Water Sanitation Security: The Implementation of Autonomous Desalination in the Gaza Strip by Barbara Clark

Abstract

The ongoing Israel-Palestinian political conflict is uniquely reflected in the region’s escalating water crisis. Gaza is known to be the second most “water-poor” region in the world, leading academics to predict the state will be “uninhabitable” by 2020. While the COVID-19 has created immense struggles globally, over 2 million people still live in Gaza, and over 90% do not have access to potable water. The water crisis, coupled with the Conflict and Israeli-blockade, highlights the need for Gazans to have their own, sustainable water supply for their survival. In this case study, I explore the feasibility of implementing a large-scale reverse osmosis desalination plant to provide Gaza with an autonomous water supply. While desalination is often touted as a viable solution for Gaza, in reality, implementing a plant is an incredibly complex endeavour. I will walk the reader through how the water-crisis came to be, explaining why desalination is a technologically practical avenue to pursue. While its potential is marked, the vast barriers to desalination include, the initial high economic cost, the Palestinian National Authority’s lack of regulatory capacity within Gaza’s borders, as well as the chief concern: political objections stemming from the on-going and emotionally charged conflict with Israel.

Résumé

Le conflit politique israélo-palestinien en cours se reflète uniquement dans l’escalade de la crise de l’eau dans la région. Gaza est connue pour être la deuxième région la plus “pauvre en eau” au monde, ce qui amène les universitaires à prédire que l’État sera “inhabitable” d’ici 2020. Alors que le COVID-19 a créé d’immenses luttes dans le monde entier, plus de 2 millions de personnes vivent encore à Gaza, et plus de 90% n’ont pas accès à l’eau potable. La crise de l’eau, associée au conflit et au blocus israélien, souligne la nécessité pour les Gazaouis d’avoir leur propre approvisionnement durable en eau pour leur survie. Dans cette étude de cas, j’explore la faisabilité de la mise en œuvre d’une usine de dessalement par osmose inverse à grande échelle pour fournir à Gaza un approvisionnement en eau autonome. Si le dessalement est souvent présenté comme une solution viable pour Gaza, en réalité, la mise en place d’une usine est une entreprise incroyablement complexe. Je vais expliquer au lecteur comment est née la crise de l’eau et pourquoi le dessalement est une voie technologiquement pratique à suivre. Bien que son potentiel soit marqué, les vastes obstacles au dessalement comprennent le coût économique initial élevé, le manque de capacité réglementaire de l’Autorité nationale palestinienne à l’intérieur des frontières de Gaza, ainsi que la principale préoccupation : les objections politiques découlant du conflit en cours et chargé d’émotion avec Israël.

