GIESEKE, WILLIAM D. — CONTESTED STORIES: SELF-NARRATIVES OF CHILDREN OF DIVORCED PARENTS

The Institute for Clinical Social Work

CONTESTED STORIES: SELF-NARRATIVES OF CHILDREN OF DIVORCED PARENTS

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Institute for Clinical Social Work in Partial Fulfillment for the Degree Of Doctor Of Philosophy

By WILLIAM D. GIESEKE

Chicago, Illinois June, 2006

ABSTRACT

This research investigated how adolescents and young adults of divorced parents assign personal meaning to their decision to change the child-parent living arrangements. The study used a clinical ethnography methodology and interviewed twelve research participants. Although this study was exploratory in nature, it is the first to look at the process and the assignment of meaning by the adolescents and young adults to this decision.

This study found that the contested nature of the parental divorce permeated this process for the research participants. Other narrative themes that emerged from t hepa r t i c i pa nt s ’l i f es t or i e swe r eTo-Save-the-Relationship, Following-a-FamilyPrecedent or Coming-of-Age, The Battle-of-the-Narrators, Strengthening-theRelationship, and More-Independence or More-Self-Control. Implications for theory, research, social policies, and clinical practice were explored.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Writing a dissertation is both a process and a journey; in my case it became a rather long journey. The questions that this dissertation addresses arose while I was being trained in the late fall of 1989 to work with children and parents in the process of divorce. It was then that I made a promise to Judith Wallerstein and Janet Johnston to contribute to the research literature on children of divorced parents. I try hard to keep my promises, even if it takes me nearly two decades.

The opportunity to even consider attempting to write a dissertation was made possible only because of my seventh grade English teacher, Mrs. Cozine. Prior to being Mr s .Coz i ne ’ ss t ude nt ,Iha de i t he rf a i l e dt ol e a r norIne ve rha dbe e nt a ug hthowt o write a complete sentence, much less a complete paragraph. During my seventh grade year, she committed herself to enabling me to write. Without her daily writing exercises and her constant support, I might never have learned how to put my thoughts into writing. In this same category is my editor and good friend, Susan Joy Irion. Susan is responsible for much of the readability of this document. Without her generous and constructive help, I would never have been able to finish the writing, much less, to make my thoughts understandable to a reader.

I have been extremely fortunate in my professional life to have had a series of extraordinary teachers, mentors and friends. The late Ben Wheatley and Paul Stein,

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before their untimely deaths, were generous teachers, mentors, colleagues, and friends.

I owe both of them a great debt for the clinician that with their help and guidance I have become. Dottie Palombo has been a good and generous colleague, mentor, and friend. I credit her for much of my ability to process groups and organizations.

I have had two outstanding teachers in my professional training. The first was and continues to be Joe Palombo. He has provided me with a keen appreciation of the role of theory and philosophy as it influences clinical practice. Over many years he has served for me as the ideal of the scholar/clinician. Thayer Lindner has been the latest a ddi t i ont ot hi spe nt a dofc l i ni c a la ndt e a c hi nge xc e l l e nc e .Tha ye r ’ shug ec ur i os i t ya nd wide reading habits have helped me to forge a bridge from my narrow training in the sciences to the wider world of the humanities.

My classmates in Class X of the Child and Adolescent Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy Training Program at the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis were and have continued to be instrumental in my ongoing clinical thinking and practice.

Specifically, I would like to thank Judy Faigen, Nan Knight-Birnbaum, Susan Litoff, and especially Lynn Borenstein for their ongoing support and friendship. Collectively, and individually, they have had a major influence on how I think about and hear clinical material. The outstanding faculty of this program together with my classmates provided me with the bedrock of my clinical skills.

My cohort at the Institute for Clinical Social Work provided me with both the inspiration and the determination to finish this project. Several classmates specifically deserve recognition. Sergio Grajeda has been for me an inspirational model of

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determination. His ability to literally switch professions, languages, and cultures has left me in awe about the resilience of the human spirit. The late Sylvia Vonil sensitized met ot hei mpor t a nc eofc ont e xta sa na c t i veva r i a bl ei nde ve l opme nt .AnneGe a r i t y’ s incredible ability to read, synthesize, and sensitively explain complex clinical and theoretical material has been a real source of joy and envy. Merv Bontrager has to be one of the most decent and sensitive human beings I have ever met. Finally in Chad Breckenridge I found a colleague and friend who I have experienced as a long lost brother. I am much indebted to these last three friends for their ongoing support and encouragement in completing this dissertation.

Janet Kohrman has been a helpful dissertation committee member and a valued colleague throughout this dissertation process. In addition, I am thankful for Dean AmyEl dr i dg e ’ sg ui da nc ea nds uppor ti nhe l pi ngmena vi g a t i ngt hr oug ht heI ns t i t ut e for Clinical Social Work. Older experienced clinicians are not always the easiest of students, and I am sure that my characteristic independence and stubbornness provided her with quite a challenge.

This research could not have been completed without the personal generosity of the research participants. Their willingness to openly share their stories with me and explore the meanings that they had assigned to these events in their lives added profundity and verisimilitude to this work.

Despite never really understanding the understanding of all my inquisitiveness came, my parents, Lenice Meyer Gieseke and Harvey A. Gieseke, have always stood by me. In addition, my parents instilled in me a work ethic, bordering on workaholic,

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and they taught me that perseverance has its own rewards. My sister, Kathy, entered my life as a wonder to me, aged to become a pain, and now, as we have mellowed, has returned to wonderment for me.

My stepchildren, Kyle Anders Thomas Kick and Carson Hale Thomas, have been and continue to be a great blessing in my life. They have taught me how, and how not, to parent. They have been generous with both their helpful criticism and their love. They have inspired me to study children of divorced parents in part because of their experiences growing up with divorce. I am a better parent and, more importantly, a better person because of them. For me they will always be my children, for my love of them is complete. Each has married wonderful and well-suited partners.

Kyle married Rick Kick and they have two astonishing children, Teagan and Mackenzie. Carson married Tria Hagenah and they have two amazing children, Hale and Pavely. These four grandchildren are a great source of joy for me. I am pleased that having finished this dissertation I now will be able to spend more time with all of them.

And most important of all to me is Gaylord Andersen Gieseke who has been my partner and other half. I truly admire her work on behalf of all children. However, without her love, and encouragement, I would never have begun, much less finished, this dissertation journey.

WDG

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page ABS TRACT………………………………………………………………………………. . . . . . . ………. . . i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS …………………………………………………………………. . . . . . …. . i i i Chapter I.

I NTRODUCTI ON…. ………………………………………………. . . . . . ……….

1

II.

BACKGROUND OFRES EARCH PROBLEM…. . . ……………. . . . . . ….

6

III.

FORMULATI ON OFTHERES EARCH PROBLEM……. . . . . . . . . …. . .

1 4

IV.

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK…. . . . . . . . . . .

1 9

V.

LITERATURE REVIEW....................................................................31 The Wallerstein Research Position The Hetherington Research Position Consilience of the Research Findings YoungChi l dr e n’ sAdj us t me ntt oPa r e ntal Divorce S c hoolAg eChi l dr e n’ sAdj us t me ntt oPa r e nt a lDi vor c e Adol e s c e nt s ’Adj us t me ntt oPa r e nt a lDi vor c e

VI.

THEORETICAL ROOT METAPHORS..........................................105

VII.

SELF PSYCHOLOGY........................................................................114

VIII.

MEMORY............................................................................................139

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TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued

Chapter IX.

Page DEVELOPMENT OF A SELF-NARRATIVE..................................145 Infancy and the Emerging Sense of Self Early to Middle Childhood Middle to Late Childhood Early Adolescence Middle Adolescence Late Adolescence and Early Adulthood

X.

PERSONAL IDENTITY.....................................................................181

XI.

THE DIALOGICAL SELF.................................................................203

XII.

METHODOLOGY.............................................................................223 Research Design Participants Setting Instruments

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TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued

Chapter

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XIII. FINDINGS...........................................................................................239 Introduction to the Findings Colleen: Growing Up without Generational Boundaries Josie: Battling the Narrative of the Traditional Family Glenda: Following the Tradition of an Older Sister Callie: No Place to Call Home Esther: An Odyssey to Find a Parent Ke i r a :Mor eComf or t a bl eEa t i nga tDa d’ sHous e Emmett: From the Frying Pan to the Fire Bobbie-Jo: Just an Easier Life Ida: “ S t r a i g ht e nUpa ndFl yRi g ht ” Otis: They Both Love Me, No Matter What Ll oyd:“ IBe c a meHe rHobby” J a r r e t t :S ol omon’ sDe c i s i ona ta nEa r l yAg e Discussion and Emergent Themes Contested Stories Following a Family Precedent or A Coming-of-Age To Save the Relationship The Battle of the Narrators Strengthening the Relationship More Independence or More Self-Control Summary XIII. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS.........................................369 Implications for Theory Implications for Research Implications for Social Policies Implications for Clinical Practice Appendixes A. FORMS......................................................................................................417 B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS WITH OPPORTUNISTIC TIMING.........424 REFERENCES................................................................................................427 ix

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION This dissertation arose as I explored how to apply in my clinical practice the theories and techniques that I was learning in my clinical training for working with the children of divorced parents. Some of my patients, children of divorced parents, seemed to experience developmental milestones in ways that differ, but are no less va l i dt ha n,t he“ nor ma l ”de ve l opme ntoft he“ c l a s s i c ”c hi l d.I ns e a r c hofa ne xpl a na t i on for this disjunction, I developed a series of related questions.

Thef i r s tque s t i onwa swha twoul dt hemode lf or“ nor ma lde ve l opme nt ”bel i ke if a child grew up with divorced parents instead of in a nuclear family. The second question was what if nuclear families were no longer the norm of our society how might normal development be conceptualized? The third question was how could I understand an adolescent whose parents were divorced, but who wanted to change her/his child-parent living arrangements. There seemed to me a sense in which this was a necessary psychological task in growing up for this adolescent and perhaps others in similar circumstances. I became more convinced that this was a necessary psychological task as I considered the issues of two such adolescents in my clinical

2 practice at the time. The fourth question that occurred to me at about the same time was, whether there was any research literature on these questions.

These questions foreshadow the organization and the discussions of this dissertation. I challenge in Chapter II what I consider to be an implicit assumption in models of child development in the western world, i.e., that the model of normal child development is still based on children growing up in nuclear families. In addition, I define a particular group of children of divorced parents, who may help me challenge this implicit assumption of our culture, and also may help me to study the reasons that the members of this group use for changing their child-parent living arrangement. My assumption is that a close examination of the reasons used to make this change may also provide a window of opportunity to catch a narrative glimpse at a group of individuals in the process of reworking or revising their self-narratives. I finish this chapter by contesting current prevailing assumptions in clinical social work and in the American court system about what motivates these adolescents to make this change.

I begin to define in Chapter III the prevalence among children of divorced parents of changing child-parent living arrangements. In addition, I begin to pose some methodological questions about previous research and begin to introduce the methodology that I have used in my research. Lastly, I pose the central research question of this dissertation: what are the self-narrative reasons for making this change in child-parent living arrangements.

3 Chapter IV provides the larger theoretical and conceptual framework in which I want to place this research. This chapter explores a possible link to the larger question about models of human development within different contexts.

I critically review the research literature on children of divorced parents in Chapter V. This review reveals the contested nature of the research literature which I believe parallels the contested nature of the divorce process. The chapter ends with what I consider to be the consilience to be found in the literature if it is considered from a development point of view.

Chapter VI introduces the philosophical context for how theoretical root metaphors are used by psychological theories. This chapter is about context in the largest sense of the word. It explicates how theories creates a basic perspective for perceiving, clarifying and interpreting events, while at the same time theories constrain what can be perceived, clarified and interpreted.

Chapter VII introduces Self Psychology as the psychological theory that I used in understanding and assigning meaning to t her e s e a r c hpa r t i c i pa nt ’ ss t or i e s .Ir e de f i ne Self Psychology into a contextual theoretical root metaphor so that my psychological theory is compatible with the kind of data, a recollected self-narrative, that is to be analyzed.

Chapter VIII discusses memory because the research participants had to use their memory to create and tell their story. Understanding how memory works becomes important to analyze how the participants assign meaning to their experience and tell their life stories. Just as important is how I use my memory to assign meaning

4 t ot he i rs t or i e s .I na ddi t i on,t hi sc ha pt e rc onc e r nshowt hepa r t i c i pa nt s ’me mor i e sma y constrain the data and introduce possible sources of research errors.

Chapter IX describes the creation of a self-narrative as seen during various developmental periods from childhood to young adulthood. This chapter explains how brain development and, specifically, cognitive change, over time allow for the creation and elaboration of increasing complex self-narratives. In addition, this chapter traces the increasing complexity of self-narratives as developmental phases progress from childhood to young adulthood.

The concept of personal identity, sense of self, and narrative themes are concepts that are defined and explored in Cha pt e rX.Thedi s c us s i on“ unpa c ks ”t he s e terms and their core assumptions. In addition, my core presumption that there is one nuc l e a rs e l fi sc ont r a s t e dwi t ht hec ons t r uc t i vi s t s ’pr e s umpt i onofmul t i pl es e l ve s .I , further, propose that there is a relatively stable psychological experience that is internally perceived as a sense of self. I advocate that my assumption has more verisimilitude than the concept that specific social actions, often fleeting, lead to psychological/sociological construction of a self.

Cha pt e rXIl a yst hef ounda t i ont ous eBa kht i n’ s( 1 9 8 1 ,1 9 8 4 ,1 9 8 5 ,1 9 8 6 ) c onc e pt ua l i z a t i onoft he“ Di a l og i c a lS e l f ”a same a nst oe xa mi net hei nt e r a c t i ons be t we e nc ont e xta ndas e ns eofs e l f .Thi s“ Di a l og i c a lS e l f ”be c ome saus e f ult oolf ort he narra t i vea na l ys i soft her e s e a r c hpa r t i c i pa nt s ’r e c ol l e c t e ds t or i e sa nds e l f -narratives. By the end of this chapter I have created and defined a postmodern interpretative point of view. This viewpoint allows me to analyze and create multiple dialogues with and

5 a mongt her e s e a r c hpa r t i c i pa nt s ’na r r a t i ve sa boutc ha ng i ngt he i rc hi l d-parent living a r r a ng e me nt s .I ti sf r om t hi ss t a nc et ha tIc a nc a pt ur et hepa r t i c i pa nt s ’s e ns e sofs e l f and their self-narratives.

I define and construct my research design of clinical ethnography in Chapter XII. I characterize who my research participants were and how I gathered their stories.

I try to anticipate possible sources of research error. In addition, I outline the research interview process and the methods of data collection.

The final two chapters identity and discuss the findings. By using detailed descriptions, I depict the findings of each research participant. Finally, I use the collective depictions to create a Bakhtinian dialogue among the various participants.

These Ba kht i ni a ndi a l og ue sr e ve a lc ommont he me sa monga l loft hepa r t i c i pa nt ’ ss e l f narratives which create a larger sense of verisimilitude for the findings of my research.

I then consider the implications of this research for the field of clinical social work and for further research on this topic.

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CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM Ius et hewor d“ c ont e xt ”t ome a nt hehuma ne xpe r i e nc eoft hewor l d.Common sense tells us that the world is very different than it was four decades ago. Context, therefore, is always changing. In fact, context involves contrasts. First, context is an independent variable because, in part, it is the surround of living. It is also a dependent variable because context is influenced by our living, just as our living is influenced by our changing surroundings. Second, context is independent of culture; context just “ i s . ”Ne ve r t he l e s s ,c ont e xti sde pe nde ntonc ul t ur et og i vei tme a ni ng .Al lc ul t ur e s s t r uc t ur ea ndc ons t r a i nt he‘ wha t ’ sa nd‘ how’ sofpe r c e pt i on.These are philosophic positions that philosophers have thought and written in relationship to context for centuries.

I became interested in context as I contemplated human development over the last forty-plus years. As a student of child development I thought about how a child might develop differently within a different surrounding. As a psychotherapist I thought about how my patient might be different if he/she had grown up in a different family, or a different culture, or a different period in time. Later, as a teacher of child development, I thought about how a child developing in a different context might be

7 affected by that contextual change. As I thought and read about context in child development, it was clear to me that academic child development specialists were thinking about similar ideas. Identical twin research studies, where the twins had been separated shortly after birth and each had grown up essentially in different environments, began to be reported in the research literature. It seemed to me that the focus of these studies was more on how the twins were similar despite the different contexts each had in growing up. In other words, context was seen as an independent variable in these studies.

My reflections about child development were constrained in part by my own development; I grew up during a specific time, in a specific place, within a specific family and as part of a specific culture. I had learned models and theories of child development claimed to be universal, rather than relative. I was moderately c omf or t a bl et ha tIkne wa“ t r ut h, ”or ,a tami ni mum,ade ve l opme ntt he or yt ha tc oul d be said to be highly associated with the truth.

Fortunately for me, I was only moderately comfortable with the state of my knowledge about child development. Then, I had children. Whatever comfort I thought that I had about child development rather quickly left when I had real child development going on in front of me and with me. Child development was no longer a remembered past modified by learning and life experience to contemplate. Now, child development was right before my eyes.

Becoming a parent involved sudden change for me without an opportunity to “ e a s e ”i nt omyne wr ol e .Ig otma r r i e da ndIha dc hi l dr e nbe c a us et hewoma nt ha tI

8 married had two small children. Our marriage immediately included being a stepparent to a young stepdaughter and a younger stepson. Immediately, I realized that my new family was very different than the nuclear family that I grew up in. I tried to t hi nka boutmyc hi l dr e n’ sdevelopment and I knew that their experience was going to be very different than mine. To educate myself about their needs, I started to read about divorce and child development. At the time there was very little written about divorce or the affect that parental divorce might have on children.

In part as a reaction to our family circumstances and in part as element of my career aspirations I became a student of child development again. Fortunately, over the last 36 years a great deal has been written on the subject to help new stepparents such as myself. As a student, I observed context was absent in the models and theories on child development. Later, I became a teacher of normal and abnormal child development. By the time I started teaching, I could see that context was beginning to creep into development discussions, and universal conceptualizations were giving way to more relative formulations. Postmodernism had arrived. Diversity was now being discussed, yet despite these gains child development generally was being taught approximately with the same content as when I first learned it.

The point I want to make is that American children are growing up today in a very different context than the children growing up 50, 25, or 10 years ago. The American culture has undergone tremendous change during this period. In parallel, the demographic of the average expectable family of children has changed, but this change has not fully penetrated the texts on child development. I want to consider these

9 significant changes that have occurred in the average expectable family and see how these changes are reflected in child development texts. Further, I want to consider how these changes in the average expectable family might influence our understanding of family functioning and/or child development. The implicit assumption of many child development texts that all or even most children grow up in nuclear families is wrong.

The U.S. Bureau of the Census (2004) reported for 2003 that nearly 73 million children under the age of 18 are growing up in the United States. This group represents 25% of the total United States population. The Census Bureau reported for November 2004 an American divorce rate of 0.37% annually per capita. In addition, the Census Bureau (Kreider & Fields, 2002) projects that between 40 to 50% of first marriages will e ndi ns e pa r a t i onordi vor c ewi t hi n1 5ye a r s .I fBumpa s s ’( 1 9 8 4 )pr oj e c t i onsa r e correct, this would mean in 2003 there were over 36 million children below age 18 who experienced the divorce of their parents. These reports and projections make it difficult to continue to think that American children will be growing up in an average expectable nuclear family. Nevertheless, many child development texts still assume that the nuclear family context predominates.

Rather, I think that it is more reasonable to conclude the average expectable context in which American children are developing has changed over the last 40 years.

For 2004 the U.S. Census Bureau (2005) reported that between 68 and 69% of all children between the ages of zero and 17 lived with two married parents. This does not mean they lived in nuclear families with the original two biological or adoptive parents. This statistic means that the combination of remarried families and nuclear

10 families equals 68 to 69%. The same Census report indicated that 21% lived with a single mother and four percent lived with a single father. These statistics support that children today are growing up in many more different types of contexts than children were 40 years ago.

I suggest that these statistics have important meaning for how a society/culture defines an average expectable family. Moreover, I propose that as the definition of an average expectable context changes it creates a definitional ripple in a metaphorical contextual pond. Changes of definition about what is average and expectable have an ongoing ripple affect on child development which in turn may have a ripple affect on what is considered normal psychological development. Specifically, I am presenting the idea that this changing context creates a flux of change in every other concept that it intersects.

I sought to isolate this contextual flux of change and see how it may influence t hede ve l opme ntofac hi l d’ ss e ns eofs e l fa ndac hi l d’ ss e l f -narrative. I wanted to study this in a subgroup of children whose (a.) parents have divorced, and (b.) who during their adolescence decided to change their child-parent living arrangements. Specifically, I wanted to study those children, who if they had been living primarily with one parent as the result of the divorce decree and decided sometime between the ages of 13 and 19 to live primarily with the other parent.

The research community has reported very little about the basis for these a dol e s c e nt s ’de c i s i onst oc ha ng et he i rc hi l d-parent living arrangements. Moreover, what has been reported does not directly relate that decision to the enormous changes

11 that have occurred to our society during the last four decades. Consequently, the way wede s c r i bea na dol e s c e nt ’ sde c i s i ont oc ha ng eher/his living arrangement is too often framed within a conceptual framework that assumes that the nuclear family is the c ul t ur a lnor m.Fore xa mpl e ,a na dol e s c e nt ’ sde c i s i ont oc ha ng ehe r / hi sl i vi ng arrangements in a nuclear family is usually seen by the clinical and legal communities a s“ t hea dol e s c e ntr unni nga wa yf r om home . ”Runni nga wa ywi t hi nourc ul t ur a l norms is seen as a pathological solution to a family and personal problem.

Consequently, our society has created laws and mores that attempt to prevent this action by the adolescent.

One of the questions, but not the only question, that I want to examine with t hi sr e s e a r c hi swhe t he rt hea dol e s c e nt ’ sde c i s i ont oc ha ng ehe r / hi sl i vi ngs i t ua t i on wi t hhe r / hi sdi vor c e dpa r e nt si sr e a l l y“ r unni nga wa y. ”Culturally, because we presume currently that the norm is the nuclear family, such a decision by the adolescent is often perceived as running away. I recognize that for the divorced parent being left, it may feel like the adolescent is running away. However, no one really knowst heba s i sf ort hea dol e s c e nt ’ sde c i s i ont oc ha ng e ,ornott oc ha ng e ,he r / hi sc hi l dparent living situation. Foucault (1972, 1994, 1997) has cautioned us how cultural presumptions and the language we use to describe a phenomenon frames our understanding of a decision and an event. In light of the reports from the U.S. Bureau of the Census over the last four decades about the changing composition and structure of American families, and the changing living arrangements children have,

12 presumptions that label behavior as running away or pathological must now be called into question.

In their longitudinal study of children of divorced parents, Buchanan, Maccoby, and Dornbusch (1996) reported in Adolescents After Divorce that one-third of their sample population changed child-parent living arrangements during the fourand-a-half year period of their study. They constructed their sample to be representative of the entire population. Therefore, their findings suggest that a similar proportion of all children of divorced parents are making similar changes across the nation. Their finding thus suggests that each year millions of adolescents of divorced parents are in the process of changing their child-parent living arrangements.

However, neither their research, nor any other research to date, explains the basis for these changes. A professional research librarian and I have extensively and repeatedly searched the psychological, sociological, and social work literature and have failed to identify or find any research that looks specifically at the phenomena of changing child-parent living arrangements in divorced families. Furthermore, none of these literature searches uncovered any research into the decision-making process from the point of view of the adolescent who is making this decision. Therefore, I propose to examine the personal meaning to the adolescent of her/his decision to change childparent living arrangements from a phenomenological view that looks to describe the structures of experience, and a hermeneutic point of view that seeks to understand the original intended meaning of the experience. (Denzin, 1989a, 1989b, 1997; Husserl, 1977, 1982; Husserl & Husserl, 1970; Moustakas, 1994)

13 In addition, I propose to look at this decision from a point of view without the t r a di t i ona lbi a sofours oc i e t yt ha tt he s ec hi l dr e na r e“ r unni nga wa y. �Mor e ove r ,Ido not assume that this decision is by its very nature pathological. Since this research will use an interpretative, phenomenological, and hermeneutic methodology, it should only be considered exploratory in its use. However, I hope that the research results will be useful to clinicians in clinical social work and in clinical psychology, and to the lawyers and judges of the domestic divorce courts, by increasing the understanding of this phenomenon of changing child-parent living arrangements.

On the other hand, not all adolescents of divorced parents change their childparent living arrangements by their own choice. The divorced parents of some adolescents, whose child-parent living arrangements change, make this decision for their children. For other adolescents there is no desire to change the parent-child living arrangements that were set forth in the original divorce decree. It is beyond the scope of this research study to examine these two subgroups of adolescents who decide to remain in the child-parent living arrangements that were set out in the divorce decree or of adole s c e nt swhos epa r e nt sde c i de dt oc ha ng et he i rc hi l dr e n’ sl i vi nga r r a ng e me nt s .

These phenomena might be a later topic of study to consider after this first exploratory study is completed.

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CHAPTER III

FORMULATION OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM There is a subset of adolescents within the group of all adolescents of divorced parents, who decide during their adolescence to change the child-parent living arrangements that were set forth in the divorce decree of their parents. Buchanan, Maccoby, and Dornbusch (1996) in their book, Adolescents After Divorce, have identitified and to a degree quantified this subgroup. Many clinical social workers, clinical psychologists, psychiatrists, and attorneys have worked with this subgroup, s i nc et he r ei sc ur r e nt l yapr e s umpt i ont ha tt hea dol e s c e nt ’ sde c i s i onma ybe pa t hol og i c a l .Thea dol e s c e nt ’ sa c t i onma ybede e me dpa t hol og i c a lbe c a us et he adolescent is countering the wishes of one parent, i.e., is running away, or at very least because the decision is psychologically stressful for the adolescent. However, a search of the relevant psychological and sociological literature has not found a research study that supports this presumption or a research study in which the adolescents actually were asked to describe their feelings and/or thoughts in making such a decision. This study intends to attempt to test this presumption along with other presumptions, and to close this gap in the research literature.

15 Buchanan and her colleagues (1996) provide a sociological descriptive study that strives to describe the characteristics of adolescents in various child-parent living arrangements. The Buchanan study looked at three different custodial arrangements: 1. adolescents who live primarily with their mothers (primary maternal physical custody), 2. adolescents who live primarily with their fathers (primary paternal physical custody), and 3. adolescents who live in joint physical custody with both the mothers and father, meaning that the actual time spent with both parents is approximately equal.

The i rr e s e a r c hpr oj e c twa sc a l l e d“ TheS t a nf or dCus t odyPr oj e c t . ”I ti nvol ve di ni t i a l l y over 1,100 families in two California counties. The study was conducted in two phases.

I n“ S t udy1 , ” parents were interviewed on three successive occasions, covering a period of approximately three and a half years from the time of parental separation. This phase of the study dealt focally with the residential and visitation arrangements for the children—how these arrangements were arrived at, whether they were stable over time, and if not, how and why they changed. Both legal and physical custody (or residence) were considered. A second major focus was on co-parenting: how the parental responsibilities were divided between the two parents, how (and whether) the parents communicated, whether they were able

16 to cooperate in matters concerning the children, and how much interparental conflict existed. (Buchanan et al., 1996, p. 8-9) The results of this first phase of the research were reported in Dividing the Child: Social and Legal Dilemmas of Custody. (Maccoby & Mnookin, 1992) This book r e por t e dt her e s e a r c hf i ndi ng sf r om t hepa r e nt s ’pe r s pe c t i ve .“ S t udy2 ”wa saf ol l ow-up study of the adolescent c hi l dr e ni nt hef a mi l i e si nc l ude di n“ S t udy1 . ”Thi ss e c ond study involved telephone interviews with children aged 10 to 18, who had been 6 years or older at the time their parents separated. This study focused on this group of children because the researc he r sf e l tt he“ c hi l dr e nwe r ea bl et ode s c r i bet he i rl i ve si n detail, and they were capable of reflecting on their own perceptions and reactions to e ve nt si nt he i rf a mi l i e s . ”( p.9 )Thel ong i t udi na lna t ur eoft hec ombi ne ds t udi e s allowed the researchers to: link information obtained from the adolescents to information obtained from their parents during the preceding years. In particular we could contrast the adjustment of adolescents whose parents maintained a cooperative co-parental relationship with those whose parents were conflicted. And we could see whe t he ra dol e s c e nta dj us t me ntwa sr e l a t e dt ot hehi s t or yofa na dol e s c e nt ’ s residential arrangements. In an earlier study, we found that residential arrangements were often unstable and in a number of cases did not correspond to the form of physical custody specified in the divorce degree. Substantial numbers of children moved from one parental household to another, into or out of joint custody. We could ask not only about the impact of each of the

17 three reside nt i a la r r a ng e me nt sonac hi l d’ sa dj us t me nt ,buta l s oa boutt he impact of a history of residential instability. (Buchanan et al., 1996, p. 9) The Stanford Custody Project research findings provide a sociological framework for the phenomenological perspective of my research. My research pr ovi de st hea dol e s c e nt s ’pe r s ona lme a ni nga boutt he i rde c i s i onst oc ha ng et he i rc hi l dparent living arrangements. The findings from my research may test, the presumptive theoretical and clinical position of the helping professions that a change of an adolescent residence under these circumstances is by definition a part of a pathological process.

Ia g r e ewi t ht her e s e a r c he r sof“ TheS t a nf or dCus t odyPr oj e c t ”whof e l t a dol e s c e nt soft he i rs t udy,“ we r ea bl et ode s c r i bet he i rlives in detail, and they were capable of reflecting on their own perceptions and reactions to events in their f a mi l i e s , ”( p.9 )Ique s t i onhowe ve r ,whe t he rt hema j or i t yofa dol e s c e nt sa r ea bl et odo this adequately during a telephone interview. In general support of the verisimilitude of adolescent self-reports, Amato and Ochiltree (1987) found that adolescents are actually quite accurate reporters of their experiences and are capable of sensitively reflecting on their perceptions and experiences. These research findings would support the usefulness and verisimilitude of adolescent narrative self-reports about the bases for their decisions to change child-parent living arrangements.

Therefore, I adopted the narrative self-report methodology, but I employed it in face-to-face interviews with the adolescents. What I hoped to learn from the adolescent directly was, (a) How did you make the decision to change your child-

18 parent living arrangements? and (b) Do you remember what feelings you had about yourself, when and while you were making this decision?

I anticipated that the answers to these two questions would reveal the personal meanings to the adolescents of their considerations in changing child-parent living arrangements. Furthermore, the personal meanings that adolescents assigned to their decisions and their narrative self-reports of their lived experiences can provide a glimpse to whom they were becoming, or had become as a person. Specifically, the assignment of personal meanings to experiences can become a vantage point for a r e s e a r c he rt ol ooka ta dol e s c e nt s ’pe r s ona li de nt i t y( Ande r s on,1 9 9 7 ;Er i ks on,1 9 5 0 , 1959, 1968) their sense of their selves, and their self-narratives. (Palombo, 2001)

19

CHAPTER IV

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK Meaning is hypothesized in this postmodern post-positivistic world to be created in the mind of the thinker/perceiver. Jerome Bruner (1986) joined this philosophical debate when he proposed that there are basically two modes of thought.

The two modes of thought he proposed are complementary but distinct, i.e., neither c a nber e duc e dt ot heot he r .“ Ef f or t st or e duc eonemodet ot heot he rori g nor eonea t thee xpe ns eoft heot he ri ne vi t a bl yf a i lt oc a pt ur et her i c hdi ve r s i t yoft houg ht . ”( p.1 1 ) Each mode has its own distinct way of interpreting reality and each has its own criteria for being well-formed.

One mode of thought is the paradigmatic, or logico-scientific thinking. This me t hodoft hi nki ngi se s s e nt i a l l ypr opos i t i ona lt hi nki ngoft heki nd“ i f -t he n. ” Paradigmatic thinking attempts: to fulfill the ideal of a formal, mathematical system of description and explanation. It employs categorization or conceptualization and the operations by which categories are established, instantiated, idealized, and related one to the other to form a system. Its armamentarium of connectives includes on the formal side such ideas as conjunction and disjunction, hyperonymy and

20 hyponymy, strict implication, and the devices by which general propositions are extracted from statements in their particular contexts. At a gross level, the logico-scientific mode (I shall call it paradigmatic hereafter) deals in general causes, and in their establishment, and makes use of procedures to assure verifiable reference and to test for empirical truth. Its language is regulated by requirements of consistency and noncontradiction. Its domain is defined not only by observation to which its basic statements relate, but also by the set of possible worlds that can be logically generated and tested against observables— that is, it is driven by principled hypothesis. (J. Bruner, 1986, p. 12-13) The other mode of thought is narrative thinking. The narrative mode leads to g oods t or i e s ,g r i ppi ngdr a ma ,a nd“ be l i e va bl e( t houg hnotne c e s s a r i l y“ t r ue ” )hi s t or i c a l a c c ount s . ”( p.1 3 )Na r r a t i vet hi nki ngde a l si nhuma n,orhuma n-like intention and action, and the vicissitudes and consequences that mark their cour s e .“ I ts t r i ve st oput its timeless miracles into the particulars of experience and to locate the experience in t i mea ndpl a c e . ”( J .Br une r ,1 9 8 6 ,p.1 3 )Na r r a t i v et hi nki ng ,a c c or di ngt oJ e r ome Bruner (1986), has to deal with two landscapes simultaneously: One is the landscape of human action, where the constituents are the arguments of action: agent, intention or goal, situation, instrument, something corresponding to“ s t or yg r a mma r . ”Theot he rl a nds c a pei st hel a nds c a peof consciousness; what those involved in the action know, think, or feel, or do not know, do not think, or do not feel. (p. 14)

21 The two landscapes are essential and distinct for narrative thinking. I think that what Bruner was saying was that the first landscape is about human action, purpose and human goals. The second landscape is about the human awareness of, or sense of, agency, a sense of self, and a sense of the relationship between the agents. Narrative thinking combines these two landscapes simultaneously and ultimately deals with the vicissitudes of intention.

A next question arises regarding how one is to know the veracity of each of these modes of thinking. Spence (1982) explicated the qualities of truth in these two modes of thinking in his book, Narrative Truth and Historical Truth: Meaning and Interpretation in Psychoanalysis. Each mode has different procedures for verification of truthfulness. Paradigmatic thinking uses testable propositions or arguments and convinces one of truth by appeals to procedures and observations, to establish formal and empirical proof. On the other hand, narrative thinking appeals to its life-likeness and establishes verisimilitude, not truth. Verisimilitude is the quality of appearing as true or real. The neuroscientists, notably Daniel Schacter (1996), Allan Schore (1994), a ndKa t he r i neNe l s on’ s( 1 9 8 6 ,1 9 9 3 a ,1 9 9 3 b,1 9 9 4 ,1 9 9 6 b,2 0 0 0 )r e s e a r c h,can be used t os uppor tS pe nc e ’ sf or mul a t i ona si ta ppl i e st ot hes oc i a ls c i e nc e s .The i rr e s e a r c hi nt o the memory and regulatory systems of the brain suggests that there can never be more than verisimilitude in the study of human intention, because of the nature of the structure and functions of the memory systems of the brain.

Kenneth Gergen (1989) explored the limitations of logico-scientific thought for the social sciences. Gergen would label himself as a philosophical constructionist.

22 Constructionists view reality as a creation between two subjectivities. Reality in this philosophical tradition becomes relative, i.e., it all depends on the subjectivities that are creating it and the context in which they appear. He argues that social scientists in the logico-scientific school have adopted the armamentarium of psychometrics and statistics in an effort to define truth and therefore reality. He challenges the privileged place of quantitative research in the social sciences, especially as it applies to pe r s ona l i t yt he or i s t s ’us eofpe r s ona l i t yc ha r a c t e r i s t i c sort r a i t s .I nc ont r a s t ,hi sc l a i mi s that these personality traits reflect stable motivations and dispositions without respect to context or subjectivities. Gergen found that when he asked hi ss ubj e c t st o“ r e a d c ount e r ”t ot he i rr e g ul a rr e a di ng sofpe r s ona l i t y-test statements that this was an easy task for the subjects. He concludes from this that apparent orderliness of items in a personality measure is a deceptive result of reading the surveyed opinions in a noncritical and non-contextual manner.

Elliot Mishler (1979) contends that the importance of context has largely been ignored by traditional logico-scientific research approaches in the social and behavioral sciences. Mishler believes that the positivist model, which has dominated these disciplines, has led to a search for universal context-free laws and to the use of contextstripping methods. Mishler argues that contextual grounding of the meaning of human a c t i ona ndl a ng ua g ei svi t a lt ooure ve r yda yunde r s t a ndi ngofourowna ndot he r ’ s behavior. He proposes that meaning must be studied in context.

Context has two similar meanings. One is rhetorical. Context in a narrow rhetorical sense refers to the other words in a sentence or paragraph that determine the

23 meaning of a word, or a passage. Context in a larger sense refers to the setting or the environment in which an event happens. Luigo Pirandello (1988) wrote in his play Six Characters in Search of an Author,“ Af a c ti sl i keas a c k—i twon’ ts t a ndupi fi t ’ se mpt y.

To make it stand up, first you have to put in it all the reasons and feelings that caused i ti nt hef i r s tpl a c e . ”( t hef a t he ri nAc tI )Mi s hl e r ’ s(1979) critique of positivism in the s oc i a ls c i e nc e s ,a swe l la sGe r g e n’ sc r i t i que s( 1 9 8 5 ,1 9 8 9 ,1 9 9 0 a ,2 0 0 1 ) ,s ug g e s tt ha tt he facts being developed by the social sciences to the degree that they negate context are like sacks, i.e., they will not stand up. Context, when it comes to language and human intentions, becomes a significantly more complex concept. Bertram Cohler and Mark Freeman (1993) have posited that in considering human agency and intention within a context, one must consider the significance of the personal past in understanding present experience. Central to this consideration, they argue, is the role of earlier experiences in determining later outcomes. Their argument is that interpretative research based on experience-near, empathically informed methods integrated with traditional normative inquiry in the social sciences may lead to greater understanding oft hec our s eofl i f et ha ni spos s i bl eus i nge i t he ra ppr oa c ha l one .Cohl e ra ndFr e e ma n’ s argument (1993) for diversity of thought and approach is much like the one Jerome Bruner (1986) a dvoc a t e dwhe nhes a i d,“ Ef f or t st or e duc eonemodet ot heot her or ignore one at the expense of the other inevitably fail to capture the rich diversity of t houg ht . ”( p.1 1 ) Palombo (1991b) attempts to bridge the logico-scientific and narrative divide.

Hepos i t sus i ngKohut ’ s(1971) concept of the self that the self may be discernible but

24 ultimately not independent from others. The self, as Palombo describes it, is a member of some human community. Like Vygotsky (1978) and Bakhtin (1981), Palombo postulates that the human community functions as the fundamental source of meaning to the person. The human community is the context for the development of the self.

Further, Palombo argues that to be a self is the same as having a mind. The development of a sense of self is based on the meanings conferred on self-experiences by the community. Because the human community in which a self develops is diverse, the meanings that are imparted to the self by the community are also diverse. In addition, the biological endowment of the self creates the possibility that personal meanings, not conferred to the self by the community, but inferred from self experiences with the community, are possible. Palombo posits a narrative-self that might be created from the totality of the private and communal meanings conferred on self experiences and woven together into a coherent whole.

Martin Kohli (1981) extends the conceptualization of context even further. He warns researchers that, research acts are social acts, that researchers therefore cannot create their own set of rules, but are bound by the rules of everyday social action, and that the meaning of the data produced cannot be assessed without reference to their being social acts. (p. 61) Kohl ii sa ppl yi ngMi s hl e r ’ sc onc e pt ua l i z a t i onst ot her e s e a r c hpr oc e s s .Li ke He i s e nbe r g ’ sunc e r t a i nt ypr i nc i pl ei nphys i c s ,Kohl is ug g e s t st ha tt her e s earch process creates a context and this context influences the data that are derived from it. This

25 position stands in stark contrast to the mainstream logico-scientific view of social science research. In this tradition, the research is not a social act, but has been stripped of its contextual clues by the use of instruments, apparatus, and psychometric me t hods .Kohl i ’ spos i t i oni sl i keHe i s e nbe r g ’ s :t ha tt hi si sapr e s umpt i onofl og i c oscientific research that does not hold up to scrutiny. In contrast to the logico-science approach, Kohli argues that one needs to emphasize self-biography. Kohli quotes Dilthey (1976) that, ‘ S e l f -biography is the highest and most instructive form in which the understanding (Verstehen) ofl i f ei sc onf r ont i ngus( 1 9 2 7 : 1 9 9 ) . ’Thi sr e f e r st ot he individual life and to the historical world. The autobiography is thus not only a methodological model for hermeneutic understanding of individual lives, but also the privileged way to historical and social reality. (1981, p. 64) Kohli further argues that, The life structure, as it unfolds in the autobiography, is relevant as a structure of experience, of meaning. Second, the autobiography—as a comprehensive review of his life by the subject—is the basis on which this life can best be understood by others. (1981, p. 64) Kohli is advocating an interpretative research methodology and a research Weltanschauung [world view] that seeks to get accurate descriptions of the interviewees' life trajectories in social contexts. From these descriptions he hopes to uncover the patterns of social relations and the special processes that shaped them. His emphasis is on comparison of self-biographies. He urges researchers to search for

26 negative cases, and for researchers to attain a point of saturation with the materials. It is at the point of data saturation that Kohli suggests that the sociologist's mental representation of given patterns may be generalized to a whole social milieu.

In a similar fashion to Kohli, Edward Bruner (1997) argues for a reflexive, social constructivist view as the foundation of ethnography. His thesis is that ethnographies are guided by an implicit narrative structure. According to Bruner, ethnographies are a story we tell about the peoples we study. His point is to define ethnography as a genre of storytelling. Storytelling can have multiple purposes depending on culture and language (Holland, Lachicotte, Skinner, & Cain, 1998). Sarbin (1986) purposes that story and narrative mean the same thing to ordinary speakers of English. For Sarbin, A story is a symbolized account of actions of human beings that has a temporal dimension. The story has a beginning, middle, and an ending [or, as Kermode (1967) suggests, the sense of an ending]. The story is held together by recognizable patterns of events called plots. Central to the plot structure are human predicaments and attempted resolutions. (1986, p. 3) Storytelling, self-biographies, ethnographies, and narrative thinking are all constrained by the language and the cultures in which they have been created. Language and culture are the larger contexts that affect meaning, either shared or private/personal meanings. Dorothy Holland, William Lachicotte, Jr., Debra Skinner, and Carol Cain (1998) posit that self-narratives have a prospective quality to them, People tell others who they are, but even more important, they tell themselves and then try to act as though they are who they say they are. These self-

27 understandings, especially those with strong emotional resonance for the teller, are what we refer to as identities. (p. 3) Up to now, we have looked at context from a perspective concerning a conscious state ofmi nd.Pa l ombo’ s(1991b) narrative sense of self has both conscious and unconscious aspects to it. However, Dan McAdams (1993) in his book, The Stories That We Live By: Personal Myths And The Making Of The Self, presents his theory of human identity by focusing on what he believes is an unconscious process. Specifically, he posits that the way in which we define ourselves is often an unconscious process of creating a heroic myth. A personal myth is the culmination of the journey of shaping our personality. It is a patterned integration of a remembered past, a perceived present, and an anticipated future. McAdams tells us we do not discover ourselves in myth, we create ourselves through myth, and each of our myths is unique.

In my study of adolescent decision making, I considered the context of the a dol e s c e nt s ’na r r a t i ve s .Be g i nni ngwi t hJ e r omeBr une r(1986) I think that it is obvious that context is important for both logico-scientific and narrative thinking. I have shown that context is multi-dimensional, both conscious and unconscious. I have argued that context shapes meaning and meaning-making. Mishler (1979) asserts that you cannot have one without the other. For the subgroup of adolescents in whom I am interested, awareness of personal meaning and how it is constructed will be central to understanding them. First, the personal meanings that these adolescents assign to their lived experiences may help them to change child-parent living arrangements, or it may help them to maintain their current child-parent living arrangements. Second, it is

28 essential for clinical social workers, psychologists, and the court system to understand the basis on which the adolescent makes the decision to change living arrangements.

Third, these adolescents can provide the research community a glimpse into the pr oc e s sofa na dol e s c e nt ’ smodi f i c a t i onofs e l f -narrative when looking at how a different primary context influences t hea dol e s c e nt ’ ss e l f -narrative. Fourth, since the a dol e s c e nt ’ ss e l f -na r r a t i vei sc e nt r a l l yl i nke di nt he or yt ot hea dol e s c e nt ’ si de nt i t y,t hi s r e s e a r c hma ypr ovi deac l a r i f yi ngl i nkbe t we e none ’ ss e l f -na r r a t i ve ,one ’ ss e ns eofs e l f , a ndone ’ ss e ns eofpe r sonal identity.

Personal meaning is also linked theoretically to the concept of personal identity. Traditionally, identity formation has been thought of as the central task of adolescent development (Erikson, 1959, 1968). The formation of a personal identity takes place within a complicated matrix of personal meanings that each of us assign to our experiences. This research is trying to examine this relationship, or association. I wa ntt ounde r s t a ndhowt hedi vor c epr oc e s sofa na dol e s c e nt ’ spa r e nt sma yormay not have affected the various personal meanings that the adolescents have assigned to their lived experiences. Further, this research proposes to look closely at how the a dol e s c e nt ’ sa s s i g nme ntofpe r s ona lme a ni ngwi t hi nt hedi vor c epr oc e s soft he i r parents may have shaped the adolescent development of their individual self-narrative and the development of their individual personal identity. One of the assumptions of t hi sr e s e a r c hi st ha tt hede ve l opme ntofa na dol e s c e nt ’ ss e l f -narrative is important in understanding adolescents who decide to change their child-parent living a r r a ng e me nt s .I na ddi t i on,a ne mpa t hi cunde r s t a ndi ngofa na dol e s c e nt ’ ss e l f -narrative

29 may help the clinical professions in discerning the basis on which an adolescent is making a decision to change her/his child-parent living arrangements. This empathic understanding may, or may not, challenge the currently held theoretical and societal presumptions.

Joseph Palombo (1979, 1988, 1990, 1991c, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001) has outlined the deve l opme ntoft hea dol e s c e nt ’ snuc l e a ra ndc ohe s i ves e l f ,a swe l la st hee xi s t e nc e of a link between a cohesive self and a coherent self-narrative. His work further de l i ne a t e sa nde xpa ndsKohut ’ st he or ya boutt hede ve l opme ntoft hes e l f( Kohut ,1 9 7 1 , 1977, 1 9 8 4 ) .I nPa l ombo’ s( 1 9 9 2 ,1 9 9 6 ,2 0 0 1 )t he or i z i ng ,hee xt e ndsKohut ’ sS e l f Ps yc hol og yt oa dol e s c e ntde ve l opme nt .I nhi se xt e ns i onofKohut ’ st he or y,Pa l ombo proposes a central narrative of the self, which he labels a self-na r r a t i ve .Pa l ombo’ s papers become a valuable bridge from the rather mechanistic theoretical root metaphor (Pepper, 1942) of Self Psychology and psychoanalysis to the more contextual theoretical root metaphor of narratives. His theoretical bridge enables us to examine the assignment of personal meaning to an experience as the central process of constructing a lived experience.

Thes e c ondt he or e t i c a lbr i dg ei nl i nki ngt hec onc e pt sof“ s e l f , ”“ s e l f -na r r a t i ve , ” a nd“ pe r s ona li de nt i t y”i spr ovi de dbyRobe r tWa l l e r s t e i n(1998) in his reconsideration ofEr i kEr i ks on’ sc ont r i but i onst ops yc hoa na l ys i s .Wa l l e r s t e i npr opos e st ha tErikson r e a l l yt houg htofpe r s ona li de nt i t ya sa“ l e i t mot i f . ”Thi sc l a r i f i c a t i onofEr i ks on’ s thoughts is more than a rhetorical move. More accurately it should be considered as an effort to move Erikson back to prominence in psychoanalytic thinking and theorizing.

30 Wa l l e r s t e i n’ st he or e t i c a lbr i dg ebe t we e nas t r uc t ur eoft hemi ndc a l l e dbyEr i ks on “ i de nt i t y, ”a ndana r r a t i vec onc e pt ,mot i f ,a l l owst hi sr e s e a r c hs t udya ndot he rr e s e a r c h studies that choose to use this bridge to explore the developmental task of adolescence, as postulated by Erikson, from a narrative perspective. The new narrative perspective is more compatible with the analytic tools of clinical ethnography (Curtis, 1988; Herdt, 1999; Lindner, 2001) and hermeneutic research in trying to understand how l e i t mot i f s ,orna r r a t i vet he me s ,ove rt i mebe c omepa r tofone ’ ss e ns eofs e l f ,one ’ ss e l f narrative and one ’ spe r s ona li de nt i t y.

Therefore, I propose to look within a narrative framework at this subgroup of adolescents of divorced parents who decide to change their child-parent living arrangements. By situating the analysis and the understanding of this phenomenological study within this narrative and contextual perspective, I hope to be able to more fully comprehend how the personal meanings that the adolescents, themselves, assign to their lived experiences may affect, or not affect, their decisions to change their child-parent living arrangements.

31

CHAPTER V

LITERATURE REVIEW It is important for the reader to note that in this research I am using the term “ c hi l dr e nofdi vor c e dpa r e nt s ”r a t he rt ha nt heus ua lt e r mi nol og yoft hef i e l d,whi c hi s “ c hi l dr e nofdi vor c e . ”It hi nkt hi sdi s t i nc t i oni si mpe r a t i vef ort her e a de rt oke e pi n mind. If this research proposal is to maintain its goal of looking at a subgroup of children of divorced parents from a deconstructed position, as many hidden presumptions and assumptions must be examined and challenged as possible. I am he e df ulofFouc a ul t ’ s( 1 9 7 2 ,1 9 9 4 ,1 9 9 7 )wa r ni ng sa boutt heus e sofl a ng ua g e .Fouc a ul t contended that the language that one uses to describe a phenomenon places it within a context of power and cult ur e .Myobj e c t i ont ot henor ma lt e r mi nol og y,“ c hi l dr e nof di vor c e , ”i st ha tf i r s ti tl e a ve st her e a de rwi t ht hei mpr e s s i ont ha tt hepr oc e s sof divorce creates the children. This clearly is not accurate. Rather, men and women act to create children. In our society, today, some of the men and some of the women who create children become parents and some of these parents divorce. Therefore, there can only be children of divorced parents, not children of divorce. This distinction is vitally important, in my view, because it sensitizes the reader to be receptive to how language is used and can be used within these discussions. Since I want to look at this

32 phe nome nonf r om ana r r a t i v ea ndi nt e r pr e t a t i vei nt e r a c t i oni s m pe r s pe c t i ve ,Fouc a ul t ’ s warning is very germane .Fouc a ul t ’ sr a di c a lpos i t i onwa st ha ta l lt het e r mi nol og ymus t be deconstructed in order to get real insight into the processes that underlie the language that is being used.

My second objection to the normal terminology is that it seems to remove connota t i ve l ys omeoft hec hi l dr e n’ shuma ni t y.I nmyvi e w,t henor ma lt e r mi nol og y doe st hi sbypl a c i ngt he mi na nuna t t a c he dc a t e g or y,“ c hi l dr e nofdi vor c e , ”r a t he rt ha n i napr oc e s s ,“ c hi l dr e nofdi vor c e dpa r e nt s . ”Iwa ntt oma i nt a i n,i nde e d,Iwa ntt of oc us on,t hec hi l dr e n’ shuma ni t ya ndont hepr oc e s sofbe i ngac hi l dofdi vor c e dpa r e nt sa nd growing up within this developmental context.

Within this same perspective there are two more terminology issues that I want to highlight for the reader. At the turn of thec e nt ur y,t het e r mf ordi vor c ewa s“ a br oke nhome . ”It hi nkt ha tat e r ml i ket hi sha sobvi ousc onnot a t i ons ,e s pe c i a l l yt he connotation that something or someone needs to be fixed, is damaged, or is inadequate. There are other terms that convey a moral sense. Unfortunately, s ome t i me swec a nonl ybea wa r eoft he m.“ I nt a c tf a mi l y”i soneoft he s et e r ms .Thi si s a commonly used term for families in which both mother and father are present. The oppos i t eof“ i nt a c t ”i s“ br oke n, ”s oIt hi nkt ha ti tmus tbec l e a rthat there is an embedded value judgment in the term. In this work, I have tried to use the less c ommonr e s e a r c hl i t e r a t ur et e r m of“ nuc l e a rf a mi l y”whe nr e f e r r i ngt oaf a mi l yi n which both biological or adoptive parents are present. I also have tried to consistently us et het e r m“ r e ma r r i a g e , ”a soppos e dt o“ bl e nde d”or“ r e c ons t i t ut e d”f a mi l i e sf or

33 similar reasons. These embedded value judgments preclude the reader from considering alternative family arrangements and alternative developmental pathways both for families and for individual children.

We have learned in the second chapter that the context for children growing up in the United States has dramatically changed in the last four decades. In addition, we have learned in the fourth chapter how important context is in the creation of meaning. So following Foucault, in this chapter I want to deconstruct and unpack the literature on children of divorced parents. Because my research methodology is interpretative and contextual, I am mindful of Martin Kohl i ’ s(1981) quotation in the previous chapter: The life structure, as it unfolds in the autobiography, is relevant as a structure of experience, of meaning. Second, the autobiography—as a comprehensive review of his life by the subject—is the basis on which this life can best be understood by others. (p. 64) This research involves asking a subgroup of the children of divorced parents to tell me their autobiography. I am planning on using these narrative compositions, or self portraits created in-the-moment, to understand, as empathically as I can, the s ubj e c t ’ sl i f ea ndt hepr oc e s sbywhi c ht hes ubj e c tma deade c i s i ont oc ha ng et he i r child-parent living arrangements. I think that this methodology maintains the humanity of these children, rather than reducing them to a category in a research t ypol og yt ha tha sr e move dt hec ont e xtoft hec hi l dr e n’ se xpe r i e nc e s .Ibe l i e ve ,l i ke Kohli, that the autobiographies these adolescents create to answer to my research

34 que s t i onwi l lpr ovi det hebe s ta c c e s st ot he s ea dol e s c e nt s ’s e l f -narratives and their formation. I also believe that this process will allow the adolescents to maintain their humanity, and that these narratives as individual and collective examples of their thinking may provide windows of insight to aid the helping professions to more compassionately understand, and therefore, more sensitively respond to, these a dol e s c e nt s ’de ve l opme nt a lne e ds .

In this chapter I plan to review and to deconstruct the research literature on children of divorced parents. I want the reader to see how the subjects of my research fit within the larger research literature on children of divorced parents. As the previous chapters show, I have taken a clearly defined interpretative position with regard to this literature. Mindful of Foucault, I will explicate my reasons for endorsing certain findings and discounting other findings.

Paul Amato (1994), in Life-S p a nAdj us t me nto fCh i l dr e nt oTh e i rPa r e nt ’ s Divorce, reviewed some of the common methodological problems with the research literature on what Bruner (1986) has labeled the logico-scientific perspective. As I discussed in Chapter IV, this is the model that uses propositional thinking. Amato (1994) points out that divorce adjustment research literature does not usually lead to strong conclusions. He believes that this weakness is the result of the multiple gaps in t heknowl e dg eba s ea ndi nt hewe a kne s sofma nyoft her e s e a r c hs t udi e s ’ methodologies. Therefore, he believes that many of the research findings are tentative at best.

35 Amato (1994) looks first at the common logico-scientific methods of research study. That type of study tends to employ two common research designs. The first research design is a cross-sectional study. In a cross-sectional study the researcher compares children from divorced and continuously nuclear two-parent families at a single point in time. Cross-sectional studies pr ovi dea“ s na ps hot �t ha ti l l us t r a t e st he comparison of children from divorced parents and children of continuously nuclear two-parent families on the basis of what is being measured, using the same psychological instrument.

The other research design is a longitudinal study. In longitudinal studies the research compares children over an extended period of time following parental divorce. Longitudinal studies may include a comparison group of children from continuously nuclear two-parent families. Longitudinal studies illustrate the comparisons of a group of children over time using the same psychological instrument.

Cross-sectional studies and longitudinal studies are widely used, according to Amato (1994), in adjustment and developmental research studies because they are: suited for studies in which there are one or more nonmanipulable independent variables. In this instance, the researcher must select subjects who already possess different levels of a particular characteristic. Examples of nonmanipulable independent variables include age, sex, marital status of the parents, and socioeconomic status. The use of nonmanipulable independent variables in a study usually precludes the use of true experimental designs which involve the random assignment of subjects to groups. Subjects are

36 randomly assigned to eliminate the influence of extraneous variables. If the influence of extraneous variables has been accomplished in a study and there are significant differences found between the groups on a dependent variable, then the research may state with confidence that the independent variable caused the results to differ between the groups. In studies without random assignments of subjects, including those using cross-sectional and longitudinal designs, statements about cause and effect relationships cannot be made. Researchers are unable to determine which variable caused which or if some extraneous variable (s) could be responsible for the observed relationship between the variables. It should be noted that this difficulty is inherent in the literature on adjustment to divorce. Although cause and effect relationships may not be known, what is known is there is a correlation between parental marital status a ndc hi l dr e n’ sa dj us t me nt....( p.1 5 7 -158) The problem for social scientist researchers is, because these quasi-experimental designs a r enot“ t r uee xpe r i me nt a lde s i g ns , �ar e s e a r c he rc a nonl yknowt wof a c t or s .A researcher can know which variables are associated with each other and a researcher can know the relative strength of the association between the variables. A researcher cannot know whether, or indeed, which independent variable caused a change in the dependent variable. This is not the logico-scientific or propositional model, but rather an approximation model. It is an approximation model because the researcher cannot know the cause and effect relationship that the propositional model demands using these quasi-experimental designs.

37 As Amato (1994) has suggested, in order for the researcher to know a cause and effect relationship in the study of children of divorced parents, the researcher would need to select a group of children who were the same on every independent variable measure. The group would need to be of sufficient size to be representative of the general population. Next, the group would have to be randomly divided into two groups. Finally, all the parents in the one group would be told to divorce. Then the researcher would be able to compare the two groups to determine what effect the parental divorce caused. This is the level of rigor that propositional thinking demands.

Clearly, no social scientist could ethically carry out such a study, nor would any scientist have the social and judicial power to create such a study. Hence, the need arises for quasi-experimental designs to approximate true experimental designs.

The divorce research literature is even further compromised in terms of the clarity of the independent variables. This occurs because, as Amato (1994) explained, there are essentially three kinds of subject samples in the divorce literature. The first kind of sample is a clinical sample. Clinical samples are those samples drawn from a clinical population. In the case of children of divorced parents, it would be a sample taken from children who are in psychotherapy or counseling because their parents are divorcing or have divorced. Clinical samples are used to document the kinds of problems presented by children, of divorced parents, who have adjusted poorly to the parental divorce. However, the results from clinical samples cannot be used to generalize about the population that never received professional attention.

38 The second kind of sample is a convenience sample. Convenience samples are widely used in psychological research. The best example of a convenience sample is the use of college psychology classes that participate in psychological research. The problem with convenience samples is that these samples may contain some atypical features in comparison with the general population as a whole.

A random sample is the third kind of sample population. A random sample allows one to make valid generalizations about the majority of the population, i.e., that portion of the population that falls one standard deviation on either side of the mean. It should be noted that there is not a truly random sample population in the divorce research literature. According to Amato (1994), the national studies that he has r e vi e we dus ua l l ys e l e c ts ubj e c t sus i ngt hec r i t e r i a“ e ve r -di vor c e df a mi l i e s . ”( p.1 5 9 )A “ r a ndom s a mpl e ”a sus e dt oda t et husi sve r ydi f f e r e ntf r om t her a ndom a s s i g nme ntof subjects to groups necessary for true experimental designs and propositional thinking.

What most researchers have done in this field has been to match, i.e., statistically equate, two samples of children. One group of these statistically equal children is comprised of those children whose parents are divorced. The other group is made up of statistically equal children from nuclear families. The point is to have the g r oupsa ss i mi l a ra spos s i bl es ot ha tt hede pe nde ntva r i a bl es e e msl i kei ti s“ di vor c e d pa r e nt s ”vs .“ s t i l lma r r i e dpa r e nt s . ”Ius et heve r bs e e msbe c a us et ha ti sa l lar e s e a r c he r can know. The researcher is paradigmatically trapped by the experimental design. The samples cannot be equal, except by having the same score on whatever arbitrary instrument the researcher has designated in her/his research protocol.

39 Pushing this methodological point further, I note that the researcher is trapped by the rules of logico-scientific thinking. To actually have two identical samples within the logico-scientific paradigm, each child would have to have had identical biological substrates (identical twins), each of which would have to have had identical social and emotional experiences within identical contexts. I think that the reader can begin to see the absurdity of what it actually takes to have a true experimental design in the social sciences using a logico-scientific paradigm. Pennington (2002) makes a similar point when he describes the difficulty of creating a scientific explanation for developmental psychopathology. I think that it is obvious to the reader that unlike hydrogen atoms, which are theoretically all the same, people are not. There are real limitations to emulating scientific methodologies in the study of human psychology.

J e r omeBr une r ’ s(1986) two categories of thinking are also reflected within the divorce research literature. As discussed in Chapter IV, Bruner identifies logicoscientific thinking and narrative thinking, neither of which can be reduced to the other. Likewise the divorce research literature contains both studies that attempt to emulate logico-scientific thinking and studies that use narrative thinking. Those researchers who try to emulate scientific paradigms are usually quantitative researchers. Those researchers who use narrative thinking are usually qualitative researchers.

However, in the area of divorce research, it seems to me that the qualitative r e s e a r c he r sa r ec a ug hti nade ba t et ha tdoe snote ve nr e c og ni z eBr une r ’ sdi s t i nc t i ons .I n fact, the qualitative researchers often are pulled into drawing logico-scientific

40 conclusions based on narrative data. I think that they are pulled into this debate because there is an underlying moral issue embedded within the research question.

Amato (1994) mentions this point in his literature review. He points out that all American social science researchers are embedded in the American culture. Americans traditionally have believed that a two-parent family is necessary for the successful socialization and development of children. He argues that based on this presumption, if a child loses one of her/his parents to death, then that child is at a disadvantage or at risk compared to a child in a two-parent family. Amato (1994) points out that earlier research findings seemed to confirm this presumption of additional childhood and adult risk for children who lost a parent. The loss through parental death was both an unintended and unavoidable risk for children. Therefore, the reasoning goes that if a child lost one parent because of divorce, this represented an avoidable loss for the child. Amato (1994) a r g ue st ha tbe c a us et hel os si sa voi da bl ea ndt hepa r e nt s ’a c t i ons a r ei nt e nde d,s oc i e t yma ke samor a lpr e s umpt i ona boutt hepa r e nt s ’a c t i ons .Thi s moral tone harkens back to the presumptions of the American culture, so that the child of divorced parents, like the child who lost a parent to death, must be at risk.

Thi sc ul t ur a lpr e s umpt i oni se mbe dde di ns oc i a ls c i e nc er e s e a r c he r s ’t hi nki ng and the conclusions drawn from their data. This is an example of what Foucault (1972, 1994, 1997) was trying to expose with his analysis of culture and language as having embedded power, gender and culture assumptions.

There is still another embedded power issue that the reader should be aware of in the literature on divorce. David Leary (2001) quot e sS i g mundKoc h’ sa r t icle (1956)

41 a s“ be c omi ngi nc r e a s i ng l yi mpr e s s e dwi t ht heda ma g et ha tha sbe e nwr oug htbyt he stereotype of science as some kind of bulldozer which carves out great, linear, everl e ng t he ni nghi g hwa ysoft r ut h. ”( p.4 5 )Le a r yc ont i nue shi sa r g ume ntt ha tKoc h,one of the pillars of modern psychology, saw that psychology was caught in an historical period. This historical period valued science and science valued rules. Therefore, if psychology was to be a science, then it had to find the rules that govern human interactions and functioning. Again, Leary (Leary, 2001) quoting Koch: ‘ S c i e nc e s[ ha dpr e vi ous l y]wont he i rwa yt oi nde pe nde nc ea ndul t i mately institutional status, by achieving enough knowledge to become sciences. But, at the time of its inception, psychology was unique in the extent to which its institutionalization preceded its content and its method preceded its problems [emphasis in original]. If there are keys to history, this statement is surely a key to the brief history of modern psychology. Never had a group of thinkers been given so sharply specified an invitation to create. Never had inquiring men been so harried by social need, cultural optimism, and extrinsic prescription, the advance scheduling of ways and means, the shinning success story of the ol de rs c i e nc e s . ’( Koc h,1 9 5 9 ,p.7 8 3 ) Koch was explaining scientific psychology was created in a historical and cultural moment. The nature of this moment preordained that psychology must be a science if it was to be valued by the culture at the time. Moreover, by being valued as a science, the emerging discipline not only gained a methodology but also power and prestige. Therefore, what Jerome Bruner (1986) has called logico-scientific thinking

42 became the preferred method of thinking within academic psychology for these historical and institutional reasons. Leary (2001) argues that Koch, more than others, understood the nature of this historical moment and that he understood that psychology aspired to be a science in order to claim an institutional seat in academia.

By having an institutional seat in academia, psychology could meet a cultural and social need, and it would acquire in a Foucaultian sense status and power for itself as a discipline.

Koch, according to Leary (2001), made a major contribution to psychology by identifying this major historical and cultural shift that had its roots in the nineteenth century but oriented twentieth century psychology. This shift changed the focus of psychology from the study of human agency to the discovery of rules. Leary expresses this shift as one in which there occurred, a change of emphasis from agency to rules, from a world in which individuals took greater initiative and greater risks, based on their own sensibility, creativity, and responsibility (agency), to a world in which thought and action are more and more rationalized, bureaucratized, and routinized (ultimately reduced to a set of rules). From free, fallible, and meaningful action, humans have turned to more controlled, definitionally correct, and ameaningful behavior. This shift from open-ended, authentically responsive activity to prescriptive, rule-and method-boundbe ha vi orwa st he“ r ootofpa t hol og y�of the modern world, and everything has been tainted by it. (p. 427)

43 Leary views Koch as having understood that the aspiration of psychology to be a science like physics introduced into psychology certain methodological and procedural issues. The aspiration of psychology to be a science was like a Faustian bargain in that this aspiration moved psychology away from the study of human subjectivity and agency, and therefore, away from study of meaning into the creation of what Koch has called ameaningful rules. To use the Foucaultian terminology, this shift in defining what is paramount, rules or agency, is embedded within modern psychology. This shift is also embedded in the research literature of divorce and the effect of parental divorce on the development of children.

One cannot deconstruct the research literature of children of divorced parents, in my view, without exposing this interpretative position of modern academic ps yc hol og y.Ther e a de r ’ sa wa r e ne s sofa c a de mi cps yc hol og y’ si nt e r pr e t a t i vepos i t i on,I believe, enlightens a ndi nf or mst her e a de r ’ sunde r s t a ndi ngoft hi sr e s e a r c hl i t e r a t ur e .

Al s o,bye xpos i ngmode r nps yc hol og y’ si nt e r pr e t a t i vepos i t i on,Iha ves hownmyown interpretative position. My interpretative position, in contrast to that of modern psychology, is to prioritize research, that studies human subjectivity, agency, and meaning, over research that is about the discovery of rules. While both kinds of research have their place in understanding the children of divorced parents, I believe that for my particular research question about how adolescents of divorced parents make a decision to change child-parent living arrangements, agency and meaning are the more germane. In addition, my exposure of the interpretative position of modern academic psychology also should sensitize the reader to anticipate and to look for, I

44 hope, some of the other embedded controversies in the research literature that I am about to review.

There is an extensive body of research literature on the children of divorced parents. This research literature can be divided into two contesting camps for heuristic purposes. Each research camp has its figurative leader who has become the major spokesperson for the research findings of this camp, and who has synthesized the research findings to support her interpretative position. My plan for the first part of this chapter is to review exemplars of the research of each of these camps based upon the concepts of modern psychology already discussed. I note that this research literature provides only a broad context for my specific research question, because as I have shown in Chapter III, there does not seem to be any research literature that specifically addresses my research question. Further, I plan on doing this literature review in a unique way that is consistent and necessary for the clinical ethnography methodology that I will propose for my own research. In sum, I will describe each research camp. This description will go into detail about the research methodology and the composition of the research sample for each research camp. By providing the r e a de rwi t hwha tDe nz i n( 1 9 8 9 a ,1 9 8 9 b)ha sc a l l e d“ t hi c kde s c r i pt i on�oft her e s e a r c h camps, I am attempting to provide an historical context for my research, a methodological critique, and place this review and critique within the larger critique and review of social science research thinking.

45 The Wallerstein Research Position J udi t hWa l l e r s t e i na ndJ oa nKe l l y’ sbook,Surviving the Breakup: How Children and Parents Cope with Divorce (1980), provides a good general introduction to what I am calling the Wallerstein research position. This book has the most careful explication of the research subjects, the research methodology, and the research presumptions of this group. This research was initially called the California Children of Divorce Project. It was part of a Divorce Counseling Service of the Marin County Community Mental Health Center. According to Wallerstein and Kelly, the project was designed to: enable us to gain access to the perceptions, feelings, anxieties, and fantasies of the children and their parents. We were fully aware that these kinds of data are not available from observation or questionnaires alone, but that they must be derived from mutual participation [my emphasis] in an emotionally interactive process. (p. 7) Lindner (2001) ha sc a l l e dar e s e a r c hpr oc e s sofmut ua lpa r t i c i pa t i on“ c l i ni c a l e t hnog r a phy, ”bor r owi ngCur t i s ’( 1 9 8 8 )t e r m.Cl i ni c a le t hnog r a phyi sa ne s pe c i a l l y fitting methodological label for researching a clinical population of subjects.

Wallerstein and Kelly described this process of mutual participation: The motivations for our respondents to unburden themselves to us, then, and to let us in this way become party to their inner psychological world, would have to be in their perception of us as persons worthy of their confidence, interested in them and giving promise of being helpful to them. In this sense,

46 we knew that to succeed as a research study our program would also have to be perceived as a source of help. From the start, therefore, our project also included a broadly conceived, though necessarily brief, program of intervention designed to provide whatever psychological help and social and educational recommendations we could to alleviate acute distress and perhaps prevent, or at least diminish, poor outcomes. (J. S. Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980b, p. 7) This description is unlike many ethnographic studies. Other ethnographic studies focus on the culture practices of a culture or a popul a t i on.Wa l l e r s t e i n’ se t hnog r a phi c research in contrast tried to empathically understand the inner psychological world of her subjects. More modern terminology would describe her focus as being on her r e s e a r c hs ubj e c t s ’s ubj e c t i vi t ya nda g e nc y.Wa l l e r stein and Kelly make it very clear that while they are following a methodology, it is not one that will allow them only to observe and measure their subjects using some predefined psychological instrument.

To maintain the ideal scientific research stance with their research subjects under the circumstances the researchers were describing and studying would likely be considered unethical. They also indicate that their research project was designed to provide a service in addition to yielding research data. The provision of service allowed the research subjects to unburden themselves and provided psychological help and social and educational recommendations. In addition, the researchers told us that they used a clinical sample, as well as, a convenience sample.

Thes ubj e c t sofWa l l e r s t e i n’ sr e s e a r c ha r e6 0f a mi l i e swhovol unt e e r e dt o pa r t i c i pa t ei nt her e s e a r c hbe c a us eoft he i rne e df or“ he l pi nr e s ol vi ngt hema ny

47 problems that arise at the time of divorce in regard to the children, and not because of specifica l l yi de nt i f i e dne e dsf orps yc hol og i c a lhe l porc l i ni c a li nt e r ve nt i on. ”( J .

S .

Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980b) I want to emphasize the obvious that divorcing parents do have concerns and problems that arise regarding their children. While it is impossible to know the precise motivation at the time the subjects volunteered for the research s t udy,onec a nnotc onc l udet ha tt hedi vor c i ngpa r e nt s ’c onc e r nf ort he i rc hi l dr e n automatically meant that the parents and/or the children have a diagnosable clinical psychological disorder. While the subjects were drawn from a clinical population, i.e., subjects seeking a service, Wallerstein and Kelly (1980) placed the children within the normal range and outside the clinical range because the children were performing at age-appropriate levels in school, on the playground, and at home prior to the parental divorce. Wallerstein and Kelly further tried to reduce possible confounding independent variables. Chronic poverty, the pressures of racism, or overcrowding at home or at school did not stress the families of the study. Therefore, Wallerstein and Kelly reasoned, they had controlled all but the independent variables of divorce and had the dependent variable as the adjustment of the children to the divorce of their parents. In essence they were pursuing what Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) have called a mixed methodology. They were conducting an essentially clinical ethnographic study, trapped in the methodological thinking and parts of the methodology of logicoscientism.

Wallerstein and Kelly (1980) had several goals for their study. The first was that t he ywa nt e dt ounde r s t a ndt he“ young s t e r s ’e xpe r i e nc eofdi vor c ei t s e l f —capturing

48 nuances of the perceptions, the attitudes, the range of both intense and subtle feelings, and the unde r l yi ngc onf l i c t sa nda nxi e t i e sa tt het i meoft hema r i t a ls e pa r a t i on. ”( p.8 ) S e c ondwa st o“ f ol l owt hec hi l dr e na nda dol e s c e nt sove rt i mei nor de rt oa s s e s st he impact of divorce on their development to gauge the extent to which the various developmental processes, taken individually and together, might be impeded or a c c e l e r a t e dbyf a mi l yc ha ng e . ”( p.8 )Thi r dwa st ounde r s t a ndt he“ c ha ng e si npa r e nt child relationships that take place at the time of separation and during the years that f ol l owe d. ”( p.1 0) And finally, they were: i nt e r e s t e di nt hea dul t s ’e xpe r i e nc e sdur i ngt het i meoft hef a i l i ngma r r i a g ea nd the decision to divorce—in the hopes, disappointments, difficulties, and accomplishments that followed, with particular emphasis on the relationship of the divorced partners to each other, and as these affected their children in the period immediately after the divorce and during the years that followed. (p. 10) Wa l l e r s t e i na ndKe l l y’ ss t a t e dpr e s umpt i onwa s , Only with a realistic and informed recognition of the individual as well as the shared experience during the marriage, during the divorcing period, and in the postdivorce family does it become possible to address the many serious questions involved, and to make the decisions that will reflect true consideration for all the family members—children and adults alike. (p. 11) This presumption reflects the ethical considerations of the Wallerstein research camp on one hand, and their clinical ethnographic methodology. Wallerstein and Kelly were

49 clearly stating that their interest was in agency and meaning first, and rules s e c onda r i l y,t ous eKoc h’ sc r i t i que .

Yet, Wallerstein and Kelly were aware that their research is on the border of propositional thinking and methodology. In a footnote beginning on page nine, Wallerstein and Kelly (1980) indicate their awareness of the problems implicit in their research methodology in generating a beginning set of norms and standards for ps yc hol og i c a la nds oc i a ls t r e s sg e ne r a t e dbyt hedi vor c eofone ’ spa r e nt s .The ywr ot e , These norms and standards need to be tested, modified, or affirmed, not only by the increased sophistication of method and accumulated knowledge, but by their applicability to the diversity of socioeconomic, ethnic, and geographical communities in this society. Because these hypotheses and these beginning norms have been derived from a California, suburban, predominantly (although not entirely) white, middle-class population, it would appear especially important to study divorcing families at several points in time and with perhaps related methodology in the different socioeconomic groups and with diverse ethnic backgrounds. One problem is the absence of any control group, in the usual sense, against which our own families can be highlighted.

Short of a comparison group—families (with youngsters) equally conflicted and troubled who chose not [emphasis in original] to seek divorce as a solution, and yet made themselves equally accessible to intense and repetitive interview contact with our research group over a five-year span—no completely proper control group would exist. And, yet, aside from the obvious difficulty in

50 assembling this kind of group (and one equivalent on the matching demographic and social criteria), we chose to pursue an avowedly hypothesis generating search, one built on the fullest possible exploration of the “ e xpe r i e nc eofdi vor c e ”f or all its participants. The perspectives this study would generate would later, we trusted, become the subject of a more definitive hypothesis-testing study, one that paid attention to the specific controls necessary to test the hypothesis at issue. (p. 9) Wallerstein and Kelly clearly understood the methodological problems with the format of their research study. They indicated in this paragraph that they expected their research findings would generate other studies, which could more specifically test the particular hypotheses that their research study generated. What they believed they ha dt odowa st og e ne r a t et he“ be g i nni ngs e tofs t a nda r dsa ndnor ms . ”( p.9 )Thi s paragraph also illustrates their awareness of what the acceptable research model of academic psychology was. Wallerstein and Kelly wanted to use their study to make general predictive and associative statements about a larger population. However, they were aware that, because of construction of their sample and their methodology, they may not bea bl et og e ne r a t e“ t hee xpe c t a bl er a ng e si na t t i t ude s ,f e e l i ng s ,be ha vi or ,a nd r e s pons e si nt hewa keofdi vor c ea c t i ona nda tva r i ousi nt e r va l sl a t e r . ”( p.9 )Wi t ht hi s limitation in mind, Wallerstein and Kelly set forth on their research, for they clearly believed that other researchers would refine and help define the set of standards and norms. Secondarily, while they would have liked their research to have generated general predictive and associative propositional statements like a scientific study, they

51 believed as shown in their research goals and presumptions that the subjectivity, meaning, and agency of their research subject would be an important finding in its own right.

Wallerstein and Kelly (1980) seemed to have anticipated the methodological criticisms of academic psychology. In a sense, despite their wish to engage in a paradigmatic study, they understood the immense powerfulness of their mixed study.

They also were acutely aware of the influence that the mutual participation of both researcher and subject would have on each other. In many ways they tried to make this influence explicit. Their thinking seemed to be that by knowing ahead of time that the mutual participation of researcher and subject would be considered possible source of error, therefore they could make allowances and adjustments for it. Wallerstein and Kelly (1980) wrote in a footnote, We also want to note that, as a combined research and intervention study, our findings and their progress were inevitably confounded by the ameliorative impact of our interview method, but in its explicit and specific helpful intent, and also even in the nonspecific impact of a concerned and interested outsider seeking empathically to understand. We selected this course carefully. We decided there was no way to eliminate the effect of the interviewer, nor even to diminish that effect without vitiating access to the lives of our participants in the study, thereby in effect vitiating the study itself. We can only assume, however, that our influence was more benign than not, and that the findings were more likely to be positive because of this brief intervention. Or put in

52 another way, any negative findings could be presumed to be more pervasive in a population that was entirely lacking even the brief and limited support which we offered in our three points of contact over the five years. (p. 9-10) Wallerstein and Kelly (1980) gave extensive elaboration of their methodology and data analysis in Appendix A of their book. Instead of reviewing and commenting on Appendix A in its entirety, I am electing to highlight various aspects of Appendix A for the reader. Specifically, I want to focus on the composition of the sample. The details of the composition of the sample, I think, will give the reader a better view and understanding of the Wallerstein research findings. In addition, since the subjects have participated in this research for over 25 years (J. S. Wallerstein, Lewis, & Blakeslee, 2000), the composition details are important in understanding this research and comparing the Wallerstein research camp to other research camps.

There were 60 families in the Wallerstein and Kelly research (1980). Eightyeight percent of the families were white, 3% were black, and 9% had interracial ma r r i a g e si nwhi c honepa r t ne rwa sAs i a n.Us i ngHol l i ng s he a d’ s( 1 9 5 7 )Two Factor Index of Social Position to divide the sample by the social class at initial contact with the research project, the researchers found that 23% of the families were in Social Class I, which is the high social class in this model. Ten percent of the families were in Social Class V, which is the low social class in the model. Twenty percent of the families were in Social Class II, 28% were in Social Class III, while 18% were in Social Class IV. Therefore, 43% of the sample was in the upper two Social Class groups. Therefore, a

53 high percentage of the sample was in the middle to upper middle-class in socioeconomic terms.

The educational attainments of the parents were considerable in the sample.

Only 2% of the mothers had less than a high school education, while 5% of the fathers had less than a high school education. Thirteen percent of the fathers and 22% of the mothers had a high school diploma. Twenty-three percent of the fathers and 42% of the mothers had some college education. Twenty-two percent of the fathers and 25% of the mothers had completed college, while 10% of the fathers and 5% of the mothers had pursued some graduate work. Finally, 27% of the fathers and 3% of the mothers had a graduate degree of some kind. Wallerstein and Kelly noted that most of the mothers in the study married during their college years and ceased their formal education at the time. With 59% of the men and 33% of the women having had at least a college education, this could be considered a highly-educated sample in comparison to the general population.

The mental health status of the parents is the subject of criticism of the Wallerstein longitudinal study (Emery, 1999). Wallerstein and Kelly (1980b) made clinical judgments about the general psychological functioning of each parent. They then grouped the sample into three large categories of mental health. The first group had generally adequate psychological functioning. Adequate psychological function meant that these adults were able to cope with family, occupation, household responsibilities, and the ups and downs of an unsatisfactory marriage, on average.

About 33% of the men and women of the sample fit into this category. The second

54 group, in which 50% of the men and almost 50% of the women fit, were the moderately troubled. These were the men and women who wer e“ t hec hr oni c a l l y depressed, sometimes suicidal individuals, the men and women with severe neurotic difficulties or with handicaps in relating to another person, or those with long-standing pr obl e msc ont r ol l i ngt he i rr a g eors e xua li mpul s e s . �( p.3 2 8 )The final group, made up of 15% of the men and 20% of the women, were judged clinically to be: severely troubled during their marriages, perhaps throughout their lives. These individuals had histories of mental illness including paranoid thinking, bizarre behavior, manic-depressive illnesses, and generally fragile or unsuccessful attempts to cope with the demands of life, marriage, and family. (p. 328) At the time that this book was written about half of the women in the study had been in psychotherapy, while a third of the men had been in therapy or counseling. Most of the third that had been in therapy were men who had been in conjoint marital counseling with their wives. Since Wallerstein and Kelly did not psychiatrically group the sample, it is very hard to draw firm conclusions about the mental health status of the sample. It could be that the majority of groups I and II did not meet criteria for a mental illness. If this was the case, then the criticism that the sample had too much psychological dysfunction might be unfounded. The difficulty is that we just do not know.

In these 60 families there were 136 children. A 131 of these children participated enough in the study to be included. The children ranged from one to 22 years of age. Forty-eight percent of the children were male and 52% of the children

55 were female. Twenty-six percent of the children were in preschool to kindergarten— ages 2 to 5 years. The young school-age group made up 27% of the sample. These children were ages 6 to 8. Thirty-three percent of the sample were ages 9 to 12 and were called the older-school age group. The adolescent group, ages 13 to 18, made up 14% of the sample.

Since Wallerstein and Kelly were interested in the experience of parental divorce on a normal group of children and adolescents, they excluded from the study a nyf a mi l ywhe r ea nyc hi l d“ ha dahi s t or yofps yc hol og i c a ldi f f i c ul t i e sorwa s c ur r e nt l yi nps yc hot he r a pyf orhi sorhe rownpe r s ona ldi f f i c ul t i e s . ”( p.3 3 0 )I n addition, youngsters whose intellectual capacity or social development was retarded or significantly below appropriate norms were also excluded from the study. To ensure that the children and adolescents were in the normal range, Wallerstein and Kelly also did not include in the study any child or adolescent who had been identified by a parent, or school personnel, as particularly at risk.

