop buying is industrial machinery because it is always the case in the United States. And who are we buying industrial machinery from? The Germans. So now the Germans are facing the possibility of an American recession and that will not hurt the Americans nearly as much as it will the Germans. Normally Germany would depend on their financial system, but this is

not Greeks and they are not going to give Greeks money; the Italians know they are not French; the English know they are not really European. Thus, what is happening is the rise of nationalism, to which Claude Junker’s solution is yelling at everybody to stop doing it! Of course, they are not going to stop doing it because the question in Europe is: what is the thing that holds us together? The answer is prosperity. What is Europe without prosperity? Or what is Europe with divided prosperity in which Netherlands has one set of expectations of what life is about, and Greece has another? The global problem is therefore hipper-interdependence throughout the world. In the previous crisis like this, the Third World debt crisis, interdependence was much lower and was managed in a certain way that it did not have ripples across the entire system. This crisis has ripples everywhere and they won’t stop. In this crisis Germany depends on a given country for its consumption, that country depends on another, everybody depends on each other and it works perfectly in prosperity. But it is the management of economic dysfunctions that is

It’s been eight and a half years since the last one. are necessary and healthy to the economy. the amazing thing: Germany, economically seemingly powerful, has a chaotic financial system. Deutsche bank, Commerzbank, they cannot finance the German way through an economic crisis, partly because they have avoided economic crises by using those banks to finance their way out of those crises. So now Europe faces its own problem. In each country this becomes a social and political problem. For China the solution, thus far, is Xi Jinping. That is a political solution. For Russia it is the strengthening of Putin’s hand. For Europe it is the rise of nationalism. Because Europe has never established the idea of what it is. The European Union is a trading organization. And a country joins a trading organization when it is good for it and leaves when it’s bad. Europe also wants to talk about a European character. And that is a good idea, but the problem is that the Germans know they are

the measure of a good model and this is a big problem in this case. It’s a good idea that all of Europe can be one, but the Europeans have long memories. I was born in Hungary and my mother, years ago, still would not forgive Romania. My father said that for Europe the basic principle is: never forget, never forgive. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 was designed to show that everything is forgotten, everything is forgiven. And it was... until 2008. And then the question became: what does Germany owe Greece? Germany is now lecturing Poland on liberal democracy without any sense of irony by the Germans that this is a very strange thing to do. The Hungarians are going their own way and they don’t care what happens. We see Europe returning to what it is: a continent of 52 different nations with different languages, different histories, different enemies, different friends... who had gotten together to be rich. They did not get together to help the Greeks.

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Amid all this the United States has an import crisis. This crisis is simple: we fuelled our economy by cheap imports from the world. As a result, large segments of the American society lost their jobs and these segments have risen and produced an extraordinary person: Donald Trump. But you should have expected something like this; maybe not this much but you should expect the rise of a very strange player, because the people who used to be in control lost credibility. And the main difference is that, while Obama would have said about North Korea that we regard what they are doing as serious violation that will have the greatest consequences, what Trump said is “We’re going to bomb you till you glow!” They both said the same things but with different words. Obama was much more pleasant about it. We Americans love to have fun and we are having a great time with our politics. But this doesn’t change the fact that the United States represents 25% of the World’s economy, it is the only global power and that America doesn’t know what it’s doing. How

a part out, the entire thing comes down plunging the world into an economic crisis, which is now a social and political crisis. We are now in a political period of instability and in that political period we will hack through for the next 10 years, at least, trying to find out what to do. There is one constant in all of this: nationalism. The European Union wants to declare nationalism to be evil, and they can. But the fact is that there is a secret in Europe, a secret in China and a secret in the United States: I am an American, you are a Portuguese, they are Russian, he’s a Chinese… And we love who we are. We have love of one’s own. Europe is a place, it is not a people. And so, as this crisis deepens we are drawn farther and farther apart. Claude Juncker’s solution (I love Junker because every day he gives me something to laugh at) is to demand it to stop! Good. Somehow Victor Urban, the Hungarian president, doesn’t want to listen. We demand that the Chinese stop aggressively exporting. But they must contin-

We see Europe returning to what it is: a continent of 52 different nations with different languages, different histories, different enemies, different friends... who had gotten together to be rich. could it, since it didn’t expect to be in this position? We are still trying to figure out, a generation later, what it means to be the world’s only global power and whether we want to be it, or whether we rather be left alone. And you can see this recently in Syria, where Trump said one day: “I’m leaving!”, and the next day he bombed the Syrians. But the nice thing for the US is it can afford to do that. We can afford to be crazy. Many European countries don’t have that room to manoeuvre; you must be much more careful in what you do. What we are living in is this: in 1992, for the first time in 500 years, no European power was a global power. Russia was the last and it fell. The only global power was the US, which was completely unprepared for this. The world created a structure that I will call “cantilevered”, like a gothic cathedral where every part depended on another part and if you pull

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ue, they have no choice. We want the Russians to stop being pseudo aggressive (they are not aggressive, but they want to look that way). They can’t. And you want the Americans to stop being irresponsible. And we won’t. We are in a world where we are trapped by reality and all the fine position papers produced in Brussels and in Washington are irrelevant to the fundamental problem, which is that we are in a moment when history is out of control and we are traveling in it. This is not necessarily the most comfortable position to be in, but it’s even more uncomfortable when we have the illusion that we are in control. What policy will we follow? Who cares! History is on its own. It is very difficult to be in control of this situation, especially until the US grows up. On that lovely note, let me stop and be told why I am crazy.

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DISCUSSANT

José Félix Ribeiro Consultor do Conselho de Administração da Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian

Consultant, Administration Board of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation

think that what Professor Friedman explained is very important because globalization, as we know it from the 1980s until today, has resulted in a very asymmetric economy, with a country, the United States (the only leading global power) with huge deficits, and three or four other world countries with huge surpluses. But what is curious is that this is the best way for a country with an international currency to manage its economy – what the US, with its huge deficit, has done, giving liquidity to the world economy and creating the conditions for the development of other countries. And this deficit was never a serious issue because the Americans created debt that everybody in the world wanted to buy and also because with this debt they could have an extended defence influence and a military apparatus that was not paid (at least not all of it) by the American citizens. This is a very important point to understand. What were the countries that bought American debt? First, the Asian countries, that were protected from each other by the United States. Asian and Pacific countries have very complicated relations amongst them and the presence and influence of the US in the region gives some peace to the region and creates the opportunities for countries to develop their economies and to not have big defence budgets. The second main buyers of American debt were the Persian Gulf countries, big oil producers and al-

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lies of the US. Everybody bought American debt and thus the US could create more deficits and continue to give liquidity to the global economy. The problem was that, in a certain moment, this process reached a tipping point and exploded, resulting in the 2008 crisis. And this was a very significant crisis because it was the first one in the US with a very big impact in the capital market and financial system. And for the European Banks it was impossible to understand what was happening in the United States. When everybody needed a new country to create a deficit, looking at Germany for this, the answer was: “We must have a bigger surplus!” and today the Eurozone has the biggest surplus in the world (bigger than China). The Eurozone, with Germany as its leader, represents the opposite of the US. Europe has a surplus when the world needed it to have a deficit, and thus there was a big tension between the US and Germany. We are commemorating the anniversary of May 1968 movement. I was a modest actor in this historical event, in Portugal with the student movement. Today, 50 years after, when I think of it I conclude that the most important aspect that came from the May 68 movement in France was its president, Georges Pompidou. He changed two important things: first, he decided to invite the United Kingdom to join the European Economic Community (EEC), contrary to the Gaullist tradition; second, when the Europeans were discussing how to

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“give the dollar a lesson”, president Pompidou came to Azores to have a meeting with Richard Nixon, the American president. And what was Georges Pompidou background? Before he entered politics in France he worked at the Rothschild Bank, an extremely important reality that remains very secretive for us and that we don’t understand. How is this also relevant today? Well, president Macron also comes from the Rothschild Bank and thus we can conclude by his actions that France is trying to show that they understand Germany (but they don’t) and they

are willing to do everything to satisfy Germany (which they aren’t). However, France understood two things very clearly: it was important to speak to president Donald Trump and it was important to decide to build a new European fighter aircraft, as a joint effort between France and the United Kingdom. And this has nothing to do with the European Union but with the fact that each state must have a strategy to survive, and this is something that we completely forgot during the last 30 years, both in Europe and in Portugal.

COMMENT BY

George Friedman I will say only one thing about May 1968, that I think is a crucial year. It was a period where not only the French were rising. It was also a period of riots in Chicago and the election of Richard Nixon, who later had to resign. It was a period of worldwide uncertainty. It was also the period of the Chinese proletarian revolution. Every 50 years or so the global system undergo spasm; it does not necessarily produce anything new but it spasms. Before, in 1928, it was the great global depression, that hit the US but also Europe and other regions. And in each of these cases the most interesting thing was the rise of exotic political leaders. The political class that emerges from these spasms is unlike the one that went before, and that period appears to be catastrophic. If you look at 1968 it seemed, for any reasonable person, that the global system was collapsing. It didn’t. It reformed itself. So now, in the present, we have exotic leaders: in China, maybe also in Russia and certainly, in Europe you’ve got quite a crew. And America has the best of them all because we are Americans and we always do the best! But the thing to remember about this is that it marks the transformation of the global system. You say: “How will the US survive president Donald Trump?” Very nicely! “How will China survive president Xi Jinping?” It has done it for thousands of years, it will manage. Our horror at what is happening is really the birth pains of a new era and all the things we are seeing around us are simply

saying that the old era, that we love so much, is unsustainable, just as 1968 basically said that the old culture of that period was unsustainable and 1928/29 said that what was happening was unsustainable. We have to remember two things: first, no one will believe what I just said and will continue to try to ring back everything the way it was; and second, nothing will go back to the way it was and the people who will make money will be those who know it won’t go back and will anticipate the future and also those who will have political power. As professor Félix Ribeiro said, president Pompidou understood that things couldn’t go back. Nixon understood that it couldn’t go back but he didn’t know what to do, so we had Ronald Reagan eventually taking the US into the future. You must understand that, whether you want it or not, history is doing its rhythm, we are part of that rhythm and Portugal will not be the same afterwards. I also like to add that, when I speak of the European Union falling, that does not mean Europe. Europe is a prosperous, enormously important place that consists of Portugal and Spain, and Italy and Germany and all these other countries. But the structure that was created in Maastricht, which is only a few decades old, this may not necessarily survive. And Europe is going through many changes. What I take from what Professor Felix Ribeiro was talking about 1968 is that it represented a very good model of this global spasm.

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DISCUSSANT

Fernando Jorge Cardoso IMVF, Diretor executivo do Clube de Lisboa

IMVF, Executive Director of the Lisbon Club

he perplexity I have I will save for the end. First, I would like to say that after World War 2 (WW2), economic growth and all the dynamics associated with it started a very long economic wave. In the first twenty-five years of this wave the United States, Europe, the developing world in general and even the Socialist block benefited from economic growth. A lot of important things happened during this period, a lot of systems were built and accommodated in the new reality. And then, suddenly, we entered in a political and energetic crisis in the 1970s, and this long economic cycle that started after WW2 entered a negative slope that went from the middle of the 1970s, along the 1980s and until the end of the Cold War. It was in this second phase of the cycle, in this negative slope, that many things emerged that were technological, economic and productive responses to a new world or a new reality. A lot of innovations occurred since the 1970s: computerizing, miniaturising, optical fibre, new materials, engines that spare energy, and all the economic aspects related with Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defensive Initiative. When the surge of globalisation came, at the end of the 1980s, that represented,

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in my view, the start of the second economic cycle after WW2, with a strong political earthquake, which included, among other things, the end of the Cold War and the Maastricht Treaty. Starting at the end of the 20th century, and entering the new one, European integration entered in big troubles, because of decisions regarding the creation of a new currency and the problems associated with it, among other issues. Suddenly, when we approached the middle of the second decade of the 21th century, this second long economic cycle began its negative slope, in which we are now. My point and my perplexity are this: it is again and precisely in the negative slope of the cycle, as it happened in mid-seventies, that we are hearing and speaking about technological innovations which maybe will be part of the answers to the problems we are facing. I am thinking about robotics, artificial intelligence or other innovations or discoveries that could, in some way, counter the effects of the devaluation of labor in industrialized economies, and could also counteract the negative aspects of nationalisms (because I think that “national” is not a negative or positive thing per se; it is a fact of life.) My question is how do you look at this interaction between the political and the economic with the technological side? How should these two sides mingle?

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COMMENT BY

George Friedman You began speaking about the 1970s. In terms of core technologies, the ones that are most important are the ones that have a spawn effect, like the steam engine, or electricity (which spawns communications and a range of other things), or the internal combustion engine (that transformed transportation). If we pick (arbitrarily) 1915 as the year for the beginning of the mass-produced internal combustion engine (the automobile), by 1965 it had matured. It continued to be useful and would continue to exist for decades, but its development became only marginal because you cannot transform it anymore, and its impact on growing productivity declines. When you introduced the automobile, you had a massive up search in the 1920s and by 1965, 50 years later, it’s not growing that much. The microchip today, in terms of its industrial use, is the same age as the automobile was in 1965. It is not hi-tech anymore. It is a mature technology and it’s been a long time since I had any new relevant app. And when you look at productivity growth in this period, it looks very similar to what you saw in the late 1960s or early 1970s: a sudden decline. So, feeding into that crisis and structural shifts, you have the maturation of a technology. It doesn’t mean it is useless or that we’re getting rid of it. It will be here for a long time but the quantum leaps of productivity that it produced are not there anymore. In the 1960s, all the fantasies were about a permanent development of new transportation. We would have rockets that go from city to city and to Mars and all sorts of different transportation, because when a technology exhausts itself you believe in the extrapolations that can come from that. If you ever watched the Jetsons (Tv Series) you know that jetpacks were something we were going to have in the future to fly around with. The entire fantasy was that, yes, it is an exhausted technology, but just wait until all the new things happen.

We are now in the same period, where the only imagination on the new technologies is more of the same. We call it artificial intelligence. I was working in artificial intelligence in 1988, to produce maps that we needed. It was easier to do it by hand and they called it artificial intelligence. I don’t know what it is, and no one does! We can’t produce an analogue intelligence because we don’t know how we think. We do not understand thinking. We will produce more powerful programs and microprocessors. The idea that we are going to produce an analogue to the human thought implies that we understand human thought! Nevertheless, is an important thing to watch the present fantasies. The fantasy of the 1960s was all sorts of fantastic things made from the old technology. Same with the first aeroplanes, which were conceived with a steam engine in them. It just didn’t work! But it was the point of extrapolation - which means that the next decade will be a very difficult one, like the 1970s, where you had economic crisis and an exhaustion of that particular technological culture. Normally it takes about a decade for something really new to come out and it is nothing you will ever conceive of. The first time I saw a microchip was in a store in Cornell University (New York State) and it was a hand-held calculator with a microchip by Hewlett Packard. I looked at it and said: “You want 250 dollars for this? This is crazy!”. I never thought that, because of that I would be buying clothes at Amazon and never leave my bedroom. I didn’t understand what it meant. The next technology will be similar, something that is here now, no government is producing it and some crazy guy who can’t get a date is sitting at his garage and he finds things - and doesn’t even know what he is finding. That will be it! Historically, if you go back to the industrial revolution, there is an imperfect rhythm of production. And this is a classic period (the 2020s particularly) of economic disfunction, social instability and decline in technological innovation. Enjoy yourself!

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CHAIR

Alberto Laplaine Guimarães Secretário-Geral, Câmara Municipal de Lisboa

Secretary-General, Lisbon Municipality

If your idea is that Europe, namely the European Union, was never an independent body until the beginning of the 1990s, because it was controlled either by the United States, or by the Soviet Union, and if only after Maastricht and until

2008 we had that independence (between the end of the Cold War and the fall of Lehman Brothers) it was a short period in which the European Union was controlling its own fate… my question is: who is controlling Europe now?

COMMENT BY

George Friedman Well, usually no one controls Europe until little men with moustaches decide they want to take it all! Europe is not easy to control. It resists centralized control because it is so diverse. It is true that until 1992, Europe was occupied by the Americans and the Russians. The Russians wanted to impose governments, the Americans wanted to make money, but the question of war and peace was not decided in Lisbon or Berlin or Rome. It was decided in Washington and Moscow. And I should add that they behaved incredibly carefully to avoid war. If European diplomats from 1939 or 1914 had been in charge, God knows what would have happened. And this is important to remember because we tend to think of the Russians as irresponsible and the Americans as crazy... They were very careful not to rock the boat! Then Europe was free to do what they wanted. The United States was the first one that wanted a free trade zone. Part of the Marshall Plan was an integrated European economy. The French resisted because they didn’t want to be working with the Germans, the English or anybody. The year 1992 was a critical moment and it must be understood that this was not a European moment. This was an American moment, it was a 54 _

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Russian moment, it was a Chinese moment... It was a world system shifting apart and opening the door for Europe to chart its one future. And it did: it was the Maastricht Treaty. I would argue that it must be understood that the European Union does not exist in isolation. It is part of a global system that adjusted itself in 1992 and gave space to the European Union, and then the European Union aligned itself very carefully with forces in China that were developing and aligned itself very carefully with the United States. The idea that suddenly there was an independent European Union, the same way as the United States or China, is intimately integrated in the international system. And the idea that the international system would decline or have a crisis and Europe would not be subject to it, is the essential problem. Professor Félix Ribeiro said that there was one crisis but in my point of view there were four financial crises: there was the municipal bond crisis, there was the Third World debt crisis, there was the saves and loans crisis (my favourite because I never understood it) and there was the subprime crisis. Each of them was built around one assumption: a class of assets that could not decline. Municipal bonds could not decline; Third

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World debt could not decline because spaceship Earth was running out of oil and if you just invest in that you will make money; saves and loans I don’t know what couldn’t decline; and housing prices in the United States could not decline. It begins with a complete misunderstanding. How did the Americans deal with it? On a Sunday afternoon Ben Bernanke (FED Chairman at the time) and Henry Paulson (former American Treasury Secretary) and six bankers got together in a small room, broke fifty laws, the Banks opened the next day and that was it. There is no room to hold all the ministers of the European Union. Where would you have that meeting? In a soccer field? This is the fundamental question, that sometimes in political systems you just get a

group of people with a common interest and they must reach a deal. The European Union is not built to handle crisis. When the crisis hit EU countries, they were trying to cope with them, but they didn’t control their currencies. A free trade zone makes perfect sense. The Americans don’t tell the Mexicans what to do! Here in Europe you had the free trade zone that was working wonderfully, but it became too ambitious. I think you will find a new framework but the urgent thing to understand is that Lisbon depends not only from what is happening in Europe but also what is happening in the United States and in China, because that is defining what is happening in Europe. None of us in fully in control of what goes on...least of all Europe.

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Debate

s comentários do público mostram estar de acordo com uma visão negativa do momento histórico que atravessamos, mas contrapõem que há um outro aspeto que também é constante ao longo dos momentos mais difíceis da história: sempre que há momentos e problemas difíceis há também muita gente e muitas instituições que trabalham para resolver esses problemas. Nenhum país gosta de cometer suicídio e o nacionalismo que vemos ressurgir é uma ideologia relativamente recente, que ainda não está consolidada. A “hiper-interligação” entre países, que acabou por fazer ressurgir o nacionalismo com mais força, representa esse momento de transição que estamos a viver e reflete um modelo de desenvolvimento esgotado, que tem de mudar. A questão é como é que a política se vai adaptar a um novo modelo e a uma mudança com um impacto tão grande como a que aconteceu na revolução industrial. Será essa reação da política que vai ditar o futuro: poderemos ter um modelo autoritário ou podemos ter um modelo com o reforço dos direitos e uma partilha de poder mais horizontal. As instituições políticas atuais não são adequadas nem estão preparadas para responder às mudanças que estão a ocorrer. E se queremos que essas instituições se adaptem, a mudança não pode ser feita a partir de um modelo baseado no velho Estado-nação. Desse ponto de vista, a União Europeia é potencialmente uma base que foge a essa lógica de Estado-nação e pode vir a ser (não é ainda) um bom modelo de governação global, que permita lidar de forma eficaz com os aspetos mais negativos da globalização. O espírito com que encaramos este período difícil deve ser mais positivo, por exemplo, para os jovens, com a possibilidade real de construírem algo de raiz e algo novo. E apesar de poder-

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mos olhar para as mudanças com um olhar cínico, a evolução da história aconteceu sempre pela combinação desse cinismo com uma visão idealista. Esse idealismo está presente no projeto Europeu e não desapareceu totalmente. O Tratado de Maastricht surgiu exatamente num período, depois da Guerra Fria, em que esse idealismo estava mais presente e por isso a União Europeia, para além das questões comerciais, evoluiu num sentido de maior coesão social e humana. Este idealismo na altura teve de ser combinado com a ascensão do fundamentalismo de mercado, que acabou por ser o aspeto que nos conduziu à crise de 2008. Os comentários do keynote speaker salientaram que é preciso distinguir os ideais. Uma das raízes das guerras é exatamente a existência de ideais diferentes: a União Soviética e a Alemanha Nazi tinham ideais muito fortes, mas errados. Por isso desconfia muito do idealismo, porque as pessoas matam em seu nome e por nem sempre a noção de idealismo ser positiva. Reforçou a ideia de que atual crise não representa o fim do mundo, assim como a crise da década de 70 não representou o fim do mundo. Estamos sim num período difícil, mas claro que voltaremos a ter um período positivo baseado em novas tecnologias e novas instituições políticas. Relativamente ao Estado-nação, existe uma contradição entre o medo para com o Estado-nação e a crença na democracia liberal. Quando lemos Montesquieu ou Rosseau, a Nação era a fundação da democracia liberal porque o direito à autodeterminação era o aspeto mais importante. Um dos grandes momentos da história europeia aconteceu em 1848, representando a ascensão das nações contra o domínio dos impérios. A Europa tem uma história complexa e se a autodeterminação de uma nação é um valor fundamental, tem de estar ligado ao conceito de Estado-nação. Se não estiver, então a que refere a autodeterminação? Se não houver uma ação direta dos cidadãos para controlar o que o governo deve ser e a sua ligação

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com a população, então não teremos autodeterminação nacional. Separar o conceito de democracia liberal do conceito de autodeterminação cria um problema que está a afetar as atuais democracias liberais. A União Europeia foi criada devido às catástrofes que sempre caracterizaram a história Europeia e neste momento está a tentar-se encontrar um equilíbrio que evite que a noção de autodeterminação evolua para situações semelhantes às do passado recente. Simultaneamente, porém, esse conceito tem de ser mantido porque está na base da construção da democracia liberal. A Europa tem medo de si própria e criou instituições que evitassem a repetição dos mesmos erros, mas o direito ao voto e a escolher o tipo de governo que temos tem de ser assegurado. A Polónia e a Hungria elegeram governos de que a União Europeia não gosta, mas esses governos foram eleitos em votações livres. Como é que a Europa pode ser gerida, no contexto da União Europeia, seguindo os princípios do liberalismo, mas afirmando simultaneamente que pode intervir quando não gosta dos resultados de uma eleição? As regras da União Europeia são difíceis de entender e estão sempre a mudar. A ideia de uma Europa unida não é clara porque parece querer coisas muito diferentes, e não parece haver vontade política para clarificar estas questões. A ideia da União Europeia como entidade supranacional pode não ser baseada numa noção de imperialismo, mas muitos europeus olham para a UE dessa forma - e esses receios têm de ser atendidos. Existe um risco elevado de a Europa perder rapidamente o seu poder atual. Mesmo dentro da União Europeia há cisões significativas, que têm a ver com os interesses de cada Estado. Quem imaginaria, há vinte anos, que a Escócia estaria hoje a pensar seriamente em tornar-se independente do Reino Unido? Quantos pensavam que a Catalunha iria pelo mesmo caminho em relação à Espanha? Há movimentos na Europa que, há vinte anos, nos pareciam impossíveis de acontecer: o reaparecimen-

to de animosidades entre Polónia e Alemanha, ou entre Hungria e Alemanha, o Brexit, entre outros. As mudanças na Europa nos últimos 10 anos são dramáticas, não apenas no sentido teórico, mas na prática, com a fragmentação de Estados e a oposição entre Estados. Que força pode conter isto? Não vai ser certamente um novo policy paper de Bruxelas. Tem de haver uma mudança sistémica que acomode as forças que estão a provocar estas alterações e que, até agora, estão a ser desconsideradas. Nos anos 20, a Europa desvalorizou a ascensão do fascismo e em vez de se procurar dar uma alternativa aos possíveis simpatizantes do fascismo, ostracizou-os ainda mais. Estamos, por isso, num período muito perigoso em que, aquilo que se pensou que a criação da União Europeia ia evitar, está a acontecer novamente. E isto não é uma teoria, mas sim algo empiricamente demonstrável. O termo populismo, na Europa, é utilizado como um sinónimo de algo claramente mau. Outra maneira de olharmos para o populismo é que ele representa uma exploração de um profundo sentimento de insatisfação por parte de partidos políticos que os sistemas atuais desprezam. Por exemplo, Hillary Clinton não perdeu as eleições por causa dos russos; perdeu-as quando designou os apoiantes de Donald Trump de “deploráveis”. Nunca ninguém ganhou eleições contra os votantes de um adversário, mas sim atraindo-os para as ideias que se pretende passar. Foi também referido o atual período de aproximação entre as duas Coreias. A Coreia do Sul abriu esta porta porque a Coreia do Norte estava a mostrar-se cada vez mais agressiva e, por sua vez, a Coreia do Norte não pretende uma guerra, mas usa essa hipótese como arma para negociar com os Estados Unidos, exigindo que, em troca de abdicar do seu programa nuclear, a presença americana na região diminua substancialmente. A Coreia do Sul não quer que isso aconteça, devido à falta de confiança na Coreia do Norte, e os americanos também não querem perder a influencia na região, abrindo a possibilidade de

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os Chineses ocuparem esse lugar. A solução passa pela diplomacia, ou seja, por continuar a negociar ao longo das próximas décadas. A situação no Médio Oriente e o papel dos Estados Unidos nesta região foram também abordados no debate. Ninguém consegue impor uma solução e a região tem um modo de funcionamento próprio, principalmente porque os Estados Unidos e a Europa deixaram de lhe dar tanta atenção, desde que se verificou um crescimento da produção de petróleo pelos Estados Unidos, a qual resultou numa diminuição da importância estratégica do Golfo Pérsico. O keynote speaker considerou que o problema essencial na região não é o fundamentalismo, mas sim o Irão, que tem cada vez mais influência na região, o que leva a uma iminente reação de Israel, que a acontecer implicará necessariamente o envolvimento dos Estados Unidos. Por outro lado, a Turquia está a atentar perceber se pode manter a aliança com o Irão ou se tem de mudar de posição. Sobre a desregulação da economia, referiu-se que desde a década de 80 houve um movimento de racionalização da economia que procurou favorecer os estados mais frágeis. Parte deste movimento passou por reorganizar o sistema fiscal tornando-o apelativo ao investimento. Nos Estados Unidos isso criou uma catástrofe social, com a acumulação de riqueza numa parte muito reduzida da sociedade e com a perda de milhares de empregos. Assim, a desregulação da economia foi parte do problema, mas a questão essencial teve a ver com as mudanças fiscais, que começaram por ter um efeito muito positivo no crescimento económico mas que depois se traduziram em impactos negativos. Outro aspeto negativo gerado por este contexto é a revolta dos que perdem com esta situação, seja em relação aos que ganham com ela, seja face às instituições que criaram o problema. Este é o problema nos Estados Unidos, na Europa e também na China. Relativamente ao Brexit, foi referido que o Reino Unido pretende aquilo que a Alemanha também considera impres-

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cindível: um acordo de livre comércio com a Europa. O Reino Unido é o terceiro maior parceiro económico da Alemanha (1º Estados Unidos, 2º França, 3º Reino Unido), pelo que esta não deixará que as relações económicas com o Reino Unido sejam prejudicadas. O Reino Unido está preparado para essa zona de comércio livre, mas não está preparada para que a União Europeia mude as suas leis e regras internas. Por outro lado, verifica-se nesta altura uma maior aproximação do Reino Unido aos Estados Unidos; à medida que a Europa se fragmenta, a confiança britânica nos Europeus diminuiu e a possibilidade de um acordo de livre comércio entre Reino Unido e Estados Unidos aumenta. O Reino Unido está, assim, a aproveitar a sua posição estratégica entre a Europa e a América para negociar. Foi salientado que o Reino Unido representa a segunda maior economia europeia, pelo que o seu isolamento da Europa teria um impacto muito negativo na região; logo, a maior probabilidade é que exista um acordo de livre comércio. A este propósito, um dos comentadores defendeu que o resultado do Brexit não vai ser a criação de um bloco europeu mais integrado e centralizado, suscitando antes uma reflexão por parte da Alemanha e da França sobre o que pretendem da Europa, podendo dar origem a um Germanxit daqui a alguns anos. Por fim, foi reforçada a confiança na Europa, sendo que a União Europeia não é a Europa, mas antes um projeto institucional que pode, ou não, ser útil. A Europa é uma parte essencial da humanidade, pela qual passa muito do futuro do mundo. Nesse contexto, Portugal tem uma posição única na Europa, com um único vizinho terrestre e com uma ligação histórica com o Reino Unido que é a base do atlantismo português. Os Estados Unidos dominam atualmente o Atlântico e o fortalecimento futuro das relações entre Estados Unidos e o Reino Unido pode ter efeitos positivos ara Portugal. Este bloco atlântico, atualmente em desenvolvimento, tem interesses comuns e Portugal terá de ser ágil para aproveitar as oportunidades daí decorrentes.

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A SEGURANÇA SECURITY Terrorismo e Disputas Estratégicas Terrorism and Strategic Disputes

Que cruzamentos se verificam entre a violência extremista, interesses

económicos e disputas geoestratégicas? Como combater regimes totalitários e opressores sem que o seu fim leve à ocorrência de desastres humanitários e à instalação do caos? Como criar aliados para o combate ao terrorismo sem perpetuar, apoiar ou legitimar regimes ditatoriais?

Is there a tendency for violent extremism to collude with larger economic

interests and geostrategic disputes? How can we fight totalitarian and aggressive regimes without causing humanitarian disasters or fuelling the creation of “chaos zones”? How can we build alliances to fight terrorism without supporting, nurturing or courting dictatorship and criminal regimes?

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SPEAKER

Ivan Timofeev Diretor de Programas, Russian International Affairs Council, Moscovo

Director of Programs, Russian International Affairs Council, Moscow

ur today’s topic addresses several important and burning issues: the terrorism and the change of terrorism, the interconnection of terrorism and autocratic regimes, the social roots of terrorism and the global state of security in our relations. I will try to provide several thoughts from the Russian perspective, on how these issues are seen from Moscow, though I must admit that Moscow also contains lots of views since we have huge competition inside the city and the country about what is going on. It is of common knowledge that terrorism is our joint threat, that we need to cooperate, and we need to be allies and move in a common direction when we speak about terrorism, regardless our political views and at some point, regardless our national interests. Terrorism does not have nationalities or other national attachments; it is therefore a universal problem. If you look at the international efforts, we could see some progress and some success stories. For instance, just recently, in 2017, the UN Security Council has adopted Resolution 2353, which was voted by all of the members of Security Council, providing more ground for fighting against information propaganda from terrorist organizations, and taking other important

steps. This important resolution was preceded by other resolutions, by the General Assembly and the Security Council. Considering this, if we look at the level of the UN and see it as universal international organization, things are not as bad as they could be. However, if we look at the field, to the real politics and real relations between countries - between Russia and the US, between Russia and the West in general, between different regional powers - we will see a completely different story. Our cooperation on terrorism was significantly undermined after 2014, when the Ukrainian crisis started. There were strong ideas that the terrorism and counter-terrorism basket should be untouchable; it should not be affected by our contradictions and disagreements on other issues, even though these disagreements are hard. However, recent developments show that things are worse than they could be and that we failed to keep this counter-terrorism basket untouchable. What is going on now in Syria is quite an illustrative example. It was a great achievement that we finally managed to smash and destroy ISIS, at least ISIS infrastructure, although I would not claim that ISIS is defeated, because we have ISIS now in Afghanistan, we have the re-branding of this movement, we have new sleeping cells, etc. We did manage to make a great deal, but what is important to stress is that, unfortunately, we did it in a very uncoordinated way. There is a US-led coalition, there is a coalition

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between the Assad government and Russian forces, and in the end, what should had been as a joint action, was done in a quite uncoordinated manner. What we now see in the field, in Syria, is the result of this poor coordination and sometimes the representation of the contradictions between the great powers. We have completely different narratives on terrorism and of understanding about what terrorism means, and we regard the different groups operating in Syria in a different way. For instance, Russians claim and blame the United States for supporting Jabhat al-Nusra which is considered a terrorist organization by Moscow, and the US are blaming Russia for cooperating with Iran and for supporting Iranian cooperation with Hezbollah, which is considered a terrorist organization by Washington. There are many evidences and examples of these contradictions. It is therefore a great problem that we are failing to coordinate and to make a joint effort. At the same time, terrorists and extremists of different kinds are feeling good in this contradictory environment, creating new brands, employing new information technologists, becoming very effective in the cyber-sphere and social networks, and attracting new people, not just from the region but also from Europe. Paradoxically, we are providing a comfortable environment for terrorists and extremists of various kinds. The contradictions between the great powers are a negative factor, but I propose to look at the problem in a more fundamental and strategic way. What we should do is to look, at least, at three different factors beyond political contradictions. The first factor is the state consistency and the crisis of state in the Middle East and beyond. The rise of terrorism and extremism happened after the collapse of several regimes, and here we attach the correlation between regime change and terrorism. Considering that one major topics of this conference is development, the paradox is that, if you look at the quality of life statistics in the countries which collapsed (Libya, Syria and several others), you will find that their social indicators were on the rise before the conflicts: the level of education and GDP per capita were growing up. Accordingly, the theory which implies that revolution is the result of poverty did not work. Of

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course, there were social conflicts, for example around water, but all in all we had revolutions in countries that faced the improvement of living standards. Syria used to be quite a well-off country, and still we got a brutal revolution and civil war, as well as a comfortable environment for terrorism and extremism. The process of the crisis of the secular autocratic state has not yet ended, and there is a probability that we will have some more crises, considering there are also spill-over effects by the “global spasm” which was mentioned by George Friedman in the previous session. Another factor is ideology, as it seems that we are losing an ideological fight with radicals and extremists. If we look at those people who are joining extremists, some of them are from poor families who live in socially marginalized and underdeveloped places, but many of them are from prosperous and well-off families, which we would never suspect to be potential victims of terrorist recruitment. In this context, ideology is shared by Russia, Europe and the US, which propose similar ideological values, as the values of enlightenment and progress and rational order; and we are under attack by completely different ideas and there is still no remedy to counteract it. Could nationalism be that remedy? It may be effective in the short run, but it is dangerous - and what about our integration process? This is not only a problem of the EU but also a problem of Russia. Last but not least, there is the demography factor. If we look at the demographic dynamics, we will find different patterns: the Middle East countries which faced revolutions are still characterised by the so called youth curve, meaning there is huge representation of young people in the population. This is of course a positive element. However, when it appeared that their education and welfare level grew up, the political systems failed to satisfy their growing demands. As a result, we got revolutions, the rise of radicalism and the search for new ideological ground by the young population. I would like to conclude by calling for better coordinated action, despite political tensions and disagreements. You may find it idealistic, but no progress is possible without idealism.

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SPEAKER

Mary Kaldor Professora, London School of Economics and Political Science, Londres

Professor, London School of Economics and Political Science, London

would start where we left off in the last session, which is the transition we are living through between the end of what we might call the American model of development, based on mass production and intensive use of oil, and the emergence of a new model of development, which is largely based on the transformation brought about by information and communication technologies. It was Antonio Gramsci who said in the 1930’s: “the old is dying and the new cannot be born”, and in this interregnum we observe many morbid symptoms. The issues we are now discussing - terrorism, conflict, authoritarianism - are all the morbid symptoms of transition. Rather like the transition of the 1920’s and 30’s, which Gramsci was talking about, we have this great sense of foreboding, that something terrible is going to happen. Actually, I think something terrible is already happening. When you think about some of the things that are happening at the moment - thousands of refugees drowning in the Mediterranean, the bombing of schools and hospitals in Yemen and Syria, the terrorist driving lorries into crowded places in France or in Britain, long-range assassinations (the drones campaign on an industrial scale, which would have been kind of unthinkable a few years ago), the use of chemical weapons, nerve agents, beheading, torture, sexual slavery - all these phenomenon by a wide range of parties are things that people of my generation believed would never happen again. How do we make sense of it?

