The Review 2022

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REVIEW THE RLC

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CONTENTS 8

5 9

Master General of Logistics Professional Reading List Serve to Lead: An interview with Major General Duncan Capps CBE

8 HISTORY 14 Project OS-6: The Laying of the Lake Ladoga Fuel Pipeline 1942-1943.

By Mr Jacob Thomas-Llewellyn.

20 Which was most successful in the First World War: MI5, MI6 or Britain’s SIGINT?

By Lt Luke Guzkowshi.

26 Sustainment as a Weapon: Wellington’s War in The Peninsular.

By Lt Col Gary Allen.

32 What were the German Army’s logistic capabilities and failures during WW2?

By 2Lt Gabriel Thomas.

38 Operation OVERLORD: Lessons learnt from the Allies' main logistic issues post 6 June 1944. By Lt Alexandra Willings.

44 Why Operation LEHRGANG (the German evacuation from Sicily in 1943) was a success. By Maj Andrew Cox. 8 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING 48 Wargaming: the art of combatting cyber resilience. By Mr Richard Pasco.

51 How can the logistic element within 1st Division form part of its deception plan? By Lt Oliver Meldrum.

55 Thoughts of a Section Commander on peacekeeping operations.

By Cpl Scott Duffy.

58 Thoughts of a Section Commander on peacekeeping operations.

By WO2 David Pinch.

62 A COVID-19 generation Troop Commander's experience of deploying on Op TOSCA. By Lt Edward Dyer.

65 Could the UK generate and sustain a Falklands task force today?

By Cpl Richard Hamer.

74

Operation TORAL Logistic Drawdown: September 2020 – September 2021.

By Maj Alex Glass and Maj Rose Lambert.

8 GENERAL INTEREST 77 Does the menstrual cycle affect the performance of female soldiers?

By Lt Matilda Butler.

81 The United Nations as Peacekeepers: Is it useful as a Regulating Force?

By Lt Daniel Millington.

85 Drugs – a discipline issue or a health problem: Is the Army’s approach to drugs outdated? By Capt James Cooke.

88 Have better operational tour welfare packages eroded traditional Army bonding? By Lt Anthony Lovell.

92 Wearable technology: A combat effectiveness enhancement or a security risk? By Sgt Adam Mason.

97 Industry 4.0 and the military Supply Chain: ɆĉŨŝĉėƋƢƪëŒɆƎėǙėĉƢļŨŝșɆMr Tony Clark.

102 An insight into the Defence Support Enterprise Climate Change & Sustainability environment. Maj Mark Player.

110 Harnessing ‘Integrated Action’ to meet the MoD’s sustainability challenge.

Mr Viliame Nanovo.

8 PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 111 My journey to becoming an Adventurous Training (AT) Instructor.

By LCpl Liam Whitbread.

114 TVS Supply Chain Solutions supporting industry lives after service and advancing the MOD. By Mr Daniel Murphy.

117 Military Logistics: A Literature Review.

By Mr Tony Clark.

128 Glossary of Terms.

RLC Foundation Review 2022 Prize Winners Best article – Mr Thomas-Llewellyn (£250) ėƖƢɆĉŨŝƢƎļĈƪƢļŨŝɆĈLjɆëŝɆŨįǘĉėƎɆȱɆɆdƢɆ ƪƢŒėƎɆȩɞǤǣǣȪ ėƖƢɆĉŨŝƢƎļĈƪƢļŨŝɆĈLjɆëɆǂëƎƎëŝƢɆŨįǘĉėƎȦ©p {ɆȱɆ No selection Best contribution from a civilian – Mr Thomas-Llewellyn (£100) Best soldier – LCpl Whitbread (£100) Soldier special award – Cpl Duffy (£50)

8 Personal and Professional Development Best article – LCpl Whitbread – 6 Regt RLC (£150) Runner up – No selection

8 Operations and Training Best article – Lt Meldrum – 6 Regt RLC (£150) Runner up – Cpl Duffy – 6 Regt RLC (£100)

8 General Interest Best article – Lt Butler – 6 Regt RLC (£150) Runner up – Lt Millington – 27 Regt RLC (£100)

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8 History Best article – Mr Thomas-Llewellyn University of Reading (£150) Runner up – Lt Guzkowski – 27 Regt RLC (£100)

THE REVIEW 2022 | 1

8 FOREWORD

Welcome to the 2021-22 RLC Foundation Review.

When describing national and international affairs in the last two years, ‘unprecedented’ is in danger of becoming an overused word, but it does help to describe some of the tumultuous events that provide much of the strategic backdrop to this edition of the Review.

Whilst the world rebounds from COVID, the situation in Ukraine has largely relegated the other interdisciplinary news-cycle items, which threaten to change the principles and policies that determine how logistics is operationalised across commercial and military sectors. Some of the consequences of the decision making and interventions in Libya, Syria and 20 years in Afghanistan are now being witnessed ǂķļĉķɆśëLjɆǂėŒŒɆƋƎŨǁļĐėɆëɆŝėǂɆĈėŝĉķśëƎŏɆįŨƎɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢɆ commitment and resolution in the next decade. The ļŝǙƪėŝĉėɆŨįɆëƪƢķŨƎļƢëƎļëŝɆƖƢëƢėƖȚɆǂķļĉķɆļŝĉƎėëƖļŝİŒLjɆ threaten to change the character of transnational security, are also contributing to what is termed a global supply chain crisis and what were once considered outlier issues are now front-and-centre in all logistic estimates including, energy security, ethics, immigration, global public health and ėƢķļĉëŒȦ댌ļëŝĉėɆƋƎŨĉƪƎėśėŝƢɆëƖƖƪƎëŝĉėƖșɆ¶ķėƖėɆëƎėɆŌƪƖƢɆ

Security: ¶ķļƖɆ¡ėǁļėǂɆĉŨŝƢëļŝƖɆŨįǘĉļëŒɆļŝįŨƎśëƢļŨŝșɆ It should be treated with discretion by the recipient. ©Crown Copyright: All material in this Review is Crown Copyright and may not be reproduced without the permission of the Regimental Association of The Royal Logistic Corps. ©Cartoons are copyright.

Disclaimer: No responsibility for the quality of the goods or services advertised in this Journal can be accepted by the publishers or their agents.

Advertisements are included in good faith. The contents of this Journal and views of individual authors or units ĐŨėƖɆŝŨƢɆŝėĉėƖƖëƎļŒLjɆƎėǙėĉƢɆƢķėɆƋŨŒļĉLjɆëŝĐɆǁļėǂƖȚɆŨįǘĉļëŒɆ or otherwise, of the Corps or Ministry of Defence.

Data Privacy: We distribute The Review using mailing data held in a secure contacts database within RHQ The RLC. Your inclusion on this database is by virtue of the fact you are serving in the military, or you

2 | THE REVIEW 2022

some of the strategic shocks and growing fault lines that will continue to throw up contemporary logistic challenges, several of which are examined in this issue.

Once again, working closely with corporate members, academia and units, the Foundation has been successful in broadening the author base and I am particularly pleased with the growing contribution of quality articles from soldiers. The broad spectrum of authors and diversity of articles in this Review illustrates that anyone can make a valuable contribution to contemporary debates and the ƋƎŨįėƖƖļŨŝëŒɆĉķ댌ėŝİėƖɆǂėɆ댌ɆįëĉėșɆQɆëśɆĉŨŝǘĐėŝƢɆ ƢķëƢɆƎėëĐėƎƖɆǂļŒŒɆǘŝĐɆ댌ɆŨįɆƢķėɆķļİķɆƍƪëŒļƢLjɆëƎƢļĉŒėƖɆ in this issue thought provoking and encourage all members to consider contributing to the next edition of the Review.

Finally, congratulations to all those that have been successful in being selected for publication this year and especially those that were awarded a prize by the Foundation judging panel. I look forward to your contributions for the next edition in what will no doubt be another challenging year for commercial and military logistics.

Major General Angus Fay CB

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Email: RLC RHQ-RegtSec-SO2-Asst@mod.gov.uk Cover photographs are from The Sustainer magazine Editor: Mr Peter Shakespeare Assistant Editor: Miss Katherine Lack Graphic Design: David Blake Printed by: Holbrooks Printers Ltd.

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8 ABOUT THE RLC FOUNDATION

8 RLC Foundation Director, Alan Woods and Business Support Manager, Chrissie Ross

What is it?

The RLC Foundation was established in 2015 to provide the focus for engagement with industry and academia, for the purpose of professionalising ¶ķėɆ¡d ȼƖɆŨįǘĉėƎƖɆëŝĐɆƖŨŒĐļėƎƖșɆ ƖɆǂėɆėŝƢėƎɆŨƪƎɆ eighth year, we have established strong working relationships with a wide range of industry partners and many academic institutions. Our corporate partners, supporters and friends continue to enable ƢķėɆDŨƪŝĐëƢļŨŝɆƢŨɆǙŨƪƎļƖķɆëŝĐɆĐėǁėŒŨƋɆļƢȼƖɆƋƎŨįėƖƖļŨŝëŒɆ and academic standing within the community at large.

One of our main objectives is to enable members of the Corps (regular, reserve and veterans) to follow a professional career development path which is recognised with credibility as logistic professionals within Defence and across industry. We are already ƖėėļŝİɆƢķėɆĈėŝėǘƢƖɆŨįɆŨƪƎɆĉŨŒŒëĈŨƎëƢļŨŝɆǂļƢķɆļŝĐƪƖƢƎLjɆ and academia across many on-going initiatives. There ëƎėɆŨĈǁļŨƪƖɆĈėŝėǘƢƖɆįŨƎɆƢķŨƖėɆļŝɆĉëƎėėƎɆƢƎëŝƖļƢļŨŝɆëŝĐɆ our website www.rlcfoundation.com has links to career opportunities with our corporate partners.

Where is it?

The RLC Foundation is based at 101 Log Bde, Wellington House, St Omer Bks, Aldershot. Presently both Alan and Chrissie are working from home and can be contacted at rlcfwoods@gmail.com or therlcfoundation@gmail.com.

been well supported by the Corps at large and our corporate membership. We would hope to resume a larger live events programme by May. Our main events for 2022 are: 27 Apr – Virtual Living up to COP26; Achieving more Sustainable Supply Chains event hosted by PA Consulting. Guest speakers are Kim McCann PA Consulting and Brig Lee Daley, Head of Logistics Transformation, Defence Support Command.

11 May – Visit by RLC corporate members to RMAS event hosted by Maj Gen Duncan Capps CBE Comdt ¡n ©șɆ¶ŨɆļŝĉŒƪĐėɆdėëĐėƎƖķļƋɆĈƎļėǘŝİɆëŝĐɆƢŨƪƎɆŨįɆ Indian Room and Chapel.

Jun (date tbc) – Operational and Capability event with RLC Petroleum Operators at Northolt hosted by World Fuel Services.

19 Jul – Exercise Log SAFARI event, Worthy Down training area. RLC trade specialists showcasing skills ǂļƢķļŝɆëɆǘėŒĐɆįŨƎĉėɆƖėƢƢļŝİɆƢŨɆĉŨƎƋŨƎëƢėɆśėśĈėƎƖɆëŝĐɆ a visit to the Corps Museum.

28 Sep – Military Planning event for corporate members. Hosted by 13 AASR, Colchester.

19 Oct – Project management event hosted by DCLPA, Worthy Down.

2 Nov – RLC Foundation Awards Dinner at the {įǘĉėƎƖɆnėƖƖȚɆǥǬɆ¡ėİƢɆ¡d ȚɆ©ŨƪƢķɆ ėƎŝėLjș Why Should I join the RLC Foundation?

We offer a wide range of events throughout the year, giving our corporate members exposure to The RLC and its people. This is a unique opportunity to interact over evolving logistic capability and promote best practice between The RLC, industry and academia.

We are actively seeking new members and the three levels of membership can be seen below.

Our website address is www.rlcfoundation.com.

We are also on Facebook and LinkedIn. Please feel free to contact us if you need more information about the RLC Foundation.

What does it do?

The Foundation runs a diverse range of national events with industry and academia as well as supporting regional events in support of the RLC’s Regular and Reserve regiments. Over the past year we have run a hybrid of live and virtual events and these have both

4 | THE REVIEW 2022

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MGL READING LIST 8

The Master General of Logistics’ Professional Reading List and RLC Foundation Book Club update Professional Reading List

It is nearly two years since the Corps published ļƢƖɆǘƎƖƢɆ ƎŨįėƖƖļŨŝëŒɆ¡ėëĐļŝİɆdļƖƢșɆ¶ķėɆĉŨśƋŒėƢėɆ list, which can be viewed on the RLC Foundation’s website, is structured into seven categories and ĉƪƎƎėŝƢŒLjɆëśŨƪŝƢƖɆƢŨɆĉļƎĉëɆƖļLJƢLjȯǘǁėɆƋƪĈŒļĉëƢļŨŝƖș MGL’s intent is that the list will be updated biennially, commencing in Winter 2022, with amendments suggested largely by Foundation members. Anyone wishing to request an amendment is encouraged to contact the Director. The list deliberately covers an eclectic mixture of publications, underpinning the principle that logisticians should read widely and in selected depth. With this in mind, the book reviews listed below are offered as examples of publications that could be in contention for MGL’s revised list – since 2020 there has been over ǘįƢLjɆƖļśļŒëƎɆƎėǁļėǂƖȚɆƋƪĈŒļƖķėĐɆļŝɆ¶ķėɆ¡ėǁļėǂȚɆ¶ķėɆ ©ƪƖƢëļŝėƎɆëŝĐȦŨƎɆŨŝɆƢķėɆ¡d ɆDŨƪŝĐëƢļŨŝɆǂėĈƖļƢėșɆ The aim of MGL’s Professional Reading List remains extant; to supplement formal training and education by encouraging members to develop supplementary knowledge to support their chosen profession. This promotion of self-study is not idealistic. Knowledge attained through focused reading can be used in challenging situations to help decipher real world problems and give context to complex operating environments. Publications will continue to be chosen to develop these critical analytical skills by offering carefully selected entry points to a broad range of topics. Curiosity is the only valued currency readers need acquire to participate in the programme – after all, you are what you read. Taking reading one logical step further, the Foundation welcomes articles for the next issue of The Review from any member and invited academic institutions. Anyone contemplating writing an article is encouraged to consult the Submission Guide on the Foundation website in the ǘƎƖƢɆļŝƖƢëŝĉėɆëƖɆƢķļƖɆƋƎŨǁļĐėƖɆëɆĈëƖļĉɆįƎëśėǂŨƎŏɆįŨƎɆ constructing an initial draft. Authors are encouraged to classify their articles and The Review’s article categories have been carefully chosen to encourage the broadest possible span of submissions. The contents of this Review demonstrate that everyone has something to contribute. Finally, the recent QŝƢėİƎëƢėĐɆ¡ėǁļėǂɆļĐėŝƢļǘėĐɆƢķėɆĉŨśƋėƢļƢļǁėɆŝëƢƪƎėɆ of the international environment. Pandemics, climate change (global warming), migration, a transitioning international system and accommodation of undemocratic nations with whom the west will need to trade are just some of the considerations which will directly affect how logistics is planned and practiced in the next decade. The following book reviews are offered for consideration with this complex international backdrop in mind.

Book Reviews

8 Regional Studies/International Relations The Good War by Jack Fairweather. Johnathan Cape (2014) London, 488 pp.

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With the complete military withdrawal of the US and its allies from Afghanistan, there will undoubtedly be an outpouring of opinions over what constitutes success in wars of choice and whether the outcome was inevitable. After reading The Good War, perhaps recent interventions in Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan will be viewed as experiments, testing modern western counter-insurgency doctrine matured in Malaya, Aden and Northern Ireland and now morphing into something new, something uncomfortable and expensive in personnel and materiel. Fairweather posits the possibility that, based on experiences of Afghanistan, liberal ǁëŒƪėƖɆśëLjɆŝŨƢɆĈėɆǘƢɆįŨƎɆƪŝļǁėƎƖëŒɆėLJƋŨƎƢșɆ ŝŨƢķėƎɆ inconvenient consideration, explored from several explicit interviews, is the degree of insecurity of future alliances. These are just some of the sobering questions now being asked by western governments, NGOS and think tanks. From what seemed a morally sanctioned intervention in 2001, Fairweather explains the consequences of the fractured command structure and subsequent mission creep. He also outlines convincingly that a strategy based on western ideals could never identify a centre of gravity that could be credibly attacked whilst concurrently ĈƪļŒĐļŝİɆëɆŝëƢļŨŝșɆ¶ķėɆƢƎļĈëŒɆƖLjƖƢėśȚɆƢķėɆļŝǙƪėŝĉėɆ of regional actors and the inability to supplant the drugs trade are all explored and partly explains why it is unrealistic to believe that nations with no democratic history can be rapidly created. Whilst the author offers a view on how the situation might have been salvaged, the odds seemed so stacked that readers might be left thinking that the military did well to achieve what they did. The major takeaway is that contributing western nations, after some bitter ǘİķƢļŝİɆëŝĐɆŨƋëƍƪėɆƋŨŒļƢļĉëŒɆŒėëĐėƎƖķļƋȚɆėǁėŝƢƪ댌LjɆ settled for a degree of relative peace under any guise.

Prior to the chaotic outcome in 2020, Fairweather clearly had a premonition how it could all end. A book ǂŨƎƢķɆƎėǁļƖļƢļŝİɆĈƪƢɆǂļƢķɆƢķėɆĈėŝėǘƢɆŨįɆķļŝĐƖļİķƢɆļƢɆ makes for a salutary read in the knowledge that the West is now possibly more risk averse to involvement in future wars of choice.

8 History/Military History The Shortest History of War by Gwynne Dyer (2001) Old Street Publishing Limited, Exeter, 239 pp.

For those that have not yet discovered Gwynne Dyer, you are in for a treat. His 2017 publication, War, should be directed reading for all staff courses. His latest offering, The Shortest History of War, exposes that war is still a major problem – it is always ĐėƖƢƎƪĉƢļǁėɆëŝĐɆƖļŝĉėɆķƪśëŝƖɆƖƢëƎƢėĐɆǘİķƢļŝİɆįŨƎɆ ƎėƖŨƪƎĉėƖɆëƖɆķƪŝƢėƎɆİëƢķėƎėƎƖɆǂėɆëƎėɆƖƢļŒŒɆǘİķƢļŝİɆ – and getting better at it. With the destructive capability of modern weapons, Dyer postulates that war will continue to remain a problem. Throughout the book there is a useful examination of the nomenclature that is regularly trotted out when ǂëƎƖɆëƎėɆĐļƖĉƪƖƖėĐșɆ¶ķėɆǘŝëŒɆĉķëƋƢėƎƖɆëƎėɆƢķėɆśŨƖƢɆ

THE REVIEW 2022 | 5

8 MGL READING LIST interesting as he analysis the dichotomy that whilst we have experienced 75 years of peace, we are living in a precarious situation where, ‘the danger is extreme.’ That said, Dyer does not rule out the possibility of states learning to form a level of cooperation which offers a fair level of peace – or at ŒėëƖƢȚɆƋƎŨƢėĉƢļŨŝɆįƎŨśɆëŝŨƢķėƎɆİŒŨĈëŒɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢșɆ$LjėƎɆ can be controversial but his writing is equally well researched. Whilst there is little reference to logistics, the narrative is thought provoking and enhanced ǂļƢķɆĉëƎėįƪŒŒLjɆĉķŨƖėŝɆƖŝļƋƋėƢƖɆŨįɆǘƎƖƢķëŝĐɆëĉĉŨƪŝƢƖșɆ ŝɆļŝėLJƋėŝƖļǁėɆƋƪĈŒļĉëƢļŨŝɆǂķļĉķɆśėśĈėƎƖɆśëLjɆǘŝĐɆ useful to dip into for an initial reference.

8 Logistics Logistics: The Key to Victory by Jeremy Black (2021) Pen and Sword Books Ltd, Yorkshire, 216 pp.

The book sleeve makes a bold statement, proclaiming that this is ‘a world history of logistics – a veritable compendium.’ The author also states that it ƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢŒLjɆėLJƋëŝĐƖɆŨŝɆÔëŝɆ ƎėǁėŒĐȼƖɆ©ƪƋƋŒLjļŝİɆ War. So, no great challenge. In fact, logisticians will no doubt enjoy Black’s overview of logistics, and studied in conjunction with Supplying War, offers a very good baseline of knowledge. At 216 pages, much of the narrative is by necessity very general, WWII for example, with all of its logistic challenges and advances, is covered in 15 pages. That said, Black does analyse some interesting ground that Van Creveld chose to omit. An additional bonus to what is an enjoyable read is the Chapter Notes where Black provides a veritable goldmine of primary and secondary sources that are vital further reading for professional logisticians. All told, a useful addition to any logistician’s bookshelf.

An Unappreciated Field of Endeavour by Clem Maginniss (2018) Helion & Company, Warwick, 402 pp. Reviewed by Col Alistair McCluskey, Centre for LļƖƢŨƎļĉëŒɆ ŝëŒLjƖļƖɆëŝĐɆ ŨŝǙļĉƢɆ¡ėƖėëƎĉķș In December 1914, the BEF on the Western Front was 270,000 strong, traditionally equipped and sustained in part by 443 wheeled motor vehicles. In contrast, by November 1918, it had grown in strength to some 1.9 million men and women from across the UK and the Empire, equipped with state-of-the-art military systems and which, between August 1914 and November 1918, had received 25.5 million tons of material stock to sustain their efforts, delivered by a ǙėėƢɆŨįɆǨǨȚǧǣǣɆśŨƢŨƎɆǁėķļĉŒėƖșɆ This prodigious effort is the subject of Clem Maginniss’ book, which describes the trials, tribulations and achievements of those involved through a series of thematic essays. His core argument is that the British and Allied logistic success in the First World War was ĈëƖėĐɆŨŝɆǘǁėɆįëĉƢŨƎƖȜɆśŨĈļŒļƖļŝİɆëŝɆėĉŨŝŨśļĉɆëŝĐɆ industrial base able to produce the mass of material required; the ability of the UK’s domestic railway system to move personnel and materiel to the ports of embarkation; the maritime security and increasingly ėįǘĉļėŝƢɆśėƎĉëŝƢļŒėɆśëƎļŝėɆėįįŨƎƢɆƢķëƢɆėŝƖƪƎėĐɆƢķėɆ deployment and sustainment of the BEF in theatre; the innovation required to integrate British logistic ƎėƖŨƪƎĉėƖɆǂļƢķɆƢķŨƖėɆŨįɆDƎëŝĉėȜɆëŝĐɆǘŝ댌LjȚɆƢķėɆëĈļŒļƢLjɆ to develop effective controlling mechanisms – including the integration of civilian expertise – over the whole process.

6 | THE REVIEW 2022

Well researched and using a plethora of primary and secondary sources, this is fascinating work.

Packed with a multitude of detailed facts and insights, it also describes the key debates and disagreements along the way, such as those pertaining to the prejudicial response from military commanders to the 1916 Royden Report into the ėįǘĉļėŝĉLjɆŨįɆƋŨƎƢɆŨƋėƎëƢļŨŝƖɆļŝɆDƎëŝĉėșɆ ƖɆǂėŒŒɆ providing an aspect of First World War history that has received far too little attention to date, this book has much to commend it to contemporary military and logistical professionals, with clear relevance to expeditionary operations on a global scale, requiring rapid technological adaptation and highlighting the complete inter-dependence between military, civilian, joint and combined logistic support systems.

Whether you read this book from cover-to-cover, ŨƎɆĐļƋɆļŝƢŨɆļƢɆįŨƎɆëɆƖƋėĉļǘĉɆƎėëƖŨŝȚɆļƢɆƖķŨƪŒĐɆĈėɆŨŝɆ the shelf of anyone with responsibility for future operational logistic support.

Arnhem the Fight to Sustain: The Untold Story of the Airborne Logisticians by Brigadier Frank Steer. (2000) Leo Cooper, Pen & Sword Books, South Yorkshire, 175 pp.

It is hard to believe that it is over two decades since Brigadier Frank Steer (late RLC) published this engrossing account of the British airborne logisticians who found themselves in one of the most desperate actions of WWII. From interviews with the veterans and a broad range of archival material, the author has pieced together the tragic circumstances that led to the defeat of the British 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem in September 1944. Any study of Operation MARKET GARDEN, the Allied plan to seize a crossing over the Rhine into Germany, is enriched by Steer’s narrative. Simple explanations of the plan and organisations that were designed to sustain the parachute brigades are interspersed with personal recollections – some brutal, occasionally witty and nearly all prophetic. Steer brings the operation to life (and death) through the experiences of the participants. With hindsight, it is easy to criticise the ground-air attempt as futile, the veterans however offer a more nuanced view through this gifted author.

As the lowest common denominator in close combat, the veterans explain what happens when an alliance over-extends its capabilities and ignores its enemy in the planning phase. Whilst readers may consider that this study is now consigned to pure historic analysis, ƢķėƎėɆļƖɆëĉƢƪ댌LjɆśƪĉķɆƢŨɆƎėǙėĉƢɆŨŝɆįŨƎɆƢķŨƖėɆİƎëƋƋŒļŝİɆ with designing a logistic organisation capable of delivering a resilient supply chain to dislocated forces – like most of you!

Rails of War: Supplying the Americans and their Allies in China-Burma-India by Steven James Hantzis (2017) Potomac Books, Imprint of the University of Nebraska Press, 199 pp.

Hantzis tells the story of one small but vital element in what is still widely considered a forgotten theatre of WWII – The Far East; China-Burma and India.

The account is told through the exploits of the 721st Railway Operating Battalion, one of seven major US units sent to operate 700 miles of railway between Calcutta and Ledo in January 1944. A vital part of the theatre plan was to supply Chinese forces (the

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MGL READING LIST 8 Kuomintang), together with British and US special ŨƋėƎëƢļŨŝɆƪŝļƢƖȚɆļŝɆƢķėɆǘİķƢɆëİëļŝƖƢɆƢķėɆ`ëƋëŝėƖėșɆ The railway was the life-line to Ledo from where the materiel was airlifted over ‘the hump’ (the road from Ledo was not built when the railway men commenced their mission). The story is as much about men versus the environment as it is the enemy.

One of those unusual books which members are likely ƢŨɆǘŝĐɆļŝƖƋļƎëƢļŨŝëŒɆëƖɆŨƎĐļŝëƎLjɆśėŝɆëƎėɆƎŨƪƢļŝėŒLjɆ ordered to accomplish extraordinary tasks. Rail might seem a dated mode of transport but one only has to think about how the Northern Distribution Rail Network, running from Riga over 3,000 miles to Afghanistan, was by political and operational necessity, a route along which well over 100,000 containers were moved to support coalition forces.

Who knows what modes of transport will be relied on to deploy and sustain forces over the next three decades but only a brave (or rash) planning team will dismiss rail out-of-hand. Hantzis offers some valuable insights into the type of enduring challenges ƢķëƢɆǂļŒŒɆŝėėĐɆƢŨɆĈėɆŨǁėƎĉŨśėɆļŝɆįƪƢƪƎėɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢƖɆ and underpins why some semblance of core rail knowledge needs to be retained.

‘Logistics in the Falklands War: A Case Study in Expeditionary Warfare’, by Kenneth L Privratsky, Pen and Sword, 2016. Reviewed by Major Andrew Cox As an event which is commonly seen as a triumph ŨįɆ ƎļƢļƖķɆëƎśƖȚɆļƢɆśëLjɆƖėėśɆƖƢƎëŝİėɆƢķëƢɆƢķėɆǘƎƖƢɆ person to dedicate a whole book to the logistics of the Falklands War was an American. However, as a retired US Army Major General and a logistic ƖƋėĉļëŒļƖƢȚɆbėŝŝėƢķɆdɆ ƎļǁƎëƢƖŏLjɆļƖɆǂėŒŒɆƍƪëŒļǘėĐɆëŝĐɆ has been an intermittent student of the warfare throughout his career. Around 25 years in the making, this book is a narrative of the British conduct of the Falklands War viewed from a logistics angle. It offers the most dedicated account of the logistic aspects of ƢķėɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢɆįŨƪŝĐɆǂļƢķļŝɆëɆƖļŝİŒėɆǁŨŒƪśėɆëŝĐɆĉŨǁėƎƖɆ the whole campaign from origins to aftermath.

The book begins with the force build-up and its voyage south. The account of the task force’s formation and the enormously complex support activity on Ascension Island highlights the practical application of a ‘whole force approach’ to a crisis; ŝŨƢɆśėƎėŒLjɆƢķėɆëĈƖƢƎëĉƢɆĈėŝėǘƢƖɆĈƪƢɆƢķėɆĉķ댌ėŝİėƖȚɆ pressures and tensions that must be faced. The chapters on the amphibious landing operations at Ajax Bay and the subsequent landings around Fitzroy give a stark account of the complexities of

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amphibious operations, the need for inter-service understanding and the severe effects that a determined enemy can have on rear operations. The true impact of the loss of the MV Atlantic Conveyor and the damage to the various Round Table Class Landing Ships from Argentine air attacks is made very apparent throughout and offer a warning about what form logistic resilience must take.

The chapters on the land campaign offer insight ļŝƢŨɆƢķėɆƋƎëĉƢļĉëŒɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢļėƖɆŨįɆƋƎŨǁļĐļŝİɆėǁėŝɆƢķėɆ logistical basics in an environment so austere and lacking in infrastructure. The account ends with a ĉķëƋƢėƎɆŨŝɆƢķėɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉɆëƖƋėĉƢƖɆŨįɆƢķėɆƋŨƖƢȯĉŨŝǙļĉƢɆ activity, giving a detailed narrative of the plethora of challenges faced to return the Falkland Islands to functioning normality. It concludes with a challenge to the typical narrative of the Falklands War, arguing convincingly that the British centre of gravity was not the two aircraft carriers as is so often said, but the logistic platforms of the task force. The book is supported with well-selected photographs that capture the feel of the logistic efforts together with maps that illustrate the complex geographical challenge that the British faced.

From the outset readers will discern that Privratsky is a fan of the way in which the British conducted themselves in the Falklands War. However, he does not allow this to cloud his views and what follows ļƖɆëɆĈëŒëŝĉėĐȚɆȻǂëƎƢƖɆëŝĐɆ댌ȼɆëĉĉŨƪŝƢɆŨįɆƢķėɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢɆ from a logistical angle. The coverage of the whole crisis, from the origins right through to the postĉŨŝǙļĉƢɆëĉƢļǁļƢLjɆƋƎŨǁļĐėƖɆëɆƪƖėįƪŒɆƋėƎƖƋėĉƢļǁėɆëŝĐɆ serves to highlight some important themes, such as readiness, home base activity, interaction with the ȻǂķŨŒėɆįŨƎĉėȼɆëŝĐɆƋŨƖƢȯĉŨŝǙļĉƢɆƎėĉŨǁėƎLjșɆ¶ķėɆĈŨŨŏɆ is not technically focussed, so anyone expecting appendices crammed with tables of logistic data is going to be disappointed. It also means that the book wanders from purely logistic matters; at times lingering perhaps too much on combat, medical and operational planning aspects which may be better served under another title. However this adds to the overall picture and gives the book more of a Rear Operations scope.

Overall, this book is a welcome addition to the historiographies of both the Falklands War and military logistics in general. It is a must-read for professional military logisticians, particularly those ǂķŨɆǂŨƪŒĐɆĈėŝėǘƢɆįƎŨśɆëŝɆƪŝĐėƎƖƢëŝĐļŝİɆŨįɆƋŨǂėƎɆ projection, amphibious operations and the practical workings of the whole force approach.

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INTERVIEW 8

‘Serve to Lead’: Interview with the Commandant RMAS, Major General Duncan Capps CBE From Mission Command to digitisation and the next generation of Army leaders, The RLC Foundation interviews Major General Duncan Capps CBE revealing ķļƖɆƎėǙėĉƢļǁėȚɆŝŨȯŝŨŝƖėŝƖėɆëƢƢļƢƪĐėɆƢŨɆŒļįėȚɆëĈķŨƎƎėŝĉėɆŨįɆśėëŝļŝİŒėƖƖɆĈƪƎėëƪĉƎëĉLjɆëŝĐɆ ŨǁėƎȯļŝƢėŒŒėĉƢƪëŒļƖļŝİɆŨįɆƢķėɆįëĉėƢƖɆŨįɆŒėëĐėƎƖķļƋ Major General Duncan Capps CBE is currently the Commandant RMAS (Royal Military Academy Sandhurst), effectively the British Army’s Director of leadership. Whilst Sandhurst is often regarded as a vital element in the fabric of the heritage ŨįɆ ƎļƢëļŝȼƖɆśļŒļƢëƎLjɆƖƢƎƪĉƢƪƎėȚɆƎėëĐėƎƖɆśëLjɆǘŝĐɆ his unorthodox background and attitude to the Army refreshing. Born in Slough, he did not come from a staunch military family and his comprehensive school was not especially promilitary. Unsurprisingly, his path to leadership has not followed any recognised or prescribed route – offering hope to anyone not currently considered as destined for military greatness.

You have served in the Army for nearly four decades, was it always your intention to make a full career of it? If you had followed a different career, what do you think it might have been?

The Army was not initially a serious career option and my background did not naturally lend itself to considering it as such. The daily televised events of the Falklands War in 1982 acted as a catalyst to my ĉëƎėėƎɆƢķļŝŏļŝİɆĈƪƢɆŝŨƢɆëƪƢŨśëƢļĉ댌LjɆëƖɆëŝɆŨįǘĉėƎșɆ I lacked any military tutorship, although my father thought that I would enjoy the Army. I’d not really travelled anywhere, never stayed in a hotel and hadn’t been on an aeroplane – so no broad social experiences. I joined the Royal Corps of Transport ëƖɆëɆ$ƎļǁėƎɆëŝĐɆǂėŝƢɆƢķƎŨƪİķɆƢķėɆ ŨƢėŝƢļëŒɆ{įǘĉėƎɆ Candidate Troop and completed Rowallan Company before starting training at Sandhurst. So, from the outset I had no master plan and there was no natural ƋëƢķɆŨƎɆėëƎŒLjɆļĐėŝƢļǘĉëƢļŨŝɆŨįɆśėɆƎėëĉķļŝİɆëɆƖėŝļŨƎɆ rank. I completed tours with the junior leaders and then 5 Airborne Brigade and at this point I started

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thinking that as I was enjoying myself, perhaps I should stay. I suppose the take-away is that you ķëǁėɆƢŨɆİļǁėɆļƢɆëɆĉķëŝĉėȚɆƢëŏėɆƖŨśėɆƢļśėɆƢŨɆƎėǙėĉƢɆ before deciding what you want to do. I always said to myself that I wouldn’t stay if I wasn’t enjoying it but throughout I enjoyed being with soldiers and the responsibilities that come with that. That said, after nearly four decades in uniform, I have no idea what I would have done if I had not made a career of it.

Did you have any doubts in your ability as you progressed?

You always have doubts. It comes as a surprise ƢŨɆŨįǘĉėƎɆĉëĐėƢƖɆǂķėŝɆQɆƎėëĐɆśLjɆƎėƋŨƎƢƖɆƢŨɆƢķėśɆ and expose some of the mistakes I have made.

Everyone is a work in progress and anyone reading my early reports would not assume I was headed for the stars. Development is not a linear process and I tell everyone to expect bumps on the road.

I was 19 when I commissioned and since then I have never taken over an appointment where I thought from the outset, ‘Duncan, you’ve got this covered.’ I liken it to competing in sport; you should recognise that nerves and a degree of self-doubt are all part of the natural makeup of life and a sort of conditioning process we call a challenge. As you gain experience, you better equip yourself to deal with trepidation and uncertainty but even when I took over as Commandant I had some doubts. On ƎėǙėĉƢļŨŝȚɆQɆƎėĉŨİŝļƖėɆļƢɆëƖɆëɆƋŨƖļƢļǁėɆǂķļĉķɆķėŒƋƖɆƖƢŨƋɆ you believing in your own press. What I would say to anyone taking on a challenging role is that you are never on your own, there will be talented people around you who want to see you succeed.

You have followed an unconventional career path for a logistician, do you believe an individual joining today has the same opportunities that you did in the 1980s?

I see that there is a risk here to what people may want and what the Army can deliver. All the best experiences I have had come from operations. I think the main reason for this is that operational environments demand and allow you the freedom ƢŨɆĐŨɆLjŨƪƎɆŌŨĈɆëŝĐɆƖƋėĉļǘĉ댌LjɆǂļƢķɆŨƪƎɆĉëƋɆĈëĐİėȚɆ that involves delivering the vital logistics needed for mission success. I have been lucky that from subunit through to red-tab I have had the opportunity to command on operations. Although the current operational environment may look smaller in scale and frequency, things change quickly and the

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8 INTERVIEW contemporary security environment, although unclear, is increasingly uncertain and threatening. There is a danger that young commanders are looking at the potential environment and putting themselves under unnecessary pressure. It might be an old bloke cliché that life’s a journey but I’ve always believed in enjoying the immediate challenge in front of you and don’t worry too much about what might come next.

You have been fortunate to have been selected for a number of demanding and varied command and staff appointments, to what extent have they prepared you to be the Commandant at Sandhurst?

I believe that the experiences and education that I’ve been fortunate to have received have prepared me well for my current appointment. The career diversity and responsibilities that logisticians are offered gives a broad spectrum of useful knowledge whilst at the same time offering considerable depth in some vital functional areas. Whilst it is not a business, my previous experiences have given me some insights into business processes of large organisations, ļŝĉŒƪĐļŝİɆǘŝëŝĉļëŒɆƎėƖƋŨŝƖļĈļŒļƢļėƖɆŨįɆĉļƎĉëɆɞǤĈļŒŒļŨŝșɆ So, I believe I was uniquely prepared for this appointment and I think it helped that I was a second tour general when I assumed the post. What comes out of this is that I consider specialising too early in one’s career is not necessarily a good thing, although I recognise that there are some vital employment streams that need early commitments. There is a balancing act between experience of leadership and management. Finding the sweet spot will remain a challenge for organisations and individuals. Those that can attain a high degree of competency in both leadership and management disciplines, the gifted double-blues, will probably be the ones that achieve the highest ranks. What I would emphasize is that in The RLC, where the logistic functions are diverse and complex, you don’t have to be the font of all ƢėĉķŝļĉëŒȦįƪŝĉƢļŨŝëŒɆŏŝŨǂŒėĐİėɆĈƪƢɆLjŨƪɆĐŨɆķëǁėɆƢŨɆ know where that knowledge resides and have a degree of competency which allows you to ask the right questions. In a nutshell, you put yourself into a position where you can make the best decisions because you have got the ability to garner the best information – that is a big part of leadership.

Over the last decade, a concerted effort has been made to codify values and standards across the Army in an attempt to establish a common baseline.

LŨǂɆĉŨŝǘĐėŝƢɆëƎėɆLjŨƪɆƢķëƢɆƢķėɆ¡n ©ɆŒėëĐėƎƖķļƋɆ tenets are permeating into the wider Army? ¶ķļƖɆļƖɆëɆķƪİėɆëƎėëɆįŨƎɆƎėǙėĉƢļŨŝɆëŝĐɆĐėĈëƢėșɆdėƢȼƖɆ consider some historiography, British ineptitude in the 1793-94 Flanders Campaign acted as the catalyst for ėƖƢëĈŒļƖķļŝİɆįŨƎśëŒɆƋƎŨįėƖƖļŨŝëŒɆŨįǘĉėƎɆƢƎëļŝļŝİɆįŨƎɆ the Army. Two primary objectives were pursued as a ĉŨŝƖėƍƪėŝĉėɆŨįɆįëļŒƪƎėƖȚɆƢķėɆǘƎƖƢɆǂëƖɆƢķėɆƎėĉƎƪļƢśėŝƢɆ and development of ‘value centred servant leaders’ who understood that they had the responsibility and privilege of leading soldiers. Secondly, was instilling ëŝĐɆĉŨŝǘƎśļŝİɆëɆĐėİƎėėɆŨįɆśļŒļƢëƎLjɆĉŨśƋėƢėŝĉėɆ ëĉƎŨƖƖɆƢķėɆŨįǘĉėƎɆĉŨƎƋƖșɆQįɆǂėɆĐŨŝȼƢɆİėƢɆƢķëƢɆƖëśėɆ degree of commitment to value based leadership, clearly demonstrated by personal examples, then we’re going to fail in attaining the tenets of leadership that we desire and we’re unlikely to see the right people enter the Army.

The challenge that I and my predecessors have had is how much we are prepared to condition the development of leaders whilst also allowing individuals to develop their personal styles. With Generation Z we have to be very careful. In a lot of ĉëƖėƖȚɆƢķėLjɆķëǁėɆǘLJėĐɆǁļėǂƖɆëŝĐɆƢķėLjɆëƎėɆƋƎėƋëƎėĐɆ to offer challenges to what we offer. It’s much more about mentoring and coaching rather than directing and I’m now focused on how we affect leadership development, acknowledging that this generation is different and a different approach is needed. How do we combine emotional intelligence and social awareness with the self-awareness that they’ll need if they’re to sustain themselves emotionally and physically when leading teams of soldiers? This is what my team and I are grappling with today because the challenges they will face are different to the ones I experienced.

Now to answer the broader question of how we are permeating this leadership ethos down into the Army. There were two leadership studies conducted ļŝɆǥǣǤǨɆëŝĐɆǥǣǤǫɆëŝĐɆĈƎŨëĐŒLjɆƖƋėëŏļŝİɆƢķėLjɆļĐėŝƢļǘėĐɆ that we were not investing to the same degree in our ‘soldier leader’ development. My takeaway from that is that our soldier leaders, including our Late ,ŝƢƎLjɆŨįǘĉėƎƖȚɆëƎėɆƖƪĉĉėƖƖįƪŒɆĐėƖƋļƢėɆƢķėɆƖLjƖƢėśȚɆ not because of it. I oversaw a study last year which looked at identifying the best leadership intervention points for junior soldiers and I’m hoping that this is part of a new initiative that addresses some of the shortfalls. Another inroad is being made through the ėLJëśļŝëƢļŨŝɆŨįɆƖƋėĉļǘĉɆĉëƖėɆƖƢƪĐļėƖɆĈLjɆƢķėɆ ėŝƢƎėɆįŨƎɆ Army Leadership which comes directly under me but is ŝŨƢɆįŨĉƪƖėĐɆƖŨŒėŒLjɆŨŝɆŨįǘĉėƎƖșɆ ėƎǁėƎƖėŒLjȚɆǂķëƢɆļƖɆëŒƖŨɆ encouraging is that a by-product of COVID restrictions resulted in greater participation from the soldier ŝėƢǂŨƎŏɆǂķŨɆǂėƎėɆśŨƎėɆĉŨŝǘĐėŝƢɆƢŨɆƋëƎƢļĉļƋëƢėɆļŝɆ digital leadership debates and podcasts. We are now starting to hear the voice of our junior leaders and I’m ĉŨŝǘĐėŝƢɆƋŨƖļƢļǁėɆĉķëŝİėƖɆǂļŒŒɆĈėɆįŨƎƢķĉŨśļŝİș nļƖƖļŨŝɆ ŨśśëŝĐȚɆëƖɆëĐŨƋƢėĐɆĈLjɆƢķėɆ ƎļƢļƖķɆ ƎśLjȚɆ ļƖɆŨǁėƎɆǧǣɆLjėëƎƖɆŨŒĐșɆɆLŨǂɆĉŨŝǘĐėŝƢɆëƎėɆLjŨƪɆƢķëƢɆ it has been accepted and adapted by all ranks and that soldiers recognise what their leaders are attempting to practice?

10 | THE REVIEW 2022

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INTERVIEW 8 It’s worth remembering what Mission Command means and what it relies on. It’s about giving people the maximum freedom in how they deliver a task within an agreed resource envelope. It relies on innovation of leadership at all levels and at all times, which subsequently instils mutual trust and ĉŨŝǘĐėŝĉėșɆQįɆLjŨƪɆĐŨŝȼƢɆƋƎëĉƢļĉėɆƢķėƖėɆƢėŝėƢƖɆļŝɆLjŨƪƎɆ routine tasks then you shouldn’t expect it to work when the push comes to shove on operations or exercises. The positive here is that we have proved on recent operations that we are very good at utilising a mission command philosophy but there is a danger that without similar challenges we may revert back to a constrictive form of leadership. This is likely to deny freedoms to junior commanders and ƖƢļǙėɆëŝLjɆļŝŝŨǁëƢļŨŝɆļŝɆįƪƢƪƎėɆŒėëĐėƎƖķļƋșɆQįɆǂėɆį댌Ɇ into this trap, the likelihood is that command may fail in the future operating environments we are envisaging. We have to practice what we preach and my command philosophy is that we must be aware how we continue to instill trust outside of operations.

When people who directly work for me ask for some time to attend their child’s sports day or their own ƖƋŨƎƢȚɆQɆŒėƢɆƢķėśɆİŨșɆÕķëƢɆQɆƢķėŝɆǘŝĐɆļƖɆƢķëƢɆŝŨƢɆŨŝŒLjɆ are they motivated to perform in their day jobs but their immediate subordinates are given a chance to step up and experience greater responsibilities. These responsibilities may have to be bounded to prevent thrashing people but ultimately you are developing succession planning in a controlled, incremental way.

It is incumbent on all leaders to consciously develop their people by identifying opportunities, no matter ķŨǂɆļŝƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆƢķėLjɆśëLjɆƖėėśɆëƢɆƢķėɆƢļśėșɆQɆķëǁėɆ been fortunate that I have been on the receiving end of this forward-thinking leadership philosophy. I do worry that we talk a good game and we advocate a ƖëįėɆƢŨɆįëļŒɆƋķļŒŨƖŨƋķLjɆĈƪƢɆƖŨŒĐļėƎƖɆëŝĐɆŌƪŝļŨƎɆŨįǘĉėƎƖɆ are the best judges as to whether we are delivering on what remains an essential element in leadership and ƢķėLjɆśëLjɆǂėŒŒɆǁŨļĉėɆƢķėļƎɆėLJƋėƎļėŝĉėƖɆƢķƎŨƪİķɆǦǩǣˀɆ reporting. What I would say is that I have learnt more from my mistakes but I was fortunate that I retained a ĉŨŝǘĐėŝĉėɆļŝɆëŝĐɆįƎŨśɆśLjɆļśśėĐļëƢėɆĉŨśśëŝĐș Courageous disobedience seems to be gaining some traction in some leadership discussion groups. There seems to be a degree of controversy over how we categorise it and how it is bounded.

QįɆǂėɆëƎėɆëɆƎėǙėĉƢļŨŝɆŨįɆƖŨĉļėƢLjɆëŝĐɆƢķëƢɆƖŨĉļėƢLjɆļƖɆ becoming increasingly questioning over authority, is there a danger that any direction/command can be questioned? Is there not a case that encouraging courageous disobedience could lead to endangering lives of soldiers and potentially undermine the ethos of military leadership?

I think when the Centre of Army Leadership talk about this they are debating intelligent rather than courageous disobedience and it’s an important distinction. You need to be intelligent about it and recognise that at its heart, it’s a subset of mission command. If you have been given orders and directed to do something and the situation fundamentally ĉķëŝİėƖȚɆLjŨƪɆŝėėĐɆƢŨɆķëǁėɆƢķėɆĉŨŝǘĐėŝĉėɆëŝĐɆ initiative to be trusted to decide on a course of action ƢķëƢɆƎėǙėĉƢƖɆƢķėɆĉķëŝİėɆļŝɆƢķėɆƖļƢƪëƢļŨŝșɆÛŨƪɆëŒƖŨɆ need to be able to look at what you’re being told ƢŨɆĐŨɆëŝĐɆėŝƖƪƎėɆƢķėɆĉŨŝƢėLJƢɆķëƖŝȼƢɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢŒLjɆ

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changed. Contained within this is one of the issues that we grapple with which is toxic or destructive leadership. However, it is not toxic for me to tell someone to do something in a certain way, if broadly I’m looking most of the time for input, conjecture and discussion. If I’m doing this for 80-90% of the time, then the time when the situation does not allow ĐėĈëƢėɆŨƎɆƎėǙėĉƢļŨŝɆëŝĐɆQɆŌƪƖƢɆŝėėĐɆļƢɆĐŨŝėɆļŝɆëɆĉėƎƢëļŝɆ way seems right but if it still looks like a ‘charge of the Light Brigade situation’ then people should have ƢķėɆĉŨŝǘĐėŝĉėɆƢŨɆĉŒëƎļįLjɆƢķėɆƢëƖŏșɆ©ļƢƪëƢļŨŝƖɆŒļŏėɆƢķļƖɆ should not happen. What I’m saying is that there is a place for mission control. $ļİļƢļƖëƢļŨŝɆĉŨƪŒĐɆĈėɆĉŨŝƖƢƎƪėĐɆëƖɆëɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆ challenge to the hierarchical organisation that forms the structure of the Army. Whilst digitisation and mission command have a synergy, do you see future challenges for commanders exercising their will on their subordinates at physical distance?

LŨǂɆļƖɆ¡n ©ɆëĐĐƎėƖƖļŝİɆƢķļƖȠ We are still grappling with digitisation. The truth is that the generation of directing staff dealing with this grew up without computers or mobile phones, memos were written in manuscript and distributed in hard copy. Life was conducted at a relatively sedate pace. We recognise that digitisation has changed the landscape, actions are monitored and therefore judged down to the lowest tactical levels.

We recognise how this puts a pressure on individuals, festooned with various data inputs with the real potential of strategic interference but also guided by what seems a competing philosophy of mission command. Command decisions are becoming more visible to a wider audience which opens them up to acute examination and could lead to paralysis if we’re not careful. Look at the team who undertook the raid on Osma bin Ladin’s complex where the President ķļśƖėŒįɆǂëƖɆŨŝɆƢķėɆǂļƎėșɆ¶ķėƖėɆëƎėɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢɆĉķ댌ėŝİėƖɆ but we recognise at RMAS that we need to harness the tools of digitisation whilst keeping the person at the heart of the command decision loop.

As we develop the syllabus at Sandhurst, the kind of inputs we make are guided by the behavioural science team with advice from 77 Brigade. We consciously layer up the complexity for cadets; fusion of data, satellite imagery etc. whilst carefully playing in all the lines of operation they are likely to experience, including media. I recognise that we can only touch on this at RMAS but the cadets respond well to these challenges. There is a syllabus review going on at the moment and subsequent to this there will be a fundamental look at the whole training performance statement to make sure it’s in keeping with the direction of travel that the Integrated Review is advocating. I’m conscious that we could quickly ŨǁėƎįëĉėɆĉëĐėƢƖɆķėƎėɆëŝĐɆQɆǘƎśŒLjɆĈėŒļėǁėɆƢķëƢɆǂėɆ need to keep it as simple as we can. Crawl, walk, run is a good training mantra and if you give people some basic concurrent challenging building blocks and then throw people some environmental stresses and time pressure into the mix, they start to build ĉŨŝǘĐėŝĉėɆŒėǁėŒƖɆǂļƢķɆëɆĉŨƎƎėƖƋŨŝĐļŝİɆëĈļŒļƢLjɆƢŨɆƢëŏėɆ on increasing layers of complexity, including a myriad of digital challenges. I am amazed at the capacity of this generation to absorb information and process it.

We get to a point at the end of the third term where

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8 INTERVIEW cadets start to discard data that they don’t need for the immediate tasks in hand and this is borne ŨƪƢɆįƎŨśɆëɆĉŨŝǘĐėŝĉėɆĐėǁėŒŨƋėĐɆƢķƎŨƪİķɆĉëƎėįƪŒȚɆ incremental training. In essence, they’re developing an ability to protect themselves against being overloaded with data when they have to make clear command decisions.

The Army is often quoted as an institution that continues to offer credible opportunities for ƖŨĉļëŒɆśŨĈļŒļƢLjșɆLŨǂɆĉŨŝǘĐėŝƢɆëƎėɆLjŨƪɆƢķëƢɆ ¡n ©ɆĉëĐėƢɆėŝƢƎëŝƢƖɆƎėǙėĉƢɆƢķėɆ½bȼƖɆĐļǁėƎƖėɆ social/cultural character?

I do see a greater diversity across the intakes compared to when I joined. It’s not however where ǂėɆǂëŝƢɆļƢɆƢŨɆĈėɆëŝĐɆƖŨɆļƢȼƖɆŝŨƢɆLjėƢɆëɆƢƎƪėɆƎėǙėĉƢļŨŝɆ of contemporary UK society. It’s worth going back a step to understand how the social makeup of Sandhurst is constructed. Sandhurst doesn’t select the candidates that come here, that’s undertaken by a separate organisation at Westbury, known as the ƎśLjɆ{įǘĉėƎɆ©ėŒėĉƢļŨŝɆ ŨëƎĐɆȩ {© ȪșɆ¶ķļƖɆƖėŒėĉƢļŨŝɆ is conducted through a series of physical and mental assessments over four days where candidates are only recognisable by a unique bib candidate number to avoid any conscious or unconscious bias. That organisation however is only dealing with people who apply to join. Candidates that are successful at AOSB arrive here as cadets and Sandhurst is pretty successful at getting them through the syllabus with about 90% of cadets passing the course. So, QȼśɆĉŨŝǘĐėŝƢɆƢķëƢɆƢķėɆŒëƎİėɆśëŌŨƎļƢLjɆŨįɆĉëĐėƢƖɆƢķëƢɆ commence training have been correctly selected, based purely on their potential to become leaders.

What does the social makeup of Sandhurst look like in the summer of 2021?

We have a 13-15% female cadet population, which is clearly not representative of the national population and we need to do better in that space. In terms of ethnicity, we are broadly in line with the social makeup of the country but we are underrepresented across certain ethnic groups and again we need to do better. With regards to the split between state and ƋƪĈŒļĉȦļŝĐėƋėŝĐėŝƢɆƖĉķŨŨŒƖȚɆƢķėɆǘİƪƎėƖɆëƎėɆƖķŨǂļŝİɆ 56% from state schools but as only circa 7% of the ƋŨƋƪŒëƢļŨŝɆİŨɆƢŨɆƋƪĈŒļĉȦļŝĐėƋėŝĐėŝƢɆƖĉķŨŨŒƖȚɆƢķėɆ 44% public school intake represents a higher overall proportion of the cadet population. Additionally, about 85% of the cadet population are graduates.

There is a reason for this makeup. Traditionally, not all state schools were very positive about advocating the Army as a career. I think we could do a lot more in this space, selling ourselves through role models for example. I truly believe that the Army is an extraordinary organisation which consciously ƋƎŨśŨƢėƖɆƖŨĉļëŒɆśŨĈļŒļƢLjșɆdŨŨŏļŝİɆƖƋėĉļǘĉ댌LjɆëƢɆ The RLC, I genuinely believe that individuals are respected for what they do and not assessed on the basis of their background. I don’t think there are many organisations where your background is not a limit to your progress and it is probably one of the reasons I have stayed so long. There is also another challenge that we need to recognise and that’s the increasingly limited connection the UK population has with the Armed Forces. Mass is important here and as the Army reduces to 72,500 regular soldiers,

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there will only be a tiny civilian minority who have any connection with the military going forward. If the Army is not in the national consciousness, it will no ĐŨƪĈƢɆƋƎŨǁėɆļŝĉƎėëƖļŝİŒLjɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢɆƢŨɆƎėĉƎƪļƢșɆ There is a high probability that a future ŨśśëŝĐëŝƢɆ¡n ©ɆļƖɆĉƪƎƎėŝƢŒLjɆļŝɆƢƎëļŝļŝİɆƢŨĐëLjȚɆ what advice would you give them?

Don’t worry about what job you might be doing in 37 years; worry about what job you are doing in the here and now. If you want to get to the top, you’ll get there by doing the best by your soldiers and not thinking about how you progress. Don’t be seen to do the right thing – do the right thing.

The old adage is that we should never stop learning/developing, what is the next challenge on General Capps’ bucket list?

I suppose my biggest challenge is leaving the Army next year. I’ve been a soldier all my adult life and I don’t know what it’s going to be like not to be a soldier.

QɆŏŝŨǂɆśLjɆįëśļŒLjɆĈėŒļėǁėɆQȼŒŒɆǘŝĐɆƢķëƢɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢȚɆëƖɆëɆŒŨƢɆ of my Army friends have before me. On my bucket list, in order of priority; racing as the reigning Army kayak champion and winning my age group in the over 54s at the National Kayak Championships, competing at the RLC Ski Championships next year and leading a patrol team as a 2* which I love doing and competing in the World Masters Games in Japan next year and hopefully winning a medal in the over 55 age category.

(Readers may be interested to know that General Capps represented GB internationally at the sport of marathon Kayak racing form 1993 – 2002 and still races regularly at National level as a master and in both open divisional (ability based) competitions and for the Army and UK Armed Forces).

Any afterthoughts on the Corps as you leave the Army?

I see a lot of people apologising for being in The RLC and I see a lot of people standing up and giving presentations and saying, ‘I apologise, I’m going to talk about logistics’. I genuinely think that with the Corps having been formed in 1993 and coming through an incredible period of operational excellence and service, where we really were acknowledged as outstanding at what we do, the Corps should be rightly proud at where it has got to. We don’t need to apologise ëŝLjśŨƎėȚɆǂėɆƖķŨƪŒĐɆĈėɆĉŨŝǘĐėŝƢɆļŝɆǂķëƢɆǂėɆĐŨȚɆƢŨɆĈėɆ good across all areas of the Army and wider civilian life, which plays into the initiatives being pursued by the Foundation on behalf of its members.

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Wilson James has been raising standards in security, aviation services, construction logistics, technology and risk advisory services for over 30 years. Ɛ Ă ůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚLJ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌ͕ ǁĞ ƐƵƉƉůLJ ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů͕ ƌĞůŝĂďůĞ ƐŽůƵƟŽŶƐ ƚŽ Ăůů ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞƐ͕ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƟŶŐ ƉĞŽƉůĞ͕ ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ĂŶĚ ďƌĂŶĚ͘

tĞ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ ďĞƐƉŽŬĞ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƟŽŶ ůŽŐŝƐƟĐ ƐŽůƵƟŽŶƐ͕ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ƉƌĞͲĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƟŽŶ ƉŚĂƐĞƐ ŽĨ Ă ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŽ ĐŽŵƉůĞƟŽŶ͕ ǁŽƌŬͲ ŝŶŐ ŝŶ ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ƚŽ ŵĂŬĞ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƟŽŶ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ ŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶĂůůLJ ĞĸĐŝĞŶƚ͕ ƐĂĨĞƌ͕ ĂŶĚ ŐƌĞĞŶĞƌ͘

KƵƌ ǀŝĂƟŽŶ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ĞŶƐƵƌĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŽƵƌ ĐůŝĞŶƚƐ͛ ĂŝƌƉŽƌƚ ŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶƐ ĂƌĞ ƐĞĐƵƌĞ ĂŶĚ ĞĸĐŝĞŶƚ͕ ĂŶĚ ĚĞůŝǀĞƌĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ŽƵƚƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ůĞǀĞůƐ ŽĨ ĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌ ĞdžƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ͘

dŽ ĮŶĚ ŽƵƚ ŵŽƌĞ ǀŝƐŝƚ ǁŝůƐŽŶũĂŵĞƐ͘ĐŽ͘ƵŬ

8 HISTORICAL

Project OS-6: The Laying of the Lake Ladoga Fuel Pipeline, 1942-1943 QŝɆƢķļƖɆĈëƢƢŒėǘėŒĐɆėLJƋŨƖĘȚɆMr Jacob Thomas-LlewellynɆėLJëśļŝėƖɆƢķėɆśėëƖƪƎėƖɆëĐŨƋƢėĐɆĈLjɆ dėŝļŝİƎëĐȼƖɆ©ŨǁļėƢɆĉŨśśëŝĐėƎƖɆƢŨɆėŝƖƪƎėɆƢķëƢɆƖƪįǘĉļėŝƢɆƖƪƋƋŒļėƖɆŨįɆįƪėŒɆƎėëĉķėĐɆƢķėɆĉļƢLjɆƢķƎŨƪİķɆ the development of a revolutionary underwater pipeline

In December 1941, over three million Soviet troops and civilians found themselves ensnared in the beleaguered city of Leningrad. They would remain besieged for 900 days. Since the launching of Operation Barbarossa on 22nd June 1941, over four million German and Axis troops, along with 6,000 vehicles, 3,000 aircraft and 600,000 horses1, had surged across a porous 1,700-mile Soviet-German border in three over-extended Army level thrusts.2 Army Group South (Field Marshal Von Rundstedt), was tasked with seizing the precious Caucasus oil ǘėŒĐƖșɆQŝɆƢķėɆĉėŝƢƎėɆȩDļėŒĐɆnëƎƖķëŒɆÔŨŝɆ ŨĉŏȪȚɆƢķėɆ operational objective was the capture of Moscow and in the north (Field Marshal Von Leeb), the focus was occupying Leningrad, 490 miles from the original line of departure. In the shadow of Napoleon’s 1812 Russian invasion, Barbarossa’s ǙëǂƖɆƍƪļĉŏŒLjɆĈėĉëśėɆŒėİėŝĐș As summer turned to early winter and the ground turned into impassable mud (rasputitsa), the extended German lines of communication became increasingly brittle. Stahel summarised the desperate situation where, the hubris of the Nazi state was soon laid bare when events on the ground did not match German predictions.’3ɆɆ ļƢļŝŨɆĐėƖĉƎļĈėƖɆƢķėɆǙƪļĐɆ front where, ‘two tottering armies had collapsed at the end of their long and bitter struggle during the winter of 1941-1942.’4 Whilst the siege of Stalingrad (August 1942-February 1943) and operations in the south became the focal point of Hitler’s High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht – OKW), the battle for Leningrad was canalised due to lack of manoeuvre space with too many impassable forests, swamps and water features. Combat gradually evolved into an inhuman, attritional battle of wills.

The result in the north was a ‘war of position’ (Stellungskrieg), which subsequently incited some frantic and remarkable feats of logistical organisation and technical innovation by its defenders. ¶ķļƖɆĈëƢƢŒėǘėŒĐɆėLJƋŨƖėɆǂļŒŒɆėLJëśļŝėɆƢķėɆśėëƖƪƎėƖɆ Leningrad’s Soviet commanders adopted, ensuring ƢķëƢɆƖƪįǘĉļėŝƢɆƖƪƋƋŒļėƖɆŨįɆįƪėŒɆƎėëĉķėĐɆƢķėɆĉļƢLjɆ through the development of a revolutionary underwater pipeline. Emphasis will be placed on the unique conditions in which the pipeline was conceived, fabricated and deployed. The ƋėƎįŨƎśëŝĉėɆŨįɆƢķėɆǘėŒĐėĐɆƖŨŒƪƢļŨŝȚɆƢŨİėƢķėƎɆǂļƢķɆ the establishment of an ice road across the frozen surface of Lake Ladoga, will also be analysed in detail to illustrate how the city’s garrison was able to sustain itself through the 1942-43 winter whilst conducting a desperate urban defence.

Compared to its enemies, the Soviet Army of

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1941 was in a deplorable state. As a result of the ©ƢëŒļŝļƖƢɆƋƪƎİėƖɆŨįɆǤǬǦǪȯǤǬǦǫȚɆƢķƎėėɆŨƪƢɆŨįɆǘǁėɆŨįɆ the Army’s Marshals had been removed and the ǂļĐėƎɆ©ŨǁļėƢɆŨįǘĉėƎɆĉŨƎƋƖɆķëĐɆĈėėŝɆƋƪƎİėĐɆǂļƢķɆëɆ ŒëƎİėɆƋėƎĉėŝƢëİėɆŨįɆƢķėɆśŨƖƢɆėLJƋėƎļėŝĉėĐɆŨįǘĉėƎƖɆ permanently removed from the order of battle. As a result, according to Erickson, the Red Army, “lost what it needed most…a command group which could have maintained effective continuity in military thinking and training.”5 The effects of the purges were starkly illustrated across a number of logistical functions in the Winter War (1939-1940), where the Red Army’s supply chains were placed under such persistent overload that even experienced logisticians would likely have been challenged with the compound sustainment shortfalls.6 Defence against operational and tactical surprise from Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe assaults proved near fatal for the Soviets who, with a total breakdown in intelligence and communications7 were forced to concede territory for time. The Soviet High Command (Stavka) realised that if the northern German forces were successful in occupying Leningrad, it would allow OKW the option to redistribute formations to support objectives in the centre and south. A loss of one vital city or strategic centre could result in the loss of several others. The value of denying Leningrad and tying down German forces therefore took on a far İƎėëƢėƎɆƖƢƎëƢėİļĉɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝĉėɆƢŨɆ©ƢëŒļŝșɆ¶ķļƖɆƎëƢļŨŝëŒėɆ helps explain the extraordinary measures that the Russians were prepared to take to defend Leningrad.

Despite debilitating operational setbacks, exacerbated by the tempo with which German forces penetrated the Soviet Union, the Soviet High Command initiated an ambitious engineering program to enclose the city of Leningrad with impenetrable concentric defences. Under the direction of Marshal Georgy Zhukov, over half a million civilians were mobilised to construct 620 miles of earthworks, 400 miles of anti-tank ditches, 370 miles of barbed wire entanglements and 5000 pillboxes.8 Additionally, heavy artillery from the Baltic Fleet had been brought ashore and positioned around the city to bolster the defences.

Against this herculean defensive effort, German troops had established bombardment positions in depth across the western approaches, whilst to the north-east, Finnish troops proceeded to complete the encirclement of the city, leaving only Lake Ladoga to the east as the last potential corridor for reinforcement and resupply. By September, in a deliberate attempt to undermine the defender’s will, the Luftwaffe began to target food depots.9

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Temperatures of -40 degrees Fahrenheit exacerbated the crippling effect of wood shortages and the destruction of the city’s food stocks. Severe rationing of all commodities was introduced and by the end of December, over 4,000 people a day were dying as a result of the bombardment, starvation or hypothermia.10 Perversely, lack of logistic foresight and planning also condemned German forces to the mercy of the Russian winter.

During Barbarossa’s preparations for a falsely assumed short campaign, the OKW consciously committed their forces to an administrative nightmare as under resourced combat operations persisted into the winter. With the operational planners only stockpiling eight weeks of fuel, armoured units were quickly reduced to scavenging for supplies.11 The much-vaunted panzer armies, far from overmatching their foes with high tempo, combined arm’s actions, lay for long periods, prostrate in the Russian snow at the end of rapidly withering supply lines. The reality was that Germany did not possess adequate strategic stocks of fuel to support their operational objectives in Eastern Europe concurrent with their other theatre demands. OKW eventually recognised the inconvenient truth that domestic petroleum ƋƎŨĐƪĉƢļŨŝɆǂëƖɆļŝƖƪįǘĉļėŝƢɆĐƪėȚɆļŝɆƋëƎƢȚɆƢŨɆQEɆDëƎĈėŝȼƖɆ synthetic fuels program being too small and expensive to support the Fuhrer’s growing military aspirations.12 Only through a combination of ruthless predatory ŒŨİļƖƢļĉƖɆëŝĐɆëɆĐļƎėĉƢɆëĐǁëŝĉėɆŨŝɆƢķėɆŨļŒǘėŒĐƖɆŨįɆ the Caucasus could the armoured formations hope to sustain blitzkrieg operations in the long term.

Analysis of Wehrmacht operations from 1941 exposes a permanent failing, which at the time, could not be disguised with abstract operational concepts or supplemented with martial ethos – OKW could ŝŨƢɆƖƪƖƢëļŝɆļƢƖɆįŨƎĉėƖɆļŝɆƢķėɆǘėŒĐɆǂļƢķɆƢķėɆƎėƍƪļƖļƢėɆ ĉŨśśŨĐļƢļėƖɆǂķļĉķɆ댌ŨǂėĐɆƢķėśɆƢŨɆǘİķƢɆëƖɆƢķėLjɆ wished. The Soviets, although bending under Axis pressure, just needed certain martial conditions to align for the Wehrmacht’s weaknesses to prove fatal.

One of those conditions revolved around fuel availability and compatibility in relation to the operating environment in which the Wehrmacht ǂëƖɆĉŨśƋėŒŒėĐɆƢŨɆǘİķƢșɆɆEėƎśëŝɆǁėķļĉŒėƖɆƎëŝɆ predominately on petrol, whereas their Soviet equivalents consumed diesel. Whilst the Wehrmacht had proven adept at identifying and securing commercial and domestic fuel stocks in their western European campaigns, such opportunities in Russia were rare. When fuel stocks were captured, diesel was generally incompatible with the Wehrmacht’s ǁėķļĉŒėɆǙėėƢƖșɆ¶ķėɆĐėƖƋėƎëƢėɆƖļƢƪëƢļŨŝɆǂëƖɆĐėƖĉƎļĈėĐɆ

by Macksey, where the nature of German operations was; “distinguished by a pernicious GermanŨǁėƎĉŨŝǘĐėŝĉėɆǂķļĉķɆƢķƎŨƪİķɆļŝëĐėƍƪëƢėɆƋƎŨǁļƖļŨŝȚɆ due to unwarranted assumptions, condemned the Wehrmacht to defeat.”13 German fuel challenges aside, army quartermasters were unable to sustain their dependencies with a broad range of mundane, yet essential items of inventory as the Russian winter took hold. There were inadequate stocks of winter clothing and units were issued with lubricating oil which proved unsuitable for extreme low temperatures, resulting in weapons and vehicles failing to operate effectively. In the most extreme cases, panzer and Luftwaffe units were forced to light ǘƎėƖɆĈėŝėëƢķɆƢķėļƎɆėŝİļŝėƖɆļŝɆŨƎĐėƎɆƢŨɆĐėįƎŨƖƢɆƢķėśɆ prior to designated H-hours. As the initial German blitzkrieg ground into attritional disarray, Field

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Courtesy of the Ministry of the Russian Federation

HISTORICAL 8

Marshal Leeb’s already beleaguered armoured forces facing Leningrad were cannibalised to sustain higher priority sectors. Beevor categorised the desperate situation where Army Group North were consigned to be; “the poor relation on the Eastern Front.”14 With diminishing combat power and repeated attacks upon the city rebuffed by the Soviet garrison, Leeb made a concerted effort to sever the city’s supply lines. Lake Ladoga had become the ‘artery of life’ for the inhabitant’s survival, yet the throughput of materiel across the lake was dependant on the ice being thick enough to support trucks, mules and sleds.15 Ironically, as temperatures plummeted and Axis vehicles and materiel availability fell, so the ‘artery of life’ became more assured and effective.

During the coldest periods, the road was defended

by Soviet machine-gun and anti-aircraft positions dug into the ice, whilst igloos were built to house the ƢƎŨŨƋƖșɆ$ėƖƋļƢėɆĈėļŝİɆƪŝĐėƎɆƖļėİėȚɆƢķėɆƢǂŨȯǂëLjɆƢƎëįǘĉɆ ļŝĉŒƪĐėĐɆśëĉķļŝėƎLjɆëŝĐɆǘŝļƖķėĐɆśļŒļƢëƎLjɆėƍƪļƋśėŝƢɆ leaving the city to support the war effort in other ƖėĉƢŨƎƖȚɆǂķļŒƖƢɆįŨŨĐȚɆįƪėŒɆëŝĐɆƋėƎƖŨŝŝėŒɆǙŨǂėĐɆļŝɆƢķėɆ opposite direction. This entire operation however was ƎėƋėëƢėĐŒLjɆŌėŨƋëƎĐļƖėĐɆëƖɆƢėśƋėƎëƢƪƎėƖɆǙƪĉƢƪëƢėĐɆ ëŝĐɆƢķėɆļĉėɆĈėĉëśėɆƪŝƖƢëĈŒėɆįŨƎɆǁėķļĉŒėɆƢƎëįǘĉșɆ,ǁėŝɆ though sleds and horses were able to cross the ice, the volume of materiel proved inadequate to sustain the city and motor transport was recognised as the only mode which could meet the increasing demands. By early 1942, an acute shortage of petrol developed, leaving vehicles and tanks immobilised which subsequently threatened to undermine the city’s defences.16 At this point, the fate of Leningrad’s inhabitants and the defence of the northern route into Russia rested to a large degree on the shoulders of a 29-year-old female army diver, Colonel Nina Vasilievna Sokolova.17 Prior to the encirclement of Leningrad, the Soviet command had arranged for a communications cable to be laid beneath Lake Ladoga to avoid the severing of overland telephone lines by the enemy.18 Despite continued aerial bombardment, divers and naval personnel from the Baltic Fleet successfully completed the mission. The operation had been undertaken by Colonel Sokolova19, chief diver of the

8 Ice Road Across Lake Ladoga

THE REVIEW 2022 | 15

Courtesy of the St Petersburg Maritime Museum

8 HISTORICAL

8 Nina V. Sokolova in training

Special Expedition for Underwater Works (EPRON) and head of the 27th Detachment of Underwater Technical Works.20 At the beginning of 1942, the Stavka determined that the city would require 70,000 tons of fuel in order for armour and transport vehicle demands to be met. This volume of fuel was equivalent to 7,000 ten-ton railway tanker cars. The tanker cars were not ëǁëļŒëĈŒėɆëŝĐɆėǁėŝɆļįɆƖƪƋƋŒLjɆŨįǘĉėƎƖɆķëĐɆśëŝëİėĐɆƢŨɆ move the fuel to the eastern shore of Lake Ladoga, it would have required over 25,000 individual truck loads to distribute the fuel from the railhead across the city.21 Given that the Red Army had made ƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆëĐǁëŝĉėƖɆļŝɆƢķėɆǘėŒĐɆŨįɆƋŨƎƢëĈŒėɆƋļƋėŒļŝėɆ technology in the 1930s, the construction of a fuel pipeline was considered a viable solution. However, the primary obstacles of getting fuel to Leningrad were not consigned to the technical challenges of laying an untested pipeline beneath the lake’s ƖƪƎįëĉėɆǂķļŒƖƢɆƪŝĐėƎɆǘƎėșɆɆ ƖɆǂėŒŒɆëƖɆǘİķƢļŝİɆƢķėɆ Germans, equally demanding was the bitter contest of navigating the project through a morass of political and military bureaucracy.

After the successful deployment of the communications cable in February 1942, Colonel ©ŨŏŨŒŨǁëɆįŨƎƢƪļƢŨƪƖŒLjɆįŨƪŝĐɆķėƎƖėŒįɆŨŝɆëɆǙļİķƢɆƢŨɆ Moscow where she shared her idea of an underwater įƪėŒɆƋļƋėŒļŝėɆǂļƢķɆƖėŝļŨƎɆŨįǘĉėƎƖș22 Her proposal was to utilise conventional steel pipeline which could ĈėɆƎėƢƎŨǘƢƢėĐɆƢŨɆĐėŒļǁėƎɆįƪėŒɆĐļƎėĉƢŒLjɆƢŨɆƢķėɆĉļƢLjș23 8 Sample of OS-6 pipeline

Courtesy of St. Petersburg Maritime Museum

16 | THE REVIEW 2022

The innovative idea was presented to the head of Military Reconstruction Work, General Ivan Zubkov and considered by the State Defence Committee (SKO).24 Given the unique nature of the project, the SKO approached the engineers Sergei Petrovick Khromov and Dr David Shinberg25 of the Central ©ĉļėŝƢļǘĉɆQŝƖƢļƢƪƢėɆŨįɆQŝĐƪƖƢƎļëŒɆ ƪļŒĐļŝİƖș26 Whilst both engineers supported the feasibility of the technology and submitted the proposal to the Red Army Fuel Administration, many of their colleagues considered the project as unviable, given the conditions and distances over which the pipeline would have to be laid.

The Head of the Red Army’s Fuel Services, General Mikhail Kormilitsin however, believed that the pipeline was the only available option for addressing the city’s fuel needs and directed Dr Shinberg to the Head of Red Army Supplies, Anastas Mikoyan. Whilst the proposal was agreed in principle, Mikoyan was not ƖëƢļƖǘėĐɆǂķėŝɆķėɆǂëƖɆļŝįŨƎśėĐɆƢķëƢɆƢķėɆƋƎŨŌėĉƢɆ would take three months to complete. The engineers were informed that the pipeline would have to be completed within 50 days, with a deadline of 20th June 1942.27 The project received formal approval on 25th April 1942 under the cipher OS-6 and Dr Shinberg immediately initiated a study of the lake’s topography to identify the optimal location for the pipeline’s route.28 The pipeline was to be laid from the western shore at the Borisov Griv Railway station to Cape Karejo on the eastern shore. Of the 30km of pipeline, 8.5km would be laid on land and 21.5km underwater at depths of up to 35 metres.29 The EPRON divers assembled two 300-metre-long roller type racks which were installed on the western shore to transport the pipeline to the water.30 With the ice road and water transport providing ėLJĉėŒŒėŝƢɆĉëśŨƪǙëİėɆįŨƎɆƢķėɆŒëLjļŝİɆŨƋėƎëƢļŨŝȚɆ$ƎɆ Shinberg’s initial challenge was identifying suitable materials in Leningrad. It was discovered that a large stockpile of pipeline was held in storage in the warehouses of the Izhorskiye Zavody Plant, on the outskirts of the city. The plant had become an integral part of the Soviet defensive plan and was located at the forward edge of the perimeter. Dr Shinberg went to the plant to select the cable and arranged for its removal and transportation. During the course of packaging the lengths of pipeline, the engineers came under intensive shelling and after one of the team was killed, it was decided that all future movements would be conducted at night.31 Over 600 tons of pipeline were eventually transported by rail to the Borisov Griv Railway station where it was welded into sections under the supervision of Chief Welder Grigory Lomonosov.32 The pipeline had an internal diameter of 3.9 inches and was expected to deliver 350 tons of fuel per day.33 In contrast, the Allied PLUTO pipelines, laid to support post-Op OVERLORD missions, were 2 and 3 inches diameter respectively and were designed to pump 3,500 tons per day.34 After the Russian sections were fabricated, they were cleaned and pressure tested using kerosene. On the eastern shore, Soviet engineers delivered the required generators and built a bulk fuel installation with a capacity of 1,600 tons.35 The pumping stations which controlled the ǙŨǂɆŨįɆįƪėŒɆǂėƎėɆƢķėŝɆĐļƖƋėƎƖėĐɆëŒŨŝİɆĈŨƢķɆƖķŨƎėƖɆƢŨɆ minimise any damage from German shelling.

The laying of the pipeline was a precarious task.

With the construction site only 2km from the front

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Courtesy of the St Petersburg Maritime Museum

Courtesy of the Izhorskiye Zavody OMZ Group

HISTORICAL 8

8 Izhorskiye Zavody Plant, Leningrad

line, the divers, engineers and naval personnel were ƪŝĐėƎɆĉŨŝƖƢëŝƢɆëŝĐɆëĉĉƪƎëƢėɆėŝėśLjɆǘƎėșɆ ėİļŝŝļŝİɆ on 5th May, small motor-boats and rafts made from logs, gradually dragged the pipeline from the western shore and deployed it on the lake’s bottom.

