But now a sudden and unlooked-for hitch occurred. For some time Admiral Carden's health had been giving cause for anxiety, and on the 16th a Medical Board pronounced it imperative that he should relinquish the command and go on leave. There was nothing for it but to obey. It must always be a serious loss to an enterprise, particularly to one so original in conception, that the mind that designed it should not be able to see it through to completion. Unfortunate as his breakdown was, it did not mean a complete rupture of continuity. Admiral de Robeck, who was next in command of the fleet, had had immediate charge of most of the direct operations, and had been intimately associated with his chief in preparing the plan for the grand attack. The only difficulty in passing the command to him was that Admiral Wemyss was his senior, but this was easily overcome. Admiral Wemyss, who was already absorbed in the intricate work of establishing a base at Mudros, felt that with the Allied troops arriving he was more than ever required for the work for which he had been specially selected. It was proving to be a task of the most arduous and exacting nature. He had been sent out without a staff to establish a base for the fleet and a small auxiliary force of troops in what was de facto a neutral island, with a motley Levantine population of dubious character and sympathies, for whose behaviour he was responsible as Acting Governor. He had, in fact, to create a base out of nothing and with wholly inadequate assistance; and when it is considered that, in addition to the delicate administrative and police duties, the work had to be done and its infinite difficulties overcome without offence to neutral or allied susceptibilities, it will be obvious that even for the comparatively small and simple force originally contemplated it required tact, resource, and organising ability of a high order. Now that it was a question of a base for a large Allied army, as well as an Allied fleet, and to the former difficulties were to be added all the complexities of a large combined operation, the labour promised to be beyond the power of any one coming fresh to the task. With all the existing threads in his hands. Admiral Wemyss might hope to succeed when a newcomer could scarcely escape failure. He was therefore of opinion he ought to stay where he was, and in intimating this he expressed his perfect readiness to serve under Admiral de Robeck. So the change was smoothly effected. Admiral de Robeck was given acting rank as Vice-Admiral, and Admiral Wemyss, as second-incommand, continued under his orders the excellent work he was doing at the base. But in appointing the new officer to the command the Admiralty were careful not to bind him to a plan of operations for which he was not primarily responsible. He was asked whether, on his separate and independent judgment, the proposed attack was sound, and urged not to hesitate to say if he could not approve it. He replied at once that he fully intended to carry on, and that, weather permitting, the operations approved by his predecessor and by the Admiralty, would be commenced next day (18th).
on to Naval Operations, Vol 2, Part 2 of 2 return to Naval-History.Net revised 22/11/12
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