In previous transitions of this kind, we had a major war: the Napoleonic wars, the wars of the mid-19th century and the wars of the 20th century, all of which ended rather decisively and brought about a restructuring of both the international order and the nature of the State. The problem we face, although I am not sure if it is a problem since those wars were really horrible, is that military means just do not work any longer. This is not just because we have the threat of mass destruction; it is actually because very advanced military technology of the kind possessed by the Russian and Americans is not so different from very primitive military technology, the improvised explosive devices of insurgents and terrorists and flying airplanes into towers. If you think about it, it has been 17 years since the war on terror was declared and far from defeating terrorism, it is now a much greater problem than it was in 2001. We started with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and, particularly in Iraq, this created a terrorism problem where none had existed previously, attracting jihadists from all over the world. More recently, we have had the global coalition against ISIS and although they have taken the territory again, they have razed cities like Mosul to the ground, making them complete rubble, and they have killed hundreds of thousands of civilians, and now ISIS is reappearing in the liberated areas. People in several places in Iraq feel so much more upset by what the coalition has done because so many more people were killed than were

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killed by ISIS, which is really troubling. Moreover, the same is true about Assad and the Russians. More than 95% of the casualties in the Syrian war, which are about half a million, have been caused by Russian and Syrian bombing. You can also make a similar argument about the classic geo-political military responses to authoritarian regimes. When the West says, “we must be strong against Russia!”, that actually plays into Putin’s hands, and we see him strengthening his position domestically. We had a very good example recently in Britain with this nerve gas attack on two people in Salisbury. Theresa May, our prime minister, immediately blamed Russia (probably right, but with no evidence) and decided to expel Russian diplomats. That resulted in tit for tat expulsions and the closure of the British consulate in Saint Petersburg, but who gained from it? Theresa May probably gained politically and so did Putin. All things considered, those approaches don’t produce any answers.

be over in 15 to 20 years, because these kinds of wars tend to spread and are very difficult to end. What can we do? I believe that in this interdependent world we need approaches that were traditionally considered domestic approaches, rather than international ones. We tend to think when we deal with problems domestically, we deal them with law, politics and economic measures, whereas with things internationally, it is either war or diplomacy. I have given you reasons why the military approach does not work, but it is also true that diplomacy does not work very well either. You cannot really negotiate with terrorists. How can you mediate among warlords? How can you negotiate with criminal regimes? What kind of outcome are you going to get? Hence, diplomacy is also problematic. Therefore, we need an approach that is based on justice, political legitimacy and socioeconomic measures. First of all, in terms of justice, giving the example of 9/11, it was treated by George Bush as an attack on the US as though

(...) most importantly, we need to reconstruct political legitimacy. The huge problem is the loss of legitimacy of states and the pervasive mistrust in political institutions, which is what upholds the rule of law. What we face now is not a war like 20th century wars, but what I call a new war, which is what we are seeing in Syria or Libya. These are very different kinds of wars. They are not so much deep-rooted political contest between two sides, which is what we think of as war; rather they are an anarchic social condition in which hundreds of armed groups gain from violence itself instead of gaining from winning or losing. These groups gain from violence because it is a way to mobilise political ideologies based on fear, for example extreme jihadism, and also because they get revenue from loot, pillage, smuggling and taxing humanitarian assistance. Therefore, we have created some very rich warlords. These kinds of wars are extremely difficult to end. Some argued that classic wars tended to the extreme, as each side tries to win, yet the wars we are talking about tend to persist, as all the parties gain from a situation of violence. I am less optimistic than George Friedman, who believes that this will 70 _

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the terrorists were a foreign state. Supposing he had treated September 11th as a crime against humanity, and not a specific attack against the US, it would have required policing and intelligence responses rather than a military response, which would have meant everything would have been very different. Similarly, today’s authoritarian regimes are largely based on criminalised oligarchies and that is especially true since the financial crisis of 2008, when we have seen this enormous amount of wealth occurring to a small body of people and we have seen the way the deficit states have become increasingly dependent on finance and oil revenues, rather than on taxation. They have become effectively rentier states and if you think about both these autocratic regimes and these conflicts, they create a kind of environment in which you have to be a criminal in order to survive. There is systematic corruption and in conflict zones you cannot make a legitimate living, you have to either become a criminal or join an extremist militia if you

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want to survive. Secondly, we also need to think about how you create legitimate economies, in order to reverse this kind of process. Finally, and most importantly, we need to reconstruct political legitimacy. The huge problem is the loss of legitimacy of states and the pervasive mistrust in political institutions, which is what upholds the rule of law. Contemporary conflicts are fundamentally illegal, in a war crime sense, since they violate international humanitarian law (with the deliberate killing of civilians), human rights law and economic regulations. In the end, reconstructing political legitimacy from the ground up is the key to both reconstructing economies and establishing systems of justice. We can find areas – almost like islands – where political legitimacy exists, even in conflict zones, and building on that is of utmost importance. How do you rebuild political legitimacy, and who is going to take a lead in all of this? You will find many of the ideas that I have been put forward, for example, in UN documents on peacebuilding, in the documents of the African Union and

the European Union. I would point specifically to the European Union’s Global Strategy, which was published the day after the British referendum decision to leave the EU. I believe the EU is particularly important in this respect because it is the organization that has the most to lose from what is happening, especially if you think about the wars in the Middle East. The problem of refugees, the problem of terrorism and the problem of organized crime - these are all affecting the EU first and foremost, and yet oddly enough the EU has been absolutely nowhere in any of these conflicts. What is more to the point, the EU seems to be the only entity with the resources available for reconstruction. Trying to implement what is in the EU Global Strategy could be a very important starting point, and the problem here lies in what we were discussing earlier: the lack of political leadership. It is all there on paper. Partly thanks to Brexit, the EU is now building the tools it needs, because the UK is no longer objecting, but it needs some political leadership that is currently lacking.

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DISCUSSANT

Ana Santos Pinto Professora Auxiliar, Universidade Nova de Lisboa

Assistant Professor, Nova Lisbon University

y role as a discussant is to start the debate with some “provocations” and I will do that addressing the “elephant in the room”, which is the rising conflict between Russia and many Western countries, not only regarding terrorism, as Ivan Timofeev referred here today and also in one of his recent articles (Valdai Discussion Club, 11.04.2018) where he wrote, and I quote “The two sides, Russia and the West, do not want an cannot listen do each other”. I know that you have been positive and idealistic in saying that we need a unity for action, but when I was listening to you, the first question that arises is: how can there be a united action on terrorism if you can’t even agree on the object we must act upon? We can call it ISIS, Al-Qaeda, political insurgent movements or opposition to the regime, but what is important is what is Russia’s perspective on the definition of terrorism and can it be agreed with the NATO Atlantic Council, with the United Nations and the United States? In a Pew Research Centre opinion pool that was made in 38 countries to 40.000 people, 60% of the respondents defined terrorism as the main world threat but around 30% defined US power and influence as a major security threat, and many defined Russia and China’s power and influ-

ence also as major security threats. It is not only terrorism that is perceived as a big challenge for world stability. Regarding Mary Kaldor’s presentation, specifically regarding the European Union, the United Nations and the African Union global strategies and how they respond to these new wars, organized crime, etc, the official declarations on these issues are made by representatives of states. So, why don’t we see the implementation of the strategies by these states? Is it because the states and political institutions as we perceive them are not adequate to address these new wars? Or is it simply because they don’t want to do it? We know that, very recently, internal elections reinforced the political power of Vladimir Putin, Theresa May and many other political leaders, and they must speak to their constituencies. Is that the reason why there is a huge different between what they say, what they do and also the ideology behind that? Terrorism is an extremism that has political objectives. We have huge polarizations within societies and we are seeing again the rise of nationalism. All this might not be related only with terrorism and it is also a reaction to the recent crisis on our societies. However, linking this with Brexit, I would like to ask how will you think we will be after Brexit is finalized? How will British society react on the security level and its position regarding terrorism, which is an important issue that is affecting the United Kingdom?

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Mary Kaldor I have often asked myself the same questions. Why is the immediate reaction to a terrorist attack an air strike? I think it’s something that is built into the DNA of states because they were constructed through war and through victories in war. We always have military parades when we celebrate our national days and there is an assumption that, when something bad happens, we must engage in a military attack. It is not only a historic perspective, it is something built in the military-industrial complex and in the way the state is structured. There is also an assumption that this is what the population expects, so politicians feel they must react in this way. Politicians are behind ordinary people on their perception of these issues, and the United Kingdom in an example. Jeremy Corbin, leader of the Labour party, gave a brave speech at Chatham House, our official international affairs centre, saying the war on terror doesn’t work. We had 17 years of war on terror and it has just produced more terrorism, and we need to rethink the strategy. We know that ISIS would never have happened if we had pushed for an inclusive government in Iraq or the if we wouldn’t have contrib-

uted to the conflict in Syria. Two weeks after this speech the Manchester terrorist attack happened. Within a few days of the attack Mr. Corbyn repeated these assertions and, of course, the government attacked him and said he is soft of terrorism. However, the majority of public opinion was on his side and exactly the same thing happened over the Salisbury attack (March 4th, 2018) in which a nerve agent was used to poison two Russian citizens. I didn’t completely agree with his response on this last one, but he argued that this was a crime and we needed to find the evidence first before we started with geopolitical attacks on Russia. He was hugely attacked for these declarations but, once again, the polls showed that the majority of British opinion agreed with him. This is interesting as an example of a shift in public opinion that politicians aren’t aware of. There is a huge problem relating to Brexit in this respect, because the security policy that is closest to what Mr Corbyn defends is the one that the European Union defends, which is very different from the classic military policy of NATO. Britain is on the verge of leaving the EU and it’s not clear what will Britain security policy will be in a post-Brexit world.

Ivan Timofeev We are not doomed to be uncoordinated in this counter-terrorism effort and, technically speaking, part of the solution is the fragmentation of the terrorist problem. It is clear now that, at least to a certain point, disagreements are used in political games within a wider geopolitical context. But, if we fragment the issue into concrete sub-issues we will find a huge number of domains were we still cooperate. I would like to remind you of an episode, at the end of 2017, when a terrorist attack in Saint Petersburg, Russia’s second largest city, was prevented with the help of US intelligence. But the problem is that we stopped doing this cooperation in a systematic way. We did it after 9/11 and we no longer do it. It still works in certain areas, but on the wider context our relations are deteriorating, and we are now adversaries most times 74 _

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- and I would even use the term confrontation. The Sergei e Yulia Skripal case is quite an illustrative example because, if we look at the narrative of official diplomacy, we will find two sides which do not, cannot and would not like to listen to each other. They have completely different narratives and there is almost no attempt to find some common understanding. When I was recently discussing this issue with my EU colleagues I asked a simple question: imagine that tomorrow we have another case like Salisbury or three similar cases at the same time in different European or in Russian cities. What would we do? What leverage do we have? Should we keep expelling more diplomats? What is the way out from this if we have another provocation like that? As a scholar I have no evidence to defend any version, but we are very vulnerable regarding these issues.

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NATO and Russia are spending more and more resources to contain each other. But if we look at most terrorist attacks on

Europe and in the US, Russia is not involved. So, we are spending all of these resources and our security is not increasing.

Mary Kaldor In the UK, over the last few years, we had 14 suspicious murders of Russian oligarchs and only one, before this last case, was properly investigated and that was only because of a public outcry. This lack of investigation was clearly because of geopolitical reasons. People were nervous about Russia. The reaction to the Sergei e Yulia Skripal, was again not a criminal investigation, which is exactly what we should have done, but rather a geopolitical “tit for tat”. There should be serious criminal investigations, and for example the Litvinov case was a serious investigation that pointed the finger at the Kremlin. Regarding the Skripal case, we know that this new family of chemical weapons was indeed developed

in the Soviet Union, but we cannot establish that this particular agent was made in Russia because it is possible for many people in many countries to copy it. Nevertheless, I agree with the British government that the circumstantial evidence, given former Russian agents were involved, points to Russia. But what we must do is to engage in legal processes and not in a geopolitical one. That is really what I mean by saying we need to shift from domestic approaches to international approaches. We need to act according to law, both domestically and internationally, and this raises also other problems about what is International Law and what is happening to it.

Ana Santos Pinto I think narratives are a very important issue. The way we present reality and what reality shows us is very significant. We cannot deny reality and decisions that are being made only seem to have a geopolitical approach behind them. I must ask you a question related to criminal law and the EU approach: can we still stand by a normative EU? I think nobody believes anymore on this notion of a normative EU. When we look at the real world - where the balance of power is mainly US, Russia and China - can the EU really do something at the global level, at least for the benefit of its member states? If we look at public perception in member states, EU is not doing anything. Even if this perception comes from internal reasons, it is a very striking problem when we look at the European crisis.

Humanitarian law does not approach questions regarding human security and issues that surface with new wars. I would like to ask Mary Kaldor if we can still believe in this normative EU? To Ivan Timofeev, my last provocative question is regarding Russia’s international approach on the present global context. You asked what will happen if we have many simultaneous cases like Skripal, but we have a more immediate threat of direct confrontation which is Syria. We are talking about nuclear powers and governments that need to answer to some specific interests. Moreover, President Putin recently began a new term facing an economic and demographic problem, also with technological backwardness. Is it sustainable for Russia to keep this stand off?

Ivan Timofeev I would like to address this issue of normative concepts. The problem is that, more and more, these normative concepts are simulated; we pronounce them, but they are becoming increasingly empty and are undermining the possibility of

coordination between our two sides. That is also one of the reasons why radical Islam has become so powerful. Many people go to that side because they perceive EU values as a simulation.

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Starting with Syria, several weeks ago we were in a very dangerous situation because there was another chemical provocation in the country and the US coalition responded with a strike. I would not give a normative assessment on this but rather an instrumental one, by saying that this was very dangerous. We know that there were three scenarios provided to President Donald Trump and one of them implied the strike on Russian infrastructures, and it also included the notion that Russia would not strike back because the balance of power is on US side. But there was a clear risk of direct military collision. I won’t overestimate this probability because fortunately military officers from both sides proposed to maintain a careful policy, both in US and Russia. However,

the question remains: what will they do if similar cases continue to happen? Regarding the economic and demographic problem and also technological backwardness, all of them exist but those are not problems for President Putin’s new term in office. These are old problems for Russia, at least, since Leonid Brejnev’s time. It is such a strategic challenge that we probably need to adopt the Chinese way of thinking and have a long-term approach. These challenges cannot be overcome in just one presidential term, they require a strategy for a century and a change in strategic thinking. The key threat to our sovereignty is not the military challenge but our own economic and technological problems: if we don’t solve them, we will be increasingly vulnerable.

Mary Kaldor These military strikes are an example of what I talked about. They were a response to the use of chemical weapons in Ghouta (a suburban area of Damascus) but what did they achieve? They did not destroy the chemical stocks because they supposedly had already been destroyed by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. However, It was very easy for President Assad to keep a small amount of these nerve gases and to hide them. We have no idea whether the attacks would have destroyed them. Therefore, these strikes sent a message to President Assad that we don’t mind if he bombs his civilians or if he tortures them, we only mind if he uses chemical weapons. It was a completely useless response and it was done entirely to show domestic public that we are reacting in some way. Nobody is seriously thinking on what to do, and I think that is also true in case of Russia, although they are on the ground and have to think about it. I cannot understand why it is not possible to have a humanitarian agreement in Ghouta and in other regions of Syria, constraining Assad and allowing a UN presence in those areas. In Ghouta, local people achieved a cease fire after the chemical weapons attack. They surrounded a house of a radical preacher, who was trying to stop a cease fire from happening and they reached agreement. Those people are vulnerable and need to be defended. Although Russian forc76 _

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es are supposed to be patrolling, they only have 300 policemen for the whole of Syria. We need a UN or EU presence to protect the civilians. On normative Europe, it is one of my favourite issues, I think normative is a funny word because every state would defend they are normative. For example, the US wouldn’t just say it is pursuing their one interests; they would say US has the most brilliant values and they are exporting them. The original author that addressed the issue of normative Europe, Ian Manners (Department of Politics and International Relations, Rutherford College University of Kent at Canterbury; Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, December 2002) gave an interesting definition saying that normative Europe is about establishing what is normal in International relations. But if we think that norms reflect our self-interest, then you come to the question of what is the European Union? It is important to understand that the EU is not a state in the making, it is not a classic international organization, because it has more powers that the others, nor is it a super-state. It is something new that came about by accident, and I describe it quite often as a model of global governance. However, it has not completely reached its fulfilment because there is no internal agreement about what it is. If we are talking about self-interest, it’s important to understand that the EU is a “new kind of

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animal” that emerged in reaction to war rather than as a result of war (unlike states). The EU self-interest is to live in a peaceful and law governed world because that is the only world in which the EU will survive. In that sense, if by normative Europe we mean a political unit that is committed to a law government international order, then that is was EU means. The problem is that, as we know, the European Union is an intergovernmental organization and its different member states have different conceptions about it. I would argue that many

of the smallest states (the Scandinavian states, the Iberian states) share this conception of what the EU is, but the bigger states (particularly Britain and France) still have an old great power mentality. Also, some of the central European states still have a nationalist mentality. It is time to shift that and to really build the idea of a law governed Europe, and to mobilize popular support around that idea is incredibly important if EU is to survive. One of the ways that public support can be built is if the EU could play an effective role in places like Syria.

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Debate

debate começou por esclarecer a ligação entre os fenómenos terroristas e as disputas estratégicas, a qual dá o nome ao painel. O terrorismo não deve ser analisado como uma tempestade ou uma epidemia, mas como uma tática de guerra assimétrica, que constitui o epifenómeno das disputas estratégicas, na medida em que foi a destruição do Iraque, a destruição da Líbia e agora da Síria que fizeram acelerar a importância de ações e movimentos terroristas. Por exemplo, o Irão tem um interesse objetivo e imediato na Síria, uma influência estabelecida no Iraque e no Líbano e um papel importante no Iémen, enquanto a Turquia está interessada em evitar a formação de algum tipo de autonomia curda no Iraque, pelo que Irão e Turquia se unem no objetivo de evitar o ressurgimento do nacionalismo curdo. A isto juntam-se os interesses estratégicos de Israel (que tem dado apoio militar à al-Nusra e outros movimentos)ou da Arábia Saudita. Assim, uma grande parte do terrorismo atual tem a ver com as disputas entre potências regionais, apoiadas por potências europeias, em concreto pela França e Reino Unido no caso da Líbia e da Síria, e pelos Estados Unidos, que neste momento têm alguma indecisão sobre o que fazer. A Síria tornou-se o palco da intervenção internacional, existindo pelo menos 81 países a intervirem militarmente no país (78 membros da coligação contra o ISIS, ao que acrescem a Rússia, o Irão e Israel). Se entendemos por terrorismo o uso da força para espalhar o terror particularmente na população civil, é a tática por excelência das novas guerras, na medida em que existem muito poucos conflitos entre grupos armados definidos e a maioria da violência dirige-se a civis (como por exemplo o bombardeamento de escolas e hospitais, ou o deslocamento forçado como tá-

tica para ter ganhos políticos e ganhar poder). Neste contexto, a ideia da “guerra contra o terror” permitiu que vários regimes denominassem os ataques contra os seus adversários como sendo um combate contra o terrorismo, o que a torna insidiosa e perigosa nos moldes atuais. A ideia de sempre ter existido terrorismo suscitou algum debate, na medida em que há uma diferença essencial: o terrorismo atual tem conexões globais e usa técnicas diferentes. Para além disso, os ataques no mundo ocidental vêm de fora desse espaço e já não há grupos definidos e bem identificados. Uma questão centrou-se nos modelos de atuação europeia nos conflitos, nomeadamente o condicionalismo democrático (usado na transição da europa de Leste) e as alterações de regime. Foi referido que um ponto comum a muitos conflitos é o facto de começarem com um regime autocrático a abrir-se ao mundo, em termos políticos e económicos, através da liberalização e da tomada de medidas neoliberais, que têm consequências no plano social (nomeadamente em termos de proteção social, desemprego, etc.). No passado, a condicionalidade política imposta pela União Europeia em termos de tomada de medidas neoliberais pode ter sido um fator de agravamento das tensões nos países, embora a condicionalidade em termos de maior transparência e menor corrupção seja, em geral, bem-vinda nas sociedades. O debate centrou-se ainda nas formas de intervenção internacional que devem ser prosseguidas e em quem deve ser incluído nas negociações. Foi referido que as pessoas que se manifestaram pela democracia na Síria na Primavera Árabe não pretendiam a violência, mas um grupo de “empresários militares” que pretendiam criar o caos mobilizaram homens pobres e desempregados permeáveis às ideias extremistas – e estes tornaram-se a oposição, o que tem muito pouco a ver com democracia. As pessoas que participaram nos protestos tornaram-se a sociedade civil, começaram a intervir nas

comunidades, a fornecer mediação local e apoio humanitário às vítimas – e estas pessoas devem ser encaradas pela comunidade internacional como parceiros na procura de soluções para o problema da Síria. Se por um lado foi referida a necessidade de adotar intervenções e meios militares como única forma de contrariar o objetivo do ISIS em criar um Estado totalitário no médio oriente, por outro lado, os meios militares adotados são, tipicamente, ataques aéreos combinados com o empoderamento de grupos militares no terreno, como aconteceu na Líbia e contra o ISIS. Na Líbia o resultado foi o caos entre os grupos armados e na Síria e no Iraque o resultado foram números astronómicos de vítimas civis e grande destruição. Nesse sentido, o principal deve ser o enfoque nos meios de resolução de conflitos. Devemos desenvolver outras formas de uso da força, mais aproximadas da área policial e menos focadas no combate militar, focadas na proteção dos civis (corredores

humanitários, safe havens, etc.) e na detenção de criminosos e terroristas, em vez de tentar a derrota militar dos grupos armados. A legitimidade política é um fator chave, pois por exemplos não será possível resolver de forma sustentada o problema do ISIS sem que os sunitas sejam envolvidos no governo iraquiano. Os oradores foram também questionados sobre se existe algum tipo de autocrítica na Rússia sobre os atuais acontecimentos – p. ex. a interferência nas eleições norte-americanas, o apoio ao regime de Assad ou os episódios de envenenamento – e em que medida isso tem um papel nas tensões entre a Rússia e o Ocidente. A esse propósito, o orador russo referiu também que a Rússia poderia adotar outra linguagem, mais sensível aos problemas e ao clima de tensão internacional. A oradora inglesa apelou ao apoio russo às Nações Unidas para intervirem em termos humanitários, o que significaria o novo enfoque em cessares-fogo negociados localmente.

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A GLOBALIZAÇÃO GLOBALIZATION Será a Globalização Reversível? How Reversible is Globalization?

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SPEAKER

Montek Ahluwalia Antigo Vice-Presidente da Comissão de Planeamento da Índia, Nova Deli

Former Vice-President of the India Planning Commission, New Delhi

his session is supposed to address three questions: Firstly, are we entering a new age of protectionism? Secondly, is this being caused by Crony Capitalism, which is wiping out the operations of free markets? Thirdly, how will China and India react to all this? This is the first time that the developing countries enter the discussion. But before addressing these questions, I want to come back to the brilliant presentation that Prof. George Friedman made this morning. The answers to the questions I just mentioned depend on whether he is right in his assumptions or whether there is another explanation to what is happening. His view is clearly that the underlying momentum of the global economy has reached a major breaking point. There will be traumas, we might not be lost forever, but this model has run out of steam and it will take a decade for it to be reset. The other understanding is a more conventional one, admitting that there has been some unbalancing, and because of it, there is an imbalance in policies. If all countries were to realize that, for their own self-interest, they should make some changes and then everything would be set right again, and we would be back to a world of prosperity. This is what the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and to some extent the World Economic Forum regularly put out. They don't

deny there is a problem, but they don't believe it is a fundamental problem. You must keep these two views in mind when you look at the answers that we put forward. I think that perhaps there is more truth in the idea that there are some fundamental changes happening, but I don't entirely agree with what George Friedman said about the nature of those changes. With that background, let me try to give some answers to the questions I first mentioned. Are we entering a new age of protectionism? Let us be clear: things are different, and suddenly governments are saying things that they didn't said earlier. But even if, for example, the President of the United States (US) is far more outspoken on these things that its predecessors were, it doesn’t mean that we are seeing a surge in anti-trade ideas. The anti-trade movement predates President Donald Trump. The Doha Round, in December 2015, was neatly barred, not only by the United States but by many other developed countries. The basic fact that we encountered a difficulty on trade is not to be attributed to anything that happened on the course of the last year. There were problems building up to it and we need to keep that in mind. However, even if I don't believe we are in a fundamental 10-year disruption period, I do think it will not be easy to get out this difficult period. If anybody was hoping to see a quick return to progress in trade liberalization they will be disap-

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pointed, but we maybe witness less rolling back that what it looks like now. This is something yet to be sorted out and a lot depends on the tactics that different groups adopt. Certainly, the US Administration is the first one to “fire the shots” and we will have to see what China does, what Europe does, etc. When people see the cost of what they do, they are usually nimble enough to change their position slightly. The assumption that trade liberalization will proceed in an easy way is not valid, but there is a chance that we may be able to stop a major reversal. Regarding the second question: is all this the result of Cronyism? Cronyism really means the use of politically well-connected people to extract policies that clearly benefit them. I think that, although there's no doubt that there is some cronyism in place, what we are seeing is not just the result of it. It

We were discussing earlier that the second best football player in the world is probably not that much worse than Ronaldo (and I know that I am treading dangerous ground because he is a Portuguese star) but even a nationalist Portuguese would accept that there must me a second best player, and I don't see a single t-shirt anywhere other than a red one with the number 7. That really shows that “the winner takes all” is a real phenomenon in many sectors and issues. The system must be run in a way in which most people feel that there is something in it for them. If, for whatever reason, either due to bad policies or due to a crisis, the system begins to work in a way where most people feel that it doesn't deliver anything to them, you can expect a push back that will either damage democracy, lead to protectionism or both. If we

If the system begins to work in a way where most people feel that it doesn't deliver anything to them, you can expect a push back that will either damage democracy, lead to protectionism or both. is the result of underlying factors, some of which probably reflect social weaknesses and others reflect the way the economy works. If you believe, for example, Thomas Piketty (French economist), he's not saying that problems arise because of cronyism; he's saying that there's something fundamental in the way a liberal market economy works that is going to lead to an increasing concentration of power and inequality. I want to mention that there is a lot of work done on weather globalization and democracy can actually survive together. The assumption is: they can if the system is run in a way which ensures a broad base of prosperity. Earlier today Mary Kaldor implied this point, saying that in the post-world war II European expansion, a very import reason why rapid growth took place and was accepted was that the social security network that would support the broad base of prosperity had been laid. And that was certainly true in most of Europe (not in the United States, but in Europe yes). So, the question really is, even if there are inherent tendencies of rising inequalities, (inherent in the neoliberal classical model) another view is that globalization encourages a "winner takes all" approach, which leads to a huge concentration of incomes and inequalities. 90 _

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want the believe the assumption of a well-functioning market economy that has a lot of proficiency factors to it, we must make sure that the social outcomes that it generates are acceptable. We need to think of it broadly, rather than narrowly, only in terms of Cronyism. On the third question, regarding the role of China and other developing countries. China is the most spectacular example of a successful developing country, because since the mid-80's (the last 30 years or so) it has benefited of a growth rate around 10% or plus. In more recent years other developing countries have also been doing that; it is not just China but also other emerging market countries. The structure of the world economy has changed so that the share of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) accounted for by these countries is now close to 50%, and in another 10 years it will be more than 50% of the world GDP. This is very relevant when you ask the question: what should China and India, and other developing countries do? If the underlying global model that you have in mind is that these countries only "piggyback" on the success of industrialized countries, then you come to the problem that Professor Friedman raised in the morning: if that model is broken, everybody

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has had it. Nobody can run a model that is dependent on huge amounts of consumption fed by debt in the United States and in Europe. But if you believe that there are other models, you have a developing world quite capable of growing autonomously at a reasonable rate, because its own supply factors have improved. What are they? Economists, when they look at what determines growth, they look at things like human capital, physical capital, access to technology and some basic institutions that can bring about efficiency (particularly the financial sector abut also the regulatory system). The proposition that I put forward is that, in all these dimensions, the developing countries have made remarkable progress. High growth rates and less people living under the poverty line reflect this success. When you think about it, if around 55% of world GDP is coming from these countries, there is no reason why they can't autonomously continue to grow and not be dependent of growing demand from other countries. What can break this system is the pressure that this would put on the limited resources of the planet. That is a very serious problem and I think it is the biggest global failing right now. There is no way that GDP can grow without energy growing, and most energy today still comes from fossil fuels. We are hoping there will be lots of technology and greener fuel sources, but from everything I know, the present path that the world is on, post Paris Agreement on Climate Change - and irrespective of President Trump withdrawal from it - will not be enough. The Paris Agreement was a very inadequate response to the problems we face. It was wonderful because, for the first time, the whole world said: "we agree that there is a prob-

lem and we agree that we are going to do something about it". But while we were so busy celebrating that, we didn't make it plane that the agreement is about 1/3 of what needs to be done (and the withdrawal from the US will make it a little bit less than that). Considering this, the real question must be “what are we going to do in terms of global governance to find some solution?” We haven't seen much progress in that since 2015. One of the difficulties is, if there must be an agreement on global governance, there must be a shared understanding of how to moderate your own actions. Clearly, people will come to a shared understanding if there's an agreement on what must be the “sharing of the burden”. The good news is that the developing countries are no longer saying that "we don't have to do anything" - which they were, for a very long time. From the recognition that something must be done, to a system where what we all agree upon makes some sense, it takes a very long time and means a very big leap that still hasn’t happened. If we don't get any progress about that (and unlike trade, where there won't be that much damage), we will have a bad outcome. All countries are supposed to be starting negotiations for the 2050 strategy and the present position is that every country, including all the industrialized ones and the developing ones, would have to agree to a very substantial reduction in emissions (higher than what they currently have incorporated into their targets). Frankly, I wouldn’t be negative about trade, GDP growth or the global financial system, but this is the thing to be negative about. I just don't see any good news there at all.

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SPEAKER

Daniel Hamilton Fundador e Diretor Executivo, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Washington

Founding Director, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Washington

think the basic questions on this subject are: is globalization continuing? What is the backlash? How should who thing about it? The quick answer is: globalization is continuing and in fact, in some areas, it is accelerating and there is already some backlash and a great questioning of its effects in many other areas. I think about globalization in a much broader sense than only trade. We do get hang up by what do we mean by globalization. There are different narratives about it, and they have become problematic because they don't really help us to understand what we are talking about. Let me briefly talk about three of those. One of the prevailing narratives, that the "apostles" of globalization use, is that it is global and seamless, and distance doesn't matter anymore (you can find books on the death of distance). But the reality is that distance still matters, and it is in fact one of the reasons why globalization is uneven in its effects. It can thicker, or it can be thin, depending on the connections that we are talking about. And that's were politics comes in because the unevenness of globalization means a lot of different things to different people and different societies. This notion that the death of distance is what we refer to on addressing globalization is neither true nor helpful. The second narrative is not quite the same, but it is talked about in the same way (I heard it today): it refers to the rise

of what some call "the multipolar world". We must pause a minute to think about what this really means. It seems to imply that we have different centres of power (it was a reaction to the "unipolar moment" after the end of the Cold War) and that somehow these poles are similar or almost equal: United States (US), Europe, India, China, Russia. This really deserves a secondary reflection. First, that's a very state centric view of the world we're in, whereas globalization is much more than that. And we must wonder if this view really helps us to understand the current phenomenon of globalization. On the other hand, when we think about power in all its dimensions [soft power, hard power, sharp power - used when we refer to China], which countries have this full spectre of power resources and the capability not only to have them but also to deploy them in a very agile way and combine them? I think we end up with only a couple of countries. Thus, I don't think the multipolar concept gets us too far. The better way to approach this is to talk about the current diffusion of power. And we are in fact seeing a diffusion of power, away from the state centric world – this is the model that globalization is challenging us with. We see power leaking from states to non-state actors. We also see power leaking among states and, especially relevant for Europe, we see power leaking above the state to something like the European Union, which has qualities that individual member states no

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longer have real competence for (for example on trade). We must think harder about this diffusion of power and how it relates to globalization (linking this with the point about thick and thin connections). If we must use the “polar” term, I would say “inter-polar” is better, because it brings in the interdependencies between those centres of power. The third narrative that I often hear about as one of the prevailing narratives on globalization - certainly in the media is that globalization is all about the rise of Asia. There are some famous books on this. For example, about ten years ago Kishore Mahbubani wrote "The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East”. Everyone is really caught up in this dynamic: China will save the world; India is changing the world. But, by definition, globalization is not about only one part of the world and if there is an Asian hemisphere, there must also be an Atlantic hemisphere. If we open that term, we see some interesting connections. Tom Friedman, columnist for The New York Times, wrote a book a long time ago (The World is Flat: A Brief Story of the Twenty-First Century, 2005) where

The idea that we can break the connection between the production of wealth and the consumption of resources, which would be truly revolutionary, has a real potential because of innovation happening here in Europe. Around 80% of the bio-fuels of the world come from the Atlantic. The US are shifting away from the Persian Gulf, but as it becomes less an important energy source for the US, it becomes much more important for Asia because this region doesn't have the energy resources; the Atlantic hemisphere will start to produce energy for the rise of Asia. The second example is commerce. We talk about the rise of these big economies but there is still more commerce flowing within the Atlantic basin than in any other basin. If we include trade, investment and all these kinds of flows, the Atlantic is still the fulcrum of the global economy. However, it is a hemisphere of great wealth but also of great inequality, because all these flows do not occur evenly. And, again, that's where politics come in. If you think about it, where is the greatest centre of German investment in the World? It's in São Paulo, Brazil.