One of the criticisms of the children in the sample is that the children did not represent a normal population with respect to mental health issues (Emery, 1994).

Wallerstein and Kelly (1980b), as they had done with the parents, developed an a s s e s s me ntoft hec hi l d’ sove r a l lps ychological adequacy. This assessment was essentially a shorthand psychodevelopmental profile. The children were then placed into three large categorical groups. The children and adolescents were evaluated for psychological function with respect to self esteem, creativity, anger, capacities to sublimate, feelings of deprivation, anxiety, depression, conscience development, peer

56 relations, social maturity and school functioning. Thirty-six percent of the sample (20 boysa nd2 6g i r l s )f a c e dt he“ di vor c i ngpe r i od with well-integrated personalities and s uc c e s s f ulc opi ngt ha tha dbe e nar e c ur r e nta ndg r a t i f yi nga s pe c toft he i rf unc t i oni ng . ” ( p.3 3 1 )Thi sg r oupofc hi l dr e nc onf i r me dt her e s e a r c he r s ’hopet ha t“ uns a t i s f yi ng marriages can still provide an arena for successful parenting and loving relationships be t we e na tl e a s tonepa r e nta ndt hec hi l d. ”( p.3 3 1 ) The second group, consisting of 48% of the sample (30 boys and 33 girls), came to the divorce process with a mixture of successes and failures. For Wallerstein and Kelly this group represented the adequate and average child who copes as best as he or she can, where he or she can, with a mixture of supports and environmental givens.

These children may do well in one area, but may not succeed in another.

The third group (13 boys and 9 girls), 17% of the sample, entered the divorce pr oc e s swi t h“ s e r i ousha ndi c a psofe i t he rde ve l opme nt a la r r e s t si nf unc t i onornot a bl e psychological problems and a prior history of successive and accumulating failures in c opi ng . ”( p.331) Wallerstein and Kelly reported that, when deciding to place children in this group, they were cautious and conservative. They did not want to place a child in this group by diagnosing psychopathology in a case where this pathology might be stress related. Yet, the impairments and failures of psychological function of this group “ we r es oobvi ous l yc hr oni ct ha tt hedi vor c es e e me dt or e pr e s e ntye ta not he rt r a uma t i c event in a life filled with trauma, lack of gratification, and failures in mastery at various de ve l opme nt a ls t a g e s . ”( p.3 3 1 )

57 Nowt ha tweknowal i t t l ea boutWa l l e r s t e i na ndKe l l y’ ss t udys a mpl e ,wene e d to know what they did with this sample. The researchers gathered their data by interviewing every member of the family. Each family member was seen individually.

Additional information was obtained from the school, so that there was an independent source of information about each family, both collectively and individually. Wallerstein and Kelly essentially were getting what Denzin (1989b) c a l l e d,“ t hi c kde s c r i pt i ons . ”Ther e s e a r c he r swa nt e dt o“ t r i a ng ul a t e ”da t at ha tont he s ur f a c ec a na ppe a rt obei r r e c onc i l a bl ei nt o“ ame a ni ng f ulps yc hological portrait of the f a mi l ya ndi t sme mbe r si nt hemi ds tofdi vor c e . ”( p.3 2 0 )Ea c hpa r e ntwa si nt e r vi e we d weekly over a six-week period. Each child was interviewed for three or four sessions after the first two interviews with the parents. The parent interviews lasted from one to one-and-a-half hours. The child interviews were mostly for 50 minutes per session.

Generally, the same interviewer/clinician saw all the family members. Families were not excluded because one family member refused to participate. The average number of interviews per family was 15. The average amount of research staff time spent on each family was approximately 30 hours. Detailed dictations were prepared of all the interviews. At the end of the six week period, the families were invited to come back for further consultations in a year. If there was need in the interim for more consultations, the families were assured that the interviewer/clinician would be available. The families were then followed up at intervals of 1 year and 5 years. The time period for this initial study was between 1971 and 1977.

58 The findings of the 1 year and 5 year studies were reported in Wallerstein and Ke l l y’ s(1980) book, Surviving the Breakup: How Children and Parents Cope with Divorce. Subsequently, 10 year findings were reported in Wallerstein and Sandra Bl a ke s l e e ’ s(1989) book, Second Chances: Men, Women, and Children a Decade after Divorce. Twenty-five year findings of this study are presented in Wallerstein, Julia Le wi s ,a ndBl a ke s l e e ’ s (2000) book, The Unexpected Legacy of Divorce: A 25 Year Landmark Study.

The Hetherington Research Position The second research camp has E. Mavis Hetherington as its major spokesperson. Hetherington and John Kelly (2002) s umma r i z e dHe t he r i ng t on’ s4 5 years of studying families in her book, For Better Or Worse: Divorce Reconsidered.

He t he r i ng t on’ squa nt i t a t i ver e s e a r c hs t udi e dc hi l dr e na nda dol e s c e nt sofdi vor c e d parents from a risk and resiliency point of view. Her research was based on three longitudinal studies. Study I was The Virginia Longitudinal Study of Divorce and Remarriage, Study II was The Hetherington and Clingempeel Study of Divorce and Remarriage, and the third study was The National Study of Nonshared Environment.

Each study used, a family systems life span framework, similar constructs, and often the same or similar measures, each contributed unique information about family functioning, individual adjustment, and adaptation in diverse family types. The use of similar measures often permitted us to pool data from multiple studies in

59 our analyses. All three studies were approximately evenly divided across male and female children and had non-divorced families as comparison groups.

(Hetherington & Kelly, 2002, p. 281) Hetherington used a family systems theoretical approach, while Wallerstein and her colleagues used a psychodynamic theoretical approach. These theoretical approaches represent different points of view about what information is privileged. In addition, these theoretical approaches also represent different interpretative positions about what is the central area of focus. Specifically, a family systems approach conceptualizes the central area of concern to be in the relationship between the parents. It is hypothesized in this theoretical model that the parents, to minimize a nxi e t yi nt hepa r e nt s ’r e l a t i ons hi punc ons c i ous l yc r e a t eat a r g e tc hi l ds ot ha tt he parents can focus on the child, thereby reducing the anxiety in their relationship. This is in contrast to the psychodynamic theoretical model used by Wallerstein that hypothesizes the difficulty as being located in an individual as a reaction to a specific context, given the genetic endowment the individual brings to that specific context.

Hetherington used larger data sets than did the Wallerstein group and she included a comparison group of non-divorced families in the research in contrast to the first two Wa l l e r s t e i n’ sbooks( 1 9 8 0 b,1 9 8 9 ) .AsIdi dwi t hJ udi t hWa l l e r s t e i n’ sr e s e a r c h,Iwa nt to look closely at these samples and the research designs.

60 The Virginia Longitudinal Study of Divorce and Remarriage (VLS) (Hetherington & Kelly, 2002) “ wa sor i g i na l l yi nt e nde donl ya sac ompa r a t i ves t udyof family functioning and adjustment in recently divorced, mother-custody, and nondi vor c e df a mi l i e s . ”( p.2 8 2 )Thi ss a mpl ewa sc r e a t e dt oa ns we rt heque s t i ons , Why did girls from divorced families have more social and psychological problems than girls from widowed families? Was there a unique developmental dynamic—perhaps even a uniquely harmful dynamic—in divorced families? (p.

13) Some of the earlier divorce research had relied only on the report of a single family member, usually the mother, to study the effects of divorce. The initial sample of the VLS contained 72 middle-class white divorced families with mother-custody and 72 middle-class white non-di vor c e df a mi l i e swi t ha“ t a r g e tc hi l d”f ourye a r sofa g e . “ Ta r g e torf oc a lc hi l d”i sac onc e ptoff a mi l ys ys t e mst he or yt ha tpos t ul a t e st ha ta “ t a r g e tc hi l d”e xpr e s s e sbe haviorally and symptomatically the tension, conflicts, and disharmonies in the relationship between the mother and father. In contrast to some of the earlier divorce studies that had small sample sizes and single research informants, the VLS enlarged the informant base. It included the mother, the father, the target child, and a sibling in the family. It also included the people around the family. The VLS used interviews, questionnaires, standardized tests, and observations of the participants. Some of these instruments had never been used before or were created

61 especially for this study, according to Hetherington (2002). Hetherington devised detailed, methods for observing family interactions and activities; I and my team of investigators studied families in the home . . .. We had a very personal look at how our families behaved when they disagreed, fought, relaxed, played, and soothed each other. (p. 13) The VLS was the first study to employ, according to Hetherington, a structured diary in studying divorce. One of the research goals was to be able to study the mood fluctuations and activities of the adults in the study. Hetherington asked the adults to note where they were, whom they were with, and what they were doing in the diaries that they kept three days a week at half-hour intervals. According to Hetherington (2002),t he s edi a r i e s“ yi e l de dag r e a tde a lofuni quea ndf i ne -grained de t a i l �( p.1 3 )t ot hes t udy.

Children and families were studied at 2 months, 1 year, 2 years, and 6 years, with a truncated assessment at 8 years, 11 years, and 20 years after the divorce, when the oldest target children were 24 years old. Assessments were also made when the young people married, cohabited for more than 6 months, or had a child. Of the original sample, 122 families continue to participate in the study.

Hetherington expanded the sample when the children were 10. She added 108 families to the sample. She expanded the sample again 5 years later by adding another 125 families. When the target child became 24 years old, the study added another 150 families. Hetherington reported that with the last addition, the study included 450

62 families and 900 youth distributed across non-divorced, divorced and remarried families.

A confounding variable was that throughout the study, divorces and remarriages were occurring. Hetherington did not see this as a confounding variable as much as she saw it as: an opportunity to examine family functioning and the adjustment of family members before and after a marital transition occurred. It also permitted us to examine whether there were times at which these transitions were easier or more harmful. (p. 282-283) She saw that her risk and resiliency approach to interpreting the data required increasing the sample size in order to study marital transitions and diverse life pathways.

Hetheri ng t on’ ss t udyc ol l e c t e dwi der a ng i ngda t af r om wi t hi na ndout s i det he home. For example, In this study observations of younger children and parents included unstructured play; structured observations of parents and children; observations of family relationships from the time the children got home from school until they went to bed; and observations of children in school and in peer interactions. (Hetherington & Kelly, 2002, p. 285) In addition, the researchers observed the family at the dinner table and gathered information about marital, sibling, and parent-child relationships. The researchers also l ooke df ori ndi c a t i onsofc hi l dr e n’ sc ompe t e nc ea ndbe ha vi orpr obl e ms .The

63 researchers obtained their information from the children, parents, siblings, and teachers. In addition, data were collected on variables outside the home, such as school quality, peer networks, social support, life events and stresses, and relationships with grandparents and non-residential fathers. The researcher also collected measured i nf or ma t i onon“ t hema r i t a lr e l a t i ons hi p,ma r i t a ls a t i s f a c t i on,a r e a sofc onf l i c t ,f a mi l y t a s ksa ndr ol e s ,wa r mt h/ s uppor t ,a ndc onf l i c t / ne g a t i vi t yi nt hec oupl e ’ sr e l a t i ons hi p. ” ( p.2 8 5 )Fur t he r mor e ,t her e s e a r c he r sa s s e s s e dt hec hi l d’ sne g a t i ve / c oe r c i ve / conflict behavior in the parent-child relationship, along with the warm, congenial behavior and feelings of closeness with the parent. Hetherington conceptualized four parenting dimensions that were central to her view point regarding marital transitions. These dimensions are warmth/involvement, negativity/conflict, monitoring, and control.

These dimensions were also assessed in this study.

Sibling relationships were assessed through standardized inventories, obs e r va t i onsbyr e s e a r c he r s ,a ndpa r e nt s ’r e por ts on the relationships. In addition, the researchers measured sibling aggression, avoidance/embarrassment, rivalry, involvement/companionship, teaching/guidance, and empathy. Assessments of the c hi l dr e n’ sa dj us t me nti nc l ude dmul t i pl eme a s ur e sofe xt e r na l i zing antisocial behavior, internalizing depressed anxious behaviors, social and academic competence, social r e s pons i bi l i t y,a nds e l fe s t e e m.Ther e s e a r c he r sa s s e s s e dt hepa r e nt s ’pe r s ona l i t i e s through standardized tests, interviews and observations. Specifically, the parents were evaluated for depression, anxiety, antisocial behavior, sensation-seeking, locus of control, social responsibility, and self esteem.

64 He t he r i ng t on’ sf i ndi ng s( 1 9 8 9 ,1 9 9 1 a ,1 9 9 1 b,1 9 9 3 ,1 9 9 9 a ,1 9 9 9 b;He t he r i ng t on & Jodl, 1994) on these studies have been widely reported. She integrated all of her research findings in writing her book, For Better or Worse: Divorce Reconsidered (Hetherington & Kelly, 2002). However, in her selected bibliography in this book, she neglected a series of important early research findings from the VLS. Specifically, she neglected to reference her collaborative work with Martha Cox and Roger Cox (Hetherington, Cox, & Cox, 1978, 1979a, 1979b, 1979c, 1982, 1985). These research studies reported and interpreted the findings of the VLS from a different perspective that found that children were not as resilient as what Hetherington has now proposed in her summary book.

The second longitudinal study on which Hetherington based her research is The Hetherington and Clingempeel Study of Divorce and Remarriage (Hetherington & Clingempeel, 1992). Hetherington (2002) wa sf i ndi ngf r om he rr e s e a r c hs t udi e s“ t ha t early adolescence was an especially difficult time at which to have a remarriage take pl a c e . �( p.2 8 3 )Thi ss t udywa sde s i g ne dt oe xa mi nea da pt a t i oni ns t e pf a mi l i e swi t h young adolescent children. Hetherington (2002) viewed the first 26 months as the initial crisis period following a remarriage. There were comparison groups of nondivorced families, and divorced non-remarried mother-headed families, where the mother had been divorced for the same period as the mothers who had remarried into stepfamilies. The stepfamilies were all studied at 4 months, 17 months and 26 months after remarriage. The non-divorced and the divorced-not-remarried were studied at the same intervals. Two hundred and two white middle-class families living in Philadelphia

65 and its suburbs were studied. These findings were reported in Hetherington and Cl i ng e mpe e l ’ s( 1 9 9 2 )monog r a ph,Coping with Marital Transitions: A Family Systems Perspective.

The third study was The National Study of Nonshared Environment. The primary aim of this study was to, ‘ e xa mi net hec ont r i but i onof genetics, shared environment, and nonshared environment—that is, experiences that differ for siblings in the same family—to the development of both competence and psychopathology in adolescence.

However this study offered an unusual opportunity to examine the functioning and development of children in different kinds of stepfamilies (Hetherington, Henderson, & Reiss, 1999). ’( He t he r i ng t on& Ke l l y,2 0 0 2 ,p.2 8 3 ) This study was a national sample comprised of 720 two-parent families with a pair of same-sex adolescent siblings no more than 4 years apart in age. The study had: six groups of families with siblings of varying degrees of genetic relatedness.

These six family types were: 1. families with dizygotic twins [two eggs]; 2. families with monozygotic twins [one egg]; 3. s t e pf a mi l i e swi t hf ul ls i bl i ng swhe r ebot hc hi l dr e nwe r ef r om mot he r ’ s previous marriage; 4. s t e pf a mi l i e swi t hha l fs i bl i ng swhe r eonec hi l dwa sf r om mot he r ’ spr e v i ous marriage and one was born in the new marriage;

66 5. bl e nde ds t e pf a mi l i e swi t hunr e l a t e ds i bl i ng s( onef r om t hemot he r ’ s pr e vi ousma r r i a g ea ndonef r om t hef a t he r ’ spr e vi ousma r r i a g e ) ;a nd 6. non-divorced families with full siblings (intact).

The stepfamilies were stabilized stepfamilies that had been remarried for an average of almost nine years. (Hetherington & Kelly, 2002, p. 284) This study examined simple stepfamilies, defined by Hetherington and her associates as “ s t e pf a mi l i e si nwhi c honl yt hec hi l dr e nf r om t hemot he r ’ spr e vi ousma r r i a g ea r e presenti nt hef a mi l y. ”( p.2 8 4 )I na ddi t i on,t hes t udya l s oe xa mi ne dc ompl e x s t e pf a mi l i e s ,de f i ne dbyHe t he r i ng t ona ndhe ra s s oc i a t e sa s“ s t e pf a mi l i e si nwhi c ht he s i bl i ng si nt hef a mi l yva r yi nbi ol og i c a lr e l a t e dne s st ot hemot he ra ndt hef a t he r . ”( p.

284) Hetherington had two hypotheses in this study. The first was that the more complex relationships would be associated with more problems in the parent-child relationship and in the adjustment of the children. The second was that the quality of the sibling relationship was expected to be influenced by the biological relationship of the specific sibling pair rather than the complexity in biological relationship among all family members.

The researchers conducted two assessments of the population sample. They did an initial assessment and then four years later did a repeat of the original assessment.

During the second assessment, only 404 families participated, because one of the adolescents in the sibling pair had left home. In addition, fewer than 72 families refused to participate in the second assessment.

67 Hetherington (2002) and her associates, like Wallerstein and her associates, used “ mul t i pl es our c e sofi nf or ma t i oni na l lt hes t udi e s . ”( p.2 8 5 )AsHe t he r i ng t on(2002) not e d,“ ...apa r e nt ’ sora na dol e s c e nt ’ sr e por tofhowt he yvi e wt he i rf a mi l ys i t ua t i on is interesting in understanding their perspective, [however] it may not be accurate in pr e s e nt i ngwha ti sg oi ngoni nt hef a mi l y. ”( p.2 8 4 -2 8 5 )He t he r i ng t ona s s e r t e dt ha t“ By using multiple sources of information . . . , we attempted to derive convergent measur e st ha twoul dbemor eva l i da ndr e l i a bl et ha na nys i ng l eme a s ur e . ”( p.2 8 5 ) Hetherington (2002) s t a t e d“ e a c hwa veofda t ac ol l e c t i oni nvol ve dal a r g es e tof interviews, questionnaires, standardized test measures, and observations of family problem-solving sessions in various combinations of parents, siblings and target c hi l dr e n. ”( p.2 8 5 ) The data from these studies was analyzed using a wide variety of analytic techniques. The researchers were trying to assess differences in the average levels of “ f a mi l yf unc t i oni nga nda dj us t me ntin men and women, boys and girls, and different t ype soff a mi l i e s . ”( He t he r i ng t on,& Ke l l y,2 0 0 2 ,p.2 8 6 )The ywe r ea t t e mpt i ngt o “ i de nt i f yt hef unc t i ona la ndc a us a lr e l a t i ons hi pst ha tc ont r i but e dt oc ha ng e si nf a mi l y relations and adjustment of family membe r sove rt i me . ”( p.2 8 6 )Ther e s e a r c he r sus e d c l us t e ra na l ys e s“ t oi de nt i f yt het ype sofma r i t a lr e l a t i ons hi ps ,s i bl i ngr e l a t i ons hi ps , parent-c hi l dr e l a t i ons hi ps ,a ndpa t t e r nsofa dj us t me nt . ”( p.2 8 6 )The s ec l us t e ra na l ys e s created the typologies of parenting styles—authoritative, permissive, authoritarian, and neglecting parents. At other times researchers were able to use variables made by combining the information from various informants and measures. These composite

68 variables were created by combining the reports by mothers, fathers, and adolescents, with the rating of observers on such factors as parent-child conflict, parental warmth orc ont r ol ,orc hi l da nt i s oc i a lbe ha vi or .He t he r i ng t ona r g ue st ha t“ s uc hc ombi ne d measures are more reliable and better predictors of later behavior than are single me a s ur e s . ”( p.2 8 6 -287). However, Hetherington as an addendum assured her reader t ha tt her e por t sf r om t hei ndi vi dua li nf or ma nt s“ we r ea l s oe xa mi ne di nor de rt o understand the different perspectives of individua lf a mi l yme mbe r s . ”( p.2 8 7 ) The Hetherington research camp in these three longitudinal studies has created a ni mpr e s s i ver e s e a r c hl i t e r a t ur e .S henot e dwi t hmor et ha nahi ntofpr i det ha t“ ove r two hundred theses, dissertations, papers, and books have been based on the data dr a wnf r om t he s es t udi e s . ”( p.2 8 7 )I na ddi t i on,s het ha nke d“ t hehundr e dsof undergraduate and graduate students and staff without whose dedication and effort t he s es t udi e sc oul dnotha vebe e nc ompl e t e d. ”( p.2 8 7 ) Hetherington reported that non-residential fathers were an information source.

I would think that those fathers provide a very important source of information about the adjustment of children of divorced parents. Her reason for getting information from non-residential fathers in part may be due to the membership inclusion criteria of her sample. To be part of her sample, the divorced family had to have mother custody.

This membership criterion is not generally the current norm, where joint custody is the preferred custody arrangement of the courts. The mother custody criterion t he r e f or ema yha vea f f e c t e dt heHe t he r i ng t onc a mp’ sa bi l i t yt oma kepr opos i t i ona l

69 inferences about the national population, which would constitute a weakness of the study.

The reader may have noticed words like, measured, accurate, reliable, s t a nda r di z e di nve nt or i e sa ndpr e di c t or si nHe t he r i ng t on’ sr e s e a r c hde s c r i pt i ons .The use of these words emphasize for the reader that Hetherington used a propositional research model. Her research has been methodologically designed to be able to make science-like statements. I have already demonstrated the problems with this model in s oc i a ls c i e nc er e s e a r c h.Thec onc e ptof“ me a s ur e d”i nvol ve st hec r e a t i onofa n a bs t r a c t i ona boutme a ni ng .Thec onc e ptof“ a c c ur a t e ”s ug g ests a standard to which this a c c ur a c yc a nbec ompa r e d.“ Re l i a bi l i t y”i sac onc e ptt ha ti sg e ne r a l l yde f i ne da sbe i ng reproducible over many samples. These concepts, measured, accurate, and reliability, are too strong a statement for studies that can yield correlations, at best. And finally, t hewor d“ pr e di c t or s ”s t r ong l ys ug g e s t st ha thuma na c t i onsc a nbepr e di c t a bl ei na cause and effect methodology emulating science methodology, which I believe is quite suspect in social science research.

Finally, I want to emphasize what I consider a significant difference between these two research camps with respect to their methodologies. In the Hetherington c a mp,t her e s e a r c hi sbe i ngc onduc t e dby“ hundr e dsofunde r g r a dua t ea ndg r a dua t e s t ude nt sa nds t a f f , ”whi l ei nthe Wallerstein research group, the research was being conducted by trained experienced clinicians. I believe that there is a substantial qualitative difference between these two groups of research assistants. Further, I submit that while academic social science research has depended on the Hetherington

70 kind of research assistants, these research assistants are a source of error in the research.

Academic propositional researchers have tried to quantify this error in two ways: by using measures of rater variability to show that the raters would rate the same experience quantitatively the same, and by specifying their level of confidence or the significance of the finding. In respect to rating the adjustment of divorce families, I suggest that an undergraduate does not have sufficient life experience to serve as a consistently reliable rater. Furthermore, I would suggest that undergraduates who have never been married, and never had children like graduate students with similar experience, would have a difficult time understanding the experiences of the families that they are observing. Therefore, the Hetherington research group has had to use standardized measures and inventories in its research because of who has been doing the observing. By using these measures, this research camp can lower its source of possible sources of error.

He t he r i ng t on’ sr e s e a r c ha s s i s t a nt sa r er e duc e dt oma ki ngobs e r va bl ebe ha vi or a l observations. These observations must be restricted to the categories that her research has previousl yg e ne r a t e d.The s eobs e r va t i onsc a nnotbea ni nf e r e nc ef r om t hef a mi l y’ s behavior. In other words, the observer is assigning a meaning to specific behaviors in the family. Observers might be able over time to make an association or prediction about what behaviors the family might exhibit next based on past observations. This kind of understanding may lead to be ability to correlate future behavior on previous behavior. However, the family may have assigned a different meaning to a specific behavior than what the research observer has.

71 In contrast, the Wallerstein research camp has used experienced clinicians, or wha te a r l i e rIc a l l e d“ c l i ni c a le t hnog r a phe r s . ”The s ee t hnog r a phe r sha vebe e nt r a i ne d to understand the life experiences of the children and families that they have been interviewing and for whom they are performing a clinical service. There is a qualitative difference between understanding a family and observing a family. This qualitative difference creates the possibility of understanding or misunderstanding the meanings that parents and children are placing on their experiences during the divorce process.

In contrast the clinical ethnographer asked the family members what a specific behavior means to each of them individually or collectively. The family members a s s i g nt heme a ni ngt ot hebe ha vi or .Thee t hnog r a phe r ’ sunde r s t a ndi ngoft hef a mi l y’ s assigned meanings has the possibility to lead to a greater sensitivity to the experiences of divorce.

Another but related issue is that none of the raters/evaluators in either research g r oupwe r e“ bl i nd”t ot hec hi l d’ shi s t or y,i . e . ,t ha tt hec hi l dwa sf r om adi vor c e d family. There is the hope among the researchers that multiple raters over multiple times might counteract this possible source of error, but it is a possible source of error nevertheless. In addition, as Emery (1999) points out the raters are aware of other domains, meaning that they had information from other sources. The mother, for e xa mpl e ,mi g htbea s ke dt or a t et hec hi l d’ sdi s obedience with her, and at the same time rate the extent of conflict between the father and the child. Awareness of information from other domains may influence the rater and so the danger for possible error remains very high.

72 I hope that these cautions and these deconstructions of the major longitudinal research samples help the reader to more cautiously evaluate the general research that I am now going to review. In addition, I would hope that the reader would quickly come to realize that despite the criticisms and the manifest problems with the research designs and samples of both camps of researchers, the research findings seem to agree more than disagree. This consilience in the research findings from both camps suggests that there is more verisimilitude in this literature than previously was supposed. I plan to review this consilience of the literature developmentally, since I have repeatedly stressed the role of context.

Consilience of the Research Findings I have discerned three interrelated themes in the research literature on the a dj us t me ntofc hi l dr e nt ot he i rpa r e nt ’ sdi vor c e .Onet he mei st ha tt hec ont e xtoft he parental divorce has an emotional impact on the adjustment of the children. A submotif of this major theme is that the age of the child at the time of parental separation and divorce has implications for the way the child handles the experience. Another, butr e l a t e dt he me ,i st ha tpa r e nt a ldi vor c ec ha ng e st hec our s eofac hi l d’ sde ve l opme nt .

And the third theme in the research is that parental divorce is a process, not a single event. These themes interweave within the divorce literature to form what can seem like a confusing tapestry of research results whose patterns often seem contradictory.

The following section reviews this research, using the common and convenient t ypol og yofa g epe r i odst oe mpha s i z et hel i t e r a t ur e ’ sc ons i l i e nc e .

73 Children, whatever the age, are almost always distressed at the separation of their parents (J. S. Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980). This is true even in families where the pa r e nt sha vebe e ni nc hr oni chi g hc onf l i c tf orye a r s .Chi l dr e ne xpe r i e nc edi vor c ea s“ a cataclysmic and inexplic a bl ea nde a r t hs ha ki nge ve nt . ”( He t he r i ng t on& Ke l l y,2 0 0 2 ,p.

10) Young children typically have operated on the assumption that they could depend on the predictable availability of both parents (Hodges, 1991). When this assumption proves to be incorrect, then children may question many of their assumptions about the world. Wallerstein found that with divorce such an assurance, of continued nurturance and protection, which had been implicit in an intact family, had been breached: They confronted a world which suddenly appeared to have become less reliable, less predictable, and less likely in their view to provide for their needs and expectations. (J. S. Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980b, p.

45) Wa l l e r s t e i n’ swe l l -taken point is that what had been implicit, i.e., without question, becomes questioned by the child.

In addition, the egocentrism common to young children may lead them to c onc l udet ha tapa r e nt ’ sa bs e nc ei sduet ot hec hi l d’ sunl ova bi l i t yort ot hec hi l d’ s actions. Therefore, abandonment by a noncustodial parent can be very damaging to t hec hi l d’ sself-esteem. In contrast, some children whose parent dies may be able to mourn the loss without such a loss of self-esteem. Abandonment is often connected in t hec hi l d’ smi ndwi t ht hec hi l d’ ss e ns eofbe i ngunl ova bl e .I fIwe r et owr i t eac onc r e t e script ofac hi l d’ st hi nki ng ,i tmi g htbes ome t hi ngl i ke ,“ I fDa dha squi tl ovi ngMom,

74 ma ybeDa dc a nqui tl ovi ngme . ”Ava r i a t i onoft hes a met he memi g hta l s obe ,“ Ma ybe Da dqui tl ovi ngmea ndt hi si swhyhel e f tme . ”Thi sc onc r e t ef e a rc a nc a us et hec hi l d, especially the younger child, to try to behave especially well in order to preserve her/his relationship(s) with a parent or parents. Since it is very hard for a younger child to maintain emotional control for long periods of time, the child might develop anxiety attacks or anger over the fears of rejection. It may be in part the explanation of why children of divorced parents continue to hope for the reunification of their parents. Kurdek and Berg (1987) in an empirical study with children (N=170) ages 6 to 17 found that the hope of reunification is negatively correlated to the age of the child (r=-.48), that is, as the children grow older they are more able to give up the belief that their parents will reconcile.

Yo ungCh i l dr e n’ sAdj us t me ntt oPa r e nt a lDi vo r c e Young children ages 0 to 5 years of age have a difficult time with parental di vor c e .The s ec hi l dr e na r e“ f r i g ht e ne d,be wi l de r e da ndve r ys a d. ”( J .

S .Wa l l e r s t e i n& Kelly, 1980b, p. 57) Their immature understanding of what their parents are doing and what concretely parental divorce means to their current living situation creates fear.

This fear is intensified because these children have the hardest time separating their fantasies, their dreams, and reality. Hetherington (2002) wr i t e s ,“ Fora dul t s ,di vor c e brings a world to an end; for young children, whose lives are focused in the family, it seems to bring the wor l dt oa ne nd[ e mpha s i si nor i g i na l ] . ”( p.1 1 1 )Fort he s eyoung children, Wallerstein and Kelly (1980) found that the daily separations of routine life

75 became a source of anxiety and dread. These children became clingy and needed almost desperately to be attached to the remaining parent. Activities that had been enjoyable before parental separation became intolerable for the children. The children this age in the Wallerstein study were very emotionally labile and were panic stricken much of the time.

Wallerstein and Kelly also found that these young children regressed in their behavior to an earlier developmental period in order to cope with the stress of the parental separation and divorce process. Children were overwhelmed with anxiety and once again needed transitional objects (Winnicott, 1951) to provide additional security.

The children seemed to need to always have a parent in view; or otherwise, they were overwhelmed with fear and anxiety. Some of the children created their own e xpl a na t i onsorf a nt a s i e st oe x pl a i nt he i rpa r e nt s ’be ha vi or .The s ef a nt a s i e si nt he Wallerstein sample often took the form of being left hungry by the parents and having to cope for themselves. Wallerstein and Kelly (1974b) in their study of preschool children found that psychological deterioration occurred in the behavior and function of 15 out of 34 children ages 2 to 6 years, and the quality of the mother-child relationship was diminished in half of the families with children in this age group.

They reported that the children showed regression, irritability, aggression and tantrum behavior. Regression included loss of toilet training, separation anxiety, masturbation a ndt hec hi l d’ sus eoft r ansitional objects such as blankets or dolls for reassurance the child.

76 Some of the children seemed lost, or were seen to be searching for some lost object. Aggressiveness and irritability increased in these children as an initial response to parental separation and divorce (Hetherington & Kelly, 2002; J. S. Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980). In general, the children in these study samples showed emotional neediness and a hunger for affection and physical contact.

Infants respond to parental divorce as a function of how upset the custodial parent, most often the mother, may be about the divorce, i.e., a mother who is very upset will upset her infant (Hodges, 1991). The self-regulatory functions that the parents provide the infant likely will be upset during parental divorce. Wallerstein (J. S. Wallerstein & Blakeslee, 1989) has talked about this phenomenon as a diminished capacity for parenting during the separation and divorce process. Hetherington (2002) wr i t e s ,“ Ani nvol ve d,c ompe t e ntc us t odi a lpa r e ntwa st hemos te f f e c t i vebuf f e ra young child could have against postdivorce stress; an irritable, punitive, uncaring, or disengaged parent put the child at great risk for developing problems . �( p.1 1 2 ) .

Therefore, if parents can maintain the self-regulatory functions of an infant, the impact on the infant is buffered against the postdivorce stress.

Hetherington and Kelly (2002) described the divorce experience and the young c hi l d’ st hi nki ng .

For most, it included seeing parents they loved fight or become hostile and distant, and seeing one parent intermittently or not at all. For all, it involved a loss of trust. Children are dependent on and attached to parents, even not very competent parents. When their parents seem unreliable and untrustworthy, the

77 ve r ybe dr oc kofc hi l dr e n’ swe l l -being is shattered. How can you rely on parents whoqua r r e l ,l e a ve ,be c omepr e oc c upi e d,ordon’ ts e e mt oc a r ea boutt hepa i n they are inflicting on you?

It is not surprising, then, that unmoored from the security of their predictable world, young children become anxious and angry. They become non-compliant or unruly or dependent, regress and wet the bed or suck their thumb, or fight with their friends or cry at things that never used to bother them. Many are afraid of being separated from their parent—of going to school or being left with a baby-sitter or in day care. Some blame themselves and wonder what they did to drive their parent away. (p. 113) The fears and confusion of the children often spread to other adults, like teachers or day care providers: The problems are not confined to relationships with parents and in the home. They flood into behavior with friends and siblings, teachers and other adults. Some children become loners and fringers. They play alone or hang around watching at the edge of the group of other children playing; young boys in particular may become incompetent bullies, making ineffective aggressive forays against other children. The incompetent bully may grab for another c hi l d’ st r uc k:i fhei suns uc c e s s f ulort heot he rc hi l dr e s i s t s ,t hei nc ompe t e nt bully may start to cry or complain to the teacher. Competent bullies are sometimes popular in adolescence, but incompetent bullies are never popular.

Even in the preschool setting, the incompetent bully is rejected and often finds

78 himself exiled to the nursery school equivalent of Siberia. Rejected by his sameaged male peers, he ends up playing with younger peers or playing house with the girls. (p. 113-114) Ag r e e i ngwi t hHe t he r i ng t on’ sde s c r i pt i on,Wa l l e r s t e i na ndKe l l y(1974b) found that the most severe reactions in the children were in those families where the children were not given an explanation of where the absent parent was, or what was happening in and to the family as the children knew it.

Children in this age bracket have a limited cognitive ability to make sense of the loss of one parent. Because of the developmentally appropriate egocentric orientation of children in this age group, children often conclude that the parental divorce is the result of their behavior, or because of the c hi l dr e n’ sunl ova bi l i t y(J. S. Wallerstein & Kelly, 1975). In contrast, Hodges (1991) and Hetherington, Martha Cox and Roger Cox (1979a) have not found that children of this age feel responsibility for the parental divorce and if they do, this feeling as reported to the researchers was a relatively uncommon occurrence.

Hetherington (2002) found that both boys and girls have similar problems in t hef i r s tye a ra f t e radi vor c e ,“ butpa r e nt sa r emor es uppor t i veofg i r l s ,a ndmot he r s a ndda ug ht e r sl e a r nt og e ta l ongqui c kl y. ”( p.1 17) Whether there is a gendered response in divorce with regard to children has been an important area of study.

During this age period children are creating and adopting important stereotypical sex role identifications. This may help to explain both the Hetherington finding above, or the McKinnon and Wallerstein (1986; 1987) finding that in a longitudinal study of 25

79 families, with children (aged 14 months to 5 years) in joint custody that when both parents were motivated primarily by their interests in the child, where the parenting was responsive to the child, and when the child was protected from interparental conflict, younger children did well. However, significant differences were found in the adjustment of the 1 to 3 years-of-age group as compared with the 3 to 5 years-of-age group. The authors found that the older group had more difficulty. The later group struggles with the conceptualization and experience of triad relationships that may partially explain this difference. Hetherington, Cox and Cox (1979a) found in their sample that boys whose average age was 3.79 years at the time of parental divorce had a statistically more difficult time handling the divorce than did girls. Boys statistically still were showing more difficulty two years later in comparison to girls, but the difficulty was declining. Girls, on the other hand, generally had return to the level of adjustment found for girls from nuclear families after a year. This difference between girls from nuclear and divorced families had disappeared two years after the divorce.

Kalter and Rembar (1981) examined the diagnoses of 144 children ages 7 to 17 at an outpatient psychiatric clinic as a function of age and gender at the time of parental separation and divorce. They found that boys whose parents separated while the boys were between 3 years and 5-and-a-half years of age were more likely to have school-related problems and less anxiety and depression than boys experiencing parental divorce at other ages. Adolescent boys whose parents had separated during preschool showed less aggression toward parents and siblings in comparison to boys whose parents had separated later. Girls whose parents separated in preschool were

80 more likely to be more aggressive toward their parents and peers during adolescence and have greater academic problems than girls whose parents had separated later.

While this study has the problem of having been conducted upon a clinical population, it highlights the profound effect that parental divorce has on young children and their development.

In summary, these studies show that for most children in most contexts, the occurrence of parental separation and divorce during preschool tends to result in greater problems particularly for boys. However, for many children of divorced parents, a slow return to the levels of adjustment of children from nuclear families is the most likely course of events. Robert Emery (1999) delineated what he considers the four conclusions that one can draw from adjustment research with children of divorced parents: First, divorce causes much stress in children, ranging from loss of contact with one parent to economic hardship. Second, divorce increases the risk for psychological difficulties among children, often doubling the risk. Third, despite the increased risk, most children of divorced families function as well as children from married families. That is they are resilient [emphasis in original] in coping with the multiple stressors caused by divorce. Fourth, resilience is not invulnerability. (Emery, 1999, p. 35)

81 S c h o o lAg eCh i l dr e n’ sAdj us t me ntt oPa r e nt a lDi vo r c e Children in this age bracket undergo tremendous developmental changes both cognitively and emotionally as they age from 6 to 12. First, at the younger end of the bracket, the children have a still immature sense of time. To be sure, they are able to distinguish the immediate from the distant future, and they are beginning to have a sense of the length of a day, week, and month. Yet, they can self regulate their anticipation of a future event only with help from the adults around them. Second, while they are able to concretely grasp cause and effect actions, they are limited when applying this ability to human relationships. Third, they are less egocentric than they were in preschool, but they still retain much of this orientation. They cannot separate orunde r s t a ndhowt he i rne e dsc oul dbes e pa r a t ef r om t he i rpa r e nt ’ sne e ds .Four t h, they are for the most part very intent on moving into the world of school, and the playground. At the same time, the children in this age bracket are more fortunate than their preschool brothers and sisters in that they have regular and daily school. School exposes them to other supportive adults and most importantly the social support of peers.

During this period of time, the child also develops the cognitive capacity for what Piaget (1970) ha sc a l l e d“ c onc r e t eope r a t i ona lt hi nki ng . ”I nt hi ss t a g eoft hi nki ng , the child can take a posi t i onout s i deofhe r / hi ms e l fa nds e et hewor l df r om a not he r ’ s point of view. This is a valuable cognitive resource, especially for the child of divorced parents who can come to realize that her/his parents each have different points of view and different needs. Like children from nuclear families, children of divorced parents

82 begin the shift from the family to the peer group as important valuators of experience, feelings, and the sense of self.

Wallerstein and Kelly (1980) found that at the younger ages in this bracket, the most pervasive response to parental separation and divorce was sadness. The shock of thepa r e nt a ls e pa r a t i ona ppe a r e dt obes os t r ongt ha tt hec hi l d’ sus ua lps yc hol og i c a l defenses and methods of coping with stress were overwhelmed. In contrast, the olderaged children in this bracket were actively trying to manage the stress and distress of t he i rpa r e nt ’ sdi vor c e .Hodg e s(1991) believes that this shift may be largely attributed to the cognitive shift from preoperational thinking to concrete operational thinking that occurs around age seven or eight.

The younger children were frightened at the collapse of their families.

Wallerstein and Kelly (1980) found that the children were frightened that they would be left with no family or sent to live with strangers. For some this anxiety of being abandoned turned into severely disorganized behavior and even panic. The youngsters also reported feelings of being deprived of food or toys or other important aspects of their life. These children, the researchers reported, yearned for the absent parent, us ua l l yt hef a t he r .I nt e r e s t i ng l y,t her e s e a r c hf i ndi ng ss howe dt ha tt hec hi l d’ s aggression would be displayed with peers, but was inhibited around the father. (J. S. Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980) Boys, more than the girls, showed their anger at the custodial mother for either driving the father away, or causing the divorce. Largely the anger was displaced onto teachers, friends, brothers, sisters, or in temper tantrums.

83 Wallerstein and Kelly also found that the younger children in this age bracket had strong wishes for the reconciliation of their parents. In the Wallerstein and Kelly study, nearly a fourth of the children in the younger third of this age bracket were under pressure from the mother to reject their fathers. Indeed, the divorces in this age group caused the children to feel many conflicts of loyalty between the parents.

Despite the pressure to take sides, the younger children were not able to take sides and continued to be loyal to both parents, according to Wallerstein and Kelly (1980) “ i n s e c r e ta ndof t e na tc ons i de r a bl eps yc hol og i c a lc os ta nds uf f e r i ng . ”( p.7 1 )Oneofmy patients a few years ago poignantly summed up his loyalty conflict by saying, “ I tf e e l s like one parent is on one side of a canyon holding on to the edge by their fingernails, and the other one is on the other side of the canyon holding on to the edge by their f i ng e rna i l s .Theque s t i oni swhi c honedoyous a ve ? ”Thi sboy,It hi nk,captures the life and death feelings involved in these loyalty conflicts. This Solomon-like dilemma poised by his question reflects the intensity and the desperateness that the child feels f r om t hepa r e nt s .Ea c hpa r e ntwa nt st obet hewi nne roft hec hi l d’ sloyalty, and, it seems at times, at any cost.

The older children in this age bracket, beginning at approximately age nine, show a remarkable shift in being able to handle the stresses of parental separation and divorce (J. S. Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980). The researchers found that this group of children were actively trying to master their conflicting feelings and fears. Their ways of coping were numerous. They tried to understand their parents. They refused to believe that there was a marital rupture. They reached out to other adults and peers.

84 They kept themselves in constant motion, so as not to have any time to think about t he i rpa r e nt s ’di vor c e .Wa l l e r s t e i na ndKe l l y(1980) found that the children in the second half of thisa g ebr a c ke twe r ee mba r r a s s e dbyt he i rpa r e nt s ’di vor c ea ndbyt he i r pa r e nt s ’be ha vi or .The yt r i e dt oc onc e a lf r om ot he r swha twa sg oi ngoni nt he i r f a mi l i e s .I na ddi t i on,t heol de rc hi l dr e ni nWa l l e r s t e i na ndKe l l y’ sr e s e a r c hf i ndi ng s actively tried to bring about the reconciliation of their parents. While they failed in t hi ss pe c i f i ce f f or t ,“ t he ymor et ha ns uc c e e de di nt heps yc hol og i c a lpur pos eofundoi ng t he i rs e ns eofpowe r l e s s ne s sa ndpa s s i vi t ywhi c ht he yf ounds ooppr e s s i ve . ”( J .S .

Wallerstein, 1980b, p. 74) What set off the older children in this age bracket from the younger children was a fully conscious intense anger (J. S. Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980). This anger helped t oobs c ur et hec hi l dr e n’ sf e e l i ng sofs a dne s sa ndhe l pl e s s ne s s .I nc ont r a s tt oyoung e r children who became more aggressive and irritable, the older children were able to consciously focus their anger and express it. About half of the children in the Wallerstein and Kelly study were angry with their mother and about half were angry with their father (J. S. Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980). For the most part, the parent with whom the child was angry was the parent that the child held responsible for the divorce.

The finding from the Wallerstein and Kelly study that is especially important for my research study is that these older children aged 9 to 12 experienced a shaken sense of identity (J. S. Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980). These researchers believed that this s ha ke ns e ns eofi de nt i t ywa st her e s ul toft hec hi l dr e n’ se xpe r i e nc eofas ha ke nwor l d,

85 de voi doft heus ua lma r ke r sofi de nt i t y.Wa l l e r s t e i na ndKe l l yf oundt ha tt hec hi l d’ s “ s e ns eofwhothey were in the present and who they were likely to become in the f ut ur e ”( p.7 6 )wa ss ha ke n.I nc ont r a s t ,c hi l dr e noft hi sa g eus ua l l yde pe ndont he “ pr e s e nc eofpa r e nt a lf i g ur e s ,notonl yf ornur t ur e ,pr ot e c t i on,a ndc ont r olbuta l s of or the consolidation of age-a ppr opr i a t ei de nt i f i c a t i ons . ”( p.7 6 )Fore xa mpl e ,ac hi l d usually might self-i de nt i f y,“ Ia mt hes onofJ ohna ndMa r yS mi t h. ”I ns t e a d, Wallerstein and Kelly found the children in their study experiencing a different identity. The older children i nt hi sa g ebr a c ke tr e f e r r e dt o“ mys c hool , ”“ my ne i g hbor hood,“ a nd“ myhous e . ”The ys e e me dt obes e e ki ngwi t hi nt hel a r g e rc ont e xt a place for themselves.

The older children also began using somatic complaints of different kinds and severity, according to Wallerstein and Kelly (1980). The researchers reported that these symptoms were often exacerbated by parental conflict, and/or visitation. Somatic complaints serve as a defense that could allow for action and reaction from both parents. Somatic symptoms can reduce parental conflict, increase parental conflict, and serve to bring the parents together, or keep them apart. This kind of symptom is very us e f uli nunc ons c i ous l yde f e ndi ngwhi l ea tt hes a met i mee xpr e s s i ngone ’ sf e e l i ng sof helplessness.

Lastly, Wallerstein and Kelly (1980) found that 9 to 12 year-olds in this group a r e“ pa r t i c ul a r l yvul ne r a bl et obe i ngs we ptupi nt ot hea ng e rofonepa r e nta g a i ns tt he ot he r . ”( p.7 7 )The s ec hi l dr e nc oul dbeus e da s“ battle allies in efforts to hurt the other parent. (p. 77). In the most extreme of such cases, children may exhibit what Gardner

86 (1987) has labeled “ Pa r e ntAl i e na t i onS yndr ome . ”I nl e s se xt r e mec a s e s ,t hec hi l d “ a l i g ns ”wi t honepa r e nta g a i ns tt heot he r .Thi sa l i g nme nti st her e s ul tofa n“ e xt r e me i de nt i f i c a t i onwi t honepa r e nt ’ sc a us e . ”( p.7 7 )Wa l l e r s t e i na ndKe l l yf oundi nt he i r sample that 19% (25 outof1 3 1c hi l dr e n)f or me d“ s t r onga ndof t e nl ongl a s t i ng a l i g nme nt swi t honepa r e nta g a i ns tt heot he r . ”( p.7 7 )Two-thirds of these alignments were formed with the mother against the father and in a third the child formed an alignment with the father aga i ns tt hemot he r .I nWa l l e r s t e i na ndKe l l y’ ss a mpl e ,t he y f oundt ha tt he“ e mba t t l e dpa r e nt ,of t e nt heonewhooppos e st hedi vor c ei nt hef i r s t place, . . . initiated and fuels the alignment, not infrequently as he or she discovers the involvement of the othe rpa r t ne ri nane wr e l a t i ons hi p. ”( p.7 7 )Theol de rc hi l dr e ni n this age bracket developmentally are particularly strong team members, and often are unshakably loyal friends. When used by one parent against another, children in this age group can be particularly easy to exploit because of their development.

Hodges (1991) reminds us that another developmentally important cognitive shift happens with these older children. Specifically, he reminds us that, Another major cognitive shift is occurring in children age 9 to 12. While children as young as 1½ are capable of empathy, the ability to understand the perspective of parents does not begin until the child enters the concrete operational stage of elementary school. In this state, the child improves substantially in the ability to see thewor l df r om s ome onee l s e ’ spoi ntofvi e w.

This empathy is still quite limited to those people whom the child knows quite well. The average elementary-age child will participate in vicious teasing, yet

87 children of this age can be enormously caring and concerned about the pain that their parents are going through in handling divorce. (Hodges, 1991, p. 23) Hodges also identified another problem for children in the age group 9 to 12.

Hede s c r i be dt hepr oc e s soft he“ pa r e nt i f i c a t i onoft hec hi l d,ama j orpr oblem of 9 to 1 2ye a rol dsi nwhi c hpa r e nta ndc hi l dr e ve r s er ol e s . ”( p.2 3 )Apa r e ntl one l ya nd depleted from the stress of the divorce turns to the child for a sympathetic ear. As the parent repeatedly does this, the child takes on the emotional burden of caring for the psychological well being of the parent.

To label these children, Wallerstein and Blakeslee (J. S. Wallerstein & Blakeslee, 1989) suggested t het e r m“ ove r bur de ne dc hi l d, ”be c a us ei nt he i rvi e wt he r ei snotat r ue role reversal between parent and child. Hodges (1991) f e e l st ha t“ ove r bur de ne d”doe s not really capture the psychological experience of the child who expects her/himself to take care of the psychological needs of the parent in addition to keeping the household running.

These overburdened and parentified children do not usually become identified as children with problems by the school or other outside casual observers. They are pseudo-mature rather than truly grown up. Yet, prematurely taking on too many burdens stunts their psychological growth and maturity. On the few occasions when these children do reach a mental health professional, they present themselves to the clinician with either a psychosomatic illness or a depression.

As adults they present themselves as joyless and super-responsible adults.

Johnston, Gonzalez and Campbell (1987) found in a sample of 56 children who were

88 ages 4 to 12 years-old at the time of entry into the study and were from highly conflicted and divorcing families, that role reversal predicted poorer child post-divorce adjustment. The authors defined role reversal as the child taking care of a parent, soothing an angry or depressed parent, or protecting the parent from stress. Children who took care of the father had more behavior problems, depression and withdrawal compared to children who did not take care of the father. The child who took care of the mother was less withdrawn and had less uncommunicative behavior than the child who did not take care of the mother. Hodges (1991) found sufficient evidence from this to support the proposition that being overburdened with the divorced father may be more related to maladjustment in the child, while being overburdened with the mother likely leads to more pseudo-mature behavior and the creation of a superresponsible child.

Ado l e s c e nt s ’ Adj us t ment to Parental Divorce Hodges (1991) pointed out that a key concept easily overlooked in unde r s t a ndi ngt hi sa g eg r oupi st ha t ,dur i ngt hi spe r i od,t hec hi l dmove sf r om Pi a g e t ’ s concrete operational period to formal operational logic (Piaget, 2000). This developmental shift means that the child gives up her/his relative concrete cognitive approach to problem solving and attempts to solve cognitive problems on a more abstract level. This is an age period which begins as the adolescent views the world as revolving around her/his experiences. It is a transition period in which the adolescent moves from this egocentric position to a more empathic one in which she or he can

89 vi e wt hewor l df r om a not he r ’ spe r s pe c t i ve .The r e f or e ,t hedi vor c eofone ’ spa r e nts during this period is experienced as having to do specifically with the adolescent.

Wallerstein and Kelly (1974a) reported that the 21 teenagers in their sample who experienced the divorce of their parents during this period tried to withdraw from the family to protect themselves.

Allison and Furstenberg (1989) analyzed data for the 1,197 children who participated in the National Survey of Children. This study estimated the effects of a marital dissolution on several measures of children's well-being at two points in time.

One data point was taken at age 11 and the other at age 16. The analysis was based on reports from parents, teachers, and the children themselves, and measured aspects of problem behavior, psychological distress, and academic performance. The analysis estimates suggested that marital dissolution has pervasive and long-lasting effects in all three of these areas. Sons of divorced parents did less well on measures of problem behaviors while daughters of divorced parents did less well on psychological distress.

These researchers found support in this large research sample for their assertion that greater negative effects in these areas occur among children who are very young at the time of the marital dissolution.

Another research finding concerned what Wallerstein and Kelly (1974a) have l a be l e da st he“ pr e c i pi t ousde -i de a l i z a t i on”oft hepa r e nta sar e s pons et ot hedi vor c e .

Thedi vor c eofone ’ spa r e nt sdur i nga dol e s c ence exacerbates the normal adolescent pr oc e s sofps yc hol og i c a l l ys e pa r a t i ngone ’ ss e l ff r om one ’ spa r e nt s .Eve ni nnor ma l development, adolescents have a very difficult time managing ambivalent feelings, and

90 they are prone to judge a person as all good or all bad. Ambivalent feelings are complex feelings about a person that can acknowledge, at the same time, both good and bad qualities in that person. In grappling with ambivalence in normal development, the adolescent may employ some defensiveness. The adolescent can disassociate, deny, or split off those aspects of a person that conflict with the a dol e s c e nt s ’ma i npe r c e pt i onoft hepe r s on.Thi sps yc hol og i c a lme c ha ni s me na bl e st he child to protect against internal conflicts about that person. This normal defensive process becomes exaggerated in an adolescent whose parents divorce.

Whe na na dol e s c e nt ’ spa r e nt sdi vor c e ,t he r ei sat e nde nc yt os e eonepa r e nta s all good, and the other as all bad. These feelings may be situationally mediated, i.e., the child may idealize the parent that they are with and de-idealize the absent parent.

These rather absolute judgments can lead to loyalty conflicts between the adolescent and one of her/his parents, not to mention the internal loyalty conflicts in the a dol e s c e nt ’ si dentifications with one or the other parent. While it is quite normal during the developmental course of adolescence to de-i de a l i z eone ’ spa r e nt ss l owl y ove rt i me ,Wa l l e r s t e i na ndKe l l yf oundt ha twhe na na dol e s c e nt ’ spa r e nt sdi vor c e ,t hi s de-idealization was often precipitous, because the adolescent does yet not have the cognitive and emotional ability to maintain ambivalent feelings about a person.

Therefore, the adolescent has a difficult time balancing their feelings about the divorcing parents because of this emotional limitation.

Another challenging area for children in this age group concerns their feelings a boutt he i rdi vor c i ngpa r e nt s ’obvi ouss e xua l i t y.Adol e s c e nt sf ort hemos tpa r tha ve

91 enough difficulty coming to terms with their own developing sexual feelings. They often deny that their parents have any sexual attributes, much less, feelings. The di vor c eofone ’ spa r e nt sa ndt he i rof t e ns ubs e que ntda t i ng ,ort he i ra c knowl e dg me ntof an extramarital affair, forces the adolescent to face these issues. In this situation the psychological defenses of denial and disassociation no longer work. Wallerstein and Kelly (1974a) f ur t he rf oundt ha tg i r l sa r epa r t i c ul a r l yt r oubl e dbyt he i rf a t he r ’ s decision to date someone not beyond their age. Sorosky (1977) proposed that the father leaving home can be viewed by some adolescent daughters as a sexual rejection.

Hef ur t he rs ug g e s t e dt ha tt het e e na g eboywhoi sma det he“ ma noft hehous e ”by either his mother, or both his parents, may have difficulty dealing with the incestuous quality of this metaphor, not to mention the increased closeness of the relationship with his mother. These anxieties are further increased when parents who have not dated in many years begin to act in pseudo-adolescent ways by exhibiting the mores and dating behaviors that were prevalent in the culture when they dated. Sorosky (1977) found that the generational boundaries might become blurred when fathers are dating much younger women and enter into a pseudo-adolescent relationship with their daughters and sons. The adolescent is confronted with sexual information about her/his parents that might never have been apparent without the divorce.

Consequently, the parents may no longer be safe sex objects for their adolescent children (Sorosky, 1977).

These research results suggest that adolescents of divorced parents may lose the safety of the family structure. In a healthy nuclear family, the structure of the family

92 serves to protect, contain, and script adolescent development. However, these protections maybel os tt ot hea dol e s c e ntofdi vor c e dpa r e nt s .I nt hedi vor c e dpa r e nt ’ s family, the relationship of the individual adolescent to each of her/his parents is dramatically different than the relationship of the adolescent to parents in the nuclear family. Less obvious is that these relationships within the divorced families seem to have a more dyadic quality than the more triadic quality one expects in a nuclear family. I think that these dyadic experiences for the adolescent of divorced parents are important to examine in comparison to the triadic experiences of adolescent in a nuclear family.

In the nuclear family, generally there is a slow psychological disengagement of the adolescent from her/his parents. This process of disengagement is not linear.

Rather, the adolescent disengages from the parents and moves psychologically to greater maturity. Both parents usually welcome this growing maturity, but just as the adolescent seems to achieve this greater maturity, the adolescent falls back to more childish behaviors. This process is repeated over and over again during adolescence until psychological maturity is reached and the adolescent is ready to move on into young adulthood. In the nuclear family, this back and forth process is supported by the structure of the family, until the adolescent is ready to move into the exciting but chancy world of her/his contemporaries. The parents in the nuclear family provide adult role models and are available to help psychologically refuel the developing adolescent.

93 However, for the adolescent of divorced parents, this seesaw process of development is often left without adult support, as the parents are occupied with their own psychological needs and problems. As a result, adolescents of divorced parents may experience one of three reactions. They may become pseudo-mature, i.e., mature before they are ready, with an acceleration of the move to psychological independence.

Or, these adolescents may lack the parental support and structure to continue their psychological development. Third, as we I have already discussed in the previous section, another option for the adolescent in some situations was to engage in a kind of role reversal where the child becomes the parent to the adult. Wallerstein and Kelly (1980) initially reported ample evidence for this sort of formulation, and it subsequently has been supported throughout Wa l l e r s t e i n’ sl ong i t udi na ls t udi e s( 1 9 8 9 , 2000).

As this developmental review shows, I find a great deal of consilience in the research findings. This consistency is further apparent when one recognizes that the researchers have taken differing, but not mutua l l ye xc l us i vepe r s pe c t i ve s .The“ r i s ka nd r e s i l i e nc y�r e s e a r c he r s ,ont heoneha nd,a ndWa l l e r s t e i n,ont heot he r ,a c t ua l l yhol d complementary views.

The risk and resiliency model researchers focus on resilience. They report that from their viewpoint there are four global facts about the consequences of divorce for children: First, divorce causes much stress in children, ranging from loss of contact with one parent to economic hardship. Second, divorce increases the risk for

94 psychological difficulties among children, often doubling the risk. Third, despite the increased risk, most children of divorced families function as well as children from married families. That is they are resilient [emphasis in original] in coping with the multiple stressors caused by divorce. Fourth, resilience is not invulnerability. (Emery, 1999, p. 35) To be sure, as Maluccio (2002) cautioned, resilience is defined differently by various authors and various theorists. Maluccio (2002) c ons i de r e di t“ ama ny-splendored c ons t r uc t . ”( p.5 9 6 )S a l e e be y(2002) refers to resilience as the operationalization in practice of a strengths perspective that stresses the capabilities, assets, and positive attributes of human beings rather than their weaknesses or pathologies. The point that I want to emphasize is that a resilience perspective is an interpretative position.

Resilience, as a construct or as an interpretative position, influences how one understands data, personal-narrative, or meaning.

The ris ka ndr e s i l i e nc yr e s e a r c he r sbe l i e veWa l l e r s t e i n’ svi e wsa r enot supported. The former posit Wallerstein claims there is a one-to-one relationship between being a child of divorced parents and having psychological or developmental problems. The resiliency interpretative stance does not support that view.

In my opinion, the risk and resiliency researchers wrongly characterize Wa l l e r s t e i n’ sr e s e a r c ha sc onc l udi ngc hi l dr e nofdi vor c e dpa r e nt sne c e s s a r i l yha ve pr obl e ms .Ra t he r ,It hi nkWa l l e r s t e i n’ sr e s e a r c hhighlights the increased risk for psychological and developmental problems. The issue, it seems to me, is really one of emphasis. The risk and resiliency researchers emphasize the resiliency side of the

95 equation, while Wallerstein and her colleagues emphasize the risk side of the same equation. Even the risk and resiliency researchers (Emery, 1996, 1997, 1999) a c knowl e dg et ha t“ de s pi t et he i rc ompe t e ntf unc t i oni ng ,c hi l dr e nf r om di vor c e d families report a number of painful feelings, unhappy memories, and ongoi ngdi s t r e s s . �

(Emery, 1999, p. 35) The emphasis of each research viewpoint frames for the reader what the researchers consider the truth to be. Thus, the reader is left to interpret the text and create a meaning that most fits the context in which the reader finds themselves.

I believe both of these interpretative positions agree that initially children experience the separation and divorce process of their parents as very stressful (Hetherington et al., 1978, 1982, 1999a; J. S. Wallerstein et al., 1980, 1980b, 1989, 2000). Wallerstein, et al., (J. S. Wallerstein & Blakeslee, 1989; J. S. Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980) have viewed this stress as due primarily to a diminished capacity for parenting, specifically in the parental ability to regulate aspects of family life across all domains. The risk and resiliency research group (Emery, 1999) considers the change in the family structure, the diminished contact with one parent, and socioeconomic f a c t or sa sbe i ngve r ys t r e s s f ulf ort hec hi l dr e n.Wa l l e r s t e i n’ sr e s e a r c hwoul dc onc ur with these findings of the risk and resiliency research group.

Further, the risk and resiliency researchers and Wallerstein agree that these children are resilient. However, the risk and resiliency researchers would posit, despite the increased risk, that resiliency is the normative psychological outcome for the children of divorced parents. In my view, Wallerstein would question whether the

96 measures used by these researchers are sensitive enough to measure the possible ongoing distress and unhappiness of these children as they progress to the point of r e s i l i e nc e .S hewoul da r g ue ,It hi nk,t ha tl i ve sa r el i ve d“ i nt hes ki n, �noti ns t a t i s t i c a l means, or in the outcomes of questionnaires.

In addition, I believe that Wallerstein would question whether standard measures of psychological, educational and behavioral problems are sensitive enough to detect how the children are feeling and whether these feelings over time lead to outcomes other than normative psychological functioning. For example, Amato and Keith (1991a), in a meta-analysis of 92 studies comparing children from divorced and married families, found that the average effect size was only 0.14 standard deviation units across all outcomes. In addition, they found that the more quantitatively sophisticated the study, the smaller the effect. Statistically, this is a small effect. This should not be surprising, because as sample size increases the power of the effect of the mean on statistical analysis also increases. Therefore, significant effects that are noticeable at the tails of a distribution can be lost.

Meta-analysis of multiple studies risks increasing the effect of the mean and certainly increases the effect of the mean in a standard deviation calculation used during a meta-analysis. Wallerstein(1980) suggested that if one talks with children of di vor c et ha tadi f f e r e ntpi c t ur ea bouts e pa r a t i ona nddi vor c eofone ’ spa r e nt se me r g e s .I think that Wallerstein would argue that her research results are not about the tails of a distribution curve. However, this is where the risk and resiliency researchers try to confine her findings. Rather, in my opinion, I think that she would argue that her

97 f i ndi ng sr e pr e s e ntt heus eofas e ns i t i ver e s e a r c hi ns t r ume nt ,t he“ c l i ni c a le thnographic i nt e r vi e w. ”(Herdt, 1999; Herdt & Stoller, 1990; Lindner, 2001) Wa l l e r s t e i n( 1 9 8 9 ,2 0 0 0 )c l a i mst ha tt hedi vor c eofone s ’pa r e nt sha song oi ng sequelae across the life span. Her claim is based on the longitudinal nature of her research design and findings. In addition, her findings have been supported by a number of independent investigators over time. (Allison & Furstenberg, 1989; Amato, 1986; 2000; Aseltine, 1992; Borkhuis, 1989; Brody & Neubaum, 1996; Brodzinsky, Hitt, & Smith, 1993; Buchanan, Maccoby, & Dornbusch, 1992; Bynum & Durm, 1996; Chase-Lansdale, Cherlin, & Kiernan, 1995; Cherlin, Chase-Lansdale, & McRae, 1998; Corbin, 1988; Dunn, Davis, O'Connor, & Sturgess, 1997; Emery & Coiro, 1997; Fogas, Wolchik, Braver, Freedom, & Bay, 1992; Gardner, 1990; Gietzen-Bartley, 2000; Heinicke, Guthrie, & Ruth, 1997; Hetherington & Clingempeel, 1992; Hines, 1997; Johnston, 1993; 1994; 1987; Kasen, Cohen, Brook, & Hartmark, 1996; Krementz, 1984; Kurtz, 1994; Minde, 1991; Mulholland, 1989; O'Connor, Caspi, DeFries, & Plomin, 2000; Portes, Howell, Brown, Eichenberger, & Mas, 1992; Retterath, 1992; Schaefer, 1989; Simons, 1996; Swartzman-Shatman & Schinke, 1993; Weiss, 1987; Zill, Morrison, & Coiro, 1993).Wa l l e r s t e i n’ sf i ndi ng sa r ea l s os uppor t e dbyt her e s e a r c h findings from other fields, specifically the trauma researchers Robert Pynoos ( 1988, 1990, 1998, 1999, 2001), Lenore Terr (1968, 1970, 1979, 1981, 1983a, 1983b, 1988, 1999), and Bruce Perry ( 1991, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1997), whose research findings show that stressful events have long lasting effects on the brain, and therefore, on the personal meanings assigned by the child to their lived experience.

98 There also seems to be some agreement between the two research camps that the age of the child at the time of parental separation and divorce influences how the child is able to cognitively process and understand the divorce of her/his parents (Allison & Furstenberg, 1989; Heinicke, et al., 1974a, 1997; J. S. Wallerstein & Kelly, 1974b, 1976, 1980b). There is general agreement that the younger the age of the child at the time of parental separation, the more difficult it is for the child to deal with the divorce. This finding agrees with the growing literature on attachment theory (Ainsworth, 1979; Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980, 1988) and the increased developmental understanding of the importance of a regulating environment for optimal development of infants and young children (Emde, 1989; Stern, 1985; Trevarthen, 1989, 1994, 1999).

To be sure, the data supporting these conclusions are difficult to interpret. The risk and resiliency researchers warn us that one of the dangers of focusing in on the temporal age of the child is that we become event focused instead of process focused.

(Emery, 1999) “ Obs e r va t i onsofc hi l dr e ndur i ngt hef i r s tye a ra f t e rpa r e nt a ls e pa r a t i on showed that preschool age children lack the cognitive sophistication to understand the me a ni ngofdi vor c e . ”(Amato, 1994) Whi l e“ c hi l dr e nof primary school age have greater cognitive maturity and can more accurately grasp the meaning of divorce, their understanding of what divorce entails may lead them to grieve the loss of the family as i twa s . ”( p.1 4 8 ) Emery (1999) cautioned t ha tt hea g eoft hec hi l da tdi vor c ema y“ a f f e c thow [emphasis in original] children express their struggles rather than how much [emphasis in original] they struggle. That is, any fallout from the divorce is likely to be seen in

99 the key developmental task( s )ofag i ve na g e . ”( p.6 0 )Ama t o(1994) c a ut i one dt ha t“ i n these data sets . . . the age at di vor c ea ndt het i mes i nc et hedi vor c ea r ec onf ounde d. ” (p. 149) What Amato warned the reader about is that it is impossible to separate the e f f e c t sofa g ea tdi vor c e ,l e ng t hoft i mes i nc et hedi vor c e ,a ndt hec hi l d’ sc ur r e nta g e , since as Amato pointed outt he s ef a c t or sa r e“ pe r f e c t l yc or r e l a t e d, ”( p.1 4 9 )be c a us e each is calculated from the other. Nevertheless, whichever way one looks at the data, both viewpoints agree that divorce has the possibility of negatively affecting children of all ages.

Both divorce research groups also seem to agree that the more parental conflict exists, the more difficult it is for the child to cope with the divorce. Johnston (1994) de f i ne d“ pa r e nt a lc onf l i c t ”a s“ ve r ba la ndphys i c a la g g r e s s i on,ove r thos t i l i t y,a nd di s t r us tove rt hedi vor c e . ”( p.1 6 5 )Whe nac hi l dwi t ne s s e sove r tpa r e nt a lc onf l i c t ,i t causes direct stress for the child (Amato, 1994; Johnston, 1987, 1994). Johnston (1994) reviewed the empirical research on the components of conflict in divorce, the features that contribute to high-conflict divorce, and the affects on children. Her literature r e vi e wf oundt ha t“ c hi l dr e nne e dc us t odya nda c c e s sa r r a ng e me nt st ha tmi ni mi z et he potential for ongoing interparental conflict and they especially need to be protected f r om e xpos ur et ovi ol e nc e . ”( J ohns t on,1 9 9 4 ,p.1 7 9 )I nt e r pa r e nt a lc onf l i c tbe f or ea nd after divorce and the primary parent's emotional distress were seen to be jointly predictive of more problematic parent-child relationships and greater child emotional and behavioral maladjustment (Amato & Keith, 1991a; Emery, 1982; Forehand,

100 Wierson, McCombs, & Brody, 1989; Hetherington et al., 1982; Johnston, 1994; Peterson & Zill, 1986; Shaw & Emery, 1987).

Another area of partial agreement between the two research viewpoints is that ac hi l d’ sa dj us t me ntt ot hedi vor c eofhe r / hi spa r e nt si mpr ove swi t ht hepa s s a g eof time. The risk and resiliency researchers emphasize this point more because of their focus on resiliency. Wallerstein (1989) generally agreed with this view given good child-pa r e ntr e l a t i ons hi ps ,butwa r ne dofa“ s l e e pe re f f e c t ”f orc hi l dr e nofdivorced parents, especially girls, when it comes time developmentally for them to commit to their own relationships and marriages. The essence of her proposition was that these children seemingly cope well with the divorce of their parents, but that their development comes to a halt as they enter young adulthood. These children fear betrayal, according to Wallerstein, despite seeming to function well by all outside me a s ur e sbe f or et hi st i me .Thec hi l dr e n’ sf e a rofbe t r a ya la ndl os ss oove r whe l mst he m that they cannot choose to make a commitment to love and being loved. This de ve l opme nt a li nhi bi t i oni st he i rf e a rt ha tt he i rdi vor c e dpa r e nt ’ spa s twi l lbet he i r future. The risk and resiliency researchers have not been able to confirm this proposition.

Wallerstein (1989) posited that children of divorced parents must accomplish seven psychological tasks in order to move on with their lives. The first task is to understand realistically what the divorce of their parents means to them concretely.

Second, children need to get on with their own lives and resume their normal activities at school and at play. Third, children need to deal with the loss of the nuclear family

101 and the protection that the family provided and to deal with the loss of the presence of one parent in their daily lives. The fourth task for the children is dealing with their anger at their parents who they at times have experienced as indifferent to their needs and feelings. Since children often feel responsible for the divorce, the fifth task is to wor koutt he i rg ui l tove rt he i rpa r e nt ’ sdi vor c e .Thes i xt ht a s ki sf ort hec hi l dr e nt o a c c e ptt hepe r ma ne nc eoft he i rpa r e nt ’ sdi vor c e .And the final psychological task is to take a chance on love.

It is generally recognized that the process of divorce drastically changes the relationship between the child and the non-residential parent. Seltzer (1991) reported that one third of divorced fathers had seen their children only once during the last year, or not at all. According to this report, a little more than one quarter of divorced fathers saw their children once or more a week. Additionally, Seltzer reported that 13% of the fathers separated for up to two years only saw their children once a year or less, and 43% saw them once a week or more. However, the longer that the separation of the family lasted, the less that the nonresidential fathers saw their children, with only 12% seeing their children once a week or more after 11 years. Nonresidential mothers are reported (Furstenberg, Peterson, Nord, & Zill, 1983) to maintain more contact with their children than nonresidential fathers. Zill (1988) found that 30% of nonresidential mothers saw their children once or more per week. In comparison to 55% of nonresidential fathers, only 42% of nonresidential mothers saw their children less than once a month to not at all (Zill, 1988). Buchanan, Maccoby and Dornbusch

102 (1996) reported that nonresidential mother-child contact may actually increase, and not decrease, over time in comparison to nonresidential fathers.

The post-divorce drop in parent-child contact does impact child development.

One theory about the implications of this loss of contact with a parent is that multiple separations from attachment figures can lead to insecure attachments (Ainsworth, 1979; Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980; Carlson & Sroufe, 1995). The lost or diminished availability of a parent has broad implications for the psychological development of children. Wallerstein (1980a, 1986, 1989) has posited this loss of a parent is the most difficult aspect of parental divorce for children. She posited that developmentally this loss has profound and lasting implications for the children. She argued that the loss is “ notr e a l ”i nt ha tt hepa r e nti ss t i l la l i ve ,notde a d.Cons e que nt l y, the child must find some way to assign meaning to this experience of the loss of a parent through divorce.

The result for the child, according to Wallerstein (1989, 1997, 1998, 2000), is that the child comes to question the nature of relationships and the ability of relationships to endure. It is through this questioning process and the assignment of personal meaning t ot hec hi l d’ sl i ve de xpe r i e nc et ha tt hec hi l dr e nofdi vor c e dpa r e nt sr e ve a lt he i r increased risk and vulnerability as adults, according to Wa l l e r s t e i n’ sr e s e a r c h( 1 9 8 9 , 1997, 1998, 2000).

Both research camps have warned their readers that one has to think about pa r e nt a ldi vor c ea sapr oc e s s .Wa l l e r s t e i n’ sr e s e a r c hc a mpa s s e r t e dt ha tt hee f f e c t sof parental divorce are ongoing. Wallerstein (1989) posited that parental divorce creates a second developmental task for these children at each developmental stage. Her

103 contention is that not only do the children of divorced parents have the normal de ve l opme nt a ll i f ec our s et a s ks ,butt he ya l s oha vet or e i nt e r pr e tt he i rpa r e nt s ’di vor c e (i.e., reassign personal meanings to their lived experiences) at each new developmental level. She argued that this creates a different developmental framework for children of divorced parents than for children whose parents have not divorced. In essence, Wallerstein argued that parental divorce changes the setting or context in which a c hi l d’ sde ve l opme nti s taking place and, therefore, changes the possible meanings that a child might assign to her/his experiences.

Wha tmyr e s e a r c hi st r yi ngt oe xa mi nei st hea dol e s c e nt ’ spr oc e s sofr e assigning personal meanings and creating a coherent self-narrative during adolescence and young adulthood. In my years of clinical experience in working with children and adolescents of divorced parents, I have found that adolescence is a developmental period in which the creation of an identity is very context- dependent. However, there is a yearning for a sense of self that is seemingly context-independent. The latter sense of self is one that feels coherent to the adolescent and is one in which they can tell a coherent self-narrative or self-story. Since adolescents of divorced parents are often living in two differing contexts each week, because of custody arrangements and divorce decrees, these adolescents and young adults provide a research sample that allows one to examine the issue of context in self-narrative creation. In addition, because self-narratives essentially help to script the future of the self-story, these narratives may help us to better understand the adolescents who decide to change their child-parent living arrangements.

104 As the above literature review makes apparent, the separation and divorce of one ’ spa r e nt si sac ompl i c a t e dma t t e rf orc hi l dr e n.I ta l s omus tbei nt ui t i ve l yobv i ous that there must be a great deal of individual variation within this population sample.

What is not so obvious is how this new context—growing up with divorced parents— influences how these children form their personal identities, develop a nuclear self, and create a coherent self-narrative.

105

CHAPTER VI

THEORETICAL ROOT METAPHORS In this section, I will explore the general theoretical and philosophical literature a boutt hede ve l opme ntofaps yc hol og i c a ls t r uc t ur ec a l l e dt he“ s e l f ”a sde f i ne dby He i nzKohut( 1 9 7 1 ,1 9 7 7 ,1 9 8 4 ) .Kohut ’ ss t r uc t ur a lmode loft he“ s e l f ”us e swha t Pepper (1942) would call an essentially mechanistic theoretical root metaphor, because Kohut theorizes asi ft he“ s e l f ”f unc t i onsl i keama c hi ne .

Pepper (1942) proposed in his book, World Hypotheses, that reality theories are metaphorically described. Pepper saw this method as, A man desiring to understand the world looks about for a clue to its comprehension. He pitches upon some area of commonsense fact and tries to understand other areas in terms of this one. This original idea becomes his basic analogy or root metaphor. He describes as best he can the characteristics of this area, or if you will, discriminates its structure. A list of its structural characteristics becomes his basic conceptions of explanation and description.

We call them a set of categories. In terms of these categories he proceeds to study all other areas of fact whether uncriticized or previously criticized. He undertakes to interpret all facts in terms of these categories. As a result of the

106 impact of these other facts upon his categories, he may qualify and readjust the categories, so that a set of categories commonly changes and develops. Since the basic analogy or root metaphor normally (and probably at least in part necessarily) arises out of common sense, a great deal of development and refinement of a set of categories is required if they are to prove adequate for a hypothesis of unlimited scope. (Pepper, 1942, p. 91) The kind of me t a phorus e dbe c ome sat he or y’ s“ t he or e t i c a lr ootme t a phor . ”The s e basic or root metaphors that people develop about their world help to guide their pe r c e pt i ons ,a swe l la st he i rt hi nki ng .“ Ar ootme t a phornotonl yof f e r saba s i c perspective for perceiving, classifying, and interpreting events, but it also constrains t he s ea c t i vi t i e s . ”He r ma ns& Ke mpe n,1 9 9 3 ,p.1 1 )Pe ppe r(1942) proposed that there are four theoretical root metaphors. The four root metaphors are formism, mechanism, organism, and contextualism.

Formism, as a root metaphor, stresses the organization of the world based on the form of things—big, small, short, long, round, angular. Formism functions as a metaphor to classify and compare based on individual differences. An example of psychological formism might be personality trait theories where people are classified according to psychological traits like intelligence, aggression, anxiety, shyness, impulsivity, dependency, and so forth. Another example often used in clinical social work is the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) that is comprised of descriptions and criteria for the diagnosis of a wide variety of disorders. This type of metaphor may be useful to

107 clinicians trying to obtain a degree of consensus about who should be included in a diagnostic category. However, as long as the description is restricted to trait categories, not hi ngi sknowna boutapa r t i c ul a rpe r s on.Thepa r t i c ul a re ve nt si nape r s on’ shi s t or y or the meaning those events have had for this person cannot be known with this kind of theoretical root metaphor, according to Hermans and Kempen (1993).

If a theory essentially describes reality as a perfect machine, then Pepper proposed that the theory be considered as having a mechanistic theoretical root metaphor. If reality is a perfect machine then it is predictable. The root metaphor of mechanism is considered by many to be the dominant world view of western civilization (Sarbin, 1986). The mechanistic worldview sees the events in nature as the transmittal of forces. Mechanism considers the human organism as reactive from a basic state of rest and activity as a result of stimulation. A mechanistic model of development typically focuses on the role of events as antecedents to various r e s pons e s .“ Mode r ns c i e nc eha st a ke nt hi swor l dvi e wa si t sme t a phys i c a lf ounda t i on— avi e wt ha ts uppor t st hes c i e nt i s t ’ ss e a r c hf orc a us e s ,( p.6 ) ”a c c or di ngt oS a r bi n(1986).

One trouble with this kind of metaphor for the human sciences is that life/reality does not seem to be either orderly, or predictable in terms of human affairs. Another “ pr obl e m wi t hme c ha ni s t i cmode l si st hede f i ni t i onofa nt e c e de nt -consequent relations precludes the possibility that the same event as an antecedent factor may have qualitatively [emphasis in original] different meani ng sf ordi f f e r e ntpe opl e . ”( He r ma ns & Kempen, 1993, p. 13)

108 Another possible theoretical root metaphor is an organismic one (Pepper, 1942). This root metaphor proposes that reality is like an organism. Sabin (1986) s umma r i z e st hi st he or e t i c a la t t i t ude :“ Theor g a ni c i s tt r i e st ol oc a t epa r t swi t hi n wholes. Every event is more or less a concealed organic process. The ideal structure is there to be disc ove r e da tt hee ndofpr og r e s s i ves t e ps ,ors t a g e s( p.6 ) . �Thec ompone nt s of the organism are seen as parts of an organized whole. Change is viewed not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively. An example of this process might be a descriptive tracing of the growth and blossoming of a flower. The ideal structure, or goal, of development gives unity and direction to the organized process. Therefore, causation is seen as teleological in nature, meaning that there is a final goal at the end of development. Le vi ns on’ s(1978) conception of life-span development that consists of a series of five stages represents an organismic theoretical root metaphor in that it is governed by final causation. One of the limitations of this kind of theoretical metaphor is that they typically, assume the existence of a fixed sequence of developmental stages or tasks. It is assumed that one era or stage leads invariably to the next stage and that the process involved is the same for all people. The problem with this assumption is that such a sequence is more relevant for some people than for others.

Hermans & Kempen, 1993, p. 14) In other words, organismic theories assume a fixed sequence of developmental stages for all people regardless of their socioeconomic status, gender, race, or family background. In theoretical terms, this makes organismic theories inattentive to the

109 apparent differences among people, and in particular, does not take into account their individual histories.

The last root metaphor proposed by Pepper (1942) is contextualism. The central component is the historical event that can only be understood when it is located in the context of time and space. A contextual theoretical root metaphor emphasizes meaning as most important, or, as Mishler (1979) proposed, nothing is understandable unless contextualized. Pepper (1942) proposed, When we come to contextualism, we pass from an analytical into a synthetic type of theory. It is characteristic of the synthetic theories that their root metaphors cannot satisfactorily be denoted even to a first approximation by well-known common-sense concepts such as similarity, the artifact, or the machine . . . . The best term out of common sense to suggest the point of origin of contextualism is probably the historic event . . . .

By historical event, however, the contextualist does not mean primarily a past event, one that is, so to speak, dead and has to be exhumed. He means the event alive in its present. What we ordinarily mean by history, he says, is an attempt to re-present [emphasis in original] events, to make them in some way alive again. The real historic event, the event in its actuality, is when it is going on now [emphasis in original], the dynamic dramatic active event. We may cal li ta n“ a c t , �i fwel i ke ,a ndi fwet a kec a r eofourus eoft het e r m.Buti t is not an act conceived as alone or cut off that we mean; it is an act in and with its setting, an act in its context. (p. 232)

110 Historical events are the exemplar, but as Sarbin (1986) points out, The imagery called out by the historical event metaphor is that of an ongoing texture of multiply elaborated events, each leading to others, each being influenced by collateral episodes, and by the efforts of multiple agents who engage in actions to satisfy their needs and meet their obligations. Contained in the metaphor is the idea of constant change in the structure of situations and in positions occupied by actors. The texture of events does not require linearity. (p. 6) In contrast to a social science that seeks to uncover the context-free laws of behavior as in the mechanistic and organismic root metaphor proposals, contextualism pr opos e st ha t“ e ve nt sa r ei nc ons t a ntf l ux,t heve r yi nt e g r a t i onoft hec ondi t i onsofa n e ve nta l t e r st hec ont e xtf oraf ut ur ee ve nt . ”( S a r bi n,1 9 8 6 ,p.7 ) Sarbin (1986) proposes that contextualism is embedded in dramatic accounts of conduct.

In drama, . . . we find a clear example of the application of the historical act me t a phor .Thea c t or s ’pe r f or ma nc e s ,t hes e t t i ng s ,t hepr ops ,a nds oon,mus ta l l be taken into account to make sense of an episode or scene. The actors and the audience play out their parts according to their individual and collective emplotments. Sense making in the drama are openly contextual [sic]. The me a ni ng st obea s s i g ne dt oa nya c t or ’ spe r f or ma nc ea r eaf unc t i onoft he context. (p. 7)

111 In addition to plays, forms of emplotments are found in novels, poems, parables, myths, stories, biographies, autobiographies, and histories. Hermans and Kempen (1993) agreed with Sarbin that there is a basic similarity between the historian and the novelist/dramatist. They proposed that the historical act and the narrative have approximately the same semantic structure. History is more than a collection of records of past or present events. Historians use annals and chronicles to construct interpretative narratives of past and present events. While historians write ostensibly about actual events that have been influenced by reconstructed people who have their intentions and purposes, novelists write about fictive characters. Both historians and novelists are taking an interpretative position in relationship to the facts of the history or the story. Contextualism proposes that not only are historians and novelists involved in the creation of stories, but also that ordinary people are continually ordering and reordering the events that they believe are relevant to their lives. Cohler (1982) and later Cohler and Freeman (1993) propose that personal narratives represent internally consistent interpretations of the past as presently understood, the experienced present, and the anticipated future. Such a proposal implies that a life story is never fixed. On the contrary, the story is rewritten, or retold over time as the result of new experiences, resulting in changes in situation or context, that now must be reintegrated into the life story. In other words, changes in time and space may have direct repercussions to the life story involved, and therefore both the telling and the retelling of personal narratives are essential (Hermans, Kempen, & Van Loon, 1992).

