Hill 262: How Poland Won The War

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Hill 262: How Poland Won The war Cameron Wilhelm Northern Arizona University

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Hill 262: How Poland Won The War What I Know and What I Want To Find Out For quite some time, this history books have taught us the basic causes and effects of the Second World War. They have taught us that the war began on September 1, 1939, with the german invasion of Poland, and that the Normandy landings of June 6, 1944 would bring about the fall of the Third Reich. Obviously, there is so much more than just this, but there is one crucial event that I wish to focus on in this paper: the Polish 1st Armoured Division and their dogged stand atop Hill 262. Prior to conducting formal research on the topic, my only knowledge had come from casual browsing of Wikipedia, as I am fascinated by the World Wars. The fighting at Hill 262 is some of the last to occur during the Normandy breakout, which truly began with Operation Cobra: the offensive to break free of the hedgerows and push on toward paris (Carpenter, 2002, p.6). Following the gains of Cobra, the Allies encircled the German 7th army, and elements from several others, estimated to be 175,000 troops by Carpenter (2002). British and Canadian forces approached from the North, American forces from the South, and Polish forces moved into position in the East. Much like electricity, the retreating German forces would choose the path of least resistance to escape the encirclement. In this case, they saw the Polish 1st Armoured Division as that path. (Maczek, 2006, p.18).

All of this leaves me with countless questions. Why did the German forces allow themselves to become encircled? Why were the Polish the only ones to stand in their way of escape? Most importantly, how did a single division hold off the might of hundreds of thousands of fleeing Germans? It is truly a miraculous story, that Poland was obliterated by Nazi Germany in less than a month in 1939, and how the tables turned in 1944. In this research paper, I will

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detail what truly happened at Hill 262 in August of 1944, why it affected the outcome of the war, and how it became one of the most incredible and inspiring events of the twentieth century.

My Search Process As with most internet research, mine begins on Google. Unfortunately, most sources I found were not very reliable or on-topic, such as Pinterest and Wikipedia. However, I did turn to the references section of the Hill 262 Wikipedia page. Most of the references used were books that I could not read online, some weren’t even in English. However, one source did stand out: a full account of all the Polish 1st Armoured Division’s actions during the Normandy breakout, written by the man who lead them into battle, Major-General Stanislaw Maczek. The incredible find had been republished in a 2006 issue of Canadian Military History. All of my research simply took off from there, I found numerous examples of tactical analysis of the battle, and requested articles from the Cline Library, such as Falaise: The Trap Not Sprung written by retired U.S. Army Lieutenant-Colonel Carlo D’Este.

Onto the first question: why would the German forces not escape the encirclement sooner? As it turns out, there were countless reasons, and the Germans weren’t entirely at fault, there was poor execution by the Allies as well, which lead to enormous confusion. According to Carlo D’Este (1994), American General Bradley was “fearful of a deadly collision with the Canadians” (p.61). As the American forces were positioned to the south of the Falaise Pocket, and the Canadian forces were positioned to their North, in the town of Falaise. This was only a 15 mile gap (D’Este, 1994, p.62). General Bradley was rightfully afraid of a friendly fire incident, as he had previously devised Operation Cobra, which got off to a tragic start as Allied bombing accidentally killed 110 of his men, and wounded a further 490 (D’Este, 1994, p.58).

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The Canadian attack on Falaise was slow going, having begun on August 8, they did not capture the town for more than a week. Coupled with the reluctance of American forces to move North of their position in Argentan, and British forces slowly pushing in from the East, the retreating German forces saw an easy path of retreat: the West. Essentially, Allied progress from the North and South was at a standstill, and the Germans could simply walk out of the encirclement, as British General Montgomery “proceeded to squeeze the enemy out toward the [River] Seine” (D’Este, 1994, p.64). So, the retreating German forces were not necessarily in any hurry to escape the Allied encirclement, but they were in for quite the surprise.