Sokolova’s diving team continued to monitor the pipeline for any leaks and on 26th May when part of the network was damaged by underwater currents, 50kg iron weights were attached by divers every 50 metres for stabilisation.36 Completion of the pipeline was achieved on 14th `ƪŝėɆǤǬǧǥȚɆǂļƢķɆƢķėɆǘƎƖƢɆƢƎëļŝŒŨëĐɆŨįɆįƪėŒɆƋƪśƋėĐɆ to the western shore on 18th June. Between June 1942-March 1943, the pipeline delivered over 47,000 tons of fuel.37 With over a thousand engineers and military personnel working 17-hour ƖķļįƢƖɆƪŝĐėƎɆĉŨŝƖƢëŝƢɆƢķƎėëƢɆŨįɆļŝĐļƎėĉƢɆǘƎėȚɆ©ŨǁļėƢɆ įŨƎĉėƖɆƖƪĉĉėėĐėĐɆļŝɆįëĈƎļĉëƢļŝİɆëŝĐɆŒëLjļŝİɆƢķėɆǘƎƖƢɆ underwater fuel pipeline.38 The Western Allies’ similar PLUTO solution was developed in May 1942 and

utilised in June 1944 to support their mechanised armies as they broke out from their Normandy beachhead.39 OS-6 and PLUTO demonstrated the Grand Alliance’s abilities to fuse cutting edge engineering solutions to support their logistical requirements, albeit in stovepiped projects. Whilst much of the published historiography of WWII has focussed on Nazi technologies, these pipeline case studies demonstrate the contrast in the belligerent’s technical capabilities. The Allies could fast-track their research and development to enhance their ǘėŒĐėĐɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉƖȚɆǂķļŒƖƢȚɆįŨƎɆƢķėɆśëŌŨƎļƢLjɆŨįɆƢķėļƎɆ land power, the Germans were fated to solving the medieval logistic problem of procuring horse fodder.

One unfathomable Allied consideration is the fact that they never shared their technological successes in real time. Surprisingly, despite the overwhelming

8 Overland Section of OS-6 Pipeline

unifying desire to defeat Nazism, the development of some battle winning technologies, such as fuel pipelines, was consigned to unilateral management.

Despite a perilous strategic position in 1941-43, the restrictive approach to technological development adopted by members of the Grand Alliance continues to provide some startling examples of fracture lines amongst the Allies.

8 Volume of Fuel Delivered to Leningrad

Courtesy of the St Petersburg Maritime Museum

8 Pumping Equipment on the ice of Lake Ladoga

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Acknowledgements The primary information on Project OS-6 was kindly provided by the archival research staff at the St. Petersburg Central Maritime Museum and in particular the Director, Mr Rusian S. Nekhay and the ©ĉļėŝƢļǘĉɆ©ėĉƎėƢëƎLjȚɆnƎɆ©ėƎİėļɆ$șɆbŒļśŨǁƖŏļLjș Bibliography Bayvel, Rachel (2005) “Tales of Tank City”, Jewish Quarterly, Vol.52, Issue.2, pp.70-72.

Beevor, Anthony (2012) The Second World War, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Bellamy, Chris (2007) Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War, New York: Random House.

Blank, S and Shinberg, D (1968) “On the Bottom of Lake Ladoga”, New World, No.2, pp.160-203.

THE REVIEW 2022 | 17

8 HISTORICAL Citino, Robert. M (2007) Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942, University Press of Kansas.

Erickson, John (1975) The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin’s War with Germany, Volume 1, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson Fadeyev, Alexander (1971) Leningrad in the Days of the Blockade, Trans. Charlques, R.D, Westport: Greenwood Press.

Falkevich, A.S (1944) “Construction of a Welded Oil Pipeline in Wartime Conditions”, Avtogennoe Delo, No.1, pp.19-22.

Glantz, David (1995) When Titans Clashed, University Press of Kansas.

Goralski, Robert (1987) Oil & War: How the Deadly Struggle for Fuel in WWII Meant Victory or Defeat, New York: William Morrow.

Keegan, John (1989) The Second World War, London: Hutchinson.

Korshak, A.A. (2015) “Heroic Product Pipelines”, Oil and Gas Business, No.2, pp.52-71.

Krammer, Arnold (1992) “Operation PLUTO: A Wartime Partnership for Petroleum”, Technology and Culture, Vol.33, No.3 pp.441-466 Krasnaya Zvezda, “Head of Russian MOD Central Directorate for Rocket Propellant and Fuel Interviewed”, Radio Interview, 17th February 2009.

Levchenko, Z.A, Alekseenko, D.A, Yatmanov, A.N, “Women Divers: Feat in the Name of Life”, Marine Medicine, Vol.6, No.5, pp.46-49.

Macksey, Kenneth (1989) For Want of a Nail: The Impact on War of Logistics and Communications, London: Brasseys.

Ministry of the Russian Federation, “Ladoga Artery: Overcoming the Blockade”, This is the Russian for what comes before in English, 75leningrad.mil.ru, [Accessed: ǥǦȦǣǨȦǥǣǥǤȮșɆ Pleysier, Albert Jan (2008) Frozen Tears: The Blockade and Battle of Leningrad, Plymouth: University Press of America.

Watson, Bruce (1993) Sieges: A Comparative Study, Westport: Praeger.

Welding and Fabrication, “Welding Survey: Abstracts from Recent Literature”, June 1947, p.286.

Yergin, Daniel (1991) The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power, New York: Simon & Schuster.

Endnotes Glantz, David, When Titans Clashed, University Press of Kansas, 1995, p.384.

2 Whilst the invasion centred on German formations, a number of other belligerents were also committed, including Romania, Finland, Italy, Hungary and Slovakia.

3 Stahel, David, The Battle for Moscow, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 21.

4 Citino, Robert. M, Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942, University Press of Kansas, 2007, p.86.

5 Erickson, John, The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin’s War with Germany, Volume 1, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975, p.7.

6 The Red Army had expended over 215,000 metric tons of fuel to support their armoured formations in the face of Finnish armies which were largely devoid of armour or transport, see; Krasnaya Zvezda, “Head of Russian MOD Central Directorate for Rocket Propellant and Fuel Interviewed”, Radio Interview, 17th February 2009.

7 Citino, Robert. M, Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942, University Press of Kansas, 2007, p.36.

8 Watson, Bruce, Sieges: A Comparative Study, Westport: Praeger, 1993, p.7 9 Beevor, Anthony, The Second World War, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2012, p.206.

1

18 | THE REVIEW 2022

10 Keegan, John, The Second World War, London: Hutchinson, 1989, p198.

11 Macksey, Kenneth, For Want of a Nail: The Impact on War of Logistics and Communications, London: Brasseys, 1989. p.115.

12 Gunther, A.E, “The Germen War for Crude Oil in Europe, 1934-1945”, Part 1, Petroleum Times, 8th November 1947, pp.1095-1099, Yergin, Daniel, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991. Pp.328350 and Goralski, Robert and Freeburg, Russell, Oil & War: How the Deadly Struggle for Fuel in WWII Meant Victory or Defeat, New York: William Morrow, 1987, pp.174-185.

13 Macksey, Kenneth, For Want of a Nail: The Impact on War of Logistics and Communications, London: Brasseys, 1989. p.115.

14 Beevor, Anthony, The Second World War, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2012. p.240.

15 Pleysier, Albert Jan, Frozen Tears: The Blockade and Battle of Leningrad, Plymouth: University Press of America, 2008. p.180.

16 The state of the Soviet Army’s logistical establishment in 1941 was deplorable. The Stalinist purges of 1937-1938 ķëĐɆĐėĉļśëƢėĐɆƢķėɆ©ŨǁļėƢɆŨįǘĉėƎɆĉŨƎƋƖɆëŒŨŝİɆǂļƢķɆśŨƖƢɆŨįɆ ƢķėɆ ƎśLjȼƖɆśŨƖƢɆėLJƋėƎļėŝĉėĐɆƖƪƋƋŒLjɆŨįǘĉėƎƖșɆ{įɆƢķėɆǘǁėɆ Marshals of the Army, only two survived the purge.

17 Levchenko, Z.A, Alekseenko, D.A, Yatmanov, A.N, “Women Divers: Feat in the Name of Life”, Marine Medicine, Vol.6, No.5, pp.46-49.

18 Ministry of the Russian Federation, “Ladoga Artery: Overcoming the Blockade”, (75leningrad.mil.ru), [Last ĉĉėƖƖėĐțɆǥǦȦǣǨȦǥǣǥǤȮ 19 pļŝëɆ©ŨŏŨŒŨǁëɆǂëƖɆƢķėɆǘƎƖƢɆǂŨśëŝɆƢŨɆƍƪëŒļįLjɆëƖɆëɆĐļǁėƎɆ in the Soviet Union. She was a graduate of the Leningrad Water Transport Institution and began her diving career in Sochi in 1937 as a hydraulic engineer. During the siege of Leningrad and the laying of the Ladoga pipeline she was severely wounded.

20 St. Petersburg Central Naval Museum, Private Research Report, 2021.

21 St. Petersburg Central Naval Museum, Private Research Report, 2021.

22 Ibid.

23 This steel pipeline was traditionally used for oil well exploration.

24 St. Petersburg Central Naval Museum, Private Research Report, 2021.

25 For Shinberg’s account of the project see; Blank, S and Shinberg, D, “On the Bottom of Lake Ladoga”, New World, No.2, 1968, pp.160-203.

26 Bayvel, Rachel, “Tales of Tank City”, The Jewish Quarterly, Vol.52, Issue.2, 2005, p.72.

27 St. Petersburg Central Naval Museum, Private Research Report, 2021.

28 Ibid.

29 Welding and Fabrication, “Welding Survey: Abstracts from Recent Literature”, June 1947, p.286 and Falkevich, A.S, “Construction of a Welded Oil Pipeline in Wartime Conditions”, Avtogennoe Delo, No.1, 1944, pp.19-22.

30 St. Petersburg Central Naval Museum, Private Research Report, 2021.

31 {nåɆEƎŨƪƋȚɆȹLļƖƢŨƎLjȺȚɆķƢƢƋțȦȦŨśǒȯļǒķŨƎëșƎƪȦëĈŨƪƢȦķļƖƢŨƎLjȦȚɆ ȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐțɆǣǤȦ`ƪŝėȦǥǣǥǤȮșɆ 32 St. Petersburg Central Naval Museum, Private Research Report, 2021.

33 Ministry of the Russian Federation, “Ladoga Artery: Overcoming the Blockade”, 75leningrad.mil.ru, [Last ĉĉėƖƖėĐțɆǥǦȦǣǨȦǥǣǥǤȮș

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HISTORICAL 8 Pleysier, Albert Jan, Frozen Tears: The Blockade and Battle of Leningrad, Plymouth: University Press of America, 2008. p.130.

38 St. Petersburg Central Naval Museum, Private Research Report, 2021.

39 Whittle, Tim, Fuelling the Wars: PLUTO and the Secret Pipeline Network, 1936-2015, Monkton Farleigh: Folly Books, 2017, pp.55-72

34 Krammer, Arnold, “Operation PLUTO: A Wartime Partnership for Petroleum”, Technology and Culture, Vol.33, No.3, 1992, p.454.

35 St. Petersburg Central Naval Museum, Private Research Report, 2021.

36 St. Petersburg Central Naval Museum, Private Research Report, 2021.

37

THE ROYAL LOGISTIC CORPS STRATEGY 2020-2025+ The strategic context is increasingly uncertain, complex and dynamic with threats to our nation proliferating and intensifying rapidly.

The pervasiveness of information and pace of technological change has transformed the commercial sector and is transforming the character of warfare – providing new ways and means to achieve objectives. Defence must also respond to the threat of climate change, future pandemics and natural disasters, and play its part in promoting ‘Global Britain’ and UK prosperity.

With NATO at the heart of UK Defence, new Defence and Army level concepts set out our strategic response to these challenges and opportunities; a

response that seeks advantage through information and the integration of Space, Cyber, Maritime, Air and Land, and the fusion of the military instrument with other levers of national power.

Defence Support underpins this global activity and must do so whilst balancing resilience, effectiveness ëŝĐɆėįǘĉļėŝĉLjșɆɆ ƪƢɆśëļŝƢëļŝļŝİɆƢŨĐëLjȼƖɆëƎƎëŝİėśėŝƢƖɆ to support a force that will be persistently engaged, more integrated and operating at greater reach, tempo and more dispersed is not an option.

Transformation is required, particularly the need to embrace resilient data-centric technologies and, critically, develop a digitally skilled and innovative ‘Whole Force’.

THE ROYAL LOGISTIC CORPS STRATEGY We will professionalise and value our people, strengthen our ethos and maximise talent:

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THE REVIEW 2022 | 19

8 HISTORICAL

Which was most successful in the First World War: MI5, MI6 or Britain’s SIGINT?

Credit: Shutterstock

Lt Luke Guzkowshi analyses British intelligence immediately prior to and during WWI, reviewing ƖƪĉĉėƖƖėƖɆëŝĐɆįëļŒƪƎėƖɆĈėįŨƎėɆėǁëŒƪëƢļŝİɆǂķļĉķɆŨįɆƢķėƖėɆƢķƎėėɆëƎėëƖɆŨįɆ ƎļƢļƖķɆļŝƢėŒŒļİėŝĉėɆǂëƖɆƢķėɆ śŨƖƢɆƖƪĉĉėƖƖįƪŒɆëƖɆśėëƖƪƎėĐɆĈLjɆļƢƖɆĉŨŝƢƎļĈƪƢļŨŝɆƢŨɆƖėĉƪƎļŝİɆƢķėɆ ŒŒļėĐɆǁļĉƢŨƎLjɆļŝɆǤǬǤǫ

8 The Memorial dedicated to Edith Cavell, a British Nurse executed by the Germans during WWI

British intelligence services were crucial to the allied victory in the First World War. For the purpose of this essay, the multitude of different intelligence organisations that came into being before and during the war will be grouped into three categories: MI5 covering all domestic counter-espionage and internal security organisations; MI6 including all intelligence operations carried out by Britain on foreign soil and the ‘signals intelligence agencies’ comprising of all British organisations that gathered and processed signals intelligence (SIGINT).

MI5 and MI6 were not created in a pre-WWI ‘intelligence vacuum’. Britain has a long history of using spies, Sir Francis Walsingham being a prime example under the reign of Elizabeth I.1 In October 1908, a two-page memorandum concluded that, “Unless a Secret Service system is prepared, we shall enter on a war fatally handicapped. There is no doubt whatever that the same careful preparations which were made in France before 1870 are now being made in Eastern districts of England”. As a result, the Secret Intelligence Bureau (SIB) was established in 1909.2ɆQŝɆǤǬǤǤȚɆƢķėɆ©Q ɆǂëƖɆƎėŨƎİëŝļƖėĐȜɆnQǩɆȩnQǤȩĉȪȦ SIS) was established by Commander M.G. SmithCumming as ‘the Foreign Section’ responsible for threats outside of the UK; 3ɆëŝĐɆƢķėɆnQǨɆȩn{ǨȦ©©ȪȚɆ its sister organisation, was set up as the domestic counter-espionage section, led by Captain V. G. Kell, South Staffordshire Regiment. Together, they ĉƎėëƢėĐɆƢķėɆǘƎƖƢɆŨįǘĉļëŒɆƪŝļǘėĐɆŝëƢļŨŝëŒɆļŝƢėŒŒļİėŝĉėɆ organisation. These new departments were faced

20 | THE REVIEW 2022

with challenges from the very beginning, ranging from a tight grip on the purse strings through to ȹ¡ėƖļƖƢëŝĉėɆƢŨɆĉķëŝİėƖɆļŝɆƢķėɆ{įǘĉļëŒɆ©ėĉƎėƢƖɆ ĉƢȺɆ that limited their success until war became imminent.4 In the build-up to the war, MI5 was operating with a very small staff, numbering ten permanent and four temporary employees as late as April 1914.5 Through close and extensive co-operation with other ëİėŝĉļėƖȚɆļŝĉŒƪĐļŝİɆƢķėɆEėŝėƎëŒɆ ŨƖƢɆ{įǘĉėɆȩE {ȪɆëŝĐɆ Metropolitan Police Special Branch (MPSB), together with the Chief Constables of the regional Police forces, MI5 played a ‘waiting game’ in the immediate build up to the First World War.6 With the help of ƢķėɆ ŨƖƢɆ{įǘĉėɆ ėŝƖŨƎƖȚ7 MI5, created a “‘black list’ of addresses”8 identifying German spies and their handlers in Europe and a ‘central registry’ which in 1913, contained some “28,380 names” and by 1917 had grown to “some 250,000 names”.10 This allowed for the capture of 18 German spies on the ‘arrest list’ by the morning of the 5th of August 1914, with the remaining six apprehended by the 16th August.11 Deacon highlights this success believing “that for the best part of a year Germany was without any effective ƖƋLjɆƖėƎǁļĉėɆȭŨƋėƎëƢļŝİȮɆļŝƖļĐėɆ ƎļƢëļŝȺ.12 This in turn allowed the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to cross the Channel and support the French without the Germans knowing, until it was too late for them to act.

It is important to note that this was only made possible ĈLjɆƢķėɆǤǬǤǤɆ{įǘĉļëŒɆ©ėĉƎėƢƖɆ ĉƢȚɆ$ėįėŝĉėɆŨįɆƢķėɆ¡ėëŒśɆ Act and Aliens’ Restriction Act, which, together gave much more freedom to the security services and according to Bulloch, “proved a very potent weapon against the spies who came to Britain.”13 MI5’s close relationship and liaison with Basil Thomas of the MPSB had also become a “recognised thing”,14 and MPSB acted as the “executive arm of the department”, making the arrests.15 As the threats grew, so did MI5; by the end of 1914 its numbers had more than doubled to 40 and by the end of 1915 a further 227 staff were employed by the service. This number continued to increase steadily throughout the war.16 After the initial arrests became public knowledge, a ‘Spy Fever’17 or ‘Spy Mania’ broke out triggering anti-German riots and a deluge of reports about spy sightings,18 When government statements “failed to reassure the public,”19 MI5 began using citizens as “an auxiliary of the counter-espionage service”.20 MI5 also proved effective at propaganda, exploiting German brutality to increase American sympathy towards the British cause. An example of this is the stance adopted

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by the intelligence services when the Germans executed the nurse Edith Cavell. With President T Roosevelt keeping a close eye on the case,21 MI5 took the opportunity to compare the actions of the British against the Germans, releasing the AmericanGerman spy Kenneth Triest, showing British mercy opposed to the stark German brutality. Bulloch credits this as playing a part in convincing America to join the Allies.22 Disinformation and deception was also practised widely, often using the agency of the press, or fake messages from the captured spies with the intent of confusing their handlers, or to support disinformation provided by turned agents.23 Andrew posits the success of this was limited, owing to the “government’s insistence … on public trials and court-martials for captured spies” as a method of combating spy fever.24 Despite its successes, MI5 also experienced failures, the most notable being the sabotage of four ships; HMS Bulwark (1914), Princess Irene (1915), Natal (1916) and Vanguard (1917), all involving similar circumstances, without the saboteur being discovered.25 Probably their greatest failure was MI5’s inability to identify the German walk-in spy, Jules Crawford Silber, who, according to Bulloch was, “completely successful throughout the war”,26 not only working in, but also ƋƎŨśŨƢėĐɆǂļƢķļŝɆƢķėɆE {Ɇ ėŝƖŨƎȼƖɆŨįǘĉėȚɆŨŝėɆŨįɆƢķėɆ major branches of counter-espionage. Silber passed Kell’s ‘black list’ to German Intelligence, who acted on it swiftly, forcing MI5 to start from scratch. Despite this, MI5 was overall highly successful, especially as Deacon highlights the Germans, “seldom chose their spies well” and often failed to train them effectively for the role.27 This suboptimal performance was borne out between May 1914 and June 1915, when seven spies were caught in Britain which, according to Deacon, placed the British intelligence services in an unassailable position as, “from then until the end of the war Britain was never again seriously troubled by the German spies.”28 Britain’s domestic intelligence successes were comparable to its achievements abroad where the War {įǘĉėɆëŝĐɆƢķėɆ ĐśļƎëŒƢLjȼƖɆļŝƢėŒŒļİėŝĉėɆĐėƋëƎƢśėŝƢƖɆ (generically referred to as MI6) were operating.

MI6’s foreign intelligence operations were extensive and delivered success, but not within the heartlands of Germany. There were suggestions that the Allies gained some intelligence from within the centres of power, for example Hall’s (the Director of Naval Intelligence) notes for a talk at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich in 1936 states simply ëŝɆȹ,LJëśƋŒėɆŨįɆȭëȮɆƖƢëįįɆŨįǘĉėƎɆļŝɆ ėƎŒļŝɆëŝĐɆƢķėɆ reward offered by the Germans for his name.”29 Despite this opaque remark however, there is no

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8 HMS Bulwark in 1912

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HISTORICAL 8

8 Turkish commander Cemal Pasha on the shore of the Dead Sea in 1915. He led the Ottoman Empire army against British forces in Egypt during WW1

clear evidence that either the British or the French were able to penetrate German higher commands to ëŝLjɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆĐėİƎėėșɆ,ǁėŝɆƖŨȚɆƖļLJƢėėŝɆEėƎśëŝɆŨƎɆ German-based agents, including Dr Karl Krüger and ‘agent D15 from Wilhelmshaven’ passed on useful naval intelligence.30 MI6 did operate successfully in Russia where Sidney ‘Reckless’ Reilly obtained intelligence on German aircraft through his role in organising the St. Petersburg Flying Week and on the ŒëƢėƖƢɆĐėǁėŒŨƋśėŝƢƖɆļŝɆEėƎśëŝɆŝëǁëŒɆƖƋėĉļǘĉëƢļŨŝƖɆ through his employments and military contacts.31 In 1915, in German occupied Belgium, Louise de Bettignies (Alice Dubois) led a spy network out of Lille, while in 1917, ‘La Dame Blanche’ ran a spy-ring throughout German-occupied Belgium. Alexander Szek leaked German codes from occupied Brussels while Colonel Thoroton operated throughout Gibraltar, Spain and North Africa. In America, MI6’s exposure of the German Ambassador, von Bernstorff and his Naval Attaché, Capt Boy-ed’s support for sabotage operations against the USA helped to strengthen American opposition to Germany, prior to them joining the war. Most notable was the exposure of the German sanctioned 1916 ‘Black Tom explosion’ in Jersey City, which caused immense damage and loss of life.32,33 MI6 also captured a German diplomatic code book in Persia, after the German agent Wassmuss narrowly escaped an attempt to capture him but left his luggage behind.34 nQǩɆëŒƖŨɆƋŒëLjėĐɆëɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆƎŨŒėɆļŝɆĉƎėëƢļŝİɆƢķėɆ ƎëĈɆ Revolution through the employment of Gertrude Bell, T.E. Lawrence and Prince Faisal that led to the eventual military defeat of the Ottoman Armies.35 Similarly, they made efforts to divorce the Ottoman Empire from their treaty obligations to Germany and convince them, at the very least, to adopt a policy of neutrality.

Mr George Eady, who had contacts in Constantinople, briefed MI6 in 1914 on the situation in Turkey and with Fitzmaurice and Whittall, went to the Balkans “to try to persuade the Turks to break with their new allies.”36 Despite indications that the Turks might accede to these overtures, the First Sea Lord (Churchill), through whom all such communications were routed, would not sanction them. Despite this, a meeting was planned for 15th March 1915 at which it was believed it might be possible to strike a bargain.37 Unfortunately, on

THE REVIEW 2022 | 21

8 HISTORICAL

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with MI6, the wireless intercept organisation, through the use of dedicated listening stations, allowed the Allies to get into the mind of their enemy.

The intercept organisation began with a ŒļƖƢėŝļŝİɆƖƢëƢļŨŝɆëƢɆLƪŝƖƢëŝƢŨŝȚɆƢķėɆǘƎƖƢɆŨįɆǤǧɆƢŨɆ be established during the war, and which, together ǂļƢķɆŨƢķėƎƖɆŨǂŝėĐɆĈLjɆƢķėɆEėŝėƎëŒɆ ŨƖƢɆ{įǘĉėɆëŝĐɆ Marconi, formed the ‘Y Service’.51 The Y Service, along with the help of amateur voluntary interceptors, eventually intercepted and logged almost all German ƎëĐļŨɆƢƎëįǘĉș 2 The most important product was an ėǁėƎȯļŝĉƎėëƖļŝİɆǙŨǂɆŨįɆĉŨĐėĐɆƖļİŝëŒƖɆįŨƎɆ¡ŨŨśɆǧǣɆƢŨɆ decipher which, together with the Direction Finding stations set up in Britain and Calais-Amiens (under H. Round), allowed British SIGINT the ability to plot the movements of ships, troops and zeppelins. As West asserts, this also allowed for the accurate ƋŒŨƢƢļŝİɆŨįȚɆȹļĐėŝƢļǘëĈŒėɆśļŒļƢëƎLjɆįŨƎśëƢļŨŝƖɆƢķƎŨƪİķɆ ƢķėɆļĐėŝƢļǘĉëƢļŨŝɆŨįɆļŝĐļǁļĐƪëŒɆƪŝļƢɆĉ댌ȯƖļİŝƖș53 Unfortunately, the British Expeditionary Force did not have a dedicated wireless section until 1917, and the nature of static trench warfare limited the usefulness of this information.54 Towards the end of 1916, according to Hall, ©QEQp¶ɆļĐėŝƢļǘėĐɆƢķëƢɆEėƎśëŝLjɆǂŨƪŒĐɆƖŨŨŝɆĈėɆ commencing unrestricted submarine warfare to capitalise on Britain “running short of men, food and public resolve.”55 In response to this, the British Intelligence decided to exploit the Zimmerman Telegram, a decoded transcript from the German Foreign Minister to their US Ambassador proposing he seek an alliance with Mexico should the Americans enter the war on the Allied side. Hall and a small and tightly controlled group of people set about ensuring the telegram was accepted as genuine and that it showed clear German intent to involve Mexico, and possibly Japan, in an invasion of America.56 They succeeded in convincing American intelligence,

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13th March 1915, a telegram from the Kaiser to the German Admiral Usedom in Constantinople ended Hall’s delicate negotiations with the Turks - the Dardanelles disaster soon followed.38 It would be a grave error to suggest that the activities of MI6 did not contribute to military success, the Arab Revolt demonstrates how effective it could be and MI6’s exploitation of the Zimmermann Telegram would bring the might of America into the war on the side of ƢķėɆ ŒŒļėƖȚɆĉķëŝİļŝİɆƢķėɆĉŨƪƎƖėɆŨįɆƢķėɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢɆļŝɆƢķėļƎɆ favour. All of the clandestine operations carried out

by MI5 and MI6 were possible because of the labour of the SIGINT departments which allowed the British commanders to get into the mind of the German High Command and politicians.

According to West, by June 1914 the Naval Intelligence Division knew the “exact location, range, ƪƖėɆëŝĐɆŨǂŝėƎƖķļƋɆŨįɆėǁėƎLjɆŒŨŝİȯĐļƖƢëŝĉėɆȭǂļƎėŒėƖƖȮɆ station in the world.”39 Ewing established a code and cipher-breaking section before the war. Due to this, the Admiralty was already intercepting German naval wireless communications and was well on the way to cracking the German method of ciphering.40 ƢɆƢķėɆƖƢëƎƢɆŨįɆÕÕǤȚɆśŨƖƢɆĐļƋŒŨśëƢļĉɆƢƎëįǘĉɆǂëƖɆ sent via telegraphic cable, while ships, submarines and Zeppelins were increasingly using wireless.41 Barely a few weeks into the war, the British deployed their cable ship, ‘Telconia’ to sever their overseas telegraph cables and effectively cut off all German “means of rapid communications other than radio”.42 The Germans were then forced to rely on wireless (via their Nauen long-range radio station) and the Swedish and American transatlantic cables; all of which were being monitored. The British chose to ‘allow’ the transmission from the Nauen radio station to continue uninterrupted. This permitted the ƎļƢļƖķɆƢŨɆśŨŝļƢŨƎɆ댌ɆEėƎśëŝɆƎëĐļŨɆƢƎëįǘĉȚɆŨįįėƎļŝİɆ them what West describes as a distinct ‘intelligence advantage’ and insight into German codes.43 This vulnerability remained unnoticed by the Germans and eventually provided the British with a war-winning ëĐǁëŝƢëİėșɆDƪƎƢķėƎɆëǘėŒĐȚɆƖļśļŒëƎɆŒėǁėŒƖɆŨįɆƖƪĉĉėƖƖɆ also helped strategic decision making.

British intelligence gathering in Russia was “easily the best intelligence service of any foreign power”.44 Nevertheless, it was the Russian’s gifting of the captured German SMS Magdeburg’s codebook (Signalbuch der Kaiserlichen Marine), after “an apparently vain effort to use it” themselves, which proved the greatest success.45 Hall details how the British utilised ‘trawlers’ and ‘divers’ to recover Naval books and cyphers from German zeppelins and submarines shot down or sunk.46 These cyphers, including the “Verkehrsbuch” from the sunken German destroyer47 S-119, and “copy number 369 of the Handelverkehrsbuch, the code-book used

by German merchantmen and some units of the LŨĉķƖėėǙŨƢƢėȺȚ48 İëǁėɆƢķėɆǙėĐİŒļŝİɆ©QEQp¶ɆëƎśɆŨįɆ Naval Intelligence (Room 40) what West considers a huge advantage in the early years of the war.49 These gains went on to play a major role in cracking German codes and the information gathered made the two cryptanalytic departments, Room 40 in the ĐśļƎëŒƢLjɆëŝĐɆnQǤȩĈȪɆļŝɆƢķėɆÕëƎɆ{įǘĉėȚɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆ force multipliers to the British war effort.50 Despite their successes, MI6 were not the main contributors to the products of SIGINT abroad. Working in unison

8 The Zimmermann Telegram as it was sent from Washington DC to Mexico

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HISTORICAL 8 politicians and the general public that the interception of the telegram was carried out by American authorities on American soil. It was such a success that President Wilson, a resolute isolationist, accepted the threat and soon after brought America into the war on the Allied side. The Americans joining the war is arguably one of the most important factors which ensured Allied victory in WW1. The handling of the Zimmerman Telegram therefore constitutes what Hall determines is the most successful intelligence action of the war; one which heavily relied on SIGINT.57 As to which was the most successful, MI5, MI6 or SIGINT, it is necessary to recognise that success has to be contextualised to the degree by which each ŨƎİëŝļƖëƢļŨŝɆĉŨŝƢƎļĈƪƢėĐɆƢŨɆǘŝëŒɆǁļĉƢŨƎLjșɆ$ėƖƋļƢėɆ their unique roles, each organisation’s actions helped ƎėļŝįŨƎĉėɆƢķėɆŨƢķėƎƖɆȱɆƢķļƖɆśëŏėƖɆļƢɆǁėƎLjɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢɆƢŨɆ measure the success of a singular organisation.

While MI5 was successful in keeping Britain secure by almost completely preventing German intelligence penetration, it could only, by its very nature, keep Britain safe while pursuing its war aims – not win it outright. MI6, however, was able to directly strike against Germany by taking covert action to secure vital information; subvert or corrupt the enemy; or provoke revolution through individuals like T.E. Lawrence, which collectively helped achieve a military victory. Without wishing to denigrate the efforts of the many agents engaged in the shadows, the actions of MI6 were at most a force-multiplier, not a war-winner. Had MI6 succeeded in its plan to separate Turkey from Germany, then possibly the war might have been shortened, but even then, it is arguable if this action alone could have delivered a war-winning result. The exploitation and handling of the Zimmermann telegram, obtained by SIGINT, however, was essential to ensuring the entry of America into the war on the Allied side, which was in itself a strategic war-winning advantage. While it may be argued that this was simply a force-multiplier, a compelling counter argument is that without the USA’s resolute commitment of troops and the country’s enormous economic and industrial power, it is conceivable that the war might have been lost.

To summarise, based on the evidence presented, it can be argued that all of the British intelligence services contributed to the approach Britain adopted to waging WW1. Each intelligence organisation had its successes, together with some failures, however, it is challenging to completely separate their functions from one another to ascertain a clear measure of their individual contributions. Whilst acknowledging this impediment to determining a clear metric, the weight of evidence suggests that while both MI5 and MI6 operations were important to the war effort, it was the work of the British Signals Intelligence agencies that were instrumental in bringing America into the war through the discovery of the Zimmerman telegram. MI5 and MI6 undoubtedly delivered operational advantages to the British war effort, but utilisation of selected SIGINT produced a strategic shift in the war which can be directly linked to the Germans agreeing to the 1918 Armistice.

Endnotes 1 Keith Jeffery, ‘MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949’, 2010, preface.

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2

bÔǤȦǦȚɆpëƢļŨŝëŒɆ¡ėĉŨƎĐɆ{įǘĉėȚɆɂnėśŨƎëŝĐƪśɆƎėɆDŨƎśëƢļŨŝɆ of a S. S. Bureau', 26th August 1909.

3 bÔǤȦǤȚɆpëƢļŨŝëŒɆ ƎĉķļǁėƖȚɆɂ{ƎİëŝļƖëƢļŨŝɆŨįɆ©ėĉƎėƢɆ©ėƎǁļĉėɆ (Note prepared for D.M.O. on 4th Oct. 1908'.

4 Richard Deacon, ‘British Secret Service’, Grafton Books, 1991 Edition, p.150.

5 bÔǤȦǬȚɆpëƢļŨŝëŒɆ ƎĉķļǁėƖȚɆ ëƋƢɆbėŒŒɂƖɆǩȯśŨŝƢķŒLjɆƎėƋŨƎƢƖȚɆ 1909, pp 85.

6 Op.Cit, Deacon, 1991, p.155.

7 See also Table for April 1914 at page 84 of Kell's 6-monthly ƎėƋŨƎƢƖɆëƢɆbÔǤȦǬȚɆpëƢļŨŝëŒɆ ƎĉķļǁėƖȚɆǂķļĉķɆƎėĉŨƎĐƖɆǥǫȚǫǥǣɆ Resident Aliens 'Registered' with 224 'Under Special Report' and 211 (including 15 British Suspects) 'Already on Special Watch List'.

8 David French, ‘Spy Fever in Britain, 1900-1915’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 21, No. 2, Cambridge University Press, `ƪŝėɆǤǬǪǫȚɆƋșǦǩǣɆ½¡dțɆķƢƢƋțȦȦǂǂǂșŌƖƢŨƎșŨƎİȦƖƢëĈŒėȦǥǩǦǫǥǩǧ 9 John Bulloch, ‘MI5-The Origin and History of the British Counter Espionage Service’, Transworld Publishers, 1963, p.139 10 Stephen Twigge, Edward Hampshire, Graham Macklin, ‘British Intelligence: Secrets, Spies and Sources’, The National Archives, Kew, 2008, p.22.

11 bÔǤȦǪȚɆpëƢļŨŝëŒɆ ƎĉķļǁėƖșɆ ƎƎėƖƢƖțɆǦrd-16th Aug, pp.48-49.

12 Op.Cit, Deacon, 1991, p.173.

13 Op.Cit, Bulloch, 1963, p. 88.

14 Op.Cit, Deacon, 1991, p.149.

15 Op.Cit, Bulloch, 1963, p.39.

16 Christopher Andrew, ‘The Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of MI5’, Penguin Books, UK, 2010, p.55.

17 Op.Cit, Bulloch, 1963, p.89.

18 Op.Cit, Andrew, 2010, p.53.

19 David French, ‘Spy Fever in Britain, 1900-1915’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Jun., 1978), Cambridge ½ŝļǁėƎƖļƢLjɆ ƎėƖƖȚɆƋșǦǩǬɆ½¡dțɆķƢƢƋțȦȦǂǂǂșŌƖƢŨƎșŨƎİȦ ƖƢëĈŒėȦǥǩǦǫǥǩǧ 20 Op.Cit, Bulloch, 1963, p.107.

21 Chris Northcott, ‘MI5 at War 1909-1918: How MI5 Foiled the Spies of the Kaiser in the First World War’, Tattered Flag, 2015, p.163 22 Ibid. Bulloch, 1963, p.99.

23 Op.Cit, Deacon, 1991, p.155.

24 Op.Cit, Andrew, 2010, p.65.

25 Op.Cit, Bulloch, 1963, p.103.

26 Ibid. Bulloch, 1963, p.135.

27 Op.Cit, Deacon, 1991, p.179.

28 Ibid, Deacon, 1991, p.183.

29 Op.Cit, Hall, 2017, p. 40 and again in the notes on p.193.

30 Ibid. Hall, 2017, pp.194-195.

31 Op.Cit, Deacon, 1991, p.166.

32 Ibid, Hall, 2017, pp.127-128.

33 Ibid. Hall, 2017, p.175 and 176.

34 Op.Cit, Hall, 2017, p.40.

35 Ibid. Hall, 2017, p.192.

36 Ibid. Hall, 2017, p.192 37 Op.Cit, pp.107-108.

38 Op.Cit, pp.107-108.

39 Op.Cit, West, 1987, p.40.

40 Op.Cit, Deacon, 1991, p.153.

41 Thomas Boghardt, ‘The Zimmerman Telegram: Intelligence, Diplomacy, and America’s Entry into World War I’, Naval Institute Press, Maryland, 2012, p.80.

42 Jeffrey T. Richelson, ‘A Century of Spies’, Oxford University Press, UK, 1997, p.43.

43 Op.Cit, West, 1987, p.65.

44 Op.Cit Deacon, 1991, p.144 45 Op.Cit, Richelson, 1997, p.38.

THE REVIEW 2022 | 23

8 HISTORICAL Op.Cit, Hall, 2017, pp.38-39.

Op.Cit, West, 1987, p.68.

48 Ibid. West, 1987, p.67.

49 Op.Cit, Deacon, 1991, p.170.

50 Daniel Larsen, ‘Intelligence in the First World War: The State of the Field’, Intelligence and National Security, 2014, 29:2, pp. 282-302.

51 Bartholomew Lee, 'Radio Intelligence Developments During World War One And Between The Wars', California Historical Radio Society, 1994, pp. 13-14.

52 Nigel West, ‘GCHQ: The Secret Wireless War, 1900-86’, UK, Coronet books, 1987, p.64.

53 Ibid. West, 1987, p.56-60.

54 Ibid. West, 1987, p.55.

55 Ibid. Hall, 2017, p.121.

56 Ibid. Hall, 2017, pp.119-156.

57 Op.Cit, Hall, 2017, p.156.

46 47

Bibliography Andrew, Christopher (2010).The Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of MI5. Penguin Books, UK. Bartholomew Lee (1994). Radio Intelligence Developments During World War One And Between The Wars, California Historical Radio Society.

Boghardt, Thomas (2012). The Zimmerman Telegram: Intelligence, Diplomacy, and America’s Entry into World War I, Naval Institute Press, Maryland.

Bulloch, John (1963) MI5-The Origin and History of the British Counter Espionage Service, Transworld Publishers.

Deacon, Richard (1991). British Secret Service, Grafton Books.

French, David (1978). Spy Fever in Britain, 1900-1915’, The Historical Journal, Cambridge University Press, 21:2.

Hall, Reginald (2017). A Clear Case of Genius, edited by Philip Vickers, The History Press, Port Stroud Glos.

Jeffery, Keith (2010) MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949.

Larsen, Daniel (2014). Intelligence in the First World War: The State of the Field, Intelligence and National Security, 29:2.

Northcott, Chris (2015). MI5 at War 1909-1918: How MI5 Foiled the Spies of the Kaiser in the First World War, Tattered Flag.

Richelson, Jeffrey T. (1997). A Century of Spies, Oxford University Press, UK. Twigge, Stephen, Edward Hampshire, Graham Macklin (2008) British Intelligence: Secrets, Spies and Sources, The National Archives, Kew. West, Nigel (1987) GCHQ: The Secret Wireless War, 190086, Coronet books, UK.

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8 HISTORICAL

Sustainment as a Weapon: Wellington’s War in The Peninsular DŨĉƪƖļŝİɆŨŝɆƢķėɆƋėƎļŨĐɆŨįɆǤǫǤǣȯǤǫǤǥȚɆǂķėŝɆÕėŒŒļŝİƢŨŝȼƖɆƢƎŨŨƋƖɆǂėƎėɆƋļŝŝėĐɆĐŨǂŝɆļŝɆ ŨƎƢƪİëŒɆ ëŝĐɆŨŝɆƢķėɆĈŨƎĐėƎɆǂļƢķɆ©ƋëļŝȚɆƢķļƖɆëƎƢļĉŒėɆǂļŒŒɆƖķŨǂɆķŨǂɆƖƪƖƢëļŝśėŝƢɆŨįɆƢķėɆįŨƎĉėɆǂëƖɆëɆǁļƢëŒɆįëĉƢŨƎɆ ļŝɆĐėƢėƎśļŝļŝİɆƢķėɆŨƪƢĉŨśėɆŨįɆƢķėɆ ėŝļŝƖƪŒëƎɆÕëƎșɆ Lj Lt Col Gary Allen

If the French invade Portugal, and do not succeed in forcing us to evacuate, they will be in a very dangerous position, and the longer we are able to resist them, the more they will suffer materially in Spain1

‘‘

Many readers will be familiar to some degree with the Duke of Wellington’s2 great victories in the Peninsular War, which lasted from 1808-1815; names like Talavera, Salamanca, Vittoria and of course Waterloo, remain resonant battle honours in the British Army. A story less often told is that ŨįɆÕėŒŒļŝİƢŨŝȼƖɆƖƪƋƋŨƎƢļŝİɆŨƋėƎëƢļŨŝƖɆƢŨɆƢķėɆǘƎėɆŨįɆ cannon, musket and the clash of steel against the French: the battle for resources.

Bounding operations before the decisive year of ǤǫǤǦȚɆǂķėŝɆƢķėɆDƎėŝĉķɆǂėƎėɆǘŝ댌LjɆĐƎļǁėŝɆŨƪƢɆŨįɆƢķėļƎɆ occupation of Spain, allows failures to be analysed as much as successes, as well as offering balance between defensive and offensive operations. This period set the conditions for victory and included a diverse range of sustainment challenges. Wellington led an allied army in 1812 mainly composed of Anglo-Portuguese troops, but by the end of that year he would be appointed Commander-in-Chief in Spain. In the French, he faced an enemy superior ļŝɆƖļǒėȚɆŨƪƢŝƪśĈėƎļŝİɆķļƖɆŨǂŝɆįŨƎĉėƖɆĈLjɆǘǁėɆƢŨɆŨŝėȚɆ and with advantage in guns and cavalry. With Wellington’s reliance on the Royal Navy (exterior lines) and the size of his multinational force, this was less a peer enemy than a contest against overwhelming odds. Lines of communication also spanned more than 700km (from Lisbon to Burgos) ļŝɆëɆįėǂɆśŨŝƢķƖșɆɆ¶ķėƖėɆĉŨŝĐļƢļŨŝƖɆƎėśëļŝɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆ as they could easily be replicated in future war.

The 2021 Integrated Review anticipates strategic trends that feature “systemic competition, including between states” as well as geopolitical shifts such as a conventional military threat from Russia and the rising power of China.3 While the strategic context may change, the Peninsular War is a historical case study full of relevance today in the enduring character ŨįɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢșɆɆ With typical foresight, Wellington decided early in the campaign that French logistic support was a critical vulnerability to be targeted, which he exposed mercilessly with the weapon of starvation in the defence of Portugal in 1810-11. Yet, Allied

26 | THE REVIEW 2022

sustainment was also a source of weakness and a limiting factor before the breakout across Spain.

Wellington and his commissariat developed a system that enabled defence but that fell short of facilitating offensive operations in 1811-1812. Despite endeavour in provisioning and transportation, it was not until the shift of the main magazine depot from Lisbon to Santander in July 1813 that sustainment delivered the operational agility to defeat the French.

Sustainment of the Anglo-Portuguese Army from 1811-1812 constrained Wellington’s operational ambitions, limiting offensive opportunities in the ƖƋƎļŝİɆëŝĐɆƖƪśśėƎɆǘİķƢļŝİɆƖėëƖŨŝƖɆĈėįŨƎėɆƢķėɆ necessity of winter quartering. These constraints ǂėƎėɆǁëƎļėĐɆĈƪƢɆļŝĉŒƪĐėĐɆǘŝëŝĉėɆëŝĐɆśëŝƋŨǂėƎɆëƖɆ well as transport and supply.

8 Battle of Busaco, 27 September 1810

Sustainment within doctrine Joint doctrine places sustainment and force protection ļŝɆëɆƖƪƋƋŨƎƢļŝİɆƎŨŒėɆƢŨɆƢķėɆśëļŝɆįƪŝĉƢļŨŝƖɆŨįɆǘƎėƖȚɆ information, outreach and manoeuvre. The concept of sustainment includes logistics (supply and transport), personnel services (manpower and money), medical and health, and military engineering support in infrastructure such as lines of communication.4 Land doctrine is slightly different, splitting sustainment between logistics and administrative support, the latter covering personnel services and regulations.5 While all these areas existed in the Peninsular War, scholars have used logistics as the overarching term.

Jomini, a practitioner and author on Napoleonic ǂëƎįëƎėȚɆĐėǘŝėĐɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉƖɆëƖȚɆȹƢķėɆëƎƢɆŨįɆśŨǁļŝİɆ armies,”6 which he viewed as the domain of generals-in-chief.7 More recently, van Creveld situated

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HISTORICAL 8 logistics at the centre of military operations, arguing that it incorporates, “the hardest facts of all,”8 those which make or break a campaign, and in its entirety accounts for some “nine tenths of the business of war”.9 Wellington also made logistics, as Jomini ǂŨƪŒĐɆĐėǘŝėɆļƢȚɆëɆĉƎļƢļĉëŒɆƋëƎƢɆŨįɆķļƖɆĉŨśśëŝĐȚɆëƖɆǂėŒŒɆ ëƖɆĉėŝƢƎëŒļƖėĐɆĉŨŝƢƎŨŒɆŨįɆśëŝƋŨǂėƎɆëŝĐɆǘŝëŝĉėƖșɆ For clarity, this article will divide logistics into supply ëŝĐɆƢƎëŝƖƋŨƎƢëƢļŨŝȚɆëŝĐɆëĐśļŝļƖƢƎëƢļŨŝɆļŝƢŨɆǘŝëŝĉėȚɆ manpower and force protection (health), all of which together comprise sustainment.

Logistic vulnerability ƖɆļĐėŝƢļǘėĐȚɆÕėŒŒļŝİƢŨŝɆëƖƖėƖƖėĐɆƢķëƢɆƢķėɆDƎėŝĉķɆ armies, although outnumbering his, were vulnerable in logistic support. The French, some 300,000 men in the Peninsular, had seized possession of most major cities in Spain following their invasion in 1808. They extended their limit of exploitation with a further invasion into Portugal, spurring the British government into sending a small expeditionary force to Lisbon in July 1808. Although the French in Portugal were driven back, British efforts to ƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢŒLjɆëŒƢėƎɆƢķėɆĈëƢƢŒėƖƋëĉėɆǂėƎėɆļŝļƢļ댌LjɆ unsuccessful. The British Army faced near disaster in a frantic evacuation from Spain at Corunna in January 1809, a retreat famous for the death of their commander, Sir John Moore. Wellington secured a bloody victory at Talavera in July 1809, but this was followed by retreat to Lisbon as Anglo-Spanish cooperation disintegrated. France’s Marshal Massena returned in strength to Portugal in 1810, commanding on Napoleon’s behalf, ‘a vast army’ of around 100,000 men.10 It was a force designed to crush British and Portuguese resistance once and for all. Instead, it ground to a halt against the Lines of Torres Vedras: thirty miles of defences stretching from the Atlantic to the north of Lisbon.11 These formidable defences were coupled with a scorched earth policy that removed all food sources, population and livestock from the French advance, directly targeting their ability to sustain. The French Army relied to a large extent on predatory logistics rather than magazines or lines of supply, meaning they had no means to instigate an alternative supply system before the 1810 winter set in. The result, after Marshal Massena’s Army had suffered a terrible winter in Portugal, followed by a desperate retreat into Spain from February 1811, was the loss of 30,000 French troops and the costliest defeat of Napoleon’s armies to date. This not only undermined French military morale but also offered hope to Napoleon’s enemies.

Supply The expulsion of Marshal Massena’s Army from Portugal in early 1811 proved Wellington’s view of French logistic weakness to be accurate. Wellington outlined to his brother, Henry, in the summer of 1811, how the slow strangulation of French resources would continue in Spain with a focus on their supply: “We have already, in some degree, altered the nature of the war and of the French military system.

They are now in a great measure on the defensive, and are carrying on a war of magazines. They will soon, if they have not already, come upon the resources of France; and, as soon as that is the case, you may depend upon it the war will not last long.”12

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Wellington draws reference to the French reliance upon magazines, or depots, to illustrate their ĐļįǘĉƪŒƢļėƖɆļŝɆƢķėɆ ėŝļŝƖƪŒëƎșɆ¶ķļƖɆļƖɆļŝɆĉŨŝƢƎëƖƢɆƢŨɆƢķėɆ typical French system of provisioning, via requisitions.

The latter had enabled the blitzkrieg of its age in central Europe; short campaigns conducted at speed, not prolonged occupation with massed, static armies as in Spain. Requisitioning had clear tactical ëĐǁëŝƢëİėƖɆļŝɆƖƪƋƋŒLjțɆDƎėŝĉķɆëƎśļėƖɆĉŨƪŒĐɆĈėɆǙėLJļĈŒėȚɆ without reliance upon depots, and seizure of local produce came at minimal cost. The disadvantage, as borne out in the Peninsular, was incitement of increasing partisan resistance, weakening already fragile French supply lines as they were attacked by guerrillas. This meant that French armies were often unable to concentrate force or mount operations of ƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆĐƪƎëƢļŨŝɆĐƪėɆƢŨɆėLJƢėŝĐėĐɆƖƪƋƋŒLjɆŒļŝėƖșɆ One such example was at Salamanca in November 1812, when superior numbers of French declined battle in the pursuit of Wellington’s Army from Madrid to Portugal. The limitation was recognised by the French, Marshal Jourdan highlighting to Napoleon ƢķëƢɆŒëĉŏɆŨįɆƢƎëŝƖƋŨƎƢɆëŝĐɆļŝƖƪįǘĉļėŝƢɆśëİëǒļŝėƖɆ ǂėƎėɆĉƎļƢļĉëŒɆŨƋėƎëƢļŨŝëŒɆĐėǘĉļėŝĉļėƖș13 The remedy, however, would require withdrawing French armies back from covering all of Spain’s distant provinces, a consideration unpalatable to Napoleon. For Wellington, if the French were forced to use their own national resources, they would not only have to cede territory in Spain but also quickly lose domestic support in France. Exploiting French logistic weakness through targeted offensive operations at isolated armies was the backbone of his campaign plan.

The British Army, unlike the French, favoured the magazine system. This suited both the British soldier, culturally accustomed to plentiful provisions, and the British way of warfare, operating in allied countries ëŝĐɆǂļƢķɆƋŒėŝƢļįƪŒɆǘŝëŝĉėƖɆƢŨɆƋƪƎĉķëƖėɆƖƪƋƋŒļėƖș14 Operations in Portugal were also aided by naval transports stockpiling provisions and materiel; by 1812 there were seven months of provisions held in Lisbon.15 Hence, the Anglo-Portuguese Army was well served behind the Lines of Torres Vedras to attrite the French after their invasion in 1810, as one commissary described: “Covered as we were by the lines, and with the stores of Lisbon at our disposal, we could calmly await events, and meanwhile harass the French piecemeal as they ranged the country in search of victuals.”16 However, if Lisbon’s magazines secured supply behind the defensive lines of Torres Vedras, they did not facilitate cross-border operations. In March 1811, the pursuit of Marshal Massena’s Army into Spain ground to a halt after just ten days as Wellington’s Army reached exhaustion. This was exacerbated by the British requirement to support the Portuguese, of whom 2,500 fell behind for want of provisions.17 Without extending the magazine system into Spain, Wellington was unable to mount lasting offenses; operations in Albuera and Badajoz in 1811 in the western edge of Spain were also plagued by shortages of materiel and provisions. In 1812 the line of communication was extended to an intermediary depot in Salamanca but beyond this the advance to Madrid and Burgos, in central and northern Spain, were not supported by established magazines.

Instead, local purchase was used for provisions, but

THE REVIEW 2022 | 27

8 HISTORICAL as shall be seen, this had limitations. The onset of winter in 1812 reduced the availability of forage and disrupted transportation. The impact on the retreat from Burgos was such that Wellington had to quell proposals to introduce forced requisitioning.18 Yet this order amounted to little: soldiers were, in the words of one, “killing and slaying, and capturing our daily bread”19 in order to survive without rations. Inadequate supply in 1812 caused disintegration of discipline and halted the potential of further exploitation beyond the victory at Salamanca in July. Lessons learned for the decisive year in 1813 included the establishment of magazines that extended to Palencia, in northern Spain, and supply shipments to Santander.

8 The Royal Waggon Train 1812

Transportation Whilst challenging, provisioning was less problematic than transportation. Wellington inherited an army that had no integral transport, beyond an inadequate Waggon Train that was eventually used to evacuate casualties. This meant that the commissariat had little option but to contract.20 Three transport echelons were organised: Regimental mules, Divisional mules and a third echelon of bullock carts plus, where feasible, river boats to ship supplies.21 The gradual emergence of the Divisional mule train was Wellington’s innovation, a system that became established by late 1811 and enabled, at least to a degree, a switch to the offensive.22 The disadvantage of these transport echelons was regulating the Army to the speed of a mule train if it wanted to harmonise manoeuvre with supply. Determining credible lines of communication for troop movement and supplies were further facilitated by the Quartermaster General’s cartographic services across the Peninsular, an essential resource in countries lacking collective mapping, and one that would support the Army’s advance through the north of Spain in 1813 – much to the surprise of the French.23 Beyond these śėëƖƪƎėƖȚɆƋėƎķëƋƖɆśŨƖƢɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆƢŨɆėǁėŝƢƪëŒɆ operational success, was the establishment and maintenance of sea lines of communication, a way in which Britain demonstrated its aptitude to harness sea power and partially transfer it into land power.

Importing supplies into the Peninsular was vital, ļŝĉŒƪĐļŝİɆįŨƎɆėLJëśƋŒėɆǫǣǣȚǣǣǣɆĈëƎƎėŒƖɆŨįɆǙŨƪƎɆļŝɆ 1811 and half the Army’s forage.24 As mentioned, seizure of ports in northern Spain was equally ƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢȚɆ ŨƎƪŝŝëɆëĉƢļŝİɆëƖɆëɆĐėƋŨƢɆįƎŨśɆǤǫǣǬȚɆ

28 | THE REVIEW 2022

initially in support of partisans, and then Santander being captured in August 1812. The latter was only įƪŒŒLjɆėLJƋŒŨļƢėĐɆļŝɆǤǫǤǦȚɆĈƪƢɆļƢɆǂëƖɆƢķļƖɆƢķëƢɆǘŝ댌LjɆ delivered the agility to extend operations far beyond the Portuguese border, more so than all the efforts of logistic support by land. Whilst transportation steadily improved, it never fully resolved the problem of over-extended supply lines which severely limited offensive operations.

Finance In administrative support, the commissariat also ëļĐėĐɆÕėŒŒļŝİƢŨŝɆǂļƢķɆǘŝëŝĉėșɆEƪļĐëŝĉėɆƢŨɆ ƎļƢļƖķɆ commissaries stated: “The sinews of war are money, and without it the parts of an Army cannot hold together.”25 Wellington agreed, dedicating so many dispatches to the issue it has been suggested that, “a casual glance through his correspondence would at times prompt one to imagine that he thought of little else”26. Operations were extremely expensive, the cost of the British Army effectively doubling from £20,000,000 in 1808 to over £40,000,000 in 1812.27 The strategic context was also problematic: the British war chest was repeatedly empty in 18101812, with payments demanded not just in the ėŝļŝƖƪŒëƎɆĈƪƢɆëŒƖŨɆƢŨɆƖƋŨŝƖŨƎɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢɆļŝɆ¡ƪƖƖļëɆëŝĐȚɆ from 1812, in America. Gold or silver bullion, known as specie, was in short supply, a challenge for an army that sought to purchase supplies and contract transportation, especially when on the move.

A major source of funding therefore became the sale of Treasury bills in Lisbon. However, Wellington was averse to relying upon this method as it was too unpredictable to sustain offensive operations.28 Often, this meant that his Army was operating on credit, another risk to operations should tolerance amongst suppliers expire. Wellington noted as early as January 1810 that, “nothing can now be procured without ready money”.29 Finance was clearly a constraint, but opinion is divided over its impact on operations. Napier suggests that the strain of debt in the summer of 1812 affected Wellington’s command, lack of money to fund operations becoming, “almost intolerable”.30 Wellington had complained to ministers ļŝɆėëƎŒLjɆǤǫǤǥɆƢķëƢɆëɆƖķŨƎƢëİėɆŨįɆǘŝëŝĉėɆƢķƎėëƢėŝėĐɆƢŨɆ ruin opportunity. He wrote: “It is not improbable that we may not be able to take advantage of the enemy’s comparative weakness in this campaign for the want of money.”31 Yet the subsequent advance appeared ŒļƢƢŒėɆƢƎŨƪĈŒėĐɆĈLjɆŒëĉŏɆŨįɆǘŝëŝĉėɆļįɆŌƪĐİėĐɆĈLjɆǁļĉƢŨƎLjɆëƢɆ Salamanca in July and liberation of Madrid in August 1812. It may be closer to the truth that Wellington was crying wolf in order to boost his resources.32 However, with soldier wages two months in arrears in July 1812, and payment to muleteers six months behind, Wellington had reason to highlight concerns, even if they did not prove militarily decisive.33 QįɆǘŝëŝĉėɆǂëƖɆëŝɆļŝƢƎëĉƢëĈŒėɆļƖƖƪėɆļŝɆƢķėɆĉëśƋëļİŝȚɆ Wellington did secure some reprieve in the winter of 1812-1813, courtesy of a government release of national gold reserves, which delivered a monthly subsidy of at least £100,000.34 This bullion arrived at exactly the moment Wellington was reconstituting his Army for decisive offensive operations in 1813.

LėëŒƢķļėƎɆǘŝëŝĉļëŒɆƎėƖŨƪƎĉėƖȚɆĉŨśĈļŝėĐɆǂļƢķɆ improvements in logistic support, meant sustainment was the bedrock of subsequent operational success.

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HISTORICAL 8 Manpower Manpower, in reinforcements and replacements, as well as force health protection through mitigation of sickness, was another prominent facet of administration. Through political persuasion, as well as gradual achievement of strategic objectives, manpower steadily increased during the campaign. In the summer of 1810, the British Army numbered around 31,000, supplemented by 26,000 Portuguese.35 The paucity of this force can be compared to the expectation of Marshal Massena’s French invasion of Portugal with 100,000 men.

Wellington mitigated his understrength army with the addition of 45,000 Portuguese militia to man the Lines of Torres Vedras, freeing the Anglo-Portuguese army to focus on counter-attacks.36 A year later, in July 1811, the British strength stood at 35,000, where it would stay for the remainder of 1811.37 This demonstrated the necessity of alliance for the British Army, without which it would be unable to mount ƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆŨƋėƎëƢļŨŝƖɆļŝɆ©ƋëļŝșɆ,ǁėŝɆƖŨȚɆÕėŒŒļŝİƢŨŝȼƖɆ forces in summer 1812 only numbered around 65,000, compared to over 300,000 French.38 Capability gaps went further than manpower alone. A shortage of artillery, due to the challenge of shipping ordnance from Britain, had operational impact in the failed sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz in 1811, and Burgos in 1812. Cavalry was also inferior to the DƎėŝĉķȚɆǂļƢķɆķŨƎƖėƖɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢɆƢŨɆƢƎëŝƖƋŨƎƢɆĈLjɆƖėëɆĐƪėɆ to poor conditions and risk to horses during loading and off-loading.39 This capability gap may have contributed to poor pursuits of Marshal Massena in 1811, and the French Army of the North after the stunning victory at Salamanca in 1812. Preservation of the force was paramount as replacement of losses was not guaranteed.

8 Pennant of the French 62nd Regiment of the Line captured at Salamanca, 1812

Force Health Protection This concern accounts for Wellington’s preference for winter quarters, which he used to sustain his Army in 1810, 1811 and 1812. This limited the impact of sickness, which weakened the Army in winter: in October 1811 some 17,000 were sick,40 with even śŨƎėɆƢķėɆįŨŒŒŨǂļŝİɆLjėëƎɆëįƢėƎɆƢķėɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢɆƎėƢƎėëƢɆ from Spain back into Portugal. Winter quarters had a regenerative effect through provisions, clothing, medical care and training. Wellington stated that his Army would “never be stronger” after the winter of 1812-1813.41 From operations conducted in 1812, Wellington also learned to introduce tents in place of bivouacs in 1813 as another form of force health protection for an army on the march. In the

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autumn rains, after an unsuccessful siege at Burgos in Spain, soldiers had suffered, “lying out on the sod in all weather, like any other wild beasts”.42 Due to strategic limitations in manpower availability, Wellington’s soldiers were a critical resource which he had to preserve by looking after their health.

8 'Bivouac in the Pyrenees, the night before the Battle', 1813

Summary In conclusion, despite a reputation of mastery of logistics,43 Wellington was unable to escape the constraints of the British magazine system and inadequate transportation during the switch to offensive operations in 1811-1812. Logistic support was effective in static operations in Portugal but came under continual strain beyond the Portuguese borders. Some scholars have argued that problems of supply were never resolved, but simply “ameliorated and endured”.44 However, this does not fully account for the hand Wellington was dealt. By adapting the magazine system from Lisbon to Santander in 1813, ëŝĐɆļŝǙƪėŝĉļŝİɆëŝɆļŝĉƎėëƖėɆļŝɆǘŝëŝĉėɆļŝɆŒëƢėɆǤǫǤǥȚɆ ķļƖɆ ƎśLjɆǂëƖɆļŝɆëɆƋŨƖļƢļŨŝɆƢŨɆǘŝ댌LjɆƖƪƖƢëļŝɆėLJƢėŝĐėĐɆ offensive operations. Wellington was also guided by his overriding objective to preserve the British Army and in this he never faltered, demonstrating optimal use of resources. If Britain was acting at its limits of money and manpower, so too were the French Armies, weakened by an extended war of attrition that did not suit their system of sustainment. This, Wellington recognised and exploited.

Overall, sustainment of the force proved as fundamental to operational success as any tactical victory – a lesson of relevance to military planners ƢŨĐëLjșɆÕėɆśļİķƢɆƎėǙėĉƢɆƢķëƢɆƢķėɆĉƪƎƎėŝƢɆ ƎļƢļƖķɆ ƎśLjɆ may be equally challenged by limited transportation in operational deployment and resupply at reach.

In-theatre stockpiles, as per the magazine depot system in Portugal and Spain, remain common practice; despite a focus on being lean and agile, we still require the ability to shift large quantities of resource as operations develop. This creates a critical weakness of assured inter-theatre lines of communication, upon which our resiliency depends.

And, although in the Peninsular, it was the French who suffered from their dependency on the local community, modern operations may also take risk with assumed Host Nation Support without

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8 HISTORICAL recognising that the presence of an expeditionary force can create animosity and resistance; an assumed strength may become a weakness. Sound logistics and administration were essential in the Peninsular, areas which Wellington recognised and endeavoured to improve to lever advantages over his enemy. This case study suggests that they merit being at the centre of the British Army’s model of campaigning rather than simply supporting other activities as presently depicted in joint doctrine.

Bibliography Bell, George (1867) Rough Notes of an Old Soldier: During Fifty Years’ Service, Volume 7. London: Day and Son Limited.

Davies, Huw J. (2012) Wellington's Wars: The Making of a Military Genius. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Esdaile, Charles J. (2003) The Peninsular War: A New History. London: Penguin Gates, David. (2002) The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War. London: Pimlico Hall, Christopher D. (1999) British strategy in the Napoleonic War 1803-15. Manchester: Manchester University Press Hall, Christopher. (1992) Wellington’s Navy: Sea Power and the Peninsular War, 1807-1814. Manchester: Manchester University Press Jomini, Antoine Henri de. (1996) The Art of War. London: Greenhill Books Land Warfare Centre. (2017) Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) Land Operations. Warminster: Land Warfare Development Centre Le Mesurier, Havilland. (1801) The British Commissary: In Two Parts. A system for the British Commissariat on foreign service. An essay towards ascertaining the use and duties of a commissariat in England, Parts 1-2.

Oxford: Oxford University Page, Anthony. “The Seventy Years War, 1744-1815, and Britain’s Fiscal-Naval State.” In War & Society, vol. 34, no.

3, 162-186.

Ministry of Defence. (2019) AJP 5: Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations. Version 2. London: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre Ministry of Defence, Defence in a Competitive Age (2021), ƋșǨșɆɆ ǁëļŒëĈŒėɆëƢțɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦëƖƖėƢƖșƋƪĈŒļƖķļŝİșƖėƎǁļĉėșİŨǁșƪŏȦ İŨǁėƎŝśėŝƢȦƪƋŒŨëĐƖȦƖLjƖƢėśȦƪƋŒŨëĐƖȦëƢƢëĉķśėŝƢȶĐëƢëȦ ǘŒėȦǬǪǧǩǩǤȦ ǧǤǤȶȯ$ėįėŝĉėȶ ŨśśëŝĐȶ ŒëŝșƋĐįɆ (Accessed 20 August 2021).

Moon, Joshua. (2011) Wellington’s Two-Front War: The Peninsular Campaigns, at Home and Abroad, 1808-1814.

Norman: University of Oklahoma Press Muir, Rory. (2001) Salamanca 1812. Suffolk: Yale University Press Muir, Rory. (2013) Wellington: The Path to Victory, 17691814. New Haven: Yale University Press Napier, William. (1862) History of the War in the Peninsular, Volumes I-VI. New York, Middleton Oman, Charles. (1911) A History of the Peninsular War, Volume IV. Oxford: Clarendon Page, Anthony. (2015) “The Seventy Years War, 1744-1815, and Britain’s Fiscal-Naval State.” In War & Society, vol.

34, no. 3, 162-186.

Pearce, Eva, A history of transporting horses. Available ëƢțɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșśƪƖėƪśŨįƢķėķŨƎƖėșŨƎİȦëȯķļƖƢŨƎLjȯŨįȯ ƢƎëŝƖƋŨƎƢļŝİȯķŨƎƖėƖȦɆȩ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǣɆ ƪİƪƖƢɆǥǣǥǤȪșɆ Robertson, Ian. (2008) A Commanding Presence: Wellington in the Peninsula, 1808-1814: Logistics, Strategy, Survival.

Stroud: Spellmount

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Schaumann, August Ludolf Friedrich. (2009) On the road with Wellington: the diary of a war commissary in the Peninsular Campaigns. East Sussex: Naval & Military Press Van Creveld, Martin. (1977) Supplying War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Ward, S.G.P. (1957) Wellington's Headquarters; a Study of the Administrative Problems in the Peninsula, 1809-1814.

London: Oxford UP Wellesley, Arthur and John Gurwood, ed. (1834) The Dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, during His Various Campaigns in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, the Low Countries, and France. From 1799 to 1818.

London: John Murray, Wellesley, Arthur and Arthur Richard Wellesley, ed. (1860) The Supplementary Dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, Volume 7. London: John Murray

Endnotes Wellington to Liverpool, 2nd April 1810, “The Dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington” (WD), Vol. VI (London: Murray, 1834), p.5.

2 Arthur Wellesley received the title of Viscount Wellington in 1809 and was raised to Duke in May 1814. He will be referred to as Wellington throughout.

3 Ministry of Defence, Defence in a Competitive Age (2021, nëƎĉķȪȚɆƋșǨșɆɆ ǁëļŒëĈŒėɆëƢțɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦëƖƖėƢƖșƋƪĈŒļƖķļŝİșƖėƎǁļĉėș İŨǁșƪŏȦİŨǁėƎŝśėŝƢȦƪƋŒŨëĐƖȦƖLjƖƢėśȦƪƋŒŨëĐƖȦëƢƢëĉķśėŝƢȶ ĐëƢëȦǘŒėȦǬǪǧǩǩǤȦ ǧǤǤȶȯ$ėįėŝĉėȶ ŨśśëŝĐȶ ŒëŝșƋĐįɆ (Accessed 20 August 2021).

4 UK MoD, AJP 5: Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations, version 2, (London: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, May 2019), 4-56.

5 Land Warfare Centre, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) Land Operations (Warminster: Land Warfare Development Centre, 2017), 10-1.

6 Jomini, Antoine Henri de, The Art of War (London: Greenhill Books, 1996), p. 69.

7 Ibid, p. 254.

8 Van Creveld, Martin, Supplying War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 1.

9 Ibid, p. 231.

10 Gates, David, The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War (London: Pimlico, 2002), p. 220.

11 Moon, Joshua, Wellington’s Two-Front War: The Peninsular Campaigns, at Home and Abroad, 1808-1814 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011), p. 56.

12 Wellington to Henry Wellesley, 29th August 1811, WD, Vol VIII, p. 246.

13 Gates, The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War (London: Pimlico, 2002), p.308.

14 Ward, S.G.P., Wellington's Headquarters; a Study of the Administrative Problems in the Peninsula, 1809-1814 (London: Oxford UP, 1957), p.70.

15 Ibid, p.83.

16 Schaumann, August Ludolf Friedrich, On the road with Wellington: the diary of a war commissary in the Peninsular Campaigns (East Sussex: Naval & Military Press, 2009), p.275.

17 Oman, Charles, A History of the Peninsular War, Volume IV (Oxford: Clarendon, 1911), p.199.

18 Napier, William, History of the War in the Peninsular, Volume V (New York, Middleton, 1862), p.,398.

19 Bell, George, Rough Notes of an Old Soldier: During Fifty Years’ Service, Volume 7 (London: Day and Son Limited, 1867), p. 66.

20 Hall, Christopher D., British strategy in the Napoleonic War 1803-15 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), p. 35.

1

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HISTORICAL 8 Ward, Wellington's Headquarters, p. 85.

Ibid, p. 91.

23 Ibid, p. 108.

24 Muir, Rory, Wellington: The Path to Victory, 1769-1814 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), p. 438.

25 Le Mesurier, Havilland, The British Commissary: In Two Parts. A system for the British Commissariat on foreign service. An essay towards ascertaining the use and duties of a commissariat in England, Parts 1-2 (Oxford: Oxford University, 1801), p.42.

26 Hall, Christopher, Wellington’s Navy: Sea Power and the Peninsular War, 1807-1814 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), p.130.

27 Page, Anthony, “The Seventy Years War, 1744-1815, and Britain’s Fiscal-Naval State,” in War & Society, vol. 34, no. 3, Jul 2015, p.176.

28 Moon, Joshua, Wellington’s Two-Front War: The Peninsular Campaigns, at Home and Abroad, 1808-1814 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011), p.104.

29 Wellington to Liverpool, 24 Jan 1810, WD, Vol V, p.447.

30 Napier, History of the War in the Peninsular, Volume V, p.364.

31 Wellington to Liverpool, 22 April 1812, Supplementary Dispatches of Field Marshal The Duke of Wellington, Vol VII, p.319.

32 Esdaile, Charles, The Peninsular War: A New History (London: Penguin, 2003), p.390.

33 Hall, Wellington’s Navy, p.130.

Gates, The Spanish Ulcer, p.375.

Esdaile, The Peninsular War, p.319.

36 Ibid.

37 Muir, Wellington: The Path to Victory, p.437.

38 Muir, Rory, Salamanca 1812 (Suffolk: Yale University Press, 2001), p.3-5.

39 Pearce, Eva, A history of transporting horses. Available ëƢțɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșśƪƖėƪśŨįƢķėķŨƎƖėșŨƎİȦëȯķļƖƢŨƎLjȯŨįȯ ƢƎëŝƖƋŨƎƢļŝİȯķŨƎƖėƖȦɆȩ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǣth August 2021).

40 Muir, Wellington: The Path to Victory, p.437.

41 Wellington to Bathurst, 11 May 1813, WD, Vol IX, p.574.

42 Bell, Rough Notes of an Old Soldier, p.67.

43 Robertson, Ian, A Commanding Presence: Wellington in the Peninsula, 1808-1814: Logistics, Strategy, Survival (Stroud: Spellmount, 2008), 11.

44 Davies, Huw J., Wellington's Wars: The Making of a Military Genius (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 176.

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8 HISTORICAL

What were the German Army’s logistic capabilities and failures during WW2?

2Lt Gabriel Thomas explores Germany’s logistic methodology utilising selected theatres of operation and four designated criteria together with an assessment of the reliance on technological innovation and its consequences during the Battle of Stalingrad

To understand how German land power was exercised, the philosophy of Blitzkrieg is also analysed together with the attitude adopted by the Wehrmacht to sustainment.

The stereotype of the German Army during the Second World War is one of immense speed and ferocity, utilising innovative equipment to blast holes in the western European and Russian fronts. What is less discussed is the immense logistical issues that were created as a result of these tactics and the vast logistical supply routes that had to be traversed.

The German methodology of Blitzkrieg (lightening war), although revolutionary, was fundamentally in its infancy, and logistics were not at the forefront of commanders’ minds.

Blitzkrieg stems from the development of the theory of Kesselschlacht (Pisano, 1990), which directly translates to “cauldron battle” but is more widely accepted as a form of rapid encirclement, a manoeuvre widely used in Blitzkreig operations.

Kesselschlacht was developed by Von Moltke in ƢķėɆśļĐɆėļİķƢėėŝƢķɆĉėŝƢƪƎLjɆëŝĐɆļƖɆǘƎśŒLjɆįŨĉƪƖėĐɆŨŝɆ manoeuvre strategy. In its earliest iterations, logistical considerations are not even mentioned. Von Moltke recognised this omission however and expanded his narrative to suggest the need for logistical planning (Addington, The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth ėŝƢƪƎLjȚɆǤǬǫǧȚɆƋșɆǤǩǧȪȚɆƖƋėĉļǘĉ댌LjɆƎėįėƎėŝĉļŝİɆ sustainment in the 1866 Austro-Prussian War where supplies were carried initially by steam trains and then horse drawn wagons. The issue quickly arises in the disparity between these two forms of load carriage. As the front line pushed further from rail heads, wagons were forced to cover the extended lines of communication as rail lines could not be built fast enough. The rail heads then became bottlenecks, grinding the advance to a halt (Addington, The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff, 1971, p.

42). This issue was largely discounted by the German military who believed the situation was temporal ļŝɆŝëƢƪƎėɆëŝĐɆǂŨƪŒĐɆĈėɆƎėĉƢļǘėĐɆǂļƢķɆƢķėɆǘėŒĐļŝİɆ of new types of technology. With the advent of the combustion engine, the German High Command believed the rail head bottlenecks would be eliminated, although they failed to take into account the need for maintenance and fuel (Pisano, 1990).

It is important to note the term Kesselschlacht has been subsumed into what is now known as Blitzkrieg doctrine - which also omits any credible logistical planning considerations. This ommission was largely overlooked in Germany’s early campaigns

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in Poland and the Low Countries, as the Wehrmacht, supported by the Luftwaffe, were operating on good roads in favourable weather with limited wear to vehicles over reasonably short distances. The other major logistical advantage during the initial stages ŨįɆƢķėɆǂëƎɆǂëƖɆƢķëƢɆƢķėɆEėƎśëŝƖɆĈėŝėǘƢƢėĐɆįƎŨśɆƢķėɆ relatively short duration of their offensive operations.

Apart from combat supplies, the bulk of which could ĈėɆĉëƎƎļėĐɆĈLjɆƢķėɆǘİķƢļŝİɆėĉķėŒŨŝƖȚɆƢķėɆÕėķƎśëĉķƢȼƖɆ range and depth of inventory could be kept to a minimum. During longer attritional engagements, such as Stalingrad (November 1942 – January 1943), the paucity of logistic support undermined any mobile offensive actions above the tactical level.

Gukeisen recognised that, “For the German military, one constraint was the assumption that a Blitzkrieg would last about a month, and German logistical ƋŒëŝŝļŝİɆƎėǙėĉƢėĐɆƢķļƖɆëƖƖƪśƋƢļŨŝșȺɆȩǥǣǣǨȚɆƋșǥǪȪɆ This narrow logistic focus was exposed across the Russian front where, according to Citino, ‘a way of war that had been designed to win short, sharp ĉëśƋëļİŝƖɆļŝɆƢķėɆĉŨƖLjɆĉŨŝǘŝėƖɆŨįɆǂėƖƢėƎŝɆ,ƪƎŨƋėȚɆëɆ prosperous region with a highly developed economy and communications infrastructure, found itself very far from home.’ (2007, p.34).

Another legacy weakness of German logistic doctrine was its heavy reliance on rail for its distribution of materiel. This mode of transport was ill-suited to supporting high tempo operations ǂķļĉķɆƎėŒļėĐɆŨŝɆśëŝŨėƪǁƎėȚɆĉŨƪƋŒėĐɆƢŨɆǘƎėƋŨǂėƎɆëƢɆ selected points, to overmatch superior opposition.

Strategically and operationally, the German economy, the Nazi industrial complex, military structure and doctrine were all misaligned and unable to meet the demands of Blitzkrieg. Even at the beginning of the war, the Reich was blessed with coal for trains rather than petroleum products for panzer formations (Winchester, 2002). Adapting a manoeuvrist ëƋƋƎŨëĉķɆƢŨɆƎëļŒɆĉëƋëĈļŒļƢļėƖɆǂëƖɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢȚɆĐƪėɆ in large part to the limitation on routes and the variation of rail sizes throughout Europe (IWM, n.d.). ƖɆëɆĉŨŝƖėƍƪėŝĉėɆŨįɆƢķėƖėɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆƖķŨƎƢį댌ƖȚɆ the advancing troops were expected to sustain themselves until they captured the next rail head where they could be resupplied (Citino, 2004, p.9).

This issue did not feature during the early stages of the war but as strategic and operational plans were ĐėǁėŒŨƋėĐɆįŨƎɆŝėǂɆƢķėëƢƎėƖȚɆƢķėɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉɆǙëǂƖɆƖķŨƪŒĐɆ have been obvious to the planners (Gukeisen, 2005). ©ļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆļƖƖƪėƖɆǂļƢķɆƢķėɆƋƎėƋëƎëƢļŨŝƖɆëŝĐɆ sustainment of Blitzkrieg offensives started to arise

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© IWM STT 6985

© IWM E 4061E

with Operation Barbarossa (21 June 1941) – the German invasion of Russia. The Russians, initially surprised by the offensive, despite being forewarned, eventually put up much stiffer resistance than the Heer had experienced in western Europe.

This resulted in a much more challenging attritional contest for the Germans who were committed to capturing the vital rail heads needed for their sustainment. Forced from a war of movement to one of position, the result was a severe lack of critical materiel as the German Army was stretched much further than was feasible to sustain for any ƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆƢļśėșɆÕļƢķŨƪƢɆƎëļŒɆķėëĐƖɆĉŒŨƖėɆƢŨɆƢķėļƎɆ front, the Germans were forced to return to their Kesselschlacht roots, relying on road transport travelling to and from the front line on 250-mile loops. Without adequate organic transport assets, a myriad of captured vehicles, supplemented with military specials, were rapidly pressed into service.

However, even military specials such as the Opel Blitz 3.6-ton truck, the work horse of the Wehrmacht, were forced to operate at the maximum range of 250 miles (Chanter, 2009). With such limited range and only 12 hours of driving time, there was no margin for error (Chanter, 2009). Ultimately, Blitzkrieg was a revolutionary methodology which failed to consider the logistical strains involved in conducting high tempo operations across diverse and challenging environments. The German Army undoubtably failed to learn from the issues that plagued their predecessors during Kesselschlacht’s infancy which, combined with the general adverse attitude of the Army towards ŒŨİļƖƢļĉƖȚɆĉŨŝƖļİŝėĐɆƢķėļƎɆǘİķƢļŝİɆėĉķėŒŨŝƖɆƢŨɆįëļŒƪƎėɆ once battles became attritional in nature.

