Renewed Civil War in Libya: Assessing Potential Outcomes by Celia Benhocine

Abstract

The current civil war in Libya is characterized by high factionalization, loose alliances, and economic incentives brought about by the country’s vast hydrocarbon sources. Using the “rebellion as business” theoretical framework, this paper evaluates the plausibility of the formation of a unity government, a descent into further conflict, and the continuation of conflict over the coming three years. Despite recent progress, the analysis concludes that a regression to the status quo, meaning the maintenance of territorial divisions of power between the Libyan National Army (LNA) and the Government of National Accord (GNA), as well as unstable coalitions of armed factions is most plausible. Although foreign intervention is unlikely to foster future escalation like it once did, other factors inhibiting the resolution of the war remain, such as economic conditions favourable to armed factionalization. Mismanagement and corruption of available oil revenues maintain public service delivery failures, fueling insecurity via the shadow economy as militias profit from the control of black markets. In addition, the Fezzan’s peculiar security and economic needs have been treated exogenously, threatening long term stability.

Résumé

La guerre civile actuelle en Libye est caractérisée par une forte factionnalisation, des alliances lâches et des incitations économiques provoquées par les vastes sources d’hydrocarbures du pays. En utilisant le cadre théorique de la “rébellion comme entreprise”, cet article évalue la plausibilité de la formation d’un gouvernement d’unité, d’une descente dans le conflit et de la poursuite du conflit au cours des trois prochaines années. Malgré les progrès récents, l’analyse conclut qu’une régression vers le statu quo, c’est-à-dire le maintien des divisions territoriales du pouvoir entre l’Armée nationale libyenne (ANL) et le Gouvernement d’accord national (GNA), ainsi que des coalitions instables de factions armées est la plus plausible. Bien qu’il soit peu probable qu’une intervention étrangère favorise une escalade future comme ce fut le cas autrefois, d’autres facteurs entravant la résolution de la guerre subsistent, tels que les conditions économiques favorables à la factionnalisation de l’armée. La mauvaise gestion et la corruption des revenus pétroliers entretiennent les défaillances de la prestation des services publics, alimentant l’insécurité par l’économie souterraine alors que les milices profitent du contrôle des marchés noirs. En outre, les besoins particuliers du Fezzan en matière de sécurité et d’économie ont été traités de manière exogène, menaçant ainsi la stabilité à long terme.

Introduction

In 2012, a transitional authority was tasked with piecing together the remnants of Libya’s weakened political system, newly released from 40 years of dictatorship. This effort ultimately failed, resulting in a renewed civil war in 2014 which inflamed the numerous factions already active in the power vacuum left by dictator Muammar Qaddafi’s fall in 2011. The conflict in Libya is set apart from the majority of scholarly frameworks on civil wars because of the equivocal nature of the participating actors.1 Indeed, the waters separating the “government” entity from the “rebel” entity are murky. On the surface, two main bodies appear in a tug of war for authority over the country. The Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA), a provisional government endorsed by the United Nations has been boasted as the only legitimate authority in Libya since the 2015 signing of the Libyan Political Agreement.2 It is rivaled by the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by General Khalifa Haftar. This paper explores the key drivers of the civil war and assesses the plausibility of three outcomes of the conflict over the coming three years: 1) the formation of a unity government, 2) a descent into further conflict, and 3) a backslide to the status quo. Status quo is understood in this context as the maintenance of territorial division of power between the LNA and GNA, as well as unstable coalitions of armed factions, which will be explored in the case of the Fezzan region. Despite the international community’s current optimism for progress, this paper supports that the Libyan conflict will likely backslide to a status quo over the next three years. This conclusion is informed by analysis of the ongoing struggle over the country’s oil wealth resources, the insecurity exacerbating factionalization in the Fezzan3, and the destabilizing effects of international intervention.