We have two worlds coexisting: the State-centric world, institutions and organizations; and the world of networks, that is he had a very simple definition of globalization: it is how continents connect. If we look on how continents are really connecting and all sorts of flows we have between them (people, services, goods, investment, trade, data, technology, diseases) we see that the Atlantic hemisphere is also connected in many ways that seem to be escaping a lot of our attention. This is particularly relevant for Portugal. Let me give you some brief examples. Energy was mentioned, and the Atlantic basin is becoming the world's energy reservoir for the next few decades, because of the tremendously diverse revolutionary developments that are happening all along the north and south of its basin. It's not only about the US fracking and energy revolution. If you go down trough to Brazil and all along the eastern coast of South America, we see all sorts of developments happening there, back up to West Africa. And the centre of the global renewable innovation industry is in the Atlantic, and particularly in Europe. 94 _

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US companies in the United Kingdom export more to the rest of Europe than US companies based in China export to the entire world. US assets in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are greater than US assets in India. Thus, we're progressing with globalization but it's not an even process and, of course, we are starting from a very different point. Part of the rise of the Atlantic is because of the rise of the Pacific hemisphere. We had to expand the Panama Canal; you're building all these tanker ports across the Atlantic basin: the Arctic is opening up. This will become an interaction between the Asian and the Atlantic hemispheres (a sort of Hemispheric Globalization). The last example refers to the negative side all of this. What I would call the "Dark Networks" of the Atlantic basin, which are also about globalization (for example, Crony Capitalism). We have drugs being produced in South America coming over, not only to North America and Europe, but also to Africa and into the Sahel, a vast region of the continent that is basical-

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ly run by gangs, in lawless areas and fuelled by gun purchases that come from North America, with costumers coming from Europe. This means we created a circular set of dark networks that are preying on people and are fuelled from resources that come of that circular network. Everybody in the Atlantic basin is implicated and we still don't have any institutions to deal with that. My plea here is to think about how we are connected by different flows, and how these flows and connections are more what globalization is about. To conclude, I give you three implications regarding all these reflections. We have two worlds coexisting at the moment: the Statecentric world, that we are used to, and is about sovereignty, borders, institutions and organizations. Then we have this world of networks, that is about webs, hubs, data, value chains. They coexist uneasily and that's the world that we are facing right now when it comes to the political consequences. The value-chain map of Europe is not the same as the institutional map of Europe. Companies don't stop at the border of the

tion age" (the platform companies) and we must think harder in what is coming at us real soon, in fact is already starting. The other revolutionary science, with amazing speed right now, is Biology. If we put those two together, digital revolution and biological revolution, we are heading into what I would call a” Bio-cognitive Age”, in which the next trillion dollars industries are not built on codes of one and zero. They are built on our genetic code. This raises all sorts of issues, and, because it is uneven, it's unclear who is going to capture that market and what are the implications. You can already see companies occupying this space and amazing innovations happening in the biological space that will be turned into profit making companies. Who's capturing this revolution? We haven't even grappled with the one we are in now! The last implication, regarding the darker side of this, is that our connections are what keep us going. Governments, which are accustomed to protecting their territories when it comes to traditional security, must think much harder about protecting their connectedness. It represents a different kind

that we are used to, and is about sovereignty, borders, about webs, hubs, data, value chains. They coexist uneasily (…). European Union when they are figuring out their values chains. As Professor George Friedman said today, there is a tendency in the European Union to call itself Europe but, increasingly, non-EU Europe is becoming more important to the rest of the world. We need to think about how these flows are occurring, both in positive and negative ways. This also highlights the really important issue of the digital economy, which is absorbing more and more the biggest part of the economy, either because it fuels tangible things or because it is the value behind many intangible things. And there is “no good data about data”. Governments do not know how to measure the digital economy very well, and they are not capturing it. It is not a distinct part of the economy, that we can separate. It’s becoming the whole economy and, if we hit a button of architectural design and send it across the ocean, it represents a high value click. How do you measure it? We are so preoccupied about our current challenges of the "digitiza-

of security challenge, but it's no less important. The migration challenge to Europe over the last few years was a security flow challenge, in which traditional territorial approaches are not going to work. You must think in terms of “flow security”. What is the communality behind terrorists, energy cartels, cyber hackers? They are all networks that are trying to prey on the networks of free societies and disrupt the critical functions of those societies for whatever purpose they may have. Traditional security approaches don't deal well with this. We must think about a “flow security approach” and that is also why globalization is not only about economics; it has may other dimensions to it. To conclude, in the end the political question is: is globalization working for you? How every individual answer that question determines the politics of this - and you see a new setting for trade in which many people are saying "no, it is not working for me!". This trading system is in crisis and while they

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are wondering about losing jobs, we haven't done a good job in explaining how the turn of the economy works and we certainly are not in a "business as usual" mode. The new normal is "no business as usual". In the US and in Europe, the tradition party affiliations have fragmented. On the Right we see real divisions between traditional mainstream free market conservatives and sovereigntists, and they don't agree with each other. On the Left there are many who say we need to maintain high standards, so we can set the standards throughout the globe regarding environment, safety, food, etc, and we have others that are asking "what about my job?", and they don't' agree with each

other. We are fracturing, and the real division seems to be more between those who are still arguing for the benefits of an open society and those who are arguing that we must shield and protect ourselves. For example, the French President image for Europe is a Europe that protects. That is not an outward looking message, but one of Europe looking inward, shoring down, anchoring down, protecting itself. And those are the divides, I think, we are dealing with, both in Europe, in the United States, probably in many other countries - and that are challenging our old frameworks. Therefore, repeating what George Friedman said earlier today: let's enjoy the ride.

We are fracturing, and the real division seems to be more between those who are still arguing for the benefits of an open society and those who are arguing that we must shield and protect ourselves.

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DISCUSSANT

Raquel Vaz-Pinto Investigadora do Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais (IPRI-UNL)

Researcher, Portuguese Institute of International Relations (IPRI-UNL)

rofessor Montek Ahluwalia, you talked about all these economic concerns and questions relating to countries such as India, China and so forth. One of the usual comparisons that is made between China and India is that the Chinese development and economic growth has been, at least in the first instance, led by the state whilst, in the case of India, most of its economic growth has been led by the private sector. So, my first question to you would be if you agree with this broad characterization of India's development? A second point or narrative is usually that, although India's economic growth has been slower that China's (China is of course a spectacular example of growth), the case of India´s growth is perhaps more sustainable, not only in environmental terms, but also in terms of policy. Do you agree with this view? Thirdly, while I was listening to your presentation, I was thinking about the linkage between being a liberal democracy (in the case of India being the largest democracy in the globe) and economic growth. Whenever my students talk about the complexity of elections, I always bring up the case of the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, that has two hundred million people and when you have elections you have to organize them in a way that allows more than one hundred million people to vote, which is

very complex. You talked about prosperity and what I find fascinating about India, amongst other things, is that while it is a liberal democracy since the end of the 1940s, with a Constitution since 1950, it has been able to deal with the fact that it was not a very prosperous country in the first decades of having a democratic system. What would be your advices regarding the current issues pertaining liberal democracies, and to assure the resilience of these democracies in cases in which prosperity is no longer what it used to be, at least for some sectors of society? Professor Daniel Hamilton, when you were talking about how we tend to think about globalization mostly from a State-centric approach, I remembered an article written by Samuel P. Huntington (The Lonely Superpower, Foreign Affairs Magazine, March/April 1999) in which he talks about the “uni-multipolar”. But since this article doesn’t meet your criteria for the State-centric approach, I refrain myself to develop this. Regarding a second point you made, about the diffusion of power, I also remembered a very good report by the National Intelligence Council (Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, December 2012), in which one of the key ideas was exactly on how we deal with the diffusion of power. On the one side, we have all these sectors asking the state to act and defend them, but on the other side it's quite impossible to defend them all in most areas. What I would like you to develop a little more is the last point you made regarding those sectors that are

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discontent and frustrated with globalization. We see this, for instance, in the United States and I would like to ask how can a Federal Government or a State Government deal with these sectors? How are you able to defend your voters? Lastly, regarding the e-commerce and the digital economy, one the most interesting questions besides "is globalization

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working for you?" is "how is globalization working for the main digital companies?" Are Facebook or Google so powerful that they might not be healthy for the economy and the linkage between state and society? How do we deal with them whilst, at the same time, maintaining privacy and freedom of expression, that are key issues in our societies?

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CHAIR

António Rebelo de Sousa Presidente, Sociedade para o Financiamento do Desenvolvimento – SOFID, Lisboa

Chairman, Development Finance Society – SOFID, Lisbon

rofessor Montek Ahluwalia, you mentioned that China and other Asian economies will have, in 2050, 50% of the world's GDP (Gross Domestic Product) and, although they have an endogenous market (they don't need markets from developed economies to be sustainable), they nonetheless need those developed economies to continue growing because if they don't, this means they are in crisis and this crisis will also affect China and India. Do you think there is a way that India and China could still grow their economies if there is a crisis in the developed countries? We also have the assumption that, while wages are very low in China and in India, productivity is similar to developed economies. India and China are very competitive but, if you make a segmentation of the liberal market, we conclude that there are restrictions in the supply of labor force and that is the reason why wages are increasing 7-8% a year in China. If that continues to happen, how will it be possible to maintain their competitiveness? Some authors have the idea that developed economies have a natural tendency to increase and they will always increase. For these authors, development is the growth of capital and of GDP. I don't agree with this theory, and there is also another theory that defends developed economies have a ten-

dency for stagnation. Is it possible to say that there is a third alternative that can bring growth along with some equality? There are many inequalities in globalization, and the market economy has a clear tendency to generate these inequalities, if there’s not any kind of intervention from the state. I am not a liberal, so I think it is necessary to have intervention in order to avoid the concentration of economic power and the raise of inequality problems over the long-term. This means that we must think about these negative aspects of globalization and about new models of world governance that will contribute to avoid these inequalities. Many people that like to criticise globalization don't speak about good global governance, or about the democratization of the international institutions and the importance of human rights. Finally, when we think about inequalities and the concentration of economic power, we also should thing about the necessity of a new economic model because if we criticise the models we have, we should present alternatives. And maybe this new model should have two branches. For a long time, whenever we talked about economic development, we looked to tradable goods and the necessity to invest in that area, which is of course very important; but if we want to solve the problem of unemployment, we also need to have public investment and investment in non-tradable goods. A new model should have these two branches: tradable goods and non-tradable goods, with a good governance system. Do you agree with this?

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Montek Singh Ahluwalia I come from a cultural tradition where no one is ever totally wrong. So, you can be quite confident that you are mostly right. Regarding the characterization that India is private sector driven and China is state driven, it is true that, in the Chinese case, policy has been dominated by the state and even in the post-liberalization period many of the successful private sector companies are really owned by the state. In India, the difference is that we started off with a lot of private sector and the dominant concern of the state was to try to control the private sector, falling to realize that it is very difficult to persuade people to do things. In my view, we wasted maybe 30 years or so in a very dysfunctional state-controlled effort that held back the private sector. I am not saying that we should let the private sector loose, but it was not the right approach. China started reforming in 1980 and India started reforming in 1991. Form then onwards we did the easy thing, we got rid of some dysfunctional state controls. Some of my business friends tend to say “just get the government out of the way", but that is just wrong, at least in a country like India where the government has a huge role to play in providing infrastructure. It doesn't have to be just the government doing this, we can have private partnerships, but if we are going to build a road through a certain area, someone must acquire the land and you can't do it without the government. In my view, what the government in India is doing (how well it is doing it is another matter) reflects that the objective is no longer to control the private sector. It can operate in a free market, but government must deliver on infrastructure and in basic social services like health, education and, increasingly, a little bit of the social security. Let the private sector be governed by the market and the government must only make sure that there is no one capturing the market and there is no anti-competitive behaviour. Unfortunately, between saying this and doing it there is a very big gap. Regarding democracy, all Indians are proud to live in a democracy. I personally feel that we shouldn't be given much credit on that because we are so diverse that we could not be anything else but a democracy. Mrs. Indira Gandhi tried to do 104 _

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otherwise very briefly, and it was just not possible. We must learn to live with the consequences that we are a democracy and the institutions need to support it. There are many institutional aspects of India's development which have strengthen the electoral democracy politics. For a long time, we were concerned that there should be fewer poor people. In the last 15 years (we should have done it much earlier) there has been a huge reduction in the number of people below the poverty line and the median real income has been rising. Most of the Indian public seems to think that the future is going to be better - and you don't hear this for example in the United States. But new demands come up in a democratic system which are not captured by these assumptions. Yes, there is less poverty and the middle class is experiencing a rise in income, but in India, since we have many class divisions, quite a bit of the attention is given to the idea that, while the GDP may have grown at 8% percent, my Cast hasn't done as well as others or a certain State is worse than the average. And that can be translated into politics. Gender is also a big issue where we are not doing well. Even women in well-off communities don't have as much access to everything as we think they should. On the issue of global governance, if we are going to live in an open world we need more global governance, and the current global institutions are not moving in a manner which suggests that they can deliver better governance. The United Nations is not able to take many decisions and the G20 is not representative. And even if these institutions did some good things right after the 2008 crisis, since then they failed to avoid a walking back on trade and to provide a clear set of agreements on climate change. There is a huge global governance deficiency that we must consider. On your last point, I am not saying that because the developing countries are 50% of the Global GDP they don't need the developed countries. What I am saying is that they are a large enough group, and if they remain open to each other they will set a good example to the developed countries. And even if the developed countries growth slows down, the developing

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countries possibilities to continue to grow would not be very much affected. This is a difference on the model that George Friedman was referring to, because that is a model which says that the engine that drives world growth is broken. What I am saying is that even if developed countries slow down, because they are not dealing well with their problems, many of the developing countries constitute a big-enough market, have the supply capabilities and, most important, have a huge gap be-

tween their level of productivity and the existing frontier levels. For the developed countries to grow rapidly, this frontier level must expand; for us to increase productivity, the frontier doesn't have to expand for the next 15 years. This means that, if the developed world doesn't move rapidly they will allow the developing countries to catch up with them and become more competitive. But I am not saying that we should be protective regarding developed countries. We should move together.

Daniel Hamilton Regarding the situation in the United States, if President Trump follows through on half of what he has been saying regarding the economic agenda, it will be the biggest change in US foreign economic policy since Franklin Roosevelt signed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1934, which, at the time basically included the US in the global economic system. It is still unclear how far this agenda will progress, but we do have to keep it in mind. Moreover, he is responding to his electoral base and the US is now in an eight-year growth phase and many people are asking "what's the problem with this agenda?”. However, those numbers disguise a reality: for many Americans this growth hasn't been reflected in their pay checks, and this inequality is driving a lot of these reactions. A lot of it is being exploited by political parties and there is no understanding about the turn of the economy we are witnessing. We talk about off-shore jobs but there are on-shore jobs and the dynamics is: you lose jobs and you created new ones; if someone in Massachusetts lost their job, he more likely lost it to someone in the State of Georgia than to someone in China. That's the turn within the large American economy and its dynamic. One problem in US is that we don't match our education system to our economy. We have wonderful private colleges and universities, and there is a stigma if you don't go to college and instead you go to vocational schools or community colleges. These community colleges would be a fabulous resource if we tied them to the economy, preparing people to the reality of their working lives. If you are 20 years old, you will probably have 10 to 12 jobs along the way. You are not training for a

job or a profession, you are training to be agile, to learn quickly, adapt, shift. Those are the best skills you can have in the current economy, and if we can have an education system that links to what the needs of that economy will be, that is the ideal scenario. We can see examples of that in parts of Europe, which I think would be interesting for the US to have in mind. And this is not something that the federal government in Washington should deal with. We have 50 states, and this is a role for governors in the states. If you look closely, you do see several interesting experiments in some US states, were they are having this approach. Our education system is at a state or even local level; and that's where the real laboratory is happening and that's where the jobs are. President Trump gained support because of a basic kind of feeling among his supporters, in which the Americans are the losers of the post-war system. It goes beyond foreign economic policy dynamics; and you see it also in his broader approach to the world. For our allies and in the media, the fixation seems to be on the "burden sharing" demands that President Trump is imposing on, for example, our NATO allies. I would suggest you also look to another thing he is saying, which is "burden shedding". America is not only asking others to share the burdens, it is getting out of some areas and, under this president, will not be doing things like it did before: democracy promotion, protection of human rights, etc. It is leaving the field. He is leaving it to you. And that will have more impact on Europe that the “sharing the burden” ideas. Regarding technology companies, my quick analogy is that, when they first invented the automobile, there were no rules

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_ 105

because no one new about the revolutionary impact it would have. After some time, rules were created. And we are now in a similar stage regarding tech companies, which are having a much more rapid development. There were no rules when Apple and others like it appeared, and they were the stars of media and of the politicians because they created new jobs. Now we're saying that we must create some rules regarding these companies. And future innovations will be even harder to deal with. If I talk about the Bio-cognitive age, like facial recognition technology that China is using, the potential is huge, but the challenges are even bigger. Globalization has these phases and there is an interesting book by Richard Baldwin (The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization) where he says that a

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big phase of globalization was to end barriers to goods’ flows. After that, we had another phase where we started to end barriers to services (part of the digital age we are on) and, in recent years, we are increasingly reducing the barriers to the people flow - and that really creates turmoil. If we link that to this Bio revolution, where we have not only migrants coming across the ocean but also a holographic presence of someone from India working with you, at your side, we must think hard because we are not ready for that. It's not only about artificial intelligence but also about remote intelligence, synthetic biology, tele-presence. These are the industries that are coming our way, some of them are already here. In Silicon Valley we talk about the “speed of light” and in Washington we have the "speed of law" and there is a big gap between the two.

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Debate

crescimento autónomo das economias emergentes, tendo em conta a dimensão dos seus mercados internos, pode ser um instrumento que ajude a salvar o modelo económico vigente baseado na produção em massa para um consumo em massa. No entanto, há claramente uma barreira ambiental relativamente a este aumento do consumo nos países emergentes. Outra barreira tem a ver com os interesses instalados nestas economias, uma vez que o aumento do consumo se baseia também na liberdade de escolha e na competição entre produtores, o que ameaça muitos dos interesses que existem nos países emergentes. Na China, diz-se que pretendem ter um mercado interno dinâmico que possa ser uma alternativa aos mercados europeus, mas para isso é necessário liberalizar o crédito e tal significaria o fim do modelo comunista - por isso, não há essa liberdade na China, o que põe em causa a vitalidade do seu mercado interno. No debate, considerou-se que, se as economias emergentes se mantiverem interessadas em manter relações comercias estáveis entre si, continuando também abertas aos países desenvolvidos, o seu mercado é suficientemente grande para estimular a concorrência entre si e sobreviverem sem a influencia das economias mais desenvolvidas. Não há apenas um modelo, e mesmo se o modelo vigente tiver problemas e crises, há outras formas de se manter uma dinâmica de crescimento nos países emergentes. Relativamente a uma pergunta sobre a evolução para um modelo de governação verdadeiramente global, os oradores referiram que não estamos ainda preparados para isso. Nes-

te momento, as instituições existentes estão a tentar proteger e preservar os avanços que foram conseguidos nas últimas décadas, pelo que não e provável existir um passo de gigante em direção a outro modelo. As instituições atuais estão a ser ameaçadas e o esforço político deve ser focalizado na proteção do modelo atual e não ser ainda mais ambicioso. Abordando uma pergunta sobre o papel da América Latina nesta dinâmica mundial, referiu-se que a China está a investir muito na América do Sul, mas a forma como se relaciona com os países da região parece quase ter uma base colonialista e é muito desequilibrada, em benefício da China. Por outro lado, os maiores investidores externos nessa região são o Japão e a Coreia do Sul, que têm uma abordagem diferente. A relação, por exemplo, do Brasil com os Estados Unidos é muito mais equilibrada do que a entre o Brasil e a China. Se olharmos para a dinâmica do relacionamento entre os países da bacia do Atlântico, o que a move é o investimento e não o comércio, o qual apenas segue o caminho do investimento. Por isso temos de perceber em que mercados as empresas querem estar, em vez de apenas enviarem produtos para esses mercados. As condições de investimento são, portanto, um fator essencial para perceber esta dinâmica e existem já muitas empresas de países da América Latina interessadas em investir noutras partes do Atlântico. Além disso, vários países latino-americanos têm exemplos de reformas económicas e de inovações em setores como a energia que podem ser muito importantes para, por exemplo, países africanos que se confrontam com desafios semelhantes. O debate demonstrou que estas ligações complexas - que ocorrem no contexto da globalização – fogem frequentemente aos nossos radares mas são cada vez mais relevantes na dinâmica do relacionamento entre países e regiões.

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O PLANETA THE PLANET A Instรกvel Sustentabilidade do Planeta The Unstable Sustainability of the Planet

Estará a matriz energética mundial a mudar a ritmos adequados? As energias

renováveis e as tecnologias não-poluentes estão a ganhar a competição económica e de rentabilidade contra as energias fósseis? Qual a verdadeira força e impacto global dos atores que negam a influência humana na aceleração das mudanças climáticas?

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DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

SPEAKER

Kitty van der Heijden

efore I begin, does anybody in this room know the World Resources Institute (WRI)? WRI is an independent think tank working at the intersection between environment and development issues. We are 800 experts working across the globe with offices in China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Turkey, Europe and Africa, trying to make change happen on these urgent issues. I’ve been asked to talk about energy transition in particular, because that will determine whether we will be able to keep catastrophic climate change away. I’m Dutch and we have a reputation for being honest to the point of being rude. So, let me begin with the conclusion. And the conclusion is that science knows that we are not making change fast enough, we are ruining the planet not just now, but for the next generations, and for poor and vulnerable people across this world. But it is policy makers, private sector and us as individual consumers that are still not doing enough. In my lifetime, emissions have reasoned six-fold and they show, unfortunately, no signs of abating. After a few years of being flat, hoping that we were decarbonising our economy, last year the increase of carbon emissions was 2%. We are now 145% above pre-industrial emission levels. Last year was the warmest non-El Niño year on record, and the past 5 years have been the hottest ever on the planet. This is what we are up against.

CO2 Emissions up six-fold in my lifetime 40 Carbon Dioxide Emissions - Billion Tons

Europe and Africa Director, World Resources Institute, The Hague & Addis Ababa

35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1900

1920

1940

1960

1980

2000

Source: US DOE, 2010; EU, 2012

2017: Hottest non-El Niño year on record Difference (°C) from the 20th century average

Diretora Europa e África, World Resources Institute, Haia & Adis Abeba

10 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1980

1990

2000

2010

2017

Source: NOAA

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

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CO2 emissions (GT peryear)*

Global CO2 emissions need to decline rapidly 50

Peak in 2020

* Mitigation only

Peak late 20s

Peak today

30 20 10 0 1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

Source: Carbon Crunch

Regarding the demand for energy, which is one of the largest parts of global CO2 emissions, are we seeing that step change that we need to see? Energy demand in Europe is down, and energy demand in the United States and in Japan is also in the right direction. But look at Latin America, Middle East, South East Asia, Africa, and particularly China and India. Are we changing energy demand, are we getting there in time? No, we’re not.

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1200 900 600 300 0

India

China

Africa

Southeast Asia

Middle East

Latin America

Japan

United States

European Union

-300

Energy use worldwide grows by one third to 2040, driven by Asia; EU energy demand declines by 15% over the period Source: OECD/IEA 2016

40 Historical Data

Trends: energy demand, per region, 2014-2040 Mtoe

We had 200 years to use half of the carbon budget which is emission levels to keep temperature rise below 1.5 or 2 degrees, and if we do not decarbonize our economy in the next 20 years we will not be able to keep catastrophic climate change away. What that means is that in 2020, that’s less than 1,000 days away, global emission levels will have to peak, and the energy sector will have to play a major role in that. I know that it won’t be happening by 2020, but the longer we wait, the deeper the curve of emission decreases must be. This is the reality, this is what science tells us: we are in a hurry or we simply won’t be able to make it.

While we may be safe and secure in our energy supplies, people in countries where I live and work like Ethiopia are still a long way away from where we are. More than a billion people in developing countries have no access to energy – most of them (more than 95%) live in Africa and Southeast Asia. And if we continue the way we are, we still have 675 million people without access to energy in 2030. That is what we promised in the sustainable development goals as a world community. I’ll give six reasons why I still believe we are making the change happen, but we might not be going fast enough. First of all, the trends about coal. You all know that coal is the most carbon intensive source of energy, and coal is actually dropping. It dropped 2% in 2016 and compared to 2014 this is more than 4% decrease in demand, so we are going in the right direction, but like I said: it’s just not fast enough. Every major economy in the world is reducing coal dependency except India, and even China, the largest coal consumer by far, has now reduced coal for the third year in a row. And no matter what the President of the United States says, coal has peaked and is now going out fashion, simply because we have better and cheaper options. Renewables are here, and they will stay. Good news number two: renewable energy is going up. Investment in renewable energy has doubled compared to fossil fuel investments. And that is not just for last year, that’s for five years in a row that we invest double in renewables compared to what

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

we invest in fossil fuels as a world community. And this is not because people want to stabilize the climate; that may be great, but they are doing that because the levelized cost of energy for wind and solar is decreasing. From the climate summit in Copenhagen to now, prices of solar panels have come down 86%. Solar PV and wind PV are simple becoming cheaper and more cost-competitive than any other energy source. And that’s why even in agencies like the International Energy Agency, one of the more conservative think tanks for energy has had to consistently over the years re-

vise upwards where we will end up with renewable energy. They had to revise upwards five fault since 2000 projections on wind energy and no less than 14 fault projections on solar PV installation. And even Green Peace underestimated just how fast renewable energy deployment is going. But make no mistake about it: it is not because people want to stabilise the climate, it is because it is becoming cost-competitive. By 2025 or 2030, renewable and particularly solar will simply be cheaper than coal, and this means it makes good economic sense to make that change happen.

Major LCOE decreases for wind and solar PV Generation Unsubsidized Levelized Cost of Energy – Wind and Solar PV (Historical)

$45

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

$32

$30

$226

150

$261

$270 $266

100 $37

0 2009

$60

$32

$204 $204 $166 $186 $149 $149 $104$149 $148 $101

50 0

86% (1)

$91

$177 $82$126 $72

$193

$170 $58

$193

$194

$109 $61$88 $53 $85 $49 $46

2017

$48

$323

200 $62

crease;

2016

$50

$77

tage de

2015

$81

percen

2014

$99

ht-year

2013

$101

$95

olar Eig

$342

300

67% (1)

250 $95

Scale S

$394

2012

$92

crease;

350

Utility-

2011

$148

tage de

400

2010

100

r percen

$450

2009

150

ight-yea

2017

$169

Wind E

2016

200

LCOE M/Wh

$250

2015

LCOE M/Wh

Over the last eight years, wind and solar PV have become increasingly cost-competitive with conventional generation technologies, on an unsubsidized basis, in light of material declines in the pricing of system components (e.g., panels, inverters, racking, turbines, etc.) and dramatic improvements in efficiency, among other factors

Lazard's LCOE Analysis, v.11., Nov. 2017, htttps://www.lazard.com/media/450337/lazard-levelized-cost-of-energy-version-110.pdf

Experts, Policy Makers, Investors continue to underestimete future renewable energy potential WIND 4,000

WEO 2002 WEO 2004 WEO 2006 WEO 2008 WEO 2009 WEO 2010 WEO 2011 WEO 2012 WEO 2013 WEO 2014 WEO 2015 Actual BNEF forecast

1,500

The Global Comission on the Economy and Climate

2040

2035

2040

2035

2030

2025

2020

2015

2010

0 2005

500

2030

1,000

500 2000

Revised up 14-fold since 2000

2,000

2025

1,500 1,000

2,500

2020

2,000

3,500 3,000

2015

2,500

Revised up 5-fold since 2000

2010

3,000

2005

3,500

2000

4,000

SOURCE: IEA. Bloomberg New energy Finance.

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_ 121

Wind

Gigawatts

921

300 250

258

200 145

150 333

300

100

billion kilowatthours 350 13% 16%

250

20%

200

21%

27%

40%

Conferência de Lisboa – 3 _ 2018 Lisbon Conference – 3

2015

2014

2013 hydro

biomass

Renewables

45%

25%

10%

nuclear

natural gas

oil/other

coal

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, based on Digest of U.K. Energy Statistics and National Statistics: Energy Trends Note: 2017 values are estimates based on data through September

Good news number 3: if you don’t care about climate or you don’t care about innovation and growing your economy in a sustainable way, maybe you care about employment. Clean energy is simply a very good employment sector. Solar and wind have doubled their employment since 2012 and in China renewable energy employs 35% more people than gas and oil combined. So, this is a very smart investment as a politician if you want to keep your economy growing. And while oil and gas are shading employment, we currently have about 10 million people employed in renewable energy and the expectation is that it will grow to 25 million in the next 10 years.

Italy

Ocean, CSP and Geothermical power

Source: REN21, Renewables 2017 Global Status Report

122 _

46%

33%

Wind/solar

24%

31%

2016

42%

India

Japan

Germany

United States

Bio-Power

23%

30%

100

23%

20%

23%

26%

150

China

EU-28

Solar-PV

21%

20%

2017

10%

300

0 BRICS

1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0

World Total

Gigawatts

Renewable Power Capacities in the world, BRICS, EU-2018 and Top-6 countries, 2016

Things are changing… also in Europe United Kingdom electricity generation by fuel (2012-2017)

2012

Currently, we have about a 1,000 gigawatt of renewable energy in the world. Where is that? It’s not where we live. It’s in China where we see massive deployment in renewable energy, that’s where the new green economy is being established, that’s where innovation is happening, where patterns are growing, where employment is growing. In Europe, we are slow because we haven’t established grid infrastructure, but the scenario in the United Kingdom is a good example of what is happening. In 2012, 42% of electricity was generated from coal and in 2017, 7% of electricity is from coal. If that is not a revolution in the making in just 5 years’ time, I don’t know what it is. This is shifting the balance towards renewables, which increased from 10% to 23% in 5 years, and that is not going to stop because the UK together with others aim at getting out of coal by 2025. More 20 countries, including UK, Canada, France, Finland, and Mexico, are part of the “Powering Past Coal Alliance” which also brings together businesses and civil society organizations working to accelerate clean growth and achieving the rapid phase-out of traditional coal power. In the world, while at present in we may have only 5% of renewable energy, by 2040 the expectation is that that will be well over 1/3.

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

Jobs in Renewable Energy in 2016

EV sales are up (China and USA lead the way) 2,000,000

1,500,000

1,000,000

8.3 million + 1.5 million World Total: 9.8 million jobs

= 50,000 jobs Bioenergy (biomass, biofuels, biogas) Wind power

Geothermal

Hydropower(small scale)

5,000

Solar Energy(solar PV, CSP, solar heating/cooling) Hydropower(large scale)

Source: IRENA (2017)

2010

Good news number 4: there is a revolution going on in the transport sector, which is so oil-dependent. They’re going electric, and while we’re starting from a very small base, the shift is going very fast. It’s happening not just because of climate change, but because the industry itself is seeing that there are chances in this new green automobile sector. General Motors has promised that by 2023 they will put out 20 new models that are electric, and in Volvo by 2019 all cars will be either hybrid or electric. This is an unstoppable revolution in the transport sector that will reduce dependency on oil, gas, and fossil fuels. It’s not just the industry, it is happening at country level. In Norway, by 2025 only hybrid or electric cars are allowed on the road; in the Netherlands, 0 emission cars will be mandatory by 2023. Nevertheless, there are still major governments like in Germany, China and India that have said that they want to get on this bandwagon, help on the change, get into that innovation, but someone like Merkel has still said “I don’t know when”.

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Rest of world

China

Japan

Canada

Germany

Sweden

France

United Kingdom

Netherlands

Norway

2016

United States

Source: ICCT (2017)

Good news number 5: Carbon pricing goes global, and this is a silent revolution. You will see electric vehicles, you will be able to purchase green power, but what you don’t see is that carbon pricing has long gone global. We now have more than 40 national jurisdictions that have a sort of carbon pricing, and 20 local jurisdictions - states, cities, regions - that have either emissions trading, carbon trade systems or carbon pricing. Currently, 7 of the 10 major economies of the world now have a form of carbon pricing. We still don’t have the carbon price needed to shift pollution and to make sure that companies pay up for social and environmental externalities, but it is an unstoppable revolution.

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Good news 5: Carbon pricing goes global

Good news 6: Stop subsidizing the wrong thing Fossil fuels vs. renewable energy

ALBERTA

MANITOBA ONTARIO

CANADA BRITISH COLUMBIA

ICELAND EU

UKRAINE

KAZAKHSTAN

600

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

QUÉBEC

500 JAPAN

RGGI TURKEY

CHINA

MEXICO THAILAND

billion dollars

WASHINGTON OREGON CALIFORNIA

400 300 200

BRAZIL

100

RIO DE JANEIRO SÃO PAULO CHILE

SOUTH AFRICA

NEW ZEALAND

AUSTRALIA

2008 NORWAY

2010

ESTONIA LATVIA

IRELAND

POLAND

BEIJING

KYOTO

TIANJIN HUBEI

PORTUGAL

Renewables

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

FINLAND

DENMARK

CHONGQING FRANCE

2009

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

SWEDEN

SLOVENIA SWITZERLAND

ETS implemented or scheduled for implementation Carbon tax implemented or scheduled for implementation ETS or carbon tax under consideration

Fossil fuels

Source: IEA, World Energy Outlook 2016 SAITAMA TOKYO

SHANGHAI GUANGDONG

50 countries have implemented fossil fuel subsidy reform in recent years

TAIWAN SHENZHEN

ETS and carbon tax implemented or scheduled ETS implemented or scheduled, tax under consideration Carbon tax implemented or scheduled, ETS under consideration

Egypt: cut fuel subsidies by 1/3 in 2014; aims to eliminate them by 2020

Morocco: eliminated gasoline and fuel subsidies in 2014; significantly reduced diesel subsidies

India: deregulation of diesel prices underway

Source: The World Bank, Carbon Pricing Watch (2016)

Good news number 6: another revolution is about subsidies from the public sector. There have traditionally been massive subsidies to the fossil fuel industries. In recent years – when we knew that climate change was real and we knew we are almost losing the window to keep temperature rise below 2 degrees - fossil fuel subsidies went up. Now we are seeing a gradual decline, and also that renewable energy subsidies are going up. If we could eliminate fossil fuel subsidies, we could reduce global emissions by 13%. Just by stopping to subsidise the wrong thing! In past years, 50 countries have started to reform their fossil fuel subsidies. Again, this in an unstoppable train, and it’s happening across the globe even if you don’t hear about it.

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Mexico: gradually raised gasoline and diesel prices throughout 2013 and 2014 to reach international levels

Ghana: abolished gasoline and diesel subsidies in July 2014

Indonesia: eliminated gasoline and reduced diesel subsidies in January 2015; also reformed LPG and electricity pricing

Source: IISD (2017). A Guidebook to Reviews of Fossil Fuel Subsidies.

While I started off with pessimism, I want to stress that the renewable energy transition is not just desirable but achievable, and beyond all it is unstoppable. By 2040 the expectation is that 1/3 of vehicles will be electric, 1/3 of power will be solar, wind, or other renewables, and we will have improved energy efficiency by 1/3. But even that is not going to get us where we need to be.

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

I want to highlight four accelerators that will drive this transition faster tomorrow. The first is water. The power sector is a very large consumer of a very scarce resource that is called fresh water: 20% of global fresh water goes to the energy sector. If we look at India and China, the areas with water stress – in other words, where demand outstrips supply – are increasing. Already 1 in 5 thermal power plants is facing stress because there isn’t enough water to cool the plants. A country like India last year lost 13 terawatt hours of energy, not because there were major upheavals, but because there wasn’t enough water to cool their plants. The next picture is the forecast for 2025, when half of the power plants will not have enough water. Over 50% of new proposed coal power generation in China is in areas of high or extremely high water stress; maybe not a wise investment. Water scarcity is real, and it is going to drive change irrespective of climate change.

19% of power plant design capacity in this region is located in areas of water stress concern Baseline Water Stress and Power Plants

Hydro, Nuclear & Thermal Power Plants and Baseline Water Stress (Water withdrawal ratio) Power plant design capacity (MW) Hydro Plant

0-25 25-500 500-7500

Nuclear/ Thermal Plant

Low stress (<10%) Moderate stress (10-20%) Medium-high stress (20-40%) High stress (40-80%) Extremely high stress (>80%)

No data / Out of area Arid & Low water use Ocean or inland water Rivers and streams

Source: Water Stress: The Coca-Cola Company Power Plant Location: Carbon Monitoring for Action (CARMA) and ISciences L.L.C.; Power Plant Attributes: Plats, a division of the McGraw Companies, Inc.

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55% of current power plant design capacity would see water stress grow 2 to 8 times worse by 2025 Change in Water Stress by 2025 and Power Plants (IPCC Scenario A1B)

None of the world’s top 50 cities by population meet WHO air quality standards Particulate matter per m3 for top 50 cities – higher particulate matter means worse air quality 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 New York Chicago Sao Paulo Bogota Lima Essen Istambul Kinshasa Tehran Lagos Shangai Guanghzou Tianjin Chengdu Chongqung Hong Kong Osaka Manila Taipei Ho Chi Min City Delhi Calcutta Bengaluru Ahmedabad Karachi

WHO air quality standard PM10 <20 per m3

Hydro, Nuclear & Thermal Power Plants and long term change in water stress (2025)

North America

Power plant design capacity (MW) Hydro Plant

0-25 25-500 500-7500

Nuclear/ Thermal Plant

Exceptionally less stressed Extremely less stressed Significantly less stressed Moderately less stressed Near normal conditions Moderately more stressed Severely more stressed Extremely more stressed

Middle East & North Africa

0-25 25-500 500-7500 Extremely more stressed Wetter bur still Extremely high stress Uncertainty in magnitude Uncertainty in direction Drier but still low stress Ocean or inland water No data / Out of area Rivers and streams

The second accelerator comes from us, the individual consumers, the citizens across the world: air pollution, which comes from diesel driven trucks, from gasoline cars, from coal fired plants. It is the fifth leading cause of death in India and it is the single largest cause of social agitation around the world. China is not changing because they care about global climate stability, they are changing because they are fearing societal upheaval. We are not doing enough in none of the major cities in the world. Conferência de Lisboa – 3 _ 2018 Lisbon Conference – 3

East Asia & Pacific

Europe & Central Asia South Asia

Source: World Health Organisation: http://apps.who.int/ gho/data/node.wrapper.ENVHEALTH3

Source: Water Stress: The Coca-Cola Company; Power Plant Location: Carbon Monitoring for Action (CARMA) and ISciences L.L.C.; Power Plant Attributes: Plats, a division of the McGraw Companies, Inc.