At best, logistic considerations across the majority of the Wehrmacht were mixed in their analysis and credible application. The pervading attitude across the military hierarchy was that logistics constituted operational constraints rather than freedoms. Many EėƎśëŝɆŨįǘĉėƎƖɆĉŨŝƖļĐėƎėĐɆƢķėɆƍƪëƎƢėƎśëƖƢėƎɆƎŨŒėȚɆ together with those associated with the function, to be unattractive and potentially cowardly due to its detachment from the front line. As such, logistic roles were generally avoided and given to lower-quality ŨįǘĉėƎƖɆǂķļĉķȚɆļŝɆƢƪƎŝȚɆƋƎŨĐƪĉėĐɆƋŨŨƎɆƎėƖƪŒƢƖɆȩ ļƢļŝŨȚɆ 2005, p. 428). This narrow-minded approach was particularly evident in the actions of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel during the North African Campaign (10th Jun 1940 – 16th May 1943). This desert war ƋƎŨĐƪĉėĐɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆëŝĐɆƪŝļƍƪėɆĉķ댌ėŝİėƖɆŨŝɆśėŝɆ and materiel compared to the European theatre.

Higher demands for water, faster degradation of

8 Opel Blitz Type A truck

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vehicles and the additional specialist maintenance requirements for weapons systems made the application of Blitzkrieg increasingly challenging.

Rommel was known for his “bias for action” and renowned for locating himself where the heaviest ǘİķƢļŝİɆŨĉĉƪƎƎėĐɆȩ©ƢŨŒǘȚɆǤǬǬǤȪșɆQŝɆśëŝLjɆǂëLjƖɆķėɆ acted autonomously and daringly; often as a Brigade ŨśśëŝĐėƎɆķėɆƖƢŨƎśėĐɆëķėëĐɆŨįɆķļƖɆǙëŝŏļŝİɆįŨƎĉėƖȚɆ turning off his radio to prevent the receipt of orders which may have countermanded his intent. He was ĐėƖĉƎļĈėĐɆëƖȚɆȹśŨƎėɆȭŨįȮɆëŝɆǤǫth Century hussar, cut loose on a raiding mission than a divisional commander,” (Citano, 2018). Although an inspiring military leader, his mentality was indicative of śėƎĉƪƎļëŒɆśŨƪŝƢėĐɆŨįǘĉėƎƖɆŨįɆƢķėɆƢļśėɆǂķŨɆİėŝėƎ댌LjɆ failed to contemplate the logistical implications of stretched supply lines (Vannoy, 2021). A good example of this was during one of his initial offences in early April 1941 when he pushed through from central Libya to Sollum and Ft Cupuzzo. Disobeying orders from Hitler, Rommel attacked a group of commonwealth soldiers who he deemed to be the weakest in the line and penetrated their defences. The result, although measured as a tactical success for the Germans, was a 700-mile line of communication that could not be maintained (Vannoy, 2021). Rommel’s laissez-faire attitude towards logistics not only encouraged a similar brashness with his immediate ƖƪĈŨƎĐļŝëƢėƖɆĈƪƢɆëŒƖŨɆƎėǙėĉƢėĐɆëɆƋƎėǁëļŒļŝİɆĐļƖƢëļŝɆ for sustainment considerations throughout the Wehrmacht. This institutionalised stance towards logistics should, to a degree, have been foiled by materiel standardisation which offered a semblance of inventory compliance and assurance to sustainment planning and execution.

The purpose behind the introduction of standards in fuel, ammunition and medical supplies, in the advent of the creation of NATO, was primarily to 댌ŨǂɆśëLJļśƪśɆĉŨśƋëƢļĈļŒļƢLjɆëŝĐɆǙėLJļĈļŒļƢLjɆëĉƎŨƖƖɆ allied formations. This uniformity is something that Germany in WW2 failed to achieve, exacerbated ĈLjɆƢķėɆǁëƖƢɆǙėėƢɆǁëƎļëŝƢƖɆŨįɆĉëƋƢƪƎėĐɆǁėķļĉŒėƖɆëŝĐɆ equipments pressed into service. This practice was so prevalent that captured tanks assumed their own designation - beutepanzers, (Budanovic, 2016).

This widely adopted predatory form of logistics

8 Erwin Rommel at a staff conference in the Western Desert

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8 HISTORICAL

Credit: Shutterstock

was initially instigated during the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1939. Due to necessity however it was extended as a national shortage of petroleum ƋƎŨĐƪĉƢƖɆśėëŝƢɆƢķëƢɆĈėķļŝĐɆƢķėɆƋëŝǒėƎȼƖɆǘİķƢļŝİɆ echelons, the majority of the Wehrmacht was reliant on horsepower (Holland, 2014). During the Western Campaign (10th May – 25th June 1940) alone, the German Army captured and integrated 691 British and 1,800 French tanks into their order of battle (Garraud, 2004). The result of this integration of beutepanzers was the inheritance of a complex range and scale of supporting inventory for a disparate ǙėėƢɆŨįɆǁėķļĉŒėƖɆëŝĐɆǂėëƋŨŝɆƖLjƖƢėśƖșɆnƪĉķɆŨįɆ ƢķļƖɆļŝǁėŝƢŨƎLjɆǂëƖɆƖƋėĉļǘĉɆƢŨɆƢķėɆǁėķļĉŒėȼƖɆĉŨƪŝƢƎLjɆ of origin and was near to impossible to sustain.

Subsequently, many of these beautepanzers were forced into reconnaissance and haulage roles due to limited stocks of ammunition and spares. This reliance on captured foreign inventory seriously hampered the German’s ability to maximise the potential of their nationally produced capabilities and ŨǁėƎŒLjɆĉŨśƋŒļĉëƢėĐɆƢķėļƎɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉƖșɆ¶ķėƖėɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆ logistic challenges were further complicated by the ƪŝƎėëŒļƖƢļĉɆƎėƖėëƎĉķɆëŝĐɆǘėŒĐļŝİɆŨįɆëŝɆŨǁėƎëĈƪŝĐëŝĉėɆ of innovative technologies.

8 A Soviet T-60

Because of a growing denial of the realities of Germany’s strategic situation from mid-1943, Hitler adopted an erroneous approach to the development and adoption of the Vergeltungswaffen (retaliation weapons). These weapon systems took the form of the V1 and V2 rockets and the V3, a longrange artillery piece (Hastings, 2015). The V2 was ƢķėɆǘƎƖƢɆėLJëśƋŒėɆŨįɆëŝɆļŝƢėƎȯĉŨŝƢļŝėŝƢëŒɆĈ댌ļƖƢļĉɆ missile – using some of the most sophisticated ƢėĉķŝŨŒŨİLjɆǘėŒĐėĐɆļŝɆƢķėɆǂëƎșɆÕķļŒƖƢɆƢķėLjɆǂėƎėɆ incredible pieces of technology, they were volatile to use and manufactured using slave labour in concentration camps (Thimm, 2006). The result was ëɆǘŝļƢėɆƋƎŨĐƪĉƢļŨŝɆĉëƋëĈļŒļƢLjɆǂļƢķɆŒļƢƢŒėɆƖƪƋƋŒLjɆĉķëļŝɆ resilience. The danger of using unskilled prisoners in the fabrication process resulted in 12,000 deaths in the manufacture of V2 missiles. The complete lack of spare inventory meant that the smallest issue would render the entire device useless. The ǂėëƋŨŝȼƖɆļŝƢƎŨĐƪĉƢļŨŝɆĐƪƎļŝİɆƢķėɆǘƎƖƢɆķëŒįɆŨįɆǤǬǧǧɆ ĉŨļŝĉļĐėĐɆǂļƢķɆEėƎśëŝLjɆėLJƋėƎļėŝĉļŝİɆƢķėɆǘŝëŝĉļëŒɆ ėįįėĉƢɆŨįɆǘǁėɆLjėëƎƖɆŨįɆǂëƎɆȩLëƖƢļŝİƖȚɆǥǣǤǨȪșɆdëĉŏɆŨįɆ ƖƋëƎėɆƋëƎƢƖɆƋƎŨĐƪĉėĐɆëɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆļƖƖƪėɆëƖɆĐëśëİėɆ during transit was common and the size and weight of both the V1 and V2 meant that in many ŒŨĉëƢļŨŝƖɆƢƎëļŝɆŒļŝėƖɆķëĐɆƢŨɆĈėɆŒëļĐɆĉŨŝƖƪśļŝİɆǘŝļƢėɆ

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resources. These civil engineering locations, with their distinctive signatures, become prime targets for both saboteurs and allied bombers (Rottman, 2013).

The vengeance programme is just one example where German technical innovation proved far too ambitious and exceeded their ability to sustain the capabilities. The logistic challenges that the vengeance projects presented were a microcosm of the wider sustainment problems Nazi Germany was experiencing by 1943-44. Lack of resilience across the entire supply chain, with no possibility of recovery due to a failing economy, not only undermined technical innovation but consigned the Heer to piecemeal defeat. This stark reality was epitomised by the defeat of the elite German Sixth Army at Stalingrad under General Friedrich von Paulus between 1st October 1942 and 2nd February 1943.

Whilst Stalingrad is infamous for its bitter urban ǘİķƢļŝİɆëŝĐɆƢķėɆļŝƢėŝƖėɆĈŨśĈļŝİɆŨįɆƢķėɆĉļƢLjȚɆǂķëƢɆ primarily comes to mind is the starvation and hypothermia that the beleaguered German force was subjected to. This was exacerbated after the Soviet counter-offensive, led by Marshal Vasili Zhukov’s 62nd Army, known as Operation Uranus, cut off Paulus’ Army and systematically annihilated it (Beevor, 1998). The fate of the Sixth Army was ultimately sealed when the commander of Army Group Don, Erich von Manstein, advised Hitler not to allow the 6th Army to attempt a break in whilst Goring was advising that he could supply Paulus’ force exclusively from the air (Millet, 2000). Such hubris compares to Rommel’s attitude to logistic risk during the North Africa campaign and not only suggests a degree of misplaced understanding of the situation but an overwhelming urge to impress Hitler. Four days after the co-ordinated Soviet counter attacks on 19 and 20 November, Paulus found himself at the end of a withered supply line desperately in need of rations, ammunition and winter clothing. Russian resilience across the whole eastern front undermined EėƎśëŝLjȼƖɆǘŝļƢėɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉƖɆǂķļĉķɆķëĐɆėƎƎŨŝėŨƪƖŒLjɆ aligned themselves to Hitler’s famous decree that they would be in Moscow in ten weeks (IWM, n.d.).

When the Wehrmacht crossed its Barbarossa line of departure, it was at the apogee of its logistic capabilities (Chandler, 1987). The attritional battle ƢķëƢɆėŝƖƪėĐɆėŝĐėĐɆëįƢėƎɆǘǁėɆśŨŝƢķƖɆŨįɆĈļƢƢėƎɆǘİķƢļŝİșɆɆ Whilst the cost to both sides was heavy, the Reich could not make good its losses where an estimated 100,000 German personnel had starved, were frozen or had been killed in action. A further 136,000 to 166,000 (Chandler, 1987, p. 207), (Glantz, 2002, pp. 468 - 469) were taken prisoner, of which, only 6,000 - 7,000 would ever make it home. The loss of personnel only partly revealed the deplorable state of the Wehrmacht’s logistics. The failures to adequately winterize vehicles, which could have enabled resupply and casualty evacuation, effectively rendered the panzer divisions single-shot formations (Palmer, 2010). This meant that as soon as conditions became wet and then frozen, vehicles simply could not ŨƋėƎëƢėɆëƖɆǙƪļĐƖɆįƎŨǒėȚɆƢLjƎėƖɆĉƎëĉŏėĐɆëŝĐɆƋŒëƢįŨƎśƖɆ became bogged in. The situation on the ground ĈėĉëśėɆƖŨɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢɆƢķëƢɆŌƪƖƢɆƋƎļŨƎɆƢŨɆ ëƪŒƪƖȼɆƖƪƎƎėŝĐėƎȚɆ the Quartermaster General of the Wehrmacht, Eduard Wagner, noted, "We are at the end of our resources in both personnel and materiel. We are

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about to be confronted with the dangers of deep winter,” (Chew, 1981). The proposed solution to this logistic debacle was the Stalingrad Airlift. Devised by Goring, the operational intent was to resupply troops from the air through the establishment of what he termed an “air bridge.” Even by the metrics of WW2, the task was unprecedented. With Soviet rail lines that were a different gauge to those in Germany (IWM, n.d.), supplies were either cross loaded at ƎëļŒķėëĐƖɆŨƎɆǙŨǂŝɆėŝŨƎśŨƪƖɆĐļƖƢëŝĉėƖɆȩ ĐëśȚɆǥǣǤǨȪɆ įƎŨśɆĈėķļŝĐɆEėƎśëŝɆŒļŝėƖșɆ¶ķėɆśŨƖƢɆįŨƎǂëƎĐɆëļƎǘėŒĐƖɆ in Tazinskaya were over 140 miles away (Whiting, ǤǬǪǫȚɆƋșɆǤǤǧȪɆëŝĐɆƢķėɆëŒƎėëĐLjɆŨǁėƎǂŨƎŏėĐɆëļƎɆǙėėƢɆ was quickly eroded. The unrealistic delivery forecasts also demonstrated an ignorance of the unpredictable ǂėëƢķėƎɆįŨƎɆǙLjļŝİɆǂļƢķɆƢķėɆŝŨǂɆŨĈǁļŨƪƖɆƎėƖƪŒƢɆƢķëƢɆ ƢķėƎėɆǂŨƪŒĐɆĈėɆëɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆƖķŨƎƢį댌ɆļŝɆĉƎļƢļĉëŒɆ supplies. There was a forecasted daily requirement for 700 tons of supplies with 500 tons as a bare minimum. Despite the doubts of his own staff, Goring ƋƎŨśļƖėĐɆƢŨɆǙLjɆļŝɆƢķėɆśļŝļśƪśɆĐëļŒLjɆƎėƍƪļƎėśėŝƢɆ (Overy, 2006, p.98). The outcome was as predictable ëƖɆļƢɆǂëƖɆƢƎëİļĉɆįŨƎɆƢķėɆĈėŒėëİƪėƎėĐɆįŨƎĉėșɆpŨɆǙLjɆĐëLjƖȚɆ ĐƪėɆƢŨɆƋŨŨƎɆǂėëƢķėƎȚɆĈëƎėŒLjɆƖėƎǁļĉėëĈŒėɆëļƎǘėŒĐƖȚɆ low aircraft availability as spares and specialist manpower, all contributed to an average of 85 tons a day reaching Stalingrad (Adam, 2015). The lessons learned can be extrapolated to the entire eastern front and are dominated by a lack of logistic foresight.

The German High Command fundamentally failed to accurately predict the length and intensity of the campaign and the resulting toll the Russian weather would have on man and machine. Given the German reliance on rail and the lack of supply chain resilience on land and in the air, credible options to mitigate the critical logistic shortcomings were non-existent.

In summary, the Werhmacht’s logistical capabilities in WW2 can be justifyably criticised. This is not

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© IWM BU 11149

8 Far Left: German personnel fitting the wings to a Fiesler Fi 103 flying bomb at a launching site Left: German V2 rocket at the moment of launch during Allied tests in Germany

ƢŨɆƖëLjɆƢķëƢɆƢķėļƎɆļŝļƢļëŒɆƋŒëŝƖɆǂėƎėɆëŒǂëLjƖɆǙëǂėĐȚɆ the issue was that they often failed to adhere to these plans and compromised on their logistic resilience to a degree where they were unable to react to changing situations. At the heart of these compromises were major structural issues within the Heer. These included a lack of standardisation which ensured every logistic function was overly complex - a lesson that has been learned with the creation of NATO and with it interoperability of ammunition, fuel and inventory databases to make them accessable to all alliance members. The Werhmacht’s reliance on innovative technologies, which could not be replaced or repaired due to its inherent complexity, also resigned much of the inventory to the irrelevant ĉëƢėİŨƎLjșɆ¶ķėƖėɆǙëǂėĐɆǂėëƋŨŝɆƖLjƖƢėśƖɆǂėƎėɆįƪƎƢķėƎɆ undermined by a lack of doctrinal, intellectual and physical investment in logistics, evidenced by the relatively poor quality of manning associated with all logistic functions. Within a modern battlegroup, ŒŨİļƖƢļĉëŒɆŒļëƖŨŝɆŨįǘĉėƎƖɆëƎėɆŝŨǂɆėśĈėĐĐėĐɆ 8 Russian soldiers hoist the Red Flag over a recaptured factory, Stalingrad

.© IWM (MOI) FLM 1501

© IWM CL 3431

HISTORICAL 8

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8 HISTORICAL throughout the chain of command and are expected to be consulted in the run up to any major action. If the Werhmacht had invested in selecting its logistic personnel and managed a closer integration of ŒŨİļƖƢļĉɆŨįǘĉėƎƖɆėëƎŒLjɆļŝɆƢķėļƎɆƋŒëŝŝļŝİɆĉLjĉŒėƖȚɆļƢɆļƖɆ likely that this would have gone some way to mitigate ƖŨśėɆŨįɆƢķėɆśŨƖƢɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆļƖƖƪėƖɆįëĉėĐɆļŝɆǁëƎļŨƪƖɆ theatres throughout the Second World War. Bibliography Adam, W. &. R. O., (2015). With Paulus at Stalingrad. s.l.:Pen and Sword Books.

Addington, L. H., 1(971). The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press .

Addington, L. H., (1984). The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century. Bloomington: Indiana University Press .

Beevor, A., (1998). Stalingrad. London: Viking Publishing.

Budanovic, N., (2016). Beutepanzer, How Nazi Germany Relied on Captured Military Vehicles To Continue The FightșɆȭ{ŝŒļŝėȮɆ ǁëļŒëĈŒėɆëƢțɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșǂëƎķļƖƢŨƎLjŨŝŒļŝėșĉŨśȦǂŨƎŒĐȯǂëƎȯ ļļȦĈėƪƢėƋëŝǒėƎȯķŨǂȯİėƎśëŝLjȯƎėŒļėĐȯŨŝȯĉëƋƢƪƎėĐȯśļŒļƢëƎLjȯ ǁėķļĉŒėƖȯǘİķƢȯLJșķƢśŒɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǩthɆ`ƪŒLjɆǥǣǥǤȮș Chandler, D., (1987). The Dictionary of Battle. New York: Henry Holt and Company. ķëŝƢėƎȚɆ șȚɆȩǥǣǣǬȪșɆbįǒșɆǦǣǨɆ ŒļƢǒșɆȭ{ŝŒļŝėȮɆ ǁëļŒëĈŒėɆëƢțɆ ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǥĐĈșĉŨśȦǁėķļĉŒėȶƖƋėĉșƋķƋȠƍɧǥǬǫɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆ 26thɆ`ƪŒLjɆǥǣǥǤȮș Chew, A. F., (1981). Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case Studies. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Citano, R., (2018). National WW2 MuseumșɆȭ{ŝŒļŝėȮɆɆ ǁëļŒëĈŒėɆëƢțɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșŝëƢļŨŝëŒǂǂǥśƪƖėƪśșŨƎİȦ ǂëƎȦëƎƢļĉŒėƖȦĐƎļǁėȯŝŨǂķėƎėȯśLjƢķȯëįƎļŏëȯŏŨƎƋƖȯǤǬǧǤȯǧǦɆ [Accessed 26thɆ`ƪŒLjɆǥǣǥǤȮș Citino, R. M., (2004). Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.

Citino, R. M., (2005). The German Way of War: From the Thirty Year's War to the Third Reich. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Cook, R., (2016). High Hitler: how Nazi drug abuse steered the course of history.Ɇȭ{ŝŒļŝėȮɆ ǁëļŒëĈŒėɆëƢțɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂș ƢķėİƪëƎĐļëŝșĉŨśȦĈŨŨŏƖȦǥǣǤǩȦƖėƋȦǥǨȦĈŒļƢǒėĐȯŝŨƎśëŝȯ ohler-adolf-hitler-nazi-drug-abuse-interview [Accessed 26thɆ`ƪŒLjɆǥǣǥǤȮș

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Garraud, P., (2004). LE RÔLE DE LA " DOCTRINE DÉFENSIVE " DANS LA DÉFAITE DE 1940: une explication trop simple et partielle. EƪėƎƎėƖɆnŨŝĐļëŒėƖɆėƢɆ ŨŝǙļƢƖɆ ŨŝƢėśƋŨƎëļŝƖȚ p. 97–123.

Glantz, D., (2002). The Battle for Leningrad. Kansas: University Press of Kansas.

Gukeisen, M. T. B., (2005). The Operational Art of Blitzkrieg: Its Strengths and Weaknesses in a Systems Perspective.

Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff.

Hastings, M., (2015). Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1944-1945. New York City: Vintage Publishing.

Holland, J., (2014). 10 Things You Probably Didnt Know About The Second World War.Ɇȭ{ŝŒļŝėȮɆ ǁëļŒëĈŒėɆëƢțɆ ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșķļƖƢŨƎLjėLJƢƎëșĉŨśȦƋėƎļŨĐȦƖėĉŨŝĐȯǂŨƎŒĐȯ ǂëƎȦǤǣȯƢķļŝİƖȯLjŨƪȯƋƎŨĈëĈŒLjȯĐļĐŝƢȯŏŝŨǂȯëĈŨƪƢȯƢķėȯ ƖėĉŨŝĐȯǂŨƎŒĐȯǂëƎȦɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǩthɆ`ƪŒLjɆǥǣǥǤȮș IWM, n.d. Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Failure in the Soviet UnionșɆȭ{ŝŒļŝėȮɆɆ ǁëļŒëĈŒėɆëƢțɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșļǂśș ŨƎİșƪŏȦķļƖƢŨƎLjȦŨƋėƎëƢļŨŝȯĈëƎĈëƎŨƖƖëȯëŝĐȯİėƎśëŝLjƖȯ įëļŒƪƎėȯļŝȯƢķėȯƖŨǁļėƢȯƪŝļŨŝɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǩɆ`ƪŒLjɆǥǣǥǤȮș Millet, W. M. &. A., (2000). War To Be Won. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Palmer, M. A., (2010). The German Wars: A Concise History, 1859–1945. s.l.:Zenith Press.

Pisano, M. P. J., (1990). The MAGTF's Approach to Logistics in Maneuver WarfareșɆȭ{ŝŒļŝėȮɆɆ ǁëļŒëĈŒėɆëƢțɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂș İŒŨĈëŒƖėĉƪƎļƢLjșŨƎİȦśļŒļƢëƎLjȦŒļĈƎëƎLjȦƎėƋŨƎƢȦǤǬǬǣȦ `șķƢśɆ [Accessed 27thɆ`ƪŒLjɆǥǣǥǤȮșɆ Rottman, G. L., (2013). World War II Allied Sabotage Devices and Booby Traps. London : Bloomburg Publishing. ©ƢŨŒǘȚɆ¡șȚɆȩǤǬǬǤȪșɆA Bias for Action: the German 7th Panzer Division in France & Russia 1940-1941. Quantico: The Marine Corps Association .

Thimm, U., (2006). Am Anfang war die V2. Vom Beginn der Weltraumschifffahrt in Deutschland. s.l.:s.n.

Vannoy, A., (2021). North African Campaign: WWII’s Ultimate War of Logistics. ȭ{ŝŒļŝėȮɆɆ ǁëļŒëĈŒėɆëƢțɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦ ǂëƎįëƎėķļƖƢŨƎLjŝėƢǂŨƎŏșĉŨśȦǥǣǤǫȦǤǥȦǥǬȦŝŨƎƢķȯëįƎļĉëŝȯ ĉëśƋëļİŝȯǂǂļļƖȯƪŒƢļśëƢėȯǂëƎȯŨįȯŒŨİļƖƢļĉƖȦɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆ 27thɆ`ƪŒLjɆǥǣǥǤȮș Whiting, K. R., (1978). Soviet Air Power in World War Two. s.l.:s.n.

Winchester, C., (2002). Advancing Backwards: The Demodernization of the German Army in World War 2.

Oxford: Osprey Publishing.

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8 HISTORICAL

Operation OVERLORD: Lessons learnt from the Allies' main logistic issues post 6 June 1944 ¶ķƎŨƪİķɆëŝɆëŝëŒLjƖļƖɆŨįɆƢķėɆ{ƋɆ{Ô,¡d{¡$ɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉɆƋŒëŝȚɆƢķėɆƖƪƋƋŒLjɆƋƎŨĈŒėśƖɆƢķëƢɆĐėǁėŒŨƋėĐɆļŝɆ `ƪŝėɆëŝĐɆ`ƪŒLjɆǤǬǧǧɆëŝĐɆƢķėɆƖƪƖƢëļŝśėŝƢɆĉķ댌ėŝİėƖɆįëĉėĐɆļŝɆ ƪİƪƖƢɆëŝĐɆ©ėƋƢėśĈėƎɆǤǬǧǧȚɆ Lt Alexandra WillingsɆėLJƋŒëļŝƖɆƢķėɆśëļŝɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉɆƋƎŨĈŒėśƖɆįëĉėĐɆĈLjɆƢķėɆ ŒŒļėƖɆëŝĐɆļĐėŝƢļǘėƖɆ ļĐėŝƢļįLjļŝİɆŒėƖƖŨŝƖɆƢķëƢɆĉëŝɆĈėɆŒėëƎŝƢ

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8 Supplies being unloaded from a ship at the Mulberry artificial harbour at Arromanches in Normandy, July 1944

On 6th June 1944, the Allied forces landed on the beaches in Normandy to liberate France and Western Europe from German occupation. The overall size and scale of the invasion, known as Operation OVERLORD, was vast, with 1,200 assault planes, 6,000 vehicles and 160,000 Allied Troops crossing the Channel on D-Day alone (National Army Museum, 2021). The Allied troops established a foothold at the beaches, before breaking out and defeating the German Army, successfully liberating France in September 1944. However, the invasion ëŝĐɆƖƪƖƢëļŝśėŝƢɆŨįɆƢķėɆƖƪĈƖėƍƪėŝƢɆĈƎėëŏŨƪƢɆ battle created a huge logistic challenge for the Allied forces, the outcome of which had strategic implications for the future of Europe. ¶ķėɆ ŒŒļėĐɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢļėƖɆļŝɆpŨƎśëŝĐLjɆǂėƎėɆ temporal in nature as they were directly linked to transitioning tactical engagements. As the troops advanced into the hinterland of Normandy, the character and demands of the battle changed. ŨŝƖėƍƪėŝƢŒLjȚɆļŝɆŨƎĐėƎɆƢŨɆėŝƖƪƎėɆƖƪįǘĉļėŝƢɆƖƪƖƢëļŝśėŝƢɆ ƢŨɆƢķėɆĐëļŒLjɆļŝĉƎėëƖļŝİɆŝƪśĈėƎɆŨįɆǘİķƢļŝİɆėĉķėŒŨŝƖȚɆ ŒŒļėĐɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉƖɆķëĐɆƢŨɆƎėśëļŝɆǙėLJļĈŒėșɆLŨǂėǁėƎȚɆƢķėɆ problems and planning considerations of WWII were not dissimilar to any contemporary theatre level logistics that The RLC would face today – demonstrating the enduring nature of some logistic considerations and the need to identify key lessons for potential future global operations.

Planning for an Allied invasion of north west

38 | THE REVIEW 2022

Europe commenced in October of 1941, when Lord Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations, was instructed by Churchill to prepare plans (Heathcote 2002: p.102). In January 1943, Lt Gen Morgan was appointed as COSSAC and started the detail planning, with Normandy chosen as the target in June 1943, and OVERLORD was adopted as the operational name in August 1943. As an amphibious operation, the supply problems were ëƋƋëƎėŝƢɆįƎŨśɆƢķėɆƖƢëƎƢȜɆśŨǁļŝİɆëɆŒëƎİėɆǘİķƢļŝİɆįŨƎĉėɆ and its equipment across the Channel presented a unique array of challenges. Furthermore, the challenges faced were different to the Mediterranean amphibious operations that had gone before, in that the tidal range and Channel weather posed problems on a different scale. The logistic plan was to move the force and equipment across the Channel and rapidly organise the beaches as temporary supply bases, where supplies would be built up concurrent with sustainment operations. To aid this and ensure they had the capacity, the Allied Forces planned to capture the ports along the north coast of Normandy, utilising ƢķėƖėɆëƖɆǂėŒŒɆëƖɆĉƎėëƢļŝİɆƖLjŝƢķėƢļĉɆǙŨëƢļŝİɆȻnƪŒĈėƎƎLjȼɆ harbours. The planning for Op OVERLORD estimated ƢķëƢȚɆļŝɆƢķėɆļŝļƢļëŒɆƖƢëİėƖȚɆƢķėɆǙŨǂɆŨįɆƖƪƋƋŒļėƖɆŝėėĐėĐɆ to sustain the forces would be 10,000 tonnes per day on D+3, rising to 15,000 tonnes per day on D+12 and 18,000 tonnes per day on D+18. This estimate was taken on an assault by three divisions, with a plan of building up of forces on the continent to a strength of 10 divisions by D+5, and the landing of approximately one division a day after that (Ruppenthal 1995: p.270). The Allies wanted to build the size of their reserves on the continent, which initially was planned to be 14 days of supply. Once they had established a foothold on the beaches and captured the ports, they planned on building lines of communication to push supplies forward in line with the advance of troops. In accordance with these plans, map recces had chosen sites for every logistic installation and had allocated spaces for maintenance areas which were planned for the Allied advance through France (Ruppenthal 1995: p.430).

The Op OVERLORD logistic plan was crucial to the cross-Channel assault and breakout. The success ŨįɆƢķļƖɆļŝǁëƖļŨŝɆĐėƋėŝĐėĐɆǘƎƖƢŒLjɆŨŝɆƢķėɆ ŒŒļėƖɆëĈļŒļƢLjɆ to break through coastal defences and establish a foothold on the beaches, then subsequently relied upon the Allies ability to build up enough supplies on the beaches to defeat the enemy at their rate of reinforcement (Ruppenthal 1995: 270). Knowing

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8 A Mulberry Harbour, the idea for which was conceived following the failed amphibious raid on Dieppe in August 1942

this critical battle would be won by those who could reinforce their formations the quickest, the German’s main effort was the prevention of the Allies securing the north Normandy ports to prevent their necessary build-up of troops and supplies. The Allies envisaged ƢķėƖėɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢļėƖȚɆķëǁļŝİɆŒėëƎŝƢɆįƎŨśɆ$ļėƋƋėɆƢķëƢɆ they could not directly assault a well-founded port, sparking the need for synthetic harbours. However, the loss of Mulberry A, combined with the time it took to capture Cherbourg and access its port facilities, put further pressure on the Allies in the initial phases of the operation. These were only the start of the resupply issues that the Allies would face post 6th June 1944.

Whilst the Allied troops were successful in their initial break in phase, the logistic issues began to mount up almost immediately. Due to the strong German defences, the Allied troops were not able to capture the major ports of Cherbourg and Brittany as planned (Johnson 2021), creating a ƖķŨƎƢëİėɆŨįɆƖƪƋƋŒLjɆƢķƎŨƪİķǙŨǂșɆ ŒƢķŨƪİķɆƢķėLjɆ were able to capture minor ports, their capacity was not expected to reach 1,300 tonnes per day in ƢķėɆǘƎƖƢɆƢǂŨɆǂėėŏƖȚɆİƎŨƖƖŒLjɆƪŝĐėƎɆǂķëƢɆƢķėɆ ŒŒļėĐɆ troops required to sustain themselves (Ruppenthal 1995: p.270). Therefore, the Allies had to utilise the ĈėëĉķėƖɆëƖɆëŝɆŨįǙŨëĐɆƋŨļŝƢɆįŨƎɆƢķėļƎɆļŝļƢļëŒɆĈƪļŒĐȯƪƋɆ of supplies before they could develop the planned logistic installations for their advance through France.

However, the problems this caused were two-fold.

Firstly, the ground on the beaches was impractical to use as a supply base, made even worse by the poor weather experienced in June 1944. The areas that were available to develop inland also had problems caused by the ground. The Normandy terrain was śëļŝŒLjɆëɆƋëƢĉķǂŨƎŏɆŨįɆƖśëŒŒɆǘėŒĐƖɆĐļǁļĐėĐɆĈLjɆƢķļĉŏɆ ķėĐİėƖɆŏŝŨǂŝɆëƖɆĈŨĉëİėȚɆśëŏļŝİɆļƢɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢɆįŨƎɆ vehicles to pass through. Although these thick ķėĐİėƖɆǂėƎėɆļŝļƢļ댌LjɆƪƖėĐɆƢŨɆƋƎŨǁļĐėɆĉëśŨƪǙëİėɆëŝĐɆ concealment for the supplies, congestion became so great that supplies had to be stacked in the middle ŨįɆǘėŒĐƖɆǂļƢķɆëƢƢėśƋƢƖɆƢŨɆĉëśŨƪǙëİėɆƢķėśɆƍƪļĉŏŒLjɆ abandoned (Ruppenthal 1995: p.431).

Compounding this storage issue was the problem of moving and distributing the supplies from the

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beaches to depots and the forward echelons. Where ĐŨĉƢƎļŝ댌LjɆƢķėɆƢķļƎĐɆȩƢķėëƢƎėȦĐļǁļƖļŨŝȪɆëŝĐɆǘƎƖƢɆŒļŝėɆ ȩǘİķƢļŝİɆėĉķėŒŨŝƖȪɆëƎėɆķƪŝĐƎėĐƖɆŨįɆŏļŒŨśėƢƎėƖɆ apart, in June 1944, they were often no more than a few kilometres. These extremely short lines of communication created a huge problem with ƖƪƖƢëļŝļŝİɆëŝɆëĐėƍƪëƢėɆǙŨǂɆŨįɆƖƪƋƋŒļėƖɆƢŨɆƢķŨƖėɆ ǘİķƢļŝİɆŨŝɆƢķėɆįƎŨŝƢȯŒļŝėȚɆĐƪėɆƢŨɆƢķėɆĉķëŨƖɆëŝĐɆ congestion in the congested rear area. Exacerbating this problem, the Allies did not advance as fast as they had planned to. On 1st July, the Allied forces were approximately 16 days behind where they had planned to be (Ruppenthal 1995: p.430). The distance between the front line of troops and the beaches was so short that inland logistic installations could not be developed. Instead, the beaches remained the main depot and maintenance areas throughout both June and July, having serious repercussions on the supply chain. The Allies lodgement area covered only 10% of the planned 15,000 square miles (Ruppenthal 1995: p.430). This made the storage areas chaotic and congested, preventing them from operating effectively. For example, the documentation and handling of supplies was poor, with supplies often arriving early, at the wrong beach or getting lost. Storing the supplies in such small areas also presented its own challenges, for example, not having the space to safely store ammunition. As well as congested storage areas, the movement of supplies to the troops over such short lines of communication was also problematic as the Normandy road network did not have the capacity for the volume of vehicles using them. The roads became “choked with vehicles,” further contributing to the chaos and congestion of the extremely shallow lodgement area (Ruppenthal 1995: p.432).

The Allied demand for supplies in June and July was also different to that which had been anticipated. Fuel was not a problem due to the slow advance, there was however a shortage of other classes of supply, in particular certain natures of ammunition. Throughout June and July, the Allies regularly engaged in small team kinetic actions which took much longer to conclude than expected. The result was that expenditure rates of some natures of ammunition were higher than forecasted. The shortages that appeared however were not due ƢŨɆĐėǘĉļėŝĉļėƖɆļŝɆƢķėëƢƎėɆĈƪƢɆƢķėɆļŝėįǘĉļėŝĉļėƖɆŨįɆ the beaches. Ammunition for example was being 8 Follow-up troops from US 1st Infantry Division disembark from an LCVP (Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel) onto Easy Red beach, Omaha area, 6th June 1944 Credit: US National Archives - Public Domain

Credit National Museum of the US Navy Public Domain

HISTORICAL 8

THE REVIEW 2022 | 39

unloaded onto the beaches at a rate of 3,000 tonnes a day, but the demand was 7,500 tonnes. They had ƖƪįǘĉļėŝƢɆëśśƪŝļƢļŨŝɆƢŨɆśėėƢɆ댌ɆĐėśëŝĐƖɆĈƪƢɆƢķėLjɆ could not unload it fast enough to sustain the frontline troops. Furthermore, the nature of the bocage ĉƎėëƢėĐɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢļėƖɆļŝɆİėƢƢļŝİɆƢķėɆƖƪƋƋŒļėƖɆƢŨɆƢķėɆ ǘİķƢļŝİɆėĉķėŒŨŝƖșɆQŝɆŨƎĐėƎɆƢŨɆĉŨƪŝƢėƎɆƢķļƖɆƋƎŨĈŒėśȚɆ the Allies reduced the number of reserves they were holding to seven days supply of rations, two days supply of ammunition, and three days supply of all other materiel classes. This is much lower than what contemporary doctrine recommends should be ķėŒĐɆļŝɆëɆǂëƎȯǘİķƢļŝİɆƢķėëƢƎėɆȩǥǫɆĐëLjƖɆŨįɆƖƪƋƋŒLjȪȚɆ highlighting how the congestion was negatively impacting on the entire supply chain in June and July 1944. Despite all the problems detailed above, the resupply of troops in June and July 1944 was relatively successful. There was not a critical shortage of any supplies, other than some selected natures of ammunition. Through some careful rationing, the Allies were able to sustain themselves for the duration of June and July.

QŝɆŒëƢėɆ`ƪŒLjɆǤǬǧǧȚɆƢķėɆǘİķƢɆįŨƎɆDƎëŝĉėɆĉķëŝİėĐɆļŝɆ character, creating a different set of combat factors and changing the nature of the problems that the Allies experienced in sustaining their front-line troops.

On 25th July 1944, Operation COBRA, the muchawaited breakout phase was launched, delivering a “decisive blow” that saw the stalemate of Op OVERLORD end, as the Allies broke the deadlock and turned the “war of attrition” into a “war of movement” (Atkinson 2010, p.1). Following extremely heavy air bombardment, the reinforced Allied troops began their offensive, unhinging the German defensive forces and pouring into occupied France. The Allies were so successful that the German lines quickly gave way and the Allies continued to advance south and east.

QŝɆĉŨśƋëƎļƖŨŝɆƢŨɆƢķėɆƋƎėǁļŨƪƖɆƢǂŨɆśŨŝƢķƖɆŨįɆǘİķƢļŝİȚɆ the Allies were now moving extremely fast, creating a different array of logistic implications to those seen in the previous months as the campaign transitioned from break-out operations to a pursuit. As the Allies crossed the River Seine, the front line extended beyond their own supply capabilities, making the re-supply of ƢķėɆǘİķƢļŝİɆįŨƎĉėƖɆėLJƢƎėśėŒLjɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢșɆ As the Allies advanced through France, the lines of

US national Archives - Public Domain

8 HISTORICAL

8 The ‘Red Ball Express’ was a truck convoy system the Allies developed and used to transport materiel from the beaches to the fighting echelons. Trucks were marked with a red ball and used roads closed to normal traffic

communication grew rapidly, by up to 300 miles by 10th September (Ruppenthal 1995: p.480). This made ļƢɆėLJƢƎėśėŒLjɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢɆįŨƎɆƢķėɆ ŒŒļėƖɆƢŨɆśŨǁėɆƖƪƋƋŒļėƖɆįëƖƢɆ ėŝŨƪİķɆƢŨɆŏėėƋɆƪƋɆǂļƢķɆƢķŨƖėɆǘİķƢļŝİɆŨŝɆƢķėɆįƎŨŝƢȯŒļŝėșɆ $ƪėɆƢŨɆƢķėɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢļėƖɆļŝɆśŨǁļŝİɆƖƪƋƋŒļėƖɆįŨƎǂëƎĐȚɆƢķėɆ focus was placed on moving only the essentials to the units who needed supplies on a day-to-day basis.

The depots remained to the rear, often as far back as the beaches, and as large stock holding instillations were unable to move, exchange points were placed further forward towards the front-lines. However, due to the speed of the advance, vehicles were having to travel up to 250 miles just to reach these exchange points. The Army’s rapid advance, combined with its inability to establish depots and move stock ĉŒŨƖėƎɆƢŨɆƢķėɆǘİķƢļŝİɆįŨƎĉėƖȚɆƢķėƎėįŨƎėɆĉƎėëƢėĐɆƖėǁėƎėɆ repercussions on the entire supply chain.

Credit US National Archives - Public Domain

8 Red Ball Express trucks moving through a Regulating Point 1944

40 | THE REVIEW 2022

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HISTORICAL 8 By the end of July, the amount of supplies that the British Army wanted to hold as its reserve in theatre was seven days of supply. However, the ƖƪƋƋŒLjɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢļėƖɆįëĉėĐɆëįƢėƎɆ{ƋɆ { ¡ ɆķëĐɆĈėėŝɆ ŒëƪŝĉķėĐɆƖëǂɆƢķļƖɆĐļƎėĉƢļŨŝɆĉķëŝİėĐɆƢŨɆŨŝŒLjɆǘǁėɆĐëLjƖɆ of supply (Ruppenthal 1995: p.489), 23 days less than we would currently expect to hold in theatre should we deploy today. In a similar situation, as in the previous months, the shortages of supply were not a result of lack of stock in theatre itself, but due to the inability to distribute the supplies to the forward echelons. At the end of August, the US First Army had an estimated daily tonnage requirement of 5,500 tonnes, and the Third Army 6,000 tonnes. However, due to a lack of vehicles, the distance that they were required to travel and the time that this took meant that movement of this enormous volume of supplies was unachievable. As described above, the depots remained on the beaches and the lack of transport to move this stock forward meant that by the end of August, 90-95% of all stock was in these depots, with no stock in between the depot and the front lines (Ruppenthal 1995: p.491). Supplies of all natures ran extremely low.

This lasted for the duration of August and September, until France was liberated from German occupation in September 1944. Throughout this time, there were shortages in every class of supply. Due to this, only the barest of essentials were moved forward, with rations, ammunition and fuel being the priorities. Over the months that this continued, shortages appeared in medical, chemical, signal and engineering equipment and the situation worsened as a result of this prioritisation. By the end of September, the Allies had reached a critical state in their supply shortages, where resupply was fragile and shortages were hampering the operational effectiveness of the Armies. By the end of September, supplies were handed to Armies on a mission-by-mission basis and were strictly rationed (Ruppental 1995: p.583). These limitations dictated the operational plans to come, highlighting the mission criticalness of logistics.

The issues in logistics post 6th June 1944 highlight some enduring key lessons in military logistics, relevant to anyone in the trade today. Firstly, the importance of planning, not only in logistics but in all aspects of war. Although the Op OVERLORD logistic plan was not executed as it had been planned, the painstaking planning itself and the subsequent understanding of the myriad of factors that could affect the initial assault and breakout set the conditions for success. A thorough estimate was conducted in the years leading ƢŨɆƢķėɆëƖƖëƪŒƢȚɆĉķ댌ėŝİėƖɆļĐėŝƢļǘėĐɆëŝĐɆƖŨŒƪƢļŨŝƖɆ provided. If the military maxim that no plan survives contact with the enemy is to be believed, then so should the adage that a plan is nothing, but planning is everything. A thorough examination of the logistic factors within a campaign plan proved crucial to the Allied success at Normandy. The Allies knew what they needed to sustain their troops, from landing on the beaches to defeating the German Army, and this was ultimately due to the extent of planning that had been conducted.

The second key take away from the logistic issues in Normandy is the importance of both transport and supply working together. Due to the diligent planning, ƢķėɆ ŒŒļėƖɆĉŨŝƖļƖƢėŝƢŒLjɆķëĐɆƖƪįǘĉļėŝƢɆƖƪƋƋŒļėƖɆļŝɆ

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theatre, however, as highlighted, having surplus supplies in supply bases is futile if you are unable to İėƢɆƖƢŨĉŏɆƢŨɆƢķėɆǘİķƢļŝİɆėĉķėŒŨŝƖșɆ¶ŨŨɆŨįƢėŝɆƢŨĐëLjȚɆ supply and transport squadrons train and work as separate entities. However, the two are completely dependent on one another and operational success will only be achieved when the two work together to achieve their commander’s overall intent.

Therefore, the gap between transport and supply ŝėėĐƖɆĈƎļĐİļŝİȚɆƖƋėĉļǘĉ댌LjɆļŝɆƢƎëļŝļŝİȚɆëŝĐɆëŝɆ understanding of the freedoms and constraints of each trade needs establishing in order to operate successfully as a coherent entity.

Thirdly, a key logistic lesson from Normandy is ǙėLJļĈļŒļƢLjșɆ½ŒƢļśëƢėŒLjȚɆëƖɆëɆ ŨƎƋƖȚɆǂėɆƖƪƋƋŨƎƢɆƢķėɆ ǘİķƢļŝİɆėĉķėŒŨŝƖɆļŝɆĈëƢƢŒėșɆ ŒƢķŨƪİķɆƋŒëŝŝļŝİɆ is important, nobody can predict how a battle may turn, and Normandy, despite its years of preparation, witnessed unexpected tactical attritional engagements across the majority of the bridgehead ƋėƎļśėƢėƎșɆ¶ķėƎėįŨƎėȚɆĈėļŝİɆƎėëĉƢļǁėɆëŝĐɆǙėLJļĈŒėɆ throughout the execution phase is crucial in order to be successful. Although potentially wasteful, the Allies ensured a level of resilience in their supply ĉķëļŝɆĈLjɆŒëŝĐļŝİɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆƍƪëŝƢļƢļėƖɆŨįɆƎėƖėƎǁėƖșɆ It was these reserves that facilitated a degree of ǙėLJļĈļŒļƢLjɆļŝɆĉŨƪŝƢėƎļŝİɆƪŝįŨƎėĉëƖƢėĐɆĐėśëŝĐƖȚɆëŒĈėļƢɆ there was a degree of waste in the system.

In summary, the Battle of Normandy highlights the vital importance of logistics. Logistics is both a science and an art; whilst the estimate and the planning are predominately a science, the ability ƢŨɆĈėɆǙėLJļĈŒėɆëŝĐɆƎėëĉƢļǁėɆƢŨɆëɆǙƪļĐɆĈëƢƢŒėɆĉëŝɆĈėɆ considered an art. Battles are won and lost due, in ŝŨɆƖśëŒŒɆƋëƎƢȚɆƢŨɆƢķėɆëĈļŒļƢLjɆŨįɆƢķėɆǘİķƢļŝİɆįŨƎĉėƖɆƢŨɆ be sustained. The Battle of Normandy remains an exemplar operation in emphasising the crucial role of logistics. To execute logistic functions across a broad ƖƋėĉƢƎƪśɆŨįɆįƪƢƪƎėɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢɆļƢɆļƖɆļśƋėƎëƢļǁėɆƢķëƢɆ¶ķėɆ RLC continues to train and develop its personnel to ĈėɆëĈŒėɆƢŨɆįƪŒǘŒɆƢķėļƎɆƎŨŒėƖɆƢŨɆƢķėɆķļİķėƖƢɆŨįɆƖƢëŝĐëƎĐƖɆ by investing in professional education to promote ǙėLJļĈļŒļƢLjɆëŝĐɆėLJƋŒŨļƢɆļŝŝŨǁëƢļǁėɆƖŨŒƪƢļŨŝƖșɆ The beach landings of 1944 marked the beginning of one of the most famous battles in history, which saw the Allies establish a foothold in north west France from which they rapidly exploited into the heart of Germany. The logistics which underscored this success are often overlooked or misunderstood.

The challenges encountered in June and July were primarily due to the extremely short distance ĈėƢǂėėŝɆƢķėɆƎėëƎɆƖƪƋƋŨƎƢɆëƎėëƖɆëŝĐɆƢķėɆǘİķƢļŝİɆ echelons, creating chaos and congestion within the short lines of communication. Conversely, August and September witnessed a new set of unforeseen problems, primarily as an ironic consequence of the rapidly growing length of the lines of communications as the Allies broke out of their restricted bridgehead.

Normandy is proof that professional armies can learn more from mistakes and challenging scenarios than operations which are concluded largely according ƢŨɆƋŒëŝșɆ¶ķėɆŏėLjɆŒėƖƖŨŝƖɆļĐėŝƢļǘėĐɆļŝɆƢķļƖɆėƖƖëLjɆëƎėɆ the importance of co-ordinated planning, the interĐėƋėŝĐėŝĉėɆŨįɆƖƪƋƋŒLjɆëŝĐɆƢƎëŝƖƋŨƎƢȚɆǙėLJļĈļŒļƢLjɆëƢɆ댌Ɇ levels and ultimately the overall importance of robust logistics, practiced across a wide range of vital trades as part of a professional Corps.

THE REVIEW 2022 | 41

8 HISTORICAL References Atkinson, R., (2010) ‘Operation COBRA and the breakout ëƢɆpŨƎśëŝĐLjȼȚɆ½©Ɇ ƎśLjɆÕėĈƖļƢėȚɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșëƎśLjșśļŒȦ ëƎƢļĉŒėȦǧǥǩǨǫȦŨƋėƎëƢļŨŝȶĉŨĈƎëȶëŝĐȶƢķėȶĈƎėëŏŨƪƢȶëƢȶ ŝŨƎśëŝĐLjɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆŨŝɆǣǪȦǣǪȦǥǤȮ Heathcote, T., (2002) The British Admirals of the Fleet 1734–1995. Havertown: Pen & Sword History Extra, (2021) ‘The Battle for Normandy: what ķëƋƋėŝėĐɆëįƢėƎɆ$Ɇ$ëLjȠȼȚɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșķļƖƢŨƎLjėLJƢƎëșĉŨśȦ ƋėƎļŨĐȦƖėĉŨŝĐȯǂŨƎŒĐȯǂëƎȦĈëƢƢŒėȯŝŨƎśëŝĐLjȯķŨǂȯśëŝLjȯ ĐļėĐȯĐȯĐëLjȯëįƢėƎśëƢķȯǂķėŝȯ댌ļėƖȯǂǂǥȦɆȭëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆ ǤǤȦǤǣȦǥǤȮ Johnson, B., (2021) ‘D-Day Mulberry Harbours’, Historic UK, ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșķļƖƢŨƎļĉȯƪŏșĉŨśȦLļƖƢŨƎLj½bȦLļƖƢŨƎLjŨį ƎļƢëļŝȦ $$ëLjȯnƪŒĈėƎƎLjȯķëƎĈŨƪƎƖȦɆȭëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆŨŝɆǣǪȦǣǪȦǥǤȮ Keegan, J., (2021) ‘Normandy Invasion: World War II’, ƎļƢëŝŝļĉëɆ,ŝĉLjĉŒŨƋëėĐļëȚɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșĈƎļƢëŝŝļĉëșĉŨśȦ ėǁėŝƢȦpŨƎśëŝĐLjȯQŝǁëƖļŨŝȚɆȭëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆŨŝɆǤǥȦǣǪȦǥǤȮ dėǂļƖȚɆ șȚɆȩǥǣǣǨȪɆȻnƪŒĈėƎƎLjɆ ƎƢļǘĉëŒɆLëƎĈŨƪƎƖȚɆÕŨƎŒĐɆÕëƎɆ QQȼȚɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșĈƎļƢëŝŝļĉëșĉŨśȦƢŨƋļĉȦnƪŒĈėƎƎLjȯëƎƢļǘĉļëŒȯ ķëƎĈŨƪƎƖȯÕŨƎŒĐȯÕëƎȯQQȚɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǣǤȦǤǣȦǥǤȮ Makim’s On-line Museum, (2021) ‘Red Ball Express Patch’, ķƢƢƋțȦȦǂǂǂșśëŏƖļśƖśƪƖėƪśșĉŨśȦƎėĐȯĈ댌ȯėLJƋƎėƖƖȯƋëƢĉķș ķƢśŒȚɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǤǤȦǤǣȦǥǤȮ

You are invited to submit an article for publication in the 2023 Review

THE ROYAL LOGISTIC CORPS FOUNDATION AND 8 OPERATIONS

Articles may be written under the following overarching categories: • Professional Development • Operations and Training • Historical • General Interest Cash prizes There are cash prizes for the best contribution in each category. Prizes are also awarded to: • The best contribution overall ȣɆ¶ķėɆĈėƖƢɆĉŨŝƢƎļĈƪƢļŨŝɆĈLjɆëŝɆŨįǘĉėƎ ȣɆɆɆ ėƖƢɆĉŨŝƢƎļĈƪƢļŨŝɆĈLjɆëɆǂëƎƎëŝƢɆŨįǘĉėƎɆŨƎɆ ƖėŝļŨƎɆŝŨŝȯĉŨśśļƖƖļŨŝėĐɆŨįǘĉėƎ

42 | THE REVIEW 2022

OPERATIONS AND TRAIN

TRAINING

T: Operation RESCRIP Reǃections on e nder’s perspectiv the Civil Authorities A Troop Comma y Aid to a providing Militar carried out during Commander operation of a new Troop learnt from an lessons can be The perspective pandemic. What during a global By 2Lt Amy Grieve national crisis?

8 2Lt Amy Grieve 4 Regiment RLC

Since its formation in April 2015, the focus of the RLC Foundation has been to promote professional engagement with industry and academia and share best practice; maintain awareness of innovation and to encourage and facilitate thought leadership.

As part of this process The RLC Foundation is inviting ŨįǘĉėƎƖȚɆƖŨŒĐļėƎƖȚɆǁėƢėƎëŝƖɆëŝĐɆĉļǁļŒļëŝƖɆǂŨƎŏļŝİɆįŨƎɆƢķėɆśļŒļƢëƎLjȚɆ or in the logistics industry and academia, to contribute thought provoking articles to the 2023 Review. The Review is the professional journal of the RLC and is distributed to members of the Corps serving at home and abroad. This includes all NATO ķėëĐƍƪëƎƢėƎƖɆëŝĐɆƢķėɆėLJĉķëŝİėɆŨįǘĉėƎƖɆĈëƖėĐɆļŝɆƢķėɆ½© Ɇ and Australia. It is also sent to all RLC Foundation corporate partners, supporters and friends.

Mayo, L., (1991) ‘THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT: ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT’, Centre of Military LļƖƢŨƎLjɆ½ŝļƢėĐɆ©ƢëƢėƖɆ ƎśLjȚɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦķļƖƢŨƎLjșëƎśLjșśļŒȦĈŨŨŏƖȦ ǂǂļļȦĈėëĉķķĐȶĈƢŒėįƎŝƢȦļŝĐėLJșķƢśŒȥĉŨŝƢėŝƢƖɆȭëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆ ǣǤȦǤǣȦǥǤȮ Military History Matters, (2021) ‘D Day: Plan of Operations ŨŝɆ`ƪŝėɆǩȚɆǤǬǧǧȼȚɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșśļŒļƢëƎLjȯķļƖƢŨƎLjșŨƎİȦįėëƢƪƎėȦ d-day-plan-of-operations-on-6-june-1944.htm, [Accessed ŨŝɆǤǤȦǤǣȦǥǤȮ National Army Museum, (2021) ‘Battle of Normandy’, pëƢļŨŝëŒɆ ƎśLjɆnƪƖėƪśȚɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșŝëśșëĉșƪŏȦėLJƋŒŨƎėȦ ŝŨƎśëŝĐLjȯĉëśƋëļİŝȚɆȭëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǤǥȦǣǪȦǥǤȮ Ruppenthal, R. G., (1995) ‘The European Theatre of Operations: Logistical Support of Armies. Volume 1: May 1941 – September 1944’, Centre of Military LļƖƢŨƎLjɆ½ŝļƢėĐɆ©ƢëƢėƖɆ ƎśLjȚɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦķļƖƢŨƎLjșëƎśLjșśļŒȦ ķƢśŒȦĈŨŨŏƖȦǣǣǪȦǪȯǥȯǤȦ nLȶ ƪĈȶǪȯǥȯǤșƋĐįɆȭëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆ ǥǣȦǣǩȦǥǤȮ U.S Coast Guard Collection in the U.S National Archives, ȻpŨƎśëŝĐLjɆQŝǁëƖļŨŝȚɆ`ƪŝėɆǤǬǧǧȼȚɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșķļƖƢŨƎLjșŝëǁLjș śļŒȦŨƪƎȯĉŨŒŒėĉƢļŨŝƖȦƋķŨƢŨİƎëƋķLjȦǂëƎƖȯëŝĐȯėǁėŝƢƖȦǂŨƎŒĐȯ ǂëƎȯļļȦĐȯĐëLjȦǥǩȯEȯǥǨǤǪșķƢśŒɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆŨŝŒļŝėɆǣǤȦǤǥȦǥǤȮ

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ING 8

REVIEW

that each hospital did have, ensuring . The NHS ventilators they cases increased in as COVID-19 usually worked had enough n from staff who team was drawn ǘrst day at Wellingto and on their the crisis), it together logistics duringBringing ǘnance recovery Headquarters key skills House (the NHS that the team lacked the became apparent plan and execute such a complex ce to d military support. and experien they requeste a task and on advice, 4 Regiment RLC deployed Within 24 hours, Squadron, including (Close Support) how we would team from 4 start planning tely and myself, to immedia Our aim was to inject logistic task. efǘciency complete the team, create into the NHS supply expertise operational agility s and ensure and in their processe nging medical with the ever-cha of two teams, to respond to . This fusion logistical demands mindsets, methods of working y created completely different languages, inevitabl and operating the outset. barriers to a confusion from potential and es communication The main differenc relationship were Close Support successful workingmilitary team had a clear der within a and . The As a Troop CommanI had always anticipated and structure responsibilities n, nt support with roles and Logistic Squadro try to impleme operations to rank structure exercises and which understand and n deploying on the NHS team, personnel who Army. Operatio d. Conversely, s of the wider ing insight the demand a period of crisis mission comman me with a fascinat ng and formed during ilities, appeared RESCRIPT provided and opportunities of supporti was ad-hoc es roles and responsibwith in a team. into the challeng with ill-deǘned I was familiar .

Aid to the ce of the the structure ‘Military importan lack civilian agencies term to the the ed of aware of ng tely highlight I was already the broad purpose This immedia rather than attempti the es (MACA)’ and as you ǘght’ support to aid Civil Authoriti The Ǚatter, less adage ‘train military crisis. a ore, providing during did however crisis. Furtherm these tasks in to re-Task Org in the NHS team during a national military United Kingdom recent events where the structured hierarchybeneǘts; it created a more s of from the better I was consciou have some obvious United Kingdom which is certainly ately 800 d parts of the environment had supporte where approxim collaborative (BBC, -Mouth crisis communities 2001 Foot-and to aid farming (MOD, personnel deployed Bridge dam crisis in 2019 Whaley ced the process, 2001) to the experien , I had never of tasks which 2019). However T s and breadth Operation RESCRIP complexity, challenge ents could create. to deploy on a ity these deploym with the opportun the United Kingdom provided me c. of the NHS and task in support COVID-19 pandemi response to the ces as a Troop Government’s my experien with the This article explores4 Regiment RLC, together within Commander throughout. of shortfall lessons I learned severe recognised a They also knew NHS (London) Greater London. of ventilators across able to receive the quantity the not region during that they were MACA tasks to sustain the the country supporting ventilators needed tial surge phase. They quickly deployed all over a team of 8 4 Regiment RLC COVID-19 exponen solution was to create tion of the best te the redistribu realised that plan and co-ordina NHS staff to FOUNDATION

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professionals from Defence, Industry and Academia for the generatio n of ideas and problem solving.

The downside of this NHS Nightinga a clear-cut understan approach is that there is not le London where ding of individual the project brought responsibilities; roles and everyone’s singular sheer size of the hence focus (BBC, 2020). goals into sharp enthusiasm, energy it was difǘcult to create and The NHS team Comparing communic drive amongst the group. were clearly an intelligent and capable team, ation styles, it teams were quite is clear the they had excellent different. Army planning and analytical skills personnel are used to working but would normally in fast-paced plan that would work to a clear environments communicating be set where the right informatio and followed through at the beginning of a project at the expedient n, in the right way, to completio time, is crucial changeable environme n. The complex – leading to the of acronyms and and nt we were working use valuing brevity. this model could So much so that in meant have Joint Services not work and we Publication 101 a plan Ǚexible throughou had to be on this style of to guide people t the task to allow communication; of new informatio for the injection most organisat do not go to these n - something ions lengths. I noted the military is to, but civilians this style of communic early on that using used are not and this is one of the reasons ation in a civilian the NHS requested was disengagi environment our help. Again, ng and isolating, of the adage ‘no this reminded leading becoming upset, me plan ultimately damaging to people enemy’ – COVID-19 survives ǘrst contact with and diminishin relationships the in this instance. g the overall output Our main role NHS have a far of the team. The was TA3E more personal (Train, Advise, Accompany, Equip) and less structured Assist, approach to communic actions. Speciǘ ating, this was and accompan cally, to assist an uncertain time reassuring in y, where we needed but also wasted and guide the to reassure, aid common working time; NHS team, as language somewhe ǘnding a well as equip them with the correct these two styles re in between tools and personnel was essential. using military for the job. Not Psychologist Bruce language was key and making Tuckman produced to listen and gently in 1965 deǘning time a model guide rather than the main stages control was extremely take absolute of developing forming a team important. We and of people. Formation good working developed a four easily recogniza usually follows relationship and built credibility trust through ǘ storming, norming, ble stages, known as: "forming, and nding common and performin ground and discussing and comparin g” (Tuckman, 1965).

Our teams needed g their issues, for example managing to perform within ventilator and because the ǘ hours of meeting ancillaries is remarkab rst set of ventilator managing vehicles ly similar to s needed to be delivered within and Complete 48 hours of the The team was Equipment Scales.

Squadron’s receipt of the task. Above, further challenge I discussed the d when of the task, social in the team’s dynamics main difference distancing requireme on day three s . These difference all communication nts meant that challenge in the s posed a now had to be ‘forming’ and remote.

The ‘storming’ stage product of this working together. planning and of They were quickly was the creation team building emotional intelligenc addressed with of a fast-movi e from both sides, ng network covering Greater London these stages to allowing the NHS be greatly accelerate allowing ventilators or or accelerating d. Skipping other vital medical to rapidly move these well-know supplies as soon as they became n stages normally produces a poor available. 55 sites team dynamic 10 Pantech vehicles were visited by or poor output, though in our and 20 drivers, case it was not day seeing 104 with the busiest an option to give time conventio ventilators delivered the nally required. period. After gaining over a 24-hour It was clear that is a galvanisin an appreciation if there g force role, I spent time of the planning collaboration becomesto motivate people (COVID-1 on the ground 9), co-ordina easier; drop off and pickup this reminded ting the why we try to of vital medical me articulate ventilators, seeing supplies and actions. This approach a unifying purpose in our ǘrst-hand the was especially immediate positive effect the intense evident at the planning and team building the front-line NHS had on staff at the sites we delivered to.

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2022

8 The British Army and RLC personnel were deployed to help with the Whaley Bridge dam crisis in 2019

FOUNDATION

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ȣɆ ėƖƢɆĉŨŝƢƎļĈƪƢļŨŝɆĈLjɆëɆŌƪŝļŨƎɆŝŨŝȯĉŨśśļƖƖļŨŝėĐɆŨįǘĉėƎ ȣɆ ėƖƢɆĉŨŝƢƎļĈƪƢļŨŝɆĈLjɆëɆŌƪŝļŨƎɆŨįǘĉėƎɆ • Best contribution by a private soldier • Best contribution by a civilian Rules Articles must not exceed 5,000 words and must be properly referenced and supported with good quality copyright permissioned illustrations and images. Reuse licence details must be stated.

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8 The closing date for submissions for the 2023 Review is 16th September 2022 Entries are open now and submissions should be sent to Chrissie Ross at: therlcfoundation@gmail.com

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8 HISTORICAL

Why Operation LEHRGANG (the German evacuation from Sicily in 1943) was a success

Credit: US Army Centre for Military History

Maj Andrew CoxɆėLJƋŒŨƎėƖɆƢķėɆEėƎśëŝɆǂķŨŒėȯįŨƎĉėɆĉŨśśëŝĐɆĉƪŒƢƪƎėɆëŝĐɆļŝǁėƖƢļİëƢėƖɆķŨǂɆ ėįįėĉƢļǁėɆƋŒëŝŝļŝİȚɆĉŨŝƢƎŨŒɆëŝĐɆėLJėĉƪƢļŨŝȚɆśŨƎëŒėɆëŝĐɆƋėƎĉėƋƢļŨŝƖɆĈėįŨƎėȚɆĐƪƎļŝİɆëŝĐɆëįƢėƎɆ {ƋėƎëƢļŨŝɆd,L¡E pEɆ댌ŨǂėĐɆƢķėɆŨƋėƎëƢļŨŝɆƢŨɆĈėɆƖŨɆėįįėĉƢļǁė

8 Map of north-east Sicily, withdrawal phase lines and evacuation routes. US Army in World War II – Sicily and the Surrender of Italy

It is a commonly held belief that a withdrawal in ĉŨŝƢëĉƢɆļƖɆëśŨŝİƖƢɆƢķėɆśŨƖƢɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢɆŨįɆśļŒļƢëƎLjɆ activities to plan and execute. Those which have a cross-component aspect, such as an airlift or sealift are perceived as particularly challenging, which is one reason why operations such as Operation DYNAMO (the British evacuation from Dunkirk in nëLjɆǤǬǧǣȪɆķŨŒĐɆƖƪĉķɆķļƖƢŨƎļĉëŒɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝĉėșɆ¶ķėɆ German withdrawal from Sicily between 1–16 August 1943 (known as Operation LEHRGANG, which translates to ‘Course of Instruction’ (D’Este, 1988, p.504)) is commonly seen as an exemplar of a military evacuation and its conduct deserves examination in order to explain this success. It also holds many lessons which a modern logistician can ĈėŝėǘƢɆįƎŨśȚɆƋëƎƢļĉƪŒëƎŒLjɆļŝɆƢķėɆƎėëŒśƖɆŨįɆ co-ordination and whole force integration.

This essay intends to examine the conduct of the evacuation chronologically and identify the key factors for its success as they are encountered. Whilst the focus will be the German operation, the Italian evacuation will be referred to for wider context.

The Allied invasion of Sicily (9 July - 17 August ǤǬǧǦȪɆǂëƖɆƢķėɆǘƎƖƢɆśëŌŨƎɆļŝǁëƖļŨŝɆŨįɆ LJļƖɆķŨśėɆ territory in the Second World War. The USA and the British Commonwealth brought considerable land,

44 | THE REVIEW 2022

sea and air forces to bear on the island, which was defended by Italian and German forces. Despite a lack of equipment and supporting air cover, as well as an initial collapse of the Italian units defending the coastline, the Axis forces used the highly defensible terrain in the interior of Sicily and fought a spirited positional defence. They were however steadily dislodged from their positions from the west and by 27thɆ`ƪŒLjɆǤǬǧǦȚɆƢķėɆ LJļƖɆįŨƎĉėƖɆǂėƎėɆĉŨŝǘŝėĐɆƢŨɆƢķėɆ north-east corner of the island. It was already clear to the Axis High Command that an evacuation had to be made over the two-mile wide Strait of Messina to relative safety in Calabria; the ‘toe’ of the Italian mainland (Keegan, 1989, pp.288-290).

The challenge was considerable: the Germans had 55,000 personnel and 10,000 vehicles in Sicily arranged into a corps of four disparate divisions: The 15th Panzergrenadier Division, the 29th Motorized Division, the Panzer Division ‘Hermann Goering’ and the 1st Fallschirmjager Division (D’Este, 1988, p.514).

The Axis powers did not have a good reputation amongst their own troops for trying to preserve their forces; the catastrophic defeat in Tunisia, where some 250,000 personnel were abandoned to face capture had occurred only months before and was fresh in the memory of many Axis troops in Sicily. The troops expected to be abandoned, yet the German High Command (seemingly from Hitler downwards) showed an unusual collective determination to prevent Sicily from becoming another Stalingrad or Tunisia (D’Este, 1988, p.504).

The Axis powers had been using the Strait of Messina as a line of communication since the start of the war in the Mediterranean theatre. It was run on a national basis with the Germans running a separate military operation to their Italian hosts, who largely co-opted the civilian shipping that plied the ©ƢƎëļƢɆȩLŨŒŒëŝĐȚɆǥǣǥǣȚɆƋșǧǪǦȪșɆ¶ķėɆEėƎśëŝƖɆĈėŝėǘƢƢėĐɆ greatly from the earlier appointment of Oberst Baade as Commandant of the Strait of Messina. Baade had already optimised the transit route and now he ƖėƢɆëĈŨƪƢɆƋŒëŝŝļŝİɆëŝɆėįǘĉļėŝƢɆǂļƢķĐƎëǂëŒɆįŨƎɆƢķėɆ German forces whilst the XIV Corps Commander, Generaloberst Hube, planned an orderly withdrawal into the evacuation points in the Messina area (Holland, 2020, p.473).

As part of his responsibilities, Baade had been given the powers of a Fortress Commander. In the German military system this gave him considerable powers to enforce unity of command over all the German forces in the Strait of Messina; irrespective

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assembly areas which fed four points of embarkation to the north of the town of Messina, and a reserve point to the south. Each division was allocated a point of embarkation, with Corps Troops being allocated its own. Concurrently, 1st Fallschirmjager Division HQ was given the important task of receiving and organising the evacuees on the mainland of the Strait (Blumenson, 1968, p.136).

Study of this operation reveals the meticulous planning that was conducted at all levels that allowed it to be the success that it was. Of equal importance was the emphasis placed on the strict control of the execution. This, plus the typically harsh discipline of German forces, undoubtedly prevented the force from falling into disorder and was a vital factor in XIV Corps maintaining its operational readiness after the evacuation (D’Este, 1988, p.516).

The attention given to the morale factors were vitally important to the success of the operation; XIV Corps as a whole did not consider themselves to be a defeated force, despite the loss of Sicily. To quote one of the evacuees, Dr Wilhelm Maus, ‘We can leave this island. This retreat never was a defeat!’ (Holland, 2020, p.480).

The days between receipt of the order and the start of the evacuation allowed for a preliminary evacuation of casualties, non-essential personnel and equipment.

In this period 8,615 troops, 4,489 casualties, 3,162 vehicles and 6,088 tons of ammunition, fuel and stores were successfully moved across the Strait into

8 Allied Officers overlook the town of Messina, the Strait and the Italian Mainland beyond after the evacuation. This clearly shows the narrowness of the Strait

8 The town of Messina under high level air attack.

The anti-aircraft force protection measures taken by the Germans ensured that Allied air attacks on the evacuation were largely ineffectual

Credit: Wikimedia Commons

of their service or Chain of Command (D’Este, 1988, p.501). This authority enabled him to command, control and co-ordinate Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine assets into a combined trans-shipment force of some 140 vessels; organised into three ǙŨƢļŒŒëƖɆƪŝĐėƎɆëɆbƎļėİƖśëƎļŝėɆŨįǘĉėƎȚɆDƎėİëƢƢėŝŏëƋļƢëŝɆ Von Liebenstein (Blumenson, 1968, p.136). ¶ķėɆEėƎśëŝɆįŨƎĉėƖɆļŝɆƢķėɆnėĐļƢėƎƎëŝėëŝɆĈėŝėǘƢƢėĐɆ from a strong joint command; for example, its overall commander, Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring was ëɆdƪįƢǂëįįėɆ{įǘĉėƎɆĉŨśśëŝĐļŝİɆëɆįŨƎĉėɆśëĐėɆƪƋɆ predominantly of land forces, whilst Baade was ëŝɆ ƎśLjɆŨįǘĉėƎɆƖƪĉĉėƖƖįƪŒŒLjɆĉŨśśëŝĐļŝİɆǂķëƢɆ was essentially a maritime activity. The adoption by the Germans of a ‘Whole Force Approach’ was fundamental to the success of the operation, as were commanders such as Von Liebenstein who had the knowledge and authority at their level to make the whole force approach function.

The peninsula of north-east Sicily is made up of highly defensible terrain which gradually narrows into a point (Image 1). This allowed Generaloberst LƪĈėɆƢŨɆǂļƢķĐƎëǂɆŨŝƢŨɆǘǁėɆƖƪĉĉėƖƖļǁėɆĐėįėŝƖļǁėɆ lines which needed 8,000 to 10,000 fewer troops to defend as the operation progressed, thus freeing troops for evacuation. The German forces were able to keep the Allied land forces at arm’s length by delaying tactics and demolishing bridges and tunnels (Holland, 2020, p.471). With his Fortress Commander status, Baade was able to combine anti-aircraft units from all three services with Kriegsmarine naval guns into an overlapping area defence. This used 333 guns of all types to cover the entire Strait from Allied air and maritime attack (Holland, 2020, p.474).

Consequently, the Allies acknowledged the Strait of Messina as one of the most heavily defended areas in Europe, and this had the effect of neutralising the Allied capabilities that were most dangerous to the evacuation (Blumenson, 1968, p.132).

These combined factors ensured that despite their superior land, sea and air strength, the Allied forces were unable to prevent or materially disrupt the evacuation; even though a copy of Axis plans fell into British hands on 31st July (Malony, 2004, p.18, D’Este, 1988, p.527). The way in which the Germans exploited the defensibility of north-east Sicily, the narrowness of the Strait of Messina; and their combined force-protection assets to provide effective Rear Area security was key to the success of the operation. This example also shows a timely reminder of the impact of a well-resourced Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) network on an operating environment.

The evacuation order was issued on 1st August 1943 with the execution planned to commence on 10 ƪİƪƖƢɆįŨƎɆǘǁėɆĐëLjƖșɆ ǂëƎėɆŨįɆƢķėɆŝėėĐɆƢŨɆƋƎėƖėƎǁėɆ morale and prevent panic after the Axis disaster at Tunisia, considerable attention was given to the organisation of the withdrawal. Evacuating troops were well briefed and given guides to the operation, including assurances that they would be evacuated as long as they maintained discipline. Their personal weapon was their ticket off the island and the penalty for panic or disorder was death (Holland, 2020, p.474 & p.502). All routes and troop concentrations were to be strictly maintained and controlled by engineers and military police in accordance with an equally strict timetable. These routes led to concealed

Credit: Wikimedia Commons

HISTORICAL 8

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Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-303-0580-04 / Funke / CC-BY-SA 3.0

8 HISTORICAL

8 A German artillery unit evacuates its priority equipment on a Siebel Ferry. These versatile vessels were essential equipment for the evacuation

mainland Italy (D’Este, 1988, p.507). The evacuation started in earnest on 11th August 1943, with inbound crossings being halted to speed up the process (Holland, 2020, p.480). Aware of the risks of Allied attack, the plan initially had equipment only moving over the Strait by day, in accordance with a strict priority which earmarked equipment important to defensive operations, such as anti-tank guns and artillery (Holland, 2020, p.474). The evacuating troops would be moved over the Strait in darkness, with 12,500 troops planned to be moved per night. Baade and Von Liebenstein worked tirelessly throughout ƢŨɆļśƋƎŨǁėɆƢķėɆėįǘĉļėŝĉLjɆŨįɆƢķėɆƢƎëŝƖȯƖķļƋśėŝƢȜɆÔŨŝɆ Liebenstein was credited with developing what was ƋŨƖƖļĈŒLjɆƢķėɆǘƎƖƢɆƎŨŒŒȯŨŝȚɆƎŨŒŒȯŨįįɆįėƎƎLjɆƖLjƖƢėśɆǂļƢķɆƢķėɆ use of twelve Siebel Ferries. These versatile craft were well suited to the task and with a 60 ton capacity they were able to carry any of the equipment in XIV Corps, including its one remaining 57 ton Tiger heavy tank (D’Este, 1988, pp.499-501).

The evacuation efforts initially faced problems with co-ordination between the assembly areas and the points of embarkation; especially for the personnel, as conducting the activity in darkness complicated and delayed the process (D’Este, 1988, p.509). For these reasons, plus the fact that Allied air and sea forces had largely failed to affect the crossings, personnel began crossing the Strait in daylight from 13th August (Blumenson, 1968, p.144). The subsequent evacuation went so well that on the 14th August Hube decided to extend the operation by a day in order to withdraw more equipment and stores (Blumenson, 1968, p.143). Von Liebenstein later claimed that the trans-shipment route was never put under excessive strain and all the requirements asked of it were successfully met (D’Este, 1988, p.514). The resilience of the route even allowed for some capacity to be allocated to the Italians to aid them in moving some of their heavy equipment when their own limited means failed (Blumenson, 1968, p.145).

Generaloberst Hube left Sicily on 16th August 1943 ǂļƢķɆƢķėɆŒëƖƢɆŨįɆƢķėɆEėƎśëŝɆįŨƎĉėƖɆëŝĐɆŨįǘĉļ댌LjɆ declared the evacuation complete the following day.

The last German troops to leave Sicily were a group of Engineers from 29th Motorised Division. It is said ƢķëƢɆƢķėLjɆǂėƎėɆƖƪįǘĉļėŝƢŒLjɆŨƎİëŝļƖėĐɆëŝĐɆƪŝķƪƎƎļėĐɆ in their withdrawal that they towed a bottle of wine behind their boat and celebrated their evacuation with chilled wine once they reached the mainland (Blackwell, 2008, p.191). The recorded data of the

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evacuation varies from source to source, and the EėƎśëŝƖɆƢķėśƖėŒǁėƖɆëĐśļƢƢėĐɆƢķëƢɆƢķėɆǘİƪƎėƖɆǂėƎėɆ imprecise and calculated in haste (D’Este, 1988, p.513). Carlo D’Este provided a detailed summary of ƢķėɆėǁëĉƪëƢļŨŝɆǘİƪƎėƖȚɆǂƎļƢļŝİɆƢķëƢɆĈėƢǂėėŝɆ 1st -17th August, the Germans evacuated 39,951 troops, 14,772 casualties, 9,789 vehicles, 51 tanks, 163 artillery pieces, 1,874 tons of combat supplies and 16,791 tons of miscellaneous stores (1988, p.514).

It is widely acknowledged that the Germans left nothing of military value in Sicily; Von Liebenstein later stated that, ‘We have not given up a single German soldier, weapon or vehicle into enemy hands’ (D’Este, 1988, p.516). Whilst the recovery of every military asset from Sicily appears to be ëŝɆėLJëİİėƎëƢļŨŝȚɆļƢɆļƖɆƪŝŒļŏėŒLjɆƢķëƢɆëŝLjɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆ resource was left for the Allies. In comparison to other operations, such as the mass denial of equipment and stores witnessed at Dunkirk, the results of Operation LEHRGANG stand out. This has fuelled an uncharitable tendency to compare it favourably to the much larger scale and much more situationally ĐļįǘĉƪŒƢɆ ƎļƢļƖķɆėǁëĉƪëƢļŨŝɆȩ 댌ȚɆǥǣǣǬȚɆƋșǥǦǦȪșɆ¶ķėɆ operation is frequently recorded in a way which extenuates the ease in which the Germans escaped Sicily and highlights the failure of the Allied forces to completely destroy the force. The very titles of studies such as D’Este’s ‘Bitter Victory’ (1988) and Blumenson’s ‘Sicily: Whose Victory?’ (1968) show this trend. Placed next to the Allied failures, the German ƖƪĉĉėƖƖɆĈėĉŨśėɆƖŨśėǂķëƢɆëśƋŒļǘėĐșɆ The success of the evacuation had several longƢėƎśɆėįįėĉƢƖɆǂķļĉķɆķëǁėɆëśƋŒļǘėĐɆļƢƖɆƖƪĉĉėƖƖɆįƪƎƢķėƎɆ still. It was heavily exploited by the Germans for its propaganda value and provided some degree of antidote to the negative impact of the reverses at Stalingrad and Tunisia (Blackwell, 2008, p.193). No doubt the positive spin of the propaganda also has an ėŝĐƪƎļŝİɆļŝǙƪėŝĉėɆŨŝɆķŨǂɆƢķėɆŨƋėƎëƢļŨŝɆļƖɆƋėƎĉėļǁėĐɆ as a success today. Perhaps the most important long-term factor was the impact this evacuation had on the subsequent Italian Campaign. It saved German forces that were experienced in defensive and delay operations which the Allies would encounter over and over again as they slowly progressed up the Italian mainland. As the war ground on, the Germans would have repeated cause to celebrate the evacuation, whilst the Allies would have cause to regret their failure to prevent it (D’Este, 1988, p.516).