The Scramble for Oil Wealth

Since 2014, the political and military divide in Libya has been deepened by the two rival administrations’ hydrocarbon-dependent economic institutions.4 Internally, General Haftar of the LNA gained negotiating ground with the GNA despite his lack of international legitimacy by monopolizing oil terminals and maintaining blockades.5 Externally, international actors such as the UAE and Russia have involved themselves to benefit from resource-related tensions.6 Academic studies of previous civil wars suggest that conflict length is likely to increase if the party in control of key natural resources fears it will lose its advantage over generated revenues.7 Although Libya’s physical oil and gas infrastructure is operated by Haftar and his backers in the Eastern Oil Crescent, the institutions in charge of sales and distribution –who, therefore, receive all the monetary gain– are located in the region of Tripoli where the GNA is headquartered.8 This lack of access to key institutions explains why the LNA cannot channel oil export revenues to strengthen its forces and continue to extend its influence over the country. In fact, gaining control of these revenue ports was one of the main motivations for the LNA-led attack on Tripoli in April 2019,9 despite the LNA framing the offensive as a security issue against militias and terrorist forces.10 Despite the unsuccessful attack, the LNA resumed oil production in September 2020 following a shutdown of the sector in January 2020.11 This shutdown had been motivated by debilitating power cuts and the ongoing stalemate with the GNA in Tripoli12 rather than any concession or confidence-building measure by Haftar. In light of these country-level dynamics, a contextual interpretation of the scholarship is needed to account for the territorial distinction between oil reserves and oil revenue ports. Until the failure of the Tripoli offensive, the dominant theory of conflict length and natural resources applied to the extent that support from foreign actors like the UAE, Russia, and Saudi Arabia enabled conflict escalation by fulfilling the typical role of oil revenues to fund the LNA’s activities. In sum, these events have fostered the LNA and GNA’s defensiveness over and persistent fear of losing oil revenues With the largest proven oil reserves in the world,13 economic fragmentation has fuelled the accumulation of oil wealth since before the civil war, particularly helping to fund Qaddafi’s patronage network.14 In addition to 96% of government revenue depending on oil sales, 65% of GDP was generated by oil production activities during Qaddafi’s rule.15 This dependence on oil sales was reflected in Libya’s exports and shaped by Libya’s proximity to European markets, with 85% of production exported to Europe in 2010.16 However, this activity was threatened by the LNA-aligned Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) militia blockades from 2013 to 2018, resulting in a drop of oil revenues from an annual $40 billion to $4.6 billion.17 Considering that the Libyan economy’s level of debt remained stable until 2013, this dent in state revenues, as well as mismanagement and corruption, resulted in public service delivery failures.18 Subsequently, the current GNA and former Libyan governments including the General National Congress failed to consolidate power. Low reliability of public services forced households to turn to the black market, strengthening the hold of local militias who controlled market access, further emboldening these groups to commit violence.19 As a result, internal displacement due to militia violence became an important source of insecurity for the Libyan population. In 2019 alone, at least 215,000 new displacements were registered by the International Displacement Monitoring Centre.20 This widespread insecurity rooted in decreased oil revenues has crucial implications for the duration of the conflict, indicating that the actor who succeeds in securing both oil facilities and oil revenues will have the upper hand either to gain back popular support or foster further instability to prolong the conflict. Rival political and military forces mobilized popular discontent over state management of oil revenues to garner support for their party. This mobilization was primarily centred around petroleum facility security enforcement and allocation of the production revenues absorbed by the Central Bank of Libya (CBL).21 Since 2015, the UN-initiated Libyan Political Agreement (which formed the GNA) has only recognized the Tripoli branches of the National Oil Corporation and the CBL as the sole legitimate national economic entities.22 Despite this, the Eastern-based CBL branches still operate without regulatory enforcement.23 Consequently, insight into Libya’s opaque financial structure is limited to officials of rival branches of the CBL and military leaders.24 This poses an important challenge to the potential formation of a unity government because the opacity of these institutions distributing oil revenues is a key factor in the poor delivery of public services, resulting in the insecurity which continues to fuel insurgency. Furthermore, the strain imposed by the growth of the underground economy produces a weak economic base for long-term stability.25 The core economic issues of control over oil production and revenue management have given rise to a pervasive “shadow economy” in Libya.26 Due to inflation and the shortage of liquidity, the majority of Libyans have been pushed into coping strategies involving the black market.27 Informal payment mechanisms have increased, resulting in over half of the money in Libya circulating within the informal sector as of 2017.28 This expanded use of the informal sector has facilitated arms proliferation across borders, migrant trafficking, and international crime networks.29 This suggests that the resolution of the Libyan conflict cannot solely depend on political and military negotiation tracks30 because the economic conditions that fostered an environment favourable to armed factionalization would still remain. The United Nations Support Mission to Libya (UNSMIL) has attempted to address these economic conditions by initiating an audit of the rival CBL branches.31 However, efforts like the audit are sparse, which means that unified and transparent financial institutions are not yet on the table, therefore, compromising the plausibility of a unity government. In light of this, transparency and oil revenue distribution will remain an obstacle to political progress.32