Introduction

The ongoing Israel-Palestinian conflict is complex, being both emotionally and politically charged. Moreover, the Middle East’s overwhelmingly arid landscape presents natural resource challenges; specifically, its water shortage compounds the fragile geopolitical relationships that characterize the region. The water shortage is a flashpoint of tension between Middle Eastern nations, especially as significant exogenous factors, such as climate change and intensified drought,1 as well as supply shortages and reverse migration back to the area, have only exacerbated the region’s water insecurity throughout time. Since late antiquity, relations between Jews and Arabs have been contentious, with a series of new tensions arising after the modern state of Israel’s foundation in 1948, and the consequential impact of the 1967 Arab-Israeli Warwhich greatly expanded Israel’s territorial size.2 These events dramatically changed the already fractured relationship between Jews and Palestinians. Since 1967, Israel has retained a form of settler-colonial control over the West Bank, although its occupation of the Gaza Strip concluded in 2005.3 The complicated political history between Israel and Palestine is especially evident in the region’s water crisis. Gaza is the second most “water-poor” area in the world.4 Gaza’s already dense population and its rising population growth rate have dramatically exacerbated the water crisis, with Gaza predicted to run out of water by the end of 2020.5 By 2005, approximately 90% of Gaza’s water was already considered to be undrinkable due to its chlorine content of 1000mg/L, which is far above the World Health Organization’s (WHO) potable standard of 250mg/L.6This is a marked contrast to Israel’s projection of an eventual 200-300% surplus in desalinated water supply.7 These predictions highlight the pervasive inequality arising from the complex relationship between the neighbouring states despite their geographical proximity and shared resources. Despite its location adjacent to the Mediterranean Sea, Gaza’s water supply is wholly reliant on the Coastal Aquifer it shares with Israel, where it is the downstream partner. Based on the concept of hydro-hegemony, it is advantageous to be the upstream partner; in this position, one is theoretically able to restrict water use through damming it, thereby reducing the downstream partner’s access.8 Thus, Gaza is disadvantaged in the asymmetrical relationship determining the Coastal Aquifer’s management, due to Israel’s ability to direct water flow.9 Gaza’s position as the downstream partner also naturally results in a degraded groundwater supply.10 Degradation primarily occurs as the water flows from the eastern Gaza Strip, where the aquifer enters from Israeli territory, down throughout the rest of the Strip. Isotopic samples from Israel and Eastern Gaza have the same salinity measure, confirming that water flow downstream to the Gazan water table naturally disadvantages the territory.11 Salinity has increased dramatically due to Gaza’s natural disadvantage in conjunction with years of overexploitation of already limited groundwater.12 Such accelerating degradation points to the need for an alternative water supply and robust water management. This paper’s proposed solution of desalination may prove to be an effective remedy for the region’s water crisis, with the aim of alleviating the resource inequality between the Israelis and Palestinians. In the following case study, I will contextualize the crisis, outlining its impact on Gazans, especially the anticipated migration problems resulting from the overwhelming water shortage that Gaza faces. I will then propose an intervention to the crisis: the development of an extensive centralized desalination plant in Gaza to primarily treat seawater from the Mediterranean Sea. In addition, the central desalination plant should also possess the capability of treating wastewater and some groundwater from the Coastal Aquifer. Finally, I will conclude by presenting the chief political objection to my proposal: the Israeli government’s sustained blockade of Gaza and its opposition to Palestinian autonomy and human rights.

Anticipated Migratory Effects: Compounding Water and Human Insecurity

The overall purpose of this case study is to evaluate a potential remedy for the migratory threat posed by a lack of water. The effects of Gaza’s water shortage are distressing. While water shortages act as a natural push factor for migration, over 1.2 million Gazans, many of whom are Palestinian refugees, are ‘trapped’ in the Strip, a territory of less than 400 square kilometres.13 Regional instability is partially responsible for the lack of freedom of movement. Since 2006, Israel has maintained a blockade against their portion of the border, while Egypt, Gaza’s other territorial neighbour, on February 10, 2021 opened its border crossing to Gazans indefinity for the first time since Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2006.14 Moreover, since over 90% of Gaza’s existing water supply is undrinkable, and previous predictions suggest that Gaza will run out of clean water by 2020, without intervention, Gaza is likely to have no potable water and thus be uninhabitable within the next decade.15 The effects of this will be drastic.The absence of water will not only impede avenues for economic development, but it will also raise the territory’s mortality rate and exacerbate the ongoing refugee and humanitarian crisis. Consequently, Gazans will be faced with a “choiceless choice” to remain in Gaza and face the consequences of life without freshwater. Alternatively, they will be compelled to leave, ultimately acquiescing to Israel’s strategy of forcing migration from Palestine, effectively beginning to restore Israel-Palestine’s population balance towards a substantial Jewish majority.16

The Goal: Eventual Water Independence for Gaza

In order to mitigate Gaza’s eventual total lack of water, there is a desperate need for the Israeli government to allow Palestinians to independently control their water supply. Due to its coastal location, Gaza has the ability, with the appropriate infrastructure, to desalinate water from the Mediterranean Sea. With this intervention, Gaza will be able to address the existing issues behind the crisis and reduce their dependence on Israel for water. The current water crisis stems from structural factors, such as the Aquifer’s inability to replenish water levels, over-exploitation of existing water causing erosion and increased salinization, Gaza’s non-existent purification infrastructure, and its rapidly growing population.17 Therefore, implementing a large-scale desalination plant is the best possible solution for the Gazan context. While desalination can be expensive, recent technological advancements have made it more affordable, especially for land situated next to ample saltwater resources, such as the Meditterean Sea.18 To clarify, a truly autonomous facility will not be possible from the outset. However, the end goal is for international and local stakeholders to participate in the establishment and short-term management of the facility, until the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) and the Palestinian National Authority (PA) are able to reduce their reliance on international expertise and funds. While I use the term “autonomous” throughout the following sections, any new, large-scale desalination plant cannot be established without more robust governing ability on behalf of Hamas, PA and PWA, significant funding from international aid sources, and Israeli participation. These are inherent limitations to the viability of such a solution. However, I will attempt to address these challenges in the following sections.