To conclude, Operation LEHRGANG is perceived by historiography as an overwhelming success and įƎŨśɆƢķėɆėǁļĐėŝĉėɆƋƎėƖėŝƢėĐȚɆŝŨɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆķļƖƢŨƎļĉëŒɆ criticisms of its conduct have been found. The evacuation was a success because it was effectively planned, commanded, controlled, organised and executed, but several factors enabled this. Thanks to their command culture, a whole force approach was taken which facilitated the entire process. The operational area lent itself towards defence and close attention was paid to Rear Area security and force protection. Discipline and morale were strictly maintained which not only prevented disorder, but ëŒƖŨɆƋŨƖļƢļǁėŒLjɆļŝǙƪėŝĉėĐɆƢķėɆǁļėǂƖɆŨįɆƢķėɆėǁëĉƪėėƖɆ towards the operation. Perceptions of the results also play a part, especially in how it was promoted in German propaganda and how it compared to the performance of the Allied forces in the same

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HISTORICAL 8 operation and other less fortunate operations of a similar nature. Finally, Operation LEHRGANG had a positive impact on the subsequent defensive campaign the Germans fought in mainland Italy which gave an enduring aspect to its overall success.

Bibliography Ball, S, (2009), The Bitter Sea, Harper Collins, London.

Beevor, A, (2014), The Second World War, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London.

Blackwell, I (2008), Battle for Sicily, Pen and Sword, Barnsley.

Blumenson, M, (1968), Sicily: Whose Victory?, Macdonald, London.

Burleigh, M, (2010), Moral Combat, Harper Press, London.

Carver, L, (2001), War in Italy 1943-1945, Sidgwick and Jackson, London.

D’Este, C, (1988), Bitter Victory, Collins, London.

Hastings, M, (2011), All Hell Let Loose, Harper Press, London.

Holland, J, (2020), Sicily ’43, Bantam Press, London.

Keegan, J, (1989) The Second World War, Viking Press, New York.

Malony, C, (2004) History of the Second World War, The Mediterranean and the Middle East, Vol V, The Naval and Military Press, n.l.

Parish, T (Ed), The Encyclopaedia of World War II, Secker & Warburg, London.

Pond, H, (1962), Sicily, William Kimber, London.

Porch, D, (2009), The Path to Victory, Kenecky and Kenecky, n.l.

Shepperd, G, (1968), The Italian Campaign 1943-45, Arthur Barker, London.

Stetson-Conn (Ed), (1963), US Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, Garland and Smith, n.l. Available from: ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșļĈļĈŒļŨșŨƎİȦķLjƋėƎǂëƎȦ½© Ȧ½© ȯn¶{ȯ©ļĉļŒLjȦ ½© ȯn¶{ȯ©ļĉļŒLjȯǤǬșķƢśŒɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǤǦɆ©ėƋƢėśĈėƎɆǥǣǥǤȮșɆ Strawson, J (1987), The Italian Campaign, Secker and Warburg, London.

http://rlcfoundation.com/ Follow The RLC Foundation on social media ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșŒļŝŏėĐļŝșĉŨśȦĉŨśƋëŝLjȦƎŨLjëŒȯŒŨİļƖƢļĉȯĉŨƎƋƖȯįŨƪŝĐëƢļŨŝȦ @RoyalLogisticCorpsFoundation

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THE REVIEW 2022 | 47

8 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

Wargaming: the art of combatting cyber resilience Richard Pasco, Head of Operational Analysis at Techmodal, explains how wargaming provides a ƖëįėȯƢŨȯįëļŒɆėŝǁļƎŨŝśėŝƢɆƢŨɆėįįėĉƢļǁėŒLjɆŒėëƎŝɆķŨǂɆƢŨɆƋŒëŝɆëŝĐɆǂļƢķƖƢëŝĐɆƋŨƢėŝƢļëŒɆĉLjĈėƎɆëƢƢëĉŏƖ

ɆƖėŝļŨƎɆŨįǘĉėƎɆŨŝĉėɆƢŨŒĐɆśėɆƢķëƢɆŝŨɆƋëƋėƎɆļƖɆ ĉŨśƋŒėƢėɆǂļƢķŨƪƢɆëɆƍƪŨƢėɆįƎŨśɆëɆEėƎśëŝɆEėŝėƎëŒɆ so let’s start with one.

“This is not a game! This is training for war! I must recommend it to the whole Army,” General von nƪįǙļŝİȚɆ ķļėįɆŨįɆƢķėɆ ƎƪƖƖļëŝɆEėŝėƎëŒɆ©ƢëįįȚɆǤǫǥǧșɆ Anyone in the military has certainly attended a Tabletop Exercise, Tactical Exercise Without Troops, Rehearsal of Concept drill, or wargame before. They can be an effective way of assessing a plan against a range of threats. The military use them for planning and learning how to plan, which is increasingly relevant in our rapidly changing world. Speaking from experience, good quality data, and effective handling and analysis of that data (alongside willingness to play the game), is critical in delivering effective and well-informed wargaming.

A data-led approach A data-led wargame has the advantage of focussing the conversation on the tangible problem and avoids the potential of a discussion without resolution. If analysts are able to model the wargame scenario in advance and pull out the key logistic issues, a simple graph or data table projected around the room can focus the conversation on the key issue(s). Even better than that is a tool that can be operated live in the room so new courses of action (COAs) can be suggested, tested and adjudicated all within the wargame itself. The advantages of applying machine speed calculations to bring logistics issues to life greatly ĈėŝėǘƢɆƢķėɆëĉƢɆŨįɆƋƎėƖėŝƢļŝİɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉƖɆĉķ댌ėŝİėƖɆȩëŝĐɆ opportunities) to a commander. Predictive analytics that forecast usage linked to real-time stock levels and an understanding of nodal constraints via open-source or satellite data is a compelling offering.

Logistics is a science but wrapped in an art and a numbers-centric wargame can bring out both sides of this challenge.

A willingness to commit to the game is also critical.

Dice, chance cards and voting can all feel a bit geeky, but there is a great body of academic evidence to demonstrate that these tools are incredibly effective in aiding good decision-making. Anonymity of voting on likelihood of success or suggesting alternative COAs can initiate a brilliant idea from those who would otherwise have been lost or hidden behind their rank badge.

48 | THE REVIEW 2022

How do you wargame a threat that exists in a virtual domain?

The internet has interconnected our world and revolutionised the way in which we shop, the way we bank, the way we watch television and the way we live almost every part of our lives. Our personal lives and the business world exist in a heavily integrated global network and as a group we tend to believe that our IT security is covered by others, rolling our eyes when our phone decides to update or when MODNET unexpectedly reboots at 1100hrs on a nŨŝĐëLjɆśŨƎŝļŝİșɆ ƖɆƢķėɆƎėĉėŝƢɆpëƢļŨŝëŒɆ ƪĐļƢɆ{įǘĉėɆ report stated, the internet is inherently vulnerable and attempts to exploit its weaknesses, known as cyber-attacks, continue to increase and evolve. The Government’s view is that cyber risks can never be eliminated, but they can be managed to the extent that the opportunities provided by digital technology, such as reducing costs and improving services, outweigh the disadvantages.

In the Defence industry, ‘cyber’ is rapidly becoming ëɆǂëƎǘİķƢļŝİɆĐŨśëļŝȚɆǂļƢķɆįƎŨŝƢŒļŝėɆƖŏļƎśļƖķėƖɆ happening as we speak. Of all the domains, it can be argued that Defence Support has the greatest software, services and systems which it does not and may never come to completely control. We depend on contracted partners at all stages of activity, from routine support on the home base to working with a service provider when forward deployed. To do so, we share many types of information between ourselves and with our partners in order to deliver logistic effect.

What is the potential impact of a cyber attack?

In 2017, the attack known as NotPetya was released, ƢëƎİėƢļŝİɆëɆ½ŏƎëļŝļëŝɆĈëŝŏļŝİɆǘƎśșɆQƢɆƖƋƎėëĐɆƎëƋļĐŒLjɆ around the world, infecting millions of PCs including those of Maersk. Maersk operate 340 ports around the world and play a role in 20% of all global shipping. The NotPetya outage left Maersk unable to process shipping orders until systems were restored, freezing revenue from several of the company’s shipping container lines for weeks.

The attack was so severe that Maersk lost the ability to function, to the extent that they could not even open the gates of their ports. In a chance relief, there was a critical server powered down in Lagos ǂķļĉķɆǂëƖɆǙŨǂŝɆĈëĉŏɆƢŨɆƢķėɆ½bɆǂķėƎėɆëɆƢėëśɆŨįɆ consultants were locked in Reading Industrial Park to rebuild the entire Maersk network. The loss of several weeks of activity is estimated to have cost Maersk £200-300 million.

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OPERATIONS AND TRAINING 8

Credit Shutterstock

Credit Shutterstock

That is why cyber resilience wargames were created. We need to understand the impact of a cyber event so that we can put the right mitigation processes in place. No one can ever be completely secure, but we must understand and then manage that risk. A huge part of the wargaming process is education and, like many things, a cyber attack feels very ethereal until it happens to you. We have found that simply stepping through the wargame can change mindsets and start to create a cyberaware culture which is far more effective than the mandatory training on its own.

A cyber resilience wargame in operation A cyber-resilience wargame takes a logistic capability - be that a piece of LogIS, a logistic node or process - and brings together Subject Matter Experts who understand the subject into a (suitably cleared) room. Often there is a vulnerability investigation into the technical attack vectors that can be used to gain access. This provides some background but the conversation we are aiming for is about the resulting impact of an event and not how someone could get inside. The players are briefed on the rules of the game; most importantly, this is a safe-to-fail environment. We are not technical experts in cyber but it affects us all which means we all start the challenge with equal equity.

Step One: Availability A scenario is presented of a routine activity for this capability and then challenges are introduced. These ĉëŝɆĈėɆëŝɆėǁėŝƢɆëİëļŝƖƢɆĉŨŝǘĐėŝƢļëŒļƢLjȚɆļŝƢėİƎļƢLjɆŨƎɆ availability (also known in the cyber world as ‘CIA’). It is easiest to start with an event against availability with a total loss of system function. Quite often we have found that business continuity plans for any sort of loss are already in place as part of military contingency planning, often based on phone calls and reverting to previous procedures (as long as the number isn’t stored on the system that’s gone down!). This redundancy offered through extra capacity, reversionary modes or staff experience is critical to maintaining the logistic task. Any “updates” to a system in the name of ėįǘĉļėŝĉLjɆśƪƖƢɆĈėɆśėëƖƪƎėĐɆëİëļŝƖƢɆėįįėĉƢļǁėŝėƖƖɆļŝɆëɆ constantly degraded environment.

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Step Two: Integrity Next, we introduce an attack against integrity where data is changed or manipulated. Maybe an order is duplicated, cancelled or changed. What if a delivery arrives that you weren’t expecting or twice as much as you thought you had ordered? How can that be ŝŨƢļĉėĐɆļŝɆëśŨŝİƖƢɆƢķėɆǁŨŒƪśėɆŨįɆŨƎĐėƎƖɆǙŨǂļŝİɆ through a system? How would you identify if this was an attack or human error? ©ƢėƋɆƢķƎėėțɆ ŨŝǘĐėŝƢļëŒļƢLj Dļŝ댌LjȚɆǂėɆƢėƖƢɆëŝɆėǁėŝƢɆëİëļŝƖƢɆĉŨŝǘĐėŝƢļëŒļƢLjșɆQįɆ an attacker can gain access to a system and simply observe, what can they learn? Would logistic activity signal an operational change or signify an imminent deployment? What would a combination of these insights from several systems provide a potential aggressor? ¶ķėɆǘŝĐļŝİƖɆŨįɆŨƪƎɆĉLjĈėƎɆƎėƖļŒļėŝĉėɆǂëƎİëśėƖɆĉëŝɆ be grouped into three major themes: 1. Defence needs to truly understand its appetite to ƢƎëĐėɆėįǘĉļėŝĉLjɆŨįɆŝėǂɆƢėĉķŝŨŒŨİLjɆǂļƢķɆŨƋėƎëƢļŨŝëŒɆ effectiveness.

2. Defence Support will always be working with ƋëƎƢŝėƎƖɆëŝĐɆśƪƖƢɆǘŝĐɆëɆǂëLjɆŨįɆƖķëƎļŝİɆƢķėɆĉLjĈėƎɆ response (including the operational risk) with those partners.

3. Education is the best way to combat the cyber threat and wargaming is an excellent way to teach the players how to think about cyber in a meaningful and actionable way.

We have run these games inside Defence Support but also have also provided this service to other ļŝĐƪƖƢƎļėƖɆëŝĐɆëĉëĐėśļëșɆ¶ŨɆǘŝĐɆŨƪƢɆśŨƎėȚɆŨƎɆƢŨɆ discuss how a cyber resilience wargame could be applied to your company, unit or department please ǁļƖļƢɆŨƪƎɆǂėĈƖļƢėțɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșƢėĉķśŨĐëŒșĉŨśȦ ĉŨŝƢëĉƢȯƪƖȦɆ About Techmodal About Techmodal: Techmodal is a UK-based applied data science business solving complex data problems for its clients in Defence and Industry. Its purpose is to help customers harness their data using experts, teams and bespoke tools to support their most important business decisions. More information about Techmodal can be found at: www.techmodal.com

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How can the logistic element within 1st Division form part of its deception plan?

The use of deception in combat is not a new concept, it has always been part of warfare.

Examples of military deception litter history from as far back as the Trojans in the 13th century BC. During the Punic Wars, Hannibal became legendary for his use of deception in his campaign against Rome, holding off superior forces on multiple occasions. Much focus in history is given ƢŨɆƢķėɆǘİķƢļŝİɆĉŨŝƢļŝİėŝƢɆŨįɆëƎśļėƖɆëŝĐɆƢķėļƎɆ use of deception as the foremost movers on the ĈëƢƢŒėǘėŒĐȜɆķŨǂėǁėƎȚɆƢķėɆƖƪƋƋŨƎƢļŝİɆëƎśƖɆŨįɆëŝLjɆ modern army compose a large part of the deployed įŨƎĉėɆëŝĐɆśŨĐėƎŝɆĐėƋŒŨLjśėŝƢƖɆķëǁėɆëɆŒėƖƖɆĐėǘŝėĐɆ ‘front line’ - especially in peacekeeping and stabilisation operations.

The British Field Army operates in two distinct ĐļǁļƖļŨŝƖșɆÕķļŒƖƢɆƢķėɆǦƎĐɆ$ļǁļƖļŨŝɆļƖɆĉŨŝǘİƪƎėĐɆǂļƢķɆ ëƖƖėƢƖɆįŨƎɆƋėėƎȯëĐǁėƎƖëƎLjɆǂëƎǘİķƢļŝİȚɆƢķėɆǤƖƢɆ $ļǁļƖļŨŝɆļƖɆĉŨŝǘİƪƎėĐɆǂļƢķɆŒļİķƢėƎɆėƍƪļƋśėŝƢɆëŝĐɆǂļƢķɆ a more adaptable posture to achieve a broader range of global tasks. The 1st Division does not operate armour; it is a smaller, lighter force thus enabling a more rapid deployment. For example, an armoured infantry brigade which form the 3rd Division create a massive lift requirement to move their equipment into theatre. With a typical makeup of 56 Challenger 2 Main Battle Tanks and 18 AS90s Self-Propelled Artillery platforms before support vehicles, troops and logistic materiel, deployments would quickly become reliant on rail and sea. Exercise TRACTABLE in 2019 demonstrated the timeline required to move an armoured battle group. The exercise deployed to Estonia entirely utilizing rail, taking a total of 10 days to deploy. This is where the scalable 1st Division becomes more attractive. A lighter, air deployable force, could be deployed and have an effect in theatre within hours, as opposed to days or even weeks.

The lower physical signature of the Division also provides a spectrum of choice between hiding in plain sight to an overt military presence and it is better ĉŨŝǘİƪƎėĐɆƢŨɆŨƋėƎëƢėɆļŝɆëɆŒėƖƖɆŏļŝėƢļĉȚɆśŨƎėɆŝƪëŝĉėĐȚɆ ĉŨŝǙļĉƢɆėŝǁļƎŨŝśėŝƢșɆDŨƎɆėLJëśƋŒėȚɆëɆƋƎŨƢėĉƢėĐɆ ǁėķļĉŒėɆƖƪĉķɆëƖɆëɆDŨLJķŨƪŝĐɆƋƎŨĐƪĉėƖɆëɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢŒLjɆ less aggressive posture than a Challenger 2. The Division’s mobility also makes its units favourable for operations where long-range patrolling is required, such as Operation NEWCOMBE in Mali. This highlights the major advantage of the 1st Division, its ability to project force quickly, globally and to adapt to different environments across a broad ƖƋėĉƢƎƪśɆŨįɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢș

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Lt Oliver MeldrumɆėLJƋŒŨƎėƖɆƢķėɆįėëƖļĈļŒļƢLjɆŨįɆƪƖļŝİɆƢķėɆǤƖƢɆ$ļǁļƖļŨŝȼƖɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉɆįŨƎĉėɆėŒėśėŝƢƖɆëƖɆƋëƎƢɆ ŨįɆƢķėɆ$ļǁļƖļŨŝȼƖɆĐėĉėƋƢļŨŝɆƋŒëŝɆĈLjɆķļİķŒļİķƢļŝİɆƢķėɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉɆĉŨśƋŨŝėŝƢƖɆŨįɆƢķėɆǤƖƢɆ$ļǁļƖļŨŝȚɆ ĐļƖĉƪƖƖļŝİɆŨƋƋŨƎƢƪŝļƢļėƖɆƢŨɆśëLJļśļƖėɆĐėĉėƋƢļŨŝɆëŝĐɆėLJëśļŝļŝİɆƎėĉŨśśėŝĐëƢļŨŝƖɆƢŨɆĈėɆƢëŏėŝɆ forward for experimentation

The UK Government is increasingly seeking to ĐėǁėŒŨƋɆƖŨįƢɆƋŨǂėƎɆļŝǙƪėŝĉėɆëƎŨƪŝĐɆƢķėɆİŒŨĈėȚɆǂļƢķɆëɆ particular interest in Africa, “Building on the success of the 2020 Africa Investment Summit, we will revitalise UK economic engagement with Africa, deepening and developing mutual partnerships, working together to build resilient and productive economies and open societies, with improved development, investment ëŝĐɆǘŝëŝĉļŝİɆŨįįėƎƖȚɆśŨƎėɆėįįėĉƢļǁėɆķƪśëŝļƢëƎļëŝɆ response, increased climate resilience and reduced security threats.” (HM Government , 2021). HQ 1 (UK) Division is the lead for delivery of land operations outside the Euro-Atlantic. The establishment of a Land Regional Hub in Kenya, as well as elsewhere, lays the operational foundations for future deployments with forces operating out of hubs into prescribed areas of exploitation. The Light Division’s likely theatres or enemies are very wide in scope, but with the wide variety of units within the Division, commanders at the strategic level are provided a wide array of viable options for their deployed forces. Light role regiments can be used to rapidly deploy and hold areas with a lower threat level. Mechanised units allow greater protection, mobility and lethality, but require longer to deploy and present a more aggressive posture. Whilst these threats are diverse and arbitrary, one clear trend, however, is the likelihood of operating in and around ƋŨƋƪŒëƢļŨŝɆĉėŝƢƎėƖɆŨŝɆƢķėɆƎƪƎëŒȦƪƎĈëŝɆļŝƢėƎįëĉėș Logistic support is delivered within the Light Division on a small and reactive scale. While the ǦƎĐɆ$ļǁļƖļŨŝɆƎėƍƪļƎėƖɆǘǁėɆįƪŒŒɆƎėİƪŒëƎɆ¡d ɆƪŝļƢƖɆƢŨɆ support its deployment, the Light Division’s scale

8 1 Division does not operate any heavy armour

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8 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

52 | THE REVIEW 2022

ëɆƖƪƋƋŨƖėĐŒLjɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆƢëƎİėƢɆǂŨƎƢķɆëƢƢëĉŏļŝİșɆ This style of deception can allow an ambush of the enemy in an area favourable to friendly forces. During Operation HERRICK, (the umbrella codename for the UK’s counter insurgency (COIN) and stabilisation missions within Afghanistan between June 2002 and December 2014) logistic patrols would occasionally be tasked to drive through an area in order to draw opportunistic attacks from the Taliban. The seemingly undefended logistic vehicles would be closely followed by Warthog Squadrons and Attack Helicopters. Logistic elements of the division are large and visible and seen as a soft target; this reinforces the deception and suits the purposes of dissimulation.

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ƎėƍƪļƎėƖɆëɆĐļƖƢļŝĉƢɆĉŨŝǘİƪƎëƢļŨŝɆŨįɆƖƪƋƋŨƎƢɆėƍƪëƢļŝİɆ to two regular RLC units. With a reduced demand for fuel and ammunition, the number of supporting units also reduce, and a single composite Logistic Squadron supports each Brigade. Comprised of two transport and two supply troops, each squadron can support forward and reverse supply chains for their dependencies. In addition, with the ability to hold four Days of Supply (DOS) on wheels, the Squadron can advance with a Brigade, restocking its DOS as necessary, whilst operating from a Brigade Support Area (BSA). The size of the BSA (5km2) is such that ļƢɆļƖɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢɆƢŨɆĈėɆëĐëƋƢëĈŒėɆŨƎɆśŨĈļŒėȜɆƢķļƖɆļƖɆëɆ vulnerability when facing a sophisticated enemy with ISTAR and IDF assets; against a less powerful enemy there remains the risk of low-level sabotage rather than wholesale destruction. Dispersion and deception are therefore key to survival.

According to the ADP Land Operations Handbook, deception includes measures that will induce the enemy to act, ‘in a manner prejudicial to their interests’ (British Army, 2017). There are two types of deception: simulation, which is the visible show of a false activity, and dissimulation, which is the hiding of true activity. Both simulation and dissimulation can be used together but must have a clear aim. It is also important to understand the enemy’s ‘perceptions, prejudices, and likely reactions’ (British Army, 2017) in order to achieve this aim. Key, too, is the proportionate use of resources when using deception. ëśŨƪǙëİėɆļƖɆëɆƋƎŨśļŝėŝƢɆëŝĐɆǂėŒŒȯŏŝŨǂŝɆįŨƎśɆŨįɆ dissimulation; it prevents an object from being easily seen by blending it with its surroundings, which in turn hides the location, size, intent, or composition of a force. Though scrim cover is an attempt at ĉëśŨƪǙëİėɆįŨƎɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉɆëƖƖėƢƖȚɆļŝɆƋƎëĉƢļƖėɆƢķėɆƖƪƋƋŨƎƢɆ vehicles and supply areas do not easily blend into the background so other methods must be used. This may involve hiding vehicles and stores in woods or buildings and using routes that are hard to observe, but increasingly prominence is given to ‘hiding in plain sight’ – that is, appearing to be part of the civilian infrastructure. British and coalition forces on Operation SHADER, (the UK’s ongoing contribution of military force against ISIL from August 2014.

This includes ground support and training, targeted airstrikes and the distribution of humanitarian aid) currently make extensive use of Civilian Armoured Vehicles (CAV) to enable movement without harassment in major urban centres such as Erbil and Baghdad. There is scope to consider the use of Pantechs for command posts or as a prime śŨǁėśėŝƢɆǙėėƢȚɆëŝĐɆƋŒëļŝɆĉŒŨƢķļŝİɆƢŨɆĉŨŝĉėëŒɆƢƎŨŨƋɆ activity. It is impossible to hide a whole BSA, but it is possible to prevent the enemy identifying what each type of store is, utilising ISO containers or storage in civilian buildings for example, thus minimising the effectiveness of enemy surveillance.

While dissimulation hides our forces’ true ĐļƖƋŨƖļƢļŨŝȚɆƖļśƪŒëƢļŨŝɆŨįįėƎƖɆƋŨƢėŝƢļëŒɆļŝǙƪėŝĉėɆŨǁėƎɆ an enemy’s actions. This may be a deterrent; the impression of a large and aggressive force, where there is none, such as the Allied forces use of dummy ĉëśƋƖȚɆįëŒƖėɆƎŨëĐɆśŨǁėśėŝƢƖɆëŝĐɆļŝǙëƢëĈŒėɆǁėķļĉŒėƖɆ to simulate the logistic build up to divert attention away from the Normandy landings in 1944. It is also often achieved by offering ‘bait’ in the form of

8 Composite logistic Sqns hold four days of supply on wheels

When exploring options for how deception could be employed in the 1st Division, it is necessary to look at both short-term and long-term implementation. In the short term, current 102 Logistic Brigade holdings would support the creation of dummy BSAs if more assets were aligned to exercises; this would enable a degree of experimentation, although assets would likely remain limited for operational deployments.

The key to a successful deception plan is to fully understand the surveillance capability of the enemy, playing to their surveillance assets, whether that ļƖɆķėëƢɆȩƪƖļŝİɆİėŝėƎëƢŨƎƖɆëŝĐɆǘƎėƖɆƢŨɆśļśļĉɆ ƖȚɆ vehicles and personnel), visual (building a complete or near complete site using spare containers, cam nets and tentage), electromagnetic (using signallers to produce high numbers of transmissions from an area in a fashion resembling that of active sights) or physical (resourcing the deception plan with vehicles and personnel).

Another short-term method would be to use dispersal to protect and hide the main body of a force.

For example, forces are more able to physically hide įƎŨśɆƢķėɆėŝėśLjȚɆëŝĐɆļįɆƢķėLjɆëƎėɆļĐėŝƢļǘėĐȚɆƢķėLjɆëƎėɆ less attractive targets. Coupled with other strategies this will allow commanders to build a robust deception plan, with for example; a dummy BSA ĐƎëǂļŝİɆǘƎėȚɆǂķļŒėɆĐļƖƋėƎƖėĐɆĉŨŝǁŨLjƖɆŨƋėƎëƢėɆĉļǁļŒļëŝɆ equipment. Concealment within urban environments ļƖɆëŒǂëLjƖɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢȜɆƖļŒķŨƪėƢƢėƖɆŨįɆśļŒļƢëƎLjɆǁėķļĉŒėƖɆëƎėɆ ėëƖļŒLjɆļĐėŝƢļǘėĐɆëŝĐɆƢķėļƎɆƖļǒėɆĐƎëǂƖɆëƢƢėŝƢļŨŝșɆ¶ķļƖɆ ultimately hampers protection, with the use of bulky and slow vehicles which are potentially vulnerable.

However, a solution centres on the survivability onion; to prevent assets being seen, the Division should look to conceal its forces in equipment or location(s) likely to draw minimal attention, for example concealing a BSA in a building site or industrial estate, with command posts operating out of civilian vehicles.

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Several units in the Division, notably 6 Regiment RLC and 9 Regiment RLC, have experimented in recent years (2020-2021) with this concept. Both units managed to achieve a successful proof of concept.

When it comes to longer-term implementation options for deception, the British Army has a plethora of external service contracts with civilian partners which aim to streamline services and reduce operational load. Private military contractors have become more prominent within recent NATO operations (such as those employed in site security ļŝɆQƎëƍȪșɆ©ƪĉķɆĉŨśśėƎĉļëŒȦĉļǁļŒļëŝɆƋëƎƢŝėƎƖķļƋƖɆĉëŝɆ be effectively employed by logistics on operations and promotes light and agile force elements. There is scope for the use of local hauliers to move nonsensitive materiel as they are more inconspicuous ǂļƢķɆƢķėļƎɆŒŨĉëŒɆėŝǁļƎŨŝśėŝƢȚɆƢķėƎėɆļƖɆëŒƖŨɆƢķėɆĈėŝėǘƢɆ of creating logistic noise to hide within. Operating with local partners carries risk, therefore contracting ŨįǘĉėƎƖɆśƪƖƢɆėŝƖƪƎėɆƢķėƎėɆëƎėɆƖƢƎļŝİėŝƢɆǁėƢƢļŝİɆ processes to mitigate threat. Regular experimentation with this should be a longer-term implementation target for the Division.

Commanders are already encouraged to experiment during exercises, think ‘outside the box’, and most importantly take calculated risks. Where we could expand this is by learning to train with deception ǂļƢķļŝɆ댌ɆƋŒëŝŝļŝİɆĉLjĉŒėƖȜɆƋƎŨǘĉļėŝĉLjɆǂļƢķɆĐėįėŝƖļǁėɆ and offensive deception plans is crucial and often ļƢɆļƖɆƢķėɆǘŝëŝĉļëŒɆŒļśļƢëƢļŨŝƖɆëƢɆƢƎŨŨƋɆëŝĐɆƖƍƪëĐƎŨŝɆ level which prevents more experimentation with deception. Investment in non-standard equipment, even in small numbers and held centrally, would aid deception. It is paramount that units can experiment in this ‘hide in plain sight’ style of operations. Using civilian vehicles such as 4x4s and articulated trucks, materiel handling equipment and command nodes built into ISOs, allows for greater visual protection while operating within urban hubs, at the expense of physical protection. It is pertinent that any move away from uniforms and traditional equipment opens the risk of fratricide. This is undoubtably increased with ƢķėɆŝėëƎɆĉėƎƢëļŝƢLjɆƢķëƢɆëŝLjɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆĐėƋŒŨLjśėŝƢɆ would be conducted as part of a coalition force. While ƢķļƖɆƋƎėƖėŝƢƖɆëɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆƢķƎėëƢɆƢŨɆëŝLjɆĐėƋŒŨLjėĐɆįŨƎĉėȚɆ mitigations can always be implemented. Practice and experimentation during build-up training would allow units to build robust tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and depending on enemy capability, ĉŨŝƢƎŨŒɆśėëƖƪƎėƖɆƖƪĉķɆëƖɆļŝįƎëȯƎėĐɆȩQ¡ȪɆļĐėŝƢļǘėƎƖɆĉŨƪŒĐɆ be employed. Use of this equipment for sustainment tasking frees the armoured military vehicles to perform diversionary moves or alternative tasks which may mask the ‘true’ movement of the supply chain. Again, ƢķļƖɆǂŨƪŒĐɆƢëŏėɆƢļśėɆƢŨɆǘŝëŝĉėɆëŝĐɆėƖƢëĈŒļƖķș Commanders must fully understand the enemy’s intentions to identify if any employed deception activity has been successful. The use of UAV is well established as a reconnaissance and strike system, but the use of fully autonomous systems is currently less prevalent. A civilian developed airborne system for area monitoring could be employed to identify enemy manoeuvres in their initial stages, providing commanders with a decision point on which to base action. 6 Regiment RLC is currently exploring this as an unfunded project over the longer-term.

Finally, as used in 1944, and more recently on

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OPERATIONS AND TRAINING 8

8 ISO containers are an everyday sight and can be used to conceal weapons and equipment

ƢķėɆ¡ƪƖƖļëŝɆĈŨƎĐėƎȚɆƢķėɆƪƖėɆŨįɆļŝǙëƢëĈŒėȦĐƪśśLjɆ equipment is an effective way to draw attention to an area. It can be used to both entice movement to an area and as a show of force. ISOs have a range of utility and are commonplace around the globe.

Both the US and Russia have already began using these to conceal both weapon systems and mobile facilities, they are easily moved and can be concealed with ease. Combining these two will allow easier concealment of units while drawing attention to more believable dummies. Whilst this concept would take the longest to implement for the Division, it offers a viable way in which the logistic elements of the formation could be used as part of the operational deception plan.

There is a well-documented history of the use of ĐėĉėƋƢļŨŝɆįŨƎɆśļŒļƢëƎLjɆëĐǁëŝƢëİėȜɆļƢƖɆėįǘĉëĉLjɆśƪƖƢɆ not be underestimated in modern warfare and with all arms of the deployed force. Due to the potential breadth and depth of deployments conducted by the 1st Division, as stated in this essay, it is vital that any deception plan must be tailored to the environment in which operations will conducted; one size will not ǘƢɆ댌șɆ In the short term, there should be a focus on increasing the collaboration between CSS groups and their brigades, with more attention on training to use deception as an established element of the normal events cycle. Logistic assets are big, obvious ëŝĐɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢɆƢŨɆĉŨŝĉėëŒșɆ¶ŨɆĐëƢėȚɆśƪĉķɆįŨĉƪƖɆļƖɆİļǁėŝɆ to dissimulation and thinking of novel ways to hide them. However, experimenting with simulation and

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8 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING exposing them as a means of contributing to the Division’s deception plan is where they could be ƪƖėĐɆƢŨɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆėįįėĉƢȜɆ,LJėƎĉļƖėƖɆÕ,©©,ÚɆ©¶{¡nɆ and ASKARI STORM seem logical places to conduct this experimentation. Medium-term strategies ƖķŨƪŒĐɆļŝĉŒƪĐėɆĉŨŝƖļĐėƎëƢļŨŝɆŨįɆǘŝëŝĉļëŒɆļŝǁėƖƢśėŝƢȚɆ ƖƋėĉļǘĉ댌LjȚɆƢķėɆƋƎŨĉƪƎėśėŝƢɆŨįɆĐƪśśLjɆėƍƪļƋśėŝƢȚɆ effective civilian equipment and risk managed contractors and ISO contained facilities. By these means the force is more able to develop a convincing deception plan.

These recommended changes will only be successful if there is a tangible shift in our culture.

Training at all levels must both acknowledge and encourage commanders to explore its potential within a risk framework; collaboration between the ©©ɆĉŨśśƪŝļƢLjɆëŝĐɆƢķėɆǘİķƢļŝİɆĈƎļİëĐėƖɆśƪƖƢɆĈėɆ at the centre of this development. ADP Ops teaches that deception is a non-negotiable requirement for success on operations; logistical elements have potential to provide a pivotal role as a likely target or ruse for enemy interest, thus, we must all become proactive in developing credible deception doctrine, tactics and capabilities.

References British Army (2017) ADP - Land Operations Handbook.

Warminster: Army Doctine Publications.

British Army (2018) ADP - ƎśLjɆDļėŒĐɆnëŝƪëŒɆȯÕëƎǘİķƢļŝİɆ Tactics Part 1: The Fundamentals. Warminster : Army Doctine Publications.

British Army (2018) ADP - Planning and Execution Handbook. Warminster: Army Doctine Publications.

HM Government (2021). Global Britain in a competitive age. The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. London: ASP Group.

Spencer, J. (2021). Modern war institute. Retrieved from THE EIGHT RULES OF URBAN WARFARE AND WHY WE n½©¶ɆÕ{¡bɆ¶{Ɇ L pE,Ɇ¶L,nțɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦśǂļșƪƖśëșėĐƪȦ the-eight-rules-of-urban-warfare-and-why-we-mustǂŨƎŏȯƢŨȯĉķëŝİėȯƢķėśȦɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǨɆ`ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮ The World Bank. (2020). The World Bank, United Nations Population Division. Retrieved from World Urbanization ƎŨƖƋėĉƢƖțɆǥǣǤǫɆ¡ėǁļƖļŨŝșțɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦĐëƢëșǂŨƎŒĐĈëŝŏșŨƎİȦ ļŝĐļĉëƢŨƎȦ© ș½¡ ș¶{¶dșQpșå©Ɇȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǨɆ`ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮ

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OPERATIONS AND TRAINING 8

Thoughts of a Section Commander on peacekeeping operations An insight into one Section Commander’s experiences of implementing different leadership ƖƢLjŒėƖɆļŝɆŨƎĐėƎɆƢŨɆŨǁėƎĉŨśėɆƢķėɆĉķ댌ėŝİėƖɆįëĉėĐɆŨŝɆƢķėɆƋėëĉėŏėėƋļŝİɆŨƋėƎëƢļŨŝɆ{ƋɆ¶{© ɆǦǧșɆ

By Cpl Scott Duffy

8 The majority of the section were new to the Army or Reservists

Unlike Op HERRICK, Op TOSCA is not a kinetic tour. The Army doesn’t patrol with weapons and most patrols are two soldiers in a vehicle or on foot instead of a whole platoon. Whatever the operation, leadership will always play a crucial role in contributing to mission success. Op TOSCA 34 ĐėśëŝĐėĐɆǙėLJļĈļŒļƢLjɆįƎŨśɆ댌ɆŒėǁėŒƖɆŨįɆŒėëĐėƎƖķļƋȚɆ resulting in some adaptation but also decision making whilst under pressure. As I was only given the acting rank of Corporal on Pre-Deployment Training (PDT) a couple of weeks before deploying, it was clear that I would have to adapt quickly to my new role in order to succeed. I was given a section that I had only met one week prior and did not know what kind of leadership style they would react best to. As I had never really had the opportunity to command a section other than on short exercises, I found myself įëĉėĐɆǂļƢķɆƢķėɆĉķ댌ėŝİėɆŨįɆǘŝĐļŝİɆŨƪƢɆǂķëƢɆŏļŝĐɆŨįɆ leader I needed to become.

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Due to a lack of experience, I opted for ƢƎëŝƖįŨƎśëƢļŨŝëŒɆŒėëĐėƎƖķļƋɆǂķļĉķɆļƖɆĐėǘŝėĐɆĈLjɆƢķėɆ Army Leadership Code as a motivational leader or someone who inspires others to achieve a goal1.

For example, when challenges and tasks were given out, I would ask all members of my section for their thoughts and input and as a group we would decide on the best course of action. This style has proven effective on multiple occasions and one particular moment that comes to my mind is during a period of low manpower availability due to Adventurous Training (AT) and Operational Stand Down (OSD).

I posed the problem of how we would be able to cover 25 hours of patrols a day while also covering 60-minute Quick Reaction Force with only one vehicle. My section Second-in-Command, plus four privates and myself, came up with multiple suggestions and we picked the solution that we all thought would work best for the section. Personally, I feel this worked extremely well in this particular situation because the members of my section had an input and it made them feel part of the solution.

I also feel coaching my subordinates has played a big part in my leadership style whilst deployed.

The majority of my section are either new to the Army, inexperienced, or are reservists with little to no experience on operational tours. During PDT, the isolation phase, and on our in-theatre training days, I endeavoured to introduce them to the approach the UN encourages participating nations to adopt on their sponsored operations. Even whilst out on patrols I attempted to coach and guide my section to help identify the best possible ways to deal with any violations on the Buffer Zone.

Flexibility in leadership style has proven essential however and I also had to utilise a transactional 8 Choosing a leadership style needs to be undertaken with care

Credit: Shutterstock

Since 1974, the United Nations has been conducting peacekeeping operations in the Buffer Zone between the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The Buffer Zone covers over 180km and is broken down into three sectors; Sector 1 is patrolled by the Argentinian Army; Sector 2 by the British Army and Sector 4 by the Slovakian Army. The British joined this UN mission in 1993 after the Canadian Army withdrew from ƢķėɆŨƋėƎëƢļŨŝșɆ{ƋɆ¶{© ɆļƖɆśLjɆǘįƢķɆŨƋėƎëƢļŨŝëŒɆ tour and in comparison to other tours that I have experienced, it is very different in nature.

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Like the rest of the world, the Coronavirus pandemic had placed many restrictions on what we could do and what freedoms we had. When ǂėɆǘƎƖƢɆëƎƎļǁėĐɆļŝɆ LjƋƎƪƖȚɆǂėɆŝėėĐėĐɆƢŨɆļƖŨŒëƢėɆëƢɆ Bloodhound Camp for two weeks before moving ƢŨɆdėĐƎëɆ ëŒëĉėɆLŨƢėŒɆļŝɆpļĉŨƖļëșɆDŨƎɆƢķėɆǘƎƖƢɆƢǂŨɆ months we were not allowed to leave camp unless for patrols or reasons related to the mission and we also had to form our own bubbles to prevent any potential spread of COVID. Because of these restrictions, morale started to drop and the members of my section quickly became bored with our daily routine.

The biggest challenge from this was trying to keep my section motivated with relatively little resources.

Organising things like volleyball games, circuit training and pool competitions was the best we could offer and personally I think it worked. The day the restrictions were lifted, the morale was at an all-time high which was amazing to see and had a positive impact on the work that was carried out.

Defence images

leadership approach on Op TOSCA 34. Transactional leadership is the direct approach or the ‘do as I say’ style of leadership2. As a lot of people get comfortable on an operational tour, complacency ĉëŝɆƖƢëƎƢɆƢŨɆĉƎėėƋɆļŝɆëŝĐɆQɆǘŝĐɆśLjƖėŒįɆķëǁļŝİɆƢŨɆƢëŏėɆ a more direct and assertive approach. For example, during a period of low manpower due to OSD and ¶ȚɆǂėɆķëĐɆƢŨɆĈëĉŏǘŒŒɆŨƢķėƎɆƖėĉƢļŨŝƖɆëŝĐɆƋŒëƢŨŨŝƖɆ whilst on our training days. At this point in the tour a lot of the younger members of my section had become comfortable with our routine and did not want to operate outside of their comfort zone. It was necessary to transactionally lead in order to encourage them to adopt a different and necessary way of operating. However, using transactional methods of leadership must be carefully considered before adopting this approach. Young soldiers do not often react positively when a Section Commander shouts and barks orders at them. Each time I determined that a transactional approach was appropriate, I had to judge the reaction of individuals to ensure the task in hand was achieved whilst unit cohesion was maintained.

My main observation is that low level commanders who have to use both transformational and transactional leadership styles have to consider the environment, the task and the likely reaction of their subordinates. Essentially, each leadership approach has an optimum time and place associated with it and each needs to be carefully considered before adoption. A good Section Commander will know when and how to use both styles and get the best out of their section to complete allocated tasks. My biggest challenge was identifying the right times to use them whilst under time pressure.

With experience, I was able to understand which tasks were suited to which leadership style. With guidance from the other Section Commanders in my platoon, I believe I have grown as an individual and a commander and I am ready to take on more challenging leadership roles in the near future.

The context to these challenges of leadership were exacerbated by the conditions under which low-level command had to be exercised whilst on a longstanding international peacekeeping commitment.

The majority of my previous tours were completed as an infantry soldier, and they were all heavily kinetic tours. Learning new skills in communication and soft posture was something my section and I needed to adapt to quickly. A lot of us have broad northern accents so as you can imagine, communicating with the opposition forces and the farmers or intruders within the Buffer Zone proved a challenge from the outset. All of the UN peacekeepers within our sector of the Buffer Zone spoke English but unfortunately, not all of the farmers, intruders or opposition forces did. The English language, especially when spoken with an accent, has a huge variety of connotations and meanings and when parochial military vernaculars are introduced, communication with the Turkish and Greek Cypriot soldiers and locals could ĈėɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢșɆ ƖɆƢķėɆƢŨƪƎɆƋƎŨİƎėƖƖėĐɆëŝĐɆǂėɆķëĐɆ댌Ɇ had our share of incidents and violations to deal with, these communication and soft skills began to become second nature to us all. Through reviewing every incident we encountered, we were able to tailor our response to deal with similar future occurrences.

8 Soft skills are key to being a UN Peacekeeper

During PDT in the United Kingdom, I quite often heard members of the company refer to Op TOSCA as though we were deploying on Op TELIC or Op HERRICK. Similar to my last tour of Afghanistan, we had the same work rotation consisting of patrols, QRF, guard and rest. However, this is where the similarities end. What I learnt is that you should forget about all previous tours and start afresh for Op TOSCA. You need to have an open mind towards peacekeeping and not treat it like the dangerous and kinetic world of Helmand Province.

It is essential to remember that soft skills and communication methods are key to being an effective UN Peacekeeper.

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OPERATIONS AND TRAINING 8 To conclude, for any low-level commander, selection and application of the two leadership styles discussed in this article (transactional and transformational) needs to be undertaken with care.

The main lesson learnt from my experiences on Op TOSCA 34 is that the situation dictates the style of leadership and that when using a transactional approach, you must consider what are the likely consequences of adopting it. I also learnt that different forms of communication, such as negotiation techniques, are vital for peacekeepers and this is key when compared to more kinetic operations such as Op HERRICK. What is crucial to recognise is that we all have different levels of experience on and off tours and consequently have different ways of approaching the challenges we incur on a daily basis while deployed. I would be intrigued to hear how the challenges of commanding a section on a peacekeeping deployment may change over time.

Endnotes 1

ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦëŏLJŨŝŒļŝėșĐėįėŝĉėİëƢėǂëLjșśŨĐșƪŏȦƖļƢėƖȦëŏLJȦ ŒėëƎŝļŝİȯĐėǁėŒŨƋśėŝƢȦĉėŝƢƎėȯįŨƎȯëƎśLjȯŒėëĐėƎƖķļƋȦƢķėȯëƎśLjȯ ŒėëĐėƎƖķļƋȯĉŨĐėɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥɆ ƪİƪƖƢɆǥǣǥǤȮ 2 ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșśļĉķļİëŝƖƢëƢėƪŝļǁėƎƖļƢLjŨŝŒļŝėșĉŨśȦƎėƖŨƪƎĉėƖȦ ŒėëĐėƎƖķļƋȦƢƎëŝƖëĉƢļŨŝëŒȯǁƖȯƢƎëŝƖįŨƎśëƢļŨŝëŒȯŒėëĐėƎƖķļƋȦɆ ȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥɆ ƪİƪƖƢɆǥǣǥǤȮ

Bibliography British Army. The Army Leadership Code.Ɇ ǁëļŒëĈŒėțɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦ ëŏLJŨŝŒļŝėșĐėįėŝĉėİëƢėǂëLjșśŨĐșƪŏȦƖļƢėƖȦëŏLJȦŒėëƎŝļŝİȯ ĐėǁėŒŨƋśėŝƢȦĉėŝƢƎėȯįŨƎȯëƎśLjȯŒėëĐėƎƖķļƋȦƢķėȯëƎśLjȯ ŒėëĐėƎƖķļƋȯĉŨĐėɆȭdëƖƢɆëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥŝĐɆ ƪİƪƖƢɆǥǣǥǤȮ (2021). Transactional vs. Transformational Leadership: What’s the Difference?Ɇ ǁëļŒëĈŒėțɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂș śļĉķļİëŝƖƢëƢėƪŝļǁėƎƖļƢLjŨŝŒļŝėșĉŨśȦƎėƖŨƪƎĉėƖȦŒėëĐėƎƖķļƋȦ ƢƎëŝƖëĉƢļŨŝëŒȯǁƖȯƢƎëŝƖįŨƎśëƢļŨŝëŒȯŒėëĐėƎƖķļƋȦɆȭdëƖƢɆ ëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥŝĐɆ ƪİƪƖƢɆǥǣǥǤȮ

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Has COVID-19 highlighted that better personal hygiene is required when deployed?

WO2 David Pinch explores the role of Operational Hygiene Specialists, the Operational Hygiene ©LjƖƢėśɆëŝĐɆƢķėɆƋƎŨĉėƖƖėƖɆĈėļŝİɆƎėǁļėǂėĐɆƢŨɆļŝĉƎėëƖėɆŨƪƢƋƪƢȚɆƖƢƎėëśŒļŝėɆĉëƋëĈļŒļƢļėƖɆëŝĐɆƎėĐƪĉėɆ the logistic footprint of the British Army

The Defence Medical Services are also responsible for maintaining the readiness and deployment of highly mobile Field Hospitals1. These Field Hospitals, usually staffed with around 240 personnel, can be deployed in support of a wide ƖƋėĉƢƎƪśɆŨįɆĉŨŝƢļŝİėŝĉėƖɆƎëŝİļŝİɆįƎŨśɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢȚɆ Humanitarian Aid or in reaction to a natural disaster. The task of producing clinically clean bedding and uniforms/clothing to a deployed Field Hospital is a Royal Logistic Corps task. This is the role of the Operational Hygiene Specialists.

Following the COVID-19 pandemic, demand for Operational Hygiene2 in support of exercises has never been higher. Demand is often outstripping availability of this small, niche specialisation which is primarily included in the ORBAT to support deployed Field Hospitals. While the support provided to exercise is an excellent test of the equipment and processes, this is not its designated task.

The attitude and expectation of society regarding the maintenance of personal hygiene, access to showers and clean clothing is higher now than ever before. Soldiers’ expectations of ‘en-suite’ facilities within accommodation has largely been met with Single Living Accommodation Modernisation (SLAM).

On extended exercises, showers are generally available as part of any location’s real-estate, adhoc arrangements for laundry are often in place, depending on the effectiveness of the planning staff.

Once deployed on operations, the provision of ‘Solar Showers’3 or doing the ‘dhobi in a bowl’4 during a lull is often the only solution provided to maintaining personal hygiene. Is this compatible with an army that truly represents the society it serves5 and does it meet the expectations and retention of Generation Z?

When working in warmer climates, many will be familiar with outbreaks of diarrhoea and vomiting and how quickly it can spread! The impact of infectious diseases could be catastrophic on a deployed force.

Medical Force Protection (Med FP)6Ȧ,ŝǁļƎŨŝśėŝƢëŒɆ Health Teams are an element of the Defence Medical Services that can assist with signposting unit commanders with the promotion and maintenance of health and disease prevention. This prevention can include advice on all aspects of health, hygiene and ėŝǁļƎŨŝśėŝƢëŒɆƋƎŨƢėĉƢļŨŝȚɆĈŨƢķɆļŝɆĈëƎƎëĉŏƖɆëŝĐɆǘėŒĐɆ locations. However, the provision of the resources remains a unit level requirement and responsibility.

Operational Hygiene Teams The Operational Hygiene (Op Hyg) Teams provide ëɆǁļƢëŒɆëŝĐɆǙėLJļĈŒėɆĉëƋëĈļŒļƢLjɆƢķëƢɆļƖɆśëĐėɆƪƋɆŨįɆ ƋėƎƖŨŝŝėŒɆƢƎëļŝėĐɆƖƋėĉļǘĉ댌LjɆįŨƎɆƢķėɆƎŨŒė7. The current equipment, the Operational Hygiene System (OHS) which introduced into service in 2004, was designed ëŝĐɆĐėǁėŒŨƋėĐɆǂķėŝɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢɆļŝɆŝŨƎƢķȯǂėƖƢɆ,ƪƎŨƋėɆ was considered the more likely combat zone. The logistics required to support a deployed Op Hyg Team includes daily consumables of potable water, fuel and lubricants, detergent and disinfectant etc. In addition, the careful management and disposal of waste (grey) water is a primary consideration. The OHS consists of: 5 A Laundry Transportable, which is deliverable in a single 6m container incorporating a three-phase electrical generator, water pumps and heating, industrial washers and tumble dryers. It operates to meet NHS guidance notes8 to produce ‘clinically clean’ bedding and uniforms and can require up to 12,000 litres of water to launder 1 tonne of soiled fabric per day.

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8 Working in the Operational Hygiene System Laundry Transportable. Far right: Operational Hygiene System Field Shower

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5 A Field Shower, which is similarly deployed within a 6m container, housing water pumping and heating equipment. A 12 x 36ft tent is erected alongside the container to provide a communal shower and changing area. It can require up to 60,000 litres of potable water to shower 1,000 personnel in any given 24hr period.

Cutting edge at the time but now approaching 20 years old, by modern standards the OHS equipment may be considered resource-heavy. There is currently no doctrine or guidelines for the level of service offered to forward personnel deployed in remote, hostile environments. However, given the changing operational environment (with small forces deployed worldwide, for shorter time frames which may inhibit the ability to facilitate LRS9 contracts or establish anything more than temporary tented accommodation), the increased awareness of the requirement to maintain high standards of personal hygiene within the deployed force and the expectation of society (and our soldiers) to have ready access to showers and clean uniforms, is there a greater need than ever for the Operational Hygiene Specialist to be considered an essential service and could they be included as an integral element of the proposed Theatre Enabling Squadrons within the Reserves?

This type of deployment is not without precedence.

In 2003, 60 Territorial Army (Reserve) Operational Hygiene Specialists were mobilized in support of Operation TELIC, initially attached to 6 Supply Regiment RLC. By the end of March 2003, they had been divided into smaller teams and deployed forward to provide a service to the RM Commando Brigade at Umn Qasr & Al Zubayr Ports, 7 Armoured Brigade alongside 2 Combat Support Regiment RLC ëƢɆ©ķëļĈëķɆ ļƎǘėŒĐɆëŝĐɆƢķėɆDļėŒĐɆLŨƖƋļƢëŒșɆdëƢėƎȚɆ an additional team was also sent to support 16 Air Assault Brigade at Alamara.

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OPERATIONS AND TRAINING 8

batching of personnel to ensure that each shower head is occupied, and the controlling of the time ‘under the water’ per batch, can reduce the water usage, allowing for undressing and dressing time creates a throughput of around 60 people per hour with a water consumption around 1,200 litres (a 66% reduction) or 20 litres per person. This compares favourably with Solar Showers, with the added ĈėŝėǘƢɆŨįɆǂëƢėƎɆķėëƢļŝİȚɆǂëƖƢėǂëƢėƎɆĉŨŒŒėĉƢļŨŝɆ and dispersal and a morale-boosting effect on the deployed force.

Should Op Hyg personnel be required to support forward brigades again, the function could be completed with approximately 50% of the equipment, resources and personnel10 used in 2003.

8 Field showers can use up to 60,000 litres of water per day

8 Field laundrys' primary use is to provide clean bedding and uniforms for field hospitals

Field Laundry: As with domestic washing machines, ƢķėɆǘėŒĐɆŒëƪŝĐƎLjɆķëƖɆëɆŝƪśĈėƎɆŨįɆƋƎėȯƋƎŨİƎëśśėĐɆ ǂëƖķɆĉLjĉŒėƖɆǂķļĉķɆķëǁėɆĈėėŝɆƖĉļėŝƢļǘĉ댌LjɆĐėƖļİŝėĐɆ to meet the requirements of working alongside a deployed Field Hospital. A current staff innovation suggestion has been submitted for these machines to be re-programmed to include an ‘Eco’ wash cycle.

Similar to a domestic appliance, this will reduce the overall wash time thereby increasing productivity, reducing water consumption potentially by up to 33%, reducing wastewater and reducing fuel consumption.

This wash cycle may not meet the standards required by clinical staff, however it is an improvement to doing ‘dhobi in a bowl’.

Field Shower Units: Where potable water is readily ëǁëļŒëĈŒėȚɆƢķėɆǘėŒĐɆƖķŨǂėƎƖɆĉëŝɆƪƖėɆƪƋɆƢŨɆǦȚǩǣǣɆ litres of water per hour, creating a grey water waste hazard of a similar proportion. The communal shower has 15 shower heads which, for several reasons, cannot be individually controlled. However, the

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Adapting to meet future needs Aware of the potential, Operational Hygiene Specialists are currently reviewing their work processes to increase output and reduce consumables with an aim of streamlining the capabilities and reducing the logistic footprint.

Conclusion With the recently announced Integrated Review and the resulting restructuring, ‘some industrial age capabilities will increasingly have to meet their sunset to create the space for capabilities needed for sunrise’11. A few of the small logistic trade groups may now be looking over their shoulder to see if their specialisation has become obsolete by change of need or advances of technology, however, creditable ǘėŒĐɆķLjİļėŝėɆƖķŨƪŒĐɆĈėɆĉŨŝƖļĐėƎėĐɆëƖɆëɆįŨƎĉėɆ multiplier rather than a logistic burden.

Support to exercise: As a guide, requests for Operational Hygiene support for exercise should be staffed through 104 Brigade. Small, short

THE REVIEW 2022 | 59

“IF YOU’RE ON YOUR OWN, THINK ABOUT BECOMING A CHELSEA PENSIONER. IT’S BEEN LIKE A FAMILY.” WE ARE WELCOMING APPLICATIONS TO BECOME A CHELSEA PENSIONER. To find out more, contact our admissions team: 020 7881 5204 admissions@chelsea-pensioners.org.uk www.chelsea-pensioners.co.uk/become-chelseapensioner

Before I came here, I left the house every day, just to get a walk. But then I came back to an empty flat. Nothing – just the television and the phone. I was isolated – now I’ve got people to talk to.

The best thing about being a Chelsea Pensioner is there’s care here for the guys who need it, but you can get out and about. The company’s fantastic and the food is beautiful.

Structure is important in the Army, but here you can come and go as you like.

And there’s lots to do here. I went to the quiz and there was a fantastic music night in the Chelsea Pensioners’ Club – we were all singing.

I respect the history here. Tradition and history are important in the Army and here at the Royal Hospital. All the battle honours on the wall in the Great Hall that’s our history, as soldiers.

If you’re on your own, think about becoming a Chelsea Pensioner.

It’s been like a family.

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING 8 (less than 14-day) exercises are generally not supported, although for bespoke requirements engagement with Medical Force Protection (Med FP)12Ȧ,ŝǁļƎŨŝśėŝƢëŒɆLėëŒƢķɆ¶ėëśƖɆĉëŝɆĈėŝėǘƢɆ ŌƪƖƢļǘĉëƢļŨŝɆįŨƎɆëŝLjɆƎėƍƪėƖƢƖș Training: Training of nominated personnel to undertake (or volunteer) for the task of Operational Hygiene Specialists is managed and delivered via the Logistics Specialist Training Wing within the Defence School of Logistics Policing and Administration.

Once trained, Regular personnel are currently based at 17 Port & Maritime Regiment RLC and Reserve personnel are held within 165 Regiment RLC. Involvement: There is always opportunity for personnel with an interest in this niche skill set to become more involved through a Reserve career with 165 Regiment RLC. Endnotes 1 DƎŨŝƢɆdļŝėɆDļėŒĐɆLŨƖƋļƢëŒƖɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșëƎśLjȯƢėĉķŝŨŒŨİLjș ĉŨśȦįėëƢƪƎėƖȦįėëƢƪƎėļŝƖļĐėȯƢķėȯĈƎļƢļƖķȯëƎśLjƖȯŝėǂȯįƎŨŝƢȯ ŒļŝėȯǘėŒĐȯķŨƖƋļƢëŒȯǧǫǣǬǨǩǧȦ 2 Operational Hygiene, previously known as Mobile Bath and Laundry Units (MBLU) has been an element of the British Army logistic support from Circa 1918.

3 ©ŨŒëƎɆ©ķŨǂėƎƖɆëƎėɆëɆĈëİɆǘŒŒėĐɆǂļƢķɆǂëƢėƎɆëŝĐɆķƪŝİɆļŝɆƢķėɆ sun to warm. This is then used as a temporary shower.

4 Dhobi in a bowl - colloquial military term for hand washing in a small bowl of water.

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5

nļŝļƖƢƎLjɆŨįɆ$ėįėŝĉėȚɆ{ƪƎɆǘŝėƖƢɆëƖƖėƢȚɆ ƎśLjɆ ėŨƋŒėɆÔļƖļŨŝɆ ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦëƖƖėƢƖșƋƪĈŒļƖķļŝİșƖėƎǁļĉėșİŨǁșƪŏȦİŨǁėƎŝśėŝƢȦ ƪƋŒŨëĐƖȦƖLjƖƢėśȦƪƋŒŨëĐƖȦëƢƢëĉķśėŝƢȶĐëƢëȦǘŒėȦǬǪǬǨǪǪȦ n{$ȶnļŝ$ ÔȶQ¡ȶ¡ėƋŨƎƢȶ ƎŨĉķƪƎėȶ ǧȶ$ļİļƢëŒȶǁėƎƖļŨŝȶ ƖļŝİŒėȶƋëİėȶǧȶ ¡șƋĐį 6 nėĐļĉëŒɆDŨƎĉėɆ ƎŨƢėĉƢļŨŝɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșİŨǁșƪŏȦİŨǁėƎŝśėŝƢȦ İƎŨƪƋƖȦĐėįėŝĉėȯśėĐļĉëŒȯƖėƎǁļĉėƖȥśėĐļĉëŒȯįŨƎĉėȯƋƎŨƢėĉƢļŨŝȯ med-fp 7 The role of the Reserve Operational Hygiene Specialist is unique in that they are the trade experts that advise and ƢƎëļŝɆƎėİƪŒëƎɆƖŨŒĐļėƎƖɆǂķŨɆëƎėɆŝŨśļŝëƢėĐɆƢŨɆįƪŒǘŒɆƢķėɆƢëƖŏɆëƖɆ ëŝɆëĐĐļƢļŨŝëŒɆƍƪëŒļǘĉëƢļŨŝșɆɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦëƋƋŒLjșëƎśLjșśŨĐșƪŏȦƎŨŒėƖȦ ƎŨLjëŒȯŒŨİļƖƢļĉȯĉŨƎƋƖȦŨƋėƎëƢļŨŝëŒȯķLjİļėŝėȯƖƋėĉļëŒļƖƢ 8 dļŝŏƖɆpL©ɆEƪļĐëŝĉėɆŝŨƢėƖɆįŨƎɆdëƪŝĐƎLjɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșİŨǁșļśȦ śėĐļëȦǦǨǥǩǧǦȦķėëŒƢķȶëŝĐȶƖëįėƢLjȶİƪļĐėŒļŝėƖșƋĐįɆɆʁɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦ ǂǂǂșėŝİŒëŝĐșŝķƖșƪŏȦǂƋȯĉŨŝƢėŝƢȦƪƋŒŨëĐƖȦǥǣǥǤȦǣǨȦnİśƢȶ ëŝĐȶƋƎŨǁļƖļŨŝșƋĐįɆ 9 LRS Local Resources Section, LRS provide logistic service support for units through investigation of the local market and sourcing commodities and services in the area.

10 The equipment deployed on Operation TELIC was replaced ĈLjɆƢķėɆ{ƋėƎëƢļŨŝëŒɆLLjİļėŝėɆ©LjƖƢėśɆļŝɆǥǣǣǧȦǨɆǂķļĉķɆ provided an initial reduction in personnel and resources, further improvements to procedures and systems which will produce overall reductions.

11 Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Nick Carter, delivers a speech on the Integrated Operating Concept at Policy Exchange 30 Sep 20.

12 nėĐļĉëŒɆDŨƎĉėɆ ƎŨƢėĉƢļŨŝɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșİŨǁșƪŏȦİŨǁėƎŝśėŝƢȦ İƎŨƪƋƖȦĐėįėŝĉėȯśėĐļĉëŒȯƖėƎǁļĉėƖȥśėĐļĉëŒȯįŨƎĉėȯƋƎŨƢėĉƢļŨŝȯ med-fp

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8 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

A COVID-19 generation Troop Commander's experience of deploying on Op TOSCA

Photo by Maj C Heyworth RLC

From mental health to motivation, Lt Edward DyerɆĐėƖĉƎļĈėƖɆķļƖɆėLJƋėƎļėŝĉėɆëƖɆëɆ ŒëƢŨŨŝɆ ŨśśëŝĐėƎɆŨŝɆ{ƋėƎëƢļŨŝɆ¶{© ɆǦǧɆĐƪƎļŝİɆƢķėɆİŒŨĈëŒɆƋëŝĐėśļĉ

8 The Troop Commanders' Course was heavily altered due to COVID

,ǁėƎLjɆİėŝėƎëƢļŨŝɆŨįɆLjŨƪŝİɆŨįǘĉėƎɆƢķëƢɆķëƖɆĈėėŝɆ ƢķƎŨƪİķɆ©ëŝĐķƪƎƖƢɆķëƖɆķëĐɆëɆĐėǘŝļŝİɆǂŨƎŒĐɆėǁėŝƢɆ that has shaped the way that they were trained and their leadership development. Those before us had the experience of the Boer War, the World Wars, the demise of an Empire, Northern Ireland, ǬȦǤǤȚɆQƎëƍɆëŝĐɆ įİķëŝļƖƢëŝșɆnLjɆİėŝėƎëƢļŨŝɆķëĐɆ Coronavirus; March 2020 marked a major shift in how the British Army would do business. It was the beginning of the end of the wonderful prepandemic sense of normality and we as young ŨįǘĉėƎƖɆǂėƎėɆŌŨļŝļŝİɆëŝɆ ƎśLjɆƢķëƢɆǂëƖɆǘİķƢļŝİɆƢŨɆ adapt to an embryonic and mysterious global virus.

I hail from the generation of stunted, sickly and ǂƎėƢĉķėĐɆ {ÔQ$ȯǤǬɆ{įǘĉėƎɆ ëĐėƢƖșɆÕļƢķɆŝŨɆĈ댌Ɇ or parade, our Commissioning Course was but 43 weeks, one week shy of the intended 44. Our Phase 2 courses were heavily altered to accommodate Coronavirus restrictions, with chunks being delivered digitally. Our learning curve was steep upon arrival at our new regiments, and it didn’t take long to realise that we weren’t alone in this; the entire Army was learning to adapt to a situation where major concessions were necessary - exercises cancelled, output reduced and soldiers dispersed for months on end. The show, however, must go on.

Op TOSCA 34 was on the horizon and we had to prepare during a pandemic for a United Nations peacekeeping mission. The preparation for, and

62 | THE REVIEW 2022

deployment on, Op TOSCA presented challenges and these challenges provided valuable lessons.

On Op TOSCA, there were three key Opposing Forces (OPFOR) to monitor; the National Guard (NG), the Turkish Forces (TF) and Coronavirus (COVID-19). ¶ķļƖɆǘŝëŒɆ{ D{¡ɆǂëƖɆƪŝļƍƪėɆĈėĉëƪƖėɆļƢɆǂëƖɆ ļŝǁļƖļĈŒėȚɆļƢɆĉëŝŝŨƢɆĈėɆŒļëļƖėĐɆǂļƢķɆŨƎɆļŝǙƪėŝĉėĐȚɆëŝĐɆ our UN blue berets would offer us no protection from it. Coronavirus presented in itself an exclusive and daunting mission; avoid at all costs. Our potential Achilles Heel, Coronavirus could spell absolute catastrophe for the mission. One positive case could śėëŝɆĐŨǒėŝƖɆŨįɆƖŨŒĐļėƎƖɆëŝĐɆŨįǘĉėƎƖɆļƖŨŒëƢļŝİȚɆƋëƢƎŨŒƖɆ stopping, face-to-face liaison ceasing, ending in near-absolute mission failure. Heavy restrictions, UN facemasks, discipline and a unanimous bloodyminded will to not have to self-isolate in a roasting metal box were our armour.

Complacency is the enemy. Naturally, on an already busy deployment and after months of successfully dodging Coronavirus, complacency sets in. Twometre spacing becomes one-metre spacing, masks slip south of the nose, and nightclubs and bars reopen. Maintenance of standards is imperative on a deployment, and with something as frustrating and tedious as force health protection measures (FHPM), ƢķļƖɆƋƎŨǁėĐɆëɆƎėëŒɆĉķ댌ėŝİėșɆQƢɆƢŨŨŏɆŨƪƎɆǘƎƖƢɆƋŨƖļƢļǁėɆ case for people to get the picture, and to being more consistent with FHPM. Just one positive case of Coronavirus made life complicated for the Operations Company1. Rotas had to change, platoons had to support each other and quick decision-making was critical.

Lesson learned It shouldn’t have had to come to that. We should have been more proactive and more rigid in enforcing FHPM. This is a genuinely easy win, and a one-metre space quickly becomes a two-metre space again with a polite reminder.

Mental health Mental health provides a constant and sensitive command challenge when deployed on operations.

Op TOSCA, unlike Op HERRICK, is not a kinetic ǂëƎǘİķƢļŝİɆŨƋėƎëƢļŨŝȚɆķŨǂėǁėƎɆśėŝƢëŒɆķėëŒƢķɆļƖɆëɆ very real issue among service personnel, bullets or no bullets. Being away from home and one’s family is tough, especially for those with children. Being on a constant shift rotation for months has chipped away at mental wellbeing and some individuals really

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OPERATIONS AND TRAINING 8

Photo by Pte A Bramley

encourage Section Commanders to monitor the mental health within their section as well as each other’s śėŝƢëŒɆķėëŒƢķɆëŝĐɆėŝĉŨƪƎëİėɆĉŨŝǘĐėŝĉėɆļŝɆļŝĐļǁļĐƪëŒƖɆ by normalising talking about it.

8 Maintenance of standards is imperative on a deployment

struggled with this. Incidents at home that did not pass the Joint Compassionate and Compassionate Centre threshold were the worst. Soldiers felt helpless ƢŨɆļŝǙƪėŝĉėɆŨƎɆëļĐɆëŝɆļŝĉļĐėŝƢɆëƢɆķŨśėɆǂķļŒƖƢɆķëǁļŝİɆ to concentrate on the mission in hand and this was challenging to manage.

One of the biggest challenges from a command perspective is that ultimately there is no easy win when it comes to mental health. Coronavirus had ëɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆėįįėĉƢɆŨŝɆśėŝƢëŒɆķėëŒƢķɆĐƪƎļŝİɆ{ƋɆ TOSCA 34. Prolonged isolation, and periods where we as a sector were gated, created an environment where poor mental health was inevitable. Platoon Commanders can do a huge amount to improve mental health and must be constantly on the lookout for the signs of it. They can signpost to the best department or individual for a soldier to speak to for support and to that end, the Army Welfare Service and the Padre were kept very busy. The Platoon Commander also needs to be someone that a soldier can speak to about mental health, and they need to ĈėɆƎėëĐLjɆƢŨɆśëŏėɆƢļśėɆįŨƎɆƢķļƖȚɆǥǧȦǪșɆ

Photo: Author

Lesson learned Being open, honest and transparent with the individual whilst talking with them on a level can make a big difference; mental health supersedes rank. Talking and listening to your soldiers about their mental health and any issues that they are having is vital for trust building, and it can strengthen bonds within the team and make that team and the individual ultimately stronger. Encourage soldiers to talk to each other,

8 Compulsory OSD and AT kept the soldiers active and engaged

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Motivation Sunshine, a mission, the beach, a change of scenery, the promise of coming back with some dits and a medal; these were the key motivations for the vast majority of people who were deploying on Op TOSCA. The sun was too hot, the mission was often frustrating, the beach was crowded, the scenery consisted of a strip of decaying city that we call the Buffer Zone, the dits weren’t ally and the medal was cheaply made.

From public order training in blizzards in Whinney Hill in North Yorkshire to checking United Nations Observation Post 85 in scorching heat in Cyprus, motivation proved to be a challenge for everybody.

Perhaps the greatest challenge of Op TOSCA 34 for the Platoon Commanders within the Operations Company was maintaining the motivation of the soldiers. Patrolling the same Area of Operations for months can take its toll.

Motivating ourselves was also challenging at times.

Four months into a six-month tour and you are on the same morning co-ordination meeting with the same people, talking about the same stuff, drinking the same instant-brew, going in circles week in week ŨƪƢɆįŨƎɆķëŒįɆëɆLjėëƎșɆnŨƢļǁëƢļŨŝɆėĈĈƖɆëŝĐɆǙŨǂƖȚɆļƢɆ always does, however Op TOSCA for the Operations Company in particular, is a very repetitive tour.

Soldiers went dizzy from rotating between patrols, training, QRF and guard, seeing the exact same faces every day and doing the exact same thing.

People snapping at each other was common and unavoidable, and at times created problems.

Lesson learned Get the troops out whenever you can, encourage esprit de corps, keep your soldiers active and doing new things. Time away from Ledra Palace and the Buffer Zone was essential, and it did people the world of good. Some soldiers initially didn’t want to take their Operational Stand Down (OSD) or Adventurous ¶ƎëļŝļŝİɆȩ ¶ȪșɆ{ƋėƎëƢļŨŝƖɆ ŨśƋëŝLjɆƢŨŨŏɆëɆǘƎśɆ approach that everyone would do both whether they liked it or not, and the effect was tremendous. People came back to Ledra Palace, from AT in particular, completely refreshed and with a fresh burst of motivation. ,ƖƋƎļƢɆĐėɆĉŨƎƋƖɆǂëƖɆǁļƢëŒȚɆëŝĐɆļŝƢėƎȯƋŒëƢŨŨŝȦ department competition was the best way to encourage this. Motivation could be at an all-time low, but the prospect of defeating 2 Platoon Mobile Force Reserve at volleyball was just too sweet to not get psyched up about.

Keeping soldiers active both mentally and physically outside of their normal work and doing ŝėǂɆƢķļŝİƖɆļƖɆĉƎļƢļĉëŒșɆÕķėƢķėƎɆļƢɆĈėɆĈLjɆĐŨļŝİɆƋŒëƢŨŨŝȦ section socials, sport, charity events or academic studies, it will build them in character and develop them as people. There is plenty of time to read on Op TOSCA 34 and encouraging soldiers to read books and news articles will keep them mentally stimulated whilst developing them intellectually.

In terms of self-motivating, the easiest way was to ƢėŒŒɆśLjƖėŒįɆƢŨɆİėƢɆëɆİƎļƋɆëŝĐɆƎėǙėĉƢɆƢķëƢɆQɆǂëƖɆŒƪĉŏLjɆƢŨɆ

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8 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING be on an op tour as a Platoon Commander. The sun was beaming, the mission was interesting, the beach was mega, the scenery was beautiful, the dits were hilarious and the medal was still a medal.

Conclusion For the Coronavirus generation of Troop and Platoon Commanders, much of our development and training ëƖɆ ƎśLjɆ{įǘĉėƎƖɆǂëƖɆƖƢƪŝƢėĐɆĈLjɆƢķėɆĐļƖƎƪƋƢļǁėɆëŝĐɆ complex effect of the pandemic. Since April 2020, we have had to learn on the move, with our own different experiences and challenges and decide who we are as leaders. Op TOSCA 34 proved to be a continuation of our training, and a trial of leadership. It has given us a sense of relief; we led our soldiers successfully

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and had an excellent tour. We also learned a lot and have points that we can take forward and will serve us well in the years to come. Coronavirus has created a generation of junior commanders who ķëǁėɆĈėėŝɆƎėƍƪļƎėĐɆƢŨɆĈėɆǙėLJļĈŒėȚɆƍƪļĉŏȯƢķļŝŏļŝİɆëŝĐɆ emotionally intelligent. In the long term, we will see the Coronavirus pandemic not as something that has stunted our development, but instead an opportunity that has enhanced our skill set and as something that has moulded us to be the leaders that we need to be in a new, challenging and unpredictable world.

Endnotes Operations Company was made up of circa 100 Peacekeepers from the British Army.

1

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OPERATIONS AND TRAINING 8

Could the UK generate and sustain a Falklands task force today?

If the Falklands War were to break out today, could Britain’s Armed Forces generate and sustain a credible task force? ŨƎƋŨƎëŒɆLëśėƎɆƪƢļŒļƖėƖɆƖļLJɆƋƎļŝĉļƋŒėƖɆįƎŨśɆƢķėɆ½©Ȧ UK Interoperability Handbook’s ‘Rule of the Right’ to examine the logistical capabilities available to HMG in the instance of a Falklands emergency to frame his evaluation that the UK could still mount and sustain a credible recovery operation.

Codenamed Operation CORPORATE, the retaking of the Falkland Islands over a ten-week campaign in ǤǬǫǥɆǂëƖɆëŝɆëĉƢɆŨįɆļŝƢƎėƋļĐļƢLjɆƢķëƢɆǙėǂɆļŝɆƢķėɆįëĉėɆ of early predictions. The United Kingdom, a nation long in retreat from its role as a global policeman, successfully struck back against the upstart military junta of Argentina over the sovereignty of a small archipelago in the South Atlantic and the rights of the two-thousand people living there. The impact ŨįɆƢķėɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢȚɆƋŒëLjėĐɆŨƪƢɆëƢɆƢķėɆķėļİķƢɆŨįɆ ŨŒĐɆÕëƎɆ polemics, continues to be studied across the world, and lives on in the breath of every critic of Whitehall’s defence cutbacks.

In many ways, one could claim the basis of the barb to be redundant. The islands are British, and will remain so. The result of the 2013 sovereignty referendum, where 99.80% of voters declared in favour of remaining an Overseas Territory of the UK, is regularly lofted by HMG to overhaul Argentine voices of dissent in the wider international community.1 In the realms of hard power, debate rages within RUSI over gambles in the March 2021 Integrated Review – yet for all that is posited regarding the British military’s increasing dependence on luck or even “the stopping power of water”, few would not concede that the decline of the Armed Forces of the Argentine ¡ėƋƪĈŒļĉɆķëƖɆĈėėŝɆįëƎɆśŨƎėɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢș2 Argentina’s army lacks the resources to exercise, the air force is near-totally depleted of operational offensive aircraft and the loss of the ARA Santisima Trinidad – a Falklands survivor, sunk at her moorings in 2013 after a lack of maintenance – epitomises the wholescale deterioration of a navy shorn of its cruisers, carriers and working submarines.3 pėǁėƎƢķėŒėƖƖȚɆ ƎİėŝƢļŝëɆļƖɆŨŝŒLjɆǘǁėɆķƪŝĐƎėĐɆ kilometres from the Falklands at its nearest point.

It still has the capacity to land troops. Its forces are not as encumbered with other international duties as those of the UK, and whatever the future may bring, the past shows that it was British apathy, coupled with a similarly contentious defence review, that cost the Falklanders ten weeks of freedom and 255

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Credit RLC Museum

Corporal Richard HamerɆƪƢļŒļƖėƖɆƖļLJɆƋƎļŝĉļƋŒėƖɆįƎŨśɆƢķėɆ½©Ȧ½bɆQŝƢėƎŨƋėƎëĈļŒļƢLjɆLëŝĐĈŨŨŏȼƖɆ Ȼ¡ƪŒėɆŨįɆƢķėɆ¡ļİķƢȼɆƢŨɆėLJëśļŝėɆƢķėɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉëŒɆĉëƋëĈļŒļƢļėƖɆëǁëļŒëĈŒėɆƢŨɆLnEɆļŝɆƢķėɆļŝƖƢëŝĉėɆŨįɆëɆ DëŒŏŒëŝĐƖɆėśėƎİėŝĉLjɆƢŨɆįƎëśėɆķļƖɆėǁëŒƪëƢļŨŝɆƢķëƢɆƢķėɆ½bɆĉŨƪŒĐɆƖƢļŒŒɆśŨƪŝƢɆëŝĐɆƖƪƖƢëļŝɆëɆĉƎėĐļĈŒėɆ recovery operation

British servicemen their lives.4 5 Suppose then that the worst has come to pass – that Port Stanley has fallen, the garrisoned Marines overwhelmed, and most worryingly of all, the base now known as RAF Mount Pleasant is under enemy control. Imagine today’s government were faced with the same situation that Margaret Thatcher and her cabinet contended with forty years ago. Is the deployment of a task force a viable option? Does the logistical framework exist?

How well do our assets compare with what was utilised at that time? ¶ķļƖɆëƎƢļĉŒėɆƖķŨƪŒĐɆŝŨƢɆĈėɆƢƎėëƢėĐɆëƖɆëɆĐėǘŝļƢļǁėɆ answer to whether Britain would win a second Falklands War; a review of logistics cannot account for every facet such a prediction would require.

Nevertheless, the modern military now marches on far more than just its stomach, and it is inescapable ƢķëƢɆǂļƢķŨƪƢɆëɆǘƎśɆśëŝëİėśėŝƢɆŨįɆƖƪƋƋŒLjɆŨǁėƎɆ the longest lines previously seen in the history of warfare, no re-staging of Op CORPORATE would be successful. What challenges could this bring the personnel of The Royal Logistic Corps and their counterparts in other services?