Blurred Lines: A Closer Look at the Fezzan

Historically, the Southern Fezzan region has been excluded from the national political sphere due to its tribal dynamics that differ from an otherwise urban Libya.33 The pervasiveness of loosely-aligned militias and high factionalization in part stem from the power gap left by the highly centralized Qaddafi model of governance.34 This section presents a case study of the Fezzan through a security and economic lens to illustrate the overarching military factionalization dynamics in Libya. The Fezzan serves as a microcosm for militia activity in Libya where active militias are fuelled by illicit activities and emerge from the lack of strong municipal governance, porous borders, and constricted sources of economic growth.35 These factors threaten long-term stability prospects, especially if the South is treated as an afterthought. Since 2011, the general approach to security in the Fezzan has been to ensure short-term stability unadapted to the local context, rather than long-term peace and inclusion.36 This strategy has systematically neglected peace in the Fezzan, consequently undermining country-wide conflict resolution efforts. Current efforts at stabilization in Libya have been focused on Northern centres (themselves divided between “East” and “West”) of urbanization and licit economic activities, largely excluding the South from the “East” and “West” binary discourse.37 The geographically remote and sparsely populated Southern region is composed of the Awlad Suleiman, Tuareg, Tebu, Ahali, and Gadhadfa tribes.38 As a legacy of the Qaddafi rule, 30% of the population in this region lives without legal status.39 This lack of legal status for many facilitated militia recruitment and illegal activity during the civil war, since fighters finally had access to a salary and a national ID, both of which were not accessible to them otherwise under Qaddafi, by working for military coalitions.40 Armed actors in these informal security arrangements have replaced national police and official security forces since 2011,41 gaining local legitimacy as protectors of municipal politicians.42 These militias, military coalitions, and other groups backing the LNA and GNA have often shifted their allegiance based on territorial wins or defeats. For instance, ethnic Tuareg and Tebu militias turned away from the LNA after its advance towards Tripoli failed, and helped the GNA gain back oil fields in the South West of the country.43 Additionally, these shifts are not always coherent along tribal lines, with fighters belonging to Tuareg and Tebu tribes splitting internally along military lines.44 Importantly, the lack of factional loyalty to either the LNA or GNA indicates that most of them do not have an ideological or ethnic vested interest in the LNA or GNA. Although military victory is valuable, preferential access to the Fezzan’s main oil field is more important for comparative political power due to gains in regional influence from oil revenues on the black market. This reflects in the milias’ activity, which has since been characterized by local recruitment in Sabha, Ubari, Ghat, and Murzuq,45 but with an impact extending beyond the Fezzan. The ripples of low-level violence maintaining illicit economic activity in the South have been felt at the national level. Between 2014 and 2020, violent events in