112 To highlight the differences between the contextualist theoretical root metaphor and the other theoretical root metaphors proposed by Pepper, I will compare them directly by way of a summary. Formism classifies things (persons and objects) in such a way that general traits, types, or characteristics of an ahistorical kind are created. Contextualism, in contrast, attends to the particulars of time and space and, therefore, spotlights a particular event in the context of other events.

Mechanism places events in the antecedent-consequent relationship. The antecedent event must function as an efficient cause of the consequent event.

Contextualism holds that it is an oversimplification to place two events in a cause and effect relationship. Rather, contextualism presupposes a multiplicity of events, referring to the past, present and anticipated future, that form together a coherent and interconnected totality. Therefore, the person as a storyteller is not reacting to stimuli in the present, but rather is in a continuous reflexive process of meaning-making that is i nl i newi t ht hepe r s on’ spur pos e sa ndg oa l s .

Organism typically supposes a predictable series of developmental tasks, stages, or eras. Contextualism in contrast acknowledges the importance of predictable, expected, or anticipated events, but emphasizes the importance of unexpected events.

Due to the fact that events are dependent on changes in the situation, lives change over time in ways that are not anticipated or predictable. Contextualism suggests that the study of lives over time should, therefore, be concerned with the impact of unanticipated events and particularly with the manner in which people make sense of these events (Cohler, 1982, 1992, 1993, 1998; Cohler & Freeman, 1993).

113 Since my research proposes to examine the personal meanings that have been a s s i g ne dt ol i ve de xpe r i e nc e ,i nt hene xtc ha pt e rIwa ntt or e de f i neKohut ’ ss e l f psychology from its current mechanistic root metaphor theoretical model to a more contextual paradigm. Byma ki ngt hi ss hi f tIc a nus eKohut ’ ss e l fps yc hol og i c a l paradigm as an analytic tool in understanding the narratives of the adolescent and young adult participants in this research.

114

CHAPTER VII

SELF PSYCHOLOGY Kohut ’ st he or e t i c a lmode loft hes e l f, albeit a mechanistic concept, proposed a ne wmode lofps yc hol og i c a lde ve l opme nt .Thi sc ha pt e re xpl or e st heg e ne s i sofKohut ’ s t he or ya ndt he ne xt e ndsKohut ’ sc onc e pt ua l i z a t i ons .I na ddi t i on,t hi sc ha pt e r t r a ns l a t e sKohut ’ sme c ha ni s t i cmode li nt oac ont e xtual theoretical root metaphor and t he r e by,f ur t he re xt e ndsKohut ’ si ns i g ht si nt ohuma nde ve l opme nt .

I nS oc or ’ s(1997) review of post-Freudian and post-Hartmann theorizing, she suggests there is a general search in this literature for a postulation of an independent variable capable of accounting for the functioning of the psychic structures. Hartmann (1958) had introduced the view that there were autonomous elements of the ego that may be called upon to explain ego development. These autonomous elements, or “ i nbor nc ha r a c t e r i s t i c soft hee g oa ndt he i rma t ur a t i onwoul dbeat hi r df or c et ha ta c t s upon ego development . . . [and] they enter this development as an independent variabl e . ”( Ha r t ma n,1 9 5 8 ,p.1 6 9 -170) Hartmann (1958) was looking to formulate a general biol og i c a lva r i a bl ef ort he s es oc a l l e d“ i nbor nc ha r a c t e r i s t i c s ”t ha twoul d provide a source explanation for development other than the Freudian heritage of

115 drives and the modifying impact of reality on their gratification. Socor (1997) believed t ha ts ubs e que ntt oHa r t ma nn’ sc ont r i but i ons ,ps yc hoa na l yt i ct he or i s t s , became increasingly preoccupied with providing some hypothesis regarding the distinctly psychological phenomenon of the chronological experience of being; that is, the apparently distinctly human sense of past and of future which frame any given moment in time. (p. 112) This third force that Hartmann had postulated, whether as autonomous elements of the ego, or as the idea of representation, e i t he rofs e l fa sa“ pool e d”ora ve r a g e ds e tofi ma g e s ,ora sa ni ni t i a l l yf us e d selfobject conception, sought to provide an explanation for a more fundamental constellation of psychological experiences. An explanation was sought that was c a pa bl eofa ddr e s s i ngt hei ndi s put a bl eps yc hol og i c a la wa r e ne s sofone ’ sown being. Increasingly, such explanations moved, with varying degrees of ambiguity, toward the subjective, and more often called upon the self as the sought after theoretically viable third force. (Socor, 1997, p. 113) Kohut (1977) with The Restoration of the Self took the decisive step in positioning the self as the determining variable in psychological life. In addition, he postulated that subjectivity was the defining quality not only of the self, but also of the psychology of the self (Socor, 1997). In addition, he proposed a methodological blueprint, that promised the only access available to this subjective self—vicarious introspection.

116 Kohut (1977) pr opos e dt he“ s e l f ”a st hec e nt r a lps yc hol og i c a la g e nc yor s t r uc t ur e .“ Asac e nt e rofi ni t i a t i vea ndar e c i pi e ntofi mpr e s s i ons ”( p.9 9 ) ,t hes e l fi si n this reformulation assigned functional responsibilities. It is no longer a representation within the ego, but rather, a cohesive executive structure present in some form from the beginning of life. Kohut (1977, 1984, 1987) proposed that human psychological de ve l opme ntwa spr ope l l e dby“ na r c i s s i s m, ”orl oveoft hes e l f ,i nc ont r a s tt oS i g mund Fr e ud’ sde ve l opme nt a lmode lwhe r ede ve l opme ntwa spr ope l l e dbyt hedr i ve s( 1 9 0 5 , 1916x).

Ta ki nghi ss t a r tf r om Fr e ud’ sa r t i c l eOn Narcissism (1914c), Kohut in his article, Forms and Transformations of Narcissism, (1966) pr opos e dt ha t“ pr i ma r yna r c i s s i s m” begins in infancy when an infant can be seen as being between two psychobiological states. In one psychobiological state the infant can be observed to be, and seems to the outside observer to experience itself as being, in a harmonious state. In the other psychobiological state the infant can be observed to be, and seems to experience itself as being, in a disharmonious state. The infant, Kohut proposes, desires to maintain itself in a harmonious state. However, eventually the infant experiences itself in a disharmonious state. The infant, by her or his self, is not able to maintain a harmonious state. Rather the infant is dependent on his mother ( c a r e g i ve r / mot he r / f a t he r / ” ot he r ” )t ohelp maintain this harmonious state of being.

Howe ve r ,i ti si mpos s i bl ef ort he“ ot he r ”t ope r pe t ua l l yma i nt a i nt hi sha r moni ous s t a t ef ort hei nf a nt ,noma t t e rhowmuc ht he“ ot he r ”de s i r e st odot hi s .S ot hei nf a nt over time becomes aware of an existence of two psychobiological states. Eventually

117 over an even longer period of time, the infant develops a continuum of awareness that differentiates between various states of harmoniousness and disharmoniousness. These two psychobiological states form the beginningofa“ ps yc hol og i c a la nl a g e n”or imprint on the brain. Piaget (1969, 1977) and later Kegan (1982) would describe this “ ps yc hol og i c a la nl a g e n”a st hebe g i nni ngofa“ s c he ma . ” As Ii nt e r pr e tKohut ,hi sde s c r i pt i onsoft hec onc e pt sof“ c ohe s i on”a nd “ f r a g me nt a t i on”e mbodyt hei nf a nt ’ ss ubj e c t i vee xpe r i e nc eoft he s eve r ye a r l y developmental psychobiological states of being. Therefore, if a person is feeling a “ s e ns eofc ohe s i on, ”t heperson is subjectively feeling harmonious. Likewise, if a pe r s oni sf e e l i ng“ f r a g me nt e d, ”t hepe r s oni sf e e l i ngdi s ha r moni ous .Ibe l i e vet ha t Kohutus e dt het e r m“ c ohe s i on”t oi mpl yt het ot a lofone ’ se nt i r e ,uni f i e df e e l i ng s ,a nd “ f r a g me nt a t i on”t oi mpl yfeelings that exist without a whole self. In my experience, s t a t e sofc ohe s i ona ndf r a g me nt a t i ons e e mt oi nvol vet het ot a l i t yoft hei ndi vi dua l ’ s be i nga ndnotj us ts omea s pe c toft hei ndi vi dua l ’ ss e l f .The s ec onc e pt ua l i z e d psychological states parallel thei nf a nt ’ se xpe r i e nc eofbe i ngi nat ot a lha r moni ousora total disharmonious state.

Over time the awareness of the continuum between the pole of harmoniousness and the pole of disharmoniousness becomes organized in such a way that feeling harmonious is highly valued and feeling disharmonious is a state that the person wishes to avoid. Other researchers (Brazelton, 1992; Bringen, Emde, & PippSiegel, 1997; Greenspan, 1989; Greenspan & Greenspan, 1994; Greenspan with Lewis, 1999; Kaye 1982; Mayes, 1999, Mayes & Cohen, 1996; Pally, 2000; Schwartz, 1987; D.

118 J. Siegel, 1999; Trevarthen, 1989, 1990; Trevarthen & Aitken, 1994) and most notably Schore (1994), often using different developmental explanatory theories, have reported on various aspects of this developing continuum.

Kohut (1977) posits a rudimentary self from earliest infancy. He reminded his r e a de r st ha tf r om t heve r yons e tt hei nf a nti sr e s ponde dt o“ a si f ”s heorhea l r e a dyha d a self. He suggests that the beginning of the self may be attributed to the time when “ t heba by’ si nna t epot e nt i a l i t ies and the self-obj e c t ’ se xpe c t a t i onswi t hr e g a r dt ot he ba byc onve r g e . ”( p.9 9 )Theba byi sa“ s e l f ”i ns of a ra si ti s“ f us e dvi amut ua le mpa t hy wi t ha ne nvi r onme ntt ha tdoe se xpe r i e nc ehi ma sa l r e a dypos s e s s i ngas e l f . ”( p.9 9 )I n other words, the process that initiates the self begins with the first glimpse the mother has of her child and proceeds as a series of interactions between them in which, by way ofs e l e c t i ver e s pons i ve ne s st os omea s pe c t soft hec hi l d’ spot e nt i a l ,a ndnotot he r s ,t he “ nuc l e a rs e l f ”i sf or me d.Thes e l ft ha tKohutde f i ne di snota n“ a c t ua ls e l f , ”butr a t he ra “ vi r t ua ls e l f , ”as e l fin statu nascendi from the very beginning. This self according to Kohut“ mus tbede s c r i be di nt e r msoft e ns i on...noti nt e r msofve r ba l i z a bl e fantasi e s . ”( p.1 0 1 ) S oc or ’ s(1997) summary of this process is very useful at this point in terms of ke e pi ngKohut ’ sf or mul a t i onswi t hi nac ont e xt ua lmode l .S hes t a t e d, Kohut (1977) here stakes his claim for the early, original presence of the self, much before psychic structure in its traditional configuration can be said to exist. He argues for the viability of this claim in part based on the observation that the responsive environment of selfobjects responds to the infant ab initio

119 a sa“ s e l f , ”a ndi nt hi swa y,pr e c i s e l yi nc ons e que nc eoft hi swe l c omi ng anticipation, marries the expectation of selfhood to the potential for selfhood, t huse f f e c t i nga na c t ua ls e l f .I ti snotonl yt ha tt hei nf a nti sr e s ponde dt o“ a si f ” he were a self, but that potentialities of the baby and the expectations regarding the baby converge. A self emerges, in the Kohutian view, when what is possible is also what is expected; for when, conversely, what is hoped for, is also what is possible, there rests realization. In the mix of potential with expectation we observe the union of the biological and the psychological. We note further, that t hebi r t hoft heps yc hol og i c a li nt hene ona t e ,t hes ubj e c t i vee xpe r i e nc eofone ’ s own being, rests, quite literally, in the waiting arms of already established subjectivities. In the selective responses of the selfobjects to some of the infant ’ s displayed potentials and not to others, the self acquires its unique attributes, its distinctive coloration; the self becomes its own particular. (Socor, 1997, p. 117) Kohut (1977) presumed in his theorizing that the self has an innate capacity to remain cohesive. Wolf (1988),oneofKohut ’ se a r l ya ndl ongt i mec ol l a bor a t or s ,wr i t e s “ huma nbe i ng sare born pre-adapted [emphasis in original] to actively participate in both physical and psychological interactions with the environment, which provide, r e s pe c t i ve l y,f ort hei ndi vi dua l s ’phys i c a la ndps yc hol og i c a lne e ds . ”( p.1 0 )Huma n beings organize thei rs ubj e c t i vee xpe r i e nc e ss ot ha tt he i re xpe r i e nc e s“ ma kes e ns e . ”S e l f psychology, according to Wolf (1988),“ i nf e r st hepr e s e nc eofaps yc hol og i c a ls t r uc t ur e , t hes e l f ”( p.1 1 )f r om t hes ubj e c t i veme a ni ngma ki ngoft hei ndi vi dua l ;

120 The most fundamental finding of self psychology is that the emergence of the “ s e l f ”r e qui r e smor et ha nt hei nbor nt e nde nc yt oor g a ni z ee xpe r i e nc e .Al s o required are the presence of others, technically designated as objects, who provide certain types of experiences that will evoke [emphasis in original] the emergence and the maintenance of the self. (E. S. Wolf, 1988, p. 11) From these central suppositions, Kohut and his followers proposed a theory for the de ve l opme ntofaps yc hol og i c a ls t r uc t ur ec a l l e dt he“ s e l f , ”whos ec e nt r a lt a s kwa st o maintain a cohesive self within an ever changing environmental context. Wolf (1988) de f i ne d“ t hes e l fa s that psychological structure which makes its presence evident by providing one with a healthy sense of self, of self-esteem, and well-be i ng . ”( p.2 7 ) Kohut (1971) defined the self as a psychological structure within the mind. A psychological structure is not a concrete entity as the word might connotate. It cannot be specifically located within the brain. Rather, the self is a term that tries to convey t heme a ni ngof“ s t a bi l i t yove rt i me . ”( E.S .Wol f ,1 9 8 8 ,p.2 7 )Asas t r uc t ur ei nt hi s sense, the self can be thought of as having a history, i.e., a past, present and an anticipated future. In addition, as a structure within the mind, common sense and experience make it possible to accept the conceptualization that modifications in the self are possible. However, the implication is these transformations would likely occur onl ys l owl yove rt i me .Thes e l fc a nonl ybe“ e voke d”i nt hepr e s e nc e sof“ ot he r s . ”( E. S .Wol f ,1 9 8 8 )The s e“ ot he r s ”a r et e c hni c a l l yc a l l e d“ s e l f obj e c t s . ”“ S e l f obj e c t ”i sat e r m used technically within self psychology as a single word to indicate that there is no perceived boundary between the self and the object to the self (Kohut & Wolf, 1978).

121 Selfobjects respond to the needs of the self. These responses are provided by “ ot he r s ”or“ obj e c t s ”a st he ya r ec a l l e d in all psychoanalytic theories. These object responses are defined by Wolf (1988) t obe“ s e l f obj e c tr e s pons e sormor epr e c i s e l y, s e l f obj e c te xpe r i e nc e soft heobj e c t . ”( p.2 6 )S e l fps yc hol og ypos t ul a t e st ha tt hes e l f c a nnote xi s tf orl ongwi t hi naps yc hol og i c a lva c uum.Ra t he r ,“ t heve r ye me r g e nc ea nd maintenance of the self as a psychological structure depends on the continuing presence of an evoking-sustaining-r e s pondi ngma t r i xofs e l f obj e c te xpe r i e nc e s . ”( p.2 6 ) However, it is incorrect to think that selfobject experiences are specifically the person or“ ot he r . ”Ra t he r ,i ti si mpor t a ntt or e me mbe r“ s e l f obj e c te xpe r i e nc e sa r et he f unc t i on, ”( p.2 6 )be c a us es e l fps yc hol og yt a ke si t svi e wf r om t hes ubj e c t i vee xpe r i e nc e of the self, not from the point of view of an outside observer. A more complete definition of sel f obj e c te xpe r i e nc e swoul dbe“ a nye xpe r i e nc et ha tf unc t i onst oe voke the structured self (which manifests as an experience of selfhood) or to maintain the c ont i nui t yofs uc hs e l f hoodi spr ope r l yde s i g na t e da sas e l f obj e c te xpe r i e nc e . ”( p.2 7 ) Joseph Palombo (2001) refined this definition even further from the view of the child.

He maintained, The child experiences the caregiver as a selfobject as long as the caregiver is e mpa t hi c a l l yr e s pons i vet ot hec hi l d’ sps yc hi cne e ds .I ti st hena t ur eof selfobject experiences that so long as an empathic connectedness exists through which the requisite functions are performed, the child experiences a sense of wholeness and intactness. (Palombo, 2001, p. 31)

122 I ti sne c e s s a r yt or e me mbe rt ha ts e l f obj e c t sa r e“ ne i t he rs e l f sorobj e c t s ,butt he subjective [ e mpha s i si nor i g i na l ]a s pe c tofaf unc t i onpe r f or me dbyar e l a t i ons hi p. ”( E. S. Wolf, 1988, p. 27) It is not, however, an interpersonal relationship between the self and other objects, rather the term is trying to define an internal subjective experience “ ne e de df ort hes us t e na nc eoft hes e l f . ”( p.2 7 ) S e l fps yc hol og ypr opos e st ha ti nor de rf ort hes e l f“ t oma i nt a i ni t sc ohe s i on,i t s vigor, and its harmoniousness, the healthy self needs to be embedded in a milieu that is experienced as constantly supplying a self-s us t a i ni ngs e l f obj e c ta mbi e nc e . ”( E.S .Wol f , 1988, p. 55) Wolf proposed and defined six types of selfobject needs: 1. Mirroring needs [emphasis in original]: a need to feel affirmed, confirmed, recognized; to be feeling accepted and appreciated, especially when able to show oneself.

2. Idealizing needs [emphasis in original]: a need to experience oneself as being part of an admired and respected selfobject; needing the opportunity to be accepted by and merge into a stable, calm, nonanxious, powerful, wise protective, selfobject that possesses the qualities the subject lacks.

3. Alterego needs [emphasis in original]: a need to experience an essential alikeness with the selfobject.

4. Adversarial needs [emphasis in original]: a need to experience the selfobject as a benignly opposing force who continues to be supportive and responsive while allowing or even encouraging one to be in active opposition and thus confirming an at least partial autonomy; the need for the availability of a

123 selfobject experience of assertive and adversarial confrontation vis-à-vis [emphasis in original] the selfobject without the loss of self-sustaining responsiveness from the selfobject.

5. Merger needs [emphasis in original]: a. extension of self: a primitive form of the mirroring need that finds confirmation of self only in the experience of being totally one with the mirroring selfobject. b. with idealized selfobject: an intensification of the idealizing need that requires being totally one with the idealized selfobject.

6. Efficacy needs [emphasis in original]: a need to experience that one has an impact on the selfobject and is able to evoke needed selfobject experiences. (p. 55) Palombo (2001) r e i nt e r pr e t e dWol f ’ ss t r uc t ur a lpoi ntofvi e w,byc omme nt i ng on the process of maintaining self-c ohe s i on.S pe c i f i c a l l y,Pa l ombowr i t e s“ s elfcohesion is not a static state, but a dynamic one that represents the organizing capacities that are always in play to synthesize and integrate self-e xpe r i e nc e s . ” ( Pa l ombo,2 0 0 1 ,p.3 0 )J us ta st hes e l fi s“ e voke d, ”t hema i nt e na nc eofs e l f -cohesion is best accomplished within a matrix of selfobject experiences. He postulated that, across the life cycle, the sense of cohesion is maintained as a result of the success a person has in synthesizing new experiences with old ones, in reworking old experiences, in reinterpreting them in light of new ones, and in maintaining a level of attachment to those who provide selfobject functions. . . [Self cohesion]

124 is a dynamic, active process of continual movement from destabilization to restabilization. (Palombo, 2001, p. 30) By looking at the self from a process point of view, Palombo has made a subtle but important shift in emphasis that is essential to note. A process view point allows the theorist to shift what Pepper (1942) has called the theoretical root metaphor.

Pa l omboi ss hi f t i ngs e l fps yc hol og y’ sme c ha ni s t ic theoretical root metaphor to a contextual one. This shift of theoretical metaphors places Palombo in the role of a new theorist, who is redefining and then building on the structural definitions and conceptualizations of Kohut and his followers by extending self psychology beyond its original paradigm. Before we explore this shift, however, it is important to continue to unde r s t a nds e l fps yc hol og y’ sor i g i na lc onc e pt ua l i z a t i ons .

Kohut (1971) originally conceptualized the self as a bipolar structure. One pole of the self is constituted as“ apr e c i pi t a t eofmi r r or i ngs e l f obj e c te xpe r i e nc e sa ndha s be e nde s i g na t e dt hepol eofa mbi t i ons . ”( E.S .Wol f ,1 9 8 8 ,p.5 0 )Theot he rpol eoft he s e l f“ e me r g e sf r om i de a l i z i ngs e l f obj e c te xpe r i e nc e sa ndha sbe e nde s i g na t e dt hepol eof values and ideals.”( p.5 0 )Al l e nS i e g e l(1996) in his book, Heinz Kohut and the Psychology of the Self,pr ovi de dac l e a r e rr e nde r i ngofKohut ’ st he or e t i c a l conceptualizations than Kohut (1971) did in his book, The Analysis of the Self. Siegel explained the bipolar self from a dynamic point of view. Siegel (1996) summarized Kohut as postulating that the infant begins life in a state of primary narcissistic bliss of perfection. Because of unavoida bl edi s r upt i onsduet ot hec a r e t a ke r ’ sf a i l e dc a r et he narcissistic bliss of the infant is disrupted and the infant finds itself in a disrupted or

125 disharmonious state. Self psychology proposes that the infant subjectively can do one of two things in trying to get back to its state of blissful perfection. One course is to feel/think/experience that the caregiver is perfect and that the infant, as part of the caregiver, is thus also perfect. As feeling/thinking/experiences like these are repeated and repeate di nt hei nf a nt ’ sl i f e ,wha ti sl e f ti nt hei nf a nt ’ smi ndi sa ni de a l i z e dpa r e nt a l pr e c i pi t a t e .Te c hni c a l l yt hi spr e c i pi t a t ei sc a l l e da n“ i ma g o. ”Dyna mi c a l l yt hi si show a n“ i de a l i z e dpa r e nt a li ma g o”i st houg htt ode ve l op.Thr oug hr e pe a t e de xpe r i e nc e sof this kind, it is thought that idealizing narcissism (narcissism used to idealize selfobject experiences) is internalized (Kohut, 1966). Over time these internalized idealizing narcissistic selfobject experiences create within the self a set of ideals and values.

According to self psychological theory, the other possible course for the infant to restore the loss of narcissistic bliss or harmoniousness state is for the infant to feel/think/experience itself as perfect. As feeling/thinking/experiences of this kind are repeated over and over again in t hei nf a nt ’ sl i f e ,wha ti sl e f toft he s es e l f obj e c t e xpe r i e nc e si nt hei nf a nt ’ smi ndc r e a t e st hena r c i s s i s t i c / g r a ndi os es e l f .Thi si st houg ht to be the result of internalized exhibitionistic narcissism (Kohut, 1966). Over time this grandiose self is modified and integrated into the self as a set of ambitions.

Between these two poles there exists according to Wolf (1988) a metaphoric t e ns i ona r c .The s epol e sha vet hec a pa c i t y“ t opul l / pus ht hes e l fi ndi f f e r e ntdi r e c t i ons .

Al ongt hi st e ns i ona r ca r ea r r a ye dt hei nbor nt a l e nt sa nda c qui r e ds ki l l s . ”( E.S .Wol f , 1 9 8 8 ,p.5 0 )I ti st hee f f e c toft he“ t e ns i ona r c ”one a c hpol et ha tma ke se a c hs e l f different or unique in this mechanistic structural metaphor.

126 We need to return to the metaphoric two poles of the bipolar self to understand more about the process that ultimately creates a set of values and ideals, or a set of ambitions in the self. The reader may have wondered how the idealized narcissism becomes internalized by the infant, or how the exhibitionistic narcissism be c ome si nt e r na l i z e dbyt hes e l f .Asweha ves e e nf r om S i e g e l ’ se xpl a na t i on,Kohut (1971) thought that these two poles developed simultaneously as an early attempt by the infant to restore its disrupted state to a blissful state of perfection. With respect to t hei de a l i z i ngpol e ,Kohutt he or i z e dt ha tt he“ ps yc hea s s i g nspe r f e c t i ont oa na r c ha i c , rudimentary (transitional) self-obj e c t . ”( A. M.S i e g e l ,1 9 9 6 ,p.3 7 )Thec hi l d,whos e e ks constant union in an effort to feel harmonious, places all power in the idealized object.

Kohut thought that permanent psychic structures are built during a re-internalization of narcissism whether idealizing or exhibitionistic. Through everyday experience with the reality of the parents, Kohut thought that the child gradually modifies his idealization. This gradual process of de-idealization was also thought by Kohut to allow the child to internaliz es pe c i f i cqua l i t i e soft hepa r e nt s ’e mot i ona la t t i t ude sa nd responses (Siegel, 1996).

Another way that Kohut theorized that the child built permanent ps yc hol og i c a ls t r uc t ur ewa st hr oug hapr oc e s st ha thec a l l e d‘ t r a ns mut i ng i nt e r na l i z a t i on. ’Kohut ’ spr oc e s si ss i mi l a rt ot heonet ha tFr e ud(1917e) described in Mourning and Melancholia. Freud thought that psychic structure developed after a loss, when the libido invested in the lost object is withdrawn and internalized in the form of an unconscious memory. The lost object is retained in memory and the qualities of

127 t hel os tobj e c tbe c omepa r toft hepe r s ona l i t y.Kohutt ookFr e ud’ spr oc e s s ,but substituted narcissism for libido. Therefore, he thought that psychic structure de ve l ope dwhe ni de a l i z i ngna r c i s s i s mi sg r a dua l l ywi t hdr a wnf r om t hec hi l d’ s caretakers. Then this withdrawn narcissism is internalized to create new psychological structures that assume the psychological functions previously preformed by the idealized object, free of the personal qualities of the object. Or in other words, as the child gradually loses the idealized narcissism of the idealized parent imago, the child gradually incorporates these selfobject experiences and functions within the psychological structure of the bipolar self.

Kohut thought of this process of the gradual disillusionment of the child with hi ss e l f obj e c te xpe r i e nc e sa sapr oc e s sof‘ opt i ma lf r us t r a t i on. ’S oa st hec hi l dbe c ome s gradually disillusioned with his caretakers, he slowly internalizes the selfobject functions that the caretaker had provided. Notably, the child subjectively experiences selfobject functions as if the self was performing the function, not the object.

Metaphorically, to the child these functions are as much a part of the self as a body part. The critical distinction is that the child subjectively experiences the functions the object performs, not the personal qualities of the object that is performing the f unc t i on.Kohut ’ spoi nti sthis is not an interpersonal relationship, but a functional relationship. So when the object fails to provide a needed function, the child gradually becomes aware that this function is not part of the child. Over time, through the pr oc e s sof‘ t r a ns mut i ngi nt e r na l i z a t i on, ’t he s ef a i l ur e sbe c omeapa r toft hec hi l d’ ss e l f .

In contrast to a selfobject, a true object is psychologically separate and distinct from

128 t hes e l f .I ti st he s es oc a l l e d‘ t r ueobj e c t s ’t ha tc a nbepa r tofa ni nt e r pe r s ona l relationship. In this case, the child can accept that these objects have motivations and r e s pons e sofot he r sout s i deoft hec hi l d’ ss e l f .“ Ps yc hol og i c a ls t r uc t ur e sa r e internalizations of the soothing, tension-regulating and adaptive functions that have previously been per f or me dbyt hes e l f obj e c t s . ”( A.M.S i e g e l ,1 9 9 6 ,p.7 2 )Onc eapa r t of the self these psychological functions can continue to be performed in the absence of the selfobject.

Stern (1985) has shifted us away from the psychological structure of the self to a c ont e xt ua l i s t“ s e ns eofs e l f . ”Palombo (2001) wa sa wa r eofS t e r n’ sshift from structural t oc ont e xt ua la ndde f i ne dt he“ s e ns eofs e l fa st hee xpe r i e nc eofbeing a self [emphasis in original], or being a person [ e mpha s i si nor i g i na l ] . ”( p.2 5 )Thi ss hi f tmove st he reader to focus on the subjective experience, rather than the entity which self psychologists have defined as the psychological structure that both consciously and unc ons c i ous l yunde r l i e st het ot a l i t yofape r s on’ se xpe r i e nc e s .Ont hes ur f a c et hi sma y seem like a subtle shift in emphasis, but I would maintain t ha tPa l ombo’ ss hi f ti sa s revolutionary as it is evolutionary in its effect on self psychology. To my mind, Palombo has vividly shifted the theoretical root metaphor of self psychology from a mechanistic one to a contextual metaphor. With this shift, Palombo has moved the reader to consider the subjective meaning of lived experience.

Rather than conceptualizing the effects that lived experiences have on a ps yc hol og i c a ls t r uc t ur ec a l l e d“ t hes e l f , ”us i ngPa l ombo’ ss hi f twenowc a n conceptualize the effectsl i ve de xpe r i e nc e sha veonone ’ s“ s e ns eofs e l f . ”Hi ss hi f tof

129 theoretical root metaphors moves self psychology into the Humanist/Rationalist philosophical tradition where meaning, agency, subjectivity, and empathy are emphasized. It also has the effect of moving us away from a structural metapsychology t oamor e“ e xpe r i e nc ene a r ”he r me ne ut i cme t hodofunde r s t a ndi nghuma n de ve l opme nta ndps yc hol og i c a lf unc t i oni ng .Andf i na l l yPa l ombo’ ss hi f tmove st he reader into a world where narrative forms with their emphasis on metaphor, metonymy, and meaning dictate our conceptualizations. Since I believe that this shift i ss oi mpor t a nt ,Iwa ntt oc a r e f ul l yc ons i de rPa l ombo’ st he or i z i ng .I na ddi t i on,s i nc e this shift moves us into the consideration of narrative forms, it provides a tool for us to consider, examine, and interpret narratives of experiences from a self psychological point of view.

Palombo began his redefinition of self psychology by using what, on the surface, appears to be a simple rhetorical move. He move dhi st he or i z i ngf r om “ t he s e l f ”t ot he“ s e ns eofs e l f . ”Iv i e whi sr he t or i c a ls hi f ta sve r ypowe r f ul ,be c a us ei tmove s self psychology out of the positivist modernism world view into the postpositivist, rational/humanist, and postmodern philosophical world views. Palombo (2001) defined the“ s e l f ”a sr e f e r r i ngt ot hepe r s ona nd“ t hes e ns eofs e l f ”a sape r s on’ s s ubj e c t i vee xpe r i e nc eofbe i ngas e l f( p.2 6 ) .Het he npos t ul a t e dt ha t“ be i ngas e l f c ons i s t sofha vi ngas e tofe ndowme nt st ha ta r ee mbe dde di nac ont e xt . ”( p.2 6 ) Endowment for Palomboi s“ as e tofc ompe t e nc i e s . ”( p.2 5 )Amongt hec ompe t e nc i e s that the child is born with are:

130 neuropsychological strengths and weakness. Other competencies are the capacity to feel, to think, to learn, to act; the capacity to generate and interpret signs; the capacity for self-awareness, self-criticism, self-control and selfinterpretation; and the capacity for attachment to others. Furthermore, people are capable of privacy, of being in error, of having motives of which they are unconscious. (Palombo, 2001, p. 25-26) Ye t ,Pa l omboa r g ue st ha t“ e ndowme ntc a nnotbei s ol a t e df r om t hec ont e xti nwhi c h t hepe r s one me r g e s . ”( p.2 7 )Wi t ht hi sa s s umpt i on,Pa l omboa l i g ne dhi ms e l fwi t h those development theorists (Emde, 1989; Mayes, 1999; Greenspan, 1989; Stern, 1985, Trevarthen, 1980) who have argued for a reflexive and multimodal interactive model of human development.

S e l fps yc hol og yha spos t ul a t e dt ha t“ huma nbe i ng sa r emot i va t e dt oma i nt a i na sense of self-cohesion in order to maintain a sense of well-being. ”( Pa l ombo,2 0 0 1 ,p.

2 6 )Onc ea g a i n,byus i ngt hewor d“ s e ns e ”a sar he t or i c a lde vi c e ,Pa l omboha s maintained his hermeneutic perspective. Therefore, it is our sense of self-cohesion [my emphasis] that gives us a sense of well-be i ng ,“ whol e ne s s ,a ndvi t a l i t y. ”( p.2 6 )Iwa ntt o e mpha s i z et hi spoi nts ot ha tt her e a de rnot i c e sPa l ombo’ sc r uc i a lr he t or i c a lmove .Thi s rhetorical shift allowed Palombo to avoid the problems of philosophical essentialism and mechanistic metaphors.

ForPa l ombo,“ t obeas e l fi st o be a member of a human community that c ons t i t ut e st hec ont e xti nwhi c ht hec hi l di sr a i s e d. ”( p.2 7 )Thec ont e xtofhuma n de ve l opme ntf orPa l ombos e e mst obeac ompl e xma t r i x.Hepos t ul a t e dt ha t“ t he

131 context in which each child is raised interpenetrates his experiences. It is constituted of t hes oc i a l ,c ul t ur a l ,a ndhi s t or i c a lmi l i e ut ha tc ompl e me nt se a c hpe r s on’ si mma t ur eor de f i c i e ntc a pa c i t yt of unc t i oni nde pe nde nt l y. ”( p.2 7 ) Palombo seems to be asserting the idea that context helps to construct the self and as a constructor of the self, context restricts how the self is able to think about both itself and the outer world. Or, in other words, one can think about oneself only in relation to the social, cultural and historical moment in which one is raised and is l i vi ng .I na ddi t i on,Pa l omboc l a i mst ha tt hec ont e xtc a npr ovi de“ c ompl e me nt a r y functions that enhance or help maintain self-c ohe s i on”( p.2 6 ) ;t ha ti s ,t hec ont e xtc a n he l pma i nt a i none ’ ss e ns eofone ’ ss e l fa ndone ’ ss e ns eofwe l lbe i ng .

In extending his line of reasoning, Palombo tried to provide an explanation for howe a c hpe r s onc a nc r e a t eauni ques e ns eofs e l f .Hec l a i me d“ e a c hc hi l d’ sc ont e xta nd neuropsychological strengths and weaknesses act as filters of self-e xpe r i e nc e . ”( p.2 8 ) Thesef i l t e r sde t e r mi net hequa l i t yoft hepe r s on’ se xpe r i e nc e s .Butul t i ma t e l yi ti sour sense of self or feelings about a self that are registered in the memory systems of the brain that determine how we think or feel about ourselves. Another way of saying this i st ha tt hes e l fi sa s s i g ni ng“ me a ni ng s ”t ol i ve de xpe r i e nc e .The s eme a ni ng sa r es t or e d in the memory systems of the brain. Over time the meanings of these lived experiences begin to come together as our brains develop the ability to have evocative memories.

Evocative memories allow the person to recall past events and to hold together a series of feelings, impressions, and experiences that seem central to these experiences. The centrality of these feelings, impressions, and experiences develops into a “ s e ns eofs e l f ”

132 i fwema i nt a i nt hehe r me ne ut i cpe r s pe c t i ve ,a nda“ s e l f ”i fwet a keas t r uc t ur a l viewpoint outside the person.

S c ha c t e r( 1 9 9 6 )de s c r i be dt hi sme mor ypr oc e s sa sc r e a t i nga n“ e ng r a m. ” Engrams are the memory traces of lived experiences. According to Schacter (p. 60), “ t hes pe c i f i cwa yi nwhi c hape r s ont hi nksa boutore nc ode s ,a ne ve ntde t e r mi ne swha t ‘ g e t si nt o’t hee ng r a m. ”Me mor yt r a c e sa r enots t or e di nas i ng l el oc a t i onwi t hi nt he brain but are rather distributed over a wide variety of brain systems. To recall a memory, the brain must pull together these traces from various regions of the brain.

Since these memory traces are widely distributed, there are no guarantees that the memory created will be an exact duplicate of the exact experience as it was filtered through the perceptual and neuropsychological systems of the brain, nor that the memory created this time will be the memory that is recalled next time.

Pa l omboi nr e i nt e r pr e t i ngKohuta s s e r t e dt ha ta“ pr i ma r ymot i vet ha te ng a g e sa pe r s on’ ss e ns eofs e l fi st hede s i r ef ors e l f -c ohe s i on. ”( Pa l ombo,2 0 0 1 ,p.2 9 )Cohe s i oni s a concept that descriptively focuses on what I have described earlier as a harmonious psychophysiological state of being. Later in development, after the development of e voc a t i veme mor y,t hi ss t a t eofha r moni ous ne s sc a nbet houg htofa sha vi nga“ s e ns eof self-c ohe s i on. ”Butbe f or ee voc a t i veme mor yi se s t a bl i s he d,Idonotbe l i e vet ha ti ti s us e f ult ot hi nka bout“ as e ns eofs e l f -c ohe s i on. ”Ra t he r ,Pa l ombo’ si de a ss ug gest to me that the sense of self- cohesion is developmental, meaning to me that it happens over time. It comes into being as a potentiality of human development but not as a given of human development. The capacity for and the motive for a sense of self cohesion is on

133 the other hand a given, I think. Palombo would seem to agree with my summary, when he wrote, Self-cohesion is not a static state, but a dynamic one that represents the organizing capacities that are always in play to synthesize and integrate self experiences. Across the life cycle, the sense of cohesion is maintained as a result of the success a person has in synthesizing new experiences with old ones, in reworking old experiences, in reinterpreting them in the light of new ones, and in maintaining a level of attachment to those who provide selfobject functions.

(Palombo, 2001, p. 30) With the development of evocative memory, an infant has the rudimentary ability to develop what historians would call an annal (White, 1980), which means a record of an item. An annal can identify what came first, and then what came next until the present. Annals do not attempt to order the reporting, other than by sequencing events in time, and even this convention is not entirely necessary. Annals do not attempt to group events into similar or dissimilar groups. Annals can be thought of as more or less just a list of events.

A chronicle, on the other hand, does begin to group items or events. What at first seemed different in one aspect can nevertheless be seen as similar in another aspect. For example, apples, oranges, pineapples, and pears are different shapes, sizes, colors, textures, and tastes. However, they are all fruits. Likewise, might be Easter, Passover, Christmas, Yom Kippur, and Hanukkah are all distinct events in the year.

134 However, they are all religious holidays with specific religious meanings. According to White (1980), the capacity to envision a set of events as belonging to the same order of meaning requires a metaphysical principle by which to translate difference into s i mi l a r i t y.I not he rwor ds ,i tr e qui r e sa‘ s ubj e c t ’c ommont oa l loft hereferents [emphasis in original] of the various sentences that register events as they have occurred. (p. 15) Here, White was referring to a chronicle, not an annal. Chronicles are told without interpretation and they are told without a sense of a possible future. Developmentally, ac hi l d’ sa bi l i t yt oc onc e i vea na nna lpr e c e de st hea bi l i t yt ode ve l opac hr oni c l eofl i f e .

A child achieves the ability later to cognitively put experiences into various categories that are organized by a subject, which is themselves.

At a still later stage developmentally, a child develops the capacity to create a personal history. Histories provide a chronicle from a certain point of view and c onve yas e ns et ot her e a de ra boutt hepos s i bi l i t yofa‘ pr e di c t a bl ef ut ur e . ’By de f i ni t i on,hi s t or i e sa r enotc ons i de r e dva l i dunl e s sonec a n“ i ma g i net wos e t sof e ve nt s ”( Whi t e ,1 9 8 0 ,p.1 9 )t ha twoul dha vepr oduc e dt hes a mer e s ul t .Ac c or di ng to White, histories take on an authority of giving a true account of what really happened.

White (1980) c l a i mst ha t“ t he plot of a narrative imposes a meaning on the events that comprise its story level by revealing in the end a structure that was imminent in the events all along. ”[ e mpha s i si nor i g i na l ]( p.1 9 )Thus ,f orhi s t or i e st he r emus tbea subject that organizes the material and later interprets the events as being the real [my

135 emphasis] account of events. The subject that organizes the events of a life story or a life history is the self. The self is the subject of its own history, its own story. The self is both the creator of the narrative, and it is also the subject of its narrative creation.

Within this narrative framework, Cohler (1993) postulated that, The life-history construct, like all historical accounts within our own culture, may be understood as a narrative . . . that is composed of a sequence of events reflecting particular intentions and covering a presently remembered past, experienced present, and expected or assumed future and that is organized according to socially constructed understandings of time and place. (p. 112) Pa l ombous e dCohl e r ’ sc onc e pt ua l i z a t i on,a l ongwi t hhi ss ynt he s i sofJ e r ome Bruner (1987, 1990), Saari (1991), Schafer (1980, 1981, 1983, 1992), and Spence (1982, 1 9 8 6 )t opos t ul a t et hee xi s t e nc eofa“ s e l f -na r r a t i ve . ”Pa l ombode f i ne sa“ s e l f -na r r a t i ve ” as, The broad set of communications through which children tell us about themselves that reflect the organization of their experiences. These communications include explicit autobiographical statements, fantasies, play sequences, stories, as well as nonverbal enactments that give behavioral expression to their desires, beliefs, and emotions. (2001, p. 44) His postulation seems to make good common sense. All of us are aware to some degree of a story that we tell ourselves and others about who we are. Palombo is calling this story a self-narrative. He claimst ha tone ’ ss e l f -narrative is a special form of communication/knowledge (a story that we believe is true about us and reflects our

136 experience of reality). Another reason that this form of communication/knowledge is s pe c i a li sbe c a us et hepe r s on“ ma ynothave direct access to major motifs or themes t ha tor g a ni z e d”( p.4 4 )al i f e .Ra t he r ,t he“ t he me soft hes e l f -narrative are descriptively unconscious; that is, they are not available to the person without reflection and i nt r os pe c t i on. ”( p.4 4 )S i nc et hi ss t ory is special, Palombo maintained that this is a story that should be examined very closely. Palombo postulated that the self-narrative g i v e susavi e wofape r s on’ ss ubj e c t i vee xpe r i e nc e ,be c a us e , The self-narrative focuses on the meanings [emphasis in original] the child c ons t r ue sf r om he r / hi se xpe r i e nc e ,onhowot he r si nt hec hi l d’ sc ont e xtc onf e r meanings [emphasis in original] on those experiences, and on how the child organizes those meanings [emphasis in original] into thematic units within the narrative to create a coherent story. (Palombo, 2001, p. 43) S ubj e c t i vee xpe r i e nc ei st heope r a t i ona lpr i nc i pl e .One ’ ss e l f -narrative carries wi t hi ni tt hehi s t or yofone ’ ss ubj e c t i veunde r s t a ndi ngofone ’ sps yc hol og i c a la nd sociological development. In addi t i on,i tc ont a i nst hehi s t or yofone ’ sr e f l e xi ve construction of a life story. And finally, because it has the capacity to change over the course of a life span (Cohler & Freeman, 1993), the self-narrative reflects a current sense of self in the present. Self-narratives have what Spence (1982) has called narrative truth, rather than a historical or objective truth about them. Self-narratives are dynamic in that they have the capacity to change during the person’ sl i f es pa nt o r e f l e c tmor ec ompl e xunde r s t a ndi ng s ,a ndne ws ynt he s e soft hes e l f ’ sc ondi t i onwi t hi n particular contexts. Therefore, as children have new experiences within their contexts,

137 each child reworks their self-narrative to incorporate these new experiences. These new experiences have the effect of changing the self-narrative by changing the motifs and themes of the self-narrative. Moreover, as these new meanings rephrase and replace the old narrative, the new modified narrative can give new meanings to old experiences, now seen in this edited version. This edited version of the self-narrative provides the person with a method of interpreting past and present lived experiences.

When this version of the self-narrative is told to another, then the self-narrative becomes an autobiographical account that reveals the person to another.

To my mind, three questions remain to be explored in this general area. The first question concerns the nature and definition of memory, since memory is so implicated in the construction of a self-narrative. The second question, which I already br i e f l ydi s c us s e d,i showdoe sone ’ ss e l f -narrative develop? The third question is, how i sone ’ spe r s ona li de nt i t yr e l a t e dt oone ’ ss e ns eofs e l f ?Thef i r s tque s t i ont a ke susba c k to the mechanistic theoretical root metaphor of science. The second question is developmental and has the danger of pushing us back into an organismic theoretical root metaphor. And the final question of the relationship between personal identity and self has the danger, if we are not vigilant, of pushing us back again into a mechanistic theoretical root metaphor. I want to avoid, as much as I can, these conceptual problems, but on the other hand, I want the reader to note the philosophical and metaphoric tensions involved in this discussion. I too, will eventually incorporate the rhetorical device that Palombo (1991a, 1991b, 1996, 2001) ha sus e d;t ha ti s ,Iwi l lt a l kofa“ s e ns eofi de nt i t y”a nda“ s e ns eofs e l f . ”Howe ve r ,I

138 think ultimately that it may be useful for the reader to be able to follow my thinking about this change, so I will more explicitly explore the conceptual tensions in each area of question.

139

CHAPTER VIII MEMORY The first question I will explore concerns the nature and definition of memory.

Markowitsch (1995) de f i ne dme mor ya s“ t hec a pa c i t yt ol ookf r om t hepr e s e ntt ot he pa s ta nda tt hes a met i mewi t ne s st hepa s s i ngoft hepr e s e nti nt ot hef ut ur e . ”( p.7 6 7 ) Pally (2000) de f i ne st heus eoft het e r m“ me mor y”a st her ubr i ct odi s c us st he“ ne ur a l representation of information to which a person was previously exposed and which can be reactivated for us ei nt hepr e s e nt . ”( p.4 3 ) Memory is often thought of as being singular, that is, as being only of one kind.

Sometimes, memory is thought of as being related to the sense organ that is recalling it ort ha tc r e a t e di t .Fore xa mpl e ,i fyou“ s e e ”a nobj e c t , you remember it as a vision.

Until recently memory was not understood in terms of neural representation. Rather, memory was used metaphorically as a way of describing our ability to recall past events and experiences. Metaphorically, the mind was considered to be a kind of video camcorder. Neuroscience did not have the tools to explore how this video camcorder worked, but we all knew by experience that it did. After all, we had memories. Recent neuroscience research has developed the tools to understand this so-called video camcorder. We had always surmised that the information was being recorded somehow on the cells and synapses of the brain, but we were not able to full appreciate

140 the complexity of the processes involved. What neuroscience has learned since developing these tools, is that the mind is not a video camcorder. Indeed, the mind does not store endlessly all of our experiences like a video camcorder with unlimited amounts of tape. Rather, we have learned that there are a number of kinds of memories, each of which is processed in a different brain system. In addition, these processes are unconscious, i.e., not in awareness.

According to Atkinson & Shiffrin (1968) information flows through the brain in a series of steps. The steps begin with sensory input, which is followed by iconic memory, then by working or short-term memory, and then by long-term memory. “ I c oni cme mor yoc c ur swhe ne xt e r na ls t i mul ia c t i va t es e nsory end organs and these areas remain in an active state long enough for the information to be processed and l e a dt oape r c e pt i on. ”( Pa l l y,2 0 0 0 ,p.4 5 )Thi ski ndofme mor yl a s t sf orl e s st ha na s e c ond.”Wor ki ngors hor t -t e r m me mor y”l a s tf oronl yaf e wminutes, making it pos s i bl et oke e pa ni mpr e s s i onoft hei ndi vi dua l ’ sr e a l i t yf orbe yondt hes hor tdur a t i on of iconic memory (Pally, 2000).Wor ki ngme mor yi sat e mpor a r y“ wor ks pa c e ”whe r e the mind can hold a number of pieces of relevant information at the same time and then manipulate this information if necessary (Pally, 2000). Working memory works much like random access memory (RAM) works in a computer. The computer puts into temporary memory (RAM) what the processor is working on but has not yet stored permanently on the hard drive. Like RAM memory on the computer, working memory has access to current perceptions and to the information storied in long-term memory. Working and long-term memory are dynamic and interactional. According

141 to Pally (2000),“ wor ki ngmemory is responsible for the search and retrieval of information from long-term memory that is involved in many higher cognitive f unc t i ons . ”( p.4 6 ) The permanent storage of information is done in long-term memory (Pally, 2000). Long-term memory has two categories: explicit/declarative memory and implicit/non-declarative memory. Explicit/declarative memory is involved with the conscious recollection of previous experiences and the memory of specific events and facts (Pally, 2000). This is what we usually think of, when we think of memory.

Explicit memory has two subcategories. The first is semantic memory, which is the memory system used to recall general facts and knowledge. For example, semantic me mor yi si nvol ve di nr e c a l l i ngyourmot he r ’ sma i de nna me ,orwhe r eyouwe r ebor n.

Thi si s“ ve r ba l l ye nc ode d,c ont e xt -free, or generalized information which when a ppl i e dt ot hes e l f ,r e pr e s e nt ss umma r yt r a i tknowl e dg e . ”( Ha r t e r ,1 9 9 9 a ,p.3 2 ) Anot he re xa mpl eofs e ma nt i cme mor ya si ti sa ppl i e dt ot hes e l fmi g htbe ,“ Ia ma g oodboy;Ia m aha ppyg i r l . ” The other subcategory of explicit memory is episodic memory, of which autobiographical memory is a subcategory. Episodic memory is used to recall specific events (Harter, 1999a; Pally, 2000). Episodic memory refers to the memory of an experience that happened once, at a specific time and place. For example, this memory subsystem is used to remember going to a class last week and using a blue pen to take notes. Episodic memories initially are relegated to a sort of metaphorical holding pattern. If the episodes are re-established frequently, these memories are transformed

142 i nt og e ne r i ce ve ntme mor y,or“ s c r i pt s . ”(Tomkins, 1979, 1987) These scripts become schemas in the Piagetian sense, i.e., they are schemas derived from experience that sketch a general outline of a familiar event without providing the details about the specific time and place. Autobiographical memory is a special form of episodic memory that codes the experiences of the self (Nelson & Gruendel, 1986). These are memories that are very personal, and have enduring meaning for the individual (Harter, 1999a). The explicit memory system, then, is involved in processing the conscious recall of both general and specific facts.

The other major memory system of long-term memory is implicit/nondeclarative memory. This memory system is involved in the unconscious processing of the aspects of a ne xpe r i e nc e .Thi sme a ns“ t ha tc e r t a i ni nf or ma t i onc a nbes t or e di n memory without our having been consciously aware of its occurrence; it can nonconsciously influence current functioning but does not feel like conscious r e me mbe r i ng . ”( Pa l l y,2 0 0 0 ,p.5 5) Like the explicit/declarative memory system, the implicit/non-declarative memory system can be further divided into three s ubc a t e g or i e s .Thef i r s ti st he“ pr i mi ng ”me mor ys ys t e m.Thepr i mi ngs ys t e mi s concerned with the memory of shape, sound, and form. While it is independent of the semantic subcategory of the explicit memory system, it does facilitate the identification and recognition of words, sounds, and shapes (Pally, 2000). It operates in each sensory domain, according to Pally (2000) and, in addition, can alter judgments and preferences for the recognition of words and objects (Squire, 1992). For example, Schacter (1996)

143 believed that this is the memory system working in the auditory domain that plays a r ol ei na ni nf a nt ’ spr e f e r e nc ea ndr e c og ni t i onofhe rorhi smot he r ’ svoi c e .

The second subcategory of the implicit/non-declarative memory system is procedural memory. Squire (1992) defines procedural memory as the memory for motor, perceptual and cognitive skills and habits. These habits or skills are behaviors that are developed after many repetitions. An example of procedural memory might be the actual typing skills involved in writing a dissertation. A task that is learned with conscious attention and the use of the declarative/explicit memory system can eventually be turned over to the procedural memory system once it has become a habit or has become routine. Procedural memory is thought to involve the basal ganglia of the brain, according to Pally (2000).

The third subcategory of the implicit/non-declarative memory system is emotional memory. Pally (2000) de f i ne de mot i ona lme mor ya st he“ c ondi t i one d l e a r ni ngofe mot i ona lr e s pons e st oas i t ua t i on”( p.5 9 )whi c hs e e mst obeme di a t e dby t hea myg da l a .Emot i onsa r ec ompl e xe ve nt st ha ti nc l ude“ vi s c e r a lc ha ng e soft he autonomic nervous system that accompanies all emotions, such as changes in heart r a t e ,g a s t r i cmot i l i t y,a ndva s odi l a t i on. ”( p.6 1 ) Emotion is a complex neurophysiological process, but what is important to remember is that the emotions of an event are stored separately from the factual details of the event (Pally, 2000). This fact has many implications to consider. One implication is that factual details can be combined by the brain with a different emotion than actually occurred during the event. Another implication is that the

144 emotional memory of an event may be connected to an entirely different set of facts.

This is the suspected cause of the false memory syndrome. However, the central implication for our purposes is that it begins to provide an explanation on how context and emotion can shape what is remembered. It also suggests how the same event can be remembered in multiple ways by the same person at different times in her/his life. In addition, it suggests an explanation for the process of the reflexive c ons t r uc t i onofone ’ sl i ve de xpe r i e nc e sove ral i f et i me .

I think that this review of human memory system provides a very good counter-argument to the idea of human memory being like a video camcorder.

Palombo (2001) reminded us that what a child retains in implicit and explicit memory is never completely disconnected from the context in which the events occurred. My review suggests that memories are not an exact duplicate of the event as suggested by the video camc or de rme t a phor ,butr a t he rc ons t i t ut et hec hi l d’ se xpe r i e nc eoft he event. Memories are constructions or representations that closely resemble an event.

However, what is reported by the child to be true also includes elements that represent personal interpretations, transformations and inclinations that serve the child in the moment. This moment in turn has been influenced by a matrix of previous experiences, memories, scripts, schemas and emotions. Each of these and all of these can influence how one perceives and remembers the outside world or the inner world at any one moment in time. It is with this knowledge that we can begin to think about the second developmental question that I posed earlier, how a self-narrative might develop and how it might change during adolescence.

145

CHAPTER IX DEVELOPMENT OF A SELF-NARRATIVE Thepr oc e s sofa ni ndi vi dua l ’ sde ve l opme ntofas e l f -narrative contains three components. One element is the development of narrative as an expressive form.

Another element is the linkage of a developing self with this literary form. The third element is the development of a sense of self and a self-narrative. I view these three ingredients as necessary to understand the development over time of a self-narrative. I have already discussed the development of the narrative form from annal to history.

This chapter will explore a third element and will describe how an understanding of self-narrative emerged from the work of various researchers.

Infancy and the Emerging Sense of Self Researchers posit that the self begins to emerge in the pre-verbal stages of infancy and takes further shape as the toddler develops language. The initial development of the self sets the stage for the creation of a self-narrative. At the onset, I would like to remind the reader that the crucial point concerning a narrative history is that there must be a subject or a self that organizes the material and interprets the events as being the real account of events. It is real to the subject, because that is how thes ubj e c t ’ sme mor ys ys t e m ha sr e me mbe r e dt hee ve nt s .Thes ubj e c tt ha tor g a ni z e s

146 the events of a life story or a life history is the self. The self is the subject of its own history, its own story. The self is both the creator of the narrative, and it is also the subject of its narrative creation.

William James (James, 1890, 1892) first made this distinction when he proposed t he“ I -s e l f ”a ndt he“ Me -s e l f . ”ForJ a me st he“ I -s e l f ”wa st hes ubj e c tort heknowe ra nd t he“ Me -s e l f ”wa st heobj e c tort heknown.The“ Me -s e l f ”wa sf ur t he rdi vi de di nt ot he material self that included the bodily self, the social self and the spiritual self. These Jamesian distinctions about the structure of the self and its components are useful for us to keep in mind when considering the development of a self-narrative. James suggested that the social self is a social construction, i.e., characteristics of the self recognized by others. In addition, he further suggested the importance to the self of the development of language in the infant. He thought of language as the scaffolding for the elaborationoft hes e l fa ndt hee ve nt ua lc r e a t i onofa“ s e ns eofs e l f . ” Similarly, John Cooley (1902) proposed, as summarized by Harter (1999a), that significant others became a social mirror into which the individual gazes in order to de t e c tt he i ropi ni onst owa r dt hes e l f .Cool e yc ont e nde dt ha t“ wha tbe c ome st hes e l fi s what we imagine that others think of us, including our appearance, motives, deeds, character and so on. (Harter, 1999a) These formulations of James and Cooley blend ve r ywe l lwi t ht hepr opos i t i onsofKohut ’ sS e l fPs yc hol og y.I na ddi t i on,t he s e propositions blend very well with the propositions of Vygotsky (1978) who proposed that social language structured the inner world of the psyche. Vygotsky seems to have agreed with George Herbert Mead (1934), who thought that the individual came to

147 adopt the generalized perspective of a group of significant others that shared a particular societal perspective on the self.

This route of development was best described neurologically by Siegler (1991), who posited from an information-processing perspective that there are two processes in the memory systems of the brain that are involved in the social structuring of the self. The first process is encoding. Encoding is the process of identifying the most important features of objects and events. Encoding forms the basis for internal representations within the brain. The second process is strategy construction. Strategy construction refers to those processes by which various concepts are combined to form categories or higher-order generalizations.

Using these processes, Harter concluded: Moreover, there is more emphasis on how a given level of self-understanding builds upon the previous level. Processes through which concepts are combined to form categories or higher-order generalizations can be invoked to explain the developmental emergence of trait labels and abstractions that come to define the self. In addition, socialization experiences and related contextual factors contribute to our understanding of the normative-developmental trajectory of self-representations, as well as the tremendous individual differences that can be found at particular age levels. (1999a, p. 31) Harter thus summarized how a reflexive developmental model of the self proceeds to ever greater complexity and abstractions. Her summary also helps to explain individual differences with respect to social environment, and innate capacity.

148 In total, these authors provide a basis to consider that the self-narrative has a developmental quality to it. It develops as the self develops. The emerging selfnarrative changes as the cognitive and social-emotional aspects of the self develop and change. Self development begins at birth and proceeds through predictable stages during infancy (Fivush, 1987). The self is both a cognitive and a social construction: Self-processes perform organizational [emphasis in original] functions in that they provide expectations, predictive structure and guidelines that allow one to interpret and gives meaning to life experiences and to maintain a coherent pi c t ur eofone s e l fi nr e l a t i ont oone ’ swor l d.S t r uc t ur e st ha ts e r vet ode f i net he self also cement social bonds and foster appropriate social behavior as well as self-regulation. Self-processes also perform motivational [emphasis in original] functions in that they energize the individual to pursue selected goals, they provide plans and incentives, and they identify standards that allow one to achieve ideals in the service of self-improvement. Finally, self-processes perform protective [emphasis in original] functions toward the goal of maintaining f a vor a bl ei mpr e s s i onsofone ’ sa t t r i but e sa ndmor eg e ne r a l l yt oma xi mi z e pleasure and minimize pain. (Harter, 1999a, p. 10) These self-pr oc e s s e sa r edi r e c t l yc onne c t e di nmyvi e wt oKohut ’ si de a sa bout selfobjects and transmuting internalizations. Selfobjects are neither context free, nor culturally free. Rather, they are embedded within context and culture. Most importantly for the development of the self-narrative, self-objects are embedded within a language system.

149 Language acquisition is very important for the developing self (Stern, 1985).

Language allows for the verbal expression and representation of the categorical self or, as Lewis (1991) ha sr e l a be l e di t ,t he“ i de aofme . ”Thi si swha tPa l ombo(2001) has c a l l e dt he“ s e ns eofs e l f . ”Thi ss e ns eofs e l fi sar e f l e xi vec ons t r uc t i onbe g i nni ngwhe n the other/selfobject engages the toddler in a system of signs and sounds. Over time the infant learns this system of signs and sounds, and is able to use language to label itself and others with the appropriate personal pronouns. An example of this kind of l a ng ua g ewoul dbe ,“ Looka tme ! ”“ Ia m Amy,whoa r eyou? ”Thi ski ndofl a be l i ng and representation begins to be vocalized and/or understood around 18 months.

Language makes possible makes possible what Neisser (1991) referred to as the “ e xt e nde dorr e me mbe r e ds e l f , ”whi c hi sas e ns eofs e l fba s e donme mor i e sa nd narrative conventions. How might this happen?

S t e r n’ s(1985) model of Representation of Interactions Generalized (RIGs) a ddr e s s e dt heor g a ni z a t i ona lf unc t i onsofHa r t e r ’ ss e l f -processes model. RIGs can be thought of as building blocks that serve to organize interactions with significant others. Stern wrote that RIGs are internal objects, constructed from repeated, relatively small interactive patterns derived from the microanalytic perspective. Such internal objects are not people; nor are they parts or aspects of others. Rather, they are constructed from the patterned experience of self in interaction with another; what is inside (i.e., represented internally) comprises interactive experiences. . . .these internal objects are referred to as representations of interactions that have been generalized (RIGs).

150 Subsequently, I have preferred to call them ways-of-being-with, deemphasizing the process formation in favor of describing the lived experience in a more experience-near and clinically useful way. (Stern, 2000, p. xv) Ways-of-being-with are stored in episodic memory and they reflect the uniqueness of t hec ont e xt ,t heobj e c twi t hwhom t hee xpe r i e nc et a ke spl a c e ,a ndt hec hi l d’ s endowments, according to Palombo (2001).

Piaget (1969, 1970, 1972) proposed that in the preverbal period children are primed to respond to specific stimuli with a set of unconscious procedures. He referred to these procedures as sensorimotor schemas. These experiences are encoded and stored as implicit memories. Piaget regarded schemas as purely cognitive mental structures.

Tomki ns ’( 1 9 7 9 ,1 9 8 7 )wor ka dde dt hee mot i ona le l e me nt st ot he s e sensorimotor s c he ma s .Tomki nspr opos e dt ha tc hi l dr e nde ve l ope d“ s c r i pt s . ”For Tomkins scripts, were ordered sets of scenes derived from experience. He believed that scripts could be divided into types, the first type being innate scripts. Innate scripts are those that e s s e nt i a l l ya r e“ pr e wi r e d, ”e . g . ,t he yc omewi t ht hei nf a nt .ForTomki ns ,t he innate scripts were the nine categorical affect states: excitement, joy, surprise, fear, distress, anger, disgust, dismell, and shame. The second type of script is learned scripts.

Learned scripts use innate scripts as their initial building blocks, e.g., they incorporate within them the affect state elicited by the event to which the child was exposed.

The infant begins to use these scripts to anticipate and predict what will happen. These scripts are later used by the infant to shape experiences so that

151 experiences can be grouped over time into categories. Tompkins proposed that affects magnified or amplified experiences. This amplification process might be one reason why the same external experience could have different effects on different children.

Children thus create categories of experience over time. These categories of experiences, called scripts, or thematic models come to serve as filters and organizers of new and subsequent experiences and are retained in implicit memory (Palombo, 2001).

Then with the emergence of linguistic and symbolic representational capabilities, toddlers move to a new level of self awareness. They can now conceptualize the self, as an object. They can now be said to have a nascent sense of self.

Stern (Stern, 1985, 1989) posited a complementary conceptual model. He proposed five different senses of self, which emerge developmentally over the period from birth to four years of age. For Stern, originally, an emergent sense of self begins to act between birth and about 2 months. Between 2 months and approximately 6 months a core sense of self emerges. At approximately 9 months a subjective sense of self begins to emerge. With the increasing capacity for language usage, as well as working memory, a verbal or categorical sense of self begins to appear. Not until between the third and fourth years can one begin to see a narrative sense of self (Stern, 1985, p. 169). Stern suggested that these domains of senses of self are stage-like, or developmental. Once these senses of self emerge they remain for life, and they operate in concert with all the other coexisting senses of self already present. (Stern, 1985, p.

169)

152 Kagan (1981) and then Lewis (1991) have suggested that with the emergence of language toddlers gain the capacity to symbolically represent parental rules and standards. More importantly, toddlers have the potential to recognize whether they have the ability to meet these rules and standards. Emde, Biringen, Clymen and Oppenheim (1991) have proposed that acquisition of symbolically represented parental rules and standards is the earliest manifestation of moral behavior and contributes to t hede ve l opme ntofa“ we -s e l f . ”Thewe -self is a shared sense of meaning between the toddler and the caregiver. A shared sense of meaning signals that the toddler is now embedded into the context created by her/his parents and the culture. A shared sense ofme a ni ngs t a ndsi nc ont r a s tt oac hi l d’ spe r s ona lme a ni ng sofe ve nt s . Personal meanings are unique and/or private. These are meanings that would not be given to the experience by others present for the experience. However, language allows shared meanings to arise from the sharing of experience and recollections with significant others (Katherine Nelson, 1990, 1993b).

Very young children can construct episodic memories for certain events, as well as generic event memories, or scripts, for example, for bath time rituals. Yet, there are no autobiographical memories before the age of two and the average is three-and-ahalf (Pillemer & White, 1989). Harter (1999a) pos i t e d,“ Thi si nf a nt i l ea mne s i ac a nonl y be overcome by learning from adults how to formulate their own memories as narratives [ e mpha s i si nor i g i na l ] . ”( p.3 3 )S hebe l i e ve dt ha tpa r e nt sr e c ountt ot hec hi l d s t or i e sa boutt hec hi l d’ spa s te xpe r i e nc e s .Wi t hi nc r e a s i nga g ea ndl a ng ua g ef a c i l i t y, children eventually take a more active role in co-constructing the memory of the

153 experience that both the parent and the child have shared (Katherine Nelson, 1989).

However, it is important to remember that these narratives for the young child are highly supported by the parents, who reinforce those aspects of a shared experience that are important to codify and remember (Nelson, 1989). Through these interactions, or dialogues, an autobiographic account of the self is created.

The acquisition of language is the critical recording instrument in establishing a personal narrative reflecting an autobiographic account of the self. The mastery of language, particularly personal pronouns, enables young children to talk about themselves and about their sense of self (Bates, 1990). In addition, the ability to use past tense verbs greatly facilitates the representations of the self in language (Harter, 1999a).

The ability to represent the self in language develops toward the latter half of the third year. However, the development of language skills alone does not create autobiographical memory (Snow, 1990). Rather, self knowledge or an appreciation for the self, as in a sense of self, as an independent entity, with agency, desire, feelings, thoughts that are distinct from others is required for the development of autobiographical memory, according to Katherine Nelson (1990, 1992, 1993a, 1993c).

Interactions with parents, especially linguistic interactions, also affect the de ve l opi ngc hi l d’ sr e pr e s e nt a t i onofs e l f .The s es e l fr e pr e s e nt a t i onsa r es t or e di n semantic memory (Nelson, 1993a, 1989; Snow, 1990). Bowlby (1979) posited that the i nf a nt ’ sc aregivers confer these early semantic memories. Parents convey to the infant these early self representations with their extensive descriptive and evaluative i nf or ma t i ona boutt hec hi l d.Fore xa mpl e ,apa r e ntmi g htc omme ntt oac hi l d“ You’ r e

154 abi gboy, ”“ Youa r es os ma r t , ”“ Wha tapr e t t yg i r lyoua r e . ”The s ede s c r i pt i vea nd evaluative comments help the child to distinguish self from other and they help to define the rules and standards by which the child has met parental expectations.

Children incorporate these descriptions and evaluations into their self definitions, into their self experiences, and into their sense of themselves in the form of generalized trait knowledge which is represented in semantic memory (Pally, 2000). Therefore, the linguistic construction of the self is a highly interpersonal process with caretakers ma ki ngama j orc ont r i but i ont ot hes e l f ’ sr e pr e s e nt a t i oni na ut obi og r a phi c a la nd semantic memory (Harter, 1999a; Lieberman, 1993; Nelson, 1993b; Pally, 2000).

While language can support heightened levels of relatedness and allows for the creation of a self-narrative, language can also separate two forms of simultaneous interpersonal experience, e.g., life as it is lived and life as it is verbally represented (Stern, 1985). Stern argues that the very capacity for objectifying the self through verbal representations allows one to transcend, and therefore potentially to distort, one ’ si mme di a t ee xpe r i e nc ea ndt oc r e a t eaf a nt a s i z e dc ons t r uc t i onoft hes e l f .I n a ddi t i on,t he r ei st hepot e nt i a lf ori nc or por a t i ngt hebi a s e sofpa r e nt s ’pe r s pe c t i ve son the self, since these adult caregivers help to dictate the content of narratives incorporated in autobiographical memory (Bowlby, 1980; Bretherton, 1987; Crittenden, 1994). Bretherton (1987) wa r nsa boutapr oc e s st ha ts hec a l l s“ de f e ns i ve e xc l us i on”i nwhi c h negative information about the self, or the other, is not incorporated into autobiographical memory because it is too threatening. In addition, c hi l dr e nc a nr e c e i ves ubt l es i g na l sf r om a dul t sa boutwha ti sbe s t“ f or g ot t e n. ”

155 Therefore, the young child as the budding author of her/his self-narrative can select, edit, or change what is stored in memory according to personal goals and wishes, and/or in reaction to the context in which the child finds her/himself (D. P. Wolf, 1990).

Harter (1999a) s umma r i z e syoungc hi l dr e n’ ss e l f -narratives and selfrepresentations with: Ve r yyoungc hi l dr e n’ ss e l f -representations reflect concrete descriptions of behaviors, abilities, emotions, possessions, and preferences that are potentially observable by others. These attributes are highly differentiated or isolated from one another, leading to rather disjointed accounts, because at this age young children lack the ability to integrate such characteristics. Self-representations are also likely to be unrealistically positive, since young children lack the requisite skills (e.g., social comparison) to allow them to distinguish between ideal and real self-concepts. Young children are also unable to acknowledge that they can possess attributes or emotions of opposing valence (e.g., nice and mean, happy and sad). Rather, they demonstrate all-or-none thinking in which, typically, their descriptions are all positive (unless very negative life experiences lead them to construct attributes that are viewed as all unfavorable). Cognitive limitations also extend to the inability to create a concept of global self-worth or self-esteem, although manifestations of positive or negative self-esteem can be reliably observed in their behavior by others. Some of these limitations continue into the next age period, although others are overcome, as new

156 cognitive-developmental acquisitions lead to the creation of new self-structures. (p. 41) While Harter is using a different conceptual system, I think that it is evident that youngc hi l dr e n’ ss e l f -narratives require the scaffolding of the significant adults, who prompt for the required agency, coherence, affectivity, and historicity that Stern (1989a) has postulated as necessary for a narrated self.

Early to Middle Childhood Many of these same features persist in the self-narratives of early-to-middle childhood children, in that they are still typically very positive, and the child continues to overestimate her/his accomplishments. However, children in the age group (ages five to seven) begin to display a rudimentary ability to intercoordinate concepts that were previously compartmentalized (Fischer, 1980). Children during this period can form a category or a representational set that coordinates their competencies (Harter, 1999a),f ore xa mpl e ,“ Ia mg ooda tr unni ng ,j umpi ng ,a nd s c hool wor k. ”Anot he re xa mpl emi g htbe ,“ Iha vef r i e ndsa ts c hool ,a nda tc hur c h. ” This age has what is generally called black-and-white thinking.

But according to Fischer (1980) a new cognitive process begins to emerge dur i ngt hi spe r i od.Thi spr oc e s si st hec hi l d’ sa bi l i t yt ol i nkorr e l a t et he s ec a t e g or i c a l sets. The most common example of that process in this age group is linking in the form of opposites. For example, children will link tall versus short, thin versus fat, up versus down, etc. While they cannot meaningfully coordinate these representations,

157 these categorical opposites begin to appear in their descriptions of themselves and others. An example of this is that a child will describe herself or himself as being good at some self-attribute. The same child can not perceive herself or himself as being bad at the same time at some other self-attribute, since good is defined as the opposite of ba d.The s epr i nc i pl e sa l s oa ppl yt ot hec hi l dr e n’ sunde r s t a ndi ngoft he i re mot i ons .

They are not able to integrate emotions of the opposite valence such as happy and sad.

(Harter & Buddin, 1987) While there is some advance over the previous period or early childhood, children come to appreciate the fact that they can have two emotions of the s a meva l e nc e( e . g . ,‘ I ’ m ha ppya nde xc i t e dwhe nmypa r e nt swa t c hme ’ ) ;t ha ti s , they can also develop representational sets for feelings of the same valence, but these are separate emotional categories, namely, one for positive emotions (happy, excited, proud) and one for negative emotions (sad, mad, scared).

However, children at this stage cannot yet integrate the sets of positive and negative emotions, sets that are viewed as conceptual opposites and therefore incompatible. The inability to acknowledge that one can possess both favorable and unfavorable attributes, or that one can experience both positive and [emphasis in original] negative emotions, represents a cognitive liability that will be marked for those whose experiences lead them to conclude that they are a l l‘ ba d’or‘ a l lma d. ’( Ha r t e r ,1 9 9 9 a ,p.4 3 )

158 This cognitive tendency to organize experience and concepts along an evaluative dimension was postulated by Wundt (1902), according to Bretherton (Bretherton, 1992) and later demonstrated by Osgood (1957) and Bretherton (1992).

Children during this period also begin to become cognitively aware that others have a perspective, and this influences how the children think about themselves.

Higgins (1991) has observed that improved perspective-taking skills at this age permit children to realize that others are actively evaluating the self. At the same time, children this age have not internalized these evaluations sufficiently to make independent judgments about their own attributes. Therefore, he argued that vi e wpoi nt sofot he r sbe g i nt of unc t i ona s“ s e l f -g ui de s , �a st hec hi l dc ome st of ur t he r identify with what she or he perceives the socializing agents (others) expect of the child (the self). These self-guides function to aid the child in the regulation of her or his behavior.

Stipek, Recchia, and McClintic, (1992) found in an empirical study with children ages one to five years-old that children begin to perceive and identify with socializing agents shortly after three years of age. They conceptualized their findings as a three stage process. In stage one, the children are able to feel good about causality, but they lack the representational skills for self-evaluation in a self-reflective sense. In stage two, children were found to be able to anticipate adult reactions to their successes and tried to avoid negative adult reactions to failure. Finally, in stage three, the children having gradually internalized external reactions begin to evaluate their

159 performance and react emotionally to success and failure independently of their expectations of adult reactions.

Harter summarized the research in this area during this stage: Some of the features of the previous stage persist, in that self representations are typically very positive and the child continues to overestimate his/her abilities.

Moreover, the child in this period still lacks the ability to develop an overall concept of his/her worth as a person. With regard to advances, children do begin to display a rudimentary ability to intercoordinate self-concepts that were previously compartmentalized; for example, they can construct a representational set that combines a number of their competencies (e.g., good at running, jumping, schoolwork). However, all-or-none thinking persists due to a process in which different valence attributes are viewed as opposites (e.g., good vs. bad, nice vs. mean). Typically, this all-or-none structure leads to selfattributes that are all positive; however, for those with negative life experiences, uni di me ns i ona lt hi nki ngma ys uppor tc onc l us i onst ha tone ’ sa t t r i but e sa r ea l l negative. Rudimentary processes that allow the child to appreciate the fact that others are evaluating the self set the stage for the emergence of looking-glass-self behavior, although cognitive-developmental limitations preclude the child from internalizing these evaluations. Further, advances include the ability to make t e mpor a lc ompa r i s onsbe t we e none s ’c ur r e nta ndpa s tpe r f or ma nc e .Gi ve n rapid skill development during these years, such comparisons contribute to the highly positive self-evaluations that typically persist at this age level. The failure

160 to use social comparison information for the purpose of self-evaluation, however, contributes to the persistence of unrealistically favorable selfattributes. (Harter, 1999a, p. 45) As the protagonists of their self-narratives, children in this age group are still very dependent on others for the scaffolding of their narratives. From a narrative perspective, four developments occur at this time. First, and most importantly, is the temporal one, meaning that the protagonist is able to compare her/his self to another pe r i odoft hec hi l d’ sde v e l opme nt .S e c ond,t hec hi l dbe c ome smor ea wa r eofa n e va l ua t i nga udi e nc e / l i s t e ne r .Thi r d,de pe ndi ngont hec hi l d’ se xpe r i e nc e ,t he protagonist of her/his own story is generally seen with positive attributes. And finally, the narrative can contrast the emotional valence states that the child can categorically e xpe r i e nc e ,e . g . ,g oodvs .ba d,ni c evs .me a n.The r e f or e ,t hec hi l d’ ss e l f -narrative in this period has a greater sense of self agency, more coherence and affectivity, but most importantly a developing sense of historicity. This historicity is increasingly part of the way the child is able to cognitively process information and does not depend on significant adults as much to provide the scaffolding as in the earlier period.

Middle to Late Childhood In the period of middle-to-late childhood, ages 8 to 11 years-ol d,c hi l dr e n’ ss e l f descriptions are beginning to reflect higher-order cognitive generalizations or concepts.

Higher-order cognitive generalizations involve the integration of more specific behavioral features of the self. For example a child in this group might say that she is

161 “ s ma r t , ”g i vi ngt her e a s ont ha ts hei sg oodi nl a ng ua g ea r t sa ndi ns c i e nc e .Att hes a me t i me ,s hemi g hts a yt ha ts hei s“ dumb, ”be c a us ei ns oc ial studies and math she is doing poor l y.The s eki ndsof“ t r a i tl a be l sr e pr e s e ntac og ni t i vec ons t r uc t i oni nwhi c h behavioral features are subsumed under a higher-or de rg e ne r a l i z a t i on. ”( Ha r t e r ,1 9 9 9 a , p. 49) Children, beginning at this age level, realize t ha tt he yc a nbe“ s ma r t ”i ns ome s i t ua t i ons ,a nd“ dumb”i not he rs i t ua t i ons .I na ddi t i on,t he yr e a l i z et ha tt he yc a nbe “ ni c e ”unde rc e r t a i nc i r c ums t a nc e sa nd“ me a n”unde rot he rc i r c ums t a nc e s .Chi l dr e nof this age level are able to view their attributes as more situation-specific or contextspecific than they have been before. The net result, according to Harter (1999a), is that f r om a“ c og ni t i ve -developmental perspective, one feature of self-representations is that they not only become more integrated into higher-order generalizations, but they also be c omedi f f e r e nt i a t e da c r os sdoma i ns . ”( p.4 9 ) Another significant change during this period is the ability to coordinate selfrepresentations that were previously differentiated or considered to be opposites.

Indeed, the hallmark of a cohesive self is to be able to integrate concepts and feelings that were previously isolated from each other. Therefore, these cognitive concepts that in previous age levels were considered to be opposites can now be integrated, leading to both negative and positive self evaluations (Siegler, 1991). For example, the older child can acknowledge being both smart and dumb, both nice and mean. What had been different sets of experience can now be joined. These self-representations are no longer experienced as opposites, but rather are experienced by the child as being integrated within the self. In an empirical study, Harter (1987) found considerable

162 evidence for this integrated self. With the emerging ability to integrate both positive and negative self-evaluations, the child is much less likely to engage in all-or-none thinking that was characteristic of earlier stages. As a result, self-descriptions begin to represent a more balanced presentation of abilities and limitations in contrast to the earlier positive-only attributes. The self-descriptions of this age group are much more l i ke l yt oc oi nc i dewi t hot he r s ’e va l ua t i onsoft hec hi l d.Howe ve r ,Ha r t e r( 1 9 9 6 a )f ound that consistent with these changes, the children become more self-critical, as they now have the ability to reflect on their negative attributes and limitations.

While I have focused mostly on self-attributes, the same developmental pathway seems to exist for emotional concepts. Harter and Buddin (1987) found in an empirical study that the child develops a representational system in which positive e mot i ons( e . g . ,“ Ia m ha ppywi t hmypa r e nt s ” )a r ei nt e g r a t e dwi t hne g a t i vee mot i ona l r e pr e s e nt a t i ons( e . g . ,“ Ia ms a dwhe nt he r ei snoonet opl a ywi t h” ) .The i rf i ndi ng s revealed that initially the simultaneous experience of positive and negative emotions is usually confined to two separate targets. For example, this exists when the child who reports feeling worried in s c hoola boutg e t t i nga l l“ A” sonhe rr e por tc a r da l s oi s happy that the family is getting a new cat. Fischer (1980) proposed that at this level of development, this demonstrates the child ability to shift the focus of emotions. The child directs the positive feeling to a positive target or event, and can then shift the focus of a negative feeling to a negative event or target. In middle-childhood the concept that the very same target can simultaneously provoke both a positive and a negative emotion response is not yet cognitively accessible (Harter & Whitesell, 1989).

163 Byl a t ec hi l dhood,a c c or di ngt oHa r t e ra ndBuddi n’ s(1987) findings, positive and negative emotions can be brought to bear on the target, given the emergence of cognitive representational systems that better allow the child to integrate emotional concepts that previously were highly differentiated. For example, a child might say that she or he was happy about getting a good grade on a test, but mad about missing the easiest question on the test.

As in earlier periods of development, these integrations can be enhanced by socializing agents, or delayed if such environmental support is not present. If there is little environmental support for the integration of positive and negative self-attributes, or positive and negative emotions, then the child would likely incorporate either mostly positive attributes and emotions as she/he had previously done, or the child would incorporate mostly negative attributes and emotions into the self-portrait or self-narrative. Harter (1998b) and Terr (1990) identified this kind of emotional split among children who are raised in chronically neglecting and abusing situations. Those c hi l dr e n’ sne g a t i vea t t r i but e sa nd emotions are typically reinforced, and they develop negative self-portraits or self-narratives.

Another way in which both positive and negative self-attributes, and positive and negative emotions are integrated, is by the process of social comparison. Around middle childhood, children begin to utilize comparisons with others as a gauge of the skills and attributes of the self. Damon and Hart (1988) found in an important series of cross-sectional and longitudinal studies that children in middle childhood can begin to apply comparative assessments with peers as a method of self-e va l ua t i on.“ Thea bi l i t y

164 to use social comparison information toward the goal of self-evaluation requires that the child has the ability to relate one concept to another simultaneously, an ability not s uf f i c i e nt l yde ve l ope da tyoung e ra g e s . �( Ha r t e r ,1 9 9 9 a ,p.5 3 )Thi sa bi l i t yt out i l i z e social comparison, or specifically the ability to simultaneously compare representations of the self and others, is also supported by the socializing environment.

Parents use social comparison in making assessments of how a specific child in the f a mi l yi spe r f or mi ngr e l a t i vet ot hec hi l d’ ss i bl i ng s ,f r i e nds ,orschool classmates.

Teachers begin using social comparison increasingly in the classroom, and they convey these comparisons to their students.