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Latin America

Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chair of the financial sector reform in the G20, stated that “Shifts in our climate bring potentially profound implications for insurers, financial stability and the economy.” He is not an activist, and he stresses that climate change will undermine our growth, our investments, our lives and our livelihood and if we do not change. He set up a Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). Are we sure about where we are investing our money, and what do we get back for our buck in the long run, or do we have a carbon bubble? Mike Bloomberg created the Bloomberg’s Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, to disclosure of the carbon risks in investment portfolios. Do you have stocks in fossil fuel companies, and are they investing in green infrastructure? Do you know where your money is being spent? So, investors are already changing, and the clear majority of world’s biggest investors are acting on climate change now. When horse carriage driven carts were faced with competitions from cars in the previous century, they said: we are

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a transport service company, we will survive. Well, the horsedrawn carriages are out of business. The companies in energy sector will have to change the business model, otherwise they will be out of business – and this is the third accelerator. Shareholder resolutions on climate change are happening: Exxon is now producing scenarios to be compatible with the 2-degree world and agrees to disclosure their climate risks and their portfolio; Statoil committed to 20% reduction in emissions intensity by 2030; Shell committed to $1billion investment in renewable energy and to half emissions intensity by 2050. And the largest sovereign wealth fund, the Norwegian Pension Fund, has now been told by the Norwegian Central Bank (again, this is not an activist environmental agency) to divest from oil and gas, because it’s not a viable business proposition for the future. AXA also said it is going to quit insuring any project in oil and pipeline, because these are stranded assets, and they will never yield the rate of return compatible with the 2-degree world. The last accelerator is about economics. Climate change has very often in our lifetime been pursued as a moral imperative: we have to do this because of poverty and because it’s good for the world. That has never convinced any politician or CEO to do the right thing. The only thing that will be convincing is if climate change is a threat to our economy - and the business sector is already getting this. If you look at investment rewards, they are simply stronger and better for those companies that disclose climate risks and invest sustainably.

The World Economic Forum, in Davos, asks every year to every big company in this world: if you think about risks that will undermine your business continuity, what would you think is most important? In the next 18 months, the answers are about migration, state collapse, conflict, unemployment, failure of governance; but if the question is about the single biggest threat to the continuity of the business 10 years from now, the first answer is water scarcity and the second the failure of reducing emissions and adaptation to climate change. The next top threats are extreme weather events and food crisis - clearly climate related - resulting in profound social instability. If we do not address these issues as public and private sector, we will not achieve the SDGs and we will not stay off catastrophic climate change.

Investors are rewarding companies for sustainable growth strategies

Source: The Global Risks Report 2016. Figure 1.2. World Economic Forum http://www3.weforum.org/docs/Media/ TheGlobalRisksReport2016.pdf Note: Percent of participants mentioning the respective risk to be of high concern for the time frame of 18 months or 10 years, respectively. Participants could name up to five risks in each time frame. In each category, the risks are sorted by the total sum of mentions.

S&P 500 companies rated as climate change leaders performed better

18%

Higher RoEa than low scoring peers

50%

Lower volatility of earnings over the past decade than low scoring peers

21%

Stronger dividend growth than low scoring peers Source: Business and Sustainable Development Commission. Carbon Disclosure Project; Global Insights World Industry Service (Capex data); McKinsey analysis

What worries you? Global Risks of Highest Concern: For the Next 18 Months Large-scale involuntary migration State collapse or crisis Interstate conflict Unemployment or underemployment Failure of national governance

52,0% 27,9% 26,3% 26,0% 25,2%

What worries you? Global Risks of Highest Concern: For the Next 10 Years Water crisis Failure of climate-change mitigation and adaptation Extreme weather events Food crises Profound social instability

39,8% 36,7% 26,5% 25,2% 23,3%

Unfortunately, the Paris Agreement is not enough. We’re not even meeting the Paris commitments at the moment, but even the Paris agreement brings us climate change between 2.7 and 3 degrees, which is catastrophic climate change according to science. We need to do a lot more if we want to limit the increase in global average temperature to 1.5 degrees above the pre-industrial levels.

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But it is not enough

Business as usual

5 4

Country commitments

Paris agreement goal

4-5º C 2.7-3.7º C 1.5-2º C

Estimated increase in global average temperature above pre-industrial levels (in degrees C) by 2100

1 0

Source: WRI analysis by Kelly Levin and Taryn Fransen http://www.wri.org/blog/2015/11/insider-why-are-indcstudies-reaching-different-temperature-estimates

Acceleration of energy transition essential for a 2 degree world 40

If this is such a massive undertaking, how can I deal with this? I’m only a humble individual, how am I going to contribute to this change? I want you to think about what you can do as an individual. I hope everybody now understands that we need to change. But more is needed, because even when people understand the need to change, very few people think how they themselves can change. Whether you are a CEO or a private citizen, every single day you make choices in your life that contribute to a better world or continue with business as usual. The food that you buy, the energy you buy, the car that you drive, the politician you vote for office – all that is part of a solution or remains part of the problem. I lived in Africa and Africans always say one thing when you feel overwhelmed by the enormity of a challenge: if you think you are too small to be noticed and to make change happen, go and sleep in a bedroom with a mosquito. I want you to be my mosquitoes.

Trend post-COP 21

17.9 Gt

32 28 24

2 °C Scenario

20 16 2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

Energy efficiency

Fuel & technology switching in end-uses

Renewables

Nuclear

CCS

2040

Other

Energy efficiency & renewables account for the bulk of the additional emission reductions required for a 2 °C pathway, but all forms of clean energies are needed Source: OECD/IEA 2016

We need to see a revolution in energy. Currently, power generation from renewables is 18% (and 1/4 of final energy consumption) and it needs to be 85% in 30 years from now (and 2/3 of final energy consumption. This is a massive undertaking. It will impact your lives, your investment portfolio, and your children’s lives. 128 _

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SPEAKER

Victor Alcobia Diretor de Projetos, Beicip-Franlab, Paris

Project Director, Beicip-Franlab, Paris

n my presentation I will try to answer to the questions: Are energy consumption & producing patterns changing fast enough to save the Planet? Are renewables and non-pollutant technologies winning the cost-effectiveness competition against fossil fuels? How effective and influential are the players and interests that deny human responsibility on climate change accelerations? We all agree that we have to go to a decarbonated economy. But things don’t happen from one day to the other, and the big question is how fast we can go in this transition. When there was COP 15 in Copenhagen, the goal was to limit the increase of temperature to 2° C in 2050 and 2.5° C in 2100. This was not a very successful agreement. The Paris agreement, signed at COP21, sets out a global action plan to put the world on track to avoid dangerous climate change by limiting global warming to well below 2°C and make efforts to limit the increase to 1.5°C by 2100. This is much tougher. What is the current situation? CO2 emissions in 2016 were 33.4 Gigatons (or billion tons, if you use the UK unity). A cumulative total of 1 962 Gt of CO2 was emitted by the end of 2013. The Asia-Pacific region contributes much to the increase.

Carbon dioxide emissions (million tonnes CO2) 35000

30000

25000

20000

15000

10000

5000

Asia Pacific

Africa

South and Central America

Middle East

Europe & Eurasia

North America

Source: 2018 BP Energy Outlook

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Growth rates 1990-2016 and projections 2016-2040 10 9 8 % per annum

The Fifth Assessment Report (2014) of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) quantifies the global maximum CO2 the world can still emit and also have a likely chance of keeping global average temperature rise below 2°C above pre-industrial temperatures. This goal is likely to be met if cumulative emissions do not exceed 3 670 Gigatons of CO2. That’s a big challenge, if we consider the current levels and also the fact that we are not going to achieve zero emissions from one year to the other. CO2 emissions can be estimated using the Kaya identity1. The Kaya identity states that the total emission level of the greenhouse gas Carbon Dioxide (per year) can be expressed as the product of four factors. The first is carbon intensity (CO2 emissions per unit of energy consumed). We all need energy and it does not happen in nature naturally, so we need to generate this electricity. We can therefore estimate how many tons of CO2 are sent to the air to produce 1 MWh. For example, if I use coal to generate MWh, It’s certainly much less environmentally friendly than if I use renewable energy that has no CO2. Carbon intensity depends on the source type (coal, oil, gas, nuclear, non-fossils, etc.) reflected on the Primary Energy Mix. The second factor is energy intensity (energy consumed per unit of GDP), the third is gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (probably not a very reasonable or sustainable concept) and the forth factor is human population. Of course, the more people we have, the more energy we need and the more we need to produce MWh and, therefore, we will send more CO2 in the atmosphere. Energy transition has to look at these 4 factors, and I will start with the last ones. Everyone loves economic growth and every government these days wants at least a 3% growth rate per year. With a 3% growth rate, there is no deficit, social security has enough money to pay for the elderly people, to pay for the hospitals, etc. According to BP, the world GDP per capita will increase by 3.25% a year between 2016 and 2040, which would represent an increase of 122% in 25 years. In the Kaya equation, if I double the GDP and we do not change any of the other factors, I double the amount of CO2.

7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

World

China

Africa

OECD

Other

Productivity Population 1990-2016 2016-2040 Source: 2018 BP Energy Outlook

Regarding population, and accordingly with the United Nations, the world population is currently 7.6 billion, and will be 9.2 billion (+21%) in 2040 and approximately 10 billion (+32%) in 2055. If things remained unchanged the CO2 emissions for the combination of population and economic growths, we will be emitting 98 gigatons in 2040, which is three times as much as of today. And there are currently no actions are in place to reduce economic or population growths. Therefore, there are only two factors that we can work on: carbon intensity (how many tons of CO2 do I need to produce 1 MWh), and energy intensity (how many MWh do I need to produce 1 KEUR of wealth). Energy transition can only be achieved through reducing these two factors. The Energy Information Agency (EIA) projected that worldwide emissions of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels would grow 16 percent by the year 2040 from the levels of 2015, the year of the landmark Paris Agreement on climate change that is intended to reverse the trend. BP has a scenario that is rather pessimistic.

Kaya, Yoichi; Yokoburi, Keiichi (1997). Environment, energy, and economy: strategies for sustainability. Tokyo [u.a.]: United Nations Univ. Press. ISBN 9280809113.

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India

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Scenarios in Energy Transition Billion tonnes CO2 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

Less gas switching

Renewables push (RE push)

Evolving transition (ET)

Faster transition (FT)

Internal combustion engine ban (ICE ban)

Even faster transition (EFT)

Source: 2018 BP Energy Outlook

Carbon Intensity depends on the source used to generate Energy. In the case of Fossil Fuels, Coal emits 70% more CO2/ MWh than Gas. If I burn coal, then for every MWh I would need 0.345 tons of CO2 emitted in the atmosphere; if I use gas it’s 0.2 tCO2/MWh. If we could eliminate the use of coal or oil from day to night, the estimate is that the emissions would go from 33 to 15 gigatons. We need some CO2 in the atmosphere, we should not forget that, and 15 gigatons is a number that the earth can cope with. The current situation of the Primary Energy Mix is not a nice picture. There are five major industrial and human activities: • Electricity generation (represents 37% of the total Mix) - main sources: Coal (47%), Non-fossils (26%) & Gas (22%). Almost half of the electricity in the world is generated by coal. This also raises other questions. For instance, electric cars can

be good solution, but don’t forget that if I have an electric car that uses electricity generated by coal it is not good. We need to go to non-fossil energies, which also includes nuclear energy (the main source of electricity generation in France, and very important in some other countries as Japan) These are very good in terms of CO2 emissions, but they have other problems like how to recycle the by-products. • Industry (22% of the Mix) - main sources: Coal (43%), Gas (31%), Oil (19%) & Non-fossils (7%). The weight of coal is again very high, and we can act upon that. • Transportation (19% of the Mix) - main sources: Oil (92%) & Non-fossils (6%). We use mainly oil, and this is probably the major challenge, because personally I don’t see that today we can have electric airplanes or even big ships. This is one of the major difficulties in this sector. • Buildings (15% of the Mix) - main sources: Non-fossils (45%), Gas (32%) & Oil (16%). It is good news today that 45% of the buildings use energy from non-fossil energy and 32% from gas. • Transformation (7% of the Mix) - main sources: Oil (74%), Gas (17%) & Coal (9%). Oil is dominant in this sector. Our life is invaded by plastic - and I’m not discussing the interest of having or not having plastic, but we need plastic for our life and plastic comes from oil. Reducing CO2 emissions is largely dependent on the modification of the Primary Energy Mix by using less CO2 intensive energy sources, and I think gas is certainly the best option for energy transition. Maybe I can shock some of you with this opinion, but if we replace coal and oil by gas we will reduce the emissions of CO2 in the atmosphere significantly. The expected trends reveal some good news: oil will decrease in the energy mix, gas and renewables proportion will increase. Nevertheless, coal volumes consumed slightly increased before 2015, because the Americans did the shale gas revolution, and coal from the US became very cheap. The Americans replaced coal by gas – and therefore reduced the emissions of CO2 - and the coal was exported to other countries, particularly in Europe. The major difficulty I see is that, although the proportion of coal in the mix will decrease in the future, unfortunately some predict that this will stable the

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consumption. It’s good that it’s not going up, but I think there should be an effort to reduce the volumes of coal consumed in the planet. Primary Energy Mix trends 50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0% 1965

1975 Oil

Coal

1985 Gas

1995

2005

Hydro

2015 Nuclear

2025

2035

Renewables

Source: 2018 BP Energy Outlook

Regarding energy intensity (how many MWh of energy do I need to produce wealth for our economy), the numbers vary a lot across the world. It is very high in some countries like Russia, India or China (Russia = 4.7, India = 4, China = 3.7), but the European Union countries have some positive results (France = 1.1, Germany = 1.0, U.K. = 0.8). This is what I call sometimes “the poor’s dilemma” – most of the effort about energy intensity has to be done by poor countries, because Europe somehow has done its job (in terms of energy intensity, I’m not talking about carbon intensity). Even the US is worth almost the double as Europe (USA = 1.7) but it is better than the world average that is 2.3. 134 _

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Regarding the trends for CO2 emissions, they rose by 2% per year between 1995 and 2015, but CO2 should rise by 0.5% per year between 2015 & 2035, due to lower GDP growth, Energy Intensity reduction and Energy Mix shift. However, we don’t need a 0.5% growth, we need a decrease; current amounts of CO2 emissions should be significantly reduced to fulfil the Paris agreement pledge. These are the current trends, and they are important because they let us know where we should act. They also point out that we are not going fast enough. Many uncertainties exist concerning the future of energy demand and supply, including potential actions that societies may take to address the risks of climate change. For instance, I think a carbon tax is probably a good thing, but it should be worldwide and not country by country or the EU on its own. In conclusion, we need to reduce carbon intensity and this can mainly be achieved through : (i) reducing the carbon intensity by replacing coal and oil by gas and renewables sources; (ii) reducing the energy intensity by Improving the efficiency to generate electricity (cogeneration, combined gas-steam cycle, improve renewables, etc.); (iii) reduce consumption in transports (electric cars in the cities) and buildings (better isolation); and (iv) optimize the use of energy in the industry. For instance, when I come to Portugal, I’m always really shocked that the buildings are all very bad from an isolation point of view; and this is good for the local economy as you cannot delocalize this in China: the buildings are here, so the work has to be done here. In this context, gas is certainly the “best friend” of renewable sources for the energy transition, because we can’t go to a zero carbon situation in one day, and we have to use the fossil fuel that has less impact in the environment. Of course, there are 3 pillars for the governments to at upon: Environment (climate), Society (energy security) & Economy (competitiveness). The policies have to be articulated around those three axes.

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DISCUSSANT

António Costa Silva Executive Chairman, Presidente da Comissão Executiva, Partex Oil & Gas, Lisbon Partex Oil & Gas, Lisboa

he climatic threat is real. I always remember that professor Richard Muller, skeptical about climate change, admitted before the US Senate in 2011 that he was wrong, and that climate change is real. In the last three decades, ice in the North pole has dramatically decreased, and ice reflects most of solar energy, which is crucial for the stability of the Earth climate system. We cannot negotiate with mother nature. We can negotiate with governments, with trade unions, with troikas, but not with nature. The challenge is ahead of us, and as the speakers have demonstrated very clearly, there are interesting changes happening, but the pace is not fast enough. We should look at the global conditions: we are around 7.4-7.5 billion people, with a GDP of 65 trillion USD and with more than 1 billion cars, but in 2040 we will be 9 billion, the GDP will significantly increase, and the world fleet could double or even triple. In China, the number of cars increased from 1 million, in 1990, to 100 million, in 2012. Just in 22 years, the fleet of a big country increased 100 times, and this has never happened before in history. These discussions cannot therefore be disconnected from the population growth and from the current economic model. We must challenge this model, because we are obsessed with the continuous and exponential economic growth, and if we

continue we will certainly destabilize the planet even further. Energy consumption is tied to this economic model, which is dominant for more than 100 years. The consumption of oil, gas or coal is directly connected with GDP growth, and therefore we need also to tackle the economic model issues, regardless of all the changes going on in the energy sector. We are really at a crossroads. There are still 1.1 billion people in our planet with no access to water. Water is a big issue and maybe Kitty could comment on our relationship with the resources. We currently transform resources in garbage with a speed with no parallel in history. There is a very interesting study by the US Geological Survey which shows that in comparison with 60 years ago, we are consuming today 618 times more oil, 1000 times more gas, 756 times more nickel, and 1500 times more bauxite. And all these elements are crucial for industrial development, for the automotive industry, for the devices that regulate and govern our life. Another issue relevant for our relationship with resources is to introduce the notion of circular economy. In Europe we create every year around 3 billion tons of waste and if we recycle this waste the European Union dependence from strategic minerals can decline around 25%. We need a new paradigm: not only transforming resources into garbage, but also transforming garbage into resources. This requires a mental shift. With this, we come to the crucial point of energy transition.

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As a human race, we are very catastrophic, but there are solutions. I remember that some years ago we had the ozone layer depletion and the media said that all of us will be burned, but suddenly the international community was mobilized and today the ozone layer problem is controlled. Of course, the climate threat is on a much wider scale, and it is a very important challenge ahead us, but as the two speakers have shown we already have some significative changes in the system. We cannot ignore that 4 countries in the world – China, Japan, India and the United States (US) – are responsible for 75% of the world consumption of coal. It is the dirtiest of fossil fuels. Eliminating this consumption would mean we could control more or less the climatic change. In the last years, the shale gas revolution in the US meant that the coal power plants started to be replaced by gas power plants, and in 2015 the US consumed 13% less coal and emissions dropped. China is following this path: is spite of the huge consumption of coal still today, last year it consumed 1,5% less coal and the emissions are under stabilization. Only India is an exception regarding the use of coal (it decreased in 2015 and 2016 but increased by 2% in 2017), so if this country also follows the decrease of coal consumption maybe we can have a stabilization of emissions. This is one of the trends, already mentioned by Kitty and I would like to hear her comments about our relationship with resources. As Victor as shown, the key issue in energy transition is electricity and also transport. Even today, despite of the increasing of renewables, the carbon intensity or our electric system is around 400 kgs of carbon/Mw per hour, and to stabilize the climatic system in the planet we would need it to be around 100kg. We have therefore a huge path ahead of us. How do you see that we can achieve that?

We know that oil and gas are still dominant in world energy, because we can store them and consume them when we want, in contrast with electricity. Renewable energies are increasing in an amazing way, and China is investing more than 100 billion USD per year on renewables (more than the US and Europe combined), but these are intermittent sources of energy. We cannot have a technological and developed society without the backup of energy sources. Victor also pointed out that gas is the cleanest of the fossil fuels. Everything can be changed if we could store electricity at a large scale; when this happens, maybe larger segments of the world economy can be electrified. When do you think we’ll be able to do this? And can oil and gas companies play a role in this transformation? Regarding our relationship with resources, we have still 1.5 billion people in the world without access to electricity. Adding to that, we have the aspirations of a growing populations to have good living standards and the growth of cities. Cities only represent 2% of our planet surface, but more than half of the world population lives in cities, and they consume 75% of the total energy and 85% of global emissions. To face this problem, we need a now model for cities (with electric cars, new mobility, etc), but how far can we go and what the main challenges? There is also the issue of implementing new energy business models. There’s a new wave of digitalisation, new information technologies, autonomous cars, and concepts like shared economy that young generations embrace (and they prefer to pay for the services and not for the good itself). Lisbon could survive with less 80% of cars. These new business models are very disruptive and can completely change the landscape in cities and create a new path for the future. Kitty, do you think we have the necessary public policies in place to make these changes?

Kitty van der Heijden I really wish I had the answer. We know what the problem is, we’ve analysed it over and over again, we have the beginning of the solutions, but I don’t think we are there yet. I would also like to come back to other resources beyond oil and gas and talk about minerals and materials. We have to 138 _

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think what is going to happen to this planet with 10 billion people, all wanting the same comfortable lifestyle that we have – they want to flight for holidays, they want to buy new clothes, they want to have the latest car model, they want a new computer and more electrical appliances – and isn’t

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that a human right? All the materials we use consume a huge amount of natural resources. We’ve published a report called “Tomorrow’s Markets” which shows that if we were to grow in a business as usual trajectory, and all people would like a comfortable lifestyle, the economy would completely go broke. We simply cannot feed people, transport people or build cities the way we used to. Unless we see a transformation, namely in the energy system, we will not be able to stabilize climate, but moreover, to bring prosperity to people as we promised with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Water, a very simple resource, is the most underrated scarcity that is coming our way. We are used to use our atmosphere as an open sewer were we just dump CO2, but we are not seeing that water is becoming increasingly scarce. We cannot change the quantity of fresh water, unless we desalinize salt water. We have already more than 1 billion people with no access to drinkable water, but in 2025, just seven years from now, water will be so scarce that 2.4 billion people in areas of “absolute water scarcity”, which means that it will undermine and reverse development progress of poor people in poor nations. This is particularly dominant in developing countries but is in good part due to our consumption patterns. I want to add that almost everything you wear or the car that you drive was produced in China or India, so the way you live has an impact in people’s lives in other parts of the world.

Regarding the new business models, I’m hopeful and pessimistic. I see the changes happening mostly in developed economies, where millennials really want to make change happen: they don’t want to own assets, they want to share assets. It is a totally radically different way of organising our lives, because older generations are not used to that. The problem is that this does not represent enough of the GDP in the world, because if you ask millennials in India, China or Africa, they think differently from European millennials. They want a big car (or more than one car), to have an apartment, to live in a big city and to go on holidays. This is the majority of people, which will determine how tomorrow’s economy will look like. We are also underestimating the crucial importance of designing cities in a different way. Our cities in Europe and across the world are designed around cars. This costs a lot of money, it is economically inefficient and not productive, and we are also contributing to air pollution. In 2050, 70% of the world population will live in cities, particularly in China, India, Brazil, Indonesia and other developing countries. We have to look on how to design cities, particularly the use of materials – are these materials recyclable, are they energy efficient, are we sufficiently focused on public transport, etc. –; otherwise we will simply not be able to contain climate change, water scarcity and societal upheaval caused by air pollution and other factors.

Victor Alcobia I was coming from Cascais this morning, and I saw the majority of cars with one single occupant, which is very inefficient. We have to completely change the way we move in cities. There are some studies about the distance travelled every day from home to work and back, and for instance in Paris, there are a lot of people living in the eastern part and working on the western part of the city, which means they have to travel big distances, and may use the car – this is a loss of time but also a loss of resources. Electric cars, which are still more expensive, have some externalities that we tend to forget, because if you have electricity produced in your country from coal, using an

electric car is not a good option. Electric cars are a good option if the electricity is 100% renewable. The second element we tend to forget is that today these cars require lithium and cobalt. The world reserves of cobalt are 7 million tons, half of which in the Democratic Republic of Congo, were this mineral is produced in miserable conditions, not far from slavery. We should not be proud of having an electric car and ignore these facts. In addition, lithium and cobalt are limited resources and we cannot base our development in two relatively scarce resources. Another detail is that the lithium and cobalt batteries we use in cars are not currently recyclable – are we going to build

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piles of batteries? So, we have to consider that sometimes the solutions also create problems. Regarding the question on electricity and renewables, I don’t think the oil companies are ready to help with this transformation, because the majority of them will have to change their business model. Some will do that, because they have the financial and human resources to change. Storing electricity is a major issue for decarbonising the economy. There are currently many ideas on this, such as creating microgrids, because some of the electricity is loosed in transport. Also, when we generate electricity from thermal stations (coal or gas) the efficiency is very low, around 40%.

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This means that 60% is completely wasted, and it generates C02 emissions. Cogeneration, for instance, where gas turbines are used in a combined cycle, allows to go from 40% to 80% in efficiency. Just by doing this, we can reduce by half the amount of CO2 in the same quantity of megawatts produced. The major externality or setback in renewable is intermittence: wind is not blowing all the time, and sun is not there in the night. Some electrical companies build dams and pump significant amounts of water with windmills, in order to produce energy. The hydraulic energy is the cleanest source of energy we can have in the world, although some ecologists are against it.

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Debate

audiência questionou a possibilidade de se descobrir uma nova fonte de energia, até agora desconhecida. Pode ser um sonho passível de se realizar no futuro, mas atualmente, apesar de todas as experiências que têm sido feitas, não existe um novo modelo que seja exequível do ponto de vista económico, racional e justo do ponto de vista social e passível de ser financiado. Conhecemos os riscos, os aspetos positivos e negativos das várias fontes de geração de energia, mas há potencialidades ainda por explorar. Por exemplo, há quem defenda que a fusão nuclear poderá ser um caminho no futuro, que terá um desperdício zero. Atualmente, para a energia nuclear, precisamos de retirar urânio da natureza, construir centrais, e gerir os resíduos nucleares, que têm grande impacto. Já em termos de CO2 libertado para a atmosfera, a energia nuclear tem baixas emissões, sendo aliás a razão pela qual a França tem níveis de emissões tão reduzidos. Outra fonte de energia a explorar poderá ser o hidrogénio (existindo já carros a hidrogénio); em termos de emissões de CO2 é uma fonte de energia limpa, mas é ainda muito cara e pode ter outros riscos. Por fim, as fontes disponíveis de energia geotermal têm potencialidades (existem alguns projetos nos Açores) e estão ainda, em grande medida, inexploradas. Em suma, é preciso otimizar e desenvolver as fontes de energia que já conhecemos e que poderemos melhorar. Por exemplo, a Alemanha gera mais eletricidade a partir da energia solar, por habitante, do que Portugal, embora tenham muito menos dias de sol, o que prova o quanto ainda há a fazer em termos de otimização. Foi também levantada a hipótese de existir alguma relação entre a eficiência energética, a descentralização e a dimensão

das cidades, dado os países com maior eficiência energética na Europa serem a Alemanha, a Suécia, a Holanda e a Suíça, onde as cidades são em geral de menor dimensão. No entanto, esta perspetiva foi contrariada pelos oradores, porque apesar de a Holanda ter a reputação de ser um dos líderes na responsabilidade ambiental e do crescimento verde, na realidade, ao longo dos últimos quinze anos, o país apostou na desregulação e investiu muito pouco nas energias renováveis, tendo aberto três novas fábricas a carvão nos últimos cinco anos. Assim, a Holanda está nos três piores lugares relativamente à implementação de energias seguras, limpas e ambientalmente responsáveis. Em relação às cidades, porém, é verdade que nas cidades mais pequenas tem havido um enfoque maior nos transportes públicos e na eficiência energética dos edifícios. Isto é relevante, porque boa parte da solução no combate às alterações climáticas terá de vir da melhoria da eficiência energética. Foi também referido que não existe uma relação entre a dimensão das cidades e a competitividade, porque as cidades maiores geram outro tipo de problemas (como a subida de preços da habitação, a deslocação dos habitantes para a periferia, etc.) que têm de ser geridos com políticas públicas mais coerentes e ambiciosas. O debate centrou-se ainda em alguns dos principais desafios à implementação dos Objetivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável (ODS), particularmente no âmbito da governação. Os desafios são muito específicos consoante o contexto, a região e o país. No entanto, em geral, pode afirmar-se que há um grande desconhecimento sobre como implementar esta agenda de desenvolvimento, nomeadamente nos países africanos e em países pobres, incluindo uma grande falta de competências e capacidades técnicas no setor público sobre como melhorar a eficiência energética, como construir cidades mais sustentáveis, ou como implementar sistemas alimentares que não contribuam para a desflorestação e erosão dos solos.

Embora a comunidade internacional se tenha comprometido a disponibilizar 100 mil milhões de USD para o combate às alterações climáticas, está muito longe de o cumprir. Para que o desenvolvimento seja sustentável, é necessário transitar de fontes energéticas não-renováveis para fontes renováveis. Contudo, os recursos financeiros não estão disponíveis onde

deveriam estar, e isto levanta questões sobre como os países desenvolvidos estão, ou não, a apoiar os países mais pobres nas transições necessárias. A responsabilidade é global e cabe a uma grande diversidade de atores – dos governos às empresas, das instituições aos cidadãos – agir para acelerar as mudanças necessárias.

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Diminuição da pobreza absoluta e aumento da concentração de riqueza são

duas faces do mesmo modelo ou resultam de diferentes políticas? Serão a abertura de mercados e a deslocalização compatíveis com a preservação dos níveis de vida das classes médias nos países industrializados? Como interagem estas políticas e realidades com o populismo e a xenofobia?

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SPEAKER

Alfredo Valladão Professor, Sciences Po, Paris

Professor, Sciences Po, Paris

classe média é um tema complexo, porque quando se fala deste conceito nos Estados Unidos ou na Europa, um indivíduo residente num país subdesenvolvido ou em desenvolvimento não vê uma classe média, mas sim uma classe alta. A classe média dos pobres não é a mesma que a classe média dos ricos. A questão central é, portanto, a própria definição de classe média. A única definição existente é, como se diz no Brasil, uma definição mercadológica, ou seja, a da sabedoria dos publicitários: classe média é o grupo de pessoas que compra bens de consumo, duráveis ou não, em comparação com os que não têm essa capacidade. Corresponde à famosa “classe C” dos publicitários. Esta definição tem a vantagem de permitir comparar países pobres e ricos sem passar pela questão do nível salarial, focando-se na capacidade de adquirir bens de consumo (casa, carro, viagens, etc.) Atualmente, está na moda a preocupação com o fim da classe média. Isto porque a maioria dos cientistas sociais acha que este grupo social é o que sustenta a democracia. Sem classe média próspera não existe democracia, o que é uma preocupação, pelo menos para os democratas. Esta equação faz todo o sentido quando olhamos para o século XX: a dita classe média é a filha da 2ª revolução industrial (implementada

desde o começo do século XX e desenvolvida depois nos anos 30 e décadas seguintes), de um modelo de produção em massa, para o consumo em massa, graças a uma comunicação de massa. Quem teve a intuição genial para esse modelo foi o famoso Henry Ford, que criou o primeiro automóvel de massas e que afirmava que era necessário pagar bem aos trabalhadores, para que estes pudessem comprar em massa os seus automóveis. Este tipo de circuito impôs-se no século XX como modelo não só das sociedades ditas industriais e avançadas, mas também atualmente das sociedades emergentes ou em desenvolvimento. Este modelo precisava de grandes fábricas, cheias de operários comuns que desempenham mais ou menos o mesmo tipo de trabalho e que tomaram consciência dos seus interesses comuns. É daí que vem a ideia do conceito de classe como ator da sociedade. A famosa classe geral dos trabalhadores do século XIX transformou-se em classe operária, com reivindicações, organizações, etc., acompanhada de uma classe média – com uma parte que os marxistas chamavam de aristocracia operária, mas incluindo também todos os empregados do setor de serviços, em torno deste tipo de produção e consumo em massa, bem como os batalhões de funcionários públicos necessários para garantir o funcionamento deste novo tipo de modelo. Falo do famoso modelo de Roosevelt no final dos anos 30,

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o New Deal, que era “big labor, big business, big government”, o qual foi, em boa parte, exportado para a Europa após a II Guerra Mundial. Isto foi feito contra muitas das elites europeias que não queriam ter no continente europeu um consumo de massas, mas como estas elites tinham sido destruídas pela guerra ou estavam falidas, houve uma nova geração que aceitou este modelo com base no Plano Marshall. Este modelo, que permite a expansão da classe média, foi absolutamente fundamental para o que chamamos democracia representativa. Eu prefiro a designação de democracia representativa partidária, isto é, a base desta democracia é constituída por partidos de massas, verticais, onde uma vanguarda que se acha esclarecida define um projeto de sociedade a partir de uma ideologia, tratando depois de vender esse projeto às massas que querem representar, para angariarem votos e chegarem ao poder.

o Japão num certo sentido, pois tinha acesso ao grande mercado americano e este modelo permitiu-lhes exportar e criar um mínimo de sociedade industrial que deu origem à classe média. Ao mesmo tempo, foi nessa década que se verificaram os primeiros impactos “negativos” para a classe média americana e europeia, com o fim das três décadas de ouro. Esta solução das multinacionais também começou a exaurir-se muito rapidamente, tendo batido no teto logo nos anos 80. A salvação foi o fim da Guerra Fria, que abriu um enorme mercado: centenas de milhões de chineses e indianos, a Europa de Leste, etc. De repente, o capitalismo liberal convenceu toda a gente e foi uma farra. O número de consumidores aumentou de forma brutal, entraram centenas de milhões de trabalhadores baratos, e as novas tecnologias (a mais importante foi, na minha opinião, o container que permitiu as grandes exportações e as tecnologias informáticas) permitiram a criação das

A classe média tradicional está estagnada ou a desaparecer nos países Isto porque o modelo não consegue continuar a sustentar este grupo social. mas sim dos limites deste modelo O problema deste modelo socioeconómico de massa é que, para sobreviver, tem de encontrar permanentemente novos mercados e consumidores solventes, bem como aumentar sempre a produtividade da sua própria indústria, senão esmorece. É uma espécie de corrida, porque mais consumidores representam menos custos (e menos custos através das novas tecnologias ou baixando a renda dos trabalhadores) Esta corrida infernal que vivemos desde o pós-guerra acaba por criar sempre crises, quando não se consegue seguir esse ritmo. Nos anos 70, a solução para a estagnação dos mercados e das margens das empresas foi o aparecimento do uma nova forma de empresa: as multinacionais. A ideia era instalar unidades de produção em países em desenvolvimento, para tentar aproveitar os possíveis novos mercados que iriam surgir nesses países e para produzir com mão-de-obra barata para os mercados centrais. Isto permitiu criar os primeiros embriões de classe média em países que entraram nessa lógica. Foram sobretudo os tigres asiáticos, como Taiwan e Coreia do Sul, mas também 152 _

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transnacionais, ou seja, empresas que faziam cadeias globais de valor, com base numa fragmentação muito forte da produção no mundo inteiro. Isto também foi possível graças a uma diminuição importante dos preços de produção das mercadorias. Nos Estados Unidos, por exemplo, a Wallmart começou a vender roupas ao preço da chuva, o que permitiu o aumento do consumo. Mais importante ainda, depois da Guerra Fria, em meados dos anos 90 e 2000, os países ditos emergentes (e particularmente a China) conseguiram nichos bastante rentáveis dentro destas grandes cadeias de produção. Até o Brasil conseguiu alguma coisa, tendo começado a exportar ferro e soja para China, com preços elevados. A China encontrou um nicho que foi fabricar produtos finais importando todos os componentes de vários sítios e vendendo depois para os Estados Unidos e a Europa, que representavam (e ainda representam) 60% do consumo privado mundial. Qualquer coisa produzida no mundo terá der ser comprada pelo menos 60% pelos consumidores europeus e norte-americanos, o que significa que, se eles não comprarem,

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é mau para todo o mundo. Nesses países emergentes, foi assim possível a criação de uma significativa classe média: desde logo, de operários industriais, mas também da classe que vem em conjunto com isso. Isto foi interessante para esses países, só que os países do Norte, mais industrializados, começaram a ter problemas: houve muito emprego que se deslocou para fora e foi difícil manter a prosperidade dessa grande classe média que tinha sido criada nas décadas anteriores. A solução foi recorrer a empréstimos. Todos os países se endividaram, quer no privado quer no público, e chega uma altura em que já não é possível. Este novo avatar da produção em massa para um consumo em massa, que corresponde às cadeias de valor montadas, bateu em dois muros: o primeiro é o muro da mudança climática e meio ambiente (se toda a gente quer carros, casas, viajar, etc., não há lugar para todos) e o segundo é o muro dos interes-