these cities represented a mere 3% of the annual average of 1040 violent events by militia and armed groups in the country.46 However, militiamen recruited from these areas have gone on to fight in incendiary regions such as Zintan, Sirte, and al Jufra for various groups, not necessarily aligned with the GNA or LNA, suggesting that conflict outside of the Fezzan may be rooted in or fuelled by recruitment and other militia activities in this region.47 Addition-ally, a number of Sudanese and Chadian fighters with unclear allegiances have benefited from the Southern porous borders to infiltrate militia ranks.48 Several law enforcement projects focused on building migrant detention centers funded by the EU have failed to materialize because the root problem of the illicit economy providing structure to migrant flows and smuggling was not addressed.49 Considering that almost 90% of the regional economy is based on black market trading of commodities and migrants,50 lucrative smuggling and trafficking will continue to weaken stabilization prospects until an equally profitable source of licit income and institutional capacity is established.51 There are two main types of smuggling; the first including fuel, food, and migrants, with a hub in Sabha.52 Rerouting oil from Sabha storage tanks to sell on the black market for a 98% profit margin instead of channelling this oil to the national distribution network is common practice.53 The second hub is in Ubari, through which arms and militant fighters easily transit due to nonexistent national border security.54 The International Crisis Group estimates that people smuggling generates $1 to $1.5 billion in annual revenue, with a truck driver able to make four times the salary of a policeman, and independent smugglers making up to twenty-five times that amount.55 With few startup resources required and a quick return on investment, there is no incentive to turn to legal routes.56 Global optimism is rising as the LNA and GNA agreed to negotiate in the Fall of 2020, but the loose nature of these actors’ alliances with armed groups means that independently of political agreements, excluded populations will continue to have economic incentives to pursue destabilizing activities, such as smuggling. The entrenchment of the Tripoli stalemate and consequently observed ceasefire between the LNA and the GNA may quell Northern cities, but demilitarizing smuggling routes and rebuilding a legal economy in the Fezzan remains a significant challenge for long-term stability. Peace talks with local tribal leaders have no concrete impact if armed group leaders are not integrated into wider national security plans, nor if competition between nominally aligned groups continues.57 Redistributing oil revenues to the broader Libyan population may help to steer some people away from the informal sector, however, this will only serve a temporary purpose if access to public services such as medical facilities remains inaccessible.58 Think tanks such as Brookings and Democracy Reporting International have proposed policy solutions entailing the implementation of variants of federalism to “empower municipalities,”59 but de-centralization alone may not be sufficient to shield Libya from renewed monopolized power in the capital as in the Qaddafi era, especially if local governments and institutions are weak and corrupt.60