For the children, the awareness of social comparisons, and the ability to use social comparisons in constructing and evaluating the self, can have positive and negative consequences. For those children who are doing well in their families, with their peers, and with their classmates, the ability to use social comparison contributes to self esteem and to a positive self-evaluation. However, for those children who are notdoi ngwe l li nt he i rf a mi l i e s ,orwhoha vef a mi l i e st ha tdi f f e rf r om t he“ nor m, � social comparison has potential liabilities. With the ability of the child to rank-order her/his performance in various domains comes the liability that all but the most competent children will fall short most of the time. Therefore, children of divorced parents, or children who have learning disabilities, as two examples that come to my mind, will have more negative perceptions with regard to their self evaluations because of the use of social comparison. Secondarily but more precipitously for the child, the varied ability and proclivity of children this age to make social comparisons with

165 others makes the self more vulnerable in those domains that are highly valued, (e.g., scholastic competence, athletic prowess, and peer popularity) according to Harter (1999a).

In addition, there is another danger at this age. Harter (1999a) has found that these negative self-evaluations are now being organized as higher-order traits, rather than mere behaviors. Her finding supports her idea that these negative self-evaluations become more resistant to disconfirmation. So in t e r msoft he s ec hi l dr e n’ s constructions of their self-narratives, negative motifs and themes can continue to predominate despite new evidence or new experiences which might disconfirm these negative self-evaluations.

Children in middle childhood become increasingly aware of the attitudes that others hold toward the self. These social attitudes of others over time become internalized in terms of domain-specific self-judgments about the self. These social attitudes are initially domain-specific, but beginning in the later part of this developmental period, these attitudes become internalized as a component of global self-worth. Global self-wor t hi sat e r mt ha ta ppl i e st ot het ot a l i t yofone ’ sf e e l i nga bout one ’ sva l ueorwor t ha sape r s on.I ti sama j orde ve lopmental acquisition of middle childhood, according to cognitive developmental researchers like Harter (1999a) and Higgins (1991).

166 Early Adolescence The developmental period of adolescence represents a dramatic transition in many domains. There are the pubertal and physical changes representing the transition to adult endocrine and physical functioning. There are cognitive-developmental advances, specifically, the ability in Piagetian (1969) terms to think abstractly. And finally there are changing social expectations of the social environment for the adolescent. Damon and Hart (1988) found that in terms of the content of young a dol e s c e nt s ’s e l f -portraits or self-narratives, the most significant factors are i nt e r pe r s ona la t t r i but e s ,s oc i a ls ki l l st ha ti nf l ue nc ei nt e r a c t i onswi t hot he r s ,a ndone ’ s social appeal. Therefore, the typical adolescent will describe herself/himself as having or not having personal characteristics or social attributes that enhance being accepted byone ’ spe e r s .I na ddi t i ont ot hes oc i a la t t r i but e s ,t hee a r l ya dol e s c e ntf oc us e she r / hi s self represent a t i onsonc ompe t e nc i e s ,a swe l la sa f f e c t s .Fore xa mpl e ,“ Ia m ag ood a t hl e t e , ”or“ I ’ m aha ppype r s on. ”Mor e ove r ,Ha r t e r( 1 9 9 9 a )f oundt ha tf r om a developmental perspective there is considerable evidence that the self becomes increasingly differentiated. In addition, she found that the self functions differently in different social contexts, e.g., with father, mother, close friends, and romantic partners.

Therefore, the self-descriptions that begin to emerge during early adolescence reflect multiple changes depending on the social context. Moreover, the self-descriptions reflect the different roles that the self takes in different social contexts.

These self-descriptions also represent abstractions about the self, based on the newfound cognitive ability to integrate trait labels into higher-order self-concepts. See

167 Harter (1990b, 1990d, 1997), Fischer (1980), and Higgins (1991). Although these abstractions about the self represent a cognitive advance, Higgins (1991) found that these abstractions are highly compartmentalized; that is, they are quite distinct from one another. Fischer (1980) posited that when an adolescent first moves to the level of abstract thought, she/he lacks the ability to integrate the many single abstractions that are constructed to define the self in different relational contexts. As a result, according to Fischer, the adolescent will engage in all-or-none thinking at an abstract level.

Therefore, the early adolescent is only able to think about isolated self-attributes, because she/he lacks the cognitive control to think about multiple self-attributes.

Harter and Monsour (1992) found in an empirical study that though the young adolescent can construct single abstractions about the self, she or he cannot yet simultaneously compare these abstractions in order to experience opposing attributes.

Therefore, it would seem that fragmentation of the self-representations during early adolescence is more the rule than the exception. In addition, the early adolescent is less concerned about conflicts in her/his self-representations. In fact, it seems as if the early adolescent does not even notice the conflicts and contradictions in her/his selfrepresentation.

In another empirical study, Harter, Waters and Whitesell (1998) tested the hypothesis of whether adolescents (ages 13 to 17) were able as individuals to evaluate their self-worth differently across relational contexts. They found that beginning in the middle school years, the majority of adolescents can discriminately report that their self-worth varies as a function of the relational context, while a minority report little

168 variation in their self-worth across relational contexts. In addition, the researchers concluded that the support/validation within a given relationship was more highly associated with relational self-worth in that relationship, compared to self-worth in other contexts. These findings support the idea that young adolescents become very sensitive to the potentially different opinions and standards of the significant others in each relational context. So adolescents might report very high self-worth around their friends, while at the same time report very low self-worth when they are around their parents (Harter, 1999a).

Therefore, the early adolescent has difficulty constructing a self-narrative that is c ohe r e ntove rdi f f e r e ntr e l a t i ona lc ont e xt s .Thee a r l ya dol e s c e nt ’ sa l l -or-none thinking, as well as her/his ability to compartmentalize abstractions about the self, precludes constructing a very coherent self-narrative. What the early adolescent can do is construct a self-narrative that is somewhat different in each relational context without being aware of the motifs, themes, or narrative conflicts embedded in their self story.

Middle Adolescence Rosenberg (1979) observed that during the middle adolescence period, an a dol e s c e nt ’ sf or me r l yunque s t i one ds e l f -truths become problematic self-hypotheses.

Erikson (1968) has described this shift in awareness as a central concern about what and who am I. To be around this age group is to be aware of the labyrinthine nature of this search. Adolescents describe themselves as being different within different contexts.

For example, an adolescent might describe herself/himself as being tolerant when with

169 close friends, yet as being intolerant when with general friends. Moreover, an adolescent might describe herself/himself as being close with her/his mother while being distant from her/his father. It is during this developmental period that adolescents take on new roles, such as an employee, or a girl/boy friend, that require the creation of new context-specific self-attributes.

What is different in this period from the previous period, according to Fischer (1980), is that for the first time, the adolescent has the ability to make comparisons between single self-abstractions within the same role-related self and comparisons across a s e l fi ndi f f e r e ntr ol e s .Fi s c he rl a be l e dt hi sde ve l opi nga bi l i t ya s“ a bs t r a c t ma ppi ng s . ”The r e f or e ,t hea dol e s c e nti nt hi sde ve l opme nt a lpe r i odc a n“ ma p” constructs about the self into other constructs about the self. These mappings force the adolescent to compare and contrast different self-attributes. These mappings are developmentally limited in that the adolescent is not yet able to integrate these mappings or self-representations in a manner that would resolve any apparent contradictions. Therefore, at the level of self-representations, the awareness of these opposites causes substantial conflict, confusion, and distress for the adolescent given her/his inability to coordinate these ostensibly clashing self-attributes (Harter & Monsour, 1992; Higgins, 1991).

In addition, this confusion leads the adolescent to have a very unstable selfrepresentation, or self-cohesion in self psychological terms. The lack of cohesion leaves the adolescent often with a lack of coherence in her/his self-narrative. For example, t hea dol e s c e ntmi g htc omme nt ,“ Ir e a l l ydon’ tunde r s t a ndhowIc a nbes oc he e r f ul

170 with my friends, then when I come home I start feeling worried, and then I get angry and sarcastic with mypa r e nt s .Whi c honei st her e a lme ? �Thi sl a c kofs e l f -narrative coherence is very worrisome for adolescents. They would like to be able to feel more integrated about themselves, but just cannot. However, from a cognitive developmental viewpoint, they are not able to integrate or solve this personal dilemma at this period in their lives (Harter, 1999a).

Harter and Monsour (1992) conducted an empirical study to study this developmental phenomena with seventh, ninth, and eleventh graders. They asked these adolescents to write self-descriptions for the following six different roles: as a student in the classroom, with a group of friends, with mother, with father, with best friend, and in romantic relationships. Next the researchers asked the respondents to identify any self-attributes that they perceived to reflect opposites. Finally, the respondents were asked to specify whether any of these opposites were experienced as clashing or in conflict with each other. They found that early adolescents moving into middle adolescence could begin to detect opposite self-attributes as well as acknowledge that such an apparent conflict made them feel disjointed or conflicted. In addition, they found that the adolescents sought to have a sense of coherence in their self-representation, but that the cognitive abilities to create such harmony were not yet in place during middle adolescence. Moreover, middle adolescents were found to have the ability to distinguish between two types of opposing self-attributes. Middle adolescents can distinguish between opposite attributes occurring within a given role (i.e., frustrated and withdrawn at home) and those occurring across relational contexts

171 (i.e., close with father, but distant from mother, rowdy with a best friend, but quiet with a romantic interest). Adolescents in this middle stage are wholeheartedly preoccupied with creating, defining, and differentiating their role-related selves; therefore, there is little overlap in the self-attributes associated with different roles (Harter, 1999a). Harter, Bresnick, Bouchy, and Whitesell (1997) found that as these middle adolescents develop the cognitive capacity to detect seeming contradictions in their self-attributes, they focus on contradictions across roles, and not within roles.

However, because the middle adolescent can detect contradictory self-attributes does not mean that the middle adolescent can effectively cognitively integrate them within the self.

The socializing environment provides the middle adolescent with a road map of standards and self-attributes which she/he should internalize. However, the socializing environment is not a monolithic one. The socializing environment is full of contradictory messages from different significant others that can lead to confusion about which characteristics the adolescent should adopt. Harter and other researchers (Harter, 1999b; Harter, Bresnick, Bouchey, & Whitesell, 1997; Harter, Marold, Whitesell, & Cobbs, 1996; Harter & Monsour, 1992; Harter et al., 1998) have found that: Differential support, in the form of approval or validation, will also lead to differing levels of self-worth across relational contexts. Cognitivedevelopmental advances also represent the limitations that can lead to distortions in the interpretation of the opinions of significant others, as in the

172 c r e a t i onofa n“ i ma g i na r ya udi e nc e , ”a swe l la st hepe r c e pt i ont ha tone ’ s experiences are uniquely different. The liabilities of this period are legion and with regard to potential conflicts and confusion over contradictory attributes and messages, concern over which characteristics define the true self, distortions in the perceptions of self versus others, as well as preoccupation with discrepancies between the real and ideal self-concepts, which can lead to lower self-worth. (Harter, 1999a, p. 77) These research findings summarized the intense normative struggles of the middle adolescent. The unpredictable behaviors, the mood swings, and the shifting selfevaluations and descriptions of middle adolescence can easily be seen as intentional, or more likely pathological. However, if one keeps in mind that this gestalt for the middle adolescent is the result of cognitive-development limitations and capacities, then one can more empathically understand this age group. In addition, for adults to know that these behavioral changes, mood swings, and shifting self-evaluations are not intentional, nor personal, helps to prevent the understandable exasperation, anger, and altercations that strain the adolescent-adult relationship during this period.

The self-narratives of adolescents during this period are equally shifting. New themes and motifs emerge, are tried out, and then often quickly are rewritten, or sometimes are kept and become a more permanent theme, or motif within the selfna r r a t i ve .Thec ohe r e nc eoft hemi ddl ea dol e s c e nt ’ ss e l f -narrative is severely limited by the cognitive and developmental capacities and limitations of this period. What can seem like a lack of self-cohesion may, in reality, be the result of the rapidity of the

173 changes that the self is experiencing during this time. To the degree that the adolescent performs selfobject functions for the adults around them, this can be a very confusing and unpr e di c t a bl et i mef ore ve r yonewi t hi nt hea dol e s c e nt ’ sc ont e xt .

Late Adolescence and Early Adulthood Damon and Hart (1988) found that the content of the self-representations that begin to emerge in late adolescence and early adulthood reflect the personal beliefs, values, and moral standards that the adolescent has either internalized or constructed from her/his experiences. In addition, the content of these self-representations begin to acquire a future orientation. This means that the adolescent is beginning to project out his development into the future, i.e., think about whom she/he would like to be.

While thinking about the future, the late adolescent does not usually reference the potential origins of her/his goals, i.e., who or what experiences have effected her/his development. However, this failure to acknowledge the socializing agents and environment does not mean that they had no impact on the developing adolescent.

Rather, the older adolescent seems to experience various values as personal choices, rather than attributing them to the sources from which they might have come.

Steinberg (1990) found that the attitudes of older adolescents and their parents are quite similar about occupational, political, and religious decisions or beliefs. Higgins (1991) views this process as one in which the adolescents actively select among alternative self-guides and are increasingly less influenced by the expectations of

174 s i g ni f i c a ntot he r s .I not he rwor ds ,a dol e s c e nt s ’s e l f -guides become increasing internalized and are less tied to their socializing agents or contexts.

Older adolescents, in contrast to middle-stage adolescents, no longer experience contradictory self-attributes as personal characteristics that are in opposition to each other. For example, an adolescent who perceived herself/himself as being ethical, does not experience any conflict with acknowledging that she/he has engaged in some une t hi c a lbe ha vi or s ,i . e . ,“ i t ’ sna t ur a lt oma kes omemi s t a ke s . ”Cog ni t i veg a i nss e pa r a t e the older adolescent from the middle adolescent, allowing the older adolescent not to experience internal conflict over contradictory self-attributes, as the middle adolescent might. These cognitive achievements involve the use of higher-order abstractions.

High-order abstraction involves the meaningful intercoordination of single abstractions according to Fischer (1980) and Case (1978, 1988, 1992, 1993). For example, one can be both introverted in certain circumstances and extroverted in others, by forming a cognitive construction of a higher-order abstraction and defining t hes e l fa sbe i ng“ a da pt i ve . ”Thec ons t r uc t i onofhi g he r -order abstractions by the adolescent allows the adolescent to bring meaning and legitimacy to self-attributes that previously seemed contradictory. This ability to construct higher-order abstractions provides the cognitive-developmental process a method to resolve what in the previous developmental period had been experienced as an internal conflict between opposing self-attributes.

Fischer (1980), Case (1991) and their colleagues observed that this cognitivedevelopmental achievement, during late adolescence, of being able to construct higher-

175 order abstractions was dependent on the cognitive scaffolding of the socializing agents and the socializing contexts. Those agents and contexts provided support, experiences, and instruction for the individual adolescent to function at her/his optimal level. If these higher-order abstraction skills are encouraged, then the adolescent is able to integrate opposing self-attributes in a manner that does not produce internal conflict or stress. Indeed, by helping the adolescent to construct these higher-order abstractions, the socializing environment helps her/him to avoid the distress, the unpredictable behaviors, the mood swings, and the shifting self-evaluations and descriptions of middle adolescence.

These fi ndi ng sc or r e s pondst oHa r t e ra ndMons our ’ s(1992) findings that older adolescents, in contrast to middle adolescents, potentially have been able to reduce the number of contradictory self-attributes identified in the self portrait, as well as diminish the felt internal conflict. Therefore, older adolescents are able to conclude that it is okay to be different across relational contexts, and in doing so are still able to remain authentic and real to themselves and others. In fact, according to Harter (1999a), there is a tendency for older adolescents to normalize, and/or find value, in s e e mi ngi nc ons i s t e nc y.Fore x a mpl e ,Iha veof t e nhe a r da na dol e s c e nte xc l a i m,“ I t would be abnormal to act the same with everyone. You act one way with your friends, and you act another way with your pa r e nt s . �Anduponhe a r i ngs uc hac l a i m,t he listener does not feel that the adolescent is being unauthentic or unreal, but is only expressing an internal acceptance that context influences the roles that one takes, and the feelings that one has.

176 Harter (1997, 1999) provided a caveat to these generalizations about older a dol e s c e nt s .S her e por t e dt ha ts heha sf oundt ha t“ t hea bi l i t yt or e s ol vepot e nt i a l l y contradictory attributes may be more difficult for some role-pair combinations than for others, particula r l yf orf e ma l e s . ”( Ha r t e r ,1 9 9 9 a ,p.8 1 )“ Howe ve r ,t hes e pa r a t i onof self with mother and self with father also creates the potential for self-attributes with the mother to be in opposition to self-a t t r i but e swi t ht hef a t he r . ”( p.8 2 )Thi s separation and aggregation of self-attributes in different contexts that begins in midadolescence is not usually a problem for most adolescents. But it can become a problem, if the adolescent, the mother, and the father are in the same room talking, and the adolescent is not able to find a cognitive solution to reconcile the various selfattribute contradictions or conflicts of which the adolescent is aware within herself/himself.

Harter, Bresnick, Bouchey, and Whitesell, (1997) found that especially for older adolescent girls, having opposite self-attributes with mother and with father was associated with increased internal and external conflict. For example, the adolescent girl might feel closer with mother versus distant with father; open with mother, but not with father; hostile with mother, but cheerful with father; respectful with father yet stubborn with mother. These kinds of conflicts between self-attributes, in addition to the conflicts between the self-attributes that the adolescent identifies between peers and each parent are, it seems, more profound for female adolescents according to this research than for male adolescents. Therefore, it seems that it is more difficult for girls

177 to resolve these self-attributes conflicts cognitively. In questioning what would account for this difference, one of the researchers speculated that: Family therapists observe that children and adolescents typically develop different relations with each parent, which in turn may cause the salient attributes in each relationship to vary considerably. Contributing to these dynamics is the fact that each parent may have a different set of expectations about those characteristics that he/she values and therefore attempts to foster.

First the adolescent may be caught in a struggle between two parents who are encouraging and reinforcing different facets of her/his personality, provoking opposing attributes and resulting conflict. Second, both of these roles, self with mother, and self with the father, occur within the same [emphasis in original] general context, namely the family, whereas other multiple roles are not as likely to be called upon simultaneously. These particular conditions may exacerbate the contradictions and conflicts that the adolescents experience in their respective roles with mother versus father. These family dynamics appear to be relevant to the increase in across-role opposing attributes for female [emphasis in original] adolescents in particular, who may be more likely to be sensitive to the fact that they are behaving differently with mother and father.

(Harter, 1999a, p. 83) These speculations by one researcher in this group seem to be confirmed by other research findings (Harter et al., 1997). In this research they observed that during the period of mid-adolescence, females display more concern over relationship issues,

178 which may make the opposing self-a t t r i but e smor es i g ni f i c a nt .I na ddi t i on,“ a dol e s c e nt females may also feel that in order to remain connected to both mother and father, it is important to be consistent [ e mpha s i si nor i g i na l ]a c r os st he s er e l a t i ons hi ps... . �

(Harter, 1999a, p. 83) While gender literature suggests that connectedness is more critical to females than to males (L. Brown, 1994; L. M. Brown, 1998; Chodorow, Rocah, & Cohler, 1989; Gilligan, 1982), the adolescent development literature reveals that it is important for both genders in adolescence to remain connected to their parents in the process of establishing autonomy. (Palombo, 1990; L. Steinberg, 2001; L. Steinberg & Silverberg, 1986; L. D. Steinberg, 1990, 1999) What all of these findings suggest is that contextual factors such as the family, parent expectations, and the family constellation will have an impact on cognitive development to the extent that the adolescent experiences opposites and conflictual self-attributes, or roles.

Ultimately, the self-narratives of older adolescents reflect these cognitivedevelopmental changes. The self-narrative begins to reflect an anticipated future self, and this anticipated future self gives the adolescent a sense of direction. With the ability to create higher-order generalizations about self-attributes comes increasing narrative complexity and the ability to create coherence out of what in the previous developmental period was incoherence in the self-narrative. Importantly, the older adolescent, by using higher-order generalization, is able to normalize potential conflicts or incoherencies within the self-narrative. However, these cognitive skills need the support of socializing contexts and socializing agents. These socializing agents in self psychological terms are, selfobjects. So with the help of good enough selfobjects,

179 and good enough contexts, the adolescent can construct a more coherent sense of self and, therefore, coherent self-narrative. These constructions reflect another trend, i.e., the internalization of the standards and opinions of significant others, that are now reflected by the adolescent as personal choices and attitudes without reference anymore to their origin.

I have traced the development of an ever increasingly complex self-narrative during adolescence. This complexity, I ha ves hown,i sr oot e di nt hea dol e s c e nt ’ s increasing cognitive capacity and development. How the adolescent is able to integrate self-attributes and self-representation that are inconsistent and at times oppositional across relational contexts has been shownt obet her e s ul toft hea dol e s c e nt ’ sg r e a t cognitive capability. Further, the integration results from the cognitive and emotional scaffolding provided for the adolescent by the socializing agents and environment. It is this scaffolding that Harter (1999a) suggested needs more research. Specifically, she suggested: Future research should attend to the contextual factors and attempt to assess the underlying processes more directly. To return to our own findings in this regard, it would be of interest to determine whether the conflict between selfattributes with mother versus father is more intense if the adolescent is living in a two-parent family where both mother and father are in the same household, or if the parents are divorced and living apart. One hypothesis is that living under the same roof with both parents makes it difficult to avoid conflict if different attributes in each relationship are demanded simultaneously.

180 Alternatively, conflict may be exacerbated in the situation of divorce to the extent that in an acrimonious separation, each parent intensifies his or her differential expectations for attributes they want the adolescent to display as part of a power struggle in which the adolescent becomes a pawn. Such a process would be intriguing to investigate. (Harter, 1999a, p. 84) Myr e s e a r c hs e e msi ndi r e c t l yt os pe a kt oHa r t e r ’ sc a l lf orf ur t he rr e s e a r c h.Ia m looking at the self-narratives of adolescents of divorced parents who decide to change their child-parent living arrangements. To use Ha r t e r ’ sf r a me wor k,c oul dt hi sc ha ng e of living arrangements be due to irreconcilable differences in contradictory or oppositional self-attributes of the self with mother and the self with father? Moreover, could this change of living arrangements reflect the intensity of differential expectations for attributes from the adolescent by the mother or by the father? And f i na l l y,c oul dt hi sc ha ng eofl i vi nga r r a ng e me nt sr e f l e c tt hea dol e s c e nt ’ sa t t e mptt o create a coherent and cohesive self-narrative, given a social context that makes this process more difficult by not providing a coherent or cohesive cognitive and emotional scaffolding?

181

CHAPTER X

PERSONAL IDENTITY In considering the development of the self-narrative, my view is that the cognitive researchers introduced a conceptual problem about how to describe the a dol e s c e nt ’ sde pi c t i onofbe i ng / f e e l i ngdi f f e r e nti nva r i ousr ol e s ,a ndi ndi ve r s e contexts. Harter (1999a) talked about the adolescent as having multiple selves. She posited that the adolescent could possibly have a different self for each role and for each context.

For me this creates a theoretical problem in that the context or the role defines t hes e l f .Ha r t e r ’ spos i t i ons e e mst omovet hedi s c us s i onofs e l f -narrative into a more constructionist philosophical perspective, like that espoused by Gergen (1987, 1990, 19991, 1994a, 1994b). I am uncomfortable with this perspective. I feel that if the context or the relationship creates the self, the self loses, in my view, the capacities for self agency and self responsibility. In addition, this perspective suggests the possibility, theoretically, that all of us have multiple personalities. This suggestion flies in the face of reason in my view. This position also creates difficulties in explaining actual multiple personalities and other phenomena about which clinical social work is well aware. Therefore, I want to maintain the presumption of a core nuclear self as defined

182

by Kohut (1971, 1977, 1984). However, while maintaining the concept of a nuclear self, it is important to find some alternative explanation for phenomena that the cognitive researchers report regarding conflict between various self-attributes in different contexts (Bretherton, 1991, 1993; Broughton, 1981; Gergen & Gergen, 1987; Harter, 1999a; Harter & Monsour, 1992; Harter & Whitesell, 1989; Hermans, 1999; Higgins, 1999).

I think that there is a relatively straightforward alternative explanation. Let me remind the reader of another experience-near concept (Kohut, 1984),Er i kEr i ks on’ s c onc e ptof“ i de nt i t y. ”Wha tIa m pr opos i ng ,a ndwha tIwa ntt oout l i nef ur t he ri nt hi s chapter, is that one can have multiple identities, but only one core nuclear self. For my pur pos e s ,t het e r ms“ s e l f ”a nd“ i de nt i t y”are not interchangeable, nor are these terms synonymous within psychoanalytic theorizing. Rather, these terms refer to different c onc e pt ua l i z a t i onsa boutt hepe r ma ne nc eove rt i meofape r s on.The r e f or e ,one ’ s identity in one context can be said to be in conf l i c twi t hone ’ si de nt i t yi na not he r context when viewed from the position of a cohesive self, or from a temporal position.

The cohesive self might subjectively experience this sort of contextual conflict as fragmenting, to use the structural metaphoric explanation of self psychology. Or using a contextual metaphor, the cohesive self may feel a sense of being incoherent. Within the contextual theoretical root metaphor, which my research is using, the same phenomena might be described: a self-motif or theme i none ’ ss e l f -narrative in one context may be in another context in conflict with another self-motif or theme. This c onf l i c tori nc ohe r e nc ei ss ubj e c t i ve l ye xpe r i e nc e dwi t hi none ’ ss e ns eofs e l fi n

183 consciousness or within the dynamic unconscious, called the pre-conscious by Freud (1923B). Having said this, however, gets the reader ahead of my argument in this chapter. Rather, I think that it is more useful for the reader to begin or enter this discussion by examining the philosophical debate about the issue of personal identity, or the idea of a temporal person.

Personal identity has been a modern philosophical problem since John Locke (1632-1704) started its investigation. According to Sydney Shoemaker (1999), the que s t i on,“ wha ti spe r s ona li de nt i t y, ”i si nc l ude di nt heque s t i onof“ wha ti ti s( wha t the necessary and sufficient conditions are) for a person existing in one time and a pe r s one xi s t i ngi na not he rt i met obeonea ndt hes a mepe r s on. ”( p.6 6 0 ) In other words, Shoemaker was discussing the concept of a temporal person.

The“ t e mpor a lpe r s on”ha sbe e nofphi l os ophi c a li nt e r e s tbe c a us e“ pe r s onsha ve ,i n memory, an access to their own past histories that is unlike the access they have to ot he rt hi ng s( i nc l udi ngot he rpe r s ons ) . ”( p.6 6 0 )S pe c i f i c a l l y,“ whe noner e me mbe r s doing or experiencing something one normally has no need to know that the subject oft her e me mbe r e da c t i onore xpe r i e nc ei s( i . e . ,i de nt i c a lwi t h)ones e l f . ”( p.6 6 0 ) Consequently, the philosophical concept of personal identity raises epistemological and ontological issues that have repercussions within the psychological sphere. Within this sphere of inquiry, the continuity of an identity over time and space has special meanings that are, in part, what makes each person unique. How one begins to understandone ’ suni que ne s sa ndr e l a t i ons hi pt oot he r si sahuma ndi l e mmat ha t c onf r ont susa l l .Wha tS hoe ma ke ra ndLoc kewe r ede f i ni nga s“ pe r s ona li de nt i t y, ”i s

184 r e a l l y,i nmyvi e w,t hes a me ne s soft he“ s e l f ”ove rt i mea nds pa c e .I ti st hi spr oc e s sof self underst a ndi ngt ha tbe g i nsa tbi r t ha ndc ont i nue st hr oug houtone ’ sl i f e .I ti sa pr oc e s sofdi s c ove r i nga ndr e f l e xi ve l yde f i ni ngone ’ sr e l a t i ons hi pt ot hewor l d/ r e a l i t y a ndone ’ sr e l a t i ons hi pt o“ ot he r s ”ove rt hec our s eofal i f e .

Because of human memory there is a continuity of experience that one can call upont ohe l pdi s c e r none ’ ss e l f .Whi l et hi si sdoubt l e s s l ya nong oi ngpr oc e s s ,i ti snot likely that this process is conducted constantly at the forefront of consciousness.

Rather, I think, it is a process that proceeds within the dynamic unconscious. The dynamic unconscious is a metaphoric concept. It was developed in order to descriptively account for how the brain does not keep in working memory all the knowledge available to the person all of the time. Rather, the brain has the ability to recall knowledge from various kinds of memory to serve working memory in the moment. An example for the reader of how the dynamic unconscious works might be t oa s kt her e a de ra tt hi smome nt ,“ Wha ti st hepr oduc tofmul t i pl yi ngt wobyt wo? ” Ther e a de rwi l ll i ke l yqui c kl ya ns we r ,“ f our , ”a st her e s ul tofhe r / hi sdyna mi c unconscious brain processes. Another way of describing the dynamic unconscious is that it consists of those processes of the brain that can be intentionally brought to awareness.

Within psychoanalytic theorizing during the last century there has been an active debate about various metaphorical structures of the mind. However, all ps yc hoa na l yt i ct he or i e smor eorl e s sbe g i nwi t h“ t hedi vi de dors pl i ts ubj e c t ;pa r tly c ons c i ous ,a ndpa r t l yunc ons c i ous . “(Socor, 1997) In addition to the division of

185 different types of consciousness, Freud (1923B) also divided the mind into three me t a phor i c a ls t r uc t ur e s ,t he“ e g o, ”t he“ i d, ”a ndt he“ s upe r -e g o, ”butheus e d“ e g o”a nd “ s e l f ”i nt e r c ha ng e a bl yi nhi swr i t i ng s .Ha r t ma nn’ s(1958) t he or i z i ngs e pa r a t e dFr e ud’ s t e r msof“ e g o”a nd“ s e l f . ”ForHa r t ma nt hes e l fwa sapa r toft hee g o.Howe ve r ,t he work of Hartmann (1958) and the other so called ego psychologists led to theorizing about what almost became a more tangible structure within the mind. Their structural mind became increasingly more corporeal and the metaphoric nature of these concepts or labels was gradually being lost within the metapsychological debate about mind structures (Klein, 1976).Wha tha dbe e nme t a phor i c a li nFr e udwa sbe c omi ng“ a c t ua l ” in the theoretical work of the ego psychologists. The ego was seen by these theorists to be the executive agency for the management of the mind, but the subjective experience of being, located in the self by these theorists, was neglected.

Kohut (1959) refocused psychoanalytic theorizing with his paper on introspection and empathy. By the time he had written The Restoration of the Self, Kohut (1977) had decisively posited the “ s e l f “a st hede t e r mi ni ngva r i a bl ei nps yc hi c life. In addition, Kohut posited that subjectivity is the defining quality not only the self, but of the science of the self. Kohut in The Restoration of the Self assigned the self functional responsibilities. He moved the self from a representation within the ego, as Hartmann had come to define it, to a cohesive executive structure present in some form from the beginning of life. Kohut defined the self as the center of initiative.

Indeed, as we have seen in an earlier chapter, Kohut maintained that the self is ultimately responsible for the overall functioning of the psyche.

186 While Hartmann and the ego psychologists were theorizing about the structure of the ego, Erik Erikson began to think about the relationship of the ego to the environment, especially to the social environment. He asked, how did different experiences with the outside world (reality) shape the inner world of the psyche?

Specifically, how did the social world affect the inner world of the psyche? Erikson considered this question to be the beginning of an important set of theoretical questions and accordingly, he proposed a psychosocial model of development. In particular, Erikson (1950) in his seminal work Childhood and Society tried to extend what Rapaport and Gill (1959) had labeled the adaptive point of view within psychoanalysis. Specifically, Erikson sought to understand how the interpersonal and relational external world might affect the development of the inner world of the ego.

He was interested in the effect of nurture on the psychoanalytic structures of the mind. He proposed that the social relational environment in which an individual de ve l ope dwoul dha vea ne f f e c tont hei ndi vi dua l ’ se g o.

Previously, psychoanalytic writers saw psychic development as the result of innate developmental lines that could only result in either normal or psychopathological structures of the mind (A. Freud, 1965).Er i ks on’ sf or mul a t i onwa s a radical re-conceptualization, because it posited that the outside world had an ongoing influence on the psyche. He called into question the cause and effect theorizing of the psychoanalytic model. In essence, he questioned whether two egos developing within the same context always developed the same structures and relations hi psof“ e g o”t o “ i d” ,a nd“ e g o”t o“ s upe r -e g o” .I na ddi t i on,hi st he or i z i ngpos i t e dt ha te g o

187 development continued beyond childhood and adolescence (Erikson, 1950; 1959). In order to consider these contextual and theoretical questions, Erikson had to extend the developmental assumptions of Hartmann (1958) and the ego psychologists. Erikson i nt r oduc e dt hec onc e ptof“ e g oi de nt i t y”t ode s c r i bet heps yc hosocial influence of the e nvi r onme ntont hei nna t ede v e l opme ntoft hee g o.Hec onc e pt ua l i z e done ’ si de nt i t y as being a part of the ego.

Robe r tWa l l e r s t e i n( 1 9 9 8 ) ,i nr e c ons i de r i ngEr i ks on’ sc onc e ptofe g oi de nt i t y, s ubmi t t e dt ha tEr i ks on’ sf or mul a t i ons ,r a ther than being embraced as a necessary c ont r i but i ont ops yc hoa na l ys i sbyt hee g ops yc hol og i s t s ,we r ei nf a c t“ ne ve ri nt e g r a t e d i nt oe g ops yc hol og y. ”( p.2 3 0 )I ns t e a d,hi sf or mul a t i onswe r ee i t he rr e j e c t e dorr e interpreted so that they would fit within the general epistemology of psychoanalysis at the time (R. S. Wallerstein, 1998). In contrast to the psychoanalytic community, Er i ks on’ sf or mul a t i onswe r ewi de l ye mbr a c e dbyde ve l opme nt a la nda c a de mi c psychologists (Marcia, 1980), who understood his theorizing as extending the conceptualizations of development and forming the foundations for what is now considered life cycle development (Greenspan & Pollock, 1991; Levinson et al., 1978; Levinson & Levinson, 1996).

Erikson (1959) postulated that the epigenesis of a mind structure called the “ e g o”e vol ve df r om mut ua lc oor di na t i ona ndi nt e r a c t i onbe t we e nt hede ve l opi ng individual and the social environment. He conceived of this coordination and interaction as a process that would leave as a precipitate of that process certain affective qua l i t i e si na ni ndi vi dua l ’ sps yc he .The s ea f f e c t i vequa l i t i e swe r ede s c r i be da sbe i ngon

188 a dialectic continuum depending on the psychosocial challenge that Erikson formulated for each stage of the human development. These stages were synchronized wi t hFr e ud’ ss t a g e sofde ve l opme nt ,whi c he g ops yc hol og i s t st houg htt obei nna t e .

Each stage was thought to have been built on the previous stage, i.e., an epigenetic theoretical model. The psychosocial dialectic of adolescence was formulated to be “ i de nt i t y”ve r s us“ r ol ec onf us i on”(Erikson, 1968). R. S. Wallerstein (1998) in his r e vi e wa r t i c l ebe l i e ve st ha tEr i ks ons a we g oi de nt i t ya sa“ l e i t mot i ff r om t heve r y start . ”( p.2 3 4 )Al e i t mot i fha st hea bi l i t yt oor g a ni z e ,f i l t e r ,ors ha pef ut ur e development while maintaining a sense of continuity with the past. Wallerstein (R. S. Wallerstein, 1998) vi e we dEr i ks on’ sde s c r i pt i onof“ e g oi de nt i t ya sa ne xpr e s s i onoft he e g o’ s“ s a me ne s sa ndc ont i nui t y”ove rt i mea nds pa c e . ”( p.2 3 5 ) According to Wallerstein (1998), Erikson (1959) in Identity and the Life Cycle, ma de“ amor ec ons i de r e dde f i ni t i ona le f f or t ”oft het e r m/ s t r uc t ur e“ e g oi de nt i t y”a nd howone ’ se g oi de nt i t yi nf l ue nc e st hee g oove rt i me .I nt hi sbook,Er i ks onr e pe a t e dl y me nt i one dt he“ s a me ne s sa ndc ont i nui t y”oft hee g oi de nt i t y.Fore xa mpl e ,Er i ks on de f i ne de g oi de nt i t ya s“ ac ons c i ouss e ns eofi ndi vi dua li de nt i t y. ”( p.2 0 9 )Ye t ,i not he r pl a c e shede f i ne de g oi de nt i t ya s“ a nunc ons c i ouss t r i vi ngf ora“ c ont i nui t yofpe r s ona l c ha r a c t e r . ”Eg oi de nt i t ya l s or e s ul t sf r om “ t hes ol i ddoi ng sofe g os ynt he s i s ”a ndi s c ha r a c t e r i z e df i na l l ya sa“ s ol i da r i t ywi t hag r oup’ si de a l sa ndi de nt i t y. ”( p.2 0 9 ) I f“ whoa mI ? ”i sr e a l l yaque s t i ona boutwha ti sone ’ sl e i t mot i f ,t he na swe learned in Chapter VI, we are on a border between theoretical root metaphors. This

189 philosophical border shifts us from the consideration of structures (positivism) to a consideration of meanings (hermeneutics).

From a contextual view, Mark Freeman (1993) in Rewriting the Self argued that human experience is always mediated through language, stories, and the actors (persons) one enc ount e r si nl i f e .Hi sunde r s t a ndi ngwa ss i mi l a rt oEr i ks on’ s conceptualization that the ego has evolved from mutual coordination and interaction between the developing individual and the social environment. The contestable issue here is one of viewpoint. “ Whoa r eyou? ”i saque s t i ona s ke df r om apos i t i onout s i de oft hei ndi vi dua l .“ Whoa r eyou? ”a saque s t i ont a ke sac ont e xt ua lpos i t i on.Thi s question can only be posed between two subjectivities. Because there are at least two subjectivities to this question, postmodernism suggests that one answer to this question is the result of at least two constructions.

The first construction is composed of those aspects of the self that are being portrayed to the other. In general parlance, we can think of this portrayal as a kind of performance. The performer understands this portrayal within the meaning system created by and mediated by the language and cultural matrix within which the individual has developed. In everyday language this is what is generally considered one ’ s“ publ i cpe r s ona . ”Ia m pos i t i ngt ha tt hi s“ publ i cpe r s ona ”i sa n“ i n-the-mome nt ” performance. It may have characteristics which are enduring and which are reflective ofwha tEr i ks onwa sde s c r i bi nga s“ e g oi de nt i t y. ”Ont heot he rha nd,i tma ybes i mply a performance for the benefit of the other, or what the performer assumes that his/her audience expects.

190 The second set of constructions is created by the observer(s) or questioner(s) whoi sa s ki ng ,“ Whoa r eyou? ”Thi sque s t i ona l s oi sf r a me dwi t hi nthe language, e xpe r i e nc e s ,a ndc ul t ur eoft heque s t i one r .Tounde r s t a ndt he“ pe r f or ma nc e , ”ort he “ publ i cpe r s ona , ”t heque s t i one rha st oa s s i g nme a ni ng st ot hepe r f or ma nc e .The me a ni ng sa s s i g ne dwi l lv a r yde pe ndi ngont heque s t i one r ’ sunde r s t a ndi ngoft he performance, which is another way of saying that language and culture mediate the understanding of the performance. Thus, both the performer and the questioner together create the public persona within a cultural matrix of customs and language.

This process description falls within the contextual theoretical root metaphor, for it i mpl i e st hee xi s t e nc eofa“ he r me ne ut i cc i r c l e ”i na s ki nga nda ns we r i ngt heque s t i on, “ Whoa r eyou? ” Howe ve r ,i fwet hi nka bouti t ,doe se a c hi ndi vi dua lha veonl yone“ publ i c pe r s ona , ”ori si tbe t t e rt ot hi nka boute a c hi ndi vi dua lha vi ng“ publ i cpe r s ona e ? ”I t hi nkt ha ti ti si nt ui t i ve l yobvi oust ha te a c hi ndi vi dua lha smul t i pl e“ publ i cpe r s ona e , ” e a c hc r e a t e d“ i n-the-mome nt ”f ort hebe ne f i toft heobs e r ve r( que s t i one r ) .Ia l s othink that it is equally intuitively obvious that each individual does not have an infinite number of public personae, but rather selects the public personae from a limited subset of all possible public personae. It is this subset of public personae that I believe is in s omewa yr e l a t e dt ot hepe r s on’ s“ s e ns eofi de nt i t y. ”Fore xa mpl e ,out s i deoft he theater, a high school student does not usually try to portray him/herself as a geriatric adult to an observer (questioner). Rather, the student tries to portray himself or herself in a fashion more congruent with some internal sense of who he/she is (sense of self),

191 or who he/she wants to be, or who he/she can be in that context (sense of identity). It seems to me that the student/performer seeks congruence between an internal sense of s e l fa nd“ r e s ona nc e ”wi t ht heque s t i one r(T. Lewis, Amini, & Lannon, 2000). In addition, for the experience of the performance to be believable, it must be close to what the questioner (observer/audience) is likely to expect. Otherwise, the performance is perceived as parody and therefore is not really an answer to the que s t i on,“ Whoa r eyou? ”Thes e l fmi g htbes a i dt oha veave s t e di nt e r e s ti ns ome c ont e xt si nwhi c h“ ot he r ”( que s t i one r / vi e we r )knows / unde r s t a ndshi m orhe r .I ft he self is understood in these situations, the sense of self is enhanced. Likewise, if the self i na not he rc ont e xtde s i r e snott obeknown/ unde r s t oodt ot he“ ot he r , ”t hes e ns eofs e l f is also enhanced.

I have used a performance analogy as a means of highlighting the constructive aspects of this process. I am trying to highlight in this psychological/sociological process the act of creation both in the conscious and unconscious mind. The constructive act takes place not in the context but in the person. The advantage to this explanatory model is that it enables us to locate desire, defense and agency within the person and not the context. The context can constrain desire, defense, or agency. The context cannot construct these functions. For this model, congruence and resonance are embedded conceptual constructs within the context. Congruence and resonance are a t t r i but e sofc ul t ur e ,l a ng ua g e ,a ndbi ol og ya c c or di ngt oLe wi s ’(2000) sense of resonance. Both the subjectivities of the person and the other are constrained by the context of language, culture, and past experiences.

192 If one considers this from another point of view, one could also think that the pe r f or ma nc ei sc ons t r a i ne dbyt hepe r f or me r ’ shi s t or yofe xpe r i e nc e s .Ea c hpe r f or me r brings a history of both procedural and episodic memories (Nelson, 1997; Schacter, 1996, 1999) to be used in the construction of this performance. This is also true for the observer of the performance. A sense of the continuity of the self over time is necessary for the performer to give consistent and therefore coherent performances to the observer. Denzin (1989a) suggested that this coherence explicitly suggests the pe r f or me r ’ sa wa r e ne s soft he“ ot he r . ”Thi sa wa r e ne s soft he“ ot he r ”a l ong with the a wa r e ne s sofone ’ ss ubj e c t i vi t yma ke spos s i bl et he“ i mpl i c i tknowi ngofr e l a t i ons hi ps ” (Stern, 1998) in-the-mome nt .Thepe r f or me r ’ ss e ns eofc ont i nui t yi sde r i ve df r om t he pe r f or me r ’ spe r s ona lhi s t or ywhi c hi nc l udea l loft hepe r f or me r ’ se xpe r i e nc e s , i nc l udi nga l loft he“ a c t or s ” /“ ot he r s ”t ha tt hepe r f or me rha se nc ount e r e ddur i nghe r or his life. This internal history of experience is encoded within both the procedural and episodic memory systems of the brain.

Dan McAdams (1988; 1993) de c l a r e d“ i de nt i t yi sal i f es t or y. ”(1988) He a dvoc a t e dt ha tal i f es t or yi s“ ape r s ona lmyt ht ha ta ni ndi vi dua lbe g i nswor ki ngoni n late adolescence and young adulthood in order to provide his or her life with unity or pur pos ea ndi nor de rt oa r t i c ul a t eame a ni ng f ulni c hei nt heps yc hos oc i a lwor l d. ”( p.5 ) Hi sc onc e ptof“ i de nt i t ya sl i f es t or y”c ombi ne sni c e l ywi t hEr i ks on’ sc onc e ptofe go identity as a leitmotif. A leitmotif is defined by the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1992) a s“ adominant and recurring theme within a story or pi e c eofmus i c . ”

193 Joe Palombo (1990) appropriated these literary concepts of dominant themes and motifs to describe his narrative self psychological viewpoint. Hec ont e nde d,“ t he adolescent will begin to construct a coherent narrative that attempts to encompass the totality of self-e xpe r i e nc e s . ”( p.3 4 8 )Hes e pa r a t e dhi sc onc e pt i onsf r om t hos eof Erikson because he wants to maintain a subjective point of view with regard to these a s s e r t i onsi nke e pi ngwi t hKohuta nds e l fps yc hol og y,r a t he rt ha nt of ol l owEr i ks on’ s view that identity is a precipitate of adaptation to the psychosocial world. However, all of these authors, it seems to me, were really attempting from a contextual point of view to talk about the creation of a central self-narrative and how the creation of this na r r a t i ve“ pr ope l st hepe r s ont oa c t ua l i z e ”( p.3 4 9 )i torma ket hi sna r r a t i ver e a l (Palombo, 1990).

Like any story, self-narratives can have many different sub-plots and many different, even conflicting, narrative themes and motifs. These sub-plots and motifs may reflect different aspects of the self, or may be ways of reflecting and reconciling different experiences and the meanings that have been assigned to these experiences.

To the degree that a person can be aware of these motifs and sub-plots, I am positing these as constructors of behavior.

Anot he rwa yofs a yi ngt hi si st ha tape r s on’ ssense of self agency is related to t hec ons c i ousa s pe c t soft he s emot i f s .Thi ss e ns eofone ’ ss e l fa g e nc yc a na l s obe unde r s t ooda st hes e l f ’ sa wa r e ne s soft hes our c e sofmot i va t i onf orone ’ sa c t i ons .

Therefore, using the literary metaphor, a composition is performed in answer to the que s t i on“ Whoa r eyou? ” .Thec ompos i t i oni si n-the-moment. It is a creation that

194 de mons t r a t e sa n“ i mpl i c i tknowi ngoft heot he r ”(Stern, 1998),ora“ r e s ona nc e ”wi t h t heot he r ,t ous eLe wi s ’(2000) terminology. It is a creation, which shows only those aspects of the centralized self-narrative that the performer consciously deems necessary to compose for her/his questioner. It is a composition that is socially determined by the performer, the audience, the language, and the culture of the participants. To the degree that a creation becomes predictable or repeated over time and place, one could say that it represents a leitmotif of the performer. And it is this leitmotif that Erikson has defined as ego identity.

Wha tIa mt r yi ngt os ug g e s ti st ha tone ’ si de nt i t yi sc onc e r ne df i r s ta nd foremost with a relationship to a specific in-the-moment world/reality. Secondly, I am proposing that identity is shaped by several factors. The first factor is a sense of what S t e r nc a l l e dt he“ i mpl i c i tknowi ngoft heot he r ”(Stern, 1998).The“ ot he r ”a ndt he c ont e xta r ei nvol ve di nc r e a t i ngone ’ si n-the-moment persona. Since this is a complex creation (construction), we have some explanation for how the same person (personal identity) can seem to an external viewer to be somewhat different in different circumstances (contexts both material and temporal) and with different people (the c onc e ptoft he“ publ i cpe r s ona ”a sas ubs e tofa l lpos s i bl e“ publ i cpe r s ona e ” ) .The s e c ondf a c t ori nvol ve dwi t hi de nt i t yi sone ’ ss e l f -narrative. I, like McAdams, conceive ofi de nt i t ya ndone ’ sl i f es t or ya sl i nke d.Thi r d,one ’ si de nt i t yi ss ha pe dbyt he t he ma t i cdi a l e c t i cofl a ng ua g e ,c ul t ur e ,a ndt he“ ot he r s ”ofone ’ se xperience. No one grows up in a vacuum. Rather, there are multiple influences that shape who we become. Fourth, there is no mind-body duality, contrary to the concept that Descartes

195 introduced into our philosophical thinking. We need to account for modern neurobiological findings in addition to the philosophical dilemmas as we think about identity, self-narratives, and self (Searle, 1998).

Therefore, how can we incorporate a concept of leitmotif, provided by Robert Wa l l e r s t e i n’ st r a ns l a t i on,i nt oEr i ks on’ st he or izing? I would suggest that the context could be thought of as creating dialectics of possible narrative themes for each developing individual. These dialectics might be thought of as being culturally specific.

These dialectics might also be thought of as gendered, to incorporate important contributions of feminist theorists like Benjamin (1990, 1995), Butler (1997), Chodorow (1991, 1995), Fast (1998), Gilligan (1982), and Kristeva (2000). These narrative theme dialectics would function much as Erikson already postulated within hi sf r a me wor k.I ns t e a dofvi e wi ng“ e g oi de nt i t y”a sa“ pr e c i pi t a t e ”c onnot i nga corporeal reality within the mind, I would propose that the developmental dialectics create emotionally laden self-attributes that color the leitmotifs and themes that one c r e a t e si none ’ ss e l f -narrative.

We have explored only one side of a rhetorically constructed boundary. We have examined the external world relationship with the self. If we now turn our attention to the sense of identity, we almost immediately know that most of us do not spend our every waking moment thinking about our identity. Rather, this is a process that is often going on in the background. However, in the foreground, in general, we are concerned about what is happening to ourselves, or in more theoretical words, what is happening in a context in relationship to our sense of self. Like Kohut (Kohut,

196 1977, 1984) I think of the self as a psychological structure that can only be understood from an empathic perspective. Unlike Kohut I see the self as a descriptive metaphor.

The empathic perspective both creates and influences the data that I can know about a person (Kohut, 1959). This perspective also creates epistemological difficulties within a contextual philosophical metaphor, of which we need to be aware. However, I think that it is important to explore the other side of this rhetorically constructed dialectic, na me l yt he“ pr i va t epe r s ona , ”oras e ns eofs e l f .It hi nkt ha tonene e dst oa ppr oa c ht hi s side developmentally, since a sense of self does not leap forth like Minerva fully formed from Ze us ’he a d.

One way to approach the development of a sense of self is from infant observations. Stern (1985) t houg htt ha tt hec hi l d’ s“ s ubj e c t i vee xpe r i e nc eoft he obs e r va bl ee ve nt ”r e s ul t sf r om t heuni quel i f e -experiences of each partner in the relationship. These experiences begin at birth and occur as short-lived episodes of assistance with regulation and attunement. Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1980) introduced the c onc e ptof“ i nt e r na lwor ki ngmode l s ”t oc a pt ur et hea f f e c t i vei nt e r a c t i onofc hi l dcaregiver interactions. Eva Appelman (2000) has researched how the, unde r pi nni ng soft hedyna mi ct r a ns f or ma t i onoft hei nf a nt ’ snonve r ba l a t t a c hme ntbe ha vi ori nt ot hea dul t ’ sve r ba ls t a t eofmi ndi nr e l a t i ont o attachment is rooted in the nonverbal organization ofi nf or ma t i on.Thei nf a nt ’ s nonverbal, yet organized, working model functions as a structural matrix for t hede ve l opme ntoft hei nt r i c a t el i ng ui s t i ce xpr e s s i onoft hea dul t ’ s representations of attachment. (p. 192)

197 By the second half of the first year of life, Stern believes that the child and the caretaker have fashioned a relationship based on reciprocally shared intents and feelings. Attunement permits the baby to match his or her own state with that of others, providing the foundation for the subsequent capacity to both use the care provided by others and to offer care to other persons. The developing capacity for self r e g ul a t i onofone ’ si nne rs t a t e si sa l s oc ons i s t e ntwi t hKohut ’ sf or mul a t i onsa bouts e l f psychology derived from adult reconstructions (1971, 1977, 1984).

Kohut ’ sf or mul a t i onoft hebi pol a rs e l ft ha tde ve l opsbe t we e npol e sof g r a ndi os i t ya ndi de a l i z a t i oni sa not he rdi a l e c t i c a lc ont i nuum.Whi l eKohut ’ sl a ng ua g e positions him within a positivist philosophical model, I think that the reader can easily see that these same formulations also hold within a more hermeneutic approach. From this perspective I think that Kohut is trying to describe a self that is developing within what Galatzer-Levy (1990a) ha sc a l l e da“ c ompl e xma t r i xofme a ni ng s . ”Thedi a l e c t i c a l continuum that Kohut proposed helps to emphasize the tensions between the internal and the external world as experienced internally by the individual.

Er i ks on’ se mphasis, it seems to me, looked at this same internal/external tension from an external point of view. It may be that this is why Kohut was so careful in his writing to point out that he and Erikson were talking about different concepts.

Thus, if I were to re f or mul a t eKohut ’ sdi a l e c t i c a lc ont i nuum f r om ahe r me ne ut i c perspective, I would posit that the self develops between two poles of meanings. On one side of the dialectic would be those meanings that converge around feelings and experiences of grandiosity. On the other side of the dialectic would be those meanings

198 that converge around feelings and experiences of idealization. To keep the metaphor consistent, one would posit that the self develops by assigning meaning to its experiences with the external world. These assigned meanings would over time tend to group themselves along this dialectical continuum in a unique way that would be e xpe r i e nc e dbyt hes e l fa sa“ s e ns eofs e l fa g e nc y. ”Thi sc onve r g e nc eoft he s eme a ni ng s would be experienced by the self as a feeling of coherence in relationship to the internal/subjective world. This coherence of the self might be described from an external view as having a coherent story. In addition, it might be described in Er i ks on’ st e r msa sha vi ng“ s a me ne s sa ndc ont i nui t y”ove rt i me .

I am suggesting one can have several personae or several identities depending on the context, while retaining a core sense of self. Instead of multiple selves, as proposed by cognitive psychologists (Bretherton, 1991, 1993; Broughton, 1981; Gergen & Gergen, 1987; Harter, 1999a; Harter & Monsour, 1992; Harter & Whitesell, 1989; Hermans, 1999; Higgins, 1999), one could have several identities. Recognizing multiple identities depending on context, like conflicting self-attributes in different contexts, eliminates the need to theorize multiple selves and yet still accounts for the data of this research. In addition, if one accepts that the context helps to construct the identity, then it follows that the conflicts described by the cognitive researchers are not so much conflicts between various selves, but are conflicts between various identities in differing contexts. This theory of multiple identities serves to place conflicts between self-attributes in consciousness. Another benefit of this solution is that it allows one to think about these conflicts between self-attributes as conflicts of leitmotifs, or narrative

199 themes within a central narrative or life story. I think this solution is intuitively reflected in the common adolescent stateme nt ,“ I twoul dbea bnor ma lt oa c tt hes a me with everyone. You act one way with your friends, and you act another way with yourpa r e nt s . ”Thec og ni t i veps yc hol og i s t si nt e r pr e tt hi ss t a t e me nta sr e f l e c t i ng mul t i pl es e l ve s ,as e l fwi t hone ’ sf r i e nds ,a nda not he rs e l fwi t hone ’ spa r e nt s .My solution is to propose that the more experience-near interpretation of this statement is that an adolescent has one identity with her or his friends and another identity with her or his parents. Erikson (1968) captured the essence of this problem when he proposed that the adolescent dialectic is between identity and role confusion. My unde r s t a ndi ngofEr i ks on’ sdi a l e c t i ci st ha ti tde s c r i be sj us twha tt hec og ni t i ve psychologists were finding in their research, i.e., a conflict of self-attributes, and of identities in differing contexts, and a wish to integrate these self-attribute conflicts into a more coherent sense of self. Within a contextual metaphor, another way of saying this is that the adolescent is motivated to construct a coherent life story, or selfnarrative. Palombo (1990, 1992) made this very point when he explained that the older adolescent is trying to maintain a cohesive self, and to create a coherent self-narrative t ha tc a nbeus et oa c t ua l i z et hea dol e s c e nt ’ sl i f e .

I remind the reader ofRobe r tWa l l e r s t e i n’ s(1998) unde r s t a ndi ngofEr i ks on’ s mor ec ont e xt ua lme a ni ngof“ e g oi de nt i t y,“na me l yt ha thewa sr e a l l yt r yi ngt o de s c r i be“ l e i t mot i f s . ”Le i t mot i f sa ndt he me sc a nbei nc onf l i c twi t he a c hot he r .

Differing narrative themes, like differing or conflicting self-attributes, can be in conflict with each other and create tensions for the author and for the reader/other. If

200 these tensions are within the self-narrative, then to both the author and the reader (observer/other) in this configuration, the self-narrative will seem to be incoherent.

The r e f or e ,a not he rwa yt or e s t a t eEr i ks on’ sdi a l e c t i cofa dol e s c e nc ei st ha ti ti s between self-narrative coherence and self-narrative incoherence.

We have seen that both the cognitive psychologists and Palombo have argued ba s e dupondi f f e r e ntt he or e t i c a lme t a phor sf orwha ti si ne s s e nc et hea dol e s c e nt ’ s desire for an experience of non-c onf l i c t i ngs e l fa t t r i but e s ,ori nPa l ombo’ sc a s ef ora coherent self-narrative. Our sense of self would seem to be the result of the self taking a temporal position remembering its past, its present experience and its anticipated or extrapolated future. This sense of self comes to be as the result of subjective experiences to which meanings have been assigned. These subjective meanings are not fixed in memory, as we have already seen, by some brain video camera. Rather, the subjective meanings are re-created using the various memory systems of the brain.

There is yet another way in which incoherence can be experienced within the self-narrative. Incoherence is experienced if the self-narrative is not authentic.

Winnicott (1958) warned about the creation of a false self, a self that accepts a falsified ve r s i onofe xpe r i e nc e .Thi sf a l s es e l fdoe snotr e pr e s e ntone ’ si nne rs e ns eofe xpe r i e nc e , butr e f l e c t sade s i r et oc ompl ywi t ht heot he r ’ sde ma ndsa nde xpe c t a t i ons .Crittenden (1994) pr opos e dt ha tpa r e nt sma yr e j e c tt hei nf a nt ’ s“ f e l ts e l f ”a nda ppr oveonl yoft he falsely presented self. Stern (1985, 1989b, 1991, 1993, 1995) alerted us that the display of false-self behavior can be selected because it meets the needs and desires of someone else. This false-self behavior has the risk of alienating oneself from those inner

201 experiences that represent the true self. We have seen in the last chapter that being authentic is very important, beginning in middle adolescence. If these structural metaphors are translated back into a contextual metaphor, then self-narratives that are pr e s e nt e df ort hebe ne f i toft heot he rwi t houtr e g a r dt o“ f e l te xpe r i e nc e ”i nhe r e nt l y risk a core incoherence. This incoherence represents an inauthentic, or possibly a subjectively felt incoherence, in the self-narrative. This kind of incoherent selfnarrative has the effect of making the self more vulnerable and of making a selfnarrative more difficult to actualize.

Genuineness is an important characteristic in the model that I am proposing.

Genuineness leads to veracity in the performance metaphor that I have proposed.

Wi t houti tweha vepa r ody;wi t houtt r ut hf ul ne s st oone ’ ss ubj e c t i ve l y“ f e l te xpe r i e nc e ” within a particular context, and within a particular culture and language, there can be no verisimilitude. And without verisimilitude there cannot be empathic understanding and interpretation. Therefore, I am proposing that one can have multiple identities and multiple personal personae, for these metaphors reflect a relationship with others and the social-relational world. These identities are a construction of a core nuclear self, and its sense of self within a culture and a language system. These identities are dependent on the in-the-moment context. These identities reflect the variety of leitmotifs or narrative themes within the larger themes of the self-narrative. These identities from a temporal position may be in conflict with each other, although there may be no conflict within the core nuclear self and its felt experience of the world.

These identities reflect an interpretation of the self arising between the context in

202 which it occurs and the subjectively felt experiences of having lived and developed within a specific culture, with a specific family using a specific language. Culture, others, language and subjective experience limit the total number of possible identities that the self can create in-the-moment. Therefore, one does not have unlimited identities from which to choose. Rather, the set of all possible identities or leitmotifs has been limited by these factors to a smaller, personally specific subset of all possible narrative themes.

203

CHAPTER X

THE DIALOGICAL SELF In the last chapter I proposed a relationship between personal identity and the self. I suggested that in contrast to the proposals by various cognitive psychologists and other theorists that individuals have multiple selves, another explanatory model could account for the phenomenon that shows up in their research findings. I proposed that having differing identities in different contexts could account for the phenomenon that these researchers and theorists were describing. The descriptive advantage of my proposal is that it allows one to retain the concepts of a core nuclear self, a sense of self, and a coherent self-narrative. In addition, my proposal seems more experiencenear, and it meets the demands imposed by the philosophic discussion of personal identity, i.e., that one can know and others can know that a person is the same person over time.

This chapter has two purposes. First, it explores how my explanatory model fits into a larger philosophical tradition. Second, it connects this explanatory model to the research methodology that I used. What I am creating in these last chapters is a metaphorical interpretative lens. I believe that it is important for the reader to understand the larger context in which I plan to situate my research findings.

204 American psychological and social work research does not usually attempt, in my opinion, to place itself within a philosophical tradition. For the reasons that I explained in an earlier chapter, psychological and social work research has felt compelled to locate itself within the traditions of a science. As the era of Modernism that began at the time of the Enlightenment ends and the era of postmodernism begins, I have an opportunity to place my research within alternative philosophical traditions rather than the traditions of science. This new era uses different standards for its claims for privilege in wisdom and knowledge. I want to briefly outline this shift of philosophical traditions. This shift of philosophical traditions from science to hermeneutics in the social sciences is similar to the shift from mechanism to contextualism that I have already explored.

Ironically, the roots of this alternative philosophical tradition, hermeneutics, began shortly after Descartes (1596-1650) founded modernism with his Meditations (Descartes, 1641/1984) and his famous “ Cogito ergo sum. ”Gi a mba t t i s t aVi c o( 1 6 6 8 1 7 4 4 )pr opos e da na l t e r na t i vephi l os ophi c a lvi e wt oDe s c a r t e s ’mode r ni s m.Vi c o’ s ( 1 7 3 0 / 1 9 6 8 )ma i nt he s i swa st ha tt hi shi s t or i c a lwor l di sc r e a t e dbyhuma nbe i ng s“ ... and its principles are therefore to be found in the modifications of our own human mi nd. ”( p.9 6 )Vi c owa swr i t i ngi noppos i t i ont oDe s c a r t e s ’pr oc l a ma t i on,“ It hi nk, t he r e f or e ,Ia m. ”Vi c ot houg htt ha tt hemi nda ndt hebodya r ei ns e pa r a bl e : ‘ Bur i e di nabody, ’t hehuma nmi ndi si nhi s t or ya ndma kes history at the same time. It is because I consist of both body and mind that I think; so that the body and mind united are the cause of thought. (Vico, 1730/1968, p. 96)

205 Hundreds of years later, Erwin Straus (1958) e xt e nde dVi c o’ sc r i t i c i s m of Descartes. Straus constructed a commonsense criticism of modernism based on a c r i t i queofDe s c a r t e s ’i ni t i a lc r e a t i onoft wophi l os ophi c a ls e pa r a t i ons .Thef i r s t separation is between body and mind and the second is between self and other. As Straus pointed out this seems contrary to everyday experience. In normal experience I f e e lmybodynots i mpl ya sa nobj e c ti nt hewor l d,buta s“ mi ne . ”Mor e ove r ,t heot he r pe r s oni snott her e s ul tofar e a s oni ngpr oc e s s ,butofi mme di a t er e l a t i on“ t ome , ”e ve n before one starts to think explicitly. Or as Leo Strauss concluded: In sensory experience I always experience myself and [emphasis in original] the world at the same time, not myself directly and the Other [emphasis in original] by inference, not myself before the Other, not myself without the Other, nor the Other without myself. (L. Strauss, 2001, p. 148) Whereas Descartes took as his starting point the thinking mind, Vico rooted his starting point in the historical mind. Vico (1730/1968) proposed a history of human i de a s ,ba s e dont hepr i nc i pl e“ t hes c i e nc e smus tbe g i nwhere their subject matter be g a n. ”( p.1 0 4 )Vi c opr opos e dt ha thuma nknowl e dg ei se mbodi e da ndt ha t knowledge serves to interrelate related people. According to Hermans and Kempen (1993), Vico postulated a strong link between language and history: Words, combined into speech acts, had their emotional connotations from the beginning and were eventually used to tell the first fables and myths that e xpr e s s e da s‘ t r uena r r a t i ons ’t hec ol l e c t i vee xpe r i e nc e soft ha tt i me ....i n Vi c o’ svi e w,knowl e dg edoe snotr e s ul tf r om a ni ndi vi dua lmi nde ng a g e di n

206 abstract thinking, but from a social and cultural process where the kind of knowledge is closely related to the function of language. This language, in turn, is modified in the context of historical and societal changes. (p. 7) The epistemological tensions between Descartes and Vico are similar to the same tensions that Plato explicated in his dialogues. Leo Strauss (2001), writing about t hePl a t o’ sdi a l og ue s ,de s c r i be ss i mi l a re pi s t e mol og i c a ls t r a i nsi na nc i e ntGr e e c e .

Strauss wanted his reader to understand that there was tension between the poets and the philosophers in ancient Greece. Since this is a struggle over what knowledge is privileged, and the result of this struggle is understanding or wisdom, he suggested: Pl a t o’ sdi a l og ue sde ma ndt ober e a dwi t he xc e e di ngc a r e .The r ei snot hi ng superfluous, nothing meaningless in a Platonic dialogue. Socrates in the Phaedrus compares the good writing, the perfect writing, to a living being in which each part, however small, has a necessary function for the life and activity of that living being. The Platonic dialogue has a function—the function is to make us understand. And the dialogue is comparable to an organism insofar as every part of it has a function in making us understand. (L. Strauss, 2001, p. 5) Inasmuch as Socrates sought understanding in his dialogues, his dialogues created a dialectic between the poets on one hand and the philosophers on the other.

Aristophanes (1994) in his work The Clouds, according to Strauss (2001), suggested in contradistinction to poetry that philosophy is:

207 unable to persuade or to charm the multitude. Philosophy transcends the ephemeral, the mundane, the political. However it cannot find its way back to it. The philosopher is blind to the context in which the philosophy exists, namely political life. He does not reflect on his own doing, he lacks self knowledge—he lacks prudence in the wide Platonic sense of the word, because he does not understand political things. This is connected with the fact—again I f ol l owAr i s t opha ne s ’i ndi c a t i on—that philosophy is unerotic and a-music [sic], unpoetic. Philosophy is blind to the human things as experienced in life, in the acts of living. These acts of living are precisely the theme of poetry. Poetry integrates purely theoretical wisdom into a human context. It completes the completely theoretical wisdom by self-knowledge. Poetry is the capstone of wisdom. Poetry alone makes for the most comprehensive knowledge. (p. 6-7) Mark Johnson (1987) argued that the dominant paradigm that is guiding the contemporary work of social workers, psychologists, linguists, computer scientists, a ndphi l os ophe r sc a nbede s c r i be di nt e r msof“ obj e c t i vi s m.

“J ohns onde s c r i be st hi s paradigm as follows: The world consists of objects that have properties and stand in various relationships independent of human understanding. The world is as it is, no matter what any person happens to believe about it, and there is one correct “ God’ s -Eye-Vi e w”about what the world really is like. In other words, there is a rational structure to reality, independent of beliefs of any particular people, and correct reason mirrors this rational structure. To describe an objective reality

208 of this sort, we need language that expresses concepts that can map onto objects, properties, and relations in a literal, univocal, context-independent fashion. Reasoning to gain knowledge of our world is seen as requiring the joining of such concepts into propositions that describe aspects of reality.

Reason is thus a purely formal capacity to connect up, and draw inferences from, these literal concepts according to rules of logic. Words are arbitrary symbols which, though meaningless in themselves, get their meaning by virtue of their capacity to correspond directly to things in the world. And rational thought can be viewed as an algorithmic manipulation of such symbols.

(Johnson, 1987, p. x) Like the philosophers in the Plato dialogues and Descartes, the objectivist (positivist), according to Johnson (1987), wants to see reasoning as an essentially disembodied rule-governed manipulation of connections among symbols. In addition, the objectivist presumes that there is a basic split between the reasoning scientist and t he“ e xt e r na lwor l d. ”Andf i na l l y,t heobj e c t i vi s tvi e wst hee xt e r na l world as subjected to the reasoning process of the knowledgeable scientist representing one correct “ God’ s -eye-vi e w. ” The alternative pole in this dialectic is that of the poet. The poet sees the mind not as disembodied, but as bodied. The poet uses image schema as a frame for orienting oneself in varying situations on the basis of the form of our body. Johnson (1987), for e xa mpl e ,c i t e da“ ve r t i c a l i t ys c he ma ”t ha te me r g e sf r om ourt e nde nc yt oe mpl oya nupdown orientation in picking out meaningful structures of our experience. Hermans

209 and Kempen (1993) pointed out that we use our body, which is part of the spatial world and has a verticality structure to it, as a means of orientation in that world.

In addition, the image schema is not a purely corporeal structure. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argued that the image schema of our bodies is used to organize our more abstract understanding. Their point is that we often use the verticality structure ofourbodi e sa same t a phor .Ase xa mpl e s ,“ pr i c e sa r eg oi ngup, ”“ t ur nt hehe a tdown, ” a nd“ he ’ sa tt hepe a kofhe a l t h”a r eme t a phor st ha tus et heve r t i c a l i t yofouri ma g e s c he ma .The r ei snoi nt r i ns i cr e a s onwhy“ mor e ”s houl dbe“ up, ”or“ l e s s ”s houl dbe “ down. ”La kof fa ndJ ohns ona r g ue dt ha tag i ve ni ma g es c he mae me r g e sf i r s ta sa structure of bodily interactions and then is figuratively developed as a structure around which meaning is organized at more abstract levels of cognition. Hermans and Kempen (1993) expanded this idea: If one accepts the body as a first and basic metaphor for human understanding, then metaphor is not to be viewed as an ornament or a mere figure of speech, frequently used by poets or children. On the contrary, metaphor is an indispensable structure of human understanding by which we can figuratively comprehend our world. The central significance of image schemata and metaphor is in sharp contrast to basic notions of the objectivist view. The objectivists hold that the concepts that are used to analyze meaning must map definitive, discrete, and fixed objects, properties and relations. Such concepts a r e“ l i t e r a l . ”Me t a phor i c a lpr ojections, however, are not of that sort, for they involve categories that do not exist objectively in the world. In its simplest

210 definition, metaphor is an implicit comparison between two unlike entities.

The quality of one entity is transferred to the other entity (the Greek metapherein me a ns“ t ot r a ns f e r ” ) .Thet woqua l i t i e sf or m ac ombi na t i ont ha t does not correspond to something that already exists in the world. Rather, metaphorical combinations involve a construction of the world. It is this notion of construction that Vico (1968) had in mind when he concluded that “ t oknowi st oma ke ”a nd“ t oma kei st oknow. ”( p.9 -10) Herman and Kempen (1993) viewed the emergence of a narrative approach as one of the major developments in psychology over the past decade. This approach s t udi e st hehuma nmi ndf r om t hepe r s pe c t i veoft he“ na r r a t i ve ”or“ s t or y. ”Ana r r a t i ve approach to reality emphasizes the construction of the mind and is therefore more Vichean than Cartesian in its approach. Sarbin (1989) posited that in the realm of human emotions, the study of narrative provides a more satisfying verisimilitude, than do the explanations of psychophysiology that are found in most psychological textbooks. His argument is that essentially the psychophysiological models promote t hede t a c hme ntofaphe nome nai de nt i f i e da s“ e mot i ons ”f r om s i t ua t i ona lc ont e x t s .

Sarbin argued that emotions cannot be removed from their situational contexts.

Herman and Kempen (1993) understood Sarbin as arguing that: The tendency to take emotional phenomena out of context is expressed in a particular metaphor: The body is a container. This metaphor suggests than an emotion is a fluidlike substance that is located in a container, separating the substance from the environment. The container metaphor suggests also a

211 reification (objectification) of the emotion: It is not something that emanates from a living person in a particular situation (I as an emotional being) but something that happens in a machinelike apparatus (emotions as physiological reactions). The traditional view of emotions reflects the dominating role of the root metaphor of mechanicism in psychology as a science. From this perspective the body works as a machine that can be studied in its thinglike operations. (p. 19) What Sarbin argued is that context is important to understanding. He did not contend, like psychology as a science does, that human beings are machines who can operate without regard to context. The contextual point of view appreciates that context defines the questions that one asks and the answers that one gives. This position is not t he“ God’ s -eye-vi e w�oft heobj e c t i vi s t .S a r bi n( 1 9 8 9 )pr opos e dt ha tt hehuma ne ve nt s that we call emotions or passions are best considered as "narrative emplotments."

These narrative emplotments are organized as narratives, with plot, actors, and setting.

Sarbin wanted to illustrate the way in which roles, plot, and the rhetorical actions that make up an emotion can be identified and used to understand how the external world is constructed. He argued that by looking rhetorically at these narrative emplotments, researchers can locate aspects of emotions. He believed that these emplotments are embedded in the cultural prescriptions at work behind all dramatistic acts, and that these prescriptions themselves take a largely narrative form, as myths, parables, songs and stories. Hermans and Kempen (1993) noted that:

212 when we tell stories or listen to them, we are involved in the actors and their vicissitudes. Actions, however, are not only in the story, they also follow from it. We engage in conduct to advance the plot, particularly when we imagine ourselves as the protagonist. (p. 20) S a r bi n’ s( 1 9 9 7 )“ Qui xot epr i nc i pl e ”i st ha tr e a di ngs t or i e sc a nhelp to shape identity.

Byde s c r i bi ngt ha tpr i nc i pl e ,S a r bi ni se xpa ndi ngonLe vi n’ s( 1 9 7 0 )i de at ha ti de nt i t y c a nbes ha pe dbyr e a di ngs t or i e s .Ac c or di ngt oS a r bi n’ svi e w,t her e a de ri sa tf i r s ta n involved participant in the story, identifying with one of the main characters. The reader can imagine the role of the character, and this has the potential for guiding the r e a de r ’ sf ut ur ebe ha vi or .I fi de nt i f i c a t i ona ndi ma g i na t i onc a ni nf l ue nc ei de nt i t y,t he n identity can once again be thought of as being context-dependent.

I am trying to illustrate again how context helps to shape identity. The context of listening to a story, or the context in which the story is told, shapes the meaning of the narrative. The context plays a role in what the narrator of the story assumes is a reservoir of common knowledge of the listener, the person to whom the story is told.

This assumed common knowledge and interest of the listener function as criteria for the selecting and ordering of events as parts of a told narrative. The story includes events that are not obvious except to the listener and the narrator. The story includes only those events that are worth telling to the listener. As a result, the listener can be said to influence the content of the story and also the organization of the story.

Therefore, the story is a flexible organization of events in which the content and organization are dependent on the intentions of the narrator and the interest and

213 que s t i onsoft hel i s t e ne r .Ac c or di ngt oHe r ma nsa ndKe mpe n( 1 9 9 3 ) ,“ [ t]his embeddedness of the story in social relationships makes it a true representative of the r ootme t a phorofc ont e xt ua l i s m. ”( p.2 4 ) This description of narrator and listener suggest another apt metaphor, namely, a dialogue. Narratives are dialogues between the narrator and the listener. The listener to understand the dialogue tries to detect a meaningful relationship between the events oft hes t or ya ndt hei nt e nt soft hea c t i onsoft he“ a c t or s ”i nt hes t or y.Thi sde t e c t i on helps the listener to understandt he“ poi nt ”ort het he meoft hes t or y.Thi sde t e c t i on suggests a dialectic relationship between event and plot. Polkinghorne (1988) has suggested that recognizing how events and plot interact produces the meaning of a particular event. Events and plot provide the form for each other. Events do not dictate plot, and plots do not necessarily dictate the order of events. Rather, by moving back and forth between events and plot an appropriate configuration of meaning is established. A dialectic process that discloses the significance of the events takes place between the events and the theme. An emplotment is not the imposition according to Polkinghorne (1988), of a ready made-plot structure on an independent set of events.

Rather, it is a reflexive process in which the plot influences the events that are reported, and the events that are reported reveal the plot. The theme of a story f unc t i onsa sa“ f i l t e r ”f ort hes e l e c t i onofc e r t a i ne ve nt sa sr e l e va nta ndot he re ve nt sa s irrelevant. This notion of emplotment implies a story is never defined in some final way. Rather, narratives as part of a reflexive process are always capable of changing depending on the context, the narrator and the listener. This reflexive dialectic process

214 means that new plots can always emerge from a similar event or even the same event.

Essentially, this is describing a dialogic process to continue the use of the metaphor.

The themes of a story give coherence to the events of the story.

Cultures can be said to provide a limited number of basic themes for plots (Hermans and Kempen, 1993). These cultural limited themes organize how one understands and interprets the events of a life; in other words, they provide an i nt e r pr e t a t i vel e nst ot hee ve nt sofone ’ sl i f e .The s et he me sa r es ha r e dby many people and have a history, i.e., the themes have been effective over multiple points in time.

These themes offer a structure for understanding the events in the lives of many people. Therefore, cultural researchers have been tempted to create typologies of these t he me s .Onee xa mpl eoft hi si sFr ye ’ s( 1 9 5 7 )a t t e mptt oc l a s s i f yna r r a t i vet he me swi t h natural events. He posited that the themes of narratives are rooted in the experience of nature and in the evolution of the seasons. Accordingly he saw the uprising of spring a si ns pi r a t i onf or“ c ome dy. ”Hevi e we dt hec a l ma nda bunda nc eofs umme ra sg i vi ng r i s et ot het he meof“ r oma nc e , ”whi c hpoe t i c a l l yde s c r i be st het r i umphofg oodov e r e vi l ,ofl i g htove rda r kne s s ,a ndofvi r t ueove rvi c e .“ Tr a g e dy”c ome s during autumn, as people confront the contrast between the pining away of life and the coming death of winter. Lastly, in winter people become aware that ultimately one is captive in a wor l d,a ndnoti t sma s t e r .I nt hi ss e a s on“ s a t i r e ”i sc r e a t e d,a swerealize that we are ultimately inadequate when confronting death. These basic general theme types, comedy, romance, tragedy, and satire, organize how one understands the events of life.

215 Gergen and Gergen (1988) classified narratives according to the narrative movement to a desired end state. This more linear classification saw a progressive narrative as one in which the individual links experiences in such a way that they incrementally move toward a desired end state. A regressive narrative is marked by a gradual movement away from a desired end state. A stability narrative is one in which the person remains the same over time. This narrative classification was proposed as a us e f ulwa yt oi nt e r pr e ta ni ndi vi dua l ’ smove me ntove rt i me .

Finally, Joseph Campbell (1956) proposed in his book, The Hero with a Thousand Faces, that there is one monomyth representing the collective experiences in va r i ousc ul t ur e s .I nCa mpbe l l ’ svi e w,myt hsofva r i ouski ndsa ndc ul t ur et e l lt hes t or y of an impressive figure, the hero, who has an important message for the community.

The hero must overcome personal and historical limitations to reach a transcendental understanding of the human condition that he must convey to the community.

These examples of possible narrative typologies illustrate that despite the multitude of different stories people tell one another, there are a limited amount of themes that organize the content of stories so that they become meaningful or coherent to individuals and communities.

Another way to view narratives is to look at the psychological motives of the actors. The Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) developed by Murray (1938) is an example of this kind of effort. Basically, the underlying assumption is that themes expressed in stories reflect the more or less unconscious needs and desires of the

216 subjects. By having the subject tell the examiner a story, the examiner can analyze the s ubj e c t ’ smot i ve sa ndde s i r e s .

I am proposing a series of possible interpretative lenses for looking at narratives that people tell each other. One lens is plot, which transforms a purely chronological listing of events into an organized whole that recognizes the contribution certain events make to the development of a story. Another lens is the theme of the story, which plays a central role in the plot in individual or collective stories that serves to highlight certain events as more relevant than others in the telling of a story at a particular time and in a particular place. A third lens is that story themes and psychological motives embedded within the story bring coherence to the told events and facts that would be otherwise fragmented and dispersed over time. These lenses have reflexive and dialectic properties to them in that they each are constantly interacting with each other in time and place. This would explain how a same story told at different times to different listeners or the same listeners in different contexts might have different meanings. In addition, I have suggested that to think metaphorically about these processes as a dialogue might be a contextually useful tool.

Now, I want to further delineate this dialogic process.

Mikhail Bakhtin (1985) places himself outside of Aristotelian linear logic and suggests that dialogic stands in a dialectic relationship to logic. In a dialogic relationship voices can be separated spatially. Take for example—I am paraphrasing Hermans and Kempen (1993)—the following two phrases that are completely identical, “ l i f ei sg ood”a nda g a i n“ l i f ei sg ood. ”Fr om Ar i s t ot e l i a nl og ic these two phases are

217 identical, they are one and the same statement. Bakhtin maintains that from a dialogical perspective they may represent two remarks expressed by the voices of two spatially separated people who are in a relationship of agreement. In this perspective, t hef i r s t“ l i f ei sg ood”i sas t a t e me nta ndt hes e c ond“ l i f ei sg ood”i sac onf i r ma t i on.

There is agreement about life being good by both speakers. In a similar way there c oul dbeadi s a g r e e me nta boutl i f ebe i ngg oodwi t h“ l i f ei sg ood”a nd“ l i f ei snotg ood. ” I nBa kht i n’ svi e wt her e l a t i ons hi pbe t we e na g r e e me nta nddi s a g r e e me nti sl i ke question and answer, basically dialogical. While Bakhtin (1985) did not reject the rules ofl og i chea s s e r t e d,“ Di a l og i c a lr e l a t i ons hi psa r et ot a l l yi mpos sible without logical and concrete semantic relationships, but they are not reducible to them; they have their owns pe c i f i c i t y. ”( p.1 5 2 ) I nBa kht i n’ svi e w,l og i c a lr e l a t i ons hi psa r e“ c l os e d”i ns of a ra st he ydonot permit any conclusions beyond the rules that manage the relationship. In contrast, in Ba kht i n’ sdi a l og i c a lvi e w: consciousness is never self-sufficient; it always finds itself in an intense r e l a t i ons hi pwi t ha not he rc ons c i ous ne s s .Thehe r o’ se ve r ye xpe r i e nc ea ndhi s every thought is internally dialogical, polemically colored, and filled with opposing forces . . . open to inspiration from outside itself . . . . (1985, p. 26) Openness is an intrinsic feature of dialogue, and the recognition of openness a necessary condition for the understanding of individual life. Or as Bakhtin (1985) said, “ Theg e nui nel i f eoft hepe r s ona l i t yc a nbepe ne t r a t e donl ydi a l og i c a l l y,a ndt he nonl y whe ni tmut ua l l ya ndvol unt a r i l yope nsi t s e l f . ”( p.4 8 )Ba kht i n’ sc onc e pt i onof

218 di a l og uei sope n,“ unf i na l i z e d”a ndhi g hly personal. People respond to each other and t he r e f or e ,“ adi a l og i c a lr e a c t i onpe r s oni f i e se ve r yut t e r a nc et owhi c hi tr e a c t s . ”( p.1 5 2 ) Holquist (1990) pointed out that Bakhtin opposed abstract objectivism, which treats language as a pure system of rules that manage phonetic, grammatical and lexical forms that confront individual speakers. Rather, Holquist viewed Bakhtin as a theorist who vi e wst hei ndi vi dua la st he“ I ”whoi si nf ul lc ont r olofme a ni ng .Thedi a l og i cna t ur eof conversation allows for both the existence of preexisting structures of language and the subject as an innovative agent (Holquist, 1990).

For Bakhtin, the idea of dialogue opens the possibility to differentiate the inner world of one and the same individual in the form of an interpersonal relationship.