An Overview of Desalination and the Challenges to its Implementation

Environmental Concerns

New research has led to the development of desalination methods that use membranes to separate particles in the water. Known as reverse osmosis (RO) membrane systems, their smaller energy footprint makes them more economical and thus the more popular choice over older desalination methods, such as thermal distillation, which are extremely energy intensive. RO systems apply pressure to force water through membranes and divide it into two streams, effectively separating salt from water.19 Globally, experts cite RO as an innovative solution for the simultaneous increase in water demand and water scarcity. While the efficiency of RO systems point to their potential to be the most viable option in this regional context, desalination facilities using such technology cannot be implemented without addressing the possible environmental impacts. There are two environmental concerns with seawater RO systems: entrainment and impingement. Entrainment occurs when small aquatic organisms get pumped into the desalination plant. Impingement is the same process but for larger marine life.20 Furthermore, RO systems produce brine waste which has approximately twice the salinity as seawater and has a higher temperature than seawater, meaning it must be properly disposed of. A potential disposal method would be to incrementally dilute the brine with seawater to decrease its harmful effects on marine life, effectively reducing the brine’s salt concentration before it is deposited back into the Mediterranean Sea.21 This process, known as dumping, is currently the most popular disposal method for coastal desalination facilities.22 Efforts to properly mitigate brine waste are especially important due to the prevalence of marine life and the economic role that the fishing industry plays in the Gazan economy. It is also important to note that scientists and engineers are aware of this brine issue and are therefore developing and testing innovative solutions for reject-brine. One potential solution that could be beneficial in the Gazan context is the use of reject-brine for aquaculture.This solution, when tested in Dubai, increased certain fish biomass by over 300%. 23Conversely, while such alternative uses for brine are environmentally preferable, it is important to be cognizant of Gaza’s economic situation and lack of regulatory capacity. Perhaps, in the future, alternative brine use would be an excellent opportunity for international collaboration. Despite these immediate environmental impacts, implementing RO desalination in Gaza is preferable, as it requires less energy than distillation (which requires heating water to its boiling point). Distillation would place a considerable strain on Gaza’s already fragile heating system.24 To mitigate concerns of entrainment and impingement, the paper’s suggested seawater collection area will utilize a well intake system. These are environmentally friendly and provide a level of natural filtration, which can reduce the pre-treatment requirements.25 Wells are appropriate for the Gazan context due to the plant’s proximity to the Meditterean Sea as well as the need to treat sewage that currently gathers on the shores. In addition, proper maintenance is crucial to negating the environmental impact of desalination. To mitigate environmental risk, PWA experts will be tasked with managing the rigorous compliance standards for the new desalination plants. For instance, the pre-treatment filters must be washed every three to four days “to avoid clogging and preserve efficiency.”26 Experts should also monitor the surrounding sea area’s water temperature weekly to examine the plant’s environmental impact on marine life. The energy consumed through desalination accounts for a substantial portion of the costs associated with maintaining a desalination plant. The energy costs can be between 30-50% percent of the total cost of the produced water.27 A steady-state can be met by approaching energy consumption through either hybrid energy sources - such as mixing potash (potassium bearing minerals and chemicals) or thermal with hydro energy - or by using Energy Recovery Devices to reduce the overall energy consumption.28 In choosing an appropriate energy source, both the PA and the PWA will need to evaluate the economic feasibility and sustainability of energy sources. As Gaza has been mostly reliant on Israel for energy since 1967, relying on the Gazan electricity grid would require at least 40% of Gaza’s entire grid supply and cost around $0.125/ kWh.29 This is certainly a high cost; however, relying solely on Israel is likely to be politically fraught and would impede full autonomy. Therefore, it is of great importance, especially at the early stages, that Gazan authorities work with international experts and Israel to develop an energy plan, and then transition to full autonomy as regulatory capacity improves.