When the Cat’s Away, the Mice will Play

Bridged by oil-related economic incentives, the third dynamic behind the Libyan civil war is set in motion by international actors, directly and indirectly fuelling the conflict.61 This section analyzes international actors’ incentives and extent of involvement, arguing that they have been a powerful force in conflict escalation. This “geostrategic nightmare”, as described by Tarek Megerisi in The Geostrategic Dimensions of Libya’s Civil War,62 has its roots in the 2015 creation of UNbacked institutional bodies such as the advisory High Council of State that failed to form a consensus on political rule. Instead of providing resources and a forum to resolve the crisis, these bodies have been used by international powers to pursue their own economic and geopolitical interests, siding with the actor most likely to secure these positions for them.63 Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia have been the primary countries supporting the LNA since 2012, whose ostensible motivations have chiefly been ideological. Haftar’s territorial expansion coincided with the United States-created war on terror, as his anti-political Islam rhetoric garnered the support of states redlining political Islam movements.64 However, once Islamist militias were driven out of Eastern Libya, implicit motivations for involvement remained. In the case of Egypt, Haftar was close to Egyptian head of state Abdel Fatah el-Sisi’s militarism and Egypt’s repression of the Muslim Brotherhood.65 More importantly though, security concerns at the border and reliance on remittances from expatriate workers66 shaped Egypt’s siding with the LNA to bring back stability. Overall, Egypt stood out as the actor least vested in past escalation of the conflict. Conversely, apprehension towards the Muslim Brotherhood overshadowed the UAE’s interest in Libyan hydrocarbon sources and hopes for reconstruction deals after the war.67 The UAE’s interest in the conflict is greater than Egypt’s, due to the expected payout of long-term economic projects, and this is apparent in the support it has provided. Significant military aid to the LNA was supplied in the form of arms and drones, in addition to massive disinformation campaigns to promote Haftar’s public image.68 Though Haftar is no longer seen as a viable alternative to govern the country,69 UAE-backed campaigns provided him with the next best option: popular legitimacy as a negotiating counterpart to GNA leader Fayez el-Sarraj, giving the UAE an advantage in potential settlements. Though considered a secondary external actor, another power who flooded the Libyan media landscape in favour of Haftar was Saudi Arabia.70 Saudi support for the LNA shifted from a covert approach by infiltrating Haftar’s security services through Salafist group Rabea al-Madkhali,71 to more overt support in the form of financial aid to propel the April 2019 assault on Tripoli.72 This included funding for the 300 to 2000 Russian mercenaries who participated in the assault.73 Saudi Arabia is arguably not economically motivated in their involvement with Libya, since Libya’s resource endowment competes with Saudi production. Instead, Saudi Arabia is generally understood by scholars to be grounded in making Libya a political ally in North Africa to prevent the rise of democracy in the region, which is perceived to be a threat to its authoritarian rule.74 Though less invested in the conflict than the UAE, Saudi Arabia had an interest in escalation because anything less than Haftar securing political control would indicate the failure of its political allyship goal. Therefore, Saudi Arabia may participate in lengthening the conflict if given adequate opportunity, and if this participation decreases the likelihood of an eventual transition to democracy.75 Russia has also played a key role in the escalation and duration of the conflict, making the European front appear disjointed at the UN. While most European powers have avoided this conflict,76 Russian involvement in Libya is primarily motivated by the desire to access to Europe’s southern border via Libyan ports, as well as access to oil resources.77 Russian support to Libya has come in the form of providing mercenary forces and military equipment, as well as circulating parallel currency to create instability within CBL branches.78 Russia additionally used its presence in Libya to advance relations with Egypt and the UAE to increase regional influence. Hence, the longer the conflict, the more opportunities Russia has to forge itself a seat in Mediterranean geopolitics. Conversely, the GNA mainly relies on Turkish support. Amidst international disengagement facing the GNA, Turkey was able to leverage an agreement in November 2019 granting it access to an exclusive economic zone connecting the two countries through maritime corridors.79 Considering that Turkey also has over $15 billion worth of frozen contracts with the previous Libyan administration,80 a settlement to the Libyan conflict where the GNA is victorious would translate as a sigh of relief for the Turkish economy.81 In addition, Turkey’s access to the Libyan market challenges UAE and Russian interests, upping the stakes for both sides of international interests. In this case as well, an array of military support from Turkey including air support, ground forces, equipment and training has been indispensable to the retreat of LNA forces from Tripoli.82 Though intervention by the international community in the Libyan conflict is economically motivated, the use of violence as a political tool and the zero-sum mindset of international actors has been facilitated by blatant disregard for UN-imposed sanctions since 2011 regarding military equipment and training.83 Given the lack of binding authority relating to foreign intervention, future conflict outcomes as they relate to international interference depends on whether participating actors got what they wanted out of the conflict’s progression as well as their level of involvement in the conflict.