The motto of the Falklands Islands is Desire the RightɆëŝĐɆļƖɆƎėǙėĉƢėĐɆļŝɆ¡ DɆnŨƪŝƢɆ ŒėëƖëŝƢȼƖɆ motto, Defend the Right. $ƎëǂļŝİɆįƎŨśɆƢķėɆ½©Ȧ½bɆ Interoperability Handbook, The RLC observes a ‘Rule of the Right’ in maintaining Defence activity at home and overseas.6 These veins can be drawn together to examine the logistical capabilities available to HMG in the instance of a Falklands emergency, utilising six principles – the right item, quantity and condition, the

8 Bringing CS ashore at Ajax Bay 4 June 1982

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8 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING right time, place and the economic viability – to frame my evaluation that the UK could still mount and sustain a credible recovery operation.

The Falklands War represented the largest British ëļƎȯŝëǁëŒɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢɆƖļŝĉėɆƢķėɆėŝĐɆŨįɆÕÕQQșɆ©ŨśėɆǤǥǪɆ vessels carried nearly 30,000 military personnel and associates, alongside 42 combat aircraft, to the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) established some 8,000 miles from Great Britain. Labelled a “military impossibility”7 in an early assessment by the US Navy, Britain’s recapture of its occupied sovereign overseas territory is revered as much it is reviewed, yet, in his assessment of the damage to the landing craft after the Battle of San Carlos, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Craig commented that for “six better fuses... we would have lost.”8 Such claims demonstrate the vitality of the limited resources that allowed a beachhead in East Falkland to be established, as much as the luck the task force accrued in having thirteen Argentinian bombs strike its vessels without managing to explode.

This luck was sorely needed, as Britain went to war without many of the ‘right’ items that hindsight would later vindicate. The absence of a hospital ship ǂëƖɆķƪƎƎļėĐŒLjɆƎėĉƢļǘėĐɆƢķƎŨƪİķɆƢķėɆĉŨśśëŝĐėėƎļŝİɆ of SS Uganda, a steamer pulled from an educational cruise in the Mediterranean and augmented at EļĈƎëŒƢëƎɆǂļƢķɆǂëƎĐƖȚɆŨƋėƎëƢļŝİɆƢķėëƢƎėƖɆëŝĐɆǘƢƢļŝİƖɆ for replenishment at sea, including a helicopter platform. A heavy repair ship was also lacking in the Navy’s lists, with HMS Triumph having been scrapped in 1981, leading to the oil rig support ship Stena Seaspread being ǘŒŒėĐɆǂļƢķɆƢķėɆƎėƍƪļƖļƢėɆƖƋëƎėɆƋëƎƢƖ.

Most crucial of all was the lack of an airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) asset, which might have spared the task force considerable personnel and materiel losses by being able to detect enemy aircraft at an extended range. Six British ships were ŒŨƖƢɆļŝɆƢķėɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢȜɆ댌ɆëįƢėƎɆëƢƢëĉŏɆįƎŨśɆƢķėɆëļƎșɆɆ Victory though, provides proof in itself that enough key items did make it into the TEZ. Serious losses – such as the three Chinook and seven Westland helicopters that burned aboard the deck of the sinking SS Atlantic Conveyor – were allayed by sheer quality of manpower, particularly amongst ƢķėɆ ëƎëƖɆëŝĐɆnëƎļŝėƖɆǂķŨɆëĐǁëŝĉėĐɆǘįƢLjȯƖļLJɆśļŒėƖɆ on foot from San Carlos to Douglas, carrying their supplies in bergans. Elsewhere, several commanders cited the assistance offered by the United States as crucial – as well as providing Sidewinder missiles,

ƎėĐļƢɆÕļŏļśėĐļëɆ ŨśśŨŝƖɆEƎļįǘƢķƖɆbėŝ

8 HMS Fearless, San Carlos Water 1982

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American forces granted the British use of their fuel ƎėƖėƎǁėƖɆëƢɆÕļĐėëǂëŏėɆ ļƎǘėŒĐɆëŝĐɆėǁėŝɆëɆŒėëƖėɆŨŝɆ a replacement aircraft carrier should Hermes have been lost.9 The eventual triumph ensured many cuts announced in the 1981 Defence White Paper were undone in its December 1982 successor – but changing priorities, and the impact of the ‘peace dividend’ popularised by Thatcher in light of the dissolution of the U.S.S.R, have led to several being implemented in later years regardless.10 11 Few reductions have raised more eyebrows than the phase-out of the Harrier Jump Jet, without which the task force and its item demands would never have made it ashore. Its replacement, the American-made F35-B Lightning, retains the crucial Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) capabilities that made ƢķėɆLëƎƎļėƎɆƖƪĉķɆëŝɆėįįėĉƢļǁėɆĉŒŨƖėɆëļƎɆƖƪƋƋŨƎƢɆǘİķƢėƎȚɆ but it is still in a procurement stage, along with Britain’s AEC&W capability in the form of the Boeing E-7 Wedgetail. With just twenty-one Lightnings currently in British ownership, and three Wedgetails not even due to arrive before 2023, one must query which ‘rights’ are at risk of becoming wrong.12 Quantity, the second principle, provides the most immediately visible bone of contention. Although the ¶LjƋėȯǧǨɆĐėƖƢƎŨLjėƎɆśļİķƢɆĈėɆëĈŒėɆƢŨɆƢëƎİėƢɆǘǁėɆƢļśėƖɆ as many objects as its Type-42 predecessor, it cannot ĈėɆļŝɆƢǂŨɆƋŒëĉėƖɆëƢɆŨŝĉėɆȱɆëɆįëĉƢɆśëİŝļǘėĐɆļŝɆƢķëƢɆ there were fourteen of the latter in British service over 1975-2013, but only six of the former operating today, with no further vessels ordered.13Ɇ¶ķėɆƖëĉƎļǘĉėɆ of quantity for idealised quality has been mirrored throughout Defence. Since 1982, the number of personnel in Britain’s Armed Forces has fallen from ǦǥǪȚǩǣǣɆƢŨɆëƎŨƪŝĐɆǤǧǨȚǣǣǣɆƢŨĐëLjɆȱɆëɆǘİƪƎėɆƖśëŒŒėƎɆ than the size of the regular British Army at the time of the Falklands invasion. In addition, excluding coastal ƋëƢƎŨŒɆǁėƖƖėŒƖȚɆƢķėɆŝƪśĈėƎɆŨįɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆƖķļƋƖɆļŝɆƢķėɆ Royal Navy has declined by almost 75%, while the Royal Fleet Auxiliary has halved, dropping from 22 ships in 1982 to 11 in 2021.14 15 ,ǁėŝɆĐƪƎļŝİɆƢķėɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢȚɆƢķėɆ¡ŨLjëŒɆpëǁLjɆǂëƖɆ forced to look beyond its own inventory to carry the task force ashore. Shortfalls in numbers were made up with STUFT (Ships Taken Up From Trade); after inspection some 54 civilian vessels were requisitioned or chartered, carrying 9,000 personnel, 100,000 tonnes of stores and a further 400,000 tonnes of fuel; the latter desperately required, owing to the ĐļįǘĉƪŒƢLjɆŨįɆƖŨƪƎĉļŝİɆļƢɆįƎŨśɆƢķļƎĐȯƋëƎƢLjɆŝëƢļŨŝƖș16 This crucial complement represented 42.5% of the naval assets sent south. The pool of ships available to be immediately commandeered by British forces has undergone a similar decline, falling from 1,600 in 1975 to only 429 in 2019.17 Such trends have made the United Kingdom increasingly reliant on the international community for blue-water support; the Gulf War in 1991 saw 114 ships chartered to ĉëƎƎLjɆśėŝɆëŝĐɆėƍƪļƋśėŝƢȚɆĈƪƢɆŨŝŒLjɆǘǁėɆŨįɆƢķėƖėɆ ǁėƖƖėŒƖɆǂėƎėɆ ƎļƢļƖķȯǙëİİėĐșɆ ŨŝƖļĐėƎļŝİɆƢķëƢɆśŨƖƢɆ vessels plying international trade are on contract, any emergency entry of HMG’s agents into the dwindling pool of marine hire opportunities is likely to be met with challenge. Overall, it would be apt to say that a future task force would be bulked out not by an ëĐśļƎëŒȼƖɆǙėėƢȚɆĈƪƢɆĈLjɆëɆĉļǁļŒɆƖėƎǁëŝƢȼƖɆĉķėƍƪėĈŨŨŏșɆ

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The expenditure of ammunition was some four times higher than what had been predicted, particularly in 105mm shells and 81 mm mortar rounds – haemorrhaging the thirty day’s supply held for 3 Commando Brigade in the War Material Reserve and alarming commanders until the surrender, when the need for extra rations and water for prisoners took precedence.18 The Army had gone in without its usual 3:1 advantage ratio in assaulting land force numbers, but had counted on its superior training and where possible, the element of surprise to overmatch the 13,000 strong Argentinian force, made up mainly of conscripts. Success was hardly due to ƍƪëŝƢļƢLjɆȱɆĈƪƢɆśŨĐėƎŝɆĐėǘĉļėŝĉļėƖɆļŝɆŝƪśĈėƎƖɆśėëŝɆ there can be no substitute for the best personnel and equipment available.

Then, as now, there can be no allowance for depreciation in the third principle of the Rule of the Right – that of condition. With threats abound from the environment, and not least from Argentina’s stockpile of Exocet missiles, the safe delivery of assets in an optimum condition for battle was paramount. Notably, the outbreak of war caught the Royal Navy in a precipitous position in regards to its capital ships. With their replacements still under construction, Britain hastened to utilise its extant ŒļİķƢɆǙėėƢɆĉëƎƎļėƎƖȜɆHMS Hermes, which was nearing the end of its service life – and Invincible, which had been earmarked for sale to Australia. Both were in Portsmouth in April, but neither were ready to sail – Hermes was undergoing repairs to its propulsion and electrical systems, while the crew of Invincible was on leave. Nevertheless, it was only three days ŒëƢėƎɆƢķëƢɆĈŨƢķɆǂėƎėɆśëŝŝėĐȚɆǘƢƢėĐɆëŝĐɆƖëļŒļŝİɆįŨƎɆ the South Atlantic, with many of their 42 Harrier aircraft proudly displayed on deck – an intentional act, illustrating both Britain’s resolve to reclaim the Falklanders’ freedoms by whatever means necessary, but also because the hangars below were fully loaded; in Hermes’ case, with an additional 200 tonnes of ammunition.19 Similar tales preceded the launch of the two landing platform dock (LPD) ships, with HMS Intrepid mothballed and Fearless ķŨƖƢļŝİɆŨįǘĉėƎɆĉëĐėƢƖɆŨŝɆ sea training. Both quickly reassembled their crews įƎŨśɆŨƢķėƎɆƋŨƖƢļŝİƖɆëŝĐɆįŨŒŒŨǂėĐɆƢķėɆǙėėƢɆƖŨƪƢķǂëƎĐȜɆ Fearless reached Ascension on 17 April with 47 Air Despatch Squadron on board, enabling supply of further key resources to the frigates and carriers ǁļëɆÕļĐėëǂëŏėɆ ļƎǘėŒĐɆȱɆƢķėɆƢļśėɆĈėƢǂėėŝɆƎėƍƪėƖƢɆ

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OPERATIONS AND TRAINING 8

and receipt of high-priority items was ultimately reduced to just 40 hours.20 Intrepid would rise from the ignominy of rust and dust to serve as the deck on which the Argentinian forces would sign their surrender, not two months after its departure beside Atlantic Conveyor, Norland and Europic Ferry. Such miraculous turnarounds of personnel and materiel were commonplace throughout the services; however, ƖƪĉķɆǂëƖɆƢķėɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢLjɆŨįɆƖŨƪƎĉļŝİɆëŝĐɆĐėŒļǁėƎļŝİɆ replacements that in some cases operational effectiveness had to be partially mitigated. Ahead of Operation SUTTON – the landings on San Carlos – the Commando Logistic Regiment requested that the specialised Landing Ship Logistics (LSLs) be beached for easier unloading. Commodore Michael Clapp refused, citing the risk of damage and knowing that his captains had not been trained in performing such manoeuvres, owing to peacetime budget constraints.

The result was that the Royal Marines were forced ƢŨɆƪƖėɆnėLJėǙŨƢėƖȚɆĐŨƪĈŒėȯķëŝĐŒļŝİɆƖƢŨƎėƖɆįƎŨśɆƖķļƋɆ ƢŨɆƖķŨƎėɆȱɆƢķŨƪİķɆƢķėɆƖķļƋƖɆŒļǁėĐɆƢŨɆǘİķƢɆëŝŨƢķėƎɆ day, it was hardly ideal in the realms of retaining the strategic initiative.

Today, though the Royal Navy may have allowed its tonnage to shrink, it has not been permitted to rust. The delivery of HMS Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales cement Britain’s continuous carrier strike capability, its four active Astute class nuclear submarines ward off ocean-borne threats to its supply lines, and a concept Type 83 destroyer is set to replace the unparalleled Type 45 after its planned retirement in the late 2030s. Replacement LPDs were ordered in 1996, with HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark brought out of a state of ‘extended readiness’ in 2017, while the March 2021 Integrated Review further promises the conversion of a Bay-class landing vessel into a littoral strike ship, syncing with the role requirements of the Future Commando Force – the ƎėǁļƖėĐɆ¡ŨLjëŒɆnëƎļŝėƖȚɆĈėŝėǘĉļëƎļėƖɆŨįɆëɆɞǧǣɆśļŒŒļŨŝɆ cash injection.21 ¶ķėɆİƎėëƢėƖƢɆƢķƎėëƢɆƢŨɆƢķėɆ¡ŨLjëŒɆpëǁLjȼƖɆǙėėƢɆ is cannibalisation; the practice of removing a component from one ship to another that is deemed to have a greater operational need, with some 3,230 instances involving 6,378 parts occurring in the Navy between 2012-17.22 Reductions in the number of ships, planes and land-based vehicles mean

8 HMS Dauntless, a Type 45 guided missile destroyer

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8 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING that a higher proportion will need to be at state of immediate readiness at any one time, leading to a greater need to scavenge parts from assets not on duty. Amongst those that are sailing, it is key that they remain ready to tackle crises anywhere in the world, wherever they may be placed. How Britain’s increased persistent engagement aspirations, articulated in the Integrated Review, align with śëļŝƢëļŝļŝİɆëɆƖƢëƢėɆŨįɆķļİķɆƎėëĐļŝėƖƖɆǂļƢķɆǘŝļƢėɆ supporting inventory is yet to be seen.

The fourth key principle of the ’Rule of the Right’ refers to the right place, but one could argue this is as much a state of mental readiness as it is a physical location. In his autobiography, former Defence Secretary John Nott confessed that in the build-up to the invasion, he did not know where the Falkland Islands were.23 He resorted to spinning the globe in ķļƖɆŨįǘĉėɆƢŨɆėLJëśļŝėɆķŨǂɆįëƎɆƢķėɆ½ŝļƢėĐɆbļŝİĐŨśɆ would need stretch in the defence of its values.

Though this distance has not changed, attitudes have – the war has played an immeasurable part ļŝɆĉėśėŝƢļŝİɆƢķėɆƋŒëĉėɆŨįɆƢķėɆǂļŝĐƖǂėƋƢȚɆįëƎȯǙƪŝİȚɆ southern bastion of Britishness within popular culture. Many politicians since have sought to deemphasise geographical propinquity – both to chip at the rafters of Argentina’s claim, and to exemplify ƢķėļƎɆǂļŒŒļŝİŝėƖƖɆƢŨɆǘİķƢɆįŨƎɆ ƎļƢëļŝȼƖɆĉëƪƖėɆëĉƎŨƖƖɆ the globe. None however, have found themselves in a comparable position to Nott in the early 80s.

Whilst the permanent committed force elements and wider supporting capabilities are a demonstration of Britain’s continuing commitment to the defence of the Falkland Islands, their credibility remains debatable.

Physically and conceptually, the stepping-stone towards victory in 1982 was Ascension Island, 4,300 miles from the UK and 3,800 miles from the Falklands. The base boasted the US-built Wideawake ļƎǘėŒĐȚɆǂķļĉķɆ댌ŨǂėĐɆįŨƎɆįƪƎƢķėƎɆƖƢŨƎėƖɆƢŨɆĈėɆǙŨǂŝɆ in via Hercules transport aircraft, and for the RAF to initiate its Black Buck raids against Stanley Airport to deny its use to the enemy. However, it did not have equivalent harbourage facilities – forcing ships to depend on helicopter airlifts to restow materiel – ǂķļŒƖƢɆƢķėɆƎƪŝǂëLjɆŒëĉŏėĐɆëɆƖƪįǘĉļėŝƢɆķëƎĐƖƢëŝĐļŝİɆ area to park planes. Security was minimal, leading to pilferage and the mix-up of equipment, particularly between 3 Commando and elements of the SAS.24 Most notably, the rapid rise in population from 1,000 to 2,000 personnel and dependents placed a heavy

ƎėĐļƢɆÕļŏļśėĐļëɆ ŨśśŨŝƖɆEƎļįǘƢķƖɆbėŝ

British vessels off Ascension Island, April 1982

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strain on the island’s resources, particularly water, forcing the British Forces Support Unit Commander to send some units back on the planes they arrived on.25 Teething pains were noted in the island’s sudden transition to a staging post; nevertheless, Ascension provided an integral stop-short for the task force that has been boosted in recent years, gaining an enlarged harbour and a dedicated RAF station. Other bases ķëǁėɆĈėŝėǘƢƢėĐɆƖļśļŒëƎŒLjɆȱɆnëƎĉķǂŨŨĐɆnļŒļƢëƎLjɆ ŨƎƢɆ received £18 million of upgrades and improvements after the war’s end – but cuts elsewhere have forced the closure or privatisation of other key Falklands SPODs, including Chatham, Portland and Rosyth, with Marchwood itself marked to retain only a limited MOD presence after plans to convert it into a civilian port were revealed in August 2020.26 The distance from the UK to the Falklands was not the only geographic challenge facing logisticians.

Many important assets were moored at Portsmouth and Marchwood, but more had to be drawn in from further overseas. This included two of the six LSLs – RFA Sir Tristram was diverted from Belize and Sir Bedivere was ordered back to Marchwood from Vancouver.27 As with Uganda, the SS Canberra was cruising in the Mediterranean before it was called up to carry 3 Commando Brigade, whilst the fuel tanker RFA Brambleleaf was pulled from the Persian Gulf; its fellow oiler RFA Tidepool was rerouted from Chile.

With modern Britain still bound to several military commitments across the globe, it is hardly practical ƢŨɆėLJƋėĉƢɆëɆŨŝėɆķƪŝĐƎėĐȯƖƢƎŨŝİɆǙėėƢɆƢŨɆëǂëļƢɆŨŝɆ standby for a second Falklands invasion to occur.

Nevertheless, a prospective invader needs only the basest rudimentary information on ship locations to gain an early advantage. Identifying, preparing and concentrating a credible task force of naval assets remains an extant challenge for logisticians and interpreting global risk will be a vital strategic competency if timely intervention options (or threat of them) are to be maintained. ¶ķėɆƎļİķƢɆƢļśėɆƋƎŨǁļĐėƖɆëɆǘįƢķɆƋƎļŝĉļƋŒėɆŨįɆƢķėɆ rule. Admiral Sandy Woodward, Commander of the Hermes carrier group, was given the task of devising the timetable for the Falklands’ campaign, which he produced by taking the date of the presumed accomplishment of the mission objectives and working backwards to the moment of departure.28 Recognising the islands were three weeks’ sailing time away from Portsmouth, he balanced the need of the task force to land as well-equipped and well-supplied as possible with the reality that no campaign would succeed in the face of the brutal South Atlantic winter, set to reach its most tumultuous period in June and July. These strategical and seasonal factors have not changed, although the planners of today are greatly advantaged in having the blueprint of a successful (albeit historic) logistical undertaking; Woodward, on the other hand, worked without even a contingency plan to ref to.

Time was again of the essence in support from the Tug, Repair and Logistics Area (TRALA), a dedicated zone 20 hours from San Carlos from which ships could receive supplies and assess battle damage.

Whilst delivery vessels could only sail through Falkland Sound by night for security purposes, demands from units on the islands took a minimum of two days to be met from the TRALA. There were

THE ROYAL LOGISTICS CORPS FOUNDATION

not enough helicopter crewmembers to allow for round-the-clock operations, nor enough personnel within the Commando Logistics Regiment to maintain the stores aboard every ship, resulting in damages, pilferage and confusion over the contents of each individual vessel.29 Many of these incidents were ultimately judged to have been avoidable – a product of snowballing haste, negated only by Major General Jeremy Moore’s patience in ensuring his logistical base was secure before moving forward.

In after-action reviews, it was accepted that a great deal of time could have been saved had the principles of tactical loading been properly observed. In their haste, many units sent the most urgently required ƖƢŨƎėƖɆƢŨɆƢķėɆƋŨƎƢƖɆǘƎƖƢȚɆĈƪƢɆŨŝĉėɆŒŨëĐėĐɆƢķėƖėɆĈėĉëśėɆ ƢķėɆśŨƖƢɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢɆƢŨɆëĉĉėƖƖɆǂķėŝɆƢķėɆǁėƖƖėŒƖɆǂėƎėɆ full. The ammunition aboard Baltic Ferry could not be reached unless all the 1,874 tons of stores aboard were shifted.30 Elsewhere 3 Commando needed 11 days to restow its equipment prior to departure from Ascension, while Commodore Clapp’s decision not to beach the LSLs at San Carlos meant priority stores had to be shifted from bow to stern, pushing mission objectives back by another hour. No graver lesson on ƢķėɆļśƋŨƎƢëŝĉėɆŨįɆėįǘĉļėŝƢɆŒŨëĐļŝİɆëŝĐɆƪŝŒŨëĐļŝİɆĐƎļŒŒƖɆ can be found than in the air attacks at Bluff Cove on 8 June, where the 5th Infantry Brigade were set upon ĈLjɆ ƎİėŝƢļŝėɆǘİķƢėƎƖɆǂķļŒƖƢɆƎėśŨǁļŝİɆƖƢŨƎėƖɆįƎŨśɆƢķėɆ ships in the bay, resulting in 56 deaths – the largest British loss of life in any single incident since WWII. Adhering to ‘the right time’ in logistical execution thus means conducting the right training and learning the right lessons in the aftermath. ¶ķėɆǘŝëŒɆƋƎļŝĉļƋŒėɆŨįɆƢķėɆȻ¡ƪŒėɆŨįɆƢķėɆ¡ļİķƢȼɆ dictates that logisticians must strive to accomplish their taskings in the most economical manner. In its ƖļśƋŒėƖƢɆƢėƎśƖȚɆƢķėɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢɆĉŨƖƢɆƢķėɆ½șbșɆɞǥșǪǫɆĈļŒŒļŨŝɆ (equivalent to over £10 billion in 2020). This total includes the expense of the campaign, procurement in the aftermath, and the replacement of lost materiel – nearly half the 1982 total, including £69 million for a new LSL (again named Sir Galahad), £641 million for four new frigates (the Broadsword class) and £116 million to replace the 34 aircraft that never made it home.31 Cast against the backdrop of the previous decade’s oil crises and the Winter of Discontent, the costs generated dissent from the backbenches of the House of Commons, with members highlighting council rate caps and local hospital closures even amidst the 3% workplace productivity boost economic analysts later attributed a so-called ‘Falklands Factor’.32 33

THE ROYAL LOGISTICS CORPS FOUNDATION

{ŝėɆśļİķƢɆƎėëƖŨŝɆƢķëƢɆǘŝëŝĉļëŒɆĈƪƎĐėŝƖɆëƎėɆ secondary and should remain so. It was not immaterial that Thatcher’s war cabinet included the PaymasterGeneral, Cecil Parkinson, but not the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Geoffrey Howe. Through boom and bust, Britain’s commitment to the safety of the Falklands has remained constant over the decades, today representing 0.177% of the Defence budget, or £79 million annually (equal to some £23,000 per islander).34 ¶ķėɆƍƪėƖƢļŨŝɆŨŝɆǂķėƢķėƎɆƢķėɆ ƎļƢļƖķɆĈƪĐİėƢɆĐėǘĉļƢɆ could deepen to allow for war in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis is one for another analyst to consider; increasing pressures on all government departments post Covid, restructuring the national economy postBrexit, a commitment to persistent global engagement ëŝĐɆƢķėɆn{$ɆǘŝëŝĉļëŒɆƎėĈëŒëŝĉļŝİɆŨįɆļƢƖɆėƍƪļƋśėŝƢɆ plan are all likely to pressure any future commitment to the defence of the Falklands.

ÕļŏļśėĐļëɆ ŨśśŨŝƖɆEƎļįǘƢķƖȚɆbėŝɆȩǤǬǫǦȪ

A Westland Wessex helicopter delivers supplies at Ascension, May 1982

ÕļŏļśėĐļëɆ ŨśśŨŝƖɆEƎļįǘƢķƖȚɆbėŝɆȩǤǬǫǥȪ

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING 8

It is fair to state the United Kingdom is not championing its expeditionary logistic capabilities as the guarantor of security in the South Atlantic.

The many problems in location, timing and costing are, and will continue to be, the very same faced

by Britain’s logisticians 40 years ago. The tacit acquiescence exists that many of the solutions must again be “miracles wrought by ordinary men and women with extraordinary qualities”, as Lady Thatcher described in her memoirs.35 Investments have gone into operational communications, island infrastructure and the renewal of the air defence system – earmarked to receive a £300 million boost over the ten years from 2015.36 The kinetic sphere ļƖɆŝŨɆŒŨŝİėƎɆƖŨɆļśƋŨƎƢëŝƢȜɆƢķėɆǘİķƢɆįŨƎɆƢķėɆDëŒŏŒëŝĐƖɆ has moved into dialogue and diplomacy, the nature of war into cyberspace and outer space and the eyes of the world to regions like the South China Sea, half the world away from the kelp-strewn outcrops off the South American coast.

Nevertheless, none of this is stands to say that Britain’s Armed Forces have lost their ability to project power there, or anywhere else. In conclusion, based on the evidence provided, it is clear that a future task force would be highly dependent on STUFT, chartering and more than likely the blessing of the international community. Success would additionally depend on the prior provision of logistically realistic exercises, like the establishment of a TRALA, the recreation of a Floating Interim Port and Storage System (FIPASS), the road move of a material reserve, or manoeuvres where commanders must face the choice between moving soldiers or munitions.37

8 RFA Sir Tristram, carried by MV Dan Lifter in 1983. It was returned home for extensive repairs

THE REVIEW 2022 | 69

Defence imagery

8 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

8 HMS Invincible on her welcome home to Portsmouth Harbour, July 1982

It remains clear that as much as The RLC upholds its Rule of the Right, soldiers must look to their values ëŝĐɆƖƢëŝĐëƎĐƖɆļŝɆǘİķƢļŝİɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉƖɆƢķƎŨƪİķșɆQƢɆǂëƖɆ discipline that carried the aforementioned conversion of Uganda from cruise liner to hospital ship in a mere 65 hours.38ɆQƢɆǂëƖɆƖėŒǙėƖƖɆĉŨśśļƢśėŝƢɆƢķëƢɆ fuelled the loaded march of 3 Commando Brigade in the absence of helicopter transport. Finally, it was courage that gave the Falklanders back their freedom, from the clarion call of Admiral Sir Henry dėëĉķȚɆƢŨɆƢķėɆƖëĉƎļǘĉėɆŨįɆdƢșɆ ŨŒșɆȻLȼɆ`ŨŝėƖɆŨŝɆƢķėɆ ǘėŒĐƖɆŨįɆEŨŨƖėɆEƎėėŝșɆ ĈŨǁėɆ댌ɆȻƎļİķƢƖȼȚɆļƢɆļƖɆƢķėɆƎļİķƢɆ attitude that carries the day.

Thus, in answer to whether the UK could deploy a credible force and sustain its 8,000-mile line of communication, only one caveat can be added to the ëįǘƎśëƢļǁėșɆ ƎļƢëļŝɆĉëŝɆśƪƖƢėƎɆƢķėɆƖƢƎėŝİƢķɆƢŨɆƎėĉŨǁėƎɆ the Falklands, if it still believes that the defence of liberty matters enough.

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70 | THE REVIEW 2022

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Jordan, D. (2019) “The Defence Review Dilemma: The British Experience” Freeman Air & Space Institute, KCL ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșŏĉŒșëĉșƪŏȦǂëƎƖƢƪĐļėƖȦëƖƖėƢƖȦĐėįėŝĉėȯƎėǁļėǂȯ ĐļŒėśśëȯƢķėȯĈƎļƢļƖķȯėLJƋėƎļėŝĉėșƋĐįɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǣǤȦǤǤȦǥǤȪ Margaret Thatcher Foundation (orig. 1981, released 2012) “The United Kingdom Defence Programme: The Way Forward” Churchill Archive CentreȚɆ¶L ¡ɆǥȦǩȦǥȦǧǪɆ ëƎƢɆǤɆ DǧɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșśëƎİëƎėƢƢķëƢĉķėƎșŨƎİȦĐŨĉƪśėŝƢȦǤǥǤǦǣǪɆ ȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǥȦǤǣȦǥǤȪ Nott. J. (2002) Here Today, Gone Tomorrow: Memoirs of an Errant Politician, Politico’s, London.

Privratsky, K. (2015) Logistics in the Falklands War, Pen & Sword, Barnsley.

Roberts, P. (2021) “Requiring Perfect Alignment: The UK’s 2021 Defence Command Paper” RUSI: Commentary ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦƎƪƖļșŨƎİȦėLJƋŒŨƎėȯŨƪƎȯƎėƖėëƎĉķȦƋƪĈŒļĉëƢļŨŝƖȦ ĉŨśśėŝƢëƎLjȦƎėƍƪļƎļŝİȯƋėƎįėĉƢȯëŒļİŝśėŝƢȯƪŏƖȯǥǣǥǤȯ ĐėįėŝĉėȯĉŨśśëŝĐȯƋëƋėƎɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǣǤȦǤǤȦǥǤȪ Romaniello, F. (2020) “What is the RAF’s E-7 Wedgetail ƎŨİƎëśśėȠȺɆDŨƎĉėƖțɆ ļƎĉƎëįƢɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșįŨƎĉėƖșŝėƢȦ ŝėǂƖȦǂķëƢȯƎëįƖȯėȯǪȯǂėĐİėƢëļŒȯƋƎŨİƎëśśėɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆ ǤǤȦǣǬȦǥǤȪ Sanders, D. (1987) “Government Popularity and the Falklands War”. British Journal of Political Science, 17, No.1, Cambridge.

Thatcher, M. (Easter 1983) Memoirs of the Falklands War ȩnëƎİëƎėƢɆ¶ķëƢĉķėƎɆDŨƪŝĐëƢļŨŝȪɆķƢƢƋțȦȦǫǩėǫǪǪǨǧĉǤǨǦǣɆ cd7c4a7873dc3788ab15d5cbb1e3fe45dbec9b4.r88. ĉįǤșƎëĉŏĉĐŝșĉŨśȦǫǦǣǧǣǤɼǥǣDëŒŏŒëŝĐƖɼǥǣnėśŨļƎɼǥǣ ¡,${p,șƋĐįɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǣǥȦǤǤȦǥǤȪɆɆ Thompson, J. (1991) Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed ŨŝǙļĉƢɆȩ ƎëƖƖėLjȼƖȚɆdŨŝĐŨŝȪș Valovcin, P. (1992) Logistics Lessons for the Operational Commander – The Falklands War (Report). Newport, ¡ķŨĐėɆQƖŒëŝĐțɆpëǁëŒɆÕëƎɆ ŨŒŒėİėȚɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦëƋƋƖșĐƢļĉșśļŒȦƖƢļȦ ƋĐįƖȦ $ ǥǧǬǫǬǩșƋĐįɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǣǪȦǣǬȦǥǤȪ US/UK Logistics Interoperability Guide (2010) Section QQQȚɆdŨİļƖƢļĉƖɆ ƎļŝĉļƋŒėƖȚɆǦșǦǤșɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦëŏLJŨŝŒļŝėș ĐėįėŝĉėİëƢėǂëLjșśŨĐșƪŏȦƖļƢėƖȦǁëƪŒƢȦ ė ©©ȦǥǣǤǣǪȯ ½©ȯ½bȶd{EQ©¶Q ©ȶL p$ {{bȯǁėƎƖļŨŝȶǤșƋĐįɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆ ǥǨȦǤǣȦǥǤȪ

THE ROYAL LOGISTICS CORPS FOUNDATION

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING 8 Watt, N. (2002) “Crucial Falklands role played by US śļƖƖļŒėƖȺɆ¶ķėɆEƪëƎĐļëŝɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșƢķėİƪëƎĐļëŝșĉŨśȦ ƪŏȦǥǣǣǥȦƖėƋȦǣǩȦįëŒŏŒëŝĐƖșǂŨƎŒĐɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǣǤȦǤǤȦǥǤȪ Watts, J. (2013) “Falkland Islands: respect overwhelming ‘yes’ vote, Cameron tells Argentina” The GuardianɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦ ǂǂǂșƢķėİƪëƎĐļëŝșĉŨśȦƪŏȦǥǣǤǦȦśëƎȦǤǥȦįëŒŏŒëŝĐȯļƖŒëŝĐƖȯ ƎėįėƎėŝĐƪśȯǁŨƢėƖȯLjėƖɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǪȦǤǣȦǥǤȪ Webb, K. (2007) "The Continued Importance of Geographic Distance and Boulding's Loss of Strength Gradient".

Comparative Strategy, 26, No. 4, Taylor & Francis.

Woodward, S., (2012) One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of a Falklands Battle Group Commander, Harper Press, London ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșĈĈĉșĉŨșƪŏȦŝėǂƖȦƪŏȯǧǤǫǥǥǥǥǤɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆ ǤǣȦǣǬȦǥǤȪ ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦĉŨśśļƢƢėėƖșƋëƎŒļëśėŝƢșƪŏȦĉŨśśļƢƢėėȦǤǥǪȦƋƪĈŒļĉȯ ëĉĉŨƪŝƢƖȯĉŨśśļƢƢėėȦŝėǂƖȦǤǨǥǪǪǩȦŝėǂȯĐėįėŝĉėȯśŨŝėLjȯ potentially-lost-in-funding-black-hole-at-centre-of-ukĐėįėŝĉėȯėƍƪļƋśėŝƢȯƋŒëŝȦɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǣǬȦǣǬȦǥǤȪ ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșįŨƎĉėƖșŝėƢȦŝėǂƖȦƎŨLjëŒȯśëƎļŝėƖȦǂķëƢȯƎŨLjëŒȯ śëƎļŝėƖȯįƪƢƪƎėȯĉŨśśëŝĐŨȯįŨƎĉėɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǤǣȦǣǬȦǥǤȪ ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșŝëƪƢļŒƪƖļŝƢșŨƎİȦėŝȦŝėǂƖȯļŝƖļİķƢȦƢėŒėİƎëƋķȦ ƖëįėİƪëƎĐļŝİȯƢķėȯįƪƢƪƎėȯŨįȯĈƎļƢļƖķȯśëƎļƢļśėȦɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆ ǤǣȦǣǬȦǥǤȪ ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșƢķļŝŏĐėįėŝĉėșĉŨșƪŏȦƖķŨƎėȯŒŨİļƖƢļĉƖȯƖëŝȯĉëƎŒŨƖȯ ĈėLjŨŝĐȦɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǣǬȦǣǬȦǥǤȪ

Endnotes 1 ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșƢķėİƪëƎĐļëŝșĉŨśȦƪŏȦǥǣǤǦȦśëƎȦǤǥȦįëŒŏŒëŝĐȯ ļƖŒëŝĐƖȯƎėįėƎėŝĐƪśȯǁŨƢėƖȯLjėƖɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǪȦǤǣȦǥǤȪș 2 ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦƎƪƖļșŨƎİȦėLJƋŒŨƎėȯŨƪƎȯƎėƖėëƎĉķȦƋƪĈŒļĉëƢļŨŝƖȦ ĉŨśśėŝƢëƎLjȦƎėƍƪļƎļŝİȯƋėƎįėĉƢȯëŒļİŝśėŝƢȯƪŏƖȯǥǣǥǤȯ ĐėįėŝĉėȯĉŨśśëŝĐȯƋëƋėƎɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǣǤȦǤǤȦǥǤȪș 3 Allison, G., “Argentina has now ceased to be a capable military power”, UK Defence Journal,ɆǤǩɆnëLjɆǥǣǤǫɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦ ƪŏĐėįėŝĉėŌŨƪƎŝëŒșŨƎİșƪŏȦëƎİėŝƢļŝëȯķëƖȯŝŨǂȯĉėëƖėĐȯƢŨȯĈėȯ ëȯĉëƋëĈŒėȯśļŒļƢëƎLjȯƋŨǂėƎȦɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǣǧȦǬȦǥǣǥǤȪș 4 The 1981 Defence White Paper recommended the withdrawal of HMS Endurance – an act widely judged to have demonstrated weakness in the face of the Argentine military junta.

5 ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșŏĉŒșëĉșƪŏȦǂëƎƖƢƪĐļėƖȦëƖƖėƢƖȦĐėįėŝĉėȯƎėǁļėǂȯ ĐļŒėśśëȯƢķėȯĈƎļƢļƖķȯėLJƋėƎļėŝĉėșƋĐįɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǣǤȦǤǤȦǥǤȪș 6 ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦëŏLJŨŝŒļŝėșĐėįėŝĉėİëƢėǂëLjșśŨĐșƪŏȦƖļƢėƖȦǁëƪŒƢȦ ė ©©ȦǥǣǤǣǪȯ½©ȯ½bȶd{EQ©¶Q ©ȶL p$ {{bȯ ǁėƎƖļŨŝȶǤșƋĐįɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǨȦǤǣȦǥǤȪș 7 Herman, A., To Rule The Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World (Harper Collins, New York, 2004) p.560.

8 Chamberlain, G., "Would British forces be able to retake the Falklands today?". The Scotsman (5 April 2002) p.12.

9 ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșƢķėİƪëƎĐļëŝșĉŨśȦƪŏȦǥǣǣǥȦƖėƋȦǣǩȦįëŒŏŒëŝĐƖș ǂŨƎŒĐɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǣǤȦǤǤȦǥǤȪșɆɆ 10 ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșśëƎİëƎėƢƢķëƢĉķėƎșŨƎİȦĐŨĉƪśėŝƢȦǤǥǤǦǣǪɆ ȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǥȦǤǣȦǥǤȪș 11 ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦëƋļșƋëƎŒļëśėŝƢșƪŏȦķļƖƢŨƎļĉȯķëŝƖëƎĐȦĉŨśśŨŝƖȦǤǬǫǥȦ ĐėĉȦǤǧȦįëŒŏŒëŝĐȯļƖŒëŝĐƖȯǂķļƢėȯƋëƋėƎɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǥȦǤǣȦǥǤȪș 12 Romaniello, F., “What is the RAF’s E-7 Wedgetail Programme?” Forces: AircraftȚɆǥǤɆ$ėĉėśĈėƎɆǥǣǥǣȚɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦ ǂǂǂșįŨƎĉėƖșŝėƢȦŝėǂƖȦǂķëƢȯƎëįƖȯėȯǪȯǂėĐİėƢëļŒȯƋƎŨİƎëśśėɆ ȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǤǤȦǣǬȦǥǤȪșɆɆ 13 ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșƢķėƢļśėƖșĉŨșƪŏȦëƎƢļĉŒėȦĉƪƢĈëĉŏƖȯŒėëǁėȯĈƎļƢëļŝȯ with-no-major-warships-overseas-nkqlsgfc7 (accessed ǤǣȦǤǣȦǥǤșȪ

THE ROYAL LOGISTICS CORPS FOUNDATION

14

ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșįŨƎĈėƖșĉŨśȦƖļƢėƖȦĐëǁļĐëLJėȦǥǣǥǤȦǣǥȦǤǥȦ the-royal-navy-keeps-shrinking-frigates-to-drop-byƢķƎėėȦȠƖķɧǦįĐǫėǫĉĐǩǩǥǤɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǨȦǤǣȦǥǤȪș 15 ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșƎėƪƢėƎƖșĉŨśȦëƎƢļĉŒėȦƪƖȯƪŏȯśļŒļƢëƎLjȯŝëǁLjȯ ĉŨśśėŝƢëƎLjȯļĐ½©b pǤǣdǤ $ɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǨȦǤǣȦǥǤȪș 16 Webb, K., "The Continued Importance of Geographic Distance and Boulding's Loss of Strength Gradient".

Comparative Strategy, 26, No. 4 (2007) pp. 295-310.

17 ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșŝëƪƢļŒƪƖļŝƢșŨƎİȦėŝȦŝėǂƖȯļŝƖļİķƢȦƢėŒėİƎëƋķȦ ƖëįėİƪëƎĐļŝİȯƢķėȯįƪƢƪƎėȯŨįȯĈƎļƢļƖķȯśëƎļƢļśėȦɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆ ǤǣȦǣǬȦǥǤȪș 18 ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșƢķļŝŏĐėįėŝĉėșĉŨșƪŏȦƖķŨƎėȯŒŨİļƖƢļĉƖȯƖëŝȯĉëƎŒŨƖȯ ĈėLjŨŝĐȦɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǣǫȦǣǬȦǥǤȪș 19 Privratsky, K., Logistics in the Falklands War (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2015) pp.40-42.

20 Privratsky, Logistics in the Falklands War, pp.66-69.

21 ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșįŨƎĉėƖșŝėƢȦŝėǂƖȦƎŨLjëŒȯśëƎļŝėƖȦǂķëƢȯƎŨLjëŒȯ śëƎļŝėƖȯįƪƢƪƎėȯĉŨśśëŝĐŨȯįŨƎĉėɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǤǣȦǣǬȦǥǤȪș 22 ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșĈĈĉșĉŨșƪŏȦŝėǂƖȦƪŏȯǧǤǫǥǥǥǥǤɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆ ǤǣȦǣǬȦǥǤȪș 23 Nott. J., Here Today, Gone Tomorrow: Memoirs of an Errant Politician (Politico’s, London, 2002) pp.79-80.

24 Thompson, J., dļįėĈŒŨŨĐɆŨįɆÕëƎțɆdŨİļƖƢļĉƖɆļŝɆ ƎśėĐɆ ŨŝǙļĉƢɆ (Brassey’s, London, 1991) p.263.

25 Privratsky, Logistics in the Falklands War, p.70.

26 ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșëĐǁėƎƢļƖėƎëŝĐƢļśėƖșĉŨșƪŏȦŝėǂƖȦƋŒëŝƖȯ for-major-expansion-at-port-to-create-jobs-andƢƎëįǘĉȯǬǤǨǣǨǫǫȦɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǫȦǤǣȦǥǤȪș 27 Brown, D., The Royal Navy and the Falklands War (Leo Cooper, London, 1987) pp.65-68.

28 Woodward, S., One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of a Falklands Battle Group Commander (Harper Press, London, 2012).

29 Privratsky, Logistics in the Falklands War, pp.114 – 115.

30 Valovcin, P., Logistics Lessons for the Operational Commander – The Falklands War (Report). Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College, February 1992. pp.8-9.

31 Freedman, L., Britain & the Falklands War (Blackwell, Oxford, 1988) p.59.

32 Sanders, D., “Government Popularity and the Falklands War”. British Journal of Political Science, 17, No.1 (1987) pp.

281–313.

33 ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦëƋļșƋëƎŒļëśėŝƢșƪŏȦķļƖƢŨƎļĉȯķëŝƖëƎĐȦĉŨśśŨŝƖȦǤǬǫǦȦ ĐėĉȦǥǥȦįŨƎƢƎėƖƖȯįëŒŏŒëŝĐƖȯƋŨŒļĉLjȯĉŨƖƢɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǨȦǤǣȦǥǤȪș 34 DëŒŏŒëŝĐɆQƖŒëŝĐƖɆEŨǁėƎŝśėŝƢȚɆȻ©ėŒįȯ©ƪįǘĉļėŝĉLjɂȚɆFalkland Civil Service WebsiteȚɆǥǣǤǥɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșįëŒŏŒëŝĐƖșİŨǁșįŏȦ ƖėŒįȯƖƪįǘĉļėŝĉLjȦɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǣǪȦǣǬȦǥǣǥǤȪș 35 ķƢƢƋțȦȦǫǩėǫǪǪǨǧĉǤǨǦǣĉĐǪĉǧëǪȯǫǪǦĐĉǦǪǫǫëĈǤǨĐǨĉĈĈǤėǦ fe45dbec9b4.r88. ĉįǤșƎëĉŏĉĐŝșĉŨśȦǫǦǣǧǣǤɼǥǣDëŒŏŒëŝĐƖɼǥǣnėśŨļƎɼǥǣ ¡,${p,șƋĐįɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǣǥȦǤǤȦǥǤȪș 36 Allison, G., ’£300 million to be invested in defence of the Falkland Islands’, UK Defence Journal, 25 November 2015 ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦƪŏĐėįėŝĉėŌŨƪƎŝëŒșŨƎİșƪŏȦǦǣǣȯśļŒŒļŨŝȯƢŨȯĈėȯļŝǁėƖƢėĐȯ ļŝȯĐėįėŝĉėȯŨįȯƢķėȯįëŒŏŒëŝĐȯļƖŒëŝĐƖȦɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǣǪȦǬȦǥǣǥǤȪș 37 Thompson, dļįėĈŒŨŨĐɆŨįɆÕëƎțɆdŨİļƖƢļĉƖɆļŝɆ ƎśėĐɆ ŨŝǙļĉƢȚɆ p.287.

38 Bowie, C., "Coping with the Unexpected: Great Britain and the War in the South Atlantic". Rand Paper Series (April 1985) p.11.

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8 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

FTX Logistics Ltd is a fully owned operating company of the KBR Group and has provided the UK n{$ȼƖɆĉŨŝƢƎëĉƢėĐɆLėëǁLjɆ,ƍƪļƋśėŝƢɆ Transporter (HET) capability for the past 20 years, on behalf of Fasttrax dƢĐșɆQƢɆŨǂŝƖɆǬǥɆśļŒļƢëƎLjɆƖƋėĉļǘĉëƢļŨŝɆ Oshkosh tank transporters and works ĉŒŨƖėŒLjɆǂļƢķɆƢķėļƎɆëįǘŒļëƢėĐɆƎėİƪŒëƎɆ Army unit, 19 Tank Transporter ©ƍƪëĐƎŨŝɆ¡d ɆƋƎŨǁļĐļŝİɆĉŨśśėƎĉļëŒɆ HET support in the UK and Germany delivering heavy armour and military support to exercises and operations.

FTX provides this capability through the employment of Sponsored Reserves ȩ©¡ȪɆëŝĐɆǂëƖɆƢķėɆǘƎƖƢɆĉŨśśėƎĉļëŒɆ employer to be contracted in this manner.

All Operators (Drivers) and Maintainers (Mechanics) are required to be trained Reservists, who are full time employees of FTX Logistics. Operators can live anywhere in Mainland UK. They carry out commercially operated HET tasking from a variety of military locations, delivering amour to destinations such as Castlemartin Ranges in Pembrokeshire and Marchwood Port. When not tasked with HET work, spare driver capacity is utilised by third party agencies driving C+E HGVs near to their home. This is a key mechanism to prevent professional skill-fade and to provide additional revenue generation. Maintainers are based at either Ward Barracks in Bulford, Wiltshire, which is the principle operating base; Marne Barracks in Catterick, North Yorkshire and there is a civilian employed capability in Monchengladbach, Germany.

As Sponsored Reserves, Drivers and Maintainers are required to be Attested and complete the Common Military Syllabus Reserve training programme, unless transferring to the company from the Regulars or Reserves. They have a military commitment of 35 days per year,

Loading CR2 at Tidworth

72 | THE REVIEW 2022

D¶ÚɆ©ƋŨŝƖŨƎėĐɆ¡ėƖėƎǁėƖɆŨŝɆ,LJėƎĉļƖėɆǂļƢķɆǤǬɆ¶ŏɆ¶ƋƢƎɆ©ƍŝɆ¡d

ĈƪƢɆƢķļƖɆĉëŝɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢŒLjɆļŝĉƎėëƖėɆļįɆƢķėƎėɆļƖɆ a requirement to deploy on long exercises or operations. Usually, Reservists complete their training commitment during Drill Nights, weekend exercises and annual camps; all at additional commitment above their main employment. As Sponsored Reserves, the commitment is met within the main employment with FTX – no extra loss of evenings, weekends or leave and they remain eligible for the annual Reserve Bounty payment. The concept has remained effective throughout the contract with FTX personnel supporting operations in Afghanistan

Off loading at Marchwood Port

and Iraq, as well as commitments in Oman, Germany and more recently with deployments to Estonia.

FTX Logistics is always looking for highly skilled commercial HGV drivers, ex Regular or Reservists from the Army, RN and RAF, with an HGV C+E licence (some with HGV Cat C will be considered for training), to drive its 118-ton Gross Train Weight STGO Cat 3 trucks. It’s one of the largest vehicles on the road that also requires highly skilled mechanics to conduct a six weekly inspection ëŝĐɆśëļŝƢėŝëŝĉėɆƎėİļśėȚɆƢŨɆįƪŒǘŒɆƢķėɆ Operator Licence obligation. If you have the requisite professional skills, meet the Army Reserve entry standard and wish to be part of the solution to delivering military strategic capability within a highly motivated, tried and tested commercial team; then this might be an ideal opportunity for you. Although many SRs are ex-military and enjoy the continued camaraderie whilst working in a commercial organisation, prior military ƢƎëļŝļŝİɆļƖɆŝŨƢɆëɆƋƎėƎėƍƪļƖļƢėɆĈƪƢɆĈėļŝİɆǘƢɆ and motivated is!

For further information visit the website at ftxlog.com or better still: ,śëļŒɆėŝƍƪļƎļėƖʀįƢLJŒŨİșĉŨśɆŨƎɆĉ댌Ɇ 01980667104.

Maintenance Inspections

THE ROYAL LOGISTICS CORPS FOUNDATION

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8 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

Operation TORAL Logistic Drawdown: September 2020 – September 2021

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Maj Alex Glass and Maj Rose LambertɆĐėƖĉƎļĈėɆƢķėɆĐėƋŒŨLjśėŝƢɆŨįɆƢķėɆƖƋėĉļëŒļƖƢɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉɆƖƪƋƋŒLjɆ ƖƪĈȯƪŝļƢɆǫǧɆnėĐļĉëŒɆ©ƪƋƋŒLjɆ©ƍƪëĐƎŨŝɆļŝɆëɆƖėĉŨŝĐɆŒļŝėɆƖƪƋƋŒLjɆƎŨŒėɆįŨƎɆëɆǂķŨŒėɆĉëŒėŝĐëƎɆLjėëƎɆƢŨɆ ėŝëĈŒėɆƢķėɆ{ƋɆ¶{¡ dǤ drawdown through the Middle East

8 84 MSS Sqn in Afghanistan

ǫǧɆnėĐļĉëŒɆ©ƪƋƋŒLjɆ©ƍƪëĐƎŨŝɆȩn©©ȪɆļƖɆƋëƎƢɆŨįɆǬɆ Regiment Royal Logistic Corps (RLC) Theatre Enabling Group in 104 Theatre Sustainment Brigade (104 Th Sust Bde), providing second line support to deployed Field Hospitals and assured temperature-controlled supply chain across the battle space for Defence. This aligns 84 MSS to a variety of taskings in support of the Joint Expeditionary Force Field Hospital, the Joint Expeditionary Force Theatre Enabling Group, the Joint Expeditionary Force Air Assault Task Force and the Lead Commando Group.

84 MSS was tasked to deploy to the Middle East to assist in the Op TORAL drawdown. The ©ƍƪëĐƎŨŝɆǂëƖɆĐėƋŒŨLjėĐɆƪŝĐėƎɆ{įǘĉėƎɆ ŨśśëŝĐļŝİɆ ¶ķėëƢƎėɆ$ƎëǂĐŨǂŝɆ½ŝļƢɆdëŝĐɆȩëɆƎŨŒėɆķėŒĐɆĈLjɆ{įǘĉėƎɆ Commanding 84 MSS) alongside an RAF element working directly to Standing Joint Force Logistic Component HQ (SJFLogC). SJFLogC provided the key interlink to the operational picture and gave direction for both Theatre Drawdown Units: 94 Supply Squadron Queen’s Own Gurkha Logistic Regiment, 9 Regiment RLC (in Kabul) and 84 MSS, 9 Regiment RLC (in the Middle East). The 84 MSS TDU drew on various Service Personnel from across the division, predominantly from 104 Th Sust Brigade including 29 Regiment RLC, 17 Port & Maritime Regiment RLC and 5 Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, with force protection provided by 3 Royal Military Police, 1 Royal Anglian Regiment, 2 Mercian Regiment and 4 Prince of Wales’s Royal Regiment, to complete the Land detachment taskings.

Tasked to establish a Joint Logistic Support Base ȩ`d© ȪɆƢŨɆŨƋėƎëƢėɆëƖɆëɆǙLjȦƖëļŒɆŝŨĐėɆįŨƎɆ댌ɆnëƢėƎļėŒɆ (Mat) and Vehicles and Major Equipment (VaME), with the supply chain running predominantly from Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) back to either a receiving Unit or a Team Leidos managed storage location. The deployed team received freight from the Op TORAL drawdown and repackaged it for outload by Strategic Roll-on Roll-off (SRR) to Marchwood Military Port (MMP). 84 MSS’ essential role for the deployment was the Reverse Supply Chain (RSC), the process by which materiel is ƎėƢƪƎŝėĐȚɆĈėİļŝŝļŝİɆǂķėŝɆëɆƎėƢƪƎŝɆļƢėśɆļƖɆļĐėŝƢļǘėĐɆ and ending when that item is receipted onto the account for reallocation or disposal. Whilst the ĉŨŝƢėLJƢɆǂëƖɆƖļśƋŒėɆļŝɆėƖƢëĈŒļƖķļŝİɆƢķėɆǙLjȦƖëļŒɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉɆ node, lower-level detail that could enable tactical level planning was not available during the build-up and initial deployment.

COVID imposed restrictive testing and isolation requirements on the Squadron who needed to deploy with enough horsepower to accomplish the task without impacting negatively on Service Personnel’s health and lengthy isolation periods. As Warning Orders were received, the bulk of the Squadron was already operating dispersed. In tandem to operational planning, a separate stream was created to look at what technical training had to be conducted and how this training could be completed in the safest possible environment: operational need verses protection.

When planning an operation with this many unknowns, the NATO logistic principles provided the

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8 Defined responsibilities between air and land resulted in clear orders and quick discemination of information

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ļŝļƢļëŒɆ{įǘĉėƎɆ ŨśśëŝĐļŝİɆëɆİŨŨĐɆĈëƖļƖɆƢŨɆļĐėŝƢļįLjɆ the lessons and challenges that were overcome.

Whilst not exhaustive, the areas below highlight some of the key challenges to deployment, the freedom ambiguity can bring, and the lessons that were learnt during the operation that can be taken forward for future operations.

Authority. Lack of clear direction encouraged the transfer of authority to the lowest level. The OC had the freedom to design the laydown and working practices and amend the Operational Employment Table (OET) based on the output of squadron-level estimate and planning, made easier through the support of the Brigade. This meant that ëƖɆƎėƍƪļƎėśėŝƢƖɆǂėƎėɆļĐėŝƢļǘėĐɆƢķƎŨƪİķɆëŝëŒLjƖļƖɆ and the experience of Senior Non-commissioned {įǘĉėƎƖɆļŝɆƢķėɆ©ƍƪëĐƎŨŝȚɆƢķėɆƖƪļƢëĈŒLjɆƍƪëŒļǘėĐɆ and experienced personnel requirements could be amended and agreed in a very short time frame.

Co-ordination and co-operation. With coordination through 104 Th Sust Bde, it was vital to co-ordinate training requirements and provide assurance for all deploying personnel. During the development process, direct co-ordination with Bde HQ ensured the operational picture was maintained which fuelled the future commitment planning of the Squadron and wider Regiment. The task force ensured that training was integrated across the various units and contained key training activity as well as briefs by each regiment. The aim was to accelerate the process of team building and to generate an understanding across a wide ranging and diverse force and this enhanced the camaraderie from the outset. The impact on operational effectiveness only became clear when the natural churn of deployed manpower hit a critical point and the OET had to be further amended with new suitable ŝŨśļŝëƢļŨŝƖɆļĐėŝƢļǘėĐɆƢķėŝɆėŝķëŝĉėĐɆǂļƢķɆįƪƎƢķėƎɆ ƖƋėĉļǘĉɆƢƎëļŝļŝİɆļŝɆƖķŨƎƢɆƢļśėșɆ ©ƪįǘĉļėŝĉLjɆëŝĐɆ ƖƖƪƎėĐɆƋƎŨǁļƖļŨŝș In addition to the supply role, 84 MSS was responsible for the Real-Life Support (RLS) of the joint task force. While a good level of corporate knowledge was held within the Regiment and used extensively during the preparatory phase, the COVID-19 restrictions were constantly changing, giving a level of uncertainty in the plan that had be accepted and routinely reviewed. Ensuring that an advance party deployed 14 days before the main body meant they could conduct planning and recces, all while the main body arrived and isolated. This reinforces the military maxim of “time spent on recce is seldom wasted.” Throughout the operation two prime contractors provided the bulk of our requirements. RLS was supported by Renaissance Service Village (RSV) and technical support provided an in-theatre port company. Having an empowered contract monitor within the HQ, supported by the SQMS, meant that ëƖɆƎėƍƪļƎėśėŝƢƖɆǂėƎėɆƎėǘŝėĐȚɆǂėɆķëĐɆƢķėɆëĈļŒļƢLjɆƢŨɆ talk directly with the prime providers who could agree ƢķėɆëĐĐļƢļŨŝëŒɆƖƪƋƋŨƎƢɆƎėƍƪļƎėĐɆȩǂļƢķļŝɆƢķėļƎɆǘŝëŝĉļëŒɆ authority limit). ,įǘĉļėŝĉLjș Ensuring the best use of resources (both people and equipment) was a challenge during the estimate and development stages, and further exacerbated during the initial deployment. The uncertainty of the output requirements meant that allocation of resources could be planned in outline

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OPERATIONS AND TRAINING 8

8 Freight was outloaded

by Strategic Roll-on Roll-off (SRR) to Marchwood Military Port

ŨŝŒLjɆƋƎļŨƎɆƢŨɆĐėƋŒŨLjśėŝƢɆĈƪƢɆǂëƖɆĉŨŝƢļŝƪŨƪƖŒLjɆƎėǘŝėĐɆ early in the operation. The pace of activity during the ǘƎƖƢɆƋķëƖėɆǂëƖɆįëƎɆĈėŒŨǂɆǂķëƢɆǂëƖɆėLJƋėĉƢėĐȚɆëŝĐɆ ƢķėɆļŝĈŨƪŝĐɆǙļİķƢɆƖĉķėĐƪŒėɆǂëƖɆƖƪĈŌėĉƢɆƢŨɆśƪŒƢļƋŒėɆ delays and aircraft failures. This led to routinely working unplanned long days and late nights over a ƋƎŨƢƎëĉƢėĐɆƋėƎļŨĐɆǂļƢķɆŝŨɆĐėǘŝėĐɆėŝĐșɆ Simplicity. In a joint environment, where there is limited opportunity for rehearsals prior to deployment, simplicity was vital in ensuring delivery ŨįɆįƪŒŒɆŨƋėƎëƢļŝİɆĉëƋëĉļƢLjɆǂļƢķļŝɆƢļśėŒļŝėƖșɆ¶ķėɆǙLjȦ sail node laydown was simple; the Air Detachment Commander having primacy at the Airhead; and the Land Det Comd running the JLSB, port operations and provision of RLS for the whole node. This simplistic process and structure was reinforced with a simple chain of command allowed clear orders and quick dissemination of information.

Flexibility. Flexibility was forced upon us by the constant change of requirements. The ambiguity at the beginning of each planning cycle meant ƢķëƢɆǙėLJļĈļŒļƢLjɆƋƎļŨƎɆƢŨɆĐėƋŒŨLjśėŝƢɆǂëƖɆƋëƎëśŨƪŝƢɆ ëƢɆėǁėƎLjɆŒėǁėŒșɆÕļƢķļŝɆƢķėɆǘƎƖƢɆėļİķƢɆǂėėŏƖɆŨįɆƢķėɆ operation the logistic requirement had evolved from ėƖƢëĈŒļƖķļŝİɆëɆǙLjȦƖëļŒɆŝŨĐėȚɆƢŨɆļŝĉŒƪĐėɆëɆǙLjȯǙLjɆŝŨĐėɆ and logistic support to HMS MONTROSE (undergoing ëɆƋëƎƢļëŒɆƎėǘƢɆëƖɆƋëƎƢɆŨįɆëɆƋƎŨŨįɆŨįɆĉŨŝĉėƋƢɆįŨƎɆįƪƢƪƎėɆ Naval Ops in the area), with the overarching task transitioning from a gradual drawdown in theatre to an expected 60-day surge operation. Whilst unknown how and when the operation would change during the planning phase, the breadth of skillset held by the ©ƍƪëĐƎŨŝɆ댌ŨǂėĐɆƪƖɆëɆİƎėëƢėƎɆëśŨƪŝƢɆŨįɆǙėLJļĈļŒļƢLjɆ on the ground.

Despite the initial planning timelines and estimation of completion of the mission, the operation stretched out beyond what was originally expected. Complicated by the politics and timelines surrounding the withdrawal of NATO Security Forces from Afghanistan, constrained by the effects of COVID on freedom of movement, and then delivered with all the complexities of logistic operations including both air and sea lines of communication – the key factor for all planning ƢķƎŨƪİķŨƪƢɆĐėƋŒŨLjśėŝƢɆķëĐɆƢŨɆĈėɆëİļŒļƢLjȚɆǙėLJļĈļŒļƢLjɆ ëŝĐɆƋŒëŝɆįŨƎɆĉŨŝƢļŝİėŝĉLjșɆ¶ķėɆƖėĉŨŝĐɆĐėƋŒŨLjėĐɆ{įǘĉėƎɆ Commanding has used the key Principles of Logistics to review some of the complications encountered whilst deployed to provide insight of enduring considerations for future operations.

Foresight. Having the ability to predict what is expected to be received from the far bank enabled RV Troop to establish processes and a routine that achieved the mission within timelines. Initially this

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8 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

8 The deployed team received freight and repackaged it prior to outload

was achieved with good staff work from the HQ and the far bank, but as the operation progressed, the intricacies of receiving the material off the forward units reduced the ability of the far bank Material Troop to process in good order and in line with the Defence Logistic Framework. This impacted on RV ¶ƋȼƖɆƎŨŒėɆëƢɆƢķėɆǙLjȦƖëļŒɆŝŨĐėɆĈLjɆļŝĉƎėëƖļŝİɆƢķėɆ¶ƋȼƖɆ scope, thereby impacting on workforce demands and logistic processes. Although 84 MSS fought for foresight to inform the plan, often it could not be achieved as it is dependent on external stakeholders and the battle picture in HKIA. ,įǘĉļėŝĉLjș Attempting to always achieve the maximum level of output for the least logistic effort is key and therefore we strived to make the best use ŨįɆǘŝļƢėɆƎėƖŨƪƎĉėƖșɆ¶ķļƖɆǂëƖɆƎėǙėĉƢėĐɆļŝɆƢķėɆ{,¶Ɇ and deployed equipment and meant that working ƋƎëĉƢļĉėƖɆŝėėĐėĐɆƢŨɆƎėǙėĉƢɆƢķėɆ{¡ ¶ɆëŝĐɆëĉĉėƖƖɆ ƢŨɆdŨİQ©șɆ¶ķļƖɆėįǘĉļėŝĉLjɆļŝɆƢķėɆǂŨƎŏįŨƎĉėɆĐļĐɆĈėĉŨśėɆ an issue and allowed for little continency when the detachment was hit by a COVID outbreak during a particularly intense period of the operation, combined with the increased logistic task required of RV Tp. Co-operation. Logistic operations overseas always demand a co-operative approach from ƋŒëŝŝļŝİɆƢŨɆėLJėĉƪƢļŨŝșɆ ƢɆƢķėɆǙLjȦƖëļŒɆŝŨĐėȚɆƢķėɆ execution was dependant on Host Nation (HN) agencies and contractors. From local police escort of Class I commodities to dependencies on the local ports to support the Strategic in-load of the stores on to the ship, it was mission critical that good working relationships were established with the local authorities and stakeholders from the outset. Although this was achieved with great success, there were still regular frustrations that impacted on the simplicity of the operations due to indirectly related issues. This will always continue to be the case as logistic military action will always have external contractors that have 8 The operation was a hugely educational deployment for both the command team and the wider ranks

a role in delivering success but are not always able to deliver as planned - this remains out of the direct control of the command team and it is therefore vital to have a contingency plan for contractual failure. A ŨŝƢƎëĉƢƖɆ{įǘĉėƎɆļƖɆėƖƖėŝƢļëŒɆƢŨɆëŝLjɆŨƋėƎëƢļŨŝɆëŝĐɆ focus must be on building strong relationships with external agencies from the outset.

Simplicity. Logistic delivery success is enabled by simplicity in both the concept and execution of operations. This was true for all movements of freight, outload of aircraft and in-load of the SRR. More importantly though, it was vital that all logistic processes were in accordance with the Defence Logistic Framework where possible. The use of common logistic processes on the far bank, at the Middle Eastern logistic node, and on the home bank allowed 84 MSS an understanding of the journey on which the material had been on. Not always able to complete the process fully, due to problems with receipt of disposal instructions within the constrained timelines, RV Troop adhered to policy and process in the simplest of forms, allowing įŨƎɆƢƎëŝƖƋëƎėŝĉLjɆëŝĐɆķŨŝėƖƢɆƎėƋŨƎƢļŝİɆŨįɆĐėǘĉļėŝƢɆ processes, often due to constraints that were out of the control of the command team.

Agility. Responding rapidly to the unexpected whilst remaining effective allowed the workforce to overcome the unforeseen and adjust processes to deliver success. As mentioned previously, agility was a key factor that was employed throughout the operation. Rehearsal of concept and wargaming were extremely useful tools used by 84 MSS command team whilst deployed. This allowed for thorough consideration through the enactment of various contingency plans that branched off the main scheme of manoeuvre for the many moving parts of logistic operations. Within RV Troop itself, agility was achieved by consistently reviewing working processes and ensuring that the workforce always had the capacity to take on last minute taskings in support of the node(s) and wider defence taskings, interlinked through equipment demands and the node location.

The operation was a hugely educational deployment for both the command team and the wider ranks of 84 MSS. Although it did not see the Squadron employed in the medical support supply role, it did reestablish a good operating knowledge of supply trade functions across the Squadron members and allowed the command team to practice the logistic planning techniques and tools gained over years served within The RLC. Juniors and seniors alike have developed whilst deployed, training on the ‘front line’, working within a high-tempo Joint environment, experiencing constraints and stresses never experienced within ƢķėɆ½ŝļƢȚɆëŝĐɆǂļƢŝėƖƖļŝİɆǘƎƖƢȯķëŝĐɆƢķėɆļŝƢƎļĉëĉļėƖɆŨįɆ logistic operations. Furthermore, they are now the leaders of the future, having gained further operational knowledge in a region where they can expect to deploy to again in the future, with an understanding of the local agencies, meteorological conditions and terrain challenges.

Endnotes Op TORAL was the codename for the British presence within Afghanistan post-2014 as part of NATO’s Resolute Support Mission. UK forces had two major tasks: training and mentoring Afghan Forces, and providing force protection for NATO advisors via the Kabul Security Force.

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76 | THE REVIEW 2022

THE ROYAL LOGISTICS CORPS FOUNDATION

GENERAL INTEREST 8

&ōĈŵ żĤĈ ńĈŅŵżůƁἠýƱýĽĈ áƿĈýż żĤĈ performance of female soldiers?

Women make up 50% of the world’s population, however they have been subject to a ‘gender data gap’. In all walks of life, women have been omitted from research, one element being sport. Female ëƢķŒėƢėƖɆǂėƎėɆėLJĉŒƪĐėĐɆįƎŨśɆƖĉļėŝƢļǘĉɆƖƢƪĐļėƖɆ until 1993 because it produced 'white noise' in the results (Bruinvels, 2017). Although the number of female athletes included in studies has increased, it has only reached 35% (JT Costello, 2014). Female participation in sport has grown exponentially, with ƢķėɆǤǬǣǣɆ{ŒLjśƋļĉɆEëśėƖɆĈėļŝİɆƢķėɆǘƎƖƢɆƢŨɆįėëƢƪƎėɆ women, making up 20% of the athletes competing.

Today, almost half the athletes in the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games were women, including twice as many mixed team events than the Rio 2016 Games. These athletes, like the majority of the 11% of the British Army that are women, are mostly of menstruating age.

However, the menstrual cycle (MC) has been a taboo subject for many generations. This, coupled with the low female participation in sport until recent years, has led to a gap in research around the effects of the MC on athletes and therefore, servicewomen.

The MC is composed of four phases: menstrual, follicular, ovulation and luteal. The menstrual phase ĈėİļŝƖɆƢķėɆǘƎƖƢɆĐëLjɆŨįɆśėŝƖƢƎƪëƢļŨŝɆǂķėŝɆŨėƖƢƎŨİėŝɆ and progesterone are at their lowest. The follicular ƋķëƖėɆëŒƖŨɆįŨƎśƖɆƢķėɆǘƎƖƢɆĐëLjɆŨįɆśėŝƖƢƎƪëƢļŨŝȜɆ however, this is activated with the release of folliclestimulating hormone (FSH) (Watson., 2019) and continues until ovulation, approximately on the fourteenth day of a typical cycle but can range from 11 to 27 days. Throughout the follicular phase, oestrogen levels begin to rise and trigger the release of the luteinising hormone (LH), which initiates ovulation; at this stage oestrogen is at its peak. The ovulation process lasts approximately 24 hours and can cause a rise in body temperature. Once an egg is released, it changes into the corpus luteum; this marks the ĈėİļŝŝļŝİɆŨįɆƢķėɆŒƪƢėëŒɆƋķëƖėȚɆƢķėɆǘŝëŒɆƋķëƖėɆŨįɆƢķėɆ cycle. The corpus luteum releases hormones, mainly progesterone and a small amount of oestrogen. If the egg is not fertilised, the corpus luteum shrinks away, leading to a decrease in both progesterone and oestrogen (Watson., 2019) and this drop in oestrogen leads to the onset of menstruation, restarting the MC. ¶ķėɆn ɆĐļįįėƎƖɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢŒLjɆļŝɆļƢƖɆėįįėĉƢƖɆŨŝɆ females and it is therefore hard to quantify an exact result based on the theory that the MC affects athlete performance at different phases.

It is known that individualised training methods are used to create maximum performance in elite

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Lt Matilda Butler analyses the performance level of menstruating females in order to determine whether certain phases of the menstrual cycle affect athletic performance, concluding with an overview of potential solutions to increasing performance levels for women in the British Army

athletes. Kozina et al states that, "the developed concept of individualisation… helps to optimise the autonomic balance and to increase the sportsmen' workability" (Kozina Z. L., 2015). Individualised training methods enable athletes to train optimally for a sport whilst also concentrating on their ƖƋėĉļǘĉɆǂėëŏŝėƖƖėƖșɆdļśļƢėĐɆƎėƖėëƎĉķɆķëƖɆŒėĐɆƢŨɆ hormonal changes throughout the MC not being considered when tailoring training. The MC is the most important biological rhythm that affects female reproduction and regulates physiological, metabolic, thermoregulatory and cognitive functions (Constantini NW, 2005). Therefore, it should be a consideration within individualised training for female athletes. Due to the minimal studies conducted, there is no conclusive evidence or results that can be used to create individual training programs for athletes based upon the MC alone.

Extensive research (Constantini NW, 2005) (XA, 2003) (Lebrun CM, 2004) supports the theory that muscle strength's trainability increases when levels of progesterone and oestrogen favour muscle gain. However, owing to the paucity of research in this area, many studies contradict one another (Bambaeichi E, 2004), (Elliot KJ, 2003), (Friden C, 2003). To date, there has been no consistent correlation between MC phases and muscle strength.

However, (Sung, 2014) and (Reis E, 1995) tested trainable strength in both the luteal and follicular phase of the MC. There was a higher trainability in the strength of one leg knee extensor muscle in seven women when the leg was strength trained for four

8 Female hockey players at the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games

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8 GENERAL INTEREST as to the cause, one being the laxity within the ŒļİëśėŝƢƖɆĉëƪƖėĐɆĈLjɆƢķėɆķŨƎśŨŝëŒɆǙƪĉƢƪëƢļŨŝƖɆĐƪƎļŝİɆ the MC (Belanger L, 2013). Results have shown that with an increase of oestrogen the tensile properties of the ACL change: “When bound to receptors on the ACL, it has been ƖķŨǂŝɆƢŨɆĐėĉƎėëƖėɆǘĈƎŨĈŒëƖƢɆƋƎŨŒļįėƎëƢļŨŝȚɆƖƪĈƖėƍƪėŝƢŒLjɆ decreasing collagen production. This could theoretically result in a greater incidence of ACL injuries during the pre-ovulatory phase.” (Belanger L, 2013) Once again, the amount of research into this theory is limited, but with such a detrimental injury there is a strong indication that hormone levels should be considered when conducting high velocity or impact activities.

8 Oestrogen and Progesterone levels throughout the MC phases

weeks in the follicular phase compared to the other ŒėİȚɆǂķļĉķɆǂëƖɆƢƎëļŝėĐɆļŝɆŝŨɆƖƋėĉļǘĉɆn ɆƋķëƖėɆȩ¡ėļƖɆ E, 1995). (Sung, 2014) then completed a very similar study which saw each participant completing a leg strength training program for each leg, one conducted in the luteal phase and the other in the follicular ƋķëƖėȚɆƢķƎŨƪİķŨƪƢɆǘǁėɆĉLjĉŒėƖșɆ¶ķėɆƎėƖƪŒƢƖɆĉŨŝĉŒƪĐėĐɆ that follicular base strength training increased muscle strength in untrained and moderately trained women.

The outcome of the study was the recommendation that females not using oral contraception (which changes hormone levels) base their strength training around their individual MC (Sung, 2014).

As with muscle strength, there are minimal and contradicting results on the effects of MC phases on max aerobic performance. Multiple studies (Julian, et al., 2017) (Dokumaci & Hazir, 2019) (Graja, et al., 2020) (Greenhall, et al., 2020) showed a difference in aerobic performance within different MC phases.

Conversely, in 14 studies, a large majority showed no effect on aerobic performance. Intermittent endurance exercises appeared to be more likely to be affected by phases of the MC rather than continuous endurance. An example is the improvements in distance covered in a Yo-Yo endurance test in the follicular phase (Julian, et al., 2017). Results also showed an increase in fatigue and higher peak ƋŨǂėƎɆļŝɆƢķėɆǘŝëŒɆļŝƢėƎǁëŒƖɆŨįɆëɆƎėƋėëƢėĐɆĉLjĉŒėɆ sprint test in the early follicular phase (Graja, et al., 2020). Therefore, endurance performance increases in the early follicular phase, whereas anaerobic performance is optimum in the ovulation phase where oestrogen is at its highest.

"Endurance performance is likely to be at its best early in the MC, and anaerobic performance may be best in the ovulatory phase; aerobic performance may be worst in the late luteal phase, and anaerobic performance could be worst in the late follicular phase" (Carmichael, et al., 2021).

These results indicate that the symptoms prior to menstruation, or the declining amount of female sex hormones, could play a role in reduced performance.

Furthermore, a reduction in performance and musculoskeletal injuries go hand in hand. Research has shown that during phases where oestrogen is at its peak, ligaments can become lax, putting them at a greater risk of tearing.

The Anterior Crucial Ligament (ACL) is a common place of injury for athletes and soldiers; statistics show women are more susceptible to this injury than men by 400-600%. There are many different theories

78 | THE REVIEW 2022

Women are not small men Currently, typical athletic performance training patterns start with a three week on, one week off model. This style of training is not appropriate for ǂŨśėŝɆĐƪėɆƢŨɆķŨƎśŨŝëŒɆǙƪĉƢƪëƢļŨŝƖɆƢķƎŨƪİķŨƪƢɆƢķėɆ whole MC. Although it may appear that women are at a disadvantage, it is simply that their bodies are different, and these differences haven’t been studied enough. By adjusting training, recovery and nutrition to account for the few factors we do understand, female performance can begin to reach newfound levels as knowledge of the female body develops.

The practical application of MC-based individualised training is a complex issue. To track hormonal changes accurately, continuous blood and saliva samples would be required. This can be intrusive and expensive, requiring specialist training and equipment, and therefore not viable for most sports.

Assuming such testing were possible, the results would still only provide a handrail for most athletes as their own personal MC and performance could be very different. An alternative that many sports teams are implementing is the use of apps to monitor MCs and the symptoms that result. By tracking when menstruation begins and ends, along with certain symptoms, a rough outline of the effect of the MC can be drawn. This, alongside a training journal to record details of training performance, can then be used ƢŨɆǘŝĐɆĉŨƎƎėŒëƢļŨŝƖɆĈėƢǂėėŝɆĈŨƢķɆëŝĐɆǘŝĐɆƢķėɆĈėƖƢɆ training protocol for optimum performance.

In the context of the British Army there are further ƋƎëĉƢļĉëŒɆĉŨŝƖļĐėƎëƢļŨŝƖșɆ¶ķėɆǘƎƖƢɆƖƢėƋɆƢŨǂëƎĐɆ individualising training for women in the Army would require further education delivered to all genders and ranks about the MC and the effects it has on women and how they can optimise performance.

Currently, physical training for all soldiers is based on a collective training regime based around role ëŝĐɆƢķėɆǘƢŝėƖƖɆƖƢëŝĐëƎĐƖɆƎėƍƪļƎėĐɆįŨƎɆƢķëƢɆƎŨŒėșɆ ©ėƎǁļĉėǂŨśėŝɆśƪƖƢɆĈėɆëĈŒėɆƢŨɆƋėƎįŨƎśɆƢŨɆëɆƖƋėĉļǘėĐɆ standard regardless of MC, so performance variations are not considered for baseline tests, but rather leveraged to improve the outcomes of training.

Therefore, servicewomen would not experience the įƪŒŒɆĈėŝėǘƢɆįƎŨśɆĉŨśƋŒėƢļŝİɆëɆĈëƖėŒļŝėɆƢėƖƢɆĐƪƎļŝİɆëɆ ƖƋėĉļǘĉɆn ɆƋķëƖėɆǂļƢķŨƪƢɆƢƎëļŝļŝİɆĈƪƢɆśŨƎėɆƖŨɆįƎŨśɆ progressive long-term training around their MC. The studies previously mentioned only resulted in small ĈėŝėǘƢƖɆįŨƎɆƢƎëļŝļŝİɆļŝɆĉėƎƢëļŝɆn ɆƋķëƖėƖȜɆƢķļƖɆķļİķŒLjɆ individualised type of training is most suitable for servicewomen and sportswomen looking for marginal

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GENERAL INTEREST 8 gains ahead of competition. However, if improved ƖƢƎėŝİƢķȦėŝĐƪƎëŝĉėɆƢƎëļŝļŝİɆëŝĐɆëɆƎėĐƪĉƢļŨŝɆļŝɆ dɆ injuries could be achieved through servicewomen tracking their MC using free downloadable apps, then it seems sensible to recognise that this area is deserving of further investigation and attention afterall, it effects 11% of the workforce.

Bibliography Sport, exercise, and the menstrual cycle: where is the research? Bruinvels, G. 2017.

Where are all the female participation in Sports and Exercise Medicine research? JT Costello, F Bieuzen, CM Bleakley. s.l. : Eur J Sport Sci., 2014, Eur J Sport Sci. The applying of the concept of individualisation in sport.