Local Political Concerns: The PA and PWA

In light of these organizational and political concerns, I have preliminarily located the new desalination plant on the coast in central Gaza, next to Deir al-Balah and pre-existing, sub-optimal desalination plants.30 In general, this location is optimal for reaching a steadystate in operations. Gaza’s high population density and subsequent high land cost are key factors explaining this location’s viability.31 The existing plants will be upgraded. By reusing existing pipelines, the new facility will be connected to the old plants and have a new well connecting it to the Mediterranean Sea. Moreover, the plant will have three collection areas: one for groundwater (to hold water from Coastal Aquifer), one for sewage and wastewater, and one for seawater. The plant’s coastal location will make use of well intake systems which are more environmentally friendly and cost-effective. Regarding energy consumption, the existing plants operate for only eight hours a day.. That level of operation is not sufficient to mitigate the operational costs of desalination.32 Thus, the proposed desalination plant should run for twenty-four hours a day to reach the optimal steady state between energy consumption and cost-effectiveness. The actual operation of the plant will rest in the hands of the PWA, and successful execution necessitates strong regulatory capacity as well as cross-divisional cooperation between various government departments.33 There are several political considerations which point to environmental and organizational limitations to this plan. For example, Hamas and the PA consistently battle over civil and political control of Gazam, leading to deep social divisions, inadequate provision of fundamental goods and services, and a lack of regulatory capacity. The overwhelming lack of political coordination and efficiency is a systemic failure which affects wastewater management as well as drinking water purification, and thus is a barrier to achieving the eventual “steady-state” in operations. However, it would be unwise for international bodies or Israel to wholly fund the creation of potable drinking water in Gaza. Att some stage, Hamas needs to participate, thereby taking steps to increase its regulatory capacity beyond terrorism. There are only seven PWA operated/licensed desalination plants and at least eighteen private commercially owned and operated ones.34 There is a lack of government supervision, meaning that there is no state-wide regulation of non-state-owned desalinated water, and private owners can avoid meeting the WHO’s standards. Thus, a new PWA program needs to be implemented to evaluate these private plants and assess their environmental impact. Afterwards, these small plants will hopefully be in a position to supplement the new central desalination plant, further increasing the amount of potable water available. These political issues are compounded since there is little public awareness of the private plants’ poor water quality. For the most part, Gazans who currently attempt to purify their water with at-home RO systems are unaware of the chemical build up on RO filters, and infrequently change the membrane. The lack of regulation around such practices leads to contaminated water that has the potential to cause adverse health effects and bacterial infections.35 Overall, there are a variety of significant environmental and political issues that must be systematically addressed by stakeholders, academics, politicians, and project managers if a largescale desalination plant (such as one proposed in this paper) is to succeed in providing desalinated water to Gazans in the long term.