Therefore, Bakhtin provided the theoretical bridge on how various persona, self a t t r i but e s ,ori de nt i t i e sc a n“ t a l k”wi t he a c hot he rwhi l ema i nt a i ni ngt hec onc e ptofa nuclear self. Bakhtin created this bridge by spatializing these persona, self attributes, or identities. Whether the voice represents the inner world or the outer world is not important. The effect of the spatialization of voice creates the possibility of relativity of meaning. Or as Holquist (1990) stated: Dialogism argues that all meaning is relative in the sense that it comes about only as the result of the relation between two bodies occupying simultaneous but different [emphasis in original] space, where bodies may be thought of as ranging from the immediacy of our physical bodies, to political bodies and the bodies of ideas in general ideologies. (p. 20-21)

219 The effect of spatialization also creates a complementary model with self psychology, which views from a structural point of view a bipolar self in dialogue. This dialogic model allows us to return to Chapter VIII and the development of the self-narrative.

Wi t hBa kht i n’ sc ont r i but i on,t hes e l f -narrative can have a polyphonic composition of multiple themes and therefore, multiple voices. I want to examine this area next.

I think that the reader can now see that as the result of my conceptual e xpl or a t i ons ,t hec onc e pt sof“ s e l f ”a nd“ di a l og ue ”c a nbeme a ni ng f ul l yc ombi ne di nt o a third conceptualization which Hermans and Kempen (1993) have called the “ di a l og i c a ls e l f . ”Thedi a l og i c a ls e l fi st hes e l ft ha tde ve l opsi ndi a l og uewi t hi t s e l fa nd ot he r swi t hi nac ont e xt .Thi si sa not he ra ve nuet owha tweha ves e e na sPa l ombo’ s ( 2 0 0 1 )f or mul a t i ont ha tanuc l e a rc or es e l fc r e a t e sone ’ ss e l f -narrative.

The dialogical self assumes that there is a relationship between the self and other. This relationship has spatial dimensions as it progresses over time. Stern (1985) suggested that there is some budding sense of self at birth that slowly emerges over time. When mother and infantf i r s t“ l ook”a te a c hot he r ,t he ya r enotr e a l l ys t r a ng e r s because they have been connected in the womb since conception. They are only recently separated when they first meet. The mother gets to know her infant by looking, touching, and talking with the infant (Stern, 1985). This in one sense is the be g i nni ngofadi a l og ue ,a“ ba c ka ndf or t h”be t we e nt hei nf a nta ndt hemot he r .The i nf a nt“ knows ”t hemot he ra ndt hemot he r“ knows ”he ri nf a nt .Ka ye( 1 9 7 7 )r e por t e d that from birth babies suck in a regular pattern of bursts. The mother becomes sensitive to this pattern and acts in correspondence to it, i.e., when the baby sucks, the

220 mother is quiet. Then when the baby pauses, the mother touches it, and talks to it.

Overtime, the baby and the mother develop a back and forth rhythm of your turn, my t ur n.Themot he rt r e a t st heba by’ sbur s t sa st heba by’ st ur na ndt hi sr hyt hm c r e a t e sa highly structured pattern of interaction. In fact, the mothers treat the process as if they were in actual conversation with the baby. Stern (1985) reported that in this imagined conversation the mothers will wait the length of a conversational pause and listen for an imagined response before continuing. As the baby develops, the interaction between the baby and the world follow this rhythm of conversation according to Hermans and Kempen (1993).

Hermans and Kempen (1993) posited that there are four developmental prerequisites that precede the emergence of the dialogical self. First the mother and child interact from birth onward. The mot he rt r e a t st hec hi l d’ sa c t i ons ,whi l er e a l l y biological impulses, as if these impulses are dialogical and meaningful. The parents also t r e a tt heba by’ ss pont a ne ousbi ol og i c a lmove me nt sa si ft heba bywa sg e s t ur i ngt oa social world, i.e., the parents maket he s emove me nt sme a ni ng f ul .Thi s“ a si f ” treatment eventually makes these impulses and movements meaningful to the child. It is the interaction of other and baby, a kind of pseudo-dialogue, that eventually gives r i s et ot hec hi l d’ sdi a l og i c a lpot e nt i a l .

Next, the development of memory allows the child to do more than live purely in the present. The child is able to remember events in time even when the actual event is not actually perceptually present. Memories of the past enable the child to

221 bring a past into the present. This allows for a relationship to develop within the child which distinguishes past from present.

Imagination provides the possibility to combine real events with past memories to create new thoughts that are not a copy of a perceived reality. Imagination provides for alternative ideas, experiences, and the use of past experiences to create something new.

Finally, the acquisition of language allows the child to exchange with others her/his remembered past and the ideas and experiences she/he have imagined. In addition, the child begins to take a spatial position in relationship to the other. The c hi l dbe g i nst oi de nt i f ya n“ I ”a ndus et hi s“ I ”a sar e f e r e nc epoi ntt oor g a ni z e information and knowledge about the world. By the specific combination of language, memory, and imagination, the child with the help of the parent can construct a story about her/his experiences. This narrative over time becomes a self-narrative with the development of autobiographical memory (K. Nelson, 1993b) around age three. The c hi l dt he nbe g i nst ot r a ns f or m“ youa r e... ”s t a t e me nt si nt o“ Ia m ... ”s t a t e me nt s .

Mos ti mpor t a nt l y,t he“ youa r e... ”s t a t e me nt sa r enots i mpl yc opi e di nt ot he developing self-narrative, but are certainly a major influence as we have seen earlier.

Imagination and experience work together to create an opportunity for children to take different roles in relationship to themselves.

I think that the reader can see how a dialogical self is created and that the dialogic and reflexive experiences shape our emerging sense of self. I think this di a l og i c a lpe r s pe c t i vec ompl e me nt sVyg ot s ky’ s( 1 9 7 8 )f or mul a t i onsa boutt he

222 a c qui s i t i onofl a ng ua g e ,a ndKohut ’ s( 1 9 7 1 ,1 9 7 7 ,1 9 8 4 )f or mul a t i onsa boutt he development of a structure called the self. The concept of a dialogical self then serves as the final bridge to a fully contextual model of self development. This conceptual dialogical self allows one to privilege what a researcher learns from a clinical ethnography interview. The dialogical self provides a powerful interpretative lens which looks at narratives of experience and what they tell us about self-narratives and multiple identities created within differing contexts. And finally, the concept of a dialogical self provides a logical linear extension to the methodology of interpretative interactionism used in this study.

223

CHAPTER XII

METHODOLOGY This research has been done using a variation of an interpretative interactionalism methodology (Denzin, 1989b) that examined the individual and collective selfnarratives of a group of adolescents and young adults whose parents had divorced.

These research participants had changed their child-parent living arrangements from t hos el i vi nga r r a ng e me nt ss e tf or t hi nt he i rpa r e nt s ’di vor c ede c r e e .Thes e l f -narratives of this group were collected from volunteer study subjects by using a semi-structured interview process. This study was particularly interested in the personal meanings that adolescents assigned to their lived experiences and how these meanings may have influenced the creation of self-narratives and personal identities.

Research Design The research design for this study was described by Norman Denzin (1989b) in his book, Interpretive Interactionism. Denzin set out a methodology that seeks to look systematically at complex human interactions. Hi sba s i ct he s i swa st ha t“ i ns oc i a ll i f e , there is only interpretation. That is, everyday life revolves around persons interpreting a ndma ki ngj udg me nt sa boutt he i rowna ndot he r ’ sbe ha vi ora nde xpe r i e nc e s . ” (Denzin, 1989b) De nz i n’ sde s i g nha st her e s e a r c he r“ l i s t e nt oa ndr e c or d( s )t hes t or i e s

224 t ha tpe r s onst e l lonea not he r . ”( p.1 1 )The nt her e s e a r c he rbyus i ng“ c r e a t i ve i nt e r vi e wi ng ”c r e a t e s“ t hi c ka ndde t a i l e dde s c r i pt i onsofpe r s ona le xpe r i e nc e . ” According to Denzin, it is through these thick descriptions that the researcher is able to apply her or his personal experiences to that of the participants in an interpretative manner. Lindner (2001) has suggested to Denzin, and Denzin has agreed with his s ug g e s t i on,t ha ta not he rwa yoft hi nki nga bout“ c r e a t i vei nt e r vi e wi ng ”i st ot hi nkofi t as essentially a clinical interview. Specifically, in a clinical interview, the interviewer is t r yi ngt ounde r s t a ndwi t hi nt hec ont e xtofa not he r ’ spe r s on’ sl i f e ,howt ha t interviewee has assigned personal meanings to her/his lived experiences. Lindner (2000), borrowing a descriptive term first used by Patrick Curtis (1988), believed that t hi ski ndofi nt e r vi e wi ngi sa tt hehe a r tofwha theha st e r me d,“ c l i ni c a le t hnog r a phy. ” Lindner, following in a tradition pioneered by Herdt and Stoller (1990) in their book, Intimate Communications: Erotics and the Study of Culture, and Denzin have tried to develop a method to collect deeply multi-contextualized understandings of “ pr obl e ma t i chuma ni nt e r a c t i ons . ”( De nz i n,1 9 8 9 b,p.1 1 )De nz i n(1989b) defined several important methodological terms: Interpretive [emphasis in original]: To explain the meaning of; the act of interpreting or conferring meaning.

Interpreter [emphasis in original]: One who interprets, or translates, meaning for others.

225 Interaction [emphasis in original]: to act on one another, to be capable of mutual action that is emergent. For human beings, interaction is symbolic, i nvol vi ngt heus eofl a ng ua g e ,He nc et het e r m“ s ymbol i ci nt e r a c t i on. ” Problematic interaction [emphasis in original]: Interactional sequences that give pr i ma r yme a ni ngt ot hes ubj e c t ’ sl i f e .S uc he xpe r i e nc e sa l t e rhowpe r s onsde f i ne themselves, and their relations with others. In these moments, persons reveal personal character.

Interpretative interactionism [emphasis in original]: That point of view that confers meaning on problematic symbolic interaction. (pg. 12-13) Therefore, researchers who are applyi ngt hi sme t hodol og ya r e“ i nt e r pr e t e r sof problematic, lived experiences involving symbolic interaction between two or more pe r s ons . ”( p.1 3 )Thei nt e r pr e t a t i ver e s e a r c he ri sl ooki nga t“ t hos el i f ee xpe r i e nc e st ha t radically alter and shape the meanings persons give to themselves and their life pr oj e c t s . ”( p.1 5 ) Thi sr e s e a r c hme t hodol og yf oc us e son“ i nt e r a c t i ona lmome nt st ha tl e a ve s ma r ksonpe opl e ’ sl i ve s ,...a ndha vet hepot e nt i a lf orc r e a t i ngt r a ns f or ma t i ona l e xpe r i e nc e sf ort hepe r s on. ”( p.1 5 )De nz i nc a l l st he s emome nt s“ e pi pha ni e s . ”( p.1 5 ) Wha tDe nz i ni st r yi ngt oc a pt ur ewi t ht hi st e r ma r et hos emome nt st ha ta r e“ of t e n i nt e r pr e t e d,bot hbyt hepe r s ona ndbyot he r s ,a s‘ t ur ni ngpoi nte xpe r i e nc e s , ’ ”at e r m that Denzin appropriated from A. L. Strauss (1959). By using this term, epiphany, De nz i na ppe a l e dt ot hewor d’ sl ongc onnot a t i vehi s t or ywi t hi nwe s t e r n-European Christian culture. Denzin was aware of this associative word link, and by using this

226 l i nka g eDe nz i ns e e me dt ohopet odr a ma t i z et he“ t r a ns f or ma t i ona lmome nt ”t ha the and other interpretative researchers are trying to capture in their work.

Denzin (1989b) de f i ne df ourf or msofe pi pha ny.Thema j ore pi pha nyi s“ a n e xpe r i e nc e( t ha t )s ha t t e r sape r s on’ sl i f e ,a ndma ke si tne ve rt hes a mea g a i n. ”(p. 17) Thec umul a t i vee pi pha nyi s“ t her e s ul tofas e r i e sofe ve nt st ha tha vebui l tupi na pe r s on’ sl i f e . ”( p.1 7 )Themi norori l l umi na t i vee pi pha nyoc c ur swhe n“ unde r l yi ng t e ns i onsa ndpr obl e msi nas i t ua t i onorr e l a t i ons hi pa r er e ve a l e d. ”( p.1 7 )Andfinally, t her e l i ve de pi pha nyi swhe n“ ape r s onr e l i ve s ,org oe st hr oug ha g a i n,ama j ort ur ni ng poi ntmome nti nhi sorhe rl i f e . ”( p.1 7 ) The s ee pi pha ni e soc c uri n“ pr obl e ma t i ci nt e r a c t i ona ls i t ua t i onswhe r et he subject confronts and experiences a crisis. ”( p.1 7 )The s ee pi pha ni e sa r i s e“ wi t hi nt he l a r g e rhi s t or i c a l ,i ns t i t ut i ona l ,a ndc ul t ur a l ”( p.1 7 )ma t r i c e st ha ta r epa r tofl i vi ngal i f e and give meaning to lived experiences. Interpretive interactionalism, according to De nz i n( p.1 9 ) ,“ a s s ume st ha te ve r yhuma nbe i ngi sauni ve r s a ls i ng ul a r , ”whi c hi sa term that Denzin borrowed from Sartre. (1981) Essentially his point is that no one can be studied apart from her or his cultural, social and psychological experiences, or as De nz i nphr a s e di t ,“ Eve r ype r s oni sl i kee ve r yot he rpe r s on,butl i kenoot he rpe r s on. ” (p. 19) This singular experience within the universal set of experiences is the interrelationship that interpretative interactionism attempts to explore.

I nor de rt og e ne r a t et he“ t hi c kde s c r i pt i ons ”t ha tt hi sme t hodol og yr e qui r e s ,I met with each of the research subjects and asked them to tell me what Atkinson (1998) c a l l e dt hes ubj e c t ’ s“ l i f es t or y. ”Li f es t or i e sa r et hes t or i e swet e l la boutourownl i ve s .

227 Thes ubj e c t ’ sl i f es t or yme e t st hef i r s tofDe nz i n’ sc r i t e r i af or“ t hi c kde s c r i pt i ons ”i n t ha t“ i tg i ve st hec ont e xtofa na c t . ”( De nz i n,1 9 8 9 b,p.3 3 )Li fe stories have a basic structure, according to Atkinson. For Atkinson (1998),t hepa t t e r nofl i f es t or i e s“ ha s many versions and can be represented as birth, death, rebirth; separation, initiation, r e t ur n;ors i mpl y,be g i nni ng ,mi ddl e ,r e s ol ut i on. ”( p.2 )“ Thel i f es t or ya sana r r a t i ve form has evolved from the oral history, life history, and other ethnographic and field a ppr oa c he s . ”( p.3 )“ I ti saqua l i t a t i ver e s e a r c hme t hodf org a t he r i ngi nf or ma t i onon t hes ubj e c t i vee s s e nc eofonepe r s on’ se nt i r el i f e . ”( p.3 )Thel i f es t or ybe c a met he basis for the rest of the interview process.

Fr om t hes ubj e c t ’ sl i f es t or ya ndus i ngas e mi -s t r uc t ur e di nt e r vi e w“ wi t h oppor t uni s t i ct i mi ng ”(Raine, 2000),Ime tDe nz i n’ st woot he rc r i t e r i af or“ t hi c k de s c r i pt i ons . ”Fi r s t ,Iwa nt e dt o“ unde r s t a ndt hei nt e nt i onsa ndme a ni ng st ha tor g a ni z e t hea c t i on”( p.3 3 )oft hes ubj e c t .Thes e mi -structured interview questions [see a ppe ndi x]a t t e mpt e dwi t h“ oppor t uni s t i ct i mi ng ”t og e ta tt hei nt e nt i onsa ndt he meanings that the research participants assigned to their decision to change or not to change child-parent living arrangements. In addition, the interview questions began to shape the range of possible interpretations that can be drawn from the life stories of the subjects while still maintaining a sense of genuineness for the reader and for the research subjects.

Denzin (1989b) pos i t e dt ha t ,“ t hes ubj e c tma t t e rofi nt e r pr e t a t i ver e s e a r c hi s bi og r a phi c a le xpe r i e nc e . ”( p.3 7 )Hes ubmi t t e dt ha t“ howi t( abi og r a phi c a l l y me a ni ng f ule ve ntormome nti nas ubj e c t ’ sl i f e )i se xpe r i e nc e d,howi ti sde f i ne d,a nd

228 howi ti swove nt hr oug ht hemul t i pl es t r a ndsoft hes ubj e c t ’ sl i f e ,c ons t i t ut e st hef oc us ofi nt e r pr e t a t i ver e s e a r c h. ”( p.3 7 )At ki ns on(1998) with his book, The Life Story Interview,s e e me dt obet r yi ngt obui l donDe nz i n’ st woe a r l i e rwor ks ,Interpretive Biography and Interpretive Interactionalism (1989a, 1989b). Denzin emphasized that the l i f es t or yi sana r r a t i ve .ForDe nz i n( 1 9 8 9 b,p.3 7 ) ,“ a‘ na r r a t i ve ’i sastory [emphasis in original] that tells a sequence of events that are significant for the narrator [emphasis in original] and his or her audience [ e mpha s i si nor i g i na l ] . ”De nz i ndi r e c t e dt her e s e a r c he r i nt hi sme t hodt ot r yt o“ l i vehi sorhe rwa yi nt ot hel i ve sof those being investigated.

He or she attempts to see the world and its problems as they are seen by the people whol i vei ns i det he m. ”( p.4 2 ) . ”Thi si ns t r uc t i oni sve r ys i mi l a rt ot hee mpa t hi c understanding and stance of self psychology (Kohut, 1959, 1982). Hence, there seems t obeana t ur a la f f i ni t ybe t we e nDe nz i n’ si nt e r pr e t a t i vei nt e r a c t i oni s ma nds e l f psychology as a theoretical tool for understanding t het e xta nd“ t hi c kde s c r i pt i ons ” created by this research method.

Since interpretative research as described by Denzin is at its core about biographical experience, the biographical experience of the researcher is a central and essential component in thisi nt e r pr e t a t i vei nt e r a c t i on.Ther e s e a r c he r ’ sbi og r a phy c ont a i nshi sorhe rl i f e ’ ss t or yt ha tdur i ngt hec r e a t i onofa“ t hi c kde s c r i pt i on”mus t come into play, both as a source of common experience and therefore, as a component of empathic understanding, but likewise as a source of interpretative error and misunderstanding. In this regard the reader should know that I, as a stepparent, have had an adolescent decide to change child-parent living arrangements and I have had an

229 adolescent who did not change the child-parent living arrangements set out in the divorce decree. These experiences in my biographical experience may help, or they may hinder me in this research study. These personal experiences are both important to me and have been important in the formulation of this particular research question.

Denzin (1989b) believed that interpretation is a process and not a singular event. The first step that Denzin identified in this interpretative process is that of “ f r a mi ngt her e s e a r c hque s t i on. ”( p.4 8 )Toframe the research question, the researcher mus t“ l oc a t et her e s e a r c hque s t i onwi t hi none ’ sownpe r s ona lhi s t or y,di s c ove rhow this problem . . . is becoming a public issue that affects multiple lives, institutions, and social groups . . . , begin to ask not why but how it is that these experiences occur, and a t t e mptt of or mul a t et her e s e a r c hque s t i on.... ”( De nz i n,1 9 8 9 b,p.4 9 ) Thes e c onds t e pi nDe nz i n’ si nt e r pr e t a t i vepr oc e s si st oc onduc ta deconstructed reading of the phenomenon. This deconstructi on,f ol l owi ngHe i de g g e r ’ s (1982) a ndDe r r i da ’ s( 1 9 8 1 )r e a s oni ng ,s houl d“ l a yba r epr i orc onc e pt i ons of the phenomenon in question . . . including how the phenomenon has been defined, observed, and analyzed. (Denzin, 1989, p. 51) In addition, this deconstruction should ma ke“ ac r i t i c a li nt e r pr e t a t i onofpr e vi ousde f i ni t i ons ,obs e r va t i ons ,a nda na l ys e s .The underlying theoretical model of human action implied and used in prior studies is critically examined and the preconceptions and biases that surround existing unde r s t a ndi ng s...pr e s e nt e d. ”( De nz i n,1 9 8 9 b,p.5 1 )Thi sde c ons t r uc t i ona l l owst he researcher to come to the interpretative process as fully immersed in the field as possible. Since as Gadamer (1975) has pointed out, no work is free of bias and

230 prejudice, the process of deconstruction exposes my biases and my prejudices so that the reader may evaluate my interpretative structure in contrast to other researchers in t hef i e l d.Mor e ove r ,t hi sde c ons t r uc t i onpl a c e smewi t hi n“ t hehe r me ne ut i cc i r c l e . ” Heidegger (1962) a r g ue dt ha t“ t heba s i cc onc e pt sa ndque s t i onst hei nve s t i g a t orbr ings to a study are part of the research. They determine the way in which we get an understanding beforehand of the subject matter . . . every inquiry is guided beforehand bywha ti ss oug ht . ”Ac c or di ngt oDe nz i n: Interpretative research enters the hermeneutic circle by placing the researcher and the subject in the center of the research process. A double-hermeneutic circle or interpretative circle is implied. The subject who tells a self- or personal experience story is, of course, at the center of the life that is told about. The researcher who reads and interprets a self-story is at the center of his or her interpretation of that story. Two interpretative structures thus interface one another. Each circle overlaps to the degree that the researcher is able to live his orhe rwa yi nt ot hes ubj e c t ’ spe r s ona le xpe r i e nc ea nds e l f -stories. These circles c a nne ve rpe r f e c t l yove r l a pf ort hes ubj e c t ’ se xpe r i e nc e swi l lne ve rbet hos eof t her e s e a r c he r ’ s .Thebe s tt ha tc a nbehope df ori sunde r s t a ndi ng .( De nz i n, 1989b, p. 54) In my literature review, I unpacked and deconstructed the terminology and prior definitions in the research literature. In addition, I looked critically at the prior research literature findings to identify both where there was consilience and where there was disagreement. This deconstruction process helped me in examining the

231 personal meanings that research participants assigned to the events reported in their life stories. Therefore, as an interpretative researcher, I have entered into a hermeneutic double circle with my research participants. I attempted to understand and to interpret the effect that changing child-parent living arrangements has on their self-narratives.

The process of deconstruction leads naturally to the third step in Denzin’ s me t hod.“ Ca pt ur i ngt hephe nome nai nvol ve sl oc a t i nga nds i t ua t i ngwha ti st obe s t udi e di nt hena t ur a lwor l d. ”( De nz i n,1 9 8 9 b,p.5 5 )S pe c i f i c a l l y,t oc a pt ur et he phe nome nai st o“ ma kei ta va i l a bl et ot her e a de r . ”( p.5 5 )I ti nvol ve ds e c ur i ngmul t i pl e l i f es t or i e sa boutt hephe nome nai nque s t i on.I ti nvol ve di de nt i f yi nga nd“ l oc a t i ngt he c r i s e sa nde pi pha ni e soft hepe r s onsbe i ngs t udi e d. ”( p.5 4 )Whe nt he s el i f es t or i e swe r e grouped together, I compared and contrasted the life stories of these research pa r t i c i pa nt sa ndIc onne c t e dt he i rl i f es t or i e swi t he a c hot he rus i ngt hepa r t i c i pa nt s ’ own words and experiences in addition to my observations, experiences and interpretations.

Thef our t hs t e pi nDe nz i n’ sme t hodol og yi st o“ br a c ke t . ”Hus s e r l( 1 9 6 2 ,p.86) introduced the concept of bracketing as a way to take a phenomenon out of the world where it occurs. By taking it out of the natural world, the researcher is able to examine and break down the components of the phenomenon. Denzin (1989b) suggested that t hephe nome nonbe“ t r e a t e da sat e xtordoc ume nt . ”( p.5 5 )I nt hi spr oc e s s“ t hes ubj e c t matter is confronted, as much as possible, on its own ter ms . ”( p.5 5 )I ti snot interpreted in the standard terms of the field. The bias, prejudices, presumptions, and

232 assumptions of the field that were isolated in the deconstruction phase of the study are not used during bracketing, according to Denzin. Rather, bracketing involves several s t e ps .Thef i r s tpha s ei st o“ l oc a t ewi t hi nt hepe r s ona le xpe r i e nc e ,ors e l f -story, key phr a s e sa nds t a t e me nt st ha ts pe a kdi r e c t l yt ot hephe nome noni nque s t i on. ”( p.5 6 ) Thes e c ondpa r ti st o“ i nt e r pr e tt heme a ni ng soft he s ephr a s e sa sa ni nf or me dr e a de r . ” ( p.5 6 )Thet hi r di st o“ obt a i nt hes ubj e c t ’ si nt e r pr e t a t i onoft he s ephr a s e s ,i fpos s i bl e . ” ( p.5 6 )Thef our t hi st o“ i ns pe c tt he s eme a ni ng sf orwha tt he yr e ve a la boutt he essential, recurring features of the phenomenon beings t udi e d. ”( p.5 6 )Thef i na lpha s e i st o“ of f e rat e nt a t i ves t a t e me nt ,orde f i ni t i on,oft hephe nome noni nt e r msoft he e s s e nt i a lr e c ur r i ngf e a t ur e s . ”( p.5 6 ) One tool that can help in bracketing is the use of semiotics, which is a t e c hni quef or“ r e a di ng the meaning of words and signs within narrative and i nt e r a c t i ona lt e xt s . ”( p.5 7 )As e mi ot i cr e a di ngdi r e c t sa t t e nt i ont ot heke ywor dsa nd terms that organize a text. It suggests that these terms (signs) are organized by a code, or a system of larger meanings. These meanings are, in turn, organized by oppositions.

The full meaning of a text unfolds as it is told or read. Two key types of signs within a nyt e xta r eme t a phor sa ndme t onymi e s .Ame t a phori s“ t r a ns f e r r i ngt oonewor dt he s e ns eofa not he r . ”( Mc Ke c hni e ,1 9 8 3 ,p.1 1 3 2 )Ame t onymyi s“ t heus eoft hena meof onet hi ngf ort ha tofa not he r . ”( Mc Ke c hni e ,1 9 8 3 ,p.1 1 3 4 )La kof fa ndJ ohns on(1980) argued t ha t“ me t a phori spe r v a s i vei ne ve r yda yl i f e ,notj us ti nl a ng ua g e ,buti n thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think a nda c ti sf unda me nt a l l yme t a phor i c a li nna t ur e . ”( p.3 )De nz i n( 1 9 8 9 b)pr opos e d:

233 A semiotic reading works from part to whole and from whole to part. It uncovers the codes that organize a text, and examines the oppositions that structure meaning. It alerts the reader to the use of metaphor and metonymy in the text. It draws attention to the multiple meanings of key words and utterances within interactional and narrative texts. It asks the analyst to perform both static and dynamic or processual [sic], readings of narratives. (p.

57) Denzin cautioned that there are limits to semiotic readings in thata“ wor dors i g n, taken out of context has meanings that may not have been those experienced by pe r s onsi nt hes i t ua t i on. ”( p.5 8 ) Cons t r uc t i on,a st hene xts t e pi nDe nz i n’ sme t hodol og y,bui l dsonbr a c ke t i ng .

Cons t r uc t i onl i s t s“ t hebr a c ke t e de l e me nt soft hephe nome non. ”I t“ or de r st he s e e l e me nt sa st he yoc c urwi t hi nt hepr oc e s sore xpe r i e nc e . ”I t“ i ndi c a t e showe a c h e l e me nta f f e c t sa ndr e l a t e st oe ve r yot he re l e me nti nt hepr oc e s sofbe i ngs t udi e d. ”I n a ddi t i on,i tc onc i s e l ys t a t e s“ howt hes t r uc t ur e sa nd the parts of the phenomenon c ohe r ei nt oat ot a l i t y. ”( p.5 9 )Cons t r uc t i ona t t e mpt st oc r e a t el i ve de xpe r i e nc ei n terms of its constituent, analytic elements. Construction by bringing together the lived experiences that relate to and define the phenomenon, lays the foundation for the next step of interpretation, which is contextualization.

Contextualization attempts to locate the themes and structures that were developed during the processes of bracketing and construction back into the natural wor l d.“ Contextualization locates the phenomenon in the personal biographies and

234 social environments of the persons being studied. To contextualize, according to Denzin, one must take the following steps: 1. Obtain and present personal experience and self-stories that embody in full detail the essential features of the phenomenon as constituted in the bracketing and construction phases of interpretation.

2. Present contrasting stories, which illuminate variations on the stages and forms of the process.

3. Indicate how lived experiences alter and shape the essential features of the process.

4. Compare and synthesize the major themes of these stories so that their differences may be brought together into a reformulated statement of the process. (p. 60) The goal of contextualization is to show how lived experience alters and shapes the phenomenon being studied.

Framing the research question, deconstruction, capturing, bracketing, construction, and contextualization are the six steps necessary to bring the research phenomenon into sharp focus. Taken together, these interpretative pre-activities create a large body of materials that can provide the foundation for interpretation and understanding. Denzin (1989b) pos i t e dt ha t“ i nt e r pr e t a t i onl a yst heg r oundwor kf or understanding which is the process of interpreting, knowing, and comprehending the me a ni ngofa ne xpe r i e nc e . ”( p.6 2 )The s es i xpr e -steps in the process of interpretation c r e a t e“ t hi c kde s c r i pt i ons . ”Thi c kde s c r i pt i onss e e k“ t obr i ngl i ve de xpe r i e nc ebe f or e

235 the reader . . . so that a willing reader can share vicariously in the experiences that have be e nc a pt ur e d. ”( p.8 3 ) Thick descriptions does more than . . . record what a person is doing. It goes beyond mere fact and surface appearances. It presents detail, context, emotion, and the webs of social relationships that join persons to one another. Thick description evokes emotionality and self-feelings. It inserts history into experience. It establishes the significance of an experience, or the sequence of events, for the person or persons in question. In thick description, the voices, feelings, actions, and meanings of interacting individuals are heard. (Denzin, 1989b, p. 83) Thick descriptions create verisimilitude. Verisimilitude is the term in qualitative research that encompasses what reliability and validity do in quantitative research.

Verisimilitude is the feeling created in the reader that she/he has experienced or could experience the events being described.

In addition to the audio taped interviews, I kept what Van Maanen (1988) has c a l l“ f i e l dnot e s , ”onmyf e e l i ng s ,r e a c t i ons ,i de a s ,a ndpa r t i a li nt e r pr e t a t i onst ot he r e s e a r c hi nt e r vi e ws .The s e“ f i e l dnot e s ”we r ej our na l e ddur i nge a c hi nt e r vi e wa nda f t e r e a c hi nt e r vi e wt ohe l pc or r e l a t et her e s e a r c he r ’ se xpe r i e nc e swi t ht hos eoft her e s e a r c h s ubj e c t s .I na ddi t i on,t he s e“ f i e l dnot e s ”we r eong oi ngt hr oug houtt hee nt i r er e s e a r c h process in order to capture the moments in which I empathically shared the research pa r t i c i pa nt s ’e xpe r i e nc e s .

236 Participants This research was conducted with adolescents and young adults, ages 17 years old to 31 years old, whose parents had divorced during their childhoods. There were 12 participants in this study. Five participants became involved with the research because of personal contacts with the researcher, and 7 participants become involved because of seeing an advertisement in a local college newspaper asking for research participation. All the participants were paid one hundred dollars for their participation. All the participants made a decision to change their child-parent living a r r a ng e me nt sa ss e tf or t hi nt he i rpa r e nt s ’di vor c ede c r e e .Fourpa r t i c i pa nt swe r ema l e s and 8 participants were female. Ten participants were Caucasian; one participant was Black; and one participant was of mixed race, Black and Middle-Asian. All the participants completed either the Achenbach Youth Self-Report Ages 11—18 or Adult Self Report Ages 18—59 as appropriate for their ages.

All the participants before participating in this research have signed informed assent and consent forms (Appendix A) that had been approved by an IRB panel at the Institute for Clinical Social Work, Chicago, Illinois. One participant under age 18 also had signed parental consent for being in this research study. All participants were aware that they could withdraw at any time during the research process. While the participants of this research may have been considered to be a vulnerable population because of the danger of reactivating feelings of loss from the original divorce process, or by virtue of their age, none of them needed to use the safe guards that were built in to the informed consent process of using the outside designated therapist. One

237 pa r t i c i pa ntdi dne e dmyc l i ni c a lhe l pt or e f r a met hepa r t i c i pa nt ’ sl i f es t or ya f t e r becoming overwhelmed with feelings that the interview process had stirred up. There was no deception involved in this research and I adhered to the ethical principles of Clinical Social Work with respect to children and adults throughout. (Greig & Taylor, 1999; Leever & Mulaney, 1999; Melton & Stanley, 1996; Reamer, 1990; Services, 1996; Stanley & Sieber, 1992)

Setting The interviews were conducted in my professional suburban office. I made every attempt to make the research participants feel as comfortable as possible. I paid for any transportation help needed to get to my office from the participants home.

Instruments After obtaining a signed informed assent from the adolescents in addition to a signed c ons e ntf r om t hea dol e s c e nt ’ spa r e nt ,oras i g ne dc ons e ntbyt hepa r t i c i pa nta dul t s , both groups were administered the age appropriate Achenbach screening surveys.

After the participants had finished completing the age appropriate instruments, I began a semi-s t r uc t ur e di nt e r vi e wpr ot oc ol“ wi t hoppor t uni s t i ct i mi ng ”(Raine, 2000). The interviews were audiotape recorded and transcribed.

The research interviews were tape recorded on audiotape. These audio- tapes were then transcribed to a written text. The written text was also saved electronically on a computer disk. Using the find and replace functions of a computer word

238 processing program, I assigned new proper first names to the subjects and persons that are mentioned in the text body. I assigned names keeping gender accurate by rolling t wodi c et opi c kwome n’ sna me sa ndIr ol l e dt hr e edi c et opi c kyoungme n.The number of dice was di c t a t e dbyt heor g a ni z a t i onofLa ns ky’ s( 1 9 9 7 )book,Fifteen Thousand Plus Baby Names. I nt hi sbookg i r l ’ sna me sa r ei nt hef i r s t9 9pa g e sa ndboy’ s names are in the pages following page 100. Then, I rolled two dice again to pick the name on the page to use as a substitute for the actual name. In this last roll, I did use some personal judgment about the exact name so that the name seemed to fit my impression of the research participant.

239

Chapter XIII

FINDINGS

Introduction to the Findings I have created in the previous chapters an interpretative point of view for analyzing the research findings. I have met with 12 research participants and I have interviewed them using the methodology I have previously defined as Clinical Ethnography. In addition, each participant completed either an Achenbach Youth Self Report or an Achenbach Adult Self Report. Each participant was found to be “ nor ma l ”ba s e dupont hec r i t e r i ae s t a bl i s he df ort heS e l fRe por tFor mt he yc ompl e t e d.

This means that all the participants would be considered normal in terms of standard mental health categories.

I will introduce each participant in a narrative form using her/his interview with me. The specific narrative form that I have used has been influenced by my career as a psychotherapist, and by my reading of Kenneth Burke (1969a, 1969b). He postulated that human action could only be understood by approaching it from multiple perspectives and by examining the dialectical tensions that exist among and be t we e nt he s epe r s pe c t i ve s .Bur ke ’ st ool for this examination was the pentad, which was a dramatistic perspective of human action and motives:

240 We shall use five terms as generating principles of our investigation. They are: Act, Scene, Agency, Agent, Purpose. In a rounded statement about motives, you must have some word that names the act (names what took place, in thought or deed), and another that names the scene (the background of the act, the situation in which it occurred; also, you must indicate what person or kind of person (agent) performed the act, what means or instruments he used (agency), and the purpose. Men may violently disagree about the purposes of a given act, or about the character of the person who did it, or how he did it, or in what kind of situation he acted; or they may even insist upon totally different words to name the act itself. But be that as it may, any complete statement about motives will offer some kind of answers to these five questions: what was done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who did it (agent), how he did it (agency), and why (purpose). (1969a, p. xv) In the presentation of their stories I will endeavor to capture and maintain the pa r t i c i pa nt ’ svoi c ea sIhe a r di ta ndr e c or de di t .Theg oa loft he s ena r r a t i ve si st og i ve the reader a sense of verisimilitude about the stories that each of these research participants told. In addition, I will present my own feelings, comments, and conjectures about the stories as they were being told to me. I found all of the pa r t i c i pa nt s ’l i f es t or i e sc ompe l l i ng .I felt that their testimonies to their thoughts, feelings, and their actions that led each of these research participants to change their child-parent living arrangements were thought provoking and challenging. Each of these narratives is a research finding in and of itself. In addition, I will at the end of this

241 chapter use a Bakhtinian (Bakhtin, 1981, 1984, 1985, 1986) rhetorical device to create a dialogical interchange between the various narratives to extend and amplify the research findings.

Colleen: Growing Up Without Generational Boundaries Col l e e ns t a r t e dhe rl i f es t or ybyt e l l i ngmet ha t“ I ’ m ave r ys e ns i t i vepe r son.

Tha t ’ st hebi gt hi nga boutme . ”Ia s ke dhe ra boutbe i ngas e ns i t i vepe r s ona nds he replied, Ac t ua l l y,Idon’ tr e me mbe ral ot ,l i kemyme mor ya sf a ra swhe nIwa sl i t t l e .I don’ tr e me mbe rbe i ngt hewa yIa m now.Ig ue s sIdi dn’ tha vet hei s s ue sl i keI ha venow,s oIg ue s si t ’ ski ndofdi f f e r e nt .Butl i kes t uf fdi dn’ tus e dt obot he r me at all. Something would happen and it would just kind of be like okay, like little stuff. Big stuff—Idon’ t —i t ’ smor es i nc eI ’ veg ot t e nol de r .

Ia s ke dwha twe r eCol l e e n’ sc ur r e nti s s ue sa nds hes a i d,“ J us ts t upi ds t uf fl i kef i g ht i ng with friends and like big tests and going out and homecoming—s t uf fl i ket ha t . ”I r e s ponde dt oCol l e e n’ si ni t i a lde s c r i pt i onwi t hc onf us i on.Iwa ss t r uc kbyt hec ont r a s t be t we e nCol l e e n’ sr e por tofonc ebe i ngnots e ns i t i ve( “ s t uf fdi dus et obot he rme ” ) ,a nd he rc ur r e nts t a t eoff e e l i ng .Col l e e n’ sa wa r e ne s soft hi swa sc l oudy.Iwa nt e dt oknow more about how and when this shift happened in her life story, so I entered into a dialogue with her. I as ke dhe r ,“ Wha tc a nyout e l lmea boutyourpa r e nt ’ sdi vor c ea nd howyouf e l ta bouti t ? ”Formet hi sque s t i onbe g i nst os e tupwha tBur ke( 1 9 6 9 a , 1969b) has called a scene. Colleen responded,

242 I tdi dnotbot he rme .Tha t ’ st heonet hi ngt ha tha sr e a l l ys e e me d weird to me, t ha ti tdi dnota f f e c tme .Li keIdon’ tr e me mbe r —I remember when they like t ol dmeorwha t e ve r .Idon’ tr e me mbe rhowIr e s ponde d.Buti t ’ sne ve r bothered me. Like I took it all, like moving and everything, I took it fine. And up until—like eve nnow,i tdoe s n’ tr e a l l ybot he rme .Theonl ypa r tofi tt ha t bothers me is when they fight about like money and I get brought into it.

Tha t ’ st heonl yt hi ngt ha t ’ se ve r ybot he r e dmea bouti t .S oI ’ veha ndl e di t pretty well.

I continued to set the scene for Colleen by scaffolding her story; I continued to ask her t oor i e ntmei nt i me .S hes a i d,“ Iha venoc l ue .Iha venoi de aUm—I think it was a r ounds i xt hg r a de ,butIdonotknowi ft ha ti sr i g htornot .Tha ti sj us twha tIt hi nk. ” I next asked her to tell me about the initial visitation schedule that her parents had set up for her in their divorce decree. Colleen told me, It was—well, I remember we got to go shopping for all the stuff, because every other weekend we were going to stay with my dad, and I think on Wednesdays.

I twa s n’ t —like it just—Idon’ tknow—Idon’ tknow.I tj us twa soka y.I tj us t wor ke d.I twa soka y,t oda y’ sWe dne s da y.Weg os e eda d.Ine ve rr e a l l yt houg ht about it. It just was.

I clarified with Colleen that she was seeing her father Wednesday and every other we e ke ndwhi c hi sat ypi c a lvi s i t a t i ons c he dul et he s eda ys .S hea dde d,“ Andt he ni f there was like a special, something special, then it was fine. There was never any

243 c onf l i c ti fwec oul dg owi t hmyda donada yt ha twa s n’ tWe dne s da yor something like t ha t . ” The introduction to her story led me to consider what was the larger context of Col l e e n’ swor l d.Ikne wt ha ts hewa saj uni ori napa r oc hi a lhi g hs c hooli nas ma l l midwestern city of lower middle class means. Both of her parents worked full time.

Her father had completed college and her mother had completed high school. I was interested in her peer group, so I asked her if she had friends whose parents were divorced. Colleen answered, A lot of—actually, most of my friends—all my c l os ef r i e nds ’pa r e nt sa r e .Idon’ t think I have any close friends whose parents are still together. I never thought a boutt ha tbe f or e .Idon’ tknow.Idon’ tknowi fi tj us tt ur ne doutt ha twa y.

Li keoneofmyf r i e nd’ sda di si nj a i l .Idon’ tknow.Ine ve r thought about it before. Like my—I do have people close to me whose parents are together. But now I was just thinking—Iwa sj us tl i keIwonde rwha tt ha t ’ sl i ke —thinking a boutwha ti t ’ sl i ke .Idon’ tknow.Idon’ tr e a l l yne c e s s a r i l yt hi nkt he r e ’ sa ny corre l a t i onbe t we e nt hef a c tt ha tI ’ mf r i e ndswi t hpe opl et ha ta r ea l s o—Idon’ t know. It just seems normal. Like going to their house is just like—I ’ vene ve r t houg hta bouti tunt i lr i g htnow,t ha tt he y’ r ea l ldi vor c e d.Myoneg oodf r i e nd, he rda d’ snot —like he doe s n’ tl i vehe r e .Ig ue s smyot he rg oodf r i e nd’ sda di si n j a i l ,s oi t ’ ski ndofadi f f e r e nts i t ua t i ont ha nIha ve .Butt he i rpa r e nt sa r ea l l divorced.

244 I next asked her how comfortable she was with the original visitation schedule.

Colleen said, It was f i ne .Ir e me mbe rnotl i ki ngg oi ngt omyda d’ s ,be c a us ei twa sbor i ng .

Because there was not really anything—youj us twa t c he dTV.S ot ha t ’ swha t —I r e me mbe rt ha t .Idi dn’ tmi ndi t .I tj us twa s n’ t —l i kebe i nga thome ,you’ r emor e comfortable and everything. AndIdi dn’ t ,Idon’ tknow—it never bothered me as far as I can remember. It was just fine. I just went with it.

This self description seemed to me unexpected for someone who changed child-parent living arrangements. I followed up my surprise by asking her to describe how she became a person that just went with the flow of life and whether this was a general trait of hers. She answered, Ye a h.Pr e t t ymuc h.Idon’ tknow.I ’ vebe e nl i kenot i c i ngl i kedi f f e r e ntt hi ng s like recently about myself like if I could jus tg owi t ht hef l ow,butIj us tdon’ t want to any more sometimes. Depends on like what the situation is. But for the mos tpa r t ,It hi nkI ’ m pr e t t ymuc hj us twha t e ve r .

For me the scene was now set to look at my research question and to learn how Colleen decided to change her child-parent living arrangements. How does Colleen go f r om as t a t eof“ wha t e ve r ”t obe i nga na c t i vea g e nta ndc ha ng ehe rs i t ua t i on?

Colleen told me that: Um—I know that my mom and I were fighting a lot about like everything. I don’ te ven, like, my memory really is not—l i kei t ’ sa l ls ke t c hy,e ve nt houg hi t wa sonl yl i ket woye a r sa g o.ButIknowt ha tI ’ dki ndofl i kej us tc omeupwi t h

245 the idea in my head, because I know—someone must have told me like if you di dn’ tl i vewi t h—or one of my friends or someone must—I must have somehow g ot t e nt hei de ai nmyhe a dt ha ti fIdi dn’ tl i vewi t hmymom,wewoul dn’ tf i g ht a smuc hbe c a us et he r ewoul dn’ tbea smuc hs t uf ft of i g hta bout .Iknowt ha tI saw all my friends and how they were with their parents. Like I think I kind of wanted that. Like I hated fighting. It was pretty much like taking over my life, the fighting with my mom. And I hated it. I know there had been a few times I ha dme nt i one di ta ndt he nt hi ng swoul dc a l m down.Andt he nt he y’ ds t a r tup a g a i n.Andf i na l l y,Iwa sj us tl i keIc a nnott a kei ta nymor e .S ot ha t ’ sba s i c a l l y why—Ij us tc oul dn’ tt a ket hef i g ht i ng .

I heard Colleen in these comments struggling with the idea that she could not ha veha dt hei de at os t opl i vi ngwi t hhe rmot he r( “ s ome onemus tha vet ol dme ” )a nd then coming to accept that because of the fighting with her mother that she could have ha dt hei de a .Thi ss hi f tf r om ‘ c oul dn’ tha veha d’t o‘ c oul dha veha d’c onve ye dt ome that this thought was not a fully integrated part of Col l e e n’ ss e l fna r r a t i ve .I ta l s o suggested to me that for her to consider taking action she had to feel really pushed. She was able to say that on one hand she felt pushed by the fighting and on the other hand she felt pushed by the feeling that the fighting was taking over her life. Her subtle rhetorical shift was very interesting to me. By using the metaphor of being pushed Colleen can be both a kind of victim of the fighting (I can not do anything about this) and she can maintain her sense of agency (I can do something about this) at the same time. I believed that this was more than a rhetorical strategy in her storytelling,

246 because it reflected some actual incoherence in her story. It may mark a continuing ambivalence that she felt about her decision to change her child-parent living a r r a ng e me nt sori tma ybea ni nt e r na ldi a l og i c a lmome ntwhe r es he“ s i des ha dowe d” (Morson, 1994) that she was not sure of being able to act on her own behalf. It will also become an ironic moment in her story as we will see when she reported how she thought her friends would have described her.

Col l e e npoi nt e doutas pe c i a lqua l i t yoft hi sf i g ht i ngwi t hhe rmot he r .“ I twa s l i kewewe r ef i g ht i ngl i kes i s t e r s ;f i g ht i ngj us tf ora nyt hi ng . ”Thi swa sac ons t a nt battle in her words between her mother and her. This constant fighting also occurred with he ryoung e rs i s t e rBr a nde e .Col l e e ns t a t e st ha tt hi sf i g ht i ng“ s t r e s s e dmeouts oba d.I don’ te ve nknowhowl ong[ t he yf oug ht ] .Iha venoi de a .Ir e a l l yc a n’ ts a y. I have no c l ue . ”Col l e e n’ sde s c r i pt i onoft hes i t ua t i ona thome( f i g ht i ngl i kes i s t e r s )f i t sni c e l y i nt oWa l l e r s t e i n’ sr e s e a r c hf i ndi ng s(J. S. Wallerstein & Blakeslee, 1989) that: (a) during the separation and divorce process the children lose the parental functioning of their parents, and (b) in that same vein, mothers and daughter often become companions. In other words there was a loss of the generational boundary and in this specific case, the mother was behaving more like an adolescent than an adult. Colleen captures this finding very well in her story. I asked her to tell me about how long this constant ba t t l ewi t hhe rmot he rl a s t e d.S het ol dme ,“ Um—i twe ntonf orawhi l e .Idon’ te ve n know.ButIj us tknowt ha ti ts t r e s s e dmeouts oba d. ”Whe nIa s ke da bouthe ra bout what she had done with the stress and how it affected her, she responded,

247 I ’ m adi f f e r e ntpe r s on,It hi nk,t ot a l l y,whe nI ’ mr e a l l ys t ressed out. Because l i keIs a i d,I ’ mr e a l l ys e ns i t i ve ,s oIj us t —like, every little thing when I stressed out about something—e ve r yl i t t l et hi ngwi l ls e tmeof fa ndI ’ l lj us ts t a r tc r yi ng orI ’ l lj us tbeme a ne ra ndwa yl e s spa t i e nt .Li kej us te ve r yt hi ng —it’ sl i keIj us t wa r pi nt ot hi sdi f f e r e ntpe r s on.Andt ha t ’ showe ve r ya s pe c tofmyl i f ewa s t he n,be c a us eIwa sa l wa yss t r e s s e dout .Li keIdi dn’ t —I hated fighting, but we c oul dn’ tg e ta r oundi t .

I wondered how she would describe this different person given her allusion to having an alter self. She replied, I t ’ sl i keame ,butl i keat ot a l l yuns t a bl eme .Li keIc ons i de rmys e l ft obepr e t t y e mot i ona l l ys t a bl e ,notwhe nI ’ ms t r e s s e doutore xt r at i r e d.Ij us tt ur n—like every little thing is just going to set me off. Crying or I get really mad really easy or just whatever, however I could react—l i keIwoul dn’ tnor ma l l y,butI woul di fI ’ ms t r e s s e dout .Mos t l yc r yi ngt houg h.

Colleen described herself as being different persons depending on her emotional state.

Thi sde s c r i pt i onofhe r s e l funde rs t r e s swa sma r ke dl ydi f f e r e ntt ha nhe r“ wha t e ve r ” description of herself normally. She was describing two self states. One self state was c ohe r e nc ewhi c hwa si nt e r na l l ye xpe r i e nc e da saf e e l i ngofbe i ng“ e a s yg oi ng . ”The other self state was incoherent and internally experienced as being emotionally labile.

Colleen has described the scene in which her action of changing the childparent living arrangements was going to be played out. What is interesting to me in Col l e e n’ sstory was that she was so aware of these two self states. Further, the scene in

248 which she set her story really only had two other characters beside herself. One was he rmot he r ,whom Col l e e nf e l ta nde xpe r i e nc e da si ft hemot he rwa sCol l e e n’ ss i s t e r .

The other was her sister with whom she had the same relationship as she did with her mother. Her father did not seem a part of her scene.

I had asked early in the interview where Colleen got the idea to change the child-parenting living arrangements. From the discussion above you may remember t ha tCol l e e ns a i dt ha t“ s ome onemus tha vet ol dme ”t ha ts hec oul dma keac ha ng ei n her child-parent living arrangements. This comment foreshadowed the emergence of another character in this scene. A shadow character, who was in the scene, but not actually seen. In actuality her paternal grandmother had told her that Colleen could choose to come live with her. By choosing to live with the paternal grandparents she was also choosing to live with her father, who lived with his parents.

I inquired of Colleen how she had reconciled in her mind going to live with her f a t he r ,whos hepr e vi ous l yha dde s c r i be da s“ bor i ng ”a ndwhe r ei t“ j us twa s n’ t —like be i nga thome ,you’ r emor ec omf or t a bl ea nde ve r yt hi ng . ”Col l e e nr e pl i e d, I know. Tha ti t ’ swe i r d.Iha veal otmor ei nde pe nde nc ea tmyda d’ s .Li keI don’ tha vet o—like it was a lot more—like when I would get home from school wi t hmymom,l i kes hewoul dbet he r ea ndmys i s t e rwoul dbet he r ea ndwe ’ d all have to deal with each other. At myda d’ sIj us tki ndofg ohomea ndt he y j us tl e a vemea l one .AndIl i ket ha tal ot .Nowi t ’ sal ote a s i e rf ormet og ot o mymom’ sa ndbewi t ht he m,be c a us et he y’ r enott he r ea l lt het i me .

249 As Colleen described this shift from living with her mother to living with her dad it felt to me like she had a sense of being emotionally smothered and intruded upona the rmot he r ’ s .I nc ont r a s t ,a the rf a t he r ’ ss hewa sg i ve nmor ee mot i ona la nd phys i c a ls pa c e .He rf a t he r ’ spl a c es e e me dt ohol dt heps yc hol og i c a ll ur eof more independence and certainly less fighting. For Colleen, close emotional proximity s e e me dt oi nc r e a s ehe rs t r e s s ,whi c hs hei ndi c a t e dma dehe rf e e ll i ke“ adi f f e r e nt pe r s on. ” I asked Colleen how her parents had reacted to this decision. She said, I knowmymom wa sups e ta bouti t .Idon’ tr e a l l yr e me mbe r .I ts e e me dt ome that she understood, because I know she hated the fighting, too. But I know that it bothered her a lot. I think it still kind of bothers her. But my dad just ki ndofwa soka y,you’ r eg oi ngt omovei nwi t hme .I ’ ms ur ehewa sha ppy,but Idon’ tknow.Ne i t he roft he me ve rl i kes howe da ny[ f e e l i ng s ] -it just kind of happened.

Col l e e n’ sr e s pons ewa sve r yi nt e r e s t i ngt ome .S hekne wwha the rmot he r ’ s reaction was to her decision. She believed that she and her mother both had similar reactions to her decision and that her mother understood that Colleen had to act, because they both hated the fighting. On the other hand, she does not really know how her father feels about the decision or even, it would have seemed, how he felt a bouthe r .Howe ve r ,whi l es hec a ns e pa r a t ewha ts hebe l i e ve dt obehe rmot he r ’ s feelings, she negated it at the end and reported that neither parent showed her any feelings about her decision. I responded at the time to what seemed to be her relief at

250 notbe i ngs oi nt ouc hwi t hhe rmot he r ’ sf e e l i ng s .Col l e e nwa sa bl et oc onf i r mt ha tnot be i ngs oi nt ouc hwi t hhe rmot he r ’ sf e e l i ng sha dbe e nabi gr e l i e f .S hewe ntont o describe how less emotionally and spatially she felt intruded upon, once she made the decision to live with her father. She began to enjoy her new increased independence.

Howe ve r ,t hes c e nei snotqui t eove r .Col l e e nr e t ur ne dt ohe rmot he r ’ shous ea week later for a visit. She was surprised to learn that her mother had taken her room away and had made it into an office. Colleen reported, Well, see when I move out, they just took my room away. They turned it into a nof f i c e .Andt ha tki ndofbot he r e dme ,be c a us et he nIdi dn’ tl i keg oi ngt he r e be c a us eIdi dn’ tha ve anywhere to stay. Like I remember that really bothered me. Like it felt like—Idon’ tknow,i tj us tdi dn’ t —I was upset, very upset that they just took my room away. They just took everything out. So when I went, I either had to sleep on the couch or with my mom. I just—like it felt like I s houl dn’ tbet he r ebe c a us eoft hef a c tt ha tt he r ewa snowhe r ef ormet os t a y.

This sudden change from feeling intruded upon to feeling displaced dramatically affected Colleen. She reported that she would lose her clothes at her mot he r ’ sbe c a us et he r ewa snopl a c et oputt he ma ndt he r ewa sl e s sa ndl e s sf orhe rt o do there. This vignette to a degree concretized the psychological choice Colleen felt she had to make, i.e., sleep on the couch (being banned from mom), or sleep with mom (being merged with/intruded upon by mother). Her reaction was to stay away f r om he rmot he r ’ sbe c a us es hef e l tt ha ts hedi dnotha veapl a c et og o.

251 I asked her how her friends would describe her. Colleen said that the words to Tom Pe t t y’ ss ong ,“ IWon’ tBa c kDown, ”pr e t t ywe l lde s c r i be dhowhe rf r i e ndss e e her.

We l lIwon’ tba c kdown,noIwon’ tba c kdown You can stand me up at the gates of hell ButIwon’ tba c kdown Gonnas t a ndmyg r ound,won’ tbet ur ne da r ound AndI ’ l lke e pt hi swor l df r om dr a g g i n’medown Gonnas t a ndmyg r ounda ndIwon’ tba c kdown He yba by,t he r ea i n’ tnoe a s ywa yout Hey I will stand my ground AndIwon’ tba c kdown We l lIknowwha t ’ sr i g ht ,Ig otj us tonel i f e I nawor l dt ha tke e pspus hi n’mea r ound ButI ’ l ls t a ndmyg r ounda ndIwon’ tba c kdown He yba byt he r ea i n’ tnoe a s ywa yout Hey I will stand my ground AndIwon’ tba c kdown No,Iwon’ tba c kdown.

Att het i meoft hi sr e s e a r c hi nt e r vi e wCol l e e nha sl i ve da the rf a t he r ’ sf ort wo ye a r s .S hewa sbyhe rf r i e nds ’de s c r i pt i onnol ong e ravi c t i m ofs ome onee l s e ’ sa g e nc y.

I ns t e a ds heha dbe c omea na g e nt ,t ous eBur ke ’ spe nt a di nt hes c e neofhe rc r e a t i on.

252 Josie: Battling the Narrative of the Traditional Family Josie began her story by telling me that she is a very busy person, but is having difficulty figuring out what her career is going to be. She worked three jobs and is also ac ol l e g es t ude nt .Ia s ke dhe rt ot e l lmea bouthe rpa r e nt s ’di vor c ea sonewa yof structuring her story. Josie answered, Um—we l l ,t he ydi dn’ tof f i c i a l l y get divorced for a while. I think it started like when I was in first grade. I want to say—I remember they officially sat us down whe nIwa si ns e c ondort hi r dg r a de .The yof f i c i a l l ys a tusdowna nds a i dwe ’ r e getting separated. Um—I remember my mom was sleeping in the attic and um—s t a yi ngouta tmyg r a ndma ’ shous eal ot .AndIwa syoung .Idon’ tr e a l l y— the thing I do remember really vividly is like asking her about a book she was reading. It was two people on the cover. It was two people holding hands. And I remember asking her is that one a man? She says no. I said is that one a man, poi nt i ngt ot heot he rone .S hes a i dno,t he y’ r ebot hwome n.Ands hes i t sme downa nde xpl a i nst ha twome nc a nbei nl ovewi t he a c hot he ra ndi t ’ spos s i bl e .

I kind of nudged mybr ot he ra nds a i dIt hi nkmom’ sal e s bi a n.[ La ug hs ]And told her. So we kind of had an idea before—Ime a nl i keyou’ r eki ds .You obvi ous l yknowl i kemommy’ snots uppos e dt os l e e pupt he r e .S he ’ sa wa y mor e .The nt he ys a tusdowna nds a i dwe ’ r eg e t t i ngs e pa r ated, which my br ot he rt ooki tal otha r de r ,It hi nk,be c a us ehedi dn’ tr e a l l yunde r s t a nd.I t hi nkt heonl yt hi ngheg r a ppl e dwi t hwa smom’ snotg oi ngt obehe r ea l lt he

253 time. And I kind of liked the fact—butmyda d’ sawor ka hol i ca ndIwoul d never see him.S omyt hi nki ngi soka y,we l l ,i ft he y’ r enotl i vi ngt og e t he r ,t he n da d’ sg onnaha vet obehomea tl e a s tha l foft het i me .S ot hi sc oul dbeg ood.

Li kenowhe ’ sf or c e dt oc omehomea ndt a kec a r eofusa soppos e dt o,you know.

J os i e ’ sope ni ngs howe dmet ha t multiple interwoven stories would play out in he rBur ke i a ns c e ne .Ones t or ywa she rpa r e nt ’ sdi vor c e ;a not he rs t or ywa sdi s c ove r i ng he rmot he r ’ ss e xua lor i e nt a t i on;t het hi r ds t or ywa song e t t i nghe rf a t he rba c kf r om her rival, his work; and the fourth story was about being a workaholic like her father ( t oobus yt oc hoos eac a r e e r ) .J os i e ’ ss c e ne ,It houg ht ,woul dbeac ompl i c a t e done ,a nd I anticipated a cast of characters and agents.

Josie told me about the visitation schedule, which was essentially alternating days with each parent as her parents separated from the family home and eventually got apartments near each other in the same town. Her mother, instead of moving in with her lover, Brie, got her own apartment. Josie thought about her parents: That was a good arrangement. It could have been a very bad situation and it was a very good situation in the sense that they [her parents] could be in the s a mer oom t og e t he r .Ic oul dn’ tde a lwi t ht he ml i ke ,youa ndt he yc a n’ tbei n the same room with each othe ra ndi t ’ sl i kepa s sme s s a g e s .The ywe r eve r y civil.

254 J os i ewa sa wa r et ha the rf a t he rha dne g a t i vef e e l i ng sa boutt hemot he r ’ sr e l a t i ons hi p with Brie, but since her parents continued to talk to each other and since Josie and her brother were young it seemed okay with her.

Josie transposed this previous scene to a larger relational context, when she said, it was also, with my group of friends, it was the norm—Idon’ tt hi nkIha da ny friends who their parents were still together, surprisingly enough. Yeah, most of my friends, their parents were divorced, so it was like kind of the norm whe r et he yl i ve dwi t honepa r e nta ndt heot he rpa r e ntwa s n’ tt he r e .

By having all of her friends from divorced families Josie created for herself a normalized relational context. She was normal just like the other kids. We can certainly appreciate her need to normalize her context, since her mother was c ont e s t i ngs oc i e t y’ svi e wofwha ti sa ppr opr i a t ea ndnor ma l .J os i e ’ sr e a c t i oni s portrayed so that it has a double meaning when she said, Like my mom and her partner, like she was always in the picture. We liked her.

I tt ookusawhi l ef orust og e tus et ot hef a c tt ha tl i ket hi si swhos he ’ swi t h.

Thi si sl i keas pous et ypef i g ur e .Wewe r eyoung .Wer e a l l ydi dn’ tg r a s pi t .To mei twa sl i keoh,youg e tt ol i vewi t hyourbe s tf r i e nda l lt het i me .Tha t ’ s f a bul ous .The ywe r e n’ tl i vi ngt og e t he r .

I nc ont r a s tt ohe rf r i e nds ,whowe r ee i t he ra tonepa r e nt ’ sort heot he r ,he rmot he r was with someone and there were two people at this home for Josie. I felt this to be a subtle portrayal of her self. She was normal because she was in the same situation as all

255 of her friends while at the same time she is not quite like her friends because her mother was a lesbian and had a lesbian partner. Her story contained awareness of this tension despite her young age at the time this had been happening.

J os i e ’ ss t or yc ont i nue da boutBr i e , s ol i kes hewa si nt hepi c t ur e ,buts hewa s n’ tl i kef ul lt i mei nt hepi c t ur e .And then dad started dating, which was more of a shock in terms of—because of the fact that we were living half and half, he had two nights a week free that he could do this. And um—so it came as more of a shock as in like apparently—I found out like he had dated a couple of women that I never even knew about [laughs] in this time period. And he met Theresa, his wife now. They met and we—that came as more of a shock, because he brought us into that scenario after they had been out for a while, after they were talking serious stuff. That came as like whoa, you give us—youdi dn’ te a s eusi nt ot hi sa ta l l .Li keweme t her—s hedi dn’ tha vea nyki ds .S heha dbe e ndi vor c e d.Um—she had um—and she had wanted children apparently, but like here she gets these two like pretty grown kids.

Josie was shocked to even think that her father was dating. He was a ‘ wor ka hol i c , ’s of orhe ri twa snotc onc e i va bl et ha thewoul dbeda t i ng .J os i ewa s a s t oni s he dt he ywe r e“ t a l ki ngs e r i ouss t uf f , ”pr e s uma bl ya boutl i vi ngt og e t he ror marrying. She, it seemed, had expected that the dating process with her dad would be l i ket hepr oc e s swi t hhe rmot he r ’ spa r t ne r ,i . e . ,s hea ndhe rbr ot he rwoul dbee a s e d i nt ohe rf a t he r ’ sr e l a t i ons hi pwi t hThe r e s a .The r ei se ve nt hepr obl e m ofbe i ng

256 “ g r own. ”J os i ewa si na boutf i f t hg r a dewhen she met Theresa, while she was “ young e r ”whe nBr i ewa si nt r oduc e d.J os i ewa sa l s os hoc ke dbe c a us es hebe l i e ve dt ha t wor kwa she rr i va lf orhe rf a t he r ’ sa t t e nt i on.S hewa ss ur pr i s e dt of i ndt ha ts heha d other rivals.

Unlike Brie, who had not wanted children, Theresa had wanted children, but did not have any children when she met Josie and her brother. Josie story contrasted her life pre-Theresa and after-Theresa. Josie said, a tt het i me ,we ’ r el i vi ng —i t ’ sj us tme ,mybr ot he ra ndmyda d.Andt hi si sl ike da d’ sal a i d-ba c kg uy.Ba c he l orpa da l lt hewa y.Wel ove di t .Wedi dn’ tha ve to—wec oul de a twi t hourf i ng e r si fwewa nt e dt o.Wedi dn’ tha vet oc l e a nour room every day. It was very laid back and very easy going. You now, what do you want to do for dinner. He always consulted with us for everything. And s hec a mef r om aba c kg r oundwhe r ee ve r yt hi ng ’ sve r ys t r i c t .Youma keyour bed every day. You set the table. You wash the dishes. You take out the g a r ba g e .I t ’ sve r y,youknow,di nne ront het a bl ebys i xoryoudon’ te a t .And very whatever, and my mom and my father had a very lax way of raising us, very like—when we were five, they talked to us like we were adults. Which can be good and bad. So she was kind of cramping our style [laughs], as my brother would put it. And then it seemed like in a flash, they decided they were moving in together. It seemed like it was no time at all. And um—they started looking f orhous e s .Andt he y’ dt a kemea ndmybr ot he r ,butweha dnos a ywha t s oe ve r , essentially. Because I—the one house we looked at, I was like this is perfect. It

257 was across the street from my best friend. I was like this is great. Like please.

They ended up getting a house—I was just like—Idi dn’ tl i ke .Toobi g .Um—I a l s odi dn’ tknowa tt het i met hemone yl ike situation of like how it worked l i kehomee qui t yl oa nl i kemor t g a g e .Idi dn’ t —but they kind of consulted us. I t hi nki twa smor eofaf or ma l i t yi nt e r msofl i ke ,we l lt hi si swhe r ewe ’ r el i vi ng .

Get used to it.

The contrast between pre and post-Theresa was startling to Josie. She had been used to t hi s‘ l a i dba c kba c he l orpa d’l i f es t yl ewhe r es hewa sc ons ul t e da boute ve r yt hi nga nd treated as an equal by her father and, she added, her mother.

Theresa was of a different school. She was strict in contrast to lax. She was scheduled, deliberate, and did not feel that she needed to consult the children about decisions. It was the step-mot he r ’ svoi c et ha tJ os i eha dpa r r ot e dwhe ns hes a i d,“ we l l , t hi si swhe r ewe ’ r el i vi ng .Ge tus e dt oi t . ”The r e s awa s“ c r a mpi ng ”J os i ea ndhe r br ot he r ’ ss t yl e .Whi l eJ os i eg r a nt e dt ha ts hedi dnotunde r s t a ndt hemone ya s pe c tof getting a house, she wanted to have an active part in deciding where she lived.

J os i ewa sr e l i e ve dwhe n“ c onve ni e nt l ye noug h,mymot he rmove doutofhe r a pa r t me nta ndg otac ondoaha l fabl oc ka wa yf r om whe r et he yboug htt he i rhous e . ” In contrast with the difficulties she had with her father and step-mother not consulting her, she does not seem bothered that her mother made the decision to relocate without consulting her or her brother. This suggested to me that Josie had tacit knowledge of an underlying dominant cultural master plot narrative. This narrative was hidden from vi e w,butIf e e lt ha ti the l pe dt os ha peJ os i e ’ sr e a c t i ont ot hemove .Thi sc ul t ural

258 ma s t e rpl otna r r a t i ve ,i ts e e me dt ome ,wa st ha toft he“ e vi ls t e p-mot he r ”whot a ke s t hef a t he ra wa yf r om hi sc hi l dr e n( t heCi nde r e l l as t or y) .J os i e ’ sde s c r i pt i onofhe rs t e pmother alluded to this underlying dominant cultural narrative (Bakhtin, 1986).

Josie made some allowances for Theresa as she described other things had been going on in her life during this time. She reported that at the time of the move into the new house, I think it was like seventh and eighth grade that we were living in that house, that I was living in that house. And um—t ha t ’ sar oug ht i mea nywa y.I t ’ sa horrible time. I hated middle school. It was like awful. And I wanted to be with my friends. I wanted more freedom. I hung outwi t hol de rki dsbe c a us eIdi dn’ t l i ket hepe opl ea tmys c hool .Iwa sl i keyoug uysa r el os e r s ,l i keyou’ r eme a n, youg uyst e a s epe opl e .Li ket ha t ’ shor r i bl e .Ha ngoutwi t hki dst ha twe r el i ke me. I wanted freedom. I wanted space.

Josie told me there we r eot he rf a c t or sg oi ngoni nhe rl i f ea tt hi st i me .J os i e ’ s evaluation of this time period was that this was a terrible time in her life. Josie went on t os a y,“ Iwa st ooa ng r y.Iwa sa ng r ya tt hewhol es i t ua t i on. ”S hec ont i nue dt oa dd these further indictments, She was cramping our style. She took our dad away. We were fine and then she had to come along type thing. And also, she was just the opposite. She is the oppos i t eofa nyoneIwoul de ve rs oc i a l i z ewi t hvol unt a r i l y.I t ’ ski ndofha r s h, but have you seen American Beauty?Anne t t eBe nni ng ’ sc ha r a c t e r ?Themot he r .

– In my eyes [laughing] very comparable to her. Very like—very proper—Um—

259 s he ’ sve r ymuc hi nt oa ppe a r a nc e s .Um—whenever friends come over, e ve r yt hi ngha dt obej us ts oa ndj us tl i ket hi s .AndI ’ m like very hey like—and a l s o,It hi nks het r i e dt os t e pi na ndbet hemot he rf i g ur et ooqui c kl y.Idi dn’ t like her telling me what to do at all. [laughs] And there, we got into a lot of arguments. And my dad changed as well. He was just like just do what she says.

He changed into like what she kind of wanted him to be or more like her. And I ’ ml i ket hi si s n’ tyou.Youha vene ve rc omme nt e donhowmyr oom l ooks .

Like I can have my room however I want. I can go out if I want to. You never commented on the way Idr e s s .S heus e dt os a yl i keyou’ r enotl e a vi ngt he hous ei nt ha t .Or ,I ’ m nott a ki ngyoua nywhe r el ooki ngl i ket ha t .Youknow,I was just very angry.

Josie had laid out the bill of particulars against Theresa. Probably the most da mni ngf r om J os i e ’ svi e w was that Theresa had changed her father. She was angry; he rl i f es t yl eha dbe e nc r a mpe da ndc ha ng e dbyThe r e s a ’ se f f or t st oha veas e c ond chance at having a traditional family.

Josie had now set the scene of her action in her story about changing her childparent living arrangements. She introduced all the other characters in her drama and had led me to her decision to change her parent-child living arrangements. Here is the scene that Josie cast and directed, So I started like making nightly trips to my—again, the half a block away thing.

Eve r yt i meI ’ dg e tma da tda dorg e tma da tThe r e s a ,j us twa l konove r .I ’ ml i ke a l lr i g ht ,bye .I ’ mg oi ngt omom’ shous ef ort heni g ht .Andyouknow,s hewa s

260 very like you know, you can stay here, but I want you to work things out with him. You guys need to talk. But me and my dad are both very stubborn and ve r ys e ti nourvi e wpoi nt s .Ve r yha r dt ot a l k.We ’ r et oos i mi l a r .Andhewa s very about smoothing things over with like—it was more about here, but the confrontati onswoul dbewi t hmyf a t he r .Be c a us eI ’ ml i keIdon’ twa ntt odo what she says. You have to do what she says. So my mom was just like this is g e t t i ngr i di c ul ous .Li keIl oveyouhe r e ,l i keyou’ r emor et ha nwe l c ome ,but you have to patch things up with yourf a t he r .Youc a n’ tj us tc omeove rhe r e every night saying like blah blah.

S of i na l l yIt ol dhe rl i kewhyc a n’ tIj us tl i vehe r e ?WhydoIha vet og o ba c ka ndf or t h?I ’ m ne ve rhomea nywa y.Idon’ ts e ewha tt hepoi nti s .I twoul d be better. And for a while—a ndIt ol dhe r eI ’ ml i keohI ’ l lj us tg ot he r eont he we e ke nds ,e ve r yot he rwe e ke ndI ’ l lbet he r e .Andt he nt her e s t —during the week and—he rma i nc onc e r nwa syou’ r eg onnahur thi sf e e l i ng s ,whi c hIr e a l l y di dn’ twa ntt odo.I twa sr e a l l yha r dt ot e l lhi mI wanted to live with mom. But I also felt that like if I kept living there, my resentment would just build and bui l d,a ndIwoul dj us tbel i kes c r e wi ta l l .I ’ m nott a l ki ngt oyou.Be c a us ewe woul dg e ti nt ol i ker a g i ngf i g ht sl i keI ’ ms ur pr i s e dt hene i g hbors never called domestic on us. Um—be c a us ewe ’ dbes c r e a mi nga nds c r e a mi nga nds c r e a mi ng .

And um—like—so I told him—I said, you know—he was just like—he was hurt.

Ic oul dt e l l .He ’ sve r yl i ke —buthe ’ sve r yl i keIdon’ tt a l ka boutmye mot i ons .

He ’ ss uc hama n,ve r yIdon’ tt a l ka boutmyf e e l i ng s .S owes t a r t e ddoi ngt he

261 e ve r yot he rwe e ke ndt hi ngI ’ dbet he r e .Bute ve nont hewe e ke nds ,we ’ d—the t woda ysIs pe ndt he r e ,a ndI ’ dus ua l l ybewor ki ngordoi ngs ome t hi ng .Iwoul d ne ve rbehome .Anyt i meI ’ dc omehome ,t hes a mes t uf f .S oIs a i df or g e ti t .I ’ m done. No more of this. And to be perfectly honest, it saved our relationship.

Josie had created a wonderful Burkeian dramatic scene in this passage. Josie was a ng r y.J os i eke ptl e a vi nghe rf a t he r ’ shomewhe ns he got mad at either her father or The r e s a .He rmot he rpr ovi de dt hes c a f f ol di ngf orhe rde c i s i onbe c a us ehe rmot he r ’ s house was only a half block away which made these nightly leavings materially possible. There were intense arguments with her father, but these arguments were not resolved. Josie did not want to hurt her father and she knew that a decision to move would hurt him. Yet, in the end, Josie decided to live with her mother and hurt her f a t he r ’ sf e e l i ng s .Thei r oni ct wi s tt oJ os i e ’ sdr a ma t i cs c e newa sa tt hee nd,“ I ts a ve dour r e l a t i ons hi p. ” Josie continued to live with her mother through high school and summers before and after her first year of college. Her father and she continued to battle over their relationship. Josie confirmed what Colleen had also reported. Namely, that by leaving the parent with whom they had the most conflict, they were able in time to save the relationship instead of losing the relationship.

Glenda: Following the Tradition of an Older Sister Glenda began her story not knowing where to begin, after she had told me about being the youngest child in the family and that she had a good childhood. I

262 a s ke dhe rt ot e l lmewhe nhe rpa r e nt sdi vor c e d.S her e pl i e d,“ The ys e pa r a t e dwhe nI was actually in the womb. So they got divor c e dwhe nIwa sl i ket hr e e ,butIdon’ tha ve a nyme mor i e soft he me ve rbe i ngt og e t he r . ”Ia s ke da bouthe rt ot e l lmea bouthe r earliest childhood memories. She answered, Idon’ tknowi fIa c t ua l l yha vel i keve r yvi vi dme mor i e sofmye a r l yc hi l dhood, but I do—I think I remember things when I can see pictures of them. So like if I s e eapi c t ur eofs ome t hi ng ,It hi nkIr e me mbe ri t .ButI ’ m nots ur ei fIa c t ua l l y do, or if I just remember the picture. But um—Idon’ tknow.De f i ni t e l y remember taking baths with mys i bl i ng sa tmyda d’ shous ea nddr e s s i ngupa t mymom’ shous ewi t hmyol de rs i s t e r .

Gl e ndabe g a nt oc onve yt omeac e r t a i nc omf or ta tbe i nga tbot hhe rmot he r ’ shous e a nda the rf a t he r ’ shous e .Thi squot ec e r t a i nl ybe g a nt oe s t a bl i s ht ha ts hef e l tapa r t of two different families—onea the rmot he r ’ shous ea nda not he rf a mi l ya the rf a t he r ’ s hous e .S hec onve ye dt hi sa t t i t udes i mpl ybyus i ngt hewor d“ s i bl i ng s ”whe ns pe a ki ng about her step-brothers.

I next asked her about the original visitation schedule. S her e pl i e d,“ Whe nIwa s little, it was every other weekend I was at the other house. And then Wednesdays, I wa sa tmyda d’ s .Butf ort her e s toft het i me ,Iwa sa tmymom’ s . ”Ia s ke dhowt hi s schedule felt to her back then as she thought about it. She replied, Yeah, I liked it. I liked it because—my mom worked full time when I was little.

Well, she still does. And Maria, my step-mom, only worked part time. So she would pick us up from school on Wednesdays. I remember thinking that was

263 really cool. I likedg oi ngt omyda d’ shous eonWe dne s da ys .Ye a h,e ve r yot he r weekend was fine. I played [unclear in the recording] in Evanston [location edited], so I had things going on here that I would come to do. Yeah. But it di dn’ tbot he rmea ta l lwhe nIwa sl i t t l e .Iremember it occasionally being an issue, if there was like something that one of the parents had on the weekend t ha tt he ywa nt e d,t ha twa s n’ tt he i rwe e ke nd.Andt he nt he ymi g htl i kea r g ue a bouti t .Ot he rt ha nt ha t ,i twa s n’ ts ome t hi ngt ha tIwa sr e a l l ye ver involved in.

Glenda was comfortable with the early visitation schedule. She felt comfortable being with her mother and older sister in a western suburb of Chicago and felt comfortable being with her father, step-mother and two step-brothers in a northern suburb. She did not feel like she was involved in the visitation schedule or had problems with visitation at all. She had no sense of agency about this subject. I asked hows hef e l the rpa r e nt ’ sdi vor c eha da f f e c t e dhe ra nds hes a i d, Not really. I think I was really lucky, because they did get divorced when I was so young. And having my step-mom and my stepbrothers was always s ome t hi ngt ha tIr e a l l ye nj oye d.S oIr e a l l yl i ke dbot hhous e s .Idi dn’ tf e e ll i ke angry. I remember sometimes wishing that I only had to go to one house, just s oi tc oul dbee a s i e r .Buti twa s n’ tl i keIpr e f e r r e donepl a c e .Ij us tr e me mbe r wi s hi ngs ome t i me st ha tmypa r e nt swe r e n’ tdi vor c e d,j us tbe c a us ei twoul d have been easier. But it was never like something that really upset me about it.

Gl e ndabe l i e ve donl yt ha ti tmi g htha vebe e n“ e a s i e r ”i nt e r msofl og i s t i c si fhe r parents were not divorced. Otherwise she did not have negative feelings about it. So I

264 wondered what had made her ultimately change the visitation schedule and live more with her mother than her father. Glenda answered this question with, Like we never talked about it or made a change, but my older sister, when she wa si nhi g hs c hool ,s pe ntal otoft i mewi t hhe rf r i e nds .S os hewoul dn’ tc ome outt omyda d’ shouse as much. And I would still come out. And also, just starting in junior high when I started to like go out with my friends on the weekends and be more sociable and like actually have a social life of my own is probably when I really changed. Because I didn’ twa ntt obea tmyda d’ se ve r y Fr i da ya ndS a t ur da yni g ht ,e s pe c i a l l ybe c a us ei twa ss of a ra wa y.I twa s n’ tl i ke — like some people who have divorced parents, and the parents live in the same c ommuni t y.I t ’ snobi gde a lt og oi nbe t we e nt hehous e s .Buti twas always like al ongdr i vet he r ea ndal ongdr i veba c k,s oi twa s n’ tt ha ta ppe a l i ngt obet he r e when I could be hanging out with my friends. It was probably around that t i me .Andi tpr oba bl ye ve nc ha ng e dmor es owhe nIc oul ddr i ve .The nIwa s n’ t so dependent like on my dad saying he was gonna come at 11 and I was gonna come out at 11. It was more like I got to choose when I was going out, because I was driving myself. But um—yeah, probably in junior high time.

Glenda continued in what I can only describe as a pragmatic approach to this interview. She would answer my questions but did not expand her answers or her feelings without being questioned. Glenda did what her sister did about the visitation. I felt that the sister had set a family tradition or precedent by deciding about the amount ofvi s i t a t i ona ndt ha tGl e ndaha dj us tf ol l owe dhe rs i s t e r ’ sde s i g na t e dr i t eofpa s s a g e .

265 She seemed to be able to focus on what she needed in order to live her life. She wanted t obewi t hhe rf r i e ndsa nd“ a c t ua l l yha veas oc i a ll i f e . ”He rr e a s onf ornotbe i nga the r f a t he r ’ swa spr a g ma t i c :“ i twa ss of a ra wa y. ”Byt het i mes hewa sa bl et odr i ve ,s he c oul dc hos ewhe ns hewa sg oi ngt og ot ohe rf a t he r ’ shous e .Thi sa bi l i t yt obei n control and to make decisions for herself appealed to Glenda.

I wondered how her parents reacted to this shift. Glenda replied, It hi nki twa sha r ds ome t i me sf ormyda d,be c a us ehe ’ dwa ntmet oc omeout , butI ’ dha vel i keabi r t hda ypa r t yors ome t hi ngt ha tIwa nt e dt og ot o.I remember having to be like—buts he ’ smyr e a l l yg oodf r i e nd—like having some oft hos emome nt swhe r eI ’ dha vet oj us t i f ywhyIwa nt e dt os t a y.ButIme a ni t was fine with my mom, obviously. I think my dad—I think it probably hurt his f e e l i ng ss ome t i me st ha tIdi dn’ twa ntt oc omeoutmor e ,buti tdi dn’ tha vet o dowi t hhi m orMa r i aormyda d’ shous e .I twa sj us tt hef a c tt ha tIwa nt e dt o hang out with friends and like go to the parties that I was invited to and stuff like that.

Gl e ndawa sa wa r eofhe rpa r e nt s ’f e e l i ng s .S heknew that it had been hard on her father, not seeing her, but he seemed to understand that her life took precedence ove rhi sne e ds .Gl e nda ’ sr e s pons ea l s oc ont i nue dama j ort he meofhe rs c e ne .The theme was one of pragmatics, namely what worked best for me. Glenda added later in the interview, Thi si sg onnas ounds e l f i s h,butIdon’ tr e me mbe re ve nt hi nki nga bouti tor t a ki ngt he i rf e e l i ng si nt oc ons i de r a t i on.Idon’ tr e a l l yt hi nkl i ket ha t —like in

266 looking back, I think they were obviously very sensitive and really nice to me i nt e r msofwha tIne e de d.ButIki ndofj us tt hi nkt ha t ’ st hewa yi twe nt .Li keI don’ tt hi nki tpl a ye dabi gr ol ei nmyde ve l opme ntora nyt hi ng .Idor e me mbe r f e e l i ngg ui l t ys ome t i me si fIdi dnotg ooutt omyda d’ shous e ,butt ha twa s n’ ta bi gi s s ue .I twa sj us tl i keIdi dn’ twa ntt ohur thi sf e e l i ng sorl e thi m down.

Gl e ndaf e l tt ha ts heha da l lofhe rpa r e nt s ’s uppor ti ndoi ngwha ts hene e de dt odoi n her life. Her mother, father, and step-mother understood her social needs, and they understood that the distance between the two homes made it awkward and sometimes impossible for visits. Most importantly, all the adults were proud of Glenda and supported her efforts to be in charge of her life.