Kozina Z. L., Irina S., Bazilyuk T. A., Olena R., Olena L., IInitskaya A. s.l. : J. Phys. Educ> Sport, 2015.

The menstrual cycle and sport performance. Constantini NW, Dubnov G, Lebrun CM. 2005. s.l. : Clin Sports Med, 2005.

Stages of the menstrual cycle. Watson., S. 2019.

Effects of the menstrual cycle on exercise performance. XA, Janse de Jonge. s.l. : Sports Med, 2003.

Effects of menstrual cycle phase on athletic perfomance.

Lebrun CM, McKenzie DC, Prior JC, Taunton JE. 2004.

The isolated and combined effects of menstrual cycle phase and time of day on muscle strength of eumenorrheic.

Bambaeichi E, Reilly T, Cable NT, Giacomonu M. s.l. : Chronobiol Int, 2004.

Effect of menstrual cycle phase on the concentration of bioavailable 17 beta oestradiol and testosterone and muscle strength. Elliot KJ, Cable NT, Reilly T, Driver MJ. s.l. : Clin Sci, 2003.

nƪƖĉŒėɆƖƢƎėŝİƢķɆëŝĐɆėŝĐƪƎëŝĉėɆĐŨɆŝŨƢɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢŒLjɆǁëƎLjɆ across 3 phases of the menstrual cycle in moderatley active premenopausal women. Friden C, Hirschberg AL, Saartok T. s.l. : Clin J Sport Med, 2003.

Effects of follicular versus lutel phase based strength training in young women. Sung, E., Han, A., Hinrichs, T. s.l. : SpringerPlus, 2014.

Frequency variations of strength training sessions triggered by the phases of the menstrual cycle. Reis E, Frick U, Schmidtbleicher D. s.l. : Int J Sports Med, 1995.

The effects of the menstrual cycle phases on physical performance in female soccer players. Julian, R., et al. s.l. : PLoS ONE, 2017.

Effects of the Menstrual cycle on running economy: Oxygen cost versus caloric cost. Dokumaci, B. and Hazir, T. s.l. : Res. Q. exerc. Sport, 2019.

Physical, Biochemical, and Neauromuscular Respoonses to Repeated Sprint Exercise in Eumenorrheic female handball players; effect of menstrual cycle phases. Graja, A., et al. s.l. : J. Strength Cond., 2020.

QŝǙƪėŝĉėɆŨįɆƢķėɆśėŝƖƢƎƪëŒɆĉLjĉŒėɆƋķëƖėɆŨŝɆśëƎëƢķŨŝɆ performace in recreational runner. Greenhall, M., et al. s.l. : Int. J . Sports Physiol. Perform, 2020.

The impact of menstrual cycle pahses on athletes' performance: a narrative review. Carmichael, M.A., et al. s.l. : Int. J Environ. Res. Public Health, 2021.

Anterior cruciate ligament laxity related to the menstrual cycle: an updated systematic review of the literature.

Belanger L, Burt D, Callaghan J, Clifton S, Gleberzon BJ. s.l. : J Can Chriopr Assoc., 2013.

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GENERAL INTEREST 8

The United Nations as Peacekeepers: Is it useful as a Regulating Force?

When considering the term usefulness, it is important to think about useful to whom? Some ƋëƎƢļėƖɆǂļŒŒɆëŒǂëLjƖɆƋƎŨƖƋėƎɆįƎŨśɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢȚɆǂķėƎėëƖɆ many will suffer. Regulation could be interpreted as complete prevention of all force, or just reducing ļƢƖɆļśƋëĉƢɆŨŝɆļŝįƎëƖƢƎƪĉƢƪƎėȚɆƍƪëŒļƢLjɆŨįɆŒļįėɆŨƎɆ number of casualties.

The idea of the United Nations (UN) was devised in 1942 by the Allied forces of World War Two and Ũįǘĉļ댌LjɆĉƎėëƢėĐɆļŝɆǤǬǧǨșɆQƢƖɆƋƎļśëƎLjɆëļśȚɆśƪĉķɆ like the failed League of Nations, was and still is, to promote world peace by supressing aggression that might threaten peace and to encourage international co-operation (United Nations, 2019).

The UN has already endured longer than the dėëİƪėɆŨįɆpëƢļŨŝƖɆëŝĐɆķëƖɆİƎŨǂŝɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢŒLjɆ since its formation. However, the second half of the Twentieth Century has still been rife with major ĉŨŝǙļĉƢɆëŝĐɆĐėƖƋļƢėɆëŝɆļŝĉƎėëƖļŝİŒLjɆǁŨŒëƢļŒėɆǂŨƎŒĐȚɆƢķėɆ UN has not witnessed a total war since its inception.

However, the number of humanitarian crises and ĉŨŝǙļĉƢƖɆëƎėɆŨŝɆƢķėɆƎļƖėɆëŝĐɆëƎėɆśŨƎėɆĉŨśƋŒėLJɆƢķëŝɆ ever (Melander, 2015). Though it must be questioned, ķŨǂɆśëŝLjɆśŨƎėɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢƖɆǂŨƪŒĐɆķëǁėɆŨĉĉƪƎƎėĐɆķëĐɆ the regulatory implementations of the UN not been present? The UN has attempted to prevent and ĉŨŝƢëļŝɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢɆƖļŝĉėɆļƢƖɆļŝĉėƋƢļŨŝȚɆëŝĐɆĐėƖƋļƢėɆƖŨśėɆ mixed success, it still provides an international legal įƎëśėǂŨƎŏɆƢŨɆĐėëŒɆǂļƢķɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢșɆ ŨŝƖėƍƪėŝƢŒLjȚɆļƢɆƖƢļŒŒɆ ķŨŒĐƖɆƖŨśėɆİŒŨĈëŒɆļŝǙƪėŝĉėɆëƢɆƎėİƪŒëƢļŝİɆƢķėɆƪƖėɆŨįɆ įŨƎĉėɆėǁėŝɆƢķŨƪİķɆļƢɆĉëŝɆŨįƢėŝɆǘŝĐɆļƢƖėŒįɆƋŨǂėƎŒėƖƖɆƢŨɆ ĉŨŝƢëļŝɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢșɆ©ƪĉĉėƖƖįƪŒɆ½pɆŨƋėƎëƢļŨŝƖɆëƎėɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢɆ to identify, and the majority are heavily criticised, partly due to the highly politicised international nature of deployments. The nucleus of the UN is ƋƎŨǁļĐėĐɆĈLjɆƢķėɆǘǁėɆƋėƎśëŝėŝƢɆśėśĈėƎƖɆǂķŨƖėɆ biased governance is partly responsible for the limited success of UN operations.

One of the UN’s main strengths at regulating force ĉŨƪŒĐɆëŒƖŨɆĈėɆĉŨŝƖļĐėƎėĐɆëɆǂėëŏŝėƖƖșɆÕķėŝɆ댌ɆǘǁėɆ permanent members agree unilaterally to act, they ĉëŝɆėLJėƎƢɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆİėŨƋŨŒļƢļĉëŒɆƋƎėƖƖƪƎėșɆ¶ķėɆQƎëŝɆ nuclear deal is one such example (Stent, 2016) (until the USA pulled out of the deal, raising tensions again in the Middle East). The then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-Moon, regarded the agreement as, "A comprehensive, negotiated solution ƢŨɆƢķėɆQƎëŝļëŝɆŝƪĉŒėëƎɆļƖƖƪėɆȭǂķļĉķȮɆǂļŒŒɆĉŨŝƢƎļĈƪƢėɆ to peace and stability in the region." (The Economic Times, 2015). This suggests that at least publicly the UN believed the deal would help stabilise the

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Lt Daniel MillingtonɆĐėŒļĈėƎëƢėƖɆǂķėƢķėƎɆƢķėɆ½pɆķëƖɆƋŒëLjėĐɆëɆƋëƎƢɆļŝɆƎėİƪŒëƢļŝİɆİŒŨĈëŒɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢƖɆ ëŝĐɆƢķėɆƪƖėɆŨįɆįŨƎĉėɆĈLjɆėLJëśļŝļŝİɆƢķėɆƎŨŒėƖɆƋŒëLjėĐɆĈLjɆƢķėɆƋėƎśëŝėŝƢɆ©ėĉƪƎļƢLjɆ ŨƪŝĉļŒɆśėśĈėƎƖɆ ëĉƎŨƖƖɆƖėŒėĉƢėĐɆƢķėëƢƎėƖɆŨįɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢȚɆĉŨŝƖļĐėƎļŝİɆƢķėɆƖƪĉĉėƖƖɆëŝĐɆįëļŒƪƎėƖɆŨįɆĈŨƢķɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢɆ prevention and limitation

ƎėİļŨŝɆëŝĐɆƋƎėǁėŝƢɆįƪƢƪƎėɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢƖșɆQƖƎëėŒɆśëLjɆķëǁėɆ disagreed with this statement (Toosi and Gass, 2015), believing that the easing of sanctions on Iran ǂŨƪŒĐɆĉƎėëƢėɆëɆƖƢƎŨŝİėƎɆëŝĐɆśŨƎėɆļŝǙƪėŝƢļëŒɆƎėİļŨŝëŒɆ power. Ultimately, the UN held sway over Israeli doubts and the deal was agreed until a change of US įŨƎėļİŝɆƋŨŒļĉLjșɆ¶ķļƖɆķļİķŒļİķƢƖɆƢķëƢɆƢķėɆǘǁėɆƋėƎśëŝėŝƢɆ śėśĈėƎƖɆƎėƢëļŝɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆļŝǙƪėŝĉėɆǂļƢķļŝɆƢķėɆ UN by utilising the legitimate use of the veto to enhance their own regional and global policies. Often, ķŨǂėǁėƎȚɆƢķėɆǘǁėɆƋėƎśëŝėŝƢɆśėśĈėƎƖɆķļİķŒļİķƢɆƢķėļƎɆ unilateral political interests through the power of veto, a legitimate but rather un-democratic device for an organisation that generally promotes global democratic governance.

This divergence of permanent member politics was evident during discussions regarding the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Russia and France argued that a further resolution was needed to enable a legal use of force (United Nations, 2002). The UN did not sanction an invasion, yet several key members initiated an invasion force lead by the US. Despite the cynical view that the US and UK believed they would not have obtained a new resolution, they did argue that as permanent members that they already had a resolution from 1991 which authorised the use of force against Saddam Hussein’s regime. In this ļŝƖƢëŝĉėȚɆƢķėɆ½pɆįëļŒėĐɆƢŨɆƋƎėǁėŝƢɆëɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢɆĐėƖƋļƢėɆ ƢķƎėėɆŨƪƢɆŨįɆǘǁėɆƋėƎśëŝėŝƢɆśėśĈėƎƖɆĈėļŝİɆëİëļŝƖƢɆ using force. It could be argued that, as the ‘coalition of the willing’ was made up of UN member states ëŝĐɆǂļƢķɆƢķėɆǘƎƖƢɆEƪŒįɆÕëƎɆƖƢļŒŒɆļŝɆĉŨŝƖļĐėƎëƢļŨŝȚɆļŝɆ

8 The UN still provides an international legal framework to deal with conflict

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further force later down the line (Lyman, 2004). The ǘƎƖƢɆįėǂɆLjėëƎƖɆŨįɆ{p½ ɆǂëƖɆƖƪĉĉėƖƖįƪŒɆëŝĐɆļśƋƎŨǁėĐɆ the security of the Congo and was ultimately claimed to be vital to the country retaining its unity (Lefever and Wynfred, 1966).

Sierra Leone also saw mixed success for the UN and it ultimately relied on British support to shift the balance of power back to the government. The UN force was on the verge of collapse prior to the British intervention and had effectively re-armed the rebel forces. When the UN shifted its focus to long term peace and development, it was much more ƖƪĉĉėƖƖįƪŒɆļŝɆƎėİƪŒëƢļŝİɆƢķėɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢșɆ ëŝɆbļɆnŨŨŝɆ travelled to Freetown to mark the closure of the UN mission where he praised the UN’s contribution stating, “Sierra Leone represents one of the world’s śŨƖƢɆƖƪĉĉėƖƖįƪŒɆĉëƖėƖɆŨįɆƋŨƖƢȯĉŨŝǙļĉƢɆƎėĉŨǁėƎLjȚɆ peacekeeping and peacebuilding.” (United Nations News Service, 2014). Although hailed as a success ĈLjɆƢķėɆ½pȼƖɆķļėƎëƎĉķLjȚɆƢķėƎėɆƎėśëļŝƖɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆ uncertainty if the UN would have delivered a favourable end-state without the UK’s military contribution. Whilst the effectiveness of the UN remains debatable in Sierra Leone, in Somalia its goals ultimately failed after some initial success at śėĐļëƢļŝİɆëɆĉėëƖėǘƎėșɆ©ŨśėɆŨįɆƢķėɆśļŒļƢļëƖɆƖëǂɆƢķėɆ UN presence as a threat to their status, leading to politically disastrous engagements such as the battle of Mogadishu. The operation was viewed as a failure due to the withdrawal of troops before the mission was complete (Johnson and Tierney, 2006). It could be argued that a withdrawal of UN troops was the correct decision as their presence was antagonising local militias.

In the Bosnian war (1992 – 1995), all diplomatic ėįįŨƎƢƖɆëƢɆĉėëƖėǘƎėƖɆǂėƎėɆįƎƪƖƢƎëƢėĐɆĈLjɆƢķėɆ ŨƖŝļëŝȯ Serb side who took UN personnel hostage in June 1995. Furthermore, any improvements in security ėǁėŝƢƪ댌LjɆĈėİëŝɆƢŨɆĐėƢėƎļŨƎëƢėșɆ ɆĉėëƖėǘƎėɆ facilitated by the UN between the Croatians and the Serbians was achieved and safe areas established.

Yet, Bosnian Serbs soon broke this and attacked safe zones despite UN protests and demonstrations of force by NATO. It could be argued that this highlights the ineffectiveness of the UN when employing both military and diplomatic methods. In both Bosnia and Croatia, the UN set itself up to fail and made mission success unattainable. The severe lack of troop numbers meant the level of security that was required to regulate the use of force was impossible ƢŨɆëĉķļėǁėșɆ,ëƎŒļėƎɆļŝǙƪėŝĉėɆļŝɆƢķėɆ ëŒŏëŝƖɆĉŨƪŒĐɆ

Defence images

some way the UN did act to try and pre-empt a more ƖėƎļŨƪƖɆëƎśėĐɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢșɆ ėƎķëƋƖɆƢķļƖɆĉŨëŒļƢļŨŝɆëĉƢļŝİɆ as it did spared the UN some humiliation or from appearing irrelevant, as Iraq continuously ignored the ½pȼƖɆĐėśëŝĐƖșɆ¶ķļƖɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢɆķļİķŒļİķƢƖɆëŝŨƢķėƎɆįëƪŒƢɆ in the status of the UN. On several occasions, important members of the Security Council have acted independently of UN mandates and suffered little repercussion (Berdal, 2007). It could be argued that the US, Russia and China could increasingly see the UN as an unwelcome steppingstone to sanction the use of force. Though if a permanent state can act unilaterally, regardless of UN ëƋƋƎŨǁëŒȚɆƢķėŝɆƢķėɆ½pɆķŨŒĐƖɆŒļśļƢėĐɆëĈļŒļƢLjɆƢŨɆļŝǙƪėŝĉėɆ the use of force. The UN has also provided laws on the use of force, but they have proven to be open to interpretation and have produced some disagreement on the application of these laws (Gray, 2014). Yet, it could be argued that without any legal framework śëŝLjɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢƖɆǂŨƪŒĐɆķëǁėɆĈėėŝɆƖƪĈŌėĉƢɆƢŨɆśŨƎėɆ excessive use of force. Furthermore, those countries acting outside of the UN framework may believe they can justify their actions legally. For example, ƢķėɆƎėƖƋŨŝƖėɆƢŨɆƢķėɆǬȦǤǤɆëƢƢëĉŏƖɆǂëƖɆĉŒëļśėĐɆĈLjɆ the US Government as an act of self-defence. The response by the UN’s permanent members along unilateral foreign policy lines resulted in a political impasse in Syria in 2013. Whilst Russia supported President Assad, western members were in favour of backing the rebellious factions and underwriting regime change. Again, key nations acted outside of a UN mandate knowing that Russia would veto any decision that suggested weakening Assad’s power.

With Russia directly opposing western aspirations, it suited the other states to act through NATO rather than through the UN, weakening the UN’s reputation for executive action.

Even when the UN has been able to take executive action, there are numerous occasions when its operations have proven ineffective. Even with these perceived failures however, there is usually an element of success which emphasises the complexities involved with military actions. One of the best geographical locations to judge this is the African continent where over half of the UN’s current peacekeeping missions are taking place (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2019). In the Congo, during Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) in the 1960s, the government initially welcomed the UN but was ultimately frustrated by their refusal to provide military assistance and their insistence that they remain neutral. The Congolese authority obviously did ŝŨƢɆǘŝĐɆƢķļƖɆƎėİƪŒëƢļŨŝɆŨįɆįŨƎĉėɆƪƖėįƪŒɆƢŨɆƢķėļƎɆĉëƪƖėșɆ The government therefore turned to the Soviet Union who provided arms and advisors (Gibbs, 1991). The government’s offensive soon went ahead, and the presence of the UN did not stop this use of force.

With hindsight, it is perhaps unfair to criticize the UN for this. Initially the UN maintained their neutrality and considering the Soviets were a permanent member of the Security Council it could be argued that a level of prudence was important to avoid intensifying the situation. Later in the mission the UN ėƖĉëŒëƢėĐɆƢķėļƎɆëĉƢļŨŝƖȚɆƢķėɆǘƎƖƢɆƢļśėɆļŝɆįëĉƢɆƢķėLjɆķëĐɆ used force to implement a UN resolution (Packham, 1996). This enhanced force approach was adopted with a view that it would nullify the necessity for

8 Over half of the UN’s current peacekeeping missions are taking place in Africa

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have resulted in greater success, being preventative rather than reactive. Militias were arming prior to ƢķėɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢɆëŝĐɆƖǂļįƢėƎɆëĉƢļŨŝɆǂŨƪŒĐɆķëǁėɆƋƪƢɆƢķėɆ UN in a stronger position to regulate the violence in the Balkans. As highlighted earlier, there is often disagreement around the prohibition of force (Gray, 2014). This confusion for the troops on the ground could be useful and a hinderance. It could be argued the discrepancy allowed peacekeepers to intervene when there were humanitarian issues. However, a counterargument is that a lack of clear rules of engagement resulted in some troops reluctant to engage in case they found themselves acting illegally.

In summary, it could be argued that the UN is as credible as it has ever been across its 76-year ķļƖƢŨƎLjɆëƢɆƎėİƪŒëƢļŝİɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢƖɆëĉƎŨƖƖɆƢķėɆİŒŨĈėșɆQƢɆ has maintained a record ranging from moderate success to abject failure. This is largely due to the structural makeup of the controlling bodies and permanent members whose political motivations ǂļƢķļŝɆƢķėɆ©ėĉƪƎļƢLjɆ ŨƪŝĉļŒɆĉëŝɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢŒLjɆķļŝĐėƎɆ ƋƎŨİƎėƖƖɆļŝɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢɆƎėƖŨŒƪƢļŨŝșɆQŝɆ įİķëŝļƖƢëŝȚɆƢķļƖɆ structural impediment resulted in western members acting without a UN sanctioned mandate, instead instigating the war via a US-led NATO force, whilst Russia intervened unilaterally in Georgia. Both śļŒļƢëƎLjɆļŝƢėƎǁėŝƢļŨŝƖɆǂėƎėɆŌƪƖƢļǘėĐɆĈLjɆƢķėɆƎėƖƋėĉƢļǁėɆ parties under an opaque premise of self-defence.

The fragile situation in Syria is one of the latest ĉŨŝǙļĉƢƖɆǂķėƎėɆƢķėɆ½pɆƖėėśƖɆļśƋƪĐėŝƢɆļŝɆƋƎėǁėŝƢļŝİɆ a desperate humanitarian disaster while the three western permanent members and Russia shore up ƢķėɆĈėŒŒļİėƎėŝƢƖșɆ¶ķļƖɆįŨƎśɆŨįɆƋƎŨLJLjɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢɆƪŝĐėƎŒļŝėƖɆ the weakness of the UN structure where permanent Security Council members are at liberty to pursue unilateral agendas. The UN was unable to act decisively due to opposing political ideologies and differing regional interests. Both sides claimed to be combating ISIS (Sackelmore, 2014), but it was clear that the UK and France desired regime change, and it is suspected that Russia merely wanted a distraction from other international activity while also securing access to a warm water port. Whatever the geopolitical reasons, the UN failed in regulating the use of force in Syria.

Conversely, on the African continent, the UN appears to be viewed as more effective, despite reverting to some direct (unilateral) military support from independent states such as in Sierra Leone.

Whilst valuable interventions could be partly attributed to peacekeepers being drawn from other African nations and appearing less like foreign ŨĉĉƪƋļėƎƖȚɆƢķėɆ½pȼƖɆƎėĉŨƎĐɆļŝɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢɆƎėİƪŒëƢļŨŝɆ in Africa appears relatively positive. The lack of resourcing in the Balkans however prevented the UN missions from completing their objectives in the break-up of Yugoslavia. Although there are reports of UN peacekeepers preventing the loss of life, the overall mission was ineffective. Despite highlighting śëLjɆŨįɆƢķėɆǙëǂƖɆëŝĐɆįëļŒƪƎėƖɆŨįɆƢķėɆ½pȚɆƢķėɆƖƢëƢļƖƢļĉëŒɆ evidence states that peacekeeping undoubtably works (Crocker, Hampson and Aall, 2021). It is easy to fall into the trap of thinking that all the UN’s missions are bumbling failures, fraught with abuse, sexual exploitation and disfunction (Autessere, 2014).

Most of the mainstream news reports only focus on these negative aspects, without balanced reporting

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GENERAL INTEREST 8

of measurable success. Although it may not have attained its original goals, the UN has achieved a substantial amount (Meisler, 1995) and where it has been involved, a peaceful outcome is generally the result (Fortna, 2008). The UN is dependant on its broad membership and is only as strong as its member states. Its permanent members however continue to hold the balance of power due to their post-war hierarchical positions combined with their economic, military and political powers. They therefore have the means, motives and opportunities ƢŨɆļŝǙƪėŝĉėɆĈļëƖėĐɆĐėĉļƖļŨŝƖɆŨƎɆƎėƖƢƎļĉƢɆėLJėĉƪƢļǁėɆ actions. Whether its results justify its future existence in its current guise requires further exploration, ĈƪƢɆļƢɆļƖɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢɆƢŨɆļİŝŨƎėɆļƢƖɆŨƋėƎëƢļŨŝëŒɆįëļŒƪƎėƖɆ especially while it remains impudent on long-term İėŨƋŨŒļƢļĉëŒɆļƖƖƪėƖșɆ¡ėİëƎĐŒėƖƖȚɆƢķėƎėɆëƎėɆŏėLjɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢƖɆ where the UN has facilitated peaceful resolutions ƢŨɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢșɆ½ŒƢļśëƢėŒLjȚɆƢķėɆėǁļĐėŝĉėɆƖƪİİėƖƢƖɆƢķëƢɆ UN peacekeeping works and can be useful as a regulating force. The reality is that in an imperfect world, the UN’s accomplishments still seem to outweigh its controversies - just.

8 In the Bosnian war (1992 – 1995), all diplomatic efforts at ceasefires were frustrated by the Bosnian-Serb side who took UN personnel hostage

Bibliography Autessere, S., (2014). ėëĉėŒëŝĐțɆ ŨŝǙļĉƢɆ¡ėƖŨŒƪƢļŨŝɆëŝĐɆƢķėɆ Everyday Politics of International Intervention. Cambridge University Press.

Berdal, M., (2007). The UN Security Council: Ineffective but Indispensable. Survival. 54(2), 7-30.

Crocker, CA., Hampson FO., and Aall, P., (2021). Diplomacy and the Future of World Order. Georgetown University Press. Washington DC. Fortna, VP., (2008). Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents Choices After Civil War. Princeton University Press.

Gibbs, DN., (1991). The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money, and U.S. Policy in the Congo Crisis. American Politics and Political Economy. University of Chicago Press. Chicago and London.

Gray, C., (2014). The Use of Force and the International Legal Order. International Law. Oxford University Press. Oxford.

Johnson, DDP. and Tierney, D., (2006). Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Politics.

Harvard University Press. Cambridge.

Lefever, EW. and Joshua, W., (1966). United Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo: 1960–1964: An Analysis of Political, Executive and Military Control. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. (2).

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8 GENERAL INTEREST Lyman, PN., (2004). "Ralph Bunche's International Legacy: The Middle East, Congo, and United Nations Peacekeeping". The Journal of Negro Education. 73(2), 159–170.

Meisler, S., (1995). United Nations: The First Fifty Years. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press.

Melander, E., (2015). Organised Violence in the World 2015: ŝɆëƖƖėƖƖśėŝƢɆĈLjɆƢķėɆ½ƋƋƖëŒëɆ ŨŝǙļĉƢɆ$ëƢëɆ ƎŨİƎëśșɆ ½ƋƋƖëŒëɆ ŨŝǙļĉƢɆ$ëƢëɆ ƎŨİƎëśɆ ëƋėƎșɆǬș Packham, ES., (1996). Freedom and Anarchy. Nova Publishers. New York.

Sackelmore, J., (2014). The World Against ISIS. Conceptual Kings.

Stent, A., (2016) Putin’s Power Play in Syria: How to Respond to Russia’s Intervention. Foreign Affairs. 95(1), 106-113.

The Economic Times (2015). "Iran deal will help Middle East stability: UN chief Ban Ki-moon". Agence France-Presse.

Toosi, N. and Gass, N., (2015). "Netanyahu warns of nuclear arms race".Ɇ ŨŒļƢļĉŨșɆ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǣǥȦǣǩȦǥǣǤǬșɆ ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșƋŨŒļƢļĉŨșĉŨśȦƖƢŨƎLjȦǥǣǤǨȦǣǧȦļƎëŝȯĐėëŒȯļƖƎëėŒȯ netanyahu-116643.

UN International (2002). “Joint statement from the Popular Republic of China, the Federation of Russia, and France".

United Nations News Service (2014). Ɂ ŒŨƖļŝİɆƋŨŒļƢļĉëŒɆŨįǘĉėɆ in Sierra Leone, UN shifts focus to long term development". ½ŝļƢėĐɆpëƢļŨŝƖșɆ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǣǫȦǣǩȦǥǣǤǬȚɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦƎėŒļėįǂėĈș ļŝƢȦƎėƋŨƎƢȦƖļėƎƎëȯŒėŨŝėȦĉŒŨƖļŝİȯƋŨŒļƢļĉëŒȯŨįǘĉėȯƖļėƎƎëȯŒėŨŝėȯ un-shifts-focus-long-term-development. ½ŝļƢėĐɆpëƢļŨŝƖȚɆ ķëƋƢėƎɆǤȚɆ ƎƢļĉŒėɆǤɆȩǥǣǤǬȪșɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂș ƪŝșŨƎİȦėŝȦƖėĉƢļŨŝƖȦƪŝȯĉķëƎƢėƎȦĉķëƋƢėƎȯļȦļŝĐėLJșķƢśŒș United Nations Peacekeeping (2019). Peace keeping ŨƋėƎëƢļŨŝƖșɆ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǣǫȦǣǩȦǥǣǤǬȚɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦƋėëĉėŏėėƋļŝİș ƪŝșŨƎİȦėŝș

I am Rick Jennings, an Independent Silver Consultant based in South Yorkshire. With over 20 years’ experience, I offer a wide range of services including accurate valuations for bespoke military centrepieces, sporting trophies and other pieces of silverware that provide organisations with a unique link to their heritage.

“If you want the best, look no further than Rick Jennings. The Regimental Headquarters of The Royal Logistic Corps would have no hesitation in recommending his services to others and looks forward to working with Rick again in the future”. Stephen Yafai, The RLC Regimental Secretary If you would like more information or to book a valuation, please use the details below and I will be happy to ČūŠǛƑŞ ƥĺĚ ŠƭŞċĚƑ ūIJ ēîNjƙ ƑĚƐƭĿƑĚē ƥū ČîƑƑNj ūƭƥ ƥĺĚ DŽîŕƭîƥĿūŠ îŕūŠij DžĿƥĺ Čūƙƥ îŠē îDŽîĿŕîċĿŕĿƥNjȦ

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Drugs – a discipline issue or a health problem: Is the Army’s approach to drugs outdated?

This article will explore the policies set out within AGAI 641 ‘Substance Misuse’ and JSP 8352 ‘Alcohol and Substance Misuse and Testing’. AGAI 64 states that ‘MOD and Army policy is that the misuse of drugs is incompatible with Army life. Drug misuse breaches the Army’s Values & Standards and erodes Operational Effectiveness’. The policy is based on prevention, deterrence and regulation, the intent of the policy is clear and simple. In short; SP caught taking drugs will face disciplinary action. It may be prudent for the organisation to ƍƪėƖƢļŨŝȚɆļƖɆƢķļƖɆëŒǂëLjƖɆƢķėɆĉŨƎƎėĉƢɆëƋƋƎŨëĉķȠɆ Is taking drugs purely a discipline problem, or is it a health problem, and if so, which should take prominence; disciplinary action or specialist treatment and rehabilitation?

Currently, retention is by exception only, with discharged personnel being allowed to apply to ƎėȯŌŨļŝɆëįƢėƎɆƢǂŨɆLjėëƎƖșɆ¶ķļƖɆƋŨŒļĉLjɆĈėŝėǘƢƖɆƢķėɆ ƎśLjɆ because it re-enforces that the misuse of drugs is incompatible with military service by having a ŨŝėȯƖļǒėɆǘƢƖɆ댌ɆƋƪŝļƖķśėŝƢɆëŝĐɆĉŨŝƖėƍƪėŝĉėșɆ¶ķėɆ immediate dismissal of SP that are misusing drugs sets an example to serving personnel and should deter them, therefore resulting in a more operationally effective Army. It also should not be forgotten that the misuse of drugs is illegal, as laid out by The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, and as such, the strength of AGAI 64 is that it makes clear that, as per any illegal activity, there are no exceptions.

As previously stated, the current Army policy is a disciplinary-focused policy which prioritises discipline ahead of any other aftercare and social responsibility to those SP who fail a Compulsory Drugs Test (CDT) or are caught in possession of an illegal substance.

However, it could be argued that, in some cases, this policy increases the use of drugs. Anecdotally, SP who want a quick dismissal from service are known to take or to admit to taking drugs to enable this, as they understand that under AGAI 673, Commanding {įǘĉėƎƖɆĉëŝɆįëĉļŒļƢëƢėɆƢķļƖɆįëƖƢėƎɆƢķëŝɆëɆpŨƢļĉėɆ¶ŨɆ Terminate (NTT). This therefore shows that the policy can be exploited by SP to achieve their aims, whereas if aftercare and social responsibilities were ƋƪƢɆǘƎƖƢɆëŝĐɆǂėƎėɆƪƋįƎŨŝƢɆļŝɆƢķėɆƋŨŒļĉLjɆƢķėŝɆƢķļƖɆ may deter further drug misuse. A positive CDT result should not be treated as a simple problem that can be solved with quick discipline. The incident should be investigated to the fullest level available, and it is this comprehensive investigation that should be considered in the widest possible context.

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An examination of the British and Canadian Armed Forces’ approach to the misuse of drugs measured against the perception of drugs in today’s society and the mixed demographic of ©ėƎǁļĉėɆ ėƎƖŨŝŝėŒɆȩ© ȪșɆ LjɆCapt James Cooke

SP may have taken drugs for numerous reasons - according to Drugwise, there are eight main reasons why people might take drugs4, these being: enjoyment, environment, curiosity, defence śėĉķëŝļƖśȦƖėŒįȯśėĐļĉëƢļŝİȚɆŝëƢƪƎëŒɆƎėĈėŒŒļŨŝȚɆ promotion, peer pressure and cost. When considering these, it can be seen why SP may have taken drugs.

Using the dismissal of 16 soldiers from two RLC units in 20195 as selected case studies, a more nuanced comparison with Drugwise’s environmental factor can be considered. 9 Regiment RLC’s location in Chippenham tops the unenviable list for worst infrastructure in the Army, with 7 Regiment RLC in Cottesmore also making the top 10. Also, both locations are relatively isolated with high living costs, and the perception that drugs were a cost-effective alternative to alcohol may have been a contributing factor.

Additionally, the complexity of these cases could be further exacerbated with peer pressure considerations (eight members in each location) and curiosity as a number of those who tested positive were under 21. If analysing these cases in broader terms rather than the restrictive AGAI 64 parameters, it could be logically concluded that a more detailed investigation should have taken place, not only due to the high level of drug use but for the reason that perhaps the Army unwittingly contributed to the drug misuse by not providing SP with an environment that makes them feel valued.

This article also supports the view previously

8 The British Army has a zero tolerance to drugs policy

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mentioned that deliberate drug misuse under the current policies can be manipulated to trigger a quick ƎėŒėëƖėɆįƎŨśɆƢķėɆ ƎśLjșɆQįɆƢķėɆŨįǘĉļëŒɆƋŨŒļĉļėƖɆƋƪƢɆ ëįƢėƎĉëƎėɆëŝĐɆļŝĐļǁļĐƪëŒɆ© ɆǘƎƖƢɆĈLjɆƎėĉŨİŝļƖļŝİɆĐƎƪİɆ misuse as a health problem, as opposed to a purely discipline issue, a more encompassing investigation is likely to recognise some of the nuances that contributed to each case – possibly leading to a different conclusion. Ultimately, it is recognised that the Army needs to consider its broader reputation in situations like these. By automatically dismissing all individuals from service, it deliberately re-enforces its zero-tolerance policy – a clear message which policy makers believe still offers a credible deterrent to wider drug misuse. Acknowledging the Army’s desire to minimise drug misuse, where trends are recognised, the Army should consider if it can do more to prevent individuals from using drugs such as improving infrastructure and providing areas on camps where individuals do not feel isolated and subsequently exposed to peer pressure.

When considering the Army’s approach to drugs, it is important to consider if its policies and stance ŨŝɆĐƎƪİƖɆļƖɆƎėǙėĉƢļǁėɆŨįɆëŝɆėǁėƎȯĉķëŝİļŝİɆƖŨĉļėƢLjɆ alongside the other public services’ respective drug policies. The NHS regards drug misuse by its employees as a health problem, not a discipline problem.6 These diametrically opposed policies from different departments of Her Majesty’s Government, which both work under a duty of care to their own employees and the general public, and which both operate complex machinery, seem to question the rationale of the policy makers. Can they both be right?

Is the Army’s approach in the 21st Century out of step with the society which it recruits from? The NHS policy is based on support and treatment as opposed to discipline. Everything is done to ensure that individuals are rehabilitated and once recovered, can resume work, caveated with the need to be within the limits of the law. It could be said that this is a retention-focussed policy and allows the organisation to fully explore why an individual may have turned to drugs, whilst rehabilitating them. If the Army were to take a similar stance, that was focussed on the health and well-being of drugs users and treated them as individual cases, it may see a greater return of service and also retain previous high-quality people who

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are at crisis point and using drugs as a mechanism to cope, in the same way that an individual may use alcohol.

Further to this, the likelihood of drug use increasing is high as a societal shift has seen drug use increase, mainly due to it being more affordable than alcohol and the calorie intake being low. This is because current society is more health-focussed and body image conscious. Individuals are just, if not more, likely to take drugs on a night out as opposed to drinking alcohol because it does not affect their body image as much and they can carry on the next day hangover-free.

The Canadian Armed Forces has recently updated its own drug policy in-line with a change in their national laws which has legalised the use of cannabis.7 This is relevant to our own Army’s approach to drugs, as it shows that policy amendments, in-line with laws, can have a positive impact on individuals and the service. The use of cannabis in its Armed Forces is only permitted for off-duty personnel who are physically in Canada and not permitted when on duty, overseas or deployed. This shows that a drug policy that is compliant with civil laws can be compatible with service life. The Canadian Armed Forces has not seen or yet experienced a decrease in operational effectives as a result of the legalisation of cannabis, there are also less drug related discipline incidents, arguably resulting in a stronger more reliable force.

In wider societal terms, Canada has actually seen a reduction in drug related driving incidents, with the number of people being arrested for cannabisdrug-driving reducing from 5.3% to 4.2%8. It could be easy to dismiss this as irrelevant, as cannabis use is now legal in Canada and therefore shouldn’t be compared to ourselves but there are however clear deductions that can be made. A change in drug policy that focusses on health and well-being as opposed to discipline could result in individuals behaving more responsibly (as shown by the reduction in ĐƎļǁļŝİɆƪŝĐėƎɆƢķėɆļŝǙƪėŝĉėɆŨįɆĉëŝŝëĈļƖȪȚɆƢķėɆƪƖėɆŨįɆ cannabis has not adversely affected the Canadian Armed Forces operational effectiveness, therefore, by investing in rehabilitation rather than dismissing our own SP, it may actually increase our own operational effectiveness as a rehabilitated individual may become a role model to others, as well as not reducing the size of the Army.

Further consideration to any policy debate over discipline versus health and well-being is the moral impact and the issue surrounding duty of care of individuals that are facing discipline for drug use. SP that are dismissed from service due to drug misuse are simply ‘cut loose’ into the general population. In some cases, the disciplinary action can be conducted in seven days, leaving little time for the individual to organise their release and undermines any necessary supporting welfare issues. Just because Commanding {įǘĉėƎƖɆĉëŝɆĐŨɆƢķļƖɆŨƎɆëƎėɆĉŨśƋėŒŒėĐɆƪŝĐėƎɆƢķėɆ current AGAI to do so, questions the Army’s wider duty of care and moral considerations. An individual that is dismissed from service may not have anything in place to support themselves outside of the Army, they may not have any housing, family support, employment which can have severe consequences to the individual and wider society. Unsurprisingly, these rapid releases from service have contributed in

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GENERAL INTEREST 8 some individuals taking their own lives. The current policy of dismissing individuals without allowing them to conduct some form of rehabilitation, resettlement or reintegration activity seems morally misaligned to the Army’s claim to be a fair and caring employer.

Individuals who are punished for criminal activity in the Army such as ABH, Battery and Theft which are arguably more serious offences, are often sent to the Military Corrective Training Centre (MCTC) Colchester, where they undergo rehabilitation or resettlement activity and then either re-join regular service or are dismissed from the service after their detention sentence ends. In these cases, the Army consciously manages the needs of individuals, weighed against those of the service. The outcomes are purposefully ĐėƖļİŝėĐɆƢŨɆŨįįėƎɆƖŨśėɆĈėŝėǘƢɆƢŨɆļŝĐļǁļĐƪëŒƖɆǂķļŒƖƢɆ protecting the service - those disciplined for drugs are not offered any similar courses of action.

The Army’s approach to drugs has traditionally centred on deterrence and the threat of dismissal as its primary tool to prevent drug use. This approach needs to be reviewed due to its seeming inability to reduce the levels of CDT positive results. Society outside of the Army is changing its approach to drug users, and the Army should do the same. On average there are 700 – 800 discharges a year due to CDT failure, however, this only shows drugs that are in someone’s system, it does not take intent into account, for example, an individual may be spiked, depressed or trying to self-harm. Although the Army may claim that CDT acts as a deterrent, it could be argued that CDT simply enables the punishment of individuals - it doesn’t explain the negative and unseen impact of drug use, which to many is completely unknown. It could be said that the deterrence of a CDT failure is all that is required in a drug policy as individuals can see the direct consequences of what a positive result means and if they see a colleague discharged through CDT failure, they may then be more compliant with the policy and avoid drug misuse. To be truly effective, a drug policy should be transformative, therefore greater education of soldiers on drug use would empower soldiers to make more effective decisions, as opposed to simply scaring people into doing what you want, which is what the current policy CDT attempts to achieve. Further to this, as discussed earlier, CDT and dismissal as a deterrent is only effective if individuals fear discharge, if they do not then they are less likely to abide by the policy and some may identify the policy as a viable option for orchestrating their rapid dismissal from the service. The threat of dismissal and CDT only delay drugs misuse rather than change the broader underlying reasons why an individual may choose to misuse drugs.

In summary, the Army’s approach to drug misuse śļİķƢɆŝŨƢɆĈėɆĉŨŝƖļĐėƎėĐɆëƖɆŨƪƢĐëƢėĐɆëƖɆļƢɆƎėǙėĉƢƖɆ UK law and the current policy adheres closely to this. This doesn’t mean however that this approach should not be reviewed and revised in parallel with wider societal changes. It has been highlighted throughout this article that the threat of dismissal is not always a deterrent. What has been outlined is that a more nuanced policy approach, one centred around health and well-being perhaps, not discipline and punishment, may prove to be more effective for a 21st Century Army. The legalisation of cannabis

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in Canada has shown that the majority of society can use it responsibly and certain crimes have decreased as a consequence of the change in legal policy. The NHS has demonstrated that by educating and allowing users to safely come forward to be rehabilitated creates a stronger organisation, allows the root cause of the problem to be addressed and avoids wastage of skilled human resource. Drug śļƖƪƖėɆƢķėƎėįŨƎėɆƖķŨƪŒĐɆĈėɆŨįǘĉļ댌LjɆƎėĉŨİŝļƖėĐɆ primarily as a health problem, not a discipline issue.

As the reasons for drug misuse are complex and often directly related to broader considerations of service life, users should be treated on a case-bycase basis to identify the individual and broader trends of drug misuse. Dismissal should not be the sole default solution. Individuals who ask for help should be able to receive it, free from the threat of punishment. Drug users should not be type-cast, as they may be misusing to mask wider health problems ȯɆƢķėɆ ƎśLjȼƖɆëƋƋƎŨëĉķɆƖķŨƪŒĐɆƢķėƎėįŨƎėɆƎėǙėĉƢɆƢķļƖșɆ Finally, the rapid discharge from service of individuals found misusing is morally questionable. Releasing unprepared individuals into the wider community not only leaves them vulnerable but places a burden of care onto their civilian communities – perhaps by continuing to adhere to the current AGAI policy, in an effort to maintain discipline, the Army is unwittingly eroding one of its core values, respect for others.

8 Compulsory Drug Tests are routinely carried out in the British Army

Endnotes AGAI 64 JSP 835 3 AGAI 67 4 ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșĐƎƪİǂļƖėșŨƎİșƪŏȦǂķLjȯĐŨȯLjŨƪŝİȯƋėŨƋŒėȯƢëŏėȯ ĐƎƪİƖȦɆ 5 ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșƢķėƖƪŝșĉŨșƪŏȦŝėǂƖȦǫǥǥǥǦǥǬȦƖƍƪëĐĐļėƖȯ ƖëĉŏėĐȯëƎśLjȯëįƢėƎȯĉŨĉëļŝėȯƋëƎƢļėƖȦ 6 ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșƖŨŒėŝƢșŝķƖșƪŏȦśėĐļëȦǤǥǨǨȦĐƎƪİȯëŒĉŨķŨŒȯëŝĐȯ substance-misuse-policy.pdf 7 ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșĉëŝëĐëșĉëȦėŝȦĐėƋëƎƢśėŝƢȯŝëƢļŨŝëŒȯĐėįėŝĉėȦ ĉŨƎƋŨƎëƢėȦƋŨŒļĉļėƖȯƖƢëŝĐëƎĐƖȦĐėįėŝĉėȯëĐśļŝļƖƢƎëƢļǁėȯŨƎĐėƎƖȯ ĐļƎėĉƢļǁėƖȦǬǣǣǣȯƖėƎļėƖȦǬǣǣǧȦǬǣǣǧȯǤȯƪƖėȯĉëŝŝëĈļƖȯĉëįȯ members.html 8 ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂǤǨǣșƖƢëƢĉëŝșİĉșĉëȦŝǤȦƋƪĈȦǫǥȯǣǣǦȯLJȦǥǣǥǣǣǣǥȦ ëƎƢļĉŒėȦǣǣǣǣǥȯėŝİșķƢś 1 2

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Have better operational tour welfare packages eroded traditional Army bonding?

Crown Copyright

¶ķƎŨƪİķɆķļƖɆėLJƋėƎļėŝĉėɆŨŝɆ{ƋėƎëƢļŨŝɆ¶{© ɆǦǧȚɆLt Anthony LovellɆŨĈƖėƎǁėƖɆķŨǂɆƢķėɆ ƎļƢļƖķɆ ƎśLjɆ succeeds in the provision of welfare and examines whether positive changes in the welfare ƋëĉŏëİėɆśëLjɆëŒƖŨɆķëǁėɆëɆŝėİëƢļǁėɆļśƋëĉƢɆŨŝɆƢƎëĐļƢļŨŝëŒɆǘėŒĐɆƎŨĈƪƖƢŝėƖƖɆëŝĐɆƢėëśɆĈƪļŒĐļŝİɆƋƎëĉƢļĉė

8 The elements that make up fighting power

¶ķļƖɆëƎƢļĉŒėɆǂļŒŒɆǘƎƖƢɆĐėǘŝėɆƢķėɆėŒėśėŝƢƖɆŨįɆ ǘİķƢļŝİɆƋŨǂėƎɆëŝĐɆķŨǂɆƢķėLjɆëƎėɆƋŨƎƢƎëLjėĐșɆQƢɆ will then look into the welfare packages available for deployment, the methods of communication available, accommodation, recreation options and what is on offer for families back at home. ƖɆëɆŝėǂɆ¶ƎŨŨƋɆ ŨśśëŝĐėƎɆįëĉļŝİɆśLjɆǘƎƖƢɆ operational deployment on Operation TOSCA 34 (April 2021 – October 2021), I remember recalling multiple lessons from my time at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS) including how to deliver Pre-Deployment Training and multiple theories of how to use leadership to inspire soldiers on operations, both of which are incredibly important and knowledge of these lessons have served their purpose time and time again. However, upon arrival at my unit I faced many questions from soldiers including what facilities were available for them while deployed including bars, gyms and entertainment, how they could talk to their families and what their rooms would be like. This was something that I felt completely unprepared for and I found myself having to rely and draw on the knowledge and experiences of others to answer these questions. ¶ķėɆ ƎļƢļƖķɆ ƎśLjȼƖɆĐėǘŝļƢļŨŝɆŨįɆǘİķƢļŝİɆƋŨǂėƎɆļƖɆ categorised into three main elements: the physical, conceptual and moral components.1 The physical ėŒėśėŝƢȚɆȩƢķėɆśėëŝƖɆƢŨɆǘİķƢȪɆļƖɆƖŨśėƢķļŝİɆƢķėɆ British Army excels in given that it has many teams dedicated to the procurement of equipment and materiel; the Royal Electrical and Mechanic Engineers

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for the maintenance of the equipment; The Royal Logistic Corps for ensuring it is in the correct location at the right time and many more who assist. The ĉŨŝĉėƋƢƪëŒɆėŒėśėŝƢȚɆȩķŨǂɆǂėɆǘİķƢȪɆļƖɆëŒƖŨɆƖŨśėƢķļŝİɆ that as an Army we dedicate a relatively large amount of resource to. This can be seen in the vast array of doctrine that has been produced for every theatre of war or tasks that may be faced as well as independent Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to provide further guidance on these tasks. However, ƢķėɆśŨƎëŒɆĉŨśƋŨŝėŝƢȚɆȩǂķLjɆǂėɆǘİķƢȪɆļƖɆļŝĉƎėĐļĈŒLjɆ complex and personalised, which based on my recent experience, is an area that demands further resource.

Firstly, I will look at methods of communication that are available to deployed soldiers and how they have changed over the last twenty years. When seeking advice from the more senior soldiers, I would hear multiple stories of how they would be issued a weekly phone card, which allowed for a 10 to 20 minute one-way call through the on-site phone boxes. The individuals would book timeslots and when their loved one did not answer the call, they would have to go to the end of the queue and try again. Letters; the art of expressing oneself in carefully thought-out sentences and hand drawn pictures from children to be hung up on the wall, were also a key form of twoway communication in deployments during the early 2000s. With communication therefore being limited, this led to the deployed personnel forming close bonds within their departments and team bonding becoming the primary support network for immediate help. However, nowadays everyone has a mobile phone or laptop to facilitate personal communication whenever required and individuals have continued to rely on the home support network as their primary source of support and building a deployed one is secondary. Text messages and phone calls with loved ones are now only seconds away, and so long gone are the risks of having one chance per week to talk to friends and family as there is a “94% worldwide coverage for mobile phone signal”2.

WhatsApp is another popular form of communication boasting a total number of “30.1 million users in the UK”3. Within the military and civilian life group, chats and instant messaging are in a plentiful supply and they enable people to communicate rapidly to either select people or a large group. This can be seen as a positive; soldiers now have a readily available large support network in which to communicate, one which can be maintained without disruption whilst both deployed and within

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ëĐĐƎėƖƖɆƢķļƖɆĉķ댌ėŝİėɆĈLjɆǘŝĐļŝİɆëɆĈëŒëŝĉėɆĈėƢǂėėŝɆ ƎėƢëļŝļŝİɆƢķėɆǘėŒĐɆĉƎëįƢɆƖŏļŒŒɆŒėǁėŒƖɆƎėƍƪļƎėĐɆƢŨɆĉëƢėƎɆ įŨƎɆƢķėɆįƪŒŒɆƖƋėĉƢƎƪśɆŨįɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢɆǂķļŒƖƢɆƎėĉŨİŝļƖļŝİɆ that TOSCA requires special considerations. It could be argued that due to this, millennial soldiers are often viewed as being less robust and their desire to prioritise comfort over tactical practicalities, a naivety which will be a weakness as they climb the ranks.

As the British Army currently stands, the provision of accommodation on deployed operations is something we generally excel at. However, there needs to be śŨƎėɆįŨĉƪƖɆŨŝɆƢķėɆĈëƖļĉƖɆŨįɆǘėŒĐɆĉƎëįƢɆƢŨɆƋƎėƋëƎėɆįŨƎɆ any eventuality. Having the availability to create more comfortable accommodation, such as the converted shipping containers, has had a positive impact on the morale of those deployed; however, this is causing ƢķėɆ ƎļƢļƖķɆ ƎśLjɆƢŨɆŒŨƖėɆļƢƖɆƢƎëĐļƢļŨŝëŒɆǘėŒĐɆƎŨĈƪƖƢŝėƖƖɆ and team bonding opportunities. ¡ėĉƎėëƢļŨŝɆǂëƖɆƢķėɆǘŝëŒɆĈļİɆƢŨƋļĉɆQɆǂëƖɆëƖŏėĐɆ about prior to deployment. This focused on the expectation of the readily available facilities to ensure the deployed troops had things to do in their free time that included gymnasiums, common rooms and ëɆĈëƎȦśėƖƖșɆ¶ķėƎėɆǂëƖɆƢķėɆėLJƋėĉƢëƢļŨŝɆƢķëƢɆƢķėƖėɆ were already constructed for them to use rather than them coming up with ideas of how they could improvise. Again, looking back at Op HERRICK where the deployed force in FOBs would create improvised İLjśƖɆǂļƢķɆŌėƎƎLjɆĉëŝƖɆŨƎɆǂķëƢėǁėƎɆƢķėLjɆĉŨƪŒĐɆǘŝĐɆ and common rooms consisting of a few chairs surrounding a table where cards or games would be played whenever time allowed. This was a time that harnessed and encouraged a range of creativity

8 94% of the world is covered by a mobile phone signal

8 A FOB setup on Op HERRICK

Defence images

barracks. However, there are a few negatives ƢŨɆƢķėɆİƎŨƪƋɆĉķëƢƖȜɆǘƎƖƢŒLjȚɆLjŨƪɆŝėėĐɆƢŨɆķëǁėɆƢķėɆ application to be within the loop and it can mean those without the capability to have this can feel secluded. Secondly, and especially within military group chats, last minute changes can be quickly distributed, these short notice changes can cause an unnecessary rise in stress and a level of anxiety ǂķėŝɆƎėĉėļǁļŝİɆśėƖƖëİėƖșɆ¶ķėɆǘŝëŒɆŝėİëƢļǁėɆļƖɆƢķëƢɆ it has created a sense of reliance on our phones and people preferring to message each other rather than talking face-to-face. Consequently, the days of troops gathering around in a common room just talking and socialising are becoming a relic being replaced with a WhatsApp group chat whilst they are in their own rooms. Facebook is another way of communicating with those back home. This social media platform allows individuals to view and post images to a user base of “48.5 million users in the UK alone”4. Both WhatsApp and Facebook are two different methods of communication that were not available 20 years ago. The British Army has recognised this change in ways of communication and has had to adapt to facilitate this. WIFI and phone signal boosters are therefore a common sight on military camps and although each theatre has its own Personal Electronic Device (PED) policy, Virtual Private Networks ȩÔ pƖȪɆķëǁėɆĈėėŝɆǁėƎļǘėĐɆëŝĐɆƢķėļƎɆƋƪƎĉķëƖėɆĉëŝɆĈėɆ claimed back. We can therefore see that due to these adaptations and the improvement of technology that facilitates overseas communication, the morale of troops in the British Army and the connections that they are able to have with their loved ones back home has improved. However, there is now a risk that the British Army will lose its team bonding and face-toface communication opportunities to an over reliance on messaging. Those in command positions must therefore look to provide opportunities to develop their team bonding when deployed.

Accommodation was another key area that was questioned prior to our deployment on Op TOSCA 34 and again I will compare what is available now to what was used 20 years ago. Although standards of accommodation and facilities are extremely theatre dependant, the kinetic tours of 20 years ago meant that troops still had an expectation of living in hastily ĈƪļŒƢɆĉëśƋƖɆŨƎɆļŝɆǘėŒĐɆĉŨŝĐļƢļŨŝƖșɆ¶ķļƖɆļƖɆĈėƖƢɆƖėėŝɆ during the Op HERRICK tours in Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), the small size of the camp allowed an increase in team bonding and the creation of a team identity. However, given the current peacetime Army that we are living in, there has been an increase in the expectation of relative comfort levels on deployments. Op TOSCA is a unique operation. 57 years of continuous deployment has given the British contingent of the United Nations (UN) the time to adapt the accommodation to increase comfort levels.

Secondly, the UN operates under the mandate of peacekeeping and is required to minimalise all actions that could be perceived as offensive. This passive concept of operations lends itself to a more civilised form of operating. However, from witnessing the personal skills of some of the less experienced soldiers, the ability of sustaining themselves in the ǘėŒĐɆļƖɆŨįƢėŝɆĉŨŝƖļĐėƎėĐɆƖŨśėƢķļŝİɆśŨƎėɆëŏļŝɆƢŨɆëɆ ƋƪŝļƖķśėŝƢɆƎëƢķėƎɆƢķëŝɆƢķėɆĉŨśįŨƎƢëĈŒėɆǘėŒĐɆƎŨƪƢļŝėƖɆ that they really are. Commanders should be looking to

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8 GENERAL INTEREST

8 Improvised gyms were a feature on Op HERRICK

from all ranks to make the tour as comfortable and enjoyable as possible. However, given the long-term commitment to Op TOSCA meant that all these facilities were readily available and therefore we may have lost the art of inventing games or recreational facilities. Despite this, we maintained the team bonding ability over sharing games from card games to FIFA tournaments and from this, it is apparent that the morale of a deployed force has consistently been maintained by the sharing of games. The gyms and Physical Training (PT) programmes have also been altered admittedly to better increase the physical performance of troops, but it has meant it has ĈėĉŨśėɆŒėƖƖɆŨįɆëɆƋƪŝļƖķśėŝƢɆįŨƎɆƢķŨƖėɆŒėƖƖɆǘƢɆëŝĐɆ instead more of an all-inclusive session in which the whole team works together to support each other’s physical development. From this, we can see that recreation is still an area the British Army exceeds in for the maintenance of morale of those deployed. ¶ķėɆǘŝëŒɆëƎėëɆQɆǂļŒŒɆŒŨŨŏɆëƢɆļƖɆƢķėɆǂėŒįëƎėɆŨįɆƢķėɆ families that are left behind whilst their loved ones are deployed. During our regiment’s deployment, the

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ǂėŒįëƎėɆŨįǘĉėɆļŝɆƢķėɆķŨśėɆĈëƖėɆŨƎİëŝļƖėĐɆĈļȯǂėėŏŒLjɆ coffee mornings to allow the families to socialise with a unit representative who could offer support. There were also regular welfare trips organised to centres of interest (zoos, theme parks, beaches) and shopping centres. These trips allowed the families to continue living as they did before their loved ones deployed and it gave them the support to maintain their own morale. There were also regular video calls from the ŨśśëŝĐļŝİɆ{įǘĉėƎɆƢŨɆƢķėɆįëśļŒļėƖɆƪƋĐëƢļŝİɆƢķėśɆ on what was happening, allowing a forum of open questions completing the circle of communication.

It is critical for the morale of the deployed force that their families are supported and it is also imperative that those deployed are able to quickly identify if their families are struggling as this can seriously affect their own morale.

In conclusion to this overview of British Army welfare to those deployed, we can see that this is something that has been heavily resourced by the Regiment that deployed on Op TOSCA 34.

It is apparent that there have been evolutions in what is included in the welfare packages such as accommodation, communication, recreation and family support. There has been a switch of focus from primarily building team bonds for immediate moral support of those deployed, and as technology has improved, the deployed force is able to maintain its own support network with loved ones back home.

Although it could be argued that we are losing the natural team bonding from previous tours and this has caused some to view the Army’s personnel to be less robust, it has resulted in a stronger Army through an increase of morale.

Endnotes 1

ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦëƖƖėƢƖșƋƪĈŒļƖķļŝİșƖėƎǁļĉėșİŨǁșƪŏȦİŨǁėƎŝśėŝƢȦƪƋŒŨëĐƖȦ ƖLjƖƢėśȦƪƋŒŨëĐƖȦëƢƢëĉķśėŝƢȶĐëƢëȦǘŒėȦǦǦǩǬǦȦǥǣǤǤǣǨǤǬ $ ȶ ƎśLjȶ$ŨĉƢƎļŝėȶ ƎļśėƎƋĐįșƋĐįɆ 2 ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșƢķėİŒŨĈëŒėĉŨŝŨśLjșĉŨśȦƎëŝŏļŝİƖȦnŨĈļŒėȶ ŝėƢǂŨƎŏȶĉŨǁėƎëİėȦɆ 3 ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦĉLjĈėƎĉƎėǂșƪŏȦĈŒŨİȦǂķëƢƖëƋƋȯƖƢëƢļƖƢļĉƖȯ ƪŏȦȥțɯțƢėLJƢɧ¶ķėɼǥǣƢŨƢëŒɼǥǣŝƪśĈėƎɼǥǣŨįɼǥǣ monthly,internet%20users%20in%20the%20UK 4 ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșƖƢëƢļƖƢëșĉŨśȦƖƢëƢļƖƢļĉƖȦǤǣǦǣǣǨǨȦįëĉėĈŨŨŏȯ ƪƖėƎƖȯƪŝļƢėĐȯŏļŝİĐŨśȦɆ

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8 GENERAL INTEREST

¹ĈáůáüĽĈ żĈýĤŅōĽōĞƱǡ ýōńüáż ĈƿĈýżħƪĈŅĈŵŵ enhancement or a security risk?

Sgt Adam Mason ėLJëśļŝėƖɆǂķėƢķėƎɆƢķėɆƋŨƖļƢļǁėƖɆŨįɆƪƖļŝİɆŨįɆĐëƢëɆķëƎǁėƖƢļŝİɆįƎŨśɆǂėëƎëĈŒėɆ ƢėĉķŝŨŒŨİLjɆƢŨɆļśƋƎŨǁėɆƖŨŒĐļėƎƖȼɆķėëŒƢķɆëŝĐɆǘƢŝėƖƖɆŨƪƢǂėļİķɆƢķėɆƎļƖŏƖɆŨįɆƋŨƢėŝƢļëŒɆƖėĉƪƎļƢLjɆ threats from adversaries

8 Wearable technology has dramatically changed the fitness lifestyle industry

“Wearable technologyɇĉŨśƋƎļƖėƖɆ댌ɆƋƎŨĐƪĉƢƖɆ that can be worn on a user’s body to integrate computing with their daily tasks and activities. The technology includes a wide range of devices and applications that help in collecting and displaying real-time health, motion, and other sensory data.”1 Additionally, “A basic activity tracker, also known ëƖɆëɆǘƢŝėƖƖɆƢƎëĉŏėƎȚɆļƖɆëɆĐėǁļĉėɆŨƎɆëƋƋŒļĉëƢļŨŝɆįŨƎɆ śŨŝļƢŨƎļŝİɆëŝĐɆƢƎëĉŏļŝİɆǘƢŝėƖƖȯƎėŒëƢėĐɆśėƢƎļĉƖɆƖƪĉķɆ as distance walked or run and calorie consumption.

GPS (Global Positioning System) tracking is a key feature in nearly all these products. The more advanced trackers can track anything from the oxygen saturation of the user’s blood to a person’s recovery after stress or physical activity”.2 Researching, understanding and utilising new technologies has played an integral role in the development of military capabilities. The technological evolution of engineering and electronics and the improvements in communications, mobility and ISTAR have produced a dramatic change in the application of military force. The implementation of many small advancements can create large cumulative advantages, which can ultimately produce a decisive improvement in capability and operational effect – commonly referred to as a force multiplier.

Wearable technology has been in existence since the seventies with Hewlett Packard introducing the calculator wristwatch which was considered the ǘƎƖƢɆǂėëƎëĈŒėɆĐėǁļĉėɆƢŨɆķëǁėɆëɆśëƖƖɆśëƎŏėƢɆļśƋëĉƢșɆ Fitbit released in 2009, Omate Truesmart in 2010

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and Apple Watch in 2015. Skip to 2021 and Polar, Google, Whoop and Garmin to name but a few, all ĉëƎƎLjɆƢŨƋɆƖƋėĉļǘĉëƢļŨŝɆǂėëƎëĈŒėɆƢėĉķŝŨŒŨİLjɆƢķëƢɆķëƖɆ ĐƎëśëƢļĉ댌LjɆĉķëŝİėĐɆƢķėɆǘƢŝėƖƖɆŒļįėƖƢLjŒėɆļŝĐƪƖƢƎLjș3 Vailshery states that ‘The number of connected wearable devices worldwide has more than doubled in the space of three years, increasing from 325 million in 2016 to 722 million in 2019. The number of devices is forecast to reach more than one billion ĈLjɆǥǣǥǥȼșɆQŝɆÔëļŒƖķėƎLjȼƖɆĐėǘŝļƢļŨŝɆŨįɆǂėëƎëĈŒėɆ technology, he explains that ‘Personal data of the user can be monitored and measured through powerful microchips and smart sensors that are embedded within the wearable device. Connecting to additional devices using Bluetooth, Wi-Fi or a cellular network can further enhance the user experience.’4 From the data above it is safe to presume that the majority of British soldiers will have access to some form of wearable technology. As of March 2021, the British Army was trialling the use of an app similar to which combines quantitative and qualitative data to analyse performance.5 It must be noted that currently there is no policy and procedure around the “professional” use of wearables within the British Army. Linked to these personal devices are software applications such as Strava, necessary for the interpretation of the data. Strava is widely used by soldiers and encouraged within regiments to create competition and, during the Coronavirus lockdown, a sense of accountability around Physical Training (PT).

With PT posing a social distancing risk, the use of the app meant line managers could still maintain a level of ĉŨŝƢƎŨŒɆŨǁėƎɆƎėİļśėŝƢëŒɆǘƢŝėƖƖɆëŝĐɆƖŨŒĐļėƎƖɆƢķėśƖėŒǁėƖɆ could manage their own activity. The interpretation of the data that wearables produce is only as good as the education surrounding it. Many wearable users do not use them to their full capacity and this is where opportunities lie in the British military using this ƖƋėĉļǘĉɆļŝĐļǁļĐƪëŒɆĐëƢëɆƢŨɆƢķėļƎɆëĐǁëŝƢëİėșɆɆ ɆķƪİėɆƋëƎƢɆŨįɆëɆƖŨŒĐļėƎȼƖɆŒļįėɆļƖɆǘƢŝėƖƖɆëŝĐɆśƪĉķɆ can be learned from the sporting world in how to best utilise wearables to produce better athletes and in turn better soldiers. Coaches and athletes make data-driven choices to improve performance, ƎėǘŝėɆƢƎëļŝļŝİȚɆĈėƢƢėƎɆƪŝĐėƎƖƢëŝĐɆƎėƖƢɆëŝĐɆƎėĉŨİŝļƖėɆ possible illness or injury. The ability to use data to explain suboptimal performances is ‘game changing’ – athletes can adjust early and avoid burnout later.6 Professional football clubs use GPS trackers and heart rate monitors to ensure the training they conduct is exactly what each individual player

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GENERAL INTEREST 8

8 The Strava app was useful to regiments during the pandemic

needs. MBNA’s research into wearables in football explained how, “Algorithms created using the data from these sensors show the impact a player’s movements have on their physical health, energy and performance levels”. For example, by calculating the force and angle of a tackle, these algorithms can gauge – arguably more accurately than a coach’s intuition – whether a player needs to be benched to recover or prevent further injury. While reportedly using wearables, the team had one of the lowest injury levels all season and managed to keep their best players on the pitch. “It’s not just the number of injuries they experienced that’s important either, but the severity too. Despite Jamie Vardy sustaining several injuries over the course of the season, he started every Premier League game when eligible to play, compared to Manchester United’s Wayne Rooney, who missed 36%ɇof the season due to injury.”7 However, there are rising concerns over just how accurate the data provided by these algorithms ļƖɆëŝĐɆǂķėƢķėƎɆŨƎɆŝŨƢɆļƢɆļƖɆǘƢɆįŨƎɆƋƪƎƋŨƖėșɆDŨƎɆėLJëśƋŒėȚɆ many low budget devices have not got the capacity to accurately measure heart rate zones and so if an individual was to take the data verbatim then they would incorrectly adjust their training schedule. The accuracy of this information is of course based on the model and brand of the purchased technology and it is to be expected that the more the individual invests in their technology, the more accurate and understandable the information it gives.

Wearable technology is not however restricted to enhancing physical performance or protecting the health of individuals. The American company Whoop is currently testing their wearable technology on 1,000 soldiers in Alaska during a six-month study which will track daily strain and stress in order to measure the mental health of troops operating in extreme cold environments.8 The study is designed to “uncover insights that will create a blueprint for ķŨǂɆƖŨŒĐļėƎƖɆƢƎëļŝȚɆǘİķƢȚɆëŝĐɆśëŝëİėɆƖƢƎėƖƖɆļŝɆƢķėɆ most extreme military conditions.”9 This is but one example of the useful outputs of biometric data being garnered in a challenging training environment to minimise harm and improve soldier performance.

Mental Health issues and rising rates of obesity are growing trends throughout society and the military is not shielded from this. According to an article published on Forces.net using data supplied by the Ministry of Defence, there were 8,662 obese soldiers in the British Army and more than 30,000 troops were considered overweight, based on the body

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composition measure10 while an analysis of trends from 2012-2020 stated that 1 in 8 personnel in the Army have reported to a doctor for mental health reasons11. Whilst these areas will require a multidisciplinary approach to addressing them, wearable technology might be one of the potential areas where įƪƎƢķėƎɆļŝǁėƖƢśėŝƢɆĉŨƪŒĐɆĉŨŝƢƎļĈƪƢėɆƢŨɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆ improvements.

Whilst wearable technology offers a broad range of potential advantages to managing performance, minimising injuries and supporting an array of contemporary physical and mental health issues, ƢķėƎėɆëƎėɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆƖėĉƪƎļƢLjɆĉŨŝƖļĐėƎëƢļŨŝƖɆƢķëƢɆ need to be addressed before formally adopting the technologies Army wide. In 2015, the BBC reported that “China had forbidden its Armed Forces from wearing internet-connected wearable tech”. One expert quoted, “The moment a soldier puts on a ĐėǁļĉėɆƢķëƢɆĉëŝɆƎėĉŨƎĐɆķļİķȯĐėǘŝļƢļŨŝɆëƪĐļŨɆëŝĐɆ video, take photos, and process and transmit data, it’s very possible for him or her to be tracked or to reveal military secrets,”12. The People’s Liberation ƎśLjɆ$ëļŒLjȚɆƢķėɆŨįǘĉļëŒɆśŨƪƢķƋļėĉėɆŨįɆ ķļŝëȼƖɆśļŒļƢëƎLjɆ said, “The use of watches that have internet access, location information and telephone conversation functions should be considered a violation of secrecy regulations at army barracks”. They also warned against smartphones and high-tech spectacles. 13 Taking this data harvesting into consideration, would and should the British forces deem wearable technology such a risk to our organisations? The Chinese Government is at the forefront of data capture within its borders and outside; because of this, the Chinese military has recognised the potential threat to their operations and the British Armed Forces must consider that data harvesting by an adversary makes wearable technology a potential liability. We must however consider the technology available to help combat such liabilities. Corporations and private individuals are conscious of their surveillance self-defence and with messaging apps ŒļŏėɆDëĉėĈŨŨŏɆŨǂŝėĐɆÕķëƢƖ ƋƋɆĉŨśļŝİɆƪŝĐėƎɆǘƎėɆ for their data breaches, we see the rise of encrypted communications. Signal with end-to-end encryption ensures that no data is stored in ‘clouds’ and remains on the user’s hardware. 14 If the British Military was to implement similar encryption software for the data

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8 GENERAL INTEREST collated during operations and training, any security ƎļƖŏƖɆĉŨƪŒĐɆĈėɆëĐĐƎėƖƖėĐɆëŝĐɆƢķėɆĈėŝėǘƢƖɆŨįɆǂėëƎëĈŒėɆ technology realised.

In conclusion, the more data that is gathered on a soldier’s health, whether it is stress, sleep quality, strain or recovery, the more effective the military will be in addressing these issues and ultimately improving combat effectiveness. Many of the advantages offered by wearable technology however are dependent on the understanding of performance managers. As seen in the football ǂŨƎŒĐȚɆƢķėɆƖƋėĉļǘĉļƢLjɆŨįɆǂėëƎëĈŒėɆĐëƢëɆĉëŝɆĈėɆ invaluable. Soldiers are already being encouraged ƢŨɆƪƖėɆǘƢŝėƖƖɆƢƎëĉŏėƎƖɆƢķƎŨƪİķŨƪƢɆƢķėɆ ƎśLjɆĈƪƢɆ that is as far as the guidance goes. Once the soldier has a tracker, none of the data is utilised by their Chain of Command or medical staff and compared to other large professional organisations who use ƢķėɆƢėĉķŝŨŒŨİļėƖȚɆƢķėɆ ƎļƢļƖķɆ ƎśLjɆļƖɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢŒLjɆ underutilising the potential. Improved education and data harvesting could be fused and analysed by the Chain of Command and medical staff; they already meet together monthly during Unit Health Committees and timely data can only help inform command decisions and enhance wider betterment opportunities. The outcome of this could see a huge change in the mental and physical health of our soldiers; consequentially improving the retention rate of soldiers, creating better quality soldiers and a more effective work force. Every regiment experiences issues with its workforce due to sickness and injury; if access to a soldier’s wider health and well-being was available, informed management interventions could be made to prevent long term impacts that are detrimental to the readiness and performance of the ƎļƢļƖķɆ ƎśLjșɆ¶ķėƖėɆƋŨƢėŝƢļëŒɆĈėŝėǘƢƖɆƢŨɆƢķėɆśļŒļƢëƎLjɆ however come with additional risk.

Strava GPS tracks movement and publishes the location of the user and this data is accessible in the public domain. Movement patterns, routes and routines of British personnel can be understood by adversaries and the intelligence gathered may be used against them. My caveat to this would be that soldiers are already using this wearable technology - the security risk is already a live issue and therefore an approach to utilise the technologies securely is needed as a matter of urgency. The area that the Army is not exploiting is in using the data available to improve the health of its workforce; it is tolerating the risk but not taking the opportunity to harness its utility. If you were to ask a soldier about their understanding of Heart Rate Variance, SpO2, body temperature, sleep patterns and its impact on their welfare, their answer is unlikely to be an informed one. Therefore, a strong push by leadership on educating our soldiers at all levels on the data within their devices, together with an acknowledgment on how that data can be utilised, is now sorely needed.

References ķśėĐȚÕșɆȩǥǣǥǤȪȚɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșǂķŨŨƋșĉŨśȦƢķėŒŨĉŏėƎȦ ƋŨĐĉëƖƢȯǤǤǥȯƪƖȯëƎśLjȯƖƢƪĐLjȯëŒëƖŏëȯķƎǁȦɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǤǪɆ `ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮ ɆȩǥǣǤǨȪȚɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșĈĈĉșĉŨșƪŏȦŝėǂƖȦ ƢėĉķŝŨŒŨİLjȯǦǥǪǤǫǥǩǩșëśƋɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǤǪɆ`ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮ ƪƎśëŨİŒƪȚɆ©șɆ¶ƎëŌŏŨǁļŏȚɆÔșɆ¶ƪƢƪŏëŒŨȚɆ¶șdșɆÛëŒĉļŝȚɆLșɆ ëƪŒǘėŒĐȚɆ B. (2018)

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ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșƖĉļėŝĉėĐļƎėĉƢșĉŨśȦƖĉļėŝĉėȦëƎƢļĉŒėȦƋļļȦ ǬǪǫǣǤǥǫǤǤǫǤǣǫǣǣǣǤǧǥȚɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǤǪɆ`ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮ ŨLJȚɆnșɆȩǥǣǥǤȪɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșśļŒļƢëƎLjșĉŨśȦĐëļŒLjȯ ŝėǂƖȦǥǣǥǤȦǣǥȦǥǧȦƋëƎëƢƎŨŨƋėƎƖȯëŒëƖŏëȯëƎėȯǂėëƎļŝİȯ ǂƎļƖƢȯƖėŝƖŨƎƖȯƢƎëĉŏȯƢķėļƎȯƖƢƎėƖƖȯŒėǁėŒƖșķƢśŒȦëśȚɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆ ǤǪɆ`ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮ DƎëŝĉėȯ ƎėƖƖėȚɆ șɆȩǥǣǤǨȪɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșĐėįėŝƖėŝėǂƖșĉŨśȦ İŒŨĈëŒȦëƖļëȯƋëĉļǘĉȦǥǣǤǨȦǣǨȦǤǧȦĉķļŝëȯǂëƎŝƖȯƢƎŨŨƋƖȯ ëİëļŝƖƢȯǂėëƎëĈŒėȯİëĐİėƢƖȦȚɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǤǪɆ`ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮɆ {ȼDŒëķėƎƢLjȚɆbșȩǥǣǥǤȪɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșƢķėİƪëƎĐļëŝșĉŨśȦ ƢėĉķŝŨŒŨİLjȦǥǣǥǤȦŌëŝȦǥǧȦļƖȯļƢȯƢļśėȯƢŨȯŒėëǁėȯǂķëƢƖëƋƋȯ ëŝĐȯļƖȯƖļİŝëŒȯƢķėȯëŝƖǂėƎȚɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǤǪɆ`ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮ DŨƎĉėƖɆpėƢȚɆȩǥǣǤǫȪɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșįŨƎĉėƖșŝėƢȦŝėǂƖȦëŒśŨƖƢȯ one-ten-british-troops-are-clinically-obese, [Accessed 17 `ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮ n p șĉŨșƪŏȚɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșśĈŝëșĉŨșƪŏȦĈŒŨİȦǂėëƎëĈŒėȯƢėĉķȯ ƖƋŨƎƢƖșķƢśŒȚɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǤǪɆ`ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮ n{$șƪŏȚɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșëƎśLjșśŨĐșƪŏȦŝėǂƖȯëŝĐȯėǁėŝƢƖȦ ŝėǂƖȦǥǣǥǤȦǣǦȦƢƎëļŝėėȯǂėëƎëĈŒėȯƢėĉķȦȚɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǤǪɆ `ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮɆ pİȚbșɆʁɆ¡LjĈëȚ¶șɆȩǥǣǤǫȪɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșķļŝĐëǂļșĉŨśȦŌŨƪƎŝëŒƖȦ ëķĉļȦǥǣǤǫȦǩǦǤǪǨǥǧȦȚɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǤǪɆ`ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮɆ ėëŏėȚɆ`șnȚɆbėƎƎȚɆEșɆʁɆ©ƪŒŒļǁëŝȚɆ`șɆȩǥǣǤǫȪɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂș įƎŨŝƢļėƎƖļŝșŨƎİȦëƎƢļĉŒėƖȦǤǣșǦǦǫǬȦįƋķLjƖșǥǣǤǫșǣǣǪǧǦȦįƪŒŒȚɆ ȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǤǪɆ`ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮɆ UK Armed Forces Mental Health: Annual Summary & ¶ƎėŝĐƖɆ{ǁėƎɆ¶ļśėɆǥǣǣǪȦǣǫɆȱɆǥǣǤǬȦǥǣȚɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦëƖƖėƢƖș ƋƪĈŒļƖķļŝİșƖėƎǁļĉėșİŨǁșƪŏȦİŨǁėƎŝśėŝƢȦƪƋŒŨëĐƖȦƖLjƖƢėśȦ ƪƋŒŨëĐƖȦëƢƢëĉķśėŝƢȶĐëƢëȦǘŒėȦǫǬǥǧǥǩȦǥǣǥǣǣǩǤǫȶ ŝŝƪëŒȶ ¡ėƋŨƎƢȶǤǬȯǥǣȶ{șƋĐįȚɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǤǪɆ`ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮ Vailshery, L,S. (2021) ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșƖƢëƢļƖƢëșĉŨśȦƖƢëƢļƖƢļĉƖȦǧǫǪǥǬǤȦİŒŨĈëŒȯ ĉŨŝŝėĉƢėĐȯǂėëƎëĈŒėȯĐėǁļĉėƖȚɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǤǪɆ`ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮɆ

Endnotes 1

ÕėëƎëĈŒėɆ¶ėĉķŝŨŒŨİLjɆļŝɆnėĐļĉļŝėɆëŝĐɆLėëŒƢķɆ ëƎėɆȭ{ŝŒļŝėȮɆ ǁëļŒëĈŒėɆëƢɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșƖĉļėŝĉėĐļƎėĉƢșĉŨśȦƖĉļėŝĉėȦëƎƢļĉŒėȦ ƋļļȦ ǬǪǫǣǤǥǫǤǤǫǤǣǫǣǣǣǤǧǥɆȩ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǨƢķɆ{ĉƢŨĈėƎɆǥǣǥǤȪ 2 A Critical Review of Consumer Wearables, Mobile Applications, And Equipment for providing Biofeedback, monitoring stress and sleep in physically active populations ȭ{ŝŒļŝėȮɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșįƎŨŝƢļėƎƖļŝșŨƎİȦëƎƢļĉŒėƖȦǤǣșǦǦǫǬȦ įƋķLjƖșǥǣǤǫșǣǣǪǧǦȦįƪŒŒɆȩ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǬƢķɆ ƪİƪƖƢɆǥǣǥǤȪ 3 Number of connected wearable devices worldwide įƎŨśɆǥǣǤǩɆƢŨɆǥǣǥǥɆȭ{ŝŒļŝėȬɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșƖƢëƢļƖƢëșĉŨśȦ ƖƢëƢļƖƢļĉƖȦǧǫǪǥǬǤȦİŒŨĈëŒȯĉŨŝŝėĉƢėĐȯǂėëƎëĈŒėȯĐėǁļĉėƖɆ (Accessed 11th August) 4 ibid 5 ÕėëƎëĈŒėɆƢėĉķŝŨŒŨİLjɆİļǁļŝİɆƢƎëļŝėėƖɆƢķėɆǘİķƢļŝİɆėĐİėɆ ȭ{ŝŒļŝėȬɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșëƎśLjșśŨĐșƪŏȦŝėǂƖȯëŝĐȯėǁėŝƢƖȦ ŝėǂƖȦǥǣǥǤȦǣǦȦƢƎëļŝėėȯǂėëƎëĈŒėȯƢėĉķȦɆȩ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǨƢķɆ October 2021) 6 ¶ķėɆ ƪëŝƢļǘėĐɆ ƢķŒėƢėțɆ ƖƖŨĉļëƢļŨŝƖɆŨįɆÕėëƎëĈŒėƖɆįŨƎɆLļİķɆ ©ĉķŨŨŒɆ ƢķŒėƢėƖɆȭ{ŝŒļŝėȮɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșķļŝĐëǂļșĉŨśȦŌŨƪƎŝëŒƖȦ ëķĉļȦǥǣǤǫȦǩǦǤǪǨǥǧȦɆɆȩ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǤǣƢķɆ ƪİƪƖƢɆǥǣǥǤȪ 7 LŨǂɆǂėëƎëĈŒėɆƢėĉķɆļƖɆƢƎëŝƖįŨƎśļŝİɆƢėëśɆƖƋŨƎƢƖșɆȭ{ŝŒļŝėȮɆ ķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșśĈŝëșĉŨșƪŏȦĈŒŨİȦǂėëƎëĈŒėȯƢėĉķȯƖƋŨƎƢƖșķƢśŒɆ (Accessed 10th August 2021) 8 Podcast 112: Study with U.S Army looks at Alaska ©ŨŒĐļėƎƖȼɆL¡ÔɆëŝĐɆ¡ėƖļŒļėŝĉėșɆȭ{ŝŒļŝėȮɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșǂķŨŨƋș ĉŨśȦƢķėŒŨĉŏėƎȦƋŨĐĉëƖƢȯǤǤǥȯƪƖȯëƎśLjȯƖƢƪĐLjȯëŒëƖŏëȯķƎǁȦɆɆ (Accessed 12th August 2021) 9 Paratroopers in Alaska are wearing wrist sensors to track ƢķėļƎɆƖƢƎėƖƖɆŒėǁėŒƖșɆȭ{ŝŒļŝėȬɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșśļŒļƢëƎLjșĉŨśȦĐëļŒLjȯ ŝėǂƖȦǥǣǥǤȦǣǥȦǥǧȦƋëƎëƢƎŨŨƋėƎƖȯëŒëƖŏëȯëƎėȯǂėëƎļŝİȯǂƎļƖƢȯ ƖėŝƖŨƎƖȯƢƎëĉŏȯƢķėļƎȯƖƢƎėƖƖȯŒėǁėŒƖșķƢśŒȦëśƋɆȩ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǤǣƢķɆ August 2021)

THE ROYAL LOGISTICS CORPS FOUNDATION

GENERAL INTEREST 8 10 Almost one in ten British Troops are ‘Clinically Obese’ ȭ{ŝŒļŝėȮɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșįŨƎĉėƖșŝėƢȦŝėǂƖȦëŒśŨƖƢȯŨŝėȯƢėŝȯ british-troops-are-clinically-obese (Accessed 15th August 2021) 11 UK Armed Forces Mental Health: Annual Summary & ¶ƎėŝĐƖɆ{ǁėƎɆ¶ļśėɆǥǣǣǪȦǣǫɆȱɆǥǣǤǬȦǥǣșɆȭ{ŝŒļŝėȮɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦëƖƖėƢƖș ƋƪĈŒļƖķļŝİșƖėƎǁļĉėșİŨǁșƪŏȦİŨǁėƎŝśėŝƢȦƪƋŒŨëĐƖȦƖLjƖƢėśȦ ƪƋŒŨëĐƖȦëƢƢëĉķśėŝƢȶĐëƢëȦǘŒėȦǫǬǥǧǥǩȦǥǣǥǣǣǩǤǫȶ ŝŝƪëŒȶ ¡ėƋŨƎƢȶǤǬȯǥǣȶ{șƋĐįɆȩ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǤǣƢķɆ ƪİƪƖƢɆǥǣǥǤȪ 12 China imposes Smartwatch and wearable tech army ban. ȭ{ŝŒļŝėȬɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșĈĈĉșĉŨșƪŏȦŝėǂƖȦƢėĉķŝŨŒŨİLjȯǦǥǪǤǫǥǩǩș amp (Accessed 15th August 2021)

China warns troops against wearable gadgets. ȭ{ŝŒļŝėȮɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșĐėįėŝƖėŝėǂƖșĉŨśȦİŒŨĈëŒȦëƖļëȯ ƋëĉļǘĉȦǥǣǤǨȦǣǨȦǤǧȦĉķļŝëȯǂëƎŝƖȯƢƎŨŨƋƖȯëİëļŝƖƢȯǂėëƎëĈŒėȯ İëĐİėƢƖȦɆȩëĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǤǤƢķɆ ƪİƪƖƢɆǥǣǥǤȪ 14 Is it time to leave Whataspp – and is signal the answer? ȭ{ŝŒļŝėȮɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșƢķėİƪëƎĐļëŝșĉŨśȦƢėĉķŝŨŒŨİLjȦǥǣǥǤȦ ŌëŝȦǥǧȦļƖȯļƢȯƢļśėȯƢŨȯŒėëǁėȯǂķëƢƖëƋƋȯëŝĐȯļƖȯƖļİŝëŒȯƢķėȯ answer (Accessed 6th October 2021) 13

You are invited to submit an article for publication in the 2023 Review

THE ROYAL LOGISTIC CORPS FOUNDATION AND 8 OPERATIONS

T: Operation RESCRIP Reǃections on e nder’s perspectiv the Civil Authorities A Troop Comma y Aid to a providing Militar carried out during Commander operation of a new Troop learnt from an lessons can be The perspective pandemic. What during a global By 2Lt Amy Grieve national crisis?