Considerations Regarding Timeline and Funding

Due to the large-scale nature of implementing a centralized desalination plant in an unstable and politically inefficient country, the project will be completed in phases. In these circumstances, phasing will allow the PWA to expand as needed while also monitoring desalination’s effectiveness. According to a World Bank report, Gaza will require at least 135 million cubic metres (mcm)/year of potable water for domestic use in 2030; however, without a central desalination plant, their supply will only be 56 mcm/year.36 Including agricultural needs, the estimated demand for water hovers around 260 mcm/year.37 Thus, the decade from 2020-2030 is a critical window for improvement and change. However, it is necessary to note that the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic will prove to be a significant challenge to the viability of this project. Thus, the estimated timeline and associated projections that various stakeholders made prior to 2020 are assumed to be no longer achievable. Working off Nahed Ghbn’s research, the plant should ultimately have the capacity to pump 150,000 m3/day.38 When supplemented with the existing (and improved) private plants, it should equal a positive water balance for Gaza. At its opening, the facility will have the ability to pump 50,000 m3/day. This is a feasible amount to start. Prior to recent political instability which stalled the project, USAID agreed to finance and design a major RO plant with the capacity of 60,000m3/day.39 The timeline for opening is currently in flux due to the impact of COVID-19, but due to the lack of potable water, post-pandemic, making headway on this project should be a government priority. The facility’s pumping ability will then incrementally increase, first by doubling to 100,000 m3/day and then adding an additional 50,000 m3/day in 2030. After desalination, the water will travel through existing tanker infrastructure which municipalities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and public initiatives can provide.40 Gazans will be able to access these communal tanks free of charge and in the long-term potable tap water will be more broadly accessible throughout the country, through the Associated Works program.41 During the implementation process, the PWA will be responsible for continuous environmental evaluation of the surrounding seawater, as well as mandatory testing of all desalinated water in the post-treatment phase. This objective will help to determine the presence of organic compounds and levels of salt and minerals present after RO. The first step in the plan would be for the PWA to set up a specific division of experts on desalination. Numerous reports have indicated the environmental impact of desalination; thus, sustainability is a primary concern.42 Their division’s first step would be to conduct an environmental impact assessment for Gaza and the Mediterranean Sea. The experts would then survey the existing Deir al-Balah plant and new construction for a seawater intake well would commence. The PWA will need to work with the WHO to meet the most modern potable water standards. In doing so, they will contract work to researchers, scientists, and desalination engineers who will create comprehensive plans for brine and chemical disposal, as well as strategies to prevent further groundwater erosion. While the first phase of the desalination plant is under construction, the PWA still needs to address the lack of clean drinking water. This should be undertaken through multiple public-private initiatives, such as expanding educational campaigns, providing communal, small-scale RO filters, and investing more broadly in new technologies . To mitigate further health risks, the PWA must operate a public information campaign, employing canvassers to go door-to-door. The PWAled campaign will also address how long at-home RO filter membranes last and the health risks associated with overusing membranes. A possible interim solution may come from technological advancements like Watergen. In January 2021, Watergen, an Israeli tech company, donated two solar machines to Gaza.43 The solar machines are designed to condense humidity in the air and filter it into immediately accessible clean drinking water. Ultimately, they are able to produce around 5,000 litres of water per day. While these machines cost $61,000 USD each, the company is dedicated to working with Gazan authorities.44 These machines are revolutionary in that they present a glimpse of a future solution to desalination’s environmental issues, especially in the present, where the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has eclipsed timelines for large-scale facilities. Such a massive project requires extensive funding and carries immediate large economic costs. The PWA has proposed a similar, smaller scale plan for its supporting agents in 2018, suggesting the cost of the plant, including energy, will be around EUR 562,000,000.45 This figure includes an operation subsidy of EUR 46,000,000 for the first five years as well.46 To date, organizations such as United States Agency for International Development (USAID)47, as well as the French and Austrian governments, have donated money for the initial plants.48 Both the WHO and the World Bank have pledged to fund the centralized addition. However, successful cooperation with Israel and its allies will be necessary to achieve the project’s full scale, especially as the PA and PWA’s preferred energy source for the initial phases of the project is the Israeli power grid.49 Furthermore, the PA and PWA’s proper management, coupled with the appropriate allocation of funds, will be instrumental in ensuring the plan’s long-term success in transitioning from a globally funded and managed operation into a fully autonomous desalination plant.