The Case for Unity Government, Descent into Further Conflict, and the Status Quo

Given the exploration this paper has undertaken of the roles of oil wealth, factionalization in the Fezzan, and international intervention in the Libyan conflict, this section will examine three potential future scenarios for the conflict in Libya, arguing that a backsliding to the status quo is the most plausible outcome in the near future. The first scenario regards the formation of a unity government. The prolonged stalemate encountered by Haftar and his forces after the 2019 failed offensive on Tripoli provides evidence that the formation of a unity government is plausible. Despite having territorial control over a large portion of the country, it seems that the LNA has exhausted all possible avenues to make meaningful advances in terms of resources. If the GNA were to make an advance, the LNA could comfortably absorb it because of its military endowment,84 but progressing past the stalemate that has characterized the last few months by using military force is highly unlikely. Since the conflict is rooted in preferential access to resources and power rather than ideology, the peace deal signed on October 23, 2020 could succeed in reducing tension at the level of factionalization.85 Indeed, conditions of oil revenue redistribution and greater financial transparency constitute grounds on which most factions agree.86 These groups could potentially settle if they are faced with a united front by the UN - which would require Russia to change its position with respect to the LNA - especially since UNSMIL efforts have succeeded in building trust with the Libyan population.87 However, incentives relating to oil also threaten the establishment of a unity government since terms related to the oil sector were not included in the current ceasefire agreement. As Haftar has a monopoly on oil terminals but not on oil revenue centres, there may be an incentive for him to be less cooperative in peace talks if plans of resource allocation affects his oil field monopoly without adequate compensation. On the other hand, if oil wealth distribution is not addressed, meaningful progress to a unity government will not occur. After all, the nine previous failed peace talks either focused on military avenues or on election prospects.88 Haftar’s track record shows that these failures were not independent events, and a falling out is still likely to occur if economic factors are not addressed. Despite the positive impacts of oil production resuming in September 2020, the pivotal points of national oil production security and unification of rival economic institutions remain unaddressed in conflict resolution efforts. Furthermore, a needs-based approach to federalism in the new government could adapt to the tribal dynamics in the Fezzan, and facilitate access to services. More broadly, a unifying dynamic of decentralized elements can facilitate buy-in, as that system would move away from Libya’s highly centralized political history. The best case to exemplify the potential power of community buy-in is the community-level buy-in demonstrated in Northern Libya, which has helped to maintain the benefits of the current ceasefire. If this community buy-in is widely maintained, there may be more wiggle room for compromise between the LNA and GNA to occur. On one hand, grievances have not changed; on the other hand, the LNA is running out of options. Unless international backers sustain Haftar financially, it will be difficult for the LNA to maintain its operations, making place for negotiations that could usher in a unity government. While the unity government outcome is plausible because of the entranchement of the stalemate and the existence of common ground to decrease factionaliation, such positive prospects are weak owing to the current political exclusion of the Southern region. The second, and least plausible scenario, is that of a further descent into conflict, akin to that of Syria and Yemen.89 The likelihood of this scenario depends largely on escalation from foreign actors who are competing for economic and geopolitical advantage, using Libya as a proxy. The previous sections of this paper have demonstrated the significance of economic and territorial incentives in maintaining international actors’ involvement in the conflict. Therefore, if these incentives show promise of being increased or maintained in value as the conflict continues, it is likely that international actors may maintain or increase their involvement in prolonging the conflict. Some sources even argue that Libya could be geopolitically split in half between Turkish and Russian control in the event that economic and territorial incentives are great enough.90 The plausibility of this outcome can be directly evaluated by assessing the actors’ current degree of involvement and whether their mandate justifying this involvement has been fulfilled. Egypt’s primary motivation for involvement was its concern over violence spillovers at the border. Seeing that the ceasefire has quelled tensions on that front, there is no reason for Egypt to be interested in escalation of the conflict. Saudi Arabia had bet on Haftar’s capturing of Tripoli, and the failure of this bet makes future gains from Haftar seem