Callie: No Place to Call Home Ca l l i e ’ ss t ory started at the present and then looked back at the past. She told met ha ts hec ur r e nt l ywa sac ol l e g es t ude nthopi ngt of i ni s hhe rba c he l or ’ sde g r e e .S he had been working for 5 years and she had rather recently been divorced after a 6 year marriage. She said that I got married when I was 23, got divorced 2 years ago, [laughs] which pretty muc hf ol l owst ha ti fyouc omef r om di vor c e dpa r e nt s ,you’ r epr oba bl yg oi ng to get divorced—50% chance you will. So I was one of the 50%.

I got the impression that Callie felt that she had been fated for divorce because of her pa r e nt ’ sdi vor c e .S hee xpl a i ne dt ha the rpa r e nt ss e pa r a t e dordi vor c e dwhe n,

267 Iwa s3ye a r sol d,s oI ’ vene ve rr e a l l yknownt he mt og e t he r .Um—my stepmother, who—my dad got remarried when I was 9—but she was kind of in t hepi c t ur es i nc eIwa sa bout4 .S he ’ ss t i l la r ound,s ot ha t ’ sag oodt hi ng ,Ig ue s s .

Att het i me ,i twa s n’ t .Whe nIwa swi t ht he m—I told you about that I lived back and forth. From the time I was 3 until I as 12, I did Monday with my mom, Tuesday with my dad, Wednesday with my mom, Thursday Friday with my dad, Saturday Sunday with my mom. Back and forth. Back and forth.

I asked if her parents lived close to each other. Callie replied, Yeah. They both lived like in the same neighborhood, so I was still able to go to the same school, all that. And then I think around seventh grade, I started going one whole week with my mom and then on Saturdays I would switch and go one whole week with my dad. And then on Saturday I would switch, and it would just be a weekly thing.

Callie continued her story as she moved directly into her Burkeian scene when she told me that, And then, I think like shortly after my dad got remarried, that started to be like tenser, because even though she lived there for a while, it was different onc et he yg otma r r i e d.Idi dn’ tf e e lc omf or t a bl et he r e .Andt her ul e si none house were completely different than the rules in another house. So I guess around—just after eighth grade, when I was like starting high, I wanted to live wi t hj us tmymom.AndIwoul dg oe ve r yot he rwe e ke ndt he nt omyda d’ s hous e .Andt ha twa si tl i ket hr oug hhi g hs c hool .Tha t ’ swha tIdi d.

268 My reaction was one of incredulity. After her parents had shared her so completely and fought about her so fiercely, I could not understand how there had not been some discussion between the parents about where she was going to live. Callie answered my question about this with, No, I think it was—It ol dmymom t ha tt ha t ’ swha tIwa nt e d,butIdi dn’ twa nt to hurt myda d’ sf e e l i ng s .The ya l r e a dyha t e de a c hot he r .Tha twa s —like in the be g i nni ng ,t he yt r i e dt ol i kema ket hi ng sl i keonhol i da ys ,t he y’ ds pe ndt he m together. And then somewhere down the line, probably when I was like six or seven, that was a no-go. And then the older I got, the more I had to just—I would have to relay messages, once I was old enough. Tell your mom this. Tell yourda dt ha t .Butt ha tpa r t i c ul a rone ,Idi dn’ ts a yt hi si swha tIwa ntt odo.I wa st oos c a r e da ndIdi dn’ twa ntt ohur ta nyone ’ sfeelings. So I think my mom kind of demanded it and insisted that he follow this rule or whatever. Because they had joint custody like legally. But then as my dad tells it, my mom—when they actually had the actual court date, he says she never showed up. She says he never told her that they were having this date, so when they came and were a s ke dwha t ’ st hel e g a la ddr e s sofs a i dme ,heputhi sa ddr e s s .S ot e c hni c a l l ya nd legally it made him the legal guardian by having his address there, I guess. I don’ tr e a l l yknowhowj oi ntc us t odywor ksnowa da ys .Al otofpe opl edon’ t bother with it. Where was I? So I was saying that—oh, and then so when I chose to live there, I had my mom do it. That obviously erupted into a big fight, and I felt bad. And then whenever—I remember—whenever I would go

269 over there when it was my weekend or it was time to switch—no,t ha t ’ swhe nI was still doing the switch—it was always like such an emotional turmoil every Saturday to go from one to the next.

S oi nCa l l i e ’ ss c e nes heha daf e e l ing sense of agency, but she asked her mother to be the agent. She sent a messenger (her mother), which showed me that she had learned he rpa r e nt s ’me t hodofc ommuni c a t i ng .

Callie continued her story explaining her reasons for change the living arrangements. Speaking of her step-mother and the relationship she had with her father, she said, We l ls heki ndofbr oug hti nt hedi s c i pl i na r i a nr ol e .Myda d’ save r yqui e t pe r s on,a ndhedoe s n’ t —we never really had like a—I get along with him very well, but we don’ tha v el i ket ha tbond,l i kewe ’ r e —we talk about our feelings or he talks about his feelings. Like I could say—besides when I was little—as an a dol e s c e nt ,he ’ spr oba bl yt ol dmehel ove dmewhe nIg r a dua t e df r om e i g ht h grade, when I graduated from high school, and when I got married. Those three t i me s ,Ic oul dpi c k.[ La ug hs ]S ot ha t ’ sl i kehow wea r e .Um—so my stepmother kind of took the disciplinary role, so I obviously had the issues in school of acting out and behavior issues blah, blah, blah. So um—I probably stole from places—s t uf fl i ket ha t .Theobvi ouss e e ki nga t t e nt i onwi t houtnot i c i ngyou’ r e seeking attention. So I would always get in trouble by her. And um—I never l i ke dt ha tt oomuc h.AndIwoul da l wa ysbeki ndofar e a lj e r k,l i keyou’ r enot my mom.S hutup.[ La ug hs ]Nows he ’ soneofmyve r yg oodf r i e nds ,buta tt he

270 t i me ,Ic oul dn’ ts t a ndhe r .It hi nki twa sIha dmymom.Idi dn’ tne e ds ome one e l s e .AndIha t e dt hef a c tt ha tmyda dwoul dn’ ts a ya nyt hi ng —he just let her carry on in this tirade. I was obviously probably not a pleasant person to be around at that time.

Callie had reacted to the disciplinarian role of her stepmother and to the distant relationship she had with her father when she decided to change her child-parent living arrangements. While later in the interview she told me the relationship with her stepmot he rha dc ha ng e d( “ s he ’ soneofmyve r yg oodf r i e nds ) ,s hes ha r e dac e nt r a long oi ng dynamic theme in her self narrative. She said, I think I just always felt uncom—kind of felt uncomf or t a bl e .AndIs t i l ldon’ t have—Ime a nIg e ta l ongwi t ht he mf i ne ,butIdon’ tha ve —like when I lived out of the country and would come to Chicago to visit, I would stay with my f r i e nds .Idi dn’ ts t a ya tt he i rhous e .Li ket ha twa s n’ te ve n—t ha twa s n’ ta n opt i onr e a l l y.I twa sl i keoh,wedon’ tr e a l l yha ver oom—which they did, but, you know.

Interviewer: Fr om t he i rs i dei twa s n’ ta nopt i onorf r om yours i de ?

Callie: No, I asked before, and they said no.

Interviewer: Oh, okay.

Callie: I mean it was very nerve-wracking to like do you mind if—like when Blake and I—that was my ex-husband—when we first moved back, do you mind if we stay there a week till we could either find some place to live or whatever.

Because we were in the Hebrides [location edited], s owec oul dn’ tr e a l l yf i nda

271 pl a c et ol i vef r om t he r e .Andt he ywe r el i kewe l lno,wedon’ tr e a l l yha vet he r oom.S oIdon’r e a l l yknowwha tt ha twa sa bout .[ Gi g g l e s ]Is t i l lne ve rf ound out. I never bothered to ask. Now, actually, in their new house, they probably don’ tha vet oomuc hr oom.Buti nt he i rol dhous e ,t he ydi d—the house that they lived in then. [Giggles] This theme—no place to call home—ha dbe c omeac e nt r a lt he mei nCa l l i e ’ ss e l f narrative. Her mother had always had paramours who had stayed with her for extended periods of time. The needs of the paramours I was told had been paramount t ohe rmot he r ,mor es ot ha nCa l l i e ’ sne e ds .S ode s pi t ehe rc hoi c et ol i vewi t hhe r mother nearly two decades earlier, Callie felt trapped and has lived her life going between houses, countries, and now husbands and lovers.

Esther: An Odyssey to Find a Parent Esther began her story as if she took a page from Genesis, the first book of the old testament Bible. She told me a three generational history, from her grandparents to her, of who begot whom. Her paternal grandparents were holocaust survivors while her maternal grandparents were staunch Irish Catholics. Her father was a nonpr a c t i c i ngJ e w,whi l ehe rmot he rwa sa na c t i ve l ypr a c t i c i ngCa t hol i c .Es t he r ’ smot he r encouraged her father to explore his Jewish roots. Her mother felt that it would be helpful if he felt as connected to his roots as she felt about hers. When Esther was about 8 years old, her father began this exploration. Esther believes that at best her father was ambivalent about his roots, because she remembered parental arguments

272 around Christian and pagan rituals. Her older sister was baptized, while her older brother and she were not. When she was 8, her father began to attend a conservative temple, and she was placed in Hebrew school at the temple. When she was around 11 or 12 years old, her parents separated and her father moved from a conservative Jewish community and temple into an orthodox Jewish community and temple.

Esther understood that her father must have felt a continually increasing t e ns i onbe t we e nhi sg r owi ngor t hodoxya ndhi sma r r i a g et ohe rmot he r .S hes a i d,“ I t hi nkt ha thej us tf e l tt ha thec oul dnoti nt e g r a t ehi sol ds e l fwi t hhi sne ws e l f.... ” Esther continued, So he, I guess de c i de dt ha thec oul dn’ ts t a yma r r i e dt omymot he r ,a l t houg h t he ydi dn’ tj us tl i kes pl i ti mme di a t e l y.The yr e a l l yt r i e d,ora tl e a s tf r om my little eleven or twelve-year-old memory, tried to keep the family together. I think my father kind of knew and understood the impact of divorce on kids.

He brought my mother out to the community, and she talked with other women who had been Catholic who had converted to Judaism and saw their homes and what it entailed to keep a kosher kitchen and just the whole lifestyl e .I nt hee nd,s hej us tc oul dn’ tdoi t .S hea l mos tbe c a meanun,a c t ua l l y.

She has really strong ties to her own religion. She went to Catholic school her whole life. But by the same token, she studied like Russian literature and different religions in college. And so part of her, I think, was really fascinated byOr t hodoxy.Buts hewa s n’ tg oi ngt odoi t .Wa st ha tt her e a s onwhyt he yg ot di vor c e d?Idon’ tknow.It hi nkt ha twa spr oba bl yt hel a s ts t r a w.It hi nkt he r e

273 were probably other things going on, althoug hIc oul dn’ tt e l lyouwha tt he y we r e ,be c a us eIdon’ tknowbe c a us eIne ve rs a w,ne ve rhe a r da nyf i g ht i ng .

Al t houg hmyf a t he rwa s n’ thomeal ot ,s oma ybet ha tha ds ome t hi ngt odo with that. [Laughs] I have very few memories of him being around the house like at homework time or suppertime. So yeah, that was the end of that.

Es t he runde r s t oodt hepr i ma c yofhe rf a t he r ’ sJ e wi s hor t hodoxywhe nhe rf a t he r “ r e ma r r i e ds oona f t e r —an orthodox woman who actually had three children of her own from her previous marr i a g e . ” Esther continued her story by telling me that when her parents got divorced, she lived with her mother and her older brother in a small house. Her older sister had already left for college. Her brother decided that he wanted to attend an honors program in high school, so he left them and went to live with their father and she stayed with her mother. She remembered that, Idon’ te ve nt hi nkt ha tl a s t e daye a ra ndhemove dba c k.It hi nkhewa s unhappy with the school. And also, we were really kind of wholesome, naive ki dsg r owi ngupi nwe s t e r nNe wYor kS t a t e .Idon’ tt hi nkweha da ny minority students in our school at all. We just were kind of really sheltered.

And so even transitioning from suburban, New York, not that suburbia is such a, you know—I think was probably hard for my brother. And he was also very s ma l l .Nowhe ’ sl i ke6 ’ 2 ” ,buthet ookal ongt i met og r ow.S ohewa sl i ke1 6 and really tiny. So he came back.

274 And then my father got married, and moved into a house with his new wife, my stepmother. And I wanted to attend a school for performing arts, because I played the piano and sang. It was a magnet school, and you needed to audition to get in. I at that point—I had been playing the piano since I was 4, and I was really an aspiring pianist and really wanted to pursue it. I think that— everything is such a blur. I think that was the reason why I chose to leave my mother and go with my father, initially, because I was excited about going to this school. So I auditioned and got in and left my mother. [I] went to live with my father and my stepmother and my new three stepsiblings who were younger.

So I went from being the youngest to the oldest. Not only that, but I went from the suburbs to the city. Not only that, but I went from being in a completely non-Jewish environment to an Orthodox environment, which was ont heoneha ndoka y,be c a us eI ’ dbe e ne xpos e d.S oIkne wi twa s n’ tl i ket ot a l c ul t ur es hoc k.Buta tt hes a met i me ,Iwa sac hi l dwhowa s n’ tJ e wi s hnowl i vi ng in a house with two parents—a ndIpr oba bl ys t i l lr e me mbe r e dt he“ ol d”da d.

But now I had two Orthodox Jewish parents, three Orthodox Jewish siblings ....

Esther chose to leave her mother and live with her father because she wanted to pursue her musical talent at a special magnet musical school. Her choice followed in the tradition of her older brother who decided to live with the father to pursue an honors program in high school.

275 Esther reported that, Iwa spr e t t ymi s e r a bl ea f t e rt hef i r s t ,Idon’ tknow,f e wwe e ksbe c a us et he y imposed a lot of rules on me—just things like what I wore. All the other three kids were going to an Orthodox school, and here I was going to performing arts, which was kind of like Fame, if you remember Fame.

That was really artsy and fun and I was kind of a creative kid. And t ha t ’ ski ndofwha tIl i ke d,butIc oul dn’ te ve rr e a l l yg e ti nt oi tbe c a us eoft he s e rules—such as nobody was allowed to come and pick me up in front of the house on a Saturday for a birthday party or anything because it was Sabbath.

What would it look like to have me being picked up and leaving. Or I remember my father bribing me not to go trick or treating, because what kind of model would that look like for my little step siblings, who of course were completely excited that somebody could go and get all that candy. And they wanted to see which candy was kosher. They were perfectly happy with it.

Things like that.

No boyfriends. No mini-skirts. Anything that—rather than explaining to the other children that now we have somebody coming in the house who is not Jewish, and she can do different things than you can do—a ndt ha t ’ soka y.

Tha tt ot a l l ywa s n’ tha ppe ni ng .S oIa s ke dmymot he r —actually, I begged to go back and live with her. I would call and say I was miserable and I hated the rules, and could I please come home. She said no!

276 Es t he r ’ se xpe r i e nc ewa snotl i kehe rbr ot he r ’ s .Whe ns hea s ke d/ be g g e dt omove back home, her mother refused her. The rejection that Esther felt at this point in the interview was palpable. It also foreshadowed a life path for Esther of looking for a parent/any parent which was extremely poignant in the telling. Esther went on to say speaking of her mother, It hi nkt ha t ’ ss ome t hi ngs he ’ l la l wa ysl i vewi t h,be c a us es he ’ st ol dmei nl a t e r years had I known you were going to stay with your father and X, Y, and Z was going to happen as a result, I would have taken you back in a second. They claim that the reason—mymot he rc l a i mst her e a s ons hedi dn’ twa ntmeba c k was because she felt it was healthier for me to be in a two-parent household.

Whe t he rornott ha t ’ st het r ut hort hepa r t i a lt r ut h,It hi nkpr oba bl ys hewa s de a l i ngwi t hhe rowns t uf fa nddi dn’ twa ntt her e s pons i bi l i t yofha vi nga n adolescent around or pre-adolescent around. Not that I was such a rough and t oug ha dol e s c e nt .Iwa s n’ t .ButIt hi nks hepr oba bl ywa s —she still had my br ot he ra r ound.I ’ ms ur et he r ewe r es omef i na nc i a li s s ue s .Ands oIs t a ye d.

Whi l es hes t a ye da the rf a t he r ’ shome ,a nodys s e ybe g a nt os e a r c hf orapa r e nt .

Esther felt that neither parent really accepted her. Her father could not accept her nonJewishness given the choices that he had made. She felt her mother could not accept either. This left Esther alone in the world looking for some understanding and a caring person to be the r ef orhe r .Es t he r ’ ss t or ys ug g e s t e dt omet ha ts hewa sve r ya wa r et ha t there could have been other possible stories for her to tell about herself.

277 Es t he rbe g a nhe rodys s e yunha ppi l ya ndbybe i ng“ pa r t i c ul a r l yme a na ndna s t y and rotten to my stepmother. ”S hec ont i nue d, She had a daughter, and I had never had a little sister. Never had anyone younger than me. But my stepsister was a very dainty little girl with beautiful l ong ,bl a c kha i r .AndIwa sabi tofat omboy.Al t houg ht ha t ’ showIs e ei t ,my stepmother will say—she looked at it as neglect. She thought that I looked kind of like a neglected kid. She always wanted to girl me up and take me out and g e tmef r i l l sa ndr uf f l e s .Iwa st hr i l l e dt odot ha t ,buti t ’ sj us ti nt e r e s t i ngt he different perceptions .Iwa se xt r a or di na r i l yj e a l ousofmys t e ps i s t e r ’ s relationship with my stepmother. I think that my mother is kind of a complex pe r s on,a ndIha dn’ ts e e nt heki ndofmot he r i ngt ha tmys t e pmot he rwa sdoi ng .

She was generally very nurturing. I think I was totally jealous. I was completely jealous. As a result, [I] was the queen of passive-aggressive behavior and just pretty rotten and nasty, especially once I learned that I was not going back to mymot he r ’ shous e .

There was another clash of narratives here. Esther saw herself as a tomboy while her stepmother saw her as neglected. Esther was aware of being totally jealous of the relationship that her stepsister had with her stepmother. She saw her stepmother as notbe i nga“ c ompl e xpe r s on”l i kehe rmot he r ,and she wanted the mothering that she saw her stepmother doing with her stepsisters. In other words, she wanted a parent who would look out for her and not abandon her. It was this wish that Esther in one of the epiphanies of her interview said,

278 So I guess my whole life—t hewhol ec our s eofmyl i f ec ha ng e d.Re a l l y,i t ’ ski nd of absurd when I think about it and reflect on it. But I would go out of my way to intrude upon their relationship and pull my little stepsister away from her stepmother. At any moment, any chance I got—if my stepmother would say— her name is Tamara, my stepsister—come downstairs for dinner. I would say no,don’ tg o.S t a yuphe r ewi t hme .AndIr e a l l ywa sve r yma ni pul a t i vea ndha d her wrapped around my finger. Gosh, it was probably so painful for my stepmother, but did anyone think that maybe we should be in therapy?

Nooooo.Di di te ve re ve nc r os sa nyone ’ smi nd?Nooooo.

Esther was aware that her moving in with her father and the subsequent felt rejection by her mother became a turning point in her life. It was the beginning of a long and continuing odyssey to find a parent for herself and a place to call home.

Ke i r a :Mor eComf or t a bl eEa t i nga tDa d’ sHous e Keira began to tell me about her self by telling me about all the activities that she did during the week. She is a very busy person, to say the least. She was an about to graduate from college. In addition to going to school, she held down a part-time job in a day-care center, volunteered at an old folks home, a food kitchen, and helped a ha ndi c a ppe dpe r s one a c hwe e k.Ass hes a i d,“ I t ’ snote ve nl i keIg e ts t r e s s e doutf r om t ha t .Ij us tl i kedoi ngt hi ng s .Myda di st hes a mewa y.I ’ m ki ndofl i kemyda d,whi c h i ski ndofape r f e c t i oni s t ,al i t t l e . ”S hene xta dde d,

279 Maybe not [a] perfectionist. And then at one point I guess I realized I was doing things for the purpose of doing them completely rather than still doing them to bee f f e c t i ve .S oI ’ ma c t ua l l ymor el a i dba c k,be l i e vei tornot .Le s shi g hs t r ung .

I asked her to tell me about her pa r e nt s ’di vor c ea nds her e pl i e d, My parents separated in 1989. I was 5. I was born in—I guess I was 6. I think I was 5 though. Um—they separated then, and my dad moved out for a little while. My mom was like cheating on him and stuff. She went a little crazy. She had like a big mid-life crisis thing. And so she joined a band and had these strange people move into our house. My dad went and lived in his car down the road, because he is like just the nicest guy—like a big family guy. He has a Catholic fami l y,s ohedi dn’ twa ntt ot e l lt he mt ha theha dg ot t e ndi vor c e d.S o hemove dout .It hi nkt he yf i na l i z e dt hedi vor c ei nl i ke’ 9 4 .The ywe r ei n arbitration forever. They hate each other a bunch, so it was kind of an ordeal.

I asked her how this experience was for her and she answered, I kind of developed a sense of humor about it really early. Because I have one young e rbr ot he r ,a ndhe ’ sr e a l l y,r e a l l ys e ns i t i ve .Li kehe ’ sg ot t e nt hes a mewa y now—he has more of a sense of humor. But so I just kind of took it in stride. I never thought that it was awful traumatizing. I just kind of like—this is what ha ppe ne d.I t ’ sj us tat hi ngt ha tha ppe ne d,Ig ue s s .Ide f i ni t e l yt hi nkt houg hl i ke a coping mechanism that I developed a sense of humor about it. I see it as ironic or [unintelligible] maybe [laughs].

280 Keira has taken a comedic perspective on her situation. She chose to laugh about her situation rather than dwell on the traumatizing and crazy aspects of her situation. She felt compelled to take this perspective and to teach her brother who was “ r e a l l y,r e a l l ys e ns i t i ve ”t ot a keas i mi l a ra t t i t ude .ForKe i r adwe l l i ngonwha ts he l a be l e dhe rmot he r ’ smi d-life crisis or not initially being able to live with her father was too much to bear, without changing the way she gave meaning to these experiences.

She continued, So I had an interesting growing up, because my dad lost his job right away, like when that happened. He was working for an accounting firm. He lost his job there. Then he went to go work at a hospital, and he ended up—he ’ sr e a l l y smart and he works his tail off—and so he worked his way up really fast. And so he was with all these high-powered executives, like going to these big meetings with Senators. My mom joined a band and has like—she had like keggers three times a week, all these wild parties, and band practice. So it was interesting. I got to see both sides of the—it was neat. Like a lot of people [at a pr e s t i g i ousMi dwe s t e r nuni ve r s i t y][ who]ki ndofj us tg ot he r e ,a ndi t ’ sl i ke they grew up in the suburbs and everything was all dandy and super. Little things will shock them. A bad grade is like the worst thing in the world. God, the worst thing in the world was walking in on those three lesbians in my shower [laughs]. It was nothing. I got a D. Who cares? I thought it was kind of cool.

281 Given this description of being with her mother, I asked what the initial childparent living arrangements were. Keira responded, It hi nkt hec our ts ys t e msa r eba dt of a t he r s ,be c a us emymom wa s n’ tf i t .S he was asleep almost all the time. We would get up in the morning—s he ’ dha dl i ke abi gpa r t y.The r ewa sl i kebe e rc a nsa l love r .Ands he ’ sl i ke —she had taken too many shots of tequila or whatever she drinks. She was always asleep, like wasting money on her band and stuf f .Myda ddi dn’ tg e tc us t ody,a ndIdon’ t understand why. I always thought that. So like my dad would say things always—growing up—like maybe you guys can live with me some day. And then he ended up—I forget what year—first he lived with his mom. That was like an hour away. Then he moved to a house maybe like 25 minutes away. It was a little two-family house. This 500-pound woman lived in another part of it. It was kind of funny. Then he always talked about you guys move in with me. So he bought a house int hes a met own,s oi fwet r a ns f e r r e d,we ’ dbei nt he same school district. So that was kind of what prompted us. Do you want the whole moving in story?

Yes, I responded, I really wanted to hear the whole moving story and how it had affected her. She continued, When they were getting divorced and stuff, I was young enough that it was—I just kind of like bopped along. But it sucked, getting custody for my mom, be c a us es hewoul dn’ tj us tl i keputi tove r .Weha dt og ot hr oug ht hec our t system. So we finally decided with my dad that we were gonna do it. We did it

282 t hr oug hhi sl a wye r .Idon’ tr e me mbe r .It hi nkt ha tIha dt a l ke dt ohe ror s ome t hi ng ,a nds hec r i e da ndt hr e waf i t ,be c a us es he ’ ski ndofuns t a bl et obe g i n with. So he had his lawyer write a letter. And I knew that it was coming in the mail for like—i tf e e l sl i kei tt ookf or e ve rt oa c t ua l l yg e tt he r e ,butIdon’ tknow if it actually took that long.

In contrast to the rest of the research participants in this study, Keira had to go through the courts to get the change in child-parent living arrangements. She went on to describe the process, It took forever. And so every day I would race her out, try to beat her to the ma i l boxa ndc he c ka ndma kes ur ei twa s n’ tt he r e .S oImus tha vebe e n—she was driving me to soccer practice. I played soccer in high school—soccer and lacrosse. But soccer was where we were going to. So it was in the fall. She must have—I guess she got to the mail before me, because she was driving me. And I was sitting in the car waiting. And every time—my heart would just race every time I saw her go and get the mail. So I saw her coming and I saw her kind of pe c ul i a r ,l ooki nga tt hi sl e t t e r ,l i kewha ti si t .Idi dn’ tknowwha tt hel e t t e r woul ds a y.Ij us tkne wi twa sg oi ngt os a yl i kewe ’ re suing you for custody. So s heope nsi t .S hes t a r t sr e a di ngi t .S he ’ ss i t t i ngi nt hedr i ve r ’ ss e a ta ndI ’ ms i t t i ng i nt heba c ks e a t .Ig ue s smybr ot he rwa spr oba bl yi nt hef r ont .Idon’ t remember that far. She just starts screaming, like kicking her steering wheel.

Like oh shit. So it ends up—the letter just said that like my dad was suing her f orc us t ody.I tdi dn’ tr e a l l yha vede t a i l s .S os hedi dn’ tknowt ha tIkne wa bout

283 i t .S hewa sl i keyourf a t he ri st a ki ngyouf r om me .Yourf a t he r ’ saba s t a r d.I thinkt ha t ’ swhe nweg ott hei nf a mousI ’ m-the-better-parent speech, which my br ot he ra ndIa l wa ysl a ug ha bout .Hewor ksa l lda y.Hedoe s n’ tc a r ea bout f e e l i ng s .He ’ se mot i ona l l ya bus i ve .I ’ mt hebe t t e rpa r e nt .S heke ptg oi ngona nd on. Because they still—for my graduation—I ’ mg r a dua t i ngi nJ unea ndI ’ ms t i l l having—I ’ veda t e dmyboyf r i e ndf orf ourye a r s ,a nds owe ’ r ef i na l l yha vi ngt he f a mi l i e sme e t .I ’ m ha vi ngt wos e pa r a t edi nne r s ,be c a us et he ywon’ tha vea dinner together, after like 18 years.

I responded to her description of this process saying that it seemed like her parents had not really gotten completely divorced from each other. Keira continued with, Ye a h,i t ’ ss t i l la ppa r e nt l y—t he yc a n’ tqui t es e ve ri t .I t ’ ss os t r a ng e .S ot ha t ’ s whe nweg ott heI ’ m-the-better-parent speech. And whenever she would get mad in the car, which was kind of a—s he ’ sc a l me ddowns i nc e .S heha dj us ta wi c ke dt e mpe ra ndwoul ds c r e a mr a ndoml y.Ic a n’ tbe l i e vewedi dn’ tdi ei na car wreck, because she would always drive her car when she was mad. So I r e me mbe rdr i vi ngt opr a c t i c et ha tda y.S he ’ sj us tl i kewhi ppi nga r ounda l lt he c or ne r s .I ’ ms i t t i ngt he r el i keoh,c r a p.Wef i na l l yg e tt opr a c t i c e ,a nds he s t a r t e dt ol e tmeoutoft hec a r .Ir a nout .Is udde nl yr e a l i z e dmyda d’ sof f ice doe s n’ ta c c e ptc ol l e c tc a l l s .Idi dn’ tknowwha tt odo,s oIt r i e dt oc a l lmyda d’ s of f i c ec ol l e c t ,s ohe ’ dc omea ndg e tme .ButIc oul dn’ tg e tt hr oug ht ohi m.S oI j us twe ntt opr a c t i c e .Idon’ tr e me mbe rl i ket her e s toft heda yora nyt hi ng .

284 Eventually at some point, she must have found out that I was kind of in on it. Because I remember she sat me down in the kitchen one time and just like why are you doing this kind of thing. I had a million reasons. She was asleep all the time. My brother is morbidly obese and flunking out of school.

Li keabunc hofdi f f e r e ntt hi ng s .Al lIke pts a yi ngt ohe rwa sl i kei t ’ sf a i r .We got to live with you for this long. I never really told her like all these other t hi ng s .I tj us twa s n’ tr e a l l ywor t hi t .Ij us tki ndofs a i dwhydoe s n’ tda dg e ta t ur n.Ir e me mbe rbe i ngs of r us t r a t e d.Li kewhydon’ tyouunde r s t a ndwha t ’ s fair. From an objective point of view, I thought I was being pretty objective. I t hi nkt ha tIwa s .Idon’ tknow.

Despite her feelings about her mother and the living arrangements, Keira was not really able to tell her mother about them. Instead, like other participants in this research she tried to protect the relationship with the parent that she was leaving. In Ke i r a ’ sc a s e ,s het r i e dt obef a i ra ndhopethat her mother might try to be fair in return. Keira went on to poignantly describe what the whole process was like for her until she went to college, Really, he should have had custody to begin with. Like she loved her children a lot. So in retrospect now, dating someone whose children I want to have, I can understand better, like those are your children. Like I took her children away from her. So that was interesting. So we started the proceedings, and I was probably 15 or 16 by the time it got underway.

285 By that time, I was about 80 pounds. I had an eating disorder. I was in a ndout ,be i nghos pi t a l i z e da nds t uf f .AndIwa s n’ tve r yhe a l t hy,l i kehe a r t problems and stuff. And so she did some kind of motion, I guess—Idon’ tknow everything—saying like it would be psychologically damaging for me to have to t e s t i f ya nds t uf f .Andmyda ddi dn’ twa ntt opr oc e e da nyf ur t he rwi t hi t , because he kind of agreed. And so then I was going to this one psychologist or ps yc hi a t r i s t .Ic oul dn’ tke e pt he ms t r a i g ht .[ Uni nt e l l i g i bl e ] ,s omybr a i nwa s n’ t r e a l l ywor ki ng .I twa s n’ te ve nl e g i t i ma t e .Li keIdon’ t —I ’ m notr e a l l ys ur ewhy I was doing that, but I would say like I feel more comfortable eating at my da d’ shous e ,j us tbe c a us eIwa nt e dt obea tmyda d’ shous e .Ands oi tkind of wor ke d.S owea l mos tha dpr e t t ymuc hc us t odya tmyda d’ sj us tbe c a us eI woul ds a yI ’ l le a tdi nne ri fIc a ng ot omyda d’ shous e .S ot ha twa sg ood.Ig ue s s it was good.

Keira saw herself as the agent for change. Keira was the one taking her mother’ s children from her. In the meantime Keira had become anorexic. I wondered if her anorexia was induced from the stress of living with her mother or the stress of the power that Keira was now well aware that she had going into the court proceedings.

While she claimed that she was not thinking clearly, she managed through her illness to find a compromised position that she hoped would not hurt her mother as badly as Ke i r af e l ts hewa s .S i mpl ys t a t e d,“ If e e lmor ec omf or t a bl ee a t i nga tmyda d’ shous e . ” Keira continued,

286 Then we made an agreement at that point that when I graduated high school, whatever I said went. And then my brother would go with me. So she said you’ l lr e -evaluate when you graduate high school. I was 17 when I graduated high school, and theda yIg r a dua t e d,wemove ds t uf ft omyda d’ shous e .And then mom went really berserk. She left my graduation ceremony early and went home. We had visitations Sunday night and Wednesday night, I think. We were going over like—it was over the summer of 2001, so we went maybe like two of those nights. And she would just be in like—like you walk into her hous ea ndt he r e ’ sl i keac or r i dor ,a ndt he nt he r e ’ sar oom s hec a l l she rmus i c room where she keeps a bunch of instruments and really strange pictures and CDs. And she would sit like in the back corner, in the corner of the couch with all the lights off and rock. And if you turned on the light, she would scream to t ur nt hel i g ht sof f .Ands owe ’ dg oove rt he r e ,a ndhe rboyf r i e nd—s hedoe s n’ t even believe in marriage any more—her boyfriend would like make dinner.

We ’ dbr i ngi tove rt he r ea nds hewoul dj us ts i ta ndr oc ka ndl i kenott ouc hhe r food. So we stopped going over.

He rmot he rwe nt“ be r s e r k”orpr oba bl ymor ea c c ur a t e l ys a nki nt oama j or depression. I do notbe l i e vet ha tKe i r a ’ si nt e nt i onwa st ohur the rmot he r .S hewa s well aware of the maternal family history of depression and suicide. Yet, she felt that she and her brother needed to make this change in order to have a chance at some sort of“ nor ma ll i f e . ”She wanted a life like the other kids. One that did not have a perpetual drunken party going on in her house. She had to do more than see her life as

287 an ongoing comedy. She had to radically shift her perspective and she had to take herself and her welfare more seriously than she had previously. She and her brother move dt ohe rf a t he r ’ shous ea ndt he yc ont i nue dt ot r yt oma i nt a i nar e l a t i ons hi pwi t h their depressed mother, until finally they could not any more, and they stopped visiting her.

Keira continued her story, adding this ironic comedic twist: Then 2001, September 11th happened. I was scheduled to fly to college September 14th.Obvi ous l y,wec oul dn’ tf l ya nywhe r e .Iwa sf r om [ Ne w England]. So I was working in an emergency room actually that day, which was i nt e r e s t i ng .S oIha dnowa yt og e toutt os c hool .Myda dc oul dn’ t ,s oIha dt o c a l lupmymom.Iha dn’ tt a l ke dt ohe ri nl i ket hr e emont hsort womont hs — from June to September. So I called her up [laughs] and asked her if she would drive me to college. She called back like two days later, I guess, or one day later—last minute—a nds hes a i dye a h,I ’ l ldr i veyou.Tha twa ski ndofg ood.S o it was me, her boyfriend, and her—not having spoken for like three months—in ava n,1 3hour st oChi c a g o.Idon’ tthink we actually talked about custody or a nyt hi ngont ha twhol et r i p.Butwhe nweg oonat r i pnow,s he ’ sl i kemy f r i e ndnow.S he ’ snotl i kee ve nne c e s s a r i l yr e a l l yapa r e nt .Li keI ’ l lc a l lhe rup a ndj us tc ha t .The r e ’ snot hi ngt ha tIr e a l l ywoul dn’ ts a y.

Keira and her mother reached a rapprochement so that she could attend college in the Midwest. Was this rapprochement enabled to some degree because Keira needed her mother again? Was it enabled to some degree because the mother could

288 demonstrate to Keira t ha tt hemot he rwa sus e f ul ,e . g . ,ora s“ I ’ m-the-better-pa r e nt ? ” The s ewe r eque s t i onst ha tKe i r a ’ ss t or ydi dnota ns we r .Howe ve r ,Ke i r aha da n important insight about the children of divorced parents when she said, It kind of like—Idon’ tt hi nkki dsa r enecessarily supposed to have the capacity to really hurt their parents that much. You can frustrate them or disappoint them, but to do something that like really hurts them—it kind of changes your perceptions, it changes like the power roles maybe a little, I think. So it kind of was—Idon’ tknowhowt ode s c r i bei t .Weha veadi f f e r e ntr e l a t i ons hi pnow— not even necessarily better or worse. Probably better. We get along well. She comes up to visit, and we talk on the phone probably once a week or so. So all’ swe l lt ha te ndswe l l .

Ke i r as a i di ts owe l l ,“ ki dsa r e[ not ]ne c e s s a r i l ys uppos e dt oha vet hec a pa c i t yt o r e a l l yhur tt he i rpa r e nt st ha tmuc h. ”Chi l dr e nofdi vor c epa r e nt sha veac ons c i ous knowledge of their capacity or power to hurt their parents. It does not seem fair, to us eKe i r a ’ spe r s pe c t i ve ,f orc hi l dr e nt obes opowe r f ulwi t hr e s pe c tt ot he i rpa r e nt s .

For Keira this knowledge was a burden. I believe that this burden was one finding of my research that had not been emphasized in the research literature of divorce. What to do with this power to hurt confronts children of divorced parents. In contrast, children growing up in nuclear families clearly have power to influence and affect their parents, but usually do not have the conscious knowledge or the capacity to hurt their parents so totally.

289 Keira continued her story, And my brother went and moved in with my dad. Almost moved back with my mom, because my dad was so strict with him. Because he was flunking out ofc l a s s e s .Myda ddi dn’ tr e a l l ymake him go on a diet, but stopped keeping crap around the house and like encouraging him to go out. And he lost some weight. And then my dad—l i keI ’ mr e a l l yape r f e c t i oni s ta ndhi g hs t r ung —and I t hi nkmyda d’ sa l mos twor s et ha nme .S ohea ppl i e dt ol i ke2 7,000 schools for mybr ot he r .He ’ s2ye a r sbe hi ndme .S ohej us tf i ni s he dhi ss ophomor eye a ra t [unintelligible] in Pennsylvania, which is a decent school, considering he failed most of his classes in high school. So it kind of worked. I would do it again. In r e t r os pe c t ,l i kebe i ng2 1 ,i t ’ sha r dt os a y.I nr e t r os pe c t ,Iwi s ht ha tma ybel i ke I ’ dt a l ke dt omymom—like sat her down like 14—Idon’ tknowt ha tIc oul d have done that at the time. It would have been nice to maybe like have her just hear it directly f r om me .Ima ybec oul dha veg onea bouti tbe t t e r .Buti t ’ se a s y t os a yi nhi nds i g ht .Ia l mos twi s hIha ddonei tal i t t l es oone r .Myda ddi dn’ t really get the chance to raise kids. He did—he saw us on the weekends and stuff, buthe ’ sj us tl i kes a l toft hee a r t hhuma n.He ’ sa r r og a nt ,i nag oodwa yt houg h.

He ’ spr oudofhi ms e l f .He ’ swor ke dhi swa yup.I ne ve r yt hi ngt ha thedoe s , he ’ l lg oi nt oi ta ndmoveup—not through connections or anything—just solely through working hard and doing his job well and making sure he completes his tasks and all that stuff.

290 Keira went through quite an ordeal in order to live with her father. She did preserve the relationship with both parents, but just barely. Her choice of perspective, laughing at her situation, has clearly helped her and became one of the building blocks to her sense of self and to her self narrative.

Emmett: From the Frying Pan to the Fire Emmett condensed his story to, I was born in Chicago, raised in Chicago. My parents got divorced when I was 3. That ’ swhe nt he ys e pa r a t e d.The ys e pa r a t e dwhe nIwa s3 .S oIwa spr e t t y young. I lived with my mother when my parents initially split up. I have an older sister. I lived with my mother, and we moved to north suburbs. My mom was working all the time. My sister spent a lot of time taking care of me. And then probably around when I was seven, my mother remarried. And my sister, myself, my mother, and my stepfather—we moved out to the country and lived there for a while. And then when I was—I think we moved out in the country when I was eight. And then when I was 12, my sister and I moved back with my father. When I was 12, we moved back with my father.

He presented the decision to move back with his father as a joint decision between his 15-and-a-half year old sister and him to change the child-parent living arrangements, because his sister did not really get along with his stepfather. Then with a little help from my questions, Emmett began to unpack his story. He recounted that,

291 Her stage in life played a big pa r ti nwhywemove d,be c a us es her e a l l ydi dn’ t get along with my stepfather at all. Being the adolescent girl she was, messing around with rebellion, she thought the best thing to do is just to leave. She did a good job convincing me that my stepfather was an asshole, which he was. So I ki ndofdi dn’ tr e a l l ywa ntt ol e a vet hec ount r y,butul t i ma t e l yIdi d,be c a us eI di dn’ twa ntt o—my sister had told my mother that she was gonna move. My mother was all distraught about that, but my mother was a coward at the time.

He more than suggested that the desire to change the child-parent living arrangements came from his sister, not from him. He portrayed himself as a somewhat reluctant participant in this decision. He recounted to me that there were other family issue sope r a t i ngi nt hes t or y;na me l y,t ha thi s“ s t e pf a t he rwa sa na s s hol e ”a ndt ha thi s “ mot he rwa sac owa r da tt het i me . ”The s ewe r epr ovoc a t i vea s s e r t i ons ,a ndIwa nt e dt o know more. Emmett explained that, Everyone knew my stepfather was an asshole. And um—when my mother and my stepfather met, my mother was in—it was like a horrible financial crisis for the three of us. So he came in and he brought stability. And he was considerably older. My stepfather just died 2 years ago, and my mother is 46.

He was 76. So he was 30 years older than my mother. He came into the picture.

The ydi df a l li nl ove .I twa s n’ tabus i ne s st r a ns a c t i on.The yf e l li nl ove .He offered stability for my mom. And he needed someone to take care of him as he was aging. So when my sister and I were telling my mom—when we were voicing our disgust with him, it really put her in a hard place, because she felt

292 l i kes heowe dhe rs e r vi c et ohi m,i fyouwi l l .S oye a h,mymot he rdi dn’ twa nt my sister and I to split up, so she also convinced me to move with my sister.

But I did. I was kind of excited about the idea. Little did I know I was jumping out of the frying pan and into the fire.

Emme t t ’ sf ul lde s c r i pt i onoft hes i t ua t i onpor t r a ye damuc hmor ec ompl i c a t e d picture of the situation. He was afraid, it seemed, that I might have perceived his mother to have made a business arrangement with his stepfather, i.e., you support me and my children and I will take care of you. This would not have been the act of a coward. Nor would the act of giving both children permission to go live with their father have been the act of a coward. Rather, he perceived her as a coward because she apparently did not take the side of her children against the stepfather. Emmett then foreshadowed the rest of his story in the last sentence—“ j umpi ngoutoft hef r yi ngpa n a ndi nt ot hef i r e . ” He continued by explaining the meaning of this phrase to me. He said, My father is probably—he ’ sha ndsdownoneoft hewor s thuma nbe i ng sI ’ ve ever met in my life. Um—he ’ soneoft hel e a s tunde r s t a ndi ngpe opl eyou’ l le ve r me e t .Andpa r toft ha tc ome swi t ht hef a c tt ha the ’ sf r om Gr e e c ea ndhe ’ sol df a s hi one d.Andpa r tofi ti sj us tt ha the ’ sc r a z ya ndma l i c i ous .Tha tbe c a mea huge issue.

Emmett unpacked his story about his father further as he told me, I loved high school. I loved the people. I loved high school. I hated home during high school. I was valedictorian of my high school, and I did all the

293 extracurriculars. And I did really well at school, because I hated to be home.

The worst part of my day was walking in the door. And it was 10 times worse if he was sitting in the living room when I walked in my door. It was—I mean, dur i ngpa r tofmys ophomor eye a r ,Iwa sa c t ua l l ys ui c i da l .Ic oul dn’ t —I just— he was—I mean—j us te vi l .I ’ l lt r yt ot hi nkofag oods t or y.Idon’ tknow.He was—he ’ st hemos tdi f f i c ul tpe r s onum—I ’ vee ve rme t .Ande ve not he rc r a z y, old-fashioned [Armenian] people I know think my dad is insane. People say oh, i t ’ st hec ul t ur et hi ng .Hej us tdoe s n’ tg e tt hec ul t ur e .He ’ sa successful businessman here. He owns his own business. He functions fine in the society, i nt hi sc ul t ur e ,a ndi t ’ snotac ul t ur a lt hi ng .He ’ saba dhuma nbe i ng .Whe r e ve r i tc a mef r om,Idon’ tknow.Hi sda dwa sa na s s hol e .Tha t ’ sf i ne ,buthe ’ sa horrible pe r s on.Hei sahor r i bl epe r s on.J us tme a n.Ma l i c i ous .Doe s n’ t understand.

I remember one time—I was in the seventh grade—I know I lived in fear all the time when I lived with my dad. I was just terrified of him from as long as I can remember. I remember one time when I was 5, and my parents knew— we were already separated. And my mom took me by his house so he could g i vemeabi r t hda ypr e s e nt .Iwa ss os c a r e dIc oul dn’ te ve ns a yt ha nkyou.I di dn’ ts pe a kawor dt ohi mt hewhol et i me .Ir e me mbe rt ha t .Iwas just afraid of him all the time. And one time I built up the courage to ask him if I can go ove rt oaf r i e nd’ shous ea f t e rs c hool .Hes a i dwhy.Is a i doh,j us twa ntt og o ha ngout ,ha vef un.Hes a i dwe l ldi dn’ tyouj us ts e ehi ma ts c hool .Is a i dye a h.

294 He said are you gonna see him tomorrow at school. I said yeah. He was like well come home then. I was like but I want to go have fun. And it was just—the di s c us s i onwa sove r .Heg otl oud,s t a r t e ds c r e a mi ng .I t ’ sl i kema n,t hi si sj us t c r a z y.I t ’ snots uppos ed to be this way.

I nEmme t t ’ smi nd,l i f ewa snots uppos e dt obet hi swa y.Heha dl e f tl i vi ngwi t h his mother and stepfather because his sister could not get along with his stepfather. His mother wanted him to be with his sister. The sister graduated high school and went to college, leaving Emmett alone with his father. When Emmett asked his mother if he could return to live with her, his stepfather would not allow it. He continued, Yeah, my mother knew what my sister and I were going through. And being the angry teenager that I was, I was very, very, very hurt and pissed at my mot he rwhe ns hewoul dn’ tl e tmemoveba c ki nwi t ht he m.Orwhe ns he di dn’ tha vet hec our a g et ol e a vehi m,be c a us ehewa sadi c kt ohe r ,t oo.S ot ha t really pissed me off, almost as much as just living with my dad every day. That was when, you know, I felt alone. No one gave a shit about me. My mom has her own issues.

Now, the foreshadowing comment about his mother being a coward made more sense to me. He wanted her to stand up for hi ma nds hedi dnot .I nEmme t t ’ s view, she could not even stand up for herself. Clearly he was angry and disappointed in her. He was alone and he knew it. He felt that no one cared about him, especially his parents.

295 I asked Emmett what his primary motivation was to go live with his father as he remembered it. I wondered whether he really wanted to be with his sister, or whether he felt pushed out by his mother. He said, Idi dn’ ts omuc h—the only person I really felt pressure from was my sister, because um—at that time, when I was young, I think in your profession they say I had a low level of differentiation. My sister would get very upset and I would get upset. So when she would argue with my stepdad, I would feel that tension. So it was uncomfortable for me at times. My real father and my stepfather were opposite ends of the spectrum, but they were both assholes. My dad was—youc a n’ tdoa nyt hi ng ,youc a n’ tg oa nywhe r e ,youc a n’ tdo a nyt hi ng ,youc a ns we a ri fyouwa nt ,Idon’ tc a r e .I ’ m notg oi ngt odi s c i pl ine youont ha t .You’ l lbe1 0ye a r sol d.I ’ l lt a l kt oyoua bouts e x.Iha veno shame—very, you know, crude.

Where my stepfather on the other hand, was—he was a military man.

Okay, you can go out and do your thing. Be back at 5. I came in 5 and 30 seconds, and I was grounded for a week. Or when we first moved in to the house in the country, and he was trying to grow his lawn and water was expensive, we had to take a shower by turning the water on, getting wet, turning the water off, then lathering up, then turning the water on to rinse off.

Youc oul dn’ ts i tonyourbe ddur i ngt heda y.J us tc r a z ys hi tl i ket ha t .

Myda ddi dn’ tc a r ea ta l la boutt hos et hi ng s .Goa he a da ndus ea smuc h water as you want. Go ahead, sleep in your bed. Um—but what would I

296 ultimately have rather had? I probably would have rather had my stepfather, be c a us ei twa sj us tl i keps yc hol og i c a lwa r f a r ei nmyda d’ shous e .S oa tt het i me whe nIwa sl i vi ngwi t hmys t e pda d,Iha dn’ tr e a l l ye xpe r i e nc e dmyda d.Ikne w I was afraid of him, be he was a big, scary-looking guy. And I know he gets ma da ndheha sat e mpe r ,butIha dne ve rl i ve dwi t hhi m.Andwhe nI ’ ds e e hi m ont hewe e ke nds ,he ’ dbeni c e .He ’ dt a keust obr e a kf a s t .S oi tdi dn’ ts e e m that bad.

There were times where I was very anxious living with my stepdad. So i tdi dn’ ts e e ml i keaba di de at og oa he a da ndg e toutoft he r e .S oIki ndofwe nt willingly. Because the summer before we moved in with my father, we had a c t ua l l ys pe ntas umme rwi t hhi m.I twa sal otoff un.Idi dn’ tha veal otof f r i e nds ,be c a us eIha dn’ tl i ve dt he r e ,buti twa sa l mos tl i kehewa st r yi ngt owi n usove r .Andhewa sni c et ousa ndt ookuspl a c e sa nddi dt hi ng s .Oh,t hi si s n’ t s oba d.Andt he nwe ntba c kt omys t e pda d’ sf ort hes c hoolye a r ,a ndi twa s pretty bad. I wa sl i keoka y.Andt he nmys i s t e rj us tc oul dn’ tt a kei ta nymor e , a nds hewa sl i keweg ot t ag o.Al lr i g ht ,I ’ l lg o.Le t ’ sg e toutofhe r e .I ’ mt i r e dof this, too. And we went. Almost instantly, I regretted doing it. I regretted doing it.

Emmett understood retrospectively that at this time in his life he was psychologically merged with his sister, to use self psychological terms. He was so in tune with her mood states that he would feel what she felt. From his point of view, neither his father nor his stepfather offered attractive alternatives. He was willing to go

297 a l ongwi t hhi ss i s t e rj us tt ode c r e a s ehi s / t he i r“ t e ns i on. ”Bot ha tt het i mea nd retrospectively, he understood that he had given up more than he got in moving with hi ss i s t e rt ohi sf a t he r ’ shouse. In addition as he told his story to me he was beginning to become aware that he was not, nor had he been, the author of his own story. He was an agent without agency. His sister, mother, father, and stepfather had agency, but he did not. He became desperate, angry, and depressed as he realized more and more how much he had given up by going with his sister to live with his father, a man that f r i g ht e ne dhi m.I nt hi ss t a t ehef e l ts ui c i da l ,buta l s or e a l i z e dhe“ wa st oobr oke nt o kill myself—just like res i g ne dt omyf a t e ,youknow?I twa spr e t t yba d. ” Earlier in the interview he had called his mother a coward because she would not let him return to living with her and his stepfather. At this point in time he had managed to forgive her for this because, One day I figured out why, you know? She was—I called her a coward before. I was a coward, too, because I never stood up to my dad, even though it made t hi ng sbe t t e r .Butbe i nga na ng r yt e e na g e r ,Idon’ twa ntt oma ket hi ng sbe t t e r .I wanted to change things, but I could never bring myself to confront him. So, my mom could never confront my stepdad, because the longer she stayed ma r r i e dt ohi m,t hemor el i kee nt r e nc he ds hebe c a me .Ands hec oul dn’ tg e tout of it. And then the more she felt like she owed him, because my mom was a wa i t r e s swor ki ngl i ke6 0hour sawe e kwhe ns heme thi m.Andnows he ’ savi c e president of a medium size business. And a lot of that because he told her, you know, after you get a job, you have to do this, you have to do that. But she

298 be c a mes uc c e s s f ul .I ’ ms ur es ome whe r es hef e l ts heowe dt ha tt ohi m.Be c a us e his health kept getting worse. Then she became like a nurse for him. She said s hec oul dn’ tl e a vehi m.Iwa sl i kea l lr i g ht .Iunde r s t a nd.Buts he ’ st ol dme ,l i ke she said that she thought about leaving him. Since he died, we talked about that time. She said that that was one of the worst times of her life.

Emmett realized that while his sister was a lot like his father; he was a lot like his mother. He knew that like his mother he was not the author or agent of his life, and so therefore he was a coward. He felt that he had no agency or ability to act on his own.S ous i ngame t a phormos tl i ke l yf r om hi ss t e pf a t he r ’ svoc a bul a r y,hel a be l e d both his mother and himself a coward. However ,hi smot he r ’ ss uc c e s sa ndhe ra bi l i t y to survive gave him hope that he too felt that he had a chance to be a survivor and successful in his life. This ability to identify with his mother seemed to me to have repaired the breach in their relationship caused by her capitulation to his stepfather in not allowing Emmett to return to her home. In addition, this identification seemed to foreshadow his own hoped-f ors t or y.I fhi smot he rc oul dg of r om be i nga“ c owa r d”t o a success, then he also had this same ability. With this identification Emmett was able to bring some increased sense of coherence to his own self narrative that had melted in the fire of living with his father. Of all the research participants, Emmett was the most upset by telling me his story. He required at the end of his interview most of my clinical skills to repair his story and to increase his own sense of self cohesion.

299 Bobbie-Jo: Just an Easier Life Bobbie-Jo began her story by telling me in effect that she was different than her peers in college and then continued with, I have a sister who is 3-and-a-half years younger, named Paula. We grew up— mypa r e nt swe r ema r r i e d1 0ye a r sbe f or et he yha dmei n’ 7 4 .Mymom i s5 -anda-half years younger than my father. The first house I ever lived in was the house my mom still lives in. And we all four lived as a family there um—until I was ten. And my parents told me they were going to split up. And my dad then lived in our house, but in the attic for like about a year, maybe a little more, a little less. And then he moved about half a mile—a very short distance away.

Um—we stayed with him twice a week until I was in twelfth grade, until I was 17. And then I moved in with my father. And then a year later, I came to college.

To the specific question of how she made the decision that you wanted to live with your father Bobbie-Jo replied, Well, my father and I like for the most part always got along really, really well.

Um—he and my mom are really, really different. Um—which makes sense.

Um—and I think especially in the year before um—during my junior year of high school, especially during that year, um—before I moved in with him, I think my life kind of started to change a lot, because I had lost a lot of weight.

So I was definitely—I ’ da l wa ysbe e nve r y social and had a lot of friends, but I was just like a lot more confident.

300 So I guess I was pushing the boundaries even more with my parents than I had done before. I wanted to go out more. I wanted to drink and do all the things that teenagers do. And my parents were always very different about like what they were lenient or strict about. It was kind of—my mom would argue about the stupid details, and my father was kind of, you know, a broader sense of like instilling responsibility, very strict about like cleanliness and bedtime. But like at the same time, he would let me do things that my mom woul dn’ tdo.Andum—he was also very busy because he worked full time and he also like is an entrepreneur, so he owns a few other businesses. So he just really is n’ thomene a r l ya smuc ha smymot he r .

My mother and I had been fighting—just kind of bickering constantly, just because I just found her to be such a pain in the neck. My sister was still a little angel at that point. So it was just like constant clash of wants and needs. I would constantly call my father up to complain. He would always have to be t hei nt e r me di a r y,e ve nt houg hmymot he ra ndhi m don’ tg e ta l onga ta l l — although my mother thinks they do more than he does.

So then I turned 17 in July, before my senior year of high school. My father gave me his old car for my birthday. He got a new car. And he said that I had to—the thing is, the car was just going to be at the apartment. So if I wanted to use the car at night or drive it at night, I had to stay there. So it just kind of that, coupled—like I knew I could have probably argued for him to not make that rule, but like I kind of—Idi dn’ tonl yus ei ta sa ne xc us e ,butki ndof

301 l i kebe t we e na ndl i keg e ne r a l l yf e e l i ngs t i f l e da tmymom’ s ,Ij us tde c i ded to move in there. In addition, that summer, we had moved. My father had moved, so he had moved from a two-bedroom apartment where my sister and I shared a room, across the street to a duplex where I had a big bedroom to myself. It was on the first floor, and my dad and my sister were on the top floor. So it wa sve r yi nde pe nde nt .Myda dwa s n’ thomet ha tmuc h,buthewa ss t i l l —he ’ sa very involved parent. Um—and I was just like doing my thing and um—i t ’ sa block from the train into the city, so it was just an easier life. So that was that.

Bobbie-Jo wanted an easier life and her father made it possible for her. During her junior year Bobbie-Jo had made a lot of changes. She had changed her body image by losing a lot of weight and felt more confident. While she had always been social and had a lot of friends, she wanted to push the boundaries with her parents more than she ha dbe f or e .S hewa nt e d“ t odr i nka nddoa l lt het hi ng st ha tt e e na g e r sdo. ”He rmot he r was stricter, more present in her life and the details of her life. In contrast her father was less present about the details as long as she was responsible. She fought with her mother about the details—“ ac ons t a ntc l a s hofwa nt sa ndne e ds . ”Forhe rs e ve nt e e nt h birthday, her father offered her his old car and made living with him, from Bobbie-J o’ s view, the only convenient way to use it. Bobbie-Jo used the convenience of using the car at night as a way out of the stifling environment that she felt she had living with her mother. To make the offer more enticing to Bobbie-Jo, her father moved his apartment so that now she would have a large ground floor bedroom separated from

302 he r“ l i t t l ea ng e l ”young e rs i s t e ra ndf a t he rwhowoul dnowha ves e c ondf l oor bedrooms.

Bobbie-J o’ ss t or yi l l us t r a t e dwha tmi g htbec ons idered the stereotype of how the general population in our culture thinks about children of divorced parents making changes in their child-parent living arrangements. From personal experience I know that I have had this perspective with my own stepdaughter. Namely, that the child made the decision to change the arrangements because she or he believed that l i vi ngpr i ma r i l ywi t ht heot he rpa r e nti s“ e a s i e r . ”Ge ne r a l l yt hec our t sha vema i nt a i ne d this stereotypical perspective with respect to contested changes in the child-parent living arrangements.

Bobbie-J o’ ss t or ya l s os howe da not he rna r r a t i vec ul t ur a ls t e r e ot ype ,i . e . ,t he influence of the other—the other parent, sibling, or grandparent. It would seem as if the culture could not conceive of children, acting from their own desires and sense of agency, making a decision to change their living arrangements in these situations without the help and/or encouragement of an other. We have seen in the previous reported stories that the encouragement of an other has been important, but not ne c e s s a r i l ye s s e nt i a lt ot hec hi l d’ ss e ns eofa g e nc y.Weha vea l s odi s c ove r e df r om t he s e ot he rs t or i e st ha tr e c e i vi nga not he r ’ se nc our a g e me ntha sbe e namuc hmor e complicated process than the one that Bobbie-J o’ ss t or yi l l us t r a t e s .Nevertheless, cultures form stereotypes based on the meanings assigned to experiences. Bobbie-J o’ s story illustrated the cultural stereotype.

303 I da :“ S t r a i g ht e nUpa ndFl yRi g ht ” Ida began her story by giving me the large view of her family. She has two sisters, a sister 18 months older, and a twin. She said, We were basically seen as like the perfect family. I had a really happy childhood. My parents seemed like they would do anything for us. And my mom ended up staying home. She had a business that she sold. She just did investments from home. And my dad was—is still a physician, so he worked, buthede f i ni t e l yt ookt i meof f .Li keIdi dn’ tf e e ll i kemyda dwa s n’ tt he r e .He was definitely there. They were very involved parents—wanted us to—they were always playing with us and wanted us to develop intellectually. So we rarely were allowed to watch TV. Read a lot of books. Played outside all the t i me .Ki ndofwe r et omboysa ndpl a ye da l lt hes por t s .S oI ’ ds a ywewe r e very—they were very focused on family. We a l wa ysha df a mi l ydi nne r s .We ’ d a l wa yspr a ybe f or edi nne r .We ’ dpr a ybe f or ebe d—that sort of stuff. Got along quite well with my two sisters.

Ida was describing a child centered family in which she felt loved and felt very comfortable. She continued, But I realized later, my parents—i twa s n’ tl i keave r yl ovi ngr e l a t i ons hi p.I twa s mor ej us tl i ket he ywe r ef r i e nds ,whi c hIdi dn’ tr e a l i z eunt i ll a t e rwhe nIs t a r t e d seeing relationships. They got along fine, it seemed to me. Like they never fought in front of us. But it became apparent later that there were a lot of issues t he r e .Butwede f i ni t e l yha dnoc l uea ndwe r et ot a l l yha ppy.I ’ ds a yi s s ue s

304 started happening more when I hit high school. They got divorced when I was 16. I was a sophomore in high school. And they were separated for a while before that. So they tried different things, like my mom moved out of the master bedroom and kind of slept in the study. We had a pull-out couch in there. My sisters and I all had bedrooms downstairs. And then that was n’ t working out, so then they got another apartment.

I grew up in [town name deleted]—like maybe a mile away. And they tried to switch off between living in the apartment and living at home, which clearly did not work. It was a transitional thing, and that was really hard on us, to have one parent not there for like two weeks. And then they just got divorced, and my dad suddenly bought this house without telling any of us um—way out of the city—just kind of like isolating himself. We were really upset by t ha t ,be c a us ewewe r el i keda d,we ’ r enotg onnas e eyou.Ye a h,he ’ s just kind of sporadic. But I think it was because he met someone. They wanted t obef a r t he ra wa y.S oI ’ ds a ywes t a r t e dnot i c i ngi s s ue sl i kema ybee i g ht h grade, freshman year. I could tell that there was like tension—like they were becoming colder and kind of just growing apart. Like they were in the same house, eat dinner together. It was more like a business relationship sort of t hi ng .The ywe r e n’ tr e a l l yf i g ht i ng ,buti twa sj us tki ndof like—I ’ ds e emy f r i e nds ’pa r e nt s ,a ndt he y’ dbel i kea l lki ndofl ovi ng ,a ndyouc oul dj us tt e l l they were happy to be together. But with my parents, it was just kind of like— t he y’ dj okea r ounda nds t uf f ,buti twa s n’ tl i ke —I never saw them kiss or

305 anything like that, which is really great for me to see in other places, I think.

And the divorce was really awful—really, really bad.

I da ’ spa r e nt swe r ei nar e l a t i ons hi pt ha tf oc us e dl oveont hec hi l dr e n,butnot on each other. Ida concluded later, after being in and seeing other relationships, that her parents were friends, not lovers. It seemed that without much explanation to the children, the parents began to move toward a separation and a divorce. They stopped sharing the same room, and soon stopped sharing the same house, all without any explanation or information to the children. Then without explanation her father bought a house outside of town. Ida retrospectively believed that her father moved because he had met someone and wanted his distance. The fear in Ida was that because her father was becoming more sporadic in seeing her and her sisters, that they would not see him.

Next Ida reported, Well, it seemed like they were friends, and suddenly it developed into this fullout war. Like they had been going to counseling for a long time. They brought us in, so we were all seeing this therapist. We were just like um—okay. Because wedi dn’ tr e a l l y—we were like there are not really a whole lot of problems. But then they just started accusing each other and siding. Suddenly, my dad would g e ta ng r y.He ’ dbel i kewe l lt hi si sove r .Ic a nt e l lt hi si s n’ tg oi ngt owor k—in front of us. So I just remember going home and just sobbing and sobbing and sobbing.

306 If e l tr e a l l ybe t r a ye d,be c a us eIdon’ tknow—I just had this memory of when I was really little, I just made my parents both promise—I was like promise me that you will never get divorced. I made them promise. For some reason, that was like my security blanket. I remember where I was when I asked them—in their master bathroom. They both were like oh yeah, because things were fine. That meant so much to me. Their word meant so much to me. So for some reason, that was what really hit me. I felt really betrayed. I was l i ket hi si s n’ tha ppe ni ng .We ’ r el i ket hepe r f ect family. How could this happen t ous ?Andi tj us tg otal otwor s e ,t ot hepoi ntwhe r et he yc oul dn’ tbea r ound each other. And then they started fighting over everything, especially money. It j us twe ntc r a z y.The i rt he r a pi s ts a i di t ’ soneoft hewor s tdi vor c e she ’ se ve r s e e n.I ’ ml i kewhywoul dyous a yt ha t ?Tha t ’ spr oba bl ynots ome t hi ngt ha ta ny ofuswa ntt ohe a r ,e ve ni fi t ’ st r ue .I t ’ sr e a l l ynothe l pi ng .J us tal otof accusations, a lot of fighting over money, which never seemed to matter to them before. But my dad suddenly became obsessed with money, because he had made a lot of it when they were married, but my mom also had a lot of inheritance. And he wanted that.

It was just crazy. And my [mom]—actually, before all this came up and it was just kind of like they were separated or something, my twin sister found di vor c epa pe r shi dde ni nmymom’ ss t uf f ,r i g htbe f or emymom wa ss uppos e d t og ot oI ndi af or2mont hs .Wef l i ppe dout .Wedi dn’ tt e l lmyol de rs i s t e r , be c a us es hec oul dn’ tha ndl ei t .Butt hat was really shocking to just find the

307 papers and have no one had told you anything. And she was like no no. This is j us ti nc a s eda dt r i e st opul la nyt hi ng .Wewe r el i kehe y,t ha t ’ ski ndofwe i r d.

Pe opl edon’ tj us tg og e tdi vor c epa pe r sj us ti nc a s e .

And then coming to our sporting events—it started to become really t e ns e .Li ket he y’ dbot hg oa ndt he ywoul dn’ ts i tbye a c hot he r .I fonepe r s on said something, the other one—t he y’ dki ndofg e ti nf i g ht s .I twa sr e a l l y embarrassing for us, very very embarrassing for us, especially like we all played tennis. And we were like really intense into tennis. It was just like oh gosh, t he y’ r ebot hhe r e .Ohno!Li keIhopenot hi ngha ppe ns .Ij us tha veal otof specific memories of that. It just got really ugly by the time graduation rolled around.

I dar e por t e dt ha ts hel os the rs e c ur i t ybl a nke ti nl i f e .The‘ pe r f e c tf a mi l y’t ha t wa ss oi mpor t a ntt oI daha ddi s i nt e g r a t e dwi t houtwa r ni ngbe f or ehe r .He rpa r e nt s ’ “ wor d”nol ong e rha dt hes ol i dde f i ni t i veme a ni ngt ha tI da needed to carry on. Her life wa st ur ne dups i dedown.I ne f f e c tI daha dl os tbot hpa r e nt st ot hi s“ wa r . ” Ida continued to narrate the demise of her family and the fall of her father from the pedestal on which she had placed him. She reported, My dad had this new girlfriend who he had worked with. And ironically, my older sister had worked in the office with him and loved this woman. And she totally sucked up to Caroline [her sister], trying to get to my dad. And then once they were together, she was so me a nt ous ,s ome a nt ous .I ’ vene ve rl i ke d her. I never had a good feeling about her. I still really—It hi nks he ’ se vi l .And

308 s he ’ ski ndofpoi s one dmyda d.S oa nywa y,s he ,It hi nk,pur pos e l yt r i e dt og e t pregnant, so my dad—s hewa sa f t e rmyda d’ smone y.And so then, after that, it was just like all right—I do not want to be around this. And she basically just tried to pull my dad from us. She tried to poison him, I think. Because he just— myda d’ sawe a kpe r s on.

My mom is really strong. So when he was with her, it was her style of parenting, her values. And all his values and everything switched when he married this woman, which was really hard to watch. And we were just like who are you, dad. What is this? And he seemed really unhappy, and he was—of course,hewoul dn’ ta dmi t —I ’ m ave r ydi r e c tpe r s on,s oIwoul ddi r e c t l y question him. Dad, are you happy? Why are you marrying this woman? Is it because she got preg[nant]—like I would ask him everything, and he just would not answer me. He just pretended everythi ng ’ spl a nne d,e ve r yt hi ngi sg r e a t ,I ’ m l i kes oj oyf ulwi t hl i f e .AndI ’ ml i keuh-hum. Okay dad. So now I have a brother he is a half brother who is 4 years old, which I was really upset about.

I ’ ml i ke —dad, you are gonna be a grandpa by the time he graduates from high school. And this poor kid—a nywa y.S ot ha t ’ spr oba bl ymuc hmor et ha nIne e d t oa ns we rf ort ha tque s t i on.Butt ha t ’ ski ndofhowi tpr og r e s s e d,a ndt he nal ot of other stuff regarding the relationship came up. Like my dad apparently had an affair when we were 4 years old. And he has this practice in [town name deleted] that was doing really well. Everyone knows—[town name deleted] has like maybe 300,000 people, so everyone kind of knows each other.

309 My dad is really good at what he does, so everyone we know goes to him. So in order to protect his practice, it was with someone he worked with a g a i n.Mymom di dn’ tt e l la nyone .S hedi dn’ tt e l lhe rf a mi l y.S hedi dn’ tt e l lhe r best friend. And she wanted to protect us. So that never came out till like the divorce. So she was just like dying, you know? She was really, really upset. And she ended up forgiving—my mom is incredibly strong. When he came back, she doe s n’ tknowi ft ha twa st her i g htde c i s i on.Be c a us eobvi ous l y,t he r ewa s resentment that she r e t a i ne d.Ye a h,myda da ppa r e nt l ydi dn’ te ve nf e e lt ha t guilty. He was just like well—Idon’ tt hi nkhewa sg e t t i nge noug ha t t e nt i on from my mom, he felt, because she had so much—I mean two toddlers, whatever. We were really horrible, active children. And then my older sister— and we were just all crazy and really creative and just wild. So I think that was pr oba bl ywha tha ppe ne d.Ass oona shet ol dhe r ,hewa sj us tl i keoh,t ha t ’ sof f my chest. And he was apparently fine. And my mom was just like devastated.

Interviewer: How does that correlate when you asked your parents if they were ever gonna get a divorce?

We l l ,t ha tdi dn’ tc omeupi mme di a t e l y.The ywe r ej us tl i ket hi ng sa r e n’ t working, blah blah blah. But my mom—it definitely came up. My dad was like yeah, I made a mistake, whatever. And I remember him actually crying about it once—l i keIma deami s t a kea ndi twa sr e a l l yba d.Hene ve rc r i e s .He ’ sve r y unemotional—grew up in an unemotional family. But that part of him is gone.

Nowt ha the ’ swi t ht hi swoma nhe ’ swi t hnow,hene ve rc r i e s .Hef e e l sno

310 r e mor s ea bouta nyt hi nghe ’ sdonet ohur ta nyofus —kind of denies the past, a nyt hi ng .I t ’ sj us tl i keba s i c a l l yhi ma ndhi swi f eha vet ur ne dmymom i nt ot hi s witch where they blame everything on her. And they’ r epa r a noi d,a ndt he y think my mom has hired people to stalk her. They found people and it was just l i kewi ndowpe e pe r s .The y’ r ej us tps yc hot i c ,hone s t l y.Is ome t i me st hi nkmy da d’ sl i keas c hi z ophr e ni c ,l i kei t ’ st ha tba d.Ands hei s ,t oo.

But anyway, the affair came up at the time of the divorce. It was a lot of stuff for us to handle. The funny thing is, growing up I thought my dad was perfect, which must have killed my mom. Like we adored our dad. It was like daddy, oh. Thought he was absolutely just the best, because he did every—he was a great cook. He did all our sports with us. Helped us with our homework.

He was really involved in um—and my mom—Idon’ tknowwhywedi dn’ t — she was great, too. But maybe it was because she was around more and she was s t r i c t e r .Idon’ tknowwhy.Buti twa sj us tl i kea l loft ha tg ots ha t t e r e dwhe n reality hit.

Ida told the story of the work colleague, who turned mistress, then turned mean to get the father away from his children, trapped dad by getting pregnant, and then finally turned into evil step-mother. Ida described that process as what she wanted to get away from. Ida believed that her father was a weak person in a moral sense.

Fr om I da ’ spoi ntofvi e whe rf a t he rha dnoi nt e r na ls e tofva l ue sori nt e r na lmor a l compass. As she learned more during the divorce process and subsequent experiences wi t hhe rf a t he r ,s hedi dnotknowwhohewa s .S hea dmi r e dhe rmot he r ’ smor a l

311 strength and she admired her mother for allowing her to think that her father was the perfect father, and the ideal man, when her mother knew very well that he was not.

The knowledge of the real man shattered how Ida thought about him and how she thought about herself.

Ida continued, We were just like, who are you? It almost made me, at least, question myself.

I ’ ml i keIc a n’ tbe l i e veI ’ mr e l a t e dt ohi m.Ic a n’ tbe l i e veIha vehi sg e ne s .Iwa s s oa s ha me dofhi m.Iwa sl i keIc a n’ tbe l i e veyouwoul ddot hi s .Andl i kei twa s j us tl i kewha tki ndofc ommi t me ntdoyouha vet ot hef a mi l yi fyou’ r e —you have t hr e el i t t l eg i r l sa ndyou’ r e —Ime a nhe ’ sha vi nga na f f a i rwi t hs ome onei n hi sof f i c e .Li kehowobvi ousi st ha t ?I t ’ snote ve nl i kes ma r t .Youa r ea ni di ot .I wa ss oma da thi m,a ndIl os ta l lmyr e s pe c tf orhi m.I ’ veg ot t e nt oapoi ntnow where I like don’ tc a r e .I ’ vebe e na bl et odi s t a nc emys e l ff r om hi m.I ’ vebe e n l i ket ha t ’ shi m.I t ’ snotme .Wema yha vet hes a meg e ne s ,buthe ’ sj us tawe a k person. But I think now I despise weakness like no other. Like I hate weakness, because I think of my dad.

Her fat he r ’ sbe ha vi orma deI daque s t i onhe r s e l fa ndwhos hewa s .S hedi s t a nc e d he r s e l ff r om he rf a t he ra ndhe rf a t he r ’ sbe ha vi or .He rf a t he rha sbe e na c t i ve l yt a ke n from his perfect pedestal to where she no longer cares about him. Ida is aware that she now has this psychological reaction formation about being weak, because it reminds her of her father who she does not want to be like.

312 I daa ndhe rs i s t e r ske ptt he i rpa r e nt ’ sdi vor c eas e c r e t ,j us tl i ket he i rmot he rha d ke ptt hef a t he r ’ sf i r s ta f f a i ras e c r e tf r omher daughter. At some point in time she could no longer maintain what she experienced as a double life. Ida said, Li keal otofpe opl ewhoknowt hes t or y,t he y’ r el i kei t ’ sa ma z i ngyoug uys came through. Because my two sisters and I, like I felt like I was pretty depressed in high school at times, but I was so involved and I did so many t hi ng st ha tIj us tg ott hr oug hi ta l l .I twa ss oe mba r r a s s i ngf orus .Wedi dn’ t even tell our friends. It was so embarrassing. Like seriously, we did not tell people for mont hs .Wewe r ej us tl i ket he r e ’ ss omepr obl e ms .Andt he nf i na l l y, Iwa st hef i r s tone .S c r e wi t .I ’ m notpr ot e c t i nghi ma nymor e .Ine e dt og e tt hi s off my chest. That felt better. But for a while, I felt like I was leading a double life. I remember sobbing and being so upset, and then having to go to basketball practice, joke around with everyone, and be fine. It was just like this double life. And at school—you know high school—e ve r yone ’ sa l l ,Idon’ t know, you need to act a certain—i t ’ sr e a l l ys i l l y.

To get through this period of leading a double life (ironically like her father did while having his affairs), Ida journaled in a diary. She credited her sisters for helping her get through this process. She sideshadowed an alternative outcome for herself when she said, Wi t houtmyt wos i s t e r s ,Idon’ tt hi nkIwoul dha veg ot t e nt hr oug hi t .Wea l l admit—we ’ r ea l lr e a l l yc l os e .S ot obea bl et ot a l ki tt hr oug ha ndhowwef e l t and everything all the time, we always had each other. And like if we were

313 single—I probably would not have graduated from high school. But instead, I was stellar—wewe r ea l ls t e l l a ra te ve r yt hi ng .Idon’ tknow.Andt he nIknow t he r e ’ sbe e nal otofe mot i ona lc ha l l e ng e s ,e s pe c i a l l ywi t hmyt wos i s t e r s trusting men. They have big issues trusting men. And my older sister was c l os e s tt omyda d.Fors omer e a s on,he ’ st ur ne donhe rnow.Idon’ tknow what the deal is.

I da ’ sr e a c t i onf or ma t i ona g a i ns tbe i ngwe a khe l pe dhe rt obe c omeas t e l l a r student at everything she attempted. She was aware that there are emotional challenges, especially when it came to trusting men, that were the result of experiences like the one she had with her father. However, Ida believed that she fared better than her sister: So she has been—I think she has like this core wound where now everything s hedoe s ,s he ’ st r yi ngt opl e a s ehi m—l i keg oi ngove rt het op.Whe r eI ’ ml i ke t ha t ’ ski ndofal i t t l edi s g us t i ng .I ts e e mst omea l mos tl i kedi s r e s pe c t i ng your s e l fs ome t i me s .J us tl i keoka y,I ’ l ldot hi sf orda d.I t ’ sl i keyoul ook like a de s pe r a t el i t t l epuppy.S ot he r e ’ sal otofi s s ue s ,It hi nk.

It hi nkf ors omer e a s on,I ’ vebe e na bl et ode a lwi t hi tbe s t ,a ndIt hi nk t ha tmi g htbebe c a us eIwa sa bl et oe xpr e s smya ng e r .I ’ mt heoneofus —we ’ r e all very expressive and articulate and we communicate. But like I would just— like a few times I was like fuck you, dad. Like I was so—and I never—I have never said that to anyone in my life, and I said it to him. So I think I was able to express my anger more and address issues. I tried to do it more respectfully,

314 butIt hi nkmys i s t e r sj us tdi dn’ tknowhowt o—a ndI ’ vet a l ke dt ot he ma bout this—t he yj us tdi dn’ tknowwha tt odo.AndIwr ot eal ot ,a ndIt hi nkt ha t helped get it out. And discussing it. Because I look back at the stuff I wrote, and Ic a n’ tbe l i e vewha tIwe ntt hr oug h.ButIt e l lmys e l f ,we l l ,Ic a n’ tg ot hr oug h t ha ta g a i n.I t ’ sove r .I t ’ sma demes t r ong e r .

Iwoul dn' tbewhoIa m wi t houti t .It hi nkt ha t ’ st he —and you also, I think, are a lot more compassionate having gone through something like that.

S ot ha t ’ showIc hoos et ol ooka ti t .Be c a us eyouc a nde f i ni t e l yf oc usont he negatives and like wallow in your sorrows. But we were also old enough that I think we were stable, pretty stable. We felt loved. We kind of knew who we were. Had it happened when we were seven years old, that would have been a whol eot he rs t or y,It hi nk.ButIt hi nkwe ’ r epr e t t yg r ounde d,r e l a t i ve l y speaking.

Ida viewed her sister as being wounded, but in reality Ida and her twin shared this same wound.Thedi f f e r e nc eul t i ma t e l yi nI da ’ smi ndwa st ha ts hewa sa bl et og e t angry directly with her father. She was very aware of how this process with her parents had affected her.

I da ’ ss c e nea boutde c i di ngt os wi t c hhe rc hi l d-parent living arrangements was equally direct and straightforward. The de facto living arrangement plan had been that Ida and her sisters would spend time equal time with their father and their mother.

They both had places in the same city. Ida described the decision as,

315 Well, um—tha twa sr e a l l yha r d.Li kea tf i r s t ,Idon’ tknow,myda dr e a l l y helped our decision when he moved that far away and the way he was behaving, too. It was more just like—he was really, really hurt that we decided—all of us decided to spend more time with my mom. I think we all kind of sided more with her because of the situation—the affairs. Of course, my mom ha ds ome t hi ngt odowi t hi t ,butwedi dn’ tknowa l lt hede t a i l sa ndwe know what kind of person my mom is. I think we kind of sided with her a little bit. But we felt horrible. My dad was alone in this house, because he di dn’ tg e tma r r i e df orawhi l ee ve nt houg hhewa sda t i ngt hi swoma n.Hej us t seemed so sad and all alone and coming home from work to that house. So we ’ dg ooutt he r eont hewe e ke nds ,butI definitely kept all my stuff at my mom’ spl a c e .

Thede c i s i on,Ig ue s s ,wa s n’ te ve nha r df orme .I twa s n’ te ve nl i keIs a t downa ndIwa sl i kepr osa ndc ons ,bl a hbl a hbl a h.Iwa sj us tl i kenope .I ’ m g oi ngt os t a ywi t hmom.Andmymom ke ptt hehous ewe ’ d grown up in, so it woul dj us ts e e m mor ena t ur a l ,t oo.I ’ m nott os ur ehowt ha tg otwor ke dout , but she got the house. And he got a new one. What else can I say about that? I don’ tr e me mbe re ve rdi s c us s i ngi twi t hmys i s t e r s .I twa sj us tki ndofl i keyup, we ’ r eg onnabewi t hmom.Be c a us et he ywe r ej us tl i kewe l l ,youg uysc a n de c i de .You’ r eol de noug h.Ig ue s ss omes c hoolda ysIwoul ds t a youta tmy da d’ s ,buti twa sj us ts uc hapa i nt odr i vef a r t he r .The nIwoul df or g e ts t uf fa t mymom’ s .Tha t ’ swhe r emos tofmys t uf fwa s .I t ’ sj us tbe c a us el i kepa c ki ng

316 constantly, having to have your little backpack and think about everything you mi g htpos s i bl ene e d.I t ’ ss oa nnoyi ng .I t ’ sl i keno,Idonote nj oyt hi s .Butt he n my dad started trying to kind of bribe us outt he r e .I ’ l lma keyoubut t e r mi l k chocolate chip cookies on Saturday morning if you come out here. Stuff like t ha t .I ’ l lma keyout hi sg r e a tme a l .I twa s n’ tl i ket ha t —like trying to bribe us— but he wanted us to come out there.

Ida identified several factors that helped her decide to be with her mother. One factor was that her father had moved so far outside the city. Another factor Ida related was her identification with her mother because of the affairs. She was aware that her father was feeling sad and lonely living in this house outside of the city. Another important factor for Ida was the convenience of being where she had always been, i.e., the house that she had grown up in. However, I think the most important factor was that it was annoying to her to have to keep everything she needed at both places in a little pack. She did not enjoy the going back and forth, and so Ida stopped going.

The r ei sl i t t l edr a mai nI da ’ ss c e ne .S hef e l tt ha ts heha dt hea ut hor i t yt ode c i de ,a nd she decided based on what was best for her life.

The behavior of her father and stepmother confirmed that Ida had made a good decision. Ida reported, So it became more like a weekend thing out there. And then as we went to college, vacations—kind of come, stay with our mom, see our dad for a couple days. I see him like three times a year now. He just has this new family, and t he y’ vet a ke nove r .Ands hec l e a r l ydoe snotwa ntust obeapa r tofi t .S oIf e e l

317 whenever I go back now, I just feel totally unwelcome. For instance, we were gone for a while, maybe a few months, and she packed up all of our stuff and put it in storage. Because we each had our own room. She went through like—I had my journal in some of the drawer—you know what I mean? Very personal t hi ng s .Iha ve n’ te ve ns e e ni ts i nc e .Idon’ te ve nknowwhe r es heputt he m.My da ddi dn’ te ve nknow.I ’ ml i kehowc a nyoubema r r i e dt ot hi swoma nwho t a ke sa l lyourc hi l dr e n’ ss t uf fa ndj us t —she threw away some of our stuff. Just no respect whatsoever. No one called us and said hey, you’ r enothe r eal ot .