Political Objections: Israel’s Crucial Role

The Israeli government acts as the primary political objection to ensuring that Gazans have control over their water supply, due to their refusal to acknowledge any form of independent agency for Palestinians. Despite the requirement under international law dictating that neighbouring governments must collaborate over water resources, there is an ongoing communication breakdown between the parties. Israel insists on “unilateral management” over the Coastal Aquifer and other water supplies for Palestinians.50 Since the 2007 Battle of Gaza, Israel has maintained a blockade at the Gaza border, prohibiting resources from entering the territory. Unfortunately, this has led to numerous supply shortages and has exacerbated Gaza’s water crisis.51 Thus, the political objection is evident: if the Israeli government refuses to permit even trivial consumer goods to enter Gaza, it is difficult to see how the current political dynamic and policy would lead to the Israeli government authorizing the development of independent water infrastructure for Gazans. The underlying environmental issue compounds the region’s political conflict. In general, the Middle East’s arid climate lacks sustainable water resources. Not only is it in Israel’s interest to retain hydro-hegemony over the Coastal Aquifer to advantage its citizens, but the fact that Gaza is reliant on Israel serves a distinct political advantage for the Israeli state. As a “political weapon,” maintaining unilateral water control is just another way Israel can “dominate the Palestinians.”52 For example, because aquaculture is one of Gaza’s main industries, wastewater contamination of the Mediterranean Sea harms marine life, undermines Gazan industries, and correspondingly reinforces Gaza’s dependence on Israel.53 Therefore, as Israel prefers to ignore Palestinian land claims, Israel’s interest in maintaining its aggressive settler-colonial rule is self-evident. However, in the long run, autonomous water infrastructure for Gazans has the ability to benefit Israel. Israel is currently subject to intense international scrutiny over their treatment of Palestinians. Critically referring to the Israeli state’s actions as a “water nakba,” scholars implore Israel’s blockade and their literal “dehydration” of Palestinian life - a clear extension of settler-colonialism.54 The impact of such controversy is evident: the primarily centre/left-leaning American Jewry is increasingly concerned about Israel’s policies towards Gaza, thereby leading to reduced monetary support. Today’s youth generation, who are more removed from the Holocaust, are less likely to accept and defend Israel without question. As such, the Israeli government’s systemic colonization of Palestinian’s is at odds with ‘millennials’ liberal-democratic leanings.55 Therefore, if Israel wishes to enjoy widespread support amongst Diaspora Jews and continue to build its population and economy through Diaspora Jews making Aliyah (Jewish immigration to the State of Israel), then Israel has a clear interest in attempting to resolve its conflict with Palestinians.56 Israel could see some practical benefits from working with Gaza to ensure water security. If the parties cooperate, and the desalination facility is successfully implemented, Israel will be in a good position to retain control over the entire Coastal Aquifer without political ramifications, and Gaza will no longer have to rely on Israel for its water supply, thereby enabling improved water management for Israel itself. In addition, this would alleviate international pressure on Israel. Permitting the autonomous desalination plant may have the added benefit of bringing the two parties to the bargaining table, restoring Israel’s international image as a principled political actor. For the desalination facility to be built, joint cooperation is needed. Israel would have to partially lift its blockade so that essential materials could enter Gaza. Moreover, Israel would need to open its border with Gaza and the subsequent naval blockade to allow scientists, experts, and NGO workers in for construction. This is also an opportunity for Israel to negotiate with the PA in a broader sense. For example, in the past, Israel and the PA have signed agreements, such as Oslo II Accords, which led to water compromises and coordinated usage of resources. In the 25 years since the Accords were signed, there has been little progress and the discussion on water rights has devolved into a political stalemate. A new agreement could be brokered in which Israel permits construction in return for benefits such as a permanent ceasefire or the release of political prisoners and army captives. Furthermore, Gaza wants to use Israeli power grid to supply the centralized plant with energy, at least in the short term.57 As this energy source is crucial to the plant’s functioning, Israel would still maintain a degree of control over Gaza. This reality provides Israel with additional bargaining power, allowing them to dictate the initial agreement and short-term planning to some extent. Fundamentally, though there are complex political issues between Israelis and Palestinians, desalination presents an opportunity for shared coordination and development of mutual good will. A large-scale desalination plant will have direct environmental health benefits for the millions of Gazans in need, but would also help to mitigate Israel’s (often) negative public image, improving their legitimacy on the international political stage.

Conclusion

Gaza needs a prompt and effective solution to its water crisis. Its rapidly growing population is wholly unsustainable in relation to the dire environmental circumstances it faces. In addition, Israel’s restriction on freedom of movement places an additional constraint on the region. In every sense, Gazans are entitled to the basic human right of clean water. Throughout this case study, I have presented what I see to be a feasible solution: the establishment of an eventually autonomous water supply mechanism for Gaza through a centralized desalination plant. It is accepted that this is a massive and complicated project. While a desalination plant is both energy and cost intensive, and undoubtedly has significant environmental impacts, the region’s arid climate and geopolitical conflicts make it the most viable solution to an otherwise intractable problem. The successful installation of such a system would reduce Gaza’s reliance on Israel and finally provide an adequate amount of drinking water for its residents. Unfortunately, the project is at odds with Israel’s settler-colonial rule of the Palestinian territories, as well as Israel’s policy denying Gazan’s right to autonomy. Recently, Israel has been content to abuse human rights in its pursuit of total hegemony. This approach must be overcome. Ultimately, without this practical solution, it is abundantly clear that the Gaza Strip will soon be uninhabitable, which does not bode well for Israel’s already impaired international image and the region’s geopolitical stability.

Appendix

Figure 1: Methods of Desalination

Image retrieved from: Christopher G. Reuther, “Saline Solutions: The Quest for Fresh Water,” Environmental Health Perspectives 108, no. 2 (February 2000): 79.

Figure 2: Proposed Location of New Desalination Plant

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