This is where the Polish come in. According to Maczek (2006), “The task for the day of 19 August was to attack and capture Chambois and ‘Maczuga’” (p.17). “Maczuga” (Which translates to “The Mace”) was what Major-General Maczek had named Hill 262 (D’Este, 1994, p.65). D’este (1994) states that taking the hill was viewed as an enormous honor by the Polish forces, who were mainly volunteers who had escaped the German destruction of Poland in 1939 (p.65). The Division’s task was of utmost importance, as Hill 262 dominated both the landscape below, and the only remaining highway out of the pocket (D’Este, 1994, p.65). Due to the shortcomings of other Allied armies, such as General Montgomery’s failure to reinforce Canadian forces with British troops, and General Bradley’s poor leadership, the burden of closing the pocket would fall to the Polish 1st Armoured Division (Carpenter, 2002, p.15-16).

German forces were already fleeing down the highway by the time the Polish captured Hill 262. Wasting no time, the 1st Armoured obliterated the German columns below, “leaving a string of burning vehicles, clouds of billowing smoke, and hundreds of dead Germans strewn everywhere” (D’este, 1994, p.65). As the Polish had gotten the jump on the retreating Germans,

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they picked the burnt convoys and columns clean of their supplies, making use of anything they could salvage (Sakamoto, personal communication, October 1, 2016). The once peaceful country highway now earns the nickname “The Corridor of Death”. With the primary path of escape now blocked, hundreds of thousands of German soldiers must now march straight through the Polish held position if they wish to escape. Having been briefly victorious, the 1st Armoured Division must now hold off the entire German 7th Army, as well as remnants from more than a dozen others, and wait for reinforcements to arrive.

During the night of August 19/20, German forces constantly attacked the Polish position.

In addition to the Germans retreating from the West, attacks are also launched from the East.

Maczek (2006) claims that they “were probably the 21st Panzer division” (p.18) attempting to break their comrades out of the entrapment. However, through the fog of war, it became near impossible to differentiate units on the battlefield. By the evening of the 20th, the Polish forces had been pushed back to the very top of Hill 262, and their situation grew desperate (D’Este, 1994, p.65). Separated from all other Allied forces, supplies could not reach the Polish 1st Armoured by ground. According to Maczek (2006), “The supply of ammunition and fuel by means of air transport was in preparation, but could be carried out only on the morning of 21 August” (p.18). German attacks became near suicidal, and the Polish suffered heavy losses.

According to Whitaker (2004), one Polish officer, Major Stefanowicz, had been critically wounded, and gave to his men his final orders with his dying breath, Gentlemen, everything is lost. I do not think the Canadians can come to our rescue. We are down to one hundred and ten fit men. No more supplies, very little ammunition, five shells per gun, and fifty rounds per man! That’s not very much...you must fight all the

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same! As you know, it is useless surrendering to the SS! I thank you: tonight we shall die for Poland and for civilization! (p.288) In addition to the shortage of supplies, Maczek (2006) also states that the division had lost nearly all vehicles capable of evacuating prisoners and wounded (p.18). The massive amounts of retreating Germans means that the Polish had amassed hundreds of prisoners, but they had almost no manpower to guard them. Prisoners were simply disarmed, and sat in a field, with a single Polish soldier standing guard (D. Whitaker, S. Whitaker, 2004, p.286).

Day breaks on August 21st, still without reinforcements. Suicidal attacks continued until midday, by which point the Polish had received supply drops by air, and were able to initiate a successful counterattack (Maczek, 2006, p.18-19). Still, the 1st Armoured had been fighting continuously for nearly 72 hours. That afternoon, a sight for sore eyes arrives at last. The Canadian Grenadier Guards had finally reached Hill 262. “The crisis was over” (Maczek, 2006, p.19). According to D’Este (1994), the Canadian forces were absolutely astonished to see that a single division of Polish soldiers had successfully held off the might of 13 German divisions (p.

65). Sources differ on the number of Germans who managed to escape the Falaise Pocket, and most who managed to did so before the Polish occupied Hill 262, but the generally agreed number is 20,000-40,000 troops (D’Este, 1994, p.66). While this may seem like a lot, the escaping Germans left on foot, leaving behind their weapons, ammunition, and armor. Not to mention that there were a potential of 175,000 Germans escaping (D’Este, 1994, p.67).

According to Maczek (2006), the 1st Armoured Division had destroyed or captured more than 300 vehicles (55 of which were tanks), and had taken more than 5,000 prisoners across just three

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days of fighting, while Polish losses amassed to 325 dead, 1,002 wounded, and 114 missing (p.

20).