We ’ r eg onnamoves t uf foutofyourr ooms .Wa nnac omehe l p?Wha tdoyou want? Uh-uh.S hej us tdi di t .Ands he ’ sa l wa ysdoi ngs t uf fl i ket ha t —somehow l oc ki ngusoutoft hehous ea ndj us ti s n’ tf r i e ndl y.Fori ns t a nc e ,i fIc a l l ,s he never even asks me how I am on the phone. And I always have made an effort.

I ’ ml i kehe yLe e ,how’ si tg oi ng .How’ swor k?Wha t ’ sne w?Fi ne .Ye a h.S he just—s ot ha t ’ sdr i ve nusa wa y.Andwe ’ veha d—like we brought this up to my da dal ot ,buthe ’ sj us tl i keye a h, okay, I can see how you feel that way. But you ha veapa r ti nt hi s ,t oo.We ’ r el i keda d,wha tdoyouwa ntust odo.Tr ya nds e e whe r es he ’ sc omi ngf r om.Oka y,we l ls hedoe s n’ tt a l k.Idon’ tknow.

I daf e l tunwe l c omea ndnotapa r tofhe rf a t he r ’ sne wf a mily. She felt that her father had not protected the rights of his children to see him. Ida felt this because her father ha dnott a ke nt hec hi l dr e n’ ss i dea g a i ns tt he i rs t e pmot he r ,whowa se s s e nt i a l l y unf r i e ndl ya ndl oc ke dt he m outt he i rf a t he r ’ shous e .

318 Ida ’ ss t a nc et owa r dhe rf a t he rwi t hwhom s hei sve r ydi s a ppoi nt e d,e s s e nt i a l l y reminded me of the chorus of an old jazz song written by Nat King Cole and Irving Mi l l s ,“ S t r a i g ht e nUpa ndFl yRi g ht . ”Thec hor uswe ntl i ket hi s , Straighten up and fly right straighten up and fly right straighten up and fly right a i n’ tnous ei nj i vi n’ Wha t ’ st heus eofda bbi n’ Straighten up and fly right Cooldownpa pa ,don’ tyoubl owyourt op.

Ida wanted her father to stop blaming her mother and to take responsibility for his actions. She wanted her father to have a relationship with her. She wanted her father to see what her stepmother was doing to his relationships with his daughters.

However, Ida has lost her hope that her father will ever be able to fulfill these desires, and she has moved on with her life. Her father has fallen far from the ideal dad that he once was.

Otis: They Both Love Me, No Matter What He was 2 years old when his parents got divorced. He lived mostly with his mother until age 11 or 12 years old.The nhede c i de dt og ol i vewi t hhi sf a t he r .Ot i s ’ summary description of his Burkeian scene was,

319 when I got old enough, I decided to go live with my dad. So then I moved over wi t hhi m.Heg a vemeal otmor ef r e e dom t ha nmymom di d.S ot ha t ’ swhyI enjoyed staying with him more. Plus, me and my mother, we used to get into it al ot ,t oo,whe nIwa syoung e r .Andt he nI ’ vebe e nwi t hhi m pr e t t ymuc he ve r since then, until I went to college. We get along way more—Idon’ tknow.

The r e ’ sj us ts ome t hi nga boutmea ndmyf a t he r ’ sr e l a t i ons hi p.Weg e ta l ong wa ybe t t e rt ha nmea ndmymom dof ors omer e a s ons .We ’ vene ve rbe e nt ha t c l os e .ButIdon’ tknow wha t ’ st her e a s onbe hi ndt ha t .

Otis related his decision to change child-parent living arrangements to the differing relationships that he has with each parent. He went to private school until he entered high school which was a large suburban college preparatory school. He graduated and enrolled in a four year college. He reported that his: parents, they get along pret t ywe l l .The y’ r epr e t t yg oodf r i e ndsnow.Tha t probably took about 10, 12 years to happen. But they talk a lot though. Even whe nI ’ ma ts c hool ,t he yc a l le a c hot he ra ndt a l k,j us ta boutme .It hi nkt ha t kind of helped me a lot though.

Otis believed that hi spa r e nt s ’a bi di ngi nt e r e s ti nhi m,a ndt ha thi spa r e nt sa r e now friends with each other, helped him grow up to the person that he is now. Otis continued that although he was an only child, his family was, Like our family is pretty close. Like all my aunts and uncles and everything and cousins. One of my cousins lived with my father. She used to live with us for a

320 few years. My aunt used to live with us. So it was just me and my dad, my aunt and my cousin for most of the time throughout high school.

I as ke dhi mi fhec oul dr e me mbe rhowhec a met ode c i det omovet ohi sDa d’ s .

Otis replied, Yeah, I remember exactly. Me and my mom, she was so strict on me—until I wa sa bout1 3 ,s hewoul dn’ tl e tmeda t e ,g oout ,ha veg i r l f r i e ndsora nyt hi ng .

She just wanted me—because her background is—both my parents are [nationality omitted], and their background is very strict church upbringing. So whe nIwa sl i vi ngwi t hmymom,s hewoul dn’ tl e tmeg ooutoft hehous epa s t l i kes e ve n,e i g ht .S he ’ dma kemeha vemyf r i e ndsove r .Ic oul dn’ tdoa sma ny things as all my friends could do. It kept getting to me, and I finally got fed up with it. Then when I used to go visit my dad on weekends or whatever, he let me do whatever I wanted to do. I could go out late, hang out. I mean he woul dn’ tl e tmedowha t e ve rIwa nt e dt odo,butwa smor el e ni e nt .Asl onga sI ke ptt hehous ec l e a n,a nda sl onga sIdi dn’ tg e ti nt oa nyt r oubl e ,hedi dn’ tc a r e what I did. So he let me go out, have friends over, have girlfriends, go to movies, stuff like that. I saw it was a lot more freedom, so I always wanted to live with him and enjoy my high school experience more.

So for Otis, moving in with his father offered more freedom from parental rules and the strict supervision of his mother. He had a very clear memory of how he had made his decision. I wondered how his mother felt about his decision to move to hi sf a t he r ’ shous e .Ot i sr e pl i e d,

321 She was like a little against it at first, but then she warmed up to the idea, because my dad—he wanted it to happen, too. So she like stopped fighting after a while. She still wanted me to come over on weekends a lot and see her a lot.

Af t e rawhi l e ,s heg otus e dt oi t .S hedi dn’ tr e a l l yma keabi gde a loutofi t .

I asked Otis to explain the visitation schedule with his mother was after he move dt ohi sf a t he r ’ shous e .Ot i ss a i d, I ’ ds a ya bout3t i me sawe e k.Ors ome t i me ss hewoul ds t op—I was staying at myda d’ shous ea nds he ’ ds t opbya ndvi s i t .The ns he ’ dl e a ve .OrIwoul dg ot o her house like twice a week at the mos t .S oIwa sl i kebe i nga tmyda d’ shous e mos toft het i me .Ig ots ous e dt oi ta ndIwa ss oc omf or t a bl eove rt he r e .Idon’ t know.I t ’ sl i ket hewa yheha di ts e tup.

So it seemed that despite living with his father, he saw his mother fairly often during the week. Otis was comfortable with how his father had set up the living arrangements. Significantly for Otis, his mother became comfortable with the new arrangements and she stopped fighting the new living arrangements.

I asked Otis how his father felt about the decision to change living a r r a ng e me nt s .Her e por t e dt ha t“ It hi nkhel i ke di t .It hi nkhewa sha ppya bouti t .He ne ve rr e a l l yt ol dmehowhef e l ta bouti t ,butIt hi nkt ha thel i ke di tt houg h. ” However, in responding to my question, Otis reflected, I had the feeling that my mom was kind of like upset about it though on a different level. Like she might have felt hurt, I think. As I got older, I kind of r e a l i z e dt ha ts hemi g htf e e lhur tt ha tIwa s n’ ts pe ndi nga smuc ht i mewi t hhe r

322 now and all that. I feel kind of bad about that, a little bit. But I see her as often as I can.

And with this comment, Otis conveyed that his view point changed because of being older. He could now see as he reflected on his decision that his mother might have felt hurt by his decision. This reflection led him to make more of an effort to see his mother, because he had not wanted to hurt her with his decision to change his living arrangements.

I asked him how he felt this decision might have affected the rest of his life c our s e .Her e s ponde dt omy“ wha ti f ”s c e na r i owi t h: Well, I think like if I was living with my mom most of my life, I would have been too sheltered, maybe more timid than I am now. Because my dad, he let meg r owbye xpe r i e nc ea ndt hi ng s .Li kehedi dn’ twant to just keep me sheltered from everything. He wanted me to find out for myself—like basically my own experience is learn from what I do. By doing that, I think it helped me grow up faster. It helped me mature faster. Made me more responsible, I think.

It also made me more confident as a person, too. Because like my mom, she has like self-c onf i de nc ei s s ue s ,t oo,a swe l l .S he ’ ski ndofi ns e c ur e .Andl i kes he takes I think Zoloft or Prozac or something like that, because she has a little bit of emotional problems. So I think her actions kind of rubbed off on me a little bit. If I would have lived with her most of my life, I think I probably would have been acting the way she does. So I think my dad helped me like build like

323 more confidence in myself, living with him. And I also had the strong male figure around all the time.

Ot i sf e l tt ha thi smot he r ’ si ns e c ur i t ywoul dha vebe c omeapa r tofhi m ha dhe continued to stay with her. He felt that he became more mature and more confident as a person because of his decision to live primarily with his father. In addition, he felt t ha tha vi nga“ s t r ongma l ef i g ur ea r ound”ma deadi f f e r e nc ef orhi mi nc ompa r i s ont o his friends.

I wondered if he had any ideas about how his parents thought of him when he made the decision to change his living arrangements. Otis replied, I think my dad, he was a little more—how do you say it—he ’ st het ypel i kehe doe s n’ tr e a l l yknowl i kewha t ’ sg oi ngona ndl i kewha tki dsdo.He ’ st het ype of person that like he would think like I don’ tknowl i keIt hi nkhe ’ spr oba bl y more in the dark with the things I was doing as opposed to my mom. Like she—my mom could like just guess what I was doing. When I went outside, like I ’ dc omeba c ki na nds hewoul dknowwha tIwa sdoi nga l r e a dy.S hec oul djust t e l lbyl ooki nga tmyf a c e .Myda d’ snota spe r c e pt i vea st ha t .Hec oul ds e ei f s ome t hi ng ’ swr ongwi t hme ,buthene ve rt a l ke dt ol i ke —just asked me a lot of que s t i onsa nds e ewhe r eI ’ vebe e n,wha tI ’ vebe e ndoi ng ,t hi ng sl i ket ha t .S oI think he more—he might have an idea like what I do or have a view of me, but hewa s n’ tl i kea si nt unea smymom wa s .Eve nt houg hmea ndmymom wa s n’ t as close, she always knew like what was going on with me. She could tell if I wa sl yi ng .Myda dIdon’ tt hi nkc oul dt e l li fIwa sl yi ng .Idon’ tknowwhy.

324 He ’ sj us tmor el i ke —I ’ l ls a ya bs e nt mi nde d.Li kehe ’ sr e a l l ynotl i keup-to-date l i ket ha t .ButIg ue s she ’ sal i t t l eol de r .Idon’ tknow.Butmyma ,s he ’ ski ndof young .S he ’ sl i ke4 0 .S os hepr e t t ymuc hknowswha t ’ sg oing on. She sees me as ag oodpe r s on.S heknowsIdos omet hi ng st ha ts hedoe s n’ tl i ke ,t ha ts he woul dn’ ta ppr oveof .Andmyda d,heknowst ha tIdos omet hi ng st ha the woul dn’ ta ppr oveofe i t he r .Idon’ tknow.The ybot hs a yt he yl ovemeno matter what.

Otis was aware that his mother was more in tune with the happenings of his life than his father was. In the end it did not matter because Otis felt that they both loved him, even though neither would have approved of everything that he has done.

Feeling loved by his parents became an organizing principle for Otis. He knew that despite the fact he did not always behave the way his parents would have wanted him to behave, that they both accepted him and loved him. Moreover, Otis felt pulled to hi sf a t he r ’ shouse by the opportunity for more independence and less direct supervision.

Ll oyd:“ IBe c a meHe rHobby” Ll oydde s c r i be dhi ms e l fa s“ Ig ue s st ha tIa mr e l a xe d. ”Hi spa r e nt swe r e divorced when, Iwa sr e a l l yyoung ,pr oba bl yl i ke5or6 .Idon’ tr e a l l yr e me mber. I actually don’ tr e a l l yha vet ooma nyme mor i e soft he mt og e t he r .S oIs t a ye dwi t hmy mom for a long time. And then she moved to California before my freshman

325 ye a rofhi g hs c hool .I ’ mf r om Cl e ve l a nd[ l oc a t i onc ha ng e d] .S hemove dt o Oregon [location chang e d] .AndIc oul dha vewe nt .ButIdon’ tknowwhyI di dn’ t ,butIwa nt e dt os t a ywi t hmyf r i e nds ,ba s i c a l l y,a ndj us tha ngout .

Lloyd continued his story, Idon’ tr e a l l yha veve r ymuc hofar e l a t i ons hi pwi t hmyda d,notbe c a us eI don’ tl i kehi m ornotbe c ause like he just—Iwoul dn’ tne c e s s a r i l yl a be li ta shi m l i keki ndofl e a vi nga ndt ur ni nghi sba c konme .It hi nkhe ’ sj us tl a z y,r e a l l y, when it comes down to it. Um—he remarried, and then they separated. He had three kids. That was cool. I was close—I ended up spending some time living with my dad. I think it was like eighth grade maybe. I stayed with him for a couple months. The kids are cool. We get along. I get along with my stepmom.

S he ’ syoung e r ,s os he ’ sc ool .Theki dsa r ec ool .The y’ r eba d,butt he y’ r ef un.I like them. We get along fine.

So instead of moving in with my dad, because I tried that in like eighth g r a de ,a ndi tj us twa s n’ t —he ’ sani c eg uy.He ’ sKur di s h[ na t i ona l i t yc ha ng e d] ,s o he ’ sal i t t l eol de rf a s hi one d.S oIj us tc oul dt e l lt ha tt ha twoul dn’ twor kf orf our ye a r s .Andhe ’ saDJ ,s oheha dani c ehous e ,butt hei nc omewa s n’ ts t e a dy, because he lives in Cleveland, so like all the clubs are constantly closing. And he ’ dbel ooki ngf ors ome whe r ee l s e .S oi twa sj us tt oo—so I ended up moving in with my grandma, who was—s he ’ syoung e r ,t oo,s os hewa sr e a lunde r s t a ndi ng .

We got along fine. A little towards the end there was a little friction just because I had a lot of pressure to go to the Naval Academy [changed name]. I

326 got in to the Naval Academy, because my uncle is in the Navy. So I had a lot of pr e s s ur ef r om myf a mi l yt og o.Andi t ’ sha r dt ot ur ndown.I t ’ saf ul lr i de .

You’ r epr e t t ymuc hs e t .Buti nhi nds i g ht ,i twa sag r e a tde c i s i on,be c a us eI ’ m not trying to like go to war or anything stupid like that. But at the time, they di dn’ tr e a l l yunde r s t a nd.S he[ ma t e r na lg r a ndmot he r ]g otki ndofma d.We ’ ve gotten past that, obviously.

So Lloyd, after choosing to live with his father for a few months in eighth grade, decided to live with his maternal grandmother when his mother decided to move to Oregon. Lloyd made a double shift in his child-parent living arrangements.

I asked Lloyd to tell me about the first change in eighth grade to living with his father. He said, It was just basically like there was a lot of tension between me and my mom.

Ands heha daboyf r i e nd.I t ’ sha r dt or e a l l yt hi nkba c k,be c a us eIf e e ll i kei twa s a while ago. It was eight years ago. Um—it was just more or less tension. Just, wewe r e n’ tg e t t i nga l ongf ors omer e a s on,a ndIr e a l l yc a n’ tputmyf i ng e roni t .

Wewe r ej us ta r g ui ngal ot .S hekne ws hewa sg onnamove .Idi dn’ twa ntt og o, whi c hs hewa soka ywi t h.S hewa s n’ tl i ke —she was more disappointed, because she thought that I had more opportunity out there. But I di dn’ tr e a l l yt hi nks o, be c a us es hedi dn’ tr e a l l yknowwha ts hewa sdoi ng .Ba s i c a l l y,he rboyf r i e nd had gotten a job out there. So he was setting up, and she was really excited. I wa sj us tl i keyouknow,i tj us tdoe s n’ tr e a l l y—l i ket he r e ’ samor es ur et hi ng here. You know what I mean?

327 So she was a little upset about that. So we started arguing a lot. It just got to the point where she was like you should just live with your dad or whatever. It was like probably a better idea. So I did. It was okay. Like I said, I g ota l ongwi t hmyda d.I t ’ sj us tl i kei twa sha r de r ,be c a us ehel i ve dal i t t l e farther out of the city, and I went to the school in the city. So I could tell it was taxing on him to get me to school and stuff. He was comfortable—hewa s n’ t rich or anything. And I knew that by me being there, he was struggling a little bi tmor e .I twor ke doutf ort het i meIwa st he r e ,buti tde f i ni t e l ywoul dn’ tha ve worked for four years. I know that.

Lloyd reported that he and his mother had been arguing and there is a lot of t e ns i onbe t we e nt he m.Hi smot he r ’ si de aa boutwha twa sg oodf orhi m wa sdi f f e r e nt than what he thought was good for him. She made the suggestion that he live with his father if he was not going to go to Oregon with her and her boyfriend. Lloyd tried this living arrangement, but he felt that it was a short term solution to his living situation.

He felt that it would not have worked for the 4 years of high school. He was aware that he was taxing his father by getting him to bring him into the city for school and that he would also be taxing economically to his father. He decided to live with his maternal grandmother for the next four years of high school and this is the place that het hi nksofa shome .Ora sLl oyds a i d,“ Andl i kewhe nIg ohome ,t ha t ’ swhe r eIg o. ” I asked how he came to decide on his maternal grandmother and Lloyd told me that she lived right down the street from his high school in Cleveland, so to Lloyd this seemed to be an obvious choice. He continued,

328 S he ’ sj us tl i ke ,Idon’ tknow,s hene e dshobbi e s .AndIbe c a mehe rhobby.S he ’ s retired, so it was just like something for her to do, pretty much. Like she got along with my principal. They offered her a job. And I really think that they made up a job for her. She was like parent liaison. She basically talked to parents whose kids were always late or were suspended. Um—but I was pretty bad in high school. I was worse in middle school. But I think every kid is bad i nmi ddl es c hool .Iwa sj us tac l own.Iwa s n’ tl i keg e t t i ngs us pe nde d. I never got suspended. But I was a smart ass. I liked to crack jokes and stuff. Got me into some trouble. But other than that, I was good.

Ll oyd’ sde c i s i ont oc ha ng ehi sc hi l d-parent living situation was essentially driven by forces somewhat out of his control, in contrast to the other research pa r t i c i pa nt s .Iwonde r e dhowhi smot he r ’ sde c i s i ont omovewi t hhe rboyf r i e ndt o Oregon and leave Lloyd living with his grandmother affected his relationship with his mother. Lloyd said, No, I talked to her. The thing is though, it just gets really, really messed up.

She ended up getting into trouble. Like they never really told me much about it, because I think it was my senior year. Like I talk to her pretty frequently. I would say at least once a week—probably not as much as I guess I should have.

But I was just a kid. I was busy. . . . I was always like playing football or doing s ome t hi ng .Ide f i ni t e l yt a l ke dt ohe r .Li keIl ovemymom t ode a t h.We ’ ve gotten so much closer, just in the last couple years, becauseI ’ veg ot t e nol de r a ndI ’ vebe e na bl et or e a l i z et ha tal otoft het hi ng ss hes a i dt ome —i t ’ sha r d,I

329 t hi nk,a saki dt ot r us twha tyourpa r e nt ss a y.Andnowt ha tI ’ mg e t t i ngol de r a ndI ’ mg e t t i ngt ot hepoi ntwhe r eIr e a l l ys t a r tt or e a l i z el i kewha ts hewas s a yi nga ndwha ts hewa st r yi ngt odowa sf ormybe s t .S owe ’ veg ot t e nal ot c l os e r .S he ’ se xt r e me l ypr oudofme .Li keIl ovemymom t ode a t h,a nds he l ove sme .AndIknowt ha t .S oi t ’ snots omuc hofapr obl e m.I nhi g hs c hool , we talked.

And then she basically got into a little bit of trouble. It was bad. She basically had some mental health issues that nobody even—l i kes hedi dn’ tknow a ndnobodyr e a l l ykne w.Buts hewa sde pr e s s e dal ot .S he ’ sg ot t e nal otofhe l p.

Ands hedr a nk,a nds he ’ sg ot t e nhe l pwi t ht ha t .S os hedoe s n’ tdr i nka nymor e .

S he ’ sbe e ns e e i ngs ome onea ndt he y’ veg othe ronme ds ,s os he ’ sal otbe t t e r now. But she just flipped out one night on her boyfriend and stabbed him. This is where it gets hazy. I felt like my grandma was trying to protect me and not r e a l l yt e l lme ,s oIdi dn’ tr e a l l yknowmuc ha bouti t .S os hewe nta wa yf ora couple months, which was really hard on my brother. I have a little brother.

He ’ st e c hni c a l l ymyha l fbr ot he r ,butl i keIg r e wupwi t hhi m,youknow?S o he’ sal otc l os e rt ome —we ’ r eal otc l os e rt ha nIa m wi t hmyda d’ ski ds .

Ll oyd’ ss t or yg otmuc hmor ec ompl i c a t e dt ha nj us tc hoos i ngwi t hwhi c h parent to live. He told me that the usual narrative presumption in our culture, i.e., that parents try to stay connected to their children, is erroneous in his case. Instead the opposite was true. Specifically Lloyd felt he had the responsibility to stay connected to his mother and, as we now have learned, to his younger half brother. Then during his

330 senior year of hig hs c hoolhi smot he r“ f l i ppe doutoneni g ht ”a nds t a bbe dhe r boyfriend. His grandmother had tried to protect him from knowing what really happened so that he could concentrate on finishing high school and applying to college.

The process of going to school became complicated for Lloyd since his mot he r ’ sbr ot he rwa sc a r e e rNa vya ndhene e de df i na nc i a la i dt og ot os c hool .He received an appointment to the Naval Academy which essentially means a free ride for college as long as he agreed to serve six years in the Navy. He was within a couple weeks of going to basic Naval training when he decided to attended a prestigious Midwestern university and study engineering.

Ll oyd’ sna r r a t i veBur ke i a ns c e neofde c i di ngwi t hwhom t ol i vewa sma deupof multiple acts. Clearly he had a sense of agency, and he used this sense of agency to act in his own best interests. As he has gained a broader perspective over the years since hi smot he rmove d,hec a na ppr e c i a t ehi smot he r ’ se a r l yl e s s onsofpr i or i t i z i nghi s school work, and being loyal to his friends. He cannot understand, nor has he really a c c e pt e d,hi sf a t he r ’ sl a c kofi nvol ve me nti nhi sl i f e .Hewa sa bl eonl yt oc ont r a s thi s a mbi t i ona ndpe r s e ve r a nc et owha thef e l twa shi sf a t he r ’ sl a c kofi t .Att hes a met i me he began his story by telling me that he was relaxed. In retrospect this self description to me foreshadowed his unconscious identification with his father. However, for Lloyd this identification showed itself only in how he wanted to present himself, not his sense of himself on the inside. Like his mother, Lloyd was willing to take risks.

Despite being set for life by going to the Naval Academy, he risked that safety by

331 going to engineering school. For Lloyd, the risk/reward ratio of relationships and professions are ones that he has become very good at calculating.

J a r r e t t :S ol omon’ sDe c i s i ona ta nEa r l yAg e Jarrett told me that he had grown up in suburban Chicago. He has a brother who is 15 months older than he is. His parents were divorced when he and his brother were quite young. Jarrett reported that they had the usual visitation schedule of seeing their father every other weekend and then sometimes during the week. Jarrett remembered that because of their young age, his father had decided at the time of the divorce that he and his brother should live with his mother. The parents have joint custody.

J a r r e t t ’ sBur ke i a ns c e nedi dnotr e a l l ybe g i nunt i lhewa si ns e ve nt hg r a dea nd his mother had decided to move to Maryland [location changed] to be with her new husband who lived in Baltimore. Jarrett said, But once my mom moved to Baltimore, she wanted us to go with her. That was when they finally went to court and had a custody fight over us—several years after the actual divorce. Basically, my dad lost. I think my brother and I wa nt e dt ol i vewi t hourmom,butwea l s owa nt e dt os t a yi nI l l i noi s .Wedi dn’ t r e a l l ywa ntt og ot oBa l t i mor e ,whi c hobvi ous l yc oul dn’ tha ppe n.

Jarrett reported that once his mother had won the custody fight that he and his brother had about a week-long period where they told their mother that they were not moving with her to Baltimore. Eventually however, they had ended up going to

332 Baltimore with her. Jarrett remembered a custody evaluation with a psychologist who reported his findings to judge and a meeting with the judge in his chambers. The judge decided to award sole custody to his mother and he allowed her to take Jarrett and his br ot he rt oBa l t i mor e .J a r r e t tt ol dmet ha thea ndhi sbr ot he rwe r e“ ki ndofmi s e r a bl e for the six months or so that we were there. And um—finally [we] basically convinced he rt ol e tusg oba c k. ” Jarrett remembered that, Um—I think she was pretty devastated. She certainly wanted us to stay with her. I doubt that she could provide for us better than our dad could. My dad was living with my stepmother and three stepbrothers at the time, so when we moved back, that made five of us boys living in one house, which is certainly an interesting experience. Because we were all pretty close in age, too. I think it de f i ni t e l ybot he r e dhe rf orawhi l e ,Idon’ tt hi nkt ha ti ta f f e c t sourr e l a t i ons hi p now at all. But it was certainly very difficult for her at the time.

J a r r e t t ’ sc omme nt a r yf oc us e donhi smot he r ’ sr e a c t i onsa nde xpe r i e nc e s .Hef oundi t very difficult to comment on his own subjective feelings about the decision. He hinted that he had feelings about it—“ i nt e r e s t i nge xpe r i e nc e ” —but he seemed reluctant or unwilling to state more than the observable facts of the situation. I asked Jarrett directly how hard it was psychologically for him to make this decision and communicate it to his mother. Jarrett replied, I think it was much easier having my brother make the decision with me. It would have been a lot harder had he chosen to go and I chose to stay or vice

333 versa. Having him there certainly helped. It was definitely difficult to, you know, just leave her behind when she was upset.

I inquired further if he had ever given any thought about how this decision made with his brother had affected the rest of his life and who he had become. Jarrett replied that he had never thought about this question before, but thinking about it now Jarrett thought, It hi nki ns omewa ysi t ’ sma dememuc hmor ei nde pe nde nta ndwi l l i ngt o make decisions and do my own thing. Um—like I kind of was saying earlier— but along with that independence, you know, I probably keep to myself much more than maybe I would have otherwise.

I asked Jarrett in what sense of keeping to himself did he mean this. He responded, “ If e e ll i ke ,youknow,Iha veavery open relationship right now with my fiancée, but Idon’ tne c e s s a r i l yha veapr obl e m be i ngonmyowna nddoi ngmyownt hi ng s ome t i me s . ” Jarrett went on to say about this decision, Um—I think it certainly changed my life. Not to say that my life is any worse now than it would have been before, because my life has certainly turned out better. But it sort of changed—I mean when my brother and I were living in Illinois with our mom that had become a situation that we were kind of accustomed to and comfortable with. And then pretty much changed our whole—our lives, because we went from that to living in Baltimore and flying back to Chicago every other weekend to see our dad, to then living in Chicago

334 and flying to Baltimore once or twice a month to see our mom. So it was definitely a different experience after that.

Jarrett continued, I think it certainly affects me now in terms of, you know, the things that I want to try to do in my life and in my relationship with my fiancée and in my marriage and with my kids, in terms of trying to have as open a relationship with them as I can—and in terms of trying to provide a stable family e nvi r onme ntt ha tIdi dn’ tne c e s s a r i l yha vea l lt het i me .

As hard as I tried to get Jarrett to be more specific in the rest of the interview hes t r ug g l e dt oa ns we rmyque s t i onsa bouthi sowns ubj e c t i vi t y.If e l tt ha tJ a r r e t t ’ s Burkeian scene was confused. He and his brother had chosen to live in Chicago with their father and visit his mother, but he could not really tell me the subjective basis for this decision. While I cannot know what he could not tell me, my hypothesis was that because he had been put in the Solomon-like position of having to choose a parent to live with, he had tried to reduce his feelings to facts and not feelings .The s e“ f a c t s ” we r es umme dupbyt hewor d“ c omf or t a bl e . ”Thi swa sawor dt ha tne e de d,f orma ny reasons I suspect, to remain undefined for Jarrett.

Discussion and Emergent Themes What do these scenes tell us about these research participants? What else do these scenes have to say to the reader? Are there recurrent themes that reappear in several, or even all of these constructed Burkeian scenes? These are the topics that I

335 wa ntt oe xpl or enow.Onc ea g a i nIwi l lus et hepa r t i c i pa nt s ’wor dsa smuc ha sIc a n to frame these emergent themes or motifs. Where there is disagreement, dissimilarity, or dissent I will use the rhetorical device of the Burkeian scene to allow participants to talk to each other, even though in reality none of the participants to my knowledge have ever talked with each other. This rhetorical scheme allows for a Bakhtinian dialogical interchange which may reveal more than what appeared in the single interviews.

Contested Stories As a clinician, one of the most striking aspects I have found in working with children and parents in a divorce process or post divorce has been how reality was so often contested. A father will report an event to you. The mother will report the same event to you. Both reports were often completely different. Which story was the hi s t or i c a lr e a l i t y?Iknowc l i ni c a l l yt ha tbot hs t or i e swe r et hepa r e nt s ’s ubj e c t i ve reality. However, I did not know what really happened in the event. To make matters even more complicated, each child in the family can report the same event to you.

Each story about the event conveyed a certain verisimilitude about the event, but none oft hes t or i e sf ul l ya g r e e da boutt hea c t ua lhi s t or i c a le ve nt .The r ewa snoGod’ s -eyeview of the event. Yet to make judicial or professional decisions and recommendations, i ti st hi sGod’ s -eye-view that all third party observers and participants want.

In this sense, contested stories become, if not the central qualitative aspect of a di vor c epr oc e s s ,oneoft hemos tpr omi ne nt .AGod’ s -eye-view of an event/experience

336 creates a coherent and cohesive story. Lacking this sort of knowledge of an experience, the story teller may have more difficulty creating a coherent and cohesive story. How to place a story into a larger context with appropriate foreshadowing, side-shadowing, and detail that allows the listener/reader a sense of verisimilitude becomes a challenge for the storyteller/author. However, in this particular situation—the divorce process— each participant/storyteller appears to be certain that they and only they has the God’ s -eye-view of events. There is no equivocation from any of the story tellers. It is this lack of equivocation that is another central attribute of the divorce process, and one that creates, I think, a ripe and fertile setting/stage for contested stories.

Ac e nt r a le l e me ntoft he s er e s e a r c hpa r t i c i pa nt s ’s t or i e swa st ha tt he i rs t or i e s were contested. These stories were contested in one sense because in each of their Burkeian scenes, these research participants portrayed a struggle at one level for the control of their personal self-narratives, not to mention the general narratives of their respective lives. In addition, in some instances there was competition in their selfnarratives for the best version of their narratives. Contested stories are such a part of the divorce process that it should not be surprising that children of divorced parents seemed to have internalized, to a degree, this incoherence into their narratives, or at the very least are aware of the narrative tension within them.

Another often overlooked significant aspect for the children of divorced pa r e nt si st ha tt he ya sag r oup“ c ont e s t ”orc ha l l e ng et hec ul t ur a l l ypr i vi l e g e ds t or yor cultural master plot narrative of child development in the United States. In addition, these children and their parents contest the cultural definition of what is a family. The

337 honored story of child development in our culture is one of growing up in a nuclear family and living with both a mother and a father. Jarrett commenting about growing upwi t hdi vor c e dpa r e nt sa ndonhi se xpe r i e nc ea ts c hools a i d,“ ...It hi nkIwa st he only one [a child whose parents were divorced], but [If I was not then] I certainly [I] f e l tl i keIwa st heonl yone . ”J a r r e t t ’ sbr i e f ,a l mos tt os s e dof f ,c omme ntr e vealed an already developed sense of alienation and aloneness from his school peers. He was aware of being different from his classmates because his parents were divorced.

Ida hinted at how the power of this culturally privileged story affects children of divorce parents when she said, If e l tr e a l l ybe t r a ye d,be c a us eIdon’ tknow—I just had this memory of when I was really little, I just made my parents both promise—I was like promise me that you will never get divorced. I made them promise. For some reason, that was like my security blanket. I remember where I was when I asked them—in their master bathroom. They both were like oh yeah, because things were fine.

That meant so much to me. Their word meant so much to me. So for some reason, that was what rea l l yhi tme .If e l tr e a l l ybe t r a ye d.Iwa sl i ket hi si s n’ t ha ppe ni ng .We ’ r el i ket hepe r f e c tf a mi l y.

The idea of being from a divorced family was threatening to Ida even from an e a r l ya g e .S her e me mbe r e dwa nt i nga sa“ s e c ur i t ybl a nke t ”he rpa r e nt s ’pr omi s e that t he ywoul dnotdi vor c e .S hewa nt e dt obef r om t he“ pe r f e c tf a mi l y, ”whi c hi nour c ul t ur e ’ sna r r a t i vema s t e rpl otme a ntbe i ngf r om anuc l e a rf a mi l y.ForI danott obe from a family, specifically a nuclear family, defined as the norm by the cultural

338 narrative, meant that she was not perfect, or that something was wrong with her. In what was the opposite of the often expressed parental feeling that children are a r e f l e c t i onont he i rpa r e nt s ,s hef e l the rpa r e nt s ’di vor c er e f l e c t e dba dl yonhe r .S he expressed her feelings this way: I twa ss oe mba r r a s s i ngf orus .Wedi dn’ te ve nt e l lourf r i e nds .I twa ss o embarrassing. Like seriously, we did not tell people for months. We were just l i ket he r e ’ ss omepr obl e ms .Andt he nf i na l l y,Iwa st hef i r s tone .S c r e wi t .I ’ m not protecting him any more. I need to get this off my chest. That felt better.

But for a while, I felt like I was leading a double life. I remember sobbing and being so upset, and then having to go to basketball practice, joke around with everyone, and be fine. It was just like this double life. And at school—you know high school—e ve r yone ’ sa l l ,Idon’ tknow,youne e dt oa c tac e r t a i n [way]—i t ’ sr e a l l ys i l l y.

The strength of this internalized cultural narrative master plot was so strong, that Ida felt like she needed to lead a double life. One life knew and lived the reality that her parents were separated, and the other life was pretending that she was still part oft he“ pe r f e c tf a mi l y. ”Cl i ni c a l l y,Iha ves e e npa t i e nt swhoha vede s c r i be ds i mi l a r feelings with this variation of the double life theme. They felt that certain personality traits or self-attributes came out when they were with their father and other personality traits or self attributes came out when they were with their mother. Their int e r na le xpe r i e nc ewa ss i mi l a rt oI da ’ si nt ha tt he yf e l tl i ket he ywe r el e a di ngadoubl e life. They were aware of an internal emotional and cognitive conflict about who they

339 were. I described this in Chapter IX. In speaking about this sort of internal attribute c onf l i c t ,Gl e ndar e por t e dont hewi s ht obef r om anuc l e a rf a mi l ywhe ns hes a i d,“ I j us tr e me mbe rwi s hi ngs ome t i me st ha tmypa r e nt swe r e n’ tdi vor c e d,j us tbe c a us ei t woul dha vebe e ne a s i e r . ” Anot he rwa ya tl ooki nga thow“ c ont e s t e ds t or i e s ”a r ec e ntral to the divorce process is to consider that if you interview a divorcing mother about what she considers the needs of her children and their best interests to be and you interview a father asking him the same question, you will get usually two very different answers.

Clinicians and judges working with these children and families are often confronted wi t ht wove r ydi f f e r e ntve r s i onsoft hepr i nc i pl e“ be s ti nt e r e s t sofac hi l d. ”S ome t i me s these versions are so completely different that it becomes impossible for a third party to see any similarities between the two stories. The clinician, like a judge, often feels compelled to choose which version to believe. A child growing up in this highly contested and conflicted reality might also feel compelled to choose which version, mom’ sorda d’ s ,t obe l i e ve .I na ddi t i on,ma ki ngac hoi c er e move s ,c e r t a i nl yi nyoung children, the memories and self-narrative scaffolding that parents provide for their children. The absence of coherent and cohesive memory and self-narrative scaffolds, it seem to me, would cause these children multiple contextual stressors to their development, especially considering the disruption these stressors would create in their ability to create coherent and cohesive self-narratives. Judith Wallerstein and her colleagues (J. S. Wallerstein & Blakeslee, 1989; J. S. Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980; J. S.

340 Wallerstein et al., 2000) warned us about these developmental environmental stressors from parental divorce.

These parents also contest their stories before a judge, who has to decide which pa r e nt ’ sve r s i onofr e a l i t yi smor ebe l i e va bl e .Thepa r e nt sa r ea i de dbyt he i rl a wye r si n creating and telling their versions of reality. The cultural belief is that this adversarial l e g a ls ys t e m wi l la l l owust og e tt ot he“ t r ut h”oft hes i t ua t i on.Thebe l i e fi n“ t he t r ut h”l i ke l yhi de sa“ s ha dows t or y”(Abbott, 2002). Shadow stories are stories that have gaps in them, or have narrative hints of an untold story that the reader/listener needs to use to fill in the details of the told story. Court, with its legal and procedural rules about what can be considered by the judge and what cannot be considered by the judge, create a rather ideal environment for the creation of and appeals to cultural shadow stories.

One specific shadow story of the courtroom relates to the medieval truth test which was trial by fire. In this situation, if a person survived this trial, then by definition God had decreed that she/he had spoken the truth. Sometimes these medieval trials by fire were combats with each contestant representing their version of t het r ut h.I nourmode r nc our t s ’ve r s i onoft r i a lbyf i r e ,f a mi l yl a wye r sa s k increasingly minuscule questions of the parents and witnesses about the specific details ofadi vor c es i t ua t i onort hede ve l opme ntofac hi l d.Thel a wye r ’ sg oa li st oi mpe a c h t hepa r e nt s ’a ndwi t ne s s e s ’r e por t sa ndt he r e f or ei nt hi spr oc e s sdi s c ove r“ t het r ut h. ” Children of many divorced parents have to learn how to cope with how their parent s ,i nama nne rs i mi l a rt ot hef a mi l yl a wye r s ,c ont e s te a c hot he r ’ se xpe r i e nc e sa nd

341 those of their children. Callie captured this sort of contested experience with these vignettes. She was telling me about her early living arrangements and she said, When I was with them—I told you about that I lived back and forth. From the time I was three until I as twelve, I did Monday with my mom, Tuesday with my dad, Wednesday with my mom, Thursday Friday with my dad, Saturday Sunday with my mom. Back and forth. Back and forth.

Continuing her story, They already hated each other. That was—like in the beginning, they tried to l i kema ket hi ng sl i keonhol i da ys ,t he y’ ds pe ndt he mt og e t he r .Andt he n somewhere down the line, probably when I was like 6 or 7, that was a no-go.

And then the older I got, the more I had to just—I would have to relay messages, once I was old enough. Tell your mom this. Tell your dad that.

Callie became the messenger between her two hateful parents. She was going back and forth between these two combatant residences. She then went on to amplify her understanding that there are different versions of the truth. In telling me how her father got legal custody of her she said, Because they had joint custody like legally. But then as my dad tells it, my mom—when they actually had the actual court date, he says she never showed up. She says he never told her that they were having this date, so when they c a mea ndwe r ea s ke dwha t ’ st hel e g a la ddr e s sofs a i dme ,heputhi sa ddr e s s .S o technically and legally it made him the legal guardian by having his address

342 t he r e ,Ig ue s s .Idon’ tr e a l l yknowhowj oi ntc us t odywor ksnowa da ys .Al otof pe opl edon’ tbot he rwi t hi t .Whe r ewa sI ?

OneofCa l l i e ’ sma i nt he me si nt e l l i nghe rs t or yc onc e r ne dt hec ont e s t .“ Asmy da dt e l l si t ”s het ol dme ,f ol l owe dby“ S hes a ys , ”orhe rmot he rve r s i onoft hes t or i e s .

S hee ndst he nwi t ht heque s t i on,“ Whe r ewa sI ? ”It hi nkt ha tt hi swa smor et ha na rhetorical question. For Callie, as I listen to her story, there was a real question about who was she as a person or as an agent in her own story. Did how she experienced these events really even matter to her parents? Do their versions matter to her now?

Ca l l i e ’ ss t or ya l s oi l l us t r a t e sa not he re l e me nti nt he s ec ont e s t e ds t or i e s .To choose a version is to become the judge or the God of the embedded medieval shadow story. The choice, or actually the ability to choose, can give one a kind of power and/or makes one feel powerful, the ability to choose or to act places the children of divor c e dpa r e nt sa sCa l l i e ’ ss t or yi l l us t r a t e d,i nt her ol eoft hej udg ei nt hec our tr oom.

This role for children of divorced parents is a very different position vis-à-vis the parents then the role of children growing up in nuclear families. Parents and society place the children of divorced parents in a position that is culturally unique for any child, the position as a truth or reality judge.

Colleen illustrated how this role reversal or powerful narrative shift worked when she said, ButIknowt ha tI ’ dkind of like just come up with the idea in my head, because I know—s ome onemus tha vet ol dmel i kei fyoudi dn’ tl i vewi t h—or one of my friends or someone must—I must have somehow gotten the idea in my head

343 t ha ti fIdi dn’ tl i vewi t hmymom,wewoul dn’ tf i ght as much because there woul dn’ tbea smuc hs t uf ft of i g hta bout .Iknow t ha tIs a wa l lmyf r i e ndsa nd how they were with their parents. Like I think I kind of wanted that. Like I hated fighting. It was pretty much like taking over my life, the fighting with my mom. And I hated it. I know there had been a few times I had mentioned it a ndt he nt hi ng swoul dc a l m down.Andt he nt he y’ ds t a r tupa g a i n.Andf i na l l y, Iwa sj us tl i keIc a nnott a kei ta nymor e .S ot ha t ’ sba s i c a l l ywhy—Ij us tc oul dn’ t take the fighting.

Interviewer: What did the two of you fight about?

Eve r yt hi ng .Li ket he r ewa s ,Idon’ tknow—every single thing there was to fight about, we fought about. It was like we were sisters, fight just for anything.

Interviewer: Do you and your sister fight that way, too, now?

We ’ r eg e t t i ngbe t t e ra swe ’ r eg e t t i ngol de r .Butweus e dt of i g htl i kec r a z y.

Interviewer: So it was just like a constant battle. How long did that go on?

Um—i twe ntonf orawhi l e .Idon’ te ve nknow.ButIj us tknowt ha ti ts t r e s s ed meouts oba d.Idon’ te ve nknowhowl ong .Iha venoi de a .Ir e a l l yc a n’ ts a y.I have no clue.

Colleen was lamenting that the usual power arrangement in families had br oke ndown.S hea ndhe rmot he rwe r ef i g ht i ngl i ke ,“ wewe r es i s t e r s . ”Col l e e nha d becomehe rmot he r ’ se qua l .The yha dbe c ome“ s i s t e r s , ”t ous eCol l e e n’ swor d.Ne i t he r Col l e e nnorhe rmot he rha dt hepowe rt oc l a i mt heGod’ se yena r r a t i vepos i t i on.

344 Ke i r a ’ sve r s i onoft hes hi f ti nc hi l dr e n’ sr ol e sa ndpowe rwi t hi nadi vor c e d family spoke directly to this point when she said, Idon’ tt hi nkki dsa r ene c e s s a r i l ys uppos e dt oha vet hec a pa c i t yt or e a l l yhur t their parents that much. You can frustrate them or disappoint them, but to do something that like really hurts them—it kind of changes your perceptions, it changes like the power roles maybe a little, I think.

Keira was well aware of a major change in her position within the family after her parents divorced. She saw how her decision to change her child-parent living arrangements affected her mother, i.e., sent her mother into a major depression. Keira contrasted this view with her view of the courts where she lamented, Ye a h.It hi nkt hec our ts ys t e msa r eba dt of a t he r s ,be c a us emymom wa s n’ tf i t .

She was asleep almost all the time. We would get up in the morning—s he ’ dha d l i keabi gpa r t y.The r ewa sl i kebe e rc a nsa l love r .Ands he ’ sl i ke —she had taken too many shots of tequila or whatever she drinks. She was always asleep, like wa s t i ngmone yonhe rba nda nds t uf f .Myda ddi dn’ tg e tc us t ody,a ndIdon’ t understand why. I always thought that.

In the context of the court system Keira felt powerless. She could not understand given her circumstances how her father had not been awarded custody of he ri ni t i a l l y.I nhe rGod’ s -eye-view she felt that it was obvious that her father should have been awarded custody. In the context of the court she felt that she had no power and therefore, she felt that she was helpless to affect her life. It may be the juxtapositions of relational and narrative power within the divorced family, and

345 relational and narrative powerlessness outside the divorced family that children of divorced parents feel so keenly. Most of the research participants were aware that they were hurting or disappointing the parent that they had chosen not to be with as much.

J a r r e t t ’ ss t or ywa st hemos tdr a ma t i ci nt hi sr e g a r d,be c a us ehea ndhi sbr ot he rc hos e to live with their father after the judge had already given custody to his mother. In some cases they reported that they were aware of hurting or disappointing the parent retrospectively, but were not aware at the time.

In any case, several research participants were aware of how they had been pl a c e di nt he‘ j udg eoft r ut h’pos i t i on.The y,f ort hemos tpa r t ,we r eunc omf or t a bl e with being put in this position, because they felt that they had to choose one parent ove rt heot he rpa r e nt .I nt i met he yr e por t e dl e a r ni ngCa l l i e ’ spr e f e r r e dme t hodwhi c h l e f t‘ t het r ut h’unde t e r mi ne d.Wi t ht het r ut h/ r e a l i t yunde t e r mi ne dt hei r onywa st ha t their parents retained them as a truth judge or a reality judge for specific contexts.

Ea c hpa r e ntc ont i nue dt opr e s e nt / a r g uet he i r“ c a s e ”be f or et hec hi l d.Butt hec hi l dr e n paid the price for having this judge-like position of power. They lost their sense of self a sac hi l dofbot hpa r e nt s ,ora sCa l l i es a i d,“ Whe r ewa sI ? ” Following A Family Precedent or A Coming-of-Age Story Contested stories have qualities other than the power and truth-judge attributes. Some nuclear families have traditions that are related to age or maturity level. These traditions may have to do with religious or secular practices. When children reached a certain age or maturity level, then they were expected to follow this

346 family tradition. For some children of divorced parents, changing their child-parent living arrangements simply involved following the example of an older sibling. In a narrative sense, changing child-parent living arrangements can be thought of as a variation on one of this cultural coming-of-age plots or traditions.

In a sense, both Glenda and Emmett did not think about changing their childparent living arrangements as much as they followed the example of an older sibling.

Glenda told me that, Like we never talked about it or made a change, but my older sister, when she wa si nhi g hs c hool ,s pe ntal otoft i mewi t hhe rf r i e nds .S os hewoul dn’ tc ome outt omyda d’ shous ea smuc h.AndIwoul ds t i l lc omeout .Anda l s o,j us t starting in junior high when I started to like go out with my friends on the weekends and be more sociable and like actually have a social life of my own is pr oba bl ywhe nIr e a l l yc ha ng e d.Be c a us eIdi dn’ twa ntt obea tmyda d’ se ve r y Fr i da ya ndS a t ur da yni g ht ,e s pe c i a l l ybe c a us ei twa ss of a ra wa y.I twa s n’ tl i ke — like some people who have divorced parents, and the parents live in the same c ommuni t y.I t ’ snobi gde a lt og oi nbe t we e nt hehous e s .Buti twa sa l wa ysl i ke al ongdr i vet he r ea ndal ongdr i veba c k,s oi twa s n’ tt ha ta ppe a l i ngt obet he r e when I could be hanging out with my friends. It was probably around that t i me .Andi tpr oba bl ye ve nc ha ng e dmor es owhe nIc oul ddr i ve .The nIwa s n’ t so dependent like on my dad saying he was gonna come at 11 and I was gonna come out at 11. It was more like I got to choose when I was going out, because I was driving myself. But um—yeah, probably in junior high time.

347 I not he rwor dss hef ol l owe dhe rol de rs i s t e r ’ spr e c e de nt .Choos i ngwhe nt ovi s i ta nd how long to visit were important decisions for Glenda as she came more into her life, became more sociable, and wanted to hang out with her friends.

Emme t t ’ sve r s i onwa sal i t t l edi f f e r e nt .Het ol dme , My sister is 3-and-a-half years older than I am. Her stage in life played a big part i nwhywemove d,be c a us es her e a l l ydi dn’ tg e ta l ongwi t hmys t e pf a t he ra ta l l .

Being that adolescent girl she was, messing around with rebellion, she thought the best thing to do is just to leave. She did a good job convincing me that my s t e pf a t he rwa sa na s s hol e ,whi c hhewa s .S oIki ndofdi dn’ tr e a l l ywa ntt ol e a ve the country, but ul t i ma t e l yIdi d,be c a us eIdi dn’ twa ntt o—my sister had told my mother that she was gonna move. My mother was all distraught about that, but my mother was a coward at the time.

He changed his child-parent living arrangements because his older sister, who had taken care of him while his mother was at work when he was younger, wanted to move .Hi ss i s t e rwa si napr a c t i c a l l yc ons t a ntpowe rs t r ug g l ewi t hEmme t t ’ ss t e pf a t he r .

In addition as Emmett reported, So when my sister and I were telling my mom—when we were voicing our disgust with him, it really put her in a hard place, because she felt like she owed he rs e r vi c et ohi m,i fyouwi l l .S oye a h,mymot he rdi dn’ twa ntmys i s t e ra ndI to split up, so she also convinced me to move with my sister. But I did. I was kind of excited about the idea. Little did I know I was jumping out of the frying pan and into the fire.

348 Emmett was convinced by his sister that he wanted to move with her to his f a t he r ’ shous ede s pi t ehi sde s i r et os t a ywi t hhi smot he ra nds t e pf a t he rin the country, and his conscious fear of his father. Furthermore, his mother, despite being distraught ove rhe rda ug ht e r ’ sde c i s i on,di dnotwa ntt hec hi l dr e nt obes pl i tups os he e nc our a g e dEmme t tt og owi t hhi ss i s t e r .Emme t t ’ sg oi nga l ongwi t hhi ss i s ter and mot he r ’ sde c i s i onwa sade c i s i ont ha twel e a r ne dl a t e rher e g r e t t e d.

Esther, too, followed the precedent of an older brother in moving to her f a t he r ’ si nor de rt opur s uehe re duc a t i on.Unl i keEmme t t ,whof e l tt ha theha dj umpe d from the frying pan into the fire, Esther might have characterized her decision as crossing the River Acheron directly into the underworld. Esther reported, And I wanted to attend a school for performing arts, because I played the piano and sang. It was a magnet school, and you needed to audition to get in. I at that point—I had been playing the piano since I was four, and I was really an aspiring pianist and really wanted to pursue it. I think that—everything is such a blur. I think that was the reason why I chose to leave my mother and go with my father, initially, because I was excited about going to this school. So I auditioned and got in and left my mother. [I] went to live with my father and my stepmother and my new three stepsiblings who were younger. So I went from being the youngest to the oldest. Not only that, but I went from the suburbs to the city. Not only that, but I went from being in a completely nonJewish environment to an Orthodox environment, which was on the one hand oka y,be c a us eI ’ dbe e ne xpos e d.S oIkne wi twa s n’ tl i ket ot a lc ul t ur es hoc k.

349 Buta tt hes a met i me ,Iwa sac hi l dwhowa s n’ tJ e wi s hnowl i vi ngi nahous e with two parents—a ndIpr oba bl ys t i l lr e me mbe r e dt he“ ol d”da d.

Esther chose to live with her father to pursue her study of music. In the previous four years her father had: discovered his Jewish heritage at the encouragement ofEs t he r ’ sCa t hol i cmot he r ;di vor c e dEs t he r ’ smot he r ;move df r om t hes ubur bst ot he city; joined an orthodox Jewish community; and had remarried an orthodox Jewish women with three young children. Esther followed the precedent that her older brother had set soon after the divorce when, Is t a ye dwi t hmymot he ra ndmybr ot he r .The nmyf a t he rwa s n’ tma r r i e dye t , and my brother wanted to try some city honors high school in western New York [location changed], so he went to live with my father and I stayed with mymot he r .Idon’ te ve nt hi nkt ha tl a s t e daye a ra ndhemove dba c k.It hi nkhe was unhappy with the school.

Esther wanted to pursue her musical education just like her brother wanted to pursue his academic education in a city honors high school. However her experience is qui t edi f f e r e ntt ha nhe rbr ot he r ’ se xpe r i e nc e .Fi r s t ,he rf a t he rha dnotye tr e ma r r i e d and so her brother did not have to deal with a new stepfamily in addition to his school. Esther on the other hand had to deal with a new marriage and a new stepfamily.

She described her experience of living in the new stepfamily, and going to the new musical magnet school as,

350 I was pretty miserable after the first, Idon’ tknow,f e wwe e ksbe c a us et he y imposed a lot of rules on me—just things like what I wore. All the other three kids were going to an Orthodox school, and here I was going to performing arts, which was kind of like Fame, if you remember Fame.

That was really artsy and fun and I was kind of a creative kid. And t ha t ’ ski ndofwha tIl i ke d,butIc oul dn’ te ve rr e a l l yg e ti nt oi tbe c a us eoft he s e rules—such as nobody was allowed to come and pick me up in front of the house on a Saturday for a birthday party or anything because it was Sabbath.

What would it look like to have me being picked up and leaving. Or I remember my father bribing me not to go trick or treating, because what kind of model would that look like for my little step siblings, who of course were completely excited that somebody could go and get all that candy. And they wanted to see which candy was kosher. They were perfectly happy with it.

Things like that. No boyfriends. No mini-skirts. Anything that—rather than explaining to the other children that now we have somebody coming in the house who is not Jewish, and she can do different things than you can do—and t ha t ’ soka y.Tha tt ot a l l ywa s n’ tha ppe ni ng .S oIa s ke dmymot he r —actually, I begged to go back and live with her. I would call and say I was miserable and I hated the rules, and could I please come home. She said no!

Unl i kehe rbr ot he r ’ se xpe r i e nc e ,Es t he rwa snota l l owe dt oc ha ng ehe rmi nd.He r mother would not let her return home.

351 Es t he r ’ sna r r a t i vea ndEmme t t ’ sna r r a t i vea l s oi l l ustrated how the contested nature of divorce, the narrative position of being a truth judge, and following a pr e c e de ntc a ni nt e r a c t .He rmot he rc ont e s t e dEs t he r ’ sna r r a t i vea nds hei mpos e d, Es t he rl e a r ne dl a t e r ,ac ul t ur a lma s t e rpl otna r r a t i veont oEs t he r ’ s experiences of living with her father and stepfamily. Esther told me, mymot he rc l a i mst her e a s ons hedi dn’ twa ntmeba c kwa sbe c a us es hef e l ti t was healthier for me to be in a two-pa r e nthous e hol d.Whe t he rornott ha t ’ s the truth or the partial truth, I think probably she was dealing with her own s t uf fa nddi dn’ twa ntt her e s pons i bi l i t yofha vi nga na dol e s c e nta r oundorpr e a dol e s c e nta r ound.Nott ha tIwa ss uc har oug ha ndt oug ha dol e s c e nt .Iwa s n’ t .

But I think she probably was—she still had my brothe ra r ound.I ’ ms ur et he r e were some financial issues. And so I stayed.

Themot he r ’ sc ul t ur a lma s t e rpl otwa st ha ti twa s“ he a l t hi e rf ormet obei na two-pa r e nthous e hol d. ”Es t he rc ont e s t e dhe rmot he r ’ sl a t e re xpl a na t i onwi t hhe rown created narrative abouthe rmot he r ’ smot i ve s .Emme t tl i ke wi s ec ont e s t e dhi smot he r ’ s r e f us a lt oa l l owhi m ba c kwi t hhi sna r r a t i veofhe rmot i ve s ,“ mymot he rwa sac owa r d a tt het i me . ” Esther and Emmett realized and have highlighted with their narratives that context and time be c omeope r a t i ona le l e me nt si nt hedi s c ove r yof“ t r ut h”a boutt he s e e xpe r i e nc e s .Es t he r ’ sr he t or i c a lde vi c ewa st ous et heve r b,“ c l a i ms ”i nt a l ki nga bout he rmot he r ’ sve r s i onoft het r ut h.Emme t tus e dt her he t or i c a lde vi c eofs hi f t i ngt i me — “ a tt het i me . ”These are storytelling devices that clue the listener/reader into a more

352 dialogical Bakhtinian space. The dialogue was between the reported events and other possible events that the person could have conceived. There was the possibility, had circumstances been different or had the parent considered a different cultural narrative ma s t e rpl ot ,t ha tEs t he ra ndEmme t t ’ se xpe r i e nc e swoul dha vebe e ndi f f e r e nt .Theus e of these rhetorical devices by Esther and Emmett allow for the possibility of other indeterminate plots or Burkeian scenes. A scene created like this suggests that there can never be a conclusion, only other possibilities or other plots. This vagueness contributes to what can later become an incoherent self narrative.

Within this same theme is another shadow story that was so transparent that I almost did not catch it before I found myself filling in the details of the story. These children of divorced parents were also reenacting what had been done to them, i.e., one of their parents left them to pursue what they considered at the time to be a better life. These stories also reflect or encapsulate the parent leaving the child. The children are not only following the precedent of an older sibling, they are also following the precedent of their parents’di vor c e .

To Save the Relationship One theme that emerged early in the research was that changing the childparent living arrangements saved the relationship with the parent that was being left.

Josie used these words to describe her decision to change. She said, S of i na l l yIt ol dhe r[ mom]l i kewhyc a n’ tIj us tl i vehe r e ?WhydoIha vet og o ba c ka ndf or t h?I ’ m ne ve rhomea nywa y.Idon’ ts e ewha tt hepoi nti s .I twoul d

353 be better. And for a while—a ndIt ol dhe rI ’ ml i keohI ’ l lj us tg ot he r eont he weeke nds ,e ve r yot he rwe e ke ndI ’ l lbet he r e .Andt he nt her e s t —during the week and—he rma i nc onc e r nwa syou’ r eg onnahur thi sf e e l i ng s ,whi c hIr e a l l y di dn’ twa ntt odo.I twa sr e a l l yha r dt ot e l lhi m Iwa nt e dt ol i vewi t hmom.But I also felt that like if I kept living there, my resentment would just build and bui l d,a ndIwoul dj us tbel i kes c r e wi ta l l .I ’ m nott a l ki ngt oyou.Be c a us ewe woul dg e ti nt ol i ker a g i ngf i g ht sl i keI ’ ms ur pr i s e dt hene i g hbor sne ve rc a l l e d domestic on us. Um—be c a us ewe ’ dbes c r e a ming and screaming and screaming.

And um—like—so I told him—I said, you know—he was just like—he was hurt.

Ic oul dt e l l .He ’ sve r yl i ke —buthe ’ sve r yl i keIdon’ tt a l ka boutmye mot i ons .

He ’ ss uc hama n;ve r yIdon’ tt a l ka boutmyf e e l i ng s .S owes t a r t e ddoing the e ve r yot he rwe e ke ndt hi ngI ’ dbet he r e .Bute ve nont hewe e ke nds ,we ’ d—the t woda ysIs pe ndt he r e ,a ndI ’ dus ua l l ybewor ki ngordoi ngs ome t hi ng .Iwoul d ne ve rbehome .Anyt i meI ’ dc omehome ,t hes a mes t uf f .S oIs a i df or g e ti t .I ’ m done. No more of this. And to be perfectly honest, it saved our relationship.

This is a theme that I had not anticipated prior to doing the research interviews. I never thought that the act of leaving one parent could actually strengthen the relationship with that parent, much less save the relationship. It was one of the epiphany moments for me in doing these research interviews. Rather than thinking that leaving a parent was a way of saving a relationship, I had conceptualized that the adolescent was trying to strengthen the relationship with the person that they were

354 now choosing to live with. Both Colleen and Josie reported improved relationships with the parent that they left. Josie said it this way, Because we get along so so so much better now. I mean I work for the guy.

Li kehe ’ smybos s .Butl i kei t ’ ss omuc he a s i e r .Andweg e t —and also the fact that I do work for him helps so much more, because I get along time and we go outt ol unc h.AndIg e tt ha tt i mewhe r ei t ’ sj us tt het woofusa ndwec a nt a l k.

Yeah, it really saved the relationship. And you know, we had our struggles, but the difference was that it was more of—we had struggles with like other things, buti twa s n’ tt hef a c tt ha tIwa sl i kel i v i ngt he r ea ndhewa si nmyf a c ea l lt he time. I mean we have disagreements of what courses I should take in school or where I should go to college and what job I should have and who I should not see and like—but that was more—but my mom got to deal with it firsthand.

Ands hewoul dj us tf e e dwha tda d’ si nputwa s .S ot hen when we did like get together for dinner or something, it was like nice. It was all just like how have yoube e ndoi ng .I se ve r yt hi ngoka y?I twa sj us tni c e .I twa s n’ ta nyoft heot he r built-up stuff. And we usually went out to dinner, because I insisted. Neutral g r ound.Idon’ tl i kebe i ngi nt ha thous e .I t ’ sl i kehe rhous e .I t ’ she rt e r r i t or y.I don’ tl i kebe i ngoni t .

I had anticipated that going to live with a parent would strengthen the relationship. So I was genuinely surprised when this theme emerged. Colleen endorsed this theme also when she said,

355 We l l ,wedon’ tha ves e tt i me swhe nIg os e emymom a nymor e .I t ’ ss ol i keout of order and all over the place, because now I love going over there. I love talking to my mom. I call her like every day. Likewe ’ r eal otc l os e rnow.AndI l ovei t .S oIg oot he rt he r ef ordi nne rs ome t i me s .S he ’ l lj us tc a l la ndI ’ l lj us tg o ove rt he r ef ordi nne ra ndl e a ve .Orl i kei fwe ’ r eg onnados ome t hi nge a r l yona Saturday morning, like when I come home on Friday night, I’ l lj us tg ot he r e a ndj us ts l e e p.I ’ l lj us ts l e e pi nhe rr oom,a ndus ua l l ywhe nIs l e e pt he r enow,I go home in the morning and get ready at home and stuff like—like I just s t oppe dbr i ng i ngmybi gs ui t c a s e .Andi t ’ sal otmor el a i dba c korwha t e ve r .

Josie expressed the combination of saving the relationship with her father and he rr e a l i z a t i ont ha the rde c i s i onc ha ng e dhe rna r r a t or ’ spos i t i on: Yeah. I was more like yeah—I was hurt initially and then I realized like now— oh, I feel guilty because I hurt him more than I realized. But when I—I ’ m very—Ime a nI ’ m not —s oundss e l f i s h,butIwa sve r yl i keIdon’ tc a r ei fheg e t s hur t .Iwa sve r yl i ket hi si swha twene e dt odoa ndhe ’ l lbebe t t e rl a t e r .I twa s like the—I feel like the parent/child roles were reversedi nt hes e ns eofyou’ l l thank me later for this. You may not want to be grounded now, but later in l i f e ,i t ’ sg onnapa yof f .I twa st hes a met hi ng .Ye a h,i thur t snow,butl i kei twa s mor eoft hef a c tt ha the ’ sve r yt r a di t i ona la ndve r yl i keki dss houl dbe raised by both of their parents. Fortunately, my parents were on good standings—that it wa s n’ tabi gde a l .The ydi dn’ tl i keha vet og ot oc our ta ndl i kec us t odyi s s ue s .

356 This role reversal or change of roles seemed to be prevalent in divorced families. Itg oe st owha tKe i r as a i de a r l i e ra bout“ Idon’ tt hi nkki dsa r ene c e s s a r i l y s uppos e dt oha vet hec a pa c i t yt or e a l l yhur tt he i rpa r e nt st ha tmuc h. ”Thepowe r equation of the family between parents and their children is changed in divorced families. Josie believed that had become turned upside down in her family.

The Battle of the Narrators Like Josie, Callie focused her leaving on the presence of a stepmother who was too active in her life and who had an idea that a remarried family could function like a traditional family. It was this sort of cultural narrative emplotment that these stepmothers were trying to fit their new families into. Callie told me, Um—so my stepmother kind of took the disciplinary role, so I obviously had the issues in school of acting out and behavior issues blah, blah, blah. So um—I probably stole from places—stuff like that. The obvious seeking attention wi t houtnot i c i ngyou’ r es e e ki nga t t e nt i on.S oIwoul da l wa ysg e ti nt r oubl eby her. And um—I never liked that too much. And I would always be kind of a r e a lj e r k,l i keyou’ r enotmymom.S hutup.[ La ug hs ]Nows he ’ soneofmy ve r yg oodf r i e nds ,buta tt het i me ,Ic oul dn’ ts t a ndhe r .It hi nki twa sIha dmy mom.Idi dn’ tne e ds ome onee l s e .AndIha t e dt hef a c tt ha tmyda dwoul dn’ t say anything—he just let her carry on in this tirade. I was obviously probably not a pleasant person to be around at that time.

357 Callie and Josie had involved stepmothers. The conflict for each of them was experienced as coming from their stepmothers. For Emmett the conflict came from his stepfather. Each stepparent felt the need to impose a structure on the child-adult relationships in the family based on their acculturated views of marriage, parenthood, and family. Their cultural narrative master plots drew on their experiences growing up in traditional nuclear families. Each stepparent wanted to emplot their new remarried families with the traditional family narrative master plot. Since the plot of the traditional family is not fully compatible with the emerging cultural narrative master plot of the non-traditional family, a battle began between the children as narrators and, i nt he s ec a s e s ,t hes t e ppa r e nt sa sna r r a t or s .Ca l l i e ’ squot ede mons t r a t e dt ha ti twa snot a l wa ysapol i t eba t t l e .Emme t t ’ svoi c ei nt hi s dialogue would agree with Callie and J os i e ’ sde s c r i pt i onsofba t t l ewi t has t e ppa r e nt .Howe ve r ,whi l eEmme t tdi dnotl i ke his stepfather, Emmett found him to be predictable and therefore preferable to his father. He knew where he stood with his stepfather. Emmett described living with his stepfather as: Where my stepfather on the other hand, was—he was a military man. Okay, you can go out and do your thing. Be back at 5. I came in 5 and 30 seconds, and I was grounded for a week. Or when we first moved in to the house in the country, and he was trying to grow his lawn and water was expensive, we had to take a shower by turning the water on, getting wet, turning the water off, t he nl a t he r i ngup,t he nt ur ni ngt hewa t e ront or i ns eof f .Youc oul dn’ ts i ton your bed during the day.

358 The stepfather was predictable, whereas his own father was not. Emmett preferred the predictability of the strict rules—the knowable military plot. Callie fought the disciplinarian stepmother. She wanted to narrate her story in a different way.

Another variation on this theme of battling narrators came from Ida. She said in talking about her stepmother, Andt he nonc et he ywe r et og e t he r ,s hewa ss ome a nt ous ,s ome a nt ous .I ’ ve never liked her. I never had a good feeling about her. I still really—It hi nks he ’ s e vi l .Ands he ’ ski ndofpoi s one dmyda d.S oa nywa y,s he ,It hi nk,pur pos e l y tried to get pregnant, so my dad—s hewa sa f t e rmyda d’ smone y.Ands ot he n, after that, it was just like all right—I do not want to be around this. And she basically just tried to pull my dad from us. She tried to poison him, I think.

Because he just—myda d’ sawe a kpe r s on.Mymom i sr e a l l ys t r ong .S owhe nhe was with her, it was her style of parenting, her values. And all his values and everything switched when he married this woman, which was really hard to watch. And we were just like who are you, dad. What is this?

I dabe l i e ve dt ha the rs t e pmot he r“ poi s one d”t her e l a t i ons hi ps heha dwi t hhe r f a t he r .S hes a whe rf a t he ra sa“ we a kpe r s on”notc a pa bl eof battling the narrative that he rs t e pmot he rha dbe e ns pi nni ng .I dac oul dnots t a ndhe rs t e pmot he r ’ ss t or yorhe r values and felt that she had no hope of changing the situation. Therefore, she just pulled away from her father and the stepmother. She did notwa ntt obe“ poi s one d” like she felt her father had been. Ida saw her stepmother as truly evil and her shadow

359 story seemed to hint at a number of moral fairy tales or the biblical story of the apple in the Garden of Eden.

Yet another version of the battling narrators theme is hidden, I think, in Col l e e n’ ss t or y.S het ol dmea tonepoi ntt ha t : ButIknowt ha tI ’ dki ndofl i kej us tc omeupwi t ht hei de ai nmyhe a d[ movi ng t ohe rg r a ndmot he r / f a t he r ’ shous e ] ,be c a us eIknow—someone must have told me like i fyoudi dn’ tl i v ewi t h—or one of my friends or someone must—I must ha ves ome howg ot t e nt hei de ai nmyhe a dt ha ti fIdi dn’ tl i vewi t hmymom, wewoul dn’ tf i g hta smuc hbe c a us et he r ewoul dn’ tbea smuc hs t uf ft of i g ht about.

Later she added: I know that my grandma was always like you can do it. Because my dad lives with her and she was always like you can come live here if you want to. But t ha t ’ spr e t t ymuc ha l lIc a nr e me mbe r .

What I think was captured in these two comments was how an outside narrator or “ e di t or , ”i fyouwi l l ,c a ns ug g e s ta ndt he ns c a f f ol dt he i ri de ai nt oas t or y.S hewa s aware that it came from outside of her—“ s ome onemus tha vet ol dme . ”Atf i r s ts he thought that it must have been a friend. Later she identified the other narrator as her grandmother. Shortly after both of these quotes, Colleen assured me that moving was really her idea. Close analysis of the story led me to suspect that a plot had been suggested to her to end the conflict with her mother now experienced as a sister.

360 I propose that these suggested plots are part of the larger theme of contested s t or i e s .Idonott hi nkt ha ta nyonewa nt st ot hi nkoft he ms e l ve sa sbe i ngt he“ Cha r l i e Mc Ca r t hy”i nEdg a rBe r g e n’ ss t or y.I das ug g e s t e dt ha the rf a t he rha dbe c omet he wooden puppet tohe rs t e pmot he r ,t he‘ poi s oni ng ’ve nt r i l oqui s t ,i nhe rquot a t i on.I n Col l e e n’ ss t or yt he r ewa se noug he vi de nc e ,It hi nk,t oc ons i de rt ha tCol l e e n’ sde c i s i on to move was partially animated by her paternal grandmother. The grandmother was a shadow figure tha ta ni ma t e da ndhe l pe dt oe mpl otCol l e e n’ sde c i s i ont oc ha ng ehe r child-pa r e ntl i vi ngs i t ua t i on( “ a l wa ysyouc a ndoi t ” ) .Emme t t ’ ss i s t e rwa sha r dl ya s ha dowf i g ur ebe c a us es heope nl ye nc our a g e dhi mt omovewi t hhe rt ot he i rf a t he r s ’ home. In retrospect Emmett did feel like a puppet and he wished that he had written a different story.

General wisdom supports this conjecture that others can make plot suggestions.

In my clinical practice of working with children of divorced parents, the parent being left usually assumed that his/her ex-spouse had some hidden hand or obvious hand in t hec hi l d’ sde c i s i ont omove .Bobbi eJ o’ sf a t he r ’ sof f e rofha vi ngac a rt ous ewa st he most blatant example in these stories. She said, I turned 17 in July, before my senior year of high school. My father gave me his old car for my birthday. He got a new car. And he said that I had to—the thing is, the car was just going to be at the apartment. So if I wanted to use the car at night or drive it at night, I had to stay there. So it just kind of that, coupled— like I knew I could have probably argued for him to not make that rule, but

361 like I kind of—Idi dn’ tonl yus ei ta sa ne xc us e ,butki ndofl i kebe t we e na nd l i keg e ne r a l l yf e e l i ngs t i f l e da tmymom’ s ,Ij us tde c i de dt omovei nt here.

However, the adolescent usually maintained that it was her/his decision completely. This denial was more understandable if you think that the shadow story implied one was being used as a puppet. This has been a common charge between parents in divorced situations in my experience. It may be why the adolescent, like Colleen, works to repeatedly reassure the listener that it was her/his decision and part of her/his story. Bobbie Jo used her father as the puppet for her desires in a reversal on the usual a s s ume dt he me ,s howi ngt ha ta dol e s c e nt sa r ec a pa bl eofbe i ng‘ doubl e a g e nt s . ’

Strengthening the Relationship Col l e e n’ ss t or ys uppor t e doneofmyor i g i na li de a sg oi ngi nt ot her e s e a r c h.I t houg htt ha tt hea dol e s c e nt ’ swi s ht oc ha ng et hec hi l d-parent living arrangement was an effort to strengthen the relationship with the parent who was seen less or who was less involved in day to day life. She reported, I twa sf i ne .Ir e me mbe rnotl i ki ngg oi ngt omyda d’ s ,be c a us ei twa sbor i ng .

Because there was not really anything—youj us twa t c he dTV.S ot ha t ’ swha t —I r e me mbe rt ha t .Idi dn’ tmi ndi t .I tj us twa s n’ t —l i kebe i nga thome ,you’ r emor e comfortable and everything.

Later on in the interview, when I asked Colleen how living with her father had affected her relationship with him, she responded,

362 Um—ye a h,i tha s .Il i v ewi t hhi m,s oi t ’ sg onnaha vet o.Butl i keIs a i d,hes t i l l doe s n’ t —het a l ks ,hea s ksmehowI ’ m doi nga nde ve r yt hi ng .Buthedoe s n’ t ha ndl el i ket het hi ng si nmyl i f eve r ywe l l .Li keI ’ l lt e l lhi ms omething and he j us tl i keg e t sma da tmea ndt e l l smeI ’ m wr ong .S oIdon’ tt e l lhi m al ot .Li ke he ’ sma d—he ’ snotma d,buti tbot he r shi mt ha tI ’ vebe e nwi t hmyboyf r i e nd f oraye a rnow,a nds ohej us tki ndofl i kei g nor e si t .Li keIc a n’ tt e l lhi m anythinga bouti t ,be c a us ehedoe s n’ twa ntt ohe a ri t .S oourr e l a t i ons hi pi s better than it would have been, because it would have been nonexistent.

Be c a us eIj us twoul dg oove rt he r ea ndj us ts i ta ndwa t c hTVa ndwewoul dn’ t t a l ka ta l l .Nowwe ’ r ef or c e dt o,t heye a r st ha twe ’ vel i ve dt og e t he r .ButIj us t t hi nkourr e l a t i ons hi pi st hebe s ti t ’ se ve rbe e n.It hi nki t ’ sa sc l os ea si t ’ se ve r g onnabe ,j us tbe c a us eoft hewa yhei s .Hej us tdoe s n’ ts e e mt o—Idon’ tknow.

Hej us tdoe s n’ tope nupt hewa ymymom doe s .

Col l e e nkne wg oi ngi nt ot hi st ha ts heha dnotl i ke dg oi ngt ohe rf a t he r ’ sf or visits. However, she found that living with him improved the relationship—“ i t ’ sbe t t e r t ha ni twoul dha vebe e n” —because if she had not changed the living arrangement her relations hi pwi t hhe rf a t he rwoul dha vebe e n“ none xi s t e nt . ”I r oni c a l l yCol l e e nf e l t t ha tl e a vi nghe rmot he r ’ shous es t r e ng t he ne dt he i rr e l a t i ons hi p.Thi swa sc a pt ur e di n t het he me‘ s a ve dt her e l a t i ons hi p. ’ Lloyd supported this theme in his story. The relationship that was s t r e ng t he ne dwa swi t hhi sma t e r na lg r a ndmot he r .Het ol dmet ha t“ whe nIg ohome , t ha t ’ swhe r eIg o”[ ma t e r na lg r a ndmot he r ’ shous e ] .Hea l s os t r e ng t he ne dhi s

363 relationship with his mother through regular phone calls. He found that as he aged they had more to talk about and more to share.

Josie endorsed this theme when she reported: Because we get along so so so much better now. I mean I work for the guy.

Li kehe ’ smybos s .Butl i kei t ’ ss omuc he a s i e r .Andweg e t —and also the fact that I do work for him helps so much more, because I get along time and we go outt ol unc h.AndIg e tt ha tt i mewhe r ei t ’ sj us tt het woofusa ndwec a nt a l k.

Yeah, it really saved the relationship. And you know, we had our struggles, but the difference was that it was more of—we had struggles with like other things, buti twa s n’ tt hef a c tt ha tIwa sl i kel i v i ngt he r ea ndhewa si nmyf a c ea l lt he time. I mean we have disagreements of what courses I should take in school or where I should go to college and what job I should have and who I should not see and like—but that was more—but my mom got to deal with it firsthand.

Ands hewoul dj us tf e e dwha tda d’ si nputwa s .S ot he nwhe nwedi dl i keg e t together for dinner or something, it was like nice. It was all just like how have yoube e ndoi ng .I se ve r yt hi ngoka y?I twa sj us tni c e .I twa s n’ ta nyoft heot he r built-up stuff. And we usually went out to dinner, because I insisted.

Later in the interview, Josie returned to this same theme when she said: But for the most part, just it not being a happy and healthy environment to grow up in and to be raised it. And it was interfering with everything, in truth.

Whether or not I brought it on myself and whether or not that was just a personality conflict and if I was doing drugs because I was angry at my parents

364 orIwa sa ng r ya tmypa r e nt sbe c a us eIwa sdoi ngdr ug s ,youknow.You’ r enot r e a l l ys ur ewhi c hc a mef i r s t .Whe nIc omedownt oi t ,I ’ m he a l t hi e r —I ’ m healthy and I was a lot happier and it definitely salvaged the relationship with my father. It could have been pretty bad.

I nt hee nd“ whe nIc omedownt oi t ,I ’ m he a l t hi e r ”wa sJ os i e ’ sf i na lvi e wofhe r decision to change her child-parent living arrangements. She was no longer interested in the difficult process that she had been through or the various plots twisted in her narrative. She had found some coherence in her self-narrative—“ al otha ppi e r . ”I n a ddi t i on,s heha d,whe na l lt hi ng swe r ec ons i de r e d,“ s a l va g e dt her e l a t i ons hi pwi t hhe r f a t he r . ”

More Independence or More Self-Control Almost universally in the research group, the change of child-parent living arrangements gave the adolescent more freedom from family rules, more independence, and demanded more self control. Colleen described it as, I have a lot more independenc ea tmyda d’ s .Li keIdon’ tha vet o—like it was a lot more—like when I would get home from school with my mom, like she woul dbet he r ea ndmys i s t e rwoul dbet he r ea ndwe ’ da l lha vet ode a lwi t h e a c hot he r .Atmyda d’ sIj us tki ndofg ohomea ndt he yj us t leave me alone.

And I like that a lot.

365 Ot i se xpr e s s e di ta s ,“ ...whe nIg otol de noug h,Ide c i de dt og ol i vewi t hmy dad. So then I moved over with him. He gave me a lot more freedom than my mom di d. ”La t e rhee xpa nde dhi sde s c r i pt i onoft hedi f f e r e nce between the two households, Yeah, I remember exactly. Me and my mom, she was so strict on me—until I wa sa bout1 3 ,s hewoul dn’ tl e tmeda t e ,g oout ,ha veg i r l f r i e ndsora nyt hi ng .

She just wanted me—because her background is—both my parents are Haitian, and their background is very strict church upbringing. So when I was living wi t hmymom,s hewoul dn’ tl e tmeg ooutoft hehous epa s tl i kes e ve n,e i g ht .

S he ’ dma kemeha vemyf r i e ndsove r .Ic oul dn’ tdoa sma nyt hi ng sa sa l lmy friends could do. It kept getting to me, and I finally got fed up with it. Then when I used to go visit my dad on weekends or whatever, he let me do wha t e ve rIwa nt e dt odo.Ic oul dg ooutl a t e ,ha ngout .Ime a nhewoul dn’ tl e t me do whatever I wanted to do, but was more lenient. As long as I kept the hous ec l e a n,a nda sl onga sIdi dn’ tg e ti nt oa nyt r oubl e ,hedi dn’ tc a r ewha tI did. So he let me go out, have friends over, have girlfriends, go to movies, stuff like that. I saw it was a lot more freedom, so I always wanted to live with him and enjoy my high school experience more.

Otis portrayed the huge contrast between the family rules at each household. The choice for him was less independence and more parental control or more independence and more self-control. Most adolescents, but not all, would have chosen to live with the father given these circumstances.

366 Bobbie Jo expressed it like this: So I guess I was pushing the boundaries even more with my parents than I had done before. I wanted to go out more. I wanted to drink and do all the things that teenagers do. And my parents were always very different about like what they were lenient or strict about. It was kind of—my mom would argue about the stupid details, and my father was kind of, you know, a broader sense of like instilling responsibility, very strict about like cleanliness and bedtime. But like a tt hes a met i me ,hewoul dl e tmedot hi ng st ha tmymom woul dn’ tdo.And um—he was also very busy because he worked full time and he also like is an entrepreneur, so he owns a f e wot he rbus i ne s s e s .S ohej us tr e a l l yi s n’ thome nearly as much as my mother.

As with Otis there was a very marked contrast between the family rules in two hous e hol ds .Bobbi eJ o’ sf a t he r ,l i keOt i s ’f a t he r ,wa ss t r i c ta boutc l e a nl i ne s s ,butwa s not going to argue with her about the details of her life. Bobbie Jo found it attractive that her father was not home as much as her mother. Both of these fathers granted more independence for more responsibility. Both of these fathers allowed them to do “ a l lt het hi ng st ha tt e e na g e r sdo. ” Es t he r ’ sa ndKe i r a ’ smove sbot hr e s ul t e di nmor es t r uc t ur ea ndl e s sf r e e dom f or them. Esther moved into an Orthodox Jewish kosher household. She had dietary laws to deal with as well as a dress code to maintain. Her conversion to Judaism and Judaic c a mpsa nds c hool sr e s ul t e di nl e s si nde pe nde nc ea ndl e s ss e l fr e s pons i bi l i t y.Ke i r a ’ s

367 move was to get out of the unstructured and over-stimulating environment of her mot he r ’ shous e hol d.Ke i r ag r e wupwi t hwha tBobbi eJ o,Ot i sa ndCol l e en had desired.

This theme illustrated the obvious, i.e., that there is a dialectic matrix between independence and personal responsibility that is individually dynamic. What is less obvious is that the dialectic matrix of independence and responsibility becomes distorted in the contested environment of divorced parents. It may be that the power distortion of children growing up in this context, that I discussed earlier, has the ability to make this dialectic matrix non-linear. With the exceptions of Esther, Keira a ndLl oyd,t hea dol e s c e nt ’ sde c i s i ont oc ha ng ec hi l d-parent living arrangements gave all research participants more personal freedom and required more self-control.

Summary As divorce is a contested context that seems to foster contested stories, so does being a child of divorced parents increasingly contest the cultural master plot narrative of child development. We know from the Census figures that less than half of all children growing up in the United States today will grow up within the context of this cultural master plot narrative of the nuclear family. What will be the affect of an evolving cultural master plot narrative on the development of children? What will be the affect of this cultural evolution on the self-narratives or the stories that we tell ourselves about who were are and how we came to be this way? These are questions that in essence have been shadow stories.