A crise de 2008 foi muito importante, porque mostrou a impossibilidade de manter este modelo de produção e consumo em massa com estes dois muros e, portanto, a impossibilidade de manter a classe média. Se já não há possibilidade de manter a prosperidade e aumento de classe média, o que vai acontecer? Será que tudo vai acabar, sobretudo a democracia? A classe média tradicional está, na realidade, estagnada ou a desaparecer nos países industrializados e a crescer cada vez mais devagar nos países emergentes. Isto porque o modelo não consegue continuar a sustentar este grupo social. Neste sentido, a culpa não é da globalização, nem das tecnologias digitais, mas sim dos limites deste modelo de produção e consumo em massa. Cada vez que temos um problema deste tipo na sociedade industrial, que começou há 200 anos, podemos ter como

industrializados e a crescer cada vez mais devagar nos países emergentes. Neste sentido, a culpa não é da globalização, nem das tecnologias digitais, de produção e consumo em massa. ses constituídos (vested interests). São elites – de direita ou de esquerda, operárias ou capitalistas – que não querem mudar nada, porque têm medo de perder as suas vantagens. Recusam ir mais além na competição interna externa, só que essa competição é a base do negócio do modelo de produção e consumo em massa. Dou sempre o exemplo da China, que sabe que não é possível continuar a exportar produto final para os Estados Unidos e Europa, e que têm necessariamente de desenvolver o mercado interno, só que para ter consumo interno é necessário ter escolhas e haver liberalização do crédito. Só que o poder do Partido Comunista chinês é distribuir crédito. O Brasil também é um exemplo, pois é um país extremamente anticapitalista, onde há uma elite com uma mentalidade fazendeira (explorar matérias-primas, esperando que alguém de fora compre e tendo um bando de escravos a trabalharem gratuitamente). Isto já não é possível no mundo de hoje. Tudo isto cria reticências à criação de economias modernas dentro do modelo da produção em massa para consumo em massa.

solução uma guerra, que destrói muita gente e mata muitas elites que não querem mudar. No entanto, isto é cada vez mais complicado devido ao mundo interdependente. O que está a acontecer, como aconteceu no início do século XX, é uma nova revolução industrial. Estamos a passar do modelo de produção em massa para um consumo em massa com uma comunicação de massa, para um novo modelo extremamente radical e diferente, que é uma produção em rede e adaptada, para um consumo personalizado, com comunicações permanentes de ida e volta individualizadas e em rede. Este modelo produz uma dinâmica totalmente nova e também problemas novos. E com a ideia subjacente de que este modelo tem de produzir uma tecnologia mais limpa. Esta nova economia individualizada, dita digital, está a fragmentar todas as classes. A classe operária já praticamente não existe, está a ser fragmentada em milhões de empresas e indivíduos, bem como a classes média e os vários níveis de classes capitalistas. As classes estão fragmentadas

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e conectadas. Esta transição está a provocar, como em todos os períodos de revolução económica, imensas desigualdades, não apenas a nível social, mas também desigualdades territoriais, entre e dentro dos países. Nos países, temos polos cada vez mais ricos e modernos ao lado de territórios cada vez mais pobres e sem recursos. Isto cria tensões internas muito fortes. Falamos que é importante construir cidades limpas ou as chamadas smart-cities, mas para isso são necessários enormes recursos, que não são aplicados noutras coisas. Vamos ter, nos lugares mais ricos, polos urbanos cada vez mais fortes com territórios cada vez mais desconetados mesmo ao lado, sendo que esses polos urbanos se conectam entre si através das fronteiras. Isto significa que é muito difícil para qualquer governo ou autoridade pública administrar essas dinâmicas. Atualmente, o problema central é: qual deve ser o regime político adequado para esta nova forma de vida social? A democracia representativa não pode ser vista como a única e última forma definitiva da democracia. O fim da classe média não é o fim da democracia. Temos é de mudar a forma da democracia. Os países emergentes que conseguirem manter o mínimo do velho modelo de produção em massa para consumo em massa, aumentando a competição interna, vão poder continuar a tentar alargar as suas classes médias e estabelecer maiores regimes de democracia representativa, sempre sabendo que vão bater rapidamente no limite. A outra solução são os regimes autoritários, só que estes funcionam no início, quando

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se trata de explorar fatores de produção que não eram utlizados, passando depois a bloquear as coisas que são necessárias, como a criatividade e a inovação. O desafio é evitar regimes técnico-totalitários (em que as novas tecnologias permitem controlar pessoalmente toda a gente) e inventar novas formas políticas que garantam os direitos e liberdades pessoais, que sejam “accountable” e que possamos chamar de democráticas. Dando um exemplo, vale a pena seguir a experiência em curso na França com o movimento Macron, que eu chamo uma espécie de “start-up política”: não é um partido, é um movimento; não tem ideologia; o que interessa é resolver os problemas. Antes das eleições, Macron enviou milhares de militantes auscultarem mais de 100 mil eleitores sobre quais os problemas e o que pensavam sobre diversas questões, tendo pegado em tudo isso e feito um programa político. A partir daí, tem-se um indivíduo no topo que decide, mas não decide uma ideologia ou projeto de sociedade, apenas decide como solucionar os problemas. Ou seja, basta de problematizar e analisar, o que se pretende é saber o que é preciso fazer e implementar as respetivas soluções. Eles não querem transformar-se num partido com o objetivo de ficarem durante anos ou se perpetuarem, mas apenas resolver - e se não resolverem, deixam a política. Quem sabe este possa ser um dos exemplos possíveis de um sistema transitório para uma nova sociedade, cujos contornos ainda desconhecemos. Mas sabemos que durante esta transição, vai doer: como disse George Friedman, “apertem os cintos!”.

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SPEAKER

Wang Yiwei Diretor, Instituto de Relações Internacionais, Renmin University, Pequim

Director, Institute of International Affairs, Renmin University of China, Beijing

ur Chinese dream is to be a middle-income country, so we use this term much more often than the concept of middle class. Some say our middle-income population is around 400 million people and others count approximately 600 million, according to different data and criteria. We now celebrate 40 years from the reform that brought 700 million people out of extreme poverty. But many other countries still live in poverty and seek to share their experience with China. Many countries haven’t got the possibility of enjoying the benefits of their rapid economic growth, when they don’t have electricity, infrastructures, or access to low-carbon technologies, so they still rely on fossil fuels and other energy sources that release huge amounts of CO2. How to make them rich and cut C02 emissions at the same time? The most important is not about cultural differences, but about the development model. How can people get rich and how to have the benefits of globalization? How to reform globalization? Today we have a liberalism-driven globalization, dominated by capital and focused on innovation and technology. Huge financial resources are invested in Artificial Intelligence (AI) today, as in the Internet yesterday. Of course innovation

is good, but this type of globalization tends to create bubbles. When the bubble collapses, then the global financial crisis happens. How to make the capital focus on the real economy, in order to benefit all people and not just the rich people? The Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) wants to achieve this. There are two kinds of innovation in the world: the European model saved energy and resources, focusing on sustainable development, and the US model saved labor, focusing on efficiency. But these two kinds of innovations are both terrible for the developing countries, because their comparative advantage is cheap labor, and this is diluted by both models. That is why the gap between the rich and the poor is currently so wide in the world. Today, only 10% to 15% of total trade in Africa is between African countries. But mutual connectivity is the key for the 21st century comparative advantage and it is the key of the BRI. The goal is to solve global problems through solving China’s problems: addressing poverty through growth, addressing development gaps through harmonization (mutual aid between the East and West, interconnectivity among the land and sea), and security through global governance (comprehend both symptoms and root causes with overall plan and coordination). The BRI traces back to hundreds of years ago, when the East and the West connected through Eurasia. In 1936, Sven Hedin said: “Not exaggeratedly speaking, the Silk Road is the

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longest line across the old world. In the cultural and historic perspective, it has been the most significant bond that connects all nations and continents that ever exited on Earth. (…) If Chinese government could revitalize the Road in history by means of modern transportation, it would certainly contribute to all human beings, as well as set up a momentum for itself” (Sven Hedin, The Silk Road, 1936). But how to do that? Why a Silk Road, why China, why now, what does it mean for the middle class and why is it good for the world? Along with the modernization of Europe in the 16th century, the ancient Silk Road has faded away in history. It was lost, but never forgotten, and many tried to re-establish the concept, with different contents and for different ends. International organizations and countries (UNESCO, UNDP, Japan, US, Iran, Russia, Kazakhstan, ROK) tried to revive the ancient Silk Road, mainly because of the huge costs of trade by land in Eurasia. For instance, The US approved in 2011 the “New Silk Road Strategy” and in 2010, the European Union put forward a proposal for a Eurasia Free Trade Zone. How to turn these dreams into reality – this is China’s approach. The Belt and Road Initiative means a Silk Road Economic Belt and a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road: firstly, it features the 21stCentury version of Connectography; secondly, it links projects into lines, and lines will grow into belts, zones, and economies of prosperity; thirdly, it transports, and transportation can cut through barriers towards affluence; and fourthly, a good road can begin good things. It is based in interconnectivity of transportation in the air, on land and sea, oil and gas pipelines, and telecommunications, for 65 countries and regions, comprising a giant economy of 4.4 billion on a planet of some 7 billion. The Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) is a transportation network in the Eurasian area and beyond. It comprises the railway, highway, airlines, sea lines, oil-gas pipelines, power transmission lines and communication network. A comprehensively stereoscopic transportation network with high interconnectivity, that is, an economic corridor with integrated development. A good connection between two cities can bring a lot of industry, logistics, tourism, financing and telecommunications. For 158 _

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instance, China financed the connection between Jakarta and Bandung, in the Indonesian island of Java, and this was crucial to bring the industry and other financing. So, the first objective of BRI is infrastructural development, because infrastructure benefit all, not just the rich. The BRI Transportation Network, the longest economic corridor across the globe, which has connected Asia-Pacific region (the world economic engine) with the European Union (the largest economics in nowadays’ world), would create new opportunities and development space for the continent of Eurasia and formulate an economic radiated area in East Asia, West Asia and South Asia. The basic orientation and comprehensive goals of BRI are to facilitate investment and trade, to reinforce the economic and technical cooperation, to establish free trade zone, and to exploit the great Eurasia market, in order to optimize the allocation of resources and trade, to advance regional economic integration, and to realize the synchronous development of economy and society. China’s new silk roads

Source: Manfred Zapletal, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Nadine Godehart), IWF, UNCTAD

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Coverage by region Coverage: 4.4 billion people (63% of the world); USD 2.1 trillion GDP (29% of the world) Region

Country/Region

Numbers

Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan,

South East Asia

Indonesia, Cambodia, East Timor, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar

South Asia

Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka

Poland, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia

West Asia and North Africa

Iran, Syria, Jordan, Israel, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Yemen Republic

CIS and others

Belorussia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia

Central Asia

Central and East Europe

It is developed around 8 cooperation priorities: Infrastructure connectivity; Industrial investment; Resource development; Economic and trade cooperation; Financial cooperation; Cultural exchanges; Ecological protection; Maritime cooperation. The financial resources come from: loans from World Bank, Asian Development Bank and alike; the Silk Road Fund Ltd., with 40 billion USD and growing since 2014; the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; and Public-Private Partnership like European Investment Bank. A huge project like this carries risks, some of which are described in the box. Risks can be prevented by ensuring inclusiveness, by involvement of local stakeholders and people, and by sharing (through the localization of whole industrial chain and services, bringing benefits where we are). Risks involved in the Belt & Road Initiative

The first goal is “Community”: community of shared interests, community of shared responsibility, community of shared future for humankind. There are 4 key words to highlight - (i) mutual connectivity, (ii) international capacity cooperation, (iii) synergy of strategies, and (iv) to joint develop the Third-Party Markets; around 5 pillars: policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people to-people bond. It has two wings: on land, the Silk Road Economic Belt, and at sea the 21st century Maritime Silk Road. It involves 6 economic corridors: • New Eurasian Land Bridge • China-Mongolia-Russia • China-Central Asia-West Asia • China-Indochina Peninsula • China-Pakistan • Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar

Economic • Short Term: Conflicting Monetary Policies across the World • Long Term: Shifting Global Economic Structure • Now: Investment, Financing, Taxation • Sovereign Debt, Local Debt, Weak Services, Lack of Awareness • Will it degenerate into a simple spending spree by China, as some kind of global Ministry of Finance? Political • Internal • Geopolitical • What will current Global System become? Reactions? Security • US and NATO confronting a reviving Russia • Syria, Iraq, Rise of ISIS and general terrorism, and possible manipulation of terrorism by states • Maritime Disputes • Color Revolutions Legal • Future of WTO (World Trade Organization) facing new arrangements • Insufficient Legal Frame along BRI • Obstacles in Existing Legal Systems: Laws too open for interpretation • Projects and Protest

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Moral • State Level: Unfamiliar China-- How Much do People Know but Pandas? • Business Level: Bad Behavior-- modernization in a world of Postmodern ethics • Interpersonal: There are still bad people around

The Infrastructural Gap Infrastructure investment demand in coming years. Estimated: 6.6 billion USD (2015-2020); 14.4 billion USD (2015-2025)

Per area and in billions USD 4.5 4 3.5

China’s model is based on infrastructure plus education. The Chinese experience says that if you want to get rich, build roads first; if you want to get richer, build the motor road; if you want to get richest, build the internet road; and if you want to get rich together, connect the road with China and to the world through BRI. So, we help very poor countries “to build the swimming pool, so that they can learn to swim, and then pull them into the sea”. Why should we do it now? It is time to bring maximum prosperity for not only China, but for the world. China is in a unique position in the global value chain, to help those countries to increase their integration in the global value chain (Figure 3). There is a growing importance of Silk Road regions in the global economy. But there is a huge infrastructural gap (Figure 4). The double loop value chain system The U.S

Western Europe

Japan

BRI

China Central Asia

East Asia

West Asia

Southeast Asia

Eastern Europe

South Asia Africa

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3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0

East and Southeast Asia

West Asia

Central Asia

Pacific Islands

2015-2020

There are already impacts, for instance in trade: China`s trade with BRI topped 1 trillion USD in 2013, after a decade of 19% average growth, and is still growing fast. The conventional globalization featured in tariff reduction for free trade would facilitate the economic growth by 5 percent at most, while the new one, with high levels of interconnectivity, is supposed to generate a 10-15 percent increase for global economy (Parag Khana, Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization). According to the Bloomberg analysis, BRI will contribute to 80% of global economic growth and vault 3 billion more middle class by 2050. In the coming decade, BRI will create 2.5 trillion USD trade. And this demonstrates the claim that every one-dollar increase in the infrastructure investment of developing countries would generate a 70-cent growth of import, a half of which is to come from developed countries (Justin Yifu Lin). As the new engine of global economic growth, China brings its advantages in productivity, technology, funding, experience, and development into package and offer. The Belt and Road Initiative is the result of this and China’s new phase of all-around opening-up. It is important a new global rebalance of the world economy, in which we can bridge the gaps. Traditional globalization

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starts from the sea, so coastal regions and maritime states develop first, while inland countries fall behind, forming a massive wealth gap. We need therefore to move from partial globalization to a more inclusive globalization. We also need a new model for regional cooperation for the 21st Century, and the economic Belt is an innovation in regional cooperation. Europe, China and the US should work together to achieve a new global rebalance. What is the role of Europe, and how can this be good for the European continent? Now Europe could once again be the center of this world with all Eurasian continent; this geopolitical world island could reshape global geopolitics and the entire globalization with its own integration. In sum, China’s “One Belt One Road” offers seven great opportunities for Europe. Firstly, BRI can connect with Juncker-Plan and stimulate European economic growth through mutual-connectivity and extending European single market to Eurasian Big Market, as European countries joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) indicates. Secondly, it is an opportunity to build a greater Eurasian market and to revive European civilization. Thirdly, it is an opportunity for Europe’s regional integration: for a long time, the European Union has not made a firm choice between “Eastern partnership” and “Mediterranean partnership” in terms of priority. Fourthly, the opportunity to push forward EU-China comprehensive strategic partnership, All-Around Strategic Partnership between China and EU. Fifthly, it is an opportunity for EU-Russian reconciliation, since the end of World War II and the establishment of NATO. Sixthly, it is an opportunity for the EU to access to Asia-Pacific Affairs. Seventhly, it is an opportunity for the EU to enhance its global influence. And finally, it is an opportunity to balance the development of the trans-Atlantic relationship. Europe is the “terminal station” of both the BRI. In building the four partnerships with Europe, namely “partnership of peace, partnership of growth, partnership of reform, and partnership of civilization”, maritime cooperation is the new grip. BRI is combining with the maritime strategies of both the EU and the European countries. It is especially the case with Greece, since it will become an important gateway linking China with Europe, as well as the bridgehead of the cooperation

between China and the Central and Eastern Europe. On 16 December 2014, the 3rd Meeting of Heads of Government of China and Central and Eastern European Countries, relevant parties from the two sides reached the consensus on building a new Asia-Europe maritime-land combined transport passage, relying on Belgrade-Budapest Railway and Greece’s Piraeus Port. This testifies once more to the critical position of Europe in BRI. I could present, as case-study, five ways for the United Kingdom (UK) to join BRI: First, strategies synergy. The UK is not a country along the ancient Silk Road trading routes or covered by the Belt and Road Initiative. However, it has proposed to match the Northern England Revitalization Plan with the initiative. By inviting Chinese President Xi Jinping to visit Manchester, the UK has sent a positive signal that non-member countries can also actively participate in the initiative. Second, connectivity in five aspects. China has set up offshore yuan clearing center in the UK which will be the first western country to issue yuan-denominated sovereign bonds during President Xi’s upcoming visit. As a veteran financial power, the UK plays a critical role in pushing forward the Silk Road Fund and yuan internationalization. Many countries along the Belt and Road are former British colonies which have been adopting the British-style legal system. Therefore, it is of great necessity and profound significance for China and the UK to boost the connectivity in policies, facilities and the people. Third, development of third-party markets. Compared with China, the UK has a deeper understanding of the third-party markets including legal and insurance services, which is of profound value to boost the Belt and Road Initiative and strengthen the presence of “Made in China”, “Built by China” and “Services from China” along the economic belt and silk road. Fourth, international capacity cooperation. Britain was the birthplace of industrial revolution, whose infrastructure is aging and yet fully digitized, providing immense room for Sino-UK capacity cooperation. Fifth, joint development of the Maritime Silk Road. The China-EU 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation includes integrated ocean management, marine spatial planning, marine knowledge, ocean observation and monitoring, marine -tech re-

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search and development, marine economy, and marine energy. Another factor is China-UK Cooperation in maritime shipping, logistics, maritime security, marine economy, marine spatial planning, marine resources, data development and sharing, and marine environmental protection. And also, international shipping regulations. Albert Einstein’s formula (E=MC2) can remind us that Europe should not only invest in Atlantic relations, which are very unequal, but also in Eurasia. E: Europe; M: Mutual Connectivity; C2: China multiplies Eurasian Continent And why is it good for the US? The US economy is business, and BRI is a huge business; the American companies make much money with all these projects. Take the construction of Melaka Gateway as an example: China invested 30 billion Malaysian ringgits while U.S. invested 10 billion, and the AIIB uses the U.S. dollar as its operation currency. America’s advantages in rules and standards of soft infrastructure and China’s advantages in hard infrastructure can be combined; America’s advantages in the security system and China’s in economy can be combined to jointly develop third-party markets.

Besides this, according to Justin Yifu model, every dollar the developing countries invest in infrastructure, will increase imports by 70 cents, including 35 cents from the developed countries. The Belt and Road infrastructure investment will promote the export and create jobs for the US, bringing the space for its structural reform. To jointly launch Belt and Road Bank or Global Infrastructure Investment Bank (GIIB) is the major step for BRI 2.0. Such bank will work together with AIIB, taking investment bank + IMF +World Bank + Commercial Bank” operation model, to finance global infrastructure building including in the US. With GIIB, China and the US joint hands to explore the third-party market. The US, Europe and China should work together: the US have the power of innovation, Europe the power of spirit and China the power of practice; therefore, each of them alone cannot solve the huge problems ahead of us, and if we work together, all win. We should work for a better globalization, of the people, by the people and for the people (and not of capital, by capital, for capital).

For more information: Official website: https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/ Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, March 28, 2015. http://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_chn/zyxw_602251/t1249574.shtml Building the Belt and Road: Concept, Practice and China’s Contribution. https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/12731.htm National Development and Reform Commission, State Oceanic Administration jointly release Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative, 2017-06-20. https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/wcm.files/upload/CMSydylgw/201706/201706200153032.pdf

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DISCUSSANT

Bruno Cardoso Reis ISCTE-IUL

á esta ideia da crise da classe média, mas em termos de dados fundamentais regista-se uma evolução muito positiva, pois o número de pessoas em situação de pobreza extrema foi reduzido praticamente para metade no decurso das duas últimas décadas. Isso significa que o número de pessoas que vivem nos quartis médios de rendimento aumentaram substancialmente, em termos mundiais, e hoje em dia serão a maioria. A grande questão é que, nos países chamados em desenvolvimento, as pessoas que saíram da classificação de pobreza extrema não têm muitas das características da classe média tal como nós a concebemos nos países ocidentais (não têm poupanças, heranças ou propriedade segura) e têm ainda dependentes ou muitos familiares e pessoas próximas em situação de pobreza extrema. Isso significa que a resiliência em situações de crise, que faz da classe média uma classe estabilizadora, não se verifica em muitos destes países. Por outro lado, nos países mais ricos, devido a vários fatores como a globalização mas também a automação, verifica-se uma pressão crescente sobre a classe média, a qual tem cada vez menos poupanças e mais dívidas. Isto tem implicações por exemplo ao nível político, mas também securitário. As pessoas que sentem

que estão a perder muito neste novo contexto, ou que sentem que têm menos a perder, estão mais disponíveis para opções e políticas extremas. Podem até estar mais disponíveis, numa ótica de custo-benefício, para abraçar soluções violentas para os seus problemas. A ideia da classe média como democratizadora e pacificadora fica aqui em questão. Passando dos problemas para as soluções, gostava de colocar algumas questões aos oradores. No Ocidente, há uma preocupação com os padrões mínimos de trabalho, nomeadamente nos países que exportam para o espaço europeu, onde muitas vezes as condições e padrões laborais não respeitam normas básicas. Mas qual é a solução? Fazê-los sair dos mercados acarretaria custos enormes, porque são países que vivem destas exportações e são essas atividades que geram emprego – então o que podemos fazer? Por outro lado, devemos ter em conta a questão das finanças e dos paraísos fiscais. O Estado social no Ocidente tem grandes problemas de financiamento, em parte porque o capital circula livremente e torna-se muito difícil de taxar por essa razão. É realista pensarmos em políticas mais robustas de taxação destes fluxos financeiros mais globais e de combate aos paraísos fiscais (em que perdem tanto os países ricos como os países pobres)? Em relação ao modelo chinês, de facto os dados da China demonstram que teve um grande contributo na descida da

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taxa mundial de incidência da pobreza, pelo facto de milhões de chineses terem saído da pobreza extrema. Além disso, exporta produtos baratos, tornando possível ao Ocidente comprar muito mais, num contexto de estagnação do rendimento. No entanto, a minha questão é sobre as possíveis limitações e soluções deste modelo. Devido ao seu processo de crescimento e industrialização, a China tornou-se um grande importador de matérias-primas e produtos primários com base nos recursos naturais dos países em desenvolvimento. No Brasil, por exemplo, isto é encarado como algo problemático, na medida em que representou em boa parte um regresso a um modelo anterior (o “modelo de plantação”, por contraponto ao “modelo de industrialização”). Estará a China preocupada com isto? A China anunciou recentemente uma maior abertura ao comércio e investimento externos – será esta uma das respostas a estas

preocupações, ou pensa que estas preocupações são exageradas? Mencionou também os projetos infraestruturais, que são importantes e potencialmente positivos, mas por exemplo no continente africano estes projetos têm suscitado por serem construídos com recurso a mão-de-obra chinesa, não tendo reflexos positivos imediatos na economia local ou a geração de emprego. Há atualmente mais cuidado no envolvimento dos atores locais, ou pensa que esta é uma crítica injusta? Estou igualmente muito interessado no problema das desigualdades na própria China e nos programas que estão a ser implementados para combater a pobreza e as desigualdades, particularmente nas zonas rurais e no interior. Como estão a correr estes programas - pensa que estes são passíveis de exportação e aplicação noutros países?

Alfredo Valladão Em relação aos padrões de trabalho, é preciso saber de que trabalho estamos a falar. Se falamos da produção de massa, há um certo tipo de trabalho, com funções definidas, que se prolongam no tempo, etc. Mas na nova economia, os jovens têm de pensar que vão mudar 12 vezes de emprego ao longo da sua vida. Já não existe o emprego para a vida, sempre na mesma fábrica, e até na função pública isso não se verificará. A questão não está, portanto, em proteger uma forma específica de trabalho, mas sim como educar e formar as pessoas para que possam mudar, inovar e aprender ao longo de toda a vida. Isto implica que todo o modelo social tem de ser mudado, incluindo novos tipos de escolas e de ensino, ou novos tipos de proteção e seguro social. A questão está em saber que novo tipo de consenso social é possível construir, para dar algum “colchão” às pessoas e, simultaneamente, ser eficiente neste novo modelo de inovação. É neste tipo de direção que temos de trabalhar. Quanto ao Estado social, não podemos esquecer, em primeiro lugar, que este só foi possível no contexto do Estado nacional. Quando a economia e as comunicações se transnacionalizam, torna-se muito mais difícil um governo nacional controlar os diversos parâmetros que permitem ter um Estado social eficiente. Em segundo lugar, a economia social de mer166 _

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cado é um consenso muito frágil que foi criado por causa da produção em massa para um consumo em massa. A primeira criação deste Estado social foi durante o mandato de Roosevelt no Estados Unidos, quando um presidente, pela primeira vez, foi contra os interesses do capital antigo, promoveu novos sindicatos contra os velhos sindicatos de operários sem qualificações, e isso resultou na negociação coletiva dos contratos, que hoje é algo fundamental nos países ocidentais. De repente, os sindicatos podiam negociar um contrato comum para todos os trabalhadores e isto mudou a capacidade de os trabalhadores imporem os seus interesses, pelo menos ao nível mínimo, e criou o embrião do Estado social, para dar o mínimo de segurança e proteção no trabalho. Quando isto veio para a Europa, como tínhamos uma velha tradição da luta de classes, inventámos esta economia social de mercado, que é o mesmo modelo do Roosevelt mas um pouco mais forte, para dar mais garantias. Tudo isto, porém, está baseado na capacidade de crescimento e prosperidade a partir da produção e consumo em massa. Se isto acabar, ou se ficar marginal em relação à nova economia que aí vem, vamos ter de inventar novas formas de proteção e seguro social de uma nova economia. Já existem ideias a ser pensadas e propostas, como o rendimento mínimo incondicio-

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nal. O problema central não é o financiamento, mas sim saber como se faz a equação de tudo isto com a nova economia, ou seja, como se organiza e aplica de forma a funcionar. Esta nova economia pode chegar a um ponto em que precisa de menos crescimento (menos material utilizado) para ter mais prosperidade e, num certo sentido, é esse o objetivo. Já estamos a caminhar para isso em várias vertentes. Mas ninguém sabe onde isso vai dar; pode resultar numa sociedade totalitária. Nos Estados Unidos, por exemplo, põe-se um chip no carro em que as companhias de seguros monitorizam a forma

de conduzir e isso têm influência direta no prémio do seguro. É claro que isto é uma forma de ser mais eficiente na utilização dos recursos em geral, mas inclui perigos e riscos para o futuro. No geral, nós estamos num período de transição: de uma maneira de produzir, consumir e comunicar para outro tipo diferente. A transição é sempre um período complicado, em que tudo tem de ser inventado. É preciso adaptarmo-nos a um novo tipo de modelo económico e social que está a crescer. Este é um desafio para os jovens, que terão de inventar essa sociedade, a partir do que temos e sabemos.

Wang Yiwei I don’t use the expression “China model” because there is no pure Chinese model, I prefer to refer to China’s experience and approach. The invisible hand and the visible hand should be combined. Markets are dysfunctional in so many ways, and globalization has its effects, so the poorer countries should not trust in markets and governments have an important role to play particularly at early stages and at internal level. Only afterwards they can compete in the international market and “swim in the sea”. The West says it is the end of history and China says history has just began. We should work together. If countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan have so much terrorism, because they suffered from a circle of violence and poverty for many years, the only solution is to work together to bridge the gaps, to regulate globalization and to reform the model. We solve our problems, in order to solve the problems of the world.

You mentioned that Chinese companies don’t hire many workers in Africa. In the beginning maybe that was the case, because an African worker could not work like a Chinese worker, and the Chinese companies had many problems because of that. But currently the labor price of Chinese workers is three or four times higher than the local workers, and we should hire more local people. Nevertheless, we need to provide training, not only in technical terms, but also a cultural change, and this takes time. In Kenya or Ethiopia, Chinese companies are hiring thousands of local workers, so the approach has changed. China has gone through a process of restructuring that doesn’t mean “made in China” anymore. Relocation is the issue. What is made in Africa is sold in Africa, what is made in the Middle East is sold in the Middle East.

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Debate

ivemos hoje uma transição que representa o esgotamento de um modelo. Nas últimas décadas, na prática, a economia foi baseada no crescimento económico – e o crescimento do PIB ainda é a principal medida, que tem visibilidade na economia e nos media -, o qual tem determinado as políticas até agora prosseguidas. O crescimento no setor industrial significa produzir mais, de forma mais eficiente, vender às massas e dar melhoria de rendimento às massas para comprarem esses bens. A abordagem da China também está assente nesse modelo, atualmente em crise. Por outro lado, a própria medida do PIB tem hoje uma composição muito diferente, pois se era fácil de calcular no modelo de produção em massa para consumo em massa, tornou-se muito mais difícil saber atualmente em que consiste – e existe todo um trabalho de teoria estatística a ser desenvolvido nesse âmbito. O PIB não inclui muitas coisas relevantes para as economias atuais, por exemplo no âmbito da internet ou dos serviços. O mesmo se verifica na forma como calculamos o índice de produtividade, pois existem muitos outros fatores atualmente a ter em conta na produtividade. Estas formas de medida já não funcionam no contexto atual e as instituições internacionais têm de trabalhar neste âmbito, inclusivamente criando outros tipos de indicadores. O grande sucesso dos países emergentes nos últimos 20 anos, em termos industriais, vem de estratégias de nicho dentro das cadeias de valor global, em que os produtos são vendidos à Europa e aos Estados Unidos. Isto significa que, se a procura mudar ou acabar nestes mercados, esses países vão ter problemas. A única solução seria os países emergentes abrirem-se mutuamente, para criar mercados emergentes bastante fortes e sustentarem ainda este modelo de

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produção e consumo em massa. Mas isto depende de aceitar a competição interna e externa e não vai ser possível a curto ou médio prazo. Foi também salientado que é preciso esclarecer de que produtividade estamos a falar. Atualmente, já se produz de forma muito eficiente e barata e o valor acrescentado está nos serviços que estão embutidos no produto, pelo que não são os países produtores que aproveitam os benefícios globais da economia. Um computador, por exemplo, pode ser produzido por 100 USD e na China e depois ser vendido a 1000 USD no mundo ocidental. Para além disso, há uma tentativa de criar novas formas de economia, com novos critérios de produtividade, que sejam menos dependentes do resto do mundo. Ou seja, pode acontecer que o mundo rico e ocidental esteja a criar novas formas - do qual são exemplo a economia circular, as smart-cities, entre outras – que já não dependem tanto do consumo de matérias-primas nem das interconexões globais. E isso terá certamente impactos, nomeadamente inclusivamente para as economias dos países em desenvolvimento. O modelo do século XX está a começar a mostrar os seus limites, com implicações nas questões da governação. Num mundo interconectado, os governos têm menos capacidade de ação para controlar e gerir a economia e a sociedade. Um orador referiu, a este propósito, que os cidadãos e eleitores têm cada vez menos confiança nos políticos e que mesmo os políticos têm cada vez menos confiança neles próprios, porque percebem que não têm soluções para os problemas e que a sua capacidade de ação é muito limitada. Nesse sentido, o que se passa atualmente não é tanto uma crise de crescimento, mas a passagem para um novo mundo, em que teremos de encontrar as formas políticas, económicas e sociais adequadas para esse novo mundo. O Estado pode fazer muitas coisas e tem um papel importante, mas que papel e que Estado? Num Estado autoritário é possível impor as políticas e medidas

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com autoridade, mas essa autoridade acaba depois por impedir a inovação. Não é possível estimular rapidamente a inovação e, ao mesmo tempo, impedi-la ou travá-la (como acontece com as políticas chinesas sobre a inteligência artificial, por exemplo). O Estado também tem hoje muitos níveis de governação e, nesse sentido, os próximos regimes políticos e autoridades legítimas devem ter a capacidade de articular a dimensão local, nacional e transnacional. As soluções de futuro passam necessariamente por este caminho. No entanto, continua a existir um problema central: quem vai ser a autoridade de última instância que vai garantir o funcionamento e articulação deste mundo transnacionalizado e hiperconectado? Os Estados Unidos parecem estar a demitir-se desse papel. O orador chinês referiu que o país tem aprendido com os erros e realizações dos modelos ocidentais, para criar a sua própria abordagem independente e adaptada. Nos últimos anos, a China ultrapassou o Japão e tornou-se na segunda maior economia do mundo, sendo também a maior potência industrial (maior do que o conjunto dos Estados Unidos,

Alemanha e Japão). A União Europeia não consegue criticar abertamente as medidas protecionistas dos Estados Unidos, porque depende dos Estados Unidos em termos industriais, militares e outros. Sugeriu-se, assim, uma maior abertura do Ocidente para não tentar impor os seus modelos e dialogar mais com a China, trocando experiências que podem ser muito úteis também para os países em desenvolvimento. A exequibilidade da Belt & Road Initiative foi também questionada pela audiência, não tanto do lado chinês, mas nos países que esta atravessa, muitos dos quais com instabilidade política e problemas estruturais (nomeadamente na Ásia Central e Médio Oriente) que podem limitar grandemente os resultados da ação chinesa. No entanto, para muitos destes países, a China apresenta-se como o único ator disponível e capaz de financiar as infraestruturas que necessitam. Cabe a estes países criarem as condições para que esses investimentos se realizem, tendo sido dado o exemplo do Paquistão, que assegurou 15 mil militares para protegerem 35 mil trabalhadores chineses.

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A EUROPA EUROPE Dilemas e Tendências da Integração Integration Dilemmas and Trends

Após crises sucessivas que aprofundaram clivagens entre cidadãos, políticos

e instituições da UE, o populismo parece estar a recuar e o crescimento dá sinais de retorno. Poderá a Europa renovar o pacto democrático com os cidadãos? Serão os dilemas do multiculturalismo e da assimilação resolúveis? Poderá a UE responder aos desafios estratégicos da Rússia, Turquia, China e dos EUA?