The brave men of the Polish 1st Armoured Division, who risked life and limb to put an end to the Normandy campaign, would be remembered. Canadian forces who relieved the Polish position erected a sign atop the peak of Hill 262, which simply read “A Polish Battlefield” (D’Este, 1994, p.65). According to the Memorial de Montormel (2012), Hill 262 is now a full-fledged memorial, and flies the flags of the four liberating nations: Canada, Great Britain, The United States, and of course Poland. Even more fitting, the memorial’s website may only be read in three languages: French, English, or Polish.

As for Major-General Maczek, the leader of the Polish 1st Armoured, and author of one of the resources used in this paper, he would become one of the unsung heroes of the war for many years. According to Polish-Scottage Heritage (2016), he retired to Scotland after the war, as Poland fell to communism. Though it was the Dutch government who provided him a life pension, for his efforts in freeing the oppressed people of Europe during the war. He passed away at the age of 102, on December 11, 1994. He was buried with his men, at the Polish Military Cemetery in Breda, The Netherlands.

What I Concluded and How This Search Matters My biggest question when researching this topic was simply: how did they do it? How did 1,500 Polish soldiers fight off wave after wave of desperately retreating Germans? Obviously there are tactical reasons, such as having the high ground, and getting an initial jump on the German forces. Ultimately, my research points to one thing in particular. Something the Polish had, that the Germans did not. The men of the 1st Armoured Division had determination, they

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were fighting for vengeance. These weren’t just soldiers, these were men who had lost everything. They watched as Poland was overrun by the Nazis, they watched as their families were killed, homes were burned, and possessions were stolen. If the Polish had been unsuccessful in holding Hill 262, if every last one of them was slain in battle, at least they would die knowing that they fought for their freedom.

While the Battle of The Falaise Pocket is considered a decisive Allied victory, the escape of 20,000-40,000 German troops leaves much to be desired. D’Este (1994) pins the blame on General Bradley, stating that if Bradley had not been so indecisive in his troop movements, the gap could have been closed sooner (p.66). Nonetheless, it is difficult to say that the escaped Germans, most without their weapons, and separated from their comrades, could have had a major impact on the outcome of the war. Obviously, had all 175,000 German troops been allowed to escape, the Western Front could have been much different. This possibly could have lead to the Western Allies not making as much progress on the front, meaning that once the Soviets captured Berlin, Europe would have been divided much differently.

In my researching for this paper, I quickly noticed that everything of value that I found was outside the mainstream media. Save for a single article from the BBC written more than a decade ago, the incredible story of the Polish 1st Armoured Division has not been told to the masses. Their story is not written in the history books, not told by the news corporations, and not published online in the last decade. I suppose that is because here in the United States, the media tends to focus more on American heroes, rather than what they believe to be heroes to Poland and Western Europe. If only the media could see the bigger picture.

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When asked who won the Second World War, many would say The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. In actuality, there are countless other countries who were vital to the Allied victory. However, the Polish 1st Armoured Division stand out as some of the few who were willing to sacrifice everything, in hopes that one day they may restore freedom to their people. I would like to end this paper on a more inspirational note, so if you ever think something is impossible, just remember: Nazi Germany crushed Poland in under a month in 1939. Yet less than five years later, the Polish returned to face a familiar enemy, and this time, the tables had turned. The circumstances were the same, but even when absurdly outnumbered and outgunned, the Polish emerged victorious. Nothing is impossible.

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References Carpenter, D.C. (2002) A failure of coalition leadership: the Falaise-Argentan gap. Retrieved from handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA404190 D’Este, C. (1994). Falaise: the trap not sprung. MHQ: the quarterly journal of military history, 6.

Retrieved from https://illiad.nau.edu/illiad/illiad.dll?

Action=10&Form=75&Value=605179 Gasiorek, J. (2016). General Maczek-a hero among us. Retrieved from http:// polishscottishheritage.co.uk/?heritage_item=hero-amongst-us Memorial de Montormel (2012). web. Retrieved from http://www.memorial-montormel.org/ Maczek, S. (2006). The 1st Polish armoured division in normandy. Canadian Military History, 15, 2. Retrieved from http://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? article=1385&context=cmh Whitaker, D., Whitaker, S. (2004). Normandy: the real story. Available from Google Books