unlikely. Thus, Saudi Arabia has few incentives to forge a political alliance with the LNA. Additionally, given Saudi Arabia’s generally backseat role throughout most of the conflict, a belligerent offense is also unlikely unless the opportunity arises externally from another country, such as a Russian initiative. Though the UAE and Russia’s economic interests have not been secured, further escalation of conflict may not be conducive to a favourable position in settlement talks if the ceasefire continues to be successful. Since Haftar has a seat at the negotiation table with the GNA, these two countries are likely to have one too given their important support to secure that negotiating position. Turkey is another actor whose economic interests cannot materialize at present, however, further destruction and warfare would not be helpful if it wants to recuperate its frozen assets and benefit from its maritime border agreement. Overall, a descent into further conflict is the least likely outcome: although foreign meddling continues to foster instability, incentives towards escalation are low. Conversely, the argument for a backsliding to the status quo stands on caveats in the current ceasefire, specifically relating to Southern security concerns. This could take the form of Southern militias breaking the ceasefire under the promise of monetary compensation from the LNA. Recent news sources are pushing an optimistic narrative for the ceasefire to hold until more concrete political developments occur, but there is less talk of follow-through from the very broad clauses of the agreement.91 Though the ceasefire document prioritizes the military track, it makes no mention of security concerns near the South border.92 As outlined in the Fezzan case, there are no incentives for local actors to reduce illicit activity and alternative livelihoods to support communities are inexistant. As long as no such incentives or efforts exist, smuggling routes across borders will remain operational, giving space for insurgency to evolve, potentially triggering a backslide. Thus, even if costs of breaking the ceasefire are high enough for the LNA and GNA, armed groups that are not included in negotiations could spoil the national ceasefire since both the LNA and GNA have failed to acknowledge the support received from loose alliances.93 Though the Tripoli stalemate showed that Northern factions have less of an incentive to see the country destabilized, there is no authority in place to demobilize the volatile armed groups. This is especially relevant in the South, where the breakdown of the security apparatus and weak state infrastructure enabled fighting groups to recruit freely across borders. Therefore, if strides to counter the growth of the shadow economy are not taken, the locally observed national ceasefire will likely not last. Additionally, even if there is success in disarming or demobilizing foreign fighters, their respective countries may not take them back. This could lead to a “guns for hire” situation in the Sahel region, or influence foreign fighters’ incentive structure to keep the status quo in Libya.94 The importance of including Fezzan-based military leaders in a wider national security strategy also has general relevance when looking at the LNA’s structure. Haftar’s forces are partially composed of the remnants of Qaddafi’s army, despite popular demand for Qaddafi officers to be sacked from ranks and positions of power. The inclusion decision regarding these actors is thus crucial and goes unaddressed in the peace deal. In short, factors threatening the possibility of a unity government not only apply to backsliding, but they are compounded by military instability in the South, making a backslide of the conflict towards a status quo the most likely outcome.

Conclusion

In conclusion, a backslide to the status quo is the most plausible scenario for the outcome of the Libyan civil war over the coming three years. Although disjointed international intervention has been key in escalation at the heyday of the conflict, domestic dynamics have generally prevailed in influencing the conflict. Hence, hopes for stability in Libya hinge on the domestic struggle over the country’s oil wealth resources and insecurity relating to factionalization in the Fezzan. Addressing the latter could take the form of integrating tribal and military leaders in the security negotiations, as well as providing the region with legal economic alternatives. Currently, the military-focused ceasefire agreement does not pay attention to economic stabilization which has been demonstrated to be crucial for long term stability. Mismanagement and corruption of available oil revenues maintain public service delivery failures, fueling insecurity via the shadow economy as militias profit from the control of black markets. Furthermore, hopes of demilitarizing smuggling routes and porous borders in the Fezzan are meagre because of a lack of licit sources of income and institutional capacity. These precarious factors weaken the possibility of a transition to a unity government in the coming years, suggesting that the most plausible outcome in the short run for Libya’s civil war is a backslide to the status quo.

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