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SPEAKER

Philippe Marlière Professor, University College of London

Professor, University College of London

’m going to try to sketch out a number of issues on populism and finish, because I'm the French man here and I work on French foreign policy, looking at the position of the new French president, Emmanuel Macron, who made at least three major speeches on Europe. Does Macron have a reply to European problems? I think I could paraphrase a very-well known German political philosopher who spent most of his life in exile in London (I guess you know who he is): “a spectre is haunting Europe today”. That spectre is no longer communism, it is populism. Populism has become a kind of buzzword used in the media and politics over the past ten years. It has essentially a negative connotation and it should be taken seriously: populist forces are there with a political agenda that matters very much to Europe. The majority of populist forces are not particularly friendly with Europe, they don’t like the kind of Europe we have -- rightly or wrongly, but that’s another matter. This notion of populism is really in the air, everyone uses it, but most of the times the definition is pretty unclear and confusing. I am going to propose a very simple definition, with three elements. First, populist forces or populism normally opposes, on the one hand the people – this is very broad– and on the other the elite. In some countries, they would be referring to the cast –

casta, as is the case in Spain with Podemos – or the oligarchy, that is another synonym. Elite, cast, oligarchy, all stick to the notion of elite. The second element is the valorisation of the people. Simplifying, people are good, and elite are bad. There is a denigration of the elite, whatever the shape or form, which are there to take away from the people power, representation, economic and cultural wealth. The elite can be very different but is essentially economic and political elite, and in some cases populists are also targeting the media or the judiciary. Thirdly populists like to promote sovereignty, whatever that means. Sovereignty has been lost to Brussels, which is what you hear often in the media. Brussels run our policy; we cannot decide how we want to be governed because there are European directives, because there are a number of things that stop us from doing what we want. Recapturing sovereignty. We saw this very recently in the Brexit debate in the UK. Brexit was about two things. Immigration on the one hand, which is a key thing for populist and recapturing the allegedly lost sovereignty. For the sake of clarity, I will map out populism in today’s Europe, dividing Europe in four different geographical areas, starting with Eastern Europe, where populist forces are the strongest. I am not going to bombard you with figures but at least today, as we speak, there are seven countries governed by self-declared populist forces. They are populists and they do not hide it. Bosnia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,

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Serbia and Slovakia. In two countries, there are populist parties involved in government as coalition partners. In the case of Poland and Hungary, Law and Justice Party and Fidesz, they not only have the government but also the presidency. Those forces have been trying to promote a new brand of nationalism based on soil, blood, culture, taking a hard line on immigration and, what is important, challenging the institutions, both European and domestic, undermining traditional democratic institutions such as free media or the judiciary. In Western Europe, about 13% of the electorate, according to different data, would be voting for populist forces. It’s a 4% increase compared to 2000. A steady rise and it’s happening everywhere. They are in power as junior partner in Austria, in Switzerland, in some Swiss federal councils. It may look not as a big deal when compared to Eastern Europe, but still there is a rise. In Germany, the so-called Alternative for Germany is coming third, close to the SPD, and in some parts of Germany, namely in Bavaria, coming as second party, threatening the Conservatives of CDU. This is quite a serious matter. Die Linke, on the left -- and I will make a distinction between right wing and left wing populism in a moment -- is also an important party. Regarding France, I never know where to put France, it is Western Europe or Southern Europe, it depends where you are, if you are Northern France or Southern France that is really a different landscape and culture. France is always in between the West and the South. Let us say its West. Marine Le Pen was emphatically defeated by Macron in the second round of the Presidential elections. Still, she largely improved her father’s 2002 score, when he was in the second round against Jacques Chirac. Southern Europe is interesting because populism is less prominent. There is a kind of resistance to all kinds of populism, left and right. There is no far right virtually in Portugal, in electoral terms at least, and that is not the case in most of the other European countries. There is a rise of a kind of populism which I would label left wing. Syriza in Greece (in power), Podemos, in Spain, and, if France is in the South, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, who come very close from a qualification in the second round of the Presidential election. He was only 2% behind Le Pen. It is different, its left wing, because their political and economic agenda is different from the far right. Here it is about stand178 _

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ing up to the economic elites, notably their economic policies: austerity, neo-liberalism, and privatization. It is about fiscal austerity, about putting an end to austerity. One of the reasons why there are no strong populist forces in Portugal (it is a hypothesis) is because you have a social-democratic government who has been standing up, more or less, depending on where you stand, but they are doing something and that is a different narrative from the rest of Europe. In Northern Europe, Sweden has a very strong populist party, the so-called Sweden Democrats, and the Danish People Party in Denmark, They are very strong on immigration and that, of course, is the other big issue of populist parties and the other big criticism addressed to the EU – “you don’t do anything, the EU is a place where immigrants can get in and do whatever they want, use our public services, etc.”. The politics of populist parties. There is a right wing and a left wing type of populism and it does not help the debate if you collude them, if you say they are all populists – think of the old saying, the extremes converge. They might be converging on certain issues. Left wing populism have been taking a more aggressive, restrictive stand on immigration. They do not speak the way the far right would on immigrants and foreigners, but they do say that we cannot welcome everyone. That is really a new turn of the left. They are not islamophobics; they are about being good patriots. Listening to Podemos, who would have said that the far-left or the radical left would talk about patriotism in a positive way ten years ago? What explains the rise of populism? One thing it to map out populism, another is to try to explain it. There are essentially two theses to explain the rise of populism in Europe. The first one is the economic and security thesis. People are voting more on populist parties in Europe because they feel economically insecure. Unemployment, poorly paid jobs, no rises, public services getting worse… all that could favour the support for populist parties who concentrate on that issues and criticize those who are in charge, nationally or in Europe, those who privatize, those who allegedly don’t do anything for the people. There is an expression in English, the “left behind”, the rich are doing very well, the middle class is being impoverished the working class has been it very hard: they are the left behind. Largely

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this is the narrative of all populist and some would argue that is the explanation for the Brexit vote. The second thesis is the cultural backlash. It is no longer explaining populist vote for economic reasons but explaining it for cultural reasons. You could have a job, you could be doing alright economically, still you are not happy with the situation, the reason being that you see that your country – and here the theme of immigration pops-up – has more and more immigrants, they are allegedly taking jobs, using public services, for some they don’t pay taxes (which is by a large extent a lie, immigrants who have legal jobs pay taxes). All those reasons could explain why there is a kind of backlash against open societies, against the free movement of people, which is really the essence of the EU. This is the core of UK-EU negotiations. Those who want out of the EU are really banging on this theme very strongly. Leaving means that we do not want anything to do with the EU in terms of movement of people and we want to control who comes in. Socially, the people with this so-called “cultural insecurity” would be older generation, white men, less educated people. The distinction between the two theses is artificial. If you really want to explain the rise of populism in Europe and the challenge it represents to the EU as a whole, to our democratic societies, I think you have to combine both theses. Emmanuel Macron is interesting because he is the first leader who has nothing to do with the first days of European integration, with the single market or the Maastricht Treaty, or even the Eurozone. It is a fresh start, a leader who just turned forty to be governing a big country in Europe (there is an old saying that without Germany or France Europe would probably not survive). Of course it matters to have a new president, with hopefully new ideas to try to give a response to the threats and problems of populism. Macron has made three major speeches on Europe. One was in Pnyx, a very historic place of ancient Greece, another in Paris-Sorbonne and more recently in the European Parliament. The least you can say it that there is an attempt to engage with that issue. Very few European leaders are doing that, which is very disappointing, and he is doing it. On the content of Macron’s speeches, I am not going to do justice on what he has in mind, probably, but just to re-

view quickly the main things. First, he has renewed France’s long-standing desire for a euro area budget. If you think on the European budget (approved these days) its 1,1% of the overall money given to Brussels by the 28 member states. 1,1% is the actual EU budget, the actual money that the Commission has to launch its own policies, independently from the states. It is ridiculous. There was no mention of enhancing, improving that budget, which remains ridiculous. Still, Macron is talking about a common euro area budget, not much detail in there, not much detail either on the future of the EU. Mélenchon, Le Pen, the two populists in France, radical left and far-right, if they are in power one day will want France out of the EU. Regarding labor market, Macron has talked about, in a very French stance, on social dumping, which raises the question of posted workers directive. Posted workers directive is when workers can be sent to work in a different EU country but with the wage and social security conditions of the initial country. Eastern workers can come to France, Portugal, Britain or Germany but they will be paid and will have the same obligations of the country of origin. It is social dumping in the sense that it brings unfair competition with the local, national workers. Macron wants to end that. On taxes, he has been talking about a common financial transaction tax, another idea of France, taxing more the big giants such as Google or Facebook. On democracy, he said in the speeches that the essence of the European project is democracy. Without democracy, there is no Europe and there is no peace, I should add. The post-war Europe is based on peace and democracy, and some populists are not particularly keen on democracy. On Hungary, FIDEZ and Viktor Orbán, the president, are talking about illiberal democracy which is a bit of an oxymoron: how can you be a democracy and illiberal, if you don´t respect the basic rules of democracy, the separation of powers, you are not democracy. One idea floating concerns the 73 Members of the European Parliament (MEP) of the UK that will be vacant soon, that could be replaced by transnational or pan-EU seats. In the next European election, there could a transnational list, with candidates from different countries. Migrations. Talking about common border, asylum and migration, there are two Macrons. There is the Macron who speaks

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to the EU, outside of France, with a human and liberal talk of welcoming and there is a Macron which is less liberal, less welcoming. Just think of the situation in Calais, in Northern France. Where Macron really stands on that remains to be seen. Overall his ideas are going in the right direction. Like most of the time politicians make big speeches on the future of Europe, looks very nice on the grand scheme of things however slim on details. What do people want? I think people want a Europe protective of their situation, particularly looking at the working class and the middle class. People want jobs, for themselves and their children, they want

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better pay, better public services. Each European country has its own public services, with different traditions, but what really separates Europe from the rest of the world and unites Europeans are the demands of good public services. People would fight for that and are unhappy when they see that the future will have fewer schools or worse schools or transports. It seems to me that the core issue is whether Europe, with the support of national governments - Europe does not work on a federal way, national governments decide for Europe - would really concentrate on these three policies.

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SPEAKER

Federiga Bindi Professora, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Studies, Washington

Professor, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Studies, Washington

esterday George Friedman said that the EU is squeezed between the US and Russia and that means EU is doomed. I do agree that the EU has been traditionally squeezed between the US and Russia, but I come to the opposite conclusion. The moment we are living in history offers a dramatic opportunity for the EU to step up its game and I think that in part it has done so. I have been living across the US and Europe. I am based in the US for the last 10 years and at a certain point I realized that the only way to be in the US was in fact to spend half of the time in Europe. In Europe we don’t understand what it means to have Trump. Imagine living on a permanent rollercoaster, waking up every morning wondering what is next, what is the crazy idea of the day, who resigned. It’s a bombardment. The mood of the nation has changed. Liberal US, as much as most of Europe, used to love Obama. There is a large part of American however who actually saw their condition worsened. As soon as you get out of Washington, the poverty is there. Remember Feira da Ladra as it was 20 years ago; this is the kind of poverty we find outside Washington DC. A couple of weeks ago I broke my arm and went to the doctor. 500 USD. I could afford the 500 USD, but there are many people who couldn’t. If you

have serious problems and you do not have insurance, which is very costly for families, you do not go check-up. You are sick, you stay sick and you die. The level of poverty that exists in “real” America – not in the middle of nowhere but rather near New York, Philadelphia, Washington – it’s huge. It is dramatic, and it explains why people are angry. It’s also a country that is in the end of the day profoundly racist. I consider myself white but when I was living in the US I come to realize that I’m actually a little dark skin, from a WHASP point of view. My son is blonde, and we would go to playgrounds and people thought I was the Latin nanny. We have this idea that the best success of the US is Hollywood. Hollywood gives an idea of the US, within the US and outside of it, of what they would like to be, but it is far away from reality. Large amounts of people were angry, got angrier with Obama, and sought their vindication with Trump and after a year they keep supporting him. This must be taken in consideration. Today the US is two things. Is domestically focused -Trump dominates the news, the country physically absent from the international scene -- and its obsessed with Russia. In Europe, 1989 means the end of communism. Even in the wording we use, it was the year the Berlin wall fell and the communism end. In the US 1989 is the year “we won” the Cold War. For Europe was the end of the national division, for the US was the victory over communism. If you consider that you are the win-

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ner, that means there are losers, which are the Russians. As long as the Russians were involved in their own business, no problem, but then Putin sought to restore Russia’s role on the world. The Russians have two things: a very well skilled leadership class (in my government experience, the most skilled person I have ever seen is Lavrov. He can negotiate for days and come out as nothing has happened. If Clinton’s eloquence was excellent, Lavrov is another world), which is not the case for Americans. Americans are very good at selling themselves, they are skilled in other ways. Second, the Russians have a strong sense of History, which we share in Europe. I finished a comparative book on foreign policy and the interesting thing is that if you compare European countries, Russia and the US, the founding element of Europeans foreign policy is History. The American sense of history is completely different, and it is by the way a reinterpretation of their own history. We all do it in a certain extent, but the extent Americans reinterpret history is huge. To them, they won every single war. Then you go and see they lost every single war, except for the war of independence. Canada, they lost it; Mexico, they lost it, and so on and so forth. Even from a philosophical point of view, we are in two different worlds. The US was strong at soft diplomacy, a subtle power. The problem is that today the US cut the funds available for soft diplomacy and they don’t have ambassadors, they don’t have assistants Secretaries of State. Trump thinks that the least people there are in administration the more he can do whatever he wants. One and a half years on the presidency over half if not more of the positions have not been covered. There is no Ambassador at the EU. How can the US influence without leaders? The voice of the US is increasingly unheard. Bringing to this Brexit, analysis is showing that people voting for Brexit and for Trump share sociological and economical profiles. The UK was traditionally the US arm in the EU, particularly concerning European foreign policy and European defence. Most of us remember Maastricht, that was supposed to bring economic and political union, and political union was meant to be foreign and defence policy. Then the Iraqi war took place, conveniently when the Europeans were negotiating, 184 _

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British and French were apart, and that was the end of a real defence policy. The UK is not there anymore, and we are seeing developments. PESCO, the Structured Cooperation in Foreign Policy, uses a provision in the treaties that is the possibility of going beyond with a strengthened cooperation among some member states. It brings together all the member states except the UK, Malta and Denmark who was prevented to join because of the opt-out (actually Denmark is discussing whether this opt-out is a good thing because it seems they want to be part of PESCO). PESCO has gone completely unnoticed in the US. In former times, people would have been crying wolf, far and loud. This is gone be a big mistake, because PESCO is genius in the way that is very similar to the single market. The single market also put money on the table and PESCO is doing exactly the same thing, is putting the European Defence Fund, targeting to research and development in defence, they have CARD [coordinated annual review on defence] which will monitor European spending in defence, aiming at making it more efficient. Is European Union putting money on defence research and development to buy American armament? No way. The money is going to be on the table in order to invest on European military equipment. To my astonishment, nobody is really acknowledging that in the US, nobody is worried. That is a big sign that Europe is going on. Admitting that Trump does not bring us all into a big war, which I admit I am partially afraid of, because Europeans do have this conditioned reflex to follow what the Americans say is still there, even with Trump. One example was the poisoning in the UK. My understanding from specialists in the area is that there is no single proof that that was done by the Russians, no actual proof. Why we all rushed behind the US it is very unclear to me. In the US Russia is an obsession, for both sides. The democrats cannot come to terms to the fact that they lost because they had the wrong candidate at the wrong time. Clinton was simply the wrong candidate, she destroyed the Democratic Party. I wished she won but the reality is that she was the wrong candidate. She eliminated Sanders in a very unfair way, she forced Biden out at the beginning of the primary race and in the end, they lost. They blame it on the Russians. If it were true that the Russians influenced the American elections, it would

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be devastating for American democracy. They do not realize the unintended message they are giving is that America democracy is so weak that it can be influenced by the Kremlin. On the other side, because of the elections Trump needs to show that he is tough on Russia. The test whether Europe is going to step up or not is the Iran deal. For months there have been European emissaries going to Washington. Some in an open way - Macron and Merkel, Federica Mogherini - but there were more discrete meetings, especially with Congress. Former leaders who are now trying

to help, they all went to DC, openly or more secretly, to tell the Congress and the White House that the Iran deal is good. I don't exclude Trump would find a way to renew the agreement, with some kind of excuse. But if it doesn't, whether the Europeans will stick to the Iran deal or not will proof the EU is gone step up or not. The core thing in the Iran deal is how do we shield European enterprises in business with Iran in America, since they can be sanctioned. The success of Europe on this will be a good test to see if Europe is going to be a stronger actor in the future, as I think it could and I hope it will.

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DISCUSSANT

Marina Costa Lobo Investigadora Principal do ICS Universidade de Lisboa (ICS-UL)

Senior Research Fellow, ICS, University of Lisbon

e have discussed Europe across these two days, but both speakers focused on different dimensions of the huge challenges that Europe faces today. It is fair to say the EU is facing an existential crisis. It has internal dimensions, the ones Phillipe focused on, and external ones, where Frederica concentrated on. I do agree that, at least from the standpoint of someone living and working in the US, Europe looks much brighter than for most people who are here, and this goes in the direction of what Eduardo Lourenço said previously that you only truly feel European when you are outside Europe. What I would like to highlight on Phillipe’s presentation is this idea that this rise in populism has a deadline and that deadline is the European Parliament election of May 2019. On that day, a big surge on populist parties voting will be a strong shake for Europe. We have some time from now until May 2019. There is a window of opportunity to really address some of the issues underlying the success of these parties at the national level and already at the European Parliament level, where they already have a third of the seats, depending on how you count. As Phillipe was saying, the drivers for the populism in

Europe are, on the one hand, economic interests. There is an economic story to be told in terms of the degradation of the socioeconomic conditions that is felt more or less across Europe, to different degrees but there are also different expectations, and this is driving populism. But it is also a question of identity, which relates to perceptions. Fear of immigrants to a certain or large extent are driven by economic insecurity as well but they do have an element of values that goes beyond economics, that economic prosperity would not be able to solve. There are some fundamental differences in values that have caused this rise in extreme right voting. From the discussion of the last two days, what has emerged, especially from people more concentrate on geopolitics, is that the drivers of this populist surges are not economic problems but rather the disintegration of the world order sustaining European Union. The idea would be that this is all part of the post-Cold War disintegration. The US provided the umbrella under which European states integrated, and this umbrella is being withdrawn, as Federica explained. It would be much more an externally focused driver than what we are seeing now. That would be one issue worth discussing. I would like to introduce here the question of Brexit, because I think it could be a symbol of something to come or is something particular to the UK. Can it symbolize the future of the EU or not? Before Brexit, people thought that it could have

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a contagion effect on other countries. As time goes by, and negotiations between UK and EU becomes more complicated, it is now seen more like a vaccine. Brexit poses very serious issues for the future of the EU. If you think about the future scenarios that have been laid out, you have Juncker’s white paper on the future of the EU and is basically either staying the same, nothing but the single market, gradually reducing what it is being done, or evolve towards multiple speeds -- a core Europe and other countries being integrated in a differentiated way -- and that could be also Brexit. Some would argue that Brexit is the future because you will have differentiated integration. Some countries, like the Netherlands, will not want certain parts of integration and therefore EU will have to evolve in that fashion. Eventually you will not have all the countries together, moving along and you will have differentiation. To what extent is that a plausible scenario? Macron is the only leader who is pushing for doing much more together, which was the fifth option in the Juncker agenda, and he seems to be increasingly isolated. It does not seem he is gathering support among other EU countries. With that in mind, what will be the evolution of the Franco-German relationship? Merkel won the elections but not convincingly and the formation of the coalition was very difficult, weakening her political stance.

We have this window of opportunity until May 2019, but what can we actually negotiate. To be fair to Macron, there is a contradiction between his domestic and European agendas, but the implementation of his domestic agenda it necessary for him to gain credibility vis-a-vis the Germans in order to implement a European pro-integration agenda. If he does not make those reforms at home, he will not have the credibility to get the Germans on board for a European project. Instead of being contradictory, it is a necessity. I don’t know if he will be able to achieve those changes, but it would make him credible. How will Brexit affect EU's foreign policy? The UK played a role of intermediary between the US and the EU and this link somehow is lost. To what extent can France or Germany replace the UK in that role? How can the EU position itself as an ally? Speaking with US officials or people well informed about US foreign policy, they tend to minimize the impact Trump can have. There is a system that works, the US has special structured interests that have not changed. Trump will not be able to change what is a continuum in the interest of the US. In Europe, you see a lot of alarm, perhaps excessive. Finally, on PESCO, yesterday Friedman recall the Kissinger phrase, who do I call to speak to Europe. Still there is no leadership on that front.

Philippe Marlière What was the purpose of Europe when it was founded in 1957. When I was a child at school in France, I was told the French narrative about the EU: it was about peace, and peace with Germany. That is the official rhetoric. There is a more critical take on why Europe. Back in 1957, it was essentially to rebuild Europe economically, a Europe of six nations, to start with, which economies have collapsed after the war. For France was not so much peace, since at the time German was quite a minor partner in Europe, it was for France to really gain some kind of international political clout, which she has lost with the war. That is not exactly the official version. That is why European institutions were built along the lines of the French administration, the thought, the philosophy was very French in the first instance. 188 _

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The sort of disintegration of the world order between the end of World War II up to now reflects negatively on European integration. European integration was to rebuild national economies, it was to pour France a way to regain political clout and international power. But those were the times of the Cold War period, and the EU choose a side, it was on the side of western liberal democracies, pro-US against the so-called communist bloc in the East, against Russia, the USSR (that´s why most of the communist left in Europe was against the EEC). The world order is collapsing because the settings of the Cold War are gone, raising all the political challenges we are facing. Still, something has changed. The EU is there, institutions, policies, ways of doing and thinking. The fact that there are European institutions makes us more European. We travel easily from one

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country to another, there is movement of people, movement of goods, all that has been enhanced by the EU. To put an end to it would be quite difficult. It is possible to imagine the whole EU collapses, but if it does, it would take some time. Brexit is the symptom of something larger to come. Is there a possible contagion effect? Political scientist do not like that kind of questions because it’s really about predicting something very difficult to predict. There are different scenarios. In the middle ground scenario things could unravel a bit, there could be another exit -- I think the UK is going to go, it has gone too far, it is very hard to imagine other option. Other countries? Yes, but as long as the big ones stay, EU will continue. UK was a big one, but it was always a special partner, an awkward partner. We can imagine EU life without the UK. Can we imagine life without either France, Germany, Italy, Spain or Portugal? It is harder because historically people are dedicated to European integration. EU will continue with 27. The time for expansion has probably ended. There might be one, two, or three other countries in, but I believe there will be no further expansion. Turkey will never come in, it is too late, the window of opportunity is gone. Things will stay as they are. Consolidation would be the key thing for Europe. There could be a kind of multi-speed Europe, which is not an entirely new idea. IN the 1980’s Jacques Delors talked about multi-speed, or the theory of concentric circles. There would be a core with fewer countries going ahead, because they want more political

and economic integration, and the rest would be outside, in the periphery. About Macron. The Franco-German axis has not been working well for many years, and some would argue that due to the French presidents. The last president who cared and had a project for Europe was Mitterrand, and he left in 1995. What essentially changed, however was not political personnel. When we launched the EEC in 1957 the French were the major political partner in this relationship. Germany had been defeated (France was also defeated in 1940 but Charles De Gaulle political genius managed to give France a seat at the UN, making people believe that France had actually won the war). After the war and until the 1980's France was in the driving seat. Then Germany become an economic superpower and that started to unbalance the relationship. The EMU project (and that was probably Mitterrand biggest mistake) was essentially good for Germany. Many European economies have been suffering from EMU. The setting of EMU is good for the German economy and that’s why Merkel is not in hurry to change it. Macron can make his nice speeches about further economic integration, fiscal convergence, but Merkel will not listen to him, it is not in Germany's interest. How can this change? A dramatic change of personnel, large-scale economic recession in Germany - Germany is good in macroeconomic terms, but there is a lot of poverty in Germany - strong populist parties on the left and on the far-right, those could be game changers.

Federiga Bindi Starting with transatlantic relations, Americans generally do not understand Europe. The way their leadership is formed is deprived of any understanding of history, and if you do not study history, you cannot understand Europe. Every single time Europe come up with a new idea, be it the single market in the 1980's or the euro in the 1990's Americans always said it was going to fail, essentially because they feared it. With all due respect, what Friedman said is nothing new. Obama took office the same year the Lisbon Treaty was going to be enacted. Obama shipped Phil Gordon, who was Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, on a tour and he

basically asked the European what were we going to do. Are we going to talk directly to the EU or are we going to talk to each one of you? I was in one of these meetings with Frattini who was saying it would take time, but this is where we are eventually heading, you will be talking to Europe. At the same time, officials were saying to Phil Gordon, keep talking to us. At that time, the Americans were ready to talk one-to-one to the EU, but they actually continued to talk to the national diplomacies who asked them to. In foreign policy, like in everything else, human relations count. Ashton and Clinton formed a very strong friendship which lasts to date. Slowly,

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the Secretary of State started to talk directly to the EU and many of the things that were done, including the deal on Serbia-Kosovo agreement or even the Iran deal, were possible because of this cooperation, which sometimes was not even public. It was Ashton who started secretly the negotiations on the Iran deal, at the request of the Americans. This person to person connection was very strong and it continued with Kerry. When Federica Mogherini arrived, the US administration tried his best not to have her named. Kerry is a super skilled person but also a sort of American aristocrat and resisted talking one-to-one. In the Iran deal, Federica said nothing, she was silent, but she did what Kerry told her to do, so she was instrumental in that way. She gained his confidence, so the relationship continued. Now you do not have that. When the Trump administration took service, Federica Mogherini was among the first to rush to DC (even a little bit too fast). That first visit was really very good because she has the ability of being assertive without being aggressive. But Trump is very difficult to be dealt with. Foreign policy is like physics; vacuums are filled, and there is an American vacuum. It is true that there is continuity in the US foreign policy, but

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the damage of a Trump presidency will be greater than we think, and Americans will pay that price. Brexit happened during the previous administration, and Americans panicked. Just like they didn't expect the vote on Trump they didn't expect Brexit. At the time, Kerry talked about a new referendum. Trump, which had Nigel Farage as his advisor, was actually galvanized by it and when May went to see him, and apparently one of his first questions was when the other countries are going to exit. I would say Brexit would be beneficial for European foreign policy. Without the Americans hidden arm, there is no one stopping Europeans anymore. Who is steeping in in all this is Macron, in the De Gaulle tradition. De Gaulle wanted to be the strong actor between the US and Russia. De Gaulle failed, will Macron succeed? It clear depends on who comes in next. Italy here is lacking. Eventually the prime minister will be Draghi, I would say. One way or the other the crisis will drag on until Spring 2019 when Draghi will be free from the ECB and it will be able to become prime-minister. Draghi is the only one who can talk one-to-one to Merkel, at the same level, and Draghi was the one who saved Southern Europe during the crisis.

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Debate

debate abordou questões muito diversificadas que afetam o projeto europeu, incluindo assuntos internos, como o Brexit ou os processos de decisão na União Europeia (UE) , e externos, como a relação com os Estados Unidos, a Rússia e a China. O ditado “the stronger do what they want, the weaker suffer what they have to” ainda é aplicável, pois os Estados Unidos sentem que continuam a ser, em última instância, os garantidores da ordem mundial e que todos esperam pelas suas ações e posições. Nesse sentido, não precisam de ter uma política externa consistente e sofisticada, porque a abordam especificamente caso a caso. No entanto, é preciso ter em conta que a política externa norte-americana, particularmente a que assentou numa política militar, tem sido um desastre em termos de resultados concretos na resolução dos conflitos e na erradicação da pobreza (como se vê pelos casos do Afeganistão, Iraque, Líbia ou Iémen). Estas guerras enriquecem os fornecedores militares norte-americanos, que têm muito poder internamente. As contradições do mundo ocidental nas últimas décadas, e particularmente dos Estados Unidos, estão à vista, promovendo-se externamente a guerra em nome da democracia e dos direitos humanos e assistindo a uma degradação da democracia a nível interno. Os Estados Unidos apoiaram a União Europeia até à administração Kennedy, mas posteriormente a Europa começou a diminuir as importações dos Estados Unidos e a apostar num mercado único, o que os fez mudar de opinião. Até agora, as previsões americanas sobre o processo europeu - que o mercado único não funcionaria, que o euro não funcionaria - não se concretizaram. Atualmente, verifica-se uma maior pressão nas relações, quer com a guerra comercial, quer no setor da defesa e nas relações no seio da NATO.

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No quadro das políticas de defesa, parece pouco provável que a pressão sobre os países europeus para que atinjam 2% dos respetivos PIB em gastos de defesa seja efetivamente concretizada. Contudo, com a PESCO existe uma oportunidade de gastar mais em defesa, mas investindo na Europa. Os fundos irão não para armamento mas sim para investigação e desenvolvimento (I&D) e sabemos que a investigação em defesa muitas vezes tem impacto no setor civil (como é o caso da Internet). Segundo alguns estudos, isto pode significar um aumento de postos de trabalho entre meio e um milhão. A despesa com a defesa está também relacionada com a perceção das ameaças e alguns, desde logo os norte-americanos, insistem na Rússia. No entanto, ao nível europeu, não ficou claro se essa sensação de que a Rússia é uma ameaça militar e de segurança à UE é uma realidade, ou se tudo isto é olhado pelos líderes europeus de vários quadrantes como algo pouco preocupante. Um dos oradores exprimiu a opinião de que a Rússia não é uma ameaça para a UE e que as tensões existentes têm mais a ver com as repercussões das relações russas com os Estados Unidos. A Rússia quer ver o seu papel no mundo reconhecido, o que os EUA não querem, porque se veem como vencedores da guerra fria. Além disso, o alargamento na NATO gerou desconfiança na Rússia, porque foi feita uma promessa de parar o alargamento a Leste mas posteriormente a administração norte-americana de George W. Bush quis alargar à Geórgia e à Ucrânia. Em relação à China, foram referidas as diferenças entre a atuação da UE e a penetração económica da China em África ou na América Latina. A disponibilização de recursos financeiros sem condicionalidades é a maior diferença, a qual tem sido muito importante para aqueles países e regiões, mas parece pouco provável que a União Europeia siga esse caminho. Outra possível diferença é a visão estratégica de longo-prazo, que a China tem muito presente, com base na sua forte identidade histórica. O projeto da Silk Road é um exemplo claro dessa visão, enquanto no caso

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europeu, quando se questionam os responsáveis políticos sobre avanços concretos, apontam-se o Erasmus e o roaming como os maiores exemplos dos progressos europeus. Isto não significa, porém, que estes exemplos não tenham reflexos concretos na vida dos europeus, pois o que era extraordinário para as gerações anteriores passou a ser normal para os estudantes europeus. O projeto político da União Europeia baseia-se na paz, na democracia e na prosperidade e, durante várias décadas, esses objetivos foram atingidos. Nos últimos anos, com a crise económico-financeira e com outros fatores apontados – a relação com os EUA e a Rússia, a turbulência a Sul, o Brexit – verifica-se algum défice de rumo e de sentido no projeto político. Neste contexto, foram expressas perspetivas diversas sobre a força e solidez do projeto europeu e sobre o desempenho das instituições europeias. Por um lado, foi expressa a preocupação de a Europa poder correr o risco de se tornar irrelevante a curto ou médio prazo, com Bruxelas a ter uma atuação que não contraria essa irrelevância mas antes contribui para agravar os problemas. Verifica-se uma tendência para a tecnocracia e a despolitização, nomeadamente em termos da política económica, o que cria problemas para as democracias nacionais dos países da periferia, ou seja, do sul da Europa. Isto é agravado pela resposta à crise económico-financeira, que veio reforçar as divisões entre Estados Membros da UE e ter efeitos muito negativos na Grécia, com impactos também no projeto europeu. Por outro lado, defendeu-se que a atual Comissão Europeia tem feito um bom trabalho em várias áreas, tendo em conta as circunstâncias e a margem de manobra. Na análise do projeto europeu, é preciso não esquecer que o intergovernamentalismo tem ganhado ao caminho do federalismo, e o carácter intergovernamental dos mecanismos de decisão exige que o consenso e a união sejam trabalhados. A Comissão apenas aplica o que os governos nacionais decidem e são os governos que podem construir ou destruir o projeto europeu: é uma questão de vontade

política. Tendo em conta que uns países têm maior peso político, poder e influência do que outros, o intergovernamentalismo é muito desequilibrado no quadro europeu. No fundo, é uma solução de compromisso que por vezes não é muito democrática, na medida em que muito continua a passar pelas vontades do eixo franco-alemão. Os oradores foram questionados sobre a atuação da União Europeia relativamente ao enfraquecimento da democracia em alguns países europeus. Com efeito, existe uma deriva em alguns estados europeus, como a Hungria e a Polónia, relativamente a um conjunto de procedimentos e de evoluções constitucionais que começa a ser preocupante e a pôr em causa aqueles que foram os compromissos assumidos por esses mesmos países quando subscreveram os princípios de Copenhaga. Olhando para aquilo que é o processo decisório e de formação da posição comum europeia, que caminho é possível contra essas derivas? Teremos cada vez mais uma complacência perante este tipo de derivas, mantendo um processo de recomendações e pressões não vinculativas, ou haverá vontade para ter uma posição comum forte? Foi referido que o contexto é diferente do início do século, quando foi aplicado o Art.º 7 do Tratado relativamente à Áustria. E que a questão da unanimidade a nível intergovernamental é uma realidade no contexto europeu, que pode minar todo o processo de resposta às práticas antidemocráticas em países como a Hungria ou a Polónia. No entanto, é preciso ter uma visão mais alargada destes fenómenos e perceber que o populismo é uma ameaça real; mais uma vez, a solução passa pelos Estados Membros perceberem a urgência da situação e terem vontade política para se unirem em torno de objetivos comuns. Em relação ao Brexit, as opiniões dividiram-se, com a maioria dos participantes a expressarem a opinião de que é um processo com efeitos negativos para a Europa e para o Reino Unido, mas outros a referirem que o processo pode ter efeitos benéficos, quer para unir a União Europeia, quer pelo facto de o Reino Unido

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não poder continuar a bloquear todos os progressos no Conselho Europeu. A campanha para o referendo do Brexit foi gerida com grande complacência pelos que defendiam a permanência na União Europeia, enquanto os que defendiam a saída da UE foram mobilizados pela perceção de que a sua situação interna se deve às políticas de Bruxelas. Em boa medida, a campanha foi também liderada por ideólogos de direita ou extrema direita, instrumentalizando questões como as migrações, e que não tinham a mínima ideia de qual seria o processo de saída após a votação. Eles próprios foram surpreendidos pelo resultado do referendo e praticamente desapareceram no processo complexo de negociações que está atualmente em curso. Um aspeto a salientar é o facto de o estado de espírito no Reino Unido – um dos países mais abertos, tolerantes e multiculturais da Europa – se ter alterado com este processo do Brexit, tal como se alterou nos EUA após a eleição de Donald Trump. E os potenciais efeitos disto a médio e longo prazo são difíceis de avaliar. Na França, a ambição de Emmanuel Macron poderá ser fazer à Europa o mesmo que fez em França, ou seja, dinamitar os velhos partidos e expandir um movimento europeu que ganhe eleições e se torne forte no Parlamento Europeu. É isto que está na base das grandes consultas aos cidadãos promovidas por Macron, as quais se tornaram um exercício institucionalizado e de alcance europeu, bem como da procura de aliados em vários países, incluindo partidos ou indivíduos que queiram abandonar os velhos partidos. Os próprios deputados europeus são mobilizáveis para um objetivo deste tipo, na medida em que muitos ocupam os seus lugares no Parlamento Europeu desde 2014 mas, em muitos casos, os seus partidos perderam as eleições nacionais nos seus países. No debate, as perspetivas diferiram quanto às hipóteses de sucesso de Macron neste objetivo de “europeizar a política da União Europeia”. Se um orador considerou que o objetivo de transnacionalização do seu movimento tem poucas hipóteses de sucesso, pois a política ainda tem, em grande medida, uma dimensão predominantemente nacional e partidária, o outro orador afirmou que Macron pode conseguir apelar a algumas franjas dos partidos sociais-democratas (p. ex. em Itália e Espanha) e que, se conseguir constituir uma lista abrangente e alargada a nível europeu (como fez internamente), isso será muito entusiasmante para todos os que seguem a política europeia. Foi também referido, contudo, que Ma194 _

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cron não precisa de europeizar a sua política para ter influência na Europa, embora a sua capacidade de mudança dependa, em grande medida, de convencer Angela Merkel. Em relação às eleições europeias de 2019, a complexidade e o entusiasmo em torno de Macron passa também pela indefinição sobre qual o lugar do seu movimento no Parlamento Europeu: a que grupo parlamentar pertencerão os deputados eleitos? À bancada social-democrata, à bancada liberal, ou outra? Se olharmos para o eleitorado de Macron do ponto de vista sociológico, conclui-se que angariou votos de vários quadrantes - dos eleitores sociais-democratas e socialistas, dos centristas (pulverizou o centro), dos democratas cristãos pró-europeus –, o que veio abanar e confundir a política francesa, obrigando os vários partidos a repensarem a sua organização e posicionamento. Por um lado, há quem olhe para Macron como expressão de um fenómeno novo que vai transformar a clivagem direita-esquerda que ainda domina os parlamentos mas, por outro lado, muitos encaram-no apenas como um social-democrata da terceira via, que defende algumas alterações de política interna, como reformas de flexi-segurança, uma maior desregulação do mercado francês e a aplicação de políticas neoliberais, com uma agenda pró-europeísta. Estas reformas afetam a sua popularidade interna, gerando críticas dos media e resistência na sociedade civil, de tal forma que a sua popularidade parece ser maior fora de França do que dentro do país. Segundo algumas opiniões expressas no debate, existe, assim, uma contradição inerente ao projeto de Macron, entre a sua política interna e a sua política europeia, pois como se pode ambicionar uma resposta aos problemas na Europa – emprego, padrões de vida, serviços públicos – quando simultaneamente, ao nível interno, se destrói o que resta do Estado social na França? Se olharmos para o cenário global, as duas narrativas preponderantes são a elite global neoliberal de terceira via ou os movimentos nacionalistas e populistas, sejam de esquerda ou de direita. Nesse sentido, foi referido que é preciso uma nova narrativa progressista e europeísta, e que esta poderá já estar a aparecer ao nível local, das bases da sociedade. É necessário, portanto, analisar e apoiar algumas mudanças em curso na sociedade, em vez de nos centrarmos apenas na política do topo para a base (top-down).