8 2Lt Amy Grieve 4 Regiment RLC

Since its formation in April 2015, the focus of the RLC Foundation has been to promote professional engagement with industry and academia and share best practice; maintain awareness of innovation and to encourage and facilitate thought leadership.

As part of this process The RLC Foundation is inviting ŨįǘĉėƎƖȚɆƖŨŒĐļėƎƖȚɆǁėƢėƎëŝƖɆëŝĐɆĉļǁļŒļëŝƖɆǂŨƎŏļŝİɆįŨƎɆƢķėɆśļŒļƢëƎLjȚɆ or in the logistics industry and academia, to contribute thought provoking articles to the 2023 Review. The Review is the professional journal of the RLC and is distributed to members of the Corps serving at home and abroad. This includes all NATO ķėëĐƍƪëƎƢėƎƖɆëŝĐɆƢķėɆėLJĉķëŝİėɆŨįǘĉėƎƖɆĈëƖėĐɆļŝɆƢķėɆ½© Ɇ and Australia. It is also sent to all RLC Foundation corporate partners, supporters and friends.

Articles may be written under the following overarching categories: • Professional Development • Operations and Training • Historical • General Interest Cash prizes There are cash prizes for the best contribution in each category. Prizes are also awarded to: • The best contribution overall ȣɆ¶ķėɆĈėƖƢɆĉŨŝƢƎļĈƪƢļŨŝɆĈLjɆëŝɆŨįǘĉėƎ ȣɆɆɆ ėƖƢɆĉŨŝƢƎļĈƪƢļŨŝɆĈLjɆëɆǂëƎƎëŝƢɆŨįǘĉėƎɆŨƎɆ ƖėŝļŨƎɆŝŨŝȯĉŨśśļƖƖļŨŝėĐɆŨįǘĉėƎ

THE ROYAL LOGISTICS CORPS FOUNDATION

OPERATIONS AND TRAIN

TRAINING

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ING 8

REVIEW

that each hospital did have, ensuring . The NHS ventilators they cases increased in as COVID-19 usually worked had enough n from staff who team was drawn ǘrst day at Wellingto and on their the crisis), it together logistics duringBringing ǘnance recovery Headquarters key skills House (the NHS that the team lacked the became apparent plan and execute such a complex ce to d military support. and experien they requeste a task and on advice, 4 Regiment RLC deployed Within 24 hours, Squadron, including (Close Support) how we would team from 4 start planning tely and myself, to immedia Our aim was to inject logistic task. efǘciency complete the team, create into the NHS supply expertise operational agility s and ensure and in their processe nging medical with the ever-cha of two teams, to respond to . This fusion logistical demands mindsets, methods of working y created completely different languages, inevitabl and operating the outset. barriers to a confusion from potential and es communication The main differenc relationship were Close Support successful workingmilitary team had a clear der within a and . The As a Troop CommanI had always anticipated and structure responsibilities n, nt support with roles and Logistic Squadro try to impleme operations to rank structure exercises and which understand and n deploying on the NHS team, personnel who Army. Operatio d. Conversely, s of the wider ing insight the demand a period of crisis mission comman me with a fascinat ng and formed during ilities, appeared RESCRIPT provided and opportunities of supporti was ad-hoc es roles and responsibwith in a team. into the challeng with ill-deǘned I was familiar .

Aid to the ce of the the structure ‘Military importan lack civilian agencies term to the the ed of aware of ng tely highlight I was already the broad purpose This immedia rather than attempti the es (MACA)’ and as you ǘght’ support to aid Civil Authoriti The Ǚatter, less adage ‘train military crisis. a ore, providing during did however crisis. Furtherm these tasks in to re-Task Org in the NHS team during a national military United Kingdom recent events where the structured hierarchybeneǘts; it created a more s of from the better I was consciou have some obvious United Kingdom which is certainly ately 800 d parts of the environment had supporte where approxim collaborative (BBC, -Mouth crisis communities 2001 Foot-and to aid farming (MOD, personnel deployed Bridge dam crisis in 2019 Whaley ced the process, 2001) to the experien , I had never of tasks which 2019). However T s and breadth Operation RESCRIP complexity, challenge ents could create. to deploy on a ity these deploym with the opportun the United Kingdom provided me c. of the NHS and task in support COVID-19 pandemi response to the ces as a Troop Government’s my experien with the This article explores4 Regiment RLC, together within Commander throughout. of shortfall lessons I learned severe recognised a They also knew NHS (London) Greater London. of ventilators across able to receive the quantity the not region during that they were MACA tasks to sustain the the country supporting ventilators needed tial surge phase. They quickly deployed all over a team of 8 4 Regiment RLC COVID-19 exponen solution was to create tion of the best te the redistribu realised that plan and co-ordina NHS staff to FOUNDATION

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professionals from Defence, Industry and Academia for the generatio n of ideas and problem solving.

The downside of this NHS Nightinga a clear-cut understan approach is that there is not le London where ding of individual the project brought responsibilities; roles and everyone’s singular sheer size of the hence focus (BBC, 2020). goals into sharp enthusiasm, energy it was difǘcult to create and The NHS team Comparing communic drive amongst the group. were clearly an intelligent and capable team, ation styles, it teams were quite is clear the they had excellent different. Army planning and analytical skills personnel are used to working but would normally in fast-paced plan that would work to a clear environments communicating be set where the right informatio and followed through at the beginning of a project at the expedient n, in the right way, to completio time, is crucial changeable environme n. The complex – leading to the of acronyms and and nt we were working use valuing brevity. this model could So much so that in meant have Joint Services not work and we Publication 101 a plan Ǚexible throughou had to be on this style of to guide people t the task to allow communication; of new informatio for the injection most organisat do not go to these n - something ions lengths. I noted the military is to, but civilians this style of communic early on that using used are not and this is one of the reasons ation in a civilian the NHS requested was disengagi environment our help. Again, ng and isolating, of the adage ‘no this reminded leading becoming upset, me plan ultimately damaging to people enemy’ – COVID-19 survives ǘrst contact with and diminishin relationships the in this instance. g the overall output Our main role NHS have a far of the team. The was TA3E more personal (Train, Advise, Accompany, Equip) and less structured Assist, approach to communic actions. Speciǘ ating, this was and accompan cally, to assist an uncertain time reassuring in y, where we needed but also wasted and guide the to reassure, aid common working time; NHS team, as language somewhe ǘnding a well as equip them with the correct these two styles re in between tools and personnel was essential. using military for the job. Not Psychologist Bruce language was key and making Tuckman produced to listen and gently in 1965 deǘning time a model guide rather than the main stages control was extremely take absolute of developing forming a team important. We and of people. Formation good working developed a four easily recogniza usually follows relationship and built credibility trust through ǘ storming, norming, ble stages, known as: "forming, and nding common and performin ground and discussing and comparin g” (Tuckman, 1965).

Our teams needed g their issues, for example managing to perform within ventilator and because the ǘ hours of meeting ancillaries is remarkab rst set of ventilator managing vehicles ly similar to s needed to be delivered within and Complete 48 hours of the The team was Equipment Scales.

Squadron’s receipt of the task. Above, further challenge I discussed the d when of the task, social in the team’s dynamics main difference distancing requireme on day three s . These difference all communication nts meant that challenge in the s posed a now had to be ‘forming’ and remote.

The ‘storming’ stage product of this working together. planning and of They were quickly was the creation team building emotional intelligenc addressed with of a fast-movi e from both sides, ng network covering Greater London these stages to allowing the NHS be greatly accelerate allowing ventilators or or accelerating d. Skipping other vital medical to rapidly move these well-know supplies as soon as they became n stages normally produces a poor available. 55 sites team dynamic 10 Pantech vehicles were visited by or poor output, though in our and 20 drivers, case it was not day seeing 104 with the busiest an option to give time conventio ventilators delivered the nally required. period. After gaining over a 24-hour It was clear that is a galvanisin an appreciation if there g force role, I spent time of the planning collaboration becomesto motivate people (COVID-1 on the ground 9), co-ordina easier; drop off and pickup this reminded ting the why we try to of vital medical me articulate ventilators, seeing supplies and actions. This approach a unifying purpose in our ǘrst-hand the was especially immediate positive effect the intense evident at the planning and team building the front-line NHS had on staff at the sites we delivered to.

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8 The British Army and RLC personnel were deployed to help with the Whaley Bridge dam crisis in 2019

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ȣɆ ėƖƢɆĉŨŝƢƎļĈƪƢļŨŝɆĈLjɆëɆŌƪŝļŨƎɆŝŨŝȯĉŨśśļƖƖļŨŝėĐɆŨįǘĉėƎ ȣɆ ėƖƢɆĉŨŝƢƎļĈƪƢļŨŝɆĈLjɆëɆŌƪŝļŨƎɆŨįǘĉėƎɆ • Best contribution by a private soldier • Best contribution by a civilian Rules Articles must not exceed 5,000 words and must be properly referenced and supported with good quality copyright permissioned illustrations and images. Reuse licence details must be stated.

All articles submitted for publication will be read and marked ĈLjɆƢķėɆƖėŝļŨƎɆŨįǘĉėƎƖɆƢķëƢɆśëŏėɆƪƋɆƢķėɆ¡d ɆDŨƪŝĐëƢļŨŝɆ¡ėǁļėǂɆ board. The prize winners will then be selected from the articles they judge as good enough for publication.

8 The closing date for submissions for the 2023 Review is 16th September 2022 Entries are open now and submissions should be sent to Chrissie Ross at: therlcfoundation@gmail.com

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Industry 4.0 and the military Supply Chain: ýōŅýĈŬżƁἠůĈǃĈýżħōŅ

Vignette Captain Amy Walters began her slow walk towards the Regimental Headquarters. Looking around, she surveyed the forested landscape of the Baltic as she entered the warehouse complex taken over to support the sustainment operations for the Force.

Since the hurried deployment of the Brigade from the UK, she had adopted a management by walk around ƢŨɆƖƢëƎƢɆķėƎɆĐëLjșɆ ƖɆƢķėɆ{ƋėƎëƢļŨŝƖɆ{įǘĉėƎɆįŨƎɆƢķėɆ Regiment, she was very conscious of continuously managing the Regiment sustainment operations to įƪŒǘŒɆƢķėɆŝėėĐƖɆŨįɆƢķėɆ ƎļİëĐėșɆ¶ķļŝŏļŝİɆĈëĉŏɆƢŨɆķėƎɆ logistics degree studies, she recalled the phrase, which she had adopted as her own, ‘what you can see you can manage’.

Amy began to consider her daily routine, and as ǂļƢķɆ댌ɆİŨŨĐɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉļëŝƖɆƖķėɆĈėİëŝɆƢŨɆƎėǙėĉƢɆŨŝɆƢķėɆ ĐėśëŝĐɆƢķëƢɆƖķėɆǂŨƪŒĐɆķëǁėɆƢŨɆįƪŒǘŒșɆ śLjɆķėëĐėĐɆ off to discuss this with the Digital Troop Leader.

While it was possible to do this remotely, she still believed strongly in the face-to-face contact needed to manage - a lesson learned from working from home during the pandemic of 2020. The Digital Troop, commanded by David Smith, acted as the focus for the collation of information from across the Defence Support Network. On seeing Amy, David İŨƢɆƖƢƎëļİķƢɆĐŨǂŝɆƢŨɆĈƪƖļŝėƖƖɆëŝĐɆƎėǙėĉƢėĐɆŨŝɆƢķėɆ current demand picture. David began by considering the Active Demand Dashboard. The dashboard offered a live cumulative picture of each platform based within the Brigade. The vehicle embedded life support systems captured the status of each vehicle and delivered the data to the dashboard. Building on the principles of the Internet of Things, each platform was linked by the Brigade 5G network to the newly created Sustainment Enterprise Resource Planning Suite (SERPS). This gave insight across the Brigade to the status of each vehicle. David’s liaison with

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Equipment Support (ES) enabled him to identify the vehicle health status and begin proactive planning to have the resources in place to support vehicle maintenance and preventative actions. His liaison with ES, the data from the health monitoring systems and the view of the sustainment inventory across the Brigade allowed him to quickly put in place the required spares support through ƎƢļǘĉļëŒɆQŝƢėŒŒļİėŝƢ decision-making. śLjɆļĐėŝƢļǘėĐɆƢķėɆİƎŨǂļŝİɆƢƎėŝĐɆįŨƎɆƢķėɆ ƎļİëĐėȼƖɆ ŝėėĐɆįŨƎɆǁėķļĉŒėɆǘŒƢėƎƖɆƢŨɆĐėëŒɆǂļƢķɆƢķėɆƖëŝĐLjɆƖƪśśėƎɆ ĉŨŝĐļƢļŨŝƖșɆ$ëǁļĐɆĉŨŝǘƎśėĐɆƢķļƖɆƢƎėŝĐɆëŝĐɆĐļƖĉƪƖƖėĐɆ his upcoming planning meeting with the Production Troop Leader to increase their availability.

In support of the deterrent objective of the Brigade, ŒļǁėɆǘƎļŝİɆķëĐɆĈėĉŨśėɆëɆĉŨśśŨŝɆëĉƢļǁļƢLjɆëŝĐɆƢķėɆ Brigade Commander was becoming very conscious of the need to balance ammunition stock available for training with the need to have stock immediately

Credit: Author

¶ķļƖɆƋëƋėƎɆƖƢëƎƢƖɆǂļƢķɆëɆǘĉƢļŨŝëŒɆŝëƎƎëƢļǁėɆŨįɆ a near future military sustainment operation.

The narrative offers insight into the application ŨįɆQŝĐƪƖƢƎLjɆǧșǣɆƢėĉķŝļƍƪėƖɆƢŨɆƢķėɆįƪƢƪƎėɆśļŒļƢëƎLjɆ supply chain and The RLC. Industry 4.0 is seen as the fourth industrial revolution. It embeds the role of digitalization into the economy through the fusion of the physical and digital worlds. Image 1 shows the key technologies in Industry 4.0 and Image 2 represents the building blocks within industry 4.0 and the interaction with an expeditionary digital supply chain.

Credit: Shutterstock

In this article, Mr Tony ClarkɆëļśƖɆƢŨɆİėŝėƎëƢėɆĐėĈëƢėɆëƎŨƪŝĐɆƢķėɆƎŨŒėɆŨįɆķŨǂɆƢėĉķŝŨŒŨİLjɆĉëŝɆĈėɆ ėśƋŒŨLjėĐɆƢŨɆśëŝëİėɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉƖɆĉëƋëĈļŒļƢļėƖɆƢŨɆƖƪƖƢëļŝɆśļŒļƢëƎLjɆŨƋėƎëƢļŨŝƖɆǂķļŒƖƢɆĉķ댌ėŝİļŝİɆƢķėɆǁļėǂɆ ƢķëƢɆƢėĉķŝŨŒŨİLjɆǂļŒŒɆŨįįėƎɆëɆƋëŝëĉėëɆƢŨɆǘLJɆ댌ɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉɆƋƎŨĈŒėśƖɆëŝĐɆëƎİƪļŝİɆƢķėɆŝėėĐɆƢŨɆĐėǁėŒŨƋɆƢķėɆ logistical processes through the principle of disruption applied through technology

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8 GENERAL INTEREST available to support any future kinetic activity. Amy considered how her role had become much more platform centric and aligned to delivering the military capability. Thinking back to the Troop Commanders’ Course, she remembered the importance of developing a view of being able to ‘feed’ and maintain the platform as the focus of the Sustainment Regiment. She was pleased that the implementation of sensors across the platforms to monitor the loads had been implemented. This offered her the chance to view the status of the resources needed to enable platform capability. Thinking of the Brigade Commander’s wishes, she made a mental note of the stock state of the main armament ammunition.

It was clear that Armoured Regiment’s A squadron was in the green with a healthy local reserve while C squadron was moving into the amber warning as it ĉŨśƋŒėƢėĐɆļƢƖɆŒļǁėɆǘƎėɆƢƎëļŝļŝİșɆ Thanking David, she moved forward to Production Troop. On arrival she met Tim Braithwaite. Tim was new to the Regiment and was part of the Whole Force Approach having been deployed from his normal role within the ammunition manufacturing sector in the UK. Amy began to quiz him about the role of the Additive Manufacturing Section and the ǘŒƢėƎƖșɆ¶ļśɆǂëƖɆëĈŒėɆƢŨɆƋŨƖļƢļǁėŒLjɆƎėƖƋŨŝĐɆĈLjɆƖëLjļŝİɆ he had moved their printing higher up the priority list and had discussed numbers and distribution with Data Troop. Tim opened his own dashboard from the SERPS. He explained the data that had been moved from the demand signal and into his own production ƎŨŒėɆëŝĐɆķŨǂɆķėɆķëĐɆĉŨŝǘİƪƎėĐɆƢķėɆƖƪļƢėɆŨįɆǦȯ$Ɇ printers to produce the required numbers and types.

He then managed to pre-empt Amy‘s enquiry about ammunition by linking the dashboard to the Factory in a Box deployed alongside the 3-D printers. Tim was very proud of the compact production suite that had been produced in the 20-foot containers that enabled him to produce elements of inventory as required locally. These localised production facilities mounted on autonomous vehicles enabled the sustainment of key resources through production at the local level. While not offering the volume of a traditional factory, its continuous output and ability ƢŨɆǙėLJļĈŒLjɆĉķëŝİėɆƢŨɆĐļįįėƎėŝƢɆƋƎŨĐƪĉƢļŨŝɆŒļŝėƖɆǂëƖɆ a useful stopgap in producing urgently required resources vastly reducing lead time, warehousing and inventory. Production Troop had managed to bring to fruition much of the aspirations of just-in-time logistics by production at a local level to meet actual local demand shared through the platform health monitoring systems and the SERPS. Amy was clearly impressed, however, she noted the anxious look on Tim‘s face and questioned him.

Tim explained that both elements of the Production Troop still needed raw materials to support printing and manufacturing. Tim was conscious that the long traditional supply chain of moving raw materials and printing medium forward was still in place but was being inhibited as the supply chain was established.

Tim began to explain and justify his aspiration to move to the local contracting App for stores. Using the title adopted by Production Troop he explained how ‘Uber Stores’ would enable him to set contracts locally through the App and allow provision of the required raw material and medium. While not quite Uber Eats, the colloquial naming of the local

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contracting App had taken hold and come become synonymous with the ability for the Production Troop to engage the local economy in localised contracts through the concept of the gig economy. Amy acknowledged that this might be a requirement and decided to make her next stop Contracts Troop.

Amy, was particularly keen to stop by Contract Troop. In her time in the Service she had seen the rise of the role of enabling contracts both at the local organisational and theatre levels in the deployed area. She recognised the growing importance of the Whole Force Approach and the need to integrate contractors into the planning and deployment cycles.

Having experienced many contractual challenges while on exercises across the world, she was very keen for Contract Troop to take some of the ‘heavy lifting’ away from the Regiment. On entering, she saw Helen Smith - a recent graduate of the new Troop Commanders’ Course which had adopted a technology-focused approach for the management of contracts. The use of the App enabled Contract Troop ƢŨɆƋŒëĉėɆĐėśëŝĐƖɆŨŝŒļŝėɆǂķļĉķɆǂėƎėɆƢķėŝɆįƪŒǘŒŒėĐșɆ Experience and practice through the host nation and the rollout of the App through NATO provisioning had ėŝëĈŒėĐɆƖėĉƪƎļƢLjɆëŝĐɆƖƋėĉļǘĉëƢļŨŝɆĉŨŝĉėƎŝƖɆƢŨɆĈėɆ addressed. This had been achieved by the roll out of Blockchain as a means to set smart contracts and to act as a key mechanism to ensure quality assurance.

Helen was discussing with the Troop Commander from Drone Troop, Jerome Katemba, the possibility of sending arial drones to the local host nation pickup point to collect the printer medium for Production Troop. Clearly the digital links across the Regiment and the Brigade were being exploited to offer the instant vision of the current supply chain situation.

Amy jumped into the conversation quickly to request that Contract Troop use the App to seek local transport to deliver the print medium from the host nation pick up point by requesting the use of ‘Uber Trucks’ to do the job.

Amy then walked the Drone Troop Commander to the Regimental transport hub. Amy was keen to engage with Alison Weir, Vehicle Troop Commander, to discuss current and upcoming distribution channel operations. Amy was keen to utilise both Drone ëŝĐɆÔėķļĉŒėɆ¶ƎŨŨƋƖɆƢŨɆśëLJļśļƖėɆƢķėļƎɆėįǘĉļėŝĉļėƖɆ and effectiveness. Amy requested that Jerome and his drones began preparing for speedy delivery of ammunition from Production Troop straight through to the C squadron hub. This took full advantage of the ǙėLJļĈļŒļƢLjɆŨįįėƎėĐɆĈLjɆŨśŝļȯĉķëŝŝėŒɆĐļƖƢƎļĈƪƢļŨŝɆĈƪƢɆļŝɆ particular the agility offered by the drones in reacting quickly to pick up and deliver at precise locations.

This had the advantage of addressing the brigadier’s concerns for swift action.

She looked for Alison and her Vehicle Troop to deliver the more routine nonurgent inventory like the ǘŒƢėƎƖȚɆǂļƢķɆëɆįŨĉƪƖɆŨŝɆėĉŨŝŨśļėƖɆŨįɆƖĉëŒėɆëŝĐɆėįįŨƎƢșɆ Alison was very positive about this opportunity as she was still keen to practice her Troop with the leader and follower vehicle solution. This had enabled vehicle Troop to half the number of Drivers with the ƖėĉŨŝĐɆǁėķļĉŒėƖɆļŝƢėŒŒļİėŝƢŒLjɆįŨŒŒŨǂļŝİɆƢķėɆǘƎƖƢɆƖŨŒĐļėƎɆ driven vehicle. The vehicle leader and follower role ķëĐɆĈėĉŨśėɆǂėŒŒȯƋƎŨǁėŝɆǂļƢķļŝɆǘLJėĐɆļŝįƎëƖƢƎƪĉƢƪƎėɆ but was still new to the tracks and trails she would exploit within the Brigade area.

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GENERAL INTEREST 8 also knew that as the Brigade looked towards kinetic activity the emphasis on her supply chain would śŨǁėɆįƎŨśɆėįǘĉļėŝĉLjɆƢķƎŨƪİķɆƢŨɆëƖƖƪƎėĐɆĐėŒļǁėƎLjșɆ She would be ready, and with the Regiment have the resources in place to support the Brigade to uphold the Corps moto of We Sustain.

Amy returned to full consciousness, sighed ëŝĐɆƎėƢƪƎŝėĐɆƢŨɆƢķėɆ©ƢëįįɆ{įǘĉėƎƖȼɆLëŝĐĈŨŨŏȚɆķėƎɆ inventory management tool, her pen, the laptop spreadsheet she had created and the sustainment plan to try to work out what the actual demand was İŨļŝİɆƢŨɆĈėɆëŝĐɆķŨǂɆƖķėɆǂŨƪŒĐɆįƪŒǘŒɆļƢș

Credit: Shutterstock

©ëƢļƖǘėĐɆǂļƢķɆķėƎɆśëŝëİėśėŝƢɆǂëŒŏɆëƎŨƪŝĐȚɆ śLjɆƎėƢƪƎŝėĐɆƢŨɆķėƎɆŨǂŝɆĐėƋŒŨLjėĐɆŨįǘĉėɆǂļƢķļŝɆƢķėɆ Regimental Headquarters. On entering, she noticed her operation Sergeant, Joe Smith, patiently talking ƢķƎŨƪİķɆǂļƢķɆƢķėɆǘƎƖƢɆ ëƢƢëŒļŨŝɆ ƪëƎƢėƎśëƖƢėƎɆëĈŨƪƢɆ the use of augmented reality goggles. These were being used to scan recent damage to an armoured vehicle. Joe explained that the goggles would enable mechanics to identify the actual spares requirements of the damage once the goggles’ view was scanned over the vehicle damage. Joe assured the Battalion Quartermaster that the augmented reality would identify all the component parts that were needed and send an automated demand through the SERPS, via Data Troop and onto ES. It was explained that all demands for the spares would be placed immediately and the SERPS would make sure all spares were delivered in a timely manner.

8 Augmented Reality Googles

Amy and Joe then changed their focus to future operations. Amy, through the Regimental and ƎļİëĐėɆĈƎļėǘŝİȚɆķëĐɆĈėėŝɆśëĐėɆëǂëƎėɆŨįɆƢķėɆ commander’s intentions for future operations through the digital twin of the Brigade sustainment plan.

The digital twin offered an online replication of the Brigade sustainment infrastructure. Embedded into each entity within the Brigade were data collection points that offered a real-time view of the current sustainment position within the Brigade and the Sustainment Regiment. These digital images were useful to match to Amy’s aspiration to be able to view all the supply chain so she could manage it. The ĐļİļƢëŒɆƢǂļŝɆĉŨŝĉėƋƢȚɆĈëƖėĐɆŨŝɆëƎƢļǘĉļëŒɆļŝƢėŒŒļİėŝĉėȚɆ big data and analytical tools, enabled the digital ƢǂļŝɆƢŨɆĈėɆĉŨŝǘİƪƎėĐɆƢŨɆśėėƢɆŝėǂɆƎėƍƪļƎėśėŝƢƖșɆ This enabled a modelling exercise to take place that created the optimum solution for the sustainment of the Brigade. The digital twin concept, new into service, offered a combination of modelling, real-time information and aspirations to allow planners to seek ƢķėɆƎėƍƪļƎėĐɆĉŨŝǘİƪƎëƢļŨŝșɆÕķëƢɆ śLjɆƋëƎƢļĉƪŒëƎŒLjɆ liked about the role of digital twin was the digital ǘŒƢėƎƖɆƢķëƢɆƖķėɆĉŨƪŒĐɆëƋƋŒLjɆƢŨɆĉķëŝİėɆƢķėɆėśƋķëƖļƖɆ įŨƎɆƢķėɆĐļİļƢëŒɆƋŒëŝɆśŨǁļŝİɆįƎŨśɆėįǘĉļėŝĉLjɆƢķƎŨƪİķɆ to effectiveness as required by the situation. For her, this offered the culmination of the creation of the omni-channel distribution and matching the best supply chain strategy to the required situation. She knew that while the Brigade was still in the deterrent ƋķëƖėȚɆśƪĉķɆįŨĉƪƖɆǂļŒŒɆĈėɆƋŒëĉėĐɆŨŝɆėįǘĉļėŝĉLjșɆ©ķėɆ

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Review Clearly the vignette above is designed to offer a conceptual view of the potential future of military logistic operations (Hurley et al, 2018) based on the visualisation of Industry 4.0 (Moufaddal et al., 2019).

The aim of this article is to offer a starting point for a debate within the military logistics community, not of the technology that is available, but its application and potential use within the military supply chain.

The above vignette draws on the underpinning concepts being created within industry (Team Defence Information, 2021), academia (Koot et al, 2021) and the military transformation process. While ƢķėɆƢƎëŝƖëĉƢļŨŝƖɆëĈŨǁėɆëƎėɆǘĉƢļŨŝëŒȚɆƢķėɆƪŝĐėƎƋļŝŝļŝİɆ concepts that they are based on are factual and ƎėǙėĉƢɆƢķėɆëƋƋŒļĉëƢļŨŝɆŨįɆƢėĉķŝŨŒŨİLjɆƢŨɆƢķėɆƎŨŒėɆŨįɆƢķėɆ future supply chain. What this paper hopes to achieve is to articulate the links between industry, academia and its application to the sustainment of the military capability within the deployed expeditionary concept.

Cyber Security ¶ķėɆǘƎƖƢɆŒļŝŏɆǂļŒŒɆƎėǁŨŒǁėɆëƎŨƪŝĐɆƢķėɆƖķëƎļŝİɆ of data and security. Clearly, like its industrial colleagues, the security of information is vital. The role of digital security and cyber protection from exploitation and disruption needs to be embedded into the future (Tunc and Aslan, 2021). Embedding security measures both within the system and the 5G communications network can be seen as a priority and therefore accepted as a pillar for the deployment of industry 4.0 techniques (Ghadge et al., 2020). However, a historical perspective would remind us that supply chains have always offered a military target (Thompson, 1998; Van Creveld, 2007; Privratsky, 2014; Black, 2021). While the weapons being deployed against the digital supply chain are different, the underpinning concepts of defending the supply chain remain.

Management The nature of logistics and supply chain management embraces an integrated approach to the delivery of inventory and service to a customer. This integrated approach combines entities across the distribution network into a single enterprise (Van Hoek, et al, 2020; Chopra and Meindl, 2015). As Christopher (2016) argues, the underlying principle is to be able to match supply with demand. While a relatively simple phrase, the ability to capture the actual demand from the customers and then service this demand through the distribution network offers complexity through the dynamic interaction of the transactions embedded into the movement of the goods and services.

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,įǘĉļėŝĉLjɆëŝĐɆ,įįėĉƢļǁėŝėƖƖɆ ¶ķėɆĉŨŝƢƎëĐļĉƢļŨŝɆŨįɆƢķėɆĐƎļǁėɆįŨƎɆėįǘĉļėŝĉLjɆëŝĐɆ effectiveness underpins much of the challenges that the military supply chain faces (Smith, 2018; Kress, 2016). Returning to the vignette and Industry 4.0, we see the role of Additive Manufacturing and Robotics being embedded into 3D printing and the Factory in a Box concept. In principle, the sharing of data immediately from the demand signal when transmitted to Production Troop enables instant İƎëƢļǘĉëƢļŨŝɆŨįɆƢķėɆĐėśëŝĐɆƢķƎŨƪİķɆŒŨĉëŒļƖėĐɆ production (Meier, 2020). This creates the true Just in Time model. Clearly, this offers many challenges.

DŨƎɆėLJëśƋŒėȚɆƢķėɆǘŒƢėƎƖɆǂļƢķļŝɆƢķėɆŝëƎƎëƢļǁėɆƖƢŨƎLjɆ can be seen as relatively benign objects which can be printed with little risk. The creation of munitions is clearly more complex and therefore demands more rigorous governance and quality assurance.

While not addressing the governance and quality assurance fully, the concepts of the Contract Troop and the embedding of the “Uber App” across NATO provision offers some mitigation to the risk of quality assurance. Clearly, the assurance of the raw material,

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perhaps at different levels for different commodities, is an important aspect to be dealt with to support the Just in Time production.

Digital twins As Amy considers the future sustainment plan, she draws on the concept of digital twins (Ivanov and Dolgui, 2021). This is the embedding of data collection points at different levels within the entities creating the supply chain network. For example, this might be embedded into the platforms themselves, the vehicles carrying out the distribution, the inventory location sites and the SERPS. Within the vignette, we also see the use of Augmented Reality to create a repair cycle and inventory demand to repair an armoured vehicle. These data collection points create a real time image of the supply chain ecosystem. A digital twin not only creates the chance to visualise, in real time, the current situation across the ecosystem, it also creates a separate digital simulation of the supply chain. This allows for modelling and manipulation of the digital simulation through different contingencies and with the help of ƎƢļǘĉļëŒɆQŝƢėŒŒļİėŝĉėɆļĐėŝƢļǘėƖɆƢķėɆĈėƖƢɆŝėƢǂŨƎŏɆ ĉŨŝǘİƪƎëƢļŨŝɆƢŨɆƖƪƋƋŨƎƢɆƢķėɆĐėŒļǁėƎLjɆŨįɆƢķėɆƎėƍƪļƎėĐɆ military effect.

The Cognitive Logistician Perhaps a key theme to consider in the use of technology within the military supply chain of the future is the role of the logistician. Across the vignette and the debate that has followed, there are clear points for decision making. It is the individual logistician and their behaviours, attitudes and problem-solving abilities which may act as the competitive factor (Kress, 2016). Technology can be seen as an enabling tool. The friction within military sustainment activities may always call upon the logistician to use technology to arm them with the information to apply their cognitive skills to resolve problems. This creates a supply chain based on adhocracy (Mintzberg, 1989; Morgan, 2006). This is the combination of being able to respond to an ad hoc response within the bureaucracy, doctrine and processes of the military supply chain.

Conclusion The aspiration of this article is to generate a debate about the use of technology as a tool to enable the

Credit: Shutterstock

Adopting Captain Amy’s thought of ‘what you can see you can manage’ is an important underlying concept to the role and challenges of integration within the supply chain (Koot et al, 2021). Simply, if a supply chain manager has visibility of the demand, the inventory within the supply chain, its location and the resources available to move the inventory, then ƢķėɆĐėśëŝĐɆĉëŝɆĈėɆįƪŒǘŒŒėĐɆȩDļİƪƎėɆǥȪșɆ¶ķļƖɆƖļśƋŒļǘėĐɆ version can be challenged from many positions.

However, underpinning much of the debate is the ability to capture a view of the current position within the supply chain (Koot et alȚɆǥǣǥǤȪșɆDŨƎɆƢķļƖɆǘĉƢļŨŝëŒɆ vignette the embedding of monitoring systems within vehicles to capture both their health and the inventory is the starting point to identify the actual demand being placed on the supply chain. ¶ķļƖɆŨįįėƎƖɆƢķėɆǘƎƖƢɆƖƢėƋƋļŝİɆƖƢŨŝėɆļŝɆƢķėɆƎŨŒėɆ of connectivity. In the example, 5G is used as the network to be able to transmit the data into a Management Information System. This is the underpinning concept of the Sustainment Enterprise Resource Planning Suite within the vignette. This position from an Industry 4.0 perspective is the role of connectivity through Horizontal and Vertical Integration. For example, the platform being able to communicate to the SERPS and then onwards to the entities embedded into the supply chain. This is based on the analytical power of ƎƢļǘĉļëŒɆQŝƢėŒŒļİėŝĉė and Big Data. There are also strong links to the role of the Internet of Things where objects are given the ability to become smart as they share data on their current status (Queiroz et al, 2021; Ghadge et al, 2020). Such data and management information is stored and manipulated within the Cloud Computing environment creating management information for the SERPS which in turn offers individualised dashboards for particular logistics roles. Within the vignette, these are the dashboards of the Troop Commanders. It is these dashboards which offer the visibility for the managers to make their informed decisions about how ƢŨɆĉŨŝǘİƪƎėɆƢķėɆƖƪƋƋŒLjɆĉķëļŝɆëŝĐɆļƢƖɆėŝƢļƢļėƖɆƢŨɆśėėƢɆ ƢķėɆëĉƢƪëŒɆĐėśëŝĐɆļĐėŝƢļǘėĐɆȩ ƪėļƎŨǒɆet al, 2021, Koot et al. 2021; Ghadge et al, 2020).

8 A digital twin is a virtual representation that serves as the real-time digital counterpart of a physical object or process

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GENERAL INTEREST 8 logistician to manage the supply chain. In doing so it ķëƖɆŨƪƢŒļŝėĐɆëɆǘĉƢļŨŝëŒɆĉëƖėɆƖƢƪĐLjɆëŝĐɆŒļŝŏėĐɆĈƎļėǙLjɆ to underpinning concepts and ideas. Technology ǂļŒŒɆĈėɆëɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆėŝëĈŒėƎɆŨįɆƢķėɆśëŝëİėśėŝƢɆŨįɆ supply chains in the future (Queiroz et al, 2021, Koot et al, 2021; Ghadge et al, 2020), however it will not be a panacea to address every issue imposed on the śļŒļƢëƎLjɆƖƪƋƋŒLjɆĉķëļŝșɆ¡ėëĐėƎƖɆëƎėɆëƖŏėĐɆƢŨɆƎėǙėĉƢɆ on the vignette and the concepts of Industry 4.0 and to challenge them against their own beliefs and experiences of the military supply chain. It is only by challenging the academic position through the prism of application to the military supply chain will the future military logistician be able to use technology as an enabling tool to deliver logistics capability that ensures the required military effect.

Readers are invited to look out for a future University of Lincoln and Team Defence event which will debate the above position and concepts.

References ŒëĉŏȚɆ`șɆȩǥǣǥǤȪșɇdŨİļƖƢļĉƖɆ¶ķėɆbėLjɆƢŨɆÔļĉƢŨƎLjșɇBarnsley, Pen and Sword. ķŨƋƎëȚɆ©șɆëŝĐɆnėļŝĐŒȚɆ șɆȩǥǣǤǨȪɇSupply chain management: ƖƢƎëƢėİLjȚɆƋŒëŝŝļŝİȚɆëŝĐɆŨƋėƎëƢļŨŝșɇSixth edition, Global edition edn. Boston, Pearson.

Christopher, M. (2016) Logistics & supply chain śëŝëİėśėŝƢșɇFifth edition. Harlow, Pearson Education.

Ghadge, A., Kara, M.E., Moradlou, H. and Goswami, M. (2020) The impact of Industry 4.0 implementation on ƖƪƋƋŒLjɆĉķëļŝƖȚɇJournal of Manufacturing Technology nëŝëİėśėŝƢȚɇ31(4), pp. 669-686.

Gligor, D. Gligor, N. Holcomb, M and Bozkurt, S. (2019) Distinguishing between the concepts of supply chain agility and resilience: A multidisciplinary ŒļƢėƎëƢƪƎėɆƎėǁļėǂșɇInternational Journal of Logistics nëŝëİėśėŝƢȚɇ30(2), pp. 467-487.

Hurley, P. Fogg, D. and Jeakle, R. (2018) The Future of Sustainment: A Vision of What’s Possible and How to Get There. In: Beurskens, K. (2018) The Long Haul, Kansas, Army University Press publications, pp.199 – 204.

Koot, M., Mes, M. R. K. and Iacob, M. E. (2021) A systematic literature review of supply chain decision making supported by the Internet of Things and Big Data AnalyticsȚɇ ŨśƋƪƢėƎƖɆʁɆQŝĐƪƖƢƎļëŒɆ,ŝİļŝėėƎļŝİȚɆƋșǤǨǧșɆĐŨļțɆ ǤǣșǤǣǤǩȦŌșĉļėșǥǣǥǣșǤǣǪǣǪǩș

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Kress, M. (2016). Second Operational Logistics: The Art and Science of Sustaining Military Operations edition edn.

Monterey, Springer.

Meier, K. (2020) Additive manufacturing – driving massive ĐļƖƎƪƋƢļǁėɆĉķëŝİėɆļŝɆƖƪƋƋŒLjɆĉķëļŝɆśëŝëİėśėŝƢȚɇJournal of Work-Applied Management, 12(2), pp. 221–231. doi: ǤǣșǤǤǣǫȦ`Õ nȯǣǨȯǥǣǥǣȯǣǣǥǧș Mintzberg, H. (1989) Mintzberg on Management, Free Press, New York.

Morgan, G. (2006). Images of an Organisation, Sage Publications, London.

Moufaddal, M. Benghabrit, A. and Boudhaddou, I. (2019) Industry 4.0: A roadmap to digital Supply ChainsȚɇǥǣǤǬɆ 1st International Conference on Smart Systems and Data Science (ICSSD), Smart Systems and Data Science (ICSSD), 2019 1st International Conference on, pp. 1–9. ĐŨļțɆǤǣșǤǤǣǬȦQ ©©$ǧǪǬǫǥșǥǣǤǬșǬǣǣǥǪǨǤ ëİŨŝļƖȚɆÕșɆȩǤǬǬǥȪɇnŨǁļŝİɆnŨƪŝƢëļŝƖȚɇHarvard, Harvard Business School Press. ƎļƎëƢƖŏLjȚɆbșɆȩǥǣǤǧȪɇdŨİļƖƢļĉƖɆļŝɆ¶ķėɆDëŒŏŒëŝĐȼƖɆÕëƎșɆɇBarnsley, Pen and Sword.

Queiroz, M.M., Farias Pereira, S.C., Telles, R. and Machado, M.C. (2021) Industry 4.0 and digital supply chain capabilities: A framework for understanding digitalisation ĉķ댌ėŝİėƖɆëŝĐɆŨƋƋŨƎƢƪŝļƢļėƖșɇ ėŝĉķśëƎŏļŝİȚɇ28(5), pp.

1761-1782.

Smith, J. (2018) Defence Logistics. London: Kogan Page.

Team Defence Information (2021) Team Defence Information.

Available from https://www.teamdefence.info/ [accessed 14 Oct 21]. ¶ķŨśƋƖŨŝȚɆ`șɆȩǤǬǬǫȪɇdļįėĈŒŨŨĐɆŨįɆÕëƎșɇLondon, Brassey Classics.

Tunc, A.O. and Aslan, P. (2020) Business management and communications perspectives in industry 4.0. Hershey, IGI Global. ÔëŝɆ ƎėǁėŒĐȚɆnșɆȩǥǣǣǪȪɇ©ƪƋƋŒļŝİɆÕëƎșɇCambridge, Cambridge University Press. ÔëŝɆLŨėŏȚɆ¡șȚɆDƪİëƢėȚɆ șȚɆëŝĐɆÕ댌ėƎɆȚnșɆȩǥǣǥǣȪɇIntegrating ŒŨĉŏĉķëļŝɆļŝƢŨɆ©ƪƋƋŒLjɆ ķëļŝɆnëŝëİėśėŝƢșɇLondon, Kogan Page.

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An insight into the Defence Support Enterprise Climate Change & Sustainability environment ¶ķėɆļŝƢƎŨĐƪĉƢļŨŝɆļŝƢŨɆ½bɆŒëǂɆļŝɆǥǣǤǬɆŨįɆƢķėɆ ëƎĈŨŝɆpėƢɆåėƎŨɆǥǣǨǣɆȩpåǨǣȪɆƢëƎİėƢɆĉƎėëƢėĐɆëɆŝėǂɆ ļśƋėƎëƢļǁėɆƢŨɆëĐĐƎėƖƖɆ ŒļśëƢėɆ ķëŝİėɆʁɆ©ƪƖƢëļŝëĈļŒļƢLjɆȩ ʁ©ȪɆǂļƢķļŝɆƢķėɆnŨ$ɆëŝĐɆļƢƖɆ©ƪƋƋŨƎƢɆ ĉŨśśƪŝļƢLjșɆQŝɆƢķļƖɆëƎƢļĉŒėȚɆMaj Mark PlayerɆëļśƖɆƢŨɆĐļƖƢļŒɆƖŨśėɆŨįɆƢķėɆŏėLjɆėŒėśėŝƢƖɆŨįɆ ʁ©ȚɆ identifying what they mean The greatest threat to our planet is the belief that someone else will save it

‘‘

Robert Swan (Bossick, 2017)

This approach is captured within the Sustainable ©ƪƋƋŨƎƢɆĉŨŝĉėƋƢɆëŝĐɆƖƢƎëƢėİLjɆëŝĐɆļŝɆėįįėĉƢɆĉŨĐļǘėƖɆ the pursuit of Support Advantage (competitive advantage through superior logistics, engineering ëŝĐɆėƍƪļƋśėŝƢɆƖƪƋƋŨƎƢ ) through Sustainability concepts, principles, and technologies. This paper ëŒƖŨɆƋŨƖėƖɆƖŨśėɆƍƪėƖƢļŨŝƖɆëŝĐɆëļśƖɆƢŨɆƖƢļśƪŒëƢėɆ consideration of sustainability as a matter of core interest to the Support community.

“It is human nature, for example, to dismiss or ignore what we fail to understand. And we are particularly inclined to do so when confronted with ideas that threaten our sense of reality, our hard-won certainties and our identities” (Elkington, 2020, p. 23).

CC&S can be viewed through a wide range of political, commercial, sectoral, technological, ethical or philosophical lenses and the sheer range of facts, perspectives, agendas and opinions can itself be a barrier to understanding. That said, anthropogenic or human-induced climate change is arguably the ĐėǘŝļŝİɆİŒŨĈëŒɆļƖƖƪėɆŨįɆŨƪƎɆƢļśėƖɆëŝĐɆĉëŝɆŝŨɆŒŨŝİėƎɆ be considered either a point of debate (IPCC, 2021, p. 4) nor a ‘future problem’. Its reach and tiers of consequences are increasing in scale and intensity, ëƖɆǂļƢŝėƖƖėĐɆļŝɆƢķėɆǙŨŨĐƖɆļŝɆ ķļŝëɆëŝĐɆEėƎśëŝLjȚɆ įŨƎėƖƢɆǘƎėƖɆļŝɆ ëŒļįŨƎŝļëɆëŝĐɆ¡ƪƖƖļëɆëŝĐɆķėëƢǂëǁėƖɆļŝɆ Australia – all occurring in a single year, 2021. There can be little reasonable doubt that this is both an immediate and global challenge, requiring both urgent and long-term interventions at all levels of society.

The next question then, is how does this pertain to the MoD, the Support community and the individuals within it? Sustainability is a broad term that requires a whole society approach if we are to consider the impacts of our activities, our risks, vulnerabilities and dependencies in accordance with modern corporate Environment, Social and Governance (ESG) values.

CC&S also covers a vast span of complimentary, yet ĐļƖƢļŝĉƢɆǘėŒĐƖȚɆśëŝLjɆŨįɆǂķļĉķɆķëǁėɆĐļƎėĉƢɆśļŒļƢëƎLjɆ ëƋƋŒļĉëƢļŨŝƖɆëŝĐɆƋŨƢėŝƢļëŒɆĈėŝėǘƢƖȚɆŝŨƢɆŒėëƖƢɆëƖɆëɆ point of competitive advantage e.g. dominance in markets for renewable energy (Sarkissian & Kachinski, ǥǣǥǤȪșɆɆ¶ķėƖėɆǘėŒĐƖɆëŝĐɆƢķėɆƎėŒëƢļŨŝƖķļƋƖɆĈėƢǂėėŝɆ energy, security and climate are also being considered by our allies and adversaries within their strategies (US Department of Defense, 2021) (ASP, 2021).

Closer to home, the MoD’s contribution to the UK meeting NZ50 requires a revaluation of the impacts the network of Defence and Support nodes,

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ƎėŒëƢļŨŝƖķļƋƖȚɆĉŨŝƢƎëĉƢƖȚɆĐëƢëɆëŝĐɆǘŝëŝĉļëŒɆǙŨǂƖȚɆ leadership and requirements can have. Within Support, we need to ‘see the whole board’ and then overlay this understanding of the CC&S landscape onto our organisational laydown to start to make sense of the dependencies, relationships and drivers.

With the MoD contributing approximately 50% of the entire UK Government’s Green House Gas (GHG) emissions (NAO, 2020), when set alongside the £14Bn annual Defence spend on Support, there is both a motive and opportunity to drive this change for the better. The 2021 MOD Climate Change & ©ƪƖƢëļŝëĈļŒļƢLjɆ©ƢƎëƢėİļĉɆ ƋƋƎŨëĉķɆļĐėŝƢļǘėƖɆëɆƎëŝİėɆ of early tasks for elements of the Support enterprise (MOD, 2021) but, as outlined above, a strategy to embrace sustainability within Support must also account for three main elements: 5 Enhancing the effectiveness of Support (Support Advantage through sustainability) 5 The contribution of Support activity to climate change (Net Zero 2050 and wider environmental sustainability) 5 The effects of climate change on Support activities (CC&S risks to Support).

Sustainable Support contends that all three are ƋŨƖƖļĈŒėȚɆƢķŨƪİķɆƢķėƎėɆǂļŒŒɆƪŝĐŨƪĈƢėĐŒLjɆĈėɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢɆ decisions in doing so. However, as CC&S grows in political, social and military importance, how we respond to the challenges of global climate change should concern us all.

Why does CC&S particularly matter to Support?

The military case for embracing sustainability goes beyond the MoD’s now statutory obligations in respect of NZ50 into enhancing Speed, Readiness and Resilience as described by the Integrated Operating Concept (IOpC). Alongside the obvious moral argument about the direct environmental and social impacts of military activity, there are also others in addressing climate change as one of the major drivers of insecurity (DCDC, 2018) (IMCCS, 2021), adapting to the increasing demands on śļŒļƢëƎLjɆįŨƎĉėƖɆëƖɆǘƎƖƢɆƎėƖƋŨŝĐėƎƖɆƢŨɆĉŒļśëƢėȯƎėŒëƢėĐɆ crisis (Retter, 2021) and in addressing climaterelated risks to our infrastructure, force readiness and security planning assumptions. The Support function ļƖɆǂėŒŒɆƋŒëĉėĐɆƢŨɆėLJƋŒŨļƢɆëɆƎëŝİėɆŨįɆƋŨƢėŝƢļëŒɆĈėŝėǘƢƖɆ by embracing a coherent approach to CC&S whilst simultaneously being particularly exposed to some CC&S risks and yet very able to contribute to meeting the department’s NZ50 targets.

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Emissions ȹ,ŝėƎİLjɆļƖɆƢķėɆŒļįėĈŒŨŨĐɆŨįɆŨƪƎɆǂëƎǘİķƢļŝİɆ capabilities.” (Petraeus, 2011) Given the legal status of NZ50, a most pressing need is to address Support’s contribution to climate change through the GHG emissions it creates (measured in carbon dioxide equivalent or CO2e) across Scopes 1-3. Each Service emits CO2e through energy used in infrastructure - heating buildings, lighting, powering IT (and under-desk heaters when the boiler packs up) and mobile uses such as fuelling aircraft, vehicles and generators, or use of industrial gases. The ƋƎŨǘŒėɆŨįɆƢķėƖėɆėśļƖƖļŨŝƖɆǁëƎļėƖɆëĉƎŨƖƖɆƢķėɆDƎŨŝƢɆ Line Commands; the Army has a big estate and ŒëƎİėɆǂŨƎŏįŨƎĉėȚɆĉƎėëƢļŝİɆëɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆļŝįƎëƖƢƎƪĉƢƪƎėɆ emissions bill, whereas the smaller-yet-thirsty RAF has major challenges from its capability-related emissions (Nugee, 2021). On top of this come those from beyond the UK or Scope 3 emissions created through our contracted Support services or commodities. The processing of raw materials and

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From a deployed operations perspective, a force which minimises its physical supply chain through using sustainable technologies and approaches, reduces not only one of its most prominent vulnerabilities and enhances its systemic and localised resilience, but could realise many potential ĈėŝėǘƢƖɆƢķƎŨƪİķɆļŝĉƎėëƖļŝİŒLjɆėŒėĉƢƎļǘėĐɆĉëƋëĈļŒļƢļėƖɆ and networks. A secure operational energy supply is a major challenge, so the ability to self-sustain through new energy technologies developed to reduce dependence on fossil fuels may have ƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆëĐǁëŝƢëİėƖɆįŨƎɆśŨĈļŒļƢLjɆëŝĐɆëİļŒļƢLjșɆ¶ķėɆ logistics associated with fuel and water sustainment currently constitute the bulk (by mass) of materiel throughput within deployed operations and the ƎėƖƪŒƢëŝƢɆįŨŨƢƋƎļŝƢɆƎėƋƎėƖėŝƢƖɆëɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆƢëƎİėƢɆ (Tiffen, 2014) (Eady, 2009). Reducing this footprint therefore reduces the direct risk to logistic Force Elements (FEs) and their dependencies.

Changing climate and weather patterns will create increased demand for security assistance and Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations (Retter, 2021). The resultant increased demand for Support resources, such as engineers and logistic enablers, is therefore likely to spread ƢķėƖėɆǘŝļƢėɆëƖƖėƢƖɆśŨƎėɆƢķļŝŒLjɆȯɆƪŝŒėƖƖɆǂėɆĉëŝɆ redesign our forces to enable them to meet the demand in new ways. Support is also particularly exposed to CC&S issues affecting supply networks, both forwards of the Strategic Base and rearwards into supporting industries. The Support function is therefore directly affected by CC&S on several fronts, could potentially enhance Support Advantage and yet holds several key levers to improve the MoD’s situation. Fundamentally, the Support function must be positioned to provide materiel and services to the Future Force in whatever form is required and to do so wherever is necessary within a climate changed environment. So, if the legal, moral, policy and practical reasons to adopt this approach are clear ëŝĐɆƖŨśėɆŨįɆƢķėɆƋŨƢėŝƢļëŒɆĈėŝėǘƢƖɆƢŨɆĐŨļŝİɆƖŨɆëƎėɆ apparent, how could we start to compartmentalise this problem and understand the Support considerations therein?

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GENERAL INTEREST 8

manufacturing of these commodities and Defence equipment requires energy, creating ‘embodied emissions’ within our forces, even before they are deployed let alone utilised in a theatre of operations.

As with any exercise in performance improvement, the challenge then becomes how to measure these emissions in order to determine the impact of any changes to reduce them. ¶ķėɆëĈŨǁėɆėLJëśƋŒėƖɆ댌ɆĉëƖƢɆëɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆėśļƖƖļŨŝƖɆ shadow, but many are not (yet) accounted for within the MoD’s declared emissions under the Greening Government Commitments. Much work to date has been centred on understanding existing data, what it can tell us now and what needs to be done to establish credible baseline information against which to measure future progress. Whilst this data will need to be interpretable from a range of perspectives, including through a Support function lens, the MoD proprietary data only extends so far into the tiers of our supply chains. A comprehensive support emissions baseline will require recognition that this is a Whole Force problem that needs a joined-up response. Agreeing the scope of our own emissions ĉëŒĉƪŒëƢļŨŝɆśėƢķŨĐŨŒŨİļėƖɆļƖɆëŝɆļśƋŨƎƢëŝƢɆǘƎƖƢɆƖƢėƋȚɆ but if the MoD is not asking the right questions of our partners, whether through contractual mechanisms or otherwise, decisions and change will be slower, partial and ultimately less effective.

At the heart of this challenge are individual and corporate choices, cultures and behaviours - all of which rely on understanding the issues, their role and the imperative to improve. In this way, sustainability is suitable for both top-down policy led change and bottom-up local initiatives and

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8 A model of Defence's GHG emissions, in which Support activities play a large role. It estimates that circa 4/5ths of the MOD’s emissions are classed as Scope 3

indeed the timescales do not allow for anything else. It is a complex challenge requiring networked ƖŨŒƪƢļŨŝƖɆëŝĐɆƪŒƢļśëƢėŒLjȚɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆǘŝëŝĉļëŒɆëŝĐɆ intellectual resources. Where barriers to change exist, ǂėɆƖķŨƪŒĐɆƖƢëƎƢɆƖśëŒŒɆƢŨɆĐėśŨŝƖƢƎëƢėɆƢķėɆĈėŝėǘƢƖȚɆ ƎėƖŨŒǁėɆƢėėƢķļŝİɆļƖƖƪėƖɆëŝĐɆƢķėŝɆķëǁļŝİɆŌƪƖƢļǘėĐɆƢķėɆ investment, scale up at pace – time is not on our side. ¶ķŨƪİķɆŝŨƢɆƖƋėĉļǘĉɆƢŨɆ©ƪƋƋŨƎƢȚɆėƖƢëƢėȯƖĉëŒėɆƖŨŒëƎɆ energy solutions such as Project PROMETHEUS might offer only modest CO2e savings over their lifespan as the National Grid decarbonises. They will however have both a near-term impact, provide a level of ŨįįƖėƢɆëŝĐɆėǁėŝƢƪ댌LjɆƎėĐƪĉėɆƢķėɆǘŝëŝĉļëŒȦ¡$,dɆ burden through reduced electricity bills. It also offers a valuable opportunity to understand the limitations ŨįɆƢķėƖėɆƢėĉķŝŨŒŨİļėƖȚɆĈƪļŒĐɆĉŨŝǘĐėŝĉėɆëŝĐɆėLJƋŒŨƎėɆ their applicability to deployed operations.

Whilst much can be achieved through doing current ƢķļŝİƖɆśŨƎėɆėįǘĉļėŝƢŒLjɆëŝĐɆƢķƎŨƪİķɆĈėƢƢėƎɆƪƖėɆŨįɆŨƪƎɆ data to optimise capacity, over a 30-year timeline, there is a genuine danger of the MoD being left with legacy or obsolete assets that either cannot be cost-effectively supported or are no longer legally and morally acceptable. With the UK Government intending to ban the production of ICE cars from 2030 and ICE HGVs from 2040, how long until service stations stop dispensing affordable fossil fuels, or manufacturers stop making spares for diesel engines at a competitive price? The global HGV sector is increasingly eyeing alternative energy vectors, including sustainable versions of current forms, hybrid drivetrains, (very) large batteries or Fuel Cells powered by sustainably-produced hydrogen (Ruf, 2020) (CILT, 2021). Some of these are already deployed in niche commercial uses or are being trialled for their military potential, as seen in the Army’s TD6 hybrid vehicle demonstrators (Milbrook, 2021).

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8 Fuel hungry aviation faces emissions reduction challenges

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ȩ ĐëƋƢėĐɆįƎŨśɆȩ ŒëƎėȚɆǥǣǥǤȪȚɆ½bɆnŨ$ȚɆ ƎŨǂŝɆ ŨƋLjƎļİķƢɆǥǣǥǤȪ

8 GENERAL INTEREST

8 Fuel use, materiel and operating concepts all influence the footprint and delivery of Support

At what point these technologies migrate into ǘėŒĐėĐɆĐėįėŝĉėɆĉëƋëĈļŒļƢļėƖɆļƖɆŝŨƢɆLjėƢɆĉŒėëƎɆĈƪƢɆ when they do, how will Support meet the increased demand for electrical energy, trained personnel and ƪŝļǘėĐɆŨƋėƎëƢļŝİɆĉŨŝĉėƋƢƖȠɆ{ƢķėƎɆƢėĉķŝŨŒŨİļĉëŒɆ advancements come with their own Sustainable Support considerations e.g., how do we best enable ƢķėɆėŒėĉƢƎļǘėĐɆƎŨĈŨƢļĉɆëƪƢŨŝŨśŨƪƖɆƖLjƖƢėśƖɆëŝĐɆ optionally crewed platforms that need charging rather than diesel? How will these technologies drive changes to the modes and nodes available to Support? Will it require an evolution of current Support practises, or will it demand a more fundamental shift to ways that are unachievable with current technology e.g. manufacturing fuels in situ using advanced micronuclear technology? (Holland, 2019). These questions will take time to answer ĐėǘŝļƢļǁėŒLjȚɆĈƪƢɆįŨƎɆŝŨǂȚɆ$ėįėŝĉėɆëļśƖɆƢŨɆƢëŏėɆëɆįëƖƢȯ follower approach, tracking developments closely across relevant sectors and applications whilst ensuring that the Support factors are weighed in the consideration.

Circular Economy The concept of Circular Economy (CE) relates directly to sustainability and by extension to Climate Change and draws on academic theories around closed-loop value chains. In outline, by taking a systems view and ƢķļŝŏļŝİɆĉëƎėįƪŒŒLjɆëĈŨƪƢɆƢķėɆĐėƖļİŝȚɆƖƋėĉļǘĉëƢļŨŝɆëŝĐɆ production of products, plus their through-life use, management, upgrading and eventual replacement, products can be optimised both in terms of their inputs (raw materials, manufacturing complexity and social costs) to retain as much value as possible, for as long as possible, before being directed into

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GENERAL INTEREST 8 either (in order of value effectiveness) repair, reuse or recycling (Circular Economy Overview, 2021).

With the aim of increasing the sustainability of the Defence Support Enterprise (DSE) and retaining value within the systems therein, the policies, doctrines, rules and ways of working that govern our collective behaviours should both explicitly account for the CE concept where it is already practised and direct its appropriate implementation where that is not yet the case.

Concept, Assessment, Demonstration, Manufacture, In-Service, Disposal (CADMID) can, or perhaps should, be a cyclical (or optionally-cyclical) rather than a linear process, with the Disposal considerations reinterpreted in the preceding phases to allow a deliberate triaging of equipment and its component parts into reuse, remanufacturing or recycling. The value represented within these ĉŨśƋŨŝėŝƢƖȚɆǂķėƢķėƎɆǘŝëŝĉļëŒȚɆėśĈŨĐļėĐɆELEƖȚɆ scare raw materials or otherwise can then be retained within the system through commercial mechanisms and considered at the design stage to ŨƋƢļśļƖėɆĉŨƖƢɆėįǘĉļėŝĉļėƖșɆÕļƢķɆƢķėɆŨįƢėŝɆƎėśëƎŏëĈŒLjɆ long lifespan of defence equipment, the MoD is well ƋŒëĉėĐɆƢŨɆƎėëƋɆƢķėɆĈėŝėǘƢƖɆŨįɆƖƪĉķɆëŝɆëƋƋƎŨëĉķɆëŝĐɆ in some cases already practices this in discrete parts of the enterprise. The adoption of Open Systems Architectures allows for more effective throughlife upgrades, allowing individual components or sub-systems to be iteratively replaced and enhanced, rather than scrapping and replacing entire ĉëƋëĈļŒļƢļėƖșɆ¶ķŨƪİķɆļƢɆśļİķƢɆĈėɆĐƎļǁėŝɆĈLjɆǘŝëŝĉļëŒɆ or technological considerations, this practise allows the outgoing equipment to be managed into reuse or recycling, but this phase could potentially be further optimised with the surety provided by a deliberate approach considered and costed within the throughlife support solution.

QƢɆĉëŝɆĈėɆëƎİƪėĐɆķŨǂėǁėƎȚɆƢķëƢɆëɆŒëĉŏɆëɆĉŨĐļǘėĐɆ and coherent strategy or architecture to achieve this with more complex equipment and commodities, ļƖɆëɆĉŨŝƖƢƎëļŝƢɆŨŝɆĈėŝėǘƢƖɆƎėëŒļƖëƢļŨŝșɆÕķėƎėɆŒėëĐɆ responsibility will sit between requirements setting, OEMs, engineering standards, through-life-support and acquisition policy teams is up for debate but in practise it will take a collective effort to implement.

The questions also need to be asked and answered early enough and at a high enough level in the ƋƎŨĉėƖƖɆƢŨɆLjļėŒĐɆĈėŝėǘƢƖșɆÕķëƢɆƋėƎĉėŝƢëİėȚɆįŨƎɆ example, of the new BOXER vehicle family are either repairable, reused, reusable, recycled or recyclable?

Can the Rare Earth and exotic metals within our ĉŨśƋŒėLJɆśƪŝļƢļŨŝƖɆĈėɆėįǘĉļėŝƢŒLjɆƎėĉŨǁėƎėĐɆƢŨɆ mitigate risk to our critical supply chains? How can the actors involved be incentivised to exploit and ĐļƎėĉƢŒLjɆĈėŝėǘƢɆįƎŨśɆƢķėɆǁëŒƪėɆĈėŝėǘƢƖɆŨįɆƎėĉŨǁėƎLjɆ if it were practicable? Could a more forwardƢķļŝŏļŝİɆëƋƋƎŨëĉķɆƢŨɆƢķėɆǘŝëŝĉļëŒɆëŝĐɆŝŨŝȯǘŝëŝĉļëŒɆ costs of our equipment and materiel reduce an operational constraint by design, reducing the burden of drawdown in future campaigns vice the three plus years of deliberate planning and retrograde activity as seen on Operation HERRICK? In review, ,ɆķëƖɆŨǁėƎƢɆƋŨƢėŝƢļëŒɆĈėŝėǘƢƖɆëƢɆƢķėɆśëĉƎŨɆŒėǁėŒȚɆ addresses Scope 3 emissions both from and through ©ƪƋƋŨƎƢɆëŝĐɆĉŨƪŒĐɆLjļėŒĐɆǂļĐėȯƎëŝİļŝİɆėįǘĉļėŝĉļėƖɆļįɆ coherently implemented. In so doing, it could make a comprehensive contribution to Support Advantage across the DSE. Climate resilience and risk A further perspective on CC&S concerns the risks associated with the many facets and impacts to the delivery of support at the tactical, operational and strategic or enterprise levels. We often associate resilience with military involvement in response to 8 Circular Economy System Diagram

Ellen MacArthur Foundation free to use

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8 GENERAL INTEREST

8 Keeping fit equipment in the hands of the User is a core ES tenet aligned to the principles behind CE

ĐŨśėƖƢļĉɆĉƎļƖļƖȜɆƢķėɆ ėëŏɆ$ļƖƢƎļĉƢɆśŨŨƎŒëŝĐɆǘƎėƖɆŨįɆ 2018, the Whaley Bridge Dam operations in 2019 and military support to the NHS over the COVID-19 crisis are recent examples. However, resilience ĉëŝɆëŒƖŨɆĈėɆĐėǘŝėĐɆëƖɆƢķėɆëĈļŒļƢLjɆƢŨɆƎėƖƋŨŝĐɆƢŨɆŨƎɆ ƎėĉŨǁėƎɆįƎŨśɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢļėƖȜɆļƢɆļŝǁŨŒǁėƖɆĉŨŝƖļĐėƎëƢļŨŝƖɆ of robustness or resistance to external forces. In the context of climate change and Support, there are both acute and chronic pressures on the resilience of the Defence Support Network and its ability to operate effectively in the face of the numerous disaggregated effects of global climate change.

An enterprise level view of the need to increase resilience against the effects of climate change relies in part on shared understanding of the vulnerabilities within our supporting global industries, as well as the downstream activity that support operations directly.

An end-to-end and time-sensitive view of the DSE is notoriously hard to achieve, but that it is vulnerable to the effects of climate change should come as no surprise after a period in which COVID-19 laid bare the interconnectedness, vulnerabilities and black swan cascade effects within global systems. These śļİķƢɆļŝĉŒƪĐėɆƢķėɆėįįėĉƢƖɆŨŝɆëŝɆ{,nȼƖɆǙŨǂɆŨįɆŏėLjɆƎëǂɆ materials and components of delays to shipping from enduring changes in violent weather patterns, the viability of key strategic nodes in the face of increased ǂļŒĐǘƎėɆŨƎɆķƪśëŝɆļŝƖėĉƪƎļƢLjɆƎļƖŏƖɆŨƎɆƢķėɆļśƋëĉƢɆŨįɆ permanent increases in regional temperatures on the payload of Air Transport (and the crews that ŨƋėƎëƢėɆëŝĐɆƖƪƋƋŨƎƢɆƢķėśȪșɆÕķļŒƖƢɆƖƋėĉļǘĉɆƎļƖŏƖɆśëLjɆ be particular to a given location, they can quickly aggregate with those affecting other nodes, therefore, the means to assess and address the accumulated risks to which the DSN is increasingly exposed will be vital both objectively and holistically.

Conversely, whilst CC&S creates novel risks to the DSN, the technologies being developed and deployed in repose might offer mitigations both in resilience and support terms. Deploying wind turbines in BFSAI might reduce the frequency and volume of fuel shipments, or solar power in Cyprus could potentially not only assist in a similar fashion but also reduce reliance on grid electricity įƎŨśɆƢķėɆķļİķŒLjɆƋŨŒŒƪƢļŝİɆŨļŒȯǘƎėĐɆ LjƋƎļŨƢɆƋŨǂėƎɆ

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ƖƢëƢļŨŝƖșɆ¶ķļƖɆǂŨƪŒĐɆƖļśƪŒƢëŝėŨƪƖŒLjɆĈėŝėǘƢɆ©ƪƋƋŨƎƢȚɆ enhance local resilience and improve emissions.

By extension, Support within deployed operations could also potentially be enhanced through a similar range of emergent complementary technologies, e.g., autonomous systems and sustainable energy, including through reduced fuel costs, lowered delivery risk, greater resilience and smaller footprint. An approach that addresses emissions can also mitigate Support delivery risks on a number of levels, decrease the draw on, and created by the DSN, as well as increasing resilience across the DSE. Given that the viability of deployed operations and the effects they are intended to deliver is determined to a large degree by the ability of the DSN to sustain them, the resilience of those global networks to the systemic effects of climate change should be of concern to strategists as much as logisticians.

Your part in the plan “It’s not easy being green.” – Kermit the Frog This paper has discussed the role policies have when driving collective behaviours at the organisational, national and global level in addressing the biggest strategic challenge of the next century and probably beyond, but this also relies, in part, on the individual and their choices. Whilst formal initiatives at the departmental level are under active development and in some cases already being rolled out, what individuals do as a consumer and within their professional remits matters and is directly within their control. Whether within a household, a job or through the organisational levers at ones’ disposal, routine choices provide opportunities to make śëƎİļŝëŒɆİëļŝƖɆƢķëƢɆĉëŝɆķëǁėɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆëİİƎėİëƢėɆ value when everyone participates. The meeting or conference attended online rather than in person incurs no fuel emissions (whilst saving on transport and subsistence, increasing output and arguably contributing to wellbeing). Each exercise or range day that segregates the recyclable elements of waste makes a difference. Contract requirements can be an excellent and readily available tool by which to affect wider changes through our service partners and suppliers – especially if there are built-in individual ëŝĐȦŨƎɆŨƎİëŝļƖëƢļŨŝëŒɆĈėŝėǘƢƖșɆ¶ķėɆëśŨƪŝƢɆŨįɆƎėĐɆ meat consumed, the next car bought or the holiday ǙļİķƢɆƢëŏėŝɆ댌ɆĉŨśėɆëƢɆëɆĉŨƖƢɆƖŨɆǂėɆśƪƖƢɆĉŨŝƖļĐėƎɆ our personal actions as well as demanding and using the means of our organisation to address the challenges (Ritchie, 2020).

These may seem small or even futile gestures given the scale of the challenge but small changes in habits can be built on to exploit the technological, legal, organisational and societal changes that will need to come. Opportunities to educate how sustainable approaches can enhance the delivery of Support already exist within our schools and courses and whilst the training requirements process will direct changes over time, training delivery organisations already have latitude to amend course material ëƖɆƋŨŒļĉļėƖɆëƎėɆƪƋĐëƢėĐɆƢŨɆƎėǙėĉƢɆĐėƋëƎƢśėŝƢëŒɆ approaches and the new laws. If nothing else, typing ‘Defence Green Network’ into the search bar on the MODNet homepage should connect you to a network of interested parties and valuable information

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Credit: Creative Commons BY licence - Hannah Ritchie

8 Personal Choices matter and modest changes can have a big impact

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8 GENERAL INTEREST resources to develop your own knowledge (MoD, 2021). As stated, so much of what needs to be done on a policy and practise level is already synonymous with good logistics and the technological means to achieve the required outcomes will come in due course as the MoD takes a ‘fast follower’ approach to stay in-step with developments in equivalent commercial sectors.

Summary This paper has deliberately covered a lot of ground to attempt to illustrate the span, complexity and absolute urgency of the issues around CC&S and the associated Support interests. It has attempted to describe how the destabilising effects of humanitydriven climate change cannot be consigned to the ȻƢŨŨɆĈļİɆŨƎɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢȼɆĈŨLJɆëŝĐɆǂķļŒƖƢɆƢķėLjɆǂļŒŒɆŝŨƢɆĈėɆ solved within many of our lifetimes, changes must be initiated within the span of our careers. Net Zero by 2050 will only limit the rise in global temperatures and associated impacts and even then, only to subcatastrophic level. It has discussed how, through its activities, Defence is directly contributing to one of the major underlaying causes of the security issues that it exists to defend against. It has also attempted ƢŨɆĐėǘŝėɆƢķėɆėŝĐƖȚɆǂëLjƖɆëŝĐɆƋŨƢėŝƢļëŒɆśėëŝƖɆĈLjɆ which Support might take the necessary steps to address our part in the problem and in doing so, deliver on the Support Advantage strategic ambition that drives our professional efforts.

Leaner and more agile Support networks, reduced reliance on liquid fossil fuels, and more future-proof and resilient capabilities are vital to our future whilst technologies such as renewable energy, sustainable fuels, automation, advanced analytics and additive manufacturing will all play a part. It is, however, the convergence of these technologies and collaboration with our supporting industries, combined with changes to individual and collective behaviours and a revised way of thinking about the delivery of support that will unlock the required changes. It is a truly wicked problem that demands our immediate attention, long term-focus and may require technologies and techniques that are either not yet in widespread use or which have not yet been invented.

Perhaps it is fortunate that solving the problems highlighted in this paper is one where everyone can be part of the solution – we all have skin in the game.

On a cautionary note, whilst at heart sustainability is synonymous with good logistics, it is no use ƖëĉƎļǘĉļŝİɆŨƎɆĉŨśƋƎŨśļƖļŝİɆĉëƋëĈļŒļƢLjɆļįɆļƢɆśëŏėƖɆ Support demonstrably less effective. In returning to the central theme of this piece, CC&S is going to have a fundamental and enduring effect on the Support community at all levels of the DSE. It is therefore a matter of professional and personal self-interest if we wish to remain relevant, that we understand how we might prosper through adopting a coherent response, address our contribution to the problem and respond to its direct and indirect effects on us and our dependencies.

References ASP. (2021). Defense Energy. Retrieved from American Security Project: https://www.americansecurityproject.org/ energy-security/defense-energy/ [Accessed 20 January ǥǣǥǥȮ

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Bossick, K. (2017, July 12). Robert Swan Reveals the Greatest Threat to Our Planet. Retrieved from eyesonsunvalley. com: http://eyeonsunvalley.com/Story_Reader/3998/ Robert-Swan-Reveals-the-Greatest-Threat-to-Our-Planet/ ȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǣɆ`ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮ CILT. (2021). Routes to Net Zero 2050, 2020 Year-End Summary Report. Retrieved from https://ciltuk.org.uk/ routetozeroɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǣɆ`ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮ Circular Economy Overview. (2021). Retrieved from Ellen Macarthur Foundation: https://ellenmacarthurfoundation. org/topics/circular-economy-introduction/overview ȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǣɆ`ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮ Clare, J. (2021). Decarbonising Defence: A Proposed Approach. ƎļėǘŝİɆƢŨɆƢķėɆ$ėįėŝĉėɆ©ëįėƢLjɆʁɆ,ŝǁļƎŨŝśėŝƢɆ Committee on 29 Jul 21. Contains public sector information licensed and reproduced with permission of the originator under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Crown copyright 2021 DCDC. (2018). Global Strategic Trends Ed 6. Crown.

Eady, D. S. (2009). Sustain the Mission Project: Casualty Factors for Fuel and Water Resupply Convoys. Virginia: Army Environmental Policy Institute.

Elkington, J. (2020). Green Swans. New York: Fast Press Company.