368 Thet he me st ha tha vec ol l e c t i ve l ye me r g e df r om t he s epa r t i c i pa nt s ’s t or i e sha ve to do with the contested nature of the divorced family and the tangled web of relationships created by this process. The themes of following-a-family- precedent, tosave-the-relationship, the-battle-of-the-narrators, strengthening-the-relationship and more-independence-or-more-self control are themes that you would find also in nuclear families. What makes the difference, it seems to me, on how these themes are emplotted and enacted, is the contested matrix of relationships in which these Burkeian dramas take place. This contested matrix with the shifted roles, role reversals, old emplotments, and shifts in family power arrangements have created a metaphorical, narrative, and seemingly, actual chaos. This contested chaotic matrix a l s or e f l e c t st hei mpor t a ntJ udi t hWa l l e r s t e i n’ s( 1 9 8 9 )f i ndi ngofthe diminished parenting within a divorcing couple. The research participants reported that within this often chaotic matrix, as adolescents whose parents had divorced, what they were trying to find or to create was some predictability, and some coherence in their lives and in their life stories.

369

CHAPTER XIV

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS My research methodology, clinical ethnography, has evident strengths and weaknesses. My findings emerged from the stories these research participants told me in-the-moment. There is no way of knowing, other than conjecture, that if I reinterviewed the same subjects whether they would tell the exact same story. Therefore, it is not prudent to try to extrapolate these findings onto the general population or draw broad conclusions. Instead, this study should be considered exploratory in nature. The inability to generalize to a larger population is a weakness in this methodology. On the other hand, the rich detailed reports of the research participants about their feelings, thoughts, and memories about changing their child-parent living arrangements are a real strength of this methodology. Their narratives convey the emotional and cognitive struggles each of the participants had in making their decision to make a change in their child-parent living arrangements. In addition, their stories convey how deeply and profoundly these decisions affected their lives. The feelings, the moments of discordance within their stories and the over-all complexity of their stories really does convey to the reader a multi-layered sense of verisimilitude about t hee xpe r i e nc e sbe i ngr e por t e d.The i rna r r a t i ve she l pt o“ c a pt ur e �ac ompl e xs e tof

370 experiences that the reader can share vicariously. The ability to have this shared experience is the strength of this methodology.

This research was designed from the very beginning to examine the research question from a contextual theoretical root metaphor. Therefore, how the participants assigned meaning to their life experiences was paramount. Only by using a contextual theoretical root metaphor could one justifiably look at how the research participants assigned meaning, particularly subjective meaning, to their decision to change their child-parent living situations. By carefully defining terms prior to interviewing any of the research participants, I was able to create the necessary research tools to allow the reader to participate in understanding this phenomenon. In turn these research tools allowed me to bring the reader into a hermeneutic circle with the research participants and me. My efforts at precision and inclusion were consciously and carefully thought through so that the terms I created for the reader would be consistent with the terms that the research participants heard in the interviews. These premeditated and preinterview research endeavors helped, in my opinion, to permit the findings to emerge directly from the words and narratives of the participants with a minimum of narrative scaffolding being provided by the researcher during the interviews.

By controlling the research participants for mental health status, this study tried to avoid a possible criticism that has often been leveled against Judith Wa l l e r s t e i n’ sl ong i t udi na ls t udyf i ndi ng s .Myr e s e a r c hdi dt hi sbyha vi nge a c h participant take an appropriate Achenbach mental health screening survey. Therefore, Ia ma bl et or e por tt hef i ndi ng st ha te me r g e da sc omi ngf r om ame nt a lhe a l t h“ nor ma l ’

371 group of research participants despite the mental health problems that some participants reported in their pasts. A further caveat or limitation to any wish to g e ne r a l i z et he s ef i ndi ng swoul dbet ha tt hepa r t i c i pa nt swe r ef oundt obe“ nor ma l ”on the day that they were interviewed. Achenbach Self Reports are not designed to make predictive statements about the future.

Ones t r ongf i ndi ngt ha te me r g e df r om t her e s e a r c hpa r t i c i pa nt s ’na r r a t i ve swa s that a very useful way to think about how children of divorced parents grow up is to c ons i de rt ha tt he ya r eg r owi ngupwi t hi nac ont e s t e dc ont e xt .“ Cont e s t e d”ha st wo meanings with respect to this research. First, contested means growing up in a context where there is a struggle for control; i.e., a struggle between rival or opposing individuals for control of the situation. Second, the context is contested in the sense that the children are growing up in a context with inescapable ambiguity. When a context is contested it has the possibility of reflecting the existence of multiple differing interests within it. One result of the contest nature of the framework, in which these children are growing up, is that they seemed to develop and to tell life stories where the life events were contested or the meanings of these events were contested. In short, they presented contested self-narratives full of ambiguity and reflective of struggles for a control over their sense of self, or who they feel they are, or have become.

Ironically, these children are also growing up in circumstances and with parents who also had contested a cultural narrative master plot by divorcing. Divorce does not seem to be a cultural narrative master plot at this point in time. However, as the

372 population statistics show, as divorce increasingly is becoming more mainstream and expectable, divorce may soon become a cultural narrative master plot. The parents contest with each other what at one time was their best decision with whom to spend their lives. In a similar manner the children of these divorced parents sometimes c ont e s twha ta tonet i mewa st he i rpa r e nt s ’a ndt hec our t ’ sbe s tj udg me ntabout what was best for the child. Specifically, the children contest the divorce decree provisions on where they should live and how much time they should be with each parent. The research participants reported either the informal process in which they contested this decree, or the formal court process in which the divorce decree was challenged.

While each participant had their own unique subjective reasons for changing their child-parent living arrangement, as a group it was possible to discern some reoccurring themes in their narratives. The narrative themes that emerged from the data were, Following-A-Family-Precedent or Coming-of-Age, To-Save-The-Relationship, The Battle-Of-The-Narrators, Strengthening-The-Relationship, and More-Independence-Or-MoreSelf-Control. These narrative themes are motifs that could have just as possibly emerged from children growing up in nuclear families. The obvious difference is that in divorce, each parent resides in a different residence. So these specific narrative themes carry with them in divorce the potential for enactment within two venues.

This enactment, it would seem, has at least two possible scenarios. One scene is where these children enact the original parental divorce, i.e., the child leaves one home to live in another home. This sort of enactment would from the child viewpoint repeat what the child had witnessed, namely, one parent leaving the other. The parent, who

373 wa sbe i ngl e f t ,c oul dc ons t r uc ta ne xpl a na t or yna r r a t i vet ha tt hec hi l di s“ r unni ng a wa y. ”Be c a us eoft hedi f f e r e nc ei na g ebe t we e nt hec hi l d’ sde c i s i ont oc ha ng et he r e s i de nc e sa ndt hepa r e nt s ’de c i s i ont oc ha ng et hef a mi l y—divorce—this explanation might have more cultural narrative power. This cultural narrative power would come, I would argue, because of the embedded cultural assumption, and shadow story of the nuclear family. Specifically, if a child decided to leave a nuclear family without pa r e nt a lpe r mi s s i on,i twoul dbes e e nc ul t ur a l l ya s“ r unni nga wa y. ” Another alternative view of enactment would be the child leaving one residence to live with the other to resolve a conflict within the narrative themes in the family, a conflict of consciously experienced self-attributes in each residence, or an effort to resolve a contested self-narrative. I nt hi se mpl ot me ntt hec hi l d’ sde c i s i ont oc ha ng e r e s i de nc e smi g htbec ons t r ue da sa ne f f or ta tc r e a t i ngone ’ sownl i f e ,oraki ndof emancipation from the family. This latter view of enactment seems to be more similar to how research participants portrayed their decisions to change their child-parent living arrangements.

Ihopet ha ti tc l e a r ,t ha tIa m notus i ngt hewor d“ e na c t me nt s ”wi t ht heus ua l negative connotations the word usually carries. Rather, I am trying to use it in a culturally deconstructed neutral way. I think that it is a useful term. As deconstructed I think the term, enactment, may allow for the acceptance of more diverse developmental narrative emplotments than the current cultural master narrative plot has allowed children of divorced parents.

374 One of the themes that emerged was Following-A-Family Precedent/Coming-ofAge. This theme was reflected in families where younger siblings sometimes follow the example of behavior set by an older sibling. While this theme does not have to be a particular dilemma within a nuclear family, this research showed how it can become a s i g ni f i c a nti s s uewi t hi nt hef r a me wor kofdi vor c e .Ma nyoft her e s e a r c hpa r t i c i pa nt s ’ stories reflected this theme, but each participant told a unique story on how this theme developed within their life stories.

For me, hearing for the first time the To-Save-the-Relationship theme was an epiphany moment. More than any other theme, this theme captured what I consider an emotional snapshot of particular adolescent thinking and experience. The idea that leaving a place can save a relationship seemed to me to be right on the cognitive boundary of the shift to relational thinking that occurs during adolescence. On one hand it seemed so obvious, and the other so obscure. The research participants that endorsed this theme were actively attempting to preserve a relationship with a parent that had become too intense. Without being at all aware of it, these participants were repeating a part of some divorce processes where the parents separated in order to work on their relationship. They could certainly be said to be repeating an adolescent da t i ngpr oc e s swhe r eyous ome t i me st a kea“ br e a k”f r om e a c hot he r .Thi sna r r a t i v e mot i fc a pt ur e ss oc l e a r l yt hea dol e s c e nt ’ sc ons c i ouswi s ht oha vea relationship with the parent that they are leaving, that it provides one of the best arguments against the alternative cultural narrative construction that the adolescent is running away from this parent.

375 The-Battle-of-the-Narrators theme is central to becoming a person and central to a sense of self-agency. As captured in my interviewing, the research participants reported a conflict regarding who was going to be the major narrator of family experience. In addition, conflict concerned what the central narrative of family experience was going to be. This theme seemed to reflect an on-going conflict over family roles and over family narrative content. Within the contested context of a remarried family this theme created overt struggles among the various family me mbe r s .J a ne tJ ohns t on’ s( 1 9 9 4 )r e s e a r c hha sdi s c us s e dt hi sa st hei nf l ue nc eoft he “ t r i be ”ore xt e nde df a mi l y,f r i e nds ,a ndr e l a t i ve sont hedi vor c i ngorr e ma r r i e df a mi l y.

My research captured it as a theme within the life stories of the children, and within their self-narratives.

One of the themes that I had anticipated based on my clinical practice was the theme of Strengthening-The-Relationship. This theme reflected an evaluation on the part of the adolescent that by changing the child-parent living arrangements, the adolescent could strengthen the relationship with a more distant or less known parent. This endorsed the idea that proximity, and living together more, might help a relation that did not seem to the research participant to be strong enough or in some cases even existent.

I ft hedi f f e r e nc e sbe t we e nt hea dol e s c e nt ’ st wopa r e nt a lhous e hol dswe r et oo great in terms of rules, obligations, values, and expectations, then the MoreIndependence-or-More-Self-Control narrative theme emerged from t hepa r t i c i pa nt s ’l i f e stories. There seemed to be a dialectic matrix between independence/dependence and

376 personal responsibility that was individually dynamic with each of the research participants. These contested contexts between the two homes became the ground for battles about rules, curfews, chores, and religious practices, just to name a few. The life stories told by the research participants suggested that this theme had great variability depending on the unique circumstances each participant encountered.

What made these themes more complicated in single parent and remarried families contexts after a divorce were the prior contested history of the parental divorce, and the often reversed roles of parents and children in these families with respect to power. The study suggested that an operative element that materialized from t hepa r t i c i pa nt s ’l i f es t or i e swa st ha ti nt he i rs i ng l ea ndr e ma r r i e df a mi l i e st he ywe r e pl a c e di naGod’ s -eye position. Children of divorced parents know both sides, know how both households functioned, and are placed in a position where they are able to a r bi t r a t et oade g r e ewha t“ t r ut h”wa s / i s .Thi sr ol er e ve r s a lf r om anuc l e a rf a mi l yg a ve them the power to make decisions about their child-parent living arrangements. This power was similar, yet different, than the power that children growing up in nuclear families get to make when they are more self-sufficient.

My research also suggests a more theoretically efficient method for conceptualizing terms like personal identity and sense of self. The use of a contextual theoretical root metaphor allows for a redefinition of terms that possibly provide more cognitive and conceptual clarity to theorizing. Personal identity, sense of self and selfnarratives, as defined by this research, may provide a more useful analytic tool for clinical ethnography research.

377 The research participants reported three important general findings. One, before this research interview, no one had previously asked them to tell their life stories. Two, as they tried to tell their stories, they all realized how confusing their life stories were to tell, and how much trouble they had in remembering the sequence of events in their lives. Finally, they experienced for the most part a concurrence between the stories they told me about themselves and the internal story they seemed to use to guide their lives. These conscious aspects of their self-narratives were often contested as they reviewed their lives. In addition, these self-narratives were in my judgment in the process of becoming more coherent for almost all the research participants.

I was incredulous when the research participants first told me at the end of their research interview that this was the first time anyone had asked them to tell their whole story.Es t he rc a pt ur e dt hes e ns eofi twhe ns hes a i d,“ Tha t ’ st hef i r s tt i meIe ve r r e a l l ywe ntt hr oug ht ha twhol es t or y.Tha twa ski ndofe xha us t i ng . �Be i nga bl et ot e l l your story to someone, who was interested in it, was a new experience for all of the participants. Their research interview experiences stood in stark contrast to the rest of their experiences in telling what they felt were their contested life stories. For me the interview experience felt more like a long clinical interview, where I was trying to understand what their experience felt like, had I been them. However, I think that it was my clinical skills that allowed each participant to tell their complete life story. I allowed and encouraged them to explore the incoherencies of their stories; I highlighted my confusion when I heard their stories; I made them conscious of how

378 their stories affected me, emotionally; and I explored with them how they had assigned the personal meanings that they did to the events in their lives.

An important finding of my research, therefore, was how infrequently the children of divorced parents are actually asked to tell their complex stories. Moreover, based on my experiences with the research participants, it was important to learn how often the children of divorced parents expect that their story will be contested or challenged by the listener. These stories told to me for the first time used many of the rhetorical devices, which I have already illustrated, that serve to keep life experience and their histories undetermined. This ambiguity, it seems, is necessary for their relationships with their parents and their own internal self-narratives in order to function in this uncertain living environment.

Some of the participants were very good story tellers and some were not very good story tellers. To a degree, their story telling skills directly reflected the coherence of their own self-narratives. To another degree the incoherence of their experiences reflected the incoherence of their environments. Growing up in two different households is like growing up in two different cultures. The greater the discrepancy between the households the more incoherence that seemed to appear in the life stories.

Likewise the greater the differences in the parental households, the greater the conflict s e e me dt obebe t we e nt hepa r t i c i pa nt s ’c ons c i ous l ype r c e i ve ds e l f -attributes while in e a c hhous e hol d.Al lofpa r t i c i pa nt s ’l i f es t or i e ss poket ot hef unda me nt a lt he or e t i c a l issues that I have raised earlier in this paper. I want to revisit some those issues and

379 consider them each one at a time. I will again use the thick descriptions of the pa r t i c i pa nt s ’i nt e r vi e wst oi l l us t r a t et he s ei s s ue sa ndhowIunde r s t a ndt he m.

Implications for Theory Harter, Bresnick, Bouchey, and Whitesell, (1997) found that especially for older adolescent girls, having self-attributes opposite those of the mother and father was associated with increased internal and external conflict. One finding of my research was ac onf i r ma t i onoft he s er e s e a r c he r s ’f i ndi ng .I dac a pt ur e di tdi r e c t l ywhe ns hes a i d: Like with my dad, certain traits would come out. Ones that I know he woul dn’ tunde r s t a ndora ppr oveof ,Ij us tdi dn’ ts howwhe nIwa sa r oundhi m.

I think with my mom, I c oul dmor es howe ve r yt hi ng .S he ’ sve r ymuc hl i keI love you how you are. Be who you are. But my dad—i t ’ st r ue —my sisters and I, I think, when my dad left, we really focused on academics and achievements.

Definitely!

The issue of how to internally balance these internal and external self-attribute conflicts was an issue for most of the research participants. Each found a unique way of managing the internal conflict. Keira, as an example, managed her self-attribute conflicts and her self-narrative incoherencies by framing her world with a comedic view. For her, it was easier to laugh at her situation then to take it seriously. The comedic viewpoint changed the incoherencies into comic moments in her life story.

This rhetorical maneuver is quite clever, for it takes what cannot be explained or accounted for and turns it into a chuckle. This is a useful way of dealing with a self-

380 narrative incoherency or a self-attribute conflict. The rhetorical technique has the e f f e c tofmovi ngt hei nc ohe r e nc ya wa yf r om Ke i r a ’ s sense of self. This technique, or viewpoint, has the effect of keeping Keira feeling harmonious or cohesive and capable of coping with her world.

For Ida, she ultimately gave up on her father because she felt the conflict between her self-attributes was too great. She could not find a way to bridge the selfa t t r i but ec onf l i c t swi t hi nhe r s e l f .S hec oul donl y“ f l yr i g hta ndf l ys t r a i g ht . ”He r mot he r ’ sa c c e pt a nc eofwha ts hes e ns e dwa sa l lofhe rc ont r a s t e dt oomuc hwi t hwha t s hef e l twa she rf a t he r ’ sa c c e ptance of only a part of her. She felt that her performance in terms of academics and achievements was important, but that there was more to her than just that. For Ida, her self-attributes were in stark contrast between the two households. She made her self-narrative more coherent by deciding to stay away from he rf a t he ra ndhi s“ we a kne s s e s , ”t ous ehe rde s c r i pt i on.I ns t e a ds hehe l dont owha ts he valued, which was his competence in his field.

Colleen and Josie eventually reconciled their internal self-attribute conflicts to save the relationship with the parent with whom they were struggling. Josie viewed he rf a t he ra sa“ wor ka hol i c , ”butdi dnote xpe r i e nc ehe rwor ki ngt hr e ej obsa sbe i ng s i mi l a rt ohe rf a t he r .Col l e e ns t r ug g l e dwi t hhe r“ s i s t e r ” —like relationship with her mother when they were fighting, only to reconcile with her so that her mother became her best friend. Both of these young women used distancing themselves from the conflict as a way to resolve their self-attribute conflicts and as a time to rewrite t he i rl i f es t or i e s .The s eyoungwome n’ sl i ve swe r ef i l l e dwi t ht e ns i ona ndc onf l i c t .As

381 J os i es a i da tonepoi nt ,“ I t sa ma z i ngnoneoft hene i g hbor sc a l l e ddome s t i c . ”The i r interviews dramatically illustrated and confirm what Harter and her colleagues found in their study.

One of the theoretical assumptions that this dissertation has examined and c ha l l e ng e di st het he or e t i c a lus e f ul ne s soft hec og ni t i ver e s e a r c he r s ’t he or i z i nga bout multiple selves. I have maintained the usefulness of a nuclear sense of self that may display multiple identities or public personae. I have argued that this way of conceptualizing this issue allows one, from a theoretical point of view, to know oneself as one person, but allows that identities can be created in the interactions with others and in various contexts. This way of conceptualizing a sense of self allows for both the s i ng ul a r i t yofac ohe r e nts e ns eof‘ me ’a ndt hedi ve r s i t yof‘ me ’i nbe i nga wa r eof differing self-attributes and differing social identities, or public personae depending on the context.

The way that I defined a nuclear sense of self fits within a philosophic tradition be g uni n1 6 9 4whe nJ ohnLoc kede f i ne dt he“ s e l f ”i nhi sEssay Concerning Human Understanding. My research findings are part of this now three hundred-plus year phi l os ophi c a lde ba t e .Oneque s t i ont ha tIf r a me di nCha pt e rXwa se s s e nt i a l l y“ How doIe s t a bl i s ht ha tIa m nowt hes a mepe r s ont ha tIwa sl a s tye a r ? ”Ir a i s e dt hi sque s t i on of the permanence of a person over time as a way of defining my terms within a c ont e xt ua lt he or e t i c a lr ootme t a phor .Ir a i s e dt heque s t i ona sawa yoff r a mi ngI da ’ s c omme nt sa bouts howi ngdi f f e r e ntt r a i t sa the rf a t he r ’ st ha na the rmot he r ’ s household. Locke raised this question, according to Kurt Danziger (1997), and he

382 proposed this solution as a way of accounting for what is quintessentially human over t i me .Be f or eLoc ke ,t hec onc e ptoft he“ s oul ”wa sus e dt oa c c ountf ort hepe r ma ne nc e of a person over time. But as his post-Revolutionary England moved away from social identities that were conferred by birth, such as class, kinship and occupation, a new t e r m wa sne e de d.Loc ke ’ ss ol ut i ont ot hi sc ha ng i ngc ont e xtwa st oba s ei de nt i t yona continuity of a consciousness of self. My use of the term, sense of self, tries to capture Loc ke ’ sor i g i na lde f i ni t i on.

Myc ons t r uc t e dde f i ni t i onofs e ns eofs e l fi sc ong r ue ntt oLoc ke ’ sf or mul a t i on of continuity in a consciousness of self. Locke, according to Danziger (1997), thought that this consciousness of self accompanies all of our experiences as a kind of shadow.

Da nz i g e rde s c r i be dt hi ss ha dow,byquot i ngLoc ke :‘ i ti si mpos s i bl ef ora nyonet o perceive without perceiving [ e mpha s i si nor i g i na l ]t ha thedoe spe r c e i ve . ’( p.1 4 1 )For Loc ke ,quot e di nDa nz i g e r ,‘ s i nc econsciousness always accompanies thinking, . . . it is that which makes everyone to be what he [Locke] calls self, and thereby distinguishes hi ms e l ff r om a l lot he rt hi nki ngbe i ng s ,i nt hi sa l onec ons i s t spe r s ona li de nt i t y. ’( p.1 4 1 ) According to Danziger, Locke had created a way of describing what was then within his context and history a new way of experiencing the world by separating the sense of s e l ff r om t hee xpe r i e nc eofone ’ si nne ra ndout e ra c t i ons .Mor ei mpor t a nt l y,i nt hi s new world one never just l i ve sora c t s ;r a t he r ,onei sa l wa ys‘ c ons c i ous ’ofone ’ ss e l f living and acting. That is Danziger main point.

Loc ke ’ svi e wwa st heg e ne s i soft het he or e t i c a lme t a phort ha tt hi sr e s e a r c h e mpl oye d.Loc ke ’ sde f i ni t i onoft he“ s e l f ”a ndt hes ubs e que ntphi l os ophical debate

383 gave meaning to the concept of mental philosophy. Over time the rhetorical devices proposed by Locke and others, according to Danziger, seemed to refer to real entities and removed meaning as the central element. However, as I have deconstructed the “ s e l f ”a nd“ i de nt i t y”f ort hi sr e s e a r c h,i tbe c ome spos s i bl et ot hi nkofac e nt r a ls e ns eof self that has a central self-narrative. This self-narrative has many motifs, but it is constrained by the context of its creation over time to be able to express only a limited number of these motifs. These conscious narrative motifs, like conscious selfattributes, can be willfully shifted or these narrative motifs can be in conflict. These self-narrative motifs give and constrain the meaning that can be assigned to experience as, likewise, do unconscious self-narrative motifs.

Iwi l li l l us t r a t et he s epoi nt sus i ngEs t he ra ndEmme t t ’ sl i f es t or i e s .Es t he r ’ s odyssey to find a parent was a very compelling life story. I have presented only the first part of her journey. In actuality her journey was a very long one, lasting nearly 12 years. To continue where I stopped her life story in the previous chapter, she was being particularly nasty to her stepmother and had created an intense relationship with one of her younger stepsisters, Naomi. Then Esther said: Well, I found out one day that Naomi was going to be going away to sleepover summer camp, an all-girls Orthodox camp in the Catskill Mountains. And t he r ewa snowa yt ha ts hewa sg onnag oa ndIwa s n’ tg onnag o, because I had to be near her every two seconds and make sure—even though she was gonna be apart from her mother—I still had to go and just—and so I said well I want to g o,t oo.Is t i l lr e me mbe rmys t e pmot he rl ooki nga tmea nds a yi ngwe l ldon’ tbe

384 silly, Es t he r .You’ veg ot t abeJ e wi s ht og ot ot ha tc a mp.Andt ha twa si t .I think a few months later, I just announced one day that I wanted to convert. I was 13. Of course, it was going to be an Orthodox conversion. We went to Toronto where there is a very prestigious court of rabbis that conducts conversions—howe ve r ,notr e a l l yf ora dol e s c e nt s .Us ua l l yi t ’ sa dul t st ha ta r e coming to it for whatever reason. In the end, they converted me over about 8 months. I had to go back and study some stuff. And the conversion process was very, very quick. I know people who have gone through conversions where it t a ke sye a r s .I t ’ sr e a l l yr i g or ous .The yr e a l l ywa ntyout oi mme r s eyour s e l fi n Jewish life, in Jewish law, know your stuff, and they really test you and push you becaus ei t ’ snotami s s i oni z i ngr e l i g i on.We ’ r enota s ki ngf orpe opl et o convert.

So I converted. And I think the reason that they were more lenient in my case is because I already had a father who was Orthodox, and I was in that house. I was exposed to it. Nothing was that foreign to me, although I would find out later on that it really was. And I knew how to walk the walk and talk the talk. I was a smart kid. I knew what to say. And I also was sheltered, so I kind of came across—and I was a very young 13. I was not wearing makeup. I did not know—my stepmother likes to remind me of this—I had no idea what homosexuality was at 13 or even 14. I had a vague idea. A lot of my friends kne wa t7 ,8 ,a nd9e xa c t l ywha tt ha twa s .Iha dnoc l ue .Iwa s n’ ti nt oboys .

385 Nothing. So I think that kind of helped, because I kind of donned this very genuine religious good-girl look to me. And my name was Esther.

So I went through the conversion. I think it was right before I turned 14. Part of the package deal of converting was that I would then go away to school somewhere, because there was no all-girls Orthodox Jewish high school in western [I edited out the city], New York. I actually would have to go to summer camp and experience that, which I was thrilled because Naomi was going. That was half the reason why I was converting and changing my entire life, so I could go to summer camp and be with her. And then go off to school.

The theory of the self-na r r a t i vee xpl a i nsEs t he r ’ sc onve r s i on.Iwoul d understand Esther to be in the process of changing her social identity now that she was living in an Orthodox Jewish family. Her context had changed and therefore, in response to this changed context, she changed her public persona. Her purpose for changing her pubic persona in this context was that she wanted to go to summer camp with her younger sister. To go to this camp, Esther had to be an Orthodox Jew, so she decided to convert. She was aware that internally she was still the same naïve girl that she was before. In fact, she gave a kind of developmental profile of herself. She felt that s hewa sa“ young1 3 . ”S hewa snotwe a r i ngma ke upa sa ppa r e nt l yt heot he rg i r l she r age were. She was not, in her view, as sexually knowledgeable as many of her peers.

What I believed Esther was telling me was that she was very tuned into the context of he rf a mi l ya ndhe rc l a s s ma t e s .I na ddi t i on,s hea dde d,r e ve a l i nghe rs e ns eofs e l f ,“ I kne whowt owa l kt hewa l ka ndt a l kt het a l k.Iwa sas ma r tki d. ”S hec ons c i ous l y

386 knew what she was doing and she wa sus i nghe rs e ns eofs e l f[ “ Iwa sas ma r tki d” ]t o have a different public persona or to have a different social identity in this new c ont e xt .S hewa snot ,i nmyopi ni on,c r e a t i nga not he r“ s e l f , ”ore ve na not he rs e ns eof self. Cognitive researchers might label this public persona as a self and, therefore characterize Esther as having two selves. I believe that this becomes theoretically c onf us i ng ,a nddi s t or t sLoc ke ’ sor i g i na lde f i ni t i onoft hes e l f .Ra t he r ,Ibe l i e ve ,a s Esther believed, that she was the same person, only she had to appear a certain way within this context.

A sub-question addressed by my research was whether the context helped to change or hindered the feeling of coherence in the self-narrative. Esther in her recollected memory of this time seemed to indicate that her goal of being with her younger sister gave Esther a sense of coherence and a sense of self cohesion that she experienced as feeling harmonious.

Esther continued to recount her story: “ S oIc onve r t e da ndt he nIdi dg ot os ummer camp, which was a little t r a uma t i c . ” Interviewer: “ Hows o? ” Subject:

Um—well, I was with primarily girls from New York City. So

already, we were worlds apart, just because of that. Forget the religious piece of it. They were girls who were born and bred in Brooklyn, who had been raised wi t he a c hot he rs i nc eki nde r g a r t e n.S ot ha t ’ sl i keawhol el i t t l ec ul t ur ei ni t s e l f .

Andt he nIc omei na nde ve nt houg hmyf a t he rwa sf r om Br ookl yn,i tdoe s n’ t

387 ma t t e r ,be c a us eI ’ m not .The ywe r ena s t y.Al otoft he m were just nasty, mean g i r l s .AndIwa s n’ tus e dt ot ha t .S ome how,pe opl ekne wIwa sac onve r t .And t he r ewa sar e a ls t i g maa t t a c he dt ot ha t .I twa sl i keIwa s n’ tapur e bl ood.I twa s weird for people. Things were foreign to me. For as much as I learned, I still ha dn’ tbe e nbor nwi t hi t .Andt he r ewe r ej us t —just lingo that people would use. They would announce the activities for each bunk. Well each bunk had a He br e wna me .Idi dn’ tknowwha tour swa s .Idi dn’ tknowwha ti tme a nt .No one told me, so I never knew—unless I followed everybody else—I never knew wha ta c t i vi t yIwa ss uppos e dt og ot o,be c a us eIdi dn’ tunde r s t a nd.S ot he r ewa s s omel a ng ua g eba r r i e rs t uf fha ppe ni ng .AndIwa s n’ twi t hNa omi ,be c a us es he was seven. She was in the youngest bunk. I was with the teenagers. They were just mean, nasty, rotten girls. I mean 13 and 14-year-ol dg i r l sa r e n’ ta l wa yst he most pleasant anyway, but they were just really like just so much more—they appeared more cultured and worldly than I was. The truth is I probably was more so, because they were living in their little sheltered shtetl in Brooklyn. So t ha twa s n’ tt heg r e a t e s te xpe r i e nc e .Howe ve r ,Ic a meba c ka ndwa nt e dt og o ba c kt hef ol l owi ngye a r ,s ot he ys a y.S oi tc oul dn’ tha vebe e ns ohor r i bl e .I think I probably made a few friends, and that was enough for me to get my fun out of it and want to go back.

Wha tEs t he rdi s c ove r e dwa st ha tt he“ na t i ve s ”c oul dt e l lt hedi f f e r e nc ei nhe r “ wa l ki ngt hewa l ka ndt a l ki ngt het a l k. ”Ca mpwa s“ t r a uma t i c ”a ndt he nl e s ss oa ss he put words to it. She was probably correct that it was traumatic for her at the time, but

388 in the telling she had an opportunity to compare it to the rest of her life story and then it did not feel so traumatic. I think that what is being displayed almost as a shadow story was the influence of her unconscious self-narrative. The implication in her story and in many of the stories of the research participants was that these self-narratives help to organize the story that was being told to me. If self-narratives organize the narrative constructions of life stories as I have found in my research, then this finding be c ome smor es uppor tf orPa l ombo’ s( 1 9 9 2 )t he or e t i c a lpos i t i onwi t hi ns e l f ps yc hol og y.Thi sf i ndi nga l s os uppor t sMc Ada ms ’( 1 9 8 8 ,1 9 9 3 )f i ndi ng s ,whi c h used t e r mi nol og yt ha tc ompa r e dt oPa l ombo’ s ,wa sdi f f e r e nt ,buts i mi l a ri nme a ni ng .

Fol l owi ngEs t he r ’ ss t or yal i t t l ef ur t he r ,s her e por t e dt ha tt hede a lt ha twa s struck about going to summer camp was that she would have to go to an Orthodox Jewish school ,whi c hme a nt ,i nEs t he r ’ sc a s e ,boa r di ngs c hooli nBr ookl yn.Es t he r ’ s mother would not immediately allow this, so Esther was able to continue at performing arts school that she had previously attended. Esther told me: Mymot he rdi dn’ twa ntmet og oa wa y, so we agree that I would stay in performing arts one more year, which was also very uncomfortable. Because nowIwa si npe r f or mi nga r t s ,butIwa sOr t hodox.Ic oul dn’ tt a keg ym c l a s s a nymor e ,be c a us ei twa s n’ tmode s t .The r ewe r ea l lt he s et hi ng st ha t ,now l ooki ngba c k,Is e ea sbe i ngmyf a t he r ’ swa yofdoi ngt hi ng sa ndnotne c e s s a r i l y against Jewish law to not do some of those things. It was just their particular f l a vorofhowt he ywe r e .S oIdi dn’ tdog ym,a nds i ng i ngbe c a mea ni s s ue , singing in front of men. A lot of things that had to do with modesty—

389 boyfriends. I had this crush on this little guy, Jason. Well, that was over, be c a us enowJ a s onwa s n’ tJ e wi s h.S ot ha twa sat oug hye a r .Iwoul ds ne a kl i ke pants on under my skirts, because that was also a big deal for me. Because now I had to wear skirts every day. While the Rabbis were questioning me in the process of conversion, I was—ofc our s eI ’ l lwe a rs ki r t sa ndofc our s eI ’ l lwe a r dr e s s e sa ndye s ,ye s ,ye s ,I ’ l ldoe ve r yt hi ng .Butwhe nr e a l i t y—when it came down to actually doing it, I remember sneaking pants on under my skirts and thought that was the most horrible thing. And lightning surely is going to come down and strike me because I have pants on under my skirt. So that was tough. But then the second year, I went back to camp. Actually [I] got very s i c k.Idon’ tknow—they thought it was croup, bronchitis, asthma. No one knew, but I got very, very ill and had to come home. And then went away to school—we nta wa yt oaboa r di ngs c hool ,a na l lg i r l s ’s chool in Brooklyn with some of the same girls who I supposed I said those were the girls that convinced me to go. And then I had nothing to do with them once I got there.

Esther was in this part of her story keeping a sense of self that was different than the identity that she was displaying to the world. Context was in her case a contributing factor to her creation of an identity. I felt that her sense of self remained as I listened to this part of the story. I speculated in notes to myself that her illness may have been the outward manifestation of the psychological toll her identity creation process was having on her sense of self. Again, this would seem to confirm

390 what Harter (1999a) and others was reporting about conflicted self-attributes during adolescence and the cognitive struggle to resolve them.

Es t he r ’ se xpe r i e nc e sa tt heboa r di ngs c hoolc ont i nue dhe rodys s e y.S het ol dme that the transition to living with her father to attend the performing arts school had been difficult, but said that transition was mild in comparison to going to boarding school in Brooklyn. Esther described it as: dirty and big and polluted and crowded. That was culture shock. And everywhere I looked were seas of men with black hats and long beards and all these rules of the culture that I had to get used to. Not looking at men in the eye or lots of signs were in Yiddish and in Hebrew.

Es t he r ’ sc ont e xtwa snowdr a ma t i c a l l ydi f f e r e nt .Wes houl dr e me mbe rs hei s1 5ye a r s old and she consciously only created this Orthodox Jewish identity in order to go to camp with her little stepsister.

Weknowt ha toneofhe rl e i t mot i f s“ Ia m as ma r tki d”wa spa r tofhe r conscious self-narrative and sense of self. Esther continued: It was horrible. And I was living with—I remember when my father dropped meof f .Ir e me mbe rt ha ts e pa r a t i on.Andi twa ss opa i nf ul .Iwoul dn’ tc r yi n front of him, but when he dropped me off at this house with this family that they had interviewed and thought it would be an okay match for me to live with, because the s c hooldi dn’ tha veador m—I just remember going in the room and shutting the door and pounding the walls with my fist and falling to the floor, just dropping to the floor and just sobbing. Yeah, that was the first

391 of—that was like the second major separation, because the first one was really wi t hmymot he rwhe ns hes a i dg oodbye ,g ot oyourf a t he r ’ shous e .

Esther described her sense of fragmentation filled with pain over being alone in this strange culture. She felt abandoned with no place to go and no one to turn to for help.

Esther continued: Yeah! And that year, no one really came to visit a lot. I thought I was gonna die a lot. I had thoughts of death a lot. Convinced that I had every disease. And I kne wal otofdi s e a s e s .I ’ m nots ur ehowIkne wa l lt hese neuromuscular degenerative diseases and cancer, of course was always. But I had a history of that, because in fourth grade, I thought I had a brain tumor and was horrified a nddi dn’ tt e l la nyonea ndwa sa l wa ysa f r a i dIha da ppe ndi c i t i s .It houg htIha d a million things. So this like hypochondriasis stuff preceded all of that, but then it really amplified when I was away and on my own. And I think I kind of also thought—Idon’ tme a nt oke e pi nt e r pr e t i ng ,butIg ue s sI ’ vet houg hta boutt hi s a lot. I think it probably also was hard for me because I was so nasty to my s t e pmot he r .I t ’ sl i ket ha tc onve r t i ngwa spr oba bl yawa yf ormet oc ope , be c a us emymot he rs a i ds or r y,youc a n’ tc omeba c k.S owha ti saki ds uppos e d t odowhe nt he y’ r eunha ppyi nas i t ua t i on?They find ways to cope. So I often think that converting to Judaism, to Orthodox Judaism, was just really a coping strategy for me. But then look where it landed me. Like I did it so I could fit in and maybe smack my mother in the face for saying no.

392 Esther revealed her own sense of purpose in these comments. In my i nt e r pr e t a t i on,s hea ni de nt i t y,Or t hodoxJ e w,s ot ha ts he“ c oul df i ti n. ”S her e ve a l e d i nt hi sc omme ntt ha ts hewa sa l s oa wa r et ha ts hewa st r yi ngt o“ s ma c kmymot he ri n t hef a c ef ors a yi ngno”to her request to come back and live with her mother. I heard this part of her story as her sense of self fragmenting into hypochondriasis, depression, and incoherence because she lacked appropriate selfobjects in her new context. I felt that she was seeki ngapa r e nt ,a ndEs t he rr e pl i e d,“ Exa c t l y.J us tg e tamot he ra ndbe pa r toft hi sf a mi l ya ndr e a l l yf i ti n, ”t a l ki ngofhe re xpe r i e nc eofl i vi ngwi t hhe rf a t he r and stepmother.

Her strategy for going to camp, in this sense, had not worked. Her sense of self was in danger of fragmenting and her self-narrative was in danger of becoming a self parody, or a false self. Esther continued her story: I lived with them for a couple years, not even. And then I was out and again alone. That was a really bad year. I went to the doctor quite often. I think the doctor was pretty sick of me after a while. I was rotten in school. Because I was lagging so far behind the other girls in Judaic studies, they put me in this slower class, which was really a class of all special needs kids. Meanwhile, I had been in g i f t e da ndt a l e nt e dc l a s s e s ,g onet ot hi sma g ne ts c hool .Iwa s n’ tag e ni us ,butI was bright. Here I was with girls who had diagnoses of like they were MR and ED and lots of different stuff going on. They thought that I was a slut. They a c t ua l l yt houg htt ha tIwa s n’ t —and meanwhile, it was sink or swim. I had classes that were taught in Yiddish. I had to learn to write Yiddish, read

393 Yiddish, write Hebrew, read Hebrew, Aramaic. It was just a lot of stuff. And make friends. And figure out who I was. And fit in. And adjust to all this other stuff, it was really difficult. And I became very rebellious and would just test the boundaries in any way I could. So if the uniform was—they were very strict about modesty. The teachers used to have us lift our skirts to see if we had on kne es oc ksort i g ht s .Youc oul dn’ tha vekne es oc kson,be c a us ekne es oc ksc a n fall, and therefore a part of your leg might show. So I would come in, not with knee socks on, not with tights on, but with little gym socks with like a Nike swish or something. It was very obvious. The navy blue cardigan had to be their navy blue cardigan. I would come in with a navy blue cardigan with a little Polo horse on it. Things like that, that really irritated them but it kind of made me feel . . . [alive.]

Thei r onyofEs t he r ’ ss t or ywa st ha tt hi si de nt i t yt ha ts hec r e a t e dwi t hi na context for one purpose [going to camp] was now the identity and the context she was rebelling against. The rebellion also seemed to serve another purpose which was to e xt e r na l i z et he“ e ne my” / ot he rs ot os pe a k.Or t hodoxJ uda i s ml a wsa ndc us t oms became over time a narrative theme to organize her developing self-narrative and sense of self against.

Es t he r ’ sr e be l l i onbe g a na ss her e por t e d: That Catalonian blood in me [edited, but indicating to me her sense of fight].

S omymus i cwa sove r .The r ewa snot i mef ori t ,a ndi twa s n’ tva l ue di nt ha t particular community. I went from performing arts—which we got out of

394 school at 2:20 or something like that, and I was home by 3:00, could relax, have as na c k,dowha t e ve rIwa nt e dt odo.He r ewedi dn’ tg e toutt i l l5or5 : 1 0or something ridiculous, because it was a dual curriculum. There just was no time for anything. And yeah, it was very—I feel like I was neglected a lot that year, a ndIdon’ tknowe ve r yonewa s .Ma ybet he ydi dc omet ovi s i ta ndIdon’ t remember. But they did call my father to the school once because I made an obnoxious comment in the middle of class. And they thought I had such nerve for doing that. I made some nasty comment about a leader in the community.

We were being tested on him, and I said something like oh, do we have to know his favorite color, too, and how many times he goes to the bathroom a day? I said something rude. So they called my father, and he flew in. He said he was trying very hard not to laugh. But in any case, that was not a very pleasant year. I remember just being cold, not having enough to wear, not having a proper winter coat, not having shoes—just stuff like that. Not having money. I remember watching the girls on the way to school, having no one to walk with and watching the other girls go into bakeries and buy like these big muffins and s t r ude l sa ndt hi ng sl i ket ha t .Andf ors omer e a s on,Idi dn’ te ve nha vet he dollar fifty or two dollars to go in and do that. So I feel like there was something missing about that year in terms of parenting.

Esther was describing her situation as if she was a homeless waif without parents or means. Theoretically, I would say that she is describing a depletion state, or a psychological state where she had no zest for living, or a sense of perpetual

395 fragmentation and non-cohesion. This is a world filled with selfobject failures with the possible exception of her doctor. Fortunately for Esther, her rebellion was successful in that she was able to switch the next year to different more nurturing board school.

As I listen to her tell me the story, I was left wondering where were her parents? Who was looking of for Esther? While Esther ’ ss t or yi sdr a ma t i c ,i ts e e me dt o me to be an exemplar of what several of my research participants reported experiencing. Specifically, they reported that they had lived their lives just outside the influence and care of their parents. The feeling, I had, was that they were growing up between the metaphorical spheres of parental control and influence. They seemed to me to be making up lives as they lived them. Their stories had the quality of being made up on the go, or written the night before they were due.

Similar to Esther, Emmett told a story about moving with his sister to his f a t he r ’ shomedur i nghi g hs c hool .Whe nhi ss i s t e rl e f tt og ot oc ol l e g e ,hewa nt e dt o r e t ur nt ohi smot he r ’ shous e .Hi smot he r ,l i keEs t he r ’ smot he r ,di dnota l l owhi mt o return to her home. He lost his selfobject, felt depleted, and became depressed. He combated these narcissistic injuries by creating an identity at his high school of being a successful student, athlete, and person. This identity created in this context seemed to work on the external world and with many of his relationships. Internally, he felt that he was a coward in contrast to his external heroic identity. His self-attribute conflict finally spilled out in his research interview with me. He said, this is the reason why I got by, I guess, or why I survived is because I could take it, despite how much damage it was doing to me, which is how my mother was

396 and how she got stuck with my dad for 14 years and how she got stuck with my stepdad until he died. I just t ooki t ,a ndIdi dn’ ts a ya nyt hi ng .Ij us ts mi l e d.

I avoided confrontation at all cost, because I think I was afraid of not so much what he would do, but what would happen after the confrontation, like how life would be after that. Because I could see how it was between him and my s i s t e r ,a ndIdi dn’ tl i kei t .Idi dn’ tl i ket he ywa yt he ywor ke d.Idi dn’ tl i kemy dad, so my sister complained to me about my dad. And that was fine. We commiserated. Because he was worse to me than he was to her, yet she freaked out way more than I ever did. To this day, my dad has no idea like what he did t ome ,youknow.He ’ suna wa r eofi tc ompl e t e l y.I t ’ spr oba bl ybe t t e rt ha twa y, be c a us eIdon’ twa ntt og ot he r e .Iha ve n’ tl i ve dt he r ei nal ongt i me .I ’ ve always said one day I want to tell him how big of a dick he was, but he woul dn’ tunde r s t a nd.Ic oul dt e l lhi m.Ic oul dc r yi nf r ontofhi m,a ndi t woul dn’ tdoa nyg ood,be c a us ehej us twoul dn’ tunde r s t a nd.Hedoe s n’ tt hi nk he is, which is the worst part. I figured that out a while ago, that no matter what you tell him—you can sit down and explain it to him—he has this like c og ni t i ves c he maofwha ti sr i g hta ndwha ti swr ong .Andi t ’ ss odi s t or t e da nd s ke we dt ha tnoma t t e rhowl ongyout r yt or e a s onwi t hhi m,i t ’ snotg onna hel ponebi t ,onebi t .Ye a h,het hi nksweha veag oodr e l a t i ons hi p,I ’ ds a y.And hec ompl a i nst omea boutmys i s t e ra l lt het i me .Andhe ’ sdonei tmye nt i r e l i f e .Iha t ei t .Iha t ei t ,be c a us eIdon’ twa ntt obei nvol ve d.Hes t i l ldoe si tt o this day. But yea h,Idon’ twa ntt obei nvol ve dwi t ht ha t .

397 Emme t t ’ ss e l f -narrative had a sort of heroic quality to it. He believed that he was able to take what the world sent his way. He was able to handle life, because he ha d“ s ur vi ve d”hi se xpe r i e nc eofg r owi ngupwi t h his father. He was like his mother, long-suffering. He let me know how desperate he had been by telling me that he had t houg htofki l l i nghi ms e l f .The nhea dde d,“ Iwa st oobr oke nt oki l lmys e l f —just like resigned to my fate, you know? It was pretty bad.”

Emmett continued as he talked about his reason for going into journalism: [ Hug es i g h]“ Idon’ tknow.Il i ke dha vi ngmyna mei nt hepa pe ra ndnotbe i ng i nt hes t or y.I ’ mg ooda twr i t i ng .Il i ket owr i t e .Il i ket or e a d.Idon’ tknow.I t seemed like a goodf i t .Ikne woneda yt ha tIwoul dn’ tbea bl et opl a ys por t s a nymor e ,a ndi twoul dbeag oodwa yt os t a yc l os et os por t s .S ot ha t ’ showI di di t .Il i kei t . ” I nt e r vi e we r :“ The r e ’ sawhol eboxofKl e e ne xt he r e . ” Emme t t :“ You’ r ea l lpr e pa r e d. ” Intervie we r :“ Idot hi sa l lda yl ong ,s o—” Emme t t :“ Idi dn’ te xpe c tt oc omei nhe r ea ndc r y,t ha t ’ sf ors ur e . ” I nt e r vi e we r :“ Youknow,whe nyout a l ka boutt he s et hi ng s ,t he y’ r epa i nf ul .

Tha t ’ swhyIt r ya ndbea sr e s pe c t f ula sIc a na boutwha tyou’ r es ha r i ngwith me, because it is so hard and it is so personal and it is so private. So how do you think this whole experience over the long haul affected you in terms of the s t or yyout e l lyour s e l fi ns i deyourhe a da boutwhoyoua r e ? ”

398 Emme t t :[ S t i l lc r yi ng ]“ Idon’ tknow.I ’ m ba t t l et e s t e d.Idon’ tt hi nka nyone c a nt hr owa nyt hi ngwor s ea tme . ” I nt e r vi e we r :“ Pr oba bl ynot . ” Emme t t :“ ButIknowi ta l s oc ome sba c kt obi t eme ,be c a us eIr e a l l ydon’ tl i ke doi nga nyt hi ngt ha tIdon’ te nj oydoi ngort ha tIdon’ twa ntt odo.S oI ’ m not nearly as good of a student as I was before. Before, I was like so college is coming—three years, two years, one year—it was like the motivating factor. Do we l la ndg e toutofhe r e .Got oag oods c hool .NowI ’ ma tt heg oods c hool .I ’ m outoft he r e .I t ’ sahug er e l i e f .Andnowi t ’ sl i keoka y,youwa ntmet odot hi s ?

For g e ti t .I ’ m notg oi ngt odoi t .OrIdon’ tdot hi ng sa swhol e he a r t e dl ya sI would have done them before, just because—Ime a nIdon’ tknowwhy.But yeah, yeah. But things—I tell myself that—Ime a nhe l l ,I ’ mg l a dIdi dn’ tki l l mys e l f .I ’ me ng a g e dnow. ” I nt e r vi e we r :“ Gr e a t !Cong r a t ul a t i ons ! ” Emme t t :“ Andt ha twa sa l wa ysi nt heba c kofmyhe a d—t her e a s onwhyIdi dn’ tdoi t , because I knew the grass is greener on the other side. I knew it would get better. But at the time, it was hard to convince myself that it even mattered if it wa sg oi ngt og e ta nybe t t e r .Ye a h,butnowI ’ m—what is the story I tell myself i nmyhe a d? ” Emme t twa si nana r r a t i vec r i s i s .Hewa s“ ba t t l et e s t e d”but he was having a difficult time projecting his self-narrative forward. He began to cry and I felt that I

399 ne e de dt opr ovi des ome“ e di t or i a l ”he l pi nc r e a t i ngas t or yt ha twoul dwor kbe t t e rf or Emmett.

Ibe l i e veEs t he ra ndEmme t t ’ sl i f es t or i e si l l us t r a te, as exemplars of all my research participants, the theoretical efficacy of conceptualizing a nuclear self within a contextual theoretical root metaphor. Esther and Emmett had one central sense of self, but they were conscious it was multi-faceted. They were capable of scripting many di f f e r e ntki ndsofs oc i a li de nt i t i e s .Myr e s e a r c hpa r t i c i pa nt s ’l i f es t or i e sc ol l e c t i ve l y illustrate how they each were able to create multiple social identities or public personae depending on the context in which they found themselves. I believe that their ability to emplot these stories was, in part, a result of their awareness of having multiple themes within their sense of self. These leitmotifs, I would argue, if coherently organized within the self-narrative, can emplot multiple coherent and cohesive public personae within different contexts. I could find no evidence from them or in the interview transcripts that they thought of themselves as different selves within different contexts. Rather, they seem to hold a single autobiographical self history in their memories across multiple contexts that could contain self-attribute conflicts and narrative incoherencies. In my opinion, the cognitive theorists add needless confusion to their theoretical positions when they refer to multiple selves instead of multiple identities.

Thei mpl i c a t i onsf orS e l fPs yc hol og yt he or i z i ngi st ha tt het e r ms“ s e ns eofs e l f ” a nd“ s e l f -na r r a t i ve ”pr ovi dea c c e s st oanon-reified non-me c ha ni z e dt he or e t i c a l“ s e l f . ” In addition, I would argue that these terms are a more experience-near way for

400 therapists and theorists to understand how a person assigns meaning to life experiences. Further, it eliminates much of the narrative and theoretical confusion that conceptualizing multiple selves introduces to any discussion. Moreover, by removing multiple selves from the theoretical vocabulary the negative pathological connotations of multiple personalities would be reduced, in my opinion, as a possible theoretical shadow story.

Another finding of my research that has implications for theory has to do with how the contested process of divorce impacts child development theory. This dissertation began by looking sociologically at how half of children growing up in the United States were not growing up in nuclear families. In Chapter II, I questioned, whether, because the theoretically assumed cultural context of child development had changed, the models of child development need to change. From my review of the literature on children of divorced parents, only one researcher addressed this issue.

Judith Wallerstein (1989) proposed that these children have a two-step developmental process. She proposed that these children of divorced parents first have the same developmental tasks as children growing up in nuclear families. However, unlike the children growing up in nuclear families, the children of divorced parents had an a ddi t i ona lde ve l opme nts t e pwhi c hwa st or e pr oc e s st he i rpa r e nt ’ sdi vor c ea te a c hne w developmental level.

I fWa l l e r s t e i n’ spr opos a li sc or r e c tthat the development for children of divorced parent has become a two-step process, what allowances are we going to make as a culture when the developmental course for almost half of the children has

401 doubl e d?Myr e s e a r c hc a nnotc onf i r m Wa l l e r s t e i n’ sove r a l l conceptualization directly, but it does support that development is extremely confusing and often perilous for these children of divorced parents.

Three of the research participants at the time of their research interview were trying to plan how to get their parents to cooperate at their own life stage event— college graduation. Most of the research participants in their life stories recounted how complicated life events like school graduations, going to college, going to prom, and getting married, were complicated for them because of their divorced parents. These complications at life events, I think, immediately suggest that parental divorce for children is not experienced as a single event but rather as an ongoing process. Since parental divorce becomes an ongoing process, and often a complicating process, I think the Wallerstein developmental proposal has a great deal of merit.

My research findings do speak directly to a related point in tracing the development of the self-narrative. One of my research findings was that the pa r t i c i pa nt sne e dwha ti sc a l l e d“ na r r a t i ves c a f f ol di ng . ”Ther e s e a r c hpa r t i c i pa nt sha d for the most part a difficult time telling their life stories without my help. For explanatory purposes I have categorized these narrative problems as difficulties because of their age, and difficulties because of their memories. While for the moment I will keep these categories separate, they are more likely, in fact, to be complexly interrelated.

Colleen was the youngest research participant at age 17. She had a very difficult time telling me her life story. She needed my verbal prompts in order to tell her story.

402 The s epr ompt st ookt hef or m of“ Andwha tha ppe ne dne xt ? ” ;“ Howdi dyouf e e l a boutt ha t ? ” ;or“ Howdi dyoumot he rf e e la boutt ha t ? ”These essentially were process oriented questions that attempted to hold a temporal position and slowly move it forward. Every research participant, regardless of age, needed these verbal cues to tell me their story. Colleen needed more prompts than the rest, in part, because she had never thought of her life as a story that could be told, and in part because her life was somewhat chaotically organized within her own mind. In addition, Colleen often had trouble elaborating her story so that I could understand how she was assigning meaning to the events that she told me. Therefore, I asked questions that further e xpl or e dt opi c ss heha dme nt i one d,butIt r i e dt obec a r e f ula ndnotl e a dt he“ wi t ne s s . ” In contrast, Esther was the third oldest participant at age 31. With Esther I just asked her to tell me her life story, and she did so without very many questions or pr ompt s .Oneoft her e a s onst ha tIha veus e dEs t he r ’ ss t or yi nt hi ss e c t i oni sbe c a us ei t was so rich in detail and emotional content. As a broad generalization, it seemed to me that the older research participants told more complex life stories and needed as a whole less narrative scaffolding (prompts from me).

Thes e c ondc a t e g or yofr e s e a r c hf i ndi ng sr e l a t e st opa r t i c i pa nt s ’us eoft he i r memories. Chapter VIII and Chapter IX provided the background for understanding what might almost be considered to be a separate finding of this research. Without exception, the research participants had difficulty with their autobiographical/episodic memories with respect to temporal time, i.e., they had great difficulty locating the events of their lives on a time line and, occasionally, in the sequencing of life events.

403 Esther, Callie, and Josie continued revising their life stories throughout the research interviews until the stories seemed to be at last correctly sequenced to them. For me, this concentrated experience of interviewing these research participants made me aware of their difficulty in remembering. My prior clinical experience had not revealed that trait.

Narrative scaffolding, or helping young children tell their life story, is a function that parents provide for their young children. The parents prompt the child to use their memories. Because the parents are often there, they can help the child to elaborate the memory in addition to helping the child sequence the memory.

However, the contested nature of divorce has the potential to interfere with the parental narrative scaffolding. Each divorced parent might reinforce different aspects of the same memory when it is being retold, or they might emphasize certain positive memories with themselves while emphasizing certain negative memories with the other parent. I am suggesting that the net effect is that autobiographical memory has an increased chance to become confused in children of divorced parents. In addition, because autobiographical memory is often confused or it is unable to be retrieved, the c hi l d’ sde ve l opi ngs e l f -narrative has the potential for developing inconsistency or incoherencies.

Narrative scaffolding also becomes a possible source for research error or misinterpretation. I was aware of this possibility and tried to confine my prompts to temporal and process prompts. Since I was also drawing on my own life experiences, there is the possibility that I also introduced different conceptualizations and meanings

404 into the research interviews. I was aware that my narrative scaffolding could introduce mi s unde r s t a ndi ng si nt ot hepa r t i c i pa nt s ’r e por t s .Ac c or di ng l y,i nt hi sdi s s e r t a t i onI provided large quotations, so the reader could experience the participants telling their stories in their own words.

The major finding of my research is how the thoroughly contested nature of t hedi vor c epr oc e s sc ont i nue st ope r me a t ee ve r yf i be roft he s ec hi l dr e n’ slives.

Uni ve r s a l l yt hi swa soneoft hema j ort he me si na l lt her e s e a r c hpa r t i c i pa nt s ’l i f e stories. In Chapter XIII, I revealed the repercussions for the children of the contested parental divorce process. In summary, that chapter explained that to a degree, all of the c hi l d’ sl i f ee xpe r i e nc e sa ndt ha toft hepa r e nt sbe c omeope nt oque s t i oni nt hedi vor c e process. Every motive, every act of omission or commission, every feeling or thought becomes available for reinterpretation during the divorce process. What was known is nol ong e rknown,butmus tbe“ di s c ove r e d”e i t he rbypr of e s s i ona l s ,orbye a c hoft he participants. It is this process of being between known and unknown, between each parental residence, between mom and dad, and ultimately between the accepted cultural narrative master plot of the nuclear family and some yet to be determined and narrated entity, that seems to take its toll on the children. The research participants reported that the ambiguity of the divorce process and its ongoing repercussions created great difficulty in their lives. I do not believe that theory has yet addressed the theoretical issues of growing up between.

What the research participants did report about this experience of growing up between is that it is difficult to crea t eaGod’ s -eye-view of any event or experience.

405 Wi t houtt hi sGod’ s -eye-view, it is very challenging for the child to create a cohesive sense of self, or a coherent memory story of an event. It becomes difficult to author a story that moves forward to an anticipated ending, or an anticipated future. The immense ambiguity of experience within the ongoing divorce process has the effect of making the children more comfortable with leaving the meaning of experiences unassigned or undetermined. The research participants conveyed this ambiguity of the e xpe r i e nc eofbe t we e nwi t hwha tIdi s c ove r e dwe r ec l e ve rr he t or i c a lde vi c e sl i ke ,“ As myda dt e l l si t ”or“ mymom’ sve r s i onofi t . ”The s er he t or i c a lde vi c e sa l l owt he ambiguity to remain, but also, I think, subtly prevent the child from assigning meaning to an event, or at the very least, delay the assignment of meaning to life experience.

Living, growing up and developing in contested matrices of changing meaning is a very challenging prospect for anyone. However, for a child, especially a young child, it is a recipe for problems. In Chapter XIII, remember Ida imploring her parents for reassurance that they would not get divorced. The ambiguity of meaning and the difficult in assigning meaning to life experiences seemed also to interfere with the r e s e a r c hpa r t i c i pa nt s ’c r e a t i ngac ohe r e nts e l f -narrative emblematic of a sense of self cohesion and a feeling harmony.

For Callie, the experience of learning to recite the contested nature of her experience between her parents created for Callie a shift in roles. Many of the other research participants experienced that as well. What the research participants reported was that as they were given the power to choose which version—mom’ sorda d’ s ,t ha t

406 they believed, they gained power in the between. By having the choice or the ability to choose, the child is place in the role of the judge in the court room. With this shift of roles the child, not the parent, becomes the judge of reality or truth. This is a unique cultural position for a child. Generally in the nuclear family, mom and dad are the reality and truth judges. In the divorce situation only the child lives in both hous e hol ds ,a ndf r om ana r r a t i vevi e wpoi ntha st hebe s tc ha nc eofa“ God’ s -eye-vi e w” of experience. Over time, the research participants reported that their parents seemed to appeal to them to be the judges of which version of reality to believe. This role reversal has profound implications within such an ambiguous environment. One, the child goes from helpless participant in the parental divorce to an active and powerful judge. Second, the child over time can develop the capacity to act on the various versions of reality being portrayed. Specifically, a new a sense of self agency enables the child to make decisions about living arrangements and many other family experiences. Their decisions have the power to hurt their parents, or battle with the parents for control of the situation. Keira in realizing her power said, Idon’ tt hi nkki dsa r ene c e s s a r i l ys uppos ed to have the capacity to really hurt their parents that much. You can frustrate them or disappoint them, but to do something that really hurts them—it kind of changes your perceptions, it changes the power roles maybe a little, I think.

This relational power in the post-divorced family, I would argue, drives some of the difficulties in the remarried family after a parental divorce or in the resulting two “ s i ng l epa r e ntf a mi l i e s ”t hepa r e nt a ldi vor c ec r e a t e d.

407 This relational power imparts to the child a sense of self agency within the divorced parental matrices of living. Each parent can essentially plead their case before the child, and many parents do plead their versions of experience and reality before the child. To a degree society, because of the cultural master narrative plot of the nuclear family, believes that these children of divorced parents should act, think, feel, and behave like children from nuclear families. When they do not act, think, feel, and behave like these children from nuclear families, the society seems to hold the child r e s pons i bl ea ndf a i l st os e et hewhol epi c t ur eore ve nt hes oc i e t y’ sr ol ei nt hes i t ua t i on.

To summarize this section, my research suggests multiple selves do not necessarily arise when children have internally perceived conflicts in self-attributes or have different self-attributes differentially experienced in different contexts. I argue that a more effective way of theorizing might be to consider a single self that creates multiple social identities depending on context. In addition, my research strongly suggests the narrative clarity and power of maintaining one theoretical root metaphor throughout a research process. Furthermore, theoretical models of child development need to take into consideration the decline of the nuclear family as the context of child development. My research found that the contested process of divorce, even a so-called good divorce, does not end for the children. Again this underscores that divorce is not an event, but a process. The degree to which this contested divorce process continues throughout the life of the child and permeates the psychology of the child was highlighted. Within these ambiguous matrices of meaning, my research participants suggested that children of divorced parents might have ongoing difficulties in being

408 a bl et ot e l lt he i rl i f es t or i e s .Ther e s e a r c hpa r t i c i pa nt s ’ne e df orna r r a t i ves c a f f ol di ng , temporal prompts, and process prompts suggest that internally they experience incoherencies within their own life stories and self-narratives and that these incoherencies seem to be directly related to the contested parental divorce process.

And finally, that current theories and research do not sufficiently highlight or understand the shifts in power and role that may occur in post-divorce families.

Implications for Research This research generated several research ideas. The first research idea is to explore how the narrative scaffolding which I introduced to the research process so that each research participants could tell their story, influenced the outcomes of the final stories that they ended up telling me. I feel that this is a general dilemma for clinical ethnography studies that will need to be closely studied and debated. I clearly had a psychological theory in my mind, self psychology, as the participants were telling me their stories. I have introduced earlier my awareness of how a theory c ons t r a i nst heda t aa swe l la sc r e a t e soppor t uni t i e sf ore pi pha ni e s ,t ous eDe nz i n’ s term. I tried to confine my narrative scaffolding to asking for time lines and to asking for the subjective meaning. However, the unedited transcripts shows numerous empathic comments that I made reflexively as a clinician almost without awareness of doing it at the time. Retrospectively, I feel that the empathic comments were necessary to further the interview process, but they must also be considered as an extraneous influence on the life stories each participant told.

409 Second, my research confirms, as has other research before it, that context is i mpor t a nti nt hec r e a t i onofas e ns eofs e l fa ndone ’ ss e l f -narrative. The contested context of the divorce process was evident throughout the narratives I was told. This ambiguous context, which was a major finding of my research, has numerous implications that should be further researched. A further follow-up research idea woul dbet oi nt e r vi e wa l lt heot he r‘ c ha r a c t e r s ’i nt heBur ke i a ns c e ne st ol e a r nhow they understood the scene and what stories they enacted. In this way a true Bakhtinian dialogical understanding might emerge from the totality of all the stories. Much like dropping a pebble in a still pond, one might be able to trace all of the narrative ripples.

This would be an exciting research follow-up were there time and money to carry it out.

My research suggests a third research idea, which is to study these research participants over time. I speculated earlier that to me age and experience in this group of participants had the effect of creating better stories. It would be very interesting to re-interview the subjects five years from now to see if their story telling had improved or remained the same. The research question would then be whether the context process continues to be disruptive in the self-narratives and life stories of these research participants.

Implication for Social Policies The implications of my research for the American court system are to understand its role in fostering this contested process, and to fully appreciate the

410 c ompl e xi t i e sofac hi l d’ sde s i r et oc ha ng ec hi ld-parent living arrangements. The desire may come from the child, or the desire may come from the influence of a parent, grandparent or other on the child, but wherever the desire comes from, the request must be taken seriously. Josie probably put it best when she said: if you [the parents, the courts] were sitting there listening to them [the a dol e s c e nt s ] ,ma kes ur et he yknowwha tt he y’ r edoi ng .Youc a ns a yyour e a l i z e that if you do this, this, this—these are repercussions. Do these outweigh the like[ly] harm and stuff that is going on there. Obviously like supposedly being raised by two parents is better. Two heads are better than one. And anything to avoid it, but if the child knows the consequences and knows the pros and knows the effect of their decision on both of their parents, then let them do what they think is best for them. Most of the time, if it is a rash decision, that t he y’ r el i keIc a n’ tl i vet he r ea nymor e ,a f t e ryous t a r tt a l ki ngwi t ht he m, t he y’ l lr e a l i z et ha twe l l ,t hi si sbe t t e rt ol i ve at both houses.

J os i e ’ si de awa st ha tpa r e nt ss houl dr e a l l yl i s t e nt ot he i ra dol e s c e nta ndg i vet he adolescent enough information to make an informed decision. She felt that given the freedom to choose and enough information, the adolescent would make the right decision for the adolescent, but maybe not the right decision for the parent being left.

He rf oc usr e pr e s e nt sapol i c ys hi f tbyr e de f i ni ngt he“ be s ti nt e r e s t soft hec hi l d”r ul e f r om t hea dol e s c e nt ’ svi e wpoi nt .

Another implication of this research for social policy has to do with the changing demographics of the American family. Chapter II found that most children

411 growing up in the United States were no longer going to be growing up in nuclear families. Beside the important implications about how this new evolving family structure is going to affect our theoretical models of child development, this change also means that more children and adolescents will have the opportunity and the desire to change their child-parent living arrangements. This research suggests that a shift of living arrangements is more complex than previously thought. In addition, there are repercussions from this shift that may not be anticipated at the time the shift is being considered. As a society this research suggests that we can no longer simply explain a s hi f tbys a yi ngt hec hi l d“ r a na wa y. �Ra t he r ,a sas oc i e t y,t hi sr e s e a r c hs ug g e s t st ha twe have to consider more complex explanations.

Finally, since divorce became more widespread within the society in the early seventies, society is now on the second generation of children of divorced parents. The permutations of possible family combinations and relations have increased geometrically. American society is increasingly going to have complex child-parentgrandparent living arrangements and relationships. This will have over time the potential to alter what my research has called the cultural narrative master plot.

Behaviors and narratives that now contest this cultural narrative master plots will increase and it will be more difficult for children and adolescents to conventionalize the meanings they assign to their experiences. These difficulties may require of society amore diverse and flexible understanding about the desires or children, that will need to be continuously addressed by social policies.

412 Implications for Clinical Practice Before I conducted my research, the professional literature suggests that a child ofdi vor c e dpa r e nt swa s“ r unni nga wa y”whe nt ha tc hi l dde s i r e dt oc ha ng ec hi l d-parent living arrangements. Understandably, this often is the viewpoint of the parent being left. In some cases it might have actually been true. What my research has suggested is t ha tt hi si st oona r r owofawa yt ot hi nka boutac hi l d’ sde s i r et oc ha ng el i vi ng arrangements. The research participants have told a very different story about their desire to change the arrangement. Their life stories and the reasons they had for making this change were much more complex than a simple avoidant behavior. This finding lends a new perspectivet ot hes oc i a lwor kt e r mi nol og y,“ Whoi st hec l i e nt ? ” My research suggests that, too often, the parent being left is the narrator of the experience, rather than the child. The child has a very important point of view, as her or his development is at stake in these decisions. Should not the client be the child?

My research has focused this newly identified client is, namely the child. I asked the children of divorced parents what they thought and felt about their desire to change their child-parent living arrangements. Every research participant refuted the standard of understanding within the clinical literature in the field of social work.

While the participants could all see how the understanding was arrived at, they did not believe that it was really accurate and certainly was not applicable to them.

Consequently, my research has pursued an alternative view by empathically trying to unde r s t a ndt hi sde s i r ef orc ha ng ef r om t hea dol e s c e nt ’ svi e wpoi nt .Fr om t hi svi e w,my research learned this desire for change was multidimensional and multifaceted. Rather

413 than being able to generalize a blanket view of this decision to change living arrangements, the findings that emerged from my research suggested that the unique qualities of the context and a unique individual made this decision possible and sometimes necessary. The decision to change was not made impulsively by any of the r e s e a r c hpa r t i c i pa nt sa s“ r unni nga wa y”woul dc onnot e .Ra t he rt hede c i s i onwa sa complex one, that had multiple meanings to each of them and to all of them collectively.

The research participants all felt that they had no other choice but to change their child-parent living arrangements. In a sense it felt like a necessary psychological task. While there was variation in the exact nature of the psychological task among the research participants, they were all aware that this was something they felt that had to do to have an independent life. Their feelings are in marked contrast to the current view within the field, that characterizes this desire as one of trying to avoid a necessary ps yc hol og i c a lt a s k.Es t he ra ndEmme t t ’ sna r r a t i ve ss t r ong l ys ug g e s t e dbywha tt he y suffered through that their initial wish was not a frivolous or thoughtless one. Almost every one of the research participants knew that their decision to change their living arrangements was very likely to hurt the feelings of the parent being left. The participants all reported numerous efforts to work things out in a different ways, but ultimately they decided that changing was t he i ronl yr e a lc hoi c e .Fore xa mpl e ,Ke i r a ’ s de c i s i ont oc ha ng ef r om l i vi ngwi t hhe rne g l e c t f ulmot he rt r i g g e r e dhe rmot he r ’ s major depression, but helped Keira recover from her eating disorder. Colleen could

414 not find a way, she reported, to stop being in f i g ht swi t hhe r“ s i s t e r / mot he r ”unt i l after she left.

Wha tmyr e s e a r c hs ug g e s t s ,i st ha tg e ne r a l i z a t i onsa bouta na dol e s c e nt ’ sde s i r e to change child-parent living situations needs to be carefully and individually considered. In addition, this desire to change needs to be unpacked, so to speak. It needs to be understood from various empathic perspectives, but most importantly from the viewpoint of the adolescent. Josie suggested that the parents should actually ask the adolescent how they feel. Further she suggested, if the parents explained what t her e pe r c us s i onsoft hec hi l d’ sa c t i onsmi g htbe ,a ndt hea dol e s c e nts t i l lpe r s i s t si n wanting to make change, then she felt the decision should be honored.

Therefore for the field of clinical social work, my research suggested that first we determine who the client is. And in our attempt to meet the client where they are, we should empathically listen to the client, the adolescent. While it would be wonderful if every decision to change child-parent living arrangements worked out well, it is very improbable. However, this research has found that these adolescents really need to be taken seriously and their stories listened to very carefully. It is in the process of empathically listening that clinical social work can make its greatest clinical contribution to these children and their parents.

Another important finding of this research has been to identify the shifts in roles and power within the post-divorce family. The research participants reported that there was a major shift in roles. In fact, my research found there was a kind of role r e ve r s a lwhe r et hec hi l dbe c ome st hej udg eof“ t r ut h”a ndt hepa r e nt spl e a dt he i rc a s e

415 before the child. When a divorced family enters treatment, the functional role that the child has assumed within the family as the judge of truth often becomes one of the functional roles of the therapist. This is a difficult complicated experience for the therapist (the countertransference phenomena). However, it relieves the child of this power and burden, which may be therapeutic for the child.

Along with this awareness of a role reversal, this research found the importance oft het he r a pi s tbe i nga bl et opr ovi deana r r a t i ves c a f f ol di ngf unc t i onf ort hec hi l d’ s narrative. This might mean helping the child tell their life story in a more coherent way, or helping the adolescent develop a more useful self-narrative that has the ability of helping the adolescent develop a more cohesive sense of self.

My research suggests that the contested nature of the divorce process is ongoing and, as Judith Wallerstein and others have suggested, is not a specific life event, like a marker on the road of life. Clinicians should be aware that this is an important theme in the lives of their clients who grew up in divorced families. These clients need to ne g ot i a t el i f e ’ se ve nt swi t houtt hebe ne f i tofac ul t ur a l l yor da i ne ds e tofc us t omsa nda narrative to assist them. Therapists can be beneficial in helping their clients construct both the structures needed for li f e ’ se ve nt sa ndana r r a t i vet oa c c ompa nyt he i r experience. As a developmental task, it seems that coming to an understanding of the “ t r ut h”i se s s e nt i a l .

This research suggests that the contested nature of the divorce process has the possibility of becoming part of a contested, and therefore, an incoherence inducing agent within the self-narrative of the child. Almost all of the research participants lost

416 out on the consistent narrative and autobiographical scaffolding that parents can provide for their chi l dr e na ndt he i rc hi l dr e n’ sa ut obi og r a phi c a lme mor i e s .The s e research participants also lacked a culturally supported master plot to help them structure their self-narrative. Therapists can play a vital role in helping to resolve the conflicted and contested elements through family working during the years the child is growing up. In addition, clinicians can encourage developmental appropriate selfna r r a t i ve st ha ts uppor t st hec hi l d’ sg r owi ngunde r s t a ndi ng .

Only a couple of research participants commented on the self characteristics that they have in common with their parents. One ironic example of this seeming lack ofa wa r e ne s swa sJ os i e ’ st e l l i ngmet ha ts hewa swor ki ngt hr e ej obsa nda t t e ndi ng school, but that her father was a workaholic. I found unconscious identifications with bot hpa r e nt sa nde ve ns t e ppa r e nt si nt her e s e a r c hpa r t i c i pa nt s ’s t or i e s .The combinations of these identifications are important consideration clinically. Our usual t he or i e sofi de nt i f i c a t i ona ndi de nt i f i c a t i on’ sr ol ei nt hede ve lopment of a child must be expanded. It must include the multiple identifications and selfobjects that children of divorced parents have.

417

APPENDIX A FORMS

418 I, ___________________________________, acting for my self, agree Name of the Participant t ot a kepa r ti nt her e s e a r c hs t udye nt i t l e d:“ Na r r a t i ve sofAdol e s c e nt sofDi vor c e d Parents and Their Child-Pa r e ntLi vi ngAr r a ng e me nt s . �Wi l l i a m D.Gi e s e ke ,M. S . under the supervision of Dr. Thayer Lindner, will carry out this research. This research is being conducted under the auspices of the Institute for Clinical Social Work, 180 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 1605, Chicago, Illinois, 60601-7454, (312) 726-8480.

Purpose of the Research This is a research study to learn how adolescents of parents who have divorced feel and make decisions about their child-parent living arrangements. I will read this form to you and I ask that you read this complete form silently to yourself. Please ask any questions you may have before you agree to be in the study.

Background Information Parents during their divorce process plan the child-parent living arrangements of their minor children. Sometimes, when these children become adolescents, the children feel that they wished their parents had made different living arrangements.

The purpose of this research study is to understand from your perspective the reasons you might have wish to make changes in the child-parent living arrangements, and on what basis you have made these decisions.

Procedures If you agree to participate in this research you will be asked to do the following: ď ś You will participate in a one to three hour interview with me, the researcher.

419  The interview will be audiotape recorded in order to insure the most complete record of your comments and thoughts.  The audiotaped interview will be transcribed, meaning that the words that you spoke will be written down as closely as possible to what you said.  After the interview is transcribed, you may be asked to meet with me again.

If we meet again, at that time I will read aloud to you what you told me and we can make any changes, additions or deletions to the transcription that we feel necessary to accurately reflect your feelings, thoughts and views on the subject.  You will complete an Achenbach Adult Self-Report for Ages 18-59.  The research interviews will be conducted at a time that is convenient to you.

Benefits of Participation in this Research You will be paid one hundred dollars for participating in this research. In addition, you may gain a sense of emotional relief, closure, or new understanding in reviewing this portion of your life. Moreover, your participation may contribute to a greater psychological understanding of how adolescents of divorced parents feel about and make child-parent living arrangement decisions. This knowledge may be useful to the helping professions in providing a knowledge base that might be used to help other adolescents and their families in similar circumstances. In addition, the knowledge gained from this study may help the courts have a more rational basis for rendering judgments in these matters that are consistent with the best interests of the child standard. Further, it may help future adolescents and their parents faced with the same choices and decisions to have a basis for knowing that other adolescents and their parents have had similar feelings and made similar decisions.

420 Costs There will not be any costs to you associated with your participation in this research study.

Possible Risks or Side Effects Participation in this research has minimal risks as defined by federal regulations on human subject research. However, there is a risk that in thinking about your thoughts and feelings regarding your child-parent living arrangements you might experience some uncomfortable feelings. While I do not expect this, should you become emotionally upset or too uncomfortable to continue during the research interviews, I am prepared to stop the formal research interview and talk with you about your upsetting feelings. Should you feel upset after the research interviews have ended, I am willing talk with you about these feelings for up to three sessions. If you feel uncomfortable about talking to me about these unpleasant feelings, I will pay for an independent licensed professional to talk with you about these feelings for up to three sessions.

Privacy/Confidentiality The intent of this research study is to write a doctoral dissertation. However, the records of this research study will be kept private. In any of the written materials, I may quote what you say or report it in the body of writing, but I will not use your name, nor will I use any identifying information about you. In the records that I keep you will be designated by a randomly assigned false name. All of the research materials will be kept in locked files. Only I, the primary researcher, will have access to them.

Finally, since this research is being done with both minors and adults, there are two conditions in which I will not be able to maintain the above level of personal and individual confidentiality. If you as a minor report child abuse or neglect during the course of your research interviews, then I, as a State of Illinois mandated reporter, will

421 stop the research interview and I must report it to the proper State authorities. The second condition is that if I am subpoenaed by the court, I may not be able to prevent the court from knowing the content of the research interview.

Because of my desire to make the research interview as confidential as legally possible, your research interview will first randomly be assigned a false name. If you are asked to meet with me to edit, add, or delete from the original transcript, your corrected transcript will be assigned a new false name as will all the people that you have mentioned in the interview. This second step is necessary so that even you will not know the name being used to represent your research interview. All the previous research materials that in any way can be linked to the identity of actual subject will be destroyed at this point.

Voluntary Nature of the Study If you decide to participate in this study, you may refuse to answer any question and, in fact, at any time you may withdraw from the study. Your decision on whether or not to participate in this research will have no effect on your current or future relationship with the Institute for Clinical Social Work or the primary investigator. I will be available to answer any questions that occur to you during the research interview or following the research interview to talk with you about the research interview and any feelings that you might have after completing it. Further, if you would like, I will give you a summary of the research findings after the dissertation has been completed and approved.

Statement of Assent/Consent If you are the participant, by signing this assent and consent form you agree to take part in this study. You have not given up any of your rights, or released the Institute for Clinical Social Work from responsibility for carelessness. You may cancel your consent and refuse to continue in this study at any time without any penalty or loss of benefits. Your relationship with me, or the staff of the Institute for Clinical Social

422 Work will not be affected in any way, now, or in the future, if you refuse to take part, or begin the study and then withdraw.

You have been given an opportunity to ask any questions you wish concerning this study and all such questions have been answered to your complete satisfaction. If you have any further questions about the research methods, you can call William D. Gieseke, M.S. at (847) 446-0240 or Thayer Lindner, Ph.D., the dissertation Chair, at (773) 493-4329. If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may contact Daniel B Rosenfeld, M.A., Chair, Institutional Review Board, Institute for Clinical Social Work, 180 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 1605, Chicago, IL 606017454, (312) 726-8480.

Signatures I HAVE READ THIS ASSENT AND CONSENT FORM AND I AGREE TO TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY AS IT IS EXPLAINED IN THIS ASSENT/CONSENT FORM. ____________________________ Signature of Participant

_________________ Date

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE EXPLAINED THE RESEARCH STUDY TO ________________________________________[Name of participant] AND I BELIEVE THAT THEY UNDERSTAND AND THAT THEY HAVE AGREED TO PARTICIPATE FREELY. I AGREE TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS WHEN THEY ARISE DURING THE RESEARCH OR AFTERWARD, AS DESCRIBED ABOVE. _______________________ Signature of Investigator

__________________ Date

423 I,____________________________________, acting for myself, consent to Name of the Participant authorize William D. Gieseke, M.S. from the Institute for Clinical Social Work, 180 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 1605, Chicago, Illinois 60601-7454, (312) 726-8480, to audiotape our research interviews.

I understand that the audiotapes are to be used for research purposes, subject to the following restrictions: (If none, leave blank) ___________________________________________________

Date: ____________________ Time: ________________A.M. / P.M. ______________________________________ Signature of Consenting Participant WITNESS: ____________________________________ Signature of Witness

424

APPENDIX B RESEARCH QUESTIONS WITH OPPORTUNISTIC TIMING

425 Research Interview Questions—A Semi-Structured Interview Protocol with Opportunistic Timing 1.

Please tell me a little about yourself—what you think that I should know about you.

2.

Pl e a s et e l lmewha tyouc a nr e me mbe ra boutyourpa r e nt s ’di vor c ea nda ny thoughts or feelings that you have about their divorce.

3.

Please tell me what you can about your parent visitation schedule and the living arrangements that your parents set up for you as part of their divorce process.

4.

Pl e a s et e l lmehowyout hi nka ndf e e la boutwhe t he ryourpa r e nt ’ sdi vor c e affected you as a person and affected your growing up.

5.

Please tell me about how comfortable or uncomfortable you are with the childparent living arrangements your parents made for you when they divorced.

6.

Please tell me about how you made a decision to change your child-parent living arrangements that your parents made.

7.

Please tell me about how your parents reacted to your decision to change the child-parent living arrangements.

8.

Please tell me how you felt about your decision to change the child-parent living arrangements.

9.

Please tell me how your mother felt about your decision to change the childparent living arrangements.

10.

Please tell me how your father felt about your decision to change the childparent living arrangements.

11.

Please tell me how your siblings felt about your decision to change the childparent living arrangements.

12.

Please tell me what process you had to go through to change the child-parent living arrangements.

13.

426 Please tell me the people who made it either easier or harder for you to change your current child-parent living arrangements.

13a.

How did they do this?

14.

Please tell me what you would advise other adolescents whose parents are divorced or divorcing to know about your experience with divorce that might be helpful to them.

15.

Please tell me what you would advise other adolescents whose parents are divorced or divorcing to know about your experience with the child-parent living arrangements.

16.

Please tell me what you would like other adolescents whose parents are divorced or divorcing to know about how child-parent living arrangements have influenced who you have become as a person.

17.

Please tell me if you have ever thought about your child-parent living arrangements. What did you think?

18.

Please tell me how your mother would describe who you are.

19.

Please tell me how your father would describe who you are.

20.

Please tell me how your best friend would describe who you are.

21.

Please tell me how you would describe who you are.

22.

Please tell me about yourself and what you have learned about yourself and who you are as a person as the result of this interview.

23.

Has talking about these feelings and thoughts made any changes in you or any difference to you

427

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