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Encerramento Closing Luís Amado Presidente do Clube Chairman of the de Lisboa Lisbon Club

uando há seis anos aqui estivemos pela primeira vez com esta iniciativa, tínhamos essencialmente dois objetivos. Um dos objetivos era projetar mais a cidade de Lisboa, como berço do universalismo português, na rede de instituições e do pensamento sobre problemas que afetam atualmente o mundo, num momento particularmente dramático da história da humanidade, tendo em conta a dimensão dos desafios que temos pela frente. O outro era ajudar as pessoas a debater os problemas que nos afetam a todos, atingindo as famílias, as empresas, os Estados, os governos. A dimensão dos problemas que se manifestam hoje nas nossas vidas é ainda mais impressionante do que o cenário aqui traçado nessa primeira Conferência de Lisboa, já então um pouco negro relativamente às dinâmicas disruptivas que nos afetavam, em vários planos da nossa existência. Fazendo um balanço desta conferência, começámos o debate com a questão do poder no mundo e acabámos com a questão do poder na Europa e do seu papel no mundo. A Europa não é um poder irrelevante no mundo, mas nesta crise, e em particular nos últimos anos, revelou uma situação de irrelevância estratégica. Não sendo irrelevante do ponto de vista

económico ou cultural, nem do ponto de vista dos instrumentos de soft power que usa como nenhuma outra formação multilateral no mundo, é patente a sua irrelevância estratégica no momento em que estamos confrontados com o regresso da política das grandes potências. Esta circunstância cria uma dinâmica totalmente diferente no cenário tranquilo com que a Europa exibia majestaticamente pelo mundo o seu soft power e a sua capacidade de criar desenvolvimento, prosperidade e bem-estar, num contexto de paz e diálogo entre Estados. Esse tempo não acabou, porque se acabasse a História teria um fim trágico, mas estamos num período de transição, em que a Europa tem que ganhar tempo, nomeadamente no que respeita à organização do poder no topo da pirâmide mundial. O regresso da política das grandes potências foi, em parte, potenciado pela retração estratégica americana, que começou muito antes de Donald Trump - começou até com George W. Bush antes dos ataques do 11 de setembro. O último presidente verdadeiramente liberal e intervencionista foi Bill Clinton e, desde então, a presidência americana tem vindo sucessivamente a recuar para uma trincheira isolacionista. A retração estratégica americana, em particular com Barack Obama, projetou a afirmação geopolítica de regresso da Rússia à cena mundial e contribuiu igualmente para a relativa mudança do contexto estratégico da China nos últimos anos. É, seguramente, nesse jogo de poder mundial que o lugar da Europa se vai decidir.

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A Europa tornou-se estrategicamente irrelevante porque perdeu o controlo sobre o seu destino, perdeu o controlo sobre a sua capacidade de influenciar os destinos e limites das suas fronteiras, perdeu-se no labirinto da relação com a Rússia, num conflito que tem total incapacidade de gerir sem o apoio americano, e foi incapaz de perceber que por detrás do idealismo da Primavera Árabe existia um abismo no qual se ia precipitar muito do poder e da influência que a Europa poderia gerir na sua relação de vizinhança com o mundo árabe, o Médio Oriente e o espaço mediterrânico. Não podemos ignorar o momento difícil que a Europa conhece e, nesse contexto, precisamos de ganhar tempo e de preservar o nosso ideal europeu numa base muito mais realista do que aquela que animou a política europeia da última década, onde erros sucessivos na gestão da nossa relação com o mundo agudizaram a crise em que estamos atualmente mergulhados. O fenómeno do Brexit, amplamente escrutinado nos debates destas Conferências, terá também consequências nessa pers-

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petiva de reorganização do poder em torno do Estado soberano. A questão da soberania vai ganhar uma dimensão muito mais acutilante na organização da política europeia no futuro, e o grande debate europeu vai necessariamente passar por essa questão. A Europa é hoje intergovernamental e temos que ter a noção de que assim será durante muito tempo. Se, apesar de tudo, esta década for favorável à reorganização europeia continental, sem perder o rastro de relação transatlântica que o Reino Unido lhe imprime, será possível, daqui a uma década, darmos um novo impulso que reforce a utopia europeia naquilo que tem de mais extraordinário. É este o desafio que temos pela frente, é esta a responsabilidade das nossas gerações e, sobretudo, daqueles que desempenham funções públicas ao nível do Estado e das instituições políticas e diplomáticas. É também para este universo que o debate em torno destes temas se tem organizado, ao longo das três edições, e é com essa orientação que gostaríamos de manter o rumo das Conferências de Lisboa para o futuro.

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DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

Fernando Medina Presidente da Câmara Municipal de Lisboa

Mayor of Lisbon

“desenvolvimento em tempos de incerteza” poderá não ser a expressão mais precisa para descrever o tempo em que vivemos. Tempos de incerteza viveram todos os nossos antepassados e todos os nossos descendentes, pois todas são épocas de complexidades e perplexidades. Talvez o que mais marca o sentimento do nosso tempo, a partir do ponto de vista de um europeu lisboeta olhando para a Europa e para o mundo, é um certo sentimento de um tempo de retrocesso. Retrocesso no que foram os valores dominantes da afirmação identitária da Europa e de Portugal nas últimas décadas: os valores da democracia liberal, da paz, da tolerância, do multiculturalismo (ou, mais precisamente, do interculturalismo), do desenvolvimento sustentável. Sentimos que estes valores, que tornaram o espaço europeu num elemento central, estão hoje abalados e em retrocesso, ficando nós na dúvida sobre a sua evolução no futuro. Estas dinâmicas atingem-nos em países tão próximos como a Hungria e a Polónia, ou com fenómenos como o Brexit ou a nova liderança americana na sua parte mais visível. Este quadro que nos aflige tem algumas dimensões particularmente próximas (como a incapacidade europeia, espelhada de forma visível depois da grande crise financeira

que nos assolou) e reflete um retrocesso que nos atemoriza e inquieta, colocando-nos num cenário de pessimismo sobre aspetos centrais da nossa vida e do nosso desenvolvimento. A questão central, do ponto de vista de um agente político, é perceber - com realismo e perante a frieza do diagnóstico - quais são os pontos estratégicos sobre os quais poderemos alicerçar uma mudança de orientação. É evidente que nada faremos, enquanto país, sem uma participação ativa e uma mudança substantiva do papel da Europa. Talvez seja ainda cedo para perceber a evolução das dinâmicas geopolíticas neste âmbito e todos gostaríamos, por exemplo, de sinais mais claros das potências centrais em relação ao seu desenvolvimento. Gostava de dar uma nota de ânimo e entusiasmo, bem como de realismo do ponto de vista dos agentes políticos. Esta conferência versou sobre relações internacionais, onde o Estado e as relações entre Estados são o objeto central da análise. Nesse âmbito, queria chamar a atenção para as cidades. As cidades estão hoje a ganhar uma nova dinâmica, peso e visibilidade que não tinham anteriormente. E creio que o ganham por uma razão: o contraste. Não há grande capital do mundo onde não possamos ver afirmados e refletidos nas linhas políticas dos seus dirigentes os valores opostos àqueles que hoje tememos na ordem internacional. Se olharmos para cidades como Londres, Paris, Madrid, Nova Iorque, Los Angeles, Chicago, Lisboa ou qualquer outra grande cidade do mundo,

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verificamos que todas elas afirmam os valores do interculturalismo, da tolerância, da abertura, da inovação. É onde se congregam os pontos de resistência face aos retrocessos da ordem internacional. Isto tem uma razão de ser. Estas cidades são, no fundo, os pontos de aglutinação das forças da modernidade que as décadas anteriores moldaram. É também nestas cidades que se molda o que é fundamental para a diversidade e interculturalidade, que hoje gerimos e que faz parte do nosso código identitário. Esta força das cidades é uma dinâmica que não tem retrocesso possível. Ela funda-se num processo de urbanização crescente, que vem de décadas passadas e que continuará nas décadas futuras. Atualmente, cerca de 50% da população mundial reside em cidades e as estimativas apontam para 70% em

ção vota pela pertença à União Europeia, e áreas relativamente próximas mas com características sociológicas e demográficas bastante diferentes. Aquilo que aproxima as partes abertas das grandes cidades cosmopolitas é hoje muito mais do que aquilo que aproxima estas grandes cidades das áreas mais fechadas dos próprios Estados-nação onde se localizam. Esta realidade, esta rede e esta identidade partilhada tem vindo a acentuar-se, até como movimento de resistência e de contraponto às tendências de fechamento e de unilateralismo. Refiro, a título de exemplo, a participação que as cidades têm, pela primeira vez, no acordo global de combate às alterações climáticas e o que as cidades estão a fazer na implementação desse acordo, muitas delas à revelia ou contra a vontade dos próprios Estados-nação; ou o que as cidades estão a fazer em matéria de

As grandes cidades afirmam os valores do interculturalismo, da tolerância, da abertura, da inovação. É onde se congregam os pontos de resistência face aos retrocessos da ordem internacional. 2050. Isto significa que os grandes desafios atuais, que constituem os tópicos da agenda destes debates – incluindo a tolerância, a inclusão, o combate às alterações climáticas – vão-se jogar e ganhar ou perder dentro das cidades. Aquilo que a liderança das cidades hoje afirma é um esteio de esperança para sociedades abertas, tolerantes, cosmopolitas e com uma particularidade: estas grandes cidades estão hoje muito mais próximas umas das outras do que dos setores conservadores e fechados dos seus próprios espaços nacionais. Se olharmos, por exemplo, para o resultado do referendo no Reino Unido sobre o Brexit, é clara a disparidade de votação entre uma cidade como Londres, em que cerca de 70% da popula-

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acolhimento de refugiados e de resposta à crise de refugiados no espaço europeu, mesmo em locais onde os governos nacionais e os Estados optaram por práticas de fechamento. Tudo isto dá-nos um novo olhar sobre um elemento que não pode ser dispensado ou descurado no âmbito da geopolítica. Há boas razões para que isto aconteça e vá continuar a acontecer - e não tenho dúvidas que este será um excelente tema a incluir nas próximas Conferências. Quero terminar agradecendo e reafirmando o compromisso da cidade de Lisboa, porque as Conferências de Lisboa são, também elas, uma marca da nossa abertura e da nossa vontade de participarmos, cada vez mais, como agentes dos grandes debates da atualidade.

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

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BIOGRAFIAS SHORT BIOS

Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa

Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa é Presidente da República Portuguesa. Licenciado em Direito pela Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Lisboa e Doutorado em Ciências JurídicoPolíticas em 1985, é Professor Catedrático no Instituto de Ciências Jurídico-Políticas da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Lisboa. Foi Presidente do Partido Social Democrata (1996-99) e VicePresidente do Partido Popular Europeu. Foi Secretário de Estado da Presidência do Conselho de Ministros e Ministro dos Assuntos Parlamentares e membro do Conselho de Estado (2000-2001 e 2006-16). Foi Professor da Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas e da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade Católica Portuguesa, tendo também lecionado nas Universidades Agostinho Neto, Eduardo Mondlane e da Ásia Oriental. Esteve na fundação dos jornais “Expresso” e “Semanário”. Foi membro da comissão que elaborou a primeira Lei de Imprensa e Deputado à Assembleia Constituinte.

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Guilherme d’Oliveira Martins

Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa is the President of the Portuguese Republic. With a Degree in Law from the Faculty of Law of the University of Lisbon and a PhD in Legal and Political Sciences in 1985, he is Full Professor at the Instituto de Ciências Jurídico-Políticas, School of Law of the University of Lisbon. He was President of the SocialDemocratic Party (1996-99) and Vice-President of the European People’s Party. He has been Secretary of State, Minister of Parliamentary Affairs, and a member of the Council of State (2000-2001 and 2006-2016). He has been a Professor at the Faculty of Social and Human Sciences and the Faculty of Law of the Portuguese Catholic University, and he has lectured at Agostinho Neto and Eduardo Mondlane Universities and the University of Eastern Asia. He was a founder of Expresso and Semanário newspapers. He was a member of the committee that drew up the first Press Law, and member of the Constituent Assembly.

Guilherme d’Oliveira Martins é Administrador Executivo da Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian desde novembro de 2015. Preside ao Conselho das Artes do Centro Nacional de Cultura; é Sócio Correspondente da Academia das Ciências de Lisboa; Membro efetivo da Academia de Marinha; Académico de Mérito da Academia Portuguesa da História; Professor Catedrático Convidado da Universidade Lusíada de Lisboa e do Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas da Universidade Técnica de Lisboa. Exerceu as funções de Presidente do Centro Nacional de Cultura (2002 – 2016), do Tribunal de Contas (2005-2015), do Conselho de Prevenção da Corrupção (2008-2015), da EUROSAI – Organização das Instituições Superiores de Controlo das Finanças Públicas da Europa (2011-2014) e do Comité de Contacto dos Presidentes das Instituições Superiores de Controlo da União Europeia (2011-2012) e Auditor Geral da Assembleia da UEO – União Europeia Ocidental (2008-2011). Exerceu os cargos de Ministro da Presidência, das Finanças e da Educação, e foi Deputado à Assembleia da República em várias legislaturas. Foi Vice-Presidente da Comissão Nacional da UNESCO (1988-1994) e Presidente da SEDES – Associação para o Desenvolvimento Económico e Social (1985-1995).

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

Guilherme d’Oliveira Martins is a Trustee of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation since November 2015. He has presided over the Arts Board of the National Centre of Culture; is a Corresponding Member of the Lisbon Academy of Science; a full-time member of the Naval Academy; an Academic of Merit of the Portuguese Academy of History; Guest Tenured Professor at the Lusíada University of Lisbon and ISCSP – the Higher Institute of Social and Political Sciences of the Technical University of Lisbon. He held the positions of the National Centre of Culture (2002-2016), President of the Portuguese Court of Audit (2005-2015), and Council of Corruption Prevention (2008-2015), EUROSAI – European Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (2011-2014) and the Contact Committee of the Presidents of Supreme European Union Audit Institutions (2011-2012); and General Auditor of the Assembly of the Western European Union (2008-2011). He was Minister to the Presidency, of Finance and of Education, and he was Member of the Portuguese Parliament several times. He was Vice-President of the National UNESCO Commission (19881994) and President of SEDES – the Association for Economic and Social Development (19851995).

Francisco Seixas da Costa

Francisco Seixas da Costa é presidente das Conferências de Lisboa. É administrador nãoexecutivo da Jerónimo Martins SGPS e da Mota-Engil Africa NV e consultor da Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian. Foi Embaixador junto da ONU, da OSCE, da UNESCO, no Brasil e em França. Foi secretário de Estado dos Assuntos europeus (1995-2001) e diretor executivo do Centro Norte-Sul do Conselho da Europa (2013-14). Desde 2013 é membro do Conselho Consultivo da Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra e da Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanidades da Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Leciona na Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa e é membro do Conselho Científico da Política Internacional e do Janus. Publicou vários livros e artigos sobre relações internacionais e segurança e é colunista em dois jornais diários. É licenciado em Ciências Sociais e Políticas pela Universidade Técnica de Lisboa.

Francisco Seixas da Costa is the chairman of the Lisbon Conferences. He is a nonexecutive Member of the Board of Jerónimo Martins SGPS and of Mota Engil Africa NV and consultant of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. He was Ambassador at UN, OSCE, UNESCO, Brazil and France. He was Secretary of State for European Affairs (1995-2001) and Executive Director of the North-South Centre (20132014). Since 2013 he is member of the Consultative Council of the School of Economics (University of Coimbra) and of the School of Social Sciences and Humanities (Lisbon Nova University). He lectures at University Autónoma of Lisbon and belongs to the Scientific Council of Política Internacional and of Janus - Journal of International Relations. He authored several books and articles on international relations and security and he is columnist in two daily newspapers. He got a BA on Political and Social Sciences from the Technical University of Lisbon.

George Friedman

George Friedman é um analista de geopolítica e assuntos internacionais reconhecido internacionalmente, fundador e presidente da revista Geopolitical Futures. É um autor best-seller do New York Times e o seu livro mais conhecido - The Next 100 Years – continua a ser famoso pelas suas previsões. É autor, entre outros, de Flashpoints: The Emerging Crisis in Europe, The Next Decade, America’s Secret War, The Future of War e The Intelligence Edge. Foi conselheiro de muitas organizações governamentais e militares, nos Estados Unidos e noutras partes do mundo, e colabora frequentemente com os média como perito em assuntos internacionais, política externa e intelligence. Até 2015, e durante quase 20 anos, foi CEO e depois Presidente da Stratfor, uma empresa que fundou em 1996. George Friedman é formado pela City College em Nova Iorque e tem o doutoramento pela Cornell University.

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

George Friedman is an internationally recognized geopolitical forecaster and strategist on international affairs and the founder and chairman of Geopolitical Futures. Dr. Friedman is a New York Times bestselling author and his most popular book, The Next 100 Years, is kept alive by the prescience of its predictions. Other best-selling books include Flashpoints: The Emerging Crisis in Europe, The Next Decade, America’s Secret War, The Future of War and The Intelligence Edge. Dr. Friedman has briefed numerous military and government organizations in the United States and overseas and appears regularly as an expert on international affairs, foreign policy and intelligence in major media. For almost 20 years before resigning in May 2015, Dr. Friedman was CEO and then chairman of Stratfor, a company he founded in 1996. Friedman received his bachelor’s degree from the City College of the City University of New York and holds a doctorate in government from Cornell University.

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José Félix Ribeiro

José Félix Ribeiro é consultor do Conselho de Administração da Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian e membro do IPRI-UNL Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais. É licenciado em Economia pelo ISCEF em 1971 e doutorado em Relações Internacionais pela Faculdade de Ciências sociais e Humanas da Universidade Nova de Lisboa em 2012. Fez carreira profissional na Administração Pública em órgãos de estudo, prospetiva e planeamento de 1973 a 2012, incluindo o Grupo de Estudos Básicos de Economia Industrial, o Serviço de Estudos e Planeamento da Junta Nacional de Investigação Científica e Tecnológica e o Departamento de Prospetiva e Planeamento onde foi subdiretor-geral de 1995 a 2006 com a responsabilidade das áreas de Informação Internacional e Prospetiva. Realizou numerosos estudos e tem artigos publicados na área de economia internacional, da prospetiva e das estratégias de desenvolvimento.

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Fernando Jorge Cardoso

José Félix Ribeiro is Consultant of the Administration Board of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation and a member of IPRI-UNL, the Portuguese Institute of International Relations. He got a BA in Economics at ISCEF in 1971 and a PhD in International Relations at the School of Social Sciences and Humanities of the Lisbon Nova University in 2012. He worked in several government units of studies, prospective and planning from 1973 to 2012, including the Group of Basic Studies of Industrial Economics, the Service of Studies and Planning of the National Unit of Scientific and Technological Research and the Department of Prospective and Planning where he was Deputy-General Director from 1995 to 2006, being responsible for International Information and Prospective issues. He has conducted several studies and published several articles on international economics, prospective studies and development strategies.

Fernando Jorge Cardoso coordenador da área de estudos estratégicos e do desenvolvimento do Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr. É professor convidado do ISCTEIUL e Diretor Executivo do Clube de Lisboa. É doutor com agregação em economia pelo ISEG, Universidade Técnica de Lisboa. Em Moçambique foi diretor da Faculdade de Economia (1978-1983), assessor do Ministro do Plano (1977-1983) e diretor-geral da açucareira Maragra (1983-1985). Em Portugal tem desenvolvido desde 1991 atividades de ensino, investigação e gestão em diversas instituições universitárias. Foi responsável do programa África do Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais (IEEI) de 1991 a 2012. Participou como consultor na elaboração e avaliação de programas nacionais de ajuda ao desenvolvimento em Angola, Moçambique e Cabo Verde. Foi copresidente do comité organizador das Conferências do Estoril de 2009 a 2011. Tem uma vasta bibliografia publicada sobre temas africanos, do desenvolvimento e das relações internacionais.

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

Fernando Jorge Cardoso is head of strategic and development studies of the Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr. He is also Invited Professor at ISCTE-IUL and Executive Director of the Lisbon Club. He received his PhD and Habilitations from ISEG, Technical University of Lisbon. In Mozambique, he was Dean of the School of Economics of the Eduardo Mondlane University (1978-1983), Assistant to the Minister of Planning (19771983) and CEO of Maragra, a sugar company (1983-1985). In Portugal, he has conducted since 1991 research, education and management activities in several university institutions. He was head of the Africa Programme of the Institute for Strategic and International Studies (1991-2012). He was consultant on the elaboration/ evaluation of aid programmes in Angola, Mozambique and Cape Verde. He was copresident of the Organising Committee of the 2009 and 2011 Estoril Conferences. He has an extensive list of publications on African, Development and International Relations.

Alberto Laplaine Guimarães

Alberto Laplaine Guimarães é Secretário-Geral do Município de Lisboa. É Vice-Presidente da Casa da América Latina, Administrador da Fundação Cidade de Lisboa e Diretor do Grémio Literário. Foi bolseiro do German Marshal Fund, é Auditor de Defesa Nacional e membro da Academia Europeia de Artes e Ciências. No Município de Lisboa foi Diretor do Gabinete de Relações Internacionais, Diretor do Departamento de Apoio à Gestão e Atividade Institucional, Assessor do Presidente da Câmara Municipal de Lisboa e Diretor do Gabinete de Apoio ao Investimento da Câmara Municipal de Lisboa. Foi Adjunto do Gabinete do Presidente da República (1996-2001), Diretor do Gabinete de Consulta Jurídica do Ministério da Justiça, Secretário Geral Adjunto da Organização Mundial de Cidades – CGLU (2010-11) e Secretário do Conselho de Estado (1996-2006). É Licenciado em Direito pela Universidade de Lisboa e lecionou em diversas universidades.

Alberto Laplaine Guimarães is the General-Secretary of the Lisbon Municipality. He is VicePresident of the Casa da América Latina, Administrator of the Foundation Cidade de Lisboa and Director of Grémio Literário. He had scholarship from the German Marshal Fund and is a member of the European Academy of Arts and Sciences. In the Lisbon Municipality he was Director for International Relations, Director of the Department of Support and Institutional Activity, Advisor to the Mayor of Lisbon and Director of the Office for Investment Promotion. He was Deputy Office of the President of the Republic (1996-2001), Director of the Legal Advice Office of the Ministry of Justice, Deputy General Secretary of the World Cities Organization - UCLG (2010-11) and Secretary of the Council of State (1996-2006). He holds an MA on Law by the Lisbon University and lectured in several universities.

Mary Kaldor

Mary Kaldor é Professora e Diretora da Unidade de Investigação sobre Conflitos e Sociedade Civil no Departamento de Desenvolvimento Internacional da LSE. Foi membro fundador do European Nuclear Disarmament (END), Copresidente da Helsinki Citizen's Assembly e membro da Comissão Internacional Independente para investigação da crise no Kosovo. Introduziu o conceito de “novas guerras” e de “sociedade civil global”, e o seu trabalho sobre segurança humana influenciou diretamente a política nacional e europeia. O seu mais recente livro, International Law and New Wars, em coautoria com Christine Chinkin, foi publicado em maio de 2017. É também coordenadora da publicação Global Civil Society Yearbook. A convite de Javier Solana, foi responsável pelo grupo de estudo sobre as Capacidades Europeias de Segurança. Em 2015, recebeu o Ludvig Quidde Award pelo seu contributo académico na área da paz. Em 2003, foi distinguida com o grau de Commander of the British Empire (CBE) pelos “serviços prestados à democracia e governação global”.

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

Mary Kaldor is a Professor and Director of the Conflict and Civil Society Research Unit in the LSE Department of International Development. She was a founding member of European Nuclear Disarmament (END), Co-Chair of the Helsinki Citizen's Assembly and member of the International Independent Commission to investigate the Kosovo Crisis. Professor Kaldor pioneered the concept of new wars and global civil society and her work on human security has directly influenced European and national politics. Her most recent book International Law and New Wars, co-authored with Prof. Christine Chinkin, was published in May 2017. She is also the editor of the annual Global Civil Society Yearbook. At the request of Javier Solana, she was Convener for the Study Group on European Security Capabilities. She has been awarded Honorary Professorships at the University of Sussex and Corvinus University, and holds the 2015 Ludvig Quidde Award for academic achievement in the field of peace. In 2003, she was distinguished as Commander of the British Empire (CBE) for 'services to democracy and global governance'.

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Ivan Timofeev

Ivan Timofeev é Diretor de Programas no Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) e Diretor do Valdai Discussion Club. No RIAC, tem trabalhado com dplomatas, funcionários do Estado, peritos, empresários e líderes de ONG sobre a diplomacia e a política externa russa. Desde 2015, é também responsável pelo programa sobre a Segurança Euro-Atlântica no Valdai Discussion Club. Anteriormente, foi Diretor do Analytical Monitoring Centre e Professor convidado da Universidade MGIMO (2009–2011), onde obteve o grau de Doutor em Ciência Política (2006). É autor e coautor de mais de 70 publicações e é membro do conselho editorial da Comparative Politics. Em 2013, foi nomeado Professor da Academia de Ciências Militares.

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Ana Santos Pinto

Ivan Timofeev is Director of Programmes at the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club. His personal background at RIAC includes working with Russian and foreign diplomats, governmental officials, experts, businessmen and NGO-leaders regarding Russia’s foreign policy and public diplomacy. Since 2015 he also heads Euro-Atlantic Security programme at the Valdai Discussion Club. Before joining RIAC, he was the Head of Analytical Monitoring Centre and Associate Professor at MGIMO University (2009–2011). He was awarded a doctoral degree in Political Science at MGIMO (2006). Ivan Timofeev is an author and co-author of more than 70 publications, issued in Russian and foreign academic press. He is a member of editorial board at the Comparative Politics. He was elected as a Professor of the Academy for Military Science (2013).

Ana Santos Pinto é Professora Auxiliar no Departamento de Estudos Políticos da Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Investigadora do Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais (IPRI-NOVA) e Investigadora no Instituto da Defesa Nacional. Anteriormente, trabalhou como consultora na iniciativa das Nações Unidas Aliança de Civilizações (20082010), Assessora do Ministro da Defesa Nacional (2006-2009) e Assistente de investigação no Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais – IEEI, em Lisboa (2001-2003). Tem o doutoramento em Relações Internacionais e desenvolve a sua pesquisa sobre identidade na Política Internacional e Assuntos de Segurança, particularmente no que respeita à União Europeia, Médio Oriente e Norte de África. É autora de várias publicações académicas sobre a Política de Segurança e Defesa da UE e a Geopolítica MENA, e colabora com vários órgãos de comunicação em Portugal.

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

Ana Santos Pinto is Assistant Professor of the Department of Political Studies – NOVA University of Lisbon, Research Fellow at the Portuguese Institute of International Relations (IPRI-NOVA) and Research Fellow in the National Defense Institute (Portugal). Previously, she worked as Research Consultant to the UN Alliance of Civilizations (20082010), Advisor of the Ministry of National Defense of Portugal (2006-2009) and Research Assistant at the Portuguese Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Lisbon (2001-2003). She holds a PhD on International Relations and develops her research on identity in International Politics and Security issues, mainly regarding European Union, Middle East and North Africa. She authored various academic publications on EU Security and Defense Policy and MENA Geopolitics and collaborates extensively with Portuguese media.

Vitor Ramalho

Vítor Ramalho é secretário-geral da UCCLA – União das Cidades Capitais de Língua Portuguesa desde abril de 2013. É licenciado em direito pela Universidade de Lisboa e no seu trajeto profissional desempenhou vários cargos e funções, entre os quais Secretário de Estado do Trabalho (1984-85), consultor da Casa Civil do Presidente da Republica (1986-1996), consultor do Gabinete do Primeiro Ministro (1996-97), Secretário de Estado Adjunto da Economia (1997-2000), deputado (2000-08), presidente da Fundação INATEL (2009-12), vice-presidente da Cruz Vermelha Portuguesa, professor convidado da Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa e membro do Conselho Economico e Social. Publicou Questões do Direito e do Trabalho, As Convenções e recomendações da O.I.T. ratificadas por Portugal, A memória do futuro, A Dança do Fogo, Identidade e Globalização, As partes e a reforma do Código de Trabalho.

Montek Ahluwalia

Vítor Ramalho is SecretaryGeneral of UCCLA – Lusophone Countries’ Capitals Union, since April 2013. He has a BA in Law from the University of Lisboan. On his professional carrier he was Secretary of State of Labor (1984-1985), consultant of the Staff House of the President of Republic (1986-1996), consultant of the Cabinet of the Prime-Minister (1996-1997), Deputy Secretary of State of Economy (1997-2000), Member of the Parliament (2000- 2008), President of the INATEL Foundation (2009-2012), Vice-President of the Portuguese Red Cross, Invitee Professor of the Autónoma University of Lisbon and Member of the Economic and Social Council. He authored Questões do Direito e do Trabalho, As Convenções e recomendações da O.I.T. ratificadas por Portugal, A memória do futuro, A Dança do Fogo, Identidade e Globalização, As partes e a reforma do Código de Trabalho.

Montek Singh Ahluwalia é um economista indiano que foi Vice-Presidente da Comissão de Planeamento da República da Índia entre 2004 e 2014. Obteve a licenciatura e pósgraduação na Universidade de Oxford, onde lhe foi atribuída a Rhodes Scholarship. Iniciou a sua carreira no Banco Mundial, em 1968, e desde 1979 tem ocupado diversas posições na administração pública na Índia: Secretário das Finanças, Departamento dos Assuntos Económicos; Secretário do Comércio; Secretário Especial do Primeiro Ministro; Assessor de Economia no Ministério das Finanças; e Membro do Conselho Económico Consultivo junto do Primeiro Ministro. Foi igualmente o primeiro Diretor do Independent Evaluation Office, no Fundo Monetário Internacional. Tem publicado diversos artigos sobre economia, em revistas e livros internacionais.

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

Montek Singh Ahluwalia is an Indian economist and civil servant who was the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission of the Republic of India between 2004 and 2014. He studied for his Masters and M. Phil degrees at the Oxford University, where he was a Rhodes Scholar. He began his career as an Economist with the World Bank, Washington DC in 1968. Since 1979, in India, he has held numerous prestigious positions, namely: Finance Secretary, Ministry of Finance; Secretary, Department of Economic Affairs; Commerce Secretary; Special Secretary to the Prime Minister; Economic Advisor, Ministry of Finance; and Member of the Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister. He has also served as the first Director of the Independent Evaluation Office, International Monetary Fund (2001-03). He has published several articles on various aspects of economics, in prominent international journals and books.

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Daniel Hamilton

Daniel Hamilton é o Fundador e Diretor do Center for Transatlantic Relations na Universidade Johns Hopkins. Durante quinze anos, foi Diretor Executivo do American Consortium for EU Studies, designado pela Comissão Europeia como o Centro de Excelência da UE em Washington D.C. É Diretor da Atlantic Basin Initiative. Ocupou vários cargos de topo no Departamento de Estado dos EUA, lecionou em diversas universidades e foi membro dos conselhos consultivos de instituições de renome, na Alemanha e noutros países europeus. É autor de mais de 100 livros e artigos sobre a atualidade internacional, europeia e transatlântica. Entre as publicações mais recentes estão Domestic Determinants of Foreign Policy in the European Union and the United States (2018); The Transatlantic Digital Economy (2017); The Russia File: Russia and the West in an Unordered World (2017); Eastern Voices: Europe’s East Face an Unsettled West (2017). É doutorado pela Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

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Raquel Vaz-Pinto

Daniel Hamilton is the Founding Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University. For fifteen years he also served as Executive Director of the American Consortium for EU Studies, designated by the European Commission as the EU Center of Excellence Washington, DC. He is the Director of the Atlantic Basin Initiative. He has held a variety of senior positions in the U.S. Department of State, taught graduate courses in several universities and has been a Member of the Advisory Boards for renowned institutions, in Germany and abroad. He has authored over 100 books and articles on contemporary European, transatlantic and international affairs. Most recent publications include Domestic Determinants of Foreign Policy in the European Union and the United States (2018); The Transatlantic Digital Economy (2017); The Russia File: Russia and the West in an Unordered World (2017); Eastern Voices: Europe’s East Face an Unsettled West (2017). He has a Ph.D. and M.A. with distinction from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Raquel Vaz-Pinto é Investigadora do Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais da Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Foi Presidente da Associação Portuguesa de Ciência Política de 2012 a 2016. Os seus artigos têm sido publicados no Brazilian Journal of International Politics e The American Interest online, entre outros. É autora de «A Grande Muralha e o Legado de Tiananmen, a China e os Direitos Humanos» (Tinta-da-china, 2010), «Os Portugueses e o Mundo» (Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos, 2014) e editou em 2016 pela Tinta-dachina «Administração Hillary» (com Bernardo Pires de Lima). Os seus interesses de investigação são política externa e estratégia chinesa; grande estratégia EUA e a Ásia-Pacífico; religião em relações internacionais; os portugueses e o mundo; o futebol e as relações internacionais. Atualmente, leciona a disciplina de Estudos Asiáticos na Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas da Universidade Nova de Lisboa.

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

Raquel Vaz-Pinto is Researcher of the Portuguese Institute of International Relations of Nova University of Lisbon. She was President of the Portuguese Political Science Association from 2012 to 2016. Her articles have been published, amongst others, in the Brazilian Journal of International Politics and The American Interest online. She is the author of «A Grande Muralha e o Legado de Tiananmen, a China e os Direitos Humanos» [The Great Wall and the Legacy of Tiananmen, China and Human Rights] (Tinta-da-china, 2010), «Os Portugueses e o Mundo» [The Portuguese and the World] (Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos, 2014) and published in 2016 by Tinta-dachina «Administração Hillary» (together with Bernardo Pires de Lima). Her research interests are Chinese foreign policy and strategy; US Grand Strategy and the Asia-Pacific; Religion in International Relations; the Portuguese and the World; and Football and International Relations. Currently, she teaches the course on Asian Studies at the Social and Human Sciences Faculty of the Nova Lisbon University.

António Rebelo de Sousa

António Rebelo de Sousa é presidente do Conselho de Administração da SOFID, Sociedade para o Financiamento do Desenvolvimento. É licenciado em Economia pelo ISEG da Universidade de Lisboa e Doutorado em Economia pela Universidade Lusíada de Lisboa. É Professor Associado com Agregação do Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas, ISCSP-UL, e da Universidade Lusíada de Lisboa. É Presidente do Instituto Benjamim Franklin e vice-presidente do OSCOT – Observatório de Segurança, Criminalidade e Organizações Terroristas. Foi assessor (1995-1999) e consultor do Ministro das Finanças (20012002). Foi membro do Grupo de Parlamentares da EFTA (1977-78 e 1983-1985) e deputado à Assembleia da República (1976-80 e 1983-1985). É autor, entre outras obras, de: O Sistema de Cooperação Português no Quadro da Economia Internacional(2016); Desafio Português (2013); De Um Novo Conceito de Desenvolvimento, no Quadro da Economia Internacional (2008).