Holland, A. (2019, October). Micro Nuclear Reactors, Prospects for Deploying Land-Based Nuclear Energy For The US Military. Retrieved from American Security Project: https://www.americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/ uploads/2019/10/Ref-0231-Micro-Nuclear-Reactors.pdf ȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǣɆ`ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮɆ IMCCS. (2021). THE WORLD CLIMATE AND SECURITY REPORT. International Military Council on Climate & Security.

IPCC. (2021). Climate Change 2021, The Physical Science Basis. Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Retrieved from https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/ ǂİǤȦĐŨǂŝŒŨëĐƖȦƎėƋŨƎƢȦQ ȶ ¡ǩȶÕEQȶ© nȶǘŝëŒșƋĐį ȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǣɆ`ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮ Milbrook. (2021, July 13). Hybrid Military Vehicle Programme Led at UTAC’s Millbrook Proving Ground, on Behalf of the MoDșɆ¡ėƢƎļėǁėĐɆįƎŨśɆķƢƢƋƖțȦȦǂǂǂșśļŒŒĈƎŨŨŏșĉŨșƪŏȦțɆhttps:// www.millbrook.co.uk/news/2021/hybrid-military-vehicleprogramme-led-at-utac-s-millbrook-proving-ground-onbehalf-of-the-mod/Ɇȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǣɆ`ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮɆ MOD. (2021). Ministry of Defence Climate Change & Sustainability Strategic Approach. Crown.

MoD. (2021). The Defence Green Network Homepage. Retrieved from The Defence Green Network: https://modgovuk.sharepoint.com/sites/ DefenceEnvironmentalProfessionals/SitePages/Homepage. aspxɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǣɆ`ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮɆ NAO. (2020). MoD Environmental Sustainability Overview Report. Crown.

Nugee, R. L. (2020). Climate Change and Sustainability Report. Retrieved from Defence Green Network: https://modgovuk.sharepoint. com/sites/DefenceEnvironmentalProfessionals/ Shared%20Documents/Forms/AllItems.aspx?id=/ sites/DefenceEnvironmentalProfessionals/Shared%20 Documents/Resources%20on%20Topics%20for%20 sharing/Climate%20Change%20%26%20Sustainability%2.

Contains public sector information licensed and reproduced under the terms of the Open Government dļĉėŝĉėɆǁǦșǣȚɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǣɆ`ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮɆ Petraeus, G. D. (2011, Jun 07). {įǘĉėɆŨįɆƢķėɆ ƖƖļƖƢëŝƢɆ Secretary of Defense for Sustainment - Energy. Retrieved įƎŨśɆ{įǘĉėɆįŨƎɆƢķėɆ½ŝĐėƎɆ©ėĉƎėƢëƎLjɆįŨƎɆ$ėįėŝƖėɆȯɆ

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GENERAL INTEREST 8 Acquisition & Sustainment: https://www.acq.osd.mil/ eie/Downloads/OE/U.S.%20Forces%20Afghanistan%20 Memo%20Gen%20David%20Petraeus_06-07-11.pdf ȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǣɆ`ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮ Retter, L. K. (2021). Crisis Response in a Changing Climate.

Cambridge: RAND Corporation.

Ritchie, H. (2020, Jan 24). You want to reduce the carbon footprint of your food? Focus on what you eat, not whether your food is local. Retrieved from Our World In Data: https://ourworldindata.org/food-choice-vs-eatinglocal?country= ȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǣɆ`ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮ Ritchie, H. (2020, Oct, 22). ŒļśëƢėɆĉķëŝİėɆëŝĐɆǙLjļŝİțɆǂķëƢɆ share of global CO2 emissions come from aviation?

Retrieved from Our World In Data: https://ourworldindata. org/co2-emissions-from-aviation [Accessed 20 January ǥǣǥǥȮ Ruf, Y. B. (2020). Fuel Cell Hydrogen Trucks Heavy-Duty’s High Performance Green Solution. FUEL CELLS AND HYDROGEN 2 JOINT UNDERTAKING .

Sarkissian, H., & Kachinski, E. (2021, Jul 27). The U.S. Must Counterbalance China in the Renewable Energy Market. Retrieved from American Security Project: https://www.americansecurityproject.org/the-u-s-mustcounterbalance-china-in-the-renewable-energy-market/ ȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǣɆ`ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮɆ Tiffen, A. (2014, May 22). EŨļŝİɆEƎėėŝɆ{ŝɆ¶ķėɆ ëƢƢŒėǘėŒĐɆ Saves Lives. Retrieved from War On The Rocks: https:// warontherocks.com/2014/05/going-green-on-theĈëƢƢŒėǘėŒĐȯƖëǁėƖȯŒļǁėƖȦɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǣɆ`ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮ US Department of Defense. (2021, Sep 1). Department of Defense Climate Change Adaptation Plan. Retrieved from sustainability.gov: https://www.sustainability.gov/pdfs/ dod-2021-cap.pdfɆȭ ĉĉėƖƖėĐɆǥǣɆ`ëŝƪëƎLjɆǥǣǥǥȮɆ

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Harnessing ‘Integrated Action’ to meet the MoD’s sustainability challenge Viliame NanovoȚɆ Ɇ ŨŝƖƪŒƢļŝİȚɆƋƎŨǁļĐėƖɆëɆƎėƖƋŨŝƖėɆƢŨɆnëŌŨƎɆnëƎŏɆ ŒëLjėƎȼƖɆėƖƖëLjɆȻ©ƪƖƢëļŝëĈļŒļƢLjɆ ëŝĐɆ©ƪƋƋŨƎƢțɆ ŝɆļŝƖļİķƢɆļŝƢŨɆƢķėɆĉķ댌ėŝİļŝİɆ ŒļśëƢėɆ ķëŝİėɆʁɆ©ƪƖƢëļŝëĈļŒļƢLjɆȩ ʁ©ȪɆėŝǁļƎŨŝśėŝƢɆ for the Defence Support Enterprise’

“Tackling the consequences of climate change and sustainability offers an opportunity to engage all Defence people in a common cause. We will mobilise the whole Defence community, including serving personnel, civilian staff and colleagues in industry towards more sustainable behaviours.” MOD Climate Change and Sustainability Strategic Approach, 2021.

The author provides a comprehensive account of the challenging CC&S environment for the Defence ©ƪƋƋŨƎƢɆėŝƢėƎƋƎļƖėɆëŝĐɆƎļİķƢŒLjɆļĐėŝƢļǘėƖɆƢķëƢɆ sustainability support is a now a vital consideration in every facet of Defence’s output. In this complex environment, there is ample opportunity for ingenuity and action ‘to build a positive human future’ as we ƖëLjɆëƢɆ Ɇ ŨŝƖƪŒƢļŝİșɆQŝɆįƪŒǘŒŒļŝİɆƢķėɆŒėǁėŒɆŨįɆëśĈļƢļŨŝɆ expressed above in the MoD’s strategic approach, there are a number of key themes which should frame a comprehensive response: 8 It is essential for success by 2025 that MoD sets good foundations early ĈLjɆļŝǁėƖƢļŝİɆƖƪįǘĉļėŝƢɆ resources to take early actions in 2022.

8 By being a ‘fast follower’, the MoD must take the time to properly select, assess and embrace new global developments from the private sector and from within Defence.

8ɆɆ$ėįėŝĉėȼƖɆƋŨƎƢįŨŒļŨƖɆŨįɆķļİķȯƋƎŨǘŒėɆƋƎŨİƎëśśėƖɆ need to become the ƢŨƢėśɆǙëİɆĈėëƎėƎƖɆto set the environment for MoD’s sustainability achievements over the next 20 years and contribute to the highest ļśƋëĉƢɆȩëŝĐɆśŨƖƢɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢȪɆëĉƢļŨŝƖɆƢŨɆĐėŒļǁėƎɆĈLjɆǥǣǥǨșɆ 8 There is a growing awareness that enhanced or new processes need to be developed quickly to support better collaboration with Defence industry and partners across government (PAGs); in a manner akin to Multi-Domain Integration (MDI). Integration should build upon the lessons from the COVID-19 response where private sector and cross-government organisations generally achieved more, in an open partnership and at a higher tempo than previously envisaged. There will though still be a need to manage the boundaries in these relationships around risk.

8 As an all-pervading theme, the MoD should follow an agile and adaptive thinking approach to tackle the CC&S challenge1; such as utilising

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increased experimentation to pre-empt risk and to evolve in a deliberate manner through empowered leadership.

By using the framework above, we can set out some examples of focused ways that Defence Support could take integrated action: 8 Pilot Integrated Action. Accounting for a third of the MoD’s annual budget2ɆëŝĐɆëɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆ number of prime contractors, the MoD’s Defence Support business would be a totem pilot area for establishing a MDI-like network to target sustainability goals. The launch of an industry charter as part of the MoD’s Defence Support Transformation strategy provides useful leverage to engage commercial partners.

8 Share best practice across government and industry. Sharing best practice across government on contracting with, and between, industry for solutions in an adapted sustainability centre of excellence would help to encourage the transfer of knowledge between departments and commercial enterprises. Additionally, increased exposure to industry best-practice in sustainability during military training, along with MoD work placements with industry and PAGs, would build trust and understanding to underpin integration.

8 Collaborate on technology solutions. Integrated hubs for research and development of sustainable technology solutions would be a realistic practical step for greater transparency of potential mutual ĈėŝėǘƢƖɆįŨƎɆƋƪĈŒļĉɆëŝĐɆƋƎļǁëƢėɆƖėĉƢŨƎɆİëļŝƖș 8 Harness the Whole Force. Harnessing talent from industry and academia, by encouraging reserve service, would help to share and nurture the insights and niche capabilities in MoD required to meet sustainability goals. Recent success in areas like cyber with recruitment of experts as reservists point the way ahead here.

By building an MDI-like network and focusing on the principles of adaptive working - to think big, start small and scale fast - the MoD can enhance Defence Support and the wider UK defence ecosystem and meet the greatest challenge of our generation.

Endnotes PA Opinion, 2021, The IR is a mandate for adaptive working: Here’s how to achieve it | PA Consulting 2 MoD, 2020, Defence Support Strategy overview (publishing.service.gov.uk).

1

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PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 8

My journey to becoming an Adventurous Training (AT) Instructor

¶ķėɆƢƎëļŝļŝİɆĈėİëŝɆƢķėɆǘƎƖƢɆǂėėŏɆŨįɆ©ėƋƢėśĈėƎɆëŝĐɆ took place at the Joint Service Mountain Training Centre (JSMTC) on the Isle of Anglesey. Upon arrival at JSMTC, I attended a brief outlining the aim of the AT which ultimately is to develop individual courage and leadership skills through controlled exposure to risk in a challenging outdoor environment in order to enhance operational capability. This helped to give me more of an insight into what to expect from the course and what responsibilities and roles I would be asked to undertake.

I had been given the role of training to become a Kayak Instructor which I was delighted with and ĉŨƪŒĐɆŝŨƢɆǂëļƢɆƢŨɆƖƢëƎƢșɆ¶ķėɆǘƎƖƢɆǂėėŏɆĉŨŝƖļƖƢėĐɆ of undertaking the Foundation Level Kayaking course (K2F) which is notorious for being extremely challenging at times. The course consisted of learning basic paddling techniques, capsizing, rescues and familiarisation of the kayak and equipment. I also completed classroom revision sessions which taught me basic knowledge of the weather, how to read synoptic charts, the fundamentals of kayaking, river grades, hazards, access and conservation.

To help you get through the challenges ahead of you, the instructors also went through the comfort, stretch and panic zones, which is theory surrounding learning processes. The comfort zone is when you are relaxed in your learning whereas the stretch zone is designed to push you as an individual to overcome the challenge ahead, but at a reasonable pace. Once you have achieved your stretch zone, you will be brought back into the comfort zone, your physical and mental resilience will develop and you will be ready ƢŨɆƋƎŨİƎėƖƖɆįƪƎƢķėƎɆǂķļŒėɆįėėŒļŝİɆśŨƎėɆĉŨŝǘĐėŝƢșɆ¶ķėɆ panic zone is where you begin to feel uncomfortable during your learning and it usually occurs when something has gone too fast for you, or you have tried to exceed more than you are ready for. In this zone, you will begin to feel a sense of panic and at times, it can make you not want to progress forward in the activity. This highlights the importance of only bouncing between the comfort and stretch zones and as instructors, we must refrain from pushing individuals into the panic zone.

Whilst training and developing on this course, I went into all three of these zones. Initially capsizing or accidentally capsizing sent me into the panic zone and the feelings I experienced of being trapped in the kayak underwater were not pleasant. To help me get through this I used the comfort, stretch and panic model as well as my one-to-one training. During my

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Credit: Author

nLjɆŌŨƪƎŝėLjɆĈėİëŝɆļŝɆ`ƪŒLjɆǥǣǥǣɆǂķėŝɆśLjɆ ŒëƢŨŨŝɆ©ėƎİėëŝƢɆƢŨŒĐɆśėɆëĈŨƪƢɆƢķėɆŨƋƋŨƎƢƪŝļƢLjɆëǁëļŒëĈŒėɆ ƢŨɆĈėĉŨśėɆëŝɆļŝƖƢƎƪĉƢŨƎɆįŨƎɆƢķėɆƪƋĉŨśļŝİɆ{ƋėƎëƢļŨŝɆ¶{© ɆǦǧɆĐėƋŒŨLjśėŝƢșɆLėɆƎėĉŨśśėŝĐėĐɆ ƢķëƢɆQɆƖķŨƪŒĐɆƢëŏėɆƋëƎƢɆļŝɆƢķėɆĉŨƪƎƖėɆĈėĉëƪƖėɆļƢɆļƖɆȻëɆŨŝĉėɆļŝɆëɆŒļįėƢļśėɆŨƋƋŨƎƢƪŝļƢLjȼɆëŝĐɆķėɆƢķŨƪİķƢɆ QɆǂŨƪŒĐɆĈėɆƢķėɆƎļİķƢɆƋėƎƖŨŝɆįŨƎɆƢķėɆƎŨŒėșɆ LjɆLCpl Liam Whitbread

ƢļśėɆƪŝĐėƎƢëŏļŝİɆƢķėɆĉŨƪƎƖėɆśLjɆĉŨŝǘĐėŝĉėɆĐėǁėŒŨƋėĐɆ and I found that many of my weaknesses eventually turned into strengths. The K2F course is a brilliant course to take part in, it will push you to your limits and certainly help to develop leadership attributes.

After progressing from this course, I then moved onto the O2F course which is a week-long Canoeing Foundation course. The course is very similar to the K2F apart from there are different paddle strokes and styles of rescue. On completion the O2F course, you can decide whether to take the kayaking or canoeing route. I decided to go down the kayaking route as I found it more challenging and the following two weeks ahead of me were for further development with a focus on improving my technical ability in the kayak and knowledge in the classroom.

The lessons in the classrooms were more in-depth knowledge on the aims of AT and different teaching methods. While on the two-week development, the instructors start to build you up ready to undertake your Kayaking Instructor Level 1 course (CI1). This is the start for you as a student learning to become the instructor. We learnt how to effectively deliver the lessons that we would be teaching utilising the other students on the course.

Each day ended in the classroom learning Adventurous Leadership and Resilience Training (ALERT). This consisted of learning about the Three Pillars, familiarising ourselves with the Army

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8 PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT all the prior knowledge learnt into practice with a focus on being an instructor and delivering two ŒėƖƖŨŝƖșɆLëǁļŝİɆƋëƖƖėĐɆƢķėɆëĈŨǁėɆƍƪëŒļǘĉëƢļŨŝȚɆQɆǂëƖɆ ŝŨǂɆƍƪëŒļǘėĐɆƢŨɆĐėŒļǁėƎɆįŨƪŝĐëƢļŨŝɆŒėǁėŒɆĉŨƪƎƖėƖɆŨŝɆ Op TOSCA 34.

Leadership Code (LEADERS) and, amongst other things, covering elements of the Kolb Learning Cycle. Learning about these has given me so much śŨƎėɆŏŝŨǂŒėĐİėɆëŝĐɆĉŨŝǘĐėŝĉėɆŨŝɆĐļįįėƎėŝƢɆǂëLjƖɆ of teaching and how people learn which will help push not only myself but others through their Army careers. After achieving CI1 Instructor I then moved on to a further two-week paddle development week which was building me up ready for the K3N course. ¶ķļƖɆĉŨƪƎƖėɆļƖɆśŨƎėɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢɆëŝĐɆļŝǁŨŒǁėƖɆƋëĐĐŒļŝİɆ ŨŝɆįëƖƢȯǙŨǂļŝİɆƎļǁėƎƖɆëŝĐɆƋŒëŝŝļŝİɆƎļǁėƎɆĉƎŨƖƖļŝİƖșɆ This is one of the most challenging weeks I had in the kayak that put my skills and kayaking knowledge to the test, pushing me out of my comfort zone. The week itself was fantastic and made me want to keep pushing myself further through my kayaking career.

Upon passing the K3N course, we had a further twoweeks of paddle development and then I progressed ŨŝƢŨɆśLjɆǘŝëŒɆĉŨƪƎƖėȚɆǂķļĉķɆǂëƖɆƢķėɆbëLjëŏļŝİɆ Instructor Level 2 (CI2). This course is a much more in-depth way of teaching and is where you become a coach. Instead of it just being about the teaching and ‘fun’ types of learning, it was about focusing on the students’ needs and coming up with ideas and different lessons to develop their overall paddle ƢėĉķŝļƍƪėƖșɆQƢɆļƖɆėLJƢƎėśėŒLjɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢɆëƢɆǘƎƖƢɆǘİƪƎļŝİɆŨƪƢɆ what is going wrong with the student and how to correct them, but after more practice and observing it became easier. Passing this course involved putting

Instructor life On 27 March 2021, my journey as an instructor began. I spent the duration of the op tour at Dhekelia Barracks delivering over 13 foundation courses.

It was such a fantastic opportunity to be able to put into practice what I had learnt and teach real students. Although I was fortunate in the sense that I taught many kayakers that were already competent, there were also students that struggled ŨƎɆǂėƎėɆƢėƎƎļǘėĐɆŨįɆĈėļŝİɆƖƪĈśėƎİėĐɆƪŝĐėƎɆǂëƢėƎɆ in the kayaks. I found teaching them the most rewarding and as a team we worked together to give 댌ɆƢķėɆƖƢƪĐėŝƢƖɆĉŨŝǘĐėŝĉėɆļŝɆśŨǁļŝİɆįŨƎǂëƎĐɆëŝĐɆ managing their comfort, stretch and panic zones. I believe that due to our great teaching abilities we managed to gain a 100% pass rate of students ëĉķļėǁļŝİɆƢķėļƎɆįŨƪŝĐëƢļŨŝɆƍƪëŒļǘĉëƢļŨŝƖșɆQƢɆśëŏėƖɆśėɆ extremely proud to see the students achieve what they never thought they could manage whether that ĈėɆĈƪļŒĐļŝİɆƢķėļƎɆĉŨŝǘĐėŝĉėɆļŝɆŨƎĐėƎɆƢŨɆëĉķļėǁėɆëɆ capsize, or even more impressively being able to roll.

Lessons learnt Since the day I started my journey to becoming a CI2 Instructor, I have come a long way in developing my ability to teach different types of learners. It has allowed me to understand people in a better way and notice when they are struggling. The various courses have also given me the ability to build my own ĉŨŝǘĐėŝĉėɆƢŨɆƖƢëŝĐɆƪƋȚɆƢėëĉķɆëŝĐɆļŝƢėƎëĉƢɆǂļƢķɆëŝɆ audience, which is the main thing that I have taken away from this opportunity. These are all things I can take back to my unit and can use to help develop soldiers with their own teaching abilities. It has not been an easy ride on this journey, and I have been constantly challenged. However, it is these challenges that have enabled me to adapt my instructor techniques and allow me to empathise with how the students were feeling given that I had been through similar fears. The CI1 course was very challenging on the teaching side of kayaking and the more I taught, ƢķėɆśŨƎėɆĉŨŝǘĐėŝƢɆëŝĐɆĈėƢƢėƎɆQɆĈėĉëśėɆëƢɆƢėëĉķļŝİșɆ From being on this course and always having to throw myself in at the deep end, it has pushed my ĉŨŝǘĐėŝĉėɆëŝĐɆśLjɆƖŨŒĐļėƎļŝİɆƖŏļŒŒƖɆƢŨɆƢķėɆŝėLJƢɆŒėǁėŒșɆ I now feel comfortable and more prepared to go into the next stage of my career and the lessons I have learned alongside the skills I have developed will allow me to prosper as an instructor at a training establishment.

Being an instructor on Op TOSCA 34 made me interact with all ranks in the Army from Private to 3* General. I have learnt how to interact with all ranks ëŝĐɆǂļŒŒɆĈėɆĉŨŝǘĐėŝƢɆǂļƢķɆëŝLjŨŝėɆQɆëśɆƖƢŨŨĐɆļŝɆįƎŨŝƢɆ of when instructing. I have learnt to adapt my way of instructing to cater for individual students’ needs.

Observations My main observation and aim for the students was ƢŨɆƋƎŨśŨƢėɆƖėŒįȯĈėŒļėįɆëŝĐɆĉŨŝǘĐėŝĉėɆëƖɆśƪĉķɆëƖɆ possible. I wanted to challenge the students to push

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PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 8

themselves to the next level and be able to carry that on for the rest of their careers. I believe that feeling nervous or scared during AT is a good thing as it is a start for them to get past their fear and grow as an individual. This will mean that when the next challenge comes upon them, they know that they have the ability to push themselves to achieve their goal.

Importance of AT AT is widely used in the Army and now being an ļŝƖƢƎƪĉƢŨƎȚɆQɆĉëŝɆƖėėɆƢķėɆĈėŝėǘƢƖɆŨįɆǂķLjɆǂėɆĐŨɆļƢɆ and I believe we should receive more opportunities to gain these experiences. It is important that we are pushed out of our comfort zones as it will allow us to progress forward and become better soldiers ëŝĐɆŨįǘĉėƎƖșɆ ŒƢķŨƪİķɆ ¶ɆļƖɆĐėƖļİŝėĐɆƢŨɆĈėɆįƪŝɆLjėƢɆ challenging, individuals often do not realise just how much it is developing them. The long-term ĈėŝėǘƢɆļƖɆƢķëƢɆƢķėLjɆĉëŝɆƪƖėɆƢķėɆƢŨŨŒƖɆƢķëƢɆƢķėLjɆķëǁėɆ been taught during hardships involved in AT and

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implement them in other areas. This could just start from a Pte soldier going on a CT1 exercise and taking command of the section or being a 2IC. The skills įƎŨśɆ ¶ɆǂļŒŒɆƋƎŨǁļĐėɆśŨƎėɆĉŨŝǘĐėŝĉėȚɆĉŨƪƎëİėɆëŝĐɆ teamwork abilities in a given situation. AT could also help develop the higher ranks into how they take command and deliver future training or exercises.

DŨƎɆŨįǘĉėƎƖɆļŝɆƋëƎƢļĉƪŒëƎȚɆ ¶ɆĉëŝɆƋƎŨİƎėƖƖɆƢķŨƖėɆƢķëƢɆ ķëǁėɆƖėŒįȯĉŨŝǘĐėŝĉėɆļƖƖƪėƖɆëŝĐɆĐėǁėŒŨƋɆƢķėśɆƖŨɆ they are prepared for any commanding roles that they are appointed to in the future, and it will enable śŨƎėɆƢƎƪƖƢɆĈėƢǂėėŝɆƢķėļƎɆƢėëśƖșɆDļŝ댌LjȚɆļƢɆǂļŒŒɆĈėŝėǘƢɆ all personnel, as it will give them the skills to allow them to react more effectively by panicking less and allowing them to come up with the right solution to the task ahead. Every person will come to a point in their career where they will be under an immense amount of pressure or nerves and I hope from this article that you can see how AT will help individuals to deal with them.

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TVS Supply Chain Solutions supporting industry lives after service and advancing the MoD Mr Daniel Murphy explains how TVS SCS is paving the way for service leavers to utilise their ĉëƎėėƎɆƖŏļŒŒƖɆƢŨɆƖƪƋƋŨƎƢɆƢķėɆĐėŒļǁėƎLjɆŨįɆśƪŒƢļȯśļŒŒļŨŝȯƋŨƪŝĐɆnļŝļƖƢƎLjɆŨįɆ$ėįėŝĉėɆȩnŨ$ȪɆĉŨŝƢƎëĉƢƖɆ across the United Kingdom

What we do TVS SCS is a global organisation that has a presence across the UK, Europe and North America, Asia ëĉļǘĉȚɆQŝĐļëɆëŝĐɆ{ĉėëŝļëȚɆƋƎŨǁļĐļŝİɆėŝĐȯƢŨȯėŝĐɆ supply chain management services, including global forwarding and last-mile solutions. TVS SCS currently serves multiple sectors, including Automotive, Beverage, Rail, Utilities and Defence, working with multiple global brands.

Working at TVS SCS We are a vibrant, diverse team of approximately 18,000 with core values of trust, value, service and innovation. We always act with integrity and respect human values. We have ambitions and a clear code of ethics on how to achieve them. These values guide us in all our endeavours, including how we work every day and our approach with employees, customers, partners and our larger responsibility as global corporate citizens.

TVS SCS recruits and supports Royal Logistic Corps (RLC) staff throughout their resettlement ƢƎëŝƖļƢļŨŝɆƋėƎļŨĐɆǂļƢķɆëɆƖƢƎŨŝİɆëįǘŒļëƢļŨŝɆƢŨɆ¶ķėɆ¡d Ɇ Foundation. TVS SCS currently holds a Silver Award under the Defence Employer Recognition Scheme, ƎėǙėĉƢļŝİɆŨƪƎɆĉŨśśļƢśėŝƢɆƢŨɆƖƪƋƋŨƎƢɆėLJȯƖėƎǁļĉėɆ workers as they progress through the recruitment process and our robust internal processes that support our Defence staff.

Integrated Supply Chain Solutions TVS SCS offers end-to-end supply chain services from Consultancy and Professional Services, Product Management Solutions, Manufacturing Support, Warehousing Storage and Distribution, Transportation and Integrated Logistics, Project Logistics through to Integrated Packaging Solutions.

All supported by our Information Systems.

We address supply chain challenges for international organisations, government departments, large and medium-sized businesses and trade on an ability to reduce our client’s operating costs and ļśƋƎŨǁėɆƢķėļƎɆƋėƎįŨƎśëŝĉėɆƢķƎŨƪİķɆėįǘĉļėŝƢɆƖŨŒƪƢļŨŝƖɆ ƋƎŨǁļĐļŝİɆƢķėɆįŨŒŒŨǂļŝİɆĈėŝėǘƢƖț 5 Reduced operating costs 5ɆQśƋƎŨǁėĐɆƋėƎįŨƎśëŝĉėɆƢķƎŨƪİķɆėįǘĉļėŝĉļėƖ 5 End-to-end visibility 5 A collaborative approach to doing business 5Ɇ,įǘĉļėŝƢɆëŝĐɆƖėëśŒėƖƖɆƖŨŒƪƢļŨŝƖ 5Ɇ$ėŒļǁėƎɆǘƎƖƢȯĉŒëƖƖɆƖėƎǁļĉė 5 Growth and innovation

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Our Work with the MoD Our work within the Defence sector goes as far back as 1919. We have always provided a robust service for both the UK MoD and Private Contractors that deliver advantages in the military environment.

Today, we are supporting the shift to digital-enabled support for the MoD. We manage more than 400,000 items (NATO Stock Numbers) across a wide range of military equipment, ļŝĉŒƪĐļŝİɆëƎśŨƪƎėĐɆǘİķƢļŝİɆǁėķļĉŒėƖȚɆĉŨŝƖƢƎƪĉƢļŨŝɆ vehicles, workshop spares, warships consumables, ĉŒŨƢķļŝİȚɆįŨŨĐȚɆįƪėŒȚɆśėĐļĉëŒɆėƍƪļƋśėŝƢȚɆǘėŒĐɆĉëƢėƎļŝİȚɆ pharmaceuticals and general engineering hardware.

As part of TVS SCS’s contacts with the MoD, we are committed to providing services that simultaneously provide massive added value services.

We lead the MoD to become digitalised and provide huge cost savings that allow for money to be invested where it is needed once saved. We offer this service through a blend of our consultancy services and endto-end supply chain management.

The support we provide to the MoD’s digitalised service is handled through our in-house developed Msys suite of computer programmes and software with full MoD DART Systems accreditation. This allows us to absorb huge amounts of MoD and cleanse it for reproduction through our E-Commerce platform, saving time and money at every step.

Technical Innovation Technology is constantly changing the world, and it has shaped the way industries operate. With increasing technological advancements in the logistics and supply chain industry, TVS SCS has evolved as a Digital First Supply Chain Solutions Provider. We deliver innovative and responsive IT solutions that are future proof and optimise our clients’ supply chain. We are transforming our business models in line with technology, new supply chain paradigms, and continuously evolving to keep pace with macro-economic variabilities and pandemic induced changes.

Collaboration and innovation to achieve customer goals in an accelerated fashion are the drivers of the transformation initiative. The digital solution incorporates predictive algorithms, optimisation engines and monitoring systems within every operating system to eradicate any wastage in the supply chain.

We at TVS SCS extract full value from technology.

As data, connectivity and processing power expand,

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PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 8 so do opportunities for us to create value through innovative business models, products, services and emerge as the most preferred end to end supply chain partner and collaborator in growth for our customers in line with our vision. ƎƢļǘĉļëŒɆļŝƢėŒŒļİėŝĉėɆëŝĐɆśëĉķļŝėɆŒėëƎŝļŝİ TVS SCS utilises this distinctive technology to consistently make supply chain management smarter by combining cognitive intelligence with insightful algorithms that lead to supreme operational ėįǘĉļėŝĉLjɆëŝĐɆķėŒƋɆĉƪƖƢŨśėƎƖɆƖëƢļƖįLjɆŝėǂɆëİėɆŝėėĐƖșɆ That is the staunch belief of TVS SCS for a futureproof service.

Russell Chapman and Simon Kilkenny, former RLC personnel and two of our colleagues, have provided ǘƎƖƢȯķëŝĐɆƢėƖƢļśŨŝļėƖɆŨįɆƢķėļƎɆƢļśėɆǂļƢķɆ¶Ô©Ɇ© ©Ɇ and the journey that led them to work with us after retiring from service.

Story of transition - WO1 Russell G Chapman RLC

I was recommended a role working on the Future Maritime Support Programme (FMSP). This role was very close to the Operations Director on the Portsmouth Naval Base as the Supervising Intelligent Customer (Assurance) for Alongside Services. I thoroughly enjoyed this position, especially the collaboration and reaching milestones within the project. For me personally, I enjoyed steering, bringing to life the intelligent customer services and output for Alongside Services for the Royal Navy. I was always learning from experience, recording progress and communicating with my fellow team members.

TVS SCS offered support mechanisms throughout, and I would keep in close contact with my Account Manager Stuart Minshull who always listened to any concerns I had through the project, both professionally and personally. As my initial contract ended, I was offered a new project role working closely with Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S) personnel on health checking all platforms to ensure all information is correct for the MoD and end-users. It is still early in the project but we are making good progress.

TVS SCS has empowered me to utilise my skill sets and to build strong relationships across the MoD, DE&S and other Defence support contractors. I am working from home and trusted to provide output, with the occasional routine visit to Abbey Wood to work in partnership with our counterparts in the project. Work-life balance I feel is pivotal to all service leavers and my employers have fully supported me.

I feel I have now turned a corner and I am back on track to pass on, enjoy and work with others after leaving the Armed Forces. Our career experiences in the Armed Forces will never go away! It’s how we can manage them, and TVS SCS has given me that opportunity to do so."

Simon Kilkenny, Supply Chain Manager – TVS SCS Simon is a former RLC Logistic Specialist; he completed 24 years colour service, achieving the rank of WO2. Upon leaving The RLC in September 2019, he gained employment through a consultancy agency. He was given a short-term contract for a

"I retired from The RLC in May 2020, directly in the middle of the COVID-19 outbreak. I found myself working as a Logistic Manager. I had ambitions for this new role like every other service leaver and thought the company would grasp the Army’s attributes and leadership tenets. However, there was uncertainty with resources, which strained output, and the culture was particularly challenging. It is so hugely different from what we are used to in the military workplace. I ĉķŨƖėɆƢŨɆśŨǁėɆŨŝɆëŝĐɆǘŝĐɆëɆŝėǂɆƎŨŒėșɆ After joining another company, I found myself in the same situation. I decided to work for myself and use my service experience from The RLC working as a Mechanical Handling Instructor. This was positive, enjoyable and meeting different people each day was a bonus. After several months of establishing myself, I realised I had a lot more to offer with my skill set gained over 24 years’ service, so I started to reach out to my network, and that is when I found TVS SCS.

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role in MoD Abbey Wood as a Supply Chain Manager (SCM) working within the Inventory Improvement Programme (IIP). A subsequent contract extension was offered on the same programme and this lasted until January 2020. Following this, Simon decided to try his hand at a more civilianised role and found a position as the Regional Logistics Manager (South West & Wales) for a Rail Automation company. This role, however, only lasted for four months, mainly due to the almost daily drive to Wales and other areas.

Whilst looking for a new job, he found an SCM role with TVS SCS and was fortunately offered a position.

In July 2021 Simon commenced his employment with TVS and deployed as a consultant working alongside the MoD through a Government Defence framework. ©ļśŨŝɆëĉĉėƋƢėĐɆƢķėɆƎŨŒėȚɆëŒĈėļƢɆƎėŒƪĉƢëŝƢŒLjɆëƢɆǘƎƖƢȚɆ as he found his previous role as a contractor rather isolating; although he did work alongside many exmilitary personnel, he felt that there was very little in the way of a support network and you were simply

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referred to as a ‘contractor’. This perception, however, has changed since his employment with TVS SCS which has been very supportive and is a company that understands what is engrained in the DNA of a service leaver. TVS SCS have guided Simon and assisted him in building his knowledge base, which has enabled him to make certain informed decisions about his employment career and future. Simon now ǘŝĐƖɆķļśƖėŒįɆėśƋŒŨLjėĐɆëƖɆëɆĈƪƖļŝėƖƖɆĉŨŝƖƪŒƢëŝƢȚɆ delivering supply chain and data activities back into the MoD in support of a multi-million-pound support contract.

Conclusion TVS SCS wants to support those who make vast ƖëĉƎļǘĉėƖɆǂķļŒƖƢɆĐėƋŒŨLjėĐɆĈLjɆėŝƖƪƎļŝİɆƢķėLjɆëƎėɆİļǁėŝɆ appropriate care and guidance as they reintegrate into civilian life; this includes employment within our supply chain and other assistance where required. As TVS SCS grows from strength to strength, acquiring more Defence contracts, we will be looking to recruit more veterans through The RLC Foundation and utilise the full range of exceptional experiences that we know can be found through service leavers.

If anyone is interested in having an open discussion about the roles we are recruiting for, please contact Calum Poulter, who can be reached at: Calum.

Poulter@tvsscs.com and we will be happy to assist you with any queries you may have.

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PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 8

Military Logistics: A Literature Review Military students reading logistics at the University of Lincoln frequently pose questions on what ƢķėɆśŨƖƢɆļŝǙƪėŝƢļëŒɆŨƎɆëƋƋƎŨƋƎļëƢėɆŒļƢėƎëƢƪƎėɆļƖɆįŨƎɆƢķėļƎɆƖƢƪĐļėƖșɆ¶ŨɆëĐĐƎėƖƖɆƢķļƖɆĉŨŝĉėƎŝɆëŝĐɆĈƪļŒĐɆëɆ ĈŨĐLjɆŨįɆŏŝŨǂŒėĐİėɆŨįɆśļŒļƢëƎLjȚɆƢķļƖɆëƎƢļĉŒėɆëļśƖɆƢŨɆŨįįėƎɆļŝƖļİķƢɆįƎŨśɆëɆƖLjƖƢėśëƢļĉɆŒļƢėƎëƢƪƎėɆƎėǁļėǂșɆ

By Mr Tony Clark, University of Lincoln ¶ķļƖɆëƎƢļĉŒėɆƖƋėĉļǘĉ댌LjɆëĐĐƎėƖƖėƖɆƢķėɆƎėƖėëƎĉķɆ processes, the available literature and the core ideas embedded in them. This short article is a summary of a lengthy literature review and does not therefore attempt to explore the main concepts emerging from the selected literature. The aim is twofold; to offer readers a broad view of some of the available logistic literature and highlight some study themes by linking them to a commercial supply chain model. Ultimately, it is hoped that this analysis will act as a catalyst for individuals to develop a structured framework for a personal reading programme.

To offer a panoramic view of the development of the literature, the work draws on the Supply Chain Operations Reference (SCOR) to create a framework for the investigation. Embedded into the literature review are linkages to the six elements of the Your Company (Image 2). These can be seen as headings within the review. This enables the development of the discussions surrounding the military supply chain (SC) to be set within a context of commercial and academic viewpoints. The use of the SCOR also offers an opportunity to create a holistic conceptual view of the military literature. This panoramic view is shown in Image 3.

Methodological Approach The research methods adopted within the literature review are summarized in Image 1 (a full bibliography is available on request). This paper has adopted a basic mixed and iterative approach to the literature review as outlined by Saunders et al (2019) and adheres to the 3 stage systematic process outlined by ¶ƎëŝǘėŒĐɆet al (2003) building on Moher et al (2015) of Planning, Conduct and Dissemination.

This review develops a knowledge map of the location of military and Defence logistics and is shown below. This is linked to Image 1 which explores the genres in detail.

Military Logistics Development Gropman (1993, p.339) argues that history offers a view of logistics, which can still impart contemporary lessons. These enduring lessons for military logistics are, “…how to know what you need and how to get it where you need it when you need it.”. He goes onto posit: “Logistics issues of the World War II European theatre of operations are still relevant today. ….. Echoes of the past [can be] clearly heard in discussions…The lyrics may have changed but the melody remains the same.“ (p.392) While warfare is as old as man and the tactical engagements well documented, the articulation of logistics is, by comparison, limited. Sun Tzu (writing over 2000 years ago) describes the martial ëƋƋŒļĉëƢļŨŝɆŨįɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉƖɆļŝɆëŝĉļėŝƢɆ ķļŝëɆȩEƎļįǘƢķȚɆ 1971), Engles (1980) and Roth (1993) offers a similar analysis for the armies of ancient Europe. Jomini and Clausewitz are two of the very few who broach some logistic aspects of the Napoleonic era (1803 -15) (Van Creveld, 2007) while Pagonis explores Iraq (1992) and Clement Afghanistan (2014). Hess (2017, p.xi) expresses this gap in logistic study where: “Everyone accepts the fact that armies cannot exist unless they are fed, supplied and move to meet the enemy, but relatively few historians seem interested ļŝɆǘŝĐļŝİɆŨƪƢɆķŨǂɆƢķėƖėɆŝėĉėƖƖëƎLjɆİŨëŒƖɆŨįɆśļŒļƢëƎLjɆ operations actually worked.”

Image 1

Image 2

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Image 3

Kane (2001, p.1) echoes this view summarising that, “…for every thousand books published on military strategy, one deals with logistics.” Lynn (1993) and Van Creveld (2007) argue that this absence is partially addressed by the growing interest in the topic of military logistics which is represented by publications from authors such as Maginniss (2018), Macdonald (2019) and Black (2021).

The western written theory of military logistics starts within the Napoleonic era and has strong links to the growth of professional military study.

Logistic texts establishing their own terms, often ƖƢëƎƢɆǂļƢķɆƢķėɆĐėǘŝļƢļŨŝɆŨĈƢëļŝėĐɆįƎŨśɆ`ŨśļŝļȼƖɆ Art of War: “The practical art of moving armies” ȩ¶ķŨƎƋėȚǤǬǫǩȚɆƋșLJǁļļļȜɆ ƎėĈļŒļĉʷȚɆǥǣǣǩȚɆƋșǤǩǥȪșɆ`ŨśļŝļɆ is seen by many as the ‘operational thinker’ of ƢķėɆpëƋŨŒėŨŝļĉɆėƎëɆȩ ƎėĈļŒļĉʷȚɆǥǣǣǩȪșɆ ƖɆƖƪĉķȚɆķļƖɆ ƋƎëĉƢļĉëŒɆëƋƋŒļĉëƢļŨŝɆƢŨɆǂëƎɆǘİķƢļŝİɆƪŝĐėƎƋļŝƖɆƢķėɆ

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nature of logistics as a practical task to move and feed armies. The replication of Jomini’s ideas within the Thorpe’s publication, which examines the war ļŝɆǤǬǤǪȚɆƎėǙėĉƢƖɆƢķėɆŒëĉŏɆŨįɆĐėǁėŒŨƋśėŝƢɆļŝɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉɆ thinking. For Thorpe, “… the military themselves know next to nothing about logistics.” (1986, p.1). Thorpe relies on the grand strategy thinking of Clausewitz to make the historical link and develops a working ĐėǘŝļƢļŨŝɆĈLjɆļŝįėƎƎļŝİɆƢķėɆƎŨŒėɆŨįɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉƖɆļƖɆƋëƎƢɆŨįɆ the conduct of war, aligning to tactics and strategy. ¶ķėɆŝėLJƢɆƖļİŝļǘĉëŝƢɆĐėǁėŒŨƋśėŝƢɆļŝɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉƖɆƢķļŝŏļŝİɆ comes post WWII with the writing of Eccles (1959).

Paparone and Topic (2014) call Eccles the Clausewitz of Logistics. For their editorial in the US Army Sustainment Journal, Eccles is seen as a constant relevant source of logistics principles. Eccles considers logistics as acting as the bridge from the industrial home base to the frontline. He makes the point that

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PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 8

ĉŨŝǙļĉƢƖɆķëǁėɆëŝɆëļśɆǂķļĉķɆļƖɆëĉķļėǁėĐɆƢķƎŨƪİķɆƢķėɆ exercise of power upon an enemy. He sees logistics as the creator of that power and as the means to sustain forces in the action of enforcing that power describing its function where: “Logistics is the provision of the physical means by which power is exercised by organised forces.

In military terms, it is the creation and sustainment support of combat forces and weapons. Its objective is maximum sustained combat effectiveness.” (Eccles, 1959, p.22) The next evolution in logistics literature comes with the seminal work of Van Creveld (Kane, 2001; Bury, 2020). It is interesting to see that the lead book on military logistics in the modern era, Van Creveld’s Supplying War, uses Jomini to come to a very general, ŨǁėƎŒLjɆƖļśƋŒļǘėĐȚɆǁļėǂɆŨįɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉƖɆëƖț “The practical art of moving armies and keeping them supplied.” (Van Creveld, 2007, p.1) This seems to indicate the stagnation of logistics thinking within the academic world. Van Creveld’s contribution to contemporary logistic understanding ļƖɆŝŨƢɆļŝɆķļƖɆĐėǘŝļƢļŨŝɆĈƪƢɆķļƖɆśŨĐėƎŝļƖëƢļŨŝɆŨįɆ logistics thought, and its catalyst for further study ȩ ƪƎLjȚɆǥǣǥǣȪșɆQŝɆëɆǁėƎLjɆŝëƎƎŨǂɆǘėŒĐȚɆķļƖɆǂŨƎŏɆŨįƢėŝɆ forms the natural starting point for most modern academic studies of military logistics.

Kane (2001) and Bury (2020) return to Van Creveld and uses his ideas to build their own models of logistics thinking, critiquing Van Creveld’s view of the ad hoc nature of logistics planning and control in war. Kane moves away from Van Creveld’s outlook to emphasise the role of detailed logistics planning as a war winning ƢëƖŏȚɆƋŨƖƢƪŒëƢļŝİɆëɆśŨƎėɆƖĉļėŝƢļǘĉɆëŝĐɆëŝëŒLjƢļĉëŒɆ approach to military logistics. For Kane, the role of logistics is ultimately the delivery of the maximum combat power, yet he acknowledges that it also acts more abstractly as a means to develop tactical and strategic opportunities. Kane recognises this relationship between logistics and opportunity where: “The fact that both logistics and opportunity can appear in many guises merely means that those who wish to understand strategic affairs must learn to look beyond technical facts and interpret military operations in terms of what commanders might hope to do (opportunity) and how they might assemble the means to do it (logistics).” (Kane, 2001, p.173) SCOR Plan Military Strategy and Logistics The review of the literature starts with an assessment of the need for strategy and logistics to be aligned. ¶ķėɆĐėĈëƢėɆŨǁėƎɆƢķėɆƎŨŒėɆëŝĐɆļŝǙƪėŝĉėɆŨįɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉƖɆ on military strategy is not new (Uttley and Kinsey, 2018), Roth (1999), Engles (1978), Whitehall Papers (2000a) and Dee (2020) all argue that for ancient western armies the role of logistics ļŝǙƪėŝĉėĐɆƖƢƎëƢėİLjșɆDŨƎɆƢķėɆŨƋėƎëƢļŨŝ댌LjɆįŨĉƪƖėĐɆ Jomini (reprint, 2008), the debate revolves around the trilogy of logistics, tactics and strategy, where logistics offers the bridge between the latter two. For the grand strategy view, Clausewitz (Howard and Paret, 1984) is seen as offering a link between the people, government and the army. For this strategic position, each factor supported the other to achieve aims, including the provision of military assets and sustainment. This view would be familiar to Eccles

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(1959) where logistics acts as the bridge between the home base (people) and the front line (army), įƪŒǘŒŒļŝİɆİŨǁėƎŝśėŝƢɆƋŨŒļĉLjșɆDŨƎɆÕÕQQɆƢķļŝŏėƎƖɆƖƪĉķɆ as Huston (1965), Eccles (1959), Ruppenthal (1958a; 1958b) and Gropman (1993), logistics becomes an enabler of strategy. They all express what Eccles argues for where, “…logistics assumes the character of a dynamic force, without which the strategic conception is simply a paper plan.” (1959, p.30).

This “total war” view of logistics is also applicable to limited operations. For Kane (2001), Shrader (2015) and Nash (2020), the war in Vietnam is seen through the eyes of the Viet Cong and they argue that their ability to maintain the Ho Chi Minh Trail was a strategic enabler. This position is of value as it offers a view of the role and relationship of strategy and logistics within a war which was not based on traditional front lines. An inclusive view of ŒŨİļƖƢļĉƖɆëĉƎŨƖƖɆƢķėɆįƪŒŒɆƖƋėĉƢƎƪśɆŨįɆĉŨŝǙļĉƢɆƢķėƎėįŨƎėɆ could conclude that, “Logistics is the provision of the physical means by which power is exercised…”

(Eccles, 1959, p.22).

The Military Logistics Theory Debate Lynn (1993), Hess (2017) and Kane (2001) argue that Van Creveld (2007) is the main catalyst for military logistics theory. Van Creveld makes the argument that despite the essential need to supply militaries, logistic planning has little impact on the outcomes of campaigns. For example, he argues that despite the detailed planning and resources allocated to the Normandy campaign, logistics became an inhibiting factor for the Allies in the breakout stage. Van Creveld sees the strategic position of logistics as being linked to individual actions and the ability of the force to be reactive. This has echoes of the debate over the art and science of logistics (Thorpe,1986).

This view is critiqued by the Whitehall Papers (2000b) and Kane (2001) who argue that detailed planning can be applied and result in success. This poses a challenge in identifying whether it is planning or individual innovation which creates the military logistics advantage. For Kress (2016), there is a need to combine these positions. He sees a role for cognitive thought which is applied to functional and practical activities. This cognitive view of logistics is echoed in much of the UK Defence doctrine where the, ȹȝdŨİļƖƢļĉļëŝɆŝėėĐƖɆƢŨɆĈėɆëİļŒėȚɆǁėƎƖëƢļŒėȚɆǙėLJļĈŒėɆ and professionally skilled to guarantee success on operations.” (RAF Logistics, 2020, p.14).

SCOR Enable Military Supply Chain Strategy Drivers Rutner’s et alɆȩǥǣǤǥȪɆƎėǁļėǂɆŨįɆŒļƢėƎëƢƪƎėɆļĐėŝƢļǘėƖɆƢķėɆ changing face of military logistics as it progresses from planned logistic support through prepared infrastructure for large armies to more agile logistic support to sustain expeditionary warfare. Kress ȩǥǣǤǩȪɆĉŨŝǘƎśƖɆƢķļƖɆƋŨƖļƢļŨŝɆëŝĐɆƖėėƖɆƢǂŨɆƖƢLjŒėƖɆŨįɆ ŒŨİļƖƢļĉɆƖƪƋƋŨƎƢȚɆƢķėɆǘƎƖƢɆļƖɆśëƖƖɆŨƎļėŝƢëƢėĐɆȯɆƢķļƖɆļƖɆ having vast amounts of inventory available to deliver sustainment - the “Iron Mountain” of Gropman (1993) and Pagoins (1982). However, his second view is a drive for velocity orientated logistics and this is about the development of rapid and accurate ‘just in time’ deployment of resources to achieve the military effect (O’Donohue, 2019, Kosal, 2019). Peternelj,

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ëŝĐɆbƪƎėĉļĎɆȩǥǣǤǬȪɆķëǁėɆëŒƖŨɆëƎİƪėĐɆƢķëƢɆǂķļŒƖƢɆƢķėɆ Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has impacted every facet of military thinking and execution of ƋŨǂėƎȚɆļƢƖɆļŝǙƪėŝĉėɆķëƖɆ“…evolve[ed] into major changes in technology, doctrine and organization.” (p.161). Erbel and Kinsey (2015) argue that with the growth of the complexity of weapons recognised by the RMA, there has been a need to align to a revolution in military logistics (RML). The RML is seen as a progressive incremental transformation of military logistics (Anderson and Farrand, 2000). Its current position centralises the role of distributionbased logistics which puts velocity as the preferred method of exercising logistic support, supplanting the focus on supply (Kosal, 2019; Institute of Land Warfare, 2000). In so doing, the current view of the RML puts the total force at the centre of logistics drawing on a range of stakeholders including commercial partners across all logistics activities (O’Donohue, 2019; Kosal, 2019). The position for UK Defence is an emerging view, which sees the development of new logistics strategy and theory to better meet the need of the customer.

This has impacted the development of the military supply chain. While searching for effective logistics ƖƢƎëƢėİLjȚɆƢķėɆśļŒļƢëƎLjɆķëǁėɆƢŨɆĈëŒëŝĉėɆėįǘĉļėŝĉLjșɆ ƢɆ ƢļśėƖɆƢķėɆŝėėĐɆįŨƎɆėįǘĉļėŝĉLjɆëŝĐɆėįįėĉƢļǁėŝėƖƖɆëƎėɆ seen as contradictory demands (Foxton, 1994, Thorpe 1986, Ballentine, 1998). Skipper et al (2016, p.35) argue, ȹQŝĉƎėëƖļŝİɆƢķėɆėįǘĉļėŝĉLjɆëŝĐɆėįįėĉƢļǁėŝėƖƖɆ of the distribution network is a key objective of the military.” So, the challenge for UK Defence is establishing a credible balance between effectiveness ëŝĐɆėįǘĉļėŝĉLjɆȩ©śļƢķȚɆǥǣǤǫȚɆƋșǩǨȪșɆ¶ķļƖɆĉƎėëƢėƖɆëɆ contradiction for the supply chain which must offer a point of differentiation, effectively decoupling both objectives. This offers the context for the exploration of military logistics through the SCOR model.

SCOR Make SCOR Overview SCOR Make is explored as the need to construct individual SCs to support the deployed military įŨƎĉėșɆQƢɆƎėǙėĉƢƖɆëɆƋƎŨŌėĉƢȯĈëƖėĐɆǁļėǂɆŨįɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉƖɆļŝɆ which each military deployment is supported with a uniquely manufactured sustainment operation. While each unique SC is based on doctrine, it is created and ĐėǁėŒŨƋėĐɆƢŨɆƎėǙėĉƢɆƢķėɆŝƪļƖëŝĉėɆŨįɆėëĉķɆĐėƋŒŨLjśėŝƢɆ and its unique demands.

Doctrine For the UK, military doctrine articulates the processes which are used to build and sustain the logistics bridge (MOD, 2015, p.3). This offers a prescribed approach to the construction of the process (Uttley and Kinsey, 2014, p.403). It could be argued that this directed approach creates a SC with a degree of ļŝǙėLJļĈļŒļƢLjȚɆëɆƋŨƖļƢļŨŝɆĉƎļƢļƍƪėĐɆĈLjɆĉëƖėɆƖƢƪĐLjɆëƪƢķŨƎƖɆ such as Thompson (1998). A detailed view of the role of doctrine as seen by practitioners however would challenge this view. For the UK, military doctrine: “…. contains the fundamental principles that guide how military forces conduct their actions, and provides military professionals with their body of professional knowledge. It provides the armed forces with a common basis for understanding...”

(Commander Force Development, 2012, p.1-1)

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The role of guide is important, it allows the application of principles leading to a standard methodology but also permits a level of interpretation to develop the processes to meet the context at hand. This is the cognitive logistics of Kress (2016). ëİŨŝļƖɆȩǤǬǬǥȪɆƎėǙėĉƢƖɆŨŝɆƢķėɆƎŨŒėɆŨįɆĐŨĉƢƎļŝėɆįŨƎɆ the US Army in the Gulf and argues for its role as an enabler in bringing forces together whilst also allowing development. He explores the changes needed in the logistics processes witnessed in the deployment in the ǘƎƖƢɆEƪŒįɆÕëƎȚɆǂļƢķɆļƢƖɆįŨĉƪƖɆŨŝɆĐėƢėƎƎėŝĉėɆȩİėƢƢļŝİɆ ǘİķƢļŝİɆëƎśƖɆļŝɆƢķėëƢƎėɆƖǂļįƢŒLjȪɆƎëƢķėƎɆƢķëŝɆƢķėɆėLJļƖƢļŝİɆ sustainment doctrine. In this case study, doctrine only acts as a process guide to the logistics planners as they are brought together to form the logistics SC (MOD, 2015). Like UK Military Logistics Doctrine, Pagonis ȩǤǬǬǥȪɆƎėǙėĉƢƖɆƢķëƢɆĐŨĉƢƎļŝėɆļƖɆŝŨƢɆƎļİļĐɆëŝĐɆŝėėĐƖɆƢŨɆĈėɆ considered as dynamic guidelines to be manipulated to meet the demands of each new logistics project.

Military Logistics Life Cycles Within UK sustainment doctrine, the MAKE process is articulated as an individual project cyclic approach.

For the UK, at the strategic level, the cycle is Deploy, Sustain and Recover (MOD, 2015) while the Army with its single service focus has a more detailed position of Prepare, Project, Sustainment, Rehabilitation and Recover, Redeployment and Recuperation (LWDC, 2017). Each approach seems valid and the difference can be explained through the management level they support. The US perspective ǂķļĉķɆ¶ƪƢƢŒėɆȩǥǣǤǨȪɆėLJƋŒŨƎėƖɆĉŨŝǘƎśƖɆƢķėɆĉLjĉŒļĉɆŝëƢƪƎėɆ of logistics operations. The joint focus of JDP 04 offers an insight into this position when it posits that: “The Defence support chain forms the spine of logistics support to operations. The main output ŨįɆƢķėɆėƖƢļśëƢėɆļƖɆëŝɆŨƋėƎëƢļŨŝëŒɆƖƋėĉļǘĉɆ$ėįėŝĉėɆ Support Chain.” (MOD, 2015, p.65).

This suggests that each SC will be built to meet the ŝėėĐƖɆŨįɆëɆƖƋėĉļǘĉɆƋŒëŝɆƢŨɆĐėŒļǁėƎɆƢķėɆƎėƍƪļƎėĐɆśļŒļƢëƎLjɆ effect. This is evidenced by Curtis’s (2016) argument of the need to build a set of enablers to deliver what ķėɆķëƖɆļĐėŝƢļǘėĐɆëƖɆƢķėɆŒŨİļƖƢļĉƖɆėįįėĉƢșɆ¶ķļƖɆƋƎŨƋŨƖėƖɆ a “golf bag” approach in which the relevant clubs are taken from the bag based on the needs to complete ƢķėɆǁëİëƎļėƖɆŨįɆëɆƋëƎƢļĉƪŒëƎɆĉŨƪƎƖėșɆ¶ķļƖɆƎėǙėĉƢƖɆëɆ task force methodology where various force elements are assembled into a coherent group to deliver the required effect (MOD, 2015; LWDC, 2017). This is the creation and use of logistic capabilities.

Logistics Capabilities DŨƎɆƢķėɆśļŒļƢëƎLjȚɆƢķėɆƪƖėɆŨįɆǂķëƢɆļƖɆļĐėŝƢļǘėĐɆëƖɆ`ŨļŝƢɆ Logistics Enablers represent the golf club approach. ¶ķėLjɆëƎėɆĐėǘŝėĐɆëƖțɆ“…those elements and capabilities that deliver the logistics effect…” (MOD, 2015, p.51).

This offers an interesting insight into the construction of the SC needed to support military operations. The focus appears not to be on the process elements of the SC but the assets which will be needed to enable the SC. This presents a resourcebased view (RBV) of the construction of the SC. This is enacted through the assembly of the Logistics Enablers, including the cognitive logistician (Kress, 2016), to build a unique SC (Gropman, 1993). This allows intangible and tangible assets to be combined to create core logistics competency.

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PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 8 Within the development of logistics expressed in the RML, there is a growing move towards the use of external support. This is the Whole Force Approach (WFA) (RAF Logistics, 2020; Strategic Command Defence Support, 2020), which sees a combination of enablers drawn from many sources such as industry, the reserves or civilian uniformed services.

Louth (2015) articulates the need to consider these elements of the WFA and the complexity of this combination on deployed military logistics. Erbel and Kinsey (2015) see the growth of this subcontracting role as impacting the SC and its role within Defence.

Defence logisticians will need to work within the WFA to construct the appropriate supply chain consisting of many different entities into a single whole to create ëŝɆėįǘĉļėŝƢɆëŝĐɆėįįėĉƢļǁėɆśļŒļƢëƎLjɆƖƪƋƋŒLjɆĉķëļŝș SCOR Source Platform Centric Procurement At the strategic level, the procurement focus within the MoD has become platform centric. For Smith (2018) logistics is about the provision of service ƢŨɆƋŒëƢįŨƎśƖșɆEŒëƖɆėƢɆëŒɆȩǥǣǤǦȚɆƋșǬǫȪɆĉŨŝǘƎśƖɆƢķļƖɆ position and sees the role of logistics as an enabler of the performance of the platform, indeed they argue military logistics, “…is not intended to ensure an ėįįėĉƢļǁėɆëŝĐɆėįǘĉļėŝƢɆǙŨǂɆŨįɆİŨŨĐƖɆëƖɆļŝɆƢķėɆƋƎļǁëƢė industry… rather military logistics has to ensure mission capabilities...”. This is echoed throughout history from the provision of arrows (munitions) to the longbow (weapon platform) in the battle of Agincourt to the procurement of armoured vehicles (weapon and transport platform) to protect soldiers in Afghanistan.

Traditional Procurement versus Performance Based Logistics Such positions have seen the MOD (Glas, 2013; Holmbon, 2014; Stone, 2017; Shelton, 2000) striving for a new means of procurement. Typically, this has been equipment purchased through whole life support mechanisms (Smith 2018, Stone, 2017; Jette, 2018). This approach is based on a review of the estimated support needs of the platform throughout its anticipated life. For Block et al (2014) this links back to what he calls product lifecycle management (PLM) in which the whole life of the platform is considered and planned. Here we see the capacity to deliver the required effect being linked to ëɆƋŒëƢįŨƎśɆǂļƢķɆëɆĐėǘŝėĐɆŒļįėɆĉLjĉŒėșɆDŨƎɆ`ėƢƢėɆȩǥǣǤǫȚɆ p.14) “The earlier integration of weapon system and product support package design” the more robust the sustainment operations which support the platform.

From a maintenance view, this can be the provision of both spare parts and consumable items (Smith, 2018). For authors such as Thompson (1998) and Privratsky (2014), it is the provision of the combat supplies needed to deliver the military effect. Their focus on the operational and tactical level considers “feeding” the platform as the strategy enabler provided by logistics.

Demand Management “Reduced to its basic essence, the goal of supply chain management is very simple - to try to match supply and demand.” (Christopher, 2016, p.95) Kress (2016), Smith (2018) and Moore (2014)

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śŨǁėɆƢķļƖɆƋŒëƢįŨƎśɆƖƪƋƋŨƎƢɆĐėĈëƢėɆƢŨɆƎėǙėĉƢɆŨŝɆƢķėɆ difference between predicted demand and actual ĐėśëŝĐșɆbƎėƖƖɆƖėėƖɆëɆƎŨŒėɆįŨƎɆƢķėɆļĐėŝƢļǘĉëƢļŨŝɆ of real demand to be used to close the lead time gap but accepts that this is often hidden by the nuances of military operations which might be subjected to the vagaries of the fog of war (Gropman, 1993; Ruppenthal, 1958b). Smith (2018) takes a śŨƎėɆķŨŒļƖƢļĉɆǁļėǂɆëŝĐɆƖėėƖɆëɆĐļįǘĉƪŒƢLjɆļŝɆëĉƢƪ댌LjɆ identifying real demand. He shows the challenge of identifying the consumption point and the paradox that this is unlikely to also be the demanding point.

In this way inventory vision is lost and consumption might be delayed giving a false view of the actual demand. This view leads Thompson (1998) and Pagonis (1992) to critique forecasting models and how they form the demand picture based on historical consumption rates. It is informative that the practitioners constantly challenge these predictions. nŨŨƎėɆȩǥǣǤǧȪɆƎėǙėĉƢƖɆŨŝɆƢķėɆƎŨŒėɆŨįɆƢķėɆĉŨśśëŝĐėƎɆ and their ambivalence to the SC. For academics and practitioners there is a need for commanders to have an “understanding of the tension between operation design and sustainment.” (Moore, 2014, p.101). Yet, the literature offers many examples of the commander ignoring the SC implications of their behaviours.

Ruppenthal (1958b), Gropman (1993) and Dye (2015) share this view of cognitive dissonance between ƢķėɆǂëƎɆǘİķƢėƎɆëŝĐɆƢķėɆƖƪƋƋŒļėƎșɆ¶ķļƖɆĐļƖƖŨŝëŝĉėɆ challenges the ability of the supply chain to make realistic demands when links between the operational customer and the logistics provider are broken.

This inability to supply breaks the trust established with the Commander and the solider (Beaumont, 2020; Follett, 2017). With the breakdown of trust the behaviours of the soldiers are impacted, leading to mistrust and hoarding at the local level. Follett (2017) ƎėǙėĉƢƖɆŨŝɆƢķėɆįëļŒƪƎėɆŨįɆƢƎƪƖƢɆëƖɆļŝķļĈļƢļŝİɆƢķėɆĈƪļŒĐļŝİɆ of the relationship with the combat arms. She sees this as leading to commanders wishing to become ƖėŒįȯƖƪįǘĉļėŝƢɆëŝĐɆļŝɆƖŨɆĐŨļŝİɆĉëƎƎLjɆȻeverything we ĉëŝɆǘƢɆļŝȼɆ(Follett, 2017, p.3). The unpredictable nature of military operations, with the aligned behaviours of those in the SC, impact the ability to capture demand.

SCOR Deliver Distribution Although there is a plethora of publications examining the effect of logistics on military campaigning, little is written about the practical strategies to deliver the inventory. Kress (2001), Tuttle (2005), Foxton (1994) and NATO (2012) all argue for the alignment of the logistics activities to enable the desired strategic and tactical position to be achieved.

Yet, the only distribution strategies outlined are push and pull techniques. Kress (2001) and Sarin (2014) argue that goods are moved towards the customer against the predicted demand – a push model (Image 4). These offer a centralised SC control system in which planned stock is issued against the predicted demand (Thompson, 1998; Kress, 2016; Sarin, 2014).

In contrast, the pull of the SC is articulated through the demands being placed by customers.

A drawback of this position offers no insight into any differentiation between the decoupling point between pull and push. Kress (2016) takes a pragmatic view. He sees the role of pull for the

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Image 4 deployed forces but acknowledges that in reality the deployed distribution is mostly based on a ƋƪƖķɆƖLjƖƢėśșɆ¶ƪƢƢŒėɆȩǥǣǣǨȪɆƎėǙėĉƢƖɆƢķļƖɆĈƪƢɆŨįįėƎƖɆ staging posts in the SC which are primed with a push mechanism but can react more quickly to a pull demand signal. These are the Depot sites of Image 4.

Smith (2018, p.68) offers a further nuance where certain commodities offer a more predictive pattern of demand and consumption and align themselves with a ȻƋƪƖķȼɆśėƢķŨĐŨŒŨİLjșɆ{ƢķėƎɆļƢėśƖȚɆƖƪĉķɆëƖɆƖƋëƎėƖɆëŝĐȦ or ancillaries which offer no discernible demand and consumption pattern, might need to be pulled towards the actual demand. Foxton (1994) recognises this and argues for a role for the forward deployment of inventory. Foxton’s writing, in the era of the Cold War, is sound but does not contribute to the challenge and drive for a small logistics footprint and the reliance on JIT as argued for by Erbel and Kinsey (2015) and Bury (2020) to meet the RML. To address this gap, Glas et al (2011) and Kosal (2019), with a focus on the role of performance based logistics, recognise the contradiction of the performance demands placed on the SC. They link back to commercial theory such as the decoupling point between lean and agile through strategic inventory (Image 5) to offer a view of how the SC might be constructed (Christopher, 2016).

They argue for the need to meet two contradictory ƋėƎįŨƎśëŝĉėɆśėëƖƪƎėƖțɆėįǘĉļėŝĉLjɆëŝĐɆėįįėĉƢļǁėŝėƖƖȚɆ which can be achieved through the division of the SC into parts, each with their own focus. This is the “two state demand pattern” which according to Bateman et al (2013, p.558) represents a: “…peace time state which is largely predictable, based around training schedules and below capacity, and a combat or “surge” state which is essentially unpredictable… but likely to be near, at, or above capacity…”.

The principles of the decoupling point are shown in Image 5.

Whole Force Approach (WFA)-Integration Van Creveld (2007) and Thompson (1998) explore the role of the contractor in the provision of military logistics. The focus here is on the provision of ļŝǁėŝƢŨƎLjɆƢŨɆƢķėɆĐėƋŒŨLjėĐɆįŨƎĉėșɆnëĉĐŨŝëŒĐɆƢLjƋļǘėƖɆ this with her study of catering for the British Army (2020, 2019, 2014).

For the UK military, the WFA has been adopted as means to embed the industrial base in current operations (MOD 2015, LWDC 2017; RAF Logistics, 2020; Strategic Command Defence Support, 2020).

Moore (2014, p.9) sees this as the development of “end to end support” which adopts “...a planned mix of military and civilian individuals and organisations”.

Within the US Military, this view is captured as the Joint Logistics Environment (JLEnt), which integrates the total force into logistics operations ëŝĐɆļƖɆĐėǘŝėĐɆëƖț “… a multitiered matrix of key global logistics providers co-operatively structured through an assortment of collaborative agreements, contracts, policy, legislation, or treaties utilized to provide the best possible support to the JFC or other supported organization.” O’Donohue (2019, p.ix) Anthill and Smith (2017) attribute the move to WFA, in part, to the change to a platform centric view which embeds support into the whole life of the platform. This draws the industrial base into the military SC through the contractual arrangements to ëĉķļėǁėɆėįǘĉļėŝĉLjɆëŝĐɆėįįėĉƢļǁėŝėƖƖșɆdļŏėǂļƖėȚɆ$ëǁļĐƖɆ ėƢɆëŒɆȩǥǣǤǤȪɆėLJƋŒŨƎėƖɆëƪƖƢėƎļƢLjȚɆŨįįėƎļŝİɆëŝɆėįǘĉļėŝĉLjɆ lens, as a driver to stretch the Defence pound as far as possible. A position endorsed even for the US (Shelton, 2000). Smith (2018) develops this to explore

Image 5

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PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 8 the role of contracting for capability. In this situation the WFA is adopted to create an outsourced service.

Team Leidos is seen as an example of this across UK Defence (Leidos Presentation, 2019).

While Anthill and Smith (2017) accept the role of the WFA, although they develop the debate to explore its limitations, particularity for land forces where the contractor may be exposed to enemy action. This they argue exposes the military to the need to risk assess the role and contribution of the WFA. This imposes limitations on the use of the contractor. Aligned with this risk is the competition between the contractor and the military. Louth (2015) and Smith (2012) identify a need to coordinate and govern these networks so that they support each other and avoid competition for limited resources.

This position is reinforced within the work of Ashurst and Beaumont (2020) who explore interoperability within logistics for the US and Australian forces. This view captures the role of Logistics Fratricide. This is explained as the competition for resources which both allies want. When there is not enough to meet the demand, some form of rationing will be required.

SCOR Return The military practitioner also has a focus on the reverse SC. The role it plays in the expeditionary logistics’ life cycle is explored above under the UK title of recover. For the military, it is about the ability to reform the deployed force for future activities (LWDC, 2017). This can be clearly observed at the platform level where equipment is recovered, refurbished and maintained (Smith, 2018; Smith, 2014), but also at the people level, where personnel are recovered

through rest and “decompression” activities to return to a normal state (LWDC, 2017; Baker and Schroden, 2021) and at the inventory level where stock is triaged, recovered and put back to stock (Pagonis, 1992).

Conclusion ¶ķļƖɆëƎƢļĉŒėɆķëƖɆļĐėŝƢļǘėĐɆĉŨƎėɆƢķėśėƖɆėśėƎİļŝİɆ from a systematic literature review. These have been linked directly to the SCOR model. With Image 2, the concepts of military logistics have been directly linked to commercial supply chain practises. ,śėƎİėŝƢɆƢķėśėƖɆǂķļĉķɆƎėǙėĉƢɆëŝĐɆƎėƖŨŝëƢėɆǂļƢķɆ the challenges being faced by the Defence logistician ķëǁėɆĈėėŝɆļĐėŝƢļǘėĐɆëŝĐɆėLJƋŒŨƎėĐșɆQŝɆƖļśƋŒėɆƢėƎśƖȚɆ these are the need to identify the appropriate logistics strategy which will create a bespoke supply chain. This in turn will deliver the required sustainment to enable the required military effect to be delivered. Underpinning this is the constant need for the logistician to apply their cognitive skills to the tangible assets used to enable the supply ĉķëļŝɆëĉƢļǁļƢļėƖșɆ¶ķėɆǘŝëŒɆĉķ댌ėŝİėɆļŝɆĉƎėëƢļŝİɆëŝĐɆ managing the military supply chain is the need ƢŨɆĈëŒëŝĉėɆėįǘĉļėŝĉLjɆǂļƢķɆėįįėĉƢļǁėŝėƖƖșɆ ėƎķëƋƖɆ appropriately for a literature review, this paper should conclude with a quote: “Key characteristics of the function of Defence logistics, therefore, seem to revolve around some kind of organisational imperative to deliver people and equipment from here to there, against a purposeful, considered strategy or plan, and then to sustain them for the duration of an operation, recovering them thereafter” (Louth, 2015, p.58).

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Endnotes Includes 2 multiple entries for same article.

Includes 2 multiple entries for same article.

3 Includes 2 multiple entries for same article.

1 2

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8 GLOSSARY OF TERMS

A-CJEF A1 EchelonɆ A2 AASR AATF AFM AFORGEN AFT APB APCs APOD AQIM ARRC AT BEF BEF BHC BLM BRITFOR BSA C-IED CADMID CAEC CAS CC CCWG CEGɆ CES CFA CGS CIGS CILT CMO COɆ COA ComdɆ COMZ COPD CPD CPOE CRP CSO CSS CSSRs CSUPs DCLPA DCOS DEC DEFRA DEMS DHL DOS

Airborne Combined Joint Expeditionary Force © Ɇ ƍƪëĐƎŨŝȦ ëƢƢėƎLjɆŨƎɆ ŨśƋëŝLjɆ©ƪƋƋŨƎƢɆ Vehicles Echelon Regimental or Battalion Support Vehicles Air Assault Support Regiment Air Assault Task Force Army Field Manual Army Force Generation Annual Fitness Test Ammunition Processing Building Armoured Personnel Carriers Air Port of Departure Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Allied Rapid Reaction Corps Ammunition Technician British Expeditionary Force British Expeditionary Force Bosnia & Herzegovina Command Black Lives Matter British Force Brigade Support Area Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Concept, Assessment, Demonstration, Manufacture, In-Service and Supply Committee on Arms Export Controls Army Continuous Attitude Survey Commissioning Course Cold Chain Working Group

Ɇ ëƎėėƎɆ,śƋŒŨLjśėŝƢɆEƎŨƪƋɆȭĉŨŒŒŨƍƪļ댌LjɆȯɆ¶ƎëĐėȮ Complete Equipment Schedule Commander Field Army Chief of the General Staff Chief of the Imperial General Staff Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport Contract Management Organisation ŨśśëŝĐļŝİɆ{įǘĉėƎɆȭ,ǧȮ Course of Action ŨśśëŝĐėƎɆȭ,ǨɆëŝĐɆëĈŨǁėȮ Communications Zone Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive Continuous Professional Development Comprehensive Preparation of the Operating Environment Crisis Response Planning Contractor Support to Operations Combat Service Support Combat Service Support Regiments Combat Supplies Defence College of Logistics, Policing and Administration Deputy Chief of Staff Defence Estates Optimisation Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Defence Explosive Munitions School Deutsche Handlung Logistik Days of Supply

128 | THE REVIEW 2022

DSCOM EBO ECHR ELC EPRON ERHF EUFOR F Echelon FMEA FOBs FOC FOE FRT FTC GCHQ GDP GLOC GRU HADR HET HMMWV HQ ICBM IFOR IR ISAF ISO JADTEU JEFLB JLTV JMC JNCOɆ JOFS JSP JTF KFOR LAN LFP LSR LTNA LW(AP)RC MACA MG MHE MIV MLETɆ MLRS MOD MScɆ MSP NAC NAOɆ NASA NATO NCOsɆ NCSC NEM

Defence Supply Chain Operations and Movements Effects Based Operations European Convention on Human Rights Enhanced Learning Credits Special Expedition for Underwater Works Equipment Redeployment Hub Forward European Force Fighting Echelon Failure Mode Effect Analysis Forward Operating Bases Full Operating Capability Future Operating Environment Forward Repair Team Forces Troop Command Government Communications Headquarters Gross Domestic Product Ground Line of Communication Russian military intelligence Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Heavy Equipment Transporter High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle Headquarters Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile Implementation Force International Relations International Security Assistance Force International Standards Organisation Joint Air Delivery Test & Evaluation Unit Joint Expeditionary Force Light Brigade Joint Light Tactical Vehicles Joint Helicopter Command `ƪŝļŨƎɆpŨŝȯ ŨśśļƖƖļŨŝėĐɆ{įǘĉėƎɆ Joint Operations Fuel Systems Joint Service Publication Joint Task Force Kosovo Force Local Area Network Logistic Focal Point Logistic Support Regiment Long-Term Non-Attender Lightweight (Air Portable) Recovery Capability Military Aid to the Civil Authorities Machine Gun Materiel Handling Equipment Mechanised Infantry Vehicle nŨĐļǘėĐɆdļİķƢɆ,ƍƪļƋśėŝƢɆ¶ƎëŝƖƋŨƎƢėƎ Multiple Launch Rocket System Ministry of Defence nëƖƢėƎɆŨįɆ©ĉļėŝĉėɆȯɆ$ėİƎėėɆ ƪëŒļǘĉëƢļŨŝ Medium Stress Platform National Aeronautical Centre pëƢļŨŝëŒɆ ƪĐļƢɆ{įǘĉė National Aeronautics and Space Administration North Atlantic Treaty Organisation pŨŝȯ ŨśśļƖƖļŨŝėĐɆ{įǘĉėƎƖ National Cyber Security Centre New Employment Model

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 8

NHS NORAD NSE NSN NT OCɆ OEM OKW Op BANNER Op CATAN Op GRITROCK Op HERRICK Op MANTA Op SERVAL Op TELIC Op TEMPERER Op TOSCA OPCOM OPEC ORBAT ORP OTX PDT PFT PJHQ PLMs PLO PPE PPTK PSI PTG PTSD QOGLR R-WMIK RA RAMC RAOC RASC RCT RDC RE REME RFA RFIs RLC RLS RMAS

National Health Service North American Aerospace Defence Command National Support Unit NATO Stock Number Non Taskworthy {įǘĉėƎɆ ŨśśëŝĐļŝİɆȭ,ǦɆëŝĐɆĈėŒŨǂȮ Original Equipment Manufacturer Oberkommando der Wehrmacht Counter-Terrorism operations in Northern Ireland 1969 – 1998 Support to the African Union Mission Somalia (AMISOM) UK Operation to eradicate Ebola in West Africa 2014 - 2015 Operations in Afghanistan 2006-2014 French operation in Chad 1983-84 French counter-terrorist operation in Mail 2013 to date Operations in Iraq 2003 -2012 Government plan to deploy troops in support of the police UN Peace Keeping Force Cyprus Operational Command Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Order of Battle (structure of the organisation) Operational Ration Pack Overseas Training Exercise Pre-Deployment Training Personal Fitness Test Permanent Joint Headquarters Protected Logistic Movements Palestine Liberation Organisation Personal Protective Equipment Portable Petroleum Test Kit Permanent Staff Instructor Port Task Group Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Queen's Own Gurkha Logistic Regiment Revised Weapon Mounted Installation Kit Royal Artillery Royal Army Medical Corps Royal Army Ordnance Corps Royal Army Service Corps Royal Corps of Transport Regional Distribution Centre Royal Engineers Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers Royal Fleet Auxiliary Request(s) for Information The Royal Logistic Corps Rail Load Supervisor Royal Military Academy Sandhurst

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RN ROG RPAS RPN RSOI RTCH RUSI SAC SADF SARS SAT SC SCOR SCPT SDSR SFOR SHQ SIB SJC(UK) SJFLogC SME SOF SPOD SRR STURM SV(R) TACOS TCC TES TLB TLG TPTF TRP TSF UAVs UK UN UNHCR UNMISS UNPA UNPROFOR UNSCR UORs US USA USAAF VITAL VSS WFC WFI WW1Ɇ WW2Ɇ

Royal Navy Rear Operations Group Remotely Piloted Aircraft System Risk Priority Number Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration Rough Terrain Handling Equipment Royal United Services Institute American Strategic Air Command South African Defence Forces COVID-19 Senior Ammunition Technician Supply Chain Supply-Chain Operations Reference Supply Chain Pipeline Time Strategic Defence and Security Review Stabilisation Force Bosnia Herzegovina Squadron Headquarters Secret Intelligence Bureau Standing Joint Command (UK) Standing Joint Force Logistic Component HQ Subject Matter Expert Special Operations Force Sea Port of Departure Strategic Roll-on Roll-off Sustainable Training and Operational Readiness Mechanism Support Vehicle Recovery Terms and Conditions of Service Troop Commander's Course Theatre Entry Standards Top Level Budgets Theatre Logistic Group Tactical Petroleum Tank Farm Theatre Redeployment Pool Total Support Force Unmanned Aerial Vehicles United Kingdom United Nations United Nations High Commission for Refugees United Nations Mission in South Sudan United Nations Protected Area United Nations Protection Force UN Security Council Resolution Urgent Operational Requirement(s) United States United States of America United States Army Air Force Visibility In Transit Asset Logging Vehicle Supply Specialist Whole Force Concept Whole Force Initiative ÕŨƎŒĐɆÕëƎɆ{ŝėɆȭǤǬǤǧȯǤǫȮ ÕŨƎŒĐɆÕëƎɆ¶ǂŨɆȭǤǬǦǬȯǤǬǧǨȮ

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