TECHNICAL Activity in the technical area has continued at a high level. The work programme of the technical standing committee has been completed. In addition. speeches and papers for the benefit of IFATCA delegates to conferences and meetings were prepared. Under the supervision of the Vice-President. technical. input was made to various ICAO groups. The main areas of attention were: The RTF (radio telephony study group). EARC (elimination of ambiguity in RTF call signs). EANPG-BORG (basic operational requirements). The federation's attitudes to automated conflict alert. VFR operations. beacon collision avoidance systems and helicopter operations were examined and will be reported on to conference. Active participation continues in the IFALPA/ ATS study group. The IFACTA liaison officer to ICAO. under the direction of the Vice-President. technical. has made a review of the federation's input to ICAO and he represented IFATCA in the surface movement guidance control systems study group (SMGCS). In its concern to maintain the technical involvements of the federation and to enhance the professional skills of the air traffic controller. the Executive Board has agreed to participate in the following meetings. the VPO panel (SC. I): the aerodrome. air routes and ground aids divisional meeting (AGA divisional); the aeronautical speech circuit switching and signalling study group (ASCSS). In Europe flow control continues to attract attention and the problem has been divided by ICAO into flow control west (FLOW) and flow control east (FLOE). IFATCA has been represented by the regional Vice-President EUR at FLOW and by the Austrian association at FLOE. IFATCA has also participated in the Radar applications specialist panel (RASP) of Eurocontrol. The subject of air traffic flow management is expected to continue as a matter for continued input both by standing committee I and by the Vice-President technical. The views of the federation were presented by the V1ce-Pres1dent. technical. at the 25th anniversary of the European Civil Av1at1on Conference (ECAC). The workload has continued to increase in the technical area. and the Executive Board hereby expresses its apprec1at1on to those ind1v1duals and member associations who make our input to various 1nternat1onal organisations possible. With such input. the professional image of the federation and of air traffic controllers 1s in safe hands.

ferent countries with extensive experience in labour relations. On the legal aspects of t~e profession very little is foreseen to be achieved but activity is being maintained. both through the ICAO legal commission and .the. ILO. to establish some definite protection in favour of the controller. Standing Committee IV conti~ues to be concerned with human and environmental factors. but this concern does not seem to be shared by those member associa.t1ons who fail to make adequate input to the information handbook.

CONCLUSION The Executive Board is reasonably satisfied with developments within the federation. The continued increase in the number of member associations testifies to the respect in which IFATCA is being held and to our organization's viability. However. the federation must not be complacent. The member associations must ensure that they are fully representative and fulfil their obligations. New initiatives and ideas will be submitted by the board to this conference. Input on changes. policies. the growth of the federation is expected from others as well. We are satisfied that such submissions are a healthy indicator of the changes that a fast-growing international body such as ours must undergo in order to remain viable. There is no question. either. that the international aviation community has accepted IFATCA as the only voice of the air traffic controller. This acceptance places the responsibility of countinued and increased involvement in most aspects of international av1at1on on the federation. Although we are satisfied with internal developments the outlook for developments in national air traffic control systems is not at all encouraging. Member assoc1at1ons are working hard to achieve proper national recognition of the profession m accordance with the conclusions of the I LO meeting of experts. The previous conferences have recognized the degradation of av1at1on safety under certain circumstances and decided on reactions by IFATCA and its members to these s1tuat1ons. The coming year may well be a very turbulent one. This conference in Cairo. our first 1n this part of the world. again brings together representatives from all branches of the av1at1on industry. Let us take this opportunity to further 1dent1fy IFATCA's concerns and aims. to strive for greater understanding of each other's problems and to communicate to the world our requirements.

PROFESSIONAL In the professional field status recognition remained top on the list of the problems of a number of member associations and non-member assoc1at1ons. The ILO resolutions had to be pushed forward to the various admin1strat1ons. in particular. in countries where controllers do not enioy even fundamental nghts. To further this aim the Executive Board decided on the appointment of an ad hoe committee whose members come from d1f-

SC IV Library Members are reminded that SC IV Library which is run by the Netherlands Guild is established for their use and may bollow literature upon request.

Safety Information (US NTSB) On January 10. 1980. N3839M. a Piper Arrow aircraft. crashed into a mountain after departing the Kalispell City Airport. Kalispell. Montana. All three persons aboard were killed. The Safety Board's investigation disclosed that the pilot. who was employed at the Kalispell City Airport as an instrument flight instructor. had been issued. before take-off. an I FR clearance to the Calgary Airport via direct to the Kalispell VOA. direct to the Calgary VOA. The clearance. issued by the Salt Lake City Air Route Traffic Control Center. included a climb to 14.000 feet and a transponder code. After acknowledging the clearance. the pilot asked. ·Are we going to get vectors northbound?' The controller replied. 'I could vector you to the Canadian border: after that I'm not sure if Canada can'. The pilot answered. 'We'll be receiving Lethbridge by that point'. As the aircraft reached the Kalispell VOA. the controller said 'radar contact' and requested the aircraft's altitude. After the pilot reported leaving 'five point five'. the controller made the following transm1ss1on: 'Three niner mike roger Lethbridge {unintelligible) bearing (unintelligible) five report reaching one four thousand.· About 1 minute later. the pilot asked the canter · ... to let us know coming up on some high terrain 1f you would.· The controller replied. · .... are you in the clouds now?' The pilot said that they were. There were no more transmissions from N3839M. The Kahspell Airport has no published instrument approach procedures and thus. no published I FR departure procedures. An approach by visual reference to the terrain 1s the only means of access to this airport. However. there are no procedures which prohibit a pilot from filing an IFR flight plan and receiving an IFR clearance for departure from this airport or other airports not having published instrument departure procedures. Normally. a pilot files a route that may include a published Minimum En Route Altitude (MEA). a Standard Instrument Departure (SID). a Standard Arrival Route {STAR). a published IFR Departure Procedure for small airports. or a published Instrument Approach Procedure. all of which provide sufficient altitude obstruction clearance. However. a departure clearance from an airport. such as the Kahspell Municipal. does not provide obstruction clearance In fact. paragraph (5) (c). Instrument Departures. Obstruction Clearance During Departure. of the Airman's Information Manual. states: .. At airports where instrument approach procedures have not been published. hence no published departure procedure. determine what action will be necessary and take such action that will assure a safe departure·. Thus in IFR cond1t1ons. such departures involve a hazard because the pilot does not have available any published procedures for instrument flight Furthermore. he cannot Contmued on page 36