Antonio Rebelo de Sousa is Chairman of the Board of SOFID. He got a BA in Economics from ISEG, University of Lisbon and a PhD and Habilitations in Economics from the Lusíada University of Lisbon. He is Associate Professor at the Higher Institute of Social and Political Sciences of University of Lisbon and at Lusíada University of Lisbon. He is President of the Benjamim Franklin Institute and Vice-President of the Observatory of Security, Criminality and Terrorist Organizations. He was Advisor (1995-1999) and Consultant of the Minister of Finances (20012002). He was Member of the Parliamentary Group of EFTA (1977-1978 and 1983-1985) and Member of Parliament (1976-1980 and 1983-1985). He authored, among other titles: O Sistema de Cooperação Português no Quadro da Economia Internacional (2016); Desafio Português (2013); De Um Novo Conceito de Desenvolvimento, no Quadro da Economia Internacional (2008).

Kitty van der Heijden

Kitty van der Heijden é Diretora para Europa e África no World Resources Institute. Formada em Economia (Erasmus University Rotterdam), foi Embaixadora para o Desenvolvimento Sustentável e Diretora do Departamento para o Clima, Energia, Ambiente e Água no Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros da Holanda. Liderou a delegação holandesa à Cimeira do Rio+20 e foi nomeada representante da Holanda no Grupo de Trabalho Aberto sobre os Objetivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável. Desempenhou funções nas Nações Unidas em Hanói, Vietname, onde geriu o exercício piloto “One UN”. Em 2013, foi eleita 3ª melhor funcionária pública na Holanda e foi-lhe atribuído o Ribbon of Honor pelos seus esforços para a sensibilização da opinião pública sobre um rumo de desenvolvimento sustentável. Em 2014, foi eleita Influencer of the Year e nomeada como a 20ª pessoa mais influente na Holanda no domínio da sustentabilidade.

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

Kitty van der Heijden is the Director of World Resources Institute’s Europe and Africa Offices. An economist by training (Erasmus University Rotterdam), she was the Ambassador for Sustainable Development and Director of the Department for Climate, Energy, Environment and Water in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. She led the Netherlands delegation to the Rio+20 summit and was appointed the Netherlands representative on the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals. She was appointed to the UN in Hanoi, Vietnam, where she managed the ‘One UN’ pilot. In 2013, she was elected the 3rd best civil servant of the Netherlands, and was awarded a national Ribbon of Honor for her efforts to raise public awareness on a sustainable development pathway. In 2014, she was elected as “Influencer of the Year” among civil servants and listed as 20th in the top 100 most influential people in the Netherlands dealing with sustainability.

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Victor Alcobia

Victor Alcobia é Diretor de Projetos e Engenheiro de Petróleos, colaborando com a Beicip-Franlab como consultor sénior desde 2002. Tem vasta experiência em engenharia do petróleo, nomeadamente na avaliação de campos petrolíferos, de gás e condensado, desde o Mar do Norte a Angola, México, Rússia, Venezuela, Extremo Oriente e Médio Oriente. Iniciou a sua carreira como professor de Engenharia de Minas na Universidade de Luanda. Trabalhou também para a Elf Aquitane em Angola e França (1983-90), para a Scientific Software Intercomp no Reino Unido (1990-95), para a Parexpro e a CGG (Companhia de Geologia e Geofísica Portuguesa) em Lisboa (1995-2002). Victor Alcobia é licenciado em Mineração (Angola, 1976) e em Engenharia de Petróleo (França, 1984), com mestrado na mesma área (França, 1989). É membro da SPE, da SPEE e da Ordem Portuguesa dos Engenheiros.

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António Costa Silva

Victor Alcobia is a Project Director & Senior Petroleum Engineer; he joined Beicip-Franlab as Senior Consultant in 2002. He gained a broad expertise in petroleum engineering since graduation in 1976 and benefits from a strong experience of assessing a wide variety of oil, gas and condensate fields, from those of the North Sea to those of Angola, Mexico, Russia, Venezuela, Far East and Middle East. He started his career as a professor of Mining Engineer at the University of Luanda. He also worked for Elf Aquitane in Angola and France (1983-90), for Scientific Software Intercomp in the UK (1990-95), Parexpro and CGG (Companhia de Geologia e Geofísica Portuguesa) in Lisbon (1995-2002). Victor Alcobia holds two MSc degrees, one in Mining (Angola, 1976) and another in Petroleum Engineering (France, 1984), and one MBA (France, 1989). He is a member of the SPE, the SPEE and the Portuguese Order of Engineers.

António Costa Silva é Presidente da Comissão Executiva do Grupo PARTEX Oil and Gas e Professor com agregação no Instituto Superior Técnico (IST) da Universidade de Lisboa. É licenciado em Engenharia de Minas (IST), Mestre em Engenharia de Petróleos (Imperial College, Universidade de Londres) e fez o Doutoramento no IST e no Imperial College. Em 1980 iniciou a sua atividade profissional na Sonangol, em Angola. Exerceu a sua atividade na Companhia Portuguesa de Serviços (1984-1997) e foi Diretor Executivo da Multinacional Francesa Compagnie Générale de Geophysique (1998-2001). Em 2002 foi selecionado pelo Tribunal Internacional da Câmara de Comércio de Estocolmo como perito internacional para resolver a disputa jurídica e técnica entre duas das maiores companhias de petróleo do mundo, num campo ao largo do Mar da China. De 2001 a 2003, foi Diretor de Engenharia de Reservatórios e Diretor de Operações no ramo empresarial do Instituto Francês do Petróleo, em Paris.

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

António Costa Silva is the CEO of Partex Oil & Gas and Professor at IST, University of Lisbon. He got a BA in Mining Engineering from IST-UL, a MA in Oil Engineering from the Imperial College and a PhD from the Imperial College and from the IST-UL. He initiated his professional carrier at Sonangol in Angola in 1980. He worked at the Companhia Portuguesa de Serviços (1984-1997) and was executive director of the French multinational Compagnie Générale de Geophysique (1998-2001). In 2002 he was appointed by the International Court of the Chamber of Commerce of Stockholm as international expert to solve the dispute between two major oil companies at a Sea of China field. From 2001 to 2003 he worked at the French Oil Institute in Paris, on its corporation branch, as Director of Reservoir Engineering and Director of Operations.

Clara Carvalho

Clara Carvalho é presidente da AEGIS - Africa-Europe Group for Interdisciplinary Studies. Foi diretora do Centro de Estudos Africanos / Centro de Estudos Internacionais do ISCTE-IUL (2007-2016). É professora no Departamento de Antropologia do ISCTE-IUL, foi professora convidada nas Universidades de Brown (EUA, 2004) e Lille (França, 2002 e 2003) e ministrou cursos nos seminários metodológicos promovidos pela CODESRIA em vários países africanos, nas Universidades de Rovira i Virgil, Espanha, e Mainz, Alemanha. Os seus interesses de investigação são os Estudos Africanos, com enfoque na saúde, educação e género. Desenvolve investigação na Guiné-Bissau desde 1992, onde trabalhou questões coo o poder local, a iconografia colonial e a antropologia médica. É editora da revista Cadernos de Estudos Africanos e é doutorada em Antropologia pelo ISCTE (1999).

Clara Carvalho is the president of AEGIS - Africa-Europe Group for Interdisciplinary Studies and former director of the Centre of African Studies/ Centre of International Studies at ISCTE-IUL (2007-2016). She is a professor at the Department of Anthropology, ISCTE-IUL, and has been Visiting Professor at the universities of Brown (USA, 2004) and Lille (France, 2002 and 2003), and gave short courses at the graduate methodological seminars promoted by CODESRIA in several African countries, and at the Universities of Rovira i Virgil, Spain, and Mainz, Germany. Her research interests are African Studies, focusing in health, education and gender. Her main research has been in GuineaBissau where she works since 1992 on several issues including local power, colonial iconography and medical anthropology. She is the editor of the journal Cadernos de Estudos Africanos and got a PhD on Anthropology, ISCTE, 1999.

Alfredo Valladão

Alfredo Valladão é Professor na Paris School of International Affairs (PSIA), Sciences Po, em Paris. É Investigador sénior do OCP Policy Center (Rabat) e Presidente do Conselho Consultivo da Associação UE-Brasil (Bruxelas). É membro do Conselho Consultivo Internacional do Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (CEBRI, Rio de Janeiro), membro do Comité Rencontres Internationales de Genebra e Diretor para a América Latina no Centre d’Etudes Sociales, Economiques et Managériales (CESEM - HEM Rabat). Foi anteriormente membro do Conselho de Administradores da UNITAR (2009-2015), Diretor para o Mercosul na Sciences Po (1999-2010) e Coordenador do Grupo de Trabalho sobre as negociações UE-Mercosul. Tem vasta obra publicada sobre geopolítica, economia global, integração regional e negociações comerciais, o Brasil e a América Latina. Tem o doutoramento summa cum laude em Ciência Política pela Sciences Po, Paris.

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

Alfredo Valladão is a Professor at the Paris School of International Affairs (PSIA) of Sciences Po Paris. Senior Research Fellow of OCP Policy Center (Rabat) and President of the Advisory Board of EU-Brasil association (Brussels). He is member of the International Advisory Board CEBRI (Brazilian Center for International Relations – Rio de Janeiro), member of the Committee of Rencontres Internationales de Genève, and Director Latin America Research Chair at the Centre d’Etudes Sociales, Economiques et Managériales (CESEM - HEM Rabat). Former member of the Board of Trustees of UNITAR (2009-2015) and Former Director (1999-2010) of the Mercosur Chair of Sciences Po and Coordinator of the Working Group on EU-Mercosur Negotiations. Professor Valladão has published extensively on geopolitics, global economics, regional integration and trade negotiations, Brazil and Latin America. He holds a PhD summa cum laude in Political Sciences from Sciences Po Paris.

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Wang Yiwei

Wang Yiwei é professor da Faculdade de Estudos Internacionais, diretor do Instituto de Assuntos Internacionais e diretor do Centro de Estudos Europeus na Universidade de Renmin da China. É também diretor da China-Europe Academic Network (CEAN) e investigador sénior do Charhar Institute. Anteriormente, foi professor honorário da Universidade de Tongji (2011-2012), diplomata da missão da China junto da União Europeia (2008-2011) e professor do Center for American Studies na Fudan University (2001-2008), Professor convidado da Universidade de Yonsei (2005) e investigador da Universidade de Yale (20002001). Publicou mais de 170 artigos académicos na Social Sciences da China, The Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, entre outros; e 15 livros, incluindo o recente One Belt and One Road: Opportunities and Challenges, e Haishang: Revelations of European Civilization.

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Bruno Cardoso Reis

Wang Yiwei is professor of the School of International Studies, director of the Institute of International Affairs and director of the Center for EU Studies at Renmin University of China. He is also director of the China-Europe Academic Network (CEAN) and senior research fellow of the Charhar Institute. He was formerly distinguished professor of Tongji University (2011-2012), diplomat at the Chinese Mission to the European Union (20082011) and professor of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University (2001-2008), Korea Foundation Distinguished Visiting Professor of Yonsei University (2005) and Fox Fellow of Yale University (2000-2001). He has published more than 170 academic articles in Social Sciences in China, The Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, amongst others; 15 books including the recent One Belt and One Road: Opportunities and Challenges, and Haishang: Revelations of European Civilization.

Bruno Cardoso Reis é Professor Auxiliar do ISCTE-IUL, membro do seu Centro de Estudos Internacionais (CEI-IUL) e Investigador Associado do The King’s College. É licenciado em História pela Universidade de Lisboa, Mestre em Historical Studies pela Universidade de Cambridge e Doutorado em War Studies pelo The King’s College. Leciona igualmente na Universidade Nova de Lisboa e colabora com o CEHR da Universidade Católica. É membro da Associação de Estudos Internacionais, da British International Studies Association e do London Institute for International and Strategic Studies. Tem uma lista de publicações extensa sobre temas de história e relações internacionais; o seu livro Salazar e o Vaticano (Lisboa: ICS, 2007) recebeu o Prémio do Livro Vítor de Sá e Aristides de Sousa Mendes. Os seus atuais campos de interesse incluem a História e teoria das relações internacionais, colonialismo e descolonização, estratégia e conflitos nãoconvencionais, política externa e de defesa, religiões e segurança internacional.

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

Bruno Cardoso Reis is Assistant Professor at ISCTE-IUL, member of its Center for International Studies (CEI-IUL) and associate Researcher at the King’s College. He got a BA in History from the University of Lisbon, a MA in Historical Studies from the University of Cambridge and a PhD in War Studies from the King’s College. He also lectures at the Nova Lisbon University and collaborates with the CEHR of the Catholic University. He belongs to the International Studies Association, the British International Studies Association and the London Institute for International and Strategic Studies. He published extensively on history and international relations; his work Salazar e o Vaticano (Lisbon: ICS, 2007) received the Book Prizes Vítor de Sá and Aristides de Sousa Mendes. His current fields of interest include history and theory of international relations, colonialism and decolonization, strategy and non-conventional conflicts, foreign and defense policy, religions and international security.

Paulo Telles de Freitas

Paulo Telles de Freitas é presidente do Conselho de Administração do Instituto Marquês de Valle Flor. Licenciado em medicina e especialista em medicina interna pela Universidade de Lisboa. Diplomado em medicina intensiva pela Sociedade Europeia de Cuidados Intensivos. É diretor da Unidade de cuidados intensivos polivalentes do Hospital Fernando Fonseca desde 1996. Foi professor convidado da Manchester Metropolitan University. Tem a Menção Honrosa do Prémio Qualidade 2006 e o Prémio Qualidade 2007 da Fundação Amélia da Silva Mello, a Menção Honrosa do Prémio Bial de Medicina 2008, e Louvor do Ministério da Saúde de Portugal (2009). Tem a Ordem de Mérito da Saúde (2009) do Governo de Minas Gerais, a medalha de Mérito em Saúde (2013) do Ministério da Saúde português e foi agraciado pelo Governo de São Tomé e Príncipe (2013).

Paulo Telles de Freitas is Chairman of the Institute Marquês de Valle Flor. He got a MSc in medicine and a specialization in intensive care from the University of Lisbon and a Diploma in intensive care from the European Society of Intensive Care. He is director of the Intensive Care Unit of the Fernando Fonseca Hospital. He was Invitee Professor of the Manchester Metropolitan University. He has the 2006 Honourable Deeds and the 2007 Prize Quality of the Amélia da Silva Mello Foundation, the 2008 Honourable Deeds Bial Prize of Medicine, the 2009 Praise of the Ministry of Health, the 2009 Health Order of Merit of the Govern of Minas Gerais, the 2013 Health Medal of Merit of the Portuguese Health Ministry and a Recognition of the S. Tome and Príncipe Government (2013).

Philippe Marlière

Philippe Marlière é Professor de Política Francesa e Europeia na University College of London. Antes da UCL, foi investigador no Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS, 1989-93) e no Instituto Universitário Europeu, em Florença (1991-94), onde se doutorou em Ciências Sociais e Políticas (2000). Completou a sua licenciatura em Direito e a pós-graduação em Política e Ciência Política na Universidade de Lille, França. A sua investigação tem abordado a política francesa e os partidos políticos, as ideologias políticas, a sociologia e teoria social, a cidadania e a religião, e as relações entre a França e a União Europeia. Em 2007, foi-lhe atribuído o Marcel Liebman Chair em Ciência Política pela Universidade Livre de Bruxelas.

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

Philippe Marlière is Professor in French and European Politics in the University College of London. Before coming to UCL, he was a Research Fellow at the French Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS, 1989-93) and at the European University Institute (Florence, 1991-94), where he was awarded a PhD in Social and Political Science (2000). Philippe completed his MA degree in Law and an MPhil in Politics and Political Science at the University of Lille in France. His research interests are French politics and political parties; political ideologies; French sociology and social theory; citizenship and religion; France and the European Union. He was also awarded the Marcel Liebman Chair in Political Science by the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) in 2007.

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Federiga Bindi

Federiga Bindi é Investigadora no Center for Transatlantic Relations na SAIS Johns Hopkins, Washington DC, e Professora de Ciência Política na University of Rome Tor Vergata. Lidera a Foreign Policy Initiative e o programa Women Leadership in International Relations no Institute for Women Policy Research, em Washington DC. Anteriormente, foi investigadora convidada da Brookings Institution (2008-2010) e investigadora no Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI), na Universidade Livre de Bruxelas, no Instituto de Estudos Europeus (Bruxelas), no Instituto Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa, na Universidade Católica de Lisboa e no Science Po (IEP), Paris. Tem uma vasta experiência em funções públicas, no plano nacional e internacional. É doutorada em Ciência Política pelo Instituto Universitário Europeu, Florença. É coautora de The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe’s Role in the World, 2012; The Frontiers of Europe: A Transatlantic Problem?, 2011; e Analyzing European Union Politics, 2012.

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Marina Costa Lobo

Federiga Bindi is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at SAIS Johns Hopkins, in Washington DC, and Jean Monnet Chair and Professor of Political Science at the University of Rome Tor Vergata. She also leads the Foreign Policy Initiative and the Women Leadership in International Relations program at the Institute for Women Policy Research in Washington DC. Prior to that, she was Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) (2008-2010), and researcher at the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI), the Université Libre de Bruxelles, Institut d'Etudes Européens (Bruxelles), the Instituto Ciências Sociais of the University of Lisbon, the Universidade Católica and at Sc.Po. (IEP), Paris. She has an extensive experience in government, both at the national and international levels. Prof. Bindi holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the European University Institute, Florence. She co-authored The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe’s Role in the World, 2012; The Frontiers of Europe: A Transatlantic Problem?, 2011; and Analyzing European Union Politics, 2012.

Marina Costa Lobo é Investigadora Principal com agregação pelo Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa e membro da Direção do IPP-Instituto de Políticas Públicas. É também coordenadora do Observatório da Qualidade da Democracia no ICS-UL e vice-Presidente do Clube de Lisboa. Os seus interesses de investigação incidem sobre comportamento eleitoral e instituições políticas em Portugal e na Europa numa perspetiva comparativa. Desde 2001, foi codiretora do projeto Comportamento Eleitoral e Atitudes Políticas dos Portugueses. Tem publicado livros e artigos em revistas da especialidade. Foi vencedora de um Projeto European Research Council Consolidator Grant em 2015 para investigar o aumento da politização em torno do tema "Europa" na política nacional. É Doutorada em Ciência Política pela Universidade de Oxford.

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

Marina Costa Lobo is Principal Researcher at the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon (ICS-UL), and member of the Board of IPP – Instituto Políticas Públicas. She is also Coordinator of the Observatório da Qualidade da Democracia at ICS-UL and Vice-President of the Board of the Lisbon Club. Her research interests focus on electoral behaviour and political institutions in Portugal in a comparative perspective. In particular, she was one of the co-directors of the Portuguese Election Study, which has carried out post-election surveys in Portugal since 2002. She published in several academic journals. In 2015, she won the European Research Council Consolidator Grant. She obtained her Doctorate in Politics in 2001 in Oxford University, St. Antony's College.

Miguel Anacoreta Correia

Miguel Anacoreta Correia foi Secretário-geral da UCCLA União das Cidades Capitais de Língua Portuguesa (2009-2013). Foi deputado (1981-1987 e 1999-2006) e eleito Deputado Europeu em 1987. Foi Secretário de Estado dos Transportes (1980) e Secretário de Estado da Defesa Nacional (1981). Foi VicePresidente do CDS (1986-1987 e 2005-2007). Foi Alto Funcionário da União Europeia no quadro das relações com os países ACP (África, Caraíbas e Pacífico) e Diretor para a América Latina (1992-1997). Foi Conselheiro de Estado (2006-2011). Da sua extensa experiência profissional, desempenhou entre outras, funções como Consultor da Thales Security Solutions & Services, S.A. Lisboa, VicePresidente dos Conselhos de Administração dos Bancos Pinto e Sotto Mayor, Totta & Açores e Crédito Predial Português (19972001) e Presidente do Conselho de Administração da VIABANCA (1997-2001). É Licenciado em Engenharia Civil e tem uma especialização em Transportes.

Miguel Anacoreta Correia was Secretary-General of UCCLA – Lusophone Countries’ Capitals Union (2009-2013). He was a member of Parliament (1981-1987 and 1999-2006) and elected for the European Parliament in 1987. He was Secretary of State for Transport (1980) and for National Defense (1981). He was vice-president of the political party CDS (19861987 and 2005-2007). He was EU Senior Official in the framework of EU-ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) relations and Director for Latin America (1992-1997). He was State Counsellor from 2006 to 2011. From his extensive professional experience, he worked as consultant for Thales Security Solutions & Services, S.A. Lisboa, vice-chairman of the Banks Pinto e Sotto Mayor, Totta & Açores and Crédito Predial Português (1997-2001), and Chairman of VIABANCA (19972001). He holds a degree in Civil Engineering with a specialization in Transport.

Luís Amado

Luís Amado é Presidente do Clube de Lisboa. É Presidente do Conselho de Administração da EDP. Desde a década de 1990, exerceu diversos cargos no governo português, nomeadamente Secretário de Estado dos Negócios Estrangeiros e da Cooperação (1995-1997 e 1999-2002), Ministro da Defesa (2005-2006) e Ministro de Estado e dos Negócios Estrangeiros (2006-2011). Como parte da sua atividade política, foi ainda membro da Assembleia Regional da Madeira e da Assembleia da República. Formado em Economia pela Universidade técnica de Lisboa, foi consultor internacional, assessor no Instituto da Defesa Nacional e professor na Universidade de Georgetown. É igualmente Professor Convidado no Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas (ISCSP) e na Faculdade de Economia da Universidade Nova de Lisboa.

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

Luís Amado is the Chairman of the Lisbon Club. He is the Chairman of EDP. Since the 1990s he held several positions in the Portuguese Government, including Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (1995-1997 and 1999-2002), Minister of Defense (20052006) and Minister of State and Foreign Affairs (2006-2011). As part of his political activity, he was representative at the Regional Assembly of Madeira and member of the Portuguese Parliament. He graduated in Economics at the Technical University of Lisbon. Luis Amado was international consultant, adviser to the National Defense Institute and Visiting Professor at Georgetown University. He is also Visiting Professor at the Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas (ISCSP) and at the Faculty of Economics in the Nova Lisbon University.

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Fernando Medina Correia

Fernando Medina Correia é Presidente da Câmara Municipal de Lisboa. Foi deputado à Assembleia da República (2011-13) e Vereador e VicePresidente da Câmara Municipal de Lisboa. Foi assessor do INOFOR durantes os anos de 1998 e 2000, Membro do Grupo de Trabalho do Ministério da Educação durante a Presidência Portuguesa da União Europeia, entre 1999 e 2002, assessor do Primeiro-Ministro para as áreas da educação, ciência e tecnologia, entre 2000 e 2002, e assessor do Presidente da Comissão Executiva da Agência Portuguesa para o Investimento. Foi Secretário de Estado do Emprego e da Formação Profissional e Secretário de Estado Adjunto do Ministro da Economia, nos XVII e XVIII Governos Constitucionais. É licenciado em economia pela Universidade do Porto e mestre em Sociologia Económica pelo Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão - ISEG, Lisboa.

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Michelle Bachelet

Fernando Medina Correia is the Mayor of Lisbon. He was member of the Portuguese Parliament (2011-13), Councillor and Vice-President of the Lisbon municipality. He was advisor of INOFOR (1998-2000), member of the Education Ministry Working Group during the EU Portuguese Presidency (19992002), advisor of the Prime Minister on education, science and technology (2000-2002) and advisor of the Executive President of the Portuguese Investment Agency. He was Secretary of State for Employment and Professional Training, and Deputy-Secretary of State of the Minister of Economic Affairs, in the XVII and XVIII Constitutional Governments. He holds a BA in Economics by University of Porto and MA in Economic Sociology by ISEG, Lisbon.

Michele Bachelet assumiu as funções de Alta Comissária das Nações Unidas para os Direitos Humanos em setembro de 2018. Foi a primeira mulher Presidente do Chile (2006-10 e 2014-18), bem como a primeira mulher da América Latina a ser Ministra da Defesa (2000-2002), tendo também sido Ministra da Saúde (2002-2004). Trabalha com organizações internacionais desde o início da década de 90. Em 2011, tornou-se a primeira diretora da UN Women e, em 2018, foi nomeada presidente da Parceria para a Saúde Materna, Neonatal e Infantil, uma aliança de mais de 100 organizações de 192 países sobre a saúde sexual, reprodutiva, materna, infantil e adolescente. Lançou também a “Every Woman Every Child” para a América Latina e as Caraíbas. Michelle Bachelet é médica, formada em Cirurgia, com especialização em Pediatria e Saúde Pública.

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

Michelle Bachelet assumed her functions as the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on September, 2018. She was the first female president of Chile (2006-10 and 2014-18), as well as Chile’s and Latin America’s first female Defense Minister (2000-2002), and also served as Health Minister (2002-2004). Since the early 1990s, she has worked closely with many international organizations. In 2011, she was named the first Director of UN Women, and in 2018 she was named Chair of the Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health, an alliance of more than 1000 organizations in 192 countries from the sexual, reproductive, maternal, child and adolescent health communities. She also launched “Every Woman Every Child” Latin America and the Caribbean. Michelle Bachelet has a Medical Degree in Surgery, with a specialization in Pediatrics and Public Health.

O Clube de Lisboa The Lisbon Club O Clube de Lisboa foi lançado em 2016 como corolário do projeto das Conferências de Lisboa, uma iniciativa de sete instituições, às quais se juntaram seis membros individuais como fundadores. O Clube de Lisboa é uma associação com membros individuais e coletivos que partilham a visão de Lisboa como cidade global e como espaço de reflexão, debate e intervenção sobre temas prioritários e fraturantes da agenda internacional, com atenção particular aos desafios para Portugal e a Europa. É nossa razão de ser aumentar o conhecimento, promover novas visões e perspetivas, influenciar as agendas políticas, aprofundar a reflexão e impulsionar o debate sobre temas internacionais que afetam a nossa vida em sociedade e que impactam sobre a sustentabilidade do planeta e sobre o futuro das novas gerações. Somos uma plataforma de atividades em rede, em ligação com membros do Clube, que beneficiam e contribuem ativamente para o sucesso das nossas iniciativas. Para além das Conferências de Lisboa, organizamos as Lisbon Talks (debates sobre assuntos relevantes da atualidade internacional), realizamos atividades de formação sobre temas globais em parceria com outras entidades, editamos publicações e divulgamos as temáticas globais junto dos nossos membros e de públicos alargados.

The Lisbon Club was launched in December of 2016, as an outcome of the Lisbon Conferences project, an initiative of seven institutions, to which six individual members joined as founders of the Lisbon Club. We are an association of individual and collective members. We share the vison of Lisbon as a global city particularly suited to offer a space for reflecting, debating and intervening about relevant issues of the international agenda, from development and globalization to security and sustainability, with a focus on Portugal and Europe. It is our aim to increase knowledge, promote critical thinking and new perspectives to address global challenges, in order to influence political agendas and deepen the study and discussion of issues that affect our life in community and that impact on the sustainability of the planet and on the standards of living of future generations We function as a network platform, in connection with our members, who profit from and actively participate in the conception and implementation of our initiatives. Besides the Lisbon Conferences, our work includes the Lisbon Talks (debates on relevant international issues), trainings on global issues through partnerships with other institutions, publications and dissemination activities for our members and a wider audience. Board of Directors

Conselho Diretivo Luís Amado, Presidente Alberto Laplaine Guimarães, Vice-Presidente Marina Costa Lobo, Vice-Presidente Fernando Jorge Cardoso, Diretor Executivo Francisco Seixas da Costa, Presidente das Conferências de Lisboa Hélder de Oliveira; Luís Pais Antunes; Mónica Ferro; Raquel Vaz-Pinto Mesa da Assembleia Geral Miguel Anacoreta Correia (Pres.); Clara Carvalho; Laura Vidal Conselho Fiscal António Rebelo de Sousa (Pres.); José Félix Ribeiro; Noémia Pizarro

Luís Amado, President Alberto Laplaine Guimarães, Vice-President Marina Costa Lobo, Vice-President Fernando Jorge Cardoso, Executive Director Francisco Seixas da Costa, President of the Lisbon Conferences Hélder de Oliveira; Luís Pais Antunes; Mónica Ferro; Raquel Vaz-Pinto General Assembly Board Miguel Anacoreta Correia (Pres.); Clara Carvalho; Laura Vidal Supervisory Board António Rebelo de Sousa (Pres.); José Félix Ribeiro; Noémia Pizarro

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

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A 3ª Conferência de Lisboa contou com a organização e apoios das seguintes instituições The 3rd Lisbon Conference was organized and supported by the following institutions Organização | Organization

www.clubelisboa.pt

Câmara de Comércio e Indústria Portuguesa Portuguese Chamber of Commerce and Industry A CCIP é uma associação empresarial privada ao serviço das empresas portuguesas desde 1834, que promove em particular o desenvolvimento dos seus associados a nível nacional e internacional. Diariamente trabalhamos para apoiar as empresas associadas no seu crescimento, afirmando-nos como um parceiro privilegiado para a internacionalização da economia nacional e promotores da ligação entre as Pequenas e Médias Empresas (PME) e as grandes empresas. www.ccip.pt/

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Câmara Municipal de Lisboa Municipality of Lisbon A Câmara Municipal de Lisboa é o órgão autárquico do concelho, constituído por um Presidente e dezasseis Vereadores eleitos por sufrágio direto, que tem por missão definir e executar políticas que visam a defesa dos interesses e a satisfação das necessidades da população local. Compete-lhe administrar a vida da cidade, promovendo o seu desenvolvimento, em todas as áreas da vida dos cidadãos, como a educação, o desenvolvimento social e a habitação, o ambiente e saneamento básico, o desporto, a cultura, o turismo, o urbanismo, os direitos sociais, e a proteção civil. A Câmara Municipal Lisboa visa através da atuação dos seus serviços tornar Lisboa uma cidade mais participativa, empreendedora, solidária e sustentável, apostando ainda em áreas como a economia, a mobilidade, a segurança e a cooperação internacional. www.cm-lisboa.pt/

Fundação Portugal-África Portugal-Africa Foundation A Fundação tem por fim contribuir para a realização e incremento de ações de carácter cultural e educacional a desenvolver em Portugal e em África, designadamente junto dos Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa, visando a valorização e continuidade dos laços históricos e de civilização mantidos entre Portugal e os países africanos, numa perspetiva de progresso e de projeção para o futuro. www.fportugalafrica.pt/

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

Instituto Marquês de Valle Flor Marquês de Valle Flor Institute Criado em 1951 como instituição privada de utilidade pública, o IMVF é uma Fundação para o desenvolvimento e a cooperação, tendo iniciado atividade como Organização Não-Governamental para o Desenvolvimento (ONGD) em 1988 em São Tomé e Príncipe. A partir dos anos 90 expandimos a nossa ação a outros países, com predominância aos de língua oficial portuguesa, e alargamos as áreas de atividade. Os resultados alcançados tornaram o IMVF numa entidade de referência nos domínios da cooperação, da cidadania global e da reflexão sobre o desenvolvimento. www.imvf.org

Parceiro | Partner

ISCTE – Instituto Universitário de Lisboa ISCTE – Lisbon University Institute O ISCTE-IUL é uma instituição pública de ensino universitário. No âmbito das suas atividades de ensino, investigação e prestação de serviços à comunidade, é uma instituição universitária que se destina à formação de quadros e especialistas qualificados, cujas competências culturais, científicas e técnicas os tornam aptos a intervir no desenvolvimento sustentado não só do país, mas também a nível global. Os seus objetivos estratégicos são a inovação, a qualidade, a internacionalização e o desenvolvimento de uma cultura empreendedora. www.iscte-iul.pt/

Sociedade para o Financiamento do Desenvolvimento Development Finance Society A SOFID tem como objetivo contribuir para o crescimento económico de países emergentes e em vias de desenvolvimento, articulando com os objetivos e a estratégia do Estado Português em matéria de economia, cooperação e ajuda pública ao desenvolvimento. Através da oferta de serviços e produtos financeiros junto de empresas privadas ou públicas (desde que geridas de forma comercial), a SOFID deve contribuir para o incremento das relações a nível produtivo e comercial entre Portugal e os países emergentes e em vias de desenvolvimento, de modo a estimular o seu progresso económico e social. www.sofid.pt/

União das Cidades Capitais de Língua Portuguesa Lusophone Countries’ Capitals Union A UCCLA é uma associação intermunicipal de natureza internacional, sem fins lucrativos, que tem por objetivo principal fomentar o entendimento e a cooperação entre os seus municípios membros, pelo intercâmbio cultural, científico e tecnológico e pela criação de oportunidades económicas, sociais e conviviais, tendo em vista o progresso e o bem-estar dos seus habitantes. www.uccla.pt/

DESENVOLVIMENTO EM TEMPOS DE INCERTEZA DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation Nasceu em 1956 como uma fundação portuguesa para toda a humanidade, destinada a fomentar o conhecimento e a melhorar a qualidade de vida das pessoas através das artes, da beneficência, da ciência e da educação. Com o desenvolvimento do país, o papel da Fundação foi redefinido: as prioridades deixaram de ser apenas portuguesas ou lusófonas, para passarem a inscrever-se num quadro internacional, relacionando-se com questões globais, como o diálogo intercultural, as migrações e a mobilidade, e o ambiente. É neste contexto que são criados os Programas Gulbenkian e os projetos e iniciativas que a Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian promove, diretamente ou em parceria com outras entidades, para refletir sobre temas da sociedade contemporânea, procurando respostas inovadoras para os problemas do mundo atual. www.gulbenkian.pt/ Conferência de Lisboa – 3 _ 2018 Lisbon Conference – 3

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Com o alto patrocínio do Presidente da República Under the high patronage

Apoios | Support

Instituto Diplomático idi.mne.pt/

Representação da Comissão Europeia em Portugal ec.europa.eu/portugal/

EuroBic

www.eurobic.pt

Fundação Millennium BCP ind.millenniumbcp.pt/pt/ Institucional/fundacao/

InvestimoZ – Fundo Português de Apoio ao Investimento em Moçambique www.sofid.pt/pt/investimoz

Fundação Luso-Americana para o Desenvolvimento www.flad.pt

Conferência Conference Desenvolvimento em tempos de incerteza Development in an age of uncertainty

Dezembro de 2018 December 2018 Edição Edition Clube de Lisboa e Instituto Marquês de Valle Flor Edição de conteúdos Contents & Text Editing Patrícia Magalhães Ferreira Fotografia Photography Câmara Municipal de Lisboa - Departamento de Marca e Comunicação | Âmago media Design e Paginação Design and Layout Rodrigo Saias e Rui Carvalho | Atelier 004 Produção Production Sara Fortes da Cunha | Atelier 004 Impressão Printing Imprensa Municipal - Câmara Municipal de Lisboa ISBN 978-989-54015-1-2 Depósito Legal Legal Deposit 392416/15

3 2018

Agradecimentos Acknowledgements

Disclaimer

O Clube de Lisboa agradece a todos os que, com o seu trabalho e dedicação, tornaram possível a realização da 3ª Conferência de Lisboa, nomeadamente: The Lisbon Club acknowledges the work and dedication of all who contributed to the 3rd Lisbon Conference, namely:

As opiniões expressas nos discursos e artigos desta publicação são da exclusiva responsabilidade dos autores e intervenientes e não comprometem qualquer instituição. Pode copiar ou imprimir o conteúdo desta publicação, bem como citar ou reproduzir trechos dos textos desde que mencione a fonte. Esta publicação deve ser citada como “Conferências de Lisboa (2018). Conferências de Lisboa 3: Desenvolvimento em Tempos de Incerteza. Clube de Lisboa” The views expressed in speeches and papers of this publication are those of the authors and speakers only and should not be attributed to any other person or institution. You may copy and print this publication, as well as quoting or using its contents, provided that the source is mentioned. This publication should be cited as “Lisbon Conferences (2018); Conference 3: Development in an Age of Uncertainty. Lisbon Club.”

Ana Isabel Castanheira Ana Maya Andreia Jotta Catarina Benedito Cláudia Vieira Borges Cristina Rocha Daniel Lança Perdigão Diana Alves Inês Vicente Joana Miguéis José Fernandes Luís Távora Marta Rodrigues Miguel Pires Miguel Quesada Pastor Mónica Santos Silva Patrícia Frazão Patrícia Magalhães Ferreira Patrícia Reis Patrícia Roman Paulo Madruga Pedro Gonçalves Sara Fortes da Cunha Sofia Vieira

ORGANIZADORES ORGANIZERS

PARCEIRO PARTNER

APOIOS